Transnational Ethnic Dimensions of Third-Party Interventions in Civil Conflicts

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Til Far og Mor
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INTRODUCTION

Consider the following case. In 1987 India intervened in Sri Lanka with a force that eventually numbered forty-five thousand troops (Cooper & Berdal 1993: 125). The intervention was a direct consequence of civil conflict in Sri Lanka. Violence between minority Tamil separatists and the majority Sinhalese had escalated since 1983. When the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam – LTTE announced that they take over the civilian administration of the majority Tamil Jaffna Peninsula, and the Sri Lankan government launched a blockade and offensive with a heavy civilian toll, India was compelled to intervene (Cooper & Berdal 1993: 123). Among the causes that led India to commit to an intervention with an estimated cost of $150 million and at least a thousand fallen soldiers (Cooper & Berdal 1993: 125), central mechanisms were directly set in motion by transnational ethnic affinities.

The mobilisation of Indian Tamil sympathy for the plight of their ethnic brethren revived official fears of Indian Tamil secessionism (Ganguly 1998: 205). Affinity between the Indian Tamils of Tamil Nadu and the Tamils across the strait in Sri Lanka stemmed from shared ethnic identity, language, and cultural traits (Ganguly 1998: 204). New Delhi was under immense pressure from its own outraged 50 million-strong Tamil population and their leadership to relieve the suffering of the Sri Lankan Tamils (ibid.). Ethnic affinities thus created conditions that forced New Delhi’s hand. The Indian government feared that inaction would provoke Tamil nationalists to demand the secession of Tamil Nadu into an independent Dravidastan, a separatist movement for which their were deep historical roots (Ganguly 1998: 205). The transnational dimension of
the Tamil ethnic issue raised a catalogue of additional internal security issues (Cooper & Berdal 1993: 123).

Transnational ethnic affinities were thus a central factor in setting in motion mechanisms that led to Indian intervention in the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict. Even though New Delhi responded to Indian Tamil demands, India could not accept a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka. Not only was the situation reminiscent of the prelude to an earlier partition of India; New Delhi could not be seen to contradict its rejection of nation-building based on ethnic, linguistic or religious identity in an intervention abroad when it repressed similar secessionist movements at home (Ganguly 1998: 209). Thus, while India was no friend of the Sri Lankan government, the intervention was in favour of some incarnation of the status quo, with at best some autonomy for the Sri Lankan Tamils (Cooper & Berdal 1993: 125). Being as it was intended, amongst others, to quell Tamil separatism, the Indian intervention may go down as having been implicitly supportive of the Sri Lankan government.

The case of the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka may be seen as an example of a third-party intervention in civil conflict - a broader class of phenomena to which a range of scholarship is devoted to studying (such as Aydin 2005; Carment & James 2000; Cooper & Berdal 1993; Ganguly 1998; Gleditsch & Beardsley 2004; Heraclides 1990; Lemke & Regan 2004; Pearson 1974; Pickering 2002; Regan 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002; Walter 2002), and of which this study attempts to add some understanding. For, more specifically, the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka was a third-party intervention in a civil conflict caused by mechanisms set in motion by transnational ethnic affinities. At issue is whether ethnic affinities may be mapped on to a wider set of interventions in internal conflicts. By statistically modelling data on civil conflicts in North Africa, Europe and Asia since 1944, I seek to test whether and how transnational ethnic affinities and the ethnic characteristics of intervener and target affect the likelihood of interventions and their partiality. Do transnational ethnic affinities increase the probability of interventions? Does the relative predominance of one ethnic group in potential interveners turn them into actual interveners? May
variation in the configuration of ethnic groups and power explain which side interventions favour? Those are the questions I attempt to answer.

I adopt Regan’s (2000: 10) definition of third-party interventions in internal conflicts as ‘convention-breaking military and / or economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces.’ I only address interventions by states. When several states intervened in a civil conflict I consider them as separate unilateral interventions.¹ I also use Regan’s (2000: 21) definition of civil conflict as ‘armed combat between groups within state boundaries in which there are at least 200 fatalities’, intended to capture the seriousness of a conflict, yet to exclude events like ‘bloodless’ coups, riots or demonstrations. Throughout the text, various combinations of ‘civil’ / ‘internal’ and ‘conflict’ / ‘war’ all refer to the same phenomenon.

Transnational ethnic affinities are somewhat more elusive. I assume, not unlike Davis & Moore (1997: 173), that members of an ethnic group have empathy and sympathy with others identified as being members of the same ethnic group on issues that are salient to their ethnicity. I also assume that affinity extends to groups that are not ethnically alike, but that evoke some sort of identification based on ethnic identity. Thus one form of ethnic affinities is that experienced by for instance Tamils for other Tamils, and another form of ethnic or identity-based affinities are those felt by for example African Americans for the South Sudanese. Such empathy and sympathy must have a potential for political mobilisation if ethnic affinities are to be influential on foreign policy outcomes. Political mobilisation is evident in both the case of the Indian Tamils, and African Americans’ sympathy for black Sudanese as it is expressed through lobbying the U.S. government (Perry 2004; Smith 2005) or through organisations like Africa Action, The American Anti-Slavery Group, and the Coalition Against Slavery in Mauritania and Sudan.² I propose that transnational ethnic affinities be theoretically defined, then, as empathy and

¹ I deal with the concomitant dependency problems in section 3.2.
² http://www.africaaction.org; http://www.iabolish.com; http://members.aol.com/casmasalc/.
sympathy with an ethnic group in a foreign country, identified as being ethnically alike or relevant by virtue of ethnic identification, with a potential for political mobilisation.

Besides anecdotal knowledge of cases such as the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka, there is both a theoretical and an empirical rationale for studying the effects of ethnic affinities on interventions. Theoretically, Mitchell’s (1970: 184) conceptual distinction between ‘transactional’ and ‘affective’ linkages between groups in the civil war state and the potential intervener has been formative, and resonates somewhat in Suhrke & Noble (1977: 10) and Heraclides (1990: 370). By suggesting that affective linkages, relative to transactional linkages, may be ‘more significant in any attempt to understand those linkages resulting in intervention in internal conflict’, and by explicitly listing linkages that may be loosely categorised as ethnic, Mitchell (1970: 185) suggests a very clear conceptual direction for the study of third-party interventions, and adds legitimacy to the investigation of ethnic affinities as an explanatory variable. Beyond Mitchell (1970), Suhrke & Noble (1977) and Heraclides (1990), there is no shortage of references to the possible salience of transnational ethnic affinities to interstate relations (Carment & James 1997: 2; Chazan 1991: 7; Ellingsen 2000: 243; Regan 1998: 758; van Evera 1994: 12, amongst others).

Empirically, anecdotal studies by Heraclides (1990) and Cooper & Berdal (1993), comparative case studies such as Carment & James (2000) and Ganguly (1998), and quantitative work like Davis et al. (1997), Davis & Moore (1997) and Saideman (2002), provide evidence that affective factors and ethnicity variables really do influence interstate relations, intervention, and war. Simultaneously, they leave space for further theoretical specification and empirical application, to which this study has some pretensions.

Given my set of definitions, the findings suggest that transnational ethnic affinities, as they have been operationalised, have a robust and sizeable effect on the likelihood of interventions in civil conflicts. States are more likely to intervene when they contain ethnic groups with affinity for an ethnic group in the civil war state than when they do not, ceteris paribus. The results also suggest that states in which the ethnic group in power is relatively predominant
are more likely to become interveners than states with greater ethnic pluralism. Finally, hypotheses about how the side of interventions is determined by configurations of ethnic groups and power, receive tentative, if inconclusive support. I use the terms ‘side of intervention’ or ‘intervention side’ to refer to which party in civil conflicts interventions favour - government or opposition.

The text is divided into six chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 develops an analytical framework for the empirical study of ethnically motivated third-party interventions in internal conflicts. It does so by assembling a formal model of the choice to intervene, and by specifying alternative configurations of ethnic groups and power that determine the mechanisms by which ethnic affinities are translated into interventions. Chapter 3 presents the statistical model, the data, the variables and their operationalisation, subsequent to some epistemological and methodological introspection. Chapter 4 reports the results from the statistical analyses with some preliminary comments. Chapter 5 discusses the two central projects in this thesis: the empirical findings and their potential for inference, and the theoretical advance represented by the analytical framework. Critical light is also shed on the inquiry, particularly in terms of measurement validity and theoretical limitations. Chapter 6 summarises the findings, proposes steps for further research, and thereby concludes this study.
THE ETHNIC DIMENSION OF THE CHOICE TO INTERVENE

This chapter develops an analytical framework for the inquiry. I introduce it by arguing for a dyadic approach to analysis. Then I suggest a set of expected utility functions and a contest success function as means to formalise the choice to intervene. Following that, I discuss the central distinction between dyads containing transnational ethnic affinities - *ethnically biased dyads* - and dyads containing no such affinities. More particularly, I present a four-fold typology of ethnically biased dyads, defined by how ethnic groups are placed with regard to power, and I structure the review of earlier literature according to this typology. I focus on how the different types of dyad are expected to be associated with variation in the likelihood and side of interventions. In closing, I summarise the discussion by presenting a set of hypotheses for empirical testing.

2.1 A DYADIC APPROACH TO ANALYSIS

The investigation owes much to earlier theoretical work (Kasfir 1979; Mitchell 1970; Suhrke & Noble 1977) that has contributed to the analytical organisation of later empirical research (Carment & James 2000 and Regan 1998 come to mind). Mitchell (1970), in particular, will provide the point of departure for the following argument.

Mitchell’s (1970) conceptual framework for the empirical study of third-party interventions in internal conflict is a useful contribution to ways of
approaching the matter. He is early to identify the categories of variables that ought to be investigated: ‘factors within the “disrupted” state’ and ‘factors within the intervening state’, ‘factors associated with the links [between the civil war country and the potential intervener]’, and ‘factors in the international system’ (Mitchell 1970: 170). Mitchell thus presents a comprehensive set of variable categories that encompass the determinants of relations between two states, and which I refer to as ‘monadic’, ‘dyadic’, and ‘systemic’. Monadic variables are those associated exclusively with single states, such as characteristics of its internal conflict, its economic size, and so on. Dyadic variables are the characteristics of a pair of states, for instance the ratio of power between them, or transnational relations between ethnic groups. Systemic factors pertain to the entire international system of states.

On the one hand, Mitchell (1970) provides a useful way in which to organise causal mechanisms. Although systemic factors will be included in the control variables to be presented in the following section, the focus here will be on the monadic and the dyadic. Ethnic affinities and the mechanisms that link them to third-party interventions may, after all, best be fitted in monadic and dyadic frameworks, as opposed to systemic.

On the other hand, Mitchell’s (1970: 170) categories provide alternative ways of organising data. Past quantitative studies of interventions have opted for both monadic and dyadic data designs. Whereas work from some years back have monadic data designs (such as Pickering 2002: 302; Regan 1998: 768; Saideman 2002: 33), some of the most recent contributions choose dyadic approaches (Aydin 2005: 13; Lemke & Regan 2004: 155). Some have employed a monadic rather than a dyadic data design partly as a pragmatic response to theoretically founded difficulties of case selection.

Take Regan (1998) for example. Instead of framing the question in dyadic terms, asking why some pairs of countries experience intervention when others do not, he frames the question monadically, using the internal conflict as the unit of analysis, and asks why some internal conflicts attract interventions as opposed to others (Regan 1998: 768). The monadic approach, he argues, ‘is
ultimately borne of the difficulty of identifying all relevant dyads, including those that may have considered intervening but chose not to.’ (Regan 1998: 768) This must be solved in any dyadic analysis, for underlying Regan’s (1998: 768) argument is the sense that the study of pairs of states is to be preferred. One monadic contribution is very clear on this point, suggesting that dyadic research is the way of the future ‘because the ethnic ties argument focuses on the relationship between the domestic politics in one country and the combatants in ethnic conflict elsewhere’ (Saideman 2002: 46). Subsequently, dyadic data designs have been adopted by both Lemke & Regan (2004: 155) and Aydin (2005: 13), and the question of relevant dyads has been solved by treating all states as potential interveners, and by including determinants of opportunity in the statistical model (Lemke & Regan 2004: 155).

Whereas I will discuss the question of opportunity versus willingness in the section on control variables in Chapter 3, I argue here that a dyadic data design has a conceptual appeal that makes efforts to find a solution to the question of dyadic relevance worthwhile. As Saideman (2002: 46) recognises, intervention by one state into the internal affairs of another must necessarily be a function of relational characteristics. When transnational loyalties of some sort or another generate foreign policy outcomes directed at the other state in a dyad, those transnational loyalties are necessarily a characteristic of the pair of states as one analytical unit. The same could be said for other interstate transactions and flows of goods, services, people and money. Consequently, I choose a dyadic approach to the analysis of third-party interventions in internal conflicts.

The question, then, is how dyads in which interventions occur differ from dyads with no intervention. Given my preoccupation with ethnic affinities, the question is more precisely how intradyadic transnational ethnic ties affect the likelihood and side of interventions. My unit of observation, in short, is the interstate dyad, within which affective factors such as ethnic affinities are presumed to influence the likelihood of intervention. The task for this chapter, among other things, is to reflect on how affective factors may fit in a rational process of foreign policy-making. To that end, I employ decision theory.
2.2 THE EXPECTED UTILITY OF INTERVENTION

Decision theory assumes for analytical purposes that actors’ behaviour conforms to the expectations of rational choice. It assumes that decisions are instrumentally rational. Given a set of interests – staying in power, national security, advancing or protecting one’s ethnic kin, et cetera – actors weigh alternatives against each other by comparing the known and expected costs and benefits of each alternative, choosing the one with the greatest expected utility. An expected utility framework is analytically useful because it identifies a set of terms more general than specific variables, the variation in which determine the likelihood of intervention.

Before proceeding to consider the ins and outs of my particular function, it is worth questioning whether an expected utility framework is appropriate for modelling the choice to intervene. The expected utility function concerns itself solely with the decision-making process in the potential intervener. *Do I intervene or do I not?* Such a decision-theoretic approach assumes that the potential intervener regards the target state as if it was nature, that is, as if the outcome of various intervention strategies was independent of the target state’s possible responses to intervention. In other words, the probabilities of the possible outcomes of intervention are assumed to be exogenous, and are treated as constant in the models below. Arguably, this may not be the case. One could maintain that the target of intervention is best understood as a rational opponent, and that the probabilities of alternative intervention outcomes are contingent on the target state’s response to intervention. If so, then decision theory may not be appropriate. As Tsebelis (1989: 77) argues, ‘the expected utility calculations typically used in decision theory are inappropriate when probabilities are not exogenous but part of the (equilibrium) strategy of a rational opponent.’ The question here, then, is not whether it is reasonable to expect variation in a target state’s response to intervention. To some extent it clearly is. The question, rather, is whether it is reasonable to assume that the potential
Intervener pays little regard to the possible reactions of the target when it weighs the pros and cons of intervention. Regan (1998: 759) evidently thinks it is. Referring to the 1994 French intervention in Rwanda and the 1997 Nigerian intervention in Sierra Leone, he argues that the potential responses of the Hutu leadership and Sierra Leone respectively, had little bearing on the French and Nigerian decisions to intervene (Regan 1998: 759-760). Those decisions, Regan (1998: 759-760) maintains, were the results of internal processes in the intervening states. The argument is plausible, particularly if one considers that France is a great power and Nigeria a regional power, at least with regard to Rwanda and Sierra Leone. What detracts from the argument is its basis in anecdotal evidence. One could just as easily find anecdotes in favour of strategic interaction, such as Arab states considering to intervene in Israel with the knowledge that behind stands a mighty United States. I accept Regan’s argument as a reasonable generalisation, however, noting that great powers and regional powers are the most prevalent interveners (Tillema 1989: 184). At any rate, an expected utility framework offers such gains in terms of parsimony with regard to a model of strategic interaction, and analytical clarity relative to no model, that I choose to proceed with it, knowing its limitations, but emphasising its possibilities. In the following, my reasoning is influenced by Regan (1998: 759-762).

