Editorial

Human security in Africa
Cheryl Hendricks

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The idea that our understanding and articulation of security needed to be broadened to focus on individuals and communities and that we should view democratisation, development and security as interlinked had been on the margins of the security discourse until the release of the United Nations Development Programme Report of 1994. This report gave coherent and systematic expression to these beliefs, named the concept ‘human security’, and thus posited it in the lexicon of security studies. The concept gained widespread international attention, challenging the ontological and epistemological assumptions that had become the mainstay of security studies and praxis. “Freedom from want’, ‘Freedom from fear’ and ‘Empowerment’ were constitutive of the new human security approach.

* Cheryl Hendricks is the head of the Southern African Human Security Programme at the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa.
Africa was central to the development of this new perspective: the predominance of civil wars widely attributed to the lack of good governance and the series of non-traditional threats such as HIV/AIDS, food shortages, desertification and other environmental challenges provided the context that necessitated an analytical shift in the security discourse, whilst the African intelligentsia – through for example, the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) and the contributions of people like South Africa’s previous speaker of parliament, Frene Ginwala, to the UN Commission on Human Security – were key in conceptualising the nature and referents of security. The concept found its way into the discussions, declarations and protocols of the African Union and into the policy frameworks, vision and mission statements of key security establishments and research institutions, including the Institute for Security Studies.

But the initial enthusiasm that embraced the shift to human security has waned. Post–9/11 traditional security concerns – in this case counter-terrorism – regained centre stage. A plethora of arguments critiquing the concept of human security as ill-defined and lacking operationalisation, and emphasising the central role of the state in the provision of security, also emerged. Human security advocates in turn began to divide themselves into those who purportedly advocated a broad definition and a narrow definition of human security, that is, a focus on violence/violent conflicts and a predominant focus on state security whilst admitting that security, democracy and development are interrelated. This narrow definition is evident in the Human Security Report 2005: war and peace in the 21st century.1 The report contends that ‘a concept that lumps together threats as diverse as genocide and affronts to personal dignity may be useful for advocacy, but has limited utility for policy analysis’ (p viii). Within the African context, too, human security remained a vague concept, proliferating in policy documents but with little resonance in the daily operations of the security apparatus.

Has the human security paradigm run its course and can therefore be jettisoned to the heap of other laudable developmental concepts that appear and disappear, in predictable fashion, every decade? Is it a paradigm that civil society, as the greatest beneficiary of its tenets, needs to continue to assert? Can we effectively respond to the challenges posed by its detractors? What constitutes human security in the African context and what do we need to do to achieve it?

These concerns run through the pages of this volume. There is no agreement between authors on the subject, but through their discussion, the rationale for a human security perspective, or challenges to the perspective in the African context, can be discerned.

Katja Svensson, drawing on feminist insights, questions the embeddedness of power relations in the security perspectives and cautions against the dismissal of human security of the basis of a lack of ‘analytical neatness.’ Ian Spears refocuses us on the aberration
of the post-colonial African state – that is, that it only has *de jure* validity and is often incapable of meeting its basic functions. He views the state as constitutive of the ongoing threats but as the only institution capable of creating human security on the continent. Thomas Tieku explores the ways in which human security has been introduced into the African Union and its current status, while Peter Uvin discerns, through a series of interviews with young Burundians, what their understanding of security is.

The concerns that propelled the development of a human security perspective, growing individual and community insecurity caused by poverty, crime, gender-based violence, environmental challenges, and human rights abuses remain and are increasing. Whether we call our response to these concerns ‘human security’, or any other appellation, should not be our primary occupation; that we address them, must be!

**Note**

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Human security as inclusive security – gender, epistemology and equality

Katja Svensson*

Drawing on feminist research, the author uses an inclusive approach to discuss epistemological aspects of the conceptualisation of human security. She argues for the need for a participative approach to all aspects of human security, starting from its definition through to the design and implementation of security strategies. Feminist insights regarding knowledge and power are central to the discussion, and are used to elaborate upon hierarchical structures of politics, methodological aspects and ecological concerns in relation to international security.

* Katja Svensson is a lecturer at Malmö University, Sweden, and a PhD candidate at the University of Liège, Belgium.
Introduction

Economist Mahbub Ul Haq wrote in the UNDP Human Development Report 1994 that ‘[i]t is time for humanity to restore its perspective and redesign its agenda’ (UNDP 1994:1). More than a decade later, the concept of human security outlined in the same report has managed to inspire foreign policy agendas, academic conferences, institutes, centres and commissions in the global arena. Still there is no international consensus on the scope or definition of human security; arguments abound on its analytical utility, political viability and practical merits. Supporters of the concept herald it as a paradigm shift, and the reader of the UNDP report is left with little doubt that Mahbub Ul Haq was a fierce advocate of a momentous change in how we view international security. Sadly, without political will and material capacity, the shift is still in the making, while lives are shortened through our inability to act in a unified and efficient manner.

A paradigm shift in the Kuhnian sense of the word entails a lot more than a change of ontological focus. We need an epistemological shift to guide our conceptualisation of a framework that will allow us to better meet threats to human security. Several fundamental obstacles are blocking our efforts to do so. I will list them briefly and will elaborate upon them later in this essay.

First, without a truly participative, bottom-up approach to naming and framing human security the concept will never be universally relevant. Second, the preference for quantitative indicators must give way to a more holistic approach, inclusive of qualitative dimensions, despite their elusive measurability. Security cannot be assessed outside its social and political context. Third, the hierarchies within the traditional security discourse need to be dismantled as they are counterproductive and gravely misleading. Here I refer to the placement of security above development, the state above the individual, men above women and protection above empowerment. And fourth, amid the global environmental concerns the world has to contend with, we cannot afford a human security approach that is purely anthropocentric. This may sound like a paradox in terms, but with a holistic view of human security, the security of the ecosystem should be at the very heart of our efforts.

The mission to create an epistemological space for our definition and operationalisation of human security is a daunting task, but not by any means an impossible one. Rather than attempting to reinvent the wheel, I suggest that we take direction from feminist perspectives on international relations.

Feminist security research

Critical security research, including feminist security research, has a tradition of unearthing power structures affecting how security is conceptualised to favour some over
others in international agenda setting and research (Booth 2005). Feminist scholarship has been the subject of intense criticism for its assumption that women could be treated as a homogenous group, letting the white woman’s experience of oppression stand as all women’s experience of oppression (Steans 1999). Through the debate, other relations of dominance and non-dominance were unearthed and acknowledged, including those pertaining to race, community, class and sexuality. Presumptuous and somewhat condescending in its original approach, feminist research has matured and become richer in its analytical scope through voices of opposition.

Many feminist theorists have long had a focus on the security of the individual rather than the state as they ‘define security as freeing individuals and groups from the social, physical, economic, and political constraints that prevent them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do’ (Basch 2004:9). The term ‘human security’ is inclusive in its vast scope of threats to the individual, but the risk is that we presume universality in how security and development affect individuals.

A profound understanding of human security presupposes an understanding of the gender dimension (Chenoy 2005). This does not mean that our approach should be guided by stereotypical generalisations of women as more peace-loving than men, but rather by taking into account the power relations pertaining to gender, specifically their effect on how women and men experience security and development.

Nowadays, the relevance of gender in traditional security analysis is widely acknowledged, but it rarely amounts to more than an ‘add-women-and-stir’ approach. Women are allowed into the security discourse, predominately as victims and only marginally as agents of war or agents of peace. Feminist research has more to offer than merely including women as an ontological category. I shall in this essay attempt to outline how feminist research can guide us in making human security a truly inclusive security approach, people-centred and universal in scope. In so doing, I will not attempt a gender analysis of security, however interesting and worthwhile, but limit my gender perspective to epistemological insights produced by feminist research as I believe they can help elucidate the road forwards for human security, in particular, in relation to the fundamental obstacles mentioned earlier.

**Under European eyes ...**

As a researcher based in Europe attempting to write about human security in Africa, I have to address the question of whether ‘egalitarian and noncolonizing cross-cultural scholarship’ (Mohanty 2002:502) is possible. Using a gender perspective in this essay is not unproblematic, as the actual validity of gender as a universal category for analysis has been contested by African feminist scholars (Steady 2005). There is also a danger of
promoting an oppositional structure through a sole focus on female experiences (Lennon 1995), reinforcing the duality between ‘us’ and ‘them’.

While aware of these pitfalls, and wary of establishing categories that may or may not be of universal relevance, I remain convinced that insights from feminist research allow us a greater sensitivity to structural inequality, a sensitivity that is highly useful to the theoretical development of human security, as well as the construct of a policy approach. Inherent in the gender perspective is a commitment to social change, a determination to dismantle unequal structures already in existence as well as avoid the risk of creating new ones. As post-colonial feminist theory together with post-colonial development theory have asserted, the prerogative of naming and framing security and development should reside with the people themselves and not be superimposed from outside.

A bottom-up approach to human security will therefore produce a definition better reflecting reality, and it could facilitate the spread of locally produced knowledge that would otherwise remain in the periphery. Neat constellations such as the division between the First and the Third World or even the North and the South are misleading, because human security concerns know no boundaries. The have and the have-nots live in all countries and in all societies across the globe (Sen 1999). The question of how the particular relates to the universal is relevant both in addressing policy formulations within the human security framework and in the sharing of knowledge. Through a participative approach we embrace the value of comparing experiences. ‘In knowing differences and particularities, we can better see the connections and commonalities because no border or boundary is ever complete or rigidly determining’ (Mohanty 2002:505).

The wealth of knowledge produced locally around the world is not recognised in the scholarship and policy-making in my part of the world and I suspect this is a global condition. For instance, the concept of ubuntu (Louw 1998) could help researchers transcend the current dichotomies between individuality and community, particularity and commonality in the European context. Instead, African experience and philosophy is often invisible in research outside Africa, which is a loss on all sides. I believe that the road to defining human security in Africa runs parallel to similar endeavours in the rest of the world. The epistemological space is universally relevant, while the context can and must be locally specific.

The genesis of human security

In the 1994 UNDP report, Mahbub Ul Haq argued for making the individual rather than the state our analytical referent for international security. If nothing else changed, then this could be merely an ontological shift. However, his view of human security was that it was a people-centred approach. This essentially meant that human security
focused on everyday security as experienced by individuals around the world, which would also make it universal in scope. This was an epistemological shift from traditional security analysis where the parameters of the discourse at large were defined by policy makers and scholars in the northern hemisphere. If the knowledge base needed to define security lies with the individual, the discursive power will be shifted away from the privileged few; validating local knowledge and local knowledge holders instead.

There was also an explicit recognition of the interdependence between security and development as the two main components of human life and dignity. This nexus was outlined in seven categories that, although listed separately, were clearly connected and interrelated. Human security entails, in accordance with the report, economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security (UNDP 1994). The nature of threats should guide the security measures needed, including preventive measures and empowerment as central features. With a vast array of threats falling in the non-military field, this could, and should, result in a plethora of non-state actors stepping in as security providers.

The ontological shift was embraced by many, but the epistemological shift proved less convincing and resulted in a divide within the field of human security supporters. The inability to agree on the scope of human security resulted in a division into a broad and a narrow definition of what to include as threats (Owen 2004). The broad view is in agreement with the categories listed in the UNDP report, while the narrow view focuses on security from physical violence, while maintaining the people-centred focus. The narrow view can be said to stand in agreement with the moral aspects of the broader view, but finds it analytically and operationally impossible as a ‘concept that aspires to explain everything in reality explains nothing’ (Mack 2004:367). The broad view in turn finds the narrow view misleading in that all threats are interlinked and should be included in the analysis.

Time is passing and it is now imperative that we go beyond intellectual navel-gazing to find a way forward. I am convinced that if we want to grasp the multidimensional character of international security today, we must be willing to let go of the need for analytical neatness. We cannot shy away from a theoretical framework that, although universally relevant, allows for constant contextual modifications. However repugnant to traditionalist security scholars, this is no news for the feminist researcher (or the ethnologist, sociologist or anthropologist) and the complex nature of international security today necessitates a multidisciplinary approach, accompanied by epistemological openness and methodological exchanges.

Naming and framing human security

Relations of dominance and non-dominance determine who defines norms and practices and who must follow them; who is important and who is not;
who defines the parameters of the debate and does not; who is valuable and who is not. These are the profound and longstanding inequalities of the world that, because the dominant discourses determine what we can and cannot hear and learn, go largely disregarded (Hoogensen & Stuvøy 2006:219).

The concept of human security as outlined in the 1994 UNDP report is a people-centred approach, referring to everyday life security concerns. Without a bottom-up approach to naming and framing human security, it can never be a concept of universal relevance. The concept must remain dynamic as the fundamental freedoms needed for a sense of security, what people perceive as the essence of life, vary from society to society (Commission on Human Security 2002). By default, this entails a re-evaluation of knowledge and a re-arrangement of power settings to include holders of locally relevant expertise. This will undoubtedly be met with suspicion and even hostility from the privileged few holding positions as security experts, but the complexity of international security today necessitates this paradigm shift. While participative methods should be used to assess threats as well as to formulate strategies to provide security, awareness is needed of the possible drawbacks connected with adopting a preference-based approach. As Nussbaum (2000) points out, preferences are often socially and culturally shaped, risking reinforcing existing social inequalities. Although her comment referred to social justice for women through the capability approach, it is relevant for any participative approach aiming at equal representation. Participation in itself involves a mutual exchange of information and knowledge among all stakeholders. Part of this information should be devoted to individual rights as stated in international law and knowledge produced elsewhere that pertains to the context. The fear of paternalism should not keep the information exchange from being truly participatory on all sides.

The non-governmental organisation, ActionAid International, has invented a participative methodology that is groundbreaking and very much in line with a bottom-up approach to security. Again, I find myself reiterating the importance of making use of valuable experience already in existence and refraining from trying to reinvent the wheel. If nothing else, it makes a seemingly Herculean task somewhat less daunting.

Participatory Vulnerability Analysis (PVA) is a systematic process that involves communities and other stakeholders in an in-depth examination of their vulnerability and at the same time empowers or motivates them to take appropriate action. The overall aim of PVA is to link disaster preparedness and response to long-term development. The message at the heart of PVA is that communities know their situations best and so any analysis should be built on their knowledge of local conditions. The essence of PVA is for the community not only to develop action plans, but to have their confidence built through valuing their knowledge and to be
able to constantly seek opportunities to enhance their resilience to difficult conditions (Chiwaka 2005:2).

This particular methodology developed to assess vulnerability is carried out through data collection and workshops held at three participatory stages: community level analysis, district level analysis and finally a national level analysis (Chiwaka 2005). As an operational model, this may provide us with feedback on what works well and what can be improved. Above all, it is the practical embodiment of a bottom-up approach, countering the argument that a security perspective incorporating the enlarged scope as outlined by Mahbub Ul Haq is operationally and analytically impossible.

**Measurability and context**

The early warning system is an important tool to enable us to ‘meet these threats upstream rather than downstream, early rather than late’ (UNDP 1994:3). Quantifiable indicators such as the UNDP human development index are used to enable such analysis, while providing data for long-term development estimates and comparative research. Development formerly measured through the blunt instrument of gross domestic product per capita is now measured by various context- and gender-specific indicators developed over time.

Several attempts have been made to establish a methodology that would enable us to measure human security, focusing on health security (King & Murray 2001/02) and regionally specific data (Owen 2003). The main tenet of the latter approach is that we cannot rely only on data obtained at the national level. Instead, we need to broaden our conception of space to include locally produced knowledge and expertise. The process is divided in three stages, the first being one of threat assessment where interviews with knowledge holders – both regional and local experts – will produce region-specific threats. The second and third stages involve data collection and analysis allowing for the identification of so-called hotspots, areas with multiple human security threats. Owen (2003) holds that this analysis is particularly useful, as it not only shows human insecurity outside of conflict – it also allows for an interdisciplinary approach.

Still, it is essential to remain sceptical towards wholly quantitative measures, as some factors simply cannot be measured, whether they are costs or benefits. Women’s subsistence farming and ecological resources are two examples of these ‘immeasurable’ benefits while deterioration of the environment and increased burdens of labour go unnoticed (Shiva 1995). As feminist research points out, the apparent objectivity of relying on quantifiable data is deceptive. The positivist approach to security and development merely disguises the structural power position of the dominant players. The value placed on scientific knowledge is an Enlightenment heritage of relentless staying
power. Knowledge that cannot be tested and submitted to falsification is not on par with modern science, effectively leaving it up to a privileged few to decide on the parameters.

This creates a ‘fear’ on behalf of the ‘security industry’ or the dominant security discourses. Security articulations cannot be controlled or regulated if they are context-dependent rather than ‘objectively’ established outside of any context. Specified on the basis of specific parameters such as thresholds or measures of severity, however, security can be ‘applied’ if and when the dominant discourses deem the situations or issue worthy of being considered a security issue (Hoogensen & Stuvøy 2006:221).

Nevertheless, security that is to be universally relevant must be defined within the cultural, social and political context. The qualitative aspects of human security include emancipation, empowerment and the capacity to achieve human dignity (Thomas 2000). We will have to find a way to join quantitative and qualitative dimensions of security into an inclusive methodological approach.

**Questioning the hierarchical order**

Although influenced by theories of human rights and human development, Ul Haq posited the concept of human security as an international security approach, thereby demanding a place for it in the coveted field of high politics. Security and development have long been separate fields in global institutions, security being the traditional field of high or ‘hard’ politics on the recipient end of international focus and allocation of resources. Development, on the other hand, has been an area of economic interest to some and humanitarian interest to others, but has been well ensconced in the area of low or ‘soft’ politics, receiving a far lesser part of funding from separate states as well as from the international community. Security and development have similarly been separate fields of academic study with security firmly placed within the realm of political science, while development has been more of a multidisciplinary field including economics, sociology, anthropology and politics. Even though security has increasingly been subject to multidisciplinary approaches, the linkages between security and development have yet to be developed fully in a theoretical manner.

The UN Secretary-General stated in 2005: ‘We will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights. Unless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed’ (Annan 2005:6). There is plenty of research that points to causal links between development and security, poverty and conflict, and peace and prosperity. The statement that you cannot have one without the other then puts into scrutiny whether we can have a hierarchical order between the two on the international agenda. Still, long-term perspectives on security – often of a
developmental nature – are lower on the list of priorities for the international community. What is perceived as a direct threat to security is prioritised and the military sector is still the main recipient of funds in the efforts to counter threats and stabilise countries. This could, however, be seen as a reflection of how deeply engrained the traditional conceptions of security are in the fields of academia and global governance. The same goes for our understanding of the gender dimension to security and development.

We have the commitment to gender mainstreaming in legal documents, policy statements and in the institutions and organisations within the arena of global governance. Despite all this, women still find themselves in a situation where their experiences are invisible and their ability to form their own future is an issue that is not considered a top priority on the security agenda. Despite them being true providers of security in their own community, their actions are disregarded and remain unseen.

There is a commonality between these two failures to comprehend the complexity of security issues today. Development is considered a ‘soft’ issue, while security is the ‘hard’ issue topping our agenda of priorities. Women are not perceived as posing the same threat to security as men and are therefore also a ‘soft’ security threat, at best belonging in the periphery of the security debate, if at all present. This is reductionism at its worst. Maintaining a hierarchy of hard and soft security concerns is counterproductive, and we need to come to terms with the multidimensional character of security today without trying to compartmentalise issues that by default are connected and interdependent both in cause and consequence.

Another hierarchical division that is detrimental to furthering human security is the placing of state security above the security of the individual. This perspective operates from the assumption that the Westphalia state system is the inevitable international arena with the state being the only actor of real importance, making the sovereignty principle and its correlation the non-intervention principle, pinnacles of past and current international law. The efforts to address the security of the individual in international legislation, such as the creation of the Genocide Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, have not been particularly fruitful as the attempt to secure individuals within a state often means infringing on the state’s right to non-intervention, thereby, per definition posing a threat to state sovereignty. Instead, concerned states have resorted to employing terms such as humanitarian interventions to try to bridge the gap. This has in many cases been paramount to an opening of Pandora’s Box as power politics has continued to operate under the guise of humanitarian motives. The report on ‘responsibility to protect’ (ICISS 2002) attempts to reconcile the security of the individual with the security of the state in that the state’s sovereignty is still upheld, but if the state is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens, it is the responsibility of the international community to step in. This can be seen as a move away from sovereignty as an absolute principle to sovereignty as a prerogative with some conditions pertaining
to it. If we take a Lockean view on sovereignty, the state’s right to rule rests upon its ability to deliver to its citizens the infrastructure and coordination necessary to fulfil their needs. Should it fail to do so, the social contract is broken and the state could arguably be held to have forfeited its right to absolute sovereignty. Applying a gender perspective to this line of reasoning exposes great weaknesses in several states’ abilities to act as a genuine representative for all their citizens.

In no society are women secure or treated equally to men. Personal insecurity shadows them from cradle to grave. In the household, they are the last to eat. At school, they are the last to be educated. At work they are the last to be hired and the first to be fired. And from childhood through adulthood, they are abused because of their gender (UNDP 1994:31).

Adopting an inclusive human security approach to this dilemma would enable a reassessment of the notion of sovereignty, moving away from the state’s right to non-intervention as an absolute principle. It does not mean that the state no longer is of relevance, or that its security should be disregarded. State security can, and should, be translated into the security of the individual citizen of that state. However, many factors affect the state as the provider of human security, aside from the cases where the state itself is the source of violence against its citizens. Our world today is filled with phenomena of a global nature that influence and, as commonly claimed, erode state sovereignty. The threats to security are often of a transnational character, encompassing regional conflicts, epidemics, poverty and environmental degradation. International and regional organisations, NGOs, civil society organisations, the private sector, local communities and ultimately individuals should all be seen as potential agents of peace and development. Security expertise cannot be the privilege of state officials or military leaders and protection cannot be the only means of security. Empowerment strategies and local ownership are essential factors for the success of security operations and development projects. In adopting a multi-actor approach, we can better deal with cross-cutting issues while promoting policy coherence and resource efficiency.

**Human security and the environment**

Even though environmental security is mentioned in the UNDP report of 1994, the risk of adopting a strictly anthropocentric perspective to the environment is inherent in human security. The people-centred approach is in many ways incommensurable with an ecocentric approach. What should come first? Which security is most important? There is an oppressive structure shaping our research and policy formation as long as there is a hierarchy between the two on the international agenda. Sustainable development seems to be the happy consensus between ecological and developmental concerns, but not according to many green theorists who assert that there are limits to growth (Paterson 2001). I have
dreaded addressing this part of the essay, as up to this point I have felt able to outline the obstacle and then happily go on to point to an epistemological solution. This obstacle is not insurmountable, certainly not, but I feel woefully inadequate in my rendition of it. While this issue certainly should be addressed by someone better informed, I maintain that insights from feminist research, in particular eco-feminist research, have a place in this discussion.

Measurable productivity (as mentioned before) is valued, while the activity outcome that cannot be measured is disregarded as passivity (Shiva 1995). This is a question of a value-system distinguishing between inherent and instrumental value. What is of instrumental value and useful to something else, in this context someone else, is seen and given a voice. What is merely of inherent value to itself is not. This conclusion is reached through a worldview characterised by separation and duality. The eco-feminist principle is one of inclusion, where separation is an illusion imposed from outside, in an attempt to divide and conquer. Through adopting a holistic view of the eco-system, where everything is valuable unto itself and as a part of a greater whole, we could fuse together the thesis of human security with the anti-thesis of ecological security and arrive at a final synthesis. Does this mean an end of history in true Hegelian spirit? I don't know, but I am certain that while pursuing human security, we simply must maintain a precautionary approach to biodiversity and the ecosystem as a whole.

Conclusion

I have tried to outline an epistemological place suitable for enabling a definition of human security that is universally relevant while context specific. If we let this paradigm shift amount into more than an ontological shift, we have the opportunity to address structural inequalities inherent in the current security discourse. In addition to making the individual our security referent, we must allow for the inclusion of threats experienced in everyday life, of non-state actors as security providers and of non-military means of security. The blueprint for accomplishing this does not and should not exist in this essay, but should be shaped through an approach that honours equality in diversity and values knowledge and knowledge producers at all levels in society.

Notes

1 Two later attempts at defining human security worth mentioning are:
   • ‘Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity’ (Commission on Human Security 2003:4).
   • ‘[H]uman security describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met and in which
human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be met. Thus, while material sufficiency lies at the core of human security, in addition the concept encompasses non-material dimensions to form a qualitative whole’ (Thomas 2000:xii).

Gender in this essay is seen to be a social construction of masculinity and femininity that is particular to a temporal and cultural context.

Bibliography

Books and articles

Reports
Human security and the state in Africa

Ian S Spears*

The most recent major document on human security tells us more about the ideal of human security than how this worthy objective can best be achieved. This is a problem because most African states were created to serve as a bulwark against further colonial rule rather than provide domestic order and protection for their citizens. Many African states have since become battlegrounds for ethnic or economic struggles. Neither a new and committed African leadership, nor intervention by the international community, is likely to transcend this problem and effectively advance the human security agenda. A reformed African state – one which induces leaders to be more concerned with advancing the interests of their people more broadly – remains the only viable alternative. The problem is that any reform of African states will also involve difficult trade-offs and dilemmas.

* Ian S Spears, PhD, is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada.
In 2003, the Commission on Human Security published the report *Human security now*. In it, the authors surveyed contemporary understandings and approaches to this issue. Human security, it said, ‘is concerned with safeguarding and expanding people’s vital freedoms. It requires both shielding people from acute threats and empowering people to take charge of their lives’ (Commission on Human Security 2003:iv). The commission added that what are needed are ‘integrated policies that focus on people’s survival, livelihood and dignity ...’ (ibid).

This document raises a number of questions, not least of which is whether there is such a thing as a conscious, deliberate and planned approach to security and political development more generally, or whether processes such as state-building are a crisis-driven response to other circumstances. So much of what is written on human security is a discussion of ideals rather than an inquiry as to why these ideals are not being upheld or what conditions best ensure that they are. For example, much of the commission’s document emphasises the need to ‘encourage,’ ‘uphold,’ ‘strengthen,’ ‘deepen,’ ‘enable,’ or ‘respect’ things like human rights or small arms reduction agreements. But saying that people in violent conflict need to be protected does not tell us how this worthy objective is to be achieved. Nor is saying that adversaries need to be disarmed the same as specifying how this is to be done safely. The commission’s report seeks human security, but provides little concrete discussion about the means for achieving it.

This essay begins from the premise that human security is jeopardised by the specific nature of many contemporary African states. It concludes with the view that the state as an institution still holds many of the answers to advance a human security agenda.

Literature on Africa and violent conflict suggests that human security is undermined by two factors, both of which are related to state weakness. The first, which may be called the realist approach, accepts the premise that the violence which jeopardises the security of one group is often a legitimate response (at least in the eyes of the perpetrators) to the insecurities felt by another group. In other words, ethnic conflicts are not simply about evil people irrationally committing unspeakable acts; often they are about ordinary people perceiving that their security is at such great risk that they are justified in taking pre-emptive or vengeful action. If this violence is to be stopped, the solution lies in finding ways to end or mitigate the security dilemmas that perpetuate conflict. A second and more recent approach sees violence and disorder in more protracted and instrumental terms. This literature emphasises that African leaders benefit from state weakness and will deliberately undermine efforts at state-building because the disorder that results provides opportunities for predation not otherwise available (Chabal & Daloz 1999).

The commission acknowledges that ‘the state remains the fundamental purveyor of security’ but notes that ‘it often fails to fulfil its security obligations – and at times has even become a source of threat to its own people’ (Commission on Human Security
2003:2). Consequently, it argues that ‘attention must be shifted from the security of the state to the security of the people’ (page 2). But shifting the focus from an institution – the state – to a group may not do enough to help us understand how the security of people can be addressed. Moreover, it overlooks the ongoing truism that it is perversions associated with the insecurity of the state which make it a threat to its own people. In short, what needs to be acknowledged is that the state is both an on-going threat and a possible response to the achievement of human security.

This essay attempts to do several things. First, it seeks to explain why the status quo remains so problematic in terms of advancing a human security agenda – specifically, why human security is jeopardised by an on-going attachment to the contemporary African state. Second, it explains why a reliance on the international community to ensure human security is of limited value. Third, it explores the contradictions and trade-offs that must be confronted in seeing the state as a vehicle for human security. And finally, it suggests options to be considered for a sustainable human security agenda to be realised.

Several factors can be isolated in terms of their nefarious consequences for human security, but they start with the legal or ‘juridical’ nature of the African state as identified by Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg (1982). It is generally well known that most states in sub-Saharan Africa (South Africa being an exception) were created as legal entities prior to their ability to meet empirical or Weberian understandings of the state. Since the basis of these states were territories that were more or less arbitrarily delineated by European colonial powers rather than carved out by forces indigenous to Africa, these states are notable for their internal diversity and political fragility. Yet, Africa’s independent states have maintained their territorial integrity in spite of their weakness through a continental pact manifested in the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (and its successor, the African Union) and supported by the broader international community. In the absence of effective political institutions or an ability to project power, juridical statehood became a means for weak rulers to extend control over sometimes expansive territories and/or a diversity of people while minimising the impact of the external world. In effect, then, these states have been sustained since independence on the basis of these juridical rather than empirical terms.

This approach to statehood, while seemingly more humane than the violent history of state-making found in Europe, has had consequences that have been, unexpectedly, detrimental to human security. While states may undertake a number of tasks, ultimately they have two key security functions: to manage internal conflicts and provide order, and to provide protection from external threats. Most African states were not created – as most European states were – for the sake of defending themselves against some other group. Nor did they emanate as an expression of an existing single ethnic group. On the contrary, as a result of their arbitrary borders, regimes are often required to
relly on a combination of patronage and force – either directly or through some proxy – to sustain their rule and suppress challenges or uprisings that emerge from a distant and marginalised quarter. To maintain power, regimes may also deliberately manipulate tensions between groups. In some cases – Somalia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone being the worst recent examples – the state has become a battleground rather than the protection racket Charles Tilly used to describe state formation in Europe. None of this benefits human security.

