South Africa’s Peacekeeping Role in Burundi: Challenges and Opportunities for Future Peace Missions

Occasional Paper Series: Volume 2, Number 2, 2007

ACCORD
THE AFRICAN CENTRE FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS
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About the Research Project

The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) is a South African based civil society organisation working throughout Africa to bring creative African solutions to the challenges posed by conflict on the continent. ACCORD’s primary aim is to influence political developments across the continent by bringing conflict resolution, dialogue and institutional development to the forefront as an alternative to armed violence and protracted conflict. ACCORD specialises in conflict management, analysis and prevention and ACCORD’s work involves interventions in conflict situations in Africa through mediation and negotiation, training, research and conflict analysis. ACCORD is comprised of a variety of Projects, Programmes and Initiatives in the conflict management field. ACCORD also runs a number of Special Projects which are short-term initiatives that find their objectives directly linked to the core Programmes of the organisation. The Conflict and Governance Facility (CAGE) Research Project is one such project, and is an independent research study of South Africa’s peacekeeping role in Africa within the broader context of the ‘White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions.’

The study undertook to analyse the following:

• The adequacy of the current policy in the implementation of peace support operations;
• The capacity of physical and human resources to meet and deliver on policies;
• The impact of field practitioners’ research or case examples in guiding policy-making on issues related to peace support operations; and
• The need to develop additional practical tools to analyse, monitor and disseminate information on peace support to policy-makers and practitioners (eg. Peacekeepers, non-governmental organisations, and local community organisations).

The overall objective of the project was to provide an analysis of South Africa’s role in the peace process in Burundi, as a case study. To this end, the project sought to:
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1. Determine the challenges and opportunities that presented themselves for South African peacekeeping in Burundi;
2. Measure whether the current South African policy expectations for peace missions adequately addressed the peacekeeping need in Burundi;
3. Examine the decision-making processes that led to the deployment of South African peacekeepers to Burundi; and
4. Document the key learnings from South Africa’s peacekeeping role in Burundi to serve as a case study for relevant policy-makers and training initiatives.

The study focused on the Burundi peace process as the primary case study. The project included desktop research, field study visits and a publication of the research findings, analysis and recommendations.

Semi-structured research interviews conducted during the field visits constituted the main methodology for the project. Two field study visits were conducted in Bujumbura, Burundi (from 13 – 18 May 2007) and Pretoria, South Africa (from 14 – 15 June 2007) where a series of one-on-one interviews were held with target individuals, stakeholders and groups that were relevant to the concerns and objectives of the project. Email and telephone interviews were similarly conducted with identified stakeholders who were unavailable at the time the field visits in Burundi and South Africa were held. The field visits then generated the bulk of information and research for analysis and collation for the project.

The project also incorporated desktop research, which included the analysis of secondary data sources and documentation such as journal and magazine articles, legal documents, books, newspapers, media reports and internet-based information. These were collected and reviewed as an ongoing process for the duration of the project. The information gathered has been integrated into the primary data collected during the field study visits to substantiate the study findings.

Upon completion of the research related activities, a meeting with key stakeholders was held from 11 – 12 July 2007 in Pretoria, South Africa. The meeting included representatives from the South African Department of
Defence, Department of Foreign Affairs, South African National Defence Force (SANDF), CAGE, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), who had played significant roles in the research process. This meeting was relevant to the overall study as it allowed ACCORD’s research team to verify the information and analysis, in addition to providing a forum for discussion on the recommendations made. This research hopes to make a positive and informative contribution to future South African policy relating to, and in the implementation of, peace support missions in Africa and beyond.
Disclaimer

The content of this research study reflects the strategic and operational experiences of South African policy-makers and practitioners, within the context of peace support operations in Burundi. The study was located within a four month timeframe, commencing in April 2007 and concluding in July 2007. Within the allocated timeframe, the research methodology and technique included a purposive sampling process. Therefore, the key actors considered for the study included the South African Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs – Policy and Planning Units; the SANDF – Joint Operations and Joint Training Divisions; key personnel from the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and the United Nations Mission in Burundi (ONUB); the African Union Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD); as well as local and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The overall function and responsibility assigned to these actors relate specifically to South Africa’s deployment in Burundi, and as a sample group the research analysed these multiple perspectives. However, it must be stated that only a select group of individuals, the majority currently active in the operational environment, were identified and formed part of the primary data within this period. Whereas the study focused on the White Paper as a policy construct for international peace missions, with Burundi as the case study, it did not include a wider range of higher-ranking and leading government officials in South Africa, Burundi or the AU.

In meeting the objectives of the study, it was sufficient and valid for the research to obtain information and an understanding of issues that were relevant, by dealing with the actors at the operational level. At a strategic and senior level, the requisite frameworks exist for decision-making on policy matters, but the study needed to determine if the policy was equivalent to practice at the operational level, in achieving the strategic objective.

The remaining shortcomings of the study represent the limitations of the methodology and approach adopted as well as recognising, in retrospect, the time required for such a study.
**List of Abbreviations**

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</td>
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<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Mission in Burundi</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AU ASF</td>
<td>African Union African Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU STF</td>
<td>African Union Special Task Force</td>
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<td>BINUB</td>
<td>Bureau Intègre des Nations Unies au Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNDD/FDD</td>
<td>Conseil National pour la Défense de la Democratie / Forces pour la Défense de la Democratie</td>
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<td>DFA</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defence</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>FROBEBU</td>
<td>Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi</td>
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<td>IRPS</td>
<td>International Relations Peace and Security</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NOCPM</td>
<td>National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>L’Opération des Nations Unies Au Burundi (United Nations Mission in Burundi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PALIPEHUTU-FNL</td>
<td>Parti Pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu / Forces Nationales de Liberation</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SADF</td>
<td>South African Defence Force</td>
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<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
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<td>SAPSD</td>
<td>South African Protection Service Detachment</td>
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<td>SASS</td>
<td>South African Secret Service</td>
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<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Country</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UPRONA</td>
<td>Union pour le Progrés Nations</td>
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South Africa’s Peacekeeping Role in Burundi

Executive Summary

1 The objective of this study is to provide an analysis of South Africa’s role in peacekeeping in Burundi and to identify the opportunities and challenges that confronted South Africa’s peacekeeping mission.

2 The peaceful resolution of Africa’s conflicts is one of the cornerstones of South Africa’s foreign policy. It is intended to create a better South Africa, Africa, and world.

3 The birth of a post-apartheid South Africa, through a peacefully negotiated agreement, coincided with a proliferation of intra-state conflicts in Africa.

4 Some of these conflicts manifested themselves in protracted armed conflict driven by the need to control political power and characterised by assertion of identity as well as self-determination.

5 Beneath the manifested identity and power struggles were deep-rooted causes to these conflicts that can be traced to colonial engineering of identity in African societies for the purposes of control over indigenous populations.

6 South Africa’s commitment to resolving Africa’s conflicts, coupled with her reputation for the peaceful settlement of an intractable conflict, as well as her relative economic might, made it imperative that she would be drawn into peacemaking and peacekeeping sooner rather than later.

7 Under the auspices of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), a White Paper on Peace Missions was developed to guide any future role South Africa may have in peace missions.

8 South Africa was formally drawn into the Burundi peace process in 1999 when former President Nelson Mandela was appointed Facilitator of the Arusha Peace Process and a peace agreement was signed by the parties in August 2000.

9 The Department of Defense (DoD) in its own planning set 2007 as the year for its first deployment. However, the overwhelming need to secure the peace in Burundi necessitated the deployment of the South African Protection Service Detachment (SAPSD) in October 2001, almost six years earlier than planned.
This early deployment resulted in several operational, budgetary, and personnel challenges which the paper analyses.

The paper also highlights several instances related to consultation and communication where the guidelines established in the White Paper on Peace Missions were either circumvented or overridden due to the need to act with speed to respond to a volatile conflict and a tenuous peace that had to be arrested with minimum time delays.

The authors have extensive experience in conflict intervention and are therefore sympathetic to the manner in which the deployment of the SAPSD was done and the need for expediency in such situations.

The authors are also mindful of the gravity of deploying a country’s national defense force on foreign territory and consequently the acute need for widespread consultation and communication among and between all the relevant stakeholders within the framework of the national constitution and corresponding policies.

The paper therefore concludes with a recommendation for a continuation and conclusion of the review of the White Paper on Peace Missions to make it more relevant to contemporary conflict situations and to address weaknesses identified from several years of experience gained by South Africa in peace missions throughout Africa.
Introduction

President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa expressed the following in his State-of-the-Nation address in February 2007:

“Among the greatest achievements of the peoples of Africa in the past two-and-a-half years has been the restoration of peace in the Great Lakes region. We are proud, as South Africans, of the role that our people have played in helping to bring this about – from the young men and women in our National Defence Force to employees of public and private institutions... we will continue to work with the sister people of the DRC, as well as Burundi, the Comoros and Sudan, in particular, to ensure that the condition of peace and stability thus far obtained translates without pause into concerted action for economic reconstruction and social development. However... we cannot underplay the challenges that we face in dealing with the remaining areas of conflict... Our government will respond appropriately and as our capacity permits...”

With South Africa’s transition to democracy in 1994, there was great expectation on the part of the international community that the country would actively engage in conflict resolution efforts on the continent. However, particularly during its fledgling years, the African National Congress (ANC) led government was heavily focused on its pressing domestic agenda and thus displayed a reluctance to engage in what would likely become expensive and cumbersome ventures outside of its national borders. Towards the late 1990s, however, there was a growing recognition that South Africa’s stability and prosperity would be intimately linked to the economic and political development of the continent as a whole, a realisation that reflected an appreciation of the close nexus between regional stability and national interest. This awareness contributed to the change in attitude in South Africa, and there was a display of greater willingness to engage in African conflict resolution endeavours. Thus, with South Africa’s increasing role and importance in multilateral engagements, it became evident that the country’s responsibility and participation in furthering Africa’s peace agenda would expand.

South Africa’s Peacekeeping Role in Burundi
This paper is a report of a study undertaken by the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). The study is situated within the broader context of the ‘White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions’, hereafter referred to as ‘the White Paper,’ and will largely be focused on an analysis of the broad experiences garnered in the context of the peacekeeping operations in Burundi. It hopes to contribute to the current debate on South Africa’s increasing engagement in regional and international peace support operations and the subsequent need to investigate both the adequacy of the current national policy on peace missions and the implementation of such missions.

