Effective transitional governance is one of the most formidable challenges facing reconstruction and stabilization missions in war-torn, failed states. Absent functioning institutions of governance guided by accountable leaders and the support of the governed, these states will be unable to secure lasting peace.

Governance is not a mission that intervening parties can ignore; it is a necessity for successful reconstruction and stabilization operations and the ultimate withdrawal of international assets, including peacekeeping forces and international civilian staff.

Approximately fifty key experts and practitioners met during the course of late 2004 and into 2005 to define the main issues and recommendations for those who must create or reform systems of governance in states emerging from conflict. In addition, leaders of current and past interventions from Afghanistan, Bosnia, Eastern Slovenia, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, and Timor-Leste convened in public and private sessions in March 2004 to offer their recommendations.

These recommendations are the ideals toward which intervenors should strive; however, intervenors should also understand that real-world constraints and trade-offs are likely to challenge them at every stage.

The period before deployment of troops and civilian staff offers the intervenor a critical and historically underutilized opportunity to prepare the mission for success.

Predeployment requirements for a successful mission should lead the intervenor to

- Conduct assessments of the condition and the needs of the mission area, as well as an audit of the financial flows, prior to mission deployment.
- Craft the mission mandate from the assessments and audits.
- Ensure that the mission mandate gives the mission leader executive authority and provides adequate personnel and money for national and local governance, transitional strategies, and administration.
To fulfill this mandate, the mission leader must be able to

- Procure enough resources to quickly set up ministries and other key local and national government institutions.
- Develop plans to provide resources to fund, train, and equip local and national civil service employees.
- Create a mission structure that provides for unity of purpose between civilian and military components and for broad participation from contributors by
  - Including key contributing nations and neighboring countries in consultative, administrative, or support structures.
  - Assigning robust security forces who are authorized to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including robust police units capable of operating in anarchic conditions, followed by individual police, judicial, and penal personnel to restore the rule of law.
  - Embedding governance advisors in the intervening military force structure to be responsible for establishing local authorities in advance of civilian deployment in unstable areas.
  - Developing intelligence capabilities and coordinating them in support of the overall mission objectives.
- There is a short window of opportunity, which typically lasts from the beginning of the mission through the first six months, to develop public institutions and programs.

Postdeployment requirements call for the intervenor to

- Incorporate legitimate components of the former local and national governance and bureaucratic structures into the transitional administration as quickly as possible.
- Implement revenue-generating or revenue-management strategies.
- Ensure, if needed, that the constitution-writing process is inclusive, consultative, transparent, and participatory, while also providing legal advisors and conducting a public information campaign on the process.
- Create institutions of consultation and coadministration at the local and national levels by
  - Committing to empowering, training, and funding local personnel in coadministrative or administrative governance structures.
  - Ensuring communication and coordination between local and national governance structures.
- Curb corruption early in the mission and at all levels by providing legal advisors and consultants to help develop anti-corruption legislation, designing anti-corruption public education campaigns, empowering indigenous watchdog mechanisms, ensuring that civil service personnel are properly compensated and that they receive their salary payments in full and on time, and establishing a system of meritocratic criteria for civil service.
- Provide initial accountability through audits and oversight in key agencies and ministries to ensure that political processes and institutions are transparent and accountable, and develop civil society’s monitoring capabilities.
- The postdeployment requirement of developing political participation should begin at the onset of the mission but be built on a foundation of rule of law and the maturation of political processes.

The postdeployment requirements for developing political participation call for the intervenor to

- Incorporate power brokers, including spoilers, if possible, into the political process. If they cannot be incorporated, constrain them from violence or remove them from the community.
• Seek out and empower new political leaders, especially those on the local level.
• Facilitate the development of political representation, the registration of political parties and candidates, and the implementation of political education and training programs.
• Allow time for political processes and the rule of law to mature before holding national elections.
  o Hold local elections when circumstances permit and before national elections.
  o Disarm and demobilize combatants and other armed groups and develop strategies to reintegrate these groups before elections are held.
  o Protect minority rights by establishing the rule of law.

Introduction

Effective transitional governance is one of the most formidable challenges facing reconstruction and stabilization missions in war-torn, failed states. Peace can be sustained only when power is attained through political rather than violent means and when government institutions are legitimate.

Despite numerous interventions around the world, establishing governance has too often been an elusive goal or an ephemeral achievement. Attaining this objective can involve prolonging the intervention, as was done in Bosnia, or repeating the intervention, as was done in Haiti. When the objective to establish governance fails, the entire mission may collapse, as it did in Somalia. By attending to the governance lessons from the past decade and a half, intervenors can identify and incorporate best practices into the planning and conduct of interventions to help societies move from bullets to ballots effectively and expeditiously.

There is no one-size-fits-all formula for establishing governance in states emerging from conflict. The environment international intervenors inherit when mounting reconstruction and stabilization missions will differ widely in scope and scale from state to state. The quality of the peace settlement that permits the mission to operate, including the presence or absence of fundamental power-sharing agreements, can lay the foundation for success or failure. Even with adequate peace settlements, some states lack any semblance of functioning government institutions and have no tradition of civil participation in governance. Other states offer the workable remains of past government institutions and have vibrant civil societies.

While conditions do vary, most international intervenors trying to establish transitional governance encounter the following challenges:
• Public order and security need to be restored.
• Political authority, absent in most cases, must be resurrected.
• Institutions of the state must be refashioned.
• Political processes leading to a representative government must be created.
• A constitution must often be written.
• Delivery of essential services must be ensured, as well as basic infrastructure repair and job creation.
• Ongoing fighting and tensions between warring parties must be halted and addressed.
• Criminalized power structures must be dislodged, and a functioning legal system must be established.
• A culture of fear and repression must be replaced by a culture of civic participation.
Ultimately, free and fair elections need to be held to cement the transformation from bullets to ballots.

The description below of the conditions in Afghanistan in late 2001 provides an example of recurrent challenges facing those who are charged with establishing transitional governance.

In late 2001, Afghanistan: had not convened a formal parliament since 1973; suffered from one of the poorest levels of delivery of public services and the lowest health indicators in the world; contained no viable infrastructure; had years of devastating drought and stymied development of natural resources; was a society governed by “rule of the gun” instead of rule of law; had lost both its legal texts and legal documents that governed the state before the war; possessed no functioning national government buildings or equipment, no government institutions at the local level, and no banking sector. (Barnett et al., 2005)

Common challenges are exacerbated by two major gaps that consistently plague the implementation of these operations: (1) the failure to move fast enough to stabilize a country and begin reconstruction and (2) the failure to provide sufficient resources and personnel, guided by a strong mandate at the mission’s outset.

