



RESEARCH REPORT

Survey of the United Nations Organisation's arrangements for monitoring and evaluating support to security sector reform

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List of acronyms

BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention
CO	Country Office
CPR	Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPA	Department for Political Affairs
DPET	Department of Policy, Evaluation and Training
DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping Operations
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
IDDRS	UN Integrated DDR Standards
ERBM	Enhanced Results Based Management
ERM	Enterprise Risk Management
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MONUC	UN Mission in DRC
MYFF	Multi-Year Funding Framework
MYFFR	Multi-Funding Framework Report
OCHA	UN Office for Humanitarian Affairs
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Mechanisms
OROLSI	Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
RBB	Results Based Budget
RBM	Results Based Management
ROAR	Results-Orientated Annual Report
ROL	Rule of Law
SADEV	Swedish Agency for Development Evaluations
SRF	Strategic Results Framework
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
SSR	security sector reform
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	UN Development Assistant Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia
UNDSS	UN Department for Safety and Security

1. Introduction

This report provides an overview of the United Nations Organisation's arrangements for monitoring and evaluating (M&E) security sector reform (SSR). It examines the M&E systems that already exist for similar types of work as well as looking at any specific treatment given to SSR, before also identifying outstanding needs, challenges and any trends and opportunities that exist for improving M&E in this area. It is one of five donor surveys carried out as part of the Saferworld project 'Evaluating for Security: Developing specific guidelines on monitoring and evaluating Security Sector Reform interventions'.¹

While the donor surveys unpack the institutional arrangements for M&E within the major SSR donors, they do not provide a detailed analysis of how this is carried out at the country level in particular cases. Instead, five separate country case studies have been carried out to investigate how individual SSR programmes have been monitored and evaluated. Together with a wider desk review, the case studies and donor surveys provide the evidence base from which specific guidance on monitoring and evaluating SSR can be developed.

Interviews for this research were conducted with representatives from the two primary UN agencies responsible for SSR, conflict prevention and recovery related programmes – the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and United Nations Development Programme Bureau for Crisis Prevention (UNDP BCPR). The interviewees have responsibility for policy development and implementation of SSR related programmes, as well as for M&E. The decentralised nature of programme M&E in both DPKO and UNDP BCPR made it difficult to interview those directly responsible at the country level. Thus, this report is focussed on actors engaging at the policy level and focuses predominantly on evaluation. Interviews were conducted in both New York and Geneva during the period 01-10 October 2008. (See annex one for a full list of the interviewees.)

The M&E terminology used in this study is consistent with that used by the UN and wherever appropriate, footnotes have been used to elaborate some specific terms in more detail.

2. Overall policy and approach to SSR and M&E

Over recent years a growing number of UN agencies operating at the national level have begun to provide explicit support to SSR programmes at the request of the host government and Secretary-General. While the objectives, approach and methodologies used have varied across countries and UN agencies, since 2007 the UN has started to develop a more coherent approach to SSR programming. The key document outlining how the UN should support SSR is the Secretary-General's January 2008 report: 'Securing Peace and Development'.² The report recommends a number of immediate priorities for the development of a holistic and coherent approach to SSR:

- Develop UN policies and guidelines, with a priority focus on:
 - Develop guidance on monitoring and evaluation of SSR programmes which focuses on measuring external impact and less on internal performance;
 - Develop guidance on national level reform which draws upon lessons generated at the mission level;
- Strengthen strategic advisory and specialist capacities;
- Strengthen field capacity for security sector reform;
- Assess gaps and resource requirements;
- Designate lead entities;
- Enhance the co-ordination and delivery of support;
- Build partnerships to provide effective support, expertise and adequate resources to national security sector reform processes;

¹ Other donor surveys include the institutional arrangements for M&E of SSR programmes by the, UK and Dutch Governments and the UN and EU.

² Report of the Secretary-General (January 2008), *Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform*.

- Establish a UN inter-agency security sector reform support unit to deliver on those priorities.³

Further, attempts have been made to improve cross-organisational co-operation on SSR through the establishment of an inter-agency group in 2007. The group is chaired by DPKO and comprises the UNDP, Department for Political Affairs (DPA), Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Fund For Women (UNIFEM) and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

Demands for a more coherent approach to SSR arose from the shared need of field missions and agencies to have support and guidance in the implementation of relevant activities. It was felt that, development of strategic and co-ordinated SSR programming at the central level would translate into a more coherent approach at the national level. However, while these early moves are positive, basic elements are not yet in place. Crucially, there is still no consensus between key departments within the UN on what SSR refers to. As a result, the term is employed to describe both single-issue reforms such as disarmament, and comprehensive processes based on broad principles such as good governance.

As stated above, the two primary agencies involved in SSR are the DPKO and the UNDP (BCPR). While DPKO is responsible for shorter-term programmes in an immediate post-conflict environment, through Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs), UNDP BCPR engages in longer-term programming in post-conflict environments, which focuses on broader conflict prevention and governance issues. The different mandates, set-up and competitive tensions between these two agencies have so far limited progress towards the introduction of a coherent UN approach to SSR.

2.1. Department for Peacekeeping Operations

The first PKOs to explicitly focus on SSR issues were the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and UN Mission in DRC (MONUC) in 2003. Since 2003, the number of PKOs focusing on SSR have grown substantially. As the first actors to engage in a post-conflict context, Peacekeepers are best placed to inform UN institutions on long-term SSR needs and for establishing indicators and baseline data for measuring the impact of UN programmes. As a result, DPKO has been set the task of developing best practice in this area, with member states providing information and support.

A small SSR unit was established in August 2008 within the DPKO's Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), which brings together all departments within DPKO that are relevant to SSR – that is the Police Division; Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Section; Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) section; and the UN Mine Action Service.⁴ This unit is a small team of five permanent members and is tasked with advising both PKOs that are supporting national SSR activities and the UN system as a whole.

The SSR Unit was established because of the overlap between different SSR-related programmes within DPKO and a perceived need to develop a more integrated and forward-looking approach through shared guidelines. This decision reflected the recognition that previous SSR-related programmes within DPKO had been *ad hoc* in nature: focussing on specific individual components of SSR rather than joined-up programming and not directed by common and integrated guidelines.

Within DPKO, programme authority for the undertaking of M&E is decentralised and therefore the responsibility of each individual mission. However, mission evaluations are decided upon, and ToRs developed at the headquarters level. Moreover, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) appointed for each mission is responsible for reporting directly to the Secretary-General.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ OROLSI is led by an Assistant Secretary-General who reports to the Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations.

2.2. United Nations Development Programme BCPR

The key programme through which SSR-related activities are delivered by the UNDP is the Global Programme on Justice and Security (2008-2011). As a consequence, the programme supports the implementation of relevant outcomes documented in the UNDP Strategic Plan; 2008-2011 (see Section 3.2 below [Crisis, Prevention and Recovery (CRP) – Outcomes 3, 4, 7 and 8]). Within UNDP, BCPR is a leader in CPR practice and is specifically responsible for supporting UNDP Country Offices (COs) in implementing the identified outcomes. As such, UNDP BCPR functions as both a knowledge and operational bureau.⁵

BCPR provides support to COs through technical and programmatic assistance, policy leadership and development of knowledge products.⁶ SSR-related assistance is provided by the Bureau, through the Global Programme and other mechanisms, in the form of strategy, outcome, output and indicator development. This is to ensure that activities are sensitive to local context.

At the policy level, UNDP COs are responsible for supporting national governments in achieving their Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as well as supporting the implementation of a UN Development Assistant Framework (UNDAF) – which is agreed by all the UN agencies operating within a country. The UNDAF outlines a number of agreed inter-agency outcomes and a set of indicators. These outcomes provide an overall framework for UN-wide support for national development goals.⁷

Below the level of national development goals and the UNDAF, outcomes are agency- specific in UNDP terminology. UNDP country programme outcomes are the expected development changes for which UNDP is one contributor and for which it shares accountability with governments and other partners. The UNDP contributes to outcomes through outputs produced by programmes and projects. UNDP country programmes are designed with governments and approved by the Executive Board.⁸

Programme authority for M&E is decentralised and therefore the responsibility of COs. COs receive funding from BCPR (via the Thematic Trust Fund which is supported by different donors) and bilateral donations. In 2006, an M&E specialist was appointed to the Central Strategy and Policy Cluster of BCPR. The role of this specialist is to build the capacity of the Bureau to implement a more systematic approach to M&E. This M&E system was established in early 2008 and is described in detail in Section 3.3 below.

3. Existing monitoring and evaluation arrangements

DPKO and UNDP have adopted different policy and practices with regard to M&E. UNDP has a more institutionalised approach to M&E as exemplified by BCPR's approach to SSR (see 3.2 below). In contrast, DPKO has established two sub-divisions to support M&E; this approach allows for a large degree of discretion, with individual units empowered to develop their own methodology. Thus, there is at the present time no collective and coherent approach to M&E of SSR between the different units in DPKO.

3.1. Department for Peacekeeping Operations

3.1.1 Monitoring⁹

⁵ Taken from BCPR Monitoring and Evaluation System 2008-2011.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Taken from UNDP Strategic Plan 2008 – 2011.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ DPKO does not include a working definition for 'monitoring' in its 'Glossary of Peacekeeping Terms' included on its website. The author has therefore used the OECD-DAC definition in this report: 'Regular process of examining a project's actual outputs and impact. Carried out during the implementation phase, monitoring seeks to provide a project team with current information that will allow them to assess progress in meeting project activities, and to adjust

The main formal system for monitoring is the Results Based Budget (RBB): a budgetary planning and monitoring tool (see below). Outside of this, DPKO does not maintain formal systems that support monitoring within missions; instead, each mission and DPKO Unit adopt independent and *ad hoc* processes centred around an in-country focal point. In addition, field personnel (for example, Police, Civil Affairs Officers, Human Rights Monitors and – to a lesser extent – Law and Judicial Support Officers¹⁰) play a key role in mission monitoring.

Collection of baseline data is also not mandatory, resulting in different practices being adopted by the various missions. A number of interviewees criticised DPKO for this omission, because it is considered to be crucial for effective M&E.

At the strategic level, the Office of Internal Oversight Mechanisms (OIOS)¹¹ developed the RBB framework in 2003 for DPKO units and missions to outline budgetary spending, activities and expected outputs and outcomes. As a result, the RBB is the only common monitoring tool used by the different units of Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) in DPKO.

RBB is a results-driven budgeting process in which:¹²

- Programme formulation and resource justification involve a set of predefined objectives, expected results, outputs, inputs and performance indicators which constitute a 'logical framework';
- Expected results justify resource requirements, which are derived from and linked to the outputs to be delivered, with a view to achieving such results;
- Actual performance in achieving results is measured by predefined performance indicators.

A RBB framework is developed for each outcome under each key component of mission activities, and all follow the same format. The RBB template requires information on the expected outcomes, indicators and outputs. An example RBB framework produced with support from relevant OROLSI units by UNMIL for Security Reform is provided below.¹³

Table 1: example RBB framework from UNMIL

EXPECTED OUTCOME	INDICATORS
Enhanced public law and order and operational capacity of the Liberian National Police Service	<p>3.1.1 Increase in the total number of Liberian National Police stations re-commissioned (2004/05: 15; 2005/06: 30; 2006/07: 62)</p> <p>3.1.2 Increase in the total number of deployed Liberian National Police Service officers (2004/05: 866; 2005/06: 2,300; 2006/07: 3,500)</p> <p>3.1.3 Maintained the percentage of total female Liberian National Police Service officers (2004/05: 12 per cent; 2005/06: 15 per cent; 2006/07: 15 per cent)</p> <p>3.1.4 Increase in the total number of Liberian National Police officers (in police units) deployed (2004/05: 0 officers; 2005/06: 300)</p>

implementation activities if necessary. Monitoring generates data that can be used for evaluation purposes.' Taken from OECD-DAC, *Glossary of Terms*, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/21/2754804.pdf> (accessed on 12 August 2008)

¹⁰ Blume, T (2008), *Implementing the Rule of Law in Integrated Missions, Security and Justice in the UN Mission in Liberia*.

