Small Arms and the Humanitarian Community:

Developing A Strategy for Action

Nairobi, Kenya - November 18-20, 2001
Report of the Proceedings

"It is like we are mopping the floor with the taps on. It takes five minutes to shower bullets but it takes three hours and immense resources to repair each person. Even if we could afford it, it is a horrible waste. We need to direct our full energy to trying to prevent this crisis from escalating any further. The humanitarian community can help to turn off the tap."

Dr Olive Kobusingye, Trauma Surgeon in Uganda
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INTRODUCTION

The meeting, ‘Small Arms and the Humanitarian Community: Developing a Strategy for Action’, was organised by the Humanitarian Coalition on Small Arms (Amnesty International, the ARIAS Foundation, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Human Rights Watch, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Norwegian Church Aid, and Oxfam GB).

Diverse backgrounds and experiences brought approximately 120 people together in Nairobi for 3 days in November 2001. As Basil Lucima of Oxfam said in his welcome speech, “the aim of this conference is to share our experiences so that we can move forward together and work to remove the threat of guns from people's lives. Millions of people are killed, maimed, injured or forced to flee their homes because of gun violence. This is a global catastrophe.”

This report contains edited presentations from the meeting, including observations and comments from participants. These presentations overviewed the issues associated with the ‘human cost’ of the proliferation and misuse of small arms – charting the development, health, humanitarian and human rights impacts of this deadly trade. The meeting also sought to explore lessons learnt from other campaigns with a strong humanitarian advocacy component – landmines, child soldiers and the International Criminal Court. This marked one of the first times that the small arms community had actively sought to learn lessons from other successful campaigns to enrich our thinking and approaches.

The meeting also sought to bring to the table for discussion some ideas – elaborated or in their infancy – related to possibilities for campaigning on small arms from a ‘people-centered’ standpoint. Workshops were held to further encourage creative and lateral thinking about how to move forward with humanitarian and human rights focussed campaigning.

These contributions led to the ‘germination’ of a Framework of Action which premises the importance of addressing both the supply and demand or availability and misuse of these weapons.

These series of conversations were long overdue. The small arms and humanitarian community have up to now, had very little in common and no common platform with which to come together. The meeting provided an opportunity to undertake a much-needed conversation about the practical, policy and campaigning opportunities that can be harnessed by the humanitarian community in its broadest entirety.
1. SCENE SETTING

Welcome
Basil Lucima, Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for Horn, East & Central Africa for Oxfam GB

In August 2000, I was part of an assessment mission in Ituri in the DRC. I came across a lady called Magdalena, who was severely malnourished and admitted in one of the hospitals, close to the Ugandan border.

Magdalena had lost her husband in a raid that was carried out by militias in Eastern DRC. The militias came at night, rounded up people especially men in that village and took them across the valley and shot them dead. Magdalena was 34 years old at that time. She lost two of her children because they had to flee to the bush where there was no kind of assistance and no services. Two of her children died of hunger. She managed to escape with the only child to an Oxfam run centre that was based at the hospital. It happened that Magdalena was pregnant, but the child died.

I went back in June 2001, although I did not get back to the hospital, I met the doctor who had looked after her at that time, and Magdalena with her only other child is surviving despite the loss of her children, husband and two brothers. No End in Sight, an Oxfam briefing paper on the human tragedy in DRC gives more details about this attack and countless others and the human cost of the conflict. Our task is to bring hope to people like that.

This meeting is beginning the important task of develop a strategy of action for the humanitarian community on small arms, so that in five years time when the world governments come together again we will have taken giant strides to improve the lives of people such as Magdalena and her little girl Anna living in the hospital compound with nowhere to return to. Gathered at the meeting are 64 organisations from 46 countries. If we can harness our power and speak with a united voice on guns I believe we can change the world.

Small voices collectively put together make a difference.

Oxfam GB: www.oxfam.org

Why did we participate in this meeting? There were a lot of things in common, but also a variety of incentives. To better approach research, and other sources of information on small arms, others came to learn and share experiences about campaigning. Others spoke about the internal challenges within our organisations to place the small arms question on our agenda.

Comment from a Workshop Participant
The strength of the small arms NGO community

*Sally Joss, Co-ordinator of the International Action Network on Small Arms*

IANSA is a global network on small arms with 340 NGOs and many individuals belonging to the network from 71 countries. Our common denominator is that we are all working to prevent the spread and misuse of arms. Some NGOs are doing research and working very closely with governments on policy issues. Others are out collecting weapons and working for community action on the control of small arms. There are campaigners, there are ex-combatants, women’s groups, human rights groups. This great diversity is one of the key strengths of IANSA.

IANSA was created in 1998, when a number of NGOs decided that because of the piecemeal approach that governments had to the issue, it was important for civil society to have a more coordinated approach in responding to this government inaction. IANSA aims to treble in size in the next few years - to build a worldwide social movement focused on stopping gun violence and the tragic loss of life.

We need to make clear to governments what their collective inaction means, what it means to live in constant insecurity in communities which are saturated with light weapons and small arms. This is where the humanitarian community plays a huge important role. The Humanitarian Coalition can be the voice of the humanitarian community, producing facts and figures that are required to shift governments. It is not just the stories that we need; we need to know how many hospital beds are taken up by people with gunshot wounds; we need to know how many schools are closed because of violence. And this is the information that you work with every day.

A woman in a small town in South Africa, came up to me when I was there a few years ago, and said, “Have you heard of Jubilee 2000? It is about canceling the debt which is a problem for many countries and I want to tell you why it’s a problem for our community. Our government has a huge debt to pay back so they can’t spend money on health and education.” What was amazing was that this was in the middle of the countryside in South Africa, this woman understood that it was an international and local issue. Secondly, that there was a global campaign underway to address the problem. It is a good example of where we need to go with the small arms issue.

The messages need to link the supply of weapons with the human suffering it causes and that in turn actually creates a further demand for the weapons that have been supplied in the first place. There is now a momentum that we have a responsibility to take forward at international, national and regional levels.

How is IANSA going to help facilitate this? We are going to strengthen existing small arms networks, regional networks and sub-regional networks. We are going to help participants set up new ones, and extend the existing networks into new regions and to new groups in civil society. IANSA will also be supporting the development of thematic groups, such as the Humanitarian Coalition. The doctors led by IPPNW are organising themselves, so too are NGOs working on children and armed conflict. What is important is all of those groups focus on work on particular aspects of small arms relevant to them. The work will complement each other at different times.

IANSA – [www.iansa.org](http://www.iansa.org)
Developing a Strategy for Action for the NGO Humanitarian Community on Small Arms
Cate Buchanan, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and Lora Lumpe, Norwegian Church Aid

The uncontrolled spread and misuse of small arms and light weapons is a global humanitarian crisis that results in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people every year. Countless more individuals are physically or emotionally disabled or threatened by these weapons. In addition, the presence of guns adds an unpredictable and lethal dimension to the activities of organisations dedicated to human rights; humanitarian, health and development work in the field. The ability of such workers to undertake their duties is increasingly constrained, as many are kidnapped, assaulted and deprived of their liberty under the threat of a gun. The effectiveness of efforts to reach and serve people in many parts of the world is impeded, rendered less effective and made more costly.

At the same time, guns are immensely political. Humanitarian and development groups are not in a position to work on this topic, by and large, in an isolated manner. They need to be part of a united front – a campaign. Only a global campaign can provide a framework that would allow humanitarian groups to step up to this issue in a coordinated and powerful way by providing “safety in numbers.”

There are opportunities for effective action in ways that do not jeopardize our mandates or access to target populations, but the community of organisations needs to be strategic and coordinated in how it uses these opportunities. The Nairobi meeting is an opportunity for our community to talk about those experiences and start converting it into a coordinated strategy for action.

We want to spark discussion on ideas for a Strategy for Action, which has:
- **A distinct focus:** shifting the debate from national security to human security
- **A primary goal:** curbing the supply of weapons
- **A target timeframe for effecting change:** setting goals over a five-year period
- **An interlocking set of agreed strategies:** which incorporates networking, research, targeted advocacy and campaigning
- **A commitment to raising awareness about the human cost:** drawing on where our strength and credibility resides, that is the first-hand experience of our community
- **An appreciation of lessons learnt:** constantly testing what we do against what we learn from others

Most importantly, we believe the key to success is having the people who count at the heart of the process. Ambitious campaigning on small arms must be informed by the voices and priorities of people, living and working directly with the crisis of small arms proliferation and misuse.

**Background**
Over the past five years, the small arms crisis has steadily acquired a more prominent position on the international agenda. Awareness continues to be raised and path-breaking work is being undertaken on the ground in relation to sensitisation about weapons and weapons control. However international advocacy efforts to stem the
trade in arms have been disappointing. The outcome of the July 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, a recent focal point for global efforts on small arms, was underwhelming in the face of the widespread human suffering inflicted at the hands of these weapons.

The challenges posed by the proliferation and misuse of small arms are complex and do not lend themselves to simple solutions. As a result, a multi-dimensional approach has been pursued in identifying all aspects of the problem and corresponding responses. Much has been learned from this approach, and the community of potential advocates has been broadened. But it has also had an important downside. By offering dozens of policy recommendations, rather than one or two priority goals, NGOs have enabled governments to pick and choose the options most palatable and least demanding to them.

**The Power of the Humanitarian Perspective**

A first challenge is to shift the discourse of the small arms debate away from talk about the security of states to talk about the security of people. Doing so will help establish an appropriate sense of urgency and political will on the part of governments to take any number of necessary actions. Achieving this goal will require the active participation of a much greater segment of the health, humanitarian, development and human rights communities than have engaged the issue to date.

Mobilising our communities would unleash a wealth of expertise and access to compelling evidence about the impacts of these weapons in conflict, post-conflict and ‘peaceful’ societies. Our ability to speak from direct experience provides a credibility and moral authority that will bolster international advocacy and campaigning efforts. A humanitarian perspective also brings new tools and fresh insight to an issue that has been framed up until now mainly by national security and law enforcement perspectives.

**A Campaign Goal with Regional and Global Relevance**

A second great challenge is to identify a priority advocacy goal around which health, humanitarian, development and human rights workers and organisations can rally. There are three main approaches from which to choose: curbing the fresh supply of weapons into an area where they are being misused, mopping up weapons already in existence that are being misused, or alleviating the root causes giving rise to the demand for and misuse of guns.

Workers in these communities are already – by nature of their primary missions – engaged in important demand reduction work. For example, if groups are able to facilitate sustainable economic development or social justice, they would do more to reduce demand for guns and grenades than any sensitisation or public education program could ever do.

Rubem Cesear Fernandes, from the NGO Viva Rio, says, “demand is local, but supply is national and/or international.” Put another way, the means for reducing demand are too specific to be generalized effectively into a global campaign, but approaches to stemming supply can more readily be generalized and campaigned upon.
For these reasons, we believe that the main focus of campaigning on small arms by the humanitarian community should be on curbing the fresh supply of weapons. Just as deminers and prosthetic limb builders engaged in efforts to work for the control and then a ban on the supply of landmines, doctors, human rights workers and development and relief agencies must move back through the supply chain and engage themselves with curbing the flow of new weapons and with mopping up those weapons already in circulation.

At the same time, realities differ from place to place in terms of the particulars of arms supply. In some countries state-to-state sales to abusive armed forces are the principal problem affecting people. In others, smuggled supply to criminals and insurgents is the main problem. In others, sales from local manufacturers are the biggest source of deadly guns. And in yet others, destabilisation campaigns by neighbouring (or distant) governments are the main contributor to the lethal supply of guns.

The challenge therefore is to identify one or two campaignable goals that, if achieved, would have the greatest impact in reducing the weapons of concern (those being used to kill or maim civilians) in the shortest period of time in the most places.

**Humanitarian Coalition on Small Arms**

Among the groups present at the UN Conference in July as part of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), a handful of humanitarian, health, development and human rights organisations decided to develop a Humanitarian Coalition on Small Arms (HCSA), with two main aims. Firstly, to mobilise this particular community as part of a broader contribution to the growing social movement spearheaded by IANSA, and secondly to bring compelling humanitarian perspectives and voices forward into the advocacy and campaigning on this issue in the future.

The initiative is based on the belief that to succeed, ambitious campaigning on small arms must be informed by the voices and priorities of organisations and people living and working directly with the crisis of small arms proliferation and misuse. Such organisations have particular credibility lobbying the arms supplying governments, primarily in the North.