Once a mission deploys, there is a limited time—the window of opportunity—to create law and order, establish governance, provide essential services, and begin to show progress on economic and social reconstruction. Most missions, however, face critical personnel and resource shortages at the outset and fail to meet civilian staff and force requirements for at least six to nine months. The window of opportunity typically closes long before an operation is fully staffed and resourced. The UN mission in Cambodia had “barely 200 UN civil administrators [who] were supposed to supervise 140,000 State of Cambodia civil servants” during the mission (Dobbins et al., 2005). More than a decade later, the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, overseeing a country of 26 million, staffed its governance team with fewer than two dozen people.

This report provides an overview of many of the lessons and recommendations that have been identified as vital for success in this difficult endeavor. It addresses transitional governance as a two-pronged process, implemented either through direct administration or through power-sharing arrangements, and aimed at achieving two essential goals: (1) to boost the capacity of domestic institutions of government to a level at which they are capable of providing basic security and services to all segments of the population, with only a minimum of outside intervention and in a transparent and accountable manner; and (2) to construct free and fair representative political processes in which individuals participate and compete for power through nonviolent means.

These twin requisites of governance are interrelated and cannot be executed sequentially. Where one prong in this process has been ignored or relegated to later phases of the mission, the mission has either stalled or failed. Bosnia offers the example of a mission that created state institutions but failed to erect legitimate political processes. The first mission in Haiti focused on support for political leadership and processes but woefully neglected the institutions of government. As a result of failing to recognize the interdependent nature of these goals, the international community remains mired in Bosnia ten years after the birth of the mission, and has returned to Haiti for a second time. The “Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix” on transitional governance developed for the U.S. government by the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the U.S. Department of State recognizes these two goals and the need for nonsequential implementation, and so does this report.

- Part I addresses lessons and recommendations for the predeployment phase that establishes a foundation for success and includes assessments and audits, mandates, force structure and resource procurement, and mission planning and organization.
• Part II addresses lessons and recommendations for the development of public institutions and programs.
• Part III examines lessons and recommendations for the successful development of political participation.

The report concludes with suggestions for further reading.

Requirements for a Successful Mission: The Predeployment Phase

The predeployment phase of any reconstruction and stabilization mission has a critical impact on the mission’s success. This phase typically encompasses the conduct of peace negotiations, development of the mission mandate, planning for the implementation of the mandate, assignment of responsibilities among contributing nations and agencies, and recruitment of personnel and resources for the intervention.

Conducting Assessments and Audits

Lesson: Before deployment, conduct assessments to determine the condition and the needs of the mission area.

An assessment should reveal the crucial humanitarian, security, and development needs of the target country; the continuing sources of violent conflict; and the nature of the informal power structures likely to obstruct the peace process. In addition, the assessment should take stock of the cultural, political, economic, historical, and sociological characteristics that define the society; and, when possible, strive to incorporate local participation to foster local ownership.

The Transitional Governance Working Group outlined the following key internal and external factors that can provide a platform for a comprehensive assessment. Whether or not a peace settlement or other agreement resolved disputes before a mission begins is a key factor affecting the overall mission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY INTERNAL FACTORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size of the country and demographics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation in the country prior to the intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of the conflict that led to the intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of the conflict on population, for example, health, displacement, employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of the infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence and capacity of institutions of governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political traditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History and strength of civil administration, and morale and pay of civil servants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of human capital in the country and strength of the middle class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-existing laws in the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of order, and military and public security services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of corruption and militarization of the society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type and scale of legal and illegal financial resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of militias, warlords, and other spoilers/obstructionists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of an indigenous criminal structure or international organized crime activity, and level of common crime and banditry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type, amount, and location of natural resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of ethnic nationalism in the country</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**KEY EXTERNAL FACTORS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resources (troops, money, time) available to the intervenor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition of the end state of the intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic competitiveness of the state in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship of the state to its neighbors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilizing or destabilizing activities of the state’s neighbors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability of the international community to sustain the intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective coordination of aid by international and regional institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed of delivery of assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illicit transnational sources of revenue that sustain obstructionists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Lesson:** As part of the assessment, conduct an audit of legal and illegal financial flows inside and outside the state before the intervention so that strategies can be developed to protect and enhance legal revenues and to shut down illegal sources of income and profit.

For a broad understanding of assessments and planning, the Filling the Gaps project, through its Working Group on Measurements of Progress, has produced a special report titled *Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction*. A second follow-on special report will discuss how to conduct baseline assessments and define key indicators for measuring progress. Missions typically execute this task in an ad hoc fashion on the ground, only after they are confronted with crises emanating from illegal resource flows. Without an effective strategy to prevent or halt illicit economic activity and control and generate legal sources of revenue, real authority will be divided, and successful governance will be sacrificed. The inability to stem illicit revenue generated by spoilers of the peace process has undermined numerous missions and allowed sources of instability to prosper and continue.

**Key guidelines for the predeployment audit:**

- Assess gray and black markets.
- Map legal and illegal financial flows.
- Identify financial streams flowing to obstructionists.

**Developing the Mandate**

**Lesson:** Craft the mission mandate from the assessments and audit, and ensure that adequate authorities, personnel, money, and assets for effective local and national governance, transitional strategies, and administration are assigned.

Success in transitional governance depends first on the mission mandate. Lacking the proper authority and resources, no mission can succeed. To develop the proper mandate, intervenors must decide on the political objective of the mission. They must decide initially how much control they will need to exercise and how much they can devolve to locals, what the desired end state is, and how to get there. Answers to these questions will depend on whether or not a viable government is in place at the time of intervention. In most cases, the mission leader should be involved in the development of the mandate and should be afforded executive authority with the power to act on executive, legislative, and judicial matters. Executive authority should be maintained until power-sharing arrangements with responsible local parties have been implemented. No deadline for withdrawal should be set in the mandate. The interim process for developing, passing, and amending legislation and regulations should also be articulated in the mandate, as should the authority and structure of any legislative branch.

