Cluster of Competence
The rehabilitation of war-torn societies
A Project co-ordinated by the
Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations (CASIN)

POST-CONFLICT REHABILITATION:
THE HUMANITARIAN DIMENSION

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Abstract

This paper contends that external actors do not have well-integrated and strategically coherent policies for dealing with the implementation of peace agreements. There is an obvious tension, for example, between the neo-liberal agenda of international financial institutions for reducing the direct economic and welfare roles of the state and the absence of satisfactory alternatives in safety netting for populations in dire need of a welfare system. Concrete reconstruction measures and tangible results are preferred to ‘soft’, long-term civil society programmes that hold the promise of transforming societies through social development based on local ownership of the rehabilitation process. A distinction can be drawn between external engineering that promotes change in civil, political and demographic structures that are designed to fulfil external agendas for a quick exit, and social development that emphasises longer term change in the way that power relationships are expressed. The paper suggests that an alternative to the orthodox paradigm is to promote transparency and accountability in (a) the external assistance to war-torn societies and in (b) the generation of civil society.

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Post-Conflict Rehabilitation: the Humanitarian Dimension

1.0 Introduction

The humanitarian dimension of rehabilitation refers to a wide range of activities, from social work to monitoring human rights. These efforts seek to reintegrate lives and livelihoods in the circumstances of transition from conflict to relative peace. This paper focuses less on the activities themselves than on the contextual issues that influence outcomes. Illustrations are drawn mainly from the post-Yugoslav environment, which can be regarded, admittedly, as a singular case, as indeed all cases are unique. Nevertheless, the main themes of the paper have universal applicability: first, that strategic, coherent and long-term approaches to the processes of transition are not integrated into the agendas and implementing mechanisms of interventionist policy-making institutions; second, that there is imbalance between short-term, ‘hard’, visible reconstruction measures and ‘soft’, long-term civil society programmes; and third, that the humanitarian dimension has been geared towards social engineering rather than towards civil development based on local ownership of the peacebuilding process. In this last aspect, a distinction might be made between social engineering that promotes change in civil, political and demographic structures (by holding elections, by fostering refugee returns, for example), and civil development that emphasises change in the way power relationships are expressed (by for example, promoting transparency and accountability in both external assistance to war-torn societies and in generating local civil society).

Many problems in rehabilitation reflect the conceptual difficulties arising in the nature of modern conflict from which war-torn societies are supposed to recover.

1.1 The Nature of Modern Conflict

The common view clearly exaggerates distinctions between ‘inter-state’ and ‘intra-state’ conflicts. According to statistics, fin de siècle conflict is overwhelmingly ‘intra’ and hardly ever ‘inter’. It has been claimed, for example, that in 1995 all the major conflicts were intra-state. This is misleading because such conflicts really sprawl between the two to create intermestic conflict (my term) or international social conflict (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham’s term). The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is an obvious example of
such intermestic conflict – with external state involvement by the Tudjman and
Milosevic Governments, support for Herceg-Bosna by the Croatian diaspora,
internationalisation of the war economies and a heavy international military and
humanitarian presence. The upsurge of fighting centred on the Congo during 1997-98
is another example. The interests of states and rebels intermingle freely across
borders. The Angolan Government has supported the Kabila Government to prevent its
own rebels (UNITA), from gaining access to valuable materials in the Congo, which are
traded internationally to buy weapons.

The domestic dimensions include fracturing of the state system, large refugee flows,
protagonists motivated by psychological and economic factors, rather than ideological,
or even racial, ethnic and religious causes. In particular, the role of violence as a
‘rational’ means to achieve the objectives of protagonists should not be underestimated.
International inputs are often represented by non-state interests: the multinational
media with its electronic technical capabilities and, admittedly fluctuating, interest in
human disasters; by the firmly established concepts of humanitarian crisis and
humanitarian assistance in inter-governmental organisations such as the United
Nations and European Union; and by the growth in the variety and proliferation of
external NGOs and aid agencies. Thus war economies are not sustained, as in the
Cold War by superpower support for the protagonists, but by networks throughout the
global economy. Opportunities to manipulate the local context for strategic advantage
are presented by: international sanctions, humanitarian aid, the economic impact of
peacekeepers and international field workers, fund-raising by ethnic diasporas, security
services offered by private companies and the globalisation of fraud, money laundering
and trafficking in all manner of goods from timber and diamonds to drugs and
armaments.