In addition to joining IANSA, NGOs that are operational in providing healthcare, development assistance, and humanitarian relief or human rights protection are encouraged to contribute to the work of the Humanitarian Coalition on Small Arms.

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue: [www.hdcentre.org](http://www.hdcentre.org)
Norwegian Church Aid: [www.nca.org](http://www.nca.org)
2. OUTLINING THE PROBLEM

The costs of the abuse of small arms
Isaac Lappia, Amnesty International Sierra Leone

For nearly a decade, Sierra Leone became a dumping ground for small arms and light weapons, the tools of death and destruction. The deadly illicit trade in small arms prospered in the sub regions, provided massive gains for arms traffickers, who were determined to continue uninterrupted, irrespective of the catastrophe the use of these weapons caused.

Sierra Leone was thrown into a brutal war in 1991 by a rebel group of mixed nationalities; Sierra Leoneans, Liberians and Burkinabis. The conflict was first misunderstood as a mere border skirmish involving disgruntled illicit businessmen. The conflict intensified and illicit arms dealers focused their attention to a new arms market - Sierra Leone. There was unrestricted flow of arms into the country as the conflict spread.

The Sierra Leone conflict was characterized by massive destruction of property and a huge death toll. The fundamental tactic of the Revolutionary United Front was terror. The combatants would attack a village, capture people, execute a large number of people so that the survivors obey their commands without question. They were also involved in the training of large number of young men be they willing or not. The selected trainees were first heavily drugged to derail their sound reasoning capacity and make light the evil they may have committed against their own people.

In a village close to mine, the rebels, after drinking a lot of palm wine, argued over the sex of a baby of a pregnant captive. One argued that the baby was a girl and the other countered that according to the shape of the belly, it was definitely a boy. To prove who was correct, they commanded a 10-year old child soldier to shoot the pregnant woman and slit open her stomach. The command was immediately carried out. The foetus proved to be a girl. The rebel who guessed correctly was so affected by the death and mutilation of the young woman that without a second thought, he shot his companion in the chest. He was later killed by the rebel high command for killing a comrade in the struggle because he had no right to destroy a valuable life for a useless pregnant woman.

In another instance a woman opted to give her life for her two children of 11 and 14 years. The rebels had threatened to kill the boys for hiding in a tree during an early morning attack on the village. The mother asked that she be killed instead. In her presence one of the boys was asked to pull the trigger against his mother, he refused and was shot in the leg. The younger child was then asked to shoot his mother, and he did so. He was conscripted as a hard, fearless fighter. The rebels' reason for asking the boy to kill his mother was a belief that, whoever killed their parents will be fearless, a 'hard one'.

After the capture of every village, the rebels made arrangements for food to be cooked. On some very jubilant occasions, parts of human beings were cooked especially for the foreign rebels. While the food was being cooked the rebels would select a “wife” from among the young cooks, take them to a secluded location and
rape them until the food was ready. The people lived in a constant state of terror of the gunfire. To avoid contact with the rebels, they abandoned their villages and towns and pitched make-shift huts in the bush. Today some of those hiding places have emerged as new villages. The attack on the city of Freetown saw the death of more than 5000 people. Vultures continuously fed on human bodies as there were no people to bury the dead. People were pressed at gunpoint into houses, which were sprayed with petrol and set on fire. Who ever tried to escape was immediately shot.

The largest peacekeeping operation in the UN history was established in October 1999. The country was so heavily militarised that people feared whether the weapons in circulation could ever be collected. Arms were brought in large quantities from Liberia by all sides. The government forces brought large supplies of arms which were many times ambushed and captured by the rebel forces. The Sierra Leone Army emptied the national armory to prosecute the war. A large quantity of arms was given to local militiamen by the Government to fight the rebels in their respective communities and to fight alongside ECOMOG (the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group). Executive Outcomes (a British private security company) came in with a lot of weapons, most of which was given to trained militiamen who fought along with them.

The situation today in Sierra Leone is a sharp contrast of what used to be. The guns are silent, internally displaced people and refugees are gradually returning to their places of origins. Free access to all parts of the country is guaranteed and disarmament of ex-combatants is almost complete. One may wonder what is responsible for this quick reversal of the conflict situation in my country. The general consensus is that the supply route of arms to the perpetrators of violence has been disrupted. The illicit manufactures, arms dealers and traffickers in the sub-region have been identified and shamed in the international media. Presidents have been named in the Sierra Leone crisis and their illicit transfer strategies openly discussed. The RUF have been identified as the main perpetrators of human rights abuses. They initially held 500 UN staff as hostage to derail the peace process, but surprisingly opted to cooperate for lasting peace simply because their arms supply routes had been shut down.

The story of Sierra Leone highlights the tragedy of war being prolonged and intensified by the virtually unrestricted flow of small arms. Had the UN panel of experts and NGOs investigated the arms flow to Sierra Leone at the rudimentary stage of the war and demanded appropriate action as has now been taken, Sierra Leone could have been saved years ago. It is essential to identify the crucial link between any conflicts characterized by gross violations of human rights, crimes against humanity and war crimes and that of small arms and light weapons supply to a conflict region.

To me arms make war.

Amnesty International: www.amnesty.org

“The problem of disability is the worst human cost by small arms. Wherever you go, wherever you look, you will find physical and mental disabilities perpetrated by small arms abuse.”

Richard Mugisha, People with Disabilities, Uganda
The UN Conference on small arms: diplomatic success, humanitarian failure

Joost Hiltermann, Executive Director of the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch

In a nutshell, the 2001 UN conference on small arms, from a human rights perspective, was a dismal failure, a critique of which can be found as an annex to the conference report. Human rights are not even mentioned in the Programme of Action that governments finally managed to agree to in the final hours of the conference. It is as if states feel that human rights are a luxury, something that can be addressed only after issues of high security have been settled first. This is a fundamental mistake.

Human rights, that is, the observance of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, constitute the basis for the proper conduct of governments, and are also the basis for a solution to the humanitarian crises that are caused by the uncontrolled spread and misuse of weapons.

The omission of human rights from the U.N. Conference on Small Arms and the resulting Programme of Action should be seen as a deliberate effort by states to shirk their responsibility as states for the proliferation and misuse of weapons. Governments like to blame others for this problem: arms traffickers, brokers, rebels, but rarely themselves.

The misuse of weapons invariably involves a violation of human rights, possibly a very serious one, like a war crime or a crime against humanity. And the provision of weapons and other forms of military assistance to known human rights abusers suggests a degree of complicity in human rights abuses. The key issue is the problem of impunity, a lack of accountability.

A current example can be found in Afghanistan. For the last 10 years, after the Soviets were thrown out in 1989, Afghanistan has been in the throes of a series of internal armed conflicts that have been marked by atrocities committed by all sides. As this was going on, powerful regional actors—states—provided military assistance to their friends in Afghanistan, thereby throwing fuel on the fire.

What did the United Nations do? In 1999, when it finally decided to do anything of significance, it imposed sanctions on one of the abusive parties, the Taliban. It then failed to implement or enforce these sanctions, which after December 2000 included an arms embargo. Meanwhile, Russia and Iran were arming the other side, the opposition alliance known as the United Front. The Russians told us last July: “Sure we are arming them, but the United Front is the legitimate government of Afghanistan (holding the country’s seat at the U.N.) and the United Front is not under any U.N. arms embargo.”

What message did this send to the warlords in Afghanistan? Business as usual.

September 11 happened, and the US is waging war against the Taliban and Al-Qa’ida. As part of this, the United Front was given carte blanche in northern Afghanistan and received fresh supplies of U.S.-financed arms from Russia as well as decisive air support from the United States. Uzbekistan, which has a terrible human rights record, also started receiving U.S. military and political support including no more criticism.
of the government’s violent repression of dissidents. The result: One United Front faction entered Kabul contrary to an agreement it had made with its U.S. handlers, and another faction, headed by a notorious warlord, carried out reprisal killings. They were doing whatever they liked (though admittedly with more restraint than what we had seen from them in the 1990s, when the world wasn’t watching), and of course, civilians suffered.

The issue of military support cannot be divorced from human rights. The factor that binds these two together is the existence of impunity. Our challenge, therefore, is to break down the cultures of impunity. Governments must be persuaded to say:

1. No to atrocities,
2. No to the misuse of arms,

And the Golden Rule:

3. No to the provision of military support to gross human rights abusers until the recipient makes a public commitment to end abuses and holds the perpetrators accountable.

This is why there must be a Humanitarian Coalition on Small Arms: To stress this link with governments and convey this message, and to persuade them that a human rights approach is not only a moral imperative but also in their own interest. By ignoring human rights, governments may create new problems that in the end may harm their own national security.

The world’s neglect of the situation after the Soviets were driven out, and the continuing supply of weapons without strings attached to increasingly abusive parties led to the total collapse of the state structure in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. This allowed for the entry of the Taliban, who were bankrolled by one of the prime beneficiaries of the CIA’s war against the Soviet occupation forces, who is now Suspect No. 1 in the atrocities committed here in Nairobi and in Dar Es Salaam in 1998 and in the United States two months ago, and who has sent well-trained fighters to Chechnya and Uzbekistan. Could this possibly be in the U.S. and Russia’s national interest?

The observance of human rights must be a necessary and integral part of the solution.

Human Rights Watch: www.hrw.org

“If we can actually work with the communities and make them understand that their security is very much linked to having no guns in the community, then this is a good entry point. In South Africa there have been attempts to reform policing with more emphasis on community policing. They had a lot of violence until the elders had to come and sit down and say, “Okay, look here, let us get rid of this weapon. Let us get a new police force that we can work with”, and this is being trialed in Malawi and Sierra Leone.”

Comment from a Workshop Participant
One step forward, two steps back: guns and sustainable development

Gaim Kebreab, Regional representative of the Norwegian Church Aid

“Practically the whole of the Horn of Africa is in turmoil. Somalia is a nation in shambles, without a central government. Sudan has been engaged in a civil war for a long time. Ethiopia is experiencing civil unrest. A civil war is in progress in Northern Uganda. Northern Kenya has not known sustained peace since independence.” (Breaking the Spear & Cooling the Earth by Daudi Waithaka)

For decades, the Norwegian Church Aid has been engaged in emergency and long-term development work in this region. The East African region has suffered greatly as a result of increased misuse of small arms. The impact of small arms is an on-going problem and attempts to move forward to develop the region, have proven to be difficult.

In the year 2000 the misuse of small arms caused the deaths of friends and colleagues.

- The Ugandan Lords Resistance Army killed eight colleagues on 13 January 2000. They were returning from distribution of food and non-food items to the internally displaced persons who fled from the fighting around the Government of Sudan controlled garrison town of Torit.
- One colleague was killed in March when driving a polio campaign team. The other people in the vehicle suffered injuries from the bullets of the attackers.
- Two colleagues were killed when they were returning from a hospital. They had earlier taken a patient urgently in need of emergency surgical operation. They were shot at close range and died instantly. As a result, development interventions were stalled for many months because of a lack of personnel.

In the Gedo region of Somalia, small arms are readily available and frequently used against humanitarian personnel. People have been shot critically and kidnapped at gunpoint. Staff have been evacuated. The flood of small arms, political instability, poverty and warlords with power bases in different parts of the country threaten any meaningful development intervention. The rule of the gun precedes development.

“It is identified fact now that many communities attribute insecurity, underdevelopment, sponsored banditry, the influx of guns, political and economic marginalization as some of the problems that contribute to their situation, and are beyond their capacity to control or solve”. (Daudi Waithaka, Peace & Development Foundation – Africa)

A snapshot of the key issues driving gun possession, use and misuse include:

- Poverty – this region is one of the poorest in the world. Small arms may be a strategy for survival and an indicator of no other viable options for managing day to day existence in insecure environments.

- Justice and governance – there is lack of justice, so many people take the law into their hands for the majority of people. Governments do not have a comprehensive grip on state security and are often a big part of the problem.
• Political instability – at a state and regional level. This produces refugees, movement of people, and destruction of the economy and greater recourse to armed violence, criminality and insecurity.

• Community participation – is essential for sustainable interventions. Communities need to participate in design and implementation of intervention programmes in order to ensure local perspectives and priorities have been incorporated.

The humanitarian community should look for ways to include interventions to limit and reduce the impacts of small arms on our work. Humanitarian and development organisations have significant opportunities to deal with this issue as part of our overall interventions. Comprehensive alternative perspectives are necessary. Breaking the back of the arms trade by governments, private manufacturers and illicit traffickers’ is a crucial step. This has to be challenged through coordinated international advocacy and legislation.