In security terms, then, the post-colonial African state had no raison d'être other than as a bulwark against further colonial rule. As Robert Jackson (1990:17) writes, decolonisation represented a welcome levelling of the international system since the benefits that came with statehood circumscribed future encroachments on African sovereignty. In most cases, this was insurance against a nonexistent threat. Europe’s move into Africa at the end of the 19th century had been driven largely by intra-European competition rather than a desire to exploit African resources. Once Africa had been carved up, it was largely neglected by the colonial powers who, particularly in the early days of colonialism, were rarely willing to invest substantial resources in their colonies. Even today, Africa’s minuscule portion of international trade suggests that, with the exception of oil-producing states, the continent is more often neglected than exploited. But if African states were not equal to other states in economic or political terms, at least independence provided them with equality in legal terms.

Indeed, it was the very simplicity of one form of legal recognition that makes the existing situation attractive. While alternative forms of political organisation could involve considerable nuance and sophistication, it is difficult to imagine an alternative for African states without creating at least two tiers of statehood. Precisely because colonialism had allowed Europe to subjugate and exploit Africa’s weakness, leaders of the former colonial states were insistent on nothing less than full recognition as members of the international community. Their legal recognition as equal members of this community continues to provide grounds for African regimes to keep would-be interveners at bay – even if this comes at the cost of efforts to provide humanitarian relief. ‘We do not deny that the United Nations has the right and duty to help suffering humanity,’ Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika told the UN General Assembly in 1999, ‘but we remain extremely sensitive to any undermining of our sovereignty, not only because sovereignty is our last defence against the rules of an unequal world, but because we are not taking part in the decision-making process of the Security Council’ (Algerian leader 1999). Similarly, T Abdou Maliqalim Simone (1994:8) writes that ‘the West tends to underestimate Africa’s fear of a virtual recolonization ... [and] a direct reassertion of Western economic domination. The fear is that national territory and resources will be taken away once again.’ In this sense, the granting of independence to African states was no small achievement, but in the end it was a trade-off that served the interests of elites more than ordinary Africans.
Juridical sovereignty has meant that the state is now something that can be *appropriated* by political elites rather than made. Mahmood Mamdani has argued that the crossing of the Ugandan–Rwandan border by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) relieved ethnic tensions facing the Museveni government in Kampala. In effect, he writes, ‘the Museveni government exported Uganda’s internal crisis to Rwanda’ (Mamdani 2001:268). Once the remnants of the previous Habyaramana regime were removed, the Rwandan state – with all of its juridical protections – offered a refuge to those expelled Ugandans who were originally descendants of Rwandan expatriates. Since Rwanda exists as a juridical entity, the RPF could move into the capital as one would move into a new house. As Filip Reyntjens (2004) makes clear, there is now little sense among Rwanda’s Tutsi (let alone Hutu) that the RPF actually has their security at heart. As the government of the day, the RPF has turned inward, concerning itself with its own survival and largely ignoring the plight of ordinary Rwandans. Indeed, since coming to power in 1994, RPF rule has been notable for its increasingly narrow, authoritarian and self-interested character. As Reyntjens (2004:180–181) writes, even the survivors of the genocide ‘felt that they were becoming second-rate citizens who had been sacrificed by the RPF, which was suspected of having been interested in military victory rather than in saving them’.

The RPF, like many narrowly based movements that have secured power in Africa, has violently suppressed dissent even among those who had formerly been regarded as allies but are now disenchanted with the government’s preoccupation with self-preservation. In short, the Rwandan state is neither protecting the losers nor restraining the winners. The attachment of Africa and the international community to existing states on the basis that any alternative will only generate violence requires it to overlook the violence that is already taking place in many states as regimes try to sustain their rule. One wonders whether it is possible to create an environment where elites are not solely concerned with their own survival at the expense of others within their borders, but where the imperative is to advance the interests and wellbeing of those around them and protect them from violence regardless of their ethnic affiliations.

African states need citizens of a nation rather than of an ethnic group. But even when African states are not being torn apart by violence it is difficult to forge a broader national identity within the existing state structure. African regimes face two conflicting agendas: promoting solidarity (what else is possible when the state is so arbitrary?) and accommodating diversity – which means respecting cultural difference as a human right. Most Africans have now lived their entire lives within the borders of the colonial state and one would not want to diminish the solidarity that many, say, Zimbabweans, Congolese, Eritreans or Kenyans feel. Nonetheless, in the context of highly politicised pluralist states one has to look sceptically even towards well meaning efforts to achieve a national identity as part of a human security or peacebuilding agenda since it may be obscuring underlying ethnic domination. J-H Bradol and A Guibert (cited in Reyntjens 2004:187) argue that, in Rwanda, ‘to stress the absence of ethnic identities has become
a means of masking the monopoly by Tutsi military of political power. In this case, political discourse opposed to ethnism attempts to hide the domination of society by the self-proclaimed representatives of the Tutsi community'. Similarly, in Ethiopia, where another ethnic minority, the Tigrean-led Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), has established itself as the dominant force in a multi-ethnic state, the government has sought to advance its own Tigrean expression of Ethiopian nationalism. Politically dominant groups seek to project a broader nationalism, especially if they are a minority, because that is what is necessary to keep the state together. More importantly, an attachment to the post-colonial territory also produces important material rewards for elites. ‘African elites do not embrace their state out of nationalist sentiments,’ note Pierre Englebert and Rebecca Hummel (2005:411), ‘but out of necessity’. It might be desirable to encourage the broader and more inclusive Ethiopian identity over a narrower Tigrean or Amhara identity, unless one thinks that being Ethiopian is merely obscuring on-going minority domination and enrichment.

Despite signs of political or economic progress that Afro-optimists like to point out (see, for example, Onwudiwe 2002; Wolfowitz 2007), it would appear that the state as it exists is in decline rather than ascension (Hyden 1996). Its very incompleteness means either that it is unable to maintain order or, worse, its weakness is seized upon for material gain. The Nigerian state at the time of the Biafran war (1967–1970) was hard pressed to quell dissent within its borders, but it appears to have been capable of demonstrating considerably more strength than it does today. Other countries that at the time of independence appeared to be promising and peaceful have since descended into anarchy. On the eve of Sierra Leone’s independence, the New York Times remarked that the new country was ‘a haven of temperate, civilized thought. The frontiers are tranquil [and] despite minor friction between the aristocratic ‘Creoles’ ... and the natives of the protectorate, there is internal harmony’ (Bigart 1960:15). Westerners in Sierra Leone at the time remarked that the prospect of state collapse at some future date was unimaginable. While it did enjoy three decades of relative calm, by the early 1990s, Sierra Leone was not only at the bottom of the United Nations Development Programme’s index of least developed countries, but it had descended into one of the world’s most brutal and depraved conflicts. Zimbabwe too has undergone its own form of breakdown from a promising state which had overcome the evils of minority rule to one of the region’s most predatory states. Observers speculated that the relatively peaceful post-minority rule years were a result of the fact that the previous regime provided an important degree of stateness onto which the peace process and even the new regime could be bolted (Ginifer 1995:55). Now it is hard to argue that Zimbabwe enjoys any of the benefits of Weberian rational legal rule.

Each of the countries – Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, and Rwanda – that were once identified in the influential journal Foreign Affairs (Connell & Smyth 1998) as being led by Africa’s ‘new bloc’ of leaders, has, more recently, been condemned for engaging
in the same brutal activities for which these leaders criticised their predecessors. Even in South Africa there are ongoing indications that the state is incapable of protecting all of its own citizens, compelling those who can afford it to look to private security and those who cannot to look to vigilantism (Hamber 1999:119). An institutionalised state might offer some reprieve from ethnic conflicts, but these break down under the weight of an environment of scarcity which underlies much of African politics and helps sustain neopatrimonial tendencies. Africans might prefer to have better and more institutionalised governance but, given the need for access to critical resources, will opt for patronage.

It is difficult to see how this progressive decline of the African state can be reversed. Despite the oft-repeated claim that African states are in the midst of a long process of state-building which inevitably involves fits and starts, it is not merely a question of time before states will be reorganised. Because African states remain tied to their current borders, African leaders are forever concerning themselves with their own survival which requires them either to undermine state-building processes or to violently suppress challenges from within their extended territories.

Nor is it clear that human security in African states can be advanced by intervention from abroad. The international community is at best an unreliable guarantor of human security. Even if there is agreement that there is a ‘responsibility to protect’, it is still, lamentably, hard to imagine that the nature of global politics has changed to the extent that the international community is now more willing to intervene in complicated regional conflicts, particularly in Africa.

In the short term, it is clear that the international community can stop violence. In the few places where peacekeepers were present, the genocidaires in Rwanda did not carry out their gruesome acts. John Mueller (2000) also makes the case that in most instances it is not difficult to put an end to violence; what is needed is a relatively small force of disciplined peacekeepers and determined mediators. What is in doubt, however, is the sustainability of these efforts. Internationally led mediation efforts did, for example, produce a peace agreement in Sierra Leone in 1996 that was hailed by Western diplomats. ‘If all of the continent would take careful notes of what has just happened here,’ remarked one official, ‘Africa could go a long way toward getting its house in order’ (French 1996:A8). But even this agreement, like many others that have tried to amalgamate incompatible groups or movements in the absence of a viable state, did not last and Sierra Leone returned to four more years of violence.

The view that the mere provision of peacekeepers and conflict resolution specialists to a conflict zone can lead to sustained peace assumes that the desire for peace is always stronger than the material incentives that often come from violence and disorder. Moreover, it is one thing to stop a comparatively isolated instance of targeted violence
and another to secure people in the face of progressive state degeneration in a country as large and complicated as, say, Nigeria. Is it realistic to think that either Sierra Leone, Liberia or the DRC will not descend once again into violence at some point in the next generation?

A number of commentators have also called on Western countries to be on the right side of this moral issue and undertake long-term efforts in the developing world to rebuild the state (Mallaby 2002; Rieff 1999). But one can be against violence and genocide and still be unsure what intervention will accomplish. This is because the security dilemmas in many countries as they currently exist in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world usually transcend and outlive even these efforts on the part of the international community. In cases outside of Africa where the international community has been prepared to make longer-term commitments, as in Kosovo, which the United Nations has administered since 1999, it is not clear whether the conflict has actually been resolved rather than merely suspended. Peacekeeping efforts, even when they engage in the more demanding task of state-building, often cannot fix problems because ultimately they rely on people’s willingness to abide by agreements that, on their own, do not offer them security. Not surprisingly, confronted with the challenge of state-building in a country as violent and ethnically complicated as Iraq, some of these commentators have since beat a retreat from their earlier positions (Mallaby 2004).

Finally, it is worth pointing out that the prospect of intervention has its own perversities. It may be hard for Westerners to accept that the groups they often champion as victims would allow their own people to be sacrificed in order to advance their interests, but such instances occur repeatedly in times of war. In the former Yugoslavia, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of US Forces in Europe, Charles Boyd (1995:28–29), remarked that ‘no seasoned observer in Sarajevo doubts for a moment that Muslim forces have found it in their interest to shell friendly targets [... in order to drive] up the price of black-market goods that enter the city via routes controlled by Bosnian army commanders and government officials’. And in the cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia, Danny Hoffman (2004) has demonstrated that committing the most heinous atrocities against civilians was frequently a conscious and deliberate act on the part of rebel movements precisely because it would attract the attention of humanitarian organisations and thus provide them with opportunities for material gain. Even when intervention does not occur, it is clear that local elites will seek to manipulate international opinion for their own benefit. In his memoir of the genocide in Rwanda, General Roméo Dallaire (2003:515) laments the delay of the RPF and its leader, Paul Kagame, ‘who did not speed up his campaign when the scale of the genocide became clear and even talked candidly with me at several points about the price his fellow Tutsis might have to pay for the cause’.

Thus, there are good reasons for a lack of faith in either the current state structure, a new and committed leadership to rule them, or the international community to advance
the human security agenda. But perhaps Africans should not yet give up on the state as a means of protecting human life. If one accepts Charles Tilly’s (1990:68) argument that, in spite of its own problems, the state has in fact made life more peaceful in Western societies, the task is to create African states that can in fact impose order, manage conflict and, if need be, defend its people from outside threats. From this perspective, the need for states has not whithered away. Populations that have reached a certain size and complexity have long looked to states – or some similar form of organizing themselves -to ensure their security. People do not necessarily want the state that they are in, but it is a reasonable assumption that they do still want states. Mohammed Ayoob (2002: 39) writes that ‘since no other institution can provide this order, which is essential for routine societal interactions to be stable and predictable, the state forms the cornerstone of tolerable political life within discrete territorial communities. Without it life would be truly “poor, nasty, brutish and short”.’ Moreover, he says, only effective statehood can solve the economic underdevelopment and poverty problems that plague much of the developing world.

Political theorists also emphasise the way in which the environment conditions behaviour to more peaceful or conflictual outcomes. Individuals and groups may be motivated towards violence for a variety of reasons but ultimately it is the permissiveness of the environment -as determined by other factors such as political institutionalisation or the coerciveness of the state -that determines whether violence will occur. ‘What causes a man to rob a bank are such things as the desire for money, a disrespect for social proprieties, a certain boldness,’ writes Kenneth Waltz (1959:231). ‘But if the obstacles to the operation of these causes are built sufficiently high, nine times out of ten would-be bank robbers will live their lives peacefully plying their legitimate trades.’ In short, whether for the purposes of ensuring human security or advancing economic development, we need to dispense with the idea that we do not need states. The problem is not the state per se but states as they are currently constructed in Africa.

An obvious contradiction, however, is that efforts to remedy this problem through state reform usually involve changes that are themselves perilous to human security. The international community has to deal with the fact that a state is by definition a monopoly of force over a territory, one that is often manifested by one ethnic group’s domination over another. That might not be an appealing definition or approach to the state. And certainly federal options which allow for multiple sources of power might mitigate the idea that it is all about one group’s domination over another. But in most cases, domination is precisely what is attractive and necessary about statehood: when the international community is not prepared, or is unable, to provide security for groups, the domination afforded by the state is the last best resort. In short, domination is the means of achieving security. On rare occasions war-weary groups who believe that they have been victimised by others say they will accept nothing less than a state of their own (or control of the state they are in) in spite of the obvious hypocrisy that
such unilateral action comes at the expense of someone else’s security. Believing that previously negotiated agreements signed with the central government had not secured their autonomy or prevented the years of government bombardment, most Eritreans and Somalilanders insisted on nothing short of secession – and voted that way in referendums in 1993 and 2001 respectively.

In most other cases, ethnic elites have sought domination by controlling the central levels of power in the capital city or portraying themselves as defenders of a people and struggling to maintain control over a territory. In the Angolan civil war (1975–2002), rebel leader Jonas Savimbi was regarded by many Western media reports as an unrefORMable warlord. In fact, many Angolans saw his role more benevolently. For all of the destruction of the war, many Angolans continue to praise Savimbi for having had the courage to stand up to the ruling MPLA’s monopoly on power. From this perspective, it was Savimbi’s willingness to bear the costs of the war which led to the 1992 elections. And while many Angolans were relieved to have the war end in 2002 when Savimbi was cornered and killed by government forces, his death left a vacuum and a profound sense of vulnerability among many of the Ovimbundu Savimbi claimed to be defending. In this sense, juridical sovereignty has proved to be self-defeating, because in an effort to shield the state from violence, it has politicised its groups internally while doing little to strengthen the state’s capacity to manage internal conflict.

Benyamin Neuberger (1976) observed how an obsession with territorially large states became part of the nationalist mythology in Africa. Independence leaders believed that encroachment from without could be arrested by maintaining the amalgamation of territories and peoples of the colonial state. But Neuberger argued that Africa’s leaders took the wrong lessons from the balkanisation of Europe that took place in the 19th and 20th centuries. Instead of it leading to the liberation of its peoples and the creation of more stable political entities, African leaders mistakenly regarded violence as being associated with the process and aftermath of balkanisation. Neuberger (1976:15) writes: ‘Only [Biafran secessionist leader Odumegwu] Ojukwu has been a lonely voice in the attempt to refute the anarchic picture attributed to balkanization.’ In Ojukwu’s (1969:xx) words, ‘Our struggle has been balked by the bogey of Balkanization. I reject this. Europe found peace through Balkanization, why not Africa through Balkanization?’ Elsewhere Ojukwu added: ‘For a time there were endless wars in Europe; incessant conflicts until the old European empires were dismantled, until the Balkans were balkanized -then came peace’ (Neuberger 1976:529).

If the human security agenda is to make any progress, Africans need to encourage their elites to accept responsibility for their own people, and not to think only of their own interests. To this end, a number of scholars (Ottaway et al 2004) have advocated that the international community make clear that state survival is now in the hands of governments rather than the international community. Governments need to serve and
defend the interests of their people rather than hide behind the guarantees of territorial integrity and non-intervention that the international community now provides. What this means is that partition should be accepted when viable and durable political authority appears even if partition is not advocated as a general policy (Ottaway et al 2004). In this way, the onus is on governments to find ways to ensure that Africans want to be in states because the state offers them something that is otherwise unachievable.

Pre-colonial African societies prospered because their political organisations were diverse and had emerged in response to the particular security, economic and social needs of the day. While some were more centralised and thus came closer to representing the nation-state familiar in the West (the Zulu Empire under Shaka Zulu comes to mind), many others were much more decentralised. Collectively they were a better reflection of the realities on the ground than exists today. The approach for the future should be an acceptance that the gradual recognition of local power and territorial control in a way that reinforces and strengthens existing rules and political authorities is preferable to working with borders and states that in some cases are clearly dysfunctional and beyond repair. The approach is not so much to advocate a particular form of state as to allow Africans to determine their own fate. Africans elites may regard the dissolution of some African states as undermining their power. But the reverse is more likely. African states that are viable, if sometimes smaller, and can effectively manage their people’s affairs are more likely both to advance the human security agenda and, as a result, to have greater international legitimacy.

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African Union promotion of human security in Africa

Thomas Kwasi Tieku*

This paper explores the contribution of the African Union (AU) to human security promotion in Africa. It contends that human security concerns informed the formation of the AU. Through the efforts of the AU Commission, the African ruling elite and policy-makers have become aware of human security doctrines. Human security ideas have been integrated into AU binding agreements, declarations, decisions and policies. The commission is now in the difficult, yet most important, phase of trying to persuade significant numbers of the African ruling elite and civil society to accept human security as a guiding principle and the desirable norm. Through the African Citizens’ Directorate (CIDO), the commission is using indigenous African civil society groups to institutionalise human security doctrines in Africa. The commission faces serious challenges in its efforts to make human security the only security norm. While member states of the AU that have never been comfortable with the introduction of human security doctrines into the continental integration project are tacitly undermining the CIDO’s ability to work with civil society groups to institutionalise the doctrines in Africa, the leaders who enthusiastically supported the integration of human security doctrines into the documents and work of the AU have seemed in recent times to be less resolute in their support of AU Commission’s human security work.

* Thomas Kwasi Tieku is an adjunct professor and visiting scholar of international relations in the Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto in Canada.
Introduction

Human security, defined as the protection of people and communities, rather than of states, from violence and imminent danger, has become a central feature of the contemporary international order. Human security doctrines inform the foreign policies of many states, particularly middle powers. They have strong support within research and academic institutions. Human security ideas occupy a privileged position in many institutions of higher learning in Europe, the Americas and Asia. In Canada alone 1,016 courses on human security were taught in institutions of higher learning in 2006 (Canadian Consortium on Human Security 2007). Human security is a priority area in the assistance programme of aid agencies. International organisations such as the United Nations have also assumed leadership roles in the promotion of human security. So what role, if any, is Africa’s premier organisation, the African Union, playing in the promotion of human security?

The purpose of this paper is to show the contribution the AU is making in the promotion of human security doctrines in Africa. It contends that the African ruling elite and policy-makers have become aware of human security doctrines through the AU. Human security ideas have been integrated into AU documents and work. They inform many AU binding agreements, key policy documents, treaties, memoranda of understanding, plans of action, mission and vision statements, communiqués, conventions, declarations and decisions. Almost all decisions, declarations and protocols that African leaders have adopted since the formation of the AU have had strong human security undertones. The AU Commission is now in the difficult, yet most important, phase of trying to persuade significant numbers of the African ruling elite and civil society to accept human security as the ‘only security game in town’. The commission is using indigenous civil society groups to institutionalise human security in Africa. The paper suggests that the jury is out, however, on whether the AU would be able to institutionalise human security in Africa effectively.

The argument of the paper is organised into four sections. The first sets the context for the analysis, noting that the establishment of the AU was informed, in part, by human security concerns. It is followed by an outline of ideas of human security as they may be said to exist in the AU, teasing out the human security elements in key AU documents. The third section examines AU institutions that promote human security. The fourth examines challenges that the AU faces in its efforts to convince the African elite that they should accept the human security doctrine as the desirable norm and guiding principle.

Pan-Africanism in practice:
From the OAU to the AU

African leaders created the African Union on 26 May 2001 to reflect a shift in the focus of the Pan-African project. Pan-Africanism as practised within the institutional framework
of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) focused primarily on legitimising and institutionalising statehood in Africa. Protection of states and governing regimes in Africa became the referent of Pan-Africanism. As part of the efforts to protect and consolidate the African state, the Charter of the OAU committed African governments to a treaty that contained some of the ‘purest statements [that defend and hold together the rings] … of elements of juridical sovereignty ever to be embodied in any international organization’ (Clapham 1996:111). The Charter also put in place only institutions, rules and administrative mechanisms that strengthened sovereign prerogatives and the territorial integrity of African states. Many institutional restrictions were imposed on the OAU Secretariat to prevent it becoming a supranational entity.

The institutionalisation of the state across the African continent meant that Pan-Africanism needed a new focus and meaning. A new generation of Pan-Africanists led by South African president Nelson Mandela and Tanzanian diplomat Ahmed Salim Ahmed made conscious efforts in the 1990s to give a new meaning to Pan-Africanism. They felt that Pan-Africanism needed to deal with challenges facing ordinary Africans, rather than those encountered by broader entities such as states and regimes (Mandela 1994; Salim 1990). They identified three main challenges, namely security threats, underdevelopment and the impact of international political economic forces (Salim 1995). These three major issues informed the creation of the AU and the drafting of its legal text, called the Constitutive Act of the African Union (CA). To provide a framework for dealing with human insecurity, the CA empowers the AU to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts on the continent (Powell & Tieku 2005). It is hoped that the AU will create conditions in which peace may prevail on the African continent; to make continental Africa a ‘zone of peace’. African leaders also felt that regional economic integration could provide a basis for sustainable development; as a result, the CA provides the legal and institutional framework for African states to integrate their economies (African Union 2001). Last, the AU is designed to assist African governments in managing international issues effectively. As part of the move to enhance Africa’s role in the international system, in July 2003 in Maputo in Mozambique, African leaders asked the AU Commission ‘to set up a negotiating team … headed by [an] experienced person to negotiate on behalf of all Member States the fundamental issues that are being negotiated in the World Trade Organization (WTO)’ (African Union 2003).

These three core areas drive the work of the 17 institutions that make up the AU (Cilliers 2003) the key institutions being the African Heads of State and Government (Assembly), the Executive Council, the Permanent Representative Committee, the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), the AU Commission, the Peace and Security Council, the Pan-African Court of Justice, the Economic, Social and Cultural Councils (ECOSOC), the African Central Bank, the Investment Bank, and the Monetary Fund. In theory, the Assembly provides policy directions, including the human security agenda for the Union. In practice, though, the AU Commission and the Peace and Security Council have
taken centre-stage in shaping the AU human security agenda. These human security objectives entail creating conditions for individuals to satisfy their basic needs. These include working to provide the social, economic, political, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival and dignity of the individual; striving to create conditions for the protection of and respect for human rights and good governance; and trying to guarantee for each individual the opportunity to fulfil his/her full development (African Union 2005). This understanding of human security informs the AU’s work in the areas of peace, security, political governance and economic development.

**AU human security agenda**

The AU human security agenda in the areas of peace and security is clearly expressed in article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act (CA) of the African Union. Article 4(h), which empowers the Union to intervene in the affairs of a member state in order to ‘prevent war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’, was inserted into the CA, as a number of informed writers on the CA have eloquently argued, with a view to protecting ordinary people in Africa from abusive governments (Malan 2002; Cilliers & Sturman 2002; Kioko 2003). To provide an operational arm to this specific human security element, the AU made room for the creation of an African Standby Force (ASF) charged with the task of intervening militarily in states for humanitarian purposes (African Union 2001). The condition laid down for human security intervention under the AU ‘goes “beyond” the provision made for intervention in the internal affairs of a country in the UN Charter’ (Schoeman 2003). The CA has actually set lower thresholds for intervention than those outlined in any international legal code (Weiss 2004). The specification of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity by the drafters of the CA as grounds for intervention has provided a clearer set of criteria for the Union to intercede in a state to protect human security. The AU, unlike other international organisations, does not necessarily require the consent of a state to intervene in its internal affairs when populations are at risk. That is, the OAU’s system of complete consensus has been abandoned. Under the AU, a decision on the part of a two-thirds majority of the Assembly is required for intervention (Powell & Tieku 2005). The AU used this principle to arrive at the decision to deploy a peacekeeping force to monitor a ceasefire in Burundi in April 2003. The Assembly also used this principle to decide on the mission to the Darfur region of Sudan in the summer of 2004.

The AU also approaches economic development from a human security perspective. The development agenda in articles 3 and 4 of the CA is intended to create conditions necessary for sustainable development. As part of this agenda, the AU commits its member states to ensuring balanced economic development, to promoting gender equality and good health, and to working towards eradicating preventable diseases (articles 3(j) and (n); 4(l) and (n)).
The AU has adopted an approach to political governance in Africa that is human security-centred in as much as the CA commits member states to promoting ‘respect for the sanctity of human life’ (article 4(o)). Article 4(i), moreover, makes it clear that African people have a ‘right to live in peace’. Article 3(h) therefore commits member states to a path where they will ‘promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments’. It is significant that 3(g) enjoins member governments to promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance. This provision is important, because it is generally understood in the human security research community that democratic development is a critical aspect of human security (Hammerstad 2005). The decision to exclude from the AU states whose governments came to power through unconstitutional means therefore advances the human security agenda. The strength of the human security ideas embedded in the CA provokes questions on how and why these human security doctrines entered the discourse, agenda, documents and programmes of the AU.

**Pan-Africanisation of human security**

Human security entered the discourse of Pan-Africanism in the early 1990s. It was initiated by the Kampala Movement and Salim Ahmed Salim (Deng & Zartman 2002). The Kampala Movement was an initiative of civil society groups that met in Kampala in Uganda in the early 1990s to develop a regime of principles regarding security, stability, development and cooperation for Africa. At the heart of the principles, widely known as the CSSDCA, was a conscious effort to redefine security and sovereignty, and to demand certain ‘standards of behaviour ... from every government [in Africa] in the interest of common humanity’ (Obasanjo & Mosha 1992:260). The movement demanded that African leaders redefine their states’ security as a multidimensional phenomenon going beyond military considerations to include economic, political and social aspects of the individual, the family and the society. In the view of the movement, ‘[t]he concept of security must embrace all aspects of society ... [and the] security of a nation must be based on the security of the life of the individual citizens to live in peace and to satisfy basic needs’ (Obasanjo & Mosha 1992:265).

The document was submitted to African leaders for integration into the OAU framework in early 1991. The OAU convened a meeting of African governments to discuss it in May 1991 in Kampala. The leaders who attended agreed in principle in the Kampala Declaration to explore the possibility of integrating the ideas into the OAU in another meeting in June 1991 in Abuja in Nigeria. The CSSDCA was not adopted at the Abuja summit because of opposition by Libya’s Muammar Ghaddafi, Sudan’s Omar Hassan Ahmed el-Bashir and Kenya’s Daniel arap Moi (Deng & Zartman 2002). The leaders suspended discussions on the document and, indeed, on human security indefinitely.
Although the OAU leadership rejected the CSSDCA, the Kampala initiative provided the platform for Salim Ahmed Salim to place human protection on the OAU’s agenda. The specific elements of the human protection agenda formed part of a broader policy initiative articulated in a document called *The political and socio-economic situation in Africa and the fundamental changes taking place in the world*, which the Assembly of the OAU adopted as a Declaration on 11 July 1990 (Salim 1990). This declaration recognised that the end of the Cold War had fundamentally changed the geopolitics of the world and that African governments needed to adopt specific measures to adapt to the new world order. It further argued that African states would henceforth have to do things on their own; there would be no geo-strategic basis for outside powers to protect Africans. It therefore called on the leaders to revive indigenous continental protection initiatives.

More specifically, the declaration urged the OAU leadership to develop a framework for preventing, managing and resolving conflicts, since there would be no rationale for the international community to keep peace and promote human rights in Africa in the post-Cold War era.

The declaration opened the space for Salim, at the OAU summit in July 1991 in Abuja, to propose to the assembly a framework to create a mechanism for the OAU to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in Africa. This mechanism was not just for maintaining order as many writers emphasise; it had the broader goal of protecting ordinary Africans from imminent danger. The assembly adopted the mechanism in principle and instructed the OAU secretariat to hold consultations with member states and to revise the proposal to reflect ‘the views, comments and proposals of Member States’ (AHG/Decl 1 XXVIII).

A watered-down version of the mechanism was adopted by the assembly in Cairo, Egypt, in June 1993 (Ibok 1999). Certain governments in Africa – in particular those of Daniel arap Moi of Kenya and Lansana Conté of Guinea – ensured that certain provisions in the draft framework were removed. These emphasised human protection and proposed the delegation of powers to the OAU secretariat to protect ordinary Africans from state abuse. The extensive revisions of the draft framework by African governments largely explain why the mechanism that was approved at the OAU summit in Cairo in June 1993 adopted a traditional security approach. Nevertheless, Salim’s initiative set in motion serious discussions within the OAU leadership on the need for it to play a central role in protecting ordinary Africans from imminent threats.

