Monitoring and evaluation arrangements for the implementation of community policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina: a case study

By Dorte Hvidemose and Jérôme Mellon

January 2009

List of acronyms

BiH  Bosnia and Herzegovina
CARDS  Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States
CSS  Centre for Security Studies
DAC  Development Assistance Committee
DCE  Unit for Co-operation with the Eastern Europe and the CIS
DFID  Department for International Development
DPA  Dayton Peace Agreement
EU  European Union
EUPM  European Union Police Mission
FBiH  Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
FDFA  Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
FDJP  Federal Department of Justice and Police
ICITAP  International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance
IDAG SSR  Interdepartmental Working Group on Security Sector Reform
IPTF  International Police Task Force
NGO  Non-governmental organisation
OCTN  Organised Crime Training Network
RS  Republika Srpska
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNMBIH  United Nations Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina
SEE  South Eastern Europe
SDC  Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation
SSR  Security Sector (sometimes System) Reform
ToR  Terms of Reference
1. Introduction

This report analyses the monitoring and evaluation arrangements (M&E) of a community policing project entitled *Implementation of Community Policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)*. The project was funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation (SDC) and formed part of a regional South-Eastern Europe (SEE) policing programme. This programme was the subject of an external evaluation in its entirety in the spring/summer of 2007. The report focuses on how the community policing project in BiH was evaluated within this broader evaluation. It also looks at the general monitoring systems in place during Phase 10 of the regional programme (2004–2007). It does not attempt to link the M&E of this particular project with wider safety and security concerns within BiH.

This report is one of five case studies carried out as part of the Saferworld project 'Evaluating for Security: Developing specific guidelines on monitoring and evaluating Security Sector Reform (SSR) interventions'. Together with a wider desk review and supplementary research into the broader M&E systems used by the major SSR donors, the case studies provide an evidence base from which specific guidance on monitoring and evaluating SSR can be developed.

The field research for this report was carried out in May/June of 2008 – a list of interviewees met is provided at annex one. Unfortunately the researchers were not given access to certain project documents, namely six-monthly progress reports (which has implications for the monitoring sections), and the programme document covering Phase 10 (2004-2007). However, the team attempted to make up for these shortcomings by interviewing project staff and the evaluator.

The M&E terminology used in this study is consistent with that used by SDC. Where appropriate, footnotes are used to elaborate any specific terms.

2. Context

2.1 Police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina

By almost any measure, the post-conflict state of BiH remains a divided country. The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) purchased an end to the 1992-1995 war only by establishing a complex constitution, partitioning the territory essentially along ethnic lines with a patchwork system of government. The DPA defines the political and administrative structure of the country as a loose federation comprising two entities, approximately equal in geographical size: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH, populated by a majority of Bosniaks and a large minority of Bosnian Croats) and the Republika Srpska (RS, populated by an overwhelming majority of Bosnian Serbs). A small third self-governing administrative unit, Brčko District, was established as part of both the FBiH and RS structures. Each of the two main entities have a multi-tiered administrative structure: the FBiH is divided into ten Cantons, and these are then subdivided into Municipalities, which are in turn divided into Mjesna Zajednica (MZs), which constitute the smallest administrative units in BiH. RS does not have Cantons, and the administrative structure therefore has one less layer. The two entities have their own constitutions, governments and bicameral parliaments, own judiciary and legal systems, education systems, and tax regimes.

This decentralised and highly complex structure hinders the ability to effectively implement policies in general, including those concerning reform of the security and justice sectors, a situation made worse by the fact that the leaders of the two main entities are often at odds. Shared state-level goals and structures are as much imposed by the international community, which continues to play a big part, as anything else. This includes a commitment to police reform (both in terms of structure and philosophy) that remains only partially realised.

---

1 Other case studies include the Irish/Dutch backed *Justice, Law and Order Sector in Uganda*, the Australian backed *Law and Justice Programme in Papua New Guinea*, the UK backed *Security Sector Reform Programme in Sierra Leone* and UNDP backed *Support to the Security Sector Reform Programme in Albania*. 

2
Police reforms have been ongoing in one form or another in BiH since 1996, first under the auspices of the United Nations Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina BiH (UNMBIH) and its police vetting process, implemented by the International Police Task Force (IPTF). Subsequent police-related development has included equipment and training from the EU (EUR 17m/GBP 14.5m under CARDS) and the US Government through International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance (ICITAP) directed variously at combating organised crime, anti-terrorism, criminal investigation and border control. In 2003 the EU established the European Union Police Mission (EUPM), to provide an overview on various aspects of policing, including public order management and community policing (the latter aspect phased out in 2005). Assistance from the EU and the US has mainly focused on national policing agencies (SIPA and the Border Police (BP)) and not on community-based policing.  

SDC had been supporting justice and police reform in Eastern Europe since 1992, gradually increasing its focus on the region. In 1999 a regional programme Police Reforms in South Eastern Europe was launched by the Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police (FDJP) and later handed over to the SDC in 2000. A number of projects or pilots in Bosnia fell under this regional programme, including support to juvenile justice, the Bosnia State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) and the Organised Crime Training Network (OCTN). SDC also supported the police academies in the two entities, providing technical assistance in organisational development, training, facilitation of professional exchange between the academies and international police services, as well as refurbishment of academy facilities.

In 2004, SDC began a pilot community policing project in the district of Zenica, which was ultimately deemed to be successful, and the pilot was scaled up to cover the canton level (Zenica-Dobo). Pilot projects were also conducted in RS, but implementation proceeded slower. Phase 10 of this programme (March 2005-December 2007) was budgeted at CHF 4.7m/GBP 2.3m. It is not clear how much of this was spent in BiH over the course of the phase, but from 2003 to 2007, SDC spent CHF 1.4m/GBP 800,000 on community policing in BiH. The programme had two objectives: help law enforcement improve its ability to fight trans-national organised crime, and promote community policing as a means of conflict prevention. In 2007, roughly mid-way through the programme, SDC commissioned an external evaluation of the entire regional programme. This evaluation is the subject of this case study. SDC’s work on community policing in Bosnia fits with a number of its internal priorities and cross-cutting themes (Rule of Law and Democracy; Governance, etc.). Furthermore, Switzerland is often mentioned in Bosnia as an example of a functional federal system, supporting the peaceful coexistence of people of different language and cultures. Alongside SDC, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) ran its own community policing pilot projects in Prijedor in RS and Žepče in FBiH. Centre for Security Studies (CSS), a local NGO, in co-operation with Saferworld also had a small scale pilot project in Sarajevo.

It should be noted here, that at the highest diplomatic and political levels, police reform in Bosnia has over the past couple of years been – and is still being – held hostage by political disputes. Quoting problems of low efficiency, bloated police structures and the inability for the police to carry out hot pursuits across entity lines (all legitimate concerns), the EU has stipulated the establishment of a unitary police force as a condition for the country’s accession to the EU.

---

2 Parts of the Bosnian police force played an active role in planning and carrying out actions to ethnically cleanse areas during the war. For this reason, the DPA mandated the UNMBIH to undertake an exhaustive vetting procedure to rid the Bosnian police forces of inappropriate personnel. This took place between 1996 and 2002. The vetting process was later criticised of violating the human rights of the police officers who were denied a certification to continue working as police officers. The criticism pointed to the very limited opportunities to challenge the decision, and to the fact that the decision not to grant them a certification is for life.


4 SDC spent CHF 200,000/GBP 111,000 spent on this project strand from 2003 to 2005.

5 SDC spent CHF 2.1m/GBP 1.17m on this project strand from 2003 to 2005.

to the EU. However, the establishment of a unitary police force and the redrawing of police
districts to cut across entity lines are criteria that have no basis in European standards and
have not been part of accession conditionality anywhere other than in BiH. Local politicians in
Bosnia have therefore come to perceive police reform as little more than an attempt by the
Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the EU to undermine the authority of the entities,
in order to strengthen state-level authorities ‘by the backdoor’, and have put up considerable
resistance to the police reform plans. The standoff was officially ended with the signing of a
vaguely worded statement on police reform in October 2007 (essentially agreeing to discuss
the matter further), which then enabled Bosnia to sign a Stabilisation and Association
Agreement with the EU in May 2008. However, the chances of structural police reform taking
place in this context in the foreseeable future are widely considered to be extremely slim, and
there is currently little appetite on the part of the EU to pursue the issue further.

Despite, or perhaps because of, the furore and protracted stalemate around negotiations on
police reform at this level, community policing initiatives have regained their currency,
presenting as they do means to pursue professionalism and better service delivery almost
abstracted from debates on higher level police reform and broader restructuring. As a result of
continued emphasis on community policing in the country, in mid 2006 the Ministry of Security
(a cross-entity body) convened a working group comprised of serving officers and ministry
officials from across BiH with a particular interest or expertise in community policing. The
group received (and is still receiving) support from DFID and SDC, and was mandated to
develop BiH's first country-wide strategy for community policing, stemming from a recognition
that previous efforts, including various pilots or internationally-supervised reforms (i.e. IPTF
and EUPM) had been fragmented, inconsistent and at times overly theoretical. The strategy
was eventually adopted in 2007, providing a common framework around which Bosnia's
several policing agencies, ministries, donors and interested NGOs could align their efforts. The
working group was established as an official structure in January 2008 and tasked with
developing the means of implementing the strategy.

2.2 Monitoring

The monitoring undertaken during the SDC programme (more below) was based on a standard
organisational approach. This appears to be determined by a requirement for SDC to
demonstrate to its donor (the Swiss Government) that activities are being carried out on
budget and to schedule. Accordingly, all SDC-funded projects must submit six-monthly
progress reports to SDC headquarters in Bern. The reports were written by programme staff in
Bosnia, seemingly on the basis of their own knowledge about the project.

According to SDC’s country office in BiH, logframe assessment (cross-checking of defined
indicators and outputs) and continuous mutual feedback from the beneficiaries also constituted
important monitoring instruments.8

2.3 Review / Evaluation9

The purpose of the 2006 external evaluation was to provide an assessment of Phase 10 of the
programme in order to enable SDC to make an informed decision around whether, and how,
the programme should be refocused beyond this phase. Given that the continuation of the
programme was not questioned, the exercise can be considered a review rather than an
evaluation per se. Concurrently, SDC was undertaking a restructuring of its work in Eastern

---

7 SDC uses the OECD-DAC definition of monitoring: ‘regular process of examining a project’s actual outputs and impact.
Carried out during the implementation phase, monitoring seeks to provide a project team with current information that will
allow them to assess progress in meeting project activities, and to adjust implementation activities if necessary.
Monitoring generates data that can be used for evaluation purposes’. Taken from OECD-DAC Glossary of Terms.
8 Email from Ms. Ursula Messeri Baftijaj, 27 October 2008, quoting comments received from the SDC Co-operation
Office in Sarajevo.
9 SDC defines ‘evaluation’ as ‘To evaluate means to determine the value, the price or the importance of something. In
development co-operation, an evaluation is carried generally out to appreciate to results or the effectiveness of a project,
a programme or a strategy’. Taken from SDC website (12 September 2008),
Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the evaluator was therefore asked to propose strategic options for the continued development of the programme and make recommendations in line with this. Within the South Eastern Europe regional police reform programme, five sub-projects were reviewed:

- Implementing Community Policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- Implementing Community Policing in Romania;
- Organised Crime Training Network (OCTN) for Operational Managers in South Eastern Europe;
- Enhancement of Anti-Trafficking Responses in South Eastern Europe; and
- Strengthening Law Enforcement Capacities for Fighting Human Trafficking in South Eastern Europe.

The evaluation focussed on the strategic needs of SDC, but also helped programme staff to show ‘upward’ accountability for money spent and enabled SDC to communicate successes externally.\(^\text{10}\)

The 2006 evaluation report notes that during project implementation, co-ordination with other donors working on security and policing was good, but there is no evidence of SDC co-ordinating its monitoring or evaluation work in the same way. Though potential reference points existed in that other actors were also supporting police reforms, SDC did not link its evaluation exercise with the work of others. DFID was also providing support to community policing via a series of pilot projects, but with a different approach and in different areas;\(^\text{11}\) and EUPM had a country-wide monitoring mandate which extended to community policing.

At the time of the evaluation (as mentioned above), the issue of police reform was causing political crisis in BiH. The evaluator noted in an interview for this research that this political situation did not make his task easier, and that it may have influenced the willingness of some respondents to openly answer questions relating to SSR and policing (even if community policing is generally considered as being separate from the broader issue of structure police reform in BiH).

3. Scope, method and approach

3.1 Monitoring

Two population surveys were carried out in one pilot district (Zenica) in 2005 and 2006, measuring public perceptions of security and the police – drawing upon broader public perceptions of safety, security problems and police performance.\(^\text{12}\) It is unclear whether the surveys were planned for in the programme document (as the research team was unable to access this). It appears that they were undertaken separately to the project. Nonetheless, they were considered a useful tool by the project staff (in fact, a decision was made to carry out such surveys annually in the current three-year programme period), but unfortunately, the research team was not able to gain access to the surveys, and to assess their content against the project logic. It appears that there were no additional monitoring activities (participatory or not) undertaken as part of this project to gather information from beneficiaries and other

---


\(^\text{11}\) In addition to the difference between the common law (United Kingdom) and the civil law (Switzerland) systems, the two organisations also approach community policing differently, with DFID aiming to establish community policing as the general organisational and strategic principle of the police force, and training all police staff at every level in community policing, while SDC focuses on creating dedicated community policing specialists within the different levels of the police force. This distinction is briefly mentioned in Hanspeter Uster, op cit, p 19.

\(^\text{12}\) Comments given orally on a previous draft by the SDC Local Representative Zoran Petrovic on 25 September 2008.
stakeholders (surveys, interviews, etc.), whether to inform project management or to support six-monthly reporting (see below). Factors such as gender were not considered as a significant factor in the programme’s design and so received no special attention (see section 3.2 below).

Reporting was one key element of project monitoring. SDC-funded projects are subject to a six-monthly reporting requirement that involves the submission to SDC headquarters of an internal report presenting the progress and results achieved. SDC also requests regular financial reports to monitor expenditures against the agreed budget. The objective of the reporting seems to be mainly to communicate to the donor government whether project implementation is progressing according to plan in the sense of outputs specified in the project document being delivered. Standard SDC reporting forms were used to report on the BiH project’s progress, requiring reporting against activities set out in a project logframe. It was not possible to properly assess the usefulness of these reports however, since the research team failed to gain access to the reports or a reporting template. It would have been interesting to look at which indicators were used and how these were measured, as well as the balance between the use of output (activity focussed) and outcome/impact level (measuring change) as well as the balance between qualitative and quantitative indicators.

However, although six-monthly progress reports were produced, this does not mean that monitoring was systematic, routine or in-depth. As outlined above, apart from reporting, SDC does not appear to have had any other formal monitoring mechanisms in place. There does not seem to have been any specific activities undertaken for collecting qualitative or quantitative information (e.g. stakeholder consultations, focus groups, reviews of crime data) to support reporting. That said, the management structures used to implement the project were fairly elaborate and monitoring will have included routine information exchanges during meetings held within these structures.

Overall management of the regional programme was handled from Bern, while the management of the specific BiH sub-project was shared with the SDC Office in BiH which supported Bern in the areas of planning, monitoring, steering and policy dialogue. The community policing project was fully embedded in the SDC’s Bosnia country programme.13 The evaluator found this arrangement to be useful for co-ordinating the Swiss national stakeholders, the international community and regional institutions. It was also noted that this structure was necessary to manage the synergies between the bilateral and regional sub-projects; and that it served the need for strong networking and cross-linking of regional sub-projects better than attempting to co-ordinate among country offices or a country-based programme management arrangement. Yet, as far as the research team can tell, the information that would have guided the decision-making processes within these structures was reliant on the knowledge and assessments of the implementing officers. This knowledge took the form of oral exchanges at meetings and daily communication between project staff.

It is salient then, that the 2006 evaluation report recommended that ongoing impact assessments be carried out in the future as a way of monitoring the effectiveness of the programme, but notes that this approach requires the collection of baseline data, followed by regular data collection throughout the life of the project.14 This recommendation has been taken on board for the current programme phase, where the project document states that there will be an impact monitoring. During the project a set of indicators will be proposed and tested. The set of tested and adopted project indicators forms an instrument which will help evaluate the external effects of the project.15 (See also section 5 below).

3.2 Evaluation

As mentioned, the evaluation covered Phase 10 of the regional programme, which lasted from March 2005 to December 2007. The terms of reference (ToR) for the evaluation were defined

13 Email from Ms. Ursula Messerli Baftijaj, 27 October 2008, quoting comments received from the SDC Co-operation Office in Sarajevo.
14 Hanspeter Uster, op cit, pp 13-14.
by the Unit for Co-operation with Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (the DCE in short) at SDC in Bern, who were seeking information to support the review of the project.

The review covered SDC’s entire regional project, within which the BiH sub-project was only a part. For this reason, the review focused mainly on the overall programme level which was assessed in light of three key criteria (the relevance and effectiveness of the strategy, and the efficiency of action taken) plus an assessment of the regional management structure used to implement the programme. The existing project document, which contained an overall objective, project purpose, planned results and indicators for each of the three levels, was used to guide the evaluation. (Indicators however were only specific to, and elaborated at, the output level.) The evaluator carried out the following activities to gather this information:

- Examination of available documents (provided by SDC);
- Interviews with SDC and other federal employees;
- Visits to Romania (6 days), BiH (4 days), Brussels (1 day);
- Telephone interviews with individuals abroad.

In BiH, the evaluator met a total of 14 people in the cities of Sarajevo and Zenica. This adds to the approximately 33 people met by the evaluator in Switzerland, Belgium and Romania, or interviewed by telephone, to perform his evaluation of the whole regional programme. The type of data collected was qualitative only. The available evidence indicates that participatory methods were not used, in the sense that the evaluator did not speak to beneficiaries or people truly external to the programme, but focused on resource people either directly involved in or with a link to the programme (see list of interviewees in section 4.2). As indicated in the monitoring section above, no baseline survey had been undertaken at the beginning of the programme’s implementation against which the evaluator could assess his findings.

Unfortunately, assessing the relationship between the evaluation and the project’s objectives, goals and indicators was hindered by the inability of the research team to gain access to the programme document for Phase 10. It is unclear whether the first recommendation that came out of the 2007 evaluation (to keep a system of indicators up-to-date – see section 5 below) was made in response to there being a lack of up-to-date and relevant indicators in the Phase 10 (2004–2007) programme document, or whether this was already being done and the evaluator was commending the project for doing this.

The Logframe annexed to the recent project document (2007–2010) outlines indicators for the current project phase:

**PURPOSE/OBJECTIVES/RESULTS** | **INDICATOR(S)**
---|---
**Overall Objective:** Improved quality of life and improved security in BiH society | • Police presence  
• Visible preventive police work  
• Practical co-operational security projects  
• Existing transparency regarding public order police work.

**Purpose:** enhanced sense of security of the BiH population | • Gradually better sense of security in each of the three public opinion polls

**Results** | **Etc**
---|---
• Opinion polls carried out | • Poll results are available by the end of 2007, mid 2009 and second half of 2010
• Prevention campaigns methods implemented | • Three prevention campaigns executed by the end of 2009 and second half of 2010

---

It is difficult to comment on the quality of these indicators as they are linked specifically to a different programme phase (Phase 11, 2007-2010). However, one observation is that the higher level indicators are vague, and it is unclear how progress towards them is to be achieved. It would be useful to break these indicators down into more specific elements which outline how ‘police presence’, for example, would be measured in qualitative and quantitative terms: numbers of police on the streets, percentage of population who regard the police presence to be actually having a positive impact on the safety/security situation.

As the programme did not address gender issues in its implementation, the evaluation did not look in any great detail at the programme’s impact on gender roles and expectations, which some interviewees felt was a main challenge for the programme. One sub-project did have a gender component: after the introduction in BiH of a new law criminalising domestic violence, a campaign was carried out to raise awareness about this issue, involving local police, prosecutors, judges, schools, and a local women and children’s NGO (Medica). However, given the lack of other gender-related efforts, the evaluator noted that a great deal of progress could be made in terms of making the programme contribute towards SDCs’ cross-cutting theme Gender and Youth. The current programme document does deal with gender more directly, stressing the indirect of community-based policing on gender roles within the police force, and has the increased, of female police officers as a specific project objective. It is unclear whether this is a direct result of the evaluation.

4. Inputs

4.1 Monitoring

With the notable exception of the Zenica public opinion poll cited above, monitoring inputs consisted mainly of the on-hand skill and information of programme staff deployed in BiH. They in turn relied on a combination of their personal judgement on ongoing progress and the paper outputs from activities such as training events for raw information.

4.2 Evaluation

The external evaluator, Mr Hanspeter Uster, was a lawyer and politician active in the Swiss canton of Zug. He held various positions within the Executive Council including that of Director for Justice and Police. Mr Uster has relevant experience in the criminal justice sector, both as a ‘practitioner’ and in an oversight capacity. However, this was his first assignment in BiH and his first ever evaluation. He was the sole evaluator. For his visit to BiH, the evaluator received assistance from the SDC country office in Sarajevo as well as from the sub-project team, which both participated to the identification of potential interviewees and to the organisation of the evaluator’s meetings. The interviewees listed on the evaluator’s schedule for his visit to BiH include:

- Police Commissioner of the Zenica-Doboj Ministry of Interior;
- Community Policing Co-ordinator of the Zenica-Doboj Ministry of Interior;
- Chief of the Zenica Police Unit;
- Police Commander of the Zenica central police station;
- Director of the Police Academy in Sarajevo;
- Assistant Minister (International Co-ordination Unit) of the Ministry of Security;
- Community Policing Co-ordinator of the FBiH Ministry of Interior;
- OCTN Project Manager;
- Local Representative of the BiH sub-project;
- SDC country office in BiH;
- Deputy Head of the Swiss Embassy in Sarajevo;

The evaluation report states that the co-operation between the police and the local NGO did not take place due to a lack of funding, but this is not correct: the campaign against domestic violence did take place, although the local NGO later experienced funding problems. Hanspeter Uster, op cit, p 17.

A detailed biography is available in German on Mr. Uster’s website [http://www.hanspeter-uster.ch/](http://www.hanspeter-uster.ch/).
• Chief of Joint Programme Development and Co-ordination Department of EUPM;
• the project manager of the DFID-funded community-based policing project;
• the women’s non-governmental organisation (NGO) Medica;
• Executive Director of the education and youth NGO Education builds B&H;
• Faculty of Political Science of the University of Sarajevo.

The list provided the evaluator with a good range of respondents, although none of the above could be said to be truly external to the project (the two listed NGOs having been involved in certain activities). During an interview for this research, the evaluator noted that the limited time available in-country did not allow for in-depth questioning of the respondents. Furthermore, the evaluator expressed some doubt as to whether the field-level police officers he interviewed were speaking freely, or whether they were merely repeating the official line as relayed to them by their superior.

The evaluator was provided with a large amount of written documentation prior to the field trip, including relevant Government policy documents, programme progress reports and other internal programme documents. The amount of information was found to be too much for the evaluator, who noted that it was a significant challenge to sort through the information, making him feel that he was almost unable to see the wood for the trees.\(^\text{20}\) Nevertheless, it is to SDC’s credit that sufficient background information was made available.

In-country inputs were more mixed. Despite receiving excellent support and co-operation from SDC, the evaluator himself noted a degree of reluctance among certain BiH police officers to divulge requested information other than that already in the public domain, in some cases he was only supplied with marketing materials, and a tendency to speak purely ‘on the record’, perhaps in fear of recrimination. It is impossible to say whether this is entirely due to context (the still suspicious atmosphere of post-conflict, post-Communist Bosnia and the politicisation of police reform) or failures to adequately prepare the ground for an evaluator.

Going by the rule of thumb that projects should have around 5 per cent of their budgets allocated for (M&E), this evaluation may have been under-resourced (as mentioned above, the budget for Phase 10 of the programme was CHF 4.7 million (approximately GBP 2.3 million)).

### 5. Participation and information sharing

Some interviewees criticised the programme for being based on assumptions about community needs and not testing these through consulting beneficiaries about project logic and approach. It was felt that the exclusion of beneficiaries – including vulnerable groups and civil society representatives – from the design process posed a number of risks to the efficiency, impact, sustainability and local buy-in of the project. However, other stakeholders argued that these risks were mitigated by the fact that the phase under review was a continuation of a long-term programme of work, and the project design was therefore based on previous experiences and first-hand knowledge about the local context.

This emphasises the importance of evaluators consulting with those who designed the programmes, so as to enable a thorough assessment of whether the actors involved in designing a project have based their judgements on a sensitive context assessment.

#### 5.1 Monitoring

As outlined above, some interviewees criticised the programme for not involving external stakeholders (including vulnerable groups such as women and minorities) to any significant degree in the design and M&E of the programme. The Zenica public opinion polls – which were carried out for two consecutive years (2005 and 2006) and solicited peoples’ views and perceptions on security and relationships between citizens and the police – were however important examples of where this was not the case. Although, as noted above, the polls were

---

\(^\text{20}\) Telephone interview with Hanspeter Uster, 16 June 2008.
not specifically designed to enable comparisons with the project indicators, they did demonstrate to project staff that the introduction of community policing was bringing about positive change in the pilot site. Increased police presence and improved communication, for example, had directly contributed to an increased sense of security.

Another point to note is that a good deal of co-operation was established with other relevant donors, especially in the area of monitoring. The evaluator deemed that the exchange of information between SDC and DFID was very good. The Local Representative for SDC elaborated on this point: a joint steering committee (comprising of representatives from DFID, SDC, EUPM and local police) had been established for DFID’s pilot site in Žepče and the SDC site in Zenica. The steering committee met 2-3 times a year and promoted the attendance of the members at each other’s training events. Agreed reporting procedures further facilitated the exchange of experiences and lessons learned.

Some interviewees identified this as a good example of information sharing and donor co-ordination in the area of M&E, while not threatening the integrity and independence of the objectives and approaches of the different projects.

5.2 Evaluation

As highlighted earlier, the evaluation was carried out according to a ToR prepared by SDC. No input from BiH stakeholders was sought, though a reasonably broad cross-section of BiH institutional stakeholders were consulted during the evaluation. A number of interviewees’ challenged the evaluation for failing to do this, and cited the inclusion of stakeholders in the design of evaluations as critical to their success.

Having drafted the report, the evaluator went through a consultation process, primarily with SDC, before completing the final evaluation report. A first draft was sent to a contact person at SDC for comments. These comments were incorporated into a second draft, which was presented orally to the SDC Unit for Co-operation with Eastern Europe and the CIS (DCE) for a questions and answers session. According to the evaluator, significant changes were requested by SDC at this point, whether because of a lack of clarity over the task or because of pre-conceived ideas about the future of the programme. A third version was then sent to relevant Swiss Government agencies, the project team and those interviewed. No truly external stakeholders or beneficiaries were consulted. A number of interviewees felt that this was a significant weakness.

6. Outputs and application

6.1 Monitoring

It is not possible to comment on the content of the six-monthly reports, as the research team was unable to gain access to them. As for the application of the two opinion polls undertaken in Zenica, their positive findings were used to argue for a continuation of the programme, and for its expansion to other parts of BiH. The point made was that if the introduction of community policing has had positive effects in Zenica (for example in terms of increased sense of security), it would have the same positive effects in other local communities.

As is clear from the above, much of the monitoring consisted of ongoing assessments carried out by the local project staff, and it seems that this was used efficiently to adjust project implementation. For example, when implementation in RS proved difficult due to local political resistance, the project officer responded by focusing efforts on work in Zenica-Doboj. This same flexibility seems to have been built into the current programme phase, as the current project document leaves room for special implementation plans and budgets to be drawn up if the Border Police and SIPA should express interest in being part of the project. It is also noted (in the lesson learned section) that project implementation ‘has to be adjusted to the local

circumstances in co-operation with local stakeholders who are willing to take over ownership and responsibility’.

6.2 Evaluation

The final output of the evaluation exercise was a 28-page report, to which 34 pages of annexes were attached.\(^22\) The two-page Abstract presents a concise summary of the methodology, findings and lessons; the rest of the report is divided into sections describing the programme (section 2), the approach and methodology (section 3), the relevance of the programme (section 4), the effectiveness of the programme (section 5), the programme implementation structure (section 6), two strategic options (section 7), and the expert’s recommendations (section 8).

Although the evaluator did not set out to look at other criteria, outside of those listed above, the report does mention the building of local capacity and the generation of local ownership – factors that would contribute towards sustainability ‘The regional programme goes a long way towards ensuring that state authorities are provided with well-trained personnel to handle the various threats’.  He also concluded (partly from the way police officials spoke about the community policing projects and defended them) that police officials – national regional or local – viewed the projects as being theirs.\(^23\)

Overall, the evaluation is very positive, giving the programme positive marks on all counts:

Relevance:

- The programme is relevant to other policies and strategies: it is deemed to be in line with international guidelines for SSR and governance, Swiss foreign and security policy objectives as well as SDC’s Balkans strategy. Furthermore, the programme’s approach fits with the Swiss whole-of-government approach; and the programme’s goals are complementary to the *acquis communautaire* criteria that candidate countries need to qualify for EU association and membership.
- The programme is relevant to the context: it has managed to adapt the SSR fundamentals to regional and local needs.\(^24\) Also, the evaluator notes that programme staff are able to respond to the situation on the ground: for example, in Bosnia the two bodies in charge of the programme got off to a slow start, but the SDC programme manager ‘responded to the challenging situation in an optimal and adequate manner’ by launching the initial phase without the involvement of the RS.

