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The Evolution of Franchise Terrorism: Al-Qaeda

by Katya Leney-Hall

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Introduction

On 21 December 2000, in a flat in northern Frankfurt, German intelligence discovered a bag of weapons presumed to belong to Islamic extremists. During the subsequent raid, weapons, bomb-making chemicals, false identity cards, mobile phones, copies of credit cards, an address book and a video-tape were found, indicating the existence of an active terrorist cell that aimed to attack the Strasbourg Christmas market. Subsequent investigations by German, French and British intelligence services pointed to the existence of a *mujahideen* network of Algerian extremists who had been active in France since the early 1990s and whose activities now expanded not only across Western European capitals, but also Canada and the USA where they planned to bomb Los Angeles airport.¹

In fact, following the discovery of the link to a Tunisian terrorist cell in Milan, it became clear that a network of young Muslim extremists who had been recruited in Europe and trained in Afghan camps were planning attacks anywhere in the world. The prime suspect behind this network was Osama Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda movement, already suspects for training the Somali militia that shot down two Black Hawk helicopters in 1993 in Mogadishu, killing 18 American servicemen, as well as the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that had killed 225 persons. It was only a matter of time before one of these cells was successful in launching a devastating blow.

This took place on 11 September 2001 (hereinafter referred to as 9/11), when nearly 3,000 people from more than 90 countries died as a result of the coordinated suicide attacks of al-Qaeda terrorists who hijacked four commercial airliners and crashed them on US soil, most notably on the World Trade Centre, New York City, and the Pentagon, Washington, DC. In the aftermath of these attacks, US President George W. Bush, declared a 'war on terror' (also referred to as 'Global War on Terrorism'), a much debated term that describes a multi-pronged campaign aiming to curb the expansion of terrorism on a global scale.

As a result of this campaign, efforts of intelligence and security services intensified, thus preventing a terrorist attack on a similar scale. The military forces of the Coalition Against Terrorism killed or captured thousands of al-Qaeda foot soldiers, as well as an estimated two-thirds of

¹ Peter Taylor, 'The Hunt for Al Qaeda', BBC Radio Two, 25 July 2005.

the network's pre-9/11 leaders. Following the defeat of the Taliban in 2001, it is thought that al-Qaeda's operational base in Afghanistan was dismantled. Several experts also believe that al-Qaeda no longer exists in its original form, but has been replaced by a Global Salafi Jihad network. The threat however remains, aiming to destroy what is seen as Western political and economic dominance and replacing it with a strong Islam in its strictest and purest form, as practised by the Prophet and his companions.

Origins

Islamic fundamentalist Osama Bin Laden met his mentor, Abdallah Azzam, while still a student at King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah in the late 1970s. Azzam was an Egyptian-educated Islamic scholar of Palestinian origin who had been influenced by the ideology of Syed Qutb. Qutb was the intellectual leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, an international, Sunni, religious and social movement founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1928 in Egypt. Syed Qutb believed that the modern world had reverted to a state of pagan ignorance against which the true Muslim had to insulate himself through total submission to Allah. He was executed by Nasser's regime in 1966. Azzam preached 'defensive *jihad*' for the Palestinian and Afghan peoples. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, he issued a *fatwa* (a religious edict or a ruling on Islamic law issued by an Islamic scholar) encouraging the Afghan *mujahideen* to kill the occupiers. Exiled from Saudi Arabia, Azzam moved to Pakistan. In 1984, he established Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), the Afghan Services Bureau that raised funds and recruited foreign (mostly Arab) *mujahideen* for the war in Afghanistan. MAK is widely considered as al-Qaeda's fore-runner.