Internal conflicts have international character. So have many gone far to demonstrate, for example Modelski (1964), Rosenau (1964), Stedman (1996), Marshall (1997), and Stack Jr. (1997). Other states will have a stake in how internal conflicts evolve. For the states that feel concerned, internal conflicts offer opportunities to intervene, for which either alternative must be regarded as an active policy choice: to intervene or not to intervene. Associated with any choice is a set of costs. There will be material costs, such as the costs of mounting a military expedition. There will be human costs, such as casualties from war, displaced populations, or the persecution of ethnic kin. Significantly, there will also be audience costs. Audience costs capture the public aspect of the conduct of foreign policy, the fact that responses to civil conflicts abroad have political audiences that evaluate the skill and performance of their leaders (Fearon 1994:...
Audience costs are the loss of support from whatever constituency opposes either choice of policy, be it among the masses or within the political elites (Fearon 1994: 581). Every category of costs will be part of a cost-benefit calculation, so that the cost function may be expressed as

\[ C = \sum C_{\text{material}} + \sum C_{\text{human}} + \sum C_{\text{audience}} \]

For the purposes of the expected utility functions, I express the costs somewhat differently. The costs of intervention are

\[ C_i = C_i^{EA} + C_i^\eta, \quad C_i^{EA} \leq 0, \]

expressed as the sum of the costs of intervention incurred by ethnic affinities, \( EA \), and the costs of intervention incurred by some other set of stochastic factors, \( \eta \). Note that the costs of intervention are assumed to be higher if ethnic affinities are not present. When a state intervenes, the costs of non-intervention are per definition zero, \( C_{ni} = 0 \). One may interject that a public opinion which pushes for intervention in reality raises the costs of non-intervention, and that therefore a term for the costs of non-intervention should be defined. However, all changes in costs are expressed in \( C_i \), regardless of mechanism. If ethnic affinities lead to public pressure for intervention, then it translates directly into a reduction of \( C_i^{EA} \).

So much for the costs. Integral to the rational decision is also the consideration of a set of utilities. I assume that an internal conflict may have two possible outcomes, government success or rebel success. The potential intervener may associate either outcome with a certain utility. Let the utility to the potential intervener of government success in the civil war state be expressed as

\[ U_G = U_G^{EA} + U_G^\eta, \]
where the utility of government success is the sum of the utility provided by ethnic affinities, \( EA \), and the utility determined by an unknown set of factors, \( \eta \). Similarly, the utility of rebel success is

\[
U_R = U_{EA}^R + U_\eta^R.
\]

The inclusion of an \( EA \) term in both the cost function and the utility functions is necessary because they refer to different ways in which ethnic affinities affect the choice to intervene. The reduction in costs due to ethnic affinities are mainly associated with mass pressure for intervention, or public acquiescence to intervention. Such costs are an aspect of domestic politics. They also have a temporal dimension. I assume that a reduction in audience costs results from the choice to intervene, not the eventual outcome of intervention. The utilities derived from government or rebel success, however, are estimations of rewards further down the timeline. Also, such utilities are aspects of international politics. Utilities provided by ethnic affinities are the positive returns to decision-makers of foreign policy success in aligning or realigning ethnic groups according to the foreign policy elite's preferences.

When deciding whether to opt for non-intervention or intervention, states also estimate the likelihood of the various outcomes, weighing the different utilities with their respective probabilities. States choose by comparing the expected utility of non-intervention with the expected utility of intervention. The decision may accordingly be modelled with two separate but concurrent utility functions:

\[
EU_{\text{ni}} = qU_G + (1-q)U_R
\]

and

\[
EU_i = pU_G + (1-p)U_R - C_i,
\]
where $EU_{ni}$ is the expected utility of not intervening, $q$ is the estimated probability of government success without an intervention, $EU_i$ is the expected utility of intervening, and $p$ is the estimated probability of government success with an intervention. Now, substitute the cost and utility functions into the expected utility equations. Then,

$$EU_{ni} = q(U^E_G + U^n_G) + (1 - q)(U^E_R + U^n_R) \quad (1)$$

and

$$EU_i = p(U^E_G + U^n_G) + (1 - p)(U^E_R + U^n_R) - (C^E_i + C^n_i). \quad (2)$$

In general terms, intervention will occur if $EU_i > EU_{ni}$. I substitute equations (1) and (2) into $EU_i > EU_{ni}$ and solve for costs to get expression (3). Then, intervention is expected to occur when

$$C^E_i + C^n_i < (p - q)(U^E_G + U^n_G - (U^E_R + U^n_R)). \quad (3)$$

The right hand side of expression (3) will always be positive. If the intervener favours government success in the civil conflict, then $(U^E_G + U^n_G - (U^E_R + U^n_R)) > 0$. It logically follows that $(p \cdot q) > 0$, for, when the intervener supports the government, its probability of success $p$ must by definition be greater than its probability of success $q$ with no intervention. If the intervener favours rebel success, then $(U^E_G + U^n_G - (U^E_R + U^n_R)) < 0$. With intervention in support of the rebels, the difference between $p$ and $q$ is likewise $(p \cdot q) < 0$ because intervention reduces the probability of government success, $p$.

For simplicity I rewrite the utilities term as $(U^E_G - U^E_R) + (U^n_G - U^n_R)$, which expresses $U_G - U_R$ as the sum of two differences, that accounted for by ethnic affinities and that determined by all other factors. I represent
\((U^E_{G} - U^E_{R}) + (U^E_{G} - U^E_{R})\) by denoting it \(W^E_{G} + W^E_{R}\). Then, \((W^E_{G} + W^E_{R}) > 0\) if the intervener favours the government, and \((W^E_{G} + W^E_{R}) < 0\) if the intervener favours the rebels.

In order to analyse the conditions under which interventions occur, I consider three special cases of the general expression (3). First, transnational ethnic affinities may determine that the potential intervener, \(I\), favours the government in the target state, \(T\). Second, ethnic affinities may compel \(I\) to favour the rebels in \(T\). Third, no ethnic affinities are present, and the side of intervention is not specified.

**When the potential intervener favours the government**, intervention occurs when

\[ C^i_{\eta} < (p - q)(W^E_{G} + W^E_{R}), \quad (W^E_{G} + W^E_{R}) > 0 \text{ and } (p - q) > 0. \]  \(4\)

Anything that decreases the value of the left hand side of the expression, *ceteris paribus*, raises the likelihood of intervention. The presence of ethnic affinities, for example, decreases the costs of intervention (recall that \(C^i_{\eta} < 0\)), thus lowering the value of the left side of the expression. Conversely, anything that increases the value of the right hand side of the expression, *ceteris paribus*, make interventions more likely. Thus, intervention is more likely to occur as the probability of government success with an intervention increases and as the probability of government success without an intervention decreases. A greater sum of differences between the utility of government and rebel success make interventions more likely, to which ethnic affinities contribute.

**When the potential intervener favours the rebels**, intervention occurs when

\[ C^i_{\eta} < (p - q)(W^E_{G} + W^E_{R}), \quad (W^E_{G} + W^E_{R}) < 0 \text{ and } (p - q) < 0. \]  \(5\)

Again, any decrease in the value of the left hand side of the expression, *ceteris paribus*, makes intervention more likely, as does any increase in the value of the right hand side, *ceteris paribus*. Since the potential intervener favours the rebels
in this case, the dynamics of the probability and utility terms have changed. Here, the estimated probability of government success with an intervention, \( p \), must be lower than the probability of government success without an intervention, \( q \). This is expected, given that intervention in this case is on the side of the rebels. Hence, intervention becomes more likely as \( q \) increases and as \( p \) decreases. Utility for the intervener lies in rebel success, and as the sum of differences between the utility of government and rebel success sinks further below zero, particularly with the contribution of ethnic affinities, intervention becomes more likely.

*When no ethnic affinities are present,* I leave the side of interventions unspecified. The \( EA \) terms in the expected utility expressions are excluded, and the difference between utilities expressed in its general form, so that \( I \) intervenes in \( T \) when

\[
C^i_R < (p - q)(U^g_R - U^q_R). \tag{6}
\]

The major feature of this expression is the absence of ethnic affinities. Contrast with expression (3). Contemplate how ethnic affinities are conceived to affect the expected utilities of alternative actions. On every side of expression (3) is ethnic affinity an *amplifying factor.* Suppose that the potential intervener favours the government. Then ethnic affinities increase the utility of government success. Remove ethnic affinities, as I here have done, and the utility from favourable outcomes will look blander, and the costs of intervention will appreciate. Ethnic affinities, in other words, make interventions more likely.

The question then arises how one determines where the potential intervener’s sympathies lie. The answer may be derived from the expected utility framework’s binary distinction between government and rebels in the civil war state. I adopt a somewhat analogous categorisation, that is Cederman & Girardin’s (2005: 6, 8) distinction between ‘ethnic groups in power’ (EGIP) and ‘non-governmental ethnic groups’ (NGEG). An ethnic group is in power if its ‘leaders serve (at least intermittently) in senior governmental positions, especially within the cabinet’, or when specific institutional arrangements
indicate power inclusion (Cederman & Girardin 2005: 7). The EGIP / NGEG distinction is useful because it captures the dynamics of collective action in ethnic conflict. Empirical tests lend it support (Cederman & Girardin 2005: 5, 10). The binary disaggregation of states implied by the expected utility functions and the EGIP / NGEG distinction may be combined to produce a world of states containing only two ethnic groups, one of which is in power, and one of which is not. Recall that the unit of analysis is the interstate dyad. Then one deals with the interaction of four ethnic groups. Suppose that transnational ethnic affinities run between one ethnic group in each country. Given that one country is a civil war state, \( T \), and the other a potential intervener, \( I \), then four types of dyad containing ethnic affinities emerge. I will argue in section 2.4 that the type of dyad determines whether the potential intervener favours the government or the rebels. For example, as illustrated in Table 2.1, if the EGIP in \( I \) has affinity with the EGIP in \( T \), then \( I \) is expected to favour the government in \( T \). Cells 1 and 3

Table 2.1: Four dyads with ethnic affinities defined by group affiliation: two sides of intervention.

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indicate the circumstances under which \( (W^{EA} + W^{a}) > 0 \): ethnic affinities run between ethnic groups in power or non-governmental ethnic groups in both countries. Cells 2 and 4 illustrate the contingencies in which an ethnic group in
power has affinity for a non-governmental group in the other country, in which case it is expected that \((W^{EA} + W^g) < 0\).

A fifth type of dyad is of course the pair of states with no transnational ethnic affinities. In such dyads I leave the side of interventions unspecified. Section 2.4 on configurations of ethnicity and power is devoted to analysing the dyad typology.

### 2.3 A Contest Success Function of \(p\) and \(q\)

Interventions are, according to the expected utility approach, contingent on three sorts of variables: costs, utilities, and probabilities. Variation in the utilities and costs of intervention will be addressed in the discussion of the dyad typology. That leaves the probabilities for more thorough treatment. Below, I suggest that states’ estimation of \(p - q\) may be modelled with a contest success function. I approach the question by assuming temporarily that the potential intervener favours the government in the target state.

The outcome of any struggle may be considered as a function of the commitment of forces on each side (Hirshleifer 2000: 773). Every party to a conflict controls a fixed amount of resources at any point in time, of which a greater or lesser proportion may be channelled into fighting effort (Hirshleifer 2000: 775). Other factors will affect the outcome of struggles, but success should either way be some positive function of available resources. I follow Cederman & Girardin (2005: 6) in using the demographic size of groups as a first cut measure of resources. The very high positive correlation between population and capabilities (Hegre 2005: 12) would indicate that demographic size is a good proxy for resources.

The potential intervener needs to estimate the probability of government success \textit{without} an intervention in support, as well as the probability of government success \textit{with} a supportive intervention, in order to determine the difference between \(p\) and \(q\). Recall that, in the interstate dyad \(TI\), both states contain two ethnic groups, one ethnic group in power, and one ethnic group
without central control. Denote the ethnic group in power in state $T$ $G_T$ and the ethnic group not in power $G_t$. Denote the relative sizes of the ethnic groups $s_T$ and $s_t$. Let the population in $I$ relative to the population in $T$ be $s_I$. Then, the potential intervener may estimate $q$ as a function of the ratio of resources controlled by $G_T$ to the total resources controlled by the fighting parties, $G_T$ and $G_t$. Expressed formally,

$$q = f \left[ \frac{\phi(s_T)}{\phi(s_T) + \phi(s_t)} \right].$$

When the potential intervener factors in its own intervention in the estimation of $p$, it adds its own resources to that of the government so that

$$p = f \left[ \frac{\phi(s_T) + \phi(s_I)}{\phi(s_T) + \phi(s_I) + \phi(s_t)} \right].$$

The estimation of $p$ will look somewhat different in cases where $I$ favours the rebels in $T$. Then, the potential intervener adds its resources to those of the rebels and deprives the government of its support. The contest success function (CSF) of $p$ is then

$$p = f \left[ \frac{\phi(s_T)}{\phi(s_T) + \phi(s_t) + \phi(s_I)} \right].$$

The question then becomes what form of the CSF is most appropriate for modelling the estimation of $p$ and $q$. Hirshleifer (2000: 777-779) suggests that the ratio form of the CSF may not be ideal. Arguably, the logistic CSF better captures the perceived returns to greater fighting effort. In the logistic form, the probability of government success with no intervention is expressed as

$$q = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(k(b_{s_T} - b_{TST}))},$$
the probability of government success with an intervention when \( I \) favours the government is

\[
p = \frac{1}{1 + \exp\left(k(b_iS_i - (b_{TST} + b_{SI}))\right)},
\]

and \( p \) when the intervener favours the rebels is

\[
p = \frac{1}{1 + \exp\left(k(b_iS_i + b_{SI} - b_{TST})\right)},
\]

where \( k \) is a ‘decisiveness parameter’, scaling ‘the degree to which a side’s greater fighting effort translates into enhanced battle success’, and \( b_i \) is a ‘measure of per unit-battle effectiveness.’ (Hirshleifer 2000: 775-776)

Assume now that the potential intervener favours the rebels in \( T \). In order to illustrate the advantages of the logistic CSF, Figure 2.1 plots the estimated

\[0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1\]
\[50, 100, 150, 200\]
\[0, 50, 100, 150, 200\]

\( p \) vs. size of \( I \) (% of population in \( T \)).

**Figure 2.1:** Probability of government success when \( I \) intervenes in favour of the rebels.
probability of government success with intervention when \( I \) intervenes on the side of the rebels. For illustration, all measures of battle effectiveness, \( b_r = b_c = b_I = 1 \). The sizes of \( G_r \) and \( G_c \) are taken to be \( s_r = 80\% \) and \( s_c = 10\% \). The decisiveness parameter is set to \( k = 0.04 \).

The logistic CSF has two advantages. First, it models that \( I \) experiences increasing marginal returns to its resources up until it, together with \( G_r \), reaches power parity with \( G_r \). That is, the probability of government success, which the intervener in this case does not favour, decreases at an increasing rate. The end of increasing marginal returns always corresponds to \( p = 0.5 \). The implication is that, as Hirshleifer (2000: 776) puts it, ‘reinforcement [of the rebels] is most welcome when it reverses a force disparity from slight inferiority to slight superiority.’ The decision-makers in \( I \) seem likely to adhere to this perception. A second advantage is that \( p < 1 \) even when \( I \) provides no intervening effort. This reflects that \( q < 1 \). The rebels to which \( I \) has its allegiance will always have some probability of success, even without supportive intervention.