In effect, so critical theory suggests, post-modern conflicts mirror developments in
global capitalism that often weaken the state but do little to underpin civil society
against the emergence of mafia and so-called ‘warlord’ classes. This is evident in the
absence of coherence among external actors about their role in transitions.

1.2 The Need for a Coherent Focus on Transitions

Whilst there is genuflection towards coherence and coordination at some levels in
the international community, intervention serves varied interests, different discourses
are employed, and there is limited agreement on priorities.\textsuperscript{7} Thus the World Bank advises that assistance must concentrate ‘on re-creating the conditions that will allow the private sector and institutions of civil society to resume commercial and productive activities’.\textsuperscript{8} The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD has both a more participatory approach and a more statist orientation in its operational priorities. It defines areas for support as: ‘restoring internal security and the rule of law, legitimising state institutions, establishing the basis for broadly-based economic growth, and improving food security and social services’.\textsuperscript{9} Humanitarian agencies and NGOs are more inclined to prioritise social welfare and human rights issues. Such divergence is inevitable and welcome to a degree because different institutions have different strengths.

However, international strategic objectives are being pursued in ways that are often contradictory rather than complementary. Thus, for example, the conditionality of external loans or IMF exchange rate support can counteract spending on job creation that would otherwise provide incentives to disarm and disincentives to engage in the black market. Although the problem of recovery from civil war is pervasive, costly and of continuing concern, western governments subsidise arms exports that include sales to conflict-prone areas. Arms exports are supported through export credits and offsets which Re-newed arms exporting to post-conflict areas, backed by wide-ranging credit facilities make it easier, not more difficult, for actors in low stability areas to acquire arms, and this perpetuates features of militarised war economies. In the twelve months ending in mid-May 1998 the UK issued 886 export licences to states which have areas of insurgency and refused only six applications.\textsuperscript{10} By contrast, average overseas development assistance as a percentage of GNP for members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee declined from about 0.32\% in 1992 to 0.24\% in 1996.\textsuperscript{11} This may appear to be counter-balanced by costly relief efforts, by economic packages built in to peace deals or by expenditure on earmarked peace-enforcement operations. The exodus of refugees from Rwanda led to a relief operation costing US$1.4 billion from April to December 1994.\textsuperscript{12} The post-Dayton military contingents in Bosnia cost £2.5-3 billion a year.\textsuperscript{13} But humanitarian relief funding has also declined since 1994, and there are limited international financial mechanisms to deal with transitions. Standard practice in the political economy of peace packages is, in sum, not necessarily explicit or coordinated in terms of an overall strategy of incentives and
disincentives,

Changes in institutional practice hold out the potential for achieving greater concordance. For example, the new cabinet committee system in the UN, part of Kofi Annan’s 1997 reform package, may overcome some of the gaps in policy that arise in the UN between the different roles of the humanitarian agencies, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Union, the International Management Group (IMG), USAID and other governmental agencies have also attempted to synchronise and coordinate activities.\(^{14}\) The NGO community is undergoing a shakeout and establishing codes of practice and standards of assistance, and NGO councils have attempted to provide a coherent NGO voice in relations with host authorities. For the present, however, the humanitarian dimension of rehabilitation remains basically fragmented, circumstantial and ad hoc. The dysfunction is reinforced by the fact that state and IGO actors operate to produce macro-economic stability, whereas NGO projects are essentially micro level initiatives. World Bank funding has to be through governments, though occasionally this filters down to partnerships forged at grass roots level.\(^{15}\)

In any event it is perhaps not so much an institutional problem – though one would not wish to underestimate the cut-throat competition in the aid business – as a policy and agenda setting problem. Provision for welfare, human rights and social rehabilitation in transitions needs to be a strategic, mainstream concern across interventionary institutions, and implemented coherently. Just as there have been calls for coherence in conflict prevention and for relief aid during conflict, so one can make a case for greater consistency in strategies for the transition to relative peace. It is questionable whether current standard practice is internally coherent and strategically effective. The absence of strategic consistency in planning for rehabilitation is manifested in the lack of vision in the international system for dealing with collapsed states and the regeneration of communities.

In the post-Yugoslav context, terms such as ‘peacebuilding’ are not generally part of the discourse of NGOs and agencies; they tend to use the phrase ‘implementing Dayton’, which is a very different kettle of fish. The Dayton Framework Agreement is a
legal, treaty agreement focusing on stabilising a situation and securing compliance. It is not a coherent policy document for a process of peacebuilding and regeneration. Indeed its underlying assumptions about social engineering – partly through refugee and IDP returns – look increasingly flawed and they mesh implicitly with the constitutional and political legitimation of ethnicity as a political force, whether dignified by protection of ethnic interests or combatted by leverage to achieve ethnic integration. Ironically, the inability of the international community to fulfill its peacebuilding ambitions in the Balkans generally, may result in the opposite to what is required, a rejection of external involvement rather than its reconfiguration.

1.3 Subcontracting, Safety Netting, and Capacity Building

Also, interventionary actors appear to be caught in a dilemma between support for state sovereignty and support for civil society, between degrading state responsibility and disdaining non-state activities. Thus the ideology of neo-liberal economic modernisation, with which lead organisations such as the IMF have been imbued, often has the effect of undermining the mechanisms necessary for state building and the dirigisme that could make authorities in war-torn societies take greater responsibility for the welfare and rights of their people, even though the international financial institutions (IFIs) can only operate through governments. Instead, the IFIs and their main donors have often expected the NGO, private voluntary sector and UN agencies take on a safety-netting role for such societies.

It is wholly compatible with subcontracting and the neo-liberal agenda, that humanitarian organisations are impelled to attempt to provide a safety net beyond the phase of emergency relief where government structures, revenues and public expenditure allocations have foundered. They may have positive short-term effects. The quick impact projects of UNHCR in Central America and funding for transitions through the UN Conference on Central American Refugees has also engaged local NGOs in the rehabilitation process (in contrast to the National Reconstruction Programme for El Salvador which was at odds with the aims of peacebuilding). But there is a danger that safety netting by external humanitarian organisations in conditions of weak and minimised government fosters aid junkies in abandoned communities. Safety netting also places an unfair, and intolerable, burden of responsibility on humanitarian agencies in terms of social provision, as well as a burden...
of expectation for preventing a resurgence of conflict.

Humanitarian rehabilitation grabs the headlines but not the money. The humanitarian dimension has been affected by a ‘triple whammy’. At the global level, the relative importance of non-state safety netting has been accompanied by reductions in state funding of aid. Generically, within aid budgets there is limited provision for rehabilitation, as most funding goes towards either relief or development. Specifically, within rehabilitation, there is very little provision for ‘soft’ social projects that have the potential to transform local communities (as opposed to ‘hard’, visible reconstruction programmes). Additionally, there may be over-emphasis within social funding on fashionable causes (such as psychosocial projects in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina). Above all, critics are concerned that cost-limited capacity building is a cosmetic way of mitigating the worst impacts of neo-liberalism on state involvement in welfare. They suggest that self-help has been pursued by the core areas of economic wealth in the world (the North) as part of the trend to disengagement from the problems of the periphery (the South). In effect, the dominant intervention paradigm places a premium on creating: stability rather than security; law and order rather than justice; and the ability of societies to participate in global capitalism rather than provide welfare.

A necessary component in strategic planning for the humanitarian dimension of rehabilitation may well be to promote public participation and self-sustaining capacity-building measures for local institutions and communities. However, at every level, subcontracting and self-help can be seen as a cost-limiting exercise. The implementation of a key integrative component of external involvement – local, public participation – is at best cosmetic or, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina geared to social engineering goals such as reintegrating ethnic communities.

Such a ‘vacuum of responsibility’ is undoubtedly a function of the predicament that states and institutions face in dealing with different levels of legitimacy. On the one hand they ‘recognise’ the legitimacy of non-state movements in the international system by, for example, subcontracting essential services to the private or NGO sectors. On the other, they reveal a lack of commitment to social transformation that could pose a political challenge to the regeneration of statism. Public participation during rehabilitation is widely acknowledged as a mechanism to catalyse political dialogue and strengthen the development of civil society. Furthermore, accountability to people in
need should reduce the vulnerability of communities and local NGOs (LNGOs), increase their stake in stability and give them ownership of regeneration. But there is no coherent rehabilitation policy to ensure that this kind of transformation happens.

1.4 Rehabilitation and the Continuum Concept

Another serious challenge confronting analysts, indeed it has created something of a crisis in humanitarian circles, is to decide upon the role of humanitarianism. Many humanitarian organisations, such as Oxfam, argue that the new relief agenda should be integrated with conflict resolution, respect for human rights, robust military intervention (to protect civilian victims) and with contributions to longer-term development. In this respect, sustaining processes and institutions will be as important as protecting people. Other actors restrict humanitarian activity to immediate relief for survival, and draw a line between emergencies that require intervention on the one hand and, on the other, sustainable development programmes which are the substance of political negotiation and only properly feasible when command structures are in place.

The continuum concept also assumes that poverty is transitional and that development in a neo-liberal mould is an inevitable consequence of the spread of global capitalism and human rights values. Adherents tend to see development as a solution to conflict. As Mark Duffield argues, however, development is part of the crisis of globalisation and conflict is symptomatic of new forms of political economy. The relief-development continuum is inherently contradictory because it assumes the emergence of a benign developmental state which, simultaneously, neo-liberalism is designed to diminish. The manifestation of this on the ground is that NGOs are expected to provide a welfare safety net as relief is prematurely phased out and absurd cost-recovery programmes are introduced.

In the relief-development continuum concept, rehabilitation falls somewhere in the middle as part of the Utopian transition to a post-poverty future. Indeed psychosocial rehabilitation projects have been located ‘between relief and development’. However, rehabilitation also demonstrates the weakness of the continuum concept, for it does not occur as part of a neat socio-economic convergence to western norms, but may be integral to separate development in which conflict is latent. As one observer has put it: ‘Bosnia is in limbo because it is not part of the development issue – it is not a
developing country. It is in transition from aid to something else that is not traditional development’.  

If the assumptions behind the relief-development continuum are flawed, so also is the notion of a neat break marking off conflict from peace. In practice, many humanitarian organisations have no hard and fast rule about the place of their activities but adopt a pragmatic, flexible approach, navigating their projects through the shoals of available funding. Thus Danish Save the Children began during the conflict in Bosnia by distributing food and clothing to refugees, then set up playrooms, and in the post-Dayton situation cooperated closely with municipalities in providing kindergartens as part of the education system.  

So the term transition is not used here to mean a movement from relief to development, as if socio-economic convergence towards western norms is occurring, but to indicate the ragged change from overt civil war to a condition of (perhaps temporary) non-belligerence. Transition between conflict and relative peace does not assume a particular end state. Rather it reflects the process of crisis management to contain dangerous problems. Nor does weakness in the developmental concept mean that the transition to relative peace lacks continuities. On the contrary, these continuities render the notion of a developmental continuum hard to sustain.  

2.0 Continuities in Transition from Conflict to Peace  

Rehabilitation itself plays a part in the continuities, commencing in some areas before fighting has stopped in neighbouring areas. Rehabilitation may be needed by individuals whilst entire communities remain at war. Furthermore, one can argue that structural violence persists beyond formal peace agreements. We can highlight four continuities.  

**Continuities in the humanitarian dimension**  

(1) a continuation of violent risks during rehabilitation;  
(2) continued involvement by international security forces in humanitarian activities;  
(3) persistent features of war economies that influence the humanitarian dimension;
(4) continued dominance of fragmented ‘project-ism’ within a donor-driven paradigm of humanitarian activity.

2.1 Persistence of Security Risks

Rehabilitation can occur when security situations remain acutely problematic. As demonstrated in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, non-belligerent conditions are reversible, and as a UN official has said of Bosnia: ‘this is like a video where the pause button has been pressed; the tape hasn’t finished’.\(^{31}\) In two respects, the threat to survival may even increase when conflict dies down. First, as freedom of movement is restored, and efforts are made to return to agriculture and rebuild infrastructures, the risk grows of injury by mines in areas previously inaccessible. Second, as economic activity is restored and civil rights affirmed, so the risks of getting caught up in criminal and social violence, including acts of revenge, may increase. Since 1994, deaths by intentional murders in El Salvador have exceeded the annual average of 6,000 deaths during the civil war. A similar picture is presented in Guatemala and Nicaragua.\(^{32}\) In war-affected areas of post-Yugoslavia, crimes against ethnic groups continued after Dayton, for example in Mostar where Croats opened fire on Muslims attempting to visit a graveyard in February 1997.\(^{33}\) Insecurity through the violence that dominates a situation whilst conflict is still occurring does not completely disappear when rehabilitation starts.

Although the advent of ‘non-war’ may make humanitarian activities easier, the need for public security measures for the safety of populations and humanitarian activities remains a critical issue. The security role of external military forces and the promotion of the rule of law have been discussed elsewhere.\(^{34}\) In a brief digression from the main theme of this paper, we might note, however, that a comprehensive approach to the security of humanitarian and other civilian workers, covering transitional periods, should be integral to the policies of external actors.

There is a widespread perception that the risk to the lives of aid workers has increased in recent years, and both Sergio de Mello (UN Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs) and Emma Bonino (European Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs), have called for attacks on humanitarian workers to be designated a war
Serious security incidents affecting humanitarians

In the Red Cross Movement, 10 International Committee field staff have been killed in Burundi and 6 in Chechnya. The International Federation (IFRC) also had 17 personnel killed in security incidents in 1995 and 1996.

Reported abductions and other security incidents involving the ICRC has risen from about 20 a year to 153 in 1996; for the IFRC this rose from 58 in 1995 to 131 in 1996.

In Rwanda, 3 Médecins sans Frontières members and 4 UN Human Rights Officers were killed in 1997.

From 1992 to 1998, 150 UN non-military staff have been killed in security incidents (36 of them working for the UNHCR). There is some evidence that aid workers and humanitarian assets have been deliberately targeted, particularly perhaps among UN agencies that have not been regarded as politically neutral by protagonists.

In response, prominent NGOs follow the Red Cross Movement in making the presumption that there will be no resort to direct armed protection of their activities because it would render their task more dangerous. They rely heavily on their neutral and impartial standing with local communities. Within this presumption, however, many NGOs, as well as UN agencies, such as UNICEF and UNHCR, have failed to develop and articulate general security policies, preferring an ad hoc approach according to particular circumstances in the field. Moreover, those international NGOs that have devised policies (such as the ICRC, Oxfam, MSF and latterly CARE), show considerable divergence, though all agree that the armed protection of humanitarian workers and their activities should only occur in exceptional situations. Oxfam regards using local police as a better option than the hiring of privateers, after its experiences with ‘technicals’ in Mogadishu. In exception circumstances, Oxfam indicates that it has an obligation to use international protection by forces accountable to the UN – and has called for the robust international protection of civilians at risk. By contrast, the ICRC would resort to ‘reputable’ security firms and only lastly to international forces. In any event, ICRC policy is not to avail itself of armed protection when offered by UN troops in an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter or when it is possible that
the UN would be considered as a party to the conflict.\textsuperscript{39}

There seems little prospect of standardising security guidelines, given the disparate nature of the aid agencies. But aid donors might encourage humanitarian organisations to take security more seriously. The largest funder, ECHO, has called for comprehensive security policies by all engaged in humanitarian work and suggested that agencies be prepared to fund security.\textsuperscript{40} Perhaps, too, the various security guidelines should be lodged with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The next step, as with the ICRC Code of Conduct, would be for donors to encourage recipients to establish monitoring that would check on compliance. Obviously different situations require different security measures, and it may be true that there is no substitute for experience and knowledge that comes with long service in the field. But without the establishment of general policy guidelines, and professional security training and management, agencies and NGOs will endanger not only their own workers but also the lives of others. There may be no time to engage in training on the job, and ignorance about policies can only serve to increase confusion when there is a requirement for security cooperation between numerous actors in the field.\textsuperscript{41}

\subsection*{2.2 Involvement of Security Forces in Humanitarianism}

The involvement of security forces in humanitarian assistance has become an issue, not only during conflicts but when they wind down. Peacekeepers have traditionally provided modest, impartial, humanitarian aid to the general benefit of both the communities and the peacekeeping force (in the Lebanon, for example). Regimental funds, military equipment and military personnel have been used at no great cost. Some states, such as the Netherlands, make central government funds available to their blue helmets for such purposes as repairