# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** .................................................................................................................. i

**I. INTRODUCTION** .......................................................................................................................... 1

**II. ISSUES** ........................................................................................................................................ 2
   A. MILITARY DOCTRINE AND BIO-CHEMICAL WARFARE .......................................................... 2
      1. DPRK accusations of foreign CW and BW programs ............................................................... 3
      2. Command and control.............................................................................................................. 5
   B. CHEMICAL WEAPONS ............................................................................................................... 5
      1. History of the program ............................................................................................................ 5
      2. Capabilities and inventory .................................................................................................... 6
      3. Research and production ...................................................................................................... 7
      4. Doctrine .................................................................................................................................... 8
      5. Command and control............................................................................................................ 9
      6. Exports ..................................................................................................................................... 9
   C. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS .......................................................................................................... 10
      1. History of the program ......................................................................................................... 10
      2. Capabilities and inventory ................................................................................................... 11
      3. Human experiments ............................................................................................................. 12

**III. RISKS** ...................................................................................................................................... 13
   A. WEAPONS USE ....................................................................................................................... 13
      1. Attack: deliberate, accidental, unauthorised ......................................................................... 13
      2. Retaliation, escalation .......................................................................................................... 13
      3. Internal use in a power struggle ......................................................................................... 14
   B. PROLIFERATION, SALES, TRANSFERS ............................................................................... 14
   C. ARMS RACES ............................................................................................................................ 15

**IV. POSSIBLE RESPONSES** ......................................................................................................... 15
   A. NON-PROLIFERATION, COUNTER-PROLIFERATION AND EXPORT CONTROLS ............. 15
   B. DETERRENCE AND COUNTER-STRIKE CAPABILITIES ..................................................... 17
   C. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING ................................................................................... 17
   D. DIPLOMACY, ENGAGEMENT AND ARMS CONTROL ............................................................... 18
      1. CWC ........................................................................................................................................ 18
      2. BTWC ..................................................................................................................................... 19
      3. Six-Party Talks ..................................................................................................................... 20
      4. G-8 Global Partnership ......................................................................................................... 20

**V. CONCLUSION** ............................................................................................................................ 21

**APPENDICES**
   A. MAP OF NORTH KOREA ............................................................................................................ 22
   B. MAP OF NORTH KOREAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) SITES ........................................... 23
   C. GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS .................................................................... 24
   D. DPRK CW AGENTS .................................................................................................................. 25
   E. ARMS CONTROL AND EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES .......................................................... 26
   F. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ..................................................................... 27
   G. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2006 .................................... 28
   H. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES .................................................................................. 30
NORTH KOREA’S CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report examines North Korea’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities in the context of its military doctrine and national objectives. It is based on open source literature, interviews and unpublished documents made available to Crisis Group. Companion reports published simultaneously assess the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities and what the policy response of the international community should be to its recent nuclear and missile testing.1

North Korea’s programs to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles pose serious risks to security. Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities are the greatest threat, but it also possesses a large stockpile of chemical weapons and is suspected of maintaining a biological weapons program. The Six-Party Talks (China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea and the U.S.) had been underway since August 2003 with the objective of ending the North’s nuclear ambitions, before Pyongyang announced its withdrawal in April 2009, but there is no direct mechanism for dealing with its chemical weapons and possible biological weapons. The North Korean leadership is very unlikely to surrender its WMD unless there is significant change in the political and security environments.

The Six-Party Talks produced a “Statement of Principles” in September 2005 that included a commitment to establish a permanent peace mechanism in North East Asia, but the structure and nature of such a cooperative security arrangement is subject to interpretation, negotiation and implementation. Views among the parties differ, and no permanent peace can be established unless North Korea abandons all its WMD programs. The diplomatic tasks are daunting, and diplomacy could fail. If North Korea refuses to engage in arms control and to rid itself of WMD, the international community must be prepared to deal with a wide range of threats, including those posed by Pyongyang’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities.

Unclassified estimates of the chemical weapons (CW) arsenal are imprecise, but the consensus is that the Korean People’s Army (KPA) possesses 2,500-5,000 tons, including mustard, phosgene, blood agents, sarin, tabun and V-agents (persistent nerve agents). The stockpile does not appear to be increasing but is already sufficient to inflict massive civilian casualties on South Korea. The North’s CW can be delivered with long-range artillery, multiple rocket launchers, FROGs (free rocket over ground), ballistic missiles, aircraft and naval vessels.

North Korean military doctrine emphasises quick offensive strikes to break through enemy defences in order to achieve national military objectives before the U.S. can intervene effectively on behalf of its South Korean ally. However, the North’s conventional military capabilities are declining against those of its potential foes, so the leadership is likely to rely on asymmetric capabilities for its national security objectives. This strategy poses a significant danger because it risks deliberate, accidental or unauthorised WMD attacks or incidents. North Korea has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) but has signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) as well as the Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons in war. The government denies having CW or biological weapons (BW) programs but claims to be threatened by South Korean and U.S. CBW even though Seoul and Washington are parties to the CWC, BTWC and the Geneva Protocol. South Korea had a CW program but completed the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile in 2008 and is in compliance with all its CBW arms control commitments.

Despite a dismal economy, the North Korean regime appears stable. However, leader Kim Jong-il’s health problems in the fall of 2008 have raised concerns about succession problems. In a struggle for power or a coup

North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs
Crisis Group Asia Report No.167, 18 June 2009

The proliferation of North Korean WMD materials or technology would endanger global security and non-proliferation regimes. An international norm against chemical and biological weapons has emerged, but a few nations and terrorist groups still seek to acquire them. Most states can produce chemical weapons on their own if they choose to, but North Korea could provide materials or technology for integrating CW munitions with delivery systems to shorten developmental and deployment timelines. The North’s biotechnology capability is rudimentary, but any biological agents or BW technology in its possession would be highly valued. North Korean entities, with or without government authorisation, could be tempted to sell biological weapons or agents, believing the detection risk to be low. The likelihood of such a transfer would increase if the country were to become unstable or collapse.

The North’s economy urgently needs reform, but the regime’s failure to adopt changes leaves weapons and weapons technology as its vital source of foreign exchange. Abandonment of CW and BW and integration into the global economy will require compliance with international export control rules and norms, as well as significant aid.

Diplomatic efforts to eliminate North Korean WMD and ballistic missiles must continue, but the international community must be prepared for multiple contingencies including:

- a deliberate, accidental or unauthorised chemical or biological attack or incident;
- a chemical weapons accident in North Korea;
- an accidental release of biological agents in North Korea;
- the North’s use of CW following an intentional or inadvertent military clash and escalation;
- North Korean use of biological or chemical weapons in a preventive war against South Korea;
- the transfer of chemical or biological weapons, precursors, materials and technologies to other states or non-state actors; and
- arms races.

There are a number of international institutions for dealing with the North Korean chemical and biological weapons programs. However, they may not be sufficient for addressing all issues, and new regional instruments may be necessary. Regional efforts could increase opportunities for cooperation through issue linkage and confidence-building aimed at the establishment of a collective peace and security regime. For example, the region could initiate processes for missile disarmament and cooperation in the peaceful exploration of outer space; the elimination of chemical weapons; conventional arms control; and non-traditional security cooperation in the realms of energy security, food security and public health.

While the diplomatic priority now must be to focus on the nuclear issue, progress on this front would create opportunities to address Pyongyang’s other weapons of mass destruction, including a large chemical weapons stockpile and possible biological weapons, which must be eliminated before a stable and permanent peace can be established in North East Asia. If North Korea credibly commits to abandoning its nuclear program in the Six-Party Talks, a multi-faceted effort should be made to establish a fully WMD-free Korean Peninsula.

Seoul/Brussels, 18 June 2009
NORTH KOREA’S CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMS

I. INTRODUCTION

For almost two decades, the international community has focused on eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. However, the North (DPRK) also maintains a large stockpile of chemical weapons and the capability to produce biological weapons. The Six-Party Talks (China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea and the U.S.) aimed to end Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions, before the DPRK announced its withdrawal in April 2009, but no similar effort is underway to address its chemical and biological weapons programs. Even if the DPRK abandons its nuclear weapons, a host of problems will remain before all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) can be eliminated from the Korean Peninsula. On 19 September 2005, representatives of the six parties signed a “Statement of Principles”, whereby the DPRK agreed to abandon “all of its nuclear programs” in exchange for negative security assurances and other inducements. The statement stipulated that the parties would seek the normalization of relations and a lasting peace in North East Asia. This implicitly appears to require the elimination of Pyongyang’s chemical and biological weapons (CBW).

The DPRK is one of only seven countries that has neither signed nor acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), but it is party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). It denies possessing chemical or biological weapons, though the consensus is that it has at least 2,500 tons of chemical weapons, as well as several biological agents that could be weaponized. The Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of chemical weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW) in warfare but not their production or possession. The BTWC, which was designed to address this weakness, prohibits production or stockpiling of BW but has no verification regime and permits the possession of biological agents for bio-defence research, as well as legitimate medical research. It was opened for signature in 1972 and went into effect in 1975. Pyongyang acceded in 1987 but is suspected of developing biological weapons in violation of its commitments.

The CWC, which was opened for signature in 1993 and went into force in 1997, bans the production and possession of chemical weapons, so Pyongyang would have to destroy its CW stocks under international monitoring if it were to become a party. However, the destruction of chemical weapons is dangerous and expensive, and North Korea has neither the technology nor the human and financial resources to dispose of its CW stockpile safely. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the CWC secretariat, could provide technical assistance and verify the destruction of Pyongyang’s chemical weapons, but South Korea (the Republic of Korea, ROK) and other participants in the Six-Party process might provide additional help.

North Korea is unlikely to abandon its chemical weapons in the near future unless there is a sudden change in its political orientation. Progress in nuclear and missile disarmament probably must precede any initiatives for dealing with Pyongyang’s CW and BW programs, but all the issues are linked to the overall security environment, so preliminary planning and diplomacy should begin at an early stage. North Korea’s WMD disarmament will take considerable time and resources even under the unlikely conditions of perfect cooperation. If the DPRK were to collapse suddenly and the peninsula were unified on the South’s terms, Seoul and the international community would have to secure and destroy the North’s chemical munitions and biological agents with little or no warning.

---

2 The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
4 The complete name of the Geneva Protocol is: “The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisons, or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods in Warfare”.

---
Securing and eliminating Pyongyang’s WMD are urgent tasks, but research and planning for these objectives are extremely challenging, as the Iraqi case has demonstrated. Countries may have incentives to conceal or to exaggerate their WMD capabilities, and governments try to protect their sources and methods for assessing the military programs of other states. International arms control and non-proliferation organisations also protect proprietary information and often have confidentiality agreements with member states to prevent release of sensitive information to the public.

The North Korean government takes extraordinary measures to conceal information about its military capabilities and doctrine, particularly in the area of WMD. Pyongyang openly declares itself a nuclear and missile power but denies possessing any chemical or biological weapons. Its policy process is opaque, and the details of national defence doctrine are difficult to assess. In recent years, the military has become more prominent in national affairs, as the country has endured famine and economic malaise. However, power is tightly centralised in the hands of Kim Jong-il. This report examines North Korea’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities in the context of its military doctrine and national objectives. It is based on open source literature, interviews and unpublished documents made available to Crisis Group. Companion reports, published simultaneously, assess the North’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities and the appropriate international response to its recent nuclear and missile testing.5

II. ISSUES

A. MILITARY DOCTRINE AND BIO-CHEMICAL WARFARE

For at least three decades after the DPRK was founded in 1948, Pyongyang held a significant military advantage over Seoul, but the conventional balance has now turned against it. North Korea’s alliance relationships with China and the Soviet Union basically were terminated after the Cold War, and three decades of economic stagnation has made it impossible for Pyongyang to maintain the industrial and technological base required to modernise its obsolete military hardware. This has led it to become more dependent upon asymmetric capabilities for national security. Though the Korean People’s Army (KPA) was formally established with Soviet assistance on 8 February 1948, Moscow had begun two years earlier to train North Koreans and lay the foundation for the formation of the forces that enabled Kim Il-sung to launch an invasion of the South in June 1950. That attempt to unify Korea by force would have succeeded if the U.S. had not intervened under UN auspices.