*The inability to stem illicit revenue generated by spoilers to the peace process has undermined numerous missions.*

*Lacking the proper authority and resources, no mission can succeed.*
Assessments and audits conducted in the predeployment phase are a prerequisite to these critical decisions. The following is a list of potential tasks that the intervenor may be asked to perform.

Potential Governance Tasks:
- Construct and implement a peace process.
- Rebuild civil authority.
- Integrate recalcitrant faction leaders into the peace process and overcome hard-liners.
- Deliver public security and create a legitimate police force and judicial and penal system.
- Create local, regional, and national political and administrative structures.
- Strengthen institutions of local governance and solidify their relationship to central authorities.
- Cultivate a functioning economy through appropriate institutions of governance.
- Nurture civic participation, political process development, and elections.
- Protect human rights and freedoms.
- Establish transparency and accountability.
- Create a constitutional end state.

The mandates from Timor-Leste and Haiti provide examples of the differences between strong and weak mandates. The mandate for the mission in Timor-Leste gave the intervenors direct authority to govern while they established processes for political participation. The mandate in Haiti, however, included few of these authorities and directives. The following is a set of guidelines for a successful mandate.

A single resolution embodying all directives for all international activities in the mission; statements of regional support; authority to use force to enforce the peace; executive authority; authority to interpret the mandate and the settlement; authority to impose stability by “all necessary means”; demand that all parties, states, and nonstate actors cooperate to support peace process; unified political direction that empowers the transitional authority to be the sole provider of unified political direction to all actors in the international presence, including the military; control over all civilian implementation; joint mechanisms for civilian and military planning, coordination, and objectives; specified responsibilities for transformation; discretion of transfer of authority where Transitional Authority can turn over or remove aspects of governance to indigenous actors depending on standards of performance; multi-year duration of the mission with minimum of 12 months to be reviewed by Security Council. (Covey et al., 2005)

Planning and Organizing the Mission

One of the key aspects of mission planning for effective governance is prioritizing specific goals and operations. In setting priorities, intervenors must remember that security is essential and that peace must prevail for other aspects of the mission to succeed.

Lesson: Ensure that the structure for the mission embodies unity of purpose, maintains broad participation from mission contributors, and establishes coordination mechanisms among sectors and participants.

Commonality of purpose can compensate for lack of unity of command and deficiencies in organizational structure. If the leaders of both the civilian and military operations have a clear understanding of the problems they face, they can communicate the need for coordination and cooperation down through their organizations. Coordination must also be established and maintained between international organizations and international financial institutions that have official responsibilities on the ground. In addition, a means must be created to facilitate coordination between the intervenors and local leaders.
The organizational structure of the mission has an important impact on transitional governance, as it determines the decision-making process and the relationship among the international intervenor, local elites, and the population. Previous missions have shown that unity of purpose in the organizational structure is critical. They have also shown that broad participation and burden sharing from contributors to the mission is equally important. These organizational requirements are often unavoidably in conflict. True unity of purpose is achieved in practice by limiting the number of core decision makers. This discourages participation, because stakeholders are less likely to participate if they are excluded from the policy-making process. To achieve a balance between unity of purpose and participation, it will be necessary to compromise, resulting in the emergence of a more complex, suboptimal organizational arrangement.

**Lesson:** Provide for a heavier footprint in the emergency phase and draw down as the international community transitions to full local control.

The intervening parties must first decide if the operation will have a heavy or a light footprint. A light footprint requires fewer personnel to be deployed, fewer goals for the mission, and a generally more limited impact on the local community than a heavy footprint.

Which format has proven more effective and more credible? To date, a light footprint has not proven significantly more effective or more credible than a heavier one. The experience in Afghanistan, in fact, suggests that too light a footprint is counterproductive. In the early phase in Bosnia, use of a heavier footprint offset deficiencies caused by the strict separation of the civilian and military components, and it offset the civilian component’s lack of resources and authority. In Kosovo, however, it is possible that the footprint was too heavy (although the United Nations still had to take over the judicial system one year after the mission’s start) in that it took away too much authority from the Kosovars. Ultimately, the presence or absence of a credible governing authority in the country will largely contribute to the weight of the footprint. Without a credible governing authority, the footprint will need to be heavier, especially if the system of government before the intervention was a fundamental source of conflict.

**Mission Structures**

The simplest arrangement for a reconstruction and stabilization mission is a UN “blue helmet” diagram. In this structure, the UN secretary general appoints a special representative who has authority over both the military and civilian components of the effort. Many other structures have emerged, often driven by the political realities at the time the intervention was designed. NATO, or a multinational force led by one nation, may control the military operations while the United Nations oversees the civilian tasks. This was the format employed for the operations in Timor-Leste and Kosovo. Another mission might be led by an ad hoc civilian structure, like the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia. The mission in Afghanistan has a unique hybrid structure of the Afghan government, the United Nations, NATO, and lead nations with responsibilities for different sectors, such as the police, the judiciary, and the army. Other international organizations, such as the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, participate in any of several ways, in a hierarchy (theoretically) or even independently.

**Lesson:** Establish strategies that are regionally focused, as well as “consultative frameworks” through which contributing nations and neighboring states can express interests, assist in the mission, and keep abreast of the mission plans and intentions.

Any intervention requires the support of major contributing states and neighboring countries. In every reconstruction and stabilization operation conducted over the past fifteen
years, the ability of contributors and neighbors to exert a profound negative or positive influence has been demonstrated.

The nations that have an interest in the mission and have influence in the region should be identified before the mission is deployed. Regional strategies should be created to ensure that outside influences do not negatively impact the mission. It is also important to establish a framework to provide key contributing and neighboring countries with information about the mission and to create a forum through which they can voice their input. These countries should serve, in effect, as a board of directors for the mission. This group should be small enough to be manageable but influential enough to carry weight locally and with international organizations.

Particularly important is the role played by regional powers and neighboring countries. They can play a positive role by helping would-be spoilers join the political process, or they can play a negative role by encouraging obstruction of effective governance. Supplying insurgent groups with arms or financial assistance, permitting border access, and providing sanctuaries are ways in which outsiders can all aid spoilers.