Former South African president Nelson Mandela pushed the human security discussions further on 13 June 1994 when he asked African leaders to empower the OAU to protect African people and to prevent African governments from abusing the sovereignty of states (Mandela 1994). The call emboldened the OAU secretariat to initiate a series of reform processes between 1995 and 1998 that were aimed at structuring the OAU in order to make it focus on human security concerns (Salim 1995, 1997). It also, in 1998, encouraged the secretariat to submit, and the assembly to adopt, two key human security issues. The first sought to make the promotion of ‘strong and democratic


The decision to create the AU in September 1999 provided a good opportunity for the Nigerian and the South African governments to support the OAU secretariat in merging human security doctrines with Pan-African ideas. The strategy adopted by the secretariat aimed at encouraging the delegations that negotiated the legal treaty of the AU to codify as principles some of the ideas in the CSSDCA, while simultaneously working with African leaders to ensure the adoption of the CSSDCA as a working document of the AU. The then assistant secretary-general in charge of political affairs, Said Djinnit, and the acting legal counsellor of the OAU, Ben Kioko, were instrumental in making the delegations adopt the concepts in articles 3 and 4 of the CA (discussed above). As a step towards making African leaders adopt the CSSDCA, the secretariat, with the strong backing of the Nigerian government, convened a ministerial meeting in May 2000 to discuss ways of integrating the CSSDCA into the AU/OAU. The report of the ministerial meeting was approved by the OAU summit in Lomé in July 2000. African leaders agreed to use the CSSDCA as norms and guiding principles of security, stability, development and cooperation in a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in July 2002 in Pretoria, South Africa. Though MoU added many traditional security concerns to the CSSDCA, it retained most of the human security principles.

Institutional mechanisms for promoting human security

The MoU paved the way for the secretariat to create a unit within the OAU to coordinate CSSDCA activities. The CSSDCA unit is now called the African Citizens’ Directorate (CIDO). More crucially, it opened the space for the AU Commission to try to institutionalise human security ideas in Africa, which it does through civil society channels. The CIDO is building coalitions around, and engineering consensus on, human security within civil society groups. The office of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, the Political Department, the Peace and Security Department and the Legal Affairs Department also use state channels, such as the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Representative Committee, to convince the African ruling elite to accept human security doctrines.
The African Citizens’ Directorate (CIDO)

The CIDO was originally established in 2001 as the implementation directorate of the CSSDCA. The Nigerian government, which provided the resources for the creation of the directorate, wanted the unit to focus on integrating CSSDCA ideas into all documents of the AU. The AU Commission gave the CIDO the additional responsibility of facilitating civil society engagement with the AU. As part of its efforts to engage civil society with the AU organs and process, in 2001 the CIDO developed an annual conference of indigenous African civil society and the AU. The CIDO usually invites over 50 civil society groups in Africa to attend these conferences, which are normally held before AU summits. About five conferences have been held since the first AU-civil society meeting in June 2001. The conferences have turned out to be a good place for the AU Commission to sell AU programmes, projects and agendas to civil society groups. The CIDO is using the conferences to create awareness about the AU’s work and persuade the civil society groups to integrate the AU’s policies, including the human security agenda, into their advocacy activities and promote them in their states. Because the CIDO was established to promote CSSDCA and the AU human security agenda, the discussions of all past AU-civil society conferences have been dominated by human security issues. The head of the CIDO, Jimmi Adisa, has taken full advantage of these conferences to create awareness and update civil society groups about the CSSDCA and AU human security activities.

The CIDO also promotes the human security agenda in the intellectual and diaspora communities and its head therefore took advantage of the CIDO civil society mandate to sell the human security agenda at two major conferences – the first in October 2004 in Senegal and the second in July 2006 in Brazil.

Challenges to AU human security promotion

The AU Commission faces serious challenges in its efforts to promote human security. A number of AU member states oppose the human security agenda and the space the CIDO has opened for civil society to participate in AU activities. The states that opposed the integration of the CSSDCA into the OAU in the early 1990s remain uncomfortable with the human security agenda. Perhaps these leaders are opposed to the AU’s promotion of human security doctrines because it renders their regimes vulnerable. They have, however, succeeded in creating the impression in AU leadership circles that the human security and the CSSDCA process are nothing but vehicles for promoting Western values in Africa. A number of African leaders, including Libya’s Muammar Ghaddafi, seem to think that the introduction of human security language and doctrines into the work and documents of the AU is a conscious effort by Western governments and institutions to use the AU as an instrument to pursue their cultural colonialism project.
The anti-human security leaders in the assembly have made conscious efforts in recent times to reduce the influence of human security ideas in AU policy documents. They have been able to assert their influence primarily because the unwavering support human security enjoyed in the Assembly of the AU in the early days has waned considerably. Strong supporters of the CSSDCA, such as Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki, have seemed in recent times to be less keen to talk about the issue. The ambivalent attitude of the supporters of human security has allowed anti-human security leaders in the assembly to move to curb its influence in recent AU documents. For instance, the African Union Non-Aggression and Defence Pact that was recently developed took a minimalist human security approach. Compared with the original draft of the Common African Defence and Security Policy (developed in the early days of the AU), this follow-up document has paid human security scant heed. The minimalist human security orientations of recent policy documents attest to the increasing influence of the anti-human security elements in the AU leadership. The increasing visibility of the anti-CSSDCA elements raises the question: does human security have a future within the AU when Obasanjo and Mbeki leave office?

In addition, the CIDO human security promotion through civil society groups is facing serious problems. Anti-human security governments in Africa are undermining the CIDO’s ability to meet civil society groups. These governments usually do not cooperate with the CIDO to convene the AU-civil society conferences when they host the AU summits. The Libyan and the Sudanese governments failed to give the CIDO the necessary logistical and political support to convene AU-civil society conference before the summits in Sirte in June 2005 and in Khartoum in January 2006.

AU-civil society conferences have also come under attack. Some of the big NGOs operating in Africa have started to question their relevance. They are unhappy with the CIDO’s engagements with African civil society, and claim that the civil society groups invited to these conferences are neither representative of civil society organisations in Africa nor given the opportunity to contribute to the work of the AU. A recent report by some of the NGOs sums up their concerns:

[T]he quality of the debate [during AU-civil society conferences] is often poor, with a lack of substance, and there are some concerns that the forums are rather used to endorse decisions that have already been taken than to provide a real opportunity for civil society organisations to influence decision-making at the summit ... In addition, the criteria applied by CIDO in selecting participants to attend forums are not clear; many of those who are invited are quite closely connected to governments, and there have been cases where self-funded participants have been excluded from the meetings, even though they would appear to fulfill the qualifications to attend (AfriMAP, AFRODAD, Oxfam 2007:31).
The paucity of opportunities for civil society to shape the AU agenda may discourage civil society groups from adding AU human security initiative to their work.

The CIDO unit itself is seriously understaffed. Besides Jimmi Adisa, the head, only one person works full-time. It is also poorly equipped. The AU Commission intends to add four more permanent staff members but this is still inadequate. The unit needs at least a dozen well-equipped staff members in the short to medium term. In the long term, the unit must be better resourced even than the Peace and Security Department, which is considered one of the better resourced branches of the commission.

**Conclusion**

This paper sought to show that the AU has taken a centre stage in the promotion of human security in Africa. The organisation drew on the work of the civil society movement in the early 1990s to develop a Pan-African version of human security that contains the principles of security, stability, development, and cooperation in Africa. This conceptualisation of human security is meant not only to give a new perspective on the doctrines, but also provides creative ways of making the concept acceptable.

Member states of the AU approved the principles in 2000 in Lomé, Togo, and the AU Commission has made serious efforts to integrate it into the work of the AU. The integration of human security doctrines into AU binding agreements and other documents is significant. It is significant in part because legalisation is one of the most important aspects of institutionalisation of ideas and in part because it provides a basis for the incorporation of human security doctrines into national laws and policies. Legalisation of human security doctrines has also strengthened the hands and the work of human rights advocates operating in the Africa region. It has given the human rights advocates and their organisations region-wide legal instruments and resources they could use to influence African governments to pursue human security-oriented policies.

The commission has taken the leadership role in persuading and socialising African elites to adopt the principles to guide actions and inform policies of their states. The AU is pursuing the institutionalisation processes through the CIDO and indigenous African civil society groups. The commission, however, has encountered serious challenges in its efforts to institutionalise human security. A number of African governments are undermining the CIDO’s work, tacitly undercutting its ability to meet with civil society groups. The CIDO also faces serious institutional and human resource challenges. It is understaffed and under-resourced. Also, there is a real danger that the entire human security agenda may go off the radar screen of the AU when Obasanjo and Mbeki, key supporters of human security in the AU leadership, step down as presidents of their countries.
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Notes

1 26 May 2001 is recognised as the official date that the AU came into existence because it was the date that the Constitutive Act of the African Union entered into force. It was exactly thirty days after the deposit of the instrument of ratification by two-thirds of the member states of the OAU, as provided for in article 28 of the CA.

2 The new security architecture, which is managed by a newly created fifteen-member Peace and Security Council (herein referred to as PSC), calls for the development of a rapid reaction force, an African Standby Force (ASF), to be fully developed by the year 2010. The ASF will build on the military capabilities of the regional economic communities in Africa to develop the ASF. Note that the new security regime had already undertaken its first peacemaking operations called the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB). AMIB was an integrated mission made up of 3 500 contingents drawn mainly from South Africa, Mozambique and Ethiopia deployed by the AU in April 2003 to monitor a ceasefire in Burundi. On 21 May 2004 the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution to take over the mission after AMIB had stabilised and created conditions conducive for peacekeeping operations. It has also deployed another mission to the Darfur region of Sudan.

3 The article has been amended to include intervention to ‘restore peace and stability’ and in response to ‘a serious threat to legitimate order’.

Bibliography


Human security in Burundi:
The view from below (by youth)

Peter Uvin*

This paper presents the result of a few hundreds of conversations with ordinary Burundians – foremost but not exclusively youth – about what ‘peace’ means to them. It develops a typology of answers people presented, and links these popular insights to the human security agenda.

* Peter Uvin is the Henry J Leir Professor of International Humanitarian Studies and the director of the Institute for Human Security at the Fletcher School, Tufts University. He has written extensively on violence, governance and development in the African Great lakes region. He is currently a Guggenheim Fellow.
Introduction

Burundi has just come out of 13 years of brutal civil war. It started in October 1993, when, after exactly 100 days in office, Melchior Ndadaye, the first democratically elected Hutu president (Frodebu party), was killed in a coup d'état. The coup itself formally failed a few days later, after an international outcry, bolstered by freezes of aid. Yet the dynamics it set in motion remained: a constitutional crisis that was to last for years, mass ethnic and political violence throughout the country, and further confirmation for both sides that the other was not to be trusted.

Immediately after the coup, pogroms began against ordinary Tutsi throughout the country, organised by local Frodebu leaders. The army responded violently. The political process was deadlocked. Presidents and governments came and went. Hutu rebel groups emerged, split, and launched attacks from Tanzania and the Congo. Children were the preferred soldiers on all sides. Rape was commonplace. Fear and violence prevailed. The capital city of Bujumbura became ethnically cleansed. Ordinary citizens were slaughtered by all parties. Looting was a constant threat. During those awful years, around 300 000 people were killed, over 500 000 fled abroad, and another 800 000 were displaced internally, often for many years.

Under enormous international pressure and with, among others, South African facilitation, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement was eventually signed on 28 August 2000. This agreement and its protocols marked the beginning of the transition out of war toward the development of new institutions designed to support and maintain peace, integrate the army, adopt a new constitution, organise elections, and kick-start development – a tall agenda. The fighting went on for years more, though, calming only after the Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence, and Security Power-sharing signed in October 2003 by the largest rebel group, the CNDD/FDD (National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy), and the Burundian army. Even after that, one rebel group, the FNL (National Liberation Forces in Burundi), did not lay down arms: negotiations are still under way.

By the summer of 2006 (when I did my research), a new, elected government had been in power for almost a year. The elections had gone peacefully; they were won by the CNDD/FDD, the strongest of the Hutu rebel movements. The international community had supported the process until the end, providing diplomatic, security, humanitarian and development assistance: a textbook case of a successful and well-supported transition.

My research consisted of hundreds of open-ended individual conversations with ordinary Burundians in rural and urban Burundi: farmers, peanut sellers, masons, grooms, servers in bars, demobilised soldiers, telephone card sellers, and bike-taxi drivers. I focused strongly on young men, a group that is often seen as the key threat
when it comes to violence, but I did interview women and older persons as well. The 
broad aim was simple: after 13 years of war, how do (young, male) ordinary Burundians 
see the future? Most questions were totally open-ended, with no possible ‘good answer’ 
or even, usually, a particular field of inquiry implicated. We asked, for example: ‘How 
is your life different from the life of your parents?’, ‘What is the situation here of men/ 
women your age?’, ‘If you became communal administrator tomorrow, what is the first 
thing you would do?’, or ‘Whom do you admire?’ All these questions were designed to 
allow people to talk about what they considered important, as citizens, as members of 
families, as analysts even.

In this article, I want to share the results from one specific question, with which I 
usually ended the conversations. The question was simple, and more focused than the 
others: ‘What does peace mean to you?’ I asked this question in six different places 
(three rural and three urban), representing different situations of life during the war: 
a rural commune that had been little touched by the war, and where most people had 
stayed at home (Busiga); a neighbouring commune that had been devastated by the war, 
with lots of internal violence; and a very significant IDP population (we did five weeks 
of interviews in the IDP camp of Ruhororo, which still contained more than 13 000 
people); the commune with the highest number of repatriated refugees (Nyanza-Lac, 
economically richer than the other two rural ones, and located at the other end of the 
country); and different neighbourhoods in the capital city of Bujumbura. In the latter, 
I worked in two of the poorest neighbourhoods (Kamenge and Musaga, predominantly 
Hutu and Tutsi respectively), as well as in better-off urban neighbourhoods. I received 
answers from 181 people to this question.

I had different theoretical aims with this line of questioning. First, I wanted to obtain 
an empirical sense of the ‘positive peace’ vs ‘negative peace’ debate. This debate started 
in the late 1960s, against the backdrop of the Vietnam War and an increased questioning 
of North–South differentiation. ‘Traditional peace research’ was under attack by a new 
generation of radical, mainly European, peace scholars. One of their prime complaints 
was that traditional peace researchers focused solely on negative peace, that is, the absence 
of war, uncritically elevating this situation to an absolute ideal. This, the critics argued, 
eglected what they called positive peace, that is, social justice. In situations of high 
exploitation and inequality, is the absence of overt war truly the best possible outcome? I 
was curious to know: how do Burundians, spontaneously, define peace? Do they fall into 
the negative or the positive peace camp? There is very little research on this: I personally 
know of only one paper, by a team of colleagues at Tufts International Famine Center who 
did a similar research in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Sierra Leone (Donini et al 2006).1

From this concern with positive peace and structural violence, it is but a short way to the 
concept of human security (Paris 2005:767–768). Indeed, when a radical scholar such as 
Reardon (1988:16) defines peace as ‘the absence of violence in all its forms – physical, social,
psychological, and structural’, we are very close to Jennifer Leaning’s (2001) definition of human security as the ‘social, psychological, political, and economic factors that promote and protect human well-being through time’. Two moves took place here: away from security as an attribute of states to one of people; and to a more holistic, broad-based definition, going beyond acute physical violence only (Thakur 2004:347; Thomas 2004:3533). Do ordinary people link freedom from fear intimately with freedom from want?

Finally, I wanted to compare people’s answers with the post-conflict agenda as it plays out in Burundi and other countries. This agenda is premised on at least three main parts, which one finds, ideologically and organisationally, in all post-conflict situations: security (peace negotiations and their implementation, SSR, DDR); development (economic growth and social services); and justice/reconciliation. Governance (democracy, bureaucratic competence, decentralisation, human rights, etc) is then a theme that runs through all of the above, or a fourth sector.

There is an intuitive logic to this set-up, but it has been criticised by scholars. One of these criticisms is that this agenda is an external one, an export of Western neo-liberal thinking – in both the economic and political realm – that, while nice at home and theoretically desirable everywhere, is simply not something people locally desire (Gordon 1997; Paris 2002) or want to prioritise (Paris 2004). So, the answers to this question might give me some idea whether the broad elements of the post-conflict agenda are in touch with Burundians’ own sense of what they want at the end of war.

What does peace mean to Burundians – the data

First it must be said that more than half of all the Burundians I spoke to about this issue – 180 or so people – employed multi-criteria definitions of peace. In other words, they
told me that peace was a combination of goods, which they could not or did not want to separate. Less than one half stuck to a one-dimensional definition of peace. The table tallies all definitions given to me by location: the multi-criteria ones are added up under their relevant headings.

**Negative peace**

The most frequent definition is clearly a standard ‘negative peace’ one: it occurs by far the most, coming in at double the frequency of the next answer. It also occurred most in ‘single criterion’ definitions. Most people talked about negative peace in general terms: the absence of gunshots, of fear. Many employed the same image: ‘to sleep at night without fear’. This came back over and over, in rural and urban areas. A few people made very strong ‘negative peace’ definitions, making clear that they intended to limit peace to only that notion, and explicitly excluding any ‘positive peace’ aspects. See the following statements, for example:

- ‘Peace is getting up in the morning to go work, and in the evening being able to enjoy the fruits of your work, whether it is little or much, but in calm’ (Busiga female farmer, younger than 30)

- ‘Even for those who are hungry, to have security is good for them, and it does make a difference. If there is peace, they can work to fight their hunger’ (Busiga male, 40 years, leader of local cooperative, veterinarian)

- ‘Peace is about eating and sleeping, being able to enjoy the fruits of your work. When there is peace, you can work with a calm spirit. Even if the situation isn’t good today, you can have hope for tomorrow as long as you can invest in an activity’ (28 year old male farmer and mason, Nyanza-Lac)

- ‘Peace is not hearing gun shots anymore. It is not fleeing one’s house. Even if I have to sleep on an empty stomach, I know I will wake up in security’ (23 year old unemployed woman, sexual abuse victim, Musaga)

- ‘Peace is foremost physical and psychological security. One should not have to be obsessed by security problems. One must arrive at a stage where you don’t think of those things anymore’ (36 year old demobbed, mechanic, Musaga)

We can consider this a victory for negative peace, or a loss: it is, after all, rather impressive that about 60 per cent of those who talked about what peace means to them, in a country emerging from 12 years of war, did not mention security or violence or gunshots at all! This clearly suggests that a negative peace definition does not fully cover what ordinary Burundians perceive. Peace to the majority of Burundians means more than no war.
There are no meaningful variations in this definition: both in the city and in the
countryside, among men and women, rich and poor, and all social categories, people
talk about negative peace in roughly equal proportions: it is always the largest category,
accounting systematically for about one third of all answers.

But there is more. A significant number of the negative peace answers clearly included
theft and criminality in their definition. This is primarily the case in Busiga, which must
until recently have had a chequered security record in terms of thefts and banditry. It is
also the case in the city, especially in the poor urban neighbourhoods. In other words, in
the ‘peace equals security’ definition, more is included than the absence of war: people
value the absence of crime very much, and they consider there is no peace without it.
Peace, then, is about the military as much as about the police.

Many people have suffered more over the years from criminality than from direct
politically motivated warfare. Indeed, the overwhelming issue that is brought up
repeatedly when people discuss these years of war is pillage: it is hard to find any family,
any person who was not deeply marked by the theft of his or her animals and possessions,
the destruction of his or her house, etc. For many, this happened more than once, and it
happened throughout the last 12 years, including the years when the peace agreements
had already been signed, or even when demobilisation was well advanced. In other words,
the prime face war takes for many ordinary people is criminality and banditry, and much
of this was not necessarily the same as THE WAR in capital letters – the big conflict
between clearly defined politico-ethnic parties. If that criminality continues after THE
WAR ends – or even worsens, as may occur – there is no peace dividend; indeed, in
people’s perceptions, there may be no peace, period.

Positive peace/development

The second most frequent answer people gave us to the question ‘what does peace mean
to you?’ was in terms of basic needs. Many people told us that there is no peace without a
minimum of material and psychological wellbeing. As a 35 year old woman in Ruhororo
asked us: ‘How can you have peace or be free if your stomach is empty?’ Indeed, the
image that dominates this category is overwhelmingly the empty stomach.

- ‘Amahoro starts with the belly, when it is empty there is no peace. There is no peace
  here, it is another war (a new war)’ (Ruhororo site, 52 year old female)

- ‘Peace is if you know where to get your food every day, because the stomach always
  needs something’ (Ruhororo colline, 30 year old female)

- ‘Peace is foremost having bread. If my children and those of my neighbours don’t cry
  of hunger at night I have peace in my heart’ (29 year old male migrant in Musaga)
‘Peace is having enough to eat: for example, in my region of origin I cannot say I lived in peace because I was hungry. But today I can say I live in peace because I know no hunger any more. Also, peace is not to be destabilised by gunshots’ (38 year old male migrant day labourer in Nyanza-Lac, with no education and very poor)

‘A place without peace is a place with poverty, crime, where children die of hunger. Peace is the source of life. The war left many problems – orphans, destruction – that are still not solved, so there is no peace yet’ (19 year old Musaga male student)

‘Peace is economic: it is having enough to eat, to pay for studies for those who still can do it, to get healed when you are sick’ (18 year old female in Kamenge)

‘For me peace is foremost bread. Afterwards it is security and work’ (44 year old university-educated male, Bujumbura)

These, then, seem pure ‘positive peace’ definitions: peace is not simply the absence of war (negative peace), but the achievement of a just and decent life. Note, fascinatingly, that Donini heard exactly the same thing in Afghanistan, and he quotes people as saying that ‘there is no peace without bread’.

A core belief about violent conflict held by the post-conflict and development community everywhere, including Burundi, is that poverty is the prime root cause of violent conflict. To promote peace, then, we need development, not because development is intrinsically and equally part of peace or (human) security, but because development is a pre-condition for, a root cause of peace.

Burundians intellectuals certainly would agree. They generally adhere to the popular argument that poor and desperate people – and Burundi has many of them – are wont to engage in violence, especially unemployed young men. They add a cultural argument that is more specific to Burundi: this country is profoundly characterised by jealousy, and as a result, those who have less than others will turn against the latter. In that vision, then, someone who has a lot while his or her neighbour has much less – has an empty stomach – fears the neighbour’s jealousy, his or her potential aggression.

Is that what ordinary Burundians were indirectly telling me? A few seemed to do just that:

‘There are three levels to peace. One is individual – that you are not sick and hungry. Another is mutual understanding, that there is no discrimination. My own life is at peace, but not for all of us, the individual dimension is often lacking. People are often hungry and sick, they have heavy debts and family conflicts, and that can disrupt peace’ (17 year old male herding cows in remote colline of Busiga)
‘Peace is when nobody is victim of injustice. It is also when the entire neighbourhood has enough to eat. If your neighbour doesn’t have what is needed you too become vulnerable’ (25 year old male migrant to Musaga, no education at all)

‘To me peace is security, both physical security and food security. If the two are present, there is no reason to be mean to others’ (27 year old female migrant in Musaga)

‘People must have work and quit poverty: if they don’t, they start thinking badly of each other, because they feel bad themselves’ (29 year old mechanic, Bwiza)

But these four were the exceptions; in all other conversations, people did not make explicit arguments like this. Most people just told me that somebody with an empty stomach does not live in peace, period – not that he is a danger to others, that he will engage in violence, or that his neighbour is afraid of him. More generally, in almost none of the conversations with hundreds of ordinary people was jealousy discussed as a major factor. In conclusion, I believe that these positive peace definitions are to be taken at face value. For young Burundians, one crucial element of peace is economic wellbeing. This is not because they make complicated assessments that poverty causes violent conflict; it is because they think that peace includes an element of social justice, period.

**Social peace**

The third most frequent answer defined peace as ‘good social relations’. This we may call a ‘positive peace’ definition, too: it is more holistic than simply the absence of war, privileging social relations, cohabitation, entente, love. Let us look at some of the language associated with that definition:

‘If we live in the same place and understand each other there will be peace’ (21 year old female in Busiga)

‘If there is a good entente between people, no trouble in community, and they can speak well together’ (Busiga, 30 year old male)

‘No troubles among people living in the same area’ (16 year old female in Ruhororo camp)

‘Peace is in someone’s heart, it is about giving peace, not trouble others. One’s peace depends on one’s neighbours’ (47 year old demob in Nyanza-Lac)

‘Peace is when people live together and share, they don’t kill each other but help each other. There is almost peace now, so there is hope’ (30 year old student from the interior, living in ‘Chechnya’, a very poor neighbourhood in Musaga)
‘Peace is solidarity between people. It is mutual help and good relations in general. To strengthen peace I must participate in communal development works. I must not provoke troubles. I must conduct myself as a responsible man’ (25 year old seller in a boutique, Musaga)

‘Peace for me is good cohabitation between people, without suspicions. It is also mutual help between inhabitants of the same place. To reinforce peace we need to work on the development of our country. If people are at work they have no time to think of divisions of all kinds’ (19 year old male boutique owner, Musaga)

‘Peace is when you have no problems, which is not only that people don’t shoot at each other but also that they live well together’ (24 year old restaurant cleaner, Kamenge)

‘For me, peace is not the absence of war. It must be felt in the hearts of all’ (former FAB officer, Bujumbura)

There are no particular regional variations in this answer: it comes back everywhere as a major undercurrent, either as part of broader definitions or as a single criterion. In Kamenge it is more highly represented – maybe because this neighbourhood was the epicentre of the ethnic cleansing that took place in Bujumbura in the awful years immediately after the war broke out in 1993.

Like the previous answer, it is possible to argue that this is a root-cause definition of negative peace. Indeed, the war in Burundi was an ‘ethnic’ war, and hence good social or ethnic relations can be seen as directly linked to ending war. Yet, here too I would prefer to take people at face value and not attach too much outside interpretation to their words: the way they told it to me, they seemed to value fine social relations as a good in itself. This social relations definition of peace goes beyond simple negative peace. It sets the bar higher: not only is peace the absence of violence, it is a situation of love, of cooperation and social interaction.

Mobility

A surprisingly large number of answers related peace to mobility. For example:

‘Peace is being free to move around and visit friends and family’ (24 year old female in remote colline in Busiga)

‘You can go anywhere you want to inside the country in order to get new ideas and earn a living. Wherever you go, you can come back safe’ (33 year old male in Busiga)

‘Freedom of movement – people can go anywhere to find work’ (23 year old male, Busiga)
‘You can take up opportunities that exist elsewhere’ (19 year old male, Ruhororo site)

‘When you can visit others’ (18 year old male, Ruhororo site)

‘Mobility even at night’ (32 year old male, Ruhororo remote colline)

‘Peace is when you can circulate freely through the commune and are able to do the activities you want to do’ (23 year old male, Nyanza-Lac)

‘Peace is to live in a good place where you can circulate in all liberty’ (19 year old female public phone booth operator, Kamenge)

‘Peace is when you can take care of your activities in different localities without worry about tomorrow.’ (28 year old self-demobilised, works in store in Kamenge)

‘A place where you can come and go as you wish, that is peace’ (20 year old student, Bujumbura)

All of these definitions contain a strong element of mobility, of capacity for movement: peace is the capacity to move around freely, whether for work or socially. This freedom of movement is deeply appreciated and mentioned surprisingly frequently. We find the same result in other researches. In Donini and his colleagues’ research (2006:12) in Kosovo it was mentioned as well. Yuko Miyazawa (2005) interviewed 40 youth in post-conflict Bougainville. The second most frequent category she encountered was ‘freedom of movement’.

The surprising importance of mobility in defining peace relates to three factors. First, during the war, people were very much restricted. IDPs and refugees were literally imprisoned in their camps; urban dwellers were ethnically cleansed into their own neighbourhoods, and even there could hardly leave the house. Thus it would be no surprise that the war creates a sense of imprisonment, of being trapped in a place against one’s will.  

Second, mobility is generally a symbol of wellbeing for Burundians. Indeed, this theme recurs throughout the research. When people talk about the good life, about dreams for the future, about peace, they often use mobility definitions: a better and peaceful life is one in which people can move around, can go to places – cities? abroad? – and can avail themselves of opportunities that may be available elsewhere.

Third, it relates to expectations of the state, and to security. Burundians have a sense that to be able to go to places is something the state has to be able to guarantee. If one
can do that without fear – of soldiers or rebels, of bandits, of arbitrary threats – one lives in a state that is at peace. Hence, there is an element of negative peace and possibly also of rule of law built into this definition: one further proof that the dimensions of peace overlap and interact.

**Peace as good governance**

Remarkably few definitions of peace referred to the major political stakes over which the war was fought. Here are some quotes:

- ‘Peace is to be easily capable of finding what to live off, and to live in a country where human rights are respected’ (18 year old female repatriated refugee, Nyanza-Lac)

- ‘For me there is no peace here for we have no water, electricity, and the police harass us instead of protecting us, there is no respect for the law or for rights and dignity in general’ (23 year old hotel manager, Musaga)

- ‘Peace to me is good and peaceful cohabitation and respect for individual rights and the law, without favouritism and with the same access to rights and obligations for all’ (31 year old unemployed male, Musaga)

- ‘Peace for me is when the country is on the right path, that is to say, respect for the human rights of all, freedom for all, punishment of criminals and all people who do wrong in respect of the law’ (34 year old seller of charcoal, Musaga, born in the interior)

- ‘Peace exists where there are no problems and the rulers are there to help the people and to give advice so that people behave the right way’ (17 year old student, Kamenge)

- ‘Peace is when there is justice for all and absence of corruption in a community, for then the community will have hope for a better tomorrow’ (34 year old professional, Bujumbura)

Clearly, Burundians do not spontaneously define peace in political or governance terms. Only a small category of people do, and to them it is mainly an add-on to other criteria. This may be because most ordinary Burundians feel far removed from national politics, especially as our conversations were about their own lives. Or it could be that Burundians fear to talk to a stranger about matters of high politics. History has shown that politics is a dangerous matter, and why court potential problems? The minority that constitutes the exception to this rule consists mainly of people who are politically angry; indeed, in several of these quotes, it is clear that the speaker is talking about the current situation,
and does not like it! Quite a few of them are ex-combatants as well. This interpretation is reinforced by geographic distribution: these answers occur least frequently in the communes that are politically closest to the current government and vice versa. In short, then, these governance answers seem at least in part to be an indirect way to critically comment on current politics.