Norwegian Church Aid: www.nca.org

“We have discovered that there is serious mobility problem for our workers, aid workers have found it extremely difficult to access populations in distress. Staff movement is disrupted because armed escorts are required. It displaces the target community with whom many of us work. It has damaging effect on the individual and it violates human rights. Shun the gun is the only solution.”

Comment from a Workshop Participant
Building the evidence base – what is known, where are the gaps?

Robert Muggah, Project Manager at the Small Arms Survey

Small arms, pistols, revolvers, assault rifles, grenade launchers and mortars - they are the stuff of late night conspiratorial conversation at the compound. They are part of the inevitable burden of humanitarian work. The humanitarian community are daily witnesses of their use, they are at the ever familiar roadblock, slung loosely over the shoulders of children, waved menacingly by militia, police and army factions, resting between the knees of security guards.

Available evidence tells us that small arms are used in about 75 per cent of all security instances reported by humanitarian agencies. According to UN Security Coordination Office (UNSECOORD) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 210 UN civilian personnel and about 100 ICRC delegates were killed in intentional violence in the last eight years alone.

We know that this population is not the primary victims of small arms. Small arms availability is a persistent and recurring nightmare for civilians all over the world. In virtually every emergency ward on this planet there are victims recovering from preventable, non-fatal injuries attributed to small arms. The most conservative estimates figure that about 500,000 people are killed every year with small arms. Some 300,000 in conflict situations. These are 500,000 preventable fatalities.

From a humanitarian or public health perspective there can be little doubt that small arms related violence constitutes an epidemic of global proportions. Like any disease it is preventable. To design an effective set of remedies we need to know what we’re up against. We need to generate and disseminate data about the vector and to design interventions based on irrefutable, empirical evidence. We need something that is often overlooked in the rush to provide protection and assistance: solid research.

There is a strong association between small arms availability and human insecurity. Small arms are by design made to kill and maim human beings. Evidence from criminologists, epidemiologists and public health specialists demonstrate that small arms lead to a higher incidence of lethal outcomes in any situation of conflict, including intentional violence such as homicide and suicide, or even so-called accidental or non-intentional incidents such as celebration shooting.

Small arms exacerbate and multiply violations of international humanitarian law and human rights. Principles the humanitarian community are again by definition bound by covenant to be upheld. It is becoming clearer just how little we, the disarmament and humanitarian communities, actually know about the humanitarian impacts of small arms. What is known is often fragmented, anecdotal and based on qualitative short-term studies, although there are a few exceptions. Best estimations are better than no estimate for planning interventions and guiding advocacy, but real empirical data is absolutely pivotal for guiding research and analysis and any intervention.

The secondary or indirect impacts are contentious. They are part of the broader constellation of impacts from conflict rather than isolated reservedly to small arms there is often debate over whether it’s conflict or small arms that are causing the types
of impacts this community deals with constantly. Some significant inroads into the question of causality are being made and we are starting to better distinguish the impacts of small arms from the broader constellation of consequences of war and social violence.

While we need better information on the humanitarian impact of small arms, conventional ready made statistics are currently hard to come by. In terms of firearm related deaths and injuries, national data is woefully inadequate. Less than 40 per cent of all developing countries have any vital registration or reliable surveillance on mortality and morbidity, most of which does exist in the South is in Latin America. Very few countries in Asia have surveillance mechanism and there is almost nothing in Africa with the exception of South Africa.

However, the absence of this kind of data should not stop smaller scale studies and targeted research or campaigning. Precisely because of the proximity to the human toll exacted by small arms proliferation, the humanitarian community is ideally situated to provide a range of information: neutral, objective, impartial, subjective, quantitative and qualitative analyses of the impacts and solutions to this crisis. Many organisations already collect or collate masses of information whether through baseline monitoring, incident reporting systems and short assessments. Much of which is gathering dust in the corners of offices, not effectively being used or analysed. In some cases, it’s a matter of blowing dust off and collating this data and giving it a bit of consideration.

In other cases there’s a need to collect new information. The collection of data should not be seen in a vacuum, but rather for the purposes of directly informing policy and advocacy. It should be empirically tight so that credibility and legitimacy are assured. If the prevention of gun related violence is the objective, then a big part of the research agenda should be to articulate clear research questions, appraising who is at risk, how are they at risk, why are they at risk and where are they most affected.

There are several important questions to pursue answering in research of this kind. How many people are being killed and injured by small arms compared to other sources of death and injury in your region of operation? What is the financial burden of small arms on agencies, their programmes and failed investments? How are small arms affecting livelihoods of the beneficiaries that the humanitarian and development community works to support? This research agenda should support objective and subjective data collection and analysis.

The Small Arms Survey: www.smallarmssurvey.org

“A big part of the problem of small arms is the lack of coping mechanism, a lack of human security situations at the community level which is basically responsible for many of these things: gun violence, the power of threatening others with the use of a gun.”

James Arputharaj, South Asia Partnership International
Going to the source of the illness

Dr Olive Kobusingye, Trauma Surgeon and Director of the Injury Control Centre of Uganda

This is a call for the humanitarian community to help stem the flow of arms: go to the root of the illness of small arms proliferation. To illustrate my point, I will use the example of my own country, Uganda. It is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, and unfortunately, one of the poorest. Uganda’s health care expenditure is one of the lowest in the region at about $8 per person annually with a doctor/patient ratio of one doctor for every 25,000 persons. Alarming even by African standards. About 49 per cent of our population live within 5 kilometres of a health facility, but actual real access for health care is even lower because even people that live within 5 kilometres, for many reasons are not be able to access health care. The GDP per capita is about a third of the continental average at $US511.

Since independence in 1962, there have been seven changes of government and each one of these has come through armed violence. Due to the real and perceived threat, insecurity and private security companies abound. Firearms have upgraded from those which fire one shot at a time, and hence increased capacity to maim and kill. Access to firearms is easy and government control is limited.

In 1999, we did a survey in Northern Uganda. We were looking at all injuries, in an area where there has been armed conflict for over 18 years. We looked at injury and deaths from 1994 up to 1999. We were interested to know what caused the injuries, and in particular, access to and use of health care services.

The graph (see over) reveals our findings. It was quite shocking even though we knew this was an area of conflict. Gunshot wounds were the leading cause of injuries in this group in terms of rates by 1000 persons per year. In almost any African country, and in the west, traffic incidents are the leading issue.

We looked at the time taken to reach a health facility and only about 13 per cent of the injured people were able to access health care in one hour. Even when we pushed it to six hours, only about 40 per cent of people were able to access health care within six hours. The majority of people with severe injuries will simply not survive if they do not access care in a couple of hours at most. Only 70 per cent of the victims had been able to access care and the majority of these had been able to get to a hospital or a health centre.

What have we done since the survey? We have tried to do something in the area of primary prevention especially in terms of doing landmine awareness campaigns. We have been involved in training of health care personnel that work in emergency rooms and usually these are people that are already involved in acute and emergency care. We have trained police, security and army personnel in pre-hospital and emergency skills and we have also worked in collaboration with the Ministry of Health and other agencies in trying to strengthen rehabilitation for persons that have injuries.

Police training in Uganda only offers four hours of first aid during their entire training, so we tried to improve that. We have trained multi-disciplinary teams unlike the kind of training that people go through, for instance, in medical school. This
training works in teams of doctors, nurses, orthopedic officers, ambulance driver, nurse aides – people with different competence levels. We train them using equipment and supplies that are ordinarily available in their workplaces and we have developed a curriculum that specifically addresses the needs of hospitals in Africa.

**Graph: Causes of injury in Gulu District**

![Graph showing causes of injury in Gulu District](image)

There are many constraints in delivering emergency care. Evacuation and first aid services are very limited. Some of these conflict areas have maybe one or two decent hospitals in the district and when incidents occur evacuating patients and get them to health care is very difficult. Transport is poor and referral systems are quite dysfunctional. Health care personnel are often low in numbers and can be quite unmotivated and unskilled. Shortages in hospitals often include very basic supplies. Where I work in Kampala sometimes we have no gloves! Lack of operating space is also a major challenge.

High incidence of firearm injuries in hospitals also produces unfair competition for resources. As firearm injuries are quite often severe, they demand immediate deployment of senior personnel and immense resources. Sometimes we are pulling our senior anesthesiologists away from scheduled surgery to come and do emergency work. Most firearm injuries do not occur in isolation, and can introduce an ethical dilemma for staff. Recently we had police and criminals lying side by side in the emergency room, and people were distressed to know that we were going to treat robbers ahead of policemen. We prioritise according to the severity of injury and not whether this person belongs to a rebel group or government agency or is a suspected criminal.

It is like mopping the floor with the taps on. It takes five minutes to shower bullets but it takes three hours and immense resources to repair each person. Even if we could afford it, it is a horrible waste. We need to direct our full energy to trying to prevent this crisis from escalating any further.

The humanitarian community can help to turn off the tap.
3. LEARNING LESSONS FROM OTHER CAMPAIGNS

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines
*Sue Wixley, Advocacy and Communications Officer for the ICBL*

Much of the success of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) was a product of a collaborative exercise with other international organisations like the ICRC as well as with governments, particularly a core group of states prepared to take and lead action.

It is important to learn from mistakes and achievements and it is easy to look back at the landmines campaign and see only the great achievements, but not to acknowledge that there were mistakes and compromises that were made along the way to the detriment of campaign. It is also easy to fall into the trap of simplifying the issue with hindsight. Looking at the campaign it must seem easy, but we thought there was no way we were ever going to achieve a ban on landmines.

It is easy to forget that as campaigners we tried different methods. We tried one way of working, one argument with governments, one argument with the various people that we were targeting and if that did not work we tried something else. We tried different ways of mobilising the public. If that was not working we tried something else. We had to have a contingency approach to dealing with the issue.

There are five factors to examine in looking at the ICBL’s success:

1. The message of the campaign, the fact that we called for a ban
2. The use of strong visual images and the use of media
3. The structure and the way we worked in coalition with governments and other international organisations
4. The post cold-war context in which we campaigned where there was a new role for middle powers who were carving out niches for themselves in this new political landscape
5. The use of non-UN fora to pursue negotiations of the Mine Ban Treaty.

I will concentrate on the first point - messaging and how we defined the issue. The first obvious point is that we were calling for a comprehensive prohibition: a ban. Around the time of the negotiations for the treaty a slogan used was “no loopholes, no reservations and no exceptions”. The message was clear, under no circumstances is it permissible to use anti-personnel landmines. It was clear what we were against but also what we were for. A lot of the ICBL material refers to a mine free world, a goal we are aiming for. We offered a solution.

Another of our slogans called for governments to ban landmines, to clear them and to help the survivors. Similar to the small arms challenge, we have to work with the problem and solutions at a range of levels. We made it clear that a policy alone would not change the situation. To get to this point we had to decide what to not say. The campaign specifically focused on anti-personnel landmines, not anti-tank mines, and not other weapons systems. It is worth noting that we had a lot of debate within our campaign about how mines were defined, a lot of practitioners and campaigners were arguing strongly that mines should not be defined by their design but instead by the
effect that they had on people. In many ways the treaty wording was a compromise, an anti-personnel landmine is defined as “mine designed to be exploded by the presence of a person that will incapacitate, injure or kill”.

The campaign message was definitely from a field perspective. The spokespeople of the campaign came from mine affected countries largely. They came from diverse cultures, men and women, and most people were involved with the mine issue on daily basis. The people speaking publicly were mine clearers, survivors of landmine injuries, people working on rehabilitation and disability issues, and development workers. They were able to lend direct experience which gave credibility and legitimacy to our message.

It also injected passion and strength. In some instances we had more experience and expertise than the government officials. In dealing with military personnel that were involved in mine laying and clearance, we were able to counter their arguments with direct experiences.

An emphasis at this meeting is a call to prioritise the human cost of light weapons. This was at the very basis of our campaigning: the stories of landmine survivors, the stories of communities affected by landmines, and the stories of military personnel who laid them and saw their colleagues being killed and maimed. We framed the message from a humanitarian perspective.

At the same time we countered arguments about the military utility of landmines. It was a turning point when we started arguing with the military about what they were saying. Because as campaigners and human rights people and people working in development we had kind of shied away from arguing with the military. It seemed quite technical and difficult but we skilled ourselves up, and when we started engaging in those arguments we started to make progress.