**Structures for Governance**

The governance structure will be determined by the amount of authority the intervenors must assume; it can range from direct administration to power sharing. The amount of authority needed should be determined during the predeployment assessment by the amount of conflict remaining and the extent to which locals are able to govern themselves. Transition of structures should occur in phases, as greater authority is ceded to local actors and institutions during the course of the intervention. No transitional governance structure will be fully democratic at the onset. The type of structure to be implemented must be determined prior to mission deployment, as the amount of authority to be assumed will in part dictate the level of resources needed.

**Example:** UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Joint Interim Administrative Structure

- The special representative to the secretary general (SRSG) was given executive authority to act as sole executive, legislative, and judicial authority.

- The structure had a four-pillar design, with the principal organization operating under the authority of the SRSG and departments coheaded by local and international officials. The four pillars were humanitarian issues (managed by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees), civil administration (provided by the United Nations), institution building (performed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), and reconstruction (performed by the European Union).

- The Kosovo Transitional Council, comprising thirty-five members representing all ethnic and societal groups, was formed to incorporate local participation and serve as a consultative body.

- The Interim Administrative Council, comprising eight members—three Albanians, one Serb, and four UN officials—was formed to propose policy guidelines for operations in each pillar.

**Mission Personnel**

*Lesson:* Ensure that the mission leader is trained and offered mentoring by veteran mission leaders; provide experienced and capable deputies before the deployment.

The success of a mission depends heavily on the ability of its leader to cement international support, unify the varied sectors of the mission behind a common vision, and
mobilize the mission behind effective strategies to achieve a sustainable peace. Mission leaders must recognize that they will devote at least 50 percent of their time out of the mission area to liaise with international agencies, capitals, the United Nations, and donors. This requirement must be acknowledged early on, and their frequent absences from the mission must be ameliorated by the appointment of strong, capable deputies and the use of methods to ensure rapid communication and decision making. Training and mentoring for the mission leader should be institutionalized and should include the opportunity to learn from other mission leaders. Up until recently, there has been no systematic preparation for heads of missions or their deputies.

*Lesson*: Assign a cadre of trained and experienced international personnel and administrators to staff the mission and rapidly deploy them for the provision of governance in the immediate aftermath of conflict.

UN missions, missions led by individual nations, and non-UN multinational missions must streamline hiring procedures and move international civilians quickly to the mission. Priority should be given to developing reserve rosters for new civilian units in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other nations; and the individuals serving in those units should receive regular training with their military counterparts and be ready to deploy rapidly.

### Developing the Force Structure and Procuring Resources

*Lesson*: Authorize and deploy robust security forces and contingents of stability police, as well as international police, judicial, and penal personnel, to restore the rule of law and prevent the reemergence of hostilities.

The ability to implement the mandate depends fundamentally on the level of security in the country. In an insecure environment, spoilers and obstructionists will specifically target governance institutions and moderate leaders, as seen in nearly every mission in the past fifteen years. The security of local and national government institutions and leaders must be ensured; typically, this security is provided by units of stability police.

Public security forces should have the authority to conduct the full spectrum of operations, including arrest and detention, rather than having only monitoring and mentoring authority. The intervenors must also have judicial and penal personnel present at the outset to deal with those arrested and detained, and they must also have plans to include international civilian judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and penal personnel as early as possible.

The operation in Kosovo is an example in which both the level and the mix of forces were sufficient and in which the forces were given powers of executive authority (though some deployment delays occurred). These conditions helped ensure that public safety was achieved rapidly for the majority of the Albanian population, clearing the way for progress on governance. Conversely, the operation in Bosnia suffered from the initial failure ten years ago to give international police forces (UN Civilian Police) executive authority and to develop a functioning police, judicial, and penal system.

*Lesson*: Deploy an adequate ratio of troops to civilians in the first phase of an operation to create a secure environment and minimize casualties among the population.

Past operations have demonstrated the effectiveness of a higher ratio of troops to population in the initial phase of the mission. The ratios of troops in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Afghanistan, respectively, were 20, 18.6, and 2 per 1,000 inhabitants (Dobbins et al., 2003). The inability to fully secure Afghanistan through three and a half years of the
mission, contrasted with relative security in Bosnia and Kosovo, illustrates this point. With few casualties at the outset, the mission will gain more trust from the population, it will achieve greater momentum, and the use of deadly force will be less necessary later in the mission.

**Lesson:** Place governance advisors in the military force structure before deployment and have them accompany the military to advise it on critical early governance decisions. They should be the equivalent of political advisors who advise senior military officers in peacetime. These advisors should counsel military commanders from the very beginning as they set out to secure the country locality by locality; they should pay special attention to the role of potential spoilers.

Historically, in the immediate transformation from war to peace the military has found itself responsible for governance tasks for which it has no training and little expertise. In Iraq, twenty-four-year-old platoon leaders were themselves responsible for creating town councils because no one else was there to do it. Lacking civilian expertise, the military will inevitably get into the business of appointing local “governors,” “mayors,” and “provisional councils” to jump-start governance in the early days of the mission. Such early actions will almost always involve critical errors, including putting potential spoilers in leadership positions. Given that civilian governance teams will likely be unable to immediately enter various locations around the country for security reasons, embedding governance advisors in the military force structure could assist in the rapid establishment of effective local political authorities.

**Lesson:** Develop a sufficient intelligence component for the mission prior to deployment and ensure that it supports the overall mission objectives.

Intelligence is a critical requirement for reconstruction and stabilization missions. It is necessary for determining the level of force needed to ensure security, assessing ongoing threats to the mission, and implementing strategies to address these threats. Too often, the processes for intelligence gathering can undermine the political mission because it is not shared, coordinated, or related to priority mission objectives. A priority should be placed on obtaining ongoing intelligence about informal power structures likely to oppose the peace and stabilization process; their sources of revenue, illicit as well as legal; and the networks that link criminally obtained resources to violent elements.

**Lesson:** Equip the governance mission with enough resources to quickly set up ministries and other key government institutions.

Resources for transitional governance have repeatedly been neglected to the detriment of missions. Resources must match the requirements of the mandate and should not only be measured in terms of troops and dollars.