Whether the rebels receive such support, of course, depends amongst others on \( p - q \). Intervention in favour of the rebels is only possible if \( q \) exceeds \( p \), and becomes more likely the greater the difference is. In order to represent this relationship with the relevant CSFs, let the measure of battle effectiveness for \( G_r \) and \( G_c \) be the same, assuming that capabilities are spread evenly across the population of \( T \), so that \( b_r = b_c = 1 \). The battle effectiveness of the intervener needs to be differentiated according to its relative capabilities. If the resources of a conflict party were to be reduced to the size of that party, then fighting effort would solely be a question of demographics. That would ignore the disproportionate economic and military capabilities of several countries, particularly the more wealthy. Let then

\[
b_I = \frac{\text{capabilities}_I}{\text{capabilities}_r}.
\]

Hence, the difference between \( p \) and \( q \) is expressed as
Two major inferences may be drawn from this relationship. First, with expression (5) in mind, intervention is possible only if \( q > p \). This holds per definition because \( I \) adds its own effort to that of the rebels in the denominator of \( p \), thus differentiating \( p \) from \( q \) by reducing its value.

Second, the sole determinant of the difference between \( p \) and \( q \) is the product of the relative capabilities of \( I \) and the relative size of its population. The difference between \( p \) and \( q \) increases as the size of \( I \) relative to the target increases, and as the relative capabilities of \( I \) appreciate. Put differently, large and powerful countries are more likely to intervene, ceteris paribus, because they are more likely to affect decisively the outcome of the internal conflict. It can be shown that, in cases where the intervener favours the government, \( p - q \) is determined by exactly the same factor.

The isolation of \( \frac{\text{capabilities}_I}{\text{capabilities}_T} \times s_I \) as the sole determinant of variation in the probability term of the expected utility function provides an opportunity for empirical testing of this part of the formal model. A composite measure of capabilities and demographic size is to be found in the Correlates of War CINC-score.\(^3\) The statistical analysis will thus test for positive correlation between \( \frac{CINC_I}{CINC_T} \) and the probability of intervention.

So far, I have argued for my choice of a dyadic approach, developed a set of expected utility functions on which to peg the causal arguments, and suggested a contest success function to model the differences between probabilities of government and rebel success. It is time to turn to the possible causal mechanisms. In the following section I present a typology of dyads based on the different possible configurations of ethnicity and power. I deduce how variation in dyadic ethnicity-power patterns may be expected to affect the probability and

\[^3\]The CINC-score is described in section 3.6 on control variables.
direction of interventions, and I discuss the mechanisms by which variation in ethnic domination and diversity may be linked to interventions. The typology of configurations of ethnicity and power serves the dual purpose of organising the discussion of causal mechanisms, and providing an analytical framework for the empirical investigation.

2.4 CONFIGURATIONS OF ETHNICITY AND POWER

Let me first reiterate the derivation of the dyad typology. Suppose that one deals with the generic dyad consisting of state $T$ and state $I$, in which state $T$ experiences internal conflict. State $I$, in other words, is the potential intervener. I assume, first, that either state has two, and only two ethnic groups, of which one is in power and one is not.$^4$ I assume, second, that the ethnic group in power in state $I$ controls the means of coercion and is the potential executor of intervention. Then, dyads are *ethnically biased* if there are transnational ethnic affinities between groups in both states. If one ethnic group in each state has ethnic affinity with one ethnic group in the other state, four possible dyadic configurations of ethnicity and power emerge. I name the four types of ethnically biased dyads the *symmetrical majority dyad*, the *symmetrical minority dyad*, the *asymmetrical majority dyad*, and the *asymmetrical minority dyad*.$^5$ Briefly, in a symmetrical majority dyad the two groups in power are ethnically affiliated. In a symmetrical minority dyad the ethnic group not in power in state $I$ has ethnic ties with its equivalent in state $T$. In an asymmetrical majority dyad ethnic affinities run between the ethnic group in power in state $I$ and the ethnic minority in state $T$, and in an asymmetrical minority dyad the ethnic group not in power in state $I$ has affinity with the ethnic group in power in state $T$. Dyads are *ethnically neutral* if they contain no transnational ethnic affinities. The

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$^4$ I recognise of course that states often have more than two ethnic groups. I assume that there are two groups in each state solely for analytical purposes. The typology should at any rate be applicable to all civil war dyads in the real world.

$^5$ In the dyad typology the terms ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ are short-hand for ‘ethnic group in power’ and ‘non-governmental ethnic group’. Most ethnic groups in power are also the largest ethnic group, but not all (Cederman & Girardin 2005: 20-22).
ethnically neutral dyad is the fifth type of dyad, and will serve as a reference category.

As the following discussion will make clear, I expect that ethnic affinities are linked to the likelihood of intervention by mechanisms that are determined by which configuration of ethnicity and power one has in mind. The analysis will focus on the variation in the likelihood of intervention as well as the likely side of interventions, particularly referring to changes in costs and utilities.

**The asymmetrical majority dyad**

In the asymmetrical majority dyad, the ethnic group in power in state $I$ has ethnic affinity with the non-governmental ethnic group in state $T$, the state with internal conflict (Fig. 2.2).

![Figure 2.2: The asymmetrical majority dyad.](image)

- Ethnic group in power
- Non-governmental ethnic group
- Different ethnic groups
- Civil conflict
- Line of ethnic affinity

**Figure 2.2: The asymmetrical majority dyad.**

The approach most easily applicable to the asymmetrical majority dyad is represented by the contribution of Saideman (2002: 32, 40), who both argues and finds empirical evidence that an ethnic group in internal conflict is more likely to
receive support, *ceteris paribus*, when its ethnic kin is in power in a neighbouring state. In terms of the differences between utilities and probabilities, it is expected that \((W^{E_1} + W^{N}) < 0\) and \((p \cdot q) < 0\). Saideman’s argument also receives conditional support from the empirical work of Davis et al. (1997: 160-161). He follows the logic of rational choice. First, Saideman (2002: 32) assumes that ‘politicians are rational and that they care about gaining and holding office’, second, ‘each politician requires the support of others to gain and maintain political office – the supporters forming the politician’s constituency’, and third, he assumes that ethnic identities influence the preferences of constituencies. Two expectations logically follow. First, a dominant ethnic constituency may pressure its elite to intervene in favour of its ethnic kin in conflict in another country, or second, an ethnic constituency may facilitate such intervention with more or less active acquiescence, either way lowering the audience costs of intervening. Although Saideman (2002: 32) does not state explicitly that the ethnic group receiving support from a third party is not in power, the assumption seems reasonable, given that his concern is with minorities at risk (Saideman 2002: 33). The argument above should therefore be applicable to the asymmetrical majority dyad.

One such dyad was Bosnia and Yugoslavia. The state *T* Bosnia had a minority Serb population for which the majority Serbs in state *I* Yugoslavia had ethnically based affinity. Thus Yugoslavia intervened in favour of the Bosnian Serbs in 1992 (Keylor 1996: 476).

Although the argument thus far has focused on dyadic dynamics, it is also worth asking how the monadic ethnic characteristics of the potential intervener bear on the probability of intervention. I raise this issue because it is the central concern of two writers (Carment & James 1995, 2000) who have gone far to specify the mechanisms by which ethnic interventions may occur. With reference to the potential intervener – state *I* in the asymmetrical majority dyad - Carment & James (1995, 2000) suggest that ethnically dominant states are more likely to intervene than ethnically pluralist states. With regard to the specification of causal mechanisms in a comprehensive theoretical framework, Carment & James (1995, 2000) are important contributions.
Their theoretical advancement for the purposes of the present investigation is two-fold. First, they integrate the elusive concept of ethnic affinities in a rational choice framework by linking affective factors to instrumental calculation. Second, they specify with some care the mechanisms that turn ethnic affinities into incentives for intervention.

First, with regard to the integration of ethnic affinities in a rational choice framework, Carment & James (2000: 176) conceive of affinity as an ‘enabling condition’ that provides the ‘crucial link’ between elite and mass behaviour. When affinity is in the role of an enabling condition, it serves to lower the audience cost of intervention. For example, affinities may be used by elites to manipulate mass sentiment in order to mobilise support for interventionist policies (Carment & James 2000: 176) Thus, there is interaction between affective and instrumental motivations. Further, affinities create both constraints and opportunities. Primordial drives within the elites may provide opportunities, in which case the utility of success from intervention will be high. Alternatively, affinities may create constraints by determining which foreign policy options elites may choose in order to please their ethnic constituency, and in that way lower the audience costs of intervening (Carment & James 2000: 177). In other words, ethnic affinity is a non-material factor with material consequences. By moving and mobilising people, be they among the masses or in the elites, ethnic affinity creates opportunities and constraints that rational leaders may capitalise on or be deterred by.

Second, with regard to the specification of the mechanisms by which ethnic affinity is turned into interventionist incentives, Carment & James give special significance to the degree of dominance by the ethnic group in power in the potential intervener. They coin their two ideal types ‘ethnic domination’ and ‘ethnic diversity’ (Carment & James 2000: 177). Without giving any clear operational criteria, they consider ethnic domination to exist when ‘a single group claims control over the decision process on issues concerning other groups’, and when ‘leaders can improve the standing of their own ethnic group without depending on others’ (Carment & James 2000: 177). A state is ethnically diverse when those conditions are not met. Carment & James’ usage of the terms
‘domination’ and ‘diversity’ distracts somewhat from the contrasting concepts they represent. ‘Ethnic domination’ is useful because it connotes political predominance by the ethnic group in power. ‘Ethnic diversity’ is misleading because it suggests that states with many ethnic groups are less likely to have a predominant ethnic group in power. The decisive issue for Carment & James, however, is not how many ethnic groups share territorial unity, but how well they weigh in on the political process and limit domination by one ethnic group. Thus Russia is defined as ‘ethnically dominant’ even when it has five ethnic groups according to Fearon’s (2003) list, whereas the United Kingdom is ‘ethnically diverse’ even if its number of ethnic groups is in the same order of size as Russia (seven, according to Fearon’s (2003) data) (Carment & James 2000: 190, 191). I substitute the term ‘ethnic pluralism’ for Carment & James’ ‘ethnic diversity’ in order to draw attention to the decisive dimension of representation rather than diversity. According to Carment & James, states dominated by one ethnic group are more likely to intervene in ethnic conflicts than ethnically pluralist states, _ceteris paribus_. The hypothesised mechanisms are as follows.

_In a potential intervener with ethnic domination_, institutional mechanisms for inter-ethnic conflict management may be underdeveloped. There may in other words be no culture for compromise on ethnic issues. As a consequence, ethnic issues in the foreign policy domain, such as internal conflicts in other states involving ethnic groups for which one has affinity, become particularly important. Under such conditions, an elite that seeks support and legitimacy in its own dominant ethnic group may estimate that the utility of employing successful ethnically directed interventionist policies is higher. Also, the elite may frame interventionist policies in ethnic terms in order to lower the costs of intervening by mobilising support from the masses, or public pressure may have the same effect (Carment & James 2000: 177). In cases where a dominant ethnic group controls an ethnically homogenous military, group symbols may be manipulated in order to mobilise the population. Ethnic issues are often portrayed as redistributive, that is, to the benefit of the dominant ethnic group. Interventions are less costly and ethnically oriented foreign policies become more likely (Carment & James 2000: 181). Another mechanism of ethnically dominant
militarism concerns countries with higher institutional constraints. A constituency consisting of a dominant ethnic group that transcends national borders may induce political parties, including the governing party, to outbid each other with increasingly aggressive ethnic foreign policies, increasing the utility of successful intervention, thereby leading to a heightened likelihood of intervention (Carment & James 2000: 183).

This theme of ‘ethnic outbidding’ (Lake & Rothchild 1996: 54) among political entrepreneurs, and their precursors – the ethnic activists – is taken up by both Suhrke & Noble (1977: 12-13) and Lake & Rothchild (1996: 53-54). Lake & Rothchild (1996: 53-54) quite clearly highlight ethnic activism and political entrepreneurship as factors that may increase the salience (read utility) of ethnic politics and the likelihood of intervening in ethnic conflicts. They emphasise the role of ethnic activists in the context of social polarisation (Lake & Rothchild 1996: 53), but there is every reason to believe that such activists in general would increase the salience of ethnicity in politics, inclusive of foreign policy, lower the audience costs of, for example, intervening in an internal conflict to the advantage of ethnic brethren, and simultaneously increase the utility of successful intervention. Political entrepreneurs may likewise put pressure on the political community to adopt ethnic policies by using ethnicity as a ‘key marker’ in order to ‘build constituencies for attaining or maintaining political power.’ (Lake & Rothchild 1996: 54) Moderate politicians may feel forced to adopt a stronger ethnically based position, engaging in a form of ‘ethnic outbidding’ (ibid.). Ethnic policies become more important, including foreign policies, and ethnically motivated third-party interventions become more likely.

**In a potential intervener with ethnic pluralism,** ethnically based support may provide an insufficient constituency for the policy-making elites (Carment & James 2000: 178). Issues exclusive to one ethnic group may only give small political dividends. Also, the audience costs of intervening are potentially much higher. An ethnic foreign policy is risky because it may split a ruling elite when it is ethnically mixed, or divide government and military when they are controlled by different ethnic groups (Carment & James 2000: 182). Elites will have incentives to downplay ethnicity as a source of foreign policy in order to
avoid factional conflict and loss of consensus over foreign policy (Carment & James 2000: 183). Support must be based on identities that cut across ethnic cleavages. As a consequence, ethnically motivated interventions are less likely (Carment & James 2000: 178).

I leave the analysis of the asymmetrical majority dyad by noting first, that one may expect ethnic groups in power to intervene in favour of their self-entrusted ethnic minorities elsewhere, and second, that the likelihood of intervention may be tempered by the relative ethnic dominance in the potential intervener. My hypotheses will reflect these conclusions.

**The symmetrical minority dyad**

In the symmetrical minority dyad, the non-governmental ethnic group in state $I$ has ethnic affinity for its equivalent in state $T$ (Fig. 2.3).

![Figure 2.3: The symmetrical minority dyad.](image)

The dynamics of the symmetrical minority dyad are suggested by Suhrke & Noble (1977: 11), who deduce the possibility of governments cooperating (or for present purposes, one government intervening in favour of another) over similar ethnic problems, such as similar ethnic minorities seeking independence. Thus, in the symmetrical minority dyad, I expect that $\left(W^E + W^q \right) > 0$ and $(p-q) > 0$. Consider the scenario. State $T$ experiences an internal conflict involving secessionist claims from an ethnic group not in power. Suffice *secession* to be defined inclusively as ‘an attempt by an ethnic group claiming a homeland to
withdraw with its territory from the authority of a larger state of which it is a part.’ (Horowitz 1991: 9-10) In this scenario, the secessionist group is in reality part of a stateless nation divided into ethnic minorities by several states, whose territorial integrity is threatened by the stateless nation’s actual or potential irredentist claims. I use the term *irredentism* to refer to ‘any political effort to unite ethnically, historically, or geographically related segments of a population in adjacent countries within a common political framework.’ (Chazan 1991: 1)

The dynamic is present in the Kurdish minorities’ relations with their host states. A secessionist conflict in state $T$, particularly one that threatens to be successful for the rebel group, is evidently then a material threat to the cohesion of state $I$, whose elite, whatever ethnicity, has strong incentives to intervene in favour of the ethnic group in power in state $T$. Put in terms of the expected utility framework, a state fearing for its integrity as a result of a neighbouring internal conflict would perceive a soaring difference between the utilities of government and rebel success in the civil war state.