A final crucial aspect of the campaign was that there was a broad message at the international level, and at national levels we were able to give it local significance. There was space within the campaign to do that and it is a great strength of the campaign. The fact that we got an international ban was quite a surprise at some point. We were not expecting it because our approach had been to get governments to take unilateral steps within their own country and eventually in the region and eventually we imagined it might spread further.

International Campaign to Ban Landmines: www.icbl.org

“Getting a commitment through international law made a real difference over landmines. It made governments responsible for change. Most of the time it seems so irrelevant and our challenge is to give it a meaning and urgency when it comes to small arms issues.”

Comment from a Workshop Participant
Drop the Debt Campaign – Did it work?
Adrian Lovett, Director of Campaigns and Communications for Oxfam GB, previously the Director of the Drop the Debt Campaign

Did it work? Up to 100 billion in promised debt cancellation was achieved. Not all of that by any means delivered yet. But in concrete real terms at least $800 million per year is the amount of the cut in total annual payments made by about 25 of the poorest countries. In a large number of cases you can show that direct link between the debt cancellation and improvements in human lives.

But debt is still a burden for a large number of countries and arguably the balance of power between richer and poorer countries is largely unaltered.

There are five elements in the campaign which contributed to its success:
1. Inspiration
2. Crafting of the message
3. Building the movement
4. Focus with flexibility
5. The ‘wow’ factor

1. Inspiration
The campaign was inspired by the connection of the cancellation of international debt from poorer countries with the millennium, and then further connecting that with the concept of Jubilee, which for those of Judeo-Christian tradition is very significant. The founders of the campaign managed to give energy and dynamism to an issue that had been bumping along by giving it a time-limited and popular focus around the millennium. We also picked a target: the leaders of the richest countries in the G8, focusing on their annual meetings.

2. Crafting the message
The essential part of the message was what we called ‘killer facts’. These have to be true and explain the problem, ideally in one sentence and no more. The best killer facts of all are mindset changing.

An example of a killer fact is ‘For every dollar that goes from rich to poor countries in grants three dollars come back in debt repayments.’ It is true. It is one sentence. And turns your understanding of the world on its head.

We also tried to set aside the compassionate side, having made that point, to say also that this is about economic sense. You cannot keep up a process where the rich countries give one dollar and take three back indefinitely. We called on historical precedent where some of the richer countries got very deep debt cancellation. We picked particularly on the German government after the Second World War who got massive debt cancellation from Britain and United States. If it can be done for them, it can be done for others.

Finally we said it all over and over and over again. You say something about seven times to get it heard, about 30 times to get it understood, and about 90 or 100 times to get it remembered.
3. Building the movement
The main movement building device was the Jubilee 2000 petition. We set out in 1997 to say that we were going to create the world’s largest petition by the end of the year 2000. The largest petition in the world had 21 million signatures so we had to do better than that and in the end we got 24.2 million signatures. And we did that one signature at a time.

The petition also produced stories which were extremely useful for energizing the campaign and explaining it in the media. For example, there was one woman, a nun, in South India who collected 30,000 signatures single-handedly by going from one village to another.

The petition was the bedrock of the movement building process, but the movement had its moments as well. Two defining moments were the Birmingham G8 Summit in 1998 in the UK when 70,000 people formed a vast human chain around the G8 leaders as they met and a similar event a year later in Germany in the city of Cologne. Those moments brought together celebrities and the media, but most importantly, also huge numbers of ordinary people.

The campaign was fairly criticized for not being sufficiently southern driven, but there was a lot of work done to build the movement from both sides of the world and to meet in the middle.

As a little warning for those who want to create committees and structures, it was an organisation based on disorganisation, which I do not by any means put forward as a model for anybody because it was very dysfunctional at times. But in a short life campaign with a clear time limit and a clear focus it worked and it allowed most of the energy in the campaign to go into action and campaigning rather than into our own internal deliberations.

4. Focus with flexibility
We were determined to keep focused on that overall goal, but at the same time seizing opportunities as they came along. For example, when Hurricane Mitch hit Central America in late 1998, Honduras and Nicaragua, two heavily indebted nations, were very badly hit. We had hours rather than days to get the message through to the media that these two countries were paying something like $2 million every day in debt repayments while trying to deal with this extraordinary catastrophe. This made the gestures of aid from Britain, the United States and Japan and so on look fairly insignificant. And about a month later there was a moratorium agreed on debt payments from those two countries.

Bill Clinton helped as well in September 1999 by quite out of the blue saying that the United States was willing to cancel 100 per cent of the debts it was owed by some of the poorest countries. That was not the strategy that we had been working on at that time. We had been trying to get them all to move together, but he leapt, so we thought, let us get the others to follow. We put huge pressure on the British and about a month or two later they did and then we went to the Germans, the Canadians, the French and so on.
5. The ‘Wow!’ factor
We had a “wow” factor in the human chain when 70,000 people massed around the G8 leaders. We perhaps had another one when we pulled together a meeting between the Pope and Bono and a number of other musicians and Harvard economist Geoffrey Sachs. It was a moment born out of the mind of a colleague of mine who one afternoon in the office said maybe we should get the Pope to meet with Bono and everyone else said, “Yes, right, whatever”, and about six weeks later he made it happen 100 days before the millennium.

Sometimes wow factors do not work. At the Okinawa G8 Summit in 2000 they were discussing the digital divide. Technology is a very important issue but it was not the heart of the problem they should have been addressing. So we burnt laptops on a beach in Okinawa. However, the point we were trying to make just did not quite catch on.

And that comes to the final point: you have to tolerate some failure when you are trying for the best in campaigning. You have to be ready to say, “It didn’t work, let’s try something else.”

Drop the Debt: www.jubilee2000uk.org

“Poverty is one of the root causes of the evil of gun violence, combine this with corrupt governance and inadequate civil service. It is a dangerous mix. Here in Kenya we have had a deteriorating situation for the last four years. The country has plunged deeper into poverty, wars surround and there is an influx of arms. There is a disillusioned population impoverished by mismanagement and corruption. Last year alone 300 UN staff in Nairobi were threatened at gunpoint. Good governance and quality civil service could turn off the taps.” Red Cross participant
Next steps for the campaign to stop the use of child soldiers
Rory Mungoven, Coordinator of the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers

The child soldiers campaign has faced a lot of similar challenges to those found in the small arms realm. They are not clear cut issues of supply and demand. They go to complex root causes, of conflict and inequity linked to broader social dynamics.

The child soldiers campaign began as a standard setting exercise. In the 1980s when the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child was negotiated, a key loophole to an otherwise strong and very universally ratified instrument was the participation of children in armed conflict. Broadly through the 1990s a lot of pressure began to be rallied, to try and rectify this problem, to strengthen the rights of children, as well as international law with respect to children’s participation in armed forces and armed groups. Those negotiations were a long drawn out process. The Coalition was born in that process amongst the NGOs who had been most actively following the negotiating process.

Under negotiation was an optional protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child that would rectify this problem by raising the minimum age for the participation of children in hostilities, for the recruitment of children into militaries and into armed groups, to the age of 18 in line with all of the other rights of the child. The campaign began in 1998 when those negotiations had reached a dead lock. In the course of two years, partly through our campaign and through building a Coalition of willing governments similar to the landmines campaign, pressure mounted that finally brought those negotiations to fruition. In May 2001 the optional protocol was adopted.

Along the way we also engaged in other standard setting processes. We had this issue incorporated into the International Labour Organisation Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labour. In defining child soldiering as amongst the worst forms of child labour, we tapped into a new child labour constituency. We had it included in the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court, having the recruitment of children defined as a war crime and within the jurisdiction of that court. We had it picked up by different regional bodies, the Organisation of African Unity, the Organisation of American States, in Europe, in Asia, and we had it taken on the UN Security Council agenda with a series of resolutions from the Security Council on children and armed conflict broadly.

Too much – too soon?
One of our problems was perhaps we were too successful, too quickly. In some ways while we are learning from the success of these different campaigns, particularly from the landmines process, governments have also learnt some lessons and mostly they are keen not to see another Ottawa process. There was a very concerted strategy to keep our issue locked within a UN process. Partly as a result of the campaign, and partly because of attention building up around the issue there was pressure to cut a quick deal. Key governments like the US and the UK who had been as obstructive on this issue as the landmines issue could see another Ottawa in the making. They could that if this went on for long enough then the pressure would become so impossible to countervail that they would end up with something they did not like, so they cut a deal with a standard, which while it is a step forward has a lot of weaknesses.
The optional protocol has a lot of significant problems with it ranging from definitions to terminology. Because of these changed dynamics, and the pressure that had been built up on the issue we ended up with a standard that we were not completely happy with, a standard that was difficult to mobilise around. In some ways that is a similar experience to what came out of the July UN Conference on small arms.

**Keeping Focussed**

How did we transcend that? We kept our own goal. We have remained a campaign for a global ban on child soldiers with child soldiers defined in a very inclusive way. We have ended up with a lot of different standards rather than one unitary standard but we now have five or six different conventions we can use in our advocacy. For us they are just tools, they are just elements of the solution, not the total solution.

Another lesson I would offer is not be confined by the process, by someone else’s definition, and process because that is the UN discourse. Frame your own agenda and draw upon the existing initiatives and discourses that are around. We now define our campaign in broader terms. We say we are a coalition to which has essentially three elements;

1. To prevent the recruitment and use of children as soldiers
2. To secure their demobilisation
3. To ensure their rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

We are a coalition committed to ratification of the optional protocol, this is one of our key campaign messages. However it has also broadened to a much wider range of programmatic issues. It has also taken our advocacy from focussing largely on the international level to engaging in more local and national processes.

**Changing Structure for Sustainable Campaigning**

We have changed the way we work to reflect this new goal, and tried to build a long-term campaign base. The first thing we did was to build our campaign through a series of regional conferences. We decided to take the work to the national level and selected a set of priority countries, or in some cases, subregions where we would make a much more intensive investment in building the network and campaign. This has taken different forms: it has involved bringing people together, undertaking consultations, and sharing information. To bring NGOs on board and to bring local government actors on board, sometimes even to bring representatives of non-state actors and armed groups on board, and in particular, disseminating lessons learnt, disseminating successes and strategies that have been successfully applied elsewhere, mobilising resources and twinning NGOs with our international partners so that they can continue with a more sustained programmatic effort.

We have needed to be very flexible with this transition. Sometimes the child soldiers network has gone on to other issues. It has been a catalyst to taking on other children’s issues or other conflict issues. We have been very opportunistic in terms of where we have tried to incorporate our work locally. Sometimes we have just fitted our issue into an existing coalition, maybe an existing child rights grouping, sometimes into an ICC coalition or into a national landmines campaign. We have also had to be careful in this process of separating out what is the Coalition’s role as a catalyst, as something that maybe starts up a process from the programmatic agency’s role in terms of running sustained long-term programmes.
We developed a structure that was focused on supporting and building national coalitions in 40 plus countries, who are primarily focused on the lobbying around the optional protocol. We are trying to mobilise our network across those different countries for sustained campaigning on countries or particular governments, or a set of armed groups at certain times. We do four or five of these a year, the idea is not just to maximise our pressure on those governments and armed groups but also to build solidarity across the Coalition and to create linkages between partners in the north and our campaigns in the south.

We have developed thematic groups, as we found that many organisations want to buy into just one part of the agenda, and focus on girls, refugees or non-state actors. In response to this we have created working groups that allow organisations that do not naturally fit into a national campaign to participate more fully on these thematic issues. Just as the Humanitarian Coalition has grown up within IANSA, an important development has been many of the programmatic agencies within our campaign have wanted to build their own network, to share good practice and to do policy development on particular challenges and issues that they are facing in the field.

As our work has become more multi-faceted, and our goals have become broader, it has been very important for us to have some unifying projects. One focus has been the ratification process for the optional protocol. Another is the preparation of a global report, providing a compilation of information and data. We also assembled a children’s war memorial to which we drew the names and identities of child soldiers, who have been killed over the past year. It is a portable war memorial which is a tribute displayed at conferences, initiatives and events around the world. It has also been very important for us to celebrate success. For example the demobilisation of 3500 child soldiers from southern Sudan or the change of the Colombian government’s position on the recruitment of children.

Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers: www.child-soldiers.org

“The importance of humanitarian agencies engaging in efforts to control small arms cannot be overstated. To date, the information is not available from the most accessible official sources in countries of greatest need. Working in disorganised settings, humanitarian, human rights, development and health agencies are all the more crucial to providing that base of information that is needed to analyse how to deal with the problem.”