Bin Laden followed Azzam to Peshawar where he became involved in MAK, using his substantial family fortune to pay for the training, travelling and accommodation of the *jihad* fighters. Between 1986-1989, Bin Laden fought in several battles, also building his contacts and developing a gradually more aggressive ideology.² By 1989, the Soviet troops had withdrawn from Afghanistan. However, infighting between the *mujahideen* frustrated Bin Laden. In the same year, Azzam was assassinated. The MAK split, and many of its fighters turned to Bin Laden and al-Qaeda, the organisation he had set up the previous year to fight new *jihads* elsewhere in the world.³

Leadership

Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Bin Laden was keen to engage his *mujahideen* in the region. But the government of Saudi Arabia turned down his offer, inviting instead US military forces - some

² Jason Burke, *Al-Qaeda. The True Story of Radical Islam*, Penguin, 2004, pp. 79-80.

³ Al-Qaeda means 'a base', as in 'a foundation', but it can also mean a rule, principle, method, model or pattern. Burke argues that as early as 1990, the 11-volume *Encyclopaedia of Jihad* did not mention 'al-Qaeda', but that the term has been used since the 1980s to describe the base or tactics used by Islamic radicals operating in Afghanistan. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-3.

500,000 troops fighting in the region - to base themselves on Saudi territory.⁴ In 1991, Saudi Arabia expelled Bin Laden for anti-government activities and a few years later, by which time he was calling for a global war against Americans and their allies in the Middle East, he was stripped of his citizenship and his bank accounts were frozen.

Today (May 2008), Bin Laden is at the top of America's most-wanted list and there is a US\$50 million reward for his death or capture.⁵ He is known to suffer from kidney failure, but in his video appearances (see below), he does not appear frail. His whereabouts are uncertain.

Membership and structure

In so far as it can be described in an organigram, al-Qaeda's decentralised and horizontal structure includes:

- The *shura* directing overall strategy.
- The *sharia* and political committee responsible for issuing *fatwas*.
- The military committee that conceives and plans operations and manages training camps.
- The finance committee responsible for fund-raising and concealing assets.
- The foreign purchases committee dealing with the acquisition of weapons and supplies.
- The security committee responsible for security, intelligence and counter-intelligence.
- And the information committee in charge of propaganda.⁶

However, part of what makes al-Qaeda so successful is its ability to link up with individuals and cells that have their own agenda, but seek affiliation with "the network of networks" when they need al-Qaeda to arm, train or finance them. This diversity has in fact been credited with giving al-Qaeda its global reach.⁷ As a result, al-Qaeda has established its presence in at least 45 states, while groups with varying degrees of affiliation operate in more than 65 countries. According to the Center for Defense Information, 'militants operating within the al-Qaeda structure are divided into small, independently operating cells. These cells may receive orders and financial support from top Qaeda lieutenants or they may raise funds and plan operations on their own.'⁸

Some militant extremists in Europe are European-born converts to

⁴ Tim Niblock, *Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy and Survival*, Routledge, 2006, p. 151.

⁵ News release by US Senator Byron Dorgan, issued on 14 December 2007. <http://dorgan.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=289171>.

⁶ See: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/images/al-qaida-structure.jpg>.

⁷ Kenneth Katzman, 'Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment', Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, 17 August 2005, p. 7.

⁸ Colin McCullough, Anthony Keats and Mark Burgess, 'In the Spotlight: Al Qaeda (The Base)', Center for Defense Information publication, 30 December 2002.

radical Islam who usually come from troubled backgrounds or have served prison sentences. Such was the case of “shoe bomber” Richard Reid who was born in London to an English mother and a Jamaican father, and who converted to Islam while in prison in his early 20s; as well as Muriel Degauque, a Belgian female suicide-bomber whose family claimed she had been “brainwashed” by her Moroccan husband. Many are first or second generation educated European Muslims, like the ordinary Britons who carried out the July 2005 bombings in London. Other such examples are: Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, a Briton of Pakistani descent who had attended private schools and studied at the London School of Economics, and who was convicted in 2002 for the kidnapping and murder of journalist Daniel Pearl; and Mohammed Bouyeri, an apparently well-integrated Dutch citizen of Moroccan origins who believed he was fulfilling his duty as a Muslim when he murdered filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in 2004 in Amsterdam. Especially worrying is the trend of self-radicalisation of individuals who either seek mentorship in extremism from friends and acquaintances, or begin their Islamic indoctrination by surfing the Internet. The operational threat from such self-radicalised cells will grow in importance both in the West and in Muslim-majority areas.⁹