**Peace of mind**

A final answer that seldom emerged is one that we can call the ‘peace of mind’ category: it only came up once on its own, but was usually a sort of ‘seal of quality’ on top of other criteria. See for example the 19 year old man in Busiga who gave us a complicated definition of peace, involving security, good relations and basic needs, and then added that ‘he also lives in peace because what he owns he earned, and hasn’t stolen’. Or the couple of young people whom we talked to in a remote colline in Ruhororo. He was 20 and she 17, and she had just found out that she was pregnant by him. She had immediately been kicked out of school and out of her parents’ house. Their anguish was so deep that it brought tears to the eyes of the Burundian woman doing the interview; their definitions of peace, not surprisingly, reflected this lack of personal peace. Here are his and her answers:

- ‘To have peace in my heart. For example, at this point I don’t have peace b/c of the difficulties that we are in’

- ‘This word starts with the individual. For example, I do not have this word in my life. While others here have it in their own way, I live in a situation of anguish’

**Conclusion**

More than half of all Burundians employed multi-criteria definitions of peace. This is very much in line with a recent move in international discourse towards human security. Indeed, one of the things that sets human security apart (at least in its original scholarly and UN conception) is that it is by definition a combination of concerns, namely those of development and those of traditional security. These two concerns are the ones most talked about by Burundians, at first sight suggesting that a human security approach has solid grounding in people’s own lives. And to be clear, it is the broad, ‘UN’ or ‘Japanese style’ definition of human security that they refer to, not the narrow ‘Canadian’ one (see Ball 2001).

The way in which Burundians define peace – the deep interrelation between security, development, and social relations – is even better represented in the post-conflict agenda, which is truly built on these pillars. The first three categories – accounting for 80 per
cent of all answers – are precisely the same categories that the international community privileges: security, development and reconciliation. Foreign experts and ordinary Burundians may use different terms and surely live in different worlds, but they are talking about the same things. This is good news.

The biggest difference relates to the governance dimension. When Burundians think of peace, they very rarely mention governance dimensions. Only about 10 per cent of answers referred to a governance dimension of peace, and only three people used this as their sole criterion to describe peace. In addition, it seems likely that those who did use governance in their definition of peace were making critical, opposition-type remarks about current politics. They also belonged disproportionately to two categories: better educated (and usually richer) urban people and ex-combatants.

This does constitute a difference from the general approach by the international community which is rather obsessed with governance in post-conflict situations, whether it is the rapid and strong immediate push for democracy, or the constant human rights scrutiny many post-conflict regimes are subjected to. Indeed, the governance dimension is possibly the key feature of the peace-building agenda. Take this UN Security Council definition, for example, made after the release of the Brahimi report:

... peace-building is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programs and mechanisms. This requires short and long term actions tailored to address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it. These actions should focus on fostering sustainable institutions and processes in areas such as sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence.

Governance lies at the very heart of this agenda: more words are used to describe various dimensions it is than any other aspect. If they could read Roland Paris’ recommendations – to phase in liberal democracy only later, after the service delivery and management capacity of the state has been strengthened – they seemingly would agree!

The answers we heard are generally very similar to those found by Donini and his colleagues (2006) in their studies in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Sierra Leone. Their conclusion is:

... local communities view security as safety from physical harm and abuse but also extending far beyond to encompass a sense of well-being
including elements such as employment, access to basic services, political participation, and cultural identity, as one participant put it ‘there is no peace without bread’. Thus communities have a more holistic understanding of what constitutes security than the narrower concerns of the two other sets of actors.

Yuko Miyazawa (2005) interviewed youth in Bougainville after more than a decade of war, and received similar answers: the largest category spoke about ‘harmony and togetherness of people’, followed by freedom of movement, ‘freedom of speech’, ‘justice’ and ‘order’. A few mentioned ‘human rights’. And Tezare and his colleagues interviewed Eritrean refugees in Canada (2006). Their perception of peace seems to revolve around four pillars: absence of war; communal relations; human rights and freedom; and peace of mind. All these results are similar, both in their correspondence to the human security agenda and in the low importance they attach to explicit governance variables.

Donini et al (2006:8–10) interpret their results to mean that non-security concerns come to the fore once peace has been solidly established that is, the presence of these more holistic, positive peace concerns comes chronologically after straightforward security (negative peace) has been acquired. ‘Improved overall security has allowed communities to shift their sights progressively from physical security issues – freedom from fear and violence – to a range of human security issues.’ Is that so? Or do people at all times define peace holistically? The only way to empirically solve this would be to have done the same research in the same place at different times, and see whether the trends mirror this hypothesis. Unfortunately, neither they nor I did so. In the absence of that, all I can say is that ‘negative peace’ accounts for one-third of all answers everywhere, regardless of significant differences in the security situation: in communes that have known little active violence; among displaced people clearly still afraid to return home; in urban neighbourhoods still under attack from the FNL while I was doing my research; etc. This suggests – but does not prove beyond doubt – that the ‘extra’ dimensions of peace are always included – not only after ‘hard’ security has been established.

Notes

1 They also interviewed peacekeeping organisations and aid agencies, which I did not, which allows them to make some interesting comparisons on how peace and security is differently defined by all three groups. On the other hand, all their interviews with the former two groups are individual, whereas all their conversations with ‘the population’ are in the form of focus groups, which I distrust, for the variation in opinions does not appear well in focus groups. Also, they did much fewer interviews than I did, working only two weeks in each setting.

2 For criticism of the breadth of this agenda, see Buzan 2004, Krause 2004 and Mack 2004.
3 This is Miyazawa’s explanation (2005) for the frequent occurrence of mobility in Bougainville: ‘Freedom of movement was a characteristic mentioned by those who did not have such freedom when living at care centres and bush camps.’

Bibliography


Between the devil and the deep blue sea?
Political reform in Egypt
Anneli Botha

Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration
in the Democratic Republic of Congo:
A never-ending story
Henri Boshoff
A number of media sources and commentators referred to 2005 as a turning point in Egyptian politics, given that a hint was detected that the country might move away from a semi-authoritarian political system towards democracy. Since then the government of President Hosni Mubarak has been faced with the question of whether to reform or to maintain the status quo. Two occurrences or factors played a direct role in this dilemma: Hamas’s victory over Fatah in the Palestinian elections and fear over the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Role-players in favour of political reform gained an unexpected ally in the United States, which despite giving Egypt foreign aid (second after Israel) has of late being demanding more democratisation.

* Anneli Botha is a senior researcher at the African Security Analysis Programme of the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria
Developments in Egypt therefore need to be analysed within a broader framework: former radical Islamist organisations gradually began to advocate reform that they intended to implement not through violence, but through being part of the political process. Hamas serves as the most recent example, although the Muslim Brotherhood was the first to initiate this strategy, even before the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981. The difference is that the latter is not recognised as a legitimate political party. Voter empathy in Egypt is evident in the fact that turnouts in the 2005 election and 2007 referendum were respectively 23 per cent and 27 per cent, compared to 70 per cent in the 2006 Palestinian elections (Wikinews 2006).

In Egypt: the government realised that it needed to come up with reform initiatives, since internal pressure was mounting. President Mubarak’s therefor announced his intention to amend the constitution in February 2005. The government decided to amend article 76 of the constitution to facilitate the election of the president, formerly decided through a referendum.

With the suggested amendment of article 76 in early 2005, government has made it impossible for the Muslim Brotherhood to sponsor a presidential candidate. According to this article only registered political parties with at least one seat in the People’s Assembly or the Shura Council could nominate a presidential candidate. This inevitably excluded independent candidates. In addition to article 76, article 5 – which banned the formation of political parties on the basis of religion – was amended to include political activities within any religious frame of reference and further excluded the Muslim Brotherhood from the political process.

The political reform process however received a setback with Hamas’s victory in January 2006. In February 2006, less than a month after Hamas’s victory, the Egyptian government suddenly announced the postponement of local council elections. The explanation of government was that it was in the process of introducing amendments to the Local Administration Law, which will give greater power to the councils and consolidate decentralisation in the Egyptian political system (BBC Monitoring Middle East 2006).

Despite government’s verbal commitment, reform can only be achieved after addressing various issues:

- **Voter apathy and political participation** in the political process are directly linked to the legitimacy of the political process. However, the legitimacy crisis extends beyond the government to include political parties recognised by the political system (the Muslim Brotherhood is currently excluded). Evidence of this crisis can be found in voter registration and election turnout: only 32 million voters registered (approximately 40 per cent of the total population). Voter turnout during the 2005
elections was estimated at 23 per cent, and 7.3 million people voted (of an estimated population of 77 million) (UNDP 2006). Despite the decision of the government during the 2005 elections to open up the political system and limit intervention of the security forces (in comparison with previous elections), the number of opposition seats in Parliament decreased from 17 in 2000 to 14 in 2005. In the referendum on 26 March 2007 to decide on 34 controversial constitutional amendments voter turnout was officially estimated at 27 per cent, although, according to opposition groups, voter turnout was as low as 5 per cent (Youssef 2007).

- **Representation and engagement with ordinary citizenry** is critical, particularly considering that the role of political parties in the political system is to represent the needs and realities of the electorate. If political representatives represent ordinary citizens and reflect or protect their interests, one would expect greater participation in the political process. In reality, the political debate is being exclusively conducted between the political and intellectual elites without any real participation by ordinary citizens. There is therefore a clear divide between the political elite and the masses, who do not have a constructive outlet to voice their opinions, not even when it comes to the agenda of the political reform process or the implementation strategy. In the absence of a legally acceptable channel for ordinary citizens to express their viewpoints the possibility of violence is an unfortunate reality. It is therefore essential that government reconsider its relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood in recognising it as a legitimate political party and engage with the organisation in incorporating their viewpoints into the political reform process. In addition, political parties need to mobilise support as part of the democratisation process, since without public participation in the political process essential principles of democracy are disregarded.

As a result of the growing popularity of former radical Islamist organisations throughout the Middle East after they have indicated their willingness to participate in the political process, governments are being increasingly pressured to initiate political reforms that permit them to participate in the political process. In addition to the resolve on the part of these organisations to introduce political and social reform, these groups have another advantage: the policy of Islamist organisations towards the security situation in the Middle East, in particular Israel. In the aftermath of the growing conflict between Israel and Hamas and Hizbollah it became clear that organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood represent the interests and concerns of ordinary citizens. Governments (especially the governing party in Egypt) have traditionally been following a more conservative approach when it comes to Israel – an approach which ordinary citizens regards as passive and weak. In addition to ideological similarities, the Muslim Brotherhood recognised the political advantage of supporting Hamas and Hizbollah. In mobilising support and gaining recognition the Muslim Brotherhood organised numerous (illegal) demonstrations in support of
Hamas and Hizbollah. This put the government in a catch-22 situation: whether to react by arresting organisers and demonstrators, thereby drawing the support of more ordinary citizens for the Muslim Brotherhood, or initiate a comprehensive political reform programme and face the possibility of relinquishing power.

- **Balancing stability and human rights** is a difficult act. Despite the verbal commitment of President Mubarak to ‘respect the fundamental rights of citizens’ and to ‘strengthen democracy and broader political participation’ little has materialised. Since January 2006 the government has clearly been implementing an opposite strategy manifested in limited freedom of association, especially the ability to organise and participate in protest marches; and limited freedom of expression, notably freedom of the media and journalists.

Until now the government has implemented reforms without allowing real change, leading to the question: Is Egypt really on the verge of a political transition towards democracy and liberalism? The answer will probably depend on one’s position on the political spectrum: government representatives will answer in the affirmative through referring to their decision to allow more than one candidate to participate in the presidential elections and other subsequent ‘concessions’ as the framework while the opposing side will argue that elections are not a real democratic contest.

Does this imply that the controlled reform initiatives that are being introduced will not threaten the government’s hold on power, but will rather ‘silence’ popular opposition? Two examples come to mind:

- In reaction to the growing concern about, and even outrage at, the possibility that President’s Mubarak youngest son, Gamal Mubarak, is being groomed to become the next president, the government has decided to allow more than one candidate in presidential elections. However, in the current political scenario it is doubtful whether any other candidate really stands a chance to challenge Gamal should he decide to replace his father.

- Growing popular discontent with the state of emergency that has been in place since the assassination of President Sadat in 1981 led to a government announcement that the existing state of emergency legislation would be replaced by new anti-terrorism legislation. History will later judge Egypt’s reaction to the opportunity to introduce democracy and protect civil liberties when confronted with the threat of terrorism. In addition to a disregard for civil liberties, there is a temptation for Egypt – like a number of other countries – to use counter-terrorism legislation against political opposition groups, thereby curbing political activities that are not in support of the government.
Should the Egyptian government allow all political factions to establish political parties without interfering in the affairs of those parties and allow them the freedoms of civil society, one wonders if the ruling party will win the next election. However, history has shown that as long as a government is in control of the initiatives and pace of political reform, the extent, depth and impact of democratisation will be limited. Considering that Egypt does not have a tradition of democracy and liberalism, a paradigm shift is first needed, however. This will include the realisation that a government can lose power and that the above ideals entail an openness to public scrutiny and constructive criticism which strengthen a political system if properly utilised.

Also, a stronger political opposition is necessary. It represents ordinary citizens, balances political power, and acts a check on the excessive use of power. None of these are currently evident in Egypt.

This leaves us with the question why the government announced the initiatives it refers to as ‘reform’. Was it for the sake of financial assistance and the support of the current world superpower, or in the interests of the country and its citizens? With growing concern and pressure from the US, governments throughout the Middle East may experience a fate similar to that of Fatah in the Palestinian elections. We may debate and speculate, but without critical introspection, democracy and civil liberties will remain elusive ideals for Egypt, which may have to return to the ‘political reform’ drawing board.

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Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A never-ending story

Henri Boshoff

One of the key issues in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that has not been resolved is the process of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR). It is unfortunate that unless the DDR process is completed, the security sector reform (SSR) process cannot start.

During a visit to the Institute for Security Studies in January 2007, Ambassador Aldo Ajelo, the European Union envoy for the Great Lakes region, made it clear that the completion of the DDR process and the start of SSR are crucial for the successful post-conflict reconstruction process in the DRC. These issues were discussed in detail at the last two meetings of the contact group of ten European and African countries that support the DDR/SSR process in the DRC.

* Henri Boshoff is a senior military analyst at the African Security Analysis at the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa.
Despite the acknowledgement of role-players that DDR/SSR is important, there is still a lack of coordination between the government, the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Monuc) and the contact group.

At the last contact group meeting in Brussels, on 17 November 2006, it was suggested that the European Union take the lead in the coordination process on behalf of the group. The EU delegation explained their intention to play an overall coordinating role in security sector reform in the DRC. This had been announced on 15 September 2006 through an EU Council declaration.

A draft paper was circulated by the EU delegation at that contact group meeting. The paper outlined some general principles of the EU approach, such as an intensive coordination between Congolese authorities and third parties through Kinshasa-based *comités de suivi*. It was suggested that three *comités de suivi* (army, police and justice) be created and each *comité* to be presided over by a competent Congolese minister. Global supervision will be through a broader commission to be presided by the future prime minister. All relevant partners could have a seat in these *comités*. The EU also stated that they were ready to provide logistical support to these *comités de suivi*.

The UN delegation pointed out that EU intentions for a coordinating role could fit perfectly into the UN approach. As the UN is working on a global, well-defined exit strategy which foresees a continued post-transition UN role, other partners could take the lead in a specific sector, such as justice and army. On the other hand, the UN intends to remain active in the police sector. Monuc does not intend to play a major role in SSR, although it will continue to provide short-term support to the integrated brigades of the *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC) – mainly in the east of the country and aiming at joint operations with the FARDC.

Monuc will participate in the *comités de suivi* and will promote transparency and good governance in the three sub-sectors. This was in general accepted, although Monuc pointed out that it still had a UN mandate to adhere to.

Several delegations insisted on the importance of Congolese ownership of the SSR process and the need for an overarching Congolese vision/framework to which the three *comités de suivi* should refer in the course of their work. It is indeed important that the international community and the Congolese authorities have a clear and similar understanding of the global direction and aims of the process.

It is clear from the discussions in Brussels and the position of the different role players that there is still no consensus about coordination. Since President Laurent Kabila has now appointed his cabinet – including a Minister of Defence and a Secretary of Defence – and has confirmed the Chief of Defence Staff, it is important that the SSR process should start.
What is the present status of the FARDC and the DDR process? According to the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP), to date the project has demobilised almost 94 000 ex-combatants. The Commission Nationale de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion (Conader) has closed all orientation centres (COs) and is using mobile units to handle the final wave of demobilisation (under the plan de relance), which is supposed to be completed by 31 December 2007. This plan envisions to process up to 44 000 ex-combatants.

Although the project was expected to demobilise 118 000 ex-combatants by the end of 2006, the process was not completed because of lack of funding. The planned demobilisation of a further 70 000 combatants has not taken place yet because of a change in the strategy of the Congolese government. The government decided to first integrate the forces in the east into mixed brigades before starting the demobilisation. This process has also failed and the possibility of war in North Kivu looms large.

Some 25 000 children who were involved in the fighting have also been demobilised through special projects implemented by Unicef and specialised NGOs. These projects were scheduled to close by 31 December 2006, at which point an estimated caseload of 8 700 children would still need to be demobilised. Because of a lack of funds no further demobilisation of children has taken place except for some 300 children from General Nkunda’s brigades.

Political constraints to completing the DDR and army integration process continue to this day. For political reasons groups such as the Republican Guard and residual troops refuse or are unable to enter the process and continue to pose a security risk in the country. Twenty-five thousand ex-combatants in Kinshasa and 11 300 in other military regions have not gone through the National Programme of Disarmament, Démobilisation and Reintegration (PNDDR) process and 36 000 ex-combatants still have to be processed in terms of the plan de relance. The PNDDR's budget of US$200 million was either disbursed or has been committed for ongoing project activities. The available budget is only sufficient to cover demobilisation of and reinsertion payments for 103 000 ex-combatants and reintegration support for 68 500 ex-combatants.

What does this mean in practice? The integrated combatants have been organised in 18 brigades, which are mostly deployed in the east of the DRC. Most are in bad shape and are not staffed according to the original planning. Most soldiers are more concerned with their survival and have hardly any training. Commanders also need logistical support to deploy the brigades in operations against rebels and militia. Living conditions in brigades and of dependants must also be improved substantially in order to maintain security. Recent conflict in North Kivu has shown that the integrated brigades do not have the capacity to counter the rebels without the support of Monuc. To try and address this problem Monuc has proposed, together with the
United Nations Development Fund (UNDP), a support plan that consists of the following elements:

- A consolidation of the *brassage* by financially supporting the integrated brigades and their dependants

- A conceptual approach to give advice to the Congolese authorities on future format of new military at the organisational level

- Support at the tactical level by temporarily funding for every brigade, estimated at US$290 000 per month per brigade for salaries

- Operational and logistical assistance provided through the UNDP rapid response mechanism

It is thus clear that the DDR process must be completed, and must include the Presidential Guard, the Kinshasa Garrison and the residual of Bemba’s soldiers. The process of SSR can only start after the DDR process has been completed and the new Congolese cabinet has been appointed. The only way to get the programme on track is to complete the DDR process and adopt a global approach involving all role-players, national and international. SSR is not only about the reform of army, police and justice, but should include the intelligence sector, border control, and customs.

The EU delegation to the DRC has developed what they call a ‘governance compact’ that include the SSR sector and constitutes a link between the compact and the three *comités de suivi* (SSR) and how it could be developed. The Congolese authorities will preside over the *comités de suivi* (and the global commission) and thus lead the initiative. The importance of Congolese ownership of the SSR process and the need for an overarching Congolese vision/framework to which the three *comités de suivi* should adhere are key for cooperation with the external role players.

It is important that both the international community and the Congolese authorities have a clear and a similar understanding of the global direction and aims. The drafting of ‘white papers’ for the three sub-sectors is considered to be essential for such a global conceptual approach. While the Congolese authorities should draft these white papers, the external role players could give advice. There is an understanding that Congolese authorities would start with the white paper on defence sector reform, but they should be encouraged to draft white papers on police and justice sector reform as well.

In the next few months the completion of the DDR process, the Monuc proposal for post-conflict reconstruction and consensus on coordination between the external role-players on how to move forward with SSR will be crucial for the successful start of the SSR process.
A force for good?
The European Union and human security in the Democratic Republic of Congo
Mary Martin

Landmines and conservation in Southern Africa:
Peace parks in the aftermath of armed conflict
Clara Bocchino

Poverty, pipeline vandalisation/explosion and human security:
Integrating disaster management into poverty reduction in Nigeria
Freedom Onuoha
A force for good? The European Union and human security in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Mary Martin*

Human security is part of the policy identities of both the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU). In the EU, human security is not an explicit policy, but can be seen as embedded in initiatives such as conflict prevention and crisis management. The EU’s military mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUFOR RDC) in 2006 has been the most striking example so far of the EU using human security as a methodology for its external engagement, and this experience is expected to establish a framework for future military and civilian assistance to Africa.

This paper elaborates a European concept of human security based on five operating principles and evaluates EUFOR RDC against these principles to show how, in all but name, the DRC mission was a human security initiative. It proposes that this kind of human security approach is not only significant for the development of the EU as an international security actor, but could signal an important shift in the relationship between the EU and Africa, changing the terms of discourse between the two continents.

* Mary Martin is a research fellow at the Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics, and coordinator of the Human Security Study Group
Introduction

On 1 December 2006, convoys of trucks began to roll out of Ndolo airbase in Kinshasa, heading for the port of Boma on the Congo River, as the EU’s first military mission in Africa packed its bags and headed home. EUFOR RDC, comprising 19 nations and under a joint Franco-German command, spent four months in Kinshasa with a mandate to support the United Nations mission (Monuc) in securing the country’s first democratic elections in 46 years.

The mission broke new ground by engaging the EU as a hard security actor, with military force at its disposal, in an African country with no prior or accompanying NATO involvement. Germany, which provided the operational commander and headquarters for the mission and over 700 troops, had been particularly nervous about involving its military in African security, and struggled to answer the fundamental question of what it was doing in DRC in the first place. EUFOR RDC thus represented a significant milestone in the evolution of the EU’s global security capabilities and ambitions, and its successful completion may well pave the way for the EU to contemplate future engagements in Africa, possibly in Darfur (Rettmann 2007).

The mission was also groundbreaking in the way it fulfilled its mandate, and the methods it deployed, with a combination of robust military force and carefully planned initiatives to make the intervention of European troops acceptable to the local population. This was a peacebuilding operation that relied on a distinctive mix of military and quasi-civilian methods and that reflected the evolution of a distinctive approach to EU external missions, both military and civilian, that has been taking place in the last three years.

The argument presented in this paper is that the EU is moving towards a human security approach, particularly for those interventions carried out under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) that are mandated by the intergovernmental European Council. Although this policy is not explicitly labelled human security, the focus of ESDP interventions is on a form of crisis management that takes seriously the wellbeing of individuals and their communities. Local populations are treated as if they were citizens, not aliens, and the ‘means’ as well as the goals of interventions are key considerations in deployment. The experience of EUFOR RDC suggests that this approach can be successful, and may provide an appropriate framework for further EU engagement in Africa, and useful common ground for working with other actors such as the AU or the UN.

The argument is developed in three sections. First, I look at what human security means in the EU context to provide a basis for my claim that the Congo mission displayed important aspects of a human security approach, and to situate it within alternative definitions of human security, including that adopted by the AU. The second section
is a summary of a case study of the EUFOR mission in the context of the overall EU engagement in the DRC, including an evaluation of its human security characteristics. Finally I suggest that the human security approach is part of a shift in EU discourse on external intervention and assistance to crisis zones, which has implications for the security relationship between the EU and Africa, beginning with a change in the terms of political dialogue between them.

The European Union and human security

In 2004, the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, convened by Javier Solana, the EU high representative, published the Barcelona Report proposing a human security doctrine for Europe. It defined human security as the security of individuals and communities, and used examples of intolerable threats to human security, ranging from genocide and slavery to massive violations of the right to food, health and housing. The doctrine consisted of seven principles, later reduced to five, which stated that EU intervention should be based on the primacy of human rights, legitimate political authority, a bottom-up approach, effective multilateralism and a regional focus. The report concluded: ‘A human security approach for the European Union means that it should contribute to the protection of every individual human being and not focus only on the defence of the Union’s borders, as was the security approach of nation-states’ (A human security doctrine for Europe 2004).

The Barcelona Report followed the elaboration, nine months earlier, of the European Security Strategy (ESS), in which Solana had set out the EU’s ambition to be a ‘force for good’ in the world, capable of responding to a range of threats, including distant threats made potent by globalisation (A secure Europe in a better world 2003). The ESS envisaged a distinctive role for the EU in which it provided a comprehensive package of security comprising the whole range of EU external policies under a ‘positive objective of effective governance at both the global and the regional level, that is promoting every individual’s access to … basic public goods’. As Biscop (2005) notes, the ESS can and should be a global agenda for positive power.

As well as a declaratory commitment to comprehensive security, the EU has undertaken, since 2003, a steady build-up of capabilities within the ESDP, designed to implement this vision. Two headline goals have established deadlines for EU member states to contribute military and civilian resources for the EU to undertake both rapid reaction interventions and longer-term missions to deal with conflict and post-conflict situations, including ‘out of area’ engagements beyond Europe. A joint civilian-military planning cell for operations has been established in Brussels, and greater attention has been paid to improving coherence between the European Council’s crisis management initiatives and the commission’s so-called flanking measures that provide long-term development
and reconstruction assistance. At the same time, human rights and gender issues have been mainstreamed into the planning and operation of external policies.

Yet, on paper at least, this still does not amount to a fully-fledged human security policy by the EU. The recommendations of the Barcelona Report remain largely unimplemented, owing to the failure of the EU Constitutional Treaty, which would have provided important institutional support for a human security agenda, via an EU foreign minister and a new external action service. Key member states such as the UK and Germany have argued that a human security policy may be too utopian a step for the EU to embrace wholeheartedly. However, in 2006, the Finnish presidency of the EU reconvened the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities with a request that it should examine ways of taking forward a human security agenda in the EU. At the same time, the commissioner for external relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner (2006), has stated her belief in a human security approach and recently the German presidency of the EU has indicated that it sees merit in such a policy, although it remains sceptical of some of the principles proposed in the Barcelona Report (Eberle 2007).

In an attempt to elaborate on the concept of human security in a European context, Mary Kaldor, author of the report and convenor of the study group, has proposed a definition of human security that situates it at the sharp end of individuals’ vulnerability to both physical and material threats: fear and want. The Human Security Study Group has also attempted to show through an analysis of existing EU security policies that ‘human security’, by its essence, seems to be something ‘European’, although it draws on the debates generated by other terms used more broadly in the current global discourse such as ‘responsibility to protect’, ‘effective multilateralism’ and ‘human development’ (Kaldor et al 2007).

On the definitional issue, rather than following a distinction between human security as either a development issue – in the sense used by the UN since 1994 – or a hard security issue of protection against violence, as implemented by the Canadian government, Kaldor suggests that human security is about both aspects of individual wellbeing, that these aspects are interrelated, and both are threatened by moments of crisis (Kaldor et al 2007).

Security as defence against physical violence is part of a continuum which includes development to improve living standards. Human security reimagines the problem of insecurity as human need at moments of extreme vulnerability, not only in wars, but in natural and technological disasters as well as famines, tsunamis and hurricanes. It can be treated as the crisis end of terms such as ‘human rights’ and ‘human development’. It is not just about the absence of violence, but about feeling safe on the streets or being able to influence political decision making. Emblematic features of human (in)security are displaced persons and refugees or the millions who depend on humanitarian assistance rather than develop independent livelihoods. In contemporary wars, most people die not on the battlefield, but because of violence deliberately targeted against civilians, or
because of the indirect effects of war as a result of lack of access to healthcare, the spread of disease, hunger and homelessness.

An EU human security policy is about tackling such problems and safeguarding the rights of individuals to life in decent conditions and without threats to their personal safety. Security policies and external intervention have to address the distorted economic conditions produced by war, the demobilisation of militias that threaten civilian communities, the protection of human rights and the restoration of a rule of law as crucial components in breaking chronic cycles of conflict.

As an analytical tool, the value of a human security policy is that it offers a perspective on crisis and the complex linkages between poverty and material development and pernicious, chronic states of instability and violent conflict. It can provide a means of recognising that traditional boundaries between different categories of intervention – such as civilian, military and humanitarian aid – or between different phases of action – such as prevention or reconstruction – have become blurred and have to be redrawn in an era of globalisation because they are defined largely in terms of a nation-state.

At the same time, a European human security doctrine implies a normative emphasis, intended to focus actors’ attention on the means and methods by which external intervention seeks to achieve these goals. It is about combining military force and civilian measures in such a way that it produces not merely short-term stabilisation, but the foundations of sustainable peace.

The key characteristic of the EU approach as set out in the Barcelona doctrine is human security as a methodology for external action, via a set of five principles that apply to ‘how’ and ‘why’, ends and means (A human security doctrine for Europe 2004). These principles, which are the primacy of human rights, legitimate political authority, a bottom-up approach, effective multilateralism and a regional focus, provide a framework that makes it possible for civilians and military to implement a human security approach. At tactical level they constitute a checklist for action in the field, as well as a basis of accountability for public audiences to evaluate what is done in interventionist operations. The principles not only clearly define a human security approach as a normative policy, but, importantly for practitioners, they create accessible steps by which such an approach can be realised. While the end state of human security remains vague and elusive for the realpolitikers of nation-states who regard it as utopian, a methodology that encompasses a focus on human wellbeing with ideas about combining the diverse forces of intervention – economic, military, cultural, social and political – offers a potentially more promising avenue for promoting human security policies.