A transitional government took office at the end of 2001 in Burundi and a power-sharing agreement was signed in 2003. In the context of this social and political transition between the primary parties to the conflict, as well as the sensitive circumstances surrounding the belligerent parties that remained outside of the political process initially, the need for South Africa’s participation in Burundi became important for the implementation of the peace agreement.

South Africa’s participation was also unique as a nation and as a Troop Contributing Country (TCC). After transition from apartheid, there was a substantial re-conceptualisation of the role and relevance of the South African Defence Force (SADF). In April 1994, seven separate forces, including the SADF and the forces of the independent homelands, were amalgamated into the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), which faced the difficult challenge of redefining its role under a democratic dispensation. The Defence White Paper of May 1996 and the subsequent Defence Review of 1998 determined that the primary task of the defence force would be to protect the “territorial integrity of the country and only limited resources were to be set aside for international PSOs.” However, the role of the SANDF, as stipulated in the South African Constitution of December 1996, was ‘(a) to act in cooperation with the Police Service; (b) to act in defence of the republic; and (c) in fulfilment of an international obligation,’ therefore moving away from provisions for a separation in primary and secondary tasks as defined in the Defence White Paper and Review. By 2003, the Department of Defence (DoD) Strategic Plan had already incorporated regional peacekeeping and peacemaking as a
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Priority 1 mission. It was further stated that the SANDF would only be prepared for peace support operations in 2007 to 2010. Yet, what was originally set out in the White Paper was altered by political and security realities outside South Africa’s borders. Hence, by 2007 the SANDF has already gained seven years of experience in peace support operations. In the words of General Sipiwe Nyanda, the former Commander-in-Chief of the SANDF, “South Africa could become one of the foremost contributors of forces for peace missions.”

Background

South Africa’s peacekeeping role emerged within the context of a changed landscape in Africa. The colonial legacy, the struggles against colonial rule, and its subsequent replacement with post colonial independent governments shadowed by a global Cold War ended in the early 1990’s. This was replaced by a myriad of internal conflicts which continue until today. These internal conflicts manifest themselves in violent armed rebellion between governments and opposition or militia groups.

These internal conflicts are generally characterised by armed groups built around the issue of identity. In a number of countries these identities existed harmoniously within the context of indigenous forms of social organisation. Colonial rule, however, sought to accentuate these differences between identity groups within a country by recognising some groups as superior to others, thereby creating rivalry based on stereotypes that categorised people as inferior and superior. In the cases of Burundi and Rwanda minority groups were categorised as superior and used by their colonial masters to dominate and rule over the majority granting onto them the power to subjugate the majority. These categorisations became, over time, entrenched social formations that prevail today and account for the protracted nature of conflict within the socio-political landscape.

On independence, most of these countries opted for ‘majority-rule’ systems and several of these countries were plunged into protracted civil wars that were suppressed during the period where Africa became a theatre for the
Cold War. The two rival super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, kept a tenuous hold over the continent during this period entrenching one party states and dictatorships. The end of the Cold War saw many of these systems dismantled and the emergence of an all-out war between rival identity groups. It is this environment of protracted civil wars that characterised South Africa’s entry into peacekeeping in Africa.

It is important to note at this juncture, that protracted internal conflicts are a phenomenon that has dominated the global landscape of conflict for the last decade and a half. It is also a phenomenon for which there are few solutions that are generically applicable. The world has norms and rules for dealing with inter-state wars, but no such norms and rules exist for internal civil wars. Consequently, peacekeeping in an inter-state conflict situation is very different from peacekeeping in an intra-state conflict situation.

South Africa’s role in peacekeeping in Burundi must be seen in this context. Although, the assassination of President Melchoir Ndadaye in 1993 has been cited as the beginning of the conflict in Burundi, it must be noted that the conflict had its roots deeply embedded in the colonial legacy of Burundi. The relations between Hutu and Tutsi show a ‘long history of mutual cohabitation,’ despite the politically and economically dominant Tutsi minority. Hutu and Tutsi have lived in peace with one another over many years, but the politics of Burundi has time and again been reduced to that of ‘ethnicity.’

Thus, it would seem important to reflect on an understanding of ethnicity, where ‘Hutu-ness’ and ‘Tutsi-ness’ became key political identifiers under the influence of the colonial and post-colonial period, where the political economy was determined by demographic composition or distinction as instituted by both the German and Belgium colonial administrations. However, Burundi as well as Rwanda were already established kingdoms comprising of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, who shared a common language, lived alongside each other, and even inter-married.

 Nevertheless they were categorised as tribes by the colonisers, and their level of inequality was linked to their socio-economic activities – Twa (pygmies) were hunter-gatherers or worked as servants; Hutus (physical likeness to Ugandans or Tanganykians) were peasants cultivating the soil but constituted
the majority of the population; and Tutsis, physically different (tall and thin with angular faces), the dominant group and in the eyes of the colonisers, were obviously seen as a different race altogether and not Bantus, but the descendants of a superior and more advanced migratory group – and without a doubt this simplistic difference and value-laden stereotype manifested itself in the course of history as the source of much bloodshed in Burundi and Rwanda resulting in several mass killings in both Burundi and Rwanda, establishing a deep rooted mistrust and hatred between the Hutus and Tutsis in both countries.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{Burundi in Context: Post-Colonialism}

Post-colonial politics in Burundi was shaped by the circumstances in Rwanda, and with the onset of independence in 1962 for both Rwanda and Burundi, Tutsis became threatened by a Hutu majority and the onset of democratic rule, in which political power was to be determined by the casting of votes. The rise of Hutu elites in post-independence Rwanda was marked by large scale political violence, and many Tutsis fled to neighbouring Burundi and Uganda. At this juncture, the paper will limit its discussion on Rwanda and the political details of Burundi post-independence as the purpose is to explore the key underpinnings of the peace process in the Burundi conflict. This is not to deny that the developments in Rwanda had significantly impacted upon the growing tensions between Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi – but this too is a rather simplistic examination on how political parties began to form, how the armed forces were constituted, and the detail with which Burundian politics was shaped. The post-colonial context, however, reflects on the scale of the instability and the lack of human security, which has perpetuated itself over the years in the Burundian conflict.

The Hutu insurrection in 1972 saw the massacre of 2 000 – 3 000 Tutsis and marked the first of Burundi’s mass killings, and this was followed by the killing of 100 000 – 200 000 Hutus and close to a 150 000 fled to neighbouring countries.\textsuperscript{14} This heightened tension continued, and by 1976, with Colonel Jean Baptiste Bagaza in power, Tutsi dominance was further entrenched. His
leadership was questionable, but even after elections for a new national assembly were held in October 1982, he was returned as the head of state only to be ousted by Major Pierre Buyoya in September 1987. More violence followed as Tutsis were unwilling to implement the reforms of Buyoya. In 1988 about 200,000 Hutu civilians were killed by the Army, and Buyoya tried once again to introduce transformative reforms towards democratic ends – but even his efforts were rejected by a powerful military.

By 1993, the emphasis was again strongly being placed on national unity and through the Constitutional Commission elections were planned for that same year. The elections were dominated by two parties Union pour le Progrès National (UPRONA) and Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU), and resulted in the victory of Melchoir Ndadaye (FRODEBU), the Hutu opponent of Pierre Buyoya. But the promising start to an elected state was again compromised by the large scale distrust and discontent between the parties and the growing divisions between Hutus and Tutsis in spite of reconciliatory efforts. With the assassination of President Ndadaye, only three months after taking office, it became evident that the political trajectory in Burundi was indeed curtailed, which only served to increase the conditions for a civil conflict. By this time the international and regional community’s response was intensified as compared to the 1972 massacre, and their combined efforts led to the commencement of the Arusha peace process, which endured many stages of its own since August 1995. President Nyerere of Tanzania played a crucial role in the Arusha negotiations, but he faced the challenge in that his role could not be disassociated from the Tanzanian government in spite of his international stature, and the perception that he was pro-Hutu. Nyerere was also unable to bring to the table the major rebel groups, and with the split of the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD) and the Parti Pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu (PALIPEHUTU), the Arusha talks were met with deadlocks between old and new leaders and the legitimacy of their representation. In excluding the rebel leaders from the talks, the Arusha peace process faced challenges and its implementation was problematic. Nyerere died in October 1999, and he was succeeded as facilitator of the peace process by former South African President Nelson Mandela in December 1999.
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involvement in the Arusha peace process marked the beginning of South Africa’s role in Burundi towards the attainment of peace through negotiations.

South Africa’s Political Intervention in Burundi

South Africa’s intervention in Burundi, through Mandela, came at a critical juncture for both South Africa and Burundi. For Burundi, with the rebel groups still excluded, the fighting continued with increasing civilian cost, and for South Africa, emerging from its own process of post-apartheid transition, Burundi presented the opportunity to share its own experiences through a large-scale peace process, and whose success would inevitably impact on the stability of the whole region. But the question can still be asked, ‘Why Burundi?’ It posed no immediate threat to South Africa in terms of geographical location and coming out of its own transition, its was safer, cheaper and easier to keep its Defence Force closer to home.

South Africa’s response to Burundi was a humanitarian one while efforts were made to find a political solution, but Burundi was also important from a moral standpoint and the material interests of South Africans. In the quest for its own development and its progression as a fledgling democracy, South Africa’s achievements would be measured against the progress of those same goals for the rest of the continent, and more especially for war-torn Central Africa. Its interventions were also closely linked to South Africa’s support for the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which was to serve as the vehicle for collectively addressing the continent’s lack of development through the promotion of political governance, regional integration and economic and corporate investment. But the pre-condition for such development was dependent on bringing an end to violent conflicts that marred the continent for decades. Hence, the Mandela and Mbeki regimes placed a vested interest in strengthening South Africa’s role for conflict resolution in Africa, especially in regions where ‘economic and political conditions have the most immediate impact upon South Africa, and importantly, which are increasingly major sites for South African foreign investment.’16
Additionally, South Africa’s transition would provide for a model on which Mandela set about with his role as facilitator. Using the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa – bargaining forum where all South African political parties and groupings were represented to shape its transition) as his starting point, he was keen to make the peace process completely inclusive, by ensuring that the rebel groups be included as part of the negotiations. This was no easy feat, but in using his international stature he was quick to garner international support for the peace process and increased the pressure on the Burundians. Such support was to prove to the Burundians that the international community was united in its efforts towards peace in Burundi.