Since the Korean War Armistice was signed in July 1953, North Korea consistently has sought military superiority over the South and has tried to eliminate the possibility of a second U.S. military intervention. This has led to an extraordinary allocation of national resources and a policy that aims to undermine and terminate the U.S.-ROK alliance. The KPA war-fighting strategy is offensive, focusing on achieving its military objectives quickly, before the U.S. can respond. It includes the use of chemical weapons to inflict massive casualties and lessen the ability of the ROK and U.S. to conduct combat operations or introduce rein-

5 Crisis Group Report, North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs, op. cit.; Crisis Group Report, North Korea: Getting Back to Talks, op. cit.
forcements. Though nominally the North “conducts all activities under the leadership of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP),” it is arguably the most militarised country on earth.

Under the leadership of Kim Jong-il, the military has become more prominent since the mid-1990s. The National Defence Commission (NDC) is the highest military authority, and its chairman (Kim Jong-il) “directs and commands all the armed forces”. Kim has established firm control of the military, the party and the state; he has no peers or apparent challengers. He appears to have chosen his third son, Kim Jong-un, who is only 25 years old, as his successor and reportedly informed North Korean institutions and organisations about this decision immediately after the country’s second nuclear test, on 25 May 2009.

Foreign analysts debate whether the shift in the conventional military balance against North Korea has forced the political leadership to regard its asymmetric military capabilities as essential for deterrence, national survival and maintaining the status quo, and if Pyongyang remains wedded to “completing the revolution in the South”, with force if necessary or possible. According to the KWP by-laws, the party is committed to “achieving a complete socialist victory in the northern half of the republic and to completing a people’s revolution to liberate all Korean people throughout the nation”. However, DPRK leaders appear to be preoccupied with the survival of their state and the Kim family regime and not likely to launch an unprovoked war that they know they would ultimately lose.

1. DPRK accusations of foreign CW and BW programs

DPRK government organisations and media often cite the “chemical and biological weapons programs” of the U.S., South Korea and Japan as either having harmed the Korean people in the past or as currently threatening the DPRK. Pyongyang often accuses the U.S. of possessing the world’s largest stocks of chemical and biological weapons, which the media frequently report as aimed at the DPRK. Furthermore, while consistently denying “having anything to do with chemical or biological weapons” itself, North Korea accuses the U.S. of having deployed CW and BW to South Korea and of having assisted the ROK in acquiring its own CBW capabilities.

South Korea signed the CWC in 1993 and began destroying its CW stocks in 1999. When the destruction pro-

---

9DPRK Constitution, Chapter 1, Article 11.
11DPRK Constitution, Chapter 6, Article 100; Article 102.
12For more details on DPRK military doctrine, see Crisis Group Report, North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs, op. cit.
13A frequent foreign visitor to the DPRK told Crisis Group that during the period 25-28 May 2009, North Korean officials in Pyongyang informed him of the succession plans for the first time. They reportedly said they are worried and hope the transition does not have to be implemented in the coming weeks or months, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service confirmed the succession plans on 1 June 2009. Crisis Group interview, Seoul, 29 May 2009; “Spy agency confirms N.K. leader’s third son as successor”, Yonhap News Agency, 2 June 2009; Kim So-hyun, “Kim Jong-un named next ‘Dear Leader’”, The Korea Herald, 3 June 2009.
17For example, see “Koreas: North committee denounces South ‘stockpile’ of chemical, biological weapons”, Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 22 April 1999; “Development of Biological and Chemical Weapons Exposed in S. Korea”, KCNA, 8 April 1999; and “U.S. branded as rogue state”, KCNA, op. cit.
18The ROK submitted its instruments of ratification on 28 April 1997, one day before the treaty went into effect. 박강문·문호영 [Pak Kang-mun and Mun Ho-yong], “화학무기 금지협약 한국 동 112 국 서명/오늘 새벽…북한은 불참” [“Korea and 112 countries sign CWC early this morning…North Korea doesn’t participate”], The Seoul Sinmun, 14 January 1993; “화학무기 금지협정 발효/84 국 비준 볼 때 서명 기때 [“CWC goes into effect: 84 countries ratify except North doesn’t sign”], The Munhwon Ilbo, 29 April 1997; “화학무기 수백 t 영동군서 폐기: 환경오염 가능성 없나” [“Hundreds of tons of chemical weapons being abandoned in Yongsong-ku: could there be environmental pollution?”], The Choson Ilbo, 5 May 2000; “화학무기 국비 폐기: 금지협약 가입과라 작년말부터 시작 [“Chemical weapons abandonment top secret: started last year after joining convention”], The Choson Ilbo, 5 May 2000; “Report: South Korea dismantling chemical weapons”, Associated Press, 9 May 2000; and
program was revealed by a South Korean daily in May 2000, the DPRK media immediately condemned the “South Korean puppets” for their “criminal wish to wipe out their fellow countrymen”. Despite Pyongyang’s frequent accusations, South Korea completed the destruction of its stockpile in July 2008 after having been granted an extension beyond the previous deadline of December 2007. The South’s destruction of its CW stocks has gone mostly unnoticed because Seoul has a confidentiality agreement with the OPCW and neither confirms nor denies the existence of its abandoned CW program. The issue is sensitive in the South, and the government is divided. Diplomats in the foreign and trade ministry generally favour disclosure, but the defence ministry prefers ambiguity because of the supposed residual deterrent effect on Pyongyang. The government is also reluctant to disclose controversial information for fear that domestic civil society groups might pick up the issue and protest. Full disclosure would nullify Pyongyang’s accusations that Seoul maintains a CW capability and could be a confidence-building measure for inter-Korean arms control, but officials have grown tired of waiting for the North to take reciprocal arms control measures or even respond to their overtures, and many see no need to be forthcoming when they expect no response from Pyongyang.

North Korean media occasionally cite Japanese CBW programs and use during World War II, including CBW experiments on human beings at Unit 731, a large-scale CBW research and production facility operated by the army. The reports are part of an effort to demonise Japan and warn North Koreans about the threat of Japanese militarisation. Allegations of CBW use by the U.S. during the Korean War are even more frequent. These usually focus on the magnitude of supposed atrocities and the sense of injustice felt by North Koreans. They often include accusations of recent CBW use by the U.S. in Iraq, Vietnam and even Kosovo, reminding North Koreans that “Americans feel they can use CBW with impunity, CBW and nuclear weapons are part of the U.S. arsenal, and the United States would not hesitate to use WMD against the DPRK – so be prepared”. While outsiders might discount such claims, the fear of CW attack could be real for many North Koreans.

KPA personnel are taught that ROK and U.S. chemical weapons would be used against the North, even though Seoul and Washington are both state parties to the CWC and the Geneva Protocol. North Korean media cite this supposed threat as a justification for Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal and strong military posture. Though the country suffers from extreme shortages of food and consumer goods, the defence industry produces protective suits that must be replaced after every CW defence exercise. Kim Jong-il’s “military first politics” means these factories and training centres do not experience the shortages that are ubiq-


“Hundreds of tons of chemical weapons”, op. cit.; “Chemical weapons abandonment top secret”, op. cit.; “South Korea dismantling chemical weapons”, op. cit.; “Seoul owns up to chemical arms stocks”, op. cit.; “North Korean radio decries South’s game of scrapping chemical weapons”, Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 12 May 2000; “Korean authorities’ moves for biological and chemical war”, KCNA, 13 May 2000.


Crisis Group interviews, Dr Park Yong-ok, Seoul, 31 October 2008; Col. Lim Chae-hong (ret.), Seoul, 13 February 2009. Park is a retired ROK Army lieutenant general and former vice defence minister who led the South Korean delegation in inter-Korean military arms control talks in the early 1990s. He helped negotiate the “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula” in 1991 but is pessimistic about Pyongyang negotiating in good faith and implementing arms control agreements. Lim is a former CW defence officer who was assigned to the ROK UN Mission and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.


27 The CWC requires members to declare and destroy all CW stocks; the Geneva Protocol bans the use of chemical and biological weapons in war.

Civilians are particularly vulnerable, because they generally do not have the detection and protective equipment to cope with chemical attacks. On the other hand, CW can degrade or delay the ability to conduct operations, so the KPA might employ it as part of its strategy to achieve a quick victory against the South before the U.S. could intervene effectively.\(^{33}\)

2. **Command and control**

During peacetime, the NDC and its chairman (Kim Jong-il) have ultimate control of military planning, arms production and procurement. The NDC delegates some responsibilities to the party and the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces but remains the final authority for WMD and ballistic missile assets. It can declare war and issue orders for national mobilisation and, in wartime, its chairman would assume the position of Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army (SCKPA). Nominally, power is more decentralised in peacetime but Kim Jong-il maintains tight control through a system of formal and informal networks throughout the military and the party. Decentralisation otherwise keeps party and military organisations divided, forcing them to check each other and compete for access and rewards from him. Kim disdains meetings and prefers to bypass the formal institutional lines of authority, often delivering instructions directly to relevant secretaries.\(^{31}\)

### B. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Chemical weapons (CW) are notorious for their widespread use in World War I, but they have also been employed by Iraq against Iran in the 1980s, by Japan against China in World War II and by others.\(^{32}\) CW agents are divided into five basic categories: choking, blister, nerve, blood and generally non-lethal riot control agents such as vomiting agents and tear gas. They can be dispersed across wide areas by aircraft, missiles and artillery, and some are odourless and colourless. Civilians are particularly vulnerable, because they generally do not have the detection and protective equipment to cope with chemical attacks. On the other hand, the military usefulness of CW has declined, because militaries have the means to defend themselves. However, CW can degrade or delay the ability to conduct operations, so the KPA might employ it as part of its strategy to achieve a quick victory against the South before the U.S. could intervene effectively.\(^{33}\)

1. **History of the program**

The DPRK’s motivations for acquiring offensive and defensive CW capabilities date to the Korean War, when it suffered extensive damage from U.S. bombing and was the target of implicit nuclear threats. China’s motivations to develop its own nuclear deterrent in the 1950s and early 1960s to counter “U.S. blackmail” are well documented,\(^{34}\) and North Korea followed a similar, if considerably delayed, trajectory to acquire chemical as well as nuclear weapons. Pyongyang probably wanted to develop a nuclear arsenal soon after the Korean War, but the long timeline and heavy resources involved forced it to consider CW as an immediate alternative.\(^{35}\)

In 1954, when still in ruins from the war, North Korea established a chemical department under the operations bureau in the defence ministry’s general staff.\(^{36}\) This focused on defensive measures, until the country could develop an offensive capability. It was upgraded to a bureau in 1961 and reorganised into the Nuclear and Chemical Defence Bureau (NCDB) in 1981.\(^{37}\) In 1961, Kim Il-sung issued a “declaration for chemicalisation” (化學化宣言) that was aimed at developing an independent chemical industry, with dual civilian and military use. On 1 November 1980, he told the KWP Central Military Committee (CMC) that it would be

\(^{29}\) Internal third country government memorandum made available to Crisis Group.