The primacy of human rights means that the main goal for the military is protecting civilians rather than defeating an adversary. The capture or defeat of insurgents has to
be seen as a means to protecting civilians, rather than a goal that may lead to collateral damage among the civilian population.

The establishment of legitimate political authority means a focus on local government or regional or international political arrangements such as protectorates or transitional administrations rather than dealing only with a – possibly defunct – national state. It emphasises measures such as justice and security sector reform, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of armed forces and public service reform. ‘Effective multilateralism’ means more than simply ‘acting with a group of states’, and involves task sharing rather than duplication or rivalry with regional organisations such as the AU, SADC and Ecowas (Economic Community Of West African States) in Africa, and a commitment to working through international organisations to solving problems via rule-making and cooperation.

The bottom-up principle seems obvious, but is frequently ignored in practice. Human security is about empowering vulnerable communities, even in conditions of conflict and crisis, rather than coercing or regulating them to produce peace. It requires real consultation and a willingness to let local civil society take responsibility for reconstruction. The regional focus principle stresses the need to avoid focusing only on particular countries when dealing with crises, but to deal with the reality that insecurity spills over borders in the form of refugees, transnational criminal networks, trade in illegal commodities and spread by the power of diasporas, a globalised media and ideologies.

While two other recommendations of the Barcelona Report – for a human security response force and a legal framework governing external action – remain on the backburner after the failure of the EU’s efforts at reform via a constitutional treaty, the principles retain a strong flavour of pragmatism. They attempt to bridge the perceived divide between human security as a broad security strategy for development and a narrow focus on violent threats, in other words the distinct positions on human security adopted by leading proponents such as Japan and Canada. They are closer to the goals set out by the AU Commission in its 2004–2007 strategic plan, which regards human security as part of peace and governance initiatives (Commission of the African Union 2004-7). Human development is not an either/or choice between physical and material security, it encompasses both. Moreover, an EU human security approach refutes two core dilemmas suggested by Owen and Liotta: that it involves a choice between policies that are either narrow and operable or broad and ideal; and that as a systemic practice of ethics it may need to rely on coercive force to be implemented. On the first dilemma, the point about the principles is that they are a framework for pragmatic action, as well as statements of values, and that ‘doing’ human security requires a shift in the focus of EU external action, and better coherence between individual initiatives rather than a wholesale reinvention of policy. In this sense, human security is both broad and operable.
On the second dilemma, the EU as a collective actor now has the capabilities to coerce, although there have been few examples to date of it deploying hard power in favour of the so-called soft goals of human development. Clearly the build-up of military resources for autonomous missions is designed to do just that, and was spelled out in the ESS of 2003. The EUFOR RDC mission was the clearest case to date of how the EU can use its mix of external instruments – from military force to civilian assistance – to pursue human security goals.

While there is still a gap between what the EU could do to address crisis in human security terms and what its current policy mix produces, much of a human security approach is already implicit in the EU’s initiatives on conflict prevention, human rights, and work with civil society. ESDP operations include an emphasis on civil-military cooperation and its commitment to ‘effective multilateralism’, as stated in the ESS, and highlighted as a principle of a human security doctrine in the Barcelona Report, has been demonstrated in numerous engagements in the last three years, most recently in the DRC in providing military and civilian forms of support alongside the UN mission (Monuc), and bilateral state actors in the transition.

The issue for the EU is that it hesitates to label its actions as human security, so there is a disjuncture between calling and doing human security. This is more than just semantics or taxonomy. Policy terms are necessary to help define the ideas, values, interests and goals of external relations for those applying them, such as the EU or the AU, and for those on the receiving end of such policies. In the EU, a proliferation of different, and sometimes competing policy descriptors such as crisis management, conflict prevention, civil-military cooperation and rapid response underline the incoherence and fragmentation of its external action. In this case, an explicit commitment to a human security approach could serve as an effective organising frame and mindmap, providing a unifying narrative for diverse initiatives. Consciously using the term ‘human security’ can help to take what has already been done a stage further.

**Forceful for whose good? The EUFOR mission in the DRC**

The decision to send over 2000 European troops to support Monuc and provide stabilisation during the two rounds of presidential elections in 2006 marked a turning point in the EU’s global ambitions. EUFOR RDC was the first autonomous mission to Africa. For Germany, which supplied operational command and the largest single contingent of troops, it was a controversial deployment that gave rise to nightmare scenarios of ill-informed and prepared troops caught up in a ‘domestic’ African conflict that had little to do with European interests (for example Amann 2006). Yet despite these misgivings, the mission has been deemed a success and has probably paved the
way for further EU military expeditions, including to crisis regions in Africa (Solana 2007). EUFOR RDC represents an important advance, not only in what it achieved in terms of stabilisation and conflict prevention, but also in the way that it operated. For in some respects, in its original design and implementation, EUFOR was human security in action, breaking new ground in the way that a military mission could be used to promote the long-term wellbeing of individuals with no ambition to control or defend territory, and to treat them as if they were citizens rather than an alien population.

Initial public perceptions of EUFOR RDC in Africa were negative. The media ridiculed it for having the majority of its troops based in Gabon, hundreds of kilometres from any potential conflict. To observers, it looked like another example of European tokenism – a paper tiger to vaunt the EU’s pretensions as a serious security actor.

Its mandate limited it to operating in Kinshasa, and when called upon by Monuc for back-up. It constituted a resource of last resort behind the Congolese police and army, and Monuc. Moreover, its licence was to protect elites, not ordinary Congolese, in particular foreign VIPs associated with the transitional institutions, a point not lost on the local population. A serious handicap was the legal duration of the mission: it was deliberately kept short to coincide with the electoral timetable, but delays in polling meant that EUFOR RDC was programmed to operate only until immediately after the second round of results and then withdraw from 1 December.

While technically this fulfilled the EU’s aim of providing a stable environment for the electoral process, it missed the point about supporting a peace process that would alleviate the suffering of the civilian population (ESDP newsletter 2006:15). European commanders had to deal with the public relations effect of appearing to ‘cut and run’ as soon as the elections were over and with the new president not even installed officially. More seriously, the mission had to leave when tensions between the camps of the victorious and losing presidential candidates were still high in the capital. For around a week there was a serious possibility of violence in Kinshasa between militia groups, EUFOR RDC not being authorised to use any kind of force other than limited defence of its own troops. It risked being a bystander to conflict or human rights abuses because its mandate had expired. On the other hand, the mission’s limited duration was probably a benefit. In terms of the Barcelona doctrine, the deployment of European troops succeeded in using military force to achieve a short-term stabilisation and create a space in which ‘normal’ peaceable politics could be conducted.

The mission’s main operational success stems from the way it handled the most serious outbreak of violence during the election. On 20 August, after an inconclusive first round of voting in the presidential election, militias loyal to Joseph Kabila launched an attack on the headquarters of Jean-Pierre Bemba, the runner-up in the first round. Two days of street battles followed between troops loyal to the two candidates. By coincidence, 14
ambassadors, including the head of Monuc, Ambassador Bill Swing, were in Bemba’s headquarters during an attack that left the diplomats besieged. Unable to contain the situation by itself or with the Congolese police and army, Monuc called on EUFOR RDC for back-up to evacuate the ambassadors. Meanwhile, dozens of civilians died in the street fighting.

The impact of the August events was to shift Congolese perceptions of the European force. From being part of a ‘Western’ attempt to promote the locally unpopular Kabila, the European troops gained a reputation as a neutral power and a force dissuasive. They were seen to behave differently from Monuc because they patrolled the streets up to four times a day – often on foot and without full battledress, in contrast to the UN troops who went out in tanks. At the same time they were seen as having credible force because troops carried a range of weapons from rubber sticks to guns; they were known to possess infra-red technology that allowed them to operate effectively after dark; and sparing use of Mirage jets to fly over Kinshasa enhanced their image. Crucially, too, they spoke French. Their action in defending Bemba against an attack that was widely regarded as having been launched by Kabila’s personal guard helped persuade the Congolese that they were genuine about securing a peaceful and fair electoral process.

The politically sensitive nature of the mission contributed to an acute awareness at every stage from planning through to decisions in the heat of the moment as to what level of force was appropriate, of how the Congolese would react, and the need for the European force to be seen as a neutral supporting force rather than a partisan enforcement tool.

When assessed against the five principles of a European human security doctrine, EUFOR RDC succeeded in establishing what could be called a human security approach. A human rights agenda was built into the mission from the earliest stages of planning with the appointment of a specific human rights advisor to the mission; a gender concept was developed, along with a reporting system to monitor human rights issues; training was carried out in human rights and gender issues; and street patrols took with them a human rights monitor and often medical assistance for the local population.

For the first time in EU operations, a common ‘soldier’s card’ was produced for troops with clear instructions on the use of force, gender issues such as sexual abuse and dealing with child soldiers. The cards were distributed during operational training in Gabon and in Kinshasa. The rules were intended as a framework for the actions and behaviour of EUFOR RDC troops, and to establish a ‘European’ standard in place of the different operating procedures of member states. Soldiers were warned that they were ‘personally responsible’ for respecting and promoting human rights, and told that ‘protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence … is part of your mandate’. In practice, this was a considerable deviation from the strict legal terms of the mission.
On paper, the principle of clear political authority was respected through UN Security Council Resolution (1671), which authorised EUFOR RDC to support Monuc for the duration of the elections. In practice, officers involved in the mission felt that its responsibilities were not clear, particularly in the light of the protocol that EUFOR could only intervene as a fourth line of ‘stabilisation’ after the Congolese (police and army) and then Monuc. This led to confusion in the second outbreak of violence, which occurred in November after supporters of the losing presidential candidate, Jean-Pierre Bemba, attacked and set fire to the Supreme Courthouse. The Congolese police on duty ran away from the scene and Monuc failed to prevent the arson, but EUFOR RDC was not involved, because the call for assistance never came. At the very least, it left the Congolese puzzled, provoking a number of negative articles in the local press, and the frustrating the Europeans because they were not used. One solution would have been to establish through the EUFOR mandate a discrete area of operation for EUFOR, such as the whole of Kinshasa.5

EUFOR RDC’s working relationship with Monuc was also relevant to the principle of effective multilateralism. Problems arose because there was no unity of command between the two sets of peacekeepers, and the Europeans were faced with having to ‘coordinate’ with Monuc rather than approach problems jointly. There was also limited scope for a regional focus because the military mission was limited to Kinshasa. Although commanders made efforts to communicate with EU regional structures and neighbouring countries with a stake in transition, the emphasis was on a limited duration, limited scope engagement, rather than building links with key regional stabilising influences such as Angola and South Africa.

The most successful human security aspect of the mission lay in its efforts to take grassroots views into account, and implement a bottom-up approach through a highly inventive campaign to engage with local public opinion. This began as a conventional military exercise to ‘win hearts and minds’ and ensure an efficient two-way flow of information between the mission and the citizens of Kinshasa. Out of this, however, grew the largest circulation newspaper in the country, La Paillotte, which at its peak published over 60,000 copies a week, a broadcasting campaign on air eight times a day, covering seven radio stations, and focus groups and public opinion polling to provide feedback on local views of the mission.

Initial perceptions of the European force ranged from neutral to negative: people either knew nothing of EUFOR RDC or fell back on a range of deep-seated ‘myths’: that the troops had come to support Kabila’s election; that they were there to exploit the Congo’s natural resources; or that the Congolese would ultimately have to pay for the EU mission. EUFOR RDC commanders were also acutely aware that, not only might they be seen as neo-colonial ‘occupiers’, but that the Congolese experience with their own armed forces and those of Monuc had been tainted by incidents of human rights and gender abuses. The overwhelming majority of recorded human rights violations in the DRC are blamed on the armed forces.
Human security and a discursive shift in European–African relations

The completion of the military mission to DRC raises the question whether the EU can leverage its success as a rapid reaction stabilisation force and what its long-term legacy will be in terms of the EU’s engagement in the country. EUFOR RDC itself was conscious that it had raised local expectations about European commitment to reconstruction. These will now have to be fulfilled by the two remaining ESDP missions: EUPOL Kinshasa, which is assisting with police reform, and EUSEC, which is carrying out security sector reform, concentrating on integration of militias into the national army and reorganising the chain of payments to soldiers. In addition, the European Commission has a substantial programme of governance and infrastructure assistance, amounting to over €400 million under the current framework, in addition to non-programmable aid. The military mission was planned and carried out in the context of an extensive commitment to stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction of the country after the civil war, beginning in 2003. The holding of democratic elections – at an estimated overall cost of US$500 million of which over half was contributed by the EU, including EU member states – was the centrepiece of this three-year process.

Yet on the one hand EU programmes lack coherence and risk being disconnected drops in the ocean of what needs to be done to provide sustainable peace in the DRC. On the other is the issue of whether the EU has found the right strategy for the DRC in putting so much emphasis on elections as a precondition for peaceful development.

The EU now faces a delicate balancing act as an external interlocutor for Kabila’s newly legitimised regime. While there is a need to maintain pressure on the government to honour its commitment to peaceful reconstruction and democracy, programmes such as army reform, which go to the heart of notions of sovereignty, as well as wider initiatives on justice, are highly sensitive areas for international intervention. Even less politically charged areas of assistance such as capacity-building of civil society and poverty reduction programmes risk being tainted by an old discourse of paternalism. Continued engagement poses the threat of what Sen (2006) describes as a ‘third phase of imperialism’: following classic colonialism and the imperialism of the Cold War with technical and neo-liberal forms of imperialism in influencing post-civil-war reconstruction.

The EU’s Strategy for Africa, agreed by the Council in 2005, which provided the context for the ESDP military and civilian missions to the DRC, appears to recognise that a shift, at least in rhetorical terms, is required to articulate the new relationship between Europe and Africa (The EU and Africa 2006). The strategy refers to a ‘changing Africa’, ‘the acknowledgement of common values and interests and mutual accountability’ and stresses terms such as partnership and equality.
The Presidency Conclusions on Africa in December 2006 also referred to principles of ownership and mutual accountability, with programmes to be worked out with ‘the involvement of civil society and other stakeholders’, with the same emphasis repeated by the first expert meeting of the EU-Africa Joint Strategy in 2007, which added the phrase ‘a people-centred partnership’.7 This is a significant move away from the discourse of conditionality and aid by regulation, which underpinned both the Lomé and Cotonou agreements, and which the EU admits resulted in penalising individuals. Instead the new trend is towards a dialogue structure for EU engagement with Africa.8

Human security may offer an important step towards cementing this discursive shift, and giving it real rather than merely rhetorical meaning. A human security policy could mitigate fears of a new wave of technocratic imperialism in EU engagement in Africa, on the part of local governments and populations, as well as provide a coherent narrative for the next stage of assistance in countries such as the DRC. Rather than, as Sen describes, Europe facilitating the continent’s civil wars and an engagement coloured by militarism or commercialism, a human security approach might allow Europe to recraft its intervention in terms which emphasise the normalisation of society and the rebuilding of base activities. While this still leaves unspecified what the EU might do in relation to the continuing involvement of its companies and commercial relations in the resources of Africa, it opens the way for a new channel of dialogue at grassroots, and one that builds on different identities – economic, democratic, gender, progressive – from traditional discourses, which had become bogged down in an aid/trade relationship where Africa was painted as subservient.

A human security approach signals a shift in the mindset of the EU, which in turn can alter the terms of dialogue with Africa, while at the same time anchoring dialogue in a clear and transparent set of norms.

Perhaps just as importantly, the principles of human security provide common ground at institutional level between the EU and the AU. There is sufficient overlap between the two visions of human security in terms of an emphasis on civil society, a holistic vision of security and development, and the key linkages between peace, governance and human rights. The potential of this lies first in fostering a mutual sense of trust and understanding between the two sets of actors, rather than a dialogue of the deaf or for the EU to be seen as foisting its particularistic cultural values on Africa. Second, human security principles offer a framework in which intervention can occur at levels other than elites or governments. The EU’s Africa Strategy emphasises multilayered and structured interactions among a wide range of institutions and representatives of society. The move away from a focus on state security and territorial legitimacy towards human-based policies opens up the possibility for other kinds of actors such as civil society groups, local and municipal authorities and regional powers to play a role in reconstruction and development. The image is one of two blocs, both moving towards
human-centred sets of policies, which, while having different emphases, could form the basis for a qualitatively different type of interaction than has existed hitherto.

Conclusion

The evolution of the EU’s security policies has consequences for the trajectory of peacebuilding in Africa. While the explicit adoption of a human security policy for EU external intervention remains contested, recent developments, including most notably the EU military mission to the DRC in 2006, point to a qualitative shift in the way Europe frames such engagements. The EU’s search for an active, yet normative, role on the world stage has increased interest in the concept of human security, and particularly in aspects such as a holistic approach and a bottom-up perspective to post-conflict stabilisation and conflict prevention. Concretely, the innovations introduced by the EUFOR RDC mission, together with evidence of a new rhetorical approach to assistance to Africa generally, suggest that a policy built around a set of principles that link security and development and that put individual welfare and not only government stability at the heart of assistance initiatives might inject new momentum into EU Africa relationships, for the benefit of both.

Notes

1 Interview, policy planning staff, German Foreign Office, 29 June 2006.
2 Evidence of Lt-Gen Jean-Paul Perruche, director-general EU Military Staff, to European Parliament, Brussels, 9 October 2006.
3 Telephone interview, Jeff Koinange, CNN South Africa, 20 November 2006.
4 Interview, Amigo Fonde, ASADHO Kinshasa, 4 December 2006.
5 The European force was mandated to ensure security at the international airport.
6 The name, which means ‘straw hut’, was chosen because it represents a traditional Congolese meeting place for the discussion of politics and civic issues.
8 Interview. Political advisor, European Commission, Kinshasa, 5 December 2006.

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Landmines and conservation in Southern Africa: Peace parks in the aftermath of armed conflict

Clara Bocchino*

Peace parks are a modern means of conflict resolution through nature conservation. The Great Limpopo Peace Park (GLPP), which spans South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, was established to bring new hope to an area that is infamous for racial and political divisions, civil war and widespread poverty. This paper discusses the impact of international laws governing landmines, the current priority choices of the countries involved, and the situation in the two mine-affected countries: Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Minefields and politics are interrelated, and have an impact at local, national and international level. Using the GLPP as a case study, the article argues that although they have been presented as excellent examples of integrated biodiversity conservation and socio-economic development in developing countries, peace parks will not fulfil their main objective of promoting an image of peace in the aftermath of conflict without addressing landmine contamination.

* Clara Bocchino is a PhD candidate at the University of Bologna, Italy.
Introduction

I know of no political movement, no philosophy, no ideology, which does not agree with the peace parks concept as we see it going into fruition today.

It is a concept that can be embraced by all. In a world beset by conflict and division, peace is one of the cornerstones of the future. Peace parks are building blocks in this process, not only in our region, but potentially in the entire world.

*Nelson Mandela*

According to van Amerom and Büscher (2005), transfrontier conservation areas, or ‘peace parks’ as they are popularly called, have been identified as key instruments to promote the African Renaissance dream, and are increasingly advocated and justified on this basis.

Five years after the groundbreaking meeting between the governments of Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, the treaty for the establishment of the Great Limpopo Peace Park/Transfrontier Conservation Area (GLPP/TFCA) was signed in 2002.

Through a series of land corridors, the GLPP links Mozambique’s Limpopo National Park and South Africa’s Kruger National Park to Zimbabwe’s Gonarezhou National Park. According to the treaty, a joint monitoring board and a ministerial committee will manage the GLPP. The total surface area of the peace park will be approximately 35 000 km².

Although the Southern African region has a history of over thirty years of conflict, the creation of an ad hoc organisation for the joint management of the peace park has contributed to the promotion of an image of unprecedented ecological and humanitarian success. However, many controversial issues arising from this process have been discussed both in academic and policy-driven literature. These issues include governance (Duffy 2001 and 2005), politics (Wolmer 2003 and Dzingirai 2004), and the impact on local populations (Refugee Research Programme 2002; Anderson & Pariela 2005).

Landmine contamination has only recently been addressed by scholars (Unruh et al 2003; Unruh 2001; Gruhn 1996), although without specific reference to the GLPP.

**International conventions on landmines: A legal framework**

Actions to address international concern over the legacy of the use of anti-tank/vehicle mines and anti-personnel mines in conflicts are relatively recent, dating to the late 1970s
and early 1980s. Today, emplaced mines affect some 85 states and other areas. In Africa, these include Angola, Burundi, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Somaliland.

The United Nations, as the only international body encompassing all aspects of human life from war to culture and development, was one of the first institutions to take an interest in the lack of regulation over the use of such devices and other conventional weapons, whose impacts endure long after wars have ended and mostly affect civilians. In 1980, after protracted negotiations, UN member states agreed to a Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (UNCCW).

The agreement, which opened for signature in 1981 and entered into force in 1983, contains a protocol on mines, booby-traps and similar devices (Protocol II). In 1996, Protocol II was amended to deal with the ever-increasing indiscriminate use of landmines and in particular as a response to surgeons of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), who were confronted with large numbers of traumatic amputations resulting from blast anti-personnel mines (Maslen 2004). Despite the amendments, UNCCW Protocol II has been considered a soft agreement and insufficient to reduce the level of civilian landmine casualties. This encouraged non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and some governments to call for a special treaty banning landmines. As such, it has been largely superseded as a point of reference by the more recent (1997) Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, referred to by the African Union as the APM Ban Convention.

The APM Ban Convention was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 and entered into force on 1 March 1999, becoming binding international law. This is believed to be the fastest entry-into-force of any major multilateral treaty. As of February 2007, a total of 153 countries had signed the treaty, and two more had signed, but not ratified, constituting well over three-quarters of the world’s nations (Mine Action Canada 2006). Notable non-signatories include the US, China and the Russian Federation, as well as Finland, Israel, and the countries in the Arabian peninsula. Some non-signatory countries, however, are members of the UNCCW. Despite the process being independent of the UN, the convention is deposited with the UN Secretary-General, who is responsible for sending fact-finding missions to countries alleged to be in breach of the agreement or requiring assistance. Hence it seems very unlikely that non-signatory countries would choose not to adhere to its provisions on the grounds of its illegitimacy or contrast with the UN principles and the UNCCW. Rather, it seems more plausible that the conditions set by the convention, although only covering anti-personnel mines (APM), are more
compelling than those in the UNCCW, as is clear from its very first article, which states that each state party undertakes to never, under any circumstances:

■ Use anti-personnel mines

■ Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines

■ Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a state party under the convention

In addition, each state party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of the convention (ICBL 2004a).

Protocol II of the UNCCW bans only non-detectable APMs and prohibits the intentional use of mines against civilians. It stipulates that reliable records of minefields must be maintained and that all efforts must be taken after the end of hostilities to clear minefields. While the APM Ban Convention specifically states in article 2 that only mines designed to be detonated by contact with a person are the object of the treaty, the UNCCW makes provision, albeit with restrictions, for the use of all types of mines, with the exception of anti-ship mines at sea or inland watercourses (UN 1996). The UNCCW clearly states that the protocol applies only to situations of armed conflict, whether intrastate or interstate, thus excluding rioting and internal sporadic turmoil (UN 1996). In the same vein, signatory states are allowed to use such weapons ‘to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State’ (UN 1996). Since the peripheral areas of states are those where national unity is more often questioned, this permission has the potential to place border areas in immense danger. Paradoxically, article 1(4) invalidates the whole protocol in its provision to diminish the number of deaths and casualties in conflict and post-conflict in the name of state sovereignty. However, article 1(5) adds that the protocol ‘shall not be invoked as a justification for intervening … in the armed conflict or in the internal or external affairs of the High Contracting Party’ (UN 1996). If respected, this clause simply implies that the UN has not made any provision other than punitive sanctions for breaches to the agreement, addressing ‘persons who … wilfully kill or cause serious injury to civilians’ (UN 1996).

In contrast, the APM Ban Convention is explicitly humanitarian in approach. It is couched in terms of introducing measures to alleviate suffering on an individual level. This is made clear in the first preambular paragraph, which is a declaration of its determination to stop the killing and maiming of civilians by APMs. The convention, while dealing only with anti-personnel mines, thus presents a constructive solution to a problem that has deeply affected people in developing countries, leaving them with
physical and psychological damage, as well as reduced access to resources. It takes a more holistic approach, concerning itself not only with a total ban on the manufacture, use and stockpiling, but with psycho-physical support for victims, survivors and their families (article 6), and sets deadlines for the clearance of minefields (ICBL 2004a). In this sense, it is closer to field experiences than the UNCCW, thus transferring priority targets from military to socio-economic development (Hasselberg 2003).


Under article 5 of the convention, both Mozambique and Zimbabwe are required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than 1 March 2009.

**Landmine contamination in Mozambique and Zimbabwe: A history of conflicts**

The countries that form the GLPP were historically involved in domestic and international conflicts. The separatist regimes enforced by local white governments in Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe left a social legacy that these countries are still struggling to resolve internally for the benefit of all communities. The most relevant difference between Mozambique and Zimbabwe is that in Mozambique mines were laid in response to neighbours’ military pressure, whereas in Zimbabwe they were laid by the national government, in the context of civil independence warfare. Virtually all parties laid mines before and after the independence of Mozambique from Portugal in 1975. The Portuguese military used mines to protect their strategically important assets in the 1960s. The Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front, Frelimo), having obtained independence, began to support the liberation movements in neighbouring Rhodesia against Ian Smith’s regime. To prevent weapons, goods and rebels from entering the country from the south-east border, the Rhodesian army laid mines on the strip of land that stretches from Crook’s Corner to the Gonarezhou National Park, an area known as Sengwe Communal Land.

When President Samora Machel closed the common border with Rhodesia in March 1976, thus imposing UN sanctions, Rhodesia retaliated by forming the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance, Renamo), a task force designed to hamper Mozambican development through guerrilla warfare (Minter, 1998). On the independence of Zimbabwe in 1981, Renamo was taken over by South
Africa with the cooperation of the CIA and other right-wing politicians and tycoons (Hanlon 1991 and Minter 1998) and socio-economic destabilisation became its only target (Finnegan 1992; Hall & Young 1997; Minter 1998). If mines in Zimbabwe are the legacy of the Rhodesian army only, in Mozambique both parties involved in the civil war laid most of the landmines, although with different strategies. Frelimo, the ruling party, was more interested in protecting the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric scheme, the South African and Malawian borders, the main cities, and other targets important for the economy of the country (Vines 1994).

Renamo had very different aims that also changed through time. The South African-Renamo targets were the regional transport routes linking the hinterland to the Indian Ocean (Vines 1994) and social infrastructure buildings such as schools and clinics, as well as agricultural land. However, after 1985, the movement became more ideologically independent of South Africa and began to target civilians and the army by mining roads and airfields, which impeded food and weapons supplies (Unruh et al 2003).

The lack of maps detailing minefields and the exact location of the landmines has greatly impaired efforts at effective mine clearance in these areas.

**The Great Limpopo TFP: Priority setting and landmine contamination**

The year 1995 was very important for the two countries that were still involved in domestic conflicts. The South African apartheid regime came to an end, and Mozambique saw the conclusion of a civil war that had lasted for over a decade, had starved its population, and had seriously depleted its natural resources. The then president of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Dr Anton Rupert began to discuss with the Mozambican president, Joaquim Chissano, the possibility of creating a conservation area across their common border in order to free the growing elephant population from the Kruger National Park (KNP) into the Coutada 16 hunting reserve, where they had been depleted by poaching for food during the war. On 1 February 1997, the Peace Park Foundation (PPF) was founded under the new WWF president, Dr John Hanks, thus laying the foundations for the creation of the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou Peace Park, encompassing Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, and covering the supposed old migratory route of large mammals. Together with the WWF, other international organisations decided to take part in the innovative project of transfrontier conservation in an area of the world whose natural capital is very rich and beautiful. The World Conservation Union’s Regional Office for Southern Africa (IUCN/ROSA) provided its knowledge, while the World Bank funded the projects through its Global Environmental Facility (Peace Parks Foundation 2002). Enlightened as it was, however, the idea was not so groundbreaking. Gomes de Sousa, a Mozambican ecologist, had proposed adjoining
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Kruger with bordering areas in Mozambique for ecosystem management in 1938 (GLTP 2003b), and the juxtaposition of national parks with country borders in Southern Africa had been discussed two years earlier by Griffiths. He pointed out that 76 of the 200 national parks of Africa at the time were located on international borders, and 35 of 109 African boundaries had a national park on either or both sides (Griffiths 1995).

The number of national parks on the continent had increased with greater political stability and international interest. Rupert's concept of creating a conservation area that spanned the whole of the African continent – by connecting existing national parks with ecological corridors – appeared feasible. The idea, posited by Moore (only two years after Griffiths's publication) of a new ‘Cape to Cairo’ (Moore 1997) colonialism does not seem so absurd. Other researchers expanded the concept in terms of governance (Duffy 2001; Nhantumbo & Magane 2004) and political ecology (Wolmer 2003).