Aims, motivation and ideology

In 1998, al-Qaeda merged with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, an organisation that consisted of experienced militants, but lacked funds. Its leader, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, is allegedly the author of several al-Qaeda proclamations and is widely accepted as the architect of al-Qaeda ideology. In the same year, Al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden and three other associates issued a joint *fatwa* under the title ‘World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders’. According to this:

‘The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies - civilians and military - is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country which is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Mosque (Mecca) from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.’¹⁰

So, al-Qaeda has declared war on Americans and their Western allies (the “far enemy”), as well as the Jewish (all three groups coming under the banner of ‘infidels’). It aims to expel them from Muslim lands (in particular, Saudi Arabia as the home of Islam’s holiest site, but also Jerusalem which they hope to reclaim as a Muslim city). Al-Qaeda also aims to topple the governments of Muslim states (the “near enemy”) that collaborate with the US, imposing a single Islamic political leadership through the establishment

⁹ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ‘Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate “Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States” dated April 2006’, [press release], p. 1.

¹⁰ Published in the Arabic newspaper *Al-Quds al-Arabi* in London, 23 February 1998, p. 3.

of a pan-Islamic caliphate. While this may sound far-fetched, it has been argued that many Islamist groups, 'ranging from small and local to global [...] lament Atatürk's formal abolition of the caliphate [and] see the secular states which arose from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire as illegitimate relics of the West'.¹¹

It must be noted here that the *jihad* advocated by Egyptian Salafists such as Qutb, which accuses state leaders refusing to impose *sharia* law as *kufir* (apostates) who deserve to be overthrown and killed, is controversial even among Muslims, because of its advocacy of killing, including other Muslims. (Apart from the *jihad* sanctioned by the *fatwa*, the Salafi *jihad* and the Global Salafi *jihad*, another - but this time peaceful - way of defending Islam against the infidel enemies is the *dawa*, the call to Islam.)¹² States that refuse to impose *sharia* law are, namely, Egypt, Algeria, post-2002 Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia. Other enemy states who are seen as oppressors of their Muslim populations include India, Russia and Indonesia.

Propaganda

Bin Laden was quick to recognise that 'rhetoric and satellite propaganda can be on equal footing with unmanned bombers and cruise-missiles'.¹³ A week after the 9/11 attacks, Arab media network al-Jazeera released his statement denying his connection to the attacks, but praising them.¹⁴ Al-Qaeda has subsequently invested in its media strategy by disseminating messages on satellite television and, when this is not receptive, by using the internet to recruit and train potential militants. On the other hand, as Burke pointed out, Saif al-Adel who ran much of the training in the Afghan camps has been reduced to posting terrorist skills on the internet;¹⁵ a poor replacement for the camp infrastructure of the previous two decades.

The target audience are mainly Arabs or Muslims who are deeply moved by the plight of the Palestinians and now the suffering of the Iraqi people in the hands of "the West"; thoughts that many Westerners also share. As a former CIA official explained, 'politicians really are at great fault for not squaring with the American people. We're being attacked for what we do in the Islamic world, not for who we are or what we believe in or how we live.'¹⁶ Besides, al-Qaeda tactics are cleverly constructed to exploit the fact that several of the Arab or Muslim regimes that have stood by America and its allies are corrupt and authoritarian, thus igniting the

¹¹ Dale C. Eikmeier, 'How to Beat the Global Islamist Insurgency', *Middle East Quarterly*, Winter 2005.

¹² See: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Statement of Marc Sageman to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9 July 2003.

¹³ Marc Lynch, 'Al-Qaeda Media Strategies', *The National Interest online*, 3 January 2006.