¹¹ The Office of Internal Oversight Mechanisms (OIOS) is responsible for assisting the Secretary-General in fulfilling his internal oversight responsibilities in respect of the resources and staff through monitoring, internal audit, inspection, evaluation and investigation. The Office has the authority to initiate, carry out and report on any action that it considers necessary to fulfil its responsibilities with regard to its oversight functions.

¹² See *Result Based Budgeting: An Overview*, <http://fb.unsystemceb.org/reference/06/06>.

¹³ Taken from Report of the Secretary-General (2006), *Budget for the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007*.

	officers; 2006/07: 450 officers)
Outputs	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provision of advice to Liberian law enforcement agencies in developing working manuals and defining tasks and accountability for each position • Provision of advice to the Liberian National Police in management and financial accountability¹⁴ • Provision of advice to and monitoring of the Liberian National Police Service on policing and human rights standards through co-location with 92 police units, including 25 outlying local police team sites outside • Monrovia Monitoring of and provision of advice to the Liberian National Police Service on the police emergency system • Provision of advice to the Liberian National Police Academy on training needs assessment, including specialised training and senior and mid-level police management training • Facilitation of the expansion of community forums to all counties and monthly meetings among community police, gender county co-ordinators, other local organisations, NGOs, UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP, UNHCR, the American Refugee Committee, the International Rescue Committee, the Christian Children's Fund, OXFAM Great Britain, Save the Children United Kingdom and Médecins sans Frontières to resolve community issues • Provision of advice to the Liberian National Police Service on establishing women and juvenile units in stations and evaluation of a pilot station with unit • Advice to the Liberian National Police Service on gender mainstreaming • Advice to the Liberian Government and to identified Liberian Statutory Security Agencies for further reform and restructuring • Training of 645 Liberian National Police Service officers/cadets in policing, human rights, code of conduct, policing ethics and use of force 	

The RBB template also includes an additional section for recording budgetary allocations and spending and information on staff movements.

As outlined above, the RBB focuses on measuring output-level indicators linked to budgetary planning through the collection of quantitative data (such as number of people trained) and does not measure broader strategic impact against higher-level outcomes. According to a representative from the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Team, there are no monitoring mechanisms in place for measuring the impact of missions on political relationships and dynamics, which is often the ultimate and most important aspect of SSR programming.

Consequently, the RBB is not able to monitor many issues, for example competition between the Ministry of Justice and Chief Justice in Liberia, that have a detrimental impact on the progress of national reforms. Representatives from the DDR Unit who were interviewed for this report, also noted that although quantitative output indicators are valuable for their programmes (eg providing data on the number of ex-combatants demobilised, number of arms collected etc), they do not provide sufficient information on the wider political impact of DDR programmes. Measuring impact should therefore be broadened to include progress in monitoring the wider political and social context.

In spite of this, representatives within OIOS argue that RBB is an excellent monitoring tool and useful in terms of measuring outcomes, but that it is not well understood within the different units due to an under-developed M&E culture.

In the absence of a tool for developing outcome-level indicators, mission staff use the benchmarks set by the SRSG, however there still remains no system for measuring performance against these benchmarks. Some missions have begun developing a benchmarking system to address this gap. For example, UNMIL submitted a system, which defined contextual and operational benchmarks (including 'restoration of the rule of law') for the mission's consolidation and drawdown.¹⁵ The contextual benchmarks were introduced in 2007 and incorporated political and institutional development into future UNMIL analysis.¹⁶

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ S/RES/1777 19 September 2007.

¹⁶ Blume, T (2008), *op cit.*

The absence of a shared institutional understanding of what SSR constitutes appears to be difficulties in setting high-level performance indicators at the mission level. High-level indicators were not set for measuring performance of the UN Mission in Burundi (ONUB), for example, because of difficulties faced in agreeing on whether the mission was actually working on SSR or not. It was therefore not possible to decide on what impact the mission was aiming to have and what indicators to set.¹⁷

The performance of missions and peacekeeping activities is reported through the production of mandatory annual reports to the Secretary General. These reports include: a section on financial information, a summary of the mandate and planned results, a summary of human resources information, and the RBB framework for each outcome under the key mission components. The reports also include a section on planning and financial resources, resource analyses and recommendations for required actions of the General Assembly. As the RBB is focussed specifically on budgetary spending and measuring outputs, these required actions focus on budgetary requests and not strategic direction.

At the field level, missions are responsible for producing a number of regular update reports, (or 'code cables' as they are referred to in DPKO) for headquarters, including:

- Daily updates on mission activities;
- Weekly reports, providing more analysis of activities than the daily reports;
- Monthly reports, including a break down of activities relevant to each OROLSI (for example, they include a sub-section on policing activities led by UNIPOL);
- Bi-annual reports;
- End of programme reports.

Desk Officers for each OROLSI Unit are based in the missions and are responsible for producing and contributing to report writing (for example, the police unit has a Desk Officer located in each mission where policing activities are a key focus of the mandate). The Senior Mission Management is responsible for end-of-programme reports; while reporting is a formal requirement, the production and quality of these reports varies by mission.

Finally, DPKO has no agreed system for risk monitoring at present. A risk management framework is currently being developed by the Department of Policy, Evaluation and Training (DPET). However, this is an internal document, and was inaccessible to the researcher.

3.1.2 Evaluations¹⁸

Responsibility for evaluating DPKO and missions is divided between the Evaluation Unit in DPET, situated within DPKO's Peacekeeping Best Practice Section (DBPS), and the OIOS. The DPET Evaluation Unit is focused specifically on evaluating the internal performance of missions (that is staffing, expenditure etc). In contrast, the OIOS is mandated to undertake audits and investigations for the whole Secretariat as distinct oversight functions.¹⁹ In addition, OIOS is responsible for carrying out thematic evaluations. This section provides some information on the M&E activities undertaken by each DPKO unit.

Department of Policy, Evaluation and Training

DPET is responsible for supporting evaluations of PKOs, and not monitoring. An Evaluation Unit was established in February 2008 within DPET and was tasked with supporting the Department of Field Support (DFS), DPKO and missions in evaluating activities, as well as developing self-

¹⁷ Banal, S and Scherrer, S (2008), *ONUB and the Importance of Local Ownership: The Case of Burundi in Security Sector Reform and UN Integrated Missions*, DCAF.

¹⁸ DPKO does not include a working definition for 'evaluation' in its 'Glossary of Peacekeeping Terms' included on the website. The author has therefore used the OECD-DAC definition of evaluation in this report: 'the systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, impact, effectiveness, efficiency, relevance and sustainability'. Taken from OECD-DAC, *Glossary of Terms*, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/21/2754804.pdf>, (accessed on 12 November 2008).

¹⁹ GA Res(s) 48/218B of 29 July 1994, 54/244 of 23 December 1999 and 59/272 of 23 December 2004.

evaluation capacities at Headquarter level. To this end, DPET supports evaluation at the planning, implementation and follow-up stages, including drafting ToRs, designing benchmarks (in collaboration with DPKO and DFS), and making programmes 'evaluable'.²⁰ Each ToR identifies the rationale for the evaluation, the primary issues to be addressed, the evaluation criteria and methodology and the means by which the findings will be used.

The placement of an Evaluation Unit within DPET was designed to ensure its separation from operation management functions and to ensure that evaluation findings were integrated into policy development and best practice for the institutional strengthening of DPKO and DFS.²¹

Policy Directives for: (a) DPKO/DFS Mission Evaluation, and (b) Headquarters Self-Evaluation were released in May 2008. These policies outline roles and responsibilities, define the types of headquarter evaluations to be conducted or supported by DPET and describe the process to plan, conduct and follow-up on evaluations. They also document disclosure arrangements for evaluation findings.

As DPET was only established in early 2008, and the Policy Directives for evaluations to be undertaken only agreed in May 2008, it is not possible to provide an analysis on the practical application of the policy. Instead this section will provide an outline of DPET's evaluation policy at the headquarters level.

The Mission Evaluation and Headquarters Self-Evaluation Policies were developed in response to recommendations made by Member States and OIOS that DPKO needed to strengthen its evaluation capacity and the requirement for self-evaluation, as set out in the Secretary General's Compacts with the Under-Secretaries-General for DPKO and DFS. The Headquarters Self-Evaluation policy was developed to meet organisation-wide requirements for evaluation – the Secretary-General's bulletin entitled, *'Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods for Evaluation'* mandates the conduct of evaluation.²²

As outlined in the policy, the primary purpose of undertaking DPKO/DFS evaluations 'is to strengthen the ability of these Departments and relevant missions to accumulate experience and therefore enhance effectiveness'.²³ The mission evaluations are planned to improve linkages between outputs (measured through the RBB) and intended outcomes, as well as provide mission leaders and staff with an opportunity to identify lessons learned and improve management.²⁴ 'The Headquarters Self-Evaluations are designed to support policy making and enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of DPKO/DFS to meet the tasks required in support of field operations'.²⁵ In line with OIOS recommendations (March 2004), DPKO units are required to review the capacity, structure, preparedness and effectiveness of each mission no later than one year after its initial deployment and annually thereafter.²⁶ The allocation of resources to DPET for conducting evaluations is decided by the Evaluations Advisory Body, which comprises the Assistant-Secretaries-General from DPKO and DFS. It is worth noting that there are no allocations for evaluation provided in mission budgets.

The policy states that the types of evaluations undertaken by the Evaluation Unit vary depending on whether it is a Headquarters Self-Evaluation or a Mission Evaluation. Types of evaluations undertaken at the mission level include:²⁷

- Programmed evaluations of the implementation of mission's operational plans, progress towards achieving each mission's mandate, and effectiveness of mission components;
- Cross-cutting evaluations of selected components to review effectiveness across missions;

²⁰ Interview with representative from DPET, 2 October 2008.

²¹ *Policy Directive: DPKO/DFS Mission Evaluation* (May 2008).

²² *Policy Directive: DPKO/DFS Headquarters Self-Evaluation Policy* (May 2008).

²³ Taken from *ibid*, p 2.

²⁴ *Policy Directive: DPKO/DFS Mission Evaluation* (May 2008): p 2.

²⁵ Taken from *ibid*, p 3.

²⁶ Taken from *ibid*, p 3.

²⁷ Taken from *ibid*, p 3.

- Impromptu evaluations to determine causes of emerging issues/incidents in missions.²⁸

Headquarter Self-Evaluations are undertaken at the programme or sub-programme level either directly by the Evaluation Unit (described as 'evaluation-led') or by the programme (described as 'programme-led') with support from the Evaluation Unit. The evaluations draw upon information provided in the RBB monitoring tool.

Both the Headquarter and mission evaluations are broken down into three phases: planning, evaluation and follow-up:²⁹

Planning phase – DPKO/DFS Evaluation Advisory Board, supported by the Evaluation Unit, proposes either an annual evaluation plan (Mission Evaluation) or a self-evaluation plan (Headquarters Self-Evaluation) to the Under-Secretaries-General of DPKO and DFS. 'Once approved, the "Evaluation Unit drafts a ToR, identifies an evaluation team and makes plans for the conducting of the evaluation, in collaboration with the relevant mission or, in case of Headquarters Self-Evaluations, programme/sub-programme'.³⁰

Evaluation teams generally comprise a team of five to six people, picked from DFS and DPKO and, in some cases, the UN Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS); each team is led by a senior staff member (preferably a former peacekeeping official) or consultant.³¹ Some interviewees felt that the DPET evaluation teams were too heavily focused on UN senior staff and should include national representatives. This is because it would ensure a greater sense of national ownership.

At present, local ownership is championed through consultation; undertaken during the design and implementation processes. A number of interviewees supported this as it is considered to be critical for the conducting of an effective and participatory M&E. However, this inclusion should not be over-emphasised as beneficiaries are rarely involved in the evaluation process. DPET justifies this, by arguing that the inclusion of beneficiaries is beyond their capacity and outside of their mandate. This reflects the fact that DPET is concerned with measuring performance (the internal operations of DPKO), as opposed to measuring the external impact of the programme (for instance, impact on people's security and access to justice). Developing mechanisms for measuring the impact (as opposed to the performance) of SSR programmes is perceived to be the role of the newly established SSR unit within OROLSI.