The ecological justification of the project has always been brought forward as the most urgent aim of transfrontier conservation in the area. However, with time, other priorities were introduced that provided a clearer picture of the aims of the GLTCA. In line with publications on Transboundary Natural Resources Management and Transboundary Protected Areas of that period (Cumming 1999), the priorities determined by the PPF for the establishment of the then GLTF Peace Park can be summarised as follows:

- To protect biodiversity, through ecosystem management
- To re-establish migratory routes for animals, lost to electric fencing, famine and conflicts
- To promote the image of a peaceful region, in the aftermath of segregation and wars
- To contribute to the socio-economic development of neighbouring local communities

All four objectives are related indirectly to landmine contamination in so far as awareness of their location and their clearance are concerned. Where local biodiversity is concerned, first, it is clear that the presence of minefields in ecological corridors or in single parks poses a serious problem to wildlife movement and access to water points. Most of the landmines are located along the Zimbabwe–Mozambique border, thus impairing the proposed Sengwe ecological corridor between Kruger and Gonarezhou and access to the Limpopo River. Although the parties were fully aware of the presence of landmines in Sengwe, as late as December 2001 the area was not listed as a priority for clearance. GTZ used a framework known as Community Mine Awareness Development (CMAD) ‘for those communities who are deemed low priority for mine action support’ (Weyl 1999) in the area as part of the WB/GEF Transfrontier Conservation Project. Similarly, being concerned with local socio-economic development, mine contamination should
be addressed as the first step towards allowing people access to resources (Gruhn 1996) and halting the loss of domestic livestock, as well as local wildlife (Roberts & Stewart 1999; Weyl 1999). This would promote a real message of peace among local communities by eradicating the psychological damage provoked by the presence of minefields, in terms of lack of safety and a constant reminder of past conflicts (Gruhn 1996; Hasselber 2003), as well as the current reticence towards any conservation programme in interstitial areas.

All three countries involved in the creation of the GLPP participated in the APM Ban Convention from the beginning of the process. However, Mozambique still needs to develop relevant national legislation (National Demining Institute 2004). Although South Africa is not affected by mines and unexploded ordinance (UXO) in terms of the SADC Landmine Report (Grobbelaar 2002), South Africa and Zimbabwe (ICBLc 2004) have integrated the provisions of the treaty into their national legislation. Nonetheless, as far as the peace park is concerned, the problem of mine-contaminated land did not appear as a priority in the 2002 Treaty on the Establishment of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP 2004). In addition, only two references to minefields have been found: the first in a divulgative paper, stating that:

The Zimbabwe Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management and the Joint Management Board will establish working relationships with the parties involved in clearing mines in the Sengwe corridor. Thereafter, the department will prioritize the areas to be cleared and participate in the planning to reoccupy the cleared areas (GLTP 2003a:9).

The second is included in an unpublished funding application for Nepad, where minefield clearance in Sengwe is identified as a priority for the creation of the ecological corridor and the integration of the Gonarezhou National Park in the TFP (UCACT 2004:20).

In the context of the TFCA, the Sengwe corridor has indirectly become a priority area because of two major events: the creation of the Limpopo National Park in Mozambique, thus clearing the way for the union of three existing national parks; and the completion of mine contamination surveys in Mozambique and the clearing of their priority areas for the development of the transfrontier project. Zimbabwe appears to be the only country...
that still has a mine contamination problem in the context of the peace park. However, in the second half of 2006, de-mining began in Sengwe with the aim of clearing the corridor by the year-end. Unfortunately, it appears that this work is not being publicised, despite the obvious benefits to the local population in the border area.

**Landmines and politics in Zimbabwe and Mozambique**

Although to some extent they have a shared recent history and foresee a common future in conservation and development, Zimbabwe and Mozambique are currently experiencing different political and economical situations. Despite their commitment to, and implementation of, the APM Ban Convention in the context of the GLPP, there are considerable differences for political, rather than ecological reasons.

On the one hand, with the General Peace Agreement in Rome, Mozambique entered a phase of political stability and development. On the other hand, Zimbabwe, while stable for a relatively long period, has recently been affected by political turmoil evidenced in the problems experienced in the 2002 and 2004 elections, the food and fuel shortages and the land reforms, involving first the white farmer community and recently destitute and underprivileged people in shanty towns in the suburbs of Harare.

Mozambique has proven through its policies during and after the civil war that socio-economic development is the main priority for its government, thus facilitating the arrival of international organisations, donors and other sources of funding into the country. The creation of the LNP from the ashes of the Coutada 16 hunting reserve has accelerated the process of unification with the KNP, thus providing unique opportunities for private development in the surrounding areas, facilitated by the 1997 amendment to the law on land use and exploitation. Furthermore, until 2006, Mozambique was responsible for the management of the GLPP and TFCA as a coordinating party. By completing the landmine contamination surveys in the areas included in the TFCA, as well as clearing potential residues, it has proven itself fully appreciative of the park project not only as a metaphor for newly found peace, but also as a unique opportunity to re-stock wildlife lost to landmines and consumption during the famines; to include the country in international tourism routes, exemplified by the ‘bush-to-beach’ programme; and to improve border security, because informal migration between the countries is ongoing. These accomplishments coincide with South African priorities in terms of relocating excess wildlife, in particular elephants, to maintain the ecological balance of the KNP; facilitating access to Mozambican beaches for national tourists while ensuring a market for the new Kruger Mpumalanga International Airport; and decreasing the number of illegal workers that regularly try to reach South Africa from Zimbabwe and Mozambique through the KNP.
The proactive attitude shown by Mozambique – together with governmental awareness that minefields pose a serious threat to economic development, which is why mine action was included in the 2006 Poverty Reduction Strategy (Plano de Acção de Redução da Pobreza Absoluta, PARPA II) (ICBL 2004b) – has led to the presence and cooperation of many donors, NGOs and commercial companies involved in mine action. According to the ICBL (International Campaign to Ban Landmines) report, currently 18 donors, five NGO operators and five commercial operators are involved in de-mining in the ten provinces that are affected by landmine contamination (ICBL 2004b). Although the Gaza province, in particular the TFCA zones, is considered one of the least affected (ICBL 2004b; NDI 2004; Vines 1994) Gruhn (1996:690) points out that ‘Gaza, Manica, Maputo and Sofala [alone] contain[ed] 75 per cent of the deployed mines’. The three provinces represent part of the TFCA and most of the areas concerned with the ‘bush-to-beach’ programme.

In the past two years, however, all the mines affecting the park and its immediate proximity have been surveyed and UXOs were the only residues to be found and removed.

Zimbabwe is in a less positive situation than Mozambique. This is mainly due to political decisions by President Robert Mugabe and his government over farm ownership and international supervision during elections. Although the country has always complied with the provisions of the convention regarding surveying and clearing of priority areas, in the last two years government politics have directly impacted on landmine issues, as witnessed by the 2004 ICBL country report (ICBL 2006a) as well as several newspaper articles. What emerges is a peculiar situation that seems to have reached an impasse.

First, most mines were planted by the Rhodesian army along movement corridors used by the two national liberation parties (UNMAS 2000). They are therefore located mainly along the border areas with Zambia and Mozambique. Second, tourism having been a major income generator in the country and contributing significantly to its national economy alongside extensive farming, Victoria Falls, with a 220 km mined area, was prioritised as the first area for landmine removal (UNMAS 2000). By the end of 2003, this area should have been cleared as well as the 1 km strip of land around Kariba Power Station and the 50 km strip between Stapleford Forest and Mutare (ICBLc 2004). However, the 2006 country report states that Victoria Falls

![Figure 2 Map showing minefields in Zimbabwe](image-url)
Falls was completed only in May 2005, and by May 2006 only half of the surveyed minefield had been cleared (ICBL 2006b). The area known as Sengwe Communal Land, which stretches from Malvernia (Sango) to Crook’s Corner, was not targeted as a priority, although it was reported to be badly affected by landmine contamination, and despite having been classified by UNMAS as the third in size (305,000 m²) and the fourth in length (61 km) (UNMAS 2000), with an estimated 247,600 anti-personnel landmines (ICBL 2004c). In April 2006, after a field visit to this area at the end of 2005, Zimac (the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre) reported that a small parallel minefield had been discovered, raising estimates of the contaminated area from 50 to 70 km.

In addition, Sengwe is a very socially sensitive area. Weyl (1999) notes that disturbance to the local population began with their forced relocation as a result of the need to plant landmines, which would explain why the community knows exactly where the unsafe areas are (personal observation, 2001 and 2006), thus causing a total loss of about 24,159 ha of agricultural land and 12,000 ha of traditional grazing area. When Weyl’s paper was published, over 24,000 people were directly affected by landmines, including the obstruction of traditional cross-border linkages with Mozambique (Weyl 1999). The impact of landmine contamination in the area on local livelihoods is severe, since the minefields are located along the Limpopo, where the most fertile land lies, and along the border with Mozambique, where informal commercial activities are carried out and social relations are being maintained. Within the space of one year, however, and probably because of international pressure on the opening of the peace park, Zimac was due to begin demining in Sengwe in May 2006, after a ten-day campaign in February on mine risk education, involving almost 2,000 people in eleven sessions (ICBL 2006b). These sessions were meant to continue during demining, which, according to personal observation, did not start until late July 2006.

Some authors have mentioned the disruption caused to wildlife because of the loss of traditional migratory routes (ICBL 2006b) which occurred in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, this being the rationale behind the creation of the GLTFCA. Such assumptions are debatable (Anderson 2002), because wildlife on the Mozambican side of the park was depleted for human consumption, commercial interests and personal defence by local communities and hunters, before and during the war. The subsequent erection of the electric fence to protect animals in the KNP completely blocked the little remaining movements. Similarly, in Zimbabwe, local communities in Sengwe beside the Limpopo and further north near and inside the Gonarezhou National Park exploited wildlife to increase their livelihoods and protect themselves and their crops. In recent years the application of the CITES agreement has inverted this trend, triggering a slow but natural re-stocking in some of these areas, which in turn poses safety threats to local communities.

There are key differences between the two affected countries within the peace park. The significant number of agencies and companies working on the landmines, together with
the understanding that contaminated areas hamper development and political interest in hastening the effectiveness of the Great Limpopo TFCA, have greatly contributed to solving the problem in the proximity of the park's boundaries. Owing to the current governmental situation, however, Zimbabwe has only one commercial agency for surveying, Mine-Tech, which is funded by the German Corporation GTZ (ICBL 2004c), and the clearing of priority areas is being carried out jointly with the Zimbabwean army, through ZIMAC (MAC 2004).

In 2002, the minister of the environment and tourism, F Nhema, called for US$2 million to begin clearance in Sengwe (Financial Gazette 2002). Two years later, the minister of defence, Cde S Sekeramayi, quintuplicated the amount, stating that US$10.5 million was needed ‘for the demining of the landmine-infested Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou Transfrontier Park’ (The Herald 2004). However, funding did not materialise and clearing had not begun. As public concerns grew over lack of funding for demining and the pulling out of donors owing to political decisions (Zimbabwe Independent 2005), European Union and US spokesmen have become evasive over the reason why that funding is denied (Zimbabwe Independent 2004), suggesting that international concern over the political situation is growing. Furthermore, since Sengwe is located in Matabeleland, also a stronghold of the opposition party, national political choices might have influenced decision making on demining. When up-to-date maps for minefields in Sengwe were sought, most of the organisations that were working in the field were reluctant to supply information, although the existence of maps was never doubted. Finally, Mine-Tech Harare claimed not to have any maps. When prompted, the spokesman replied: ‘When Mine-Tech worked in this area, the surveys were limited and as far as we are aware, we do not have maps showing the minefields’ (Yates 2005 – personal communication). Hence, the map (figure 2) is basic and has not been updated owing to lack of recent data. In this climate of political tension and uncertainty about the future of Zimbabwe within the international community, minefields have become sensitive issues and one is left to wonder how important a role politics plays on the safety of people and, in this case, wildlife. One year after the declaration by Mine-Tech, demining has begun in Sengwe, but this is known only from personal observation during a field visit in November 2006.

Conclusion

The Great Limpopo Peace Park/TFCA represents a major opportunity for wildlife and flora conservation that involves national governments, private companies and local people in the context of ecotourism development. This is particularly vital in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, because direct and indirect tourism activities could become feasible solutions for socio-economic development.

However, major physical and virtual constraints are hindering this process, delaying opportunities for success. Landmine contamination is doubtless one such constraint.
The interest of international agencies such as the UN, with dedicated sections such as UNMAS, and humanitarian demining NGOs, alongside the commitment of national governments, has contributed to creating binding agreements that ban or restrict mine use and promote clearance as a humanitarian, social and, in some cases, ecological priority. In this context the presence of minefields in the TFCA, as the broader influence zone of the GLTFP, should be considered a priority for the implementation of the peace park as posited by the IUCN (Sandwith et al 2001) on a worldwide scale and the PPF in the regional scale of Southern Africa.

Having considered the paradigm shift towards humanitarian mine action and the approach of the PPF with the countries involved, as well as the recent history linking Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, it is extremely unproductive to address landmine contamination as an ecological process related only to the Sengwe corridor. The holistic approach enforced by the APM Ban Convention and GTZ should be taken more into account for the long-term psychological and skill-developing effects it will entail. By involving the local communities in surveys and in clearance according to the International Humanitarian Demining Development (Pearce 1999), the people would feel confident in the process and hence in its context (the peace park), which would gradually dispel the memories of past conflicts and forced relocation. This would also improve cooperation with the park authorities.

When one considers the commitment of all three parties to the APM Ban Convention, it seems that a joint effort should have been promoted to introduce humanitarian demining among the top priorities of the peace park, in order to clear the Sengwe Corridor for the benefit of local communities, as well as wildlife (Buenker 2000) and future tourists. This attitude would have facilitated the resolution the second constraint: the impact of the current situation in Zimbabwe. The attitude of President Robert Mugabe and his government towards international and regional organisations for development, and the events of the past five years, have led to general mistrust towards the country. Now that Zimbabwe is in charge of coordination of the GLTFP, which was handed over by Mozambique, the country is facing criticism from the national press for lagging behind on its financial and operational commitments to the TFCA project. As early as 2005, an article in the *Zimbabwe Independent* stated that ‘donors are withholding funds for the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park until Zimbabwe restores the rule of law [although] huge amounts of money have started pouring into South Africa and Mozambique for the development of infrastructure agreed when the trans-frontier park agreement was signed’ (*Zimbabwe Independent* 2005).

Despite this climate of uncertainty, however, and against all odds, the demining of the Sengwe Communal Land is about to be completed, although humanitarian procedures have been limited to mine risk education, and the older military tradition of secretive missions has prevailed.
Solutions to landmine contamination and the enforcement of the idea of a Transfrontier Peace Park should rely more on socially sustainable methods. For instance, because Mozambique is receiving funding from international donors, including the World Bank with a dedicated five-year project, and has professional national demining teams in other parts of Africa and Europe, a joint team of Zimbabweans and Mozambicans should have conducted the demining. This would have shown real cooperation and integration between the two countries, while maintaining a high standard of professionalism. Completion might have taken longer, but would have been more likely to ensure future cooperation between the park and its communities.

By silently demining areas that were originally contaminated to prevent Mozambican access to Zimbabwe and to support liberation movements against the apartheid regime, the management of the parks has not conveyed the message of unity and cooperation that should characterise the Great Limpopo Peace Park as the nucleus of a broader east-west conservation area that will develop from Namibia to Mozambique and Tanzania. Rather it has proven that the legacies of the past die hard and will haunt all positive projects for many years to come.

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Poverty, pipeline vandalisation/ explosion and human security: Integrating disaster management into poverty reduction in Nigeria

Freedom Onuoha*

This paper interrogates the common official refrain to attribute vandalisation-induced pipeline explosion to poverty in the country. It argues that although poverty has explanatory relevance in terms of the ubiquity of oil pipeline explosion, such attribution conceals more than it reveals: it clearly shows that the poor are the direct and hardest hit in oil pipeline explosion in Nigeria, but conceals the fact that rich vandalisation barons are behind these threats to human security; it conceals the contradiction between the material circumstances of the victims and the sophisticated technology deployed in such nefarious acts. While it reveals the disempowerment of the poor to negotiate their survival outside the lure of fuel scooping, it conceals the power of the barons to easily negotiate their freedom from conviction. Also, it conceals the seeming contradiction of perceptions of security between the government officials and the poor citizens. The paper therefore argues that it is this prevalent situation that not only accounts for the frequency of pipeline vandalisation, but provides reasons that government fails to pay compensation to victims of explosion or to evolve proactive disaster response strategies. Thus, it advocates the integration of a disaster management framework into government’s overall effort of poverty reduction in the country.

* Freedom Onuoha is a research fellow with the African Centre for Strategic Research and studies (ACSRS) of the National War College – Nigeria.
Introduction

In recent times Nigeria has witnessed all manner of disasters, including plane crashes, bomb explosions, flooding from collapsed dams, fire outbreaks, oil pipeline explosions, road accidents and the collapse of buildings. What is often in doubt is the nature of government’s response to these sources of human insecurity. The country recently has witnessed cascading incidences of oil pipeline explosion which are a major threat to human security.

In Nigeria, whenever there has been a pipeline explosion, the official refrain has been that those who lost their lives are greedy people who resort to vandalisation to make quick money. Thus, one obvious judgement that follows is that poverty and greed are at the root of the frequent attacks on these pipelines. Undoubtedly, this judgement (as we hope to establish in this article) is not entirely wrong, but left at that, it not only conceals more than it reveals, but tends to rationalise or reinforce the official disposition not to pay compensation to victims of oil pipeline disaster, or to evolve proactive disaster prevention and response strategies to contain these incidences as part of measures of reducing poverty in the country and enhancing human security.

This paper seeks to put poverty in its proper context vis-à-vis pipeline vandalisation/explosion and human security. It explores this by identifying the causes, trends and dimensions of pipeline vandalisation as well as its impact on human security.

Conceptual clarification

Three key terms form the pillars of this work: poverty, pipeline vandalisation and human security.

There are as many definitions of poverty as there are people, scholars, analysts and institutions trying to grapple with it.

In the context of this paper, poverty refers to a situation of deprivation in which an individual or group of individuals in a society lack the requisite resources, opportunities or means of livelihood to lead a long, healthy and satisfactory life by being unable to provide for their basic life requirements such as water, food, shelter, clothing, sanitation and a minimum level of medication.

Usually at national level, and for policy direction and administrative convenience to single out those to be assisted or regarded as poor, the incidence of poverty in a country is measured in terms of the percentage of the people living below the poverty line. The poverty line refers to the income level below which a minimum nutritionally adequate
diet, plus essential non-food requirements are not affordable. It is measured in terms of the proportion of the population living on less than one US dollar a day. It is a benchmark that is usually used by the United Nations Development Programme, World Bank, and governments to measure the prevalence of poverty. It is estimated that over 70 per cent of Nigeria’s population live below the poverty line. Thus, when we refer to poverty as a factor in the incidence of oil pipeline vandalism and its associated fire disaster, it is used in this sense.

Pipeline vandalism, as it is used in this context, refers to illegal or unauthorised activities that involve the destruction of oil pipelines to disrupt supply or the puncturing of oil pipelines to siphon crude oil or its refined products in order to appropriate it for personal use or for sale in the black market or any other outlet. It includes such acts as oil bunkering, breaking oil pipelines to siphon fuel, scooping fuel from burst oil pipes and the deliberate act of oil terrorism.¹

In Nigeria, pipeline vandalism is usually regarded as an act of sabotage. It is a capital offence under the Petroleum Act and is covered by the Criminal Justice Decree of 1975 (miscellaneous provisions) (Phil-Eze 2004:278). In recent times, the incidence of pipeline vandalism and the associated fire disaster has caused serious destruction of the ecosystem of host communities, oil spillage and environmental pollution, destruction of farmlands and properties, and the loss of lives.

Security has been defined from state-centric, militaristic and strategic calculations. It has been seen as the sum total of the vital national interest of the state. A vital national interest is one for which a nation is willing to resort to force or war. Concepts of national security will vary from state to state in direct proportion to their individual willingness to risk conflict or war at any given time (Hartmann 1983:13). In this sense, the emphasis was on the protection of the state and the regime in power. This conceptualisation of security was greatly informed by the political and security milieu of the Cold War era. However, with the Cold War receding and the emergence of new threats to the survival of individuals as well as states, scholars not only began to re-conceptualise security but to emphasise such concepts as cooperative security, societal security, comprehensive security, collective security, and human security.

While the term ‘human security’ may be of recent analytical relevance and usage, it is not the case that human security suddenly developed out of nowhere and that the need for it did not exist in the past. Rather, the ontological and epistemological assumptions that have served to underpin orthodox security and policy formation did not recognise, include or value it (Thomas 1999:5).

Thus, the conceptualisation of security from the human security prism represents a paradigmatic shift from orthodox security thinking which privileges protection of state
power to that which absorbs human beings and their complex social and economic relations as the primary referents. It is premised on the fact that the security of all persons ought to be a moral goal of all governments and their citizens, not a narrowly conceived or poorly justified national security that protects state power or personal interests of privileged elite (Nelles 2003:1).


Two main aspects of human security are identified in the report: safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression, and protection from sudden disruptions in the pattern of daily life, whether in homes, jobs, or communities. Threats to human security were therefore subsumed under seven key dimensions of security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political.

In this sense, Thomas (1999:3) conceives human security as a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be realised. Human security from this perspective has both qualitative and quantitative aspects. On one level it is about the fulfilment of basic material needs, and on another it is about the achievement of human dignity, which incorporates personal autonomy, control over one’s life, and unhindered participation in the life of the community.

For Hubert (2001:62), human security does not supplant national security. A human security perspective, according to him, asserts that the security of the state is not an end in itself. Rather, it is a means of ensuring security of people. Thus, state security and human security are mutually reinforcing and supportive.

Therefore, human security as conceived here entails freedom from actual and potential threats to human life, safety and survival which may arise as a result of human actions or inactions, or from natural disaster such as flood, earthquake, famine, drought, disease and other non-man-made calamitous events resulting in death, human suffering and material damage. In this sense, human security is one focal element of national security. Nevertheless, the emphasis on human security primarily derives from three basic convictions, namely the sanctity and inviolability of human life; the universality and dignity of human rights; and the existential imperatives of and value for individual safety in a world laden with multifarious threats. Hence, any threat which thwarts or curtails an individual’s entitlement to these three core values borders on human security and, by extension, national security.

In this sense, the responsibility to provide for and protect these rights is usually the challenge of the government. The grand norm of Nigeria is not blind to this. Section 14
(2) C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria categorically emphasises this point when it provides that the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999:10).

Thus, the irreducible minimum of human security entails prevention and minimisation of threats to human rights, safety and lives. One basic advantage of the human security approach is that it conceives of security in terms of the real-life, everyday experience of human beings, vis-à-vis the importance for understanding the sources of such threats to human life and for proffering strategies for addressing these threats. Like other dimensions of security – national security, economic security and food security – human security entails recognising the importance of the people’s security needs, side by side with those of states, minimising risks, adopting preventive measures to reduce human vulnerabilities and taking remedial action when preventive measures fail (Nsirimovu 2005:184).

**Oil pipeline network and vandalisation: An overview**

Nigeria, with a land mass of 923,768 square kilometres (356,669 square miles), is undoubtedly a large country with a burgeoning economy that is heavily dependent on petroleum. The petroleum industry was born about fifty years ago when oil was first discovered in commercial quantity in Oloibiri in 1956, in present-day Bayelsa State. To enhance the distribution of crude oil products from the oil-rich region of the Niger Delta to other parts of the country, a grid of oil pipelines was constructed to interlink some states at strategic locations.

Nigeria has a total network of 5,001 kilometres of oil pipelines, consisting of 4,315 kilometres of multi-product pipelines and 666 kilometres of crude oil pipelines. These pipelines criss-cross the country, forming a mesh that interlinks the 22 petroleum storage depots, the four refineries at Port Harcourt (I and II), Kaduna and Warri, the offshore terminals at Bonny and Escravos, and the jetties at Atlas Cove, Calabar, Okirika and Warri.

The Pipeline and Product Marketing Company (PPMC), a subsidiary of Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), uses this system of oil pipelines to transport crude oil to the refineries in Port Harcourt (I and II), Warri and Kaduna – a total distance of 719 kilometres. The multi-product pipelines are used to move products from the refineries/import-receiving jetties to the 22 petroleum storage depots all over the country. The storage infrastructure, which consists of 22 loading depots linked by pipelines of various diameters ranging from 6 to 18 inches, has combined installed capacities of 1,266,890 (PMS), 676,400 (DPK), 1,007,900 (AGO),
and 74 000 (ATK) m³ tonnes (Special Committee on the Review of Petroleum Product Supply and Distribution 2000:10). The entire distribution network is made up of a number of systems (page 33):

1 System 2A  Warri–Benin–Ore–Mosimi

2 System 2AX  Auchi–Benin

3 System 2B  (a) Atlas Cove–Mosimi–Ibadan–Ilorin
(b) Mosimi–Satellite (Ejigbo in Lagos)
c) Mosimi–Ikeja

4 System 2C  Escravos–Warri–Kaduna (crude lines)

5 System 2D  (a) Kaduna–Zaria–Kano–Zaria–Gusau
(b) Kaduna–Jos–Gombe–Maidugiri

6 System 2E  PH–Aba–Enugu–Makurdi

7 System 2EX  PH–Aba–Enugu–Makurdi–Yola

8 System 2CX  (a) Enugu–Auchi (interconnection)
(b) Auchi–Suleja–Kaduna
(c) Suleja–Minna

9 System 2DX  Jos–Gombe

To ensure the safety of these pipelines before they were laid, the government acquired 3.5 metres wide right of way (ROW) on each side of the pipelines and the pipes were buried a metre deep to avoid accidental contacts, since they transverse the length and breadth of the country. Although most of these pipelines are buried underground, recent experience has shown that their integrity and safety have been compromised because vandals now incessantly tap into this huge artery of the lifeblood of Nigeria’s economic wealth. For instance, in 1995 there were seven reported cases of vandalisation. In 1996 it was 33. It later rose to 34 and 57 in 1997 and 1998 respectively (Special Committee on the Review of Petroleum Product Supply and Distribution 2000:34). However, since 1999, statistics on oil pipeline vandalisation are staggering, since 497 cases were reported in 1999.

Furthermore, recent statistics released by the group managing director of NNPC reveals that the frequency of such attacks on the pipelines has assumed an astronomical dimension. Statistical evidence shows that Port Harcourt, which recorded about 600 line
breaks in 2003, had about 1,650 line breaks from January to September 2006, while Warri area moved from only 100 line breaks to 600 during the same period. Also, Mosimi area, which recorded only 50 line breaks in 2003, reported about 375 between January and September 2006. In the north, where such occurrences used to be rare, Kaduna and Gombe areas have registered frequent line breaks (Amanze-Nwachukwu & Ogbu 2007:14). Such frequent attacks on the pipelines have accounted for recurrent pipeline fire disasters in recent years that have put the lives of many people in serious jeopardy, including the lives of those living around the routes of these pipelines.

**Poverty and pipeline vandalisation/explosion: A critique**

In a country where 85 per cent of oil revenues accrue to 1 per cent of a population of 140 million people; where perhaps US$100 billion of US$400 billion in oil revenues since 1970 have been misappropriated; where between 1965 and 2004 the per capita income fell from US$250 to US$212 and income distribution deteriorated markedly over the same period; and where between 1970 and 2000, the number of people subsisting on less than one dollar per day grew from 36 per cent to more than 70 per cent: from 19 million to a staggering 90 million, widespread poverty, discontent or failed expectations must have explanatory relevance in the upsurge of pipeline vandalisation. But to characterise it loosely would be highly unrewarding. Hence, the critical question becomes thus: how is poverty implicated in pipeline vandalisation or how do we understand or characterise the place of poverty in the incidence of pipeline vandalisation, which usually results in fire outbreaks?

The common and usual official refrain each time there is an incidence of pipeline vandalisation or rupture is that poverty is at the root of it. Thus, the poor – the constituency that lacks a voice in shaping national security concerns – are implicated. While we may not reject this point entirely, we contend that it is rewarding to probe deeper into the reality of oil pipeline vandalisation in order to capture the place of poverty in these incidences and to understand why, despite the colossal loss of lives and property, government has yet to deliver a proactive disaster response and management framework and to integrate this into the broader poverty reduction strategy.

Here, we contend that to attribute pipeline vandalisation and the associated fire disaster to poverty conceals more than it reveals. It clearly reveals that the poor are the direct and hardest hit in oil pipeline fire disaster, but conceals the fact that the rich vandalisation barons have been behind this source of colossal mortality in recent times. For instance, in the early 1990s up to the terminal point of military rule, vandals, mainly unemployed youths operating in remote areas and communities where oil pipelines pass, punctured the pipes or took advantage of ruptured or leaking pipes to siphon fuel or other petroleum
products into drums, plastic containers or storage cans for sale in the black market. The
technology involved was quite rudimentary, involving the use of funnels, drilling tools
and plastic hose to siphon the products.

In the case of leaking pipes, poor villagers or residents of such communities gathered
at the spot and use clothes or foam to soak the products from dug-out earth holes and
squeeze the content into plastic buckets and containers, which they usually sold to
unsuspecting motorists. Given this situation, the era recorded quite insignificant cases of
pipeline vandalisation. For instance, between 1993 and 1998, there were only 146 cases.

With the return to democracy, the trend assumed a venomous dimension, thus revealing
the true picture of its undercurrents. Since 1999, statistics on oil pipeline vandalisation
have become staggering, with 497 of such cases being reported in 1999. In 2000 the
greatest ever number of cases was recorded, about 909. In 2001, it was 461 cases, while 507
cases were reported in 2002, and 300 cases in the first six months of 2003.\textsuperscript{2} The incessant
vandalisation of pipelines demonstrates that not only are some rich barons behind this
criminality, but they also have the capacity to deploy modern technologies and recruit
the services of security agents in the process. As the report of the Special Committee on
the Review of Petroleum Product Supply and Distribution aptly contends, vandalisation
has become very lucrative, attracting rich and powerful individuals who have become
vandalisation barons (Special Committee on the Review of Petroleum Product Supply

Attributing incessant vandalisation to poverty conceals the contradiction between the
material circumstances of the victims and the sophisticated technology deployed in the
nefarious acts. What is often lost in such thinking is that the poor do not have access to
the kind of technology used in the process. For instance, a nurse who commented on
the class of victims of the Jesse fire disaster contended that:

\textit{Many of the dead were women and children. Some were still clutching
bottles, plastic cups, funnels and cans they were using to collect fuel from
the pipeline, which had been leaking for three days. The burnt body of one
woman was found with her dead baby still strapped to her back. Many of
the other victims were farmers and villagers sleeping in their homes when
the explosion occurred.}\textsuperscript{3}

Paradoxically, it has been determined that the vandals at the Egborode, Oviri Court,
broke the pipeline through hot tapping, a process restricted to experts in the oil industry.\textsuperscript{4}
As Bassey has cogently argued, what is happening is a methodical stealing of fuel from
the pipelines. It is systematically done by people who have the technical know-how, who
have the equipment and who know where the valves and manifolds are (Bassey, quoted
in Enogholase 2007:5). In the view of Adeniyi (2007:72):
The question we should even ask is whether there is no collusion between the vandals, the police and some NNPC staff. Because the ease with which these vandals identify the pipelines buried in remote areas, sometimes six feet below the ground, shows some expert knowledge. The confidences with which they have been operating also reveal that they definitely have powerful godfathers.