Brian Rawson, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
Campaign for an International Criminal Court

Betty Murungi, Lawyer and a member of FIDA, Kenya which is part of the Campaign for an International Criminal Court

The excessive availability of small arms in many regions of the world makes them the most utilised weapons in the predominantly internal conflicts that are taking place all over the world, and thus the primary weapon used in the commission of crimes during these conflicts. Genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are largely committed not by soldiers with heavy artillery, but by people who take up small arms against others in their own communities and countries.

While the use of small arms is not expressly prohibited in the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), if these weapons are used to commit crimes as serious as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, the individuals that use them will be held accountable. The ICC will be the first permanent international court capable of trying individuals for these crimes. It is expected that the existence of the ICC will provide powerful deterrent against committing such crimes. Where they continue to be committed, investigations and prosecutions may begin at an early stage, thus contributing to the cessation of violence. The existence of the ICC will also provide an important contribution to the healing process for individuals and communities in the aftermath of a conflict, which will undermine the potential for further violence.

The Coalition for the International Criminal Court (the Coalition or CICC) has been in existence since 1995, with the goal of promoting the establishment of a fair, effective and independent ICC. There are now more than 1000 member organisations in the Coalition, from all regions of the world, and representing various constituencies, such as children, women, victims, faith-based groups and the peace movement. It began with a meeting of a small group of NGOs in New York that were monitoring the UN General Assembly debate on a draft statute for an ICC. These NGOs agreed at the end of the meeting to form an NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court. They asked one of the organisations in attendance, the World Federalist Movement, to run the Coalition as a project, and they asked the Executive Director of the organisation, William Pace, to serve as the Coalition’s Convenor. An informal steering committee was established, including Amnesty International, Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme, Human Rights Watch, the International Commission of Jurists, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, No Peace Without Justice, Parliamentarians for Global Action and the World Federalist Movement.

From its inception, the Coalition sought to bring together a broad-based network of NGOs and international law experts to develop strategies on substantive legal and political issues relating to the proposed ICC statute. A key goal of the Coalition was and is, to foster awareness and support for the ICC among a wide range of civil society organisations, including those focusing on human rights, international law, humanitarian issues, peace, the rights of women and children, religion and many other sectors. In addition, after working to ensure that a treaty conference was held, and providing expertise at that conference, the Coalition has had the following additional goals:

- obtaining signatures and ratifications of the treaty;
ensuring that countries that ratify develop and adopt national legislation so that they can comply with their treaty obligations;
• promoting the development of ICC networks at the national and regional level;
• supporting the work of the UN Preparatory Commission working on supplemental instruments that will determine how the Court functions;
• and preparing for the first year of the Court’s operations.

The Coalition has served as a facilitator for civil society involvement in the negotiation process, a coordinating body for the NGOs involved, a liaison between governments and NGOs, and as a principle source of information on the ICC. Throughout the last three years of work by the ICC Preparatory Committee, some of the activities of the Coalition secretariat have included arranging countless meetings for NGOs with representatives of governments, UN officials and others involved in the ICC negotiations; producing and maintaining extensive electronic resources and print publications on the ICC; and promoting education and awareness of the ICC proposals and negotiations at relevant events and conferences around the world.

Vibrant national and regional networks have now been established in every region of the world. The Coalition maintains its base in New York, and has coordinators in Latin America, Asia, Europe and Africa.

The Coalition is well on its way to achieving the 60 ratifications required for the Statute to enter into force. A goal of achieving the necessary 60 ratification’s by July 17, 2002, set to “celebrate” the fourth anniversary of the adoption of the Rome Statute. We expect to surpass that goal, as we already have 43 ratification’s and at least 20 more countries are well advanced in the process.

One of the most important strategies in the ICC campaign was to develop a strong relationship, early in the process, with the like-minded group of countries to advocate for the ICC. This relationship allowed us to promote the development of principles that would govern the work of these like-minded countries. These principles not only helped to focus the work, but also proved to be an important tool of advocacy for NGOs to keep governments on track during particularly difficult periods, such as when the pressure was heaviest to accept proposals by the United States that would have undermined the effectiveness of the Court. It is also helpful for the governments to be able to use membership in such a group as a reason to refuse to accept undesirable proposals. It is crucially important to try to influence the composition of a core group of states so that it cuts across government groupings that can be divisive in other context. Seek to avoid divisions into the Non-Aligned Movement versus the North, Anglophone versus Francophone, the EU versus non-EU countries. This group must be as inclusive and representative as possible.

This relationship must be one that truly reflects a new model of diplomacy, with governments, NGOs and international organisations agreeing to mutual goals that are commonly defined. Governments have the opportunity to see the value of working closely with NGOs, viewing us as experts, and strategic partners. This does not mean that we forfeit our role as advocates, but it means that we advocate in ways that allow us to get our messages to governments while maintaining our strategic relationship. Some NGOs within any network or coalition may choose to take more adversarial approaches, and this also has value.
Building Coalitions
Inclusivity and representativeness are critical. The availability of information in as many languages as possible is critical. It has also served us well to have thematic teams for each of the substantive issues being discussed at the Preparatory Commission meetings at the UN, as well as caucuses to focus on the particular perspectives such as violence against women. With regard to the creation of teams to follow the issues in the inter-governmental process, this has really allowed NGOs working on the ICC to have the influence they have had. No single organisation could have kept on top of all the developments, and a team structure allows organisations to cooperate to most effect, while allowing them the flexibility to maintain their own organisational positions.

Perhaps the most important reason that the Coalition has stayed together with very few rifts over the years has been the approach of keeping the Coalition’s goals to general principles. Members have a forum to develop common positions and approaches, and to collaborate when they agree, but the Coalition as a whole speaks with one voice only on issues related to these basic principles. Papers and letters that members can sign on to are produced by participating NGOs, rather than producing these as Coalition statements.

In terms of structure, decentralization of the ICC campaign, in particular after the adoption of the treaty for the ICC in Rome in 1998, has been the key factor in obtaining signatures and ratifications, in ensuring that implementing legislation is developed, and creating widespread understanding of the issue among NGOs, and the media. While you can never involve enough people to make support for an issue as widespread as it needs to be, having people involved from every region is the most effective, and appropriate, approach. The encouragement of the formation of national and regional networks has worked well, as these networks can then develop a more strategic approach to the issue at that level. The role of Coalition Secretariat is then to ensure the international organisations interested in working in a particular region, in our case groups like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Parliamentarians for Global Action, and others, collaborate with those working at the national and regional level. Individuals and organisations are often quite willing to collaborate so that each can be as effective as possible – they just need a forum for this and to have an overarching body can facilitate this.

The Coalition has a Steering Committee, to serve as an advisory body and to help the Coalition Secretariat provide better service to all its members. In addition, the Coalition Secretariat must be committed to promoting the work of the member organisations and not its own agenda. The Coalition Secretariat is not an independent organisation but a project of one of its members, as the ICC Coalition Secretariat is, requiring the host organisation to be careful not to use the coalition to highlight its own work. The Secretariat must exist to maximise the participation of civil society in all regions and sectors, to meet needs for financial, political, and even technical support whenever possible, to be the focal point for the collection and dissemination of relevant information, and to promote and facilitate cooperation.

International Criminal Court Home Page: www.igc.org/icc
4. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE – CAMPAIGN IDEAS

Campaign proposal: global assault weapons ban
Lora Lumpe, Norwegian Church Aid delivered by Conmany Wesseh, Centre for Democratic Empowerment, Liberia

The goal of this campaign is to keep assault rifles out of civilian hands and out of the hands of irresponsible government forces.

What difference would it make if achieved?
High powered, high capacity automatic assault rifles are most spectacularly lethal in conflict and post conflict zones around the world. They have been used by paramilitary groups in Colombia and Mexico to commit massacres of peasants and activists; they have been used by warlords in Sierra Leone and Congo to terrorize civilian populations; they have been used by terrorists in Egypt to slaughter tourists at Luxor. These weapons have also been used to slaughter innocent children and bystanders in “peaceful” countries, like the United States, Australia and Switzerland. These weapons are a staple of nearly all armies around the world, as well as some of the most aggressive police and anti-terror forces.

The idea would not be to ban these weapons globally, but rather that states agree to bar civilian possession of deadly assault rifles and refrain from exporting such weapons except to law abiding (i.e. human rights respecting) forces under the control of lawful governments.

National implementation of this law would have to be forceful, and violations would have to be investigated and prosecuted.

If supplier states were compelled to agree to these steps, this campaign would result in reducing the state authorized commercial trade in these murderous weapons.

Restricting the overall trade would raise the costs of blackmarket dealing in these weapons and make it more difficult for bandits, terrorists and warlords to get such guns.

What are the possible steps for achieving this goal?
There are about 60 states that produce assault rifles (see Small Arms Survey Yearbook 2001, p. 20).

A first step might be for campaigners in all manufacturing/supplying countries to press for a moratorium on assault rifle and ammunition exports by all countries to all countries – pending a report by the exporting states about where they have licensed such weapons for export in the preceding year(s), and to whom (including whom they have approved to manufacture their assault rifles under a licensed production agreement).

In the United States Senate, a bill currently pending would bar the commercial export from the US (that is, from the US manufacturer to any non state forces) of any automatic or semi-automatic assault weapons. Passage and aggressive
implementation of such a measure in all of the assault rifle making and exporting countries would be a medium term goal. A call for a global moratorium on exports of these weapons into any/all conflict zones might be the longer term goal.

What are strengths of this campaign?
It is relatively easy to argue that NO civilian should have access to assault rifles (as is law in most developed countries, including even the United States) and that military and police should be trained and restrained in their use.

The child soldiers campaign would likely support this focus on these weapons, since these weapons are the ones most often singled out as allowing the recruitment/use of child soldiers.

This measure is likely to appeal to the humanitarian community, as assault rifles are directly related to the crisis situations relief organisations are most often called in to alleviate.

What are problems/complications?
Human rights organisations might not support a weapons specific focus, since the weapons themselves are not indiscriminate (even though they are often used indiscriminately). Health groups in developed and mid level countries would find this focus less appealing than a focus on handguns, which result in a larger number of casualties than do assault rifles. However, it is important to view a campaign around these weapons not as the only or final word on controlling small arms trade, but rather as a near term next step that - if realized - would contribute to the safety of people in all parts of the world.

Background from the US
In 1989 President Bush I stopped the importation of assault rifles into the United States for civilian purchase. The number of imported assault rifles traced to crime dropped by 45 percent the following year. Assault weapons still pose a major danger to Americans, particularly law enforcement officers. A recent study by The Brady Campaign analyzed 122 fatal law enforcement shootings between January 1, 1994 and September 30, 1995. The study found that at least 13 percent of the officers were shot with assault weapons.

In 1994 the US Congress passed a law banning manufacture of assault rifles for purchase by civilians within the United States. However, export of these weapons to civilians in other countries was not banned.

“Achievements in Latin America and Africa to impose moratoriums need to be better understood and applied elsewhere where possible and appropriate.”

Comment from a Workshop Participant
The Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers
Greg Puley, Project Coordinator with the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress and Michael Crowley, Senior Analyst with the British American Security Information Council

Why do we need a convention?
We know that irresponsible arms transfers fuel violent conflict, undermine sustainable development, and contribute to countless human rights violations throughout the world. We know also that the tragic consequences of these transfers are felt for years after the weapons have filled their most immediate purpose. Many of the weapons destined for Central American armies or paramilitary forces in the 1980s are now to be found in the hands of the gangs that roam the countryside of Nicaragua, or of teenage boys on the streets of San Salvador, or of untrained private security guards in San José. More still are being reshipped to guerrilla or paramilitary groups in Colombia, ready to fuel yet another war, to destroy yet more lives.

So we know that the human costs of these sales are enormous, and we know that governments bear the primary responsibility for preventing and combating them. One important way of working to prevent such transfers on human rights and humanitarian grounds is to develop national and regional systems of restraint in weapons sales. However, in the absence of a common global standard of restraint, states will always have recourse to the argument that 'if we don't approve this dodgy weapons sale, somebody else will'. Therefore what is ultimately necessary is a core common set of global minimum standards to prevent the most irresponsible weapons sales turned down by one supplier from being picked up by another.

What would the convention do?
The international community has already developed a series of binding agreements concerning human rights, international humanitarian law and peaceful co-existence which establish a number of important limitations on states' freedom to transfer weapons. Hence what we are proposing is to take the existing framework, clarify it, give it the force of renewed commitment, and apply it consistently and effectively to the trade in weapons.