Effectiveness:

- The programme was ‘both effective and efficient’.\(^25\)
- The effectiveness of the regional programme was “due in part to its careful selection of priority countries and interventions that align well with respective local and country strategies, and the closely interwoven or complementary sub-projects”.\(^26\)
- Regional co-operation in the area of law enforcement has been effective.\(^27\)
- When assessing the effectiveness of the sub-projects, the evaluator mainly focuses on outputs, but does mention that (in Romania) all of the police staff involved in the project were left with a community policing concept “that they are familiar with and are able to apply”, so this is more of an outcome.\(^28\) He also ascribes the specific strengths of the projects to the fact that they change perceptions of what police work entails, and that they establish and strengthen ties between police and civil society at all levels.\(^29\)

Assessment of programme management structure and its efficiency:

\(^{22}\) Hanspeter Uster, *op cit.*

\(^{23}\) Hanspeter Uster *op cit*, pp 5, 7, 9, 11.

\(^{24}\) *Ibid*, p 11.


\(^{26}\) *Ibid*, p 17.

\(^{27}\) *Ibid*, pp 5, 17.


\(^{29}\) *Ibid*, p 16.
On the management structure (with central steering from Bern): the evaluator states that this structure should not be changed. He finds:

- that central steering capabilities are essential for co-ordination with Swiss national stakeholders, the international community and regional institutions;
- that the specialised know-how of experts can be better galvanised and channelled through a centrally-steered programme;\(^{30}\)
- that this structure is necessary to manage the synergies between the bilateral and regional sub-projects, and that it serves the need for strong networking and cross-linking of regional sub-projects. The evaluator states that this would be impossible to achieve using a co-ordination offices/country programme manager-based structure, as this would entail an excessive workload;
- that regional and local partners praised the close working relationship between the project manager and the local managers on the ground.\(^{31}\) The evaluator was told by all SDC staff that programme co-operation works and is satisfactory.

On the integration of the different programme elements: the regional and the bilateral levels were found to be complementary and well co-ordinated.\(^{32}\) The various sub-projects are “solidly embedded at both the local and the regional levels, they complement one another, and there is an efficient use of synergies between the sub-projects” (although language barriers are an obstacle in some cases) regional co-operation in the area of law enforcement has been equally important and effective – links have been established both at the regional and at the bilateral levels, which complement each other;\(^{33}\)

On capacity: the evaluator noted that the division of labour, skills and expertise matches the specific requirements of a regional programme. He also describes it as a strength that “widely acknowledged experts are called in to work on the regional programme – the assigned external project managers have a very solid reputation and – as was repeated many times during my visit – do Swiss quality work;\(^{34}\)

On financial efficiency: the evaluator found that the regional programme has accomplished a great deal with relatively little resources at its disposal; that the cost/use ratio seems adequate and that the overhead costs of the programme can be considered moderate.\(^{35}\)

The evaluator was asked to outline two or three strategic options for the next regional programme phase and recommend one of them. The evaluator outlines two strategic options: Core Minus and Core Plus, the latter being (as the name would indicate) an expanded version of the programme. This includes four different activities that are not included in the Core Minus option.\(^{36}\) The evaluator assesses the two options in the light of a planned cutback in the DCE budget and human resources: the Core Minus option would allow for such a cutback to take place (with a budget of CHF 1.5 to 2 million), while the Core Plus option would assume that this cutback does not happen (budgeted at CHF 2 to 2.5 million). The evaluator presents his recommendations as follows:

- ‘the Core Plus option should be chosen for the next programme phase;
- the specific implementation structure should be maintained;
- the terminology used by the DCE Plan for the West Balkans should be adjusted to match the SDC portfolio;
- specific projects that lend themselves particularly well to replication (e.g. security marketing) should be adjusted and applied to other DCE programmes;
- in relation to IDAG SSR, SDC and FDFA, senior management need to determine to what extent necessary interdepartmental co-operation enables the various actors within the

\(^{30}\) Ibid, p 5.
\(^{31}\) Ibid, p10.
\(^{32}\) Ibid, pp 4, 9, 18.
\(^{33}\) Ibid, pp 17-18.
\(^{34}\) Ibid, p 11.
\(^{35}\) Ibid, pp 5-17.
\(^{36}\) These were: the promotion of regional co-operation in police and law enforcement; the development of training modules to improve the interface between criminal investigation departments and public prosecutors; the development of a project to strengthen the role of the Southeast Europe Police Chiefs Association; and the inception of a community policing pilot project in Montenegro.
Federal Administration to work together in parallel and where there is overlap in their activities.\textsuperscript{37}

The new (Phase 11) project document for \textit{Implementing Community Policing in Bosnia-Herzegovina} mentions that 'the ongoing project has been externally evaluated – with favourable results – in the framework of the evaluation of Phase 10 of the regional program [...]'.\textsuperscript{38} The sub-project team also mentioned that the evaluator’s recommendations were taken onboard for the next phase of the programme, which started on 1 October 2007 and is still ongoing. Indeed, SDC did choose to continue the programme, and in an expanded form, rolling community policing out to the rest of BiH, but did not follow the evaluator’s Core Plus plan. This is not (only) because of any SDC disagreement with the specifics of the Core Plus plan, but also because of the adoption of a national community policing strategy for BiH (see above), which was seen as an opportunity to link with existing locally-owned processes. This means that the objectives and activities for the current programme are linked specifically to the objectives in the national community policing strategy.