\(^{30}\) Crisis Group interviews, Pyongyang, April 2007.

\(^{31}\) Crisis Group interview, Seoul, 3 November 2008; internal third country government memorandum made available to Crisis Group.


\(^{33}\) CW defence is demanding logistically, and cases show that CW attacks can impact the morale of its targets and thus weaken their resolve to fight. Al Mauroni, Chemical and Biological Warfare (Santa Barbara, 2003), pp. 132-154.

\(^{34}\) For example, see John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Palo Alto, 1988).


\(^{36}\) 북한 핵-미사일 전쟁 [North Korea: Nuclear Missile War], op. cit., p. 358.

\(^{37}\) Ibid, p. 358; and “North said owning enough chemical weapons to wipe out South”, Japan Economic Newswire, 22 March 1994.
“effective to produce poison gas and germ weapons for use in combat”.

The DPRK probably was unable to acquire an independent CW production capability until 1980 or later. However, many sources claim it actually began developing its CW arsenal in the 1960s, and others believe that it began producing chemical weapons in the 1970s. In the 1960s, China and the Soviet Union reportedly transferred training and technical information, as well as CW equipment and munitions used in World War II. According to a South Korean report, the Soviet Union provided “small amounts of mustard gas and nerve agents” in 1966. An American analyst asserted that “North Korea probably produced its first small quantities of mustard and nerve agents in 1966 with Soviet assistance.” In the late 1970s, a DPRK military attaché in Berlin reportedly acquired “technical know-how” for CW production from the East German government. And according to a U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report, Pyongyang had acquired a defensive CW capability by 1979 and was then prepared to develop an offensive capability.

2. Capabilities and inventory

Open source estimates of the country’s CW capabilities are vague. According to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), North Korea in 2003 had a “sizeable but ageing chemical industry” and continued to acquire dual-use chemicals that could potentially be used to support Pyongyang’s long-standing CW program. In recent years, there have been several reports of the DPRK importing dual-use CW precursors, apparently because it “lacks a certain number of indigenous precursors.” Several shipments have been intercepted before reaching the DPRK. Over the last decade, several South Korean firms exported sodium cyanide, a precursor for sarin (a nerve agent), to North Korea through China, which has led to more restrictive South Korean export controls. The North has acknowledged the sodium cyanide imports but claims the chemical is

---

38 북한 핵-미사일 전쟁 [North Korea: Nuclear Missile War], op. cit., p. 358; and ROK Ministry of Unification, 북한개요 2004 [North Korea Summary 2004], op. cit., p. 123.
41 Bermudez, “CW”, op. cit., p. 54; “South Korea says North has biological, chemical weapons”, Kyodo News Service, 23 October 1992.
42 Some or all this equipment and munitions could have originated from imperial Japan’s extensive program in Manchuria. 북한 핵-미사일 전쟁 [North Korea: Nuclear Missile War], op. cit., p. 358.
44 Eric Croddy, with Clarisa Perez-Armendariz and John Hart, Chemical and Biological Warfare (New York, 2002), p. 50.
45 Prepaed statement of Ju-hwal Choi, former official, Ministry of the People’s Army, North Korea, “North Korean Missile Proliferation”, hearing before the Subcommittee on Inter-
not for military use.\textsuperscript{51} Mining of precious metals is a common legitimate use of this chemical, which is plausible in North Korea, but the final end-users and the disposition of these chemicals are unknown.

In 2006, the CIA’s unclassified assessment was that: “North Korea has had a longstanding CW program. North Korea’s chemical warfare capabilities probably include the ability to produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents. We assess Pyongyang possesses a sizeable stockpile of agents”.\textsuperscript{52} On 9 March 2006, General B.B. Bell, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, testified before the House Armed Services Committee that: “The size of North Korea’s chemical weapons stockpile is likely significant. We assess North Korea is probably capable of weaponising chemical agents for conventional weapons systems, missiles, and unconventional delivery”.\textsuperscript{53} However, he did not mention North Korean CW in his prepared statements before the same committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2008.\textsuperscript{54}

Recent ROK government estimates place the North’s CW stockpile at between 2,500 and 5,000 tons of various agents, including mustard, phosgene, blood agent, sarin, tabun, and V-agents (persistent nerve agents).\textsuperscript{55} This stockpile is not believed to be increasing, however, because there is no indication of what would be a necessary expansion of storage facilities. Furthermore, even 2,000-3,000 tons would be sufficient to inflict massive casualties on the South. ROK intelligence estimates that North Korea has the capacity to produce about 4,500 tons of CW per year, which is enough for both its own needs and a significant export potential.\textsuperscript{56} The KPA could deliver CW with its artillery, MRLs (multiple rocket launchers), FROGs (free rocket over ground), ballistic missiles, aircraft and naval vessels.\textsuperscript{57} However, it would be difficult to sustain the distribution of CW munitions from storage facilities to delivery systems and launch them to targets during war.

3. Research and production

The South Korean government assesses North Korea has the capability to produce all types of chemical weapons, but most, if not all, of the stockpile is believed to be unitary munitions. Binary CW munitions consist of two inert chemical compounds that once mixed together become lethal. These are more stable, safer to handle and have a longer shelf-life, but the North probably has not fully mastered this technology.\textsuperscript{58}

North Korea’s Second Natural Science Academy conducts weapons-related research and development, but the General Staff Department’s Nuclear Chemical Defence Bureau (NCDB) manages special research facilities for CW and CW defence. The main CW research facility is co-located with a production plant in Kanggye City, Chagang Province.\textsuperscript{59} Academic institutions are also involved in CW-related research. For example, in 2007, researchers at Kim Il-sung University published an article on the properties of mustard gas decontamination absorbent.\textsuperscript{60} This technology could be applied to defensive or offensive operations, so it is impossible to do more than speculate about the real intentions behind the research.

The General Staff Department in the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces drafts plans for chemical munitions demand and concomitant production requirements and


\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.; 장준익 [Chang Chun-ik], 북한 핵-미사일 전쟁 [North Korea: Nuclear Missile War], op. cit., pp. 369-375.

\textsuperscript{53} B.B. Bell, statement before the House Armed Services Committee, 9 March 2006.

\textsuperscript{54} B.B. Bell, statement before the House Armed Services Committee, 9 March 2006.

\textsuperscript{55} 장준익 [Chang Chun-ik], 북한 핵-미사일 전쟁 [North Korea: Nuclear Missile War], op. cit., pp. 366-367, “김대환 의원 ‘북한 화학학문기관설 49 곳’” [“National Assemblyman Kim T’aehwan says North Korea has CBW Facilities at 49 locations”], The Chosun Ilbo, 17 October 2006.

\textsuperscript{56} Internal memorandum made available to Crisis Group; Crisis Group interview, Seoul, 30 October 2008.

\textsuperscript{57} Internal memorandum made available to Crisis Group; Crisis Group interview, Seoul, 30 October 2008.

subsists them to the KWP’s Central Military Committee (CMC) and the National Defence Commission for approval. The NDC delegates procurement and production authority to the Second Economic Committee (SEC), which is under the CMC’s Munitions Industry Department and is responsible for the procurement, production, import and export of weapons.

The SEC, which manages the extensive munitions industry, consists of eight support bureaus, eight production bureaus and six affiliated or subordinate agencies. Its Fifth Bureau is in charge of CW production at nine dual-use facilities also capable of producing chemicals for peaceful industrial purposes. Since the chemical industry ministry manages chemical plants, the SEC has to coordinate or schedule production runs at dual-use facilities. That ministry and other relevant ones also provide materials and components when necessary. Following production runs, the NCDB manages distribution, since the munitions require special handling.61

The SEC probably focuses its CW production on mustard agents, phosgene, sarin, and V-agents (persistent nerve agents) that would be practical for meeting KPA strategic objectives and are not difficult to produce.62 The open source literature cites many suspected CW production plants but not all produce chemical munitions. The Kanggye plant is also the site of several other munitions factories and a suspected nuclear warhead storage facility.63 There are six storage sites for CW and CW-related materials and precursors, including the “Central Chemical Supply Centre” in the southern part of Pyongyang.64 Most storage sites are not located near forward-deployed KPA troops, so CW munitions would have to be delivered to operational units prior to use, although storage or deployment at unknown sites cannot be ruled out.

4. Doctrine

Most of the literature on the North’s CW doctrine contains broad assumptions, including that the DPRK would employ chemical weapons in an effort to defeat ROK forces very rapidly and achieve national unification by force before the U.S. could make its strength felt. Given the relative decline in the DPRK’s conventional capabilities, chemical weapons are considered critical for the KPA to prosecute its war plans successfully.65 The DPRK has deployed a large portion of its military forces in forward areas near the demilitarised zone (DMZ), so many analysts believe it would use CW immediately in a war.66 U.S. Army General Leon LaPorte, former Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, asserted in August 2005 that North Korean leaders do not consider CW to be WMD, and “current North Korean doctrine states that every third [artillery] round fired would be a chemical round”.67

North Korea has an estimated 8,000-10,000 artillery and multiple rocket launcher (MRL) tubes deployed near the DMZ that could strike the Seoul-Inch’ŏn metropolitan area. The KPA could use CW munitions to attack Seoul but probably would not do so indiscriminately against civilians, because this would have no real effect on military objectives, and the regime would risk massive – possibly even nuclear – retaliation. Furthermore, KPA commanders could subsequently face war crimes charges.68 But that does not mean Pyongyang is not prepared to use CW to implement its wartime objectives. If it were to use CW, it would likely target ROK and U.S. military facilities in the South, including command and control centres and transport facilities such as airfields and ports – the latter to deny access to U.S. reinforcements. Hwasŏng (Scud) missiles would be the likely delivery system. Since their accuracy is poor, the KPA would have to launch several missiles at each target, so as to saturate the area with chemical agents and degrade enemy operations.

As the balance of conventional forces continues to go against it, asymmetric capabilities, including CW, will remain an important pillar of DPRK military strategy. North Korea does not appear to be prepared to sign the

---

61 Internal third country government memorandum made available to Crisis Group.
63 Internal third country government memorandum made available to Crisis Group; Crisis Group interviews.
64 Internal third country government memorandum made available to Crisis Group.
66 For example, the “North Korea Country Handbook” prepared by U.S. Marine Corps intelligence in May 1997 concluded that North Korea would use chemical weapons in the initial stage of a hypothetical attack against South Korea. See, “US handbook says North Korea would use chemical weapons”, Kyodo News Service, in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 11 November 1999.

In the second scenario, the KPA could use CW to retaliate against the ROK and/or U.S. forces in Korea after a conflict had already begun and conventional means had proven insufficient to avoid defeat. The Chief of the General Staff would consult with Kim Jong-il and request permission. In this scenario, however, command, control and communications networks might already be seriously degraded, and CW units in the field might be unable to receive instructions and authorisation. In the 1990s, the DPRK began to install fibre-optic networks in an effort to upgrade the telecommunications system and improve the military’s command, control and communications. However, the system is vulnerable to attack, and KPA policy regarding delegation of authority to use CW to field commanders is unknown.

5. Command and control

As noted above, the National Defence Commission’s control of all military assets would shift to the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army (SCCKPA) in time of war. The threshold is presumably much lower for using chemical than nuclear weapons. Kim Jong-il, as SCCKPA, would have to approve CW use, but the munitions are already at storage facilities, and custody has been transferred to the KPA. The Chief of the General Staff would consult with the SCCKPA and request authorisation to use CW, which could happen under two scenarios.

In the first, the DPRK could use CW in a first strike against the ROK, with the approval of the NDC and its chairman (again Kim). Such a plan would be extremely risky and almost certainly would fail, but the argument for it would be that war was inevitable and the KPA would be more likely to succeed if it attacked first. Since the conventional military balance does not favour the KPA, asymmetric capabilities, including CW, could be necessary to avoid defeat.