Mandela was harsh in his criticisms of the Burundians, but with his criticism came the flexibility to adopt a variety of strategies towards reaching an agreement, and as such the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, was signed on 28 August 2000, but still without the main rebel movements, which increased the difficulty in maintaining a cease-fire. Mandela remained convinced that mounting international and regional support and pressure would eventually change the environment and serve to bring the rebel movements to the Arusha peace process. The strategy of a donor conference, in 2000 held in Paris, saw the international community pledge a total of US$ 440 million, which sought to convince the Burundians that political stability and progress would be matched by improvements in socio-economic settings. Mandela also sought the support of Thabo Mbeki’s regime with the request for South African troops to be sent to Burundi for the protection of the returning politicians – which was acceded to in October 2001 and reflected upon in detail in the subsequent sections as part of the primary focus of the research for this paper.

**South Africa’s Security Intervention**

The Arusha agreement called for security assurances in the form of international troop deployments. South Africa found itself in a position where it was expected to devise a strategy to support the fledgling peace process by
deploying its own forces. This deployment took place for the first time under the new policy conceived in South Africa’s White Paper on Peace Missions. The strategic and operational foundations for this deployment were informed by ongoing engagements with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU), and a number of regional actors. The deployment of the SANDF to protect returning political leaders effectively marked the country’s engagement in peace operations in Burundi, and was a significant part of Mandela’s strategic input into the Arusha agreement. Subsequently, the AU deployed a one-year peace operation in Burundi in April 2003 – the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in which South Africa served as one of the major TCCs. The AU mission was then transitioned into the United Nations Mission in Burundi (ONUB) and when the mission gradually wound down, the South African contingency remained on the ground in the form of an African Union Special Task Force (AU STF) from December 2006. The scale and scope of deploying in Burundi far outweighed the initial interventions of the SANDF in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where approximately 96 SANDF members were deployed as staff officers or the deployment of military observers to the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). Thus, the Burundi experience represented one of the pioneering politically motivated and security-related engagements for the SANDF, which worked in collaboration with the Defence Forces of Mozambique and Ethiopia.

The experience assisted the SANDF to conceptualise and assess its role and capabilities vis-à-vis peace support operations (PSOs) on the continent. Yet, while the political assistance to Burundi and the peace process has generally been perceived as a success, the peacekeeping operations are yet to be fully analysed in terms of their overall effectiveness. Thus, there is a need to examine not only the opportunities, but also the challenges that were encountered by South Africa during its peace support operations in Burundi.

The intention of this study, therefore, is to assess the extent to which South African peacekeeping objectives were informed by national policy and how such policy was implemented in the course of the mission deployment. The study hopes to generate insight and contribute towards a further analysis of
the South African decision-making processes as they pertain to peacekeeping, so as to inform policy, at a strategic and operational level, for future PSOs on the continent. Further, the paper aims to extract key lessons and identify best practices. This type of analysis and reflection is important for the smooth operationalisation of the country’s foreign policy through intense and broad involvement in the stability and security of Africa within peacekeeping and peacebuilding contexts.

The paper has purposefully placed the contexts of Burundi and South Africa’s interventions at the outset to provide for a clearer understanding of the discussions that follow below. The paper then follows with a brief introduction of the White Paper and provides some background on the context within which it was drafted. The discussion and analysis then centres on South African participation, particularly in peacekeeping, in Burundi. The decision-making processes leading up to and supporting the implementation of peace support operations will be explored, followed by an analysis of operational concerns encountered on the ground and the manner in which these were dealt with. The paper also outlines the problems South Africa is facing in attempting to reconcile the realities of the demand for participation in peace support operations, with its broader foreign policy objectives (both within the African and in the global context). Through its analysis, the paper also explores and determines the extent to which the realities on the ground (as they played out in the PSO in Burundi) matched and/or followed the policy as presented in the White Paper and ultimately suggests ways in which the probable gaps between peacekeeping policy and practice can be bridged.

Further objectives of this paper are to contribute to the White Paper review process; situating the roles of the DoD and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in the decision-making processes for future missions; supporting the synchronisation of objectives and priorities; highlighting issues of funding; and examining roles and functions in operations as approved by Parliament. The recommendations at the end of the paper are not intended to redirect the overall policy, but rather to improve the current process, procedures and coordination of South Africa’s engagement in PSOs. Shared common priorities and synchronisation of understanding between relevant governmental
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departments is required if South Africa is to be in a position to respond more professionally and positively to the future demands of peacekeeping on the African continent.

The Conceptualisation of the White Paper

South Africa’s return and positive reception into the international community in 1994 was set against the backdrop of raging intra-state conflicts in many parts of Africa. Ballentine attributes the main sources for the outbreak and duration of these conflicts to an interaction between economic greed, long-standing political grievances over inequitable resource distribution, and the exclusionary nature of African political systems. Most of these conflicts have their roots in the manipulation of African social organisation by successive colonial regimes in several parts of Africa which was then eventually matched with struggle for state control and power.

Thus, the White Paper formed the core policy response to the widespread expectations that South Africa had to contribute to the prevention and resolution of these conflicts. The paper was approved by Cabinet in 1999, after almost two years of consultative deliberations. It adopted a holistic, multi-disciplinary approach, where political and military tasks were also driven by humanitarian concerns. Its scope was wide, covering not only philosophical and political concerns of PSOs, but also practical issues of contributions. As a foreign policy document, it required the South African government “to outline its national interests and to define how these interests interfaced with its philosophy on conflict resolution and its general approach towards Africa.”

The White Paper reiterated the position that “participation is increasingly a prerequisite for international respectability and for an authoritative voice in the debate on the future of international conflict management and the reform of intergovernmental organisations such as the UN, the OAU and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).” Although the Paper was formulated at a time when South Africa had yet to gain its experience in international PSOs, such a position today, is still greatly valid for the country. The Paper
acknowledged that whilst guidelines and procedures had been suggested within the document, “they [would] have to be refined with growing experience of deploying on international service. Such experience [could] only be gained by converting potential resources into actual capabilities”. Peace Support Operations in the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, and Sudan bear testimony to this.

Another factor pertains to the increasingly well acknowledged truism that the nature of security has changed since the end of the Cold War. Efforts have been made to broaden the definition of security to connote a more comprehensive understanding which includes political security – freedom from dictatorship and other arbitrary governance; social and economic security – freedom from want and poverty; cultural security – freedom from ethnic or religious domination; and environmental security – freedom from environmental destruction and resource scarcity. With the changing nature of security, it should be commonplace that the instruments and interventions available to bring about peace should follow in the same vein and create an environment in which peace is sustainable – where armed conflict is absent; structural, psychological and cultural discrimination is largely non-existent; conflicts are constructively transformed; and there is internal and external legitimacy. Thus, the White Paper was appropriately conceptualised within the changing security environment, and within the context of its leading philosophy, it adequately identifies that, ‘many of the crises that beset individual countries and their respective sub-regions have deep-rooted causes. All too frequently, the resources and energies of the international community, regions and sub-regions and the national state are mobilised mainly around the symptoms of the conflict. ...there is no single, simple or short-term approach to resolving crises’. It is therefore also important to remember that the White Paper is seen as a living document, which needs to be broad enough to accommodate different mandates and the fluid nature of peace and security in Africa.

Consequently, South Africa’s policy for intervention in peace missions has been important not only due to the fact that it protects national security and provides for guidelines that enable a consistent voice in international engagements, but also that it serves to protect and promote a variety of national interests. South Africa is interested in the stability of Africa, especially
South Africa’s Peacekeeping Role in Burundi

on the economic front, as it believes that its future is linked to the future of the continent. Without an end to protracted conflicts, and the establishment of secure and effective states, there are slim prospects for stability or sustainable socio-economic development. The White Paper puts it simply, “South Africa has an obvious interest in preserving regional peace and stability in order to promote trade and development and to avoid the spill over effects of conflicts in the neighbourhood.”

Failed and fragile states in the region pose potentially serious security threats. In Rwanda, 40 percent of the population have been killed or displaced since 1994, close to 300 000 people have been killed in Burundi over the past decade, and the 20 years of civil war in Sudan has claimed the lives of 2 million people and caused the greatest displacement of people in Africa. People cross borders into South Africa so as to escape conflict and poverty, intensifying existing domestic challenges such as unemployment, poverty and crime. Additionally, conflicts create non-military security threats such as environmental degradation, the spread of disease, drug trafficking, and proliferation of small arms. The White Paper notes these concerns and adds an altruistic element, stating that it is in “South African national interest to assist peoples who suffer from famine, political repression, natural disasters and the scourge of violent conflict.” But this must be inextricably linked to its foreign policy dictates of addressing the root causes of conflict for long-term socio-economic development.

Thus, South Africa’s participation in peacekeeping missions, such as AMIB and ONUB, can be interpreted as supporting foreign policy thinking and strategies as outlined in the White Paper. These peace operations represent an integration of the government’s political and economic objectives into its national security thinking. President Mbeki stated in 2002, “it is very directly in the interests of South Africa that there should be development in the rest of the continent. I don’t think that you can have sustainable, successful development in this country if the rest of the continent is in flames.”

Through its peace support operations in Burundi, the SANDF has sought to actively contribute towards the creation of foundations for sustainable development by securing peace and a degree of stability in the Great Lakes region.
The White Paper has, however, been criticised for being largely academic and impractical. Further, though it did provide clear and necessary guidelines for the deployment of missions, it is now widely recognised that it is long overdue for revision in light of (1) the continuously changing nature of peacekeeping; (2) South Africa’s greater understanding of the challenges of participating in PSOs on the continent; and (3) the type of requirements for engagement that South Africa is best suited to fulfil. Thus, in 2005 the Paper was reviewed with the aim of updating it, rather than changing its substantive content. The review process was initiated by a Parliamentary question on whether the White Paper was outdated. In 2003 the Standing Committee on Defence and the Portfolio Committee on Defence requested the DoD to deliver a presentation on successes and experiences at the operational level relating to the White Paper. This provided the foundation for the review of the White Paper, which had been due for revision in 2006.