Recall, for example, the introductory case of the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka. The state $I$ India intervened in favour of the status quo, and by implication the government in state $T$ Sri Lanka in 1987 (Cooper & Berdal 1993: 123-124). India could not let the Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka successfully secede due to concern for secessionist ambitions in its own Tamil minority.

**The symmetrical majority dyad**

In the symmetrical majority dyad, the ethnic group in power in state $I$ has affinity for its counterpart in state $T$(Fig. 2.4).

The scenarios that I have discussed so far - the asymmetrical majority dyad and the symmetrical minority dyad - represent the most easily argued cases of likely intervention, at least in terms of costs and utilities. In the scenario to be discussed now - the symmetrical majority dyad - transnational ethnic affinity runs between the two ethnic groups in power. The concerned ethnic group in state $T$ is presumably quite powerful, given that it archetypically controls the means of coercion, and so should be less likely to attract the material support of
its ethnic trustees in state $I$. Still, rebel forces may be very effective battle ground actors, and so one should either way expect Saideman’s (2002: 32) logic to apply, as described above. State $I$, in other words, may find itself in a position where ethnic affinity compels it to intervene in state $T$ in favour of the ethnic group in power. Public pressure may lower the audience costs of intervening, at the same time as the perceived difference between the utilities of government and rebel success is greater. As in the symmetrical minority dyad, $(W^{E} + W^{g}) > 0$ and $(p \cdot q) > 0$.

The state $T$ Cyprus and the state $I$ Greece are an example of a symmetrical majority dyad. In one of several instances, Greece intervened in favour of the majority Greek Cypriots in 1974, in the ethnic conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots (Cooper & Berdal 1993: 120).

Thinking about the symmetrical majority dyad provides an opportunity to present a complimentary argument to Carment & James’ (2000) above. They expect an ethnically dominant state $I$ to be more likely to intervene than the ethnically pluralist variety, and their argument may be applied to symmetrical majority dyads as well as asymmetrical majority dyads. Whereas Carment & James’ argument does not concern ethnic diversity as such, Suhrke & Noble (1977: 13-14) address the effect of multiethnicity directly, and their thinking is most easily applied to the symmetrical majority dyad. In their mainly deductive treatment of the question, they suggest that multiethnic states should be expected to be more likely to intervene than more homogenous countries (Suhrke

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**Figure 2.4: The symmetrical majority dyad.**

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& Noble 1977: 14). They provide no definition of multiethnicity. Let 
multiethnicity be a positive function of the number of ethnic groups in a state.

Suhrke & Noble (1977: 14) propose that there are strong incentives to 
intervene in internal conflicts on grounds of, amongst others, ethnic kinship ties, 
even if one is a multiethnic state, indeed, as a consequence of being a multiethnic 
state. Given that a neighbouring multiethnic state experiences internal conflict, 
other multiethnic states may perceive an increased utility of successfully 
intervening in favour of the government in conflict in order to ‘establish the 
normative validity of the multiethnic state’ (Suhrke & Noble 1977: 13-14). As 
they put it,

‘a government may be distressed by the ideological precedent posed by a conflict 
elsewhere (that is, it may regard the conflict as a challenge to the principle of 
multiethnicity as a basis for the state structure). This distress may be reinforced by 
ethnic kinship ties, if ethnic kin are dominant in the other state and/or would suffer 
from a weakening of central authority there. Under these circumstances the 
government has strong incentives to intervene in a partisan fashion to restore the 
status quo.’ (Suhrke & Noble 1977: 14)

Although I sympathise with Suhrke & Noble’s (1977: 13-14) conclusion – 
that ethnically diverse states may intervene in other multiethnic states in order 
to safeguard their integrity – I am puzzled by their emphasis on normative 
validity and ideology. It seems somewhat contradictory that a reference to 
ideology shares a paragraph with a reference to concern for weakening political 
power. A pure instrumentally rationalist argument would be more consistent and 
do at least as well: multiethnic states, rather than worrying too much about their 
normative validity, are more interested in maintaining their territorial integrity. 
If nearby internal conflicts have the possibility of rebel success, and if a 
government for which they have ethnic affinity stands to lose their position, then 
neighbouring multiethnic states may have strong incentives to intervene only to 
avert the risk of unravelling themselves. That is, the difference between the 
utility of government and rebel success would be significantly increased. From 
such a more stringent instrumentally rationalist approach, the empirical
expectation is Suhrke & Noble’s proposal in a nutshell: multiethnic states may be quite likely to intervene in internal conflicts, precisely because of their multiethnicity.

Multiethnicity and ethnic domination are not mutually exclusive. In fact, Suhrke & Noble’s (1977: 14) reference to the centrality of ethnic ties in the government’s decision to intervene, combined with Carment & James’ (2000: 182-183) argument that ethnic affinities are downplayed in the foreign policy-making of ethnically pluralist states, suggests that states that are both ethnically dominant and multiethnic are the most likely to intervene. In Chapter 3 I develop a measure of ethnic domination that is both a positive function of the relative size of the ethnic group in power, and a positive function of the number of ethnic groups, thus enabling the empirical testing of Carment & James and Suhrke & Noble’s hypotheses.

**The asymmetrical minority dyad**

In the asymmetrical minority dyad, the non-governmental ethnic group in state $I$ has ethnic affinity with the ethnic group in power in the conflict-ridden state, state $T$ (Fig. 2.5).

![Figure 2.5: The asymmetrical minority dyad.](image)

It is least clear how ethnic affinities may be linked to third-party intervention in the asymmetrical minority dyad. The most plausible scenario may be the following. An offshoot of the internal conflict in state $T$ is that its ethnic
group in power embarks on an irredentist campaign. Given that a minority which resides in state $I$ shares ethnic identity with the group in power in $T$, the territorial integrity of $I$ is threatened as a consequence of the irredentist policies of $T$. State $I$ cannot remain indifferent to such a challenge. Among the ways in which $I$ can neutralise the threat from state $T$ is an intervention within $T$ targeted against the group in power, designed to divert the resources of state $T$ away from irredentism and to the campaign at home. In other words $(W^{E_A} + W^{g}) < 0$ and $(p - q) < 0$, precisely as in the other asymmetrical dyad, and the difference between the utilities of rebel and government success would be great. Such a causal story is logically plausible, yet depends on a number of conditions suggesting that the asymmetrical minority dyad, generally, is the scenario in which intervention is least likely to occur.

**The ethnically neutral dyad**

The ethnically neutral dyad contains an internal conflict, but has no groups with transnational ethnic affinities (Fig. 2.6).

![Figure 2.6: The ethnically neutral dyad.](image_url)

The mechanisms linking ethnic affinities to third-party interventions are not expected to apply to this dyad. One must turn to the control variables in order to explain interventions within ethnically neutral dyads. I define it here in order to have a baseline against which to compare the ethnically biased dyads.
2.5 HYPOTHESES

The discussion of the typology of ethnically biased dyads, be they signified by symmetry or asymmetry, minority or majority, spawns a set of hypotheses of greater and lesser generality that may serve as direction-givers for the empirical investigation.

First, one may deduce a general hypothesis from the distinction between ethnically neutral and ethnically biased dyads:

\[ H_1: \] Intervention is more likely to occur in ethnically biased dyads than in ethnically neutral dyads, \textit{ceteris paribus}.

Second, the typology of ethnically biased dyads suggests particular hypotheses on the side of interventions:

\[ H_2: \] In the symmetrical dyads state \( I \) is more likely to intervene in favour of the government in state \( T \) than the rebels, \textit{ceteris paribus}.

\[ H_3: \] In the asymmetrical dyads state \( I \) is more likely to intervene in favour of the rebels in state \( T \) than the government, \textit{ceteris paribus}.

Third, the discussion of the contest success function in relation to the estimation of the difference between \( p \) and \( q \) suggests that the following be tested:
H₄: The likelihood of intervention is positively associated with the ratio of capabilities between I and T.

Finally, in the discussion of the majority dyads – the asymmetrical majority dyad and the symmetrical majority dyad – hypotheses on the monadic characteristics of the potential intervener were presented. I test empirically:

H₅: Ethnically dominant states are more likely to intervene in internal conflicts than ethnically pluralist states, ceteris paribus.
I intend to test the hypotheses using statistical modelling of a dataset with some reach in space and time. In order to study effects on the occurrence of interventions I use logistical regression. The hypotheses on the side of interventions are tested with table analysis and multinomial logistic regression. In this section I elaborate on my choice of modelling techniques, present the data design, discuss my coding of the ethnicity variables, and derive a set of control variables. First, however, a word or two is in order about the approach to research of which this inquiry is an incarnation.

3.1 COUNTING VERSUS READING

Having presented in brief the model to be applied in this investigation, it is worth taking a step back in order to see and discuss the possibilities, but also the limitations inherent in such a research design. Crassly put, why is the emphasis on counting rather than reading? Being mindful of what statistical modelling can and cannot do will aid in the even-handed reflection on what the empirical analysis does and does not tell us. However, before dealing with my choice of methods, I will briefly note the range of choices made prior to the vexing counting-versus-reading conundrum. The following comments on epistemology are intended as a declaration of my approach to research, and are not subjected to discussion.

Of the myriad of approaches to International Relations research, I take as a given that this is 1) an epistemologically empiricist and positivist, 2) a rational
choice social-theoretic, and 3) a problem-solving approach to the question of ethnicity and intervention. First, it is epistemologically empiricist in the sense that the scientism of enquiry relies entirely on empirical validation or falsification (Smith 1996: 16). It is epistemologically positivist for its use of deductive reasoning, the assumed scientism of its empirical verificationism, the implicit assumption that observations are theoretically neutral, and for its reliance on the Humean theory of causation – that demonstration of causation follows from the discovery of correlation (Smith 1996: 15).

Second, its social-theoretic approach is rational choice in the sense that interests are exogenous to the causal reasoning, and collective outcomes are explained in terms of ‘individual goal-seeking under constraints.’ (Snidal 2002: 74; italics in original.) That is, actors are assumed to choose the course of action that involves the least costs and the greatest benefits, given a set of interests.

Third, the type of theory is ‘problem-solving’ theory in the sense that the approach simply seeks to explain an empirical phenomenon which it takes as is. It does not question normatively the workings of social relations, ‘it [merely] seeks to know that which exists at present.’ (Jackson & Sørensen 2003: 248)

I will not discuss the relative merits of any of these delimitations. Within those perimeters, however, I have made the choice of employing a quantitative approach using statistical modelling of extensive data instead of approaching the question qualitatively using in-depth data, typically with a comparative case study of some sort or another. Given that this is a piece of positivist, problem-solving research, that choice is not a principled choice. It is a strategic choice. I share Grønmo’s (1996: 75) opinion that qualitative and quantitative approaches, in principle, are not in a competing relationship, but in a complimentary one. Neither approach is better or more scientific than the other (Grønmo 1996: 75). Indeed, given a positivist epistemology, the logic underlying a quantitative approach and a qualitative comparative approach is exactly the same (King et al. 1994: 3). Explanatory variables are isolated and analysed by means of controlling for variation in other variables, be it statistical control in the case of statistical modelling or analytical control in comparative case studies. The science in social science is derived from the quality of design, not the type of data it analyses –
quantitative or qualitative (King et al. 1994: 7). They are only different in style (King et al. 1994: 4). The choice, then, between one style or the other should only be made with reference to the research question, as should all methodological discussion (Grønmo 1996: 75). Keeping my research question in mind, I will discuss the gain from choosing statistical modelling, as well as the loss from excluding case-specific insights from the research design.

In the most general form I ask ‘why do states intervene in internal conflicts?’, implicitly asking ‘what are the causes of third-party interventions in internal conflicts?’ Given the ‘why’-form of the question, given that I do not ask ‘by what causal mechanisms?’ and given my reliance on the Humean theory of causation, it seems sensible to choose a research design that facilitates generalisation about statistical correlations that are valid for as extensive a universe as possible. That is precisely what statistical modelling can do. As Cederman & Girardin (2005: 1) put it, ‘econometrics allows us to draw systematic and precise inference about a large number of cases, provided the underlying causal “story” remains stable throughout the population.’ This investigation solves the question of stability in the causal narrative by assuming that any significant correlation is likely to conform to the causal mechanisms derived by deductive logic. The causal story as such is not empirically investigated. The emphasis is on correlation. That being said, and as Cederman & Girardin do point out (2005: 1), statistical modelling offers the possibility to generalise across a large number of cases. Indeed, the entire universe of cases considered relevant may be included in a statistical model. In contrast, although generalisation based on the investigation of one or a few cases is quite possible (Andersen 1997: 16), the extent of such inference is severely limited by the restricted spatio-temporal domain of validity associated with comparative case studies.

Aside from the generality of inference, statistical modelling has the advantage of making possible the comparison of the relative sizes of effects. Statistical software will report the size of partial effects, indicate multi-causality, and test for interaction between variables. As such it is very precise. Hypothesis-testing techniques will even estimate how precise one’s inference may be. As Andersen (1997: 92) points out, case studies cannot do any of this. Instead, case
studies may be prone to infer deterministically rather than probabilistically. They are unable to uncover either interaction or multi-causality.

It is also worth noting that statistical modelling has its own way of dealing with cases that deviate from theoretically determined empirical expectations. Whereas single test cases that do not conform to the empirical expectations of general theories easily are cited as disproof of such theories, or more moderately, as significantly weakening such theories, deviant cases in statistical models are regarded as unexplained variance. Such residual variance does not necessarily invalidate the model, but merely indicates that there are causes of the observed phenomenon that either are unknown or that apply to only one or a few cases.

For all the possibilities inherent in a quantitative approach, there are significant limitations that must be kept in mind, particularly when interpreting and discussing the output of the statistical analyses. International Relations scholars with a quantitative bias would do well to remember that statistical models cannot uncover causal mechanisms – least of all empirically demonstrate them. Hypotheses about causation may be strengthened. Strong associations may suggest that some causal mechanism is present. Demonstrating the temporal priority of changes may plausibly establish causal direction (Stinchcombe 1968: 34). The confirmation of empirical expectations by the deductive-nomological logic (Smith 1996: 15) will lend weight to general laws about causation. Still, the actual uncovering of causal mechanisms is the domain of process-tracing case studies. Quantitative work is and will be correlational.

Implicit in this limitation is the inability of statistical models to convey the richness of historical material, the nuance afforded by details, and the uniqueness of cases. Case studies are typically appropriate for this, conventionally understood as single case or small-N comparisons, focusing on the social and historical complexities of associations (Andersen 1997: 19).

The extent of inference from statistical analyses may be even further impaired by the challenges of measurement associated with quantitative data. Although data collection is no priority in this investigation, it is worth noting that procedures for data collection may not register all relevant data, neither may categories and typologies work as intended (Grønmo 1996: 82). Such
limitations will impair the measurement validity of the data. Even if statistical inference facilitates precise interpretation, the conclusions can only be valid for the variables as they are operationalised. Depending on the level of measurement validity, one may thereby ask how relevant such interpretation is (Grønmo 1996: 83). Data may be numerical, but be lacking in depth (ibid.). So may interpretations.

By locating this inquiry on the epistemological and social-theoretic map, and by highlighting some of the opportunities and limitations inherent in my methodological priorities, the intention has been to recognise the diversity of approaches to International Relations, as well as laying the foundation for a fair - if sober – discussion of the empirical findings. In the meantime, my statistical model requires some more attention.