The General Staff Department’s Nuclear Chemical Defence Bureau (NCDB) would have to deploy defensive measures before the KPA could launch a CW attack. Gas masks and protective suits would have to be distributed, and monitoring and detection equipment would have to be deployed to ensure that KPA troops avoided or at least minimised self-contamination. As CW units prepared for an assault, the NCDB would deliver munitions to combat units. The defensive and offensive preparations would be observable from outside North Korea, and the resulting warning time would nullify some of the first-strike advantages. Of course, this scenario would include the mobilisation of other military resources in addition to CW munitions, so it would be impossible for the KPA to launch such a strike without the South having at least a few days’ warning.

6. Exports

North Korea has been accused of exporting CW, as well as having assisted others with developing the munitions. In February 1997, then Israeli Foreign Minister David Levi charged it was supplying Syria with chemical weapons. A September 2003 report asserted that the North has been suspected of trans-shipping chemical weapons through Georgia. On 26 July 2007, an explosion occurred at a Syrian military facility when engineers reportedly were attempting to load

69 Internal government memorandum made available to Crisis Group.
70 Ibid.
71 ROK intelligence can detect KPA artillery preparations in forward areas, but U.S. intelligence is much better at detecting ballistic missile launch preparations in rear areas. Crisis Group interview, Seoul, 30 October 2008.

73 “North Korean Smart Book”, U.S. Forces Korea, Camp Garry Owen, March 2001, pp. 4-11. One indication of North Korea’s backwardness in telecommunications technology is that Seoul agreed in 2007 to help it strengthen its telecommunications network in order to improve the military hotline between the two sides, but the assistance has been delayed after Lee Myung-bak was elected president and relations deteriorated. Despite the deep freeze in relations, North Korea asked again for assistance to upgrade the hotline during military talks in October 2008. Arguably, the transfer of South Korean telecommunications equipment and technology for the inter-Korean military hotline could be applied more broadly to the North Korean military. Byun Duk-kun, “Pyongyang blasts Seoul over anti-communist leaflets”, Yonhap News Agency, 27 October 2008.
75 “Georgian officials say country may be used to transport chemical weapons”, Mze TV (Tbilisi), in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 28 September 2003.
a CW warhead onto a Scud-C missile. Initial reports claimed that Syrian and Iranian engineers were killed in the blast, but in September 2008, Japan’s Sankei Shimbun reported that three North Korean military personnel also died in the accident. The Reform Party in Syria, an opposition group, claimed in July 2008 that North Korea in cooperation with Syria supplied Lebanese Hizbollah with mustard gas and nerve gas for delivery on its short-range missiles. All these accusations are unconfirmed, but the threat of North Korean exports will remain as long as there is a demand for these weapons.

The KWP’s Second Economic Committee operates the Yong’aksan General Trading Company, the Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID), the Yŏn’yu Company and other affiliates and front companies for managing arms exports. Yong’aksan and KOMID are under U.S. economic sanctions, for allegedly selling missiles and other proliferation activities, but there is no open source evidence linking North Korea with CW exports. However, transfers of CW precursors, agents and technologies are not that difficult to conceal. Given Pyongyang’s capabilities and intentions in bio-warfare, it is reasonable to suspect that it would also violate BTWC commitments.

The North’s motivations for a BW program also stem from the Korean War experience, but the objectives and doctrine are less clear than for the nuclear and CW programs. Likewise, the blurring of biological technologies into the realm of public health makes it hard to assess the program. Nevertheless, Pyongyang almost certainly is interested in BW technologies, at least for bio-defence purposes. The open source literature includes several references to the 1960s as the beginning of the BW program. However, most recent assessments of that program have been revised downward; many analysts and policymakers now doubt Pyongyang’s capabilities and intentions in bio-warfare.

1. History of the program

During the Korean War, North Korea was involved in operations to discredit the U.S. and other UN Forces that had intervened to support the ROK. In the winter of 1951–1952, its health minister travelled to Shenyang in China to obtain a sample of plague bacilli that was later injected into two North Korean criminals who had been sentenced to death. Their tissue samples were then provided to international investigators as part of a hoax to prove the U.S. used biological weapons in the Korean War. The accusations generally were accepted at the time but have subsequently been discredited. Nevertheless, the case indicates Pyongyang’s awareness and interest in BW during the war, and the DPRK still insists that the U.S. used such weapons during the conflict.

A South Korean source claimed that the DPRK began to obtain BW technology in the 1950s from China, Vietnam, Ethiopia, and Middle Eastern countries in order to develop an independent production capability. However, the technology from these sources must

---

80 “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments”, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification and Compliance, 30 August 2005, www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rpt/51977.htm; Im Hong-gun, op. cit.; Pak Tong-sam, op. cit.
83 신성택 [Sin Sŏng-t’aek], “북한의 생물학무기 위협 및 대응방안” [“The North Korean Biological Weapons Threat and Proposed Countermeasures”], Chapter 4 in 북한의 대량살상무기별 위협분석 및 대응책연구 [Analysis of
have been rudimentary at best. In 1992, South Korea’s Agency for National Security Planning (renamed the National Intelligence Service in 1999) reported to the National Assembly that in the early 1960s, Kim Il-sung directed the Academy of Defence Sciences (since renamed the Second Natural Science Academy) to develop biological weapons. The academy established a testing centre and reportedly acquired Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), Yersinia pestis (plague) and Vibrio cholerae (cholera) from Japan in 1968.84

In the 1970s, the DPRK reportedly established a large “germ research institute” in Sŏngch’ŏn-kun, South P’yŏng’ŏn Province, and in 1980 it established the Central Biology Research Institute, as well as a military bio-defence unit and the No. 25 Factory in Ch’ŏng’an Province. The factory reportedly was to produce thirteen types of biological agents, including Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis and Vibrio cholerae.85 According to a 1994 DIA report cited in The New York Times, the North acquired the smallpox virus from the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and began working on weaponisation of it in the early 1990s.86 In 1999, The New York Times reported that North Korean soldiers had been vaccinated against the smallpox virus, indicating the DPRK could be considering its use as a biological weapon.87 However, that newspaper’s reporting on suspected Iraqi WMD later proved to be inaccurate, and many assertions regarding the North’s BW program have not been confirmed.

2. Capabilities and inventory

In years past, the literature commonly assumed that the DPRK had an offensive BW capability, but recent assessments have weakened many of the claims. For example, in 1997, General John Tilelli, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, testified that the North “deploys a large stock of chemical and perhaps biological weapons” (emphasis added).88 In March 2000, the U.S. Defense Department declared that North Korea had been pursuing BW research and development since the 1960s, but that its biotechnology infrastructure was “rudimentary by Western standards”.89 In 2003, the CIA reported that “North Korea is believed to possess a munitions production infrastructure that would have allowed it to weaponise BW agents and may have some such weapons available for use”.90 The 2006 CIA assessment was nearly identical except it judged North Korea’s “biotechnology infrastructure to be rudimentary but that it could support the production of various BW agents”.91

In August 2005, General Leon LaPorte, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, said he did not believe the DPRK had been able to weaponise biological agents, but “we know they have worked that and are experimenting”.92 General Bell, who replaced LaPorte in 2006, told the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee in March of that year that “some reports suggest that Pyongyang may have a biological weapons research program”.93

The South Korean government believes that North Korea does not possess weaponised BW agents, only samples of the agents. The North maintains at least three possible BW production facilities and seven BW or BW-related research centres. The production facilities include: the No. 25 Factory in Ch’ŏngju, the Central Biological Weapons Research Institute in Pyongyang and a plant in the City of Munch’ŏn, Kang’won Province.94 The ROK assumes the North has acquired samples of the smallpox (variola) virus, but again this has not been confirmed.95 If Pyongyang planned to use smallpox as a weapon, KPA soldiers and civilians would have to be vaccinated, which would be expen-

86 “Unclassified Report”, CIA, op. cit.
87 Jim Garamone, “Commander assesses”, op. cit.
88 B.B. Bell, statement, 2006, op. cit.
89 Internal government documents made available to Crisis Group. Theoretically, large quantities of biological weapons can be produced in days, but the planning and preparation for BW use on a large scale would probably take several weeks.
90 Crisis Group interviews, Seoul. The last known case of smallpox was in 1978. All countries except Russia and the U.S. have reported they do not possess the variola virus, but the World Health Organisation has not been able to confirm this. Russia and the U.S. maintain samples in heavily guarded laboratories in case they are needed to treat a recurrence of the disease. Intelligence agencies in Russia, South Korea, and the U.S. assess that the DPRK has samples of the virus, but the U.S. believes the evidence is “medium quality”. Barton Gellman, “4 Nations Thought to Possess Smallpox”, The Washington Post, 5 November 2002.
sive and risky, since the vaccination campaign would reveal intentions.\textsuperscript{96}

The most likely agents for weaponisation are \textit{Bacillus anthracis} (anthrax), \textit{Yersinia pestis} (plague), \textit{Vibrio cholerae} (cholera), and botulinum toxin.\textsuperscript{97} Anthrax is a disease caused by a bacterium common in soil throughout the world. Humans usually contract it through exposure to infected animals or animal products after the animals have ingested the spores. The most common form is cutaneous anthrax, which develops when spores penetrate breaks in the skin, but this is treatable.\textsuperscript{98} Gastrointestinal anthrax is contracted by eating contaminated meat or animal products but requires the ingestion of a large amount of spores and is very rare. Inhalation anthrax, although theoretically treatable, is almost always fatal, because antibiotic treatment is ineffective once symptoms occur.

Anthrax is possibly the best candidate for a biological weapon, because it is lethal but not contagious. In aerosol form, the spores are invisible to the naked eye and odourless. Symptoms appear as soon as two days after exposure and resemble a severe cold or flu at first. Despite the lethality of inhalation anthrax, several factors mitigate against any planned use. The particle size of the aerosol must be fairly precise to cause a pulmonary infection, and environmental factors are also critical. Exposure to prolonged direct sunlight will kill the spores, and wind or rain can also eliminate them. However, there are no practical early devices to detect dispersion of aerosol BW agents.

If North Korea were to use biological weapons, KPA Special Forces or special agents under KWP control would probably disperse the BW in South Korea or Japan, while seeking to escape detection. This might precede a large DPRK military operation such as invasion in order to degrade ROK and U.S. response capacity. In a limited conflict scenario, where it wished to avoid escalation, Pyongyang might have an incentive to use BW, since it would offer plausible deniability. But biological weapons can infect friendly forces and civilians, and North Korean BW defence and public health systems have no capacity to deal with epidemics. Though some analysts believe the DPRK has armed or would arm its ballistic missiles with BW warheads, this is very unlikely. It would be an inefficient use of expensive missile systems, and the KPA probably does not have the technical capability.

3. Human experiments

North Korea reportedly has used live human beings for experiments with chemical and biological agents, but some analysts question this. For example, Mrs Yi Sun-ok, who defected from the DPRK in December 1995, said children have been taken from their parents for testing chemical and biological weapons.\textsuperscript{99} She also claimed to have witnessed “many prisoners lying on the slope of a hill, bleeding from their mouths, motionless, enveloped by strange fumes and surrounded by scores of guards in gas masks”.\textsuperscript{100} In February 2004, a BBC documentary, “Access to Evil”, reported the North has used humans for CBW tests, but the program drew protests from the UK Foreign Office.\textsuperscript{101} It included testimony from a chemical engineer who had defected from North Korea and claimed to have participated in a chemical experiment that resulted in the death of two prisoners in April 1974.\textsuperscript{102}

On 12 February 2004, a South Korean human rights organisation published a document that appeared to have the official stamp of North Korea’s State Security Agency and details of a prisoner transfer for CW experiments.\textsuperscript{103} The source reportedly fled North Korea but was arrested in China and repatriated.\textsuperscript{104} Inconsistencies were discovered that discredited the

\textsuperscript{96} Crisis Group interview, Seoul, 30 October 2008. There have been no indications that Pyongyang has implemented a smallpox vaccination effort, which would cause serious side effects for small numbers in the population.