The “ministry-in-a-box” concept, first implemented by the United Nations in Afghanistan and used again by the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office of Transition Initiatives in Iraq, is a very effective innovation in transitional governance. The concept was created to respond to the total destruction or absence of government institutions in both these countries. It aims to deliver items ranging from paint and basic office supplies to more sophisticated mail and computer operations, which can jump-start the operability of a ministry or local government institution. In Afghanistan, a standardized governance package was developed for each province that included, for example, the requirements for a post office and a police station. The ministry-in-a-box concept enables governance missions to rapidly set up the key institutions of governance. Just as peacekeeping troops arrive in theater with the tools necessary to do their job (for example, weapons, transport, logistics), so should those who must resurrect institutions of governance.

**Lesson:** Budget adequate financial resources to immediately pay essential civil service workers such as teachers, police, medical personnel, and local and national...
administrators. Raise reserve funds for this purpose and hold them to ensure reliable disbursement.

Appropriate and timely pay mechanisms for local personnel involved in transitional governance are often overlooked in the budgeting process but are critical to success. In some cases, there is a total lack of pay mechanisms for governance personnel. In Iraq, for example, governance staff from the Coalition Provisional Authority toted bags of cash, commandeered from seized, not preplanned, appropriated resources, to looted ministries to pay workers so that services could be restored. In Afghanistan, as in almost every other mission, civil service workers have gone months without pay. As a result, local support for governance erodes and corruption and criminality become widespread, as workers take bribes and other forms of income to feed their families.

Compounding this problem is the tendency for international missions to hire the best local talent at inflated wage rates, often for low-ranking support jobs, such as driving and translating.

**Lesson:** Create plans to mentor and train civil service personnel.

Having a civil service training package ready to implement immediately upon arrival will help civilian workers enable government to function. In Afghanistan, the absence of a civil service with requisite skills for government has been a chief obstacle to effective governance. Bosnia, like many other postwar states, has suffered from an exodus of skilled workers. In Timor-Leste, fewer than 100 law school graduates remained in the country at the time of the intervention, resulting in critical shortages of personnel to administer justice. In southern Sudan, intervenors must start from scratch, as there is no existing workforce to build on. Standard operating procedures and manuals for civil administration, literacy training, accounting, record-keeping skills, and training in the use of databases and computers are basic requirements that should be planned for and brought to the field in the earliest stage of the mission.

Typical international missions dedicate only one or a few advisors to state ministries. Such a limited number of advisors is not sufficient to mentor and train the civil service that must inherit the responsibilities of governance. Plans and resources to execute this part of the mission are essential for a viable peace.

**Shifting from Predeployment to Deployment: Capitalizing on the First Three to Six Months**

Instead of stumbling through the first moments, an operation should hit the ground running. From day one, the mission needs to establish conditions for success and avoid the typical delays that allow obstructionism to gain strength and squander the chances of winning the support of the population by making peace pay.

**Developing Public Institutions and Programs**

**Developing Institutions of Governance**

**Lesson:** Incorporate legitimate aspects of existing governance and bureaucratic structures into the transitional administration, while building new structures and mechanisms where needed.

Some countries in which interventions occur will already have basic governance institutions and bureaucratic structures, although they may be significantly degraded. Intervenors should protect the legitimate aspects of existing institutions and structures at the
onset of the mission so that they can be used as a foundation for transitional governance. 
In the aftermath of the war in Iraq, coalition troops failed to protect the Iraqi ministries from rampant looting. This situation resulted in the total destruction of a majority of Iraq’s ministries.

As important is ensuring the continuity of competent staff for governance. Rather than dissolving the former government wholesale, employee dismissal should be selective. This is especially important given the typically short supply of trained and experienced local government officials and the need to employ people rapidly.

Lesson: Determine the need for revenue generation and revenue management programs, assist in implementing them, and build in transparent and accountable budget processes.

To ensure sustainability, governments must both generate and properly manage revenue. However, countries with extreme poverty and poor systems of taxation face great difficulty in generating money. Countries with widespread corruption and poor systems of oversight, transparency, and accountability face great difficulty in managing the revenue that is collected. Kosovo, for example, required revenue-generating strategies, while Sudan needs assistance in revenue management. Effective governance requires personnel trained in effective accounting practices, public disclosure of budgets and receipts, and professional auditing on a regular basis.

Writing a New Constitution

Lesson: Ensure that the constitution-making process is inclusive, consultative, transparent, and participatory. Provide legal advisors to assist in the process and help conduct a public information campaign on the constitution-making process.

Most interventions eventually lead to the creation of a new constitution, which typically plays a significant role in distributing power and articulating the principles on which the state will be based. Creating a new constitution can help engage the population in the political process and give them a stake in their political future. This process in many ways is as important as the information contained within the document.

Developing Institutions of Consultation and Coadministration

The National Level

Lesson: Create and support advisory councils and other mechanisms for local input or administration as early as possible, and support them with resources and staff. Such councils and mechanisms should aim not only to ensure local input but also to build local capacity.

Two important questions in reconstruction and stabilization operations are how quickly indigenous leaders should be involved in governance and to what extent. Two general formats for local participation should be used during the operation prior to full self-governance: consultation and coadministration. Local participation through either of these formats should occur as early as possible in the intervention. The transition to local control and full local administration should occur in phases and be determined by realities on the ground.

There are many ways in which consultation and coadministration can incorporate local input and assistance, build the political capacity of the local population, and ensure the legitimacy of the mission (Covey et al., 2005). The following are three general methods:

Rather than dissolving the former government wholesale, employee dismissal should be selective.

The transition to local control and full local administration should occur in phases and be determined by realities on the ground.
- **Political advisory council**: Composed of local leaders who serve as representatives of the local population, a political advisory council should provide the mission leadership with advice and consultation on a variety of political decisions. This council can also facilitate communication between the intervenors and the local population.

- **Joint military committee**: Often including high-ranking military commanders from various factions in the area, the joint military committee should address, and provide counsel regarding, military and security procedures, activities, and resources.

- **Joint functional committees**: Composed of civilians from a variety of sectors and backgrounds, joint functional committees should provide counsel and oversee civil administration functions. Such committees can address a variety of civil administration functions, such as health care, communication services, and education.

**Consultation in Timor-Leste**

The UN Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET) created the National Consultative Council (NCC) to serve as a consultative body. It was composed of fifteen members: seven representatives of the National Council of Timorese Resistance, one representative from the Catholic Church, three representatives from pro-autonomy groups, and four UNTAET representatives. While one of the pro-autonomy groups refused to join the NCC, the council was still able to serve as a fairly effective forum for local participation in the international administration. Moreover, because the NCC was largely representative, it helped confer legitimacy on the international administration.