Furthermore, another dimension of poverty and pipeline vandalisation is the contradictory perception of security between the top government officials and the majority of the poor population. Poverty is a common thread that interlocks over 70 per cent of the population. For the poverty-ridden majority, security is defined in terms of the bare imperative of survival. In this sense, the only word their psyche can understand is survival, and this can assume any form in so far as their needs are met. This desperation on the part of the majority of poor was captured by a newspaper editorial:

If we don’t scoop fuel from here, hunger will kill us. If we die from explosion here, it is still death out of want. We might as well stay here, scoop and hope to survive (Thisday 2007:15).

This explains why, under such conditions, a leak attracts hundreds of Nigerians – men and women, young and old – seeking free fuel, regardless of the inherent dangers. However, for the rich and top government officials, security entails free flow of oil revenue into the government purse – the pool from which they derive fabulous and mostly unaccountable wealth. In this context, pipeline vandalisation is a threat to security to the extent that it reduces the size of the pie and is not too relevant to the safety and wellbeing of the people, for whom government exists in the first instance.

Finally, it reveals the seeming weakness and disempowerment of the poor to negotiate their survival outside the lure of fuel scooping and conceals the pervasive influence of the barons to negotiate their freedom from the full weight of the law.

For instance, one recent development in the country portrays this irony. On 2 October 2006, the vandals arrested by the police in Awawa, in Kwali Division of Abuja, alleged that:

Big time vandals in the area use fuels tankers to siphon crude oil from the broken pipes and have not been arrested. We were not the ones that broke these pipes. We only went with jerry cans to fetch the fuel gushing out of the pipe to avoid wastage and they arrested us (Abubakar 2006:32).

This was corroborated by a trader, Bala Ahmed (cited in Abubakar 2006:32):

The private vehicle of a council chairman was recently used for transporting siphoned fuel. Some vandals also named a council chairman as their sponsor.
He gave them money, arms and tools to go and vandalise pipelines. The chairman was not arrested, even for a minute. When you go to the NNPC pump station at Awawa, you will see some vehicles parked there. They were seized from a vandal. The man is still around and has not been arrested.

Vandalisation is a crime; however, the weight of the law in achieving deterrence and punishing offenders is modulated by one’s economic class (poverty). Through the poverty lens, we can better appreciate the disempowerment of the weak and the power of the rich. Because pipeline vandalism is a ‘bailable’ offence, the power of the rich to negotiate their freedom is easily deployed. As Osiyemi (cited in Adeniyi 2007:72) has stated, the moment these people are arrested, the police, apparently acting in concert, ensure that the matter is taken to court immediately and the next day they are back in business. This situation explains why vandalism continues to thrive, even with the law prohibiting it.

**Pipeline networks, vandalism and human security**

Having contextualised how poverty is implicated in most incidences of pipeline vandalism, it is pertinent to briefly examine how pipeline vandalism and its associated fire disaster impinge on human security. Pipeline vandalism threatens human security in different ways, namely threats to human rights, safety, and life; destruction of means of livelihood; inducement of internal displacement and the dislocation of family structure.

Undoubtedly, pipeline vandalism and attempts by local residents to scoop fuel from vandalised or leaking pipelines constitutes one of the major causes of mortality in recent times. Adeniyi (2007:15) has asserted that for any scourge other than war to consume more than 2,297 nationals in seven separate incidents is simply disastrous. It is tragic that eight years after the first major pipeline inferno claimed over 1,000 lives and nearly wiped out two communities, the issue scarcely registers on the national agenda. It is believed that no fewer than 5,000, including innocent persons, might have been killed in pipeline explosions since 1998 (Amanze-Nwachukwu 2007:23).

Although statistics in table 1 lay no claim to being comprehensive, they are indicative of this recurrent threat to human lives.

Apart from the destruction of lives and infliction of physical and permanent injuries, the incidence of pipeline vandalism, with its associated fire disaster, has become a disturbing source of destruction of the means of livelihood and properties. Crude oil and refined petroleum products from leaking pipelines are known to destroy aquatic
Table 1  Some cases of oil pipeline vandalisation and associated fire disaster in Nigeria, 1998–2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/NO</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Death toll</th>
<th>Observed consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>17 October 1998</td>
<td>Jesse Delta</td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>At least 1 000</td>
<td>Damage to farmlands, environmental pollution, dozens of people injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>22 April 1999</td>
<td>Bayana, Ijaw Community Delta</td>
<td>At least 10</td>
<td>Damage to farmlands, pollution (air and water)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8 June 1999</td>
<td>Akute Odo Ogun</td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>At least 15</td>
<td>Damage to farmland (land and air pollution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>13 October 1999</td>
<td>Ekakpanre, Ughelli Delta</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Damage to farmland, destruction of flora and fauna, environmental pollution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>14 January 2000</td>
<td>Gana Community Delta</td>
<td>At least 12</td>
<td>Damage to farmlands and the environment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>7 February 2000</td>
<td>Ogwe Community Abia</td>
<td>At least 15</td>
<td>Damage to farmlands and the environment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>20 February 2000</td>
<td>Lagos Lagos</td>
<td>Abia</td>
<td>At least 3</td>
<td>Damage to farmlands, destruction of a canoe, environmental pollution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>14 March 2000</td>
<td>Umughede Community Abia</td>
<td>At least 50</td>
<td>Environmental pollution, damage to farmlands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>22 April 2000</td>
<td>Uzo-Uwani Enugu</td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>At least 6</td>
<td>Damage to farmlands, environmental pollution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>3 June 2000</td>
<td>Adeje Delta</td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Damage to forest, destruction of a high-tension power cable of two electricity plants, youths/police clash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>20 June 2000</td>
<td>Okuedjeba Delta</td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Damage to farmlands, environmental pollution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>10 July 2000</td>
<td>Adeje/Egborode, Okpe Delta</td>
<td>At least 150</td>
<td>Damage to farmlands, environmental pollution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>10 July 2000</td>
<td>Oviri Court Delta</td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>At least 300</td>
<td>Damage to farmlands, environmental pollution, dozens of people injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>5 November 2001</td>
<td>Umuudike Imo</td>
<td>At least 3</td>
<td>Several burnt bicycles, more than 17 people injured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>19 June 2003</td>
<td>Onitcha Amiyo – Uhu Abia</td>
<td>At least 125</td>
<td>Dozens of people injured, damage to farmland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>6 January 2004</td>
<td>Elikpokwodu Rivers</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>About 200 hectares of farmland and properties worth millions of Naira destroyed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>30 July 2004</td>
<td>Aghani Enugu</td>
<td>At least 7</td>
<td>Several people injured, environmental pollution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>16 September 2004</td>
<td>Ijegun Lagos</td>
<td>At least 60</td>
<td>Air and water pollution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>December 2004</td>
<td>Imore Village Lagos</td>
<td>At least 500</td>
<td>Environmental pollution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>30 May 2005</td>
<td>Akinfe Oyo</td>
<td>Oyo</td>
<td>At least 1</td>
<td>34 persons were injured, 15 died after eleven days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>13 January 2006</td>
<td>Iyeke Edo</td>
<td>At least 7</td>
<td>Six persons injured, damage to farmland, environmental pollution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>12 May 2006</td>
<td>Ilado Village Lagos</td>
<td>At least 150</td>
<td>Pollution of water, incineration of everything within a 20 metre radius, dozens of people injured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>2 December 2006</td>
<td>Ijecododo Lagos</td>
<td>At least 1</td>
<td>Environmental pollution, damage to farmland.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>26 December 2006</td>
<td>Abule Egba Lagos</td>
<td>At least 500</td>
<td>Incineration of 40 vehicles, a dozen homes including a mosque and two churches, and innumerable business ventures comprising auto mechanic workshops, a saw mill and network of timber shops</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the researcher from various newspaper reports.
life, crops and farmlands and pollute water formations and streams. Both at individual and community level, pipeline vandalisation seriously disorganises economic and social activities. As a result of inferno, residents lose not only their source of income, but also their dietary balance and sources of drinking water. Important economic crops such as palm trees, rubber, cocoa, plantain, and coffee are usually destroyed during fire disaster caused by vandalised pipelines. Also, contaminated marine animals such as fish, periwinkles, crayfish and polluted water can cause serious health problems for human beings when consumed. Thus, by destroying the ecological balance that sustains life, pipeline vandalisation threatens the life-support system that sustains human security and exacerbates the level of poverty of the poor.

More so, vandalisation-induced destruction of properties adds another dimension to human insecurity. For instance, the fire incident on 26 December 2006, in Ebule Egba community in Lagos State, consumed about 40 vehicles, a dozen homes, including a mosque and two churches, as well as innumerable business ventures. The explosion affected the power supply in the area (Nnabuife et al 2006:1). In the case of Oviri Court, the communities lost over US$500 million worth of property in addition to environmental pollution and the death of more than 300 people. These fire outbreaks usually lead to economic dislocation of the local residents and further compound economic hardship, making them more vulnerable in the society.

Furthermore, pipeline disasters have negatively affected the security and wellbeing of many individuals and families. Through bereavement and internal displacement, pipeline explosions lead to deep fracturing of family structures. Consequent to the death of many parents in these disasters, children were left without parents and husbands without wives, or vice versa. Even among survivors of the pipeline inferno, many victims suffered several degrees of burns and damage to internal organs as the result of the inhalation of fumes and poisonous gas, thus making them liabilities to their family. Indeed, for every death or injury caused by pipeline explosion, there are many who must cope with the psychological, physical and economic aftermath. In this context, the poor are hardest hit.

**Government response to pipeline explosions**

Since the first major pipeline fire disaster in October 1998, pipeline explosions have become a disturbing source of physical and permanent injuries, internal displacement, environmental degradation, destruction of means of livelihoods, and loss of lives. However, it is somehow curious that the government has failed to adopt an effective disaster prevention and management strategy to contain and mitigate the impacts of these disasters on the citizen. The reason may not be far-fetched. It derives essentially from the warped understanding of how poverty is implicated in pipeline vandalisation and the
associated inferno. It is this prevalent situation that not only accounts for the ubiquity of pipeline vandalism but explains why government has failed to pay compensation or evolve proactive disaster prevention and response strategies to contain these incidences which seriously threaten human security.

Consequently, official response to situations of pipeline explosion has largely included accusations of greed on the part of the poor, belated responses to reports of leaking or vandalised pipes, arrests of helpless villagers who may not be the vandals, but who were scooping oil from the burst pipes, non-payment of compensation to victims and the virtual absence of an effective disaster prevention and management framework. One major impact of this weak response is the exacerbation of poverty among the poor and the vulnerable that have been injured, bereaved, forcefully uprooted, or deprived of their means of livelihood.

Hence, with oil pipeline disasters occurring more or less frequently, there is the need for government to begin to design and implement measures that will not only protect human lives and properties, but also cushion the harsh effects of oil pipeline explosions. This paper therefore advocates for the adoption of an integrated disaster management framework that entails a synergic collaboration involving the National Emergency Management Authority (NEMA), the private sector, the media, civil society and community-based organisations,
and governments (state and local) as part of the government’s poverty reduction strategy. Such disaster management will emphasise prevention-oriented and proactive strategies, and the common thread that will run through the system will be consistent exchange of information, ideas and lessons among the stakeholders.

As can be seen in the figure above, such a proactive and integrated disaster management framework will ensure effective participation and utilisation of the capabilities and unique advantages of the identified actors to achieve a robust system aimed at responding to key early warning signs, ensuring effective risk-reduction measures and developing appropriate disaster mitigation and response strategies. Based on this framework, while the community-based organisations (CBOs) and local governments will provide the public awareness and education services; the media will anchor the communication and information management aspects; the state government will provide hospital and accommodation services as well as compensation to victims; the civil society will undertake the first-aid, evacuation and distributive services; the private sector will assist with the material and relief support; and NEMA will provide the organisational, operational and logistic platform.

In this sense, more sustainable and proactive disaster management approaches will be developed which will enhance not only effective utilisation of the unique capabilities of the various stakeholders and ensure that they do not work at cross purposes, but also human security by reducing the vulnerability of citizens to oil pipeline explosions. This will reduce the rate at which ordinary citizens of the country slide into the expansive well of poverty and provide safety nets to the majority of the people who suffer the effects of oil pipeline explosion, whether engendered by natural rupture as a result of wear and tear or by the activities of vandals.

**Conclusion**

While not rejecting the assumption that poverty has a role to play in terms of the incidence of pipeline vandalisation in Nigeria, this paper has placed the issue of poverty in the proper context vis-à-vis pipeline vandalisation and human security by demonstrating how the usual official refrain to attribute vandalisation-induced fire disaster to poverty conceals more than it reveals. Having laid bare these misconceptions, it advocated the adoption of an integrated disaster management framework as part of government’s efforts to reduce poverty in the country and enhance the security of its citizens.

**Notes**

References


Africa’s maritime dimension: Unlocking and securing the potential of its seas – interventions and opportunities
Captain (SAN) Frank C van Rooyen

The AU Standby Force and the challenge of Somalia
Deane-Peter Baker

2007: The return to the traditional security paradigm?
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Almost half of the world’s population is poor,¹ with one sixth living in extreme poverty² – devastated by HIV/Aids, famine, intra-state wars, with the poorest nations attended by the four horsemen of the apocalypse, ensnared in a wasteland of despair and death. Geographically, the majority of those described as being in ‘the perfect storm of human deprivation, one that brings together climatic disaster, impoverishment, the Aids pandemic and the long-standing burdens of other diseases’³ are found in Asia, but the continent with the greatest ratio of its population is Africa, with almost half existing in extreme poverty.

Africa is the only region where this figure has increased – in fact almost doubled – since 1981 (Optima 2005). It would be charitable to say that the situation can only improve.

* Captain (SAN) Frank C van Rooyen, PB, MMM, serves in the post of senior staff officer maritime strategy in the South African Navy at its headquarters in Pretoria.
But it is clear that Africa (with sub-Saharan Africa being described as the ‘epicentre of the crisis’⁴) is in dire need of development, where development would be a function of sustainable economic growth coupled with qualitative governance.⁵ Nelson Mandela said à propos these countries that they are ‘trapped in the prison of poverty. It is time to set them free.’⁶

This ties in with the concept of *Mare liberum*, Hugo Grotius’s work of the free seas,⁷ as well as the aim of this paper; which proposes the elevation of the vast underutilised, neglected or suboptimally managed maritime resources of Africa’s seas to sustainable and economically viable areas of endeavour.

To achieve its aim, the paper focuses on three apparently dissimilar, yet linked interventions, one being of a developmental nature and the other two in the realm of geopolitics, all three finding applicability in the maritime domain. The first and third interventions are maritime assets-in-being, accrued to African nations, which can become the resources that will build upon the founding developmental layer. The second intervention has the ultimate function of laying the required minimum developmental foundation for distressed nations, correctly utilising a given (that is, maritime) resource.⁸ Managed transparently and effectively, these may produce a wrought opportunity that can change the face of development permanently and positively, provided that the challenges that may lie in securing and unlocking the harvest of Africa's oceanic estates are overcome. The interventions may be likened to three streams joining the ever-growing river of enhanced development.

**The first intervention**

The first intervention, almost literally, flowed from the UN conventions produced over a number of years by many mainly maritime-interest-based nations. Since the oceans and seas cover much of the earth's surface, historically the sea has had two important functions. First, it is a medium of communication, providing linkages and interconnections between cultures and enterprises. Second, it is a ‘vast reservoir of resources’ (Shaw 1998:390) with abundant reserves of mineral and living resources which offer a multitude of benefits to (not only) littoral and island states. As development would be a ‘function of sustainable economic growth’ (see above), the seas may well provide the resources which can propel indigent Africans to levels of sustained growth and enhanced development. As the world’s population increases and with the predicted growth plateau⁹ some years away, the struggle for resources will intensify both intra and interstate. This will put even greater pressure on governments, exacerbated because the majority of the world's population live within 150 kilometres of the coast, in what has been called ‘coastalopolis’ (Blakely 2006). This risk management will include the vexed problems of waste and pollution.
There are inherent conflicts in the potential offered by the sea’s reservoirs and associated maritime activities: presenting challenges to maintaining balances between effectively and efficiently utilising its resources, while simultaneously ensuring sustainment for future prosperity and development. The requirement, therefore, to govern the economic exploitation of the sea was recognised long ago, culminating in the UN assuming responsibility for drawing up the international legal supporting structures. The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982 was accepted into international law in 1994 (Shaw 1998:392). Thirty-seven of the 53 African states are either littoral or island nations, implying that much can be made of the maritime resources at their disposal. It is of cardinal interest that each government is charged with the responsibility for the application and enforcement of defined coastal zones; for managing these to international standards. Landlocked (not only African) states also enjoy free access to the sea. Although landlocked states would not have an absolute right to transit, such arrangements would be a function of negotiation between landlocked and transit or coastal states. UNCLOS sanctions the extension of offshore limits to various distances. Coastal states, where appropriate, can claim four distinct zones: first, the territorial sea (which extends 12 nautical miles out from the low water mark); second, the contiguous zone (out to 24 miles); third, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (out to 200 nautical miles or about 320 kilometres); and last, the continental shelf zone (which can extend out to 350 nautical miles, depending on water depth, seabed geology and other factors). The jurisdiction, legal rights and obligations of coastal states differ in each of the zones in certain specified aspects.

This paper will concentrate on the EEZ and its associated management, benefits and obligations. The African states which administer and control these offshore zones have exclusive rights to exploit their living and mineral resources, or to license their exploitation to others; which may in turn be state-owned or commercial enterprises. Many coastal states have neither surveyed their maritime estate, nor established legal procedures to survey or chart their maritime areas (Nhnyete 2005) and register continental shelf claims as required by UNCLOS. This form of negligence, no doubt arising from a combination of ignorance and incapacity, is an indictment on what should constitute essential maritime resource management, with attendant benefits.

In many parts of the world, fish remains a valuable source of food (protein) and export earnings, but over-exploitation (usually in the presence of poor or no coastal state control over zones) has destroyed stock levels or sensitive ecosystems. At present, the prime offshore mineral resources are hydrocarbons (oil and gas), with in excess of 40 per cent being obtained from offshore wells. Other minerals are rare metals, diamonds, sand and gravel, and increasing prospects for copper, nickel, zinc, cobalt and manganese. As a general guideline, the following responsibilities of coastal states have the potential for resources:
Each country deals with its management of the zones (particularly the potential of the EEZ) in different ways. Typically, the responsibilities would be assigned to the navy, the air force, the police, the coast guard, customs, fisheries control, minerals and energy affairs, and other, as the exigencies of each coastal or island state demand. Often, these responsibilities are reflected in a matrix of maritime management. These functions involve various and wide-ranging skills, equipment and assets; and coordination is important, or else duplication will exist, or, worse, omissions of maritime management tasks will occur.

It may be seen then that the maritime endowments to coastal states offer potential for sustained economic benefits. It is common cause, however, that the coastal and island states of Africa have not begun to take control of their maritime heritages. The medium term offers the opportunity to manage these resources optimally.

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<th>Task</th>
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The second intervention

The second intervention is being facilitated by the UN. In response to the ‘dire need’ (above) of Africa and others, developed nations in particular are increasingly giving attention to Africa and other regions that are subjected to poverty and associated underdevelopment; while all nations have been ‘galvanised’ by the undertaking of all 191 UN member states to meet the millennium development goals.\(^{12}\) This second intervention, which for the convenience of this paper could be called an altruistic intervention, is meant to include the sense of the poorer nations setting about self-help schemes to at least attempt to make steadfast progress towards attaining the goals. The UN reports that the world has made meaningful progress towards achieving these admirable objectives by 2015. Between 1990 and 2002 average overall incomes increased by approximately 21 per cent. The number of people in extreme poverty declined by an estimated 130 million. Child mortality rates fell from 103 deaths per 1 000 live births a year to 88. Life expectancy rose from 63 years to nearly 65 years. An additional 8 per cent of the developing world’s people received access to water. And an additional 15 per cent acquired access to improved sanitation services.\(^{13}\)

But progress has been far from uniform across the world or across the goals. There are huge disparities across and within countries. Within countries, poverty is greatest in rural areas, though urban poverty is extensive, growing, and underreported by traditional indicators.\(^{14}\)

Sub-Saharan Africa is the epicentre of crisis, with continuing food insecurity, a rise of extreme poverty, stunningly high child and maternal mortality, large numbers of people living in slums, and a widespread shortfall for most of the MDGs. Asia is the region with the fastest progress, but even there, hundreds of millions of people remain in extreme poverty, and even fast-growing countries fail to achieve some of the non-income goals. Other regions have mixed records, notably Latin America, the transition economies, and the Middle East and North Africa, often with slow or no progress on some of the goals and persistent inequalities undermining progress on others.\(^{15}\)

But, be that as it may, at the very least the key points are that the goals have been identified and prioritised, their issues highlighted. Pledges have been made, commitments have commenced, numerous plans in dozens of countries are being executed, and in many ways actions are inexorably under way. In Africa too, a decade from now, surely the foundation for meeting the Millennium Development Goals will have progressed. This first intervention, this act of benevolence from within countries and from richer to other poorer countries, should predispose affected countries towards even greater development, as ways and means unfold in further interventions. However, this can only be the case if ‘we break with business as usual’ (Annan 2005).

This aspect needs to be linked to the first intervention, in that countries which appear to lack project resources to initiate the actions required to operationalise the benefits to
be accrued from its maritime real estate may approach developed nations (who may have funds set aside for this) to assist. This may well lead to what politicians call a ‘win-win’ situation, where developed nations are seen to assist indigent nations.

**The third intervention**

In order to focus on the third intervention it is necessary to briefly analyse the two main attributes of the world’s seas (noted above), which apply *mutatis mutandis* to all littoral states.

As a means of communication, in military maritime terms referred to as ‘sea lines of communication’ (SLOC), it provides the medium to link economies, to transport inter alia the hydrocarbons (specifically the current and potential gas and oil) which may be gainfully exploited within African countries’ EEZs. This has great significance for African countries, which are required by international maritime law to manage their EEZs. The reason is that the oil trade is seaborne. Not only do current trade routes transit the EEZs of an impressive number of states, but the unique continental geography of Africa presents the challenges of possessing or being alongside well-known maritime chokepoints.16 Already, on the west coast of Africa (in the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) region) and off the east coast (the seas off Somalia/northern Kenya) increasing scales of piracy are prevalent, thus extending the definition of maritime chokepoints (Christie 2005).

Because the oil trade is seaborne, and in compliance with international maritime law, African nations that are responsible for managing their EEZs need to be proactive. They need to monitor, track and predict movement of maritime traffic in their regions for the International Maritime Organisation’s regulatory compliance,17 pollution control, preventing and combating terrorism, maritime crime and piracy – to name a few.

The second attribute of the sea centres on its inherent resources, which, with due appreciation to UNCLOS, now lie largely within the domain of littoral states. Focusing on fossil fuel energy, the hydrocarbons of Africa have rapidly begun to gain in importance on world economic markets. ‘Suddenly Africa is a major strategic oil supplier (Christie 2005:29).’ ‘The US wants to break Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Companies’ (OPEC’s) hold over world oil supplies and sees Africa as a viable alternative. Africa, with its resources and expansive geography, had always been considered strategically important to US global interests and, according to the latest oil-trade statistics, oil imports accounted for more than 70% of all US imports from Africa.’ 18 In total, in 2004 Africa exported 15 per cent of the world’s 2 380.7 million tons of oil. Angola became the top source of crude imports to oil-hungry China in 2006, having replaced Saudi Arabia as its main supplier. Oil-based geopolitical tensions that started in 2004 have continued
to heighten. Prevailing issues such as the current Iraq war, world economic growth, intense rivalry between the great economies of the US, Japan, Russia, China and India, and the volatility of certain producer countries (Nigeria, Venezuela) fuel the demand for energy. Other reasons for shifting the focus to African oil are the relative predictability and manageability of African issues vis-à-vis Middle Eastern or Persian Gulf issues, the need to preserve Persian Gulf oil reserves for future use, the need to be seen to be ‘doing something’ to assist Africa. Increasing oil prices, high demand and oil scarcity must aggravate the oil security challenges (Creamer Media’s Mining Weekly 2006). This has led the media to refer to a ‘new scramble for Africa’, where, in order to be assured of oil reserves and to counter corruption and chaos, the US is considering redeploying troops, especially to Nigeria (Creamer Media’s Mining Weekly 2006). By extension, the so-called Carter Doctrine would apply to Africa for oil energy is the commodity for which the West (and most likely other states) will go to war in order to preserve their national interests.

There can be no doubt that the scramble for oil in Africa will increase political-strategic tensions and have associated repercussions. Africa needs to be prepared for future oil wars and to be aware of its collective duties and obligations and related aspects of sovereignty and other international maritime law rights. The three interventions should be managed proactively, transparently and through qualitative governance. Africa must take positive charge of its assets at maritime level, so that the benefits can accrue to the government and to the people of coastal and adjoining landlocked states. By knowing the extent of their UNCLOS inheritance and concomitant responsibilities, coastal states can develop national and regional integrated oceans management policies, so as to survey, evaluate and exploit in a responsible manner the maritime resources of their zones. By effectively and efficiently using their maritime resources, coastal states can generate funding at sustainable levels, and hence enhance the economic and social development of individual states to ensure the upliftment of their peoples.

**Recommendations**

The challenge to the navies and coast guards of Africa is to ensure optimal utilisation of the sea, so as to support their respective governments in achieving and maintaining peace, security and the consequential stability, factors which are sine qua non for economic and social development. Navies must possess the professional capability to prioritise the planning and execution of the following three tasks at national and regional level:

Control their maritime offshore estates, where an effective patrol capability would be essential. They must excel at EEZ management and organisation. Here surveillance is key. Although its effectiveness would be difficult to quantify, ‘the more surveillance there is, the less the illegal activity there will be’ (Exclusive Economic Zone Catalogue 1997–1998:24–
25). Coordinating mechanisms must be established between government departments and agencies that are tasked to manage coastal states’ national maritime interests.

To optimally utilise scarce resources, navies and coast guards need to cooperate at regional level. Within four of the five envisaged regional economic communities (East, West, North and South – Central will probably contain only land-locked states) (Meeting of experts 2005) achievable cooperation can involve sharing of assets (including exchange of personnel), agreements on acquisition and procurement standards, so that interoperability can be achieved. Common training areas and facilities and joint/combined (that is, multinational) exercises to be able to deal with disasters, emergencies and de facto operations would be critical.

Navies and coast guards need to employ their inherent collateral utility value to the advancement of their populations, as a major national resource. In operations other than war, in peacetime, they need to concentrate not only on the constabulary or policing tasks, the diplomatic functions, but also on making fundamental contributions to the social development of their nations.

If the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad) is to achieve its aims, Africa must deal with insecurity and instability. In 2001, the South African president, Thabo Mbeki, said at the World Economic Forum in Davos that without ‘peace, security and stability, and democratic governance ... it would be impossible to engage in meaningful economic activity’. This applies equally at maritime level. In his address in celebration of the South African Navy’s 75th anniversary in Table Bay in April 1997, then President Mandela spoke on behalf of all maritime nations when he said that ‘the sea is a vital interest, and that is why we maintain a navy. Just as we believe that all people should be free, so as a nation we believe in the freedom of the seas ... We accept our obligation to combine with other maritime nations to uphold the freedom of the seas and to protect our national interests through naval power.’ May these words find an anchorage in African maritime nations.

Notes

1 According to the World Bank’s definitions of poverty, there are three degrees of poverty: extreme or absolute poverty, moderate poverty and relative poverty. In conditions of extreme poverty a household exists on less than US$1 per day, such households being unable to survive at basic level – suffering chronic hunger, being unable to obtain health care, having no access to safe drinking water and sanitation, being unable to afford their children’s education, and lacking in basic shelter and articles of clothing such as shoes (Optima 2005:26–27). The other side of this matrix is named ‘income poverty’, which means earning less than US$1 a day – 1.2 billion people suffer from income poverty. But there is also ‘non-income poverty’. This includes not having access to infrastructure, facilities and services, being unable to free one’s entrepreneurial spirit, and being in a condition of insecurity. See <http://www.srds.co.uk/mdg/poverty.htm>.