\textsuperscript{97} Internal government documents made available to Crisis Group.

\textsuperscript{98} Without antibiotic treatment, about 20 per cent of cutaneous anthrax cases are fatal, but with treatment, fatalities are very rare. Thomas V. Inglesby, Tara O’Toole, Donald A. Henderson, et al., “Anthrax as a Biological Weapon, 2002: Updated Recommendations for Management”, \textit{Journal of the American Medical Association}, 1 May 2002, vol 287, no. 17.

\textsuperscript{99} A. Butcher, “Babies killed in N. Korean weapon trials”, \textit{Courier Mail} (Queensland, Australia), 8 July 1996.


\textsuperscript{101} John Deane, “UK protests over N. Korea’s ‘weapons tests on prisoners’”, Press Association, 13 February 2004.

\textsuperscript{102} 김범수 [Kim Pŏn-su], “나는 북한 화학무기 실험실에 참여했다” (“I participated in North Korean chemical weapons experiments on live humans”), \textit{미래한국 [Future Korea]}, 12 June 2004, p. 7.


assertions,\textsuperscript{105} and South Korean officials initially were sceptical about the claims.\textsuperscript{106} Four of the source’s North Korean family members appeared before the DPRK media to declare the document had been fabricated and misused by the foreign media to “attack the fatherland”.\textsuperscript{107} They probably had no information about the document and could well have been coerced into making their statements, but it is not uncommon for defectors to exaggerate their claims for various reasons, so the document could have been forged. In sum, it is unclear whether the DPRK has conducted CBW experiments on humans since the 1952 case, but it cannot be ruled out.

\section*{III. RISKS}

\subsection*{A. WEAPONS USE}

There are several possible scenarios for the use of DPRK chemical or biological weapons in Korea or elsewhere. While mutual deterrence on the Korean peninsula is robust, it could fail; in the case of transfers to other states or non-state actors, the likelihood of CBW use increases. South Korea’s population density and Seoul’s proximity to the DMZ make millions of civilians vulnerable to a North Korean attack. As the conventional balance of forces continues to deteriorate for Pyongyang, its leaders might feel they would have to use CW early in a conflict to avoid defeat.

1. Attack: deliberate, accidental, unauthorised

While it is difficult to imagine North Korea using its nuclear weapons in an unprovoked first strike, the literature stresses the generally offensive nature of DPRK military doctrine, and, as has been noted, the threshold for CW use is much lower. The Supreme Commander of the KPA must authorise it, but the KPA has custody of the munitions, which also increases the likelihood of accidental or unauthorised use. The regime might use chemical weapons either while conducting preventive war or as a “doomsday weapon” in the face of imminent defeat in war. Either BW research or efforts to weaponise biological agents could lead to accidental exposure or release in North Korea. Although unlikely, the North might use biological weapons in the first phase of a preventive war.

2. Retaliation, escalation

The Korean peninsula is one of the world’s most dangerous flashpoints. The DPRK has the fourth largest military in the world, with one million active duty personnel, but most of its hardware is obsolete.\textsuperscript{108} Escalation and all-out war were avoided during a period of high tension and serious North Korean provocations in the 1960s, but there have been several close calls in the now more than half-century since the end of the Korean War.\textsuperscript{109}


\textsuperscript{107}“Truth behind false report about ‘experiment of chem. weapons on human bodies’ in DPRK disclosed”, KCNA, 30 March 2004; “화학무기인체실험” 문서들은 허위문건이다~ 당사자가족 기자회견” [“Chemical weapons experiments on live humans’: a press conference with family who say documents are fake”], ibid.


\textsuperscript{109}Notable examples include: the North Korean capture of the USS Pueblo in January 1968; the shooting down of a U.S. Air Force reconnaissance plane in April 1969; the axe murders of two U.S. Army personnel at Panmunjom’s Joint Security Area in the DMZ in August 1976; the bombing and attempted assassination of former ROK President Chun...
Misperception or miscalculation could yet lead to an escalation spiral. Deliberate or accidental incursions during a time of rising tensions might create incentives to strike first. In particular, Pyongyang does not recognise the Northern Limit Line (NLL) — the west sea boundary extending from the DMZ — and the area has seen two deadly battles over the last decade. In June 1999, the ROK navy sank a DPRK naval vessel, and in June 2002 the North sank a South Korean ship in a similar skirmish. In the 2002 case, the South Korean military called off its pursuit of North Korean vessels after electronic intelligence indicated the North had turned on radars for onshore anti-ship missiles. If the ROK had attacked the radar and missile sites to protect its ships, the situation could have escalated into a full-scale war, including the possible use of North Korean chemical weapons against the South.

3. Internal use in a power struggle

Political transitions in authoritarian states are often resolved through violence, though some one-party states (such as the former USSR and China) have institutionalised peaceful transition mechanisms. At the time of the DPRK’s only power transition, following the death of Kim Il-sung in July 1994, many analysts were surprised at the smooth transfer of authority to Kim Jong-il and the state’s resiliency. Many ROK analysts believe Kim Jong-il’s “military first” policy has paved the way for another smooth transition, at least in the short run, but if the next leader is unable to deliver economic recovery, internal pressures could create instability or even a military coup. Any struggle for power involving the military could be violent, with at least a possibility of chemical weapons being involved. Indeed, some senior South Korean military analysts believe such weapons are more likely to be employed in an internal power struggle than in a conflict with the South.

B. PROLIFERATION, SALES, TRANSFERS

North Korea’s proliferation activities, at least regarding ballistic missiles to the Middle East and Pakistan, are well documented. There is also substantial evidence suggesting the North was assisting Syria to build a nuclear reactor at Dair al-Zor (Al Kibar) before Israel bombed the site in September 2007. Given its track record, the relative ease with which such transfers can be concealed and its well-established network, Pyongyang very well could sell chemical munitions or the materials and technology to produce them. However, there is no clear evidence of such exports.

Compared to its neighbours, the DPRK economy is under-developed, with little foreign trade. Economic sanctions have not persuaded Pyongyang to abandon its proliferation activities, and they are particularly ineffective when imposed by countries that have no economic relationship with it. China, North Korea’s main trading partner, is unwilling to impose an economic blockade to compel non-proliferation compliance. Food, fuel and humanitarian assistance are also essentially off the table for sanctions from its perspective. The South Korean government under Lee Myung-bak is more willing to apply pressure but not to suspend or block humanitarian assistance.

Ironically, sanctions intended to curtail North Korean proliferation can have the opposite effect. Since few legitimate international business opportunities have been available to Pyongyang, illicit activities have become a major source of foreign exchange needed to balance the chronic current account deficit. The North’s comparative advantage is in weapons and little else. Transforming its munitions industry into peaceful civilian enterprises would be difficult and perhaps not possible under the Kim family regime, but disarmament and economic recovery would eventually require reforms that open the economy and provide it access to international markets.


C. ARMS RACES

North Korea’s WMD programs could trigger arms races in North East Asia or other regions by posing direct security threats or by undermining non-proliferation regimes. The nuclear and missile programs pose the greatest such threat, but the ROK and Japan are unlikely to seek their own WMD capabilities, relying instead on their alliance relationships with the U.S. and bolstering their conventional capabilities. However, these measures could trigger responses from North Korea (or, in some circumstances, also China). South Korea is most threatened by North Korean chemical weapons, but Seoul is in full compliance with its CWC commitments and has destroyed its former CW stocks. It will continue to develop advanced, precision-guided munitions, including cruise missiles, as a counter-strike option for meeting the North Korean CW threat. However, North Korean CW proliferation could help trigger or exacerbate arms races in regions that are already insecure, such as the Middle East.

IV. POSSIBLE RESPONSES

A. NON-PROLIFERATION, COUNTER-PROLIFERATION AND EXPORT CONTROLS

Non-proliferation efforts are necessary but not sufficient for managing the North Korean WMD threat. Non-proliferation requires international cooperation, including among national governments, international organisations and the private sector. An international norm against chemical and biological weapons has emerged. Non-proliferation tools can thus be focused on a few states or the non-state actors that still seek CBW capabilities, but it is very difficult to stop determined proliferators, since the technical barriers for acquiring chemical and biological weapons are not that high.

The discovery of the A.Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network and numerous other cases of WMD-related trafficking have led to the establishment of counter-proliferation mechanisms. In particular, the U.S.-initiated Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), founded in 2003, is aimed at interdicting WMD shipments before they reach countries of concern or terrorist groups. The PSI began as a coalition of eleven countries but now includes 95. The participants adopted a set of principles in September 2003, but there is no treaty, central authority or secretariat to manage the coalition. Members rely upon domestic and international law to intercept dangerous cargoes. There have been some successes, but excellent intelligence and international co-ordination are required. The PSI alone is not a full solution to proliferation, but it raises the costs and difficulties for proliferators.113

South Korea announced its intention to join the PSI as a full member one day after North Korea conducted its second nuclear test on 25 May 2009.114 Seoul’s announcement brought a swift rebuke from Pyongyang, which described the South’s move as a “declaration of war” and warned that “the DPRK will deal a decisive and merciless retaliatory blow, no matter from

which place, at any attempt to stop, check and inspect its vessels”.  

The Australia Group was established in 1985 to restrict the supply of CW and BW agents and materials. While export controls have made it more difficult and costly to acquire illicit materials and technologies, it is hard to monitor the large volume of international trade, and proliferators have been creative in surmounting export controls. 

UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (28 April 2004) requires all member states to take “effective measures to prevent the transfer of WMD and their delivery systems to non-state actors”. These include accounting and physical security, border security and law enforcement against smuggling, as well as export and trans-shipment controls. The resolution also calls upon states to adopt, strengthen and comply with relevant multilateral treaties.

Although the UN is able to provide technical assistance to those that request it, member states’ resources and commitments are often insufficient, and Resolution 1540 has not been universally implemented. It established a committee that has prepared a checklist for implementation and reports to the Security Council. Member states were required to submit an initial report to this body by October 2004, but as of July 2008, 37 countries had failed to do so. Of those 37, only the DPRK is believed to possess WMD. While the North has not denounced the resolution and receives 1540 Committee communications, it has not taken any initiative to implement it.

Export control systems require national legislation, human resources, and cooperation between the private and public sectors, as well as international cooperation. North Korea has no experience in this area, and it could take years to put together an export control regime if Pyongyang decides to abandon its WMD programs. The Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), an inter-Korean joint economic project in North Korea just five kilometres north of the DMZ, offers a test case for the application of export controls in the DPRK. According to South Korean law (the “Inter-Korea Exchange and Cooperation Act”), ROK firms must receive approval from the unification minister before sending any strategic items into the KIC.

In December 2004, the KIC established export control rules and a committee that reviews and monitors export control compliance for KIC firms, which are required to submit compliance documents to the committee every October. Prior to investing in the KIC, firms must receive approval from the unification ministry, which delegates the export control review to the Korea Strategic Trade Institute (KOSTI), a semi-private industry association that works with the government and firms on export control compliance and submits the results of the review to the ministry. One firm’s application for the pilot phase of the project was rejected because it exceeded certain machine tool specifications.