Also, despite the positive assessment of the programme’s management structure, SDC chose to revise and change it in the following programme phase, transferring more autonomy and decision-making power to the local country offices. Therefore, given that the evaluator’s recommendations did not seem to form the basis for SDC’s decisions concerning future programme scope and management structure, and the fact that the review did not offer much in terms of criticism, it is difficult to assess exactly what impact this exercise had on the next phase of the BiH sub-project, besides supporting its continuation for three more years.

In terms of the (M&E) structure however, the evaluation has presumably had an impact. For example, the evaluation report contains a recommendation on the public opinion survey conducted in Zenica in 2005 and 2006, noting that it ‘showed positive results but does not lend themselves to comparison with areas where there are no community policing projects.’\textsuperscript{39} This is a straightforward observation for SDC to take on board when drawing up the ToR for the next opinion polls. Also the reporting, monitoring and assessment section states that:

- a system of indicators will be kept up to date;
- an impact monitoring will take place;
- public opinion polls will be conducted to assess the external effects of the project;
- yearly progress reports will be submitted to the two entity governments of BiH;
- regular reports on achieved results will be delivered to SDC;
- an internal evaluation is foreseen by the end of 2009.\textsuperscript{40}

7. Challenges

The challenges outlined in this section reflect the views of the authors and not of the SDC or the evaluator.

7.1 Monitoring

Given the fairly straightforward monitoring arrangements in place for this project, there appears to have been few challenges for staff. The information required to complete six-monthly reports was narrative, focussing on activities carried out.

7.2 Review / Evaluation

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ibid}, p. 6. IDAG SSR refers to the Swiss Interdepartmental Working Group on Security Sector Reform, and FDFA refers to the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.


\textsuperscript{39} Hanspeter Uster, \textit{op cit} p 14.

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Ibid}, p 25.
The most obvious challenges encountered during this evaluation are those of resource and time constraints, particularly given the regional scope of the project. The main challenge in terms of gathering evidence was a lack of time to review what was a substantial regional programme; both in the preparatory phases when reviewing the documentation (to illustrate his point, the evaluator described the stack of documentation he received as 2 metres high), and in-country when interviewing informants. This was particularly an issue as the evaluator had very limited experience in evaluating, and no geographical experience.

A further challenge identified through the research and outlined above was the exclusion of beneficiaries and stakeholders external to the programme in the design and conduct of the evaluation – which some stakeholders felt limited local ownership of the programme. This is a common challenge experienced when conducting evaluations in many contexts and is often linked to difficulties in convincing management that the results will be worth the effort, funding constraints and difficulties in accessing relevant groups of people, and soliciting their input in a constructive manner. Although it is unclear what challenges were faced in this specific project, this highlights the importance of including beneficiaries and external stakeholders in evaluation design and feedback processes.

It seems that the evaluator was able to carry out his task in-country without any kind of cross-departmental interference or complications stemming from other Swiss Government institutions and there is no evidence that higher-level political agendas impacted on the implementation of the evaluation and its findings. However, this could be partially due to the fact that other parts of the Swiss Government are not very active in BiH. Reluctance on the part of Bosnian stakeholders was however noted by the evaluator who emphasised the fact that several police interviewees seemed reluctant to divulge information or talk freely (see above).

A final challenge may relate to the lack of a shared understanding between the evaluator and SDC on what was expected of him. Although a ToR was provided and an initial briefing given to the evaluator, he remarked that it was only prior to his third draft of the report for the DCE, after many revisions that he finally understood what they really wanted – this is not unusual, but does inhibit the focus and efficiency of the evaluator. It is not possible to stay with certainty whether this was because SDC themselves were not sure what exactly they wanted out of the evaluation, or whether they just did not communicate it sufficiently well to the evaluator. However the evaluator felt that SDC had a firm commitment to continue its project and, while prepared to vary the design somewhat, also knew (broadly speaking) which form they wanted the next phase of the programme to take. This would indicate that SDC did have a broad idea at least of what they wanted and that the problem here was mainly one of communication. Politics is likely to have played a role here, in that a continuation of the regional programme was a Swiss government priority, and – for the Bosnian sub-project – that there was an obvious interest in linking up with the new national Bosnian strategy of community policing, which meant that the evaluators recommendations were going to be weighed against these other priorities.

8. Lessons

The lessons learned outlined in this section are formulated by the research team on the basis of the analysis outlined above. They relate to both the monitoring and evaluation of the project:

*The need to validate monitoring information:* Given the output-focussed nature of SDC’s progress reports and accompanying monitoring during the project, the information provided was mainly based on the knowledge and perceptions of the programme staff. While this provides those working ‘inside’ the project with an opportunity to analyse successes and challenges (at least at the level of outputs) a ‘reality check’ would require external views to be sought. The exchange taking place with project managers from DFID and EUPM was therefore a positive initiative, and one which could contribute to checking internal assumptions and theories of change against those of other project implementers. However – while recognising
that this is more resource-intensive – the project could also benefit from seeking the views of beneficiaries, as this generally helps in gauging outcomes, impacts, validate information and checking for unintended results.

The value of public opinion polling: SDC took the unusual step (in SSR terms) of piloting public opinion polls as a monitoring tool in connection with this project, apparently finding them a powerful and persuasive form of information collection. A number of interviewees felt that the undertaking of these surveys had ensured the participation of external stakeholders and beneficiaries and a sense of local ownership over the monitoring of the programme. It is therefore very positive that SDC is planning to continue carrying out these surveys annually with modifications across BiH in the current three-year programme phase. A total of three will be carried out, one before, one in the middle and one at the end of the project, in order to measure the development of the sense of security in the population, with further activity in the project [being] adjusted according to the poll results. For those who value quantitative information sources for their theoretical ability to provide statistically valid comparisons within sub-groups of a sample, such surveys also offer a unique way to ‘prove’ whether observed changes in one area are attributable to programme activities, through a comparison with ‘control’ areas. However, it is obviously important to think carefully about what the programme management wants out of these surveys and tailor them accordingly so as to ensure that they are in fact replicable, reliable and well processed. In many cases it may pay to use other more rapid or qualitative techniques depending on budgets and context.