2 Some progress: at 1.1 billion, the figure is down from 1981’s 1.5 billion (Optima 2005).
3 A simile used by Carol Belamy, head of UNICEF; in *Optima* 2005:25.
5 Own definition.
7 Published in 1609, Grotius formulated the new principle (as part of his mature work on international justices, *De jure belli ac pacis*) that the sea was international territory and all nations were free to use it for seafaring trade. From <http://www.wikipedia.com> [accessed 2 March 2007].
8 It is not the aim of this paper to analyse or promote any theory of economic development, especially the two predominant ones (either ‘free market and trickle-down wealth’ or ‘regulated markets and pro-poor growth’). It has been jokingly said that the problem with economic theories is that economists have two hands, as in ‘but on the other hand ...’!
9 According to Sergei Scherbov (2005:232) the world population growth will stop at ten billion. See also Lutz et al 2004.
10 For a condensed history of the international legal development, see Shaw 1998:39–393.
12 The eight Millennium Development Goals – which range from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education, all by the target date of 2015 – using 1990 as a benchmark. They form a blueprint agreed to by all the world’s countries and all the world’s leading development institutions. The eight goals encompass 18 targets and 48 indicators have been identified to measure progress against each target, and have also been described as being the world’s time-bound and quantified goals for addressing poverty in its many dimensions: <http://unmillenniumproject/goals/index.htm> [accessed 28 March 2006]; <http://www.adb.org/MDGs/about.asp> [accessed 29 March 2006].
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 The use of this term implies that at such points there is the opportunity for closure, or at least restriction, of the flow of ocean-borne traffic and/or overflight which are critical to the well-being of a particular state or group of states’. Although there may be no official listing of these phenomena, the term – as a generic concept – is readily acceptable (Nincic 2002:131).
18 That was the message from US Senator Rodney Ellis, on 22 March 2006, when he addressed the Oil Africa 2006 Conference in Cape Town. ‘There is a long-term strategy from the US government to weaken Opec’s hold on the market, and one way to do that is to peel off certain countries,’ he quoted the Petroleum Finance Company MD Roger Diwan as saying. Ellis said that America planned to replace over 75 per cent of its oil imports from the Middle East by 2025 and that Africa had the opportunity to replace the Persian Gulf as America’s main foreign source of oil. The US is currently the world’s largest consumer of oil and energy, accounting for some 25 per cent of the global daily oil consumption (*Creamer Media’s Mining Weekly* 2006).
19 President Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address, 23 January 1980: ‘An attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force’ (quoted in Christie 2005:25).
20 Also recommended in Heitmann 2005.

**Bibliography**


The AU Standby Force and the challenge of Somalia

Deane-Peter Baker*

Recent events in Somalia have highlighted once again a glaring gap in the African Union’s capabilities. Yet again the continent’s main regional body has shown itself to be unable to deploy a capable peacekeeping force at short notice.

Let us recap. In December 2006, in response to what seemed like the imminent fall of the southern city of Baidoa to the forces of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), Ethiopian troops launched an offensive into Somalia in support of the country’s beleaguered interim federal government. Apparently catching the UIC off-guard, Ethiopian soldiers – backed by tanks, artillery, attack helicopters and fixed-wing ground attack aircraft – quickly drove the UIC forces out of Mogadishu and most of the territory it had previously occupied. The remnants of the UIC fled to a rugged, forested corner of southern Somalia on Kenya’s border.

* Dr Deane-Peter Baker is the director of the University of KwaZulu-Natal Strategic Studies Group.
However, despite the initial success of the Ethiopian invasion, Ethiopia’s position in the country quickly became uncomfortable. Pressure from parts of the international community, the early stirrings of a guerrilla war against Ethiopian troops by disaffected Somalis, and the potential for a regional conflict involving Eritrea have all contributed to the decision by Ethiopia to withdraw its forces from Somalia. Part of the justification is that the AU’s Peace and Security Council has authorised the deployment of the African Union Mission to Somalia (Amisom), a planned force of some 8,000 African peacekeepers. Unfortunately, only Uganda and Malawi have thus far offered to contribute troops to Amisom, and there appears little likelihood that a meaningful force will be on the ground before or even soon after the completion of the Ethiopian withdrawal. In the interim Somalia again faces the prospect of a security vacuum in which chaos reigns – an all-too-common occurrence in Somalia’s recent history.

The case of Amisom is by no means the first time this capabilities gap has become evident. While the AU has unquestionably played an increasingly important role in peacekeeping on the continent, its responses have typically been slow, logistically creaky, and piecemeal. This problem, of course, has not escaped the attention of decision-makers in Addis Ababa. It was precisely to address situations such as that now developing in Somalia that the AU developed its doctrine of the African Standby Force (ASF).

A central element of the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC), the ASF is intended to be a body of multidisciplinary military and civilian contingents for rapid deployment when authorised by the PSC. The central rationale for the ASF was to enable the AU to respond rapidly to situations of conflict in order to prevent a developing situation of conflict from becoming catastrophic. This capability was considered particularly important, since it takes on average three to six months for the UN to get peacekeeping boots on the ground once a resolution has been passed, allowing far too much time for the situation to deteriorate. At the heart of the ASF concept is the idea of five regional standby brigades, each consisting of anywhere between 2,000 and 6,000 troops and their equipment. Together this should give the PSC between 10,000 and 20,000 troops available for rapid deployment to hotspots around the continent.

The standby force concept is a good one. Unfortunately, it is a good idea that, since being launched in 2003 and despite some genuine progress, has yet to become a functional reality. Despite an announcement by the South African Minister of Defence, Mosiuoa Lekota, in late 2005 that the SADC brigade is ready to deploy, there has been no suggestion of deploying the brigade to Somalia makes it clear that this is not the case. As usual, the biggest obstacle to implementation is lack of resources. African countries are generally poor, and having the capability to project military power is expensive. Consider, by way of comparison, the NATO Response Force.
NATO describes its Response Force as a ‘coherent, high readiness, joint, multinational force package’ that is ‘technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable’. This capability allows NATO to project a 25 000-strong force across the globe, where it can sustain itself under high-tempo combat conditions for a period of 30 days.

There is no question that the NATO Response Force is a powerful force that offers a potentially valuable tool for addressing international conflict. But the fact that the world’s wealthiest security grouping can only manage to sustain a rapid reaction capability of 25 000 troops illustrates how ambitious the AU Standby Battalion concept is.

The biggest problem is not one of finding the troops, though with countries such as South Africa increasingly stretched to meet existing peacekeeping commitments, this is not an inconsiderable issue. The biggest difficulty, however, is having the capability to move necessary forces to where they are needed and to keep them supplied. The old adage remains applicable: ‘amateurs talk strategy, professionals talk logistics’. Given the vastness of Africa, there are realistically only two ways to move and supply a force such as one of the standby battalions, by air or by sea.

Because the naval forces of African nations, where they exist at all, have virtually no sea-lift capability, the transport of choice for the standby brigades is airlift. But while the AU’s members have more airlift than sealift capability, that is not saying much. The South African Air Force is relatively well off in this regard, but even the SAAF capability falls well below what might be desired. The introduction between 2010 and 2014 of the recently ordered batch of between 8 and 14 Airbus A400M tactical transport aircraft will help, but will not be enough to resolve the problem. Consider, for example, the proposed order of battle of the East Africa Brigade of the ASF. Apart from over 2 000 troops, there is the logistical challenge of moving close to 160 vehicles, not to mention food, ammunition and other supplies.

Existing AU deployments are largely supported by commercial airfreight companies and air assets of Western air forces. This puts AU deployments at the mercy of both Western governments, already facing overstretch of their airlift capabilities, and expensive contracts with companies that some deem to be little more than flying mercenaries. Exclusive reliance on airlift will continue to be expensive and, given the reliance on external providers for airlift capacity, unreliable.

How might this situation be improved? It seems to me that the sealift option needs to be reconsidered. This is generally not regarded as a live option because, though sealift is considerably cheaper than airlift, particularly for transporting bulky items such as armoured personnel carriers, trucks and the like, the cost of acquiring the ships capable of transporting a military force of significant proportions is prohibitive. The Royal
Australian Navy, for example, has recently put out an Aus$2 billion (over R11 billion) tender for two new multi-purpose amphibious ships.

But perhaps some out of the box thinking might help things. Here is one thought. Recent pressure on the UK defence budget, caused by the costs of involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, have led the UK Ministry of Defence to consider early retirement for some of its ships, many of which still have several years lifespan. Among the ships under consideration for early retirement is the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Ship Sir Bediviere. (Readers of a certain longevity will perhaps remember that this ship was slightly damaged in combat actions during the Falklands War, while her sister ships Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram were respectively sunk and badly damaged by the Argentinian Air Force.) Rather than prematurely mothball Sir Bediviere, perhaps the British government could be persuaded to lend it to the SADC Brigade until the end of its useful service. RFA Sir Bediviere offers a very useful transport and amphibious capability: it can carry between 340 and 534 troops, 34 vehicles (up to and including main battle tanks), 30 tons of ammunition and supplies. In addition it can accommodate two helicopters. Alternatively, if troops are not needed, it can carry 120 tons of humanitarian aid. Imagine being able to dispatch such a vessel, supported perhaps by the SA Navy’s newly purchased frigates and submarines, to an area where trouble is brewing. With attack helicopters decked on Sir Bediviere or the frigates, this amounts to a potent entry package. Even just anchoring such a force offshore could in some circumstances be sufficient to send warring parties hurrying to the negotiating table.

The added bonus of this idea is that Sir Bediviere would make an ideal training ship. Apart from South Africa, the navies of the SADC region have very limited capability, and having such a vessel as a shared asset would allow for significant personnel development and national pride. Joint efforts such as this can only contribute to mutual understanding and stability between SADC nations. In addition, this training dimension would mean that this endeavour could benefit from funding through such mechanisms as the US State Department-funded African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program, which aims to help African nations develop their capabilities in peacekeeping operations.

Whether something like this could be made to work remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is that current events in Somalia have reinforced the need for the African standby brigades. If conflict on our continent is to be properly managed by the African Union, ways must be found to make the ASF operational.
The start of each new year brings the familiar pundit forecasts for the political and economic year ahead. At continental level numerous issues are calling for attention. These include the burning violence in Sudan’s Darfur region; northern Uganda’s fledgling peace process between the Museveni regime and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA); and the now-deteriorating situation in the Horn of Africa – a result of the clashes between Ethiopian troops and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) on Somalian territory towards the end of 2006. The fallout from these hostilities has meant that the Horn of Africa may receive more prominent international attention, which it has not enjoyed since the ill-fated US foray into Somalia in 1993. At global level it is clear that the ‘war on terror’ remains the ultimate foreign policy imperative for the US administration. It can also be expected to play a major influencing factor on the foreign policy orientation for the UK and the European Union.

Mariam B Jooma* is a researcher with the Africa Security Analysis Programme at the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria.
One could therefore argue that 2007 will look very much like 2006. Aside from the political facts and fiction that will influence hardcore policy-making in the capitals of power, there are the traditional ‘soft’ issues such as humanitarian relief and development assistance to the so-called Third World that take a standard place on the foreign policy agendas. These humanitarian issues have largely been perceived as being part of the social and moral obligation to populations in the ‘Third World,’ rather than part of the wider political issues pertaining to governance and transparency.

The de-linking of issues between the economic and social realm has become somewhat established when approaching African conflicts. However, what is particularly interesting is the move from approaching the concept of refuge and asylum as political towards viewing refugees as security threats or mental/physical health victims. Certainly the tremendous increase in global migration through the rapid process of globalisation (some coupled with major changes in the post-Cold War era) has meant that the idea of ‘citizenship’ has been fundamentally challenged. Despite these shifts, however, the situation of stateless people has never been more precarious, emphasising that such status opens the individual to a constant state of flux which is relegated to the realm of the ‘humanitarian’ rather than seen as the concrete outcome of political realities.

These concerns have been eloquently summed up in a research paper for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) by Vanessa Pupavac (2006). She sees the current management of refugee concerns, which uses a health and bureaucratic paradigm, as a negative development and one that diminishes the agency of refugees. Using Hannah Arendt’s key works as a base, Pupavac argues that the weak sense of political subjectivity of refugees excludes them from any sense of belonging. Arendt boldly asserts that the state-based model of citizenship has confined a large part of the world’s population to the position of non-entities:

As long as mankind is nationally and territorially organized in states, a stateless person is not simply expelled from one country, native or adopted, but from all countries – none being obliged to receive and naturalize him, which means he is actually expelled from humanity.

The current use of the war on terror and its increasing imposition of militarism as foreign and domestic policy threaten to set back any gains made by civil rights and the human security approaches to human security. International policy towards refugees and other migrants has shifted towards seeing the refugee not as an individual, but as a collective problem and more often than not as a threat to the security of the host country. The stereotypes around the economic impact of accepting refugees and migrants have also fed a whole new discourse of xenophobia from within African countries. This is perhaps most aptly demonstrated by the recent attacks on a large number of Somalis who live in South Africa’s Western Cape region. And while there is a great deal of contention around
whether these attacks are truly representative of an anti-foreign sentiment or merely part of the overall climate of crime in South Africa, they highlight an emerging and worrying trend of securitisation of sovereignty that in effect depoliticises questions of asylum and refuge. Thus, as Pupavac suggests, there is now marked change in emphasis from state threats to the threat of individuals. She writes that there is a

… shift in concern from security threats as other states to non-state actors. These changing security concerns have been discussed as a shift from geopolitics to biopolitics, which seeks to restrict mobility and keep people in their place rather than champion the rights of the stateless. The rights of man are still the rights of citizens (Pupavac 2006:10).

In the African context, the situation of the Somalis is perhaps the most acute, since they are stateless even within the borders of the territory of Somalia. However, the plight of thousands of people who have sought refuge from political or economic conditions of hardship in their countries of origin is perpetually determined by their individual ‘responsibility’ to their new host country rather than the reverse. This speaks to a new interpretation of the 1951 Convention on Refugees, which was steeped in responsibility to protect the individual. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to suggest that the global war on terror, and its accompanying paradigm that pits ‘us’ against ‘them’, has altered fundamental principles of human rights, particularly as they relate to the world’s most marginalised people. The loss of political status of asylum seekers threatens to take us back to the Cold War understanding of human security.

**Bibliography**

Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and determinants
Edited by Pieter Kok, Derik Gelderbom, John Oucho and Johan van Zyl

Private actors and security governance
Alan Bryden and Marina Caparini (editors)
Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and determinants*

Edited by Pieter Kok, Derik Gelderbom, John Oucho and Johan van Zyl

Through the contribution of prominent migration scholars, this book offers insight into contemporary issues pertaining to migration in South and Southern Africa, focusing on the changes in patterns of migration in the post-apartheid era.

The book is divided into three broad sections dealing with macro-level migration patterns in Sub-Saharan Africa (chapters 2–5), micro-level factors in South African migration (chapters 6–11) and current theories of migration (chapter 12).

The introductory chapter provides an analysis of international and internal migration in South and Southern Africa. It maintains that post-apartheid South Africa has affected migration patterns both internally and in the Southern Africa sub-region. During the apartheid era, only migrant workers had permission to enter South Africa to work on

* Human Science Research Council, 2006, 364 pages, R190, paperback
farms and mines. Post-apartheid South Africa has experienced a brain gain through numerous black African professionals who have relocated to work in the country.

In chapter 2, Adepoju explores the migration-development nexus. He notes that spatial mobility is an important social and historical phenomenon of life in Africa. He cites poverty as a push factor for migration and notes that female migration is on the rise as the struggle to survive intensifies. Remittances are identified as an extremely important source of survival for the remaining families, and the need to think through the effective utilisation of these remittances is recommended.

This chapter also focuses on the importance of addressing migration in a regional framework. The author proposes a standard definition of data collection procedures on international migration. Although there is need for cooperation, the author should have delved deeper into the implications of standardising systems that have caused delays in the implementation of regional frameworks.

The third chapter, by Oucho, assesses the migration patterns in the region noting that South Africa, Namibia and Botswana have drawn largest numbers of immigrants because they arguably have the most advanced economies in the region. Oucho maintains that cross-border migration should be easy to monitor if the countries in question are able to reach consensus on the process. According to Oucho, the future of refugees and asylum seekers cannot be easily foreseen and he fears the emergence of a refugee threat if the situation becomes worse. SADC, and its constituent states, therefore need to be able to deal with the issue of migration in order to preserve the peace.

On undocumented migration, Oucho notes the need to have carefully designed data collection systems that would provide reliable data to inform policy. He notes that the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) initiative is a positive development within SADC and that countries are better placed to manage migration patterns. However, given the failure to ratify, let alone implement, the SADC Protocol on Free Movement of People over the last decade, it is clear that SADC still faces many challenges in relation to managing migration in the region.

In chapter 4 Wentzel and Tlabela place migration in South Africa in a historical context and discuss rural–urban migration.

Chapter 5 by Anderson is a comparative approach to international and internal migration patterns in South Africa and the rest of the world since 1950. The author states that restrictive immigration laws are in place to protect good jobs for South African citizens. Anderson argues for the removal of barriers to attract skilled labour. (It is, however, important to note that South African immigration policy is to some extent promoting the inflow of skilled labour, considering the introduction of work permits for what is
defined as rare skills in various disciplines and the granting of permanent residency status to skilled workers employed on a permanent basis.)

In chapter 6, Roux and Van Tonder address an important connection between migration and health in South Africa. The discussion is based on the Migration Health Survey conducted in 2000. Migrants are shown to be vulnerable and susceptible to disease in view of the obstacles and uncertainty that characterise their migration. For this reason certain authorities dread the consequences of migration on local health delivery systems. The authors call for further research to establish migrants’ health knowledge, health-seeking behaviour, and the role that health plays in migrants’ decision-making. Further research on this important topic should make use of the work done by the International Organisation for Migration at the borders to conscientise migrants about health risks and the impact of this on their behaviour.

Chapter 7 by Van Zyl presents the results of an HSRC survey on migration which, he argues, was characterised by incompetence, negligence and cheating. The survey lacked training and supervision. Van Zyl suggests how to prevent similar problems in future surveys.

In chapter 8, Wentzel, Viljoen and Kok discuss the characteristics of cross-border migrants and internal migrants in South Africa. They draw comparisons between these two groups, noting that more often than not cross-border migrants have very little knowledge of their destination and that internal migrants are better informed about their destination. Movement is precipitated by employment-related issues and other factors such as improving the standard of living and better economic prospects.

In chapter 9, Cross reports that South Africa has a powerful urban pull – perhaps the greatest in Africa. The rural populations seem to be moving closer to urbanised spaces, especially on the fringes of small towns. Cross notes that these settlements could become important areas as population flows from the remote rural populations become concentrated on the major transport routes. The implications of these potential settlements on migration policy would be worth investigating.

The central argument in chapter 10 is that social connections in the destination area are important in influencing potential migrants. Gelderblom and Adams note that family and friends are cited as important sources of information regarding conditions in the destination area, while neighbours are not recognised as very helpful sources of information. The authors observe that the affluent do not form part of the migrant network system. Migrant networks are important in influencing migration. However, they are a fluid phenomenon and hence an understanding of the cultural context in which they operate is a necessity. It would be interesting to identify the type of environment such networks thrive in and determine the reasons for this.
Chapter 11 focuses on the determinants of migration intentions in South Africa and elsewhere. De Jong and Steinmetz identify being young and dissatisfied with life, in addition to a poor quality of life, being divorced or separated, as some of the key causes of migration. The limitation of the analysis in this chapter is that it was not designed to analyse a formal migration decision model, nevertheless, it does substantiate evidence from elsewhere in the world.

Chapter 12 by Gelderblom is the concluding chapter. The author suggests a synthetic model of migration that incorporates both structural and behavioural aspects of migration theory. The causal factors and mutual connections of different migration theories are identified. However, he points out that more work needs to be done to establish the relationships between the micro-level issues of migration and causes and the macro-level forces of social transformation.

I would recommend this book to scholars of migration, for the book is theoretically rich and complemented by empirical data. Migration is a critical policy matter within Southern Africa, as elsewhere. There are many issues around citizenship, human security, and livelihoods that need to be grappled with. The book augments the growing body of literature in this field, but also points to the many gaps that need to be researched.

Aquilina Mawadza
Private actors and security governance*

Alan Bryden and Marina Caparini (editors)

Private actors have, rightly or wrongly, become part and parcel of the global security architecture. They have also become the subject of great interest within the contemporary security discourse. The privatisation of security has not only forced policymakers to reconsider their approach when utilising private actors in security-related matters, but it has also tied down researchers into analysing its impact on the security governance in different parts of the world.

The Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) drew from a pool of researchers and outstanding contributors to interrogate this issue from multidimensional angles. Private actors and security governance is a fourth edition which pays particular attention to ‘security privatization, from the perspective of both the top-

* Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2006, 314 pages, €29,90, paperback
down decision to outsource military – and security related tasks to private firms, and
the bottom-up activities of armed non-state actors such as rebel opposition groups,
insurgents, militias and warlord factions that challenge the state’s authority’ (page
3). The volume is the product of a workshop which was part of the bi-annual DCAF
International Advisory Board meeting.

Compiled in 314 pages, the volume is logically divided into five parts, namely
Introduction; The international policy context; Regional and national perspective;
Challenges of regulation; and Conclusion. The annex appears to have been added after
the manuscript was finalised, as it does not feature in either the introduction or the
conclusion.

In chapter 1, Alan Bryden takes us through the volume, which clearly covers what he
terms ‘a range of disparate private actors who have in common that they play a significant
if differentiated role in security governance’ (page 17).

Four well-grounded researchers contributed to the second part of the volume (chapters
2–5) which focuses on the international policy context. In chapter 2, Ulrick Schneckener
interrogates the question of fragile statehood, armed non-state actors and security
governance. Schneckener argues that ineffective, weak, failing or failed states, best listed
under the rubric of fragile statehood, ‘tend to undermine both functions and cause problems at
the national, regional and global level’ (page 23). He looks at the typology of armed non-state
actors where he considers rebels or guerrilla fighters, militias or paramilitaries, clan chiefs
or big men, warlords, terrorists, criminals, mercenaries and private security companies and
marauders. The grouping of mercenaries and the private security companies as one is rather
disturbing, however – not all private security companies engage in mercenary activities.
And not all private security companies engage in combat. Also, the work of mercenaries
and private security companies differs in that while the mercenarism is outlawed, private
security work is not, but is rather regulated in many parts of the world.

Schneckener further looks at the relationship between a fragile statehood and armed
non-state actors and how to deal with the latter in so far as security governance is
concerned. He argues that in spite of the dilemmas, difficulties and obstacles presented
in the so-called fragile statehood with armed non-state actors, ‘the alternative of staying
out of war-torn societies and ignoring problems of fragile statehood is neither realistic
nor desirable’ (page 38).

In chapter 3, Alyson Bailes looks at the relationship between the private sector and
public security. In her introduction, she quotes four headlines from one week’s issues of
the Financial Times which help illustrate ‘the wide, and sometimes unexpected, variety
of ways in which the private sector has become linked with international, national and
individual security and well-being in a globalised world exposed to multi-dimensional
threats’ (page 41). Bailes analyses the manner in which corporate norms and behaviour need to be adjusted in order to fit the public sector (and public) requirements and considers what she terms the permanent interface between public and private sector, the private sector’s evolving role in defence and security, and the wider security spectrum.

In chapter 4, Albrecht Schnabel interrogates the interplay between insurgencies, security governance and the international community. In his introduction he speaks of the critical challenge which armed non-state actors represent for security governance. He asserts that ‘[t]hey highlight the instability, insecurity and the unpredictable environment characterized by violence and destruction typical of latent conflict situations’ (page 65). He looks at the following subtopics: limits of traditional approaches to defend against insurgencies; understanding and judging insurgencies; response strategies; and the international community and challenges of insurgencies. He suggests that ‘[b]uilding institutional structures of security governance that are legitimate, accountable and trusted by both the population and the international community is a key part to this endeavour’ (page 83).

In chapter 5, Herbert Wulf looks in detail at the issue of reconstructing the public monopoly of legitimate force. He highlights the fact that weak countries lack the means to effectively deal with violent conflict or ensure internal security. He then considers the notion of privatising and internationalising violence, the interplay between security governance and democratic control of the monopoly of force, and the need for a multi-level public monopoly of force. Under the security governance and democratic control subtopic, Wulf presents a table which considers arguments for and against the deployment of private military companies. This table illuminates that while there are spin-offs resulting from the deployment of private military companies, there are also negative aspects that must be considered. One such example is the cost-effectiveness of private military companies against their lack of transparency. Wulf underscores the fact that the failure or inadequacy of the state to ensure the monopoly of legitimate force is a central problem in those societies that are haunted by violent conflicts and wars (page 103). He also gives three politico-legal areas for the development of peace and security and the regulation of force, namely the regulation and the strict legal control of private military companies to overcome the legal grey zone in which they currently operate; overcoming the democratic deficit; and overcoming the security deficit and reforming the state monopoly of force.

The third part of the volume (chapters 6–9) considers regional and national perspectives. Phillip Gounev’s chapter presents a Bulgarian perspective. Of interest is the fact that for each Bulgarian police officer there are two guards employed by private security companies and about three more private guards in in-house security teams, a fact which speaks of the need for greater resources and measures to ensure adequate control over the private security companies (page 123).
In chapter 7, Duncan Hiscock presents a post-Soviet case by looking at the commercialisation of the private security from a security sector governance perspective, particularly in Georgia and the Ukraine. The Ukraine presents an interesting case study where the private security industry is dwarfed by its government counterpart, the State Protection Service, which is accountable to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Otherwise known as derzahavna suzhba okhorony (DSO), the State Protection Service offers the same range of services as the private security industry, as well as others that non-state actors cannot undertake, such as armed protection of banks and cash transportation (page 135). This makes it difficult to have a line of demarcation between the ‘private’ or ‘commercialised’ security sector and ‘public’ security sector, since the state also provides the same services on a commercial basis.

In chapter 7, David Isenberg looks at Iraq. He dispels the notion that private military companies (a term with which he, for the sake of convenience, groups both private and security firms), have open entry into the Middle East. Isenberg argues that ‘[b]y and large, countries in the Middle East do not want Western foreigners carrying weapons and even if a PMC could land a contract it is most likely that it would be forced out once the required knowledge had been imparted’ (pages 149-150). Isenberg considers the private actors, security provision and the reform of the security sector in Iraq, the consequences for Iraq, which he views as a state that has become ‘the poster child for the private military and security sector’, governance challenges in perspective and PMC regulation. On the latter he highlights the problem of regulating PMCs due to their ‘somewhat ambiguous legal status in regard to existing international treaties relevant to conflict and war’ (page 159).

In chapter 9, Raenette Taljaard, presenting the South African perspective, looks at the implementation of the South Africa’s Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act (RFMA), which was enacted by the new democratically elected South African government in 1997. Taljaard considers the South African regulatory system, DDRR and the South Africa’s transition, the key features of the RFMA, and the contemporary challenges to regulation, focusing on the South African cases involving Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Zimbabwe, Iraq and the DRC. In her conclusion Taljaard flags the key challenge for analysts, policy- and law-makers, which is ‘to determine the measures that will be required to adequately address the emergence of the private sector as a key player in the security sector and to craft an international regulatory framework capable of responding credibly to this challenge globally’ (page 185).

Part four, chapters 10–13, broadly looks at the challenges of regulations. Elle Krahmann looks at the regulation of military and security services in the European Union. She points out that there has been in recent years ‘a growing disillusionment with the lack national and international regulation of private military and security services’ (page 190). She maps out the extent to which private military and security services are controlled
by national and international regulation and the option for strengthening existing legislation, which have been underestimated.

In chapter 11, Victor-Yves Ghebali looks at the United Nations and the dilemma of outsourcing peacekeeping operations. Ghebali basically analyses what he refers to as ‘the shifting position of the UN towards mercenarism’ (page 214). He looks at the problem in the context of the central debate on PSCs/PMCs and directs our focus to two major hurdles, namely the legal definition of the concept of ‘mercenary’ and the advantages versus the inconveniences of a possible partial ‘privatisation’ of UN peacekeeping operations.

In chapter 12, Christopher Spearin assesses the relationship between humanitarian actors and private security companies. He notes that the interaction between Relief and Development Agencies (RDAs) and PSCs is increasing as humanitarian crisis increase. Spearin argues that the time has come for a change of perception towards the use of PSCs by RDAs.

In chapter 13, Peter Wilson identifies two distinct elements which are key to any discussion of the role of the private security in security sector reform, namely to see the private security as a target for reform, and in particular to develop a country’s ability to regulate and control the security activities of the private sector; and to understand the positive contribution made by the private sector as implementers of reform, in particular in providing training and advisory services to governments and donors (page 247). Wilson underscores the importance of distinguishing between the so-called ‘internal’ and ‘external’ private sector actors, both of which in different ways have significant implications for democratic security sector governance (page 247). The private security sector is viewed as a target for security sector reform and the private sector as an aid to security sector reform. In his concluding remarks Wilson implores the private sector ‘to offer distinctive house-styles and the development of doctrine and training rather than just act as ‘body-shops’ for consultants with operations security experience but no developmental track record’ (page 257).

Part five (chapter 14) forms the conclusion of the volume. In this chapter, Marina Caparini interrogates the issue of applying a security governance perspective to the privatisation of security. Caparini makes a distinction between what she terms ‘privatisation from above’ and ‘privatisation from below’ (page 264). This is in agreement with the point raised by Bryden in chapter 1. Caparini addresses various subtopics: the pluralisation of security; the blurring of public and private; security governance regulation and accountability; and implications for security reform.

Jonas Hagmann and Moncef Kartas analyse international organisations and the governance of private security. They introduce the discussion by highlighting that the
international regulation of non-state security providers revolves around two debates: first, whether such security providers allow for an effective provision of security, and second, the ongoing debate about the means by which such non-state security providers can or should be held accountable to international humanitarian law and international human rights law in particular. On the latter, they argue that these legal frameworks, given their traditional focus on states, often fail to address non-state actors (page 285).

Hagmann and Kartas also consider international organisations and private agents of (in)security, focusing on the United Nations, international law and private security actors, mercenaries, PMCs and peacekeeping, private security actors, and small arms. They further make a comparative analysis of the European Union and Council of Europe, the African Union and Ecowas, the Organisation of American States, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. They highlight the fact that these organisations have not yet established effective regulatory frameworks for private military and security companies and that they only cover selected private security actors, mercenaries being the most addressed (page 299). In their conclusion, the authors underscore ‘the substantial need for coherent and regionally-informed agendas for the democratic control of privately-sponsored armed forces’ (page 299).

The volume substantially augments the literature on this topic. It is easy to read and rich enough to address all issues related to private actors and security governance. The case studies presented also give a fair comparative analysis of the involvement of the private actors and how they are addressed through different means. Most importantly, the South African case study is an interesting one, especially for those interested in the dynamics around the South African government’s approach towards private security actors involved in security- and military-related activities abroad.

Sabelo Gumede
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