The proposed convention arranges states responsibilities in the arms trade into three general groupings:
1. States have a responsibility to ensure that all arms sales are authorized. Each agreement for the provision of weapons must be reviewed individually, and each must be scrutinized in light of other obligations under international law. It is the most basic, fundamental responsibility of all, and as such is the first provision of the proposed Framework Convention.

2. Arms transfers must not violate states' direct commitments under international law. This simply re-iterates a very clear existing responsibility not to authorize transfers, a) of certain types of weapons which are prohibited under international humanitarian law because they are incapable of distinguishing between combatants and civilians or are of a nature to cause superfluous harm or injury; or b) arms transfers to a particular country, where the UN or other regional body to which the state is a party has imposed a binding arms embargo.
3. This grouping is concerned with the use to which the transferred weapons are to be put. This is the crux of the matter for those of us who are primarily concerned with the human impact. It is the specific application to the arms trade of that body of international obligations aimed at protecting people: human rights, humanitarian law, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. If there exists a clear risk that a arms transfer could contribute to any of these grave violations, or be diverted towards those ends, that arms transfer must not go ahead. This, then, is the central operative and normative purpose of the Framework Convention. This is the golden rule. This is simply the international legal codification of the principle: ‘no arms for atrocities’.

**What would a campaign for such a convention look like?**

It important to underline that the Convention gives the international community, gives YOU a future tool to ensure that States abide by their responsibilities...that States do not send arms to those forces in your country who will use such weapons to hurt and kill your people, abuse your human rights, impoverish or destroy your society.

To develop this tool:
- we need more research to develop an irrefutable body of evidence of when, where, how state authorized weapons transfers have contributed to such human suffering.
- we need to build national and regional systems of effective arms control and restraint, to build consensus and momentum towards an international agreement.
- we need a strong and simple popular message (like ‘no arms for atrocities’) to make it comprehensible to everyone, and that allows people to make the connection, in a direct and compelling way, between the unregulated trade in weapons and the violence in their communities or on their television screens.
- we need a steering mechanism for the campaign which is open, transparent, and inclusive of a broad cross section of regional and thematic representation.

On all of the above, the current group of NGOs that have developed the Framework Convention are eager to get to work, and very eager for dialogue, feedback and suggestions from all interested parties. Our goal is to help build the broadest possible campaign towards an international agreement. We believe that the human rights, the humanitarian, the health and development communities should be at the forefront of this campaign.

We believe that the Framework Convention is a tool that can and must be used by all of us in our fight to end the scourge of weapons proliferation and misuse. We are convinced that if we do not place government responsibility at the very heart of our campaign agenda, we may condemn ourselves to repeat the fatal flaw of the recent UN Conference, and in so doing be guilty of holding the dealings of arms brokers and traffickers to greater scrutiny and higher standards of behaviour than we do the dealings of our own governments.

Our proposal to you today is to accept a challenge - a challenge to make governments abide by their own rules. And though this challenge is ambitious, and though it will take several years, we must not shrink away from it, because if we do, then the massive human costs of arms will happen again and again, with nothing to stop it.

**BASIC:** [www.basicint.org](http://www.basicint.org)
Arias Foundation – Framework Convention website: [www.armslaw.org](http://www.armslaw.org)
No Arms for Atrocities
Lisa Misol, Researcher, Arms Division of Human Rights Watch

This presentation focuses on ideas for a campaign to prevent human rights abuses at the end of the barrel of a gun. "No Arms for Atrocities" is both a slogan for a campaign and an approach to carrying out such a campaign.

As the focus of a campaign, it has several compelling features:
1. It offers a simple, clear, and powerful message;
2. It focuses on the human cost of small arms misuse;
3. It provides a framework for the work required to pursue needed policy changes;
4. It suggests a theme to unify our work, which has various perspectives (for example, health and development).

How Might it Work?
No Arms for Atrocities can provide an umbrella under which we as an NGO community can advocate for specific policy changes that, if fully implemented, would reduce human rights abuse from small arms.

The policy changes we would advocate could include:
- Binding codes of conduct for arms transfers;
- Greater transparency, including mechanisms such as small arms registers;
- Brokering controls;
- Enforcement of arms embargoes;
- An international treaty combining some or all of the above.

These are opportunities on the supply side. There are also policies to push for amongst recipient countries, still under the "No Arms for Atrocities" umbrella. Some example include:
- Import moratoria;
- Transparency regarding arms purchases and stockpiles;
- Greater controls on domestic weapons and ammunition production, including those produced under license;
- Police and military reform – to stem the misuse of these weapons by state forces.

This approach creates space and opportunities to pursue international objectives with strong national campaigns that relate to local conditions. The slogan could be adapted for country campaigns, for example: No British Arms for Atrocities, No Brazilian Arms for Atrocities, No South African Arms for Atrocities, No Kenyan Ammunition for Atrocities. Thus the campaign would generate both national and international pressure on governments to clean up their behavior.

Another critical dimension under this campaign proposal would be regional action. We could tackle the small arms problem at this level by pushing for regional arms registers, regional codes of conduct, binding agreements on small arms controls, and cross-regional cooperation. This would help create
momentum for states to act. We would combine national, regional and international objectives under one campaign and could both use and create opportunities at more than one level at a time.

**Why Consider Pursuing this Approach?**

- It highlights human costs, which are at the core of the humanitarian community’s approach to small arms issues.
- It emphasises the responsibility of governments to tackle the problem (for example, No British Arms for Atrocities) and makes clear that governments who irresponsibly supply arms may be complicit in their misuse.
- It has flexibility that can be tailored for national context, and that can be focussed on both supplier governments and the recipients of the weapons.
- It provides a common message to unify and reinforce work at different levels and in different countries.
- The use of a common slogan helps to build identity for the campaign as a global movement.
- It shows that the problem is not insurmountable by pointing to who is responsible and what they should do to stop atrocities.
- Finally, such an approach can popularise ideas that otherwise may seem irrelevant to those in small arms-affected countries, as well as the public in the countries that supply arms, and it’s this essential public pressure that we need to capture and to direct toward governments in order to achieve our objective: No arms for atrocities.

Human Rights Watch: [www.hrw.org](http://www.hrw.org)

“Small arms availability and misuse, affect our mandates and often further complicates our work, whether it reverse developmental gains, hinders humanitarian assistance or demands resource intensive medical care for injured victims, and additional security burdens and fears for staff.”

_comment from a workshop participant_
Human Security - Not Small Arms Abuse
Brian Wood, Coordinator of the Military, Security and Police Programme at Amnesty International Secretariat

Small arms are the cause of big crimes. It is necessary to have a global campaign to strengthen controls on the proliferation and misuse of small arms based on respect for international law. A global campaign with two distinct but interrelated parts: 1) stopping the proliferation of small arms and, 2) preventing the abuse of small arms.

1) "No arms for atrocities"
The goal of this campaign is identified with the "Golden Rule on Supply", which should be included in state policy in all countries covering all world regions and incorporated in the UN Programme Of Action by the 2006 Review Conference.

The Golden Rule On Supply: No government should authorise any transfer of small arms or light weapons where there is a clear risk that these items will be used by the likely recipient to commit: a) grave human rights abuses, b) war crimes or c) crimes against humanity.

Golden Rule On Demand: All states must uphold human rights and apply non-violent means as far as possible before resorting to the use of force. The lethal use of small arms is legal a) in law enforcement only when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life and b) in military conflict only if proportionate and targeted.

When we talk about abuse caused by small arms we refer to:
1. Crime by armed citizens, gangs, syndicates etc
2. Human rights violations by "law enforcers", ie those with powers of arrest and detention could include military, police and other security personnel,
3. War crimes by "combatants" in armed conflict, ie soldiers, paramilitaries, armed political groups,
4. Crimes against humanity by any of the above.

Please see in a table in the Annex in which the human rights violations are associated to the applicable humanitarian law.

In order to reach the goal an international campaign should focus on:
1. Advocacy - Promote the Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers based on International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in all world regions and target the 600 or more companies producing these weapons;
2. Projects:
   – Popularise the "Golden Rule", for example using actions linked to sport and games, the slogan could be: “Play by the Rules”;
   – Publish "Small Arms: Big Crimes" materials and connect it to events on Afghanistan, Rwanda, DR Congo, Indonesia, Colombia, etc;
   – National actions at arms fairs or at factories in supplier countries.

2) "Prevent small arms abuse"
The second part of this international global campaign is to prevent the misuse of small arms. The goal is a global review of all states' use of small arms in terms of
international law and standards and the creation of a UN Rapporteur on Small Arms by 2004.

In order to reach this goal an international campaign should focus on:
1) Advocacy: focus on governments at the UN Human Rights Commission and use regional Programme Of Action meetings;
2) Projects:
   - Global Lobbying: publish Humanitarian Coalition draft review to strengthen accountability and training of soldiers and police in the use of force in line with Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law;
   - Community Safety, e.g. Mobile Videos and drama groups to promote civil-military and civil-police structures for NGO monitoring and best practice;
   - Impunity: seek redress for victims and prosecution of small arms abusers
   - Civic Education: make general public aware of risks (e.g. "The Travellers Guide to the Risks of Small Arms Abuse")

The emerging agenda on Human Security
a) Military and law enforcement organisations should be accountable to elected civilian authorities and operate according to the rule of law - this should be based upon international human rights and humanitarian law and accompanied by judicial and penal reform;

b) All security sector financial plans and reports, as well as other resources such as personnel policies and recruitment projections, should be made available to legislatures and to the wider public;

c) Civil society organisations should be actively encouraged and strengthened to monitor the activities of defence and law enforcement agencies - civil policing to be developed with active engagement of local communities;

d) Regional institutions and arrangements should be developed to enhance security co-operation;

e) International action to prevent armed conflict, step up de-mining and support peace-building and mediation efforts, including demobilization, disarmament and the reintegration of former combatants - increasingly this includes cooperation to stem the proliferation of small arms.

International donors could support:
- International aid projects to prevent the proliferation and misuse of small arms should promote strict adherence to international human rights standards and humanitarian law.
- Projects should include concerted efforts to increase the capacity of law enforcement agencies to control the proliferation and misuse of small arms, in accordance with international standards, including the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.
- An international fund should be established to provide resources to assist countries in the collection and destruction of small arms which are not in legal civilian possession or acquired for legitimate national defence or internal security purposes.

In order to reach this goal an international campaign should focus on:
1) Advocacy: focus on governments at the UN Human Rights Commission and use regional Programme Of Action review meetings;
2) Projects:
   - Global Lobbying: to strengthen accountability and training of soldiers and police in line with Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law; especially the neglected UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials,
   - Community Safety, e.g. Mobile Videos and drama groups to promote civil-military and civil-police structures for NGO monitoring and best practice;
   - Impunity: seek redress for victims and prosecution of small arms abusers
   - Civic Education: make general public aware of risks (e.g. "The Travellers Guide to the Risks of Small Arms Abuse")

Amnesty International: www.amnesty.org

This is a problem that cannot be solved just focusing on any one level. The task is to translate the solutions into effective options for campaigning at national, regional and international levels. 

Comment from Workshop Participant
Ideas from workshops on campaigning

Participants meeting in workshop format offered their views on a number of key topics, which are summarised here.

Some ideas for the focus of an international campaign
In addition to those ideas already discussed around developing legal instruments (such as the brokering convention, framework convention etc.) other ideas were proposed for further consideration:

- Focusing on taking assault rifles out of civilian hands could be the raison d’etre of a campaign which allows a host of other options to be pursued. It could provide a practical wedge to demand safety and security for civilians.

- Reducing the amount of guns in circulation. We could set as our goal reducing guns in circulation by 1 million weapons a year up to 2006.

Challenges

- Participants discussed some of the difficulties facing the humanitarian community as we tackle the small arms issue. They noted that one of the challenges we face is to inspire action from the ordinary people. It is obvious that many people still find small arms not to be a very relevant issue, a technical or boring issue that does not resonate with them. People to people connection can change this: we need real stories and messages!

- The lack of concerted political will is a huge obstacle. We have to finesse our messages so that we build that political will. The flipside is that currently we have insufficient allies.

- It was suggested that one approach would be to look at the obstacles/arguments that are put in our way and do some work on laying them to rest - e.g. such as the argument that in fact machetes produce more civilian casualties than small arms.

- How can we make statistics real to people? What does 500 million mean to ordinary people? This is all part of trying to move away from the cerebral to the real.