Japan feels most threatened by any nuclear-armed North Korean missiles and believes missile defence offers the only real countermeasure. Distance and geography make it technologically feasible to intercept North Korean missiles, and the Japanese constitution, domestic laws, and national defence policies proscribe the use of offensive military means. However, missile defences are not perfect and North Korean ballistic missiles can strike Japan in about seven minutes, so a successful

---


120 The 1540 Committee was preparing to deliver the checklist to DPRK authorities in the summer of 2008. The DPRK has the authority to release this document to the public or to keep it confidential. Crisis Group email communication, 1540 Committee member, 20 June 2008. However, with the collapse of the Six-Party Talks, Pyongyang has ignored its non-proliferation obligations under Security Council resolutions.

121 Crisis Group interview, Shim Soung-kun, president, Korea Strategic Trade Institute (KOSTI), Seoul, 25 June 2008.

122 개성공단 5 년 [Kaesong Industrial Complex: 5 Years], ROK Ministry of Unification, Seoul, December, 2007, pp. 120-121.

123 In the case of conventional weapons or sensitive items, the ROK conducts an inter-agency review that can include the national defence; knowledge economy; education, science and technology; and other relevant ministries as warranted. However, none of these items is even considered for KIC or inter-Korean trade.

interception would require immediate detection of the launch and very quick decisions.

B. DETERRENCE AND COUNTER-STRIKE CAPABILITIES

Deterrence and credible precision-strike capabilities will be indispensable until the DPRK abandons its CBW programs. The U.S. plays a prominent role in deterring North Korea through its bilateral military alliance commitments with Seoul and Tokyo. In 1978, the U.S. and South Korea established the Combined Forces Command (CFC) to integrate their military forces on the peninsula in wartime under a U.S. four-star general and a four-star ROK deputy commander. The CFC is scheduled to be disbanded in April 2012, when Seoul regains wartime operational control of its military.

Since the end of the Korean War, the majority of U.S. ground forces have been deployed close to the DMZ. Because their presence would ensure U.S. involvement, this arrangement was thought to deter a DPRK attack. In recent years, however, the Pentagon has increasingly viewed these troops as vulnerable hostages that reduce U.S. military options. As part of its force transformation policy, U.S. ground forces are being redeployed further away from the DMZ to reduce the American military footprint and move them beyond North Korean artillery range.

At the same time, the U.S. Army has deployed artillery and Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) with the Second Infantry Division near the DMZ, which has drawn North Korean criticism. In 2002, South Korea became the first country to purchase ATACMS missiles from the U.S. It has also developed and deployed the Hyonmu, an upgraded version of the U.S. Nike-Hercules. It has a range of only about 180km, but South Korea has also developed and deployed highly accurate land-attack cruise missiles that can strike targets throughout the North. In October 2006, Seoul established an integrated missile command under the army to manage counter-strike forces.

If North Korea refuses to abandon its CBW capabilities, the fallback position for potential adversaries is a mix of nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, deterrence and containment. A preventive military option is unthinkable unless there is clear foreknowledge that the DPRK is about to launch unprovoked military operations against its neighbours, a contingency that is very unlikely, since it would be observable and suicidal for the DPRK.

C. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING

Mutual deterrence is robust but nonetheless capable of failing on the Korean peninsula. North Korean WMD is most likely to be used, if at all, in an inadvertent conflict and escalation along the DMZ or the NLL in the Yellow Sea, but ROK emergency response agencies must be prepared for any scenario. South Korea has conducted civil defence exercises for decades, but civilians today appear to be more complacent than in the Cold War era. Critics have argued that previous military leaders exaggerated the North Korean military threat as a means to instil fear in the South Korean people and justify authoritarian rule. On the other hand, conservatives argue that the government delib-

---

132 For example, in 1986 North Korea began constructing a large dam on a tributary to the Han River that runs through Seoul. President Chun du-hwan and others asserted that the dam could be used to flood Seoul. South Korea began to build its own dam – the Peace Dam – south of the DMZ in 1987 to block any such attempt. Construction of the Peace Dam was suspended when it was half finished, but it was finally completed in 2005 at a cost of about $429 million. Choe Sang-hun, “Peace dam still waits for the flood that never came”, The New York Times, 28 August 2007.
erately discounted or ignored the North Korean threat during ten years of liberal rule under former Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. However, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S. and large natural disasters around the world have increased awareness of the need for emergency response planning.

South Korea enacted its “Basic Disaster and Safety Management Law” in March 2004 and established the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) three months later. The agency responds to natural disasters, and its civil defence division is responsible for training. NEMA has signed international cooperation agreements with the UN and the U.S., but a North Korean chemical or biological attack could overwhelm it and other ROK government agencies. Nevertheless, preparedness can reduce the number of casualties and help survivors recover.

### D. DIPLOMACY, ENGAGEMENT AND ARMS CONTROL

Numerous international institutions specialise in disarmament and confidence building with respect to weapons of mass destruction. However, East Asia does not share Europe’s experience of strong multilateral institutions, particularly in the security realm. Some mechanisms are universal and indispensable, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the CWC, but so far they have been insufficient for dealing with North Korean WMD. This has led to the proliferation of ad hoc instruments over the last two decades: the Agreed Framework; the Four-Party Talks; the Six-Party Talks; inter-Korean summits; inter-Korean ministerial meetings; inter-Korean military talks; and Track II dialogues. No single mechanism can resolve all outstanding issues surrounding North Korean WMD and regional security, so a patchwork of existing and new ones will be necessary if diplomacy is to succeed.

#### I. CWC

The Chemical Weapons Convention, as noted above, bans the production, possession, transfer and use of chemical weapons and requires member states to declare their chemical weapons stocks and destroy them under monitoring from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) at the Hague. Parties are also required to declare their civilian chemical industry facilities and allow OPCW inspections to verify CW are not produced and dual-use precursors are not diverted.

Convincing North Korea to join the CWC will be difficult, since its policymakers view international organisations and arms control regimes as biased instruments of the powerful, who seek to undermine their country. Although North Korean negotiators are well-versed in arms control terminology and treaties, they view them as means to enable the strong to impose their will on Pyongyang. Leaders feel they need their panoply of weapons as protection against a more powerful and hostile world and even say that their nuclear weapons provide security and stability for the Korean peninsula and all North East Asia. Their power-oriented view of international relations is suspicious of arms control and restraint.

If North Korea verifiably terminates its nuclear weapons program, that could be a sign it feels secure enough to surrender its missiles and CW stockpile as well. The destruction of chemical weapons is dangerous and costly, however, so it will need assistance. If Pyongyang accedes to the CWC, the OPCW could offer technical and financial assistance. Given its experience with CW destruction, Seoul could also help, though the South Korean government has concluded a confidence agreement with the OPCW and will neither confirm nor deny that it ever had a CW program. Nevertheless, the OPCW has designated a South Korean Agency for Defence Development chemical laboratory in Taegon as an accredited site to conduct testing and sampling in technical support or offsite CW inspections and CW destruction. The lab is mobile and can assess environmental samples for CW contamination.

---

133 For more information on NEMA, see its website at: http://eng.nema.go.kr/
135 For example, former South Korean Vice Defence Minister Park Yong-ok, who participated in several rounds of inter-Korean arms control talks in the early 1990s, described the North Koreans as very suspicious of arms control and unwilling to compromise. Crisis Group interview, Seoul, 31 October 2008.
137 “Report of the Organisation on the Implementation of the Convention (1 January-31 December 1998)”, OPCW, 2 July 1999; Crisis Group email communication, Dr Kim Il-
Regional or bilateral cooperation could be applied to supplement weapons disarmament under the CWC. Two areas must be addressed if the DPRK agrees to abandon its chemical weapons: CW destruction and chemical industry conversion and compliance with peaceful use obligations. International inspectors from the OPCW would have to verify the destruction, but the ROK could assist with the actual destruction of the weapons given its own experience. South Korea’s Samyang Chemical Company destroyed the ROK’s CW stockpile under a contract from the national defence ministry. However, South Korea’s CW stockpile apparently consisted of binary nerve agent munitions, which are easier to handle and destroy than the unitary munitions that are believed to make up North Korea’s arsenal. Therefore, the ROK’s technical ability to assist the DPRK might be limited.

If the DPRK were to collapse, most of its chemical plants and infrastructure would be shut down because they are obsolete. However, if Pyongyang were to sign the CWC, the factories would be subject to OPCW inspections. In the ROK, the Korea Specialty Chemical Industry Association (KSCIA) works with the OPCW to implement inspections. Theoretically it could perform this function after Korean unification, but it has no current plans for handling the North’s chemical industry and CWC compliance.

While the OPCW must be the main actor in assisting North Korea to comply with CWC commitments, China and Japan could provide training and education for North Koreans to show how they have cooperated in north-eastern China to destroy CW munitions abandoned by the Japanese military at the end of World War II. Beijing and Tokyo could provide examples of best practices and the handling of unanticipated difficulties in working together to destroy CW as the case might apply to North Korea.

2. BTWC

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) prohibits development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of biological agents and toxins of “types and quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes”. Parties are required to “destroy or divert to peaceful uses any agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and their means of delivery”. However, the treaty has been criticised for weak verification mechanisms. Parties consult to address compliance and verification issues, but many are not transparent about their programs. It is difficult to distinguish offensive BW programs from defensive ones, and many states wish to shelter national biotech firms and their proprietary information from inspection. Parties can report suspected violators to the Security Council, but this has never been done.

While North Korea’s BW threat probably has been exaggerated, any illicit pathogens or toxins and related equipment in its possession should be destroyed. Since BW pathogens and toxins exist in very small quantities, and production facilities are small and easy to conceal, disarmament in this area will require extensive cooperation.

DPRK officials and scientists would have to disclose facilities, technologies, materials and equipment. This will be difficult for Pyongyang and likely require initial confidence-building measures as well as a quid pro quo to improve the DPRK’s security and make it possible to transfer personnel into peaceful pursuits. Given the ROK’s developed biotech industry and common language and culture, Seoul could provide training in peaceful bio-safety and bio-security procedures to North Korean scientists and technicians.

North-South public health cooperation is another potential confidence-building measure that could be linked to BW. For example, South Korea has been supplying medicine and equipment to deal with the re-emergence of malaria in the DPRK, even as relations have deteriorated significantly.

---

139 Internal document made available to Crisis Group.
of avian flu is another area that could benefit from inter-Korean cooperation, and such cooperation in further public health areas could likewise help build confidence and transparency.

3. Six-Party Talks

The Six-Party Talks were established in August 2003 to seek a diplomatic solution to North Korea’s nuclear program. As noted above, China, the DPRK, Japan, the ROK, Russia, and the U.S. signed a “Statement of Principles” on 19 September 2005, whereby Pyongyang agreed to abandon that program in exchange for a package of security assurances and economic and political incentives. The six parties have formed five working groups to address the various objectives: denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula; economic and energy cooperation; establishment of a North East Asian Peace and Security mechanism; normalisation of DPRK-U.S. relations; and normalisation of DPRK-Japan relations. While North Korea declared in April 2009 that it would never again participate in the Six-Party Talks, the process holds out some hope in the longer run of evolving into a mechanism for addressing North East Asian security issues more generally, including the issue of WMD disarmament.

4. G-8 Global Partnership

The G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership) was established in June 2002 at the G-8 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada with the objective of raising $20 billion over ten years to eliminate WMD threats through dismantlement and the employment of weapons scientists in peaceful pursuits. The U.S. has pledged to provide at least $10 billion, and other industrialised countries have joined the effort. Until now, efforts have focused on the former Soviet Union, but the partnership is looking to apply the program to WMD programs in other countries, including the DPRK.