Conducting evaluation – 'The evaluation team reviews documentation and conducts interviews with staff from both headquarters and the field. It also interviews external partners, such as NGOs and other UN agencies'.³² Beneficiaries are not interviewed as part of the evaluation process due to the fact that DPET is focussed on internal performance of DPKO/DFS/missions and not impact (see below). A number of interviewees criticised the institutional set-up for undertaking evaluations within DPKO, citing the division between internal performance and external impact as a particular concern, because they considered the two to be interlinked.

Recommendations are then developed on the basis of each evaluation and are summarised in a report. At the end of the evaluation, the team is also required to debrief either Senior Mission Leadership (Mission Evaluations) or Programme Managers (Headquarters Self-Evaluations) on their findings and recommendations. At the headquarters level 'a further briefing is given to the Under-Secretaries-General of DPKO and DFS. Each report prepared by an evaluation team is then distributed to Senior Management in DPKO and DFS and in the case of Mission Evaluations to the Head of Mission for comments'.³³ These are then integrated into a final report.

²⁸ Taken from *ibid*, p 3.

²⁹ Taken from *Policy Directive: DPKO/DFS Headquarters Self-Evaluation Policy* (May 2008) and *ibid*.

³⁰ *ibid*, p 4.

³¹ *ibid*, p 4.

³² *ibid*, p 4.

³³ *ibid*, p 4.

The Policy Directive stipulates that the evaluation findings are only shared with the UN Secretary-General and not the General Assembly or the Security Council. As a consequence, reports are not made publicly available. In some cases, 'if approved by the Under-Secretary-General of DPKO, the findings may be shared with legislative bodies in-country'.³⁴ The findings also inform risk management monitoring within DPKO and DFS. A number of interviewees felt that the findings should be shared more broadly with programme stakeholders to ensure a greater sense of participation and promote local ownership. In cases where the information included in an evaluation is felt to be too sensitive to be shared with a broader set of stakeholders, one interviewee felt that two evaluation reports should be produced – one for internal use and a second external distribution.

Follow-up phase – The distribution of reports within DPKO and DFS is 'intended to catalyse follow-up action and to facilitate the regular monitoring of recommendation implementation. Overall, implementation is continually monitored by the Evaluation Unit by the conducting of bi-annual reviews. Furthermore, Mission Evaluations are supported by a follow-up visit from the evaluation team to help address any difficulties in implementing reforms'.³⁵

DPET is currently supporting four evaluations at the mission level (Darfur – overall mission management; Sudan – support operations; Lebanon – maritime operations; Sierra Leone – internal planning processes for DPKO and DPA) and two at the headquarters level (Integrated operations Team; Standing Police Capacity). The ToRs for these evaluations have been agreed and evaluations will take place over the next two months.

The Office of Internal Oversight Mechanisms

In addition to financial and oversight-related audits of all activities under the Secretary-General's authority, OIOS is responsible for co-ordinating thematic evaluations of mission activities. While DDR is the current thematic focus for evaluations, there are plans to expand this focus to include wider SSR activities in the future, although this depends on resources. Due to the large number of evaluations undertaken by OIOS (including internal oversight, programme performance reports, reports for government and internal inspections),³⁶ this report focuses on OIOS's thematic evaluations as an example of its approach.

OIOS does not employ a specific methodology for evaluating SSR programmes, instead it uses the same methodology as PKO-related evaluations:³⁷

- Literature review of primary and secondary sources on the relevant programmes and methodologies;
- Evaluation design, including ToRs, identifying sources of data, and scheduling a detailed work programme of collecting and analysing data and reporting findings;
- Data collection, including research and desk reviews, official document review, surveys, in-depth interviews and focus groups, and direct observation (see Box One³⁸ below for an example drawn from an evaluation of DDR mission activities undertaken in 2008);
- Data analysis;
- Drafting and reporting, involving the initial drafting of the report and subsequent circulation for review and comments from parties involved prior to release of the final report.

³⁴ *Ibid*, p 5.

³⁵ *Policy Directive: DPKO/DFS Mission Evaluation* (May 2008), p 4.

³⁶ See OIOS, *About US*, http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/pages/about_us.html.

³⁷ Interpreted from ToR for *Thematic Evaluation of Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) in Peacekeeping Operations* (2008), OIOS.

³⁸ Information in Box One is interpreted from *ibid* and is taken from interview with representative from OIOS, 10 October 2008.

Box One: Data collection methods

Research and desk review of publicly available literature and documents.

Official document review of missions' mandates, budgets, work plans and related guidelines, reports, and other relevant materials. At the beginning of the evaluation, OIOS requests a list of pertinent documents from DPKO/DFS and missions, and may request further documentation throughout the evaluation.

Surveys – OIOS conducts web-based survey with all senior management, professional-level civilian, military, and police staff working at all missions working on activities linked to the programme being evaluated. In addition, the preparation, conduct, and compilation of one national population survey is usually outsourced to an external consultant in order to gauge public opinion on the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of mission operations in their country.

In-depth interviews and focus groups – OIOS conducts semi-structured interviews with selected members of stakeholder groups, such as donors and regional organisations, across a sample of missions with DDR mandates - including senior staff and management at missions and staff at headquarters in DPKO, DFS, DPA and other relevant Secretariat departments. Interviews are also sometimes undertaken with select UN Country Team members, relevant agencies and departments of national governments, and other stakeholders in the peace process, such as foreign donors, resident NGO and intergovernmental bodies (e.g. the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations). Additionally, in some cases OIOS collects data by conducting focus-group interviews, which involve multiple interviewees simultaneously in a semi-structured group discussion format.

Field visits – In theory, OIOS attempts to visit all missions whose mandates include the operations of the DPKO Unit being evaluated and other entities, although in reality this is not always the case due to resource constraints.

As outlined above, the methodology for undertaking thematic evaluations by OIOS, in theory, includes the collection of both quantitative and qualitative information, and the involvement of beneficiaries in the evaluation process. However, in practice, this varies between missions depending on the methodology adopted and political context. As previously highlighted, the inclusion of beneficiaries in the design and conduct of an evaluation is crucial for local ownership of a process and in qualifying progress against impact-level indicators.

The framework for thematic evaluations is similar to that developed by OECD DAC for its development evaluations. Although stakeholders felt that the evaluation of the criteria of: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and co-ordination, had produced a positive step in terms of allowing progress to be measured against higher-level objectives, it was felt that a lack of capacity varied significantly between evaluations. Therefore, the effectiveness of an evaluation was dependent on the knowledge and experience of the evaluation team.

For an example of the use of these criteria, the evaluation framework from a DDR mission, undertaken in 2008, is outlined below:

Table 2: example thematic evaluation – DDR mission activities

EVALUATION CRITERIA ³⁹	EVALUATION ISSUES
A. Relevance Evaluate the relevance of DDR programmes, plans and results with respect to the missions' mandates.	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Do DDR programmes support the missions' general mandate?2. Are the mandates for DDR programmes periodically reviewed, and are the related plans updated accordingly?3. Do the DDR programmes appropriately reflect the points in transition (changes in social, political, military and humanitarian situations) from conflict to development?4. Is there national ownership of DDR programmes?5. Are gender mainstreaming issues included in DDR programmes?6. Are other cross-cutting and related issues such as security sector reform (SSR), humanitarian matters and socio-economic recovery reflected in DDR programmes?

³⁹ UNDDR, 'Table 3.50.5 Evaluation criteria', *Operational Guide to IDDRS 3.50*, (2006).

<p>B. Effectiveness Evaluate the effectiveness of DDR programme planning and implementation in the delivery of planned and intended outputs and results.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Are both national and mission-level DDR mandates coherent and mutually reinforcing? 2. Are DDR programmes aligned with IDDRS? 3. To what extent are the DDR planning processes integrated with the missions' planning processes? 4. To what extent does DDR planning consider capacities to implement DDR programmes at both the national and mission level? 5. Does the DDR programme design cycle include detailed assessments, results-based framework of documentation and detailed implementation plans? 6. How useful are current indicators and benchmarks in measuring DDR results? 7. Are planned and intended results⁴⁰ of DDR activities clearly defined? 8. Are planned and intended results of DDR activities consistently achieved? 9. How effectively have DDR results to date contributed to the fulfilment of the DDR mandate? 10. To what extent is it probable that planned and intended results will be achieved? 11. How are the effects of external factors on DDR programmes monitored, evaluated and adjusted? 12. Is there a formal Monitoring and Evaluation structure for DDR programmes?
<p>C. Efficiency Assess the efficiency with which DDR programmes have utilised and leveraged resources.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Are DDR programme outputs delivered on a timely basis as planned? 2. Are the human and physical resources used in DDR programmes adequate for the particular DDR activities? 3. Are DDR programme resource inputs provided in a timely manner? 4. Are quality and quantity of DDR outputs optimised vis-à-vis inputs?
<p>D. Co-ordination, Communication & Best Practices Assess the extent of co-ordination and communication across all levels of DDR processes; assess the application of best practices.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To what extent do DDR components communicate with their counterparts in DPKO, mission management, external partners, and stakeholders? 2. How effectively do the missions' DDR components co-ordinate with their counterparts in UN partner agencies, funds, and programmes, and with national and regional actors and other external stakeholders? 3. Are information management systems in place? 4. Are Best Practices reviews conducted, and if so, are the results of Best Practices' reviews implemented?

Evaluations last approximately 6-8 months and are conducted by a team primarily comprising representatives from OIOS. It is rare for representatives from the mission under review or national stakeholders to be included. This lack of local-ownership is again seen as a weakness in the approach.

The draft evaluation report is shared with DPKO Heads of Department, both at headquarters and mission, for comment. These are then integrated into a final report. There are no guidelines for the sharing of findings in-country outside of UN bodies, a limitation that is compounding a general culture of poor information sharing. However, OIOS does post most of its evaluations on its website; where access to a report would be inappropriate for reasons of confidentiality or risk of violating the rights of individuals involved, the report may be modified, or in extraordinary circumstances withheld by the Under-Secretary-General for OIOS. Following the completion of an evaluation, OIOS supports missions in implementing recommendations, a process that is monitored through six-monthly updates.

It is worth noting that there is a general feeling of apprehension within some missions towards evaluations conducted by the OIOS, as they are perceived to be driven by headquarters-based staff in order to conduct a quick audit without fully understanding the context the mission is operating in.

⁴⁰ The usage of the term 'results' refers to the entire change of 'outcomes' from immediate output to impact.

Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions

In the past evaluations were either undertaken with support from OIOS (when focussing on internal oversight functions), or independently without formalised processes or guidance from headquarters. Prior to the establishment of DPET each unit had M&E specialists. Some units continue to maintain M&E specialists.

Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit

The Criminal Law and Justice Advisory Unit is currently developing an evaluation methodology with support from the UK Government. M&E of Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory programmes are led by the missions. Programme evaluations are undertaken at the minimum biennially. However, since greater focus has been given to Rule of Law in Assistant-General Reports, support for increasing the number of evaluations undertaken by the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit has grown, and evaluations are becoming more frequent.

Evaluation findings are usually shared with the mission and national institutions, although this varies between missions and there are no set guidelines in place. Some missions have begun pushing for evaluations that focus on the impact of missions on the external environment (which would involve engaging with CSOs, national institutions and communities), and for the findings to be shared publicly and posted on mission websites. For example, the evaluation of corrections and legal system monitoring and training conducted by UNMIL, which recognised institutional strengths and outlined steps for improvement, was shared publicly as it focussed on external system-wide issues. A number of interviewees identified this as a positive and crucial move, and one that should be considered best M&E practice. There are other cases where missions have worked with national counterparts to encourage the involvement of beneficiaries in evaluations, for example in the constitutional process in Albania, which has ensured civilian buy-in to the process.

However, where evaluations have focussed specifically on the internal performance of missions – in terms of operations, staffing and expenditure – as designed and conducted by headquarters (such as those undertaken by OIOS and more recently DPET), findings are less focussed on external impact and are only shared internally. As with the other evaluations highlighted, there is an open question as to whether findings of these internal evaluations should be shared with external stakeholders to promote local buy-in. Interviewees were of the opinion that findings could be shared, even if it is through an edited second report.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Unit

The DDR Unit is currently writing a concept paper on developing guidelines for the conducting of M&E in DDR programmes. The DDR Unit plans to draw on support from DPET further into the process. For the moment, the M&E chapter in the UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) provides guidance on M&E, however, it focuses on generic approaches (that is definitions, guiding principles and developing an M&E strategy) and does not cover practical application. The chapter also provides support in using RBB as an M&E tool. With regard to integrated DDR, for example, it states that M&E can be divided into two RBB-related-levels – measuring: (a) performance in achieving outcomes and outputs by a series of activities,⁴¹ and (b) outcomes in contributing towards an overall goal, such as reductions in levels of violence in society, increased stability and security, and consolidation of peace processes.⁴²

Although the second level recognises the need to expand on the output analysis provided by RBB and measure the outcomes of a programme, there has not been any practical support provided from the DDR Unit (headquarters) in the development of an M&E system to monitor this.