Opportunities

- The 2006 Review Conference for the 2001 UN World Conference on small arms is a clear opportunity to work towards and mobilise around. The humanitarian community missed the boat at the 2001 Conference, and very little attention was directed toward human rights and humanitarian issues. The path to the Review Conference offers us a chance to change the political landscape, so that governments feel significant pressure to act.

- One suggestion was that there is the need to have a rapid reaction to articles about the impact of small arms in communities so that if we see something in the media then we can respond to it quickly with a set of demands and options for actions which can be localised to respond to the situation.

- Another participant suggested that stories from the human rights and humanitarian community if harnessed can have a great impact. Everyone here has got many stories up their sleeves. We can translate them into action.
Logos
Logos need to be as simple as possible and should be tested outside of the arms community, because we have all got used to seeing broken guns, guns with knots, guns with lines through and that might actually mean something totally different to the man or the woman on the street. We need to test them in the real world rather than amongst us.

Possible WOW ideas:
- A trial of governments responsible for arms deals which has led to genocide and chucking them in gaol.
- One thousand pounds, what could that buy in terms of education for people. Every child that dies could be a future leader from small arms, and it could be your child that dies and how that would make you feel.
- A register of gun dealers in your country.
- Building on the Silent March, and going global.
- An image of one gun and 30 bodies, to highlight the impact of one gun.
- Celebrities: Michael Jordan whose dad was a victim of shooting.
- Trays of the human form filled with bullets.
- 2004 is exactly 10 years after the Rwanda genocide.
- The World Cup “play by the rules”.
- A tourists guide for gun free zones i.e. empty pages.
- The world press photo exhibition gets a lot of exposure.
- Tracking bullets or weapons and their victims and where they were made, ie. this bullet manufactured at the factory near you shipped by British Airways, transported by a Land Rover and killed Joe Smith on his way to school.
- A big concert to link up capital cities.
- An arms song, number one for Christmas.

Possible Slogans:
- Light weapons, heavy cost
- ‘Stop the bleeding trade’ - could possibly work in the UK.
- Keep out of arms way
- Keep abuse at arms length
- You might not be interested, but guns are interested in you.
- Arm free zones
- Say no to guns
- Aim higher, no arms to abusers
- Educate the enforcers
- Shun the gun, say no to the gun
- Shot to pieces
- Small arms, big harms
- Small arms, big problem
- Small arms, big crimes
- Small arms, big abuse
- Aim higher
- Guns travel further than bullets
- Shot to pieces, shot away
5. FRAMEWORK AND CONCLUSION

The conference provided an excellent forum for NGOs of widely differing backgrounds and mandates to get together and discuss the problems caused by small arms and how to address them. However, in some ways, our work appeared to be disparate – many NGOs working in different ways with different outputs. We wanted to find a way of pulling these strands together, to

- better conceptualise the broad spectrum of our work and how it all fits together to achieve a shared goal
- unite health, human rights, relief and development NGOs, helping to build a critical mass of effort which would push forward to achieve that common goal
- create an arena in the small arms debate for a people-centred approach.

Hence at the end of the conference, the following Nairobi Framework for Action on Small Arms was presented and discussed. It was accepted by the participants as a useful approach to thinking about the way forward, noting that although it was a good first step, it was not yet perfect.

A campaign with a humanitarian focus should highlight the human cost of small arms – including underdevelopment, social violence, human rights abuses, fear and insecurity - with the clear demands to stop the availability and supply of weapons. This is the humanitarian community’s ‘comparative advantage’. Most efforts to date have focussed little attention to this humanitarian dimension to the problem.

The meeting challenged us to think outside of our organisational perspectives and think as a humanitarian community as a whole. What do we have in common, an overarching objective that we can all be moving towards, at the same time that we are undertaking the core work of our individual organisations? What do we all have in common that we can put forward as our concrete contribution to the small arms debate that prioritises the humanitarian dimension? The meeting was an important first step in this “conversation” of refining the options, encouraging lateral thinking and innovative responses.

There were a number of issues that echoed through the meeting; the importance of the clarity of message, the visibility factors, the creation of irrefutable facts, the importance of having cross-section of voices and multiple constituencies with a broad base internationally and a grounded way of working, locally the importance of taking advantage of opportunities as they come along and being creative, the whole question of keeping your goal clear and yet being able to adapt to circumstances as they present themselves.

We have been clear about the fact that there is a need for action. There is an urgent need to confront the human suffering caused by small arms. Everybody has their own reasons why they know this to be true. On that point we are of one voice.

The organisations gathered at the meeting are witnesses to immense human suffering and are impeded by arms as we struggle to relieve the suffering. We speak from our own personal and organisational experience.
To confront the problem, action is needed now on two fronts. Neither will be effective in reducing the human cost of small arms without the other. These two fronts fit together as part of an overall framework:
- The first is a flow front - we must stop the flow of arms to abusers.
- The second is a community front - we must make our communities safe from armed violence.

It is clear that reducing the flow of weapons to abusers is a critical step. There are clear links between the simple availability of arms and the levels of violence – the presence of arms escalates the impact of conflict and can destabilize a difficult situation. Stopping arms flows to known abusers deprives them of the tools to carry out more atrocities. But this is not enough. Work has to be done at a community level to create the environment for peaceful resolution of conflict, to ensure that arms are used responsibly and for legitimate defence purposes only.

**The Nairobi Framework for Action on Small Arms**

- **`FLOW`** A targeted campaign
  - one campaign, one target
  - Stopping the flow of arms to abusers

- **`COMMUNITY`** A collection of concerted activity
  - many activities, several targets
  - Making communities safe from armed violence

On the **flow** front, in order to stop the flow of arms to abusers, we must:
- control the legal flow. This means working on international conventions and regional agreements to prevent arms transfers to abusers.
- stop the illegal flow, tackling brokers, preventing diversion and enforcing embargoes.

The primary targets of the flow front are governments.

On the **community** front, there are a number of things that we know need to be worked on, including:
- reducing the quantity of arms through collection and destruction, and national/domestic gun programmes
- ensuring responsible use by those who are supposed to be legitimate users of arms by reforming the security sector
- punishing violations and working to end impunity, which is also a dimension of the flow front
- reducing the resort to arms through conflict resolution and transformation.

The targets in this case are more diverse, governments, security services and other users of guns.

In terms of the campaigns, it is clear that the approach adopted by those working on each front will be different:
- the flow front is a targeted campaign, to prevent the uncontrolled proliferation of arms and hence stop the flow of arms to abusers. This will have a clear focused objective and be an international campaign.
- the community front is a collection of concerted activity to make communities safe from armed violence. It has many activities and several targets. Much of this work will be at a local or national level, targeting specific problems within communities. However, some may benefit from international campaigning, such as campaigning to ensure that governments promote a rule of law and security sectors do not abuse human rights.

We recognise that organisations may focus on one or other fronts, or both, depending on our relative strengths and chosen focus. The framework clearly demonstrates how the work we all do, even if diverse, distinctive, with widely differing resources, all contributes to the reduction of the human cost of small arms.

Hence the two fronts are symbiotic; dependent on each other and mutually reinforcing, not just coexisting. Actors working on each front should share information and experience to inform and guide those on the other. The evaluation of our effectiveness lies with the community front - whether or not our communities are safer.

Hence, at the end of the conference, progress has been made in developing a humanitarian framework for small arms work, one that outlines how we as the humanitarian community can move forward to advance our shared goals and reduce the devastating human toll of small arms. There is still much to be done in:
- Building a humanitarian dialogue on small arms – making our voices heard
- Fleshing out the framework, building on the progress made and strengthening our understanding of the interplay between the demand and supply sides
- Undertaking research to build a strong foundation of knowledge for campaigning and lobbying work
- Joint campaigning, putting our strengths and perspectives together to achieve great things
- Advocacy work, persuading the decision makers
- Media work, getting our message out to those with the power to change and those with the power to influence
- Building the coalition of NGOs working on humanitarian aspects of small arms.

**PLEASE JOIN US AND GET INVOLVED!**
ANNEXES


On July 9-20, 2001, the United Nations sponsored a governmental conference on “the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons in all its aspects” in New York. Many nongovernmental organizations attended. The following is an analysis of the conference and its outcome from the perspective of humanitarian, human rights, health and development organizations that were there. Their main assessment: The conference was a humanitarian failure.

Why the Conference was a humanitarian failure
The Conference failed in the eyes of many, especially those in the human rights, humanitarian, health and development communities, because it failed to achieve what we considered to be key objectives.

These objectives were to have a robust Program of Action that, in addition to having strong normative language on government responsibility and acknowledging the human rights and humanitarian consequences of small arms proliferation and misuse, would include a binding commitment on signatories to negotiate one or more treaties on small arms and light weapons (SALW) that would:

1. Reflect the cardinal norm (the “golden rule”): “No arms for atrocities,” and set a high uniform standard for arms trade controls, consistent with states’ existing obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law.
2. Establish a transparent universal mechanism of marking, tracing, record keeping, and reporting, including through registers.
3. Regulate the activities of arms brokers.

The Program of Action does not even approximate these objectives:

1. It is not binding, nor does it provide a single mandate for the negotiation of a binding instrument
2. It has no significant normative language placing primary responsibility for uncontrolled SALW proliferation on states.
3. It virtually ignores the human cost of irresponsible small arms flows, consistently privileging the values and legal concepts of sovereignty, national security and non-interference over those of human rights and humanitarian law.

Several issues regarding the Conference process itself were also of concern for the humanitarian, human rights, health and development communities. These factors further compounded the disappointment of the Conference, and include:

Conference Scope
The scope of the conference was too limited from the start, forcing those states with a progressive approach and NGOs with a human rights and humanitarian focus to fight an uphill battle to push open the door that was kept ajar by the phrase “in all its aspects” in the conference mandate. The conference came too early at a time when
political will to seriously tackle the human cost of small arms proliferation and misuse is not fully developed. Clearly most states are not prepared to put human security before national security. However the Conference placed the small arms crisis on the agenda of some regional bodies and some states who are encouraged to consolidate this focus into action in the coming years.

**Consensus**

This conference, like all United Nations conferences, was driven by consensus, which, for all practical purposes, meant the lowest common denominator. States could water down the Program of Action simply by drawing “red lines” about which they refused to engage in any serious negotiation. Many states did—to the detriment of the comprehensive security of their own citizens suffering under the threat of small arms violence and abuse.

The most prominent of these was the United States government, which successfully drove down the common denominator to the lowest conceivable level. The U.S. position had been tough throughout the negotiating process (including the PrepComs). Ironically there was no difference between the base-line positions taken by the Clinton and Bush administrations – merely a difference in delivery and style.

Other states were either too divided or were insufficiently organized to make a common front. Many governments came to the meetings ill-prepared, disinterested and effectively ceded control over the conference agenda to ‘rejectionist’ states. Still, the European Union and some other states deserve credit for trying to rally others around certain key concerns, such as state responsibility and human rights.

States’ main concern with respect to the SALW question was the ‘destabilizing accumulation’ of these weapons, but that concern was not sufficient to bring states together behind a progressive agenda, and in fact proved divisive, demonstrating that one state’s destabilizing accumulation is another state’s welcome influx of weapons needed for self-defence. The humanitarian dimension of the SALW question, which could have provided the glue for a higher level of consensus as well as pressure on states to address the problem in a constructive and timely manner, was largely absent.

**Civil Society Participation**

NGOs were effectively excluded from participating in the conference. Granted one three-hour session of presentations and relegated to the gallery for the mainly symbolic high-level speeches, NGO delegates were otherwise carefully kept out of meetings that made a difference. This is increasingly standard practice for UN conferences despite the Ottawa Process providing a model for genuine and collaborative exchange between states and civil society.

Despite the repetition of the importance of civil society participation throughout the Conference process, during the Conference itself it was a pale shadow of what it could and should have been. Those few states that allowed NGO representatives onto national delegations are to be commended in this regard.

**U.S. Unilateralism**

The Bush administration’s attitude toward the Conference, articulated for the first time on the opening day, reflected an emerging strategic posture of the U.S.
government that has little to do with SALW in particular and has everything to do with larger U.S. concerns about multilateral arms control and the projection of U.S. power in the world. In 2001 the new administration has given every sign of not wanting to be part of any entangling treaty commitment, especially those bearing on U.S. strategic concerns.