¹⁴ <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,34440,00.html>.

¹⁵ Burke (2004), pp. 260-261.

¹⁶ 'Lou Dobbs Tonight', 7 July 2005.

<http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0507/07/ldt.01.html>.

discontent of the people who suffer under them.

Trying to spread fear amongst his Western audience, Bin Laden has threatened Americans with 'another Manhattan'¹⁷ and has invited them to rid themselves of 'the impotence of the democratic system'.¹⁸ Whether for health reasons or as a security precaution, Bin Laden rarely appears on video these days: his last appearance was released on the sixth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks although it is thought that the recording is in fact older. (In fact, the video's authenticity has not been confirmed. Nevertheless, it features the logo of As-Sahab Media, the company that handles al-Qaeda public communications.)¹⁹ Since then, various audio-tapes have been released, the authenticity or chronology of which have not been verified. The latest communication from Bin Laden, in May 2008, was through two postings on the internet. Possibly preparing his followers for a strategic failure in Iraq, he shifts his focus from Iraq to Palestine, saying: 'I would like to stress here that the Palestinian question is my nation's top issue.'²⁰

Targets

In 2004, a Yemeni court charged six al-Qaeda extremists in connection with the attack on USS Cole in Aden that had killed 17 American sailors in 2000. Since 9/11 and apart from the countless attacks in Iraq, al-Qaeda has been linked directly or indirectly to a number of attacks across the world: in 2002, the explosion in Djerba, Tunisia, that killed 19 persons, including 14 German tourists; the bombing of two nightclubs in Kuta, Bali, killing 202, most of whom were young tourists; in 2003, the death of 16 persons in an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa, Kenya; a series of bomb attacks against compounds housing mostly foreigners in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, that killed at least 34 people; bomb attacks against a Spanish restaurant, a 5-star hotel, a Jewish community centre and the Belgian Consulate in Casablanca, Morocco, killing 45 persons; the death of 23 persons at the bombings of synagogues, followed by the suicide attacks against the HSBC bank and the British Consulate that killed 27 persons in Istanbul, Turkey; in 2004, the explosions on commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, that killed 191 persons; the death of the head of the Iraqi Governing Council in Baghdad; the death of 22 people following a siege and capture of foreign nationals in Khobar, Saudi Arabia; the beheading of an American engineer in Iraq; in 2005, the rush-hour explosions on the underground and a bus in London, killing 52 people; and in 2006, a suicide attack against Saudi Arabia's largest oil processing facility killing four; as well as the gunmen attack against the home of an Afghan Communications Ministry official, killing four persons. (The death toll mentioned here includes dead militants such as suicide bombers.)

¹⁷ Video aired by Al-Jazeera on 30 October 2004.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3966741.stm.

¹⁸ For the English translation, see:
<http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/transcript2.pdf>.

¹⁹ <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/B4D1DC75-FDEC-4516-8653-2D551838261C.htm>.

²⁰ Paul Reynolds, 'Is Bin Laden Moving On from Iraq?', BBC website, 21 May 2008.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7411334.stm.

This grim list shows that al-Qaeda's targets are mainly civilian, sometimes American or Jewish, in accordance with the 1998 *fatwa*, but often indiscriminately Western. As the CIA Director put it, 'this war is different. In a very real sense, anyone who lives or works in a major city is as much a potential target as the victims of 9/11 or of the London subway bombings or the strikes in Madrid'.²¹ Targets are selected to cause maximum casualties amongst non-combatants, spreading terror, forcing political developments (such as in the case of the Madrid bombings on the eve of elections in Spain) and aiming to create rifts in the Coalition Against Terrorism.