3.2 THE STATISTICAL MODEL

The choice of logistical regression for studying effects on the occurrence of interventions is natural given that the dependent variable is categorical and binary. Either an intervention occurred or it did not. The unit of observation is the interstate dyad in which one country is in civil conflict. The inquiry is then quite simply designed to investigate whether dyads in which intervention occurs differ systematically from dyads in which no intervention takes place. I test the hypotheses on the side of interventions with simple bivariate table analysis and multinomial logistic regression. The table analysis provides a quick test of the association between dyad symmetry and intervention side. The multinomial logistic regression both replicates the table analysis and controls for possible confounding variables.

The estimation of parameters and standard errors in logistical regression is based on binomial or multinomial sampling models that assume independence between units of observation (Helland 1999: 23; Agresti 1996: 7-8). The present data set may violate this assumption. As indicated in the introduction, more than one intervention occurred in several civil conflicts. Indeed, the 79 interventions recorded in the data were distributed on a mere 41 conflicts. Twenty-two of those
conflicts experienced 2 – 5 interventions. The decision by one state to intervene most likely influences the choices of other states. Hence, both interventions and non-interventions within the same conflict must be expected to depend on each other. I compensate for this by using the Huber-White estimator of variance, often referred to as a robust estimator of variance (Stata User's Guide 2005: 275). I cluster the estimation of robust standard errors by civil conflict, based on the assumption that each conflict gives rise to a unique set of contingencies so that interventions or non-interventions in different conflicts may be treated as independent of each other.

With regard to the estimation of coefficients, the choice of regular maximum likelihood logistical regression estimation is not uncontroversial. King & Zeng (2001: 703-705) argue that applications of logistical regression to the study of rare events are typically prone to two misrepresentations: they generate biased coefficients and underestimated probabilities, and their methods of calculating probabilities lead to additional errors. Interventions are rare events. In the present data, interventions occur in less than 2 percent of the dyads. When I nonetheless choose to proceed with logistical regression instead of using King & Zeng’s (2001: 702) ‘ReLogit’ computation, I do so, observing that the difference in approaches is somewhat irrelevant to my purposes. ReLogit is argued to calculate probabilities as well as relative changes in probabilities with greater accuracy than logistical regression. That may be, but I am hesitant to put primary analytical emphasis on the calculation of absolute probabilities or the effects on probabilities of single variables. Flaws in measurement validity and the historical contingency of samples are sufficient sources of uncertainty to suggest that the analysis of estimated probabilities is a perilous exercise. More faith may be put in interpreting the signs of coefficients and comparing effects between variables based on odds ratios. Nothing in King & Zeng (2001) suggests that such mild scepticism of the accuracy of statistical inference justifies the extra effort to employ ReLogit.
3.3 DATA

The backbone of the data is the interventions data set analysed in Lemke & Regan (2004). To that I have added ethnicity variables, as well as data on capabilities, geographical proximity, and a macroeconomic indicator. I adopt Lemke & Regan’s (2004: 155) data design, whose unit of analysis is the civil war dyad. Each civil war country paired with each other country in the international system is thus taken as one observation, irrespective of how long the internal conflict has lasted, or whether it is ongoing. The data set includes all internal conflicts that began between 1944 and 1994, beginning with the Greek civil war, 1944 - 1949, and ending with the conflict over Chechnya, 1994 and ongoing (Regan 2000: 153-158). Below, I present the dependent variables, the ethnicity variables, and the control variables in turn.

3.4 DEPENDENT VARIABLES

As indicated by the set of hypotheses, two dependent variables are to be analysed: the occurrence of intervention and the side of intervention.

**Intervention**

Conceptually, interventions are cases in which states mobilise significant resources in order to influence the course and outcome of civil conflicts (Regan 2000: 9). Indeed, much of my discussion has been devoted to suggest circumstances under which states would be willing to mobilise such resources. The operational art is in distinguishing cases of real intervention from mere attempts at influence (ibid.). The decisive two criteria are that interventions break with the conventions of international relations, and that they are designed to change or preserve the authority structures in the target state (ibid.). Accordingly, Regan (2000: 10) register as interventions ‘convention-breaking military and / or economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government and opposition forces.’
‘Intervention’ is a dichotomous variable in the Lemke & Regan data set, indicating whether \( I \) intervened in \( T \) within a civil war dyad.

**Side of intervention**

Another central concern with this investigation is whether states intervene in favour of the government or the rebels. For that purpose, the Lemke & Regan data set contains two dummy variables, one indicating whether interventions favoured the government, the other on whether interventions favoured the opposition. One of 79 interventions favoured neither.

### 3.5 ETHNICITY VARIABLES

When explaining the incidence and side of interventions, the preoccupation here, of course, is with the possible effects of various configurations of ethnicity. The set of hypotheses suggests that three central dimensions be measured: the existence of transnational ethnic affinities, the type of dyad if such affinities are present, and the ethnic domination in potential interveners.

**Ethnically biased dyad**

The question of transnational ethnic affinities is in distinguishing ethnically biased dyads from those that are ethnically neutral. I operationalise ethnically biased dyads as dyads in which members of the same ethnic group reside in both states. This is an operational short-hand for the theoretical definition of transnational ethnic affinities, that nonetheless has had some usage (Davis et al. 1997: 157; Davis & Moore 1997: 176; Saideman 2002: 37), but that has some very clear limitations in terms of measurement validity. As I will elaborate on in the discussion of the results, this operationalisation implicitly assumes that transnational bonds between similar ethnic groups are politically relevant, and that transnational ethnic affinities only exist between groups with the same ethnic identity. Both assumptions are dubious. The resort to such an operationalisation is a pragmatic response to two factors: the meagre offerings of ready cross-sectional data on ethnicity, and the recognition that, as a short-hand,
the identification of similar ethnic groups does provide a rough measure of transnational ethnic affinities.

I code as *ethnically biased dyad* pairs of states containing groups with the same ethnic identity according to Fearon’s (2003) list of ethnic groups. In order to refine the measure somewhat, dyads in which the same ethnic group in both countries was part of a diaspora when neither country was the homeland were excluded. Thus Malaysia and Mongolia, for instance, were not coded as an ethnically biased dyad, even if both countries have a Chinese population. This move was based on the assumption that transnational ethnic affinities within diasporas, excluding relations with the home country, are of no political relevance. Intra-diaspora transnational relations run mainly between home countries and areas of settlement (Van Hear 2002: 234-235), and diaspora cultures are as a rule not irredentist or separatist (Clifford 1994: 307-308). I treat the Romanies as a diaspora even if they have no contemporary home state (Chaliand & Rageau 1995: 96-110). The variable *ethnically biased dyad* is a dummy indicating whether dyads are ethnically biased or not.

**Ethnic domination in potential intervener**

The operational guidelines for measuring ethnic domination are derived from Carment & James (2000). Ethnic domination exists, they suggest, when ‘a single group claims control over the decision process on issues concerning other groups’, and when ‘leaders can improve the standing of their own ethnic group without depending on others’ (Carment & James 2000: 177). At issue, it seems, is the relative predominance of the ethnic group in power. What degree of sovereignty does it enjoy? Predominance should be a positive function of size. Larger groups should have more power than smaller groups, *ceteris paribus*. But size is not all. Ethnic domination should also be contingent on the dynamics of ethnic politics. Other ethnic groups may be in a position to rein in a potentially dominant ethnic group in power. A united opposition should limit ethnic domination, whereas fractionalised ethnic politics may facilitate the predominance of one ethnic group. Ethnic domination should therefore also be a positive function of the number of
I operationalise *ethnic domination* as the product of the relative size of the ethnic group in power and the number of ethnic groups,

\[ \text{EGIP}_{\text{size}_i \times n_i}, \]

where both relative size and number of ethnic groups are taken from Fearon’s (2003) data.

**Dyad type**

I have argued that one may explain the side of interventions by differentiating between different types of ethnically biased dyads. In order to categorise the ethnically biased dyads according to configurations of ethnic groups and power, I rely on Cederman & Girardin’s (2005) identification of ethnic groups in power (EGIP), based on Fearon’s (2003) list of ethnic groups. The variable *dyad type* is disaggregated into four dummy variables, each indicating whether a dyad is a *symmetrical majority*, *symmetrical minority*, *asymmetrical majority*, or an *asymmetrical minority dyad*. Considering that Hypotheses 2 and 3 on the side of interventions primarily hinge on the symmetry or asymmetry of ethnically biased dyads, the *dyad type* dummy variables are also aggregated into two dichotomous variables indicating whether a dyad is *symmetrical* or *asymmetrical*. Thus, the symmetrical minority dyad Sri Lanka / India and the symmetrical majority dyad Cyprus / Greece, for example, are both coded as ‘1’ for *symmetrical*, because they both are expected to experience intervention in favour of the government. Indeed, they both did. When coding dyad types, some dyads were clearly ambiguous in that they could be coded within two or three of the categories. The dyad *TI* Bosnia / Yugoslavia, for example, was coded as ethnically biased with reference to both Serbs and Muslims, and could accordingly be categorised as both asymmetrical majority and asymmetrical minority. In such cases I have chosen one dyad type over the other by determining which ethnic group was most salient for relations between the two states. Bosnia / Yugoslavia is coded as an asymmetrical majority dyad because the minority Serbs in Bosnia and their campaign for power is considered to have been decisive for Yugoslavia’s
intervention in Bosnia. An overview of the remaining ambiguous dyads and their resolution is provided in the appendix.

The reliance on Cederman & Girardin’s coding of EGIP for determining dyad types imposes certain spatial limitations on the data set. Theirs is a work in progress, and at present the coding of EGIP is limited to North Africa, Europe and Asia. That is, the Americas, Oceania, and sub-Saharan Africa are excluded. Lemke & Regan’s (2004) data set of 19,533 civil war dyads is thus reduced to 4,336 dyads. From having encompassed 138 civil conflicts and 187 interventions, the corresponding frequencies are now 69 and 79. Note, however, that the relative drop in numbers of civil conflicts and interventions (50% and 58%) is not as great as the relative drop in the number of dyads (78%). I choose to proceed with the empirical analyses within this restricted spatial domain, recognising that the theoretical harvest from identifying ethnic groups in power is sufficient to preclude discarding the data, and registering that the number of conflicts and interventions still enables some statistical inference. Also, it is not apparent that the inquiry’s regional selectivity significantly impairs its external validity.\textsuperscript{6} Table 3.1 summarises some descriptive statistics on the data set.

\section{CONTROL VARIABLES}

The primary purpose of this investigation is to study variation in the probabilities of intervention and intervention sides in civil conflicts. Some of that variation may be accounted for by ethnic affinities, and that will be tested on the data. Whether ethnic affinities have significant effects or not, other variables most certainly explain much variation in the probability of interventions and their sides. These must be included in any model of intervention worth its claim to explanatory power. In more technical terms, it is necessary to include a set of control variables in order to disaggregate correlations into partial components. Only that way may the variance – however minute – accounted for by ethnic

\textsuperscript{6} The exclusion of Latin America, for example, should not be a great problem due to the large number of non-ethnic conflicts there (Cederman & Girardin 2005: 10n). If one included sub-Saharan Africa, one should only expect to strengthen any findings on ethnicity variables due to the salience of ethnic politics in the region (Horowitz 1985: 6).
Table 3.1: Summary statistics on the data set, absolute frequencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dyadic statistics</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dyads</td>
<td>4336</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnically biased dyads</td>
<td>382</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symmetrical majority dyads</td>
<td>108</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sum of symmetrical dyads: 141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symmetrical minority dyads</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetrical majority dyads</td>
<td>102</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sum of asymmetrical dyads: 241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetrical minority dyads</td>
<td>139</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict statistics</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflicts</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflicts with interventions</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interventions</td>
<td>79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. interventions per conflict</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max. interventions per conflict</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

affinity, be extracted from the empirical noise made by the data.

In the following I present a list of ten control variables. Some argue that such inflationary control variable practices are methodically reckless and substantively meaningless. Ray (2003: 21) and Achen (2004: 17), for example, agree that multivariate analyses ought to have no more than three explanatory factors. Ray’s (2003: 16-17) argument turns on the need to limit the number of independent variables in order to better specify the causal linkages between them. Achen’s (2004: 6, 17) preoccupation is with the use and misuse of monotonicity as a proxy for linearity, and the need for a return to the careful inspection of data using graphical analyses, partial regression plots, and non-linear fitting. They both offer timely textbook criticism of many scholars’ disregard of basic preconditions for statistical modelling: the specification of interrelationships between independent variables, and the investigation of the
functional form of correlations. I choose to employ a larger set of control variables because the purpose of my analysis is different from the sorts of analyses addressed by Ray and Achen. My purpose is not to study the causal links between explanatory factors in their direct, indirect, or spurious forms. My purpose, rather, is to test whether ethnicity variables explain additional variance after controlling for variables that already are established as having effects on the likelihood of intervention. To that end, a full set of explanatory factors is needed.

Opportunity and willingness

The independent variables address two different aspects of the choice to intervene: the opportunity to intervene, and – given the opportunity – the willingness to intervene (Starr 1978: 364, 376). Distinguishing between the two is important in order to understand why interventions are such rare events. Of the 4336 dyads in the data only 79 experience an intervention. That is less than 2 percent. Given that I seek to explain variation in the incidence of interventions, then non-interventions are in a sense as interesting as interventions. Prediction is complicated, however, by the fact that there are two classes of states that do not intervene, those that consider intervention but choose not to, and those for whom intervention is not even an option (Lemke & Regan 2004: 152). The line between the two may run between states with the opportunity to intervene and those without such opportunity. It is reasonable to infer that states with opportunity should be separated from the lot before the choice to intervene is fairly assessed, but efforts to create samples based on a dichotomous conception of opportunity have created major selection bias (Clark & Regan 2003: 97). Such bias stems from the fact that the factors that determine opportunity also affect the willingness to engage in conflict (Clark & Regan 2003: 98; Siverson & Starr 1991: 25). It is better then to treat all states as potential interveners, and include the determinants of opportunity in the model. That would allow for the intuition that opportunity is continuous, something states have to a greater or lesser
extent (Clark & Regan 2003: 101; Siverson & Starr 1991: 24). As has been widely practiced, I model opportunity as a function of geographic proximity and power (Clark & Regan 2003: 100; Starr 1978: 368). The willingness to intervene is primarily thought of in terms of the ethnicity variables as well as the set of control variables.

I have selected the control variables among those found to have significant effects in three different studies of third-party interventions in internal conflicts: Regan (1998), Pickering (2002), and Lemke & Regan (2004). They all investigate empirically why states intervene in internal conflicts, albeit with somewhat differing emphases. Derived from these studies and the discussion of opportunity and willingness, the following variables suggest themselves as candidates for statistical control.

**Power asymmetry**

The *absolute* capabilities of the potential intervener should be directly related to its opportunity to intervene. In other words, capabilities are expected to determine which class of states that truly can contemplate intervention, and the group of states for which intervention is no option. The capabilities of a potential intervener indicate its ability to project power (Boulding 1962 / 1988: 231). Consequently, one should expect the likelihood of intervention to be directly proportional to the capabilities of state $I$.