Canada has taken a strong interest in the initiative and could approach North Korea and propose participation as a way to help Pyongyang meet its obligations in the Six-Party process.

---

144 For detail on the Six-Party Talks, see Crisis Group Report, North Korea: Getting Back to Talks, op. cit.
V. CONCLUSION

North Korea’s chemical and biological weapons programs pose serious security threats that require immediate and sustained international efforts to eliminate them. The Six-Party Talks have focused on the nuclear weapons program, and although the participants are committed to establishing a peace mechanism in North East Asia, they are not addressing either the chemical or the biological programs. While the North projects a menacing image, it faces challenges of food, energy and economic insecurity and a deteriorating conventional arms balance. These present opportunities for issue linkages, even a grand security bargain, but the negotiations will be daunting.

Pyongyang’s chemical weapons arsenal is sufficient to cause huge civilian casualties in South Korea. The evidence of the arsenal seems irrefutable, but Pyongyang denies the existence of any chemical or biological weapons programs. North Korean media proclaim the DPRK is threatened by non-existent South Korean and U.S. chemical and biological weapons. This indoctrination extends to KPA soldiers in the form of CW defence training, even though Seoul signed the CWC and has destroyed its CW stocks.

The North Korean nuclear threat is the most urgent regional security issue, but if progress is made on rolling back Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions, there could be opportunities to construct a cooperative diplomatic solution for chemical weapons and the suspected biological weapons program. Serious diplomatic efforts must continue to address all North Korean WMD capabilities, but the international community must also be prepared for a number of other contingencies including a deliberate, accidental, or unauthorised chemical or biological attack or incident; chemical or biological retaliation following a military clash and escalation; and arms races.

Effective responses require planning and policy coordination among international agencies and national governments, but also NGOs. There are a number of international institutions for dealing with the complex and extensive North Korean WMD issue including the Six-Party Talks; the G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction; the Chemical Weapons Convention; and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. However, these mechanisms are not sufficient for addressing all issues, and new regional mechanisms focusing on other sources of insecurity will be necessary.

If North Korea credibly commits to abandon its nuclear program in the Six-Party Talks, diplomatic efforts should quickly move towards a multi-faceted approach to establish a WMD-free Korean Peninsula and a cooperative security mechanism for the region. Issue linkage addressing North Korean insecurities will be necessary to obtain Pyongyang’s cooperation for WMD disarmament. Addressing the North’s legitimate security concerns should not be viewed as appeasement as long as it is linked to progress in such WMD disarmament.

Every possible diplomatic effort must be made to achieve North Korean WMD disarmament, and diplomatic solutions will hopefully be available to establish a WMD-free Korean Peninsula. But as insurance against diplomacy failing, the international community must maintain robust deterrence and containment against the several North Korean threats.

Seoul/Brussels, 18 June 2009
APPENDIX A

MAP OF NORTH KOREA
### APPENDIX C

**GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATACMS</td>
<td>Army Tactical Missile Systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTWC</td>
<td>Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. It prohibits the development, production and use of biological and toxin weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBW</td>
<td>Chemical and biological weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFC</td>
<td>Combined Forces Command, established in 1978 by the U.S. and South Korea to integrate their military forces under a U.S. four-star general and a ROK four-star deputy commander in time of war. Scheduled to be disbanded in April 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>(U.S.) Central Intelligence Agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Central Military Committee, under the (North) Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee. The CWC is mostly inactive but would probably oversee the mobilisation of the North’s reserves in time of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CW</td>
<td>Chemical weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>(U.S.) Defense Intelligence Agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarised zone, the four-km wide buffer zone dividing the two Koreas, with two km on each side of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROG</td>
<td>Free rocket over ground.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIC</td>
<td>Kaesŏng Industrial Complex, an inter-Korean joint economic project in North Korea five km north of the DMZ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOMID</td>
<td>Korea Mining Development Corporation. Operated by the North’s Second Economic Committee, it is under U.S. sanctions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOSTI</td>
<td>Korea Strategic Trade Institute, a semi-private industry association delegated by the ROK government to work with the government and firms on export control compliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA</td>
<td>[North] Korean People’s Army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSCIA</td>
<td>[South] Korea Specialty Chemical Industry Association, works with the OPCW in the ROK to implement inspections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDL</td>
<td>Military Demarcation Line, divides the two Koreas and represents the line of contact when the Korean War Armistice was signed on 27 July 1953.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRL</td>
<td>Multiple rocket launcher.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCDB</td>
<td>[North Korean] Nuclear and Chemical Defence Bureau, under the General Staff Department of the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>National Defence Commission, highest military authority in the DPRK, chaired by the SCKPA, at present Kim Jong-il.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEMA</td>
<td>South Korean National Emergency Management Agency, established in 2004 to respond to natural disasters; its civil defence division is responsible for training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLL</td>
<td>Northern Limit Line, the west sea boundary extending from the MDL. It is not recognised by Pyongyang and has been the site of two deadly sea battles over the last decade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCW</td>
<td>Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; secretariat of the CWC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Proliferation Security Initiative. U.S.-inspired and founded in 2003, it is aimed at interdicting WMD shipments before they reach countries of concern or terrorist groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCKPA</td>
<td>Supreme Commander of the (North) Korean People’s Army, at present Kim Jong-il.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEC</td>
<td>Second Economic Committee, under the CMC’s munitions industry department and responsible for the procurement, production, import and export of weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of mass destruction.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX D

### DPRK CW AGENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nerve Agents</th>
<th>Blister Agents</th>
<th>Blood Agents</th>
<th>Choking Agents</th>
<th>Riot Control, Vomiting Agents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tabun (GA)</td>
<td>Lewisite (HD)</td>
<td>Hydrogen chloride (AC)</td>
<td>Phosgene (CG)</td>
<td>Adamsite (DM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarin (GB)</td>
<td>Mustard agent (L, H)</td>
<td>Cyanogen chloride (CK)</td>
<td>Diphosgene (DP)</td>
<td>Vomiting agent (DA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soman (GD)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chloropicrin (PS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tear gas (CN)s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tear gas (CS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX E

### ARMS CONTROL AND EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technology</th>
<th>International Regime</th>
<th>Monitoring Secretariat</th>
<th>Export Control Regime</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>NSG, Zangger Committee</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile</td>
<td>MTCR / ICOC</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>MTCR / ICOC</td>
<td>No secretariat enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>CWC</td>
<td>OPCW</td>
<td>Australia Group</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological</td>
<td>BTWC</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Australia Group</td>
<td>Weak enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional Arms</td>
<td>CCWC / Wassenaar Arrangement</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Wassenaar Arrangement</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 130 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is co-chaired by the former European Commissioner for External Relations Christopher Patten and former U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive since January 2000 has been former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.

Crisis Group’s international headquarters are in Brussels, with major advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is based as a legal entity) and New York, a smaller one in London and liaison presences in Moscow and Beijing. The organisation currently operates nine regional offices (in Bishkek, Bogotá, Dakar, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, Nairobi, Pristina and Tbilisi) and has local field representation in eighteen additional locations (Abuja, Baku, Bangkok, Beirut, Cairo, Colombo, Damascus, Dili, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kathmandu, Kinshasa, Ouagadougou, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria, Sarajevo, Seoul and Tehran). Crisis Group currently covers some 60 areas of actual or potential conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Russia (North Caucasus), Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine; in the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Gulf States, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen; and in Latin America and the Caribbean, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti and Venezuela.

Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitable foundations, companies and individual donors. The following governmental departments and agencies currently provide funding: Australian Agency for International Development, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Austrian Development Agency, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canadian International Development Agency, Canadian International Development and Research Centre, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Federal Foreign Office, Irish Aid, Japan International Cooperation Agency, Principality of Liechtenstein, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency for International Development, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom Department for International Development, United Kingdom Economic and Social Research Council, U.S. Agency for International Development.


June 2009
## APPENDIX G

### INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS SINCE 2006

### CENTRAL ASIA

**Uzbekistan: In for the Long Haul**, Asia Briefing N°45, 16 February 2006 (also available in Russian)

**Central Asia: What Role for the European Union?**, Asia Report N°113, 10 April 2006

**Kyrgyzstan’s Prison System Nightmare**, Asia Report N°118, 16 August 2006 (also available in Russian)

**Uzbekistan: Europe’s Sanctions Matter**, Asia Briefing N°54, 6 November 2006

**Kyrgyzstan on the Edge**, Asia Briefing N°55, 9 November 2006 (also available in Russian)

**Turkmenistan after Niyazov**, Asia Briefing N°60, 12 February 2007

**Central Asia: Energy Risks**, Asia Report N°133, 24 May 2007 (also available in Russian)

**Uzbekistan: Stagnation and Uncertainty**, Asia Briefing N°67, 22 August 2007

**Political Murder in Central Asia: No Time to End Uzbekistan’s Isolation**, Asia Briefing N°76, 13 February 2008

**Kyrgyzstan: The Challenge of Judicial Reform**, Asia Report N°150, 10 April 2008 (also available in Russian)

**Kyrgyzstan: A Deceptive Calm**, Asia Briefing N°79, 14 August 2008 (also available in Russian)

**Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure**, Asia Report N°162, 12 February 2009

### SOUTH ASIA


**Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake**, Asia Briefing N°46, 15 March 2006

**Nepal’s Crisis: Mobilising International Influence**, Asia Briefing N°49, 19 April 2006

**Nepal: From People Power to Peace?**, Asia Report N°115, 10 May 2006 (also available in Nepali)


**Bangladesh Today**, Asia Report N°121, 23 October 2006

**Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes**, Asia Report N°123, 2 November 2006


**Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants**, Asia Report N°125, 11 December 2006


**Afghanistan’s Endangered Compact**, Asia Briefing N°59, 29 January 2007


**Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas**, Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007

**Nepal’s Maoists: Purists or Pragmatists?**, Asia Report N°132, 18 May 2007 (also available in Nepali)


**Nepal’s Troubled Tarai Region**, Asia Report N°136, 9 July 2007 (also available in Nepali)


**Nepal’s Fragile Peace Process**, Asia Briefing N°68, 28 September 2007 (also available in Nepali)

**Pakistan: The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan**, Asia Briefing N°69, 22 October 2007


**Winding Back Martial Law in Pakistan**, Asia Briefing N°70, 12 November 2007

### NORTH EAST ASIA

**China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?**, Asia Report N°112, 1 February 2006 (also available in Korean)

**After North Korea’s Missile Launch: Are the Nuclear Talks Dead?**, Asia Briefing N°52, 9 August 2006 (also available in Korean and Russian)

**Perilous Journeys: The Plight of North Koreans in China and Beyond**, Asia Report N°122, 26 October 2006 (also available in Korean and Russian)

**North Korea’s Nuclear Test: The Fallout**, Asia Briefing N°56, 13 November 2006 (also available in Korean and Russian)

**After the North Korean Nuclear Breakthrough: Compliance or Confrontation?**, Asia Briefing N°62, 30 April 2007 (also available in Korean and Russian)

**North Korea-Russia Relations: A Strained Friendship**, Asia Briefing N°71, 4 December 2007 (also available in Russian)

**South Korea’s Election: What to Expect from President Lee**, Asia Briefing N°73, 21 December 2007

**China’s Thirst for Oil**, Asia Report N°153, 9 June 2008 (also available in Chinese)

**South Korea’s Elections: A Shift to the Right**, Asia Briefing N°77, 30 June 2008

**North Korea’s Missile Launch: The Risks of Overreaction**, Asia Briefing N°91, 31 March 2009

**China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping**, Asia Report N°166, 17 April 2009
South East Asia

Nepal: Peace Postponed, Asia Briefing N°72, 18 December 2007 (also available in Nepali)