**Coadministration in Kosovo**

In Kosovo, public services were managed and delivered under the Joint Interim Administrative Structure by administrative departments that were codirected by a Kosovar and a senior UNMIK international staff member, both of whom were chosen by the transitional administrator. While this format for coadministration was useful in that it helped incorporate local participation into the international administration, optimal results in situations of coadministration occur only when the intervenors have a strong commitment to empowering and training local personnel and are willing to delegate authority and resources.

**The Local Level**

**Lesson**: Create decentralized, consultative, and coadministrative institutions for local governance as soon as possible.

Establishing local governance, especially in areas with diverse populations or minority groups that have been repressed by central authorities, is fundamental to long-term effective governance. This is primarily because representation, participation, and results—key elements of governance—are experienced most concretely at the local level. Representation is realized through direct contact between local government officials and their local constituencies. Participation occurs directly in communities when constituents attend local council meetings, mayor’s or governor’s town meetings, and meetings of other civic institutions. Results attained through the provision of essential services restore the public’s identity and sense of community. Delivering results on the local level (for example, rehabilitation of schools and cultural centers) engages the population; these results are the concrete products of governance.

Local governance institutions, such as city or provincial councils, can play a significant role in creating political stability, meeting the needs of the people, and ensuring
representation in a pluralistic society. Consultative and coadministration structures similar to those used on the national level should be implemented without delay for local governance. Decentralizing governance, however, can be a difficult task, particularly in insecure areas. One of the most critical tasks of any intervention, aside from maintaining security, is providing adequate resources and personnel to assist in creating and sustaining consultative and coadministrative local governance structures.

**Lesson:** Enhance communication and coordination between local and national government structures and assign significant resources and personnel to local governance structures.

The experience in Timor-Leste provides examples of several problems that can hinder the decentralization of governance. To administer local governance, district administrations were established in all thirteen districts and were given full executive authority. While this structure could have helped develop local governance throughout Timor-Leste, a lack of communication and coordination between the district administrations and the national government, combined with a lack of resources and staff, seriously hindered its impact. Ultimately, the head of the Office of District Administrators resigned, and the development of local governance faltered.

While substantial resources should be directed to local governance, and local structures that adopt participatory processes should be rewarded with additional resources, the intervenor must be sure that resources are not flowing to those who do not know how to use them efficiently or who may misappropriate them. Increasing oversight capabilities and training local personnel can help mitigate problems that might arise from inexperience or corruption.

**Ensuring Transparency and Accountability**

**Lesson:** To help curb corruption early in the mission and at all levels, provide legal advisors and consultants to help develop anti-corruption legislation; design anti-corruption public education campaigns; and empower indigenous watchdog mechanisms and groups to monitor government corruption. Bring in international auditors and corporate management teams for ministries public enterprises.

Corruption and illicit economic transactions can be so pervasive in countries where reconstruction and stabilization operations are occurring that they can capture and criminalize the state. While it is difficult, there are a variety of mechanisms to overcome a criminalized political economy. First, the intervening party should not only help develop anti-corruption laws and provide legal advisors and consultants but should also help civil society enhance its capabilities for monitoring corruption in the government. The intervening party can help civil society curb corruption by helping design anti-corruption public education campaigns and by empowering indigenous watchdog mechanisms and groups with personnel and resources. Finally, and most decisively, the intervenor must ensure that the rule of law prevails. This requires the ability to address and overcome the impunity enjoyed by criminalized political elites. International personnel may have to play a direct role in the criminal justice system for this purpose, and mission staff must be held accountable as well.

**Lesson:** Ensure that peace “pays” (salaries) and establish a system of meritocratic criteria for civil service.

Another requirement for combating corruption is to ensure that civil service personnel receive adequate salaries and that they are paid on time. This offers a guarantee that
peace “pays.” It will help reduce the likelihood that government officials will work in the gray and black markets to make ends meet. In addition to ensuring adequate and timely pay, establishing a system of meritocratic criteria for civil service personnel and ministerial responsibility can help diminish corruption.

**Lesson:** Establish systems of transparency and accountability in political processes and help to develop the capacity of civil society to monitor government actions.

Most countries that undergo reconstruction and stabilization operations have a history of governmental abuse of the population or the country’s resources. Whether the abuse was through direct human rights violations, general neglect, corruption, or capture of the state by predatory and criminalized elites, effective governance relies not just on building the capacity of the government but also on building public support for the government. Transparent and accountable political processes are essential for the development of trust and support.

Transparent and accountability cannot be ensured solely through legal mechanisms. It is also necessary for civil society to be able to monitor political processes. The intervenor should encourage the development and enforcement of legal protection for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), as well as provide training and resources for civil society groups. Strategies to ensure transparency and accountability should also go hand in hand with public information campaigns on issues of governance. This serves two purposes. First, with timely and accurate public information, the expectations of the local population will be better managed. With realistic expectations, it is less likely that the frustrations of the population will be easily manipulated or unduly increased. Second, since the information supplied in public education campaigns depends on transparent, accountable political processes, the campaigns themselves provide a mechanism to enforce transparency and accountability.

**Developing Political Participation**

**Dealing with Spoilers**

**Lesson:** Incorporate spoilers into the political process or constrain them from violence if political participation is impossible. If the spoilers continue to violently obstruct political processes, remove them from the community through legal mechanisms.

Most reconstruction and stabilization operations enter environments riddled with individuals and groups opposed to the aims of the peace process: sophisticated, well-armed militia groups; intelligence operatives of the parties to the dispute; well-organized, wealthy criminal organizations; juvenile, ragtag gangs; private security organizations; and veterans’ groups. Informal networks may link the obstructionist activities of many of these actors. Peace is a threat to their illegitimate power and illicit revenue sources. Such spoilers often attempt to create security or humanitarian crises aimed at overwhelming nascent public institutions and limiting public political participation. The intervenor must address the role of the country’s preexisting armed groups in the transitional government and the subsequent new order. Existing forces cannot just be cashiered—if they are excluded from the transitional process, they will have no incentive to assist in the stabilization effort.