Policing Unit

⁴¹ For example, disarmament (number of weapons collected and destroyed); demobilisation (number of ex-combatants screened, processed and assisted); and reintegration (number of ex-combatants reintegrated and communities assisted).

⁴² Interpreted from IDDRS (2006), *Monitoring and Evaluation of DDR Programmes*, http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/03/download/IDDRS_350.pdf.

The policing unit undertakes assessment visits to police missions to evaluate the impact of applicable activities. These assessments are not usually pre-planned and are conducted in response to changes in the context or mandate or because of a need to assist the country (for example, supporting preparations for an upcoming election). The evaluation team usually comprises and is led by representatives from DPKO Headquarters but in some cases includes Desk Officers from the relevant Mission. A recent assessment of policing activities in Timor-Leste in March 2008 was led by a UN Police Adviser from DPKO, and comprised other representatives of DPKO, the national police, UNHCR, UNDP and United Nations Integrated Mission In Timor-Leste (UNMIT).⁴³

Each assessment lasts approximately 10 days and involves interviews with least 50 key informants, including representatives from Government, Parliament, political parties, civil society, security institutions, armed forces, relevant UN agencies, NGOs. Beneficiaries and communities are generally not consulted in the assessment process. Interviewees were critical of this evaluation methodology, for beneficiaries are seen to be critical in ensuring local ownership and in measuring progress against impact-level indicators.

3.2 United Nations Development Programme

UNDP has an organisation-wide system for monitoring, evaluation and reporting. It defines monitoring as:

‘the continuous function providing managers and key stakeholders with regular feedback on the consistency or discrepancy between planned and actual activities and programme performance, and on the internal and external factors affecting results. It provides an opportunity to validate the programme theory and logic and to make necessary changes in programme activities and approaches. Information from systematic monitoring serves as a critical input to evaluation.’⁴⁴

Evaluation is defined as:⁴⁵

‘the judgment made on the relevance, appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of development efforts, based on agreed criteria and benchmarks among key partners and stakeholders. It involves a rigorous, systematic and objective process in the design, analysis and interpretation of information to answer specific questions; provides assessments of what works and why; highlights intended and unintended results and provides strategic lessons to guide decision-makers and inform stakeholders’. Thus, monitoring is perceived to measure what is happening, evaluation explains how and why desired results were (or were not) achieved. Monitoring is a planning and management process carried out by those implementing the activity while evaluations can be conducted either internally or externally as appropriate.⁴⁶

Responsibility for undertaking M&E and reporting⁴⁷ is decentralised in UNDP and is the responsibility of COs. Accordingly, Senior Office Management is required to focus on the M&E of Country Programmes, UNDAF overall performance and Millennium Development Targets, and is closely involved in the choice of M&E mechanisms, including the selection of outcomes. Programme Managers and Policy Advisors are responsible for the overall monitoring of

⁴³ *Report of the expert mission to Timor-Leste on policing 17-27 March 2008.*

⁴⁴ Taken from, *BCPR M&E System 2008-2011.*

⁴⁵ UNDP defines evaluation as, ‘the judgment made on the relevance, appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of development efforts, based on agreed criteria and benchmarks among key partners and stakeholders. It involves a rigorous, systematic and objective process in the design, analysis and interpretation of information to answer specific questions; provides assessments of what works and why; highlights intended and unintended results and provides strategic lessons to guide decision-makers and inform stakeholders’. Taken from, *BCPR M&E System 2008-2011.* Thus, monitoring is perceived to measure what is happening, evaluation explains how and why desired results were (or were not) achieved. Monitoring is a planning and management process carried out by those implementing the activity while evaluations can be conducted either internally or externally as appropriate.

⁴⁶ Taken from, *BCPR M&E System, op cit.*

⁴⁷ Reporting is described by UNDP as an integral part of monitoring and evaluation. Reporting is the systematic and timely provision of essential information at periodic intervals.

projects' strategic outputs, for monitoring progress towards outcomes, as well as taking on a greater role in advocacy and partnership building. Project staff are, in theory, responsible for delivering the outputs of each project, actual implementation, input management and administrative management. They are also responsible for developing a project work plan and an annual project report for the CO – thus providing critical information and lessons learned regarding the effectiveness of the implementation strategy and the delivery of outputs.⁴⁸ There is however great variance in the quality and quantity of M&E undertaken at the country level depending on the skills of the project staff and the political context.

To a greater extent than in DPKO, UNDP has developed a comprehensive institutional system for M&E, which is in theory applicable to all UNDP programmes at different levels. UNDP openly shares its guidelines on M&E on its website, including:

- Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures;⁴⁹
- User Guide, which includes the Results Based Management Framework, and Evaluation Policy – see below;
- M&E Handbook,⁵⁰ which was developed by the Evaluation Office in 2002 and describes a range of formal and informal monitoring methods.

These guidelines are used to different degrees by UNDP staff at the country and regional levels, as well as by policy/practice bureaus. While M&E formats are adaptable to local needs, a certain minimum content is required, namely progress towards outcomes, outputs, and partnerships. However, one interviewee thought that, "In some cases the guidelines on indicators and data collection do not apply well to the context on the ground".⁵¹

The stated purposes of M&E in the UNDP is to assess whether activities are achieving their intended results; to learn from; and to improve the effectiveness and impact of programmes.⁵² The stated (and unstated) purpose of M&E at the country level varies depending upon the political context. However, it is beyond the scope of this research to analyse the variety of purposes of M&E at the country level.⁵³

M&E of UNDP programmes focuses on reporting performance against goals, outcomes and outputs for each of the four focus areas formulated in the Development Results Framework included in its Strategic Plan 2008-2011:

- Achieving the MDGs and reducing human poverty;
- Fostering democratic governance;
- Supporting crisis prevention and recovery;
- Managing energy and the environment for sustainable development.⁵⁴

The purpose of the Development Results is to facilitate monitoring and reporting. Furthermore, it compliments the narrative description of the four UNDP focus areas provided in the 'UNDP operations' section of the Strategic Plan 2008-2011, by providing goal statements, expected outcomes and sample outputs for each of the focus areas.⁵⁵ The Development Results Framework for Focus Area 3 (CPR) is outlined below:⁵⁶

Table 3: Development Results Framework for crisis prevention and recovery

GOAL 3: SUPPORTING CRISIS PREVENTION AND RECOVERY
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⁴⁸ Evaluation Office (2002), *Handbook for Monitoring and Evaluating for Results*.

⁴⁹ See UNDP, 'Introduction', *Programme and Project Management*, <http://content.undp.org/go/userguide/results/?lang=en#top>.

⁵⁰ Evaluation Office (2002), *op cit*.

⁵¹ Interview with representative from DPKO, 3 October 2008.

⁵² Taken from 'Addendum 1: Document and Institutional Results Framework', *UNDP Strategic Plan 2008 – 2011*, p.3.

⁵³ Please refer to the case study on the UNDP backed Support to the Security Sector Reform Programme in Albania for an example of the application of institutional M&E practices at the country level.

⁵⁴ Taken from, *UNDP Strategic Plan 2008 – 2011*.

⁵⁵ Taken from 'Addendum 1: Document and Institutional Results Framework', *UNDP Strategic Plan 2008 – 2011*.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*.

Expected outcomes supported by UNDP upon request by programme countries	UNDP outputs/activities	Output indicators used in reporting on UNDP contribution
1. Solutions generated for natural disaster risk management and conflict prevention through common analysis and inclusive dialogue among government, relevant civil society actors and other partners (i.e., UN, other international organisations, bilateral partners)	1. Policy and technical advisory services	1. Number of programme countries requesting UNDP support for each of the democratic governance outcomes.
2. <i>Disaster</i> : Strengthened national capacities, including the participation of women, to prevent, reduce, mitigate and cope with the impact of the systemic shocks from natural hazards	2. Analysis of technical and implementation capacities	2. Proportion of UNDP offices that have integrated these outcomes into project-level design
3. <i>Conflict</i> : Strengthened national capacities, with participation of women, to prevent, mitigate and cope with impact of violent conflict	3. Gender mainstreaming	3. Proportion of independent evaluations and surveys that rate UNDP contribution to democratic governance outcomes as positive. This will include aggregated information derived from the end-of-cycle performance data of country and regional programmes.
4. Early post-crisis resumption of local governance functions	4. Facilitation of the process of reflecting nationally-adopted international commitments in national laws and policies.	
5. <i>Disaster</i> : Post-disaster governance capacity strengthened, including measures to ensure the reduction of future vulnerabilities	5. Facilitation of consultative processes	
6. <i>Conflict</i> : Post-conflict governance capacity strengthened, including measures to work towards prevention of resumption of conflict	6. Programme design and management	
7. Gender equality and women's empowerment enhanced in post-disaster and post-conflict situations	7. Development of technical and implementation capacities, e.g., (a) Mentoring and leadership development	
8. <i>Conflict</i> : Post-crisis community security and cohesion restored	(b) Training and on-the-job learning	
9. Post-crisis socio-economic infrastructure restored, employment generated, economy revived; affected groups returned/reintegrated	(c) Procurement	
	8. Facilitation of UN-wide responses	
	9. Facilitation of aid co-ordination	
	10. Partnership building	
	11. South-South co-operation	
	12. Monitoring and evaluation Knowledge management	

As illustrated above, the indicators are both output and outcome focussed. It is not clear how SSR programmes fit into these higher-level CPR outcomes, as it is not referred to explicitly in the framework. However, BCRP's framework of indicators for Justice Security Sector Reform (JSSR) makes the links between these higher-level UNDP CPR outcomes and SSR (see Section 3.3 below).

The indicators, outcomes and outputs outlined in the framework were developed as a result of a growing demand for UNDP Headquarter support to COs, which drew upon surveys of

country-level demand for UNDP development and advisory services, and the analysis of UNDAF and UNDP country programmes⁵⁷.

The Strategic Plan supports the development of a UNDP Country Programme document, which outlines a number of outputs required for achieving the outcomes outlined in the Strategic Plan (and the UNDAF). COs are responsible for developing these programme documents with support from regional and policy/practice bureaus (headquarters) and for selecting the outcomes that most reflect the country-level outcomes agreed upon by UNDAF and UNDP country programmes.⁵⁸

3.2.1 Monitoring

The requirements for planning, monitoring and reporting in UNDP are outlined below:

Table 4: requirement for planning, monitoring and reporting in UNDP⁵⁹

ELEMENT	PLANNING	MONITORING AND REPORTING
Strategic plan	Every 4 years	Annual
Country, regional and global programmes	Every 4 years	Annual
Annual unit-level work plans	Annual	Bi-annual
Individual work plans ⁶⁰	Annual	Bi-annual

Results Based Management (RBM) was adopted as a monitoring system by the UNDP in 1997. Before this, monitoring was traditionally situated at the individual project level. The development of RBM is to ensure the systematic assessment of performance and progress against achievement of outcomes at country level. UNDP experience of RBM comprises:

- ‘Planning for results, including outcomes, outputs, indicators, targets;⁶¹
- Measuring performance by analysing results achieved and assessing the contribution being made by the programme to broader outcomes;⁶²
- Learning from experience to make adjustments to programmes and strategies and improve performance;⁶³
- Reporting on achievements (including outputs produced and contributions to outcomes) for accountability purposes.⁶⁴

The key components of RBM include planning and reporting instruments. Planning instruments are established in the Multi-Year Funding Framework (MYFF), which includes the Strategic Results Framework (SRF), the Integrated Results Framework and the Evaluation Plan. The SRF is the primary planning instrument, as it documents the major areas of UNDP intervention, as well as applicable development outcomes at the country, regional and global levels.⁶⁵ The Evaluation Policy is based on strategic decision-making by COs (particularly Senior Management) about how and when to evaluate. The evaluation plan ensures that evaluation activities are on track. The development of the MYFF was an important move to ensure that the funding strategy was based on the identification of clear results.⁶⁶

The key reporting instruments are the Results-Orientated Annual Report (ROAR) and the Multi-Funding Framework Report (MYFFR). ROAR is the main UNDP instrument for annual reporting

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, p 2.