Local ownership and participation: A number of interviewees criticised the evaluation for not including external stakeholders and beneficiaries in the design process and also for not sharing the findings. This emphasises the importance of taking a participatory approach in the M&E of SSR-related programmes.

The prospect of regional approaches to M&E: SDC’s regional approach to its police reform work in SEE may be instructive. Regional SSR work is rare indeed but potentially a creative solution, especially where capable regional fora exist to facilitate it. The regional policing programme (of which the Bosnian community policing sub-project was part) was managed in Bern, and all the sub-projects had similar M&E structures in place. There seems no reason in principle why a more developed version of such regional-style M&E applied by SDC in this case could not be applied in other regional SSR projects. Of course this might open up both new possibilities and challenges. For example, it could be useful to consider how programme staff and governments within a region should record information, share it and come together to reflect on progress and lessons (itself useful for cross-border co-operation and confidence building). Some form of centralised management would surely be needed to pull this off, whether housed within a donor capital or regional organisation or government, each of which would have pros and cons. (In the case of the SDC project, the evaluator did question whether centralised management from Bern made sense, concluding in the end that it was probably the surest way of handling co-ordination.) That in turn would likely need to be coupled with national-level management units who could contribute to both monitoring and evaluation if desired (in fact the SDC evaluation recommended creation of a joint working team, composed of BiH nationals and SDC staff).

Provide adequate time and resources: More resources could have been dedicated to the 2006 evaluation to ensure that the evaluator was able to range more widely, investigate unanticipated results and ask more probing questions. It can be argued that the SDC should have considered the relationship between on the one hand, the resources dedicated to carrying out the review, and on the other hand, the size of its substantial regional programme. (As a rule of thumb, projects should set aside no less than 5 percent of budgets for M&E.) The points concerning communication and resources are particularly important in this case, given that the evaluator did not have previous experience with carrying out external evaluations, and it was therefore particularly important that he be given an appropriate level of support.

Ensure clarity regarding purpose, method and focus of evaluations: The SDC evaluation indicates how important it is to establish clarity on the main points of an evaluation, for which donors should look to hold detailed pre-briefings and provide clear and unambiguous ToR
documents. In this case, it would seem that SDC knew what they wanted out of the evaluation but did not communicate this clearly to the evaluator at the outset. However, it may also be the case that the donor is not clear on the purpose of the evaluation, for example because there is not internal agreement on this within the donor organisation. In this case, it may be helpful to have a more dialectic process at the outset, where there is time for the evaluator to come back to the donor with lessons learned along the initial stage, to test assumptions and clarify the real purpose or the order of priority of different purposes of the evaluation. However, this requires that additional time is spent at the initial stage (both by evaluator and by the client), and it can be difficult to convince a donor that this is a good investment. Of course budgeting also depends on the scope and function of evaluation. If, as may have been the case here, the scope for programme changes to follow the evaluation is only moderate, there is a case for doing a more limited and clearly focused evaluation or review, ideally to be supplemented later by a more wide-ranging exercise.

**Specify and define key terms:** It would have been useful if the evaluation report had provided a justification for the criteria used in this case, together with a definition for each criterion and perhaps of other key terms. The evaluation report does not specify which indicators were used when assessing the three criteria (efficiency, effectiveness and relevance), as well as the project management structure.

**Take account of context:** One of the main conclusions of the evaluation – which may jar with the sceptical reader – was that there were, actually no real weaknesses in the programme, except for factors having to do with context and structures in individual countries as well as effects of individual donor partners. Leaving aside the question of whether this utterly positive assessment is warranted, it does raise the question of the significance of contextual factors for evaluators. SSR often takes place in fragile environments with institutions of limited capacities and subtle political economies in which charting and delivering change strategies can be difficult and risky. These should obviously be taken into account in evaluations and a degree of charity extended to programmes that grapple with them. At the same time however, evaluators could reasonably expect programmes to have analysed context, designed activities accordingly, be managing for risk and so on. It is entirely legitimate for searching questions to be asked in areas such as these.

**Widen data sources and participation during evaluations and prior to publication:** It is an open question whether this evaluation would have reached equally positive conclusions had the evaluator spoken to intended beneficiaries and perhaps widened the range of stakeholders interviewed to include respondents with little or no knowledge of the project. But had the evaluator included these people on the list of interviewees, he would have been able to corroborate or contradict the views he was offered by people involved in or linked to the programme. These need not all have been laymen. For example, EUPM conducted an independent evaluation of progress in implementing community policing across BiH around the same time as the SDC evaluation, finding significant variation in take-up across the country. Attempts to share views and information or corroborate findings with sources such as this might have been very revealing. The same point can be made about the drafting stage, where efforts could have been made to consult external stakeholders on the evaluation’s draft findings.

This apparent lack of inclusion of beneficiaries and local resource persons in M&E efforts appears to be a weakness for the programme, which risks measuring its success and failure against a set of criteria which external stakeholders may not deem appropriate or sufficient. However, it should be noted that publishing an external evaluation of SSR work is far from a universal practice and SDC deserves credit for the openness this demonstrates. Whether or not the review would have been made public had it been less positive is of course not known, but it facilitates the lessons learning and the exchange of experiences to which this project hopes to contribute.

---

41 Community Policing as Part of Programme 5 – General Overview – EUPM.
Annex 1: Interviewees

Mr. Blaise Bonvin, Senior Consultant, TC Team Consult, Geneva, Switzerland (interviewed by telephone on 12 June 2008)

Mr. Jovan Divjak, Executive Director, Education Builds B&H, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (interviewed in Sarajevo on 14 May 2008)

Mr. Denis Hadžović, Centre for Security Studies, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (interviewed in Sarajevo on 15 May 2008)

Mr. Zoran Petrović, Local Representative, Community Policing Project in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (interviewed in Banja Luka on 29 May 2008)

Mr. Sead Traljić, Lucid Links, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (interviewed in Sarajevo on 15 May 2008)

Mr. Hanspeter Uster, External Evaluator, Baar, Switzerland (interviewed by telephone on 16 June 2008)