On the other hand, the *relative* capabilities of the potential intervener should be directly related to its willingness to intervene. Given that interventions are attempts at influencing the course of internal conflicts, and as such require the mobilisation of significant resources, interventions in relatively more powerful states are expected to be more costly and therefore less likely, ceteris paribus. The likelihood of intervention should therefore be inversely proportional to the capabilities of state $T$. I integrate the opportunity aspect of power with its

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7 For a brief survey of efforts to sample cases on different conceptions of opportunity, see Clark & Regan (2003: 95-99).
willingness aspect in a measure of power asymmetry, thus hypothesising that the likelihood of intervention is positively correlated with

\[
\frac{\text{capabilities}_I}{\text{capabilities}_T}.
\]

Note that this measure is identical to the indicator of per unit-battle effectiveness of state \( I, b_I \), in the contest success function, and that its relation to the likelihood of intervention is posited to be the same. The empirical testing of power ratio will therefore also indicate whether the CSF of the difference between \( p \) and \( q \) is a plausible formalisation of the probability terms in the expected utility functions.

I measure capabilities as the natural log of power ratio\(^8\), lagged by one year prior to the outbreak of civil conflict, using the Correlates of War ‘Composite Index of National Capability’ (CINC), version 3.02 (Singer 1987; Singer et al. 1972). The CINC-score is constructed by taking country year values for total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure, converting them to a country’s share of world total in that particular year, and averaging across the six dimensions (www.correlatesofwar.org).

**The economic size of the potential intervener**

It is necessary to control for the size of the potential intervener in order to minimise omitted variable bias in the effect of power ratio. Hegre (2005: 14)

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\(^8\) Power asymmetry is only one of several variables that have been log-transformed. Such manipulation reduces outlier problems and models non-linear change in the logit. Thus a marginal increase in power asymmetry or any of the other log-transformed variables has a greater effect when the measure already is low than when it is high. Assume for illustration that the logistic regression returns a coefficient estimate for \( \ln(\text{power ratio}) \) of 0.5. A one-unit increase in power asymmetry from 1:1 to 2:1 would then be associated with a 40% increase in the odds of intervention, whereas an equal increase in power asymmetry from 100:1 to 101:1 would predict only a 0.5% increase in the odds of intervention. Log-transformation, in other words, models decreasing marginal returns.
demonstrates how severe such bias may be. In the context of interventions, power asymmetry as measured by power ratio must be controlled for the absolute size of the potential intervener in order to exclude the suggestion that great powers would seize any opportunity to intervene in small countries. By holding the absolute size of the potential intervener constant, the remaining effect of power asymmetry is more due to variation in the size of the target state. Economic size is a good proxy for other measures of size or power (Hegre 2005: 12).

Economic size is measured as the natural log of GDP in constant 1995 dollars, lagged by one year prior to the outbreak of internal conflict. The GDP data is taken from Maddison (1995), Penn World Tables, version 5.6 (Summers & Heston 1991) and the World Bank (2000), and standardised as described in Gates et al. (2005: 19-20).

**Distance**

Distance is like power considered to be a central dimension of the opportunity to intervene (Clark & Regan 2003: 100). The further a potential intervener is from the target state, the more costly it is to project force, and the less likely an intervention is expected to occur, *ceteris paribus* (Boulding 1962 / 1988: 230; Gleditsch & Singer 1974: 483-484).

Distance is measured as the natural log of the distance between the capital cities of $T$ and $I$. The data was compiled as described by Gleditsch (1995: 305).

**Joint borders**

As evidenced by the range of references in the discussion below, borders - or more precisely – contiguity, is a widely and well established correlate of interstate interaction, be it war or intervention. The effect of borders on the likelihood of intervention is found to be significant by both Regan (1998: 772), Pickering (2002: 308), and Lemke & Regan (2004: 161).

Why this association between contiguity and war? Starr & Most (1978: 451) apply a quintessentially neorealist logic by suggesting that ‘borders and war are
positively related' (Starr & Most 1978: 451) because 1) borders lead to greater interstate interaction that in and of itself may lead to war, 2) borders create a presence of threat that may lead to pre-emption, and 3) borders create uncertainty that may induce war as an uncertainty-reducing device (Starr & Most 1978: 445). Diehl (1991: 20) confirms this in his survey of literature on geography as a facilitating condition for war. Whereas Starr & Most (1978) engage the question of interstate war, Regan (1998: 766) links borders to third-party interventions in internal conflicts. With contiguity to a country in internal conflict, the argument goes, follows the possibility of contagion. Any prospect of diffusion of internal conflict increases the risk of not intervening. Simultaneously, contiguity lowers the material cost of mounting an intervention, and allows for a better estimate of the probability of success (Regan 1998: 766). Whether one is a Starr & Most (1978), a Diehl (1991), or a Regan (1998), the empirical expectation is still the same. Contiguity raises the probability of interaction, of war - and for my purposes – of intervention.

For operationalisation, I replicate Lemke & Regan (2004: 155) by applying a dichotomous variable indicating whether states are contiguous by land or not.9

Alliances

The effect of alliances on the likelihood of intervention, found by both Lemke & Regan (2004: 161) and Aydin (2005: 23), is cogently explained by Lemke & Regan (2004: 153), whose argument turn on the question of interstate interaction:

'...states interacting regularly and significantly with the civil war state are likely to care more about the civil war’s outcome, are thus more likely to undertake the cost-benefit calculation, and ultimately are more likely to intervene. That is, the pool of potential intervenors can be thought of in terms of their geographical relationship and/or their previous political and economic interactions.' (Lemke & Regan 2004: 153)

9 For a brief discussion of different sorts of contiguity, see Lemke & Regan (2004: 155). Bremer’s (1992: 327) findings would appear to suggest that contiguity may as well include both proximity by land and sea.
Alliances are included in Lemke & Regan’s (2004: 153) conception of such political interactions. States in alliance are presumed to interact more at the present, care more about each others’ internal development, and expect more interaction to take place in the future (Lemke & Regan 2004: 153). Alliance members will as a consequence be more likely to consider intervention, and more likely to actually intervene (ibid.).

Lemke & Regan (2004: 155) use Gibler & Sarkees’ (2004: 214) definition of an alliance as a treaty that ‘must contain language that would qualify it as a defense pact, neutrality or non-aggression pact, or an entente’. I use Lemke & Regan’s (ibid.) dichotomous indicator of whether T and I have entered such an alliance.

*Colonial history*

Much like the effect of alliances, a colonial history is again thought by Lemke & Regan (2004: 153) to signify closer interaction between state T and state I. As they put it, ‘former colonial powers of the civil war state are likely to interact frequently with the civil war state, anticipate they will continue to do so in the future, and thus be more likely to think about and actually intervene.’ (Lemke & Regan 2004: 153) Their empirical expectation holds water during testing. They do indeed find evidence that former colonial metropoles of states with internal conflict are more likely to intervene (Lemke & Regan 2004: 161).

The operationalisation of colonial history is a replication of that employed by Lemke & Regan (2004: 156). The variable is dichotomised, indicating whether state I was a previous coloniser of state T or not. The variable is coded zero for all dyads in which T never was a colony (Lemke & Regan 2004: 156).

*Conflict intensity*

Regan (1998: 772) finds that the intensity of the internal conflict has a negative effect on the likelihood of intervention. It would seem that the more intense an internal conflict is, the more reluctant is an external party to get involved. The
observation is not surprising. An explanation based on rational choice sensibly summarises the logic. Given that the purpose of intervening is to affect the conflict in one way or another, one should expect greater conflict intensity to increase the costs of intervention, at the same time as more intense conflicts lower the expected probability of success (Regan 1998: 766).


The type of internal war – ideological war / ethnic war

Pickering (2002: 309) finds that dummy variables indicating whether an internal conflict is a revolutionary war or ethnic war have significant effects on the likelihood of intervention. There is scant specification of why that may be so, however. In his theoretical explanation for why internal wars may attract foreign interventions, he does not distinguish between different types of internal wars (Pickering 2002: 306). The emphasis is on how internal conflict in a potential intervener may induce leaders to use diversionary force, how internal conflicts may impair states to the extent that they become targets for exploitation by intervention, and how internal conflicts may compel the parties to the conflict to seek external aid, much like Modelski’s (1964: 20) classic account of the internationalisation of internal conflict (Pickering 2002: 306).

One may presume, however, that internal conflicts over different issues have different effects on the likelihood of intervention. Given that the focus of this investigation is on ethnic affinities, one may expect there to be interaction between type of internal conflict and variation in ethnic affinities. Will the effect of ethnic affinities be more pronounced in the case of ethnic wars? This must be put to the test. I test for an effect of the type of civil war on the likelihood of intervention, as well as an interaction effect by an ethnic war dummy on ethnically biased dyad.

By way of measurement, Lemke & Regan (2004) provide two dummy variables indicating whether a civil conflict was ideological or ethnic. At question
is the ‘orientation of the primary groups involved in the fighting’ (Regan 1996: 342), determined by data from Minorities at Risk and the Correlates of War cultural data set. The two categories are mutually exclusive. Conflicts that are neither coded as ideological nor ethnic are coded as religious. Religious conflict thus serves as the baseline.

**The Cold War**

As an historic watershed, and perhaps as an historic exception, the emergence and retreat of the Cold War affected the dynamics of great power relations in major ways. The Cold War provided added and protracted opportunities to intervene. Major powers frequently intervened in an increased number of persistent conflicts (Gleditsch et al. 2004: 8). Internal conflicts during the Cold War provided important proxy battle grounds for fervent cold warriors (Regan 1998: 767). Given that a state of nuclear terror prevented direct interstate clashes between the great powers of the East and the West, internal conflicts provided opportunities to confront the adversary in a third country. The Cold War also increased the utility of successful intervention because internal conflicts so easily were cast in terms of the ideological confrontation between the East and the West (Regan 1998: 767). The perceived stakes were high, and so the great powers were quite willing to intervene in order to avert the advance of a rival bloc. Such incentives to intervene disappeared with the Cold War. The resolution of several protracted conflicts during the 1990s also reduced the opportunities to intervene (Gleditsch et al. 2004: 9). As one should expect, Regan (1998: 772) finds that the period of the Cold War had a significant effect on the likelihood of intervention. Internal conflicts were more likely to attract third-party interventions during the Cold War than after.

I replicate Regan (1998: 771) and Lemke & Regan (2004: 154), who treat the Cold War as a dichotomous variable indicating whether it was present or not. The Cold War is defined as ending on 1 January 1989.
RESULTS

This chapter presents the results from the statistical analyses with some preliminary comments. A more thorough discussion will follow in the next and penultimate chapter.

Table 4.1 contains the coefficient estimates from the logistic regression of the occurrence of interventions. The coefficients, $\beta_i$, cannot be linearly mapped onto the probability of intervention. Rather, they estimate linear change in the natural log of the odds of intervention, $\ln\left(\frac{p}{1-p}\right)$. Of the ways in which the coefficients may be made sense of, I prefer the simple conversion of $\beta_i$ into odds ratio, defined as $e^{\beta_i}$. The odds ratio indicates the relative change in the odds of intervention resulting from a one-unit increase in an explanatory variable, controlled for all other variables.

As discussed in section 3.2, standard errors are robust and clustered by civil conflict, due to some expected dependence between units of observation. The estimation of robust standard errors has the consequence that the log-likelihood statistic is represented by a proxy, the log pseudolikelihood. Table 4.1 presents a sequence of models that I now will elucidate.

Model 1 is a bivariate regression with *ethnically biased dyad* as the explanatory variable. The bivariate effect of transnational ethnic affinities, as they are operationalised, is positive and highly significant. The odds ratio, $e^{\beta} = 20.39$. The model suggests that ethnically biased dyads’ odds of experiencing intervention are twenty times higher than the odds for ethnically neutral dyads.
Table 4.1: Logistic regression estimates, probability of third-party interventions in civil conflicts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\hat{\beta}$</td>
<td>$\hat{\beta}$</td>
<td>$\hat{\beta}$</td>
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<td>(SE)</td>
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<td>(SE)</td>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>(SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-0.615***</td>
<td>-0.936***</td>
<td>-2.607**</td>
<td>-3.512***</td>
<td>-3.060***</td>
<td>-4.782***</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.222)</td>
<td>(1.214)</td>
<td>(1.330)</td>
<td>(1.568)</td>
<td>(3.188)</td>
<td>(3.217)</td>
<td>(3.047)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnically biased dyad</td>
<td>3.015***</td>
<td>1.858***</td>
<td>1.897***</td>
<td>2.458***</td>
<td>2.454***</td>
<td>2.110***</td>
<td>2.288***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.245)</td>
<td>(0.308)</td>
<td>(0.299)</td>
<td>(0.470)</td>
<td>(0.468)</td>
<td>(0.467)</td>
<td>(0.507)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic domination in intervener</td>
<td>0.277***</td>
<td>0.219*</td>
<td>0.215*</td>
<td>0.210*</td>
<td>0.203*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint borders</td>
<td>1.378***</td>
<td>1.149***</td>
<td>1.461***</td>
<td>1.440***</td>
<td>1.286***</td>
<td>1.494***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.376)</td>
<td>(0.392)</td>
<td>(0.430)</td>
<td>(0.445)</td>
<td>(0.463)</td>
<td>(0.462)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln$ Distance</td>
<td>-0.535***</td>
<td>-0.596***</td>
<td>-0.556***</td>
<td>-0.583***</td>
<td>-0.740***</td>
<td>-0.569***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.153)</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td>(0.193)</td>
<td>(0.230)</td>
<td>(0.188)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln$ Power ratio</td>
<td>0.725***</td>
<td>0.710***</td>
<td>0.718***</td>
<td>0.665***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.085)</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
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<td>Ethnic conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Ethnic conflict × Ethnically biased dyad</td>
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<td>Ideological conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\ln$ GDP_I</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln$ Conflict intensity</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Allied</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.610)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonial history</td>
<td>1.093**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.496)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>0.927***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.349)</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log pseudo-likelihood</td>
<td>-319.679</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-291.715</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-286.220</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-157.873</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-157.810</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-154.330</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-153.708</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R^2</td>
<td>0.190</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.261</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.275</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.399</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.399</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.412</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.413</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*: p < 0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01 (robust standard errors, clustered by civil conflict).

**Model 2** controls the effect of *ethnically biased dyad* for *joint borders* and *distance*. This is necessary because a major proportion of the variance in ethnic bias is likely to be accounted for by contiguity and proximity. Adjacent states are more likely to include the same ethnic group. Similarly, the density and reach of diasporas should roughly be a negative function of distance. The further states are from each other, the less likely they are ethnically biased. Model 2 confirms this by reducing the direct effect of *ethnically biased dyad* ($\hat{\beta} = 6.41$), which
nonetheless still is positive and significant. Simultaneously, the model confirms
the common knowledge that the probability of intervention is a positive function
of contiguity, and a negative function of distance (Aydin 2005: 23; Clark & Regan

**Model 3** adds the variable *ethnic domination in intervener* to the analysis.
To the extent that this measure captures the conceptual meaning of an ethnic
group in power’s domestic predominance, the estimate confirms Carment &
James’ (2000) expectation that ethnically dominant states are more likely to
intervene than ethnically pluralist states. The model suggests, for example, that
states with an ethnic domination score of 6 (max. = 6.125) have an odds of
intervening that is 4 times higher than states with an ethnic domination score of
1 (min. = 0.48). *Ethnic domination* was not expected to covariate with the other
variables in the model. That is confirmed by the marginal alterations in the
effects of *ethnically biased dyad, joint borders, and distance*.

**In model 4** I add the variable *power ratio*, discussed conceptually in the
context of the contest success functions and the opportunity versus willingness
distinction. The estimation of a positive and significant coefficient confirms two
expectations. First, it lends empirical credibility to the CSF formalisation of the
probability terms in the expected utility functions. Power asymmetry in favour of
the intervener leads to a heightened likelihood of intervention. Second, it
confirms the expectation, and widely reported result, that the likelihood of
conflictual engagement is a positive function of the ability to project power
order to facilitate comparison with model 5, the sample was defined by having no
missing values on either *power ratio or GDP*, a variable to which I turn next.