Strategies

Al-Qaeda strategy has evolved since its formation. Its first fighting ground was Afghanistan, the liberation of which Azzam thought made more political and military sense than that of Palestine for the time being. Taking advantage of the rise of the Islamic regime in Sudan in the 1990s, al-Qaeda moved its operational hub, thus increasing its emphasis on the struggle against the regimes in the Middle East. Relocating back to Afghanistan, new opportunities for *jihad* opened up; for instance, in Chechnya and, of course, Iraq. War in Iraq gave al-Qaeda the two-fold chance of conducting *jihad* against Americans and their allies in the heart of the Muslim world, while giving it the opportunity to implement its political objective of establishing an Islamic state that will serve as the core of the future caliphate.²²

It is estimated that, throughout the 1990s, some 10,000 recruits of al-Qaeda's affiliated groups were trained in the camps in Sudan and Afghanistan. In fact, most al-Qaeda fighters are veterans of insurgencies and terrorist campaigns in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kashmir, Mindanao, Chechnya, Lebanon, Nagorno-Karabakh, Algeria and Egypt.²³ Loyalty to their fellow fighters is thus intense. On the other hand, many of those trained in the camps have become "sleepers", awaiting a directive from the leadership to mount an attack.

Training manuals obtained by the Western intelligence agencies show that al-Qaeda has trained operatives in warfare ranging from assassination and suicide bombings to the use of conventional explosives and chemical weapons. Five months after the US Embassy bombings in East Africa, *Time Magazine* questioned Bin Laden about his efforts to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons. His response was:

²¹ 'General Hayden's Remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations', Transcript of Remarks by Central Intelligence Agency Director Gen. Michael V. Hayden at the Council on Foreign Relations, 7 September 2007.

²² Shmuel Bar and Yair Minzili, 'The Zawahiri Letter and the Strategy of al-Qaeda', *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, vol. 3, February 16, 2006.

²³ Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Terrorism Knowledge Base, Al-Qaeda. <http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=6>.

'Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so. And if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty.'²⁴

Soon after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, at a US Defense Department briefing in January 2001, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that 'we have found a number of things that show an appetite for Weapons of Mass Destruction'; he went on to cite diagrams, materials and attempts to acquire such weapons. A CIA report released a year later mentioned al-Qaeda diagrams that, 'while crude, describe the essential components - uranium and high explosives - common to nuclear weapons'.²⁵ Al-Qaeda's record shows that, were it in a position to obtain Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons, it would not hesitate to use them to cause civilian casualties on a massive scale. However, according to a RAND Corporation 2005 report, thus far al-Qaeda has 'little ability to execute large-scale unconventional attacks'.²⁶

Funding

It has already been mentioned that Bin Laden's bank accounts in Saudi Arabia were frozen in the 1990s. Further such measures were to follow. For instance, it is estimated that between 2001-2003, terror networks lost access to some US\$200 million, with 173 countries issuing orders to freeze the assets in more than 1,400 terrorist-related accounts around the world.²⁷ Nevertheless, apart from contributions from a few wealthy individuals (nine of whom have been named by the FBI), most of al-Qaeda's funding comes from Muslims around the world. They give to Islamic charities, either because of their sympathy to the al-Qaeda cause, or because they think the money will be used to alleviate the poverty of needy fellow-Muslims. (*Zakat*, or the giving of alms, is the third of the five pillars of Islam.) In addition, the network raises large amounts of money through drug trafficking, smuggling of valuable commodities, extortion, armed robberies and other criminal activities. The money is usually transferred through informal, untraceable remittance systems, such as *hawala*.

Conclusion

According to Burleigh, 'what was rapidly, and unsatisfactorily, described as 'the war on terror' [...] was meaningless as one cannot declare war on a tactic'. 'The word war was used because the mood called for

²⁴ 'Wrath of God. Osama Bin Laden lashes out against the West', *Time Magazine*, 11 January 1999, Vol. 153, No. 1.

²⁵ David Albright, 'Al Qaeda's Nuclear Program: Through the Window of Seized Documents', *The Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online*, Special Forum 47, 6 November 2002.