⁶⁰ These are used in individual performance assessment and are aligned to unit-level work plans.

⁶¹ Taken from ‘Addendum 1: Document and Institutional Results Framework’, UNDP Strategic Plan 2008 – 2011.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *Ibid*, p 3.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ Taken from ‘Introduction to Results-Based Management: RBM’, UNDP: *Overview and General Principles*.

⁶⁶ UNDP (2006), *The Evaluation Policy of UNDP*.

on activities at both the country and the headquarters level. At the corporate level, ROAR provides the Executive Board with a comprehensive assessment of performance with regard to key results (outcomes) annually and a review of the use of resources at the organisational level. The MYFFR is a more in-depth assessment of performance relating to the outcomes and outputs identified in the MYFF.⁶⁷

The development of the RBM system was based on a number of key strategic approaches:⁶⁸

- Learning from others – (e.g. SIDA, OECD DAC);
- Broad Consultation and Ownership;
- Combined top-down and bottom-up approaches;
- Measuring progress against results;
- Stressing management and learning;
- Focus on outcomes and challenges.

Three types of indicators are used in the RBM system to assess progress towards results:

- *Situational impact* indicators (linked to Senior Management level) that provide a broad picture of whether development changes have occurred at the national level and relate to MDGs;
- *Outcome* indicators (linked to Programme Management level) that assess progress against specific outcomes. Outcome indicators help the CO to think strategically about the outcomes they want to achieve;
- *Output* indicators (linked to Project Management level) that assess progress against operational activities. Output indicators are tangible results that can be delivered in a short time period.⁶⁹

The selection of indicators is supposed to be guided by SMART (Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant and Trackable) criteria. The RBM also provides guidance on the collection of baseline data – which (as outlined in the RBM guidance paper) should in theory be gathered and agreed by stakeholders in the project/programme design stage. In the RBM system, results are the starting point, with planning/management of activities based on how to best meet these results. However, a number of stakeholders felt that the quality of baseline data gathered varied significantly by country and was not always collected, meaning that the accuracy of results largely depended on the skills and interests of the project staff; data already available in-country; and ease in accessing rural areas to collect primary quantitative/qualitative data.

Since 2004, UNDP has also used the resource-planning tool ATLAS. ATLAS is part of RBM and is primarily focused on financial management and project-monitoring. The ATLAS template requires information on each project ('award'),⁷⁰ outputs linked to each award and activities linked to each output. ATLAS links data on projects, finances, human resources and procurement. It allows all offices to work on the same system and access the same information, thus guaranteeing a higher level of organisational transparency. The information outlined in ATLAS is used to plan budgetary expenditure and also to inform the development of RBMs. COs are responsible for completing quarterly ATLAS reports.

In 2005, the Prince2 system, a widely recognised project management tool was also adopted by UNDP. Through adopting a standardised system for managing projects, UNDP hoped to strengthen transparency in tracking project risks and results. Like ATLAS, Prince2 is a project financial management tool, focussing primarily on outputs.

The UNDP monitoring frameworks (ATLAS, Prince2 and RBM) were criticised by a number of interviewees for relying upon quantitative methods for M&E, thus marginalising qualitative

⁶⁷ Taken from 'Introduction to Results-Based Management: RBM', *ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p 2.

⁷⁰ See UNDP, *Atlas on Demand Training*,

http://ondemandweb.undp.org/OnDemandProduction/OnDemandWebPortal/pg_portal1.shtml.

information which is required to explain performance. Stakeholders interviewed for this research supported this criticism and suggested that a key challenge in UNDP monitoring frameworks has been that they are primarily managing outputs as opposed to outcomes and are therefore struggling to successfully measure the impact of programmes. (See Section 4 below for a more detailed analysis of the challenges concerning UNDP's monitoring frameworks).⁷¹

Progress against outcome indicators in the RBM is reported in the annual ROAR, which is produced at the country and headquarter levels. There are no formats or reports prescribed for such a review. The annual review was mandatory from 2002 onwards. In theory, the ROAR should be prepared based on a highly consultative annual review exercise that connects reporting, feedback, evaluation and learning to assess performance.⁷²

For risk monitoring, UNDP has developed a corporate Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) system. ERM is embedded into UNDP's planning, operational and management practices. Guidance is provided to staff, at the various levels of the organisation, on each of the five steps of an 'ERM Cycle', that is: identification of risk, assessment, prioritisation, taking action and monitoring and reporting. An Enhanced Results Based Management (ERBM) system supports the implementation of the Strategic Plan 2008-2011 and results-based budgeting framework, as well as the wider processes of results management.⁷³

Senior Management of COs, headquarter units of Central Bureaus and headquarter units that are not part of a bureau are responsible for ensuring that risk management is considered and that subsequent action is taken as necessary. The head of the unit is responsible for 'escalating' concerns about risk to a higher level in UNDP if they are considered to have wider implications for the organisation. Senior Management of Regional and Central Bureaus have similar responsibilities to Senior Management of COs (see above); in addition, they are responsible for ensuring that risks that have been escalated are responded to.

3.2.2 Evaluation

UNDP developed an evaluation policy in 2006 that underscores the purposes evaluation for increasing transparency, coherence and efficiency generating knowledge for organisation learning and accountability. Accordingly, the purpose of an evaluation is to understand impact and to draw lessons learned so as to inform future strategy at the country, regional and policy level. For example, the purpose of an outcome evaluation undertaken by the Timor-Leste CO in July 2006 was to assess the results and achievements of the programme, but also the constraints it has faced since its launch as a Revised Programme. It was also intended to inform future strategy. As outlined in the Evaluation Policy, the types of evaluations undertaken within UNDP are as follows:⁷⁴

- *Strategic evaluations:* 'Assess UNDP performance in areas that are critical to ensuring sustained contribution to development results in the context of emerging development issues and changing priorities at the global and regional levels (ie UNDP policies, practice areas, partnerships, programmatic approaches and co-operation modalities).'⁷⁵
- *Programmatic evaluations:* 'Global, regional and South-South programme evaluations assess the performance and intended and achieved results of programmes. They are intended to reinforce the accountability of UNDP to the Executive Board, and are timed to contribute to the preparation and approval of the next programme/s.'⁷⁶

⁷¹ Evaluation Office (December 2007), *Evaluation on the use of Results Based Management in UNDP*.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ See UNDP, *Enterprise Risk Management, Programmes and Operations Policies and Procedures*, <http://content.undp.org/go/userguide/results-management--accountability/enterprise-risk-management/?lang=en>.

⁷⁴ Taken from UNDP (2006), *op cit.*

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p 9.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p 9.

- *Assessments of Development Results*: 'Assess the attainment of intended and achieved results, as well as UNDP contributions to development results at the country level. Their scope includes UNDP responsiveness and alignment to country challenges and priorities, strategic positioning and engagement with partners. The number and selection of countries and the timing of these evaluations is determined to ensure coverage and to allow findings and recommendations to feed into the preparation of the subsequent programme'.⁷⁷
- *Decentralised evaluations*: COs, regional bureaus, and practice and policy bureaus commission evaluations in the programmatic frameworks for which they are responsible. All programme areas or project clusters are subject to evaluation. The selection of what is evaluated and the number of evaluations are decided with stakeholders at the outset of the programme cycle. The focus is on information for programme improvement and the development of new programmatic frameworks. Key decentralised evaluations are outcome and project evaluations:
 - *Outcome evaluations*: Address the short, medium and long-term results of a programme, or cluster of related UNDP projects. They include an assessment of the effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and relevance of the contribution of external influences and actors. Outcome evaluations also examine non-intended effects. The selection of the programme or project cluster to be evaluated is guided by strategic decisions made by the programme unit, in line with the evaluation plan. Although it is a requirement in the Evaluation Policy that outcome evaluations are undertaken annually, the decision to undertake them may also reflect change on the ground. For example, the decision by the Timor-Leste CO to undertake an outcome evaluation, in July 2006, was in response to a need to identify the impact of outbreaks of violence in April and May 2006 on the programme and the Justice System.⁷⁸
 - *Project evaluations*: 'Assess the efficiency and effectiveness of a project in achieving its intended results. They also assess the relevance and sustainability of outputs as contributions to medium and longer-term outcomes. Projects are evaluated during the time of implementation, at the end of implementation (terminal evaluation), or after a period of time after the project has ended (ex-post evaluation).'⁷⁹

Mandatory evaluations and responsibilities for undertaking them are as follows:⁸⁰

Table 5: mandatory responsibility for evaluation, by type

RESPONSIBILITY	TYPE OF EVALUATION
Evaluation Office	Strategic evaluations Evaluations of: - Global programme - Regional programmes - South-South programme Assessment of Development Results at the country level
Country Office	Outcome evaluation(s) identified in the evaluation plan Project evaluations, when required by a partnership protocol or national priority
Regional Bureaux	Outcome evaluation(s) identified in the evaluation plan Project evaluations, when required by a partnership protocol
Practice and Policy Bureau (including BCPR)	Outcome evaluations, as identified in the evaluation plan, of: - Global programmes - Practice areas - South-South programmes Project evaluations when required by a partnership

⁷⁷ *ibid*, p 9.

⁷⁸ See ToR for *Outcome Evaluation on Strengthening the Justice System in Timor-Leste* (June 2006), <http://erc.undp.org/index.aspx?module=erc&page=EvaluationShow&EvaluationID=2848>.

⁷⁹ *op cit*, UNDP (2006), p 9.

⁸⁰ *op cit*, UNDP (2006).

When conducting strategic and thematic evaluations, the Evaluation Office is in theory responsible for developing agenda, in consultation with the Executive Board and Senior Management; for setting the standards for planning; and for conducting and using the findings of the evaluation. The Evaluation Office is also responsible for supporting country-led evaluations and building the capacity of COs, through the provision of standards and information on best practice relating to evaluation management.⁸¹ Although, of course (and as stated by a number of interviewees), the quality of this support and levels of co-ordination between the Evaluation Office and CO vary depending on the CO and context.

COs and regional practice and policy bureaus are responsible for ensuring the development of programmes by identifying clear results, measurable indicators, performance targets and baseline information, identifying key focus areas for evaluation in consultation with partner governments and stakeholders, and ensuring adequate resources for evaluation.⁸²

Evaluation findings are shared with key stakeholders in-country, which a number of interviewees felt was a positive move that promoted local ownership. For example, the findings and key recommendations of the evaluation undertaken by the Timor-Leste CO were shared with key stakeholders at a debriefing meeting with relevant stakeholders, including government and donor representatives. Efforts were not made to share the findings with the beneficiaries through community consultations, for example.⁸³ Some interviewees criticised the evaluation for this and emphasised the importance of using a participatory approach (ie involving beneficiaries in evaluation design and results sharing so as to enable even greater local ownership and triangulate judgement of impact).

The COs are responsible for building the capacity of national governments in conducting evaluations, thus ensuring national ownership over evaluation processes. However, an evaluation undertaken by the Swedish Agency for Development Evaluations (SADEV) on UNDP's country level evaluation activities (drawing upon evidence from Kenya, Nepal and Uganda) in 2008 found that M&E activities are not aligned with those of the partner countries, and hence not supporting the long-term development of national capacities.⁸⁴

Senior management of COs and regional/policy and practice bureaus are responsible for interpreting and analysing findings and for implementing recommendations. The Evaluation Office maintains a system to track management responses to evaluations, and the status of follow-up actions. However, the SADEV evaluation found that UNDP's track record for effective and efficient use of (outcome) evaluation findings and recommendations was poor. This was linked to the wide range of different strategic, often overlapping, documents that are relevant to individual COs. The report stated that it was not clear the extent to which, and how, outcome evaluations feed into further activities. It also found, that in practice the quality of evaluations was poor. Information was either missing, or the criteria were not applicable in 25 per cent of the ratings. The report stated that only half of all evaluations commissioned by UNDP COs were reliable as a basis for decision-making.⁸⁵

All UNDP evaluation reports are shared publicly. To ensure that the evaluations are disseminated widely, the executive summaries of each evaluation are translated into the three working languages of UNDP. COs are (in theory) further required to translate the executive summaries into local languages, and promote the sharing of findings with stakeholders in country, although in practice, the execution of this is poor. The evaluation undertaken by SADEV found that evaluation reports need to be better disseminated and more clearly communicated in order to improve UNDP partners' use of evaluations.⁸⁶

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ See *ToR for Outcome Evaluation on Strengthening the Justice System in Timor-Leste* (June 2006), <http://erc.undp.org/index.aspx?module=erc&page=EvaluationShow&EvaluationID=2848>.

⁸⁴ *Op cit*, SADEV (2008).

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

The evaluation team for outcome evaluations at the country level in most cases comprises outside consultants and a representative from the CO or UN mission. All of which are chosen, based on their knowledge of the relevant subject matter. For example, the evaluators for Timor-Leste were experienced in judicial reform and access to justice.⁸⁷ However, one interviewee criticised the evaluation process for marginalising local consultants thus narrowing the potential for strong local ownership. It was also felt that consultants with expertise in evaluation methodology should have been hired in addition to consultants with expertise in justice sector development.

3.3 The Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery approach to M&E

Before 2007, BCPR drew purely upon RBM, the standard UNDP approach to M&E (see above). There was no specific system in BCPR for measuring the effectiveness of the Bureau in supporting COs with monitoring, reporting and evaluating CPR interventions. An evaluation of UNDP RBM in 2007 stated that although a system is in place for M&E, it is not fully operational. As a result of these findings, BCPR made a strategic decision to develop a comprehensive and systematic approach to M&E for CPR interventions, with particular focus on objectives.⁸⁸

It was recognised that crisis and conflict situations can be highly politicised, and therefore that M&E of CPR activities needed to measure the effect of a programme on a conflict context (and *vice versa*), as well as measuring results and delivery. As a result, an M&E specialist was appointed within BCPR to support this process. The new BCPR M&E Framework was developed in early 2008 and is consistent with UNDP's M&E Handbook, User Guide, Evaluation Policy and Strategic Plan.

As the BCPR M&E system was only developed in 2008, it will take a number of years until the execution and utility of this at the country level is realised. It is therefore impossible to critically analyse the application of this approach at the country level. Instead, this section will outline details of this newly established framework at the headquarters level.

The BCPR M&E system aims to assess how UNDP resources are being used to support the delivery of the Key Result Areas and outcomes outlined under Focus Area 3 (supporting crisis prevention and recovery) of the Strategic Plan 2008-2011 (see above). BCPR plans to achieve this through reporting on activities delivered by the COs and the contribution of the Bureau through programmatic support and inter-agency activities. BCPR is also responsible for reporting on its own performance.⁸⁹

The primary purpose of the BCPR M&E system is to enhance effectiveness, learning and accountability. The M&E system aims to:⁹⁰

- Assess progress towards corporate achievement of CPR Key Results and Outcomes;
- Provide relevant and accurate information on BCPR's effectiveness as interpreted through the management objectives;
- Enhance accountability to stakeholders;
- Identify good practice and lessons learned;
- Support quality reporting by the Bureau through the provision of accurate information;
- Support enhanced efficiency and effectiveness of operations and administration;
- Build Bureau and CO capacities in M&E;
- Support resource mobilisation through credible evidence of CPR results.

The BCPR M&E System is divided into three levels:

- Corporate progress against the development outcomes implemented by COs;
- Bureau contribution to development outcomes;

⁸⁷ See *ToR for Outcome Evaluation on Strengthening the Justice System in Timor-Leste*, *op cit*.

⁸⁸ Taken from, *BCPR Monitoring and Evaluation System 2008-2011*.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*.

⁹⁰ *Ibid*.

- Bureau performance effectiveness.

Level one is linked to the support BCPR will provide to COs in conducting M&E through developing guidance and mechanisms – as COs are responsible for undertaking their own M&E. This is based on the perception that, in theory, better M&E at the CO level will enable BCPR to report more comprehensively to the Executive Board on CPR practice. BCPR has recently developed a package of support mechanisms and tools for CO M&E (see Box two). Levels two and three are related to activities executed directly by BCPR, which in theory, support the achievement of development outcomes indirectly through programme support, practice leadership and inter-agency activities, and are therefore measurable through CO performance. In order to measure its own performance, BCPR has set annual targets against which the activities it delivers directly (that is those under levels two and three) can be monitored.⁹¹

The Generic M&E Framework for COs, produced by BCPR in June 2008, provides an overview of the UNDP M&E framework, highlighting the aspects of this guidance that are most relevant to the M&E of CPR activities. In addition, it outlines UNDP CO Generic CPR M&E Framework that provides guidance on activities to be undertaken at each stage of the programme cycle. It is important to note that the framework incorporates the undertaking of a participatory conflict analysis and consulting key stakeholders (including beneficiaries through community level consultations/focus groups) in the planning and design process.⁹² A number of interviewees felt this to be a very positive aspect of the framework and fundamental to ensuring participation and local ownership over the process.

Box 2: BCPR support mechanisms and tools for CO M&E

- **Development of generic indicators** – provided as a starting point for CO in the design of project and programme monitoring systems. Indicators will be developed for each outcome, and are required to be gender-sensitive. BCPR will assist COs in interpreting development outcomes and CPR priorities under focus area 3 of the Strategic Plan 2008-2011.
- **Enhanced M&E capacity of Programme Support and Operations Cluster (POSC) teams** – POSCs are the first point of contact between BCPR and COs, BCPR will focus on developing the capacity of POSCs on M&E
- **Support from M&E Specialist** – the BCPR M&E Specialist will support the CO M&E systems through BCPR missions and desk support. A template for CO M&E frameworks has been developed to guide COs.

A consultant roster will be developed for conflict prevention and recovery M&E consultants.

The development of BCPR targets draws upon the following elements, as illustrated in the result matrix below:⁹³

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² *Ibid.* Among the priority recommendations of the Issues and Recommendations Paper resulting from the regional roll out of the corporate Evaluation Policy is the need for a much fuller engagement by UNDP with government and other stakeholders with regard to M&E. Engaging stakeholders at the planning and design phase of the framework will help to ensure that BCPR's M&E priorities are in line with national objectives, Bureau and team objectives, and regional and country office objectives and will promote buy-in at all levels which, in turn, is associated with the incorporation of M & E findings in future planning. As part of this process, and to help ensure that they are appropriate and useful, identification of indicators needs to be based on inclusive dialogue and participation of relevant stakeholders.

⁹³ Taken from *BCPR Monitoring and Evaluation System 2008-2011*.

- Strategic Plan Key Results Areas and development outcomes for crisis prevention and recovery (under focus area three – see above);
- Bureau management objectives;
- Annual Bureau priorities.

Table 6: results matrix⁹⁴

CPR GOAL: TO ADVANCE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT BY STRENGTHENING NATIONAL AND LOCAL CAPACITIES TO PREVENT, MITIGATE AND RECOVERY FROM THE EFFECTS OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS AND NATURAL DISASTERS									
	Key Result Area 3.1: Enhancing conflict and disaster risk management capabilities			Key Result Area 3.2: Strengthening post-crisis governance functions			Key Result Area 3.3: Restoring the foundations for development at local level		
<i>UNDP Strategic Plan 2008-2011 Outcomes</i>	<i>Outcome 1 (OC 1 - see above)</i>	<i>OC 2</i>	<i>OC 3</i>	<i>OC 4</i>	<i>OC 5</i>	<i>OC 6</i>	<i>OC 7</i>	<i>OC 8</i>	<i>OC 9</i>
BCPR Interpretation of UNDP Strategic Plan Outcomes	Multi-stakeholder solutions generated	Solutions implemented to manage disaster risk reduction	Solutions implemented to reduce the risk of conflict	Local level governments have a minimum of financial, human and other resources available	Strengthened capacities to manage post-disaster recovery (support to planning, co-ordination and critical governance functions for building back better)	Strengthened capacities to manage post-conflict recovery (support to planning, co-ordination and critical governance functions for building back better)	1. Strengthen security; 2. Advance justice; 3. Expand citizenship; 4. Build peace with and for women; 5. Promote gender equality in DRR; 6. Ensure gender-responsive recovery; 7. Transform government; 8. Develop capacities for social change	Concrete initiatives and programmes that improve security and social cohesion	Concrete initiatives and programmes that support livelihood generation, to benefit crisis-affected communities
Integrated and coherent inter-agency interventions in CPR	Bureau targets for co-ordination interventions which cut across all development results								
Substantive leadership provided over CPR issues	Bureau target relating to development outcome 1 and management objective 1								
Integrated and coherent programme support provided to CO	Bureau targets for practice leadership which cut across all development results								
Management: Effective									

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

Bureau strategy and direction									
Management: Financial & HR managed effectively									

The BCPR interpretation of the Strategic Plan 2008-2011 'outcomes' outline the key higher-level indicators against which its performance is measured. Some BCPR targets are set annually whereas others (conflict prevention) are relevant for several years. BCPR targets are measured bi-annually and may relate to one development goal or cut across a number.

The Global Programme on Justice and Security [within BCPR] has recently developed a set of example indicators for outputs and outcomes to support COs in developing indicators for M&E on security and justice related programmes (referred to as Justice and Security Sector Reform (JSSR)). These indicators are linked to the outcomes that a programme is working to achieve under CPR and are broken down into sub-sections on policies and plans, institutions, partnerships, co-ordination and programming. (See annex two for an example of the Justice and Security Sector Reform Logframe.)

In particular, example output and outcome level indicators are developed for COs which link to outcomes 3, 6, 7 and 8 under Development Results Framework for CPR (see above). The focus on these four particular outcomes in the JSSR framework is based on the perception that these outcomes are the most relevant to SSR-related activities. The framework provides a good example of output and outcome-level indicators for work on SSR. UNDP BCPR is among the first major SSR donors to develop indicators of this quality. However, there is a question as to whether the categories are broad enough to allow for flexibility in guiding impact-orientated SSR programming.

3.3.1 Monitoring

BCPR team targets (although not derived from Bureau priorities) aim to improve team performance within the functional mandate. Monitoring frameworks have been developed and include information on baselines, indicators, data sources and risk monitoring. The results matrix template that has been developed for use by COs is outlined below:⁹⁵

Table 7: results matrix for CO use

Programmes (CO outcomes)	Projects (CO Outputs which should correspond to UNDP/UNDAAF outputs)	Target (annual)	Indicators (outcome and output)	Theory of change	Risks & assumptions	Data source	Frequency of data collection	Responsibility for monitoring

The matrix encourages teams to collect baseline data and set both output and outcome level indicators. A number of stakeholders identified these approaches as critical for M&E.

The framework requires targets to be monitored bi-annually. At the project level, monitoring is the responsibility of the Project Manager; at the team level, Team Chiefs are responsible. The outcomes of monitoring are then reviewed at BCPR feedback sessions. During these sessions it is agreed how lessons are to be drawn and used to inform future strategy and work plans.⁹⁶

An annual work plan template and monitoring framework has also been developed for the M&E of CPR activities by the CO at the project level (see below). This template is important in terms of linking planning and monitoring activities, linking baseline data to monitoring, and linking activity-level outputs to outcomes at the project level.

⁹⁵ BCPR (June 2008), *Generic CPR monitoring and Evaluation Framework for Country Offices*.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

Table 8: example annual work plan template⁹⁷

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	PLANNED ACTIVITIES	TIMEFRAME				RESPONSIBLE PARTY	BUDGET			MONITORING FRAMEWORK		
		Q 1	Q 2	Q 3	Q 4		Funding Source	Budget Description	Amount	Expenditures	Results of activities	Progress towards outputs
Output 1												
Baseline												
Indicators												
Targets												
Country Programme (CP) Outcomes												
Output 2												
Baseline												
Indicators												
Targets												
CP Outcomes												
Output 3												
Baseline												
Indicators												
Targets												
CP Outcomes												
TOTAL												

⁹⁷ Taken from *Ibid.*

The M&E framework specifies that BCPR will promote local ownership through CO monitoring exercises. They plan to achieve this through supporting the participation of local government directly in the oversight of UNDP activities at the project and programme levels. Local government will also be invited to regularly meet with UNDP programme staff to review results, analyse the recommendations and take decisions on future actions. The M&E framework specifies that COs are required to involve beneficiaries in monitoring through community consultation exercises for the collection of qualitative data, and to work with national authorities to collect baseline data through household surveys.