There are a variety of creative options to draw spoilers into the political process, and in each operation the process is somewhat different. One option is disarmament, demobiliza-
tion, and reintegration programs. Too often, however, the intervenor focuses on disarmament and demobilization and neglects reintegration. This undermines effectiveness and sustainability. Another option that has proven useful, although it can create obstacles to the reconciliation process, is to offer low-level members of militia groups or other spoilers limited amnesty.

While the options are diverse, the ultimate key to drawing spoilers into the political process is to understand their needs, goals, and capabilities. Once the shape and nature of the group are analyzed, the proper course of action can be determined. If a group is likely to contribute in a positive way, specifically tailored venues can be created for its political participation. Spoilers who are incapable of joining the political process must be identified early and dealt with rapidly.

Drawing Spoilers into the Political Process

In 1999, as NATO troops entered Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was killing nearly a hundred Serbian civilians a week. It was engaged in a violent campaign against the armed faction of another major Albanian group, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). Unable to make progress while the KLA continued to spoil the peace process, UNMIK needed to draw the KLA into the political process. To do so, UNMIK helped transform the KLA into an unarmed, uniformed nonmilitary disaster response organization, the Kosovo Protection Corps. This transformation, while imperfect, enabled the KLA to choose a more political course because it relieved the KLA’s leadership of various burdens, such as finding employment for KLA combatants. Just three weeks after the agreement was achieved, former KLA leaders formed the Kosovo Democratic Progress Party. In all, however, it took a year of intense and persistent negotiations to bring the KLA, the LDK, and Serbian moderates into a joint political structure that assisted in the administration of Kosovo.

Lesson: Prosecute criminals based on acts and not on associations.

Criminal elements within the state should be held accountable for their actions. The intervening party, however, should not condemn an entire group of individuals based on its association with warring parties or forces of disorder prior to the intervention. In Iraq, the initial firing of most government employees based on their association with the Ba’ath Party created numerous problems. Since most had joined the Ba’ath Party merely to secure employment, this decision was especially damaging. Rather than condemn an entire group outright, processes and systems should be developed for vetting former government employees individually.

Developing New Political Leadership and Political Representation

Developing New Political Leaders

Lesson: Seek out and empower new leaders, including those at the local level.

Developing new political leaders is fundamental to creating a political system that will continue to function in the post-intervention phase. This is especially true where there is a discredited national political elite. International staff should not be relied on solely to identify new leaders; instead, the local population should help the intervenor identify potential leaders in their community whom they regard as capable of articulating their needs. This will enable the intervenor to capitalize on pre-existing dynamics and order
in the community. In Burundi, the intervenor relied heavily on the local population to identify new leaders. This approach cultivated a sense of public ownership of the process and required less management by the intervenor.

While incorporating local input is important, the intervenor must be aware of local political factions and strive to ensure that leadership develops from all factions. It must pay particular attention to leadership development in local communities and among women, minority groups, the disabled, and members of the diaspora.

Developing Political Representation

*Lesson:* Facilitate the creation and development of multiple political parties, the registration of political parties and individual candidates, and the implementation of political education and development programs.

The development of a system of political representation is critical for sustainable governance. The intervenor should assist in the development of such a system in three ways. First, in the initial period of the operation, the intervenor must help define the parameters of the political system. Second, the intervenor should assist in the registration and capacity-building of political parties or individual candidates. The intervenors should be aware that certain voting processes, might constrain the development of political parties. Third, the intervenor should help implement education and development programs on political campaigns, candidates, parties, and processes. Radio and television are a particularly effective format for public education campaigns in countries where the illiteracy rate is high.

*Lesson:* Enhance civil society by helping develop regulations for NGOs that will assist in upholding political accountability and representation.

NGOs play an important role in transitional governance. They facilitate communication between the local community and government structures, and they provide watchdog mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability. Given the significant role of NGOs in supporting and monitoring both local and national governance, the intervenor should establish legal regulations to protect and develop such organizations. In addition, the intervenor should support NGO development with funding, training, and advocacy.

**Holding Elections**

**Timetables for Elections**

*Lesson:* Do not prescribe a hasty timetable for national elections. Allow sufficient time for political processes and rule of law to mature.

Elections are typically viewed as an early indicator of mission success and an important benchmark that permits the drawdown of international resources, particularly costly military troops. The nature of the transfer of power through a second election is an especially important indicator of mission progress. Yet, while elections certainly provide an indicator of mission success, they should not be used as an exit strategy.

Often, to cement international support, mission mandates prescribe exact timetables for elections. In reality, however, a variety of structural and political reasons usually force local elections to be postponed. Local elections were postponed for twelve months in Bosnia and six months in Mozambique. Some local elections, like those in Liberia, were postponed for over eight years. These postponements, while usually necessary, generate negative media coverage and reflect poorly on the mission. Moreover, postponements
can trigger a negative reaction from the local population and may damage its support for the intervention. Reasons for postponement vary but often include the following: voter registration problems, logistical problems, security problems, lack of funding, lack of census data, problems in registering refugees, problems in creating electoral districts, fraud, missing voter cards, postwar chaos, lack of organization, opposition party boycott, and lack of training for election staff.

Finally, early elections, driven by internationally mandated timetables and a desire for rapid exit, often allow for the installation of those who actually prosecuted the conflict, because political parties and alternative leaders have not had time to mature. Rather than rushing into national elections, the intervenor should concentrate on leveling the political playing field and on building a new political order, political culture, and political parties. Proclaiming an “exit strategy,” especially if it is associated with an end date, militates very heavily against a sustainable transformation.

When Should Elections Occur? What Type of Elections Should Occur First?

**Lesson:** Hold local elections within several years of the mission’s start date and prior to national elections to give the country experience with democratic governance and time to develop political parties.

Kosovo is the only recent reconstruction and stabilization mission to have held local elections prior to national elections. The experiment was a success. Most experts now believe that holding local elections prior to national elections and within several years of the intervention will ensure greater political stability. This belief is based on the notion that local elections reflect more directly on the basic needs of the population and are less likely to be fought on ethnically divisive and politically destabilizing grounds. Local elections also provide a useful test of electoral mechanisms and of the strengths of organized political forces.

To prepare for elections, the intervenor should create an independent national electoral commission that can help establish the legal procedures and general rules of the election, including the identification requirements for voting, and can create or verify the voter registry. Both local and international personnel should be recruited and trained to monitor the elections to limit fraud and mismanagement, while international and local security forces should be made available to protect both voters and ballot boxes. Finally, information about the voting process and on the results of the election should be disseminated across the country in a fashion that is accessible to the entire population.