**Model 5** is distinguished from model 4 only by its inclusion of *GDP*. The
samples are identical in order to exclude sample effects on changes in coefficient
estimates. The purpose is to study *GDP*’s influence on the effect of *power ratio*.
The minute decrease in the effect of *power ratio* (from 0.725 to 0.710) suggests
that *power ratio* suffers from no omitted variable bias in model 4 from the
exclusion of *GDP*. The non-significance of *GDP* in model 5 does not imply that it
is unimportant. Indeed, a replication of model 4 with *power ratio* replaced by
returns a coefficient estimate for \( GDP_I \) of 0.436 with \( p < 0.0005 \). Rather, the non-significance of \( GDP_I \) indicates that most of the covariance between the size of the potential intervener and the probability of intervention is accounted for by power ratio. Power asymmetry matters more than the absolute power of the potential intervener. I nonetheless include \( GDP_I \) in the remaining models.

Model 6 includes the predictors ideological conflict, ethnic conflict and an interaction term between ethnic conflict and ethnically biased dyad. None of them have significant effects, which is quite at variance with the findings of Lemke & Regan (2004: 161). The poor performance of these variables is probably best explained by the reduced and regionally defined sample of cases. I regard them as inconclusive, yet I take note of their contingence on geographical domain. The type of internal conflict may matter less for interventions in some parts of the world than others. I exclude these variables from the last analysis.

Model 7 thus includes the variables for which robust effects were estimated in models 4 through 6, \( GDP_I \), as well as the remaining control variables conflict intensity, allied, colonial history, and Cold War. Neither conflict intensity nor allied have significant coefficient estimates, but colonial history and Cold War have sizeable and significant positive effects on the probability of intervention. The latter two coefficients confirm previous findings (Lemke & Regan 2004: 161-162) and testify to the robustness of these associations since the spatial domain of the present sample is limited.

To conclude this overview of the various models, it is notable that the variables I have been most concerned with display such robust and significant effects throughout the entire set of model alterations. Ethnically biased dyad and ethnic domination have consistently positive, significant effects across all models. Power ratio performs equally well. With regard to model fit, the consistent increase in pseudo-R\(^2\) indicates a general improvement of fit across the sequence of models.

Having modelled the likelihood of intervention I turn to the question of the side of interventions. Recall that symmetrical dyads are hypothesised to experience interventions in favour of the government, whereas asymmetrical dyads are thought to see interventions in favour of the rebels. Some indication of
the effects of these variables is found in the following table analysis. Table 4.2 displays the frequency distribution of *dyad type* on *intervention side*.\(^\text{10}\) A chi-squared with \(p < 0.0005\) indicates that there is significant correlation between

Table 4.2: Frequency distribution of *dyad type* on *intervention side*, absolute and relative frequencies (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dyad type</th>
<th>Intervention side</th>
<th>Asymmetrical dyad</th>
<th>Symmetrical dyad</th>
<th>Ethnically neutral dyad</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Rebels</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>24 (10)</td>
<td>11 (8)</td>
<td>15 (0.4)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Government</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 (3)</td>
<td>7 (5)</td>
<td>13 (0.3)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>No intervention</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>209 (87)</td>
<td>123 (87)</td>
<td>3925 (99.3)</td>
<td>4257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td>241 (100)</td>
<td>141 (100)</td>
<td>3953 (100)</td>
<td>4335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-squared (df = 4) = 315.530, \(p < 0.0005\)

the variables in the table. The relative frequencies confirm the picture from Table 4.1. Intervention on any side is overwhelmingly more likely to occur within an ethnically biased dyad – symmetrical or asymmetrical – than in an ethnically neutral dyad. For example, the proportion of symmetrical dyads with intervention in favour of the government is 5%, whereas the corresponding percentage for ethnically neutral dyads is a paltry 0.3. The relative frequencies also indicate that there is little difference between the effects of symmetrical and asymmetrical dyads on intervention side. These associations must be investigated more closely.

Being as it is a three-by-three table, several changes in odds may be calculated, depending on which outcomes and baselines one is interested in. Let me illustrate with one example. The odds ratio of an *asymmetrical dyad* experiencing intervention in favour of the *rebels* with baselines *ethnically neutral dyad* and *no intervention* is \((24 \times 3925)/(209 \times 15)\) = 30.05. Using the same

\(^{10}\) Note that the grand total, 4335, is one less than the total number of dyads in the data set, 4336. This is due to the exclusion of one dyad in which the intervention supported neither the government nor the rebels. *Intervention side* was recorded as a missing value.
baselines, the odds ratio of an *asymmetrical dyad* experiencing intervention in favour of the *government* is \((8 \times 3925)/(209 \times 13)=11.55\). The greater odds ratio for intervention in favour of the rebels is indication that asymmetrical dyads are most likely to experience rebel-friendly interventions, exactly as hypothesised.

The analysis of the side of interventions is further elaborated in Table 4.3, which reports the coefficient estimates from a multinomial logistic regression of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.3: multinomial logistic regression estimates, probability of interventions in favour of <em>government</em> or <em>rebels</em>.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model 8</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention in favour of government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\hat{\beta}) (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symmetrical dyad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetrical dyad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic domination in intervener</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Distance</td>
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<tr>
<td>In Power ratio</td>
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<tr>
<td>In GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*: p < 0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01 (robust standard errors, clustered by civil conflict).

intervention side. Unlike binomial logistical regression, its multinomial sibling reports linear effects on the log odds of outcomes relative to a baseline outcome when the dependent variable is nominal and has more than two values. In this
case, the baseline is no intervention, so that the coefficient estimates indicate changes in the probability of either government-friendly intervention or rebel-friendly intervention relative to no intervention occurring at all. Knowing the baseline, one may here, as with the binomial logistic regression, interpret \( e^\beta \) as the odds ratio of a one-unit increase in an explanatory variable, ceteris paribus.

**Model 8** then replicates the frequency table with dyad type disaggregated into two dummy variables with the common reference category ethnically neutral dyad. The model confirms my sampling of the frequency table. The positive association between any ethnically biased dyad and the probability of intervention is reiterated. With regard to the side of interventions, the odds ratio of an asymmetrical dyad having intervention in favour of the rebels, \( e^{3.403} = 30.05 \), precisely as calculated from the frequency table. Likewise, the odds ratio of an asymmetrical dyad experiencing government-friendly intervention, \( e^{2.447} = 11.55 \), is a replication of the tabulated association. In the third column of models 8 and 9 I test that \( \beta_1 = \beta_2 \) using a Wald test with chi-squared distribution (Stata Manual 2003: 224). In model 8, only the coefficients of asymmetrical dyad can be claimed with some confidence (p = 0.112) to be different. Then one may infer that asymmetrical dyads are more likely to have interventions in favour of the rebels than in favour of the government, which gives conditional support to Hypothesis 3. The fact that the difference between the coefficients of symmetrical dyad is not significant (p = 0.676), and that the differences between coefficients within dyad types are not greater, either cripples the theory on intervention sides or indicates that there are limitations in the research design.

An examination of the measurement procedures suggests that the estimates in model 8 are inconclusive. The theory on dyad types relies on the assumption that ethnic groups with transnational affinities are involved in civil conflicts in ways that make them politically relevant for relations between T and I. The coding of dyad types, however, does not have procedures for ensuring that dyadic ethnic bias stems from ethnic groups that are parties to the civil conflict. Thus, the data does contain ethnically biased dyads such as the asymmetrical majority dyad TI Bosnia / Yugoslavia where the minority Serbs in Bosnia truly were part
of the civil conflict in which the Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia intervened, but the data also contains dyads such as the asymmetrical majority dyad TI Cambodia / Vietnam where there was no ethnic dimension to the conflict and ideological cleavages cut across ethnic groups. As it stands, the coding procedures have forced such dyads into dyad types based on assumptions of inter-group dynamics that do not apply. The estimates in model 8 are most probably heavily influenced by this disassociation between theory and data. Hypothesis 3 on the effects of asymmetry is conditionally supported, but a conclusive test of the dyad typology awaits more valid data.

Model 9 controls for the effects of possible confounding variables. It includes the variables tested in model 7 in Table 4.1 with the exception of conflict intensity and allied, none of which had significant effects. Overall, model 9 confirms the findings in model 7. The likelihood of intervention on any side is a positive function of all variables with the exception of distance. However, once the differential effects of symmetrical dyad and asymmetrical dyad on the side of intervention are controlled for with the remaining variables, and with the recent discussion in mind, it is no surprise that the differences between the coefficient estimates of each variable no longer are significant. All chi-squared tests of coefficient equality return p-values ranging from 0.292 to 0.888. The model is not able to predict when third parties intervene in favour of the government and when they intervene in favour of the rebels. Yet, the estimates are as inconclusive as the data is tentative.

Let that suffice for preliminary comments on the results. In the following chapter I will reflect in some more depth on the lessons that may be drawn from the statistical modelling, particularly with a focus on the ethnicity variables.
DISCUSSION

What do we now know? In minimalist terms, we know that interventions are more likely to occur when the same ethnic group resides in both the intervener and the target, we know that the probability of intervention is positively associated with the product of the relative size of the ethnic group in power in the potential intervener and its number of ethnic groups, we know that the probability of intervention is likewise positively associated with the ratio of capabilities between the intervener and the target, and we know that interventions are somewhat more likely to be in favour of the rebels when the ethnic group in power in one state is a non-governmental ethnic group in the other state. Those are the results in operational terms. In the discussion below I will first consider the central findings with some optimism about their relevance to my conception of transnational ethnic affinities, ethnic domination, battle ground effectiveness and majority-minority affective dynamics. Second, I will argue by contrasting this study to earlier quantitative work on ethnic affinities and interstate interaction, that the analytical framework developed prior to the empirical tests constitutes theoretical advancement. I will finally point out some limitations with regard to measurement and scope, suggesting that the soil is ripe for advances in data generation and theoretical-empirical specification.

5.1 FINDINGS

Ethnically biased dyads are more likely to experience interventions than ethnically neutral dyads, ceteris paribus. Once controlled for important
opportunity variables such as *joint borders, distance, and power asymmetry*, the results in Table 4.1 indicate that the odds of intervention occurring within ethnically biased dyads are ten times higher than the odds of intervention within ethnically neutral dyads. The effect is highly significant across the range of models. The expected utility function models this effect by suggesting that transnational ethnic affinities at once decrease the costs of intervention and increase the utility of intervention success, to the extent that non-material affinities have material and positive effects on states’ choice to intervene. This finding adds an important, but not wholly unanticipated (Regan 1998: 758) affective dimension to prior studies of the causes of interventions, including Regan (1998), Pickering (2002), Lemke & Regan (2004), and Aydin (2005). It also confirms the intuitions of theoretically inspirational but anecdotal work such as Heraclides (1990) and Cooper & Berdal (1993). More generally, the empirical results are supportive of analytically formative contributions such as Mitchell (1970) and Suhrke & Noble (1977). The findings add empirical legitimacy to their conceptual distinction between ‘transactional’ and ‘affective’ linkages between groups in the civil conflict state and the potential intervener (Mitchell 1970: 184), and ‘affective’ versus ‘instrumental’ motivations for external involvement (Suhrke & Noble 1977: 10). Finally, the robust effect of transnational ethnic affinities lends support to those who argue for the significance of ethnic dynamics in international relations (for example Carment & James 1997; Davis et al. 1997; Ganguly 1998; Stack Jr. 1997).

*Ethnic domination* in the potential intervener is also shown to increase its propensity to intervene. The finding provides supportive evidence for one of the central hypotheses in the qualitative work of Carment & James (1995, 2000). Empirical testing was warranted because they so explicitly address interventions motivated by ethnic affinities, and because they go to some length to theoretically specify the mechanisms by which such interventions come about. Though Carment & James (2000: 185-193) find evidence by the comparison of four cases that ethnically dominant states are more prone to irredentism and intervention, my statistical analysis suggests that their intuition holds for a much wider range of cases. Ethnically dominant states, to the extent that they
have large ethnic groups in power and are reasonably multiethnic, are more likely to intervene. The implicit positive association between number of ethnic groups and the likelihood of intervention also lends support to Suhrke & Noble’s (1977: 14) proposal that multiethnic states are more likely to intervene than others.

**Power asymmetry** may not be an ethnicity variable, but it is of central concern here because its empirical treatment is a partial test of the fruitfulness of the formal model. The positive association between power asymmetry and the probability of intervention not only confirms expectations with regard to the opportunity and willingness to intervene, it also lends empirical support to the effort to formalise the process of choice. Recall that a central dimension in the weighing of the expected utility of non-intervention against the expected utility of intervention was a comparison of the estimated probability of government success without intervention with the estimated probability of government success with an intervention. The difference between \( p \) and \( q \) was formalised as a comparison of two contest success functions. It was demonstrated that the decisive variable was a composite measure of the potential intervener’s relative capabilities and its relative population size, operationally approximated by the ratio of CINC-scores. The positive effect of power asymmetry does suggest that potential interveners rate their chances of successful intervention as higher when they can devote relatively more resources to the campaign, precisely as the contest success functions posit. Thus, the finding suggests that there is indeed congruence between the formal model and state practice.

**The side of interventions** is only partially predicted by dyad type, as they are operationalised. Hypothesis 3 about the tendency of asymmetrical dyads to have interventions in favour of the government receives conditional support, but the findings are inconclusive due to the imperfect fit between theory and data discussed in Chapter 4 and below. I emphasise, however, that this is not irredeemable damnation of the hypotheses on dyad symmetry and the side of interventions. Conclusive tests require better data.

Aside from the empirical findings, this study constitutes theoretical advancement by comprehensively specifying the alternative configurations of
ethnicity and power that determine the mechanisms by which transnational ethnic relations and interstate behaviour are linked. Such theoretical advancement is probably best highlighted by contrasting it with other quantitative work on the effects of transnational ethnic affinities on interstate dynamics. The studies I have in mind are Davis et al.’s (1997) broad investigation of politicised communal groups’ effects on the conflict levels between states, Davis & Moore’s (1997) somewhat more specified investigation of the association between transnational ethnic alliances and dyadic conflict levels, and Saideman’s (2002) inquiry into the causes of external support for ethnic groups in conflict. The earlier quantitative work share similar theoretical limitations. Their focus is minorities at risk. As a consequence they exclude possible dyad types. Saideman (2002: 32n, 33n) limits his inquiry to disadvantaged groups and advantaged minorities with ethnic kin in power in neighbouring states, thus only studying asymmetrical majority dyads and some incarnation of the symmetrical majority dyad. Davis et al. (1997: 154) and Davis & Moore (1997: 175-176) move beyond the asymmetrical majority dyad by also defining and testing effects of the symmetrical minority dyad, but no other dyad types are considered. None of them follow the advantaged / disadvantaged or majority / minority dichotomies to their logical conclusion and specify a complete set of ethnically biased dyads. The robust effects of *ethnically biased dyad* in models 1 – 7 and *symmetrical dyad* and *asymmetrical dyad* in models 8 – 9 suggest that the derivation of a saturated dyad typology has been fruitful. By way of characterisation, mine is a structural theory of ethnic groups in international relations, emphasising variation in access to power, foreign policy predominance, and resource endowment.