In theory, there are clear links between monitoring and evaluation activities, although it will take a number of years until it becomes clear how this is played out. As outlined above, the monitoring framework is comprehensive and been designed so that monitoring activities feed into project and outcome evaluations and other evaluation activities. Selecting consultants, reviewing the draft report etc. is also reflected in the monitoring framework. However, as outlined with reference to the conducting of M&E on UNDP activities at the country level, in reality, due to the poor collection of data, the extent to which evaluations can draw from activity monitoring mechanisms varies considerably. Moreover, the link is often poor. It is likely that M&E of BCPR activities in particular will share this challenge.

3.3.2 Evaluation

The BCPR M&E system document states that the purpose of BCPR evaluations is to assess how effective existing Bureau structures are: in supporting the achievement of development outcomes; and in identifying relationships between structures and processes and their impact on progress towards the development outcomes. As outlined in the UNDP Evaluation Policy (see Section 3.2 above), BCPR is required to undertake a Bureau-wide evaluation each year.

These evaluations include thematic and regional elements relating to development outcomes. As a consequence, team and unit evaluations at the country level are supposed to be co-ordinated so that they feed into Bureau-wide evaluations and support broader learning. Although the policy stipulates that the stakeholders should be consulted during the design of evaluations, this has in the past included national institutions, partner organisations and government and not beneficiaries (see example from evaluation undertaken by Timor-Leste CO in section 3.2 above). A number of interviewees felt that the inclusion of programme beneficiaries in M&E planning and reporting has in general, not been prioritised at the country level and urged BCPR to better support this when translating the M&E policy into practice.

Focus areas for assessment in evaluations are outlined in the BCPR M&E System 2008-2011 document:⁹⁸

- Assess whether the right things are being done and whether they are being done in the right way;
- Capture both intended and unintended results;
- Assess the performance of corporate and Bureau cross-cutting issues;
- Identify BCPR value added in each situation, and recommend how this can be maximised;
- Consider whether the Bureau is functioning in alignment with the strategic Bureau priorities;
- Consider the effectiveness of the Bureau's business model;
- Be conducted in accordance with the UN Evaluation Group Norms and Standards;
- Conflict related evaluations should recognise explicitly the mutual and dynamic influence of the conflict on UNDP's interventions and *vice versa*.⁹⁹

The BCPR evaluation framework therefore recognises the importance of assessing the conflict sensitivity of programmes.

⁹⁸ Taken from, *BCPR Monitoring and Evaluation System (2008-2011)*.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

The BCPR M&E framework specifies that a final project review should be conducted in the final quarter of a project's lifetime, which focuses on measuring sustainability of results, contribution to related outcomes, and capacity development.

The BCPR M&E framework specifies that the evaluation findings will be initially shared with BCPR and following this, efforts will be made to share findings in-country through feedback workshops with NGOs, CSOs, government, national institutions and others who were involved in the evaluation process. As outlined above, all UNDP evaluations (including BCPR specific evaluations) are posted on the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre website for public consumption.¹⁰⁰ Some stakeholders felt that the framework should make greater commitments to share findings with beneficiaries to ensure a participatory approach is taken and local ownership. Although a number of interviewees indicated that the collection of baseline data has generally been poor to date (see Section 3.2 above), a roster of consultants has recently been created by BCPR to allow for baseline data collection and the development of indicators to reflect the information collected.

As the BCPR M&E framework was only agreed in 2008, it is not possible to analyse the practical application of the BCPR evaluation policy and draw upon lessons learned from evaluations undertaken. However, as the BCPR M&E framework does draw upon the UNDP Evaluation Policy and M&E User Guide, the analysis of evaluations undertaken by UNDP COs on SSR-related programmes in Section 3.2 above are relevant to this section.

4. Needs and Challenges

The challenges outlined in this section reflect the views of the author, and draw upon thinking around best practice in M&E.

This section identifies the needs and challenges for both DPKO and UNDP in relation to M&E of SSR.

- *Percentage of UN SSR programmes evaluated:* It is difficult to determine the percentage of UN SSR programmes that are evaluated. As outlined above, in the past the evaluation of mission activities has been undertaken by OIOS and the relevant DPKO Units on a case by case basis and depending on a request from the Secretary General. Resources allocated to evaluations conducted by the newly established DPET in DPKO are decided by the Evaluations Advisory Body. The intention is to evaluate 4/5 missions each year until all have been evaluated (with four being evaluated in late 2008/early 2009 – see section 2 above). In total, this could take at least five years to complete.

An interviewee from the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit within DPKO stated that approximately 50% of missions have been evaluated in 2008, and the rest will be evaluated over 2009 and 2010. Efforts are made to evaluate each mission every 3-4 years although this varies and the decision to evaluate is often based on need as opposed to planning.¹⁰¹

The percentage of SSR programmes evaluated in UNDP is more clearly defined. The Evaluation policy requests that all BCPR and CO programmes be evaluated once a year; with new SSR programmes apparently being more rigorously evaluated.

- *Focus on measuring outputs over outcomes and impact:* The main pitfall in the M&E of SSR programmes in both DPKO and UNDP is the focus on measuring outputs as opposed to outcomes. This is perpetuated through the RBM in UNDP and RBB in DPKO, which focus more on the collection of quantitative data (linked to outputs) rather than qualitative data and the illustration of outcomes. This is particularly true of RBB, as it was principally designed as a financial management tool.

¹⁰⁰ See <http://erc.undp.org/>.

¹⁰¹ Based on interview with a representative of the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit, 03 October 2008.

An independent evaluation undertaken by the Evaluation Office in December 2007 on the adoption by UNDP of the RBM approach found that the UNDP is largely measuring outputs rather than outcomes and that the linkages between outputs and intended outcomes are not clearly articulated. The report stated that although the introduction of corporate systems and tools has improved efficiency, they have not however strengthened the culture of results in the organisation or improved programmatic focus at the country level.¹⁰²

However, the RBM and RBB *were* developed with a view to measuring outcomes. The fact that, in practice, measuring outcomes has been insufficient in many cases is linked to a number of factors outside of the frameworks. Firstly, DPKO and UNDP, like many other bodies engaged in SSR, have struggled to develop indicators to measure the higher-level outcomes/impact of SSR-related programmes. Difficulties have been faced in deciding what indicators would illustrate that high-level outcomes have been achieved. This problem is perpetuated by the decentralised nature of M&E in DPKO and UNDP, where different missions and COs have different ideas about what success looks like. This issue was raised by respondents from the DDR Unit who have struggled to determine the impact of DDR on broader society without isolating it from other processes and initiatives (for example, peace-building and SSR) that also have an impact.

The need for guidance on developing indicators that measure the higher-level political impact of a mission, particularly with regards to influencing political changes on the ground, was identified as a key priority by a number of DPKO Units. The existing M&E system was criticised for focussing too heavily on internal and operational performance, activities and outputs and not on the external impact, such as on political dynamics and people's lives. There is a general feeling that where mission mandates are political (which they often are), M&E should also measure impact at the political level to respond to this. It has also been argued that UN PKOs continue to focus on increasing the capacity of the state and technical improvement of the legal and security system and less so on the societal impact of these or on access to justice and security for beneficiaries.¹⁰³

One respondent from DPKO stated that, 'the M&E system is too heavily focussed on reporting to Member States and not the people whose lives we are trying to improve'. Linked to this, it was felt by a number of respondents that the mandates developed by member states for missions were not realistic, in light of time/resources/political pressure on the ground – therefore making the measurement of performance impossible. In light of this, it was felt that the development of indicators should be based on an understanding of what is 'normal' in the security and justice context of a particular country; an assessment made from the collection of qualitative baseline data. Research could include information from perception surveys, household surveys and focus groups discussion.

One respondent felt that there is a clear need to develop different methodologies for measuring the impact of programmes engaging in the different stages of post-conflict situations. This is because it was felt that the criteria for measuring the impact of missions in immediate post-crisis situations were different to measuring the impact of the longer-term post-conflict engagement of UNDP, for example.

- *Definition/Understanding of the concept 'SSR'*: Respondents highlighted that a key challenge in the M&E of SSR programmes is the confusion over what constitutes an SSR programme. As outlined above, there is no consensus on a definition across the UN system, which many respondents feel is necessary before a comprehensive and outcome focussed M&E system can be developed. A respondent from the Police Unit felt that a key challenge to the M&E of policing was the lack of one internationally recognised doctrine on policing. Until this is rectified, the respondent was of the opinion that M&E in missions would remain blurred and based on contrasting and context specific perceptions of appropriate benchmarks.

¹⁰² UNDP Evaluation Office (December 2007), *Evaluation on use of Results Based Management*.

¹⁰³ Blume, T (2008), *op cit*, p.14.

A key challenge raised by representatives from the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory section is the ongoing debate and confusion on the linkages between approaches to Rule of Law and SSR. This continues to be a key challenge to M&E of SSR in many missions and to Rule of Law in particular. This point is supported by Till Blume who, focussing on UNMIL as a case study, cites the difficulties in translating rule of law and integrated missions' concepts into meaningful frameworks in the field.¹⁰⁴

This is not only a challenge internally within the UN, but also a cause of concern for host governments in agreeing UN mission mandates. For example, a key challenge with ONUB was gaining agreement on the use of the term SSR and the idea of holistic programming, as the government would not own the term and was more comfortable with agreeing upon a piecemeal approach to SSR.¹⁰⁵ This challenge inevitably has implications for local ownership (see below).

- *M&E Culture:* There is a poor culturing of M&E in many missions, with staff often not seeing why M&E is necessary and perceive the audits undertaken by OIOS as being headquarters-led, aimed at meeting institutional requirements and therefore removed from the realities of the mission. The biggest challenge faced by DFET is getting people at the mission level to buy into and support the evaluation process. There is confusion over the differing roles of DFET and OIOS (see above). People are often sceptical about DFET and concerned that, like OIOS, they are focussed on conducting audits.

DFET addresses this challenge through referring to their work as conducting 'evaluations' as opposed to 'audits' and by illustrating the ways that the outcome of evaluations can have a positive impact on missions by focussing on what needs to be improved and identifying ways that this can be done. The need to improve communication between missions and headquarters needs to be emphasised in order to gain better buy-in to evaluations at the mission level.

- *Lack of resources:* The inadequacy of resources for conducting evaluations was emphasised by respondents from DPKO. Similarly, an evaluation undertaken by SADEV in 2008 (see above) found that there is a general need in UNDP COs for better in-house evaluation capacities, in terms of both human and financial resources.
- *National ownership and participation:* Local stakeholder's involvement in the evaluation process, including defining what constitutes success, is arguably important in order to improve the quality and utility of evaluations, as well as potentially enhance the relevance of M&E. For example, including national government representatives in the evaluation process would ensure a wider ownership of evaluations. Efforts should also be made at providing governments with increased, and better, opportunities to effectively influence processes.¹⁰⁶ There is also a significant need to involve the beneficiaries in the planning and implementation of M&E processes. In theory, M&E activities undertaken within UNDP and DPKO should already include beneficiaries through community consultations or similar activities, but in practice, this happens infrequently.

Co-operation with national counterparts has been a key challenge to successful monitoring in some cases. In Liberia, for example, the effective monitoring of local practises by field-based Legal and Judicial System Support Division has been prevented in some cases by poor co-operation by local counterparts.¹⁰⁷ Thus, national ownership is imperative in encouraging the co-operation of national actors.