In light of the peace operations experience that South Africa has gained in Burundi, the DRC, Sudan and the Côte d’Ivoire, the primary focus of the review has been on tactical or mission analysis, i.e. ‘boots on the ground’, deployment, logistics and the subsequent challenges faced. The aim was to include these experiences and lessons in the White Paper. All government departments were consulted with regard to these technical and logistical elements. Civil society was not included in this particular process as it could not offer the requisite input in the initial stages, but the intention has been to include it in the broader national consultation process once the White Paper has been approved by Cabinet. However, civil society was in fact included in the drafting of the Common African Defence Committee policy, where ‘soft’ diplomacy issues were taken into account, which would be realised through South Africa’s future interventions on the continent. The review of the White Paper is currently underway.

South Africa’s Participation in Peace Operations in Burundi

Five principal international interventions were deployed in Burundi after the signing of the Arusha Agreement. These included the South African

In order to mitigate the escalating violence that Burundi faced during the 1990s, a process of securing a peace agreement was initiated in which African leaders, notably former Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, and subsequently former South African President, Nelson Mandela, played the role of lead facilitators, as already detailed above. Mandela’s role was decisive in shaping the initial South African approach to the conflict, as he undertook the role of facilitating the peace process in his personal capacity. This process resulted in the signing of the Arusha Peace Accord on 28 August 2000. The Arusha Peace Accord attempted to create a framework for a transitional settlement that would culminate in national elections. The agreement also opened up the space for the deployment of international peacekeepers in Burundi. After the signing of the Accord, the South African government became centrally involved in the peace process, an involvement that shaped its development as a TCC and cemented the country’s foreign policy commitment to the principles of multilateralism.

The Arusha Accord stipulated that an international military force should be deployed to protect returning opposition leaders. However, the United Nations (UN) refused to do so until a ceasefire agreement had been signed. After bilateral discussions, South African President, Thabo Mbeki, decided that his country would provide the necessary troops. It is argued that this willingness and ability by South Africa to support the peacemaking process through troop deployment prevented the peace process from falling apart.

Two central aspects of the involvement of South Africa in Burundi after the signing of the Arusha Accords can be identified. First, Mandela, as mediator, was charged with approaching African leaders for the deployment of troops to Burundi, and he initiated the process at home. He persuaded President Mbeki to deploy troops that no other country had the capacity or willingness to do (Senegal, Nigeria and Ghana declined to participate in the absence of a ceasefire). Second, Mbeki saw the peace process in Burundi as essential to concurrent
initiatives to mediate peace in the DRC. Peace in Burundi was viewed as important to contributing to stability in the Great Lakes region.38

The political significance of such action was strong and decisive on the part of South Africa, but questioned whether there were limitations in the White Paper. As highlighted in this paper, South Africa’s role in Burundi underwent a series of metamorphic changes, and its initial deployment goes undefined in the White Paper as military resources are defined in the strict sense of monitoring and assisting with the implementation of agreements, providing logistical support, electoral assistance, medical assistance, de-mining tasks and even humanitarian assistance. The protection of political leaders or ‘bodyguard’ function falls outside the purest definitions of peacekeeping. But in order to secure the installation of the transitional government by November 2001, in an already suspicious political environment, the deployment of the SAPSD was deemed essential.

It must be emphasised that the White Paper was, at the time of the Burundi deployment, and still is, a guiding framework, but that South African deployments will indeed take its lead from its own foreign policy and national interest objectives – which arguably it did in the case of Burundi. Additionally, it must be presented, that whilst the VIP Protection Force is less symbolic of a peacekeeping force, the White Paper clearly articulates that ‘South Africa would obviously prefer to contribute to those initiatives that aim to address the underlying causes of conflict and not simply its short term containment. However, it is not always possible to be selective in this regard. In the event that military forces are required to respond to a humanitarian emergency, or to support an important peace process, South Africa may have to provide an appropriate contingent to supplement the international and regional effort.’

The SAPSD was deployed on 29 October 2001, in great haste and according to operational staff of the SANDF, amidst a general sense of confusion,39 which was inextricably linked to the duration for deployment as well as the preparation time and type of deployment. Whilst there were reports in August 2001 that South Africa would deploy troops to Burundi; the claims were denied because of a lack of progress on the ceasefire agreement. The initial AU mandate had called for a multi-national force, yet when no ceasefire agreement could be
secured in Burundi and all remaining potential troop contributing countries had signalled their intent not to deploy, South Africa urgently needed to devise a strategy that would legitimate a deployment of troops in Burundi.

On 26 October 2001, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the governments of Burundi and South Africa, enabling the deployment of South African troops in support of the implementation of the Arusha Accord. That same day, President Thabo Mbeki signed Presidential Minute 654/2001, authorising the deployment of troops “in compliance with the International obligations of the Republic of South Africa towards military support to the peace process in the Republic of Burundi.” Nelson Mandela managed to secure a Security Council Resolution on 29 October 2001 (SCR 1375/2001) that endorsed the entry of South African troops into Burundi.

Two interesting findings have emerged from the manner in which the deployment unfolded. The first relates to the way in which the troops were deployed when compared to the stipulations of the White Paper and the Constitution.

The White Paper outlines that military deployment, following a request from the UN or AU, requires the authorisation of the President. The President will take the decision acting on advice from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence. A Cabinet Memorandum will be jointly prepared and submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other appropriate Ministries and approved by Cabinet.

The Constitution, section 201 (3), stipulates that ‘when the Defence Force is employed for any purpose mentioned in sub-section 2, the President must inform Parliament promptly and in appropriate detail of (a) the reason for the employment of the Defence Force; (b) any place where the force is being employed; (c) the number of people involved; and (d) the period for which the force is expected to be employed.’

What emerges from an analysis of the deployment of South African troops in Burundi is that the procedures outlined in the White Paper and the Constitution could not be followed. A Cabinet Memorandum considering the deployment of troops was not signed until February 2002, four months after deployment, whilst Parliament was bypassed in the process. And whilst troops were en route to Burundi, efforts were being made in New York to secure a
Security Council Resolution endorsing the operation. Without a doubt, the volatility that beset the Burundi negotiations could not be further detained by bureaucratic bungling, and this is marked by Mandela's haste to secure support regionally and internationally for the peace process, and adds legitimacy to the decisions taken by South African policy-makers. Within this context, the role of the President, as Executive Authority and Commander-in-Chief takes the foreground, but it must be expressed that whilst procedures could not be followed, there should have been a process instituted to ensure that all decision-makers were timeously kept informed even after the deployment.

The second finding of interest which emerges is that, in the haste to deploy, a general sense of confusion persisted amongst the decision-makers and the policy implementers in the DoD and the SANDF. This confusion related to the legality of the mission and the official authorisation process. Even to date some members of the operational team argue that discrepancies still exist as to whether or not an MoU or mandate were in place prior to deployment in spite of the relevant dated documentation available.

The mission was deployed within a period of three days after the signing of the Presidential Minute and consisted of 701 troops. In the rush to deploy the troops, several operational members of the SANDF felt that there was no clear strategic process put in place. Whilst a reconnaissance mission to Burundi took place days before deployment, and rumours of possible deployment persisted, the actual speed of deployment came as a surprise to most. The SANDF was still going through its own transformation, as were all other South African government departments, that should have participated.

The White Paper also calls for an extensive media campaign to be launched prior to deployment to ensure that there would be popular and political support for the operations, but the time factor would not allow for this. It was only after deployment that the strategic process was implemented, although this still took time as it needed to be designed. It is a tribute to the forces on the ground and the military and political planners at staff headquarters that despite these significant challenges the mission was successful in regards to its mandate to protect the political leaders.
Although the SAPSD was successful in completing its assigned functions, it was limited from playing a broader role in the peace process. The SAPSD could neither play an extensive peacekeeping role, nor could it provide protection to civilians, as its deployment was primarily Bujumbura based. South Africa, therefore, through former Deputy President Jacob Zuma, who replaced Mandela as facilitator, called on donor contributions to cover a proposed regional peace support force. South Africa led in assisting the AU with planning for the initiation of AMIB, and SANDF personnel formed the majority of headquarters staff. The 91st Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, held in Addis Ababa, on 2 April 2003 mandated the deployment of AMIB for a period of one year pending the deployment of a UN Peacekeeping Mission.

AMIB was the AU’s first peacekeeping mission and proved a test case. It reflected the intention of its members to intervene in situations in which the UN would refuse to become involved as well as the manner in which the AU and UN could complement one another in peace support operations. The UN would not intervene unless a ceasefire agreement had been signed. The AU was able to respond to the needs on the ground and to secure an environment conducive for the UN to become engaged.

In early 2003, South African troops were reinforced by contingents from Ethiopia and Mozambique, who were supported by development partners such as the United States and United Kingdom. Nevertheless, South Africa substantially ‘carried the can’ in terms of funds and resources for the mission, whose main aim was to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate all belligerent troops, as well as monitor governmental transition. The military component of the mission consisted of 3 500 troops.

During this period, South Africa made strong efforts to achieve a ceasefire agreement which would allow the UN to re-hat the mission and end South Africa’s expensive commitment. The cost of the operation for 2002 was estimated at R130 million. The situation also illustrated the challenges of peacekeeping for the AU, as the organisation was unable to finance such missions through its own budget. While the cost of AMIB was US$ 110 million in 2003, the entire budget for the AU Commission in that year was around
The AU was aware of this challenge, as AMIB was operationalised on the condition that it would be a transitional step towards the set-up of a UN operation.

In terms of its mandate, it can be said that AMIB experienced partial success, although it cannot be claimed that the mission fully facilitated the ceasefire agreement. It did, however, contribute to the stabilisation of many parts of the country and to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, as well as providing protection to the returning leadership and coordinating mission activities with the UN in Burundi. After the signing of the ceasefire agreement in 2003, the UN started negotiations for the deployment of a mission. Although AMIB was credible and accepted in the country, its high costs to the TCCs highlighted the importance of a UN mission being deployed.