Afghanistan: Now for the Hard Part, Asia Briefing N°74, 2 January 2008


Nepal’s Election and Beyond, Asia Report N°149, 2 April 2008 (also available in Nepali)

Restoring Democracy in Bangladesh, Asia Report N°151, 28 April 2008

Nepal’s Election: A Peaceful Revolution?, Asia Report N°155, 3 July 2008 (also available in Nepali)

Nepal’s New Political Landscape, Asia Report N°156, 3 July 2008 (also available in Nepali)

Reforming Pakistan’s Police, Asia Report N°157, 14 July 2008


Strengthening the Judiciary in Pakistan, Asia Report N°159, 15 October 2008

Reforming the Judiciary in Pakistan, Asia Report N°160, 16 October 2008

Bangladesh: Elections and Beyond, Asia Briefing N°84, 11 December 2008

Policing in Afghanistan: Still Searching for a Strategy, Asia Briefing N°85, 18 December 2008

Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process, Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 (also available in Nepali)

Afghanistan: New U.S. Administration, New Directions, Asia Briefing N°89, 13 March 2009


Pakistan’s IDP Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities, Asia Briefing N°93, 3 June 2009

Papua: The Dangers of Shutting Down Dialogue, Asia Briefing N°47, 23 March 2006 (also available in Indonesian)

Aceh: Now for the Hard Part, Asia Briefing N°48, 29 March 2006

Managing Tensions on the Timor-Leste/Indonesia Border, Asia Briefing N°50, 4 May 2006

Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks, Asia Report N°114, 5 May 2006 (also available in Indonesian)

Islamic Law and Criminal Justice in Aceh, Asia Report N°117, 31 July 2006 (also available in Indonesian)


Resolving Timor-Leste’s Crisis, Asia Report N°120, 10 October 2006 (also available in Indonesian)

Aceh’s Local Elections: The Role of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), Asia Briefing N°57, 29 November 2006

Myanmar: New Threats to Humanitarian Aid, Asia Briefing N°58, 8 December 2006

Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge, Asia Report N°127, 24 January 2007 (also available in Indonesian)

Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup, Asia Report N°129, 15 March 2007 (also available in Thai)

Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh, Asia Briefing N°61, 22 March 2007

Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Current Status, Asia Briefing N°63, 3 May 2007

Indonesia: Decentralisation and Local Power Struggles in Maluku, Asia Briefing N°64, 22 May 2007

Timor-Leste’s Parliamentary Elections, Asia Briefing N°65, 12 June 2007

Indonesian Papua: A Local Perspective on the Conflict, Asia Briefing N°66, 19 July 2007 (also available in Indonesian)

Aceh: Post-Conflict Complications, Asia Report N°139, 4 October 2007 (also available in Indonesian)

Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries, Asia Report N°140, 23 October 2007 (also available in Thai)

“Deradicalisation” and Indonesian Prisons, Asia Report N°142, 19 November 2007 (also available in Indonesian)

Timor-Leste: Security Sector Reform, Asia Report N°143, 17 January 2008 (also available in Tetum)

Indonesia: Tackling Radicalism in Poso, Asia Briefing N°75, 22 January 2008

Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown, Asia Report N°144, 31 January 2008

Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Publishing Industry, Asia Report N°147, 28 February 2008 (also available in Indonesian)

Timor-Leste’s Displacement Crisis, Asia Report N°148, 31 March 2008

The Philippines: Counter-insurgency vs. Counter-terrorism in Mindanao, Asia Report N°152, 14 May 2008

Indonesia: Communal Tensions in Papua, Asia Report N°154, 16 June 2008 (also available in Indonesian)

Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree, Asia Briefing N°78, 7 July 2008 (also available in Indonesian)

Thailand: Political Turmoil and the Southern Insurgency, Asia Briefing N°80, 28 August 2008 (also available in Thai)

Indonesia: Pre-election Anxieties in Aceh, Asia Briefing N°81, 9 September 2008 (also available in Indonesian)

Thailand: Calming the Political Turmoil, Asia Briefing N°82, 22 September 2008 (also available in Thai)


The Philippines: The Collapse of Peace in Mindanao, Asia Briefing N°83, 23 October 2008

Indonesia: Pre-election Anxieties in Aceh, Asia Briefing N°81, 9 September 2008 (also available in Indonesian)

Thailand: Calming the Political Turmoil, Asia Briefing N°82, 22 September 2008 (also available in Thai)


The Philippines: The Collapse of Peace in Mindanao, Asia Briefing N°83, 23 October 2008

Local Election Disputes in Indonesia: The Case of North Maluku, Asia Briefing N°86, 22 January 2009

Timor-Leste: No Time for Complacency, Asia Briefing N°87, 9 February 2009

The Philippines: Running in Place in Mindanao, Asia Briefing N°88, 16 February 2009

Indonesia: Deep Distrust in Aceh as Elections Approach, Asia Briefing N°90, 23 March 2009

Indonesia: Radicalisation of the “Palembang Group”, Asia Briefing N°92, 20 May 2009
APPENDIX H

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Co-Chairs
Lord (Christopher) Patten
Former European Commissioner for External Relations, Governor of Hong Kong and UK Cabinet Minister; Chancellor of Oxford University

Thomas R Pickering
Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Russia, India, Israel, Jordan, El Salvador and Nigeria; Vice Chairman of Hills & Company

President & CEO
Gareth Evans
Former Foreign Minister of Australia

Executive Committee
Morton Abramowitz
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Turkey

Emma Bonino*
Former Italian Minister of International Trade and European Affairs and European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid

Cheryl Carolus
Former South African High Commissioner to the UK and Secretary General of the ANC

Maria Livanos Cattaui
Member of the Board, Petroplus, Switzerland

Yoichi Funabashi
Editor-in-Chief & Columnist, The Asahi Shimbun, Japan

Frank Giustra
Chairman, Endeavour Financial, Canada

Stephen Solarz
Former U.S. Congressman

George Soros
Chairman, Open Society Institute

Pär Stenbäck
Former Foreign Minister of Finland

*Vice Chair

Other Board Members
Adnan Abu-Odeh
Former Political Adviser to King Abdullah II and to King Hussein, and Jordan Permanent Representative to the UN

Kenneth Adelman
Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

HRH Prince Turki al-Faisal
Former Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the U.S.

Kofi Annan
Former Secretary-General of the United Nations; Nobel Peace Prize (2001)

Louise Arbour
Former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda

Richard Armitage
Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State

Lord (Paddy) Ashdown
Former High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Leader of the Liberal Democrats, UK

Shlomo Ben-Ami
Former Foreign Minister of Israel

Lakhdar Brahimi
Former Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General and Foreign Minister of Algeria

Zhigui Brzezinski
Former U.S. National Security Advisor to the President

Kim Campbell
Former Prime Minister of Canada

Naresh Chandra
Former Cabinet Secretary and Ambassador to the U.S.

Joaquim Alberto Chissano
Former President of Mozambique

Wesley Clark
Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Pat Cox
Former President of the European Parliament

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen
Former Foreign Minister of Denmark

Mark Eyskens
Former Prime Minister of Belgium

Joschka Fischer
Former Foreign Minister of Germany

Yegor Gaidar
Former Prime Minister of Russia

Carla Hills
Former U.S. Secretary of Housing and U.S. Trade Representative

Lena Hjelm-Wallén
Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister of Sweden

Swanee Hunt
Former U.S. Ambassador to Austria; Chair, The Initiative for Inclusive Security and President, Hunt Alternatives Fund

Anwar Ibrahim
Former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia

Mo Ibrahim
Founder and Chair, Mo Ibrahim Foundation; Founder, Celtel International

Asma Jahangir
UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or Belief; Chairperson, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan

James V. Kimsey
Former Prime Minister of the Netherlands

Aleksander Kwaśniewski
Former President of Poland

Ricardo Lagos
Former President of Chile

Joanne Leedom-Ackerman
Former Secretary of International PEN; Novelist and journalist, U.S.

Moisés Naim
Former Venezuelan Minister of Trade and Industry; Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy

Ayo Obe
Chair, Board of Trustees, Goree Institute, Senegal

Christine Ockrent
CEO, French TV and Radio World Services

Victor Pinchuk
Founder of EastOne and Victor Pinchuk Foundation

Fidel V. Ramos
Former President of Philippines

Güler Sabancı
Chairperson, Sabancı Holding, Turkey

Ghassan Salamé
Former Lebanese Minister of Culture; Professor, Sciences Po, Paris

Thorvald Stoltenberg
Former Foreign Minister of Norway

Ernesto Zedillo
Former President of Mexico; Director, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL

Crisis Group’s President’s Council is a distinguished group of major individual and corporate donors providing essential support, time and expertise to Crisis Group in delivering its core mission.

BHP Billiton
Canaccord Adams Limited
Alan Griffiths
Iara Lee & George Gund III Foundation
Frank Holmes
Frederick Iseman
George Landegger
Ford Nicholson
Royal Bank of Scotland
StatoilHydro ASA
Ian Telfer
Guy Ullens de Schooten
Neil Woodyer
Don Xia

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL

Crisis Group’s International Advisory Council comprises significant individual and corporate donors who contribute their advice and experience to Crisis Group on a regular basis.

Rita E. Hauser
(Chair)
Elliott Kulick
(Chair)
Hamza al Khali
Anglo American PLC
APCO Worldwide Inc.
Equinox Partners
Ed Bachrach
Patrick Benzie
Stanley Bergman & Edward Bergman
Harry Bookey & Pamela Bass-Bookey
David Brown
John Chapman Chester
Chevron
Richard Cooper
Neil & Sandy DeFeo
John Ebara
Seth Ginns
Joseph Hotung
Khaled Juffali
H.J. Keilman
George Kellner
Amed Khan
Zelmira Koch
Scott Lawlor
Jean Manas
Marco Marazzi
McKinsey & Company
Najib Mikati
Harriet Mouchly-Weiss
Yves Oltramare
Donald Pels and Wendy Keys
Anna Luisa Ponti & Geoffrey Hoguet
Michael Riordan
Tilleke & Gibbins
Vale
VIVATrust
Yapi Merkezi Construction and Industry Inc.

SENIOR ADVISERS

Crisis Group’s Senior Advisers are former Board Members who maintain an association with Crisis Group, and whose advice and support are called on from time to time (to the extent consistent with any other office they may be holding at the time).

Martti Ahtisaari
(Chairman Emeritus)
George Mitchell
(Chairman Emeritus)
Hushang Ansary
Ersin Arıoğlu
Oscar Arias
Diego Arria
Zainab Bangura
Christoph Bertram
Alan Blinken
Jorge Castañeda
Eugene Chien
Victor Chu
Mong Joon Chung
Gianfranco Dell’Alba
Jacques Delors
Alain Destexhe
Mou-Shih Ding
Gernot Erler
Marika Fahlin
Stanley Fischer
Malcolm Fraser
I.K. Gujral
Max Jakobson
Todung Mulya Lubis
Allan J. MacEachen
Graça Machel
Barbara McDougall
Matthew McHugh
Nobuo Matsunaga
Miklós Németh
Timothy Ong
Olara Otunnu
Shimon Peres
Surin Pitsuwan
Cyril Ramaphosa
George Robertson
Michel Rocard
Volker Rühe
Mohamed Saoun
Salim A. Salim
Douglas Schoen
Christian Schwarz-Schilling
Michael Sohlman
William O. Taylor
Leo Tindemans
Ed van Thijn
Simone Veil
Shirley Williams
Grigory Yavlinski
Uta Zapf