The theoretical limitations in Davis et al. (1997), Davis & Moore (1997) and Saideman (2002) should not mask operational strengths that expose one weak point in the association between theory and data in the present study. My research design has a somewhat imperfect fit between theory and the operationalisation of dyad types. By basing their selection of ethnic groups on Minorities at Risk, Davis et al. (1997: 152), Davis & Moore (1997: 172) and Saideman (2002: 33) ensure that they only study groups that are politically
salient. Whereas I develop a more comprehensive framework for analysis based on assumptions of political salience, my coding procedures at present do not ensure that the ethnic groups defining the various ethnically biased dyads are conflict parties or politically relevant to interstate relations. The Vietnamese in North and South Vietnam, for example, determine that the two are a symmetrical majority dyad, but the Vietnam War was not between ethnic groups. Neither the Vietnamese, Tay, Muong nor the Nung defined a conflict party.\textsuperscript{11} As indicated in the presentation of the results, the fit between assumptions of political salience and the data is left to chance, based on the simplifying assumption that ethnic groups in civil war states broadly are politically relevant. This disassociation is probably the cause of the non-significant differences between coefficient estimates in the multinomial regression of intervention side. While my analytical framework deserves to be kept and refined for later application, the imperfect fit between theory and data must be rectified in future work.

5.2 LIMITATIONS

Limitations in measurements are not confined to the somewhat tentative operationalisation of dyad types. Although the broad-gauge measure of ethnically biased dyads as pairs of states with the same ethnic group may capture some important aspects of transnational ethnic affinities, such simplification does violence to important characteristics of ethnic groups that are worth bearing in mind when analysing the data: the non-monolithic character of ethnically denominated populations, and the temporal contingency of ethnic categories. The possibility of identity-based affinities between groups that are not regarded as ethnically alike is also excluded. Finally, the scope of the inquiry does not encompass geography, although its importance for the international political salience of ethnic groups requires investigation.

\textsuperscript{11} See the appendix.
The non-monolithic character of ethnic groups is at present ignored by a coding scheme that treats ethnic groups as if they are a uniform mass with a common will. The Kurdish population is a case in point. At present, dyads containing either two of Turkey, Iran, Iraq or Syria would receive a ‘1’ for ethnic bias, masking the extent to which the Kurds are a diverse population with diverging views on secessionist and irredentist movements. The Kurdish population is highly differentiated along religious, tribal, class, political and ideological lines, has different political-institutional experiences of national identity and citizenship, and different relations with transnational networks (Somer 2005: 116). Thus the Turkish Kurds were opposed to the 2003 American invasion of Iraq, while Iraqi Kurds supported it. (ibid.). In Turkey, the Turkish-Kurdish conflict is primarily between the Turkish state and Kurdish nationalists, and has notable regional and socio-economic dimensions. Thus, surveys of the self-identification of Kurds consistently report a lower proportion than official estimates, many declare multiple identities, self-identification varies with time, region, class and ideology, and Kurdish identity is a significant determinant of political preferences only among the rural poor in the southeast and east (Somer 2005: 116-117).

The intra-ethnic variation in the Kurdish population is probably not unique among transnationally dispersed ethnic groups, and worth bearing in mind as a qualifier of the findings regarding ethnically biased dyads. Regardless of variation within ethnic groups, however, elites may very well regard ethnic groups as if they were monolithic, genealogically determinate, and the primary source of identity (Somer 2005: 113). Then, the present coding scheme would suffice to express the politically relevant form of transnational ethnic communities to the extent that such elite perceptions predominate.

The temporal and situational contingency of ethnic categories is likewise disregarded by the present measures (Cederman & Girardin 2005: 2; Kasfir 1979: 365; Laitin & Posner 2001: 14-15; Smith 1986: 68). As Kasfir (1979: 365) argues, ethnic identity is fluid and intermittent, and ethnic loyalties compete with other loyalties as the foundation of political action, precisely as Somer (2005: 114) illustrates with the case of the Kurds. Thus Smith (1986: 68)
reiterates that ‘ethnic ties and sentiments fluctuate greatly in their salience and effects in different periods and areas’. Ethnic groups and ethnic fractionalisation change. They do so, suggest Laitin & Posner (2001: 14), as ‘people over generations assimilate, differentiate, amalgamate, break-apart, immigrate and emigrate.’

Such fluidity in ethnic categories and the politicisation of dimensions of ethnicity should spawn some reservations about static measures of ethnic affinities. As with the operational monolithic assumptions, the question is also here how well the measure generally represents politically relevant ethnic categories within a limited temporal domain. The argument that conflicts may form and cement divisions along ethnic lines (Laitin & Posner 2001: 15; Somer 2005: 117) would suggest that the study of interventions in civil wars using relatively static ethnic categories has some use.

_Identity-based transnational ethnic affinities_ between groups that are not nominally regarded as ethnically equal were a component of the theoretical definition presented in Chapter 1, but are not included in the operational definition. Thus, the measure of transnational ethnic affinities as populations from the same ethnic groups living in different countries, does not capture such politically salient ethnic affinities as those between American Jews and the Israelis, or those between African Americans and the South Sudanese. Such operational limitation is not unique to this study (Davis et al. 1997: 157; Davis & Moore 1997: 176; Saideman 2002: 37).

The operational exclusion of identity-based transnational ethnic affinities has also spilt over into the assumptions underlying some of the theoretical framework. In particular, the deduction of causal mechanisms in the symmetrical minority dyad and the asymmetrical minority dyad are based on assumptions about secessions and irredentas that would not apply to minority support-groups in distant countries. One way in which to get around this is to specify that the operational definition of ethnic affinities applies to some sorts of dyad, whereas the wider concept of ethnic affinities applies to other sorts, in an effort to identify the antecedent conditions (van Evera 1997: 9-10) under which the posited causal processes work.
One could argue, for instance, that transnational ethnic affinity in the sense of equal ethnic identity applies to symmetrical minority and asymmetrical minority dyads where the countries are proximate, because of their potential for real or perceived irredentism. Ethnic affinities in the sense of empathy and sympathy for groups in foreign countries identified as being relevant by virtue of **ethnic identification** may only apply to symmetrical majority and asymmetrical majority dyads. Thus Israel and the United States may be considered a symmetrical majority dyad because the minority American Jews have access to and real influence on the people in power. Similarly, Sudan and the United States could be conceived of as an asymmetrical majority dyad in the sense that African American lobbyists may project their wishes for the South Sudanese on the groups in control of American foreign policy.

Such musings disclose theoretical limitations and the need for better specification of conditions and causes. On an optimistic note, the analytical framework is by no means a lost cause. It may be embryonic, but it has the parsimony and flexibility needed for further refinement. Its present weakness displays its future potential.

**What about geography?** While the non-monolithic character of ethnically denominated populations and the temporal and situational contingency of ethnic categories would suggest that a more flexible measure of ethnic affinities is desirable, the exclusion of geography is not so much a problem of measurement validity as it is a disregard of a perhaps decisive condition for ethnically motivated interventions.

Consider Carment & James (1995: 95), who most generally, and in the context of irredentist campaigns, insist that ‘protagonists will be territorially adjacent; because few states can project military force across the globe, borders are integral to involvement and even serve as a defining characteristic of irredentist conflict.’ Further, Heraclides’ (1990) study of secessionist minorities suggests that the geographical location of ethnic groups has very particular effects on the side of intervention. He finds that states adjacent to government-controlled territory in a neighbouring state tends to intervene in favour of the government, whereas states adjacent to mixed territory or purely secessionist-
held territory tend to intervene in favour of the rebels (Heraclides 1990: 374). The salience of group-level geographical parameters is also recognised by Cederman & Girardin (2005: 10), particularly with regard to the logistical obstacles to conflict.

The geographical and demographic arrangement of national populations is neither lost on van Evera (1994: 17) whose reasoning may be applied to the likelihood of third-party interventions in internal conflict with some deduction and adaptation. Van Evera (1994: 17) argues that ‘intermingling raises the risk of communal conflict during the struggle for national freedom, as groups that would be trapped as minorities in a new national state oppose its reach for freedom.’ Given that an internal conflict along communal lines has erupted, one may ask how variation in the demographic arrangement of national populations can be expected to influence the likelihood of intervention. Van Evera (1994: 19) indicates that the possibility of forcible rescue of a minority is an important demographic variable. It may be applied to third-party interventions in internal conflicts by expecting ‘possibility of forcible rescue’ to be determined by the geographical accessibility and the concentration of ethnic groups. Given that ethnic groups are relatively geographically concentrated, at least in some areas, one may expect the degree of contiguity between the ethnic concentration and the potential intervener to influence the likelihood of intervention. Ease of access reduces the costs of intervention.

In short, geography matters (Buhaug & Rød 2005: 2, 20). A refined empirical inquiry into the incidence and sides of ethnically motivated interventions cannot remain aloof of geography and demography. While evidence suggests that the geographical disaggregation of population data may be useful in order to understand the onset of civil war, there is recognition that measures of local ethnic composition must be improved (Buhaug & Rød 2005: 20). Subnational geographical and demographic data on ethnic groups must also be applicable to empirical treatment of the international relations of civil wars.
CONCLUSION

This inquiry is at an end. I conclude it by looking back and projecting forward. I first summarise the central advances and findings. I then offer five concrete proposals for the refinement of further research.

The study set out on the premise that earlier work on third-party interventions in civil conflicts has left space for the quantitative treatment of affective dimensions of interventions, and that existing work on the international relations of transnational ethnic affinities needs better theoretical specification. With that in mind, I posed three questions. Do transnational ethnic affinities increase the probability of interventions? Does the relative predominance of one ethnic group in potential interveners turn them into actual interveners? May variation in the configuration of ethnic groups and power explain which side interventions favour? I derived hypotheses proposing affirmative answers to these questions, as well as one hypothesis on the association between the potential intervener’s power predominance and the likelihood that it intervene.

Expected utility functions were developed in order to integrate transnational ethnic affinities in a formal model of the choice to intervene. Contest success functions (CSF) were included in the expected utility framework in order to model the potential intervener’s estimation of the probability of success for the government in the civil war country. The CSFs apply to three contingencies - non-intervention, intervention in favour of the government, or intervention in favour of the rebels. Potential interveners are thought to choose the option with the greatest expected utility. Aside from having the apparent advantage of giving the theoretical arguments a structure and language of costs and utilities, the formal model also receives some empirical support. The positive
effect of the potential intervener’s relative capabilities on the probability of intervention does suggest that the contest success function captures a central dimension of the choice to intervene.

Subsequent to the formal model, I developed a typology of interstate dyads with transnational ethnic affinities, from which the hypotheses on the occurrence of interventions and side of interventions were derived. It may be argued that the dyad typology constitutes theoretical advancement for the study of the international relations of transnational ethnic affinities. By specifying the alternative configurations of ethnic groups and power within interstate dyads, given that transnational ethnic affinities exist, I define a comprehensive set of structural conditions that may determine the dynamics of the domestic and international politics of ethnic affinities. The analytical framework is structural because it regards ethnic groups as relatively unitary actors, and because it emphasises access to or control of state power, and the resource endowment of adversarial parties. Its theoretical parsimony leaves it vulnerable to criticism based on confounding cases, yet gives it flexibility for further refinement and better specification.

The hypotheses were tested on cross-sectional data on civil conflicts and interventions within North Africa, Europe, and Asia in the period 1944-1994. The unit of analysis is the conflict dyad, that is, each civil war country is paired with every member of the international system at the time of the conflict. The empirical tests generated the following findings.

Much like the expected utility functions anticipated the effects of ethnic affinities by assigning them a separate term in the cost and utility equations, a robust and positive association between ethnically biased dyads and the likelihood of intervention indicates that ethnic affinities are – as it was put – an amplifying factor, also when duly controlled for contiguity and distance. As the expected utility function modelled it, transnational ethnic affinities at once lower the costs of intervention and raise the utility of favourable intervention outcomes, in short making interventions more likely.

The probability of intervention is also influenced by the monadic ethnic characteristics of the potential intervener. It would seem that states in which the
ethnic group in power predominates in domestic politics, particularly when they are ethnically diverse, are more likely to intervene than states with greater pluralism in domestic politics. Ethnically dominant states are less prone to settle ethnic issues cooperatively, and their governments have less to lose and more to gain from pursuing ethnic foreign policies.

Finally, the slight empirical suggestion that interveners are more likely to favour the rebels in the civil war state than its government when they are in dyads where an ethnic group in power has affinity with a non-governmental ethnic group, lends some support to the effort to explain intervention side as a result of the differential dynamics of dyad type. In light of the theoretical possibilities and operational limitations discussed in the previous chapter, the evidence is at least encouragement that the dyad typology ought to be further developed and operationally improved.

Improvement, both operational and theoretical, is the concern of this final section of the conclusion. I offer five proposals. First, the analytical framework ought to be evolved by better specifying the dynamics of the various dyad types. Particular attention should be given to enunciating the domains of application of the different aspects of ethnic affinities. Focus should be on the antecedent conditions (van Evera 1997: 9-10) or the environment (Stinchcombe 1968: 31) of causal processes.

Second, the dyad typology must be operationalised and measured in terms that ensure the political relevance of the defining transnational ethnic groups. Thus one retains the theoretical advantages of the dyad typology, while importing the operational strength from other quantitative work on the international relations of transnational ethnic affinities.

Third, given that ethnic categories are temporally contingent, and ethnic groups may gain or lose power, one should give serious thought to collecting time-series data on characteristics of ethnic groups. There is recognition of this challenge in, for example, Cederman & Girardin (2005), where ethnic groups in power are coded for temporal ambiguity. By collecting time-series data, those ambiguities may be removed, and the snap-shot image of ethnic groups provided by Fearon (2003) nuanced by accounting for time.
Fourth, the operationalisation of transnational ethnic affinities ought to have the means to capture identity-based ethnic affinities between groups that are not nominally recognised as being ethnically alike. Such operational improvement must be theoretically coordinated with developments in the dyad typology.

Finally, geography and demography must be accounted for. Relevant parameters would include the geographical location of ethnic groups, the geographical accessibility of ethnic groups for potential interveners, and the relative concentration and dispersion of ethnic groups.

Whereas some steps have been taken towards answering the research questions of this inquiry, much work, as always, remains. Some of that effort could have been included within the perimeters of this thesis, while other tasks necessitate new and otherwise framed projects.
# APPENDIX

## CATEGORISING AMBIGUOUS ETHNICALLY BIASED DYADS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dyad: TI</th>
<th>Internal conflicts</th>
<th>Alternative ethnic groups creating ethnic bias</th>
<th>Choice of dyad type (decisive ethnic group)</th>
<th>Argument</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq / Turkey</td>
<td>1956-1959, 1961-1966, 1974-1974, 1985-1993, 1991-ongoing</td>
<td>Kurds, Arabs</td>
<td>Symmetrical minority</td>
<td>The Kurdish issue has been most significant in Turkey’s dealings with Iraq. The Kurdish territories have their largest reach within Turkey, and, in Turkey’s eyes, a history of secessionism. All wars since 1961 were wars with a Kurdish secessionist content (Fisher 2003: 447, 449; Tripp 1989: 68).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dyads involving</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>Symmetrical majority</td>
<td>Pan-Arabism is assumed to be the dominant mode in inter-Arab relations, including the countries of North Africa (Choueiri 2000: 166-169).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco / Algeria / Tunisia / Libya</td>
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<td>Berbers</td>
<td>(Arabs)</td>
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<td>伊拉克/伊朗</td>
<td>1956-1959</td>
<td>Shi’is</td>
<td>Asymmetrical majority in</td>
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<td>1985-1993</td>
<td>(Shi’is)</td>
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<td>1991-ongoing</td>
<td>Symmetrical minority in</td>
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<td>1961-1966</td>
<td>1974-1974</td>
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