It was argued that AMIB should have continued with the process it had started as a good, cheap alternative to the UN peacekeeping mission (ONUB) and that greater progress was made by AMIB, with South Africa as the lead nation, than under the auspices of the UN. However, limited financial, logistical and technical capacities, linked to the international community’s unwillingness to mobilise resources and the continuing violence, impeded the AU’s ability to continue with the mission. Thus, by September 2003, ‘AMIB’s financial position was difficult and, international support minimal,’ but this did not render the regional diplomacy efforts fruitless.

High-level meetings continued to be held in Burundi and a final breakthrough was attained in October 2003. ONUB was created in May 2004 under a Chapter VII mandate. The operation aimed to assist the implementation efforts by Burundians to restore peace and bring about national reconciliation as envisioned in the Arusha Accord. The mission was mandated to be composed of up to 5 650 troops, 200 observers and 125 staff officers, 120 civilian police and an appropriate number of civilian personnel. At this stage, the AU Peace and Security Council still recognised the important role of the Protection Force, as the 20th meeting of the Peace and Security Council held in November 2004, asserted that the Protection Force was indispensable to the promotion of a climate of security and confidence, particularly in the context of the April 2005 elections, which would mark the end of the transition period.
South Africa’s Peacekeeping Role in Burundi

Again, South Africa played an important role in the transitional operation. It continued to be the largest force present on the ground, contributing approximately 1 500 troops, which proved a determining factor for the deployment of the mission.\textsuperscript{58} By January 2006, South Africa’s continued contribution to ONUB included 888 troops and five military observers.\textsuperscript{59} From the South African perspective in the field, the view has been put across that there was no decision-making process that informed the negotiation of the transition from AMIB to ONUB other than the fact that South African troops were already on the ground and in a position to take the lead in planning.

However, a new Presidential Minute was signed and Parliament was informed accordingly of the changed mandate.\textsuperscript{60} It has been stated that DoD was deeply involved, but interviewees questioned if the information was channelled to the relevant internal structures at all levels; decision-makers and implementers – especially considering the political primacy of peace support.

Whilst the conceptualisation of mandates from one structure to the next was a long-drawn out administrative process, South African peacekeepers were also in transition from being (1) South African peacekeepers to (2) being AU peacekeepers, then (3) UN peacekeepers, and now (4) part of the AU STF. The SANDF has had to reconfigure itself each time, which keeps shifting the goal posts for its own administrative structures, reporting structures, overall logistical coordination and quite simply maintaining a different policy standard for each institution.

There have been significant changes over the years which relate directly to the Peace and Security architecture of the regional and sub-regional entities of the AU and SADC. If Burundi certainly emphasised the obstacles to immediate and informed decision-making for South Africa’s operation, then clearly the revision of the White Paper must reflect how South Africa plans to interact with a changing AU and SADC peace and security architecture.

It must be noted that criticism was also levelled against the UN’s role in the country. Public opinion of the mission was not viewed with a positive lens, as reflected in a survey conducted in March 2006 in Burundi to assess the views on ONUB. Sixty two percent of respondents expressed that ONUB had done a very good or good job of implementing the peace agreement, but 73 percent
expressed that the disarmament process was proceeding poorly. In addition, an independent external study revealed that there was pressure from the new government on the UN to wind down ONUB linked to ‘political miscalculations in its relations with the new government.’

Furthermore, it was perceived that the UN ‘blue helmets’ on the ground was symbolic of the country not attaining a sustainable peace. As a result of the non-extension of the ONUB mandate, two new missions were created: BINUB (political) and AU STF (military).

This new UN mission (BINUB) was established in order to, inter alia, facilitate the implementation of the ceasefire between the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Democratie / Forces pour la Défense de la Democratie (CNDD/FDD) government and the Parti Pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu / Forces Nationales de Liberation (PALIPEHUTU-FNL), signed on 7 September 2006, which was mediated primarily by the South African government. The mission mandate mostly stated a need to support the implementation of the agreement, assist in the reform of the security sector and provide support for the reintegration of ex-combatants.

With the request from the Government of Burundi for the UN to leave the country following elections, the AU felt there was a need for a continuing mission to safeguard stability. Thus, the AU STF was deployed in order to protect the FNL leadership in cooperation with the government of Burundi, working with both the military and the police. It is important to stress that the basis of the mission was a re-hatting of South African troops previously under the UN flag. Although the AU wanted a larger presence, it did not have the financial and organisational capacity that would allow this. South Africa was, therefore, the lead nation in this mission as the only TCC and the primary source of financial support and resource assistance.

South Africa has maintained an almost continuous presence in Burundi since 2000. Political stakes, including the efforts and investments of Nelson Mandela and later Jacob Zuma, and strategic motivations invested in the peace process in Burundi meant there was certain pressure to remain engaged.

The table on page 33 details the various deployments to Burundi.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Presidential Minute</strong></th>
<th><strong>South African Protection Special Detachment (SAPSD)</strong></th>
<th><strong>African Mission in Burundi (AMIB)</strong></th>
<th><strong>L’Opération des Nations Unies Au Burundi (ONUB)</strong></th>
<th><strong>AU Special Task Force (AU STF)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cabinet Memorandum</strong></td>
<td><strong>Cabinet Memo 16 of 2001, Tabled 20 February 2002</strong></td>
<td><strong>Cabinet Memo 7 of 2003, Tabled 03 July 2003</strong></td>
<td><strong>Cabinet Memo 15 of 2004, Tabled 14 September 2004</strong></td>
<td><strong>Cabinet Memo 1 of 2007, Tabled 20 February 2007</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Memorandum of Understanding</strong></td>
<td>Between the Government of Burundi and the Government of South Africa signed on the 29 October 2001</td>
<td>AMIB’s mandate expired in April 2004 and the MOUs between the AU, the TCCs and Burundi were never finalised</td>
<td></td>
<td>As of January 2007 an MoU between GoSA and TGoB had not been signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN Resolutions or AU Mandate</strong></td>
<td><strong>UN Security Council Resolution (1375/2001) was signed on the 29 October 2001</strong></td>
<td>Mandated by the Central Organ at its 91st Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, April 2003</td>
<td><strong>UN Security Council Resolution (1545/2004) was signed on the 21 May 2004</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date of first deployment</strong></td>
<td>29 October 2001</td>
<td>27 April 2003</td>
<td>June 2004</td>
<td>February 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deployed troop numbers</strong></td>
<td>South Africa 700-800 troops</td>
<td>South Africa 1 600, Ethiopia 980, Mozambique 280</td>
<td>Algeria 2, Burkino Faso 2, Ethiopia 853, Kenya 1 005, Mali 2, Mozambique 184 Nigeria 1 Senegal 5, South Africa 913, Togo 3, Tunisia 3</td>
<td>South Africa 752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approved RSA personnel</strong></td>
<td>1 431 personnel</td>
<td>Up to 1 600 personnel</td>
<td>1 099 personnel</td>
<td>1 086 personnel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Policy Guidelines for South African Participation

There were many different actors involved in the South African decision-making and implementation of the PSOs in Burundi, including among others, the DFA, the South African Secret Service (SASS), SANDF, SANDF Intelligence Services and the President’s Office. These actors would often have different objectives and ideas as to what was supposed to happen. It is clear from discussions with senior policy level staff in the DFA that inter-departmental meetings were held where consensus on the deployment was arrived at. However, staff interviewed at the operational level felt that no consistent policy leadership was provided in the initial deployment, leading to different and contending notions of how the operations should be executed. Accounts from persons involved explained that it was rare that reference was made to policy, especially the White Paper. According to the interviewees, often the situation was handled on an ad hoc basis and little ‘controlled’ or organised planning took place.65

The Roles of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defence

It is important to remember that PSOs are essentially political operations (indicating the national and foreign interest of the participating TCC). Given this political nature, once a decision to participate in a PSO has been taken, the White Paper envisages that the DFA “will have lead responsibility for overseeing and coordinating continuing South African involvement at a national and international level.”66

The role of the DoD, in turn, is to “take the lead for the management and oversight of the operational deployment and maintenance of the South African military forces in a peace mission.”67 This function is to be carried out with regular liaison and communication with other government departments, which will be coordinated through the establishment of “a Joint Peace Operations Coordinating Committee within the Department of Foreign Affairs, or as determined by the President.”68
The National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) was set up within the DFA as part of the Africa Multilateral Section in 1999. The NOCPM coordinates South Africa’s engagements and makes political recommendations, advising principal actors on issues of conflict analysis. The office carries out monitoring and evaluation of peace missions in collaboration with a wide range of South African government departments. The NOCPM produces Cabinet memos from its own meetings, which are chaired by the DFA. The Joint Committee (the inter-departmental committee), which is organised by the NOCPM, holds meetings on a weekly or monthly basis at middle management level and compiles reports if there are key issues that need to be addressed by their Principals, before compiling submissions. The NOCPM represents the Joint Committee and reports to the International Relations Peace and Security Cluster (IRPS) of the African Renaissance Committee – a senior level inter-departmental committee.

The structures are sound in theory. However, according to several interviewees inter-departmental cooperation and individual roles are not clearly defined, which has led to overlap and miscommunication. Key inter-departmental representatives on the Joint Committee are involved in several other tasks and are often unable to attend the meetings on a regular basis. Thus, it is clear that an alternative method for a well coordinated and balanced platform for deliberation is required.

Furthermore, once an operation has been deployed, regular meetings should take place and there needs to be a ‘buy-in’ of the process by all stakeholders. For example, from a Foreign Affairs perspective, the directorate responsible for Burundi felt that it was an operation from the Office of the Presidency and that the DFA should remain outside of the process. It is clear that foreign policy is the core business of the DFA, and the practical implementation of a peace mission is the task of the DoD. DFA is still responsible for reporting within the relevant multilateral structures on the status of deployment, rotations, refunds and payments to peacekeepers. Therefore, the line of reporting and consultation with the DoD is extremely important and should be established within the framework of clearly established duties and responsibilities.
Decision-Making Processes

The White Paper is clear about the importance of an international mandate as a prerequisite for South African participation in PSOs. Whilst, South Africa took the decision to deploy bilaterally with a mandate, the system and process did not follow the internal official channels for authorisation. South Africa had invested heavily in a peace process which was threatened and on the verge of collapse, and its actions needed to be immediate and unconstrained by internal ‘red tape.’ Moreover, the decision to participate in Burundi in the form of SAPSD and AMIB was seen to be taken at the level of the Presidency, largely without initial consultation with relevant departments, except for the DoD. As Commander-in-Chief the President has such executive authority and prerogative to call for the deployment of SANDF troops, but the intention is to explore the lessons for South Africa’s future interventions, especially considering that bilateral missions will be minimised with the establishment of both the AU and SADC Standby Forces.