Preventing Elections from Triggering a Return to War

**Lesson:** Disarm and demobilize combatants and other armed, mobilized groups; implement strategies for reintegration prior to elections.

In the initial phases of reconstruction and stabilization operations, armed and mobilized groups typically maintain their wartime goals. Disarming and demobilizing them prior to elections can help prevent the resumption of violence. This is well illustrated by the experiences in Angola and Mozambique. The UN mission to Angola failed to disarm and demobilize the guerrilla organization, União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), prior to the election. When UNITA lost the election in 1992, its leaders rejected the results by deeming the election fraudulent, and the war was resumed. In Mozambique, however, elections took place after the disarmament process was well under way. When the resistance movement, the Resistencia Nacional Mozambicana (RENAMO),
lost the election, the option to return to war was not practical; thus a resumption of violence was prevented.

**Conclusion**

For decades, military actors in reconstruction and stabilization operations have drawn upon the experience gained in the field to inform their doctrine: a set of prescriptive, operational principles to guide the planning and conduct of operations. They couple doctrine with the unique demands of the specific environment to develop actions to achieve mission success.

Civilians have not conducted this exercise. The ad hoc, often chaotic nature of nonmilitary activities is one result of not documenting and codifying lessons derived from past operations. This report, one in a series under the Filling the Gaps project at the Institute, is an initial attempt to solicit and report on key principles learned by civilians in reconstruction and stabilization operations.

The resulting recommendations are meant to serve as a guide to assist U.S. government agencies as they tackle the critical tasks related to transitional governance in reconstruction and stabilization operations—a task that should be, and usually is, led and conducted by civilians. A comprehensive matrix of these recommendations follows for all phases of the reconstruction and stabilization environment.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS: A MATRIX FOR GOVERNANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRANSITIONAL GOVERNANCE MATRIX</th>
<th>Predeployment: Setting the Mission Up for Success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Assessments and Audits**     | A. Conduct assessments of the conditions and needs of the mission area.  
|                                | B. Conduct an audit of the legal and illegal financial flows inside and outside the mission area.  |
| **Mandate**                    | A. Craft the mandate from the assessments and audits.  
|                                | B. Ensure that the mission mandate gives the mission leader executive authority and provides adequate personnel and resources for national and local governance, transitional strategies, and administration.  
|                                | C. Delineate mission objectives clearly.  |
| **Planning and Organization**  | A. Recognize that providing security is the primary objective but that progress in any sector is contingent on progress in all sectors.  
|                                | B. Mission organization must embody either unity of command with broad participation from mission contributors, or commonality of purpose.  
|                                | C. Mission structure should shift from a heavy footprint in the initial emergency phase of the intervention to a light footprint, with continually increasing participation of the local population.  
|                                | D. A structure that affords coordination between all parts of the mission enables effective governance.  
|                                | E. Mission structure should include key regional powers and neighboring countries in consultative or administration frameworks.  
|                                | F. Governance structures should be chosen based on the amount of authority the intervenors will assume and should undergo phased transitions to local control.  
|                                | G. Mission personnel should include a robust number of trained and experienced international personnel and administrators who can be deployed rapidly.  
|                                | H. Mission leaders require training and mentoring prior to deployment.  |
| **Force Structure and Resource Procurement** | A. Mission structure should include robust security forces that are authorized to prevent the resumption of hostilities, in addition to constabulary, police, judicial, and penal personnel to restore the rule of law.  
|                                | B. Governance advisors, like political advisors, should be embedded in the intervening military force structure that may be responsible for establishing local authorities in advance of civilian deployment in unstable areas.  
|                                | C. Intelligence apparatuses should be developed and coordinated with the overall mission objectives.  
|                                | D. A higher ratio of troops to civilians can create a more secure environment and prevent casualties.  
|                                | E. Sufficient resources should be provided to quickly set up key government institutions, as well as to train, pay, and equip essential civil service workers.  |
**Postdeployment: Developing Public Institutions and Programs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local and National Institutions</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Incorporate legitimate aspects of the former local and national governance and bureaucratic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>structures into the transitional administration as quickly as possible.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Implement revenue-generating or revenue management strategies.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Distribute resources to local governance structures early and responsibly.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Ensure that the constitution-writing process is inclusive, consultative, transparent, and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participatory.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Provide legal advisors to help with the development of the constitution and launch a public</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>information campaign on the constitution-writing process and final outcome.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions of Consultation and Coadministration</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Create institutions of consultation and coadministration on the local and national level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to ensure local participation and support, as well as to build local capacity.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Coadministration requires a strong commitment to empower and train local personnel, as</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>well as a willingness to delegate authority and resources.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Local and national governance structures must communicate and coordinate.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transparency and Accountability</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Curb corruption early and at all levels of governance by providing legal advisors and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consultants to help develop anti-corruption legislation; designing anti-corruption public</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education campaigns; empowering indigenous watchdog mechanisms and groups to monitor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government corruption; ensuring on-time, adequate, and full payment of salaries to civil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>service personnel; and establishing a system of meritocratic criteria for civil service.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Postdeployment: Developing Political Participation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spoilers</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Incorporate spoilers into the political process. If they cannot be incorporated, constrain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>them from violence or remove them from the community.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Prosecution of criminals should be based on acts and not on associations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs are critical for the development of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effective governance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A. Seek out and empower new political leaders, particularly those at the local level.

B. Facilitate political representation development by defining the political representation system, registering political parties and candidates, and implementing political education and development programs.

C. Enhance civil society by helping develop regulations and rights for NGOs to assist in upholding political accountability and representation.

A. Allow time for political processes to mature before holding national elections.

B. Hold local elections within two years of the intervention and before national elections.

C. Disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate combatants prior to elections.

Bibliography


Of Related Interest

This report is part of a series of special reports that will be issued by the United States Institute of Peace’s Filling the Gaps series of working groups. The special reports will address the causes of failure in specific areas in reconstruction and stabilization as well as generate policy options. The other reports in the series (all to be published in 2006) are:

- *Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction*, Craig Cohen
- *The Role of Women in Reconstruction and Stabilization*, Camille Pampell Conaway
- *Filling the Gaps: Managing Natural Resource Wealth*, Jill Shankleman