The irony about the U.S. position at the SALW conference was that the U.S. can pride itself on fairly good arms trade practices at home, having strong export controls that include some human rights criteria, a tough brokering law (that remains to be implemented and enforced), an adequate marking system, and strong but by no means perfect transparency mechanisms. Many have called on the U.S. to universalise its own best practices, but the most the U.S. has been willing to do is to hold out its best practices as a model for others to emulate, not as a regulatory system to be institutionalised globally. The reason for this is a belief that only the U.S will be able to enforce an international agreement, and that the lack of enforcement by others will do irreparable harm to U.S. interests. That international treaties may have useful normative powers is dismissed as wishful thinking; a treaty unable to promise 100% compliance is not worth having.

An interesting corollary of the U.S. posture at the conference was that other rejectionist states, such as Russia, China and the Arab League, could shield themselves from scrutiny and criticism behind the U.S approach. This represented a reversal of the situation prevailing just prior to the second PrepCom in January 2001, when it appeared that the Clinton administration was counting on Russia and China to take the public heat, laying down its base-line demands only in closed-door sessions of the Permanent Five.

**The U.S Gun Lobby**

A second characteristic of the Bush administration was its willingness to accommodate the American gun lobby. Wielding a peculiar interpretation of the 2nd amendment to the U.S. Constitution concerning the putative constitutional right of U.S. citizens to own guns, the delegation proceeded to subvert the conference agenda, even though the conference was about trade much more than it was about possession. To the U.S., any talk of trade controls came to be seen as an attack on gun ownership, leading to the absurd result that measures to keep rogue operators from placing weapons in the hands of RUF limb-hackers in Sierra Leone were held hostage by the overriding need to protect the constitutional right of Joe Blow in Wisconsin to fire an automatic rifle at pigeons should he be so inclined.

**The “No Arms to Non-State Actors” Proposal**

A second divisive issue, advanced by the European Union and a number of African states, was the proposal to place a ban on arms transfers to non-state actors. The stated reason for the proposal was the claim that non-state actors are by definition irresponsible and therefore more easily prone to misusing the weapons they have, thus contributing to destabilization and humanitarian havoc. Behind this claim lurks the more persuasive notion that highly repressive African states facing armed insurgencies aimed at bringing them down may be opposing arms transfers to non-state actors out of a strong sense of self-preservation.
From a human rights perspective, the proposal suffered from at least two critical defects. One, in using the term “non-state actors” it tends to conflate civilians and armed groups. Yet the distinction between these two is important, as international humanitarian law (IHL) recognizes the status of non-state actors involved in armed conflict and bestows certain obligations on them with respect to their conduct in armed combat. Civilians, by contrast, have no such standing in IHL, but are given broad protections. Under IHL, there is no bar to non-state actors having and using weapons; it’s only the way in which they comport themselves in combat that is relevant.

Secondly, the human rights and humanitarian communities steer clear of making political judgments about whether non-state actors should enjoy international legitimacy. Doing otherwise would harm our impartiality and thus our credibility, effectiveness and safety on the ground. After all, it is often states that, with their monopoly over the means of violence, are the most serious abusers of human rights. To us, the proper criteria to employ with respect to arms transfers is the recipient’s human rights behaviour, not that recipient’s political standing in the current world of nation states.

The United States flatly opposed the proposal. In doing so its negotiators went so far as to invidiously appropriate the logic and language of the human rights community—claiming that “this proposal would preclude assistance to an oppressed non-state group defending itself from a genocidal government”—when its true motivation derived from the desire to be able to support allies militarily whether they be states or non-state actors.

What Was Good About the Conference
The Conference may have failed from our perspective, but the little progress that was made should be fully acknowledged and built upon. The conference achieved progress in the following ways:

- It acted as a catalyst for mobilizing international interest in the SALW question, drawing strong, though often fleeting, media attention, and forcing governments to at least give the appearance of being serious about the negotiations even within the restricted parameters identified above. One tangible outcome is the commitment to have a review conference in 2006 - a useful benchmark for gauging the efforts of states to clean up this lethal trade.

- Most importantly states committed themselves to “assess applications for export authorisations according to strict national regulations and procedures that cover all categories of small arms and light weapons and are consistent with States’ existing responsibilities under international law...” Although the Program of Action does not describe the nature or content of these responsibilities, we believe that this is a sound basis for weapons trading states to take greater responsibility not to authorize arms transfers which could contribute to gross violations of human rights or international humanitarian law.

- The Conference also recognized the critical need for such responsibilities to be codified in global instruments by agreeing to: “Strength(en) or develop agreed norms or measures at the global, regional or national levels that would reinforce
and further co-ordinate efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects”.

- A diverse array of international civil society groups were brought to the conference under the auspices of the International Action Network on Small arms (IANSA), and were given the opportunity to develop future partnerships and areas of common work. NGOs had a chance to coalesce, coordinate, and build frameworks for the future. Research and advocacy materials, were prepared which served to educate delegates and the media. NGOs also made powerful and provocative statements, especially when speaking from their own experiences in affected countries in every region of the world.

**A New Agenda**

As human rights, health, development and humanitarian NGOs we sought to drive home the following key points at the Conference:

1. Most weapons traded illicitly start out being traded legally before slipping—in a variety of ways—into the black market.
2. Tackling the illicit trade without tackling the licit trade is an exercise in futility.
3. To tackle the licit trade, states must take responsibility for their own arms trade practices (as well as security of stockpiles) through robust arms trade controls. What is needed ultimately is a binding global code of conduct on arms transfers that would specifically ban arms transfers to gross abusers of human rights and international humanitarian law.

This line of reasoning did not really resonate at the conference, with some notable exceptions. Motivated by this experience, a handful of NGOs decided to try to forge a fresh approach toward the SALW question that would place the emphasis on the humanitarian impact from SALW proliferation, not only the security impact from destabilizing accumulations of SALW. Working from within the network coordinated by IANSA, the Humanitarian Coalition on Small Arms* seeks to bring forward the priorities of communities that directly witness the suffering of people due to the saturation of small arms in communities and regions the world over.

The Coalition is driven by a vision that seeks to combine the notion that the unregulated spread of SALW produces a huge humanitarian impact with the insight that this comes about because of systematic violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and the determination to end states’ complicity in these violations through their irresponsible arms transfer practices.
ANNEX B: Humanitarian Statement of Concern

Addressed to the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, 9-20 July 2001, United Nations, New York

1. Humanitarian, human rights, health and development workers witness the devastating effects of small arms proliferation on civilians all over the world. Providing relief to refugees and civilians displaced by war, facilitating development projects and the provision of medical services, mediating for humanitarian access and ensuring respect for human rights often place our organisations at the frontlines. These experiences have led us to believe that the uncontrolled proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons have contributed to a global humanitarian crisis – a crisis which results in approximately 500,000 deaths a year.

2. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons adds another unpredictable and lethal dimension to the activities of organisations dedicated to human rights, humanitarian, health and development work. The ability of workers to undertake their duties is increasingly constrained due to the threat and use of small arms, as many are kidnapped, assaulted and deprived of their liberty under the threat of a gun.

   ‘More and more I am frightened to travel to the field. By air we go – small aircraft...by road, the risk of death and rape is very high. The worries before and during travel will leave a permanent impact on my health – long after I have left organisation X. I can’t cope anymore.’
   
   Humanitarian worker, Uganda, 2000

3. The UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects provides governments with an historic opportunity to set high common standards and policies to address this scourge.

4. The right of states to buy and sell weapons for purposes of self-defence brings with it important responsibilities, including to respect and ensure respect for international human rights and humanitarian law. All too often in the past, the transfer of weapons to abusive military, paramilitary, security and police forces, whether arranged by arms brokers or directly by governments, has violated this obligation. The consequences have been devastating for millions of civilians around the world.

   ‘There were about 12 of them all carrying Kalashnikov rifles with their faces covered. They asked us to give them our daughter. We refused to give her to them.... One of them lifted his Kalashnikov and shot my daughter in front of our eyes. She was only 20 and was just about to finish high school.’


5. Factors leading to the demand for small arms are multiple and complex and are related to problems of poverty, underdevelopment, human rights abuse, insecurity and injustice. Our organisations have long committed themselves to alleviating these realities. However, this work is undermined by the easy availability and violent misuse of small arms and light weapons.
6. Small arms and light weapons are almost all produced legally, often then moving through a series of legal or illegal hands. The UN Conference must examine all aspects of this flow, and governments must agree to create control mechanisms that meet their responsibilities—to their own citizens, to civilians around the world and to the international community.

7. We therefore call on all governments to take assertive and co-ordinated action to:

   i) stop the supply of small arms and light weapons to those who use them to violate recognised standards of international human rights and humanitarian law; and

   ii) address the human suffering caused by the millions of weapons in circulation.

The results of this Conference will be judged by the degree to which they contribute to the safety, dignity and well-being of those who live under the shadow of armed violence.

Organisations supporting this statement:

ActionAid
African Environmental and Human Development Agency, Nigeria
American Friends Service Committee
Amnesty International
Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress, Costa Rica
Bangladesh Development Partnership Centre
CARE International
Caritas Secours International
Canadian Auto Workers Union - Social Justice Fund
Centre for Democratic Empowerment, Liberia
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
Centre for Rehabilitation of Torture Survivors, Bangladesh
Centro de Estudios Estratégicos de Nicaragua
Disarmament and Security Centre, Aotearoa/New Zealand
Doctors of the World, USA
Engineers for Social Responsibility
HELP Network, USA
Human Rights Watch
Indian Coalition Against Small Arms
International Peace Bureau
Fundación Gamma Idear, Colombia
Fund for Peace
Foro Ciudadano de Honduras
Fundacion de Estudios Para la Aplicación del Derecho, Honduras
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
Global Lawyers and Physicians
Global Policy Forum
Hague Appeal for Peace
Injury Control Centre, Uganda
Israel Physicians for Peace and Preservation of the Environment
Indian Institute for Peace, Disarmament & Environmental Protection
International Rescue Committee
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights
Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns
New Zealand Coalition for Gun Control
Norwegian Church Aid
Nonviolence International
Medicins du Monde International
Oxfam International
Pax-Christi, Philippines
Peacebrokers International of Christchurch, Aotearoa/New Zealand
Peace Foundation, Aotearoa/New Zealand
Physicians for Global Survival, IPPNW Canada
Physicians for Peace, IPPNW Serbia
Physicians for Human Rights, Georgia
Project Ploughshares, Canada
Quaker Peace and Service, Aotearoa/New Zealand
Refugees International
Save the Children, Canada
Save the Children, United Kingdom
Security Research Information Centre, Kenya
Society of Nigerian Doctors for the Welfare of Mankind, IPPNW Nigeria
South Asia Partnership International
Trauma Foundation, USA
Turkey Health Professionals for Peace and Environment and Against Nuclear Threat, IPPNW Turkey
US Association for UNCHR
Washington Office on Africa
Water for Survival
Women’s Environment and Development Organisation
Working Group for Weapons Reduction, Cambodia
World Council of Churches, Commission on International Relations
World Vision International
Youth Approach for Development & Co-operation, Bangladesh
ANNEX C: Elements of a Strategy of Action by Cate Buchanan, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

An opportunity exists for the humanitarian NGO community to work together on a comprehensive strategy for action. It involves reframing the terms of the debate, injecting a much needed sense of urgency to act (through the media, to publics and policymakers) and forging the necessary will amongst, and pressure on, governments in the next five years. Features of this strategy might include work around four key areas:

Establishing more dialogue within and by the humanitarian community on small arms
- Educating and outreaching within our own organisations and to other members of the humanitarian community
- Exchanging lessons from other campaigns and advocacy efforts
- Discussing opportunities and challenges for work in this area
- Identifying strategic allies (present and future)

Defining and implementing a supportive research agenda
- Building an overwhelming body of evidence based on our work on the human cost of these weapons
- Re-examining past research for current political and policy potential
- Examining existing legal and political commitments
- Exploring whether and how weapons reduction programmes improve human security

Developing a unified advocacy approach
- Determining the long-term goals of key stakeholders
- Identifying effective messages to reorient the debate from national to human security
- Improving our ability to get this message out into the media and to the public and decision makers
- Identifying key legal and political tools and ‘hooks’

Building ideas and commitment for an international campaign
- Developing a clear understanding of the limits of engagement with this very political issue for humanitarian, human rights, development, health organisations
- Identifying objectives that would gain widespread acceptance among this community as near term priority goals for campaigning
- Identifying objectives that would have both global and national handles for action
### ANNEX D: Nairobi Conference Participants List

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