²⁶ Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, Robert Reville and Anna-Britt Kasupski, *Trends in Terrorism. Threats to the United States and the Future of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act*, RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy monograph series, 2005, pp. 31-38.

²⁷ The White House, 'Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism', September 2003, p. 6.

exemplary displays of military might, even though the best way to fight terrorists is through intelligence, undercover operations, informers, propaganda initiatives and so forth.'²⁸ In this vein, the invasion and occupation of Iraq was seen by many in the Muslim world as a humiliating and divisive attempt to secure oil for the West, rather than what it purported to be, i.e. the rather more moral effort to disarm and eventually oust a lethal dictatorship responsible for the death of thousands of Iraqis every year.

Arguably then, the war in Iraq made Al-Qaeda stronger, forcing it to spread, mutate and constantly evolve its strategy and ideology. According to a recent American intelligence report, al-Qaeda leaders have regrouped in Pakistani tribal areas where no government or army has ever established control. The report concludes that al-Qaeda will continue to enhance its capabilities by cooperating with regional terrorist groups, as well as trying to acquire CBRN weapons.²⁹ The performance and effectiveness of intelligence and security agencies has already proved and will continue to be vital in weakening support of al-Qaeda and the Global Salafi Jihad. Technological advances in communications will continue to help terrorist cells across the world connect to one another, thus challenging those who try to detect them. A new generation of militants now see al-Qaeda as an inspiration rather than an organisation. The battle is thus increasingly being recognised as largely an ideological one: waging a battle of ideas is an important component of the global war on terrorism.

As memories of 9/11 become more distant, there is a risk that international co-operation will become less vigorous and determination will wane, particularly amongst states with authoritarian rulers, corrupt officials, weak economies or separatist movements. However, the co-operation of the Muslim members of the Coalition Against Terrorism is critical to success, as is support from Muslim communities across the world. It becomes all the more necessary to support reform and growth in the Middle East and beyond, particularly in countries like Pakistan and Iran where the population is mostly young. For instance, using investment as a lever may well prove an effective way of encouraging Muslim states to control radical clerics; and supporting the more equal division of wealth in this oil-rich terrain will strengthen the Arab or Muslim middle-classes who appreciate the benefits of a more cosmopolitan attitude.

Together with Turkey, Russia and the South Caucasian states, the population of Europe includes 120 million Muslims. (Half of that population live in Turkey.) It is estimated that only 1-2 per cent of Western European Muslims are involved in extremist activities.³⁰ However, statistics are


²⁸ Michael Burleigh, *Blood & Rage. A Cultural History of Terrorism*, Harper Press, 2008, p. 449.

²⁹ National Intelligence Council, 'The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland', National Intelligence Estimate, July 2007.

³⁰ Daniel Fried, 'Overview of Islamist Extremism in Europe', Testimony before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US Department of State publication, 5 April 2006.

meaningless when fanaticism can drive individuals to cause unspeakable harm to unsuspecting civilians who go about their every day lives. The only way to ensure that moderation prevails in the long-term is by addressing economic, political and psychological grievances; namely, by intensifying the efforts to integrate this diverse population that is currently complaining of xenophobia, racism, unemployment, political under-representation and disillusionment with the secular policies of the state.

The most effective defence against those calling for the end of democracy is leading by example when propagating the principles of pluralism. This is not just the naïve conviction of someone who speaks from the safety of an academic environment. After all, we are all potential terrorist targets and it is in our best interests to support the most effective ways of tackling terrorism. But the examples of Guantanamo Bay or Abu Graib prison show us that inhuman or abusive behaviour by Western authorities invariably proves to be counter-productive. Europe and the US have strived for too long to acknowledge the cultural, religious and racial diversity of their nations, and establish, in law at least, equality for all and respect for human rights. Although the fight against terrorism presents the authorities with tough choices, to compromise these vital human principles and efforts in the name of the fight against terrorism is degrading, uncivilising, and plays into the hands of those accusing the West of hypocrisy and double-standards.



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