According to the White Paper, the decision to determine if South Africa is to participate in a PSO should be based on the principle of shared responsibility, which dictates that “participation in peace missions is never the prerogative of one state department or one set of actors alone.” However, by and large, civil servants and parliamentary representatives who were interviewed felt excluded from the processes of decision-making for SAPSD. It has been noted that when the SAPSD was commissioned, members of Parliament were only aware of developments through the media, which appeared better informed than the parliamentarians themselves. In Defence Joint Committee discussions on the White Paper in March 2003, members questioned the practice of the DoD of bypassing Parliament in the deployment of peace missions, which was contradictory to the policy requirements of the White Paper.

As with most policy guidelines, and legal statements, counter-arguments and counter-strategies exist. Within the parameters of the Constitution, it could be argued that the political responsibility for the ‘establishment, maintenance and deployment of the SANDF’ is vested in the President, who as head of the national executive is the Commander-in-Chief, and therefore the Burundi
deployment by all accounts and standards would be justified. Nonetheless, if section 201, (1-3) of the Constitution (as detailed above) is read in conjunction with section 201 (4), it is stated that ‘If Parliament does not sit during the first seven days after the defence force is employed as envisaged in subsection (2), the President must provide the information required in subsection (3) to the appropriate oversight committee.’ If the Defence Joint Committee discussion pointed out that they were bypassed, then it can be inferred that there was some practical fracture in how such information is communicated and coordinated.

It can be argued that the decisions by the Presidency were being undertaken during a period of Parliamentary recess, and although Parliament was only informed four months later this was nevertheless done at the first opportunity, especially when one considers the dates of the relevant documentation, since Parliament only reconvened four months later.

Again, the White Paper articulates that, “Prior to tabling a proposal in Parliament for ratifying the participation of a South African military contingent in a particular peace support operation, the following procedures must be followed:

- The President will promptly and in appropriate detail inform Parliament, if in session, or, if Parliament is not in session, the appropriate Parliamentary Committees, as to the reasons for the deployment; the place where the force is to be deployed; the number of persons involved; and the expected duration of the deployment;
- Those Parliamentary Committees with a direct interest in South Africa’s involvement in peace support operations – the Parliamentary Committees on Defence, Foreign Affairs, Intelligence and Finance – should be briefed on the preparation for the peace support operation in question...”

It is clear from the case of Burundi that the timing of the Burundi deployment determined the nature of decision-making in South Africa. There was a need to ensure deployment at all cost prior to the installation of the transitional Government in Burundi otherwise the momentum in the peace negotiations would have been lost resulting in a setback that could have reversed the process by several months or even years. There was therefore extreme urgency in
ensuring that the deployment was timely, and decisive. This abnormal situation is probably the reason for the involvement of the Presidency in the decision-making process.

It is important to note that by the very nature of political conflicts almost every situation of conflict will call for decisive, timely deployment with very short notice. The UN has often been criticised for the long time period involved between decision and deployment because of the consultation process within the UN system. The White Paper review should have wide consultations in South Africa with all stakeholders to determine how to reach a balance between decisiveness and expediency on the one hand, and transparency and accountability on the other hand. A way must be found to ensure that these two requirements are not mutually exclusive.

The slow pace inherent in formal structures of communication has necessitated the use of informal structures. This has led to, or been created by, personality-driven inter-departmental communication. This is a source of frustration for the DoD, more so at an operational level, as it does not have the authorisation to act on information from informal channels while being aware that if it waits, the time for action will have passed. In the case of AMIB, the final decision was pending for so long that preparations were in disarray. It was only for the preparation which had been initiated informally that salvaged what would have been a potentially chaotic affair. Again this dictates to the comparison between a politically mandated process and the creation of a military operational plan, and highlights the difficulty in harmonising policy and practice.

Political decision-makers could assist the SANDF by issuing early warnings for imminent deployments in addition to providing access to preparatory budgets. Additionally, interviewees felt that information flows must occur in real time instead of sitting on desks due to lack of capacity. More people, at various levels, should be empowered to take part in the system to ensure fluidity. Information and directives need to flow from Cabinet to the Minister of Defence and on to the SANDF as soon as possible. Building on this, both from a DoD and DFA perspective, military planners and foreign service officers working in directorates or sections associated with potential and current
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conflict ‘hot spots’ should be able to make positive contributions at the level of the inter-departmental Joint Committee either through submissions, reports or presentations. Interviewees argued that the process must be collaborative rather than prescriptive.

It is therefore suggested that an intra-departmental system be set-up, to support the overall strategic process, which can officiate a streamlined decision-making process not only at a senior management/decision-maker level, but at the level of middle management to ensure that while the formal legal processes (Presidential Minute, MoU) are being undertaken, there are parallel operational processes being undertaken.

The legality of South Africa’s peacekeeping presence in Burundi can also be brought into question as a result of internal processes not moving rapidly enough. The requisite legal documentation (i.e. the mandate, the MoU and Status of Forces Agreement) for a peacekeeping deployment undergoes a rigorous administrative and bureaucratic process between Member States and the relevant multilateral organisations. This does not slow down the deployment process on the ground per se, but it means that the core legal requirements that qualify the mission to be on the ground in the first place may not be settled before deployment. This leaves Member States, in this instance South Africa, open to a barrage of legal issues as a result of the high risks of peacekeeping.

The SAPSD did not experience such problems as it was a bilateral initiative and was given support by the AU and the UN through related mandates. This in itself creates a challenge on the issue of coordination not only for the Joint Committee of inter-departmental actors, but also for the DFA – some aspects of peace operations are coordinated by the bilateral desks, others by the UN desk and some by the Africa Multilateral Section, thereby substantiating the significance of the intra-departmental system identified above.

It is the task of the DFA’s NOCPM to try and coordinate the various inputs within in its own department. But even in this situation when discussions were entered into as part of the Joint Committee, related to reconciling demands for additional peacekeepers or the role of the VIP protectors with the peace talks, the legal instruments guiding them were unclear to the implementers.
South Africa’s White Paper does not detail the role or scope for VIP Protectors as do the AU and UN mandates, but parameters are offered in the White Paper to allow for such deployments as already highlighted. Furthermore, by January 2007 a new MoU for the AU STF had still not been signed. South Africa needs to pursue these legal documents more rigorously as at present, it faces the challenge of deploying without the protection of the law for its peacekeepers.

**Financing of Peace Support Operations**

The White Paper envisages that Treasury would be informed of the financial implications of PSOs. However, the paper also states that:

“In all cases, the Department of Foreign Affairs will take the lead in securing finances for South African participation in specific peace missions. The Department of Finance, on instruction from either the President or the Deputy President, will authorise the necessary funds. The Department of Defence and the Department of Safety and Security will be responsible for budgeting for and meeting the pre-deployment costs, as well as a six-month post-deployment cost, of the potential contribution earmarked for each department.”

Chief Director of Budget in DoD, Rautie Rautenbach, commented in 2003 that peacekeeping missions were largely unforeseen occurrences and, as such, there were no budgetary provisions made for them. At this time, the DoD already faced a deficit of R200 million occasioned by peacekeeping missions. The challenge to find funds to deploy is a constant issue, as the political will (peace negotiations/peacemaking) has to be matched with practical issues of deploying a force at the levels of engagement envisaged in the White Paper.

The situation in Burundi, for example, was indicative of a disconnection between presidential directives and the contingencies of the National Treasury. This was aided by the misperception that when the President signs a declaration, funds become immediately available for that particular activity. This,
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however, is not the case and financial processes need to take their full course. Thus, parallel financial processes need to be undertaken alongside the political processes to ensure that funding is secured for the deployment.

It is evident from the recent past that South Africa will continue to play a lead role in peace support operations. This is, therefore, a foreseen occurrence and, as such, resources for peace support operations should be allocated to ensure their effective implementation. Overall Defence spending has increased from R24 billion in the 2006/07 fiscal year to R26 billion in the 2008/09 fiscal year. According to the 2007 Budget Review document, the SANDF will spend R2.8 billion of its budget on African peacekeeping operations. Therefore, South Africa has allocated funds, outside of the existing DoD budget, for PSOs. In the current budget year, the total allocation is R870 million. But the question remains if the fund is adequate and what level of contingency is allowed?

It has been suggested that this budget allocation contains a contingency fund within it. For example, of the R870 million currently made available for PSO, R170 million should be set aside for short-term and often times emergency situations, like the Comoros (security during elections) or Mozambique (humanitarian interventions). The core budget of R700 million should then be allocated to the longer-term ordered operations like the DRC, Burundi, and Sudan.

The review of the White Paper will also need to include an examination of the way funds are allocated to peacekeeping. At present, the SANDF meets all new operational commitments from its current budget with additional funds only being designated at a later stage. In the context of a UN mission, for example, South Africa can be legitimately reimbursed for authorised levels of personnel and equipment, and this is detailed in the MoU and is set at the standard UN monthly rate. But this reimbursement is dependent upon verification reports completed in the mission. Thus, it is not only important for DoD to administer its resources in an efficient manner, ensuring that the equipment and personnel form part of the authorised MoU list, but there must also be a level of operational financial accountability in the field to ensure that South Africa is reimbursed for its contributions. Recognising the constricted timeframe within which deployments occur, the administration of resources
is disconnected from maladministration and mismanagement in this paper. Rather it is linked to policy and how resources are allocated for deployments.

In 2003 the Minister of Defence warned Parliament that “[we] are deploying twice as many members of the defence force than was anticipated in the Defence Review, while our budget, as anticipated in the same review, has not been met.”

The Minister went on to say that “for [a] country that has responsibilities such as we [do], with [...] regional partners that are not strong, it seems unavoidable that our country must consider raising defence expenditure.”

Operational Challenges in Burundi

Deployment in Burundi placed South African troops, still in the process of inaugurating and transforming its own new force, in the unknown territory of peacekeeping. This terrain, according to interviewees presented the force with a number of operational challenges, including maintenance and service of ageing equipment and an ageing force, training needs, logistics and procurement specific to PSOs. These experiences can be viewed as lessons identified and provide a basis for improved policy to assist in the implementation of peace missions from an operational perspective.

Apart from AMIB, where there was a shortfall in troop numbers to safeguard the combat assembly areas, the consensus among South African Generals is that force strength was almost sufficient in the other Burundi missions. This is not to deny that the capacity and reach of the SANDF is overstretched. Major challenges affecting the overstretching of troops relate to aspects of health, capacity, training, troop rotation, and the loss of experienced troops. The challenge faced in terms of mission-ready battalions was ‘fitness’. Health issues such as HIV/AIDS have had a considerable impact on the force. As a result, battalions have had to be constituted of personnel from different units so as to reach force strength. Often these newly formed battalions do not have sufficient time to train together before deployment on peace missions, weakening their ability to function as an integrated force.
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There was inadequate time for troops to rest between rotations due to the overstretch of troops which meant that often troops were not able to be rotated as often as would be optimally desired, and they were therefore unable to perform existing commitments without difficulty. It was also easier to ‘over utilise’ formed units in the rotation cycle as they were familiar with and conditioned to the Burundian environment, which was not necessarily the most positive circumstance for operational readiness. These problems were exacerbated by over-burdened troops seeking alternative employment and further aggravated by affirmative action policies which deterred experienced personnel from remaining in the armed forces.

Equipment poses another operational difficulty. Equipment was widely available and sufficient resources were placed at the disposal of the force, yet the equipment was not always suited to the task at hand or the terrain. According to interviewees, equipment for conventional defence tasks differs from equipment needed in peacekeeping. South Africa’s conventional mission equipment is suited for battle. PSOs require ease of movement and equipment needs to be very light and small and strategically inserted on short notice. For example, vehicles should be appropriate to the terrain, which generally means being lighter than those currently employed by the mechanised units, and the stoves the army currently has are suitable for one hundred and ten men, which is not suitable for the deployment of a small company or a platoon. To suggest that all equipment for South Africa’s deployment was inadequate would be incorrect. The first 24 months of deployment did require armoured vehicles and force protection type equipment, but as the mission evolved, the equipment remained the same. The equipment became unsuited to the changing nature of tasks. The type of equipment required for peace support operations should be identified, and proper systems and capacity should be developed – with inputs from South African businesses or industry.

The SANDF is known to have been extremely competent at adapting equipment and being innovative in finding solutions to problems of unsuitable equipment. Yet, whilst flexibility and adaptability are desirable under mission conditions and reflect the ingenuity employed by the SANDF, this is by no means a sustainable solution. Strategic policy supporting these types of
acquisitions, and taking into consideration the full scope of mission requirements, must be developed.

Logistical support and maintenance were also problematic in Burundi. The procurement system was not responsive or fast enough, and outsourcing proved to be ineffective. Examples include the service of vehicles and access to and availability of spare parts. Ration packs were also difficult to source. Private aircraft were contracted at extremely high cost. Bureaucracy has curtailed the SANDF dealing with these matters — as processes of motivation and tender can take up to three months. While these procedures are necessary for transparency and accountability they are not conducive to a decisive and timely deployment necessary in dynamic conflict situations that require immediate results to sustain the momentum.

An official early warning system would also give the SANDF adequate time to prepare for peace missions. Officially, the SANDF cannot procure resources or begin preparations, until a Cabinet memorandum is passed. Experience shows that this is usually done at the eleventh hour.

A key operational issue made evident in Burundi is the cost of being involved in peacekeeping missions. Both AMIB and the AU STF would not have been possible without the funding capacity of and resources made available by South Africa. The AU generally cannot afford to reimburse for mission contributions. The UN does reimburse most of the costs incurred by TCCs, but requires troops to have functioning equipment for which it can be reimbursed. For instance, in the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC), the equipment was deemed to be unusable by the UN and therefore no reimbursement was made. This is important as the SANDF does not have the resources to maintain equipment to such levels, and it is faced with a backlog which needs to be addressed. 87 Another widely expressed concern by interviewees is that South Africa does not have the available funds to support or carry out a peacekeeping mission independently.

In light of all the issues discussed above, it needs to be noted that Burundi was a learning experience for the SANDF on all levels and that solutions to the problems identified have been and continue to be sought. A simple example can be found in the supply of rations for troops. Previously, the SADSP and
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AMIB were flying in 34 tons of food per month so as to meet operational needs. The SANDF has now taken over existing UN contracts and is purchasing certain commodities on the local market instead of importing them, thereby lowering expenses significantly.

Prior to being deployed in Burundi, South African troops did not undergo training specific to their role in peacekeeping missions. The timeframe between the signing of the MoU and the Presidential Minute was only three days; therefore there was no time for any pre-deployment training or time to undertake any simulation exercises that would better prepare them for their roles. This reflects on the questions of training – Is it ‘Just in case?’ or ‘Just in time?’ Undoubtedly, South Africa’s capacity needs to be built on both fronts as ‘Just in time’ will seek to address the continental ‘need’ issue of peacekeeping and ‘Just in case’ will seek to address its own capacity and recruitment issues.

The South African National War College had only incorporated a module on PSOs into its curriculum for the Joint Senior Command and Staff Programme. With South Africa’s growing role in peace support operations, a decision was taken to establish the Peace Mission Training Centre to enhance South African capacity for peacekeeping in the hope that the Centre will continue to address the shortfalls. Peacekeeping requires a dramatic shift from a mentality of war to one of protection of rights and human security. Therefore, training specific to peace missions could help avoid some of the challenges involving discipline that have accompanied troops in Burundi. Peacekeepers should be part of the solution and avoid becoming part of the problem in conflict areas.

Strategic Challenges in Burundi

The White Paper was originally drafted through consultation with individual researchers, civil society, police and the military. This has, to some extent, created a dichotomy between the capabilities and structures of the SANDF and political aspirations and realities. The will to be a key player in peace support operations needs to be looked at from the perspective and
alignment of policy provisions, material and financial realities, as well as timing. This raises questions relating to/or underpinning the present policy. The increasing priority of peacekeeping for the SANDF is problematic without a corresponding shift in the allocation of resources necessary for the task.

This state of affairs has already been acknowledged. As expressed by the Minister of Defence, “The misalignment between Defence Policy and resource allocation, and the increasing requirements to provide military capabilities for peace and humanitarian missions placed on the DoD, have necessitated the updating of the White Paper on Defence (1996) and the Defence Review (1998).”

The Defence Update 2006 was approved by the Minister in 2006 and will be presented to Cabinet during the 2006/2007 financial year. Until it does so, it is hard to maintain the argument that the available resources are insufficient for the capabilities that are expected to support current and expected involvement in peace support operations.

Clearly the SANDF’s operational commitments continue to increase, and while the overall budget will increase in the 2008/09 fiscal year, its operating budget has declined in real terms. And without an approved revised policy both with regard to the White Paper and the Defence Update, this is no indicator to measure the budget.

Future demands made by the AU African Standby Force (ASF) on the SANDF and the financial commitments of the defence acquisition projects, mandated in the Defence Review, contribute to ever increasing pressures on the DoD. These pressures are in addition to the DoD providing the required numbers of soldiers for peace support operations while maintaining its core capabilities within the given resource envelope. It is important to acknowledge these demands and constraints and seek ways to address them. If not, the situation will no doubt lead to the eventual deterioration of capacities and capabilities across the board. This has implications for the maintenance of facilities, stockpiles, equipment and force readiness: in essence the ability of the SANDF to live up to expectations and to fulfil its obligations within South Africa and beyond her borders when mandated by SADC, the AU or the UN.

Challenges that relate to the policy provisions and time constraints have already been highlighted throughout the course of this paper. Time pressure
will continue to create complications for South Africa’s involvement, which will collide with the imperatives in a peace process and instantaneous deployment against the importance of exerting influence in an effective and efficient manner; internally (within South Africa) and externally (country of deployment). To assert that such considerations must be explored within the ambit of the White Paper may appear too prescriptive as peace support operations must be tailor-made to meet the uniqueness of each conflict situation and operation. Thus, the significance of joint decision-making and the coordination of information at all levels of leadership and management (top, middle, and low) cannot be underplayed.

Recommendations

Strategic: Decision-makers versus Implementers

After investigating South Africa’s participation in peacekeeping missions in Burundi alongside current developments in Africa, it has become apparent that there is a strain on South African peacekeeping operations as well as a lack of unity between policy and practice. Policy on peace support operations needs to be reviewed, bringing it in line with the capabilities of the SANDF to achieve peacekeeping needs and challenges. To address these challenges, both the DFA and DoD’s stated priorities, political and operational ambitions will need to be aligned including: improved information flows need to be ensured; and sufficient capability to do the job needs to be ensured, reiterating that peace support operations is not the prerogative of one department. This requires an additional review of budget and policy to adapt to the present reality and necessitates the best use of available human, material and financial resources.

Decisions concerning the deployments in Burundi were often taken at the highest levels with limited consultation with the relevant structures as outlined in the White Paper, the reasons for which have already been advanced. It is further acknowledged that South Africa’s creative peacemaking efforts in Burundi can largely be credited for paving the way for sustained peace. However, the decision to deploy troops in a peacekeeping mission must be made through
a process of consultation, cooperation and joint strategic planning between the responsible government institutions. While it is generally true that PSOs are political, the highly political nature of the peacekeeping operations in Burundi isolated tactical level decision-making. Importantly, there needs to be a ‘buy-in’ at both the political and tactical levels.

This also includes the need for improved coordination between the sub-regional, regional, and international entities, namely South Africa, the AU, and the UN. This is crucial, particularly for funding matters. The AU is still seeking funds to support South Africa’s participation in the AU STF, while South Africa is seeking funding from the same donors for the same functions as the AU. This weakens both the AU’s and South Africa’s credibility and fosters duplication and confusion on an already minimal level of support.

**Operational**

Peacekeeping operations are an opportunity for the SANDF to gain exposure to the operating mechanisms of other armed forces. AMIB and ONUB presented opportunities for South Africa to learn from partners and to influence South Africa’s peers on the continent. Burundi was also an opportunity for South Africa to prove that, despite its inexperience, it was able to carry out a successful operation.

If South Africa wants to continue, or to more successfully intervene in peacekeeping operations, it should first attempt to address its challenges. The best solution, in that case, would be to provide its defence force with the funding it needs to train, equip, maintain and perform the operations to which it is assigned. If the SANDF is to be an effective and credible force, able to perform its tasks safely and with minimal risk, it must instigate the above measures. Another secondary consideration pertains to an increased participation in peacekeeping missions. Ideally, South Africa would have three ‘mission-ready and fit’ battalions available for peacekeeping operations. This requires nine battalions in total: for every one in the field there should be one in training and one in rest/on leave. Estimates are that this will require a sustained expenditure of around 2 percent of GDP. South Africa’s expenditure for 2006 was only 1.7 percent of its GDP. Heitman suggests that
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“it is also imperative that the government sets aside contingency funds to cover the first phases of future peace support operations so that those can be launched without the armed forces having to disrupt training and maintenance to do so.”  

There is a debate as to whether capacity of the forces will be increased to meet the demands of the ASF or if provision for the force will be from existing capacities. As yet, there has been no clear answer to the question. This decision should be incorporated into new policy guidelines. The aim of peacekeeping is to establish a safe and stable environment for “peacebuilding and jump-starting socio-economic development and democracy in war torn countries.”

South Africa’s contribution in terms of peace support has predominantly been a political exercise, and the military has been its primary ‘foreign policy instrument.’ To this end, policy concerns have principally centred on military questions, such as equipment, training, logistics and funding. However, as the UN’s mixed record of success in Africa has shown, military solutions are insufficient to deal with Africa’s complex conflicts. Security is not necessarily a precursor for development.

In this light, the review of the White Paper should perhaps shift the primary focus away from the military towards police and civilian components of PSOs and should incorporate the policies of the ASF and the regional brigades.

In South Africa’s case, this means harmonisation between the SANDF and PSO policies of the SADC and the AU.

However, the limitations and challenges experienced by the SANDF correlate poorly with the government’s stated political ambitions of wanting to make significant contributions to international peace support operations and creating stability on the continent. This points to the disharmony between the DFA, (that deals with the political nature of the missions,) and the DoD, (that deals with operational capacities and implementation.)

In practice, coordination has been difficult because there is still a large gap between the setting of priorities, the allocation of resources and the establishment of time horizons for soldiers and civilians when planning for operations. Civil society groups (and academia) working in the peace and security field should also be consulted as their ability to draw analytical and objective lessons are not constrained by the bureaucratic obstacles that a state
administration presents. Thus within a restricted timeline, civil society assistance will be informative and timely.

Policy generation in peace support operations in South Africa does not operate as a single integrated mechanism. South Africa views peacekeeping as one of the strategic tools at its disposal, as demonstrated in Burundi where it was actively engaged in peacekeeping, and also in the political aspects of peacemaking. This is to say that although it was successful in Burundi, it may not translate to other contexts. South African policy-makers viewed Burundi as an individual case and sought solutions accordingly. This case-by-case approach should be applied to every request for a peacekeeping mission, i.e. responding with flexibility to the situation in the interest of peace in that particular country. However, consistent internal approaches and requisite support structures and guidelines must be established for the initiation and management of missions to ensure transparency and accountability.

Conclusion

Ideally, South Africa would be in a position to respond positively to calls for commitments to peacekeeping missions so as to promote regional stability, support its national and foreign interests and enhance its international profile. South Africa needs to strengthen and develop a well coordinated and balanced platform for deliberation and decision-making around peacekeeping. There is evidence that planning for peace support missions is largely carried out by South Africa’s diplomats and soldiers. This is of concern, as “the ultimate strategic objective of peace operations is to create an enabling environment for development (and not military security).” Thus, South Africa’s deployment should be holistic and there must be an interface between military, civilians, police, and government to better ensure that the root causes are essentially dealt with as part of the conflict resolution strategies.

South Africa must be cautious not to deploy troops without proper coordination, co-operation, information-sharing and ‘buy-in’ by all stakeholders. South Africa and the AU should be conscious that even with real
consent from the parties on the ground, as in the case of the SAPSD and AMIB, there is a danger of their role deteriorating into that of enforcer rather than peacekeeper. This distinction, while it may appear minimal, is in practical terms “the difference between projecting credible force and using force.”

South Africa must be cautious of its entry onto the continent in yielding stability because its assistance should not be misconstrued with choosing sides between conflicting parties. South Africa’s military has been guided by the principles of consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force, and recent missions have still articulated the importance of these principles.

The White Paper, in the process of review, should be revised to take into account the transformation of the OAU into the AU, (which according to interviewees has already been included) and include aspects of the current African Peace and Security architecture such as the ASF and the regional brigades, the Panel of the Wise and the continental early warning mechanism. These developments have had a significant impact on the definition of regional and sub-regional mandates and the manner in which peace operations are conceived and managed. There is an acute need for early warning systems to facilitate budgetary provisions and clear channels of communication between policy planners and the SANDF. Longer warning periods would allow the SANDF to prepare adequately.

To strengthen peace missions, lessons identified should be collected and applied to decision-making and policy development. A review mechanism to regularly evaluate the performance of the SANDF, and to evaluate missions and operating procedures against prescribed policy, is essential to bridge existing gaps. Additionally, South Africa would benefit from the establishment of procedures and systems to monitor the policy relevance of South Africa’s approach to peacekeeping operations: “There is a great need to avoid entrenching the current uncoordinated and ad-hoc approach to peace mission deployments, which, ultimately, is not sustainable.”

A final recommendation would be the increased use of diplomatic staff and the deployment of military attachés (or liaisons) in PSOs. Deploying, as in Burundi, without diplomatic representation is potentially disastrous for a mission. This type of liaison would pave the way for force arrival in the
country (both in terms of diplomatic relations and of public opinion), and would facilitate coordination and communication between the SANDF, the DFA, the UN, the AU, and the host country.

Real African solutions need to move beyond the deployment of African troops on the ground to having the capacity to conceptualise, formulate, fund, execute and evaluate peacekeeping missions without the intervention or assistance of foreign governments. Until such a time, major global players will continue to impose security and developmental policy designs on Africa. The answer to African problems lies inside Africa, and South Africa needs to position itself to meet those challenges.

Endnotes


4 The South African legislative process dictates that policy starts in the form a Green Paper, which serves as a discussion document, which then becomes a White Paper. The White Paper is considered a broad statement of government policy, and will form the basis for a Bill which is tabled in Parliament. Once approved and signed by the Executive, the Bill becomes Law.


6 *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa* (1996), Section 201 (2).

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10 The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 designated the two kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi as part of the German interest in Africa. After occupation by the Belgians in 1916, Ruanda-Urundi (Rwanda-Burundi) became mandated territory of the League of Nations and was administered by Belgium from 1923.


12 It must be expressed that not all Ugandans or Tanganyikans belong to a homogenous cultural or linguistic group. Therefore, the assertions that the Hutus and Tutsis resembled a physically likeness to their neighbours must also be considered in light of the fact that these countries represent a variety of cultural-linguistic groups. Uganda is comprised of Banyankole, Baganda, Banyole, Basoga, Langi, Acholi among others with Tanganyika comprising of 120 cultural-linguistic groups some of which include Hehe, Sukuma, Nyamwezi, Chaaga, Mbeya and Digo. Thus, this leads to question as to who did the Hutus and Tutsis really resemble.


17 In January 1999, at the first plenary meeting, Mandela informed the delegation that he had invited King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, and Presidents Jacques Chirac of France, Olessegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Bill Clinton of USA to attend the next plenary in February, as well as Presidents Mkapa of Tanzania and Museveni of Uganda and Salim Salim of the OAU. See Bentley and Southall (2005), Ch. 7.


21 Ibid.


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32 Fakir, A. (General Brigadier), 13 June 2007; and Zaayman, W., 20 June 2007, Telephone interviews.


34 Duarte, J., Department of Foreign Affairs, Interview, 31 August 2007.


36 Ibid.


38 Ibid.

39 Vrey, W., Interview online, 10 June 2007.

40 The Memorandum of Understanding establishes the contractual responsibility and standards for support, which is accompanied by annexes related personnel (troops), major equipment, self-sustainment (services and the ability for the deployed unit to survive in theatre), and mission factors (operational and environment conditions).


44 SANDF Deployment History – Burundi, received by fax 13 July 2007.

45 Vrey, W., Interview online, 10 June 2007.


50 Ibid.


54 Vrey, W., Interview online, 10 June 2007; Church, (Brigadier General), SANDF, In person interview, 24 May 2007.


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57 Ibid.

58 Kane, B., ONUB, Senior PAO, Political Section Deputy Chief; Conde, C.L., BINUB, Political Affairs Officer, Political Section and; Rejouis, E., BINUB, Political Affairs Officer, Interviews, Bujumbura, Burundi, 15 May 2007.


65 Rautenbach, G., Interview online, 21 June 2007.


68 Ibid.


72 Ibid.
73 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Section 201 (2).
75 Vrey, W., Interview online, 10 June 2007.
76 Fakir, A. (Brigadier General), Telephonic interview, 13 June 2007.
80 Ibid.
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86 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 See Policy Framework for the establishment of the ASF, Exp/ASF-MSC/2 (1), which was adopted by the Third Session of African Chiefs of Defence Staff on 15-16 May 2003 and noted by the Heads of State and Government at the Maputo Summit in July 2003. Article 13 (1.) of the PSC Protocol reads as follows: “In order to enable the Peace and Security Council perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, an ASF shall be established. Such Force shall be composed of standby multi-disciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment appropriate notice.”
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100 El Abdellaoui, J., formerly ACCORD (Burundi), Email interview, 20 June 2007.
103 Ibid.
104 Vrey, W., Interview online, 10 June 2007.