- *Balancing centralised and decentralised decision-making:* Respondents identified a clear need for continuous support to national M&E systems through the provision of financial and technical assistance. In cases where M&E tools and methodologies are developed, and capable staff exist within government, the skills of these people should be used. However,

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ Banal, S and Scherrer, S (2008), *op cit.*

¹⁰⁶ SADEV (2008), *op cit.*

¹⁰⁷ Blume, T (2008), *op cit.*

an evaluation completed by the Evaluation Office (December 2007) found that UNDP's current approach of defining and reporting against centrally defined outcomes (see section 2 above) has undermined responsiveness and alignment to nationally defined outcomes and priorities. Furthermore, an evaluation conducted by SADEV in 2008 (see above) found that UNDP's ROAR has primarily become an upward reporting tool for regional management and is of little use for COs.¹⁰⁸

For UNDP, the rapidly shifting and sometimes overlapping strategic policy documents that should guide its work appear to pose serious threats to the planning of evaluations and to conducting appropriate outcome assessments. Apparently this has sometimes led COs to manipulate their programmes to fit with over-arching predetermined outcomes. The current system favours a 'backwards' way of working, in which outputs are subsequently linked to outcomes. In general, outcomes need to be clearly specified in order to be closely interlinked with project activities. Baselines are often also missing, which further complicates proper assessments. The fact that outcomes (in most cases) can only be assessed several years after the termination of a programme also indicates that a change is required in programming to accommodate this reality. To maximise the results of an outcome evaluation, outcome evaluations should be planned several years after termination of the programme.

- *Responding to M&E findings:* The UNDP M&E system has also been criticised for lacking mechanisms that are required to trigger qualitative reviews and evaluations on a regular basis. Moreover, the poor use of evaluation findings is felt to lead infrequently to adjustments in country programme strategies.

5. Current trends and opportunities

The trends and opportunities outlined in this section reflect the views of the author.

As illustrated through this research, significant steps have been made within DPKO and, to a greater extent, UNDP to strengthen M&E of SSR programmes in 2008. The establishment of a new SSR Unit in DPKO signifies a greater commitment within the UN to develop a co-ordinated approach to addressing security and justice issues, and as part of this, identifying more comprehensive approaches to M&E. If done well, the establishment of a coherent policy towards SSR could be the first stage in a process of supporting a more co-ordinated and impact focused approach to this issue within the UN.

Reinforcing this is the growing support within DPKO Units to strengthening approaches for measuring the external impact of SSR programmes on peoples' lives; a move away from the traditional focus on measuring internal and operational performance. This need has also been fuelled by a growing demand for guidance on M&E at the mission level. Field missions have requested guidance in the form of a 'one-pager' on what information they need to collect and how to conduct M&E.

In addition, the recognition of a need for better M&E of PKOs has led to the establishment of DPET to support evaluation of mission and Headquarter activities, and the establishment of an SSR unit tasked with developing guidance on M&E for SSR programmes. However, it is important to emphasise that DPET is focussed on measuring internal performance and not impact, and although this is useful in terms of building the capacity of DPKO, this does address the gap in terms of measuring programme outcomes and broader impact.

In general there is growing recognition within UNDP of the need to move towards better M&E of outcomes. BCPR has taken further steps to strengthen approaches to M&E of SSR programmes by drawing upon UNDP M&E guidelines to develop a template for M&E of CPR programmes (see above). In addition, the Global Programme on Justice and Security has

¹⁰⁸ However, that report has been criticised by Board members as being too vague and containing little substantive detail on results. *Ibid.*

developed generic indicators to support COs in measuring the impact of justice and security programmes.

Linked to a growing recognition within DPKO and UNDP of the need to develop a comprehensive approach to measuring the impact of SSR programmes, there is support for the development of further guidance, particularly in relation to evaluation criteria and indicators sets. Suggestions from UN interviewees consulted for this research regarding the appropriate content of any additional guidance package are as follows:

- Indicators need to be developed to support measurement of national ownership of SSR processes, including for example the degree of government commitment to a reform programme in terms of financial and political capital.
- Evaluation criteria and/or indicators should promote measurement of impact not just in terms of governmental or institutional change but in terms of wider attitudinal and behaviour change in society.
- A respondent from DPKO emphasised the need to develop indicators for measuring how the mission has set the framework for longer-term SSR engagement, ie the work of UNDP and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). It was felt that this is essential in terms of better linking the measurement of the short-term output of missions with the longer-term type of engagement by UNDP.
- One respondent emphasised the need to include 'connectedness' of different actors engaged in and around SSR as an evaluation criterion.
- There is a need to measure both technical and political change resulting from programme activities, an example of the latter being the degree of trust that exists between government counterparts and the UN. This can only be measured qualitatively but was felt to be a particularly important measure in the early stages of programming (for example, the first six months).

Annex 1: Interviewee list

The following people were interviewed between 01 and 10 October 2008 in person, and over the telephone in New York and Geneva.

Alexjandro Alvarez Justice & Security Sector Reform Advisor, UNDP BCPR

Ayaka Suzuki, Chief, DDR Unit, DPKO

Andrew Carpenter, Chief of the Strategic Policy and Development Section, Police Division

Djodje Djordjevic, JSSR Programme Specialist, UNDP BCPR

Mark Pedersen, Policy Officer, DPKO Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, DPKO

Janey Lawry-White, M&E Specialist, UNDP BCPR

Jared Rigg, SSR Adviser, SSR Unit, DPKO

Jens W. Andersen, Evaluations Officer, Office of the Military Adviser, DPKO

Jerome Mellon, SSR Co-ordination Office, SSR Unit, DPKO

Kishan Sirohi, Acting Chief of Section, Office of Internal Oversight Services

Stephane Jean, Policy and Legal Affairs Officer, Police Division, DPKO

Robert Pulver, Chief, DPKO Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Section

Annex 2: Justice and security sector reform (JSSR) indicators (UNDP BCPR, May 2008).

STRATEGIC PLAN OUTCOME	STRATEGIC PLAN INDICATOR	COUNTRY OFFICE OUTCOME INDICATOR	COUNTRY OFFICE OUTPUT INDICATOR
<p>Strengthened national capacities, including the participation of women, to prevent, reduce, mitigate and cope with the impact of violent conflict</p> <p>Gender equality and women's empowerment enhanced in post-disaster and post-conflict situations</p>	<p>Percentage of countries supported by UNDP that have dedicated and effective institutions, mechanisms and/or processes for the prevention and management of conflicts and disputes at the national or local levels</p> <p>Percentage of conflict affected countries that have, with UNDP support, facilitated the effective participation of women and vulnerable populations in conflict-resolution and peacebuilding processes at the national or local levels</p> <p>Percentage of countries that have, with UNDP support, implemented national recovery plans which reflect the participation and concerns of women and vulnerable groups</p> <p>Percentage of countries supported by UNDP with capacity development plans</p>	<p>A. Policies and plans Civil society oversight mechanisms for the security sector functioning</p> <p>Independence, impartiality, transparency, accountability and due process of law ensured, with special attention to marginalised groups, including women and children</p> <p>Levels of funding to JSSR</p> <p>Percentage of objectives in JSSR programmes fully met</p> <p>Percentage of recommendations in JSSR evaluations implemented</p>	<p>A. Policies and plans Extent of policy dialogue with national partners (number of meetings, agreed action points from meetings, follow-up to action points)</p> <p>National Action Plan on Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) under implementation</p> <p>Peace agreements include an adequate gender perspective (e.g. include a focus on the special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction; how the peace agreement will promote gender equality; and include a focus on the role of women in recovery)</p> <p>Targets set for reduction in the incidence of gender based violence, including rape, sexual harassment, and domestic violence</p> <p>JSSR policies and plans developed that take into account civilian management and democratic oversight</p> <p>JSSR policies and plans developed that include judicial and prison reform</p> <p>JSSR policies and plans developed that include cross-cutting issues such as gender equality and human rights, disability, HIV/AIDS, and/or child protection</p> <p>Integrated JSSR policies and plans developed including a focus on DDR, mine action and small arms, and conflict prevention.</p> <p>JSSR policies and plans establish a clear institutional framework for the provision of security that integrates security and development policy and includes all relevant actors; strengthens the governance of security</p>

<p>Post-conflict governance capacity strengthened, including measures to work towards prevention of resumption of conflict</p>	<p>integrated into national recovery frameworks</p> <p>Percentage of countries supported by UNDP with conflict sensitive capacity development plans</p> <p>Percentage of countries supported by UNDP with concrete conflict prevention initiatives that address the structural causes of conflict in their national recovery policies, plans and programmes</p> <p>Percentage of countries that have, with UNDP support, implemented policies promoting civilian oversight and accountability of the justice and security sector</p>	<p>B. Institutions National JSSR institutions functioning and sustainable:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - degree of control over budgets - degree of control over planning processes - level of support required from external agencies - regularity of payment of staff - regularity of staff performance assessment - regularity of audit, monitoring and evaluation <p>Level of criminal investigation</p> <p>Level of impunity rates</p> <p>Level of pre-trial detention</p> <p>Numbers of war crimes tried by national courts, and percentage of crimes prosecuted which have led to convictions and sentences</p> <p>The percentage of sentences for war crimes fully implemented</p> <p>Numbers of rape and sexual and gender-based violence cases brought to court and percentage of cases leading to sentencing and convictions</p> <p>Level of confidence of public in courts and police</p>	<p>institutions; and builds capable and professional security forces that are accountable to civil authorities</p> <p>JSSR policies and plans include details on the transition from early recovery to development</p> <p>B. Institutions Nationally-owned needs assessments for technical assistance and capacity development carried out</p> <p>Capacity assessment of key justice and security institutions, such as the Judiciary, Ministry of Justice, Prosecutor's Office, Law-enforcement, Corrections and Customary Law mechanisms, carried out</p> <p>Number of police officers, judges, prosecutors and corrections officials trained, by sex</p> <p>Percentage of total police officers, judges, prosecutors and corrections officials trained on gender equality issues, by sex</p> <p>Percentage of police officers, judges, prosecutors, lawyers and paralegals who feel confident to deal with cases of sexual and gender-based violence</p> <p>Budget to programmes strengthening and reviving traditional governance and customary justice mechanisms</p> <p>Number of Legal Information Centres established</p> <p>Number of Legal Information Centres that have specific resources on sexual and gender-based violence and women/children's legal rights</p> <p>Number of rule of law institutions rehabilitated/constructed</p>
<p>Post-crisis community security and social cohesion at local level restored</p>	<p>Percentage of countries that have, with UNDP support, implemented policies promoting civilian oversight and accountability of the justice and security sector</p>	<p>C. Partnerships Percentage of objectives in joint programmes fully met</p>	<p>C. Partnerships Extent of consultation with government at national and local levels, civil society and the private sector (number of meetings, number of joint programmes developed)</p>

		<p>D. Co-ordination Co-ordination structures functioning and sustainable</p> <p>Percentage of JSSR programmes which link to other recovery activities such as DDR, mine action and small arms</p> <p>E. Programming Clearance/solution rate of crimes in poorest 40 per cent of districts</p> <p>Perceptions of public safety and security</p> <p>Percentage change in the incidence of gender-based violence, particularly rape, attempted rape, sexual harassment and domestic violence.</p> <p>Percentage of sexual and gender-based violence cases being prosecuted</p> <p>Percentage of JSSR funding going to programmes that ensure the protection of, and respect for, human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary</p> <p>Level of satisfaction with police interventions in relation to gender-based violence, including domestic violence</p>	<p>Establishment of relevant transitional justice mechanisms (e.g. truth & reconciliation commission, statutory and customary system, compensation)</p> <p>D. Co-ordination Co-ordination structures established with national stakeholders, with: -precise terms of reference (responsibilities, chairmanship, management and periodicity of the meetings, etc) -plan for handover of the co-ordination structure to the national authorities -a communications strategy and linking JSSR to public information campaigns</p> <p>Holistic JSSR programming established with links to other recovery activities such as DDR, mine action and small arms</p> <p>E. Programming Number of communities which can newly access justice and resolve conflicts/disputes without recourse to violence</p> <p>Level of access to justice mechanisms and legal aid for displaced and war-affected populations, especially women and youth, children, the disabled and the elderly</p> <p>Number of newly functioning local courts</p> <p>Number of newly functioning legal aid mechanisms</p> <p>Numbers of legal aid centres established in IDP camps</p> <p>Number of legal aid centres that have adequate staff and facilities to provide legal aid and primary psychosocial support to victims of sexual and gender-based violence</p> <p>Number of public defenders and defenders provided through legal aid and law clinic defenders per 100,000 of population</p> <p>Budget disbursed to confidence- and trust building activities (e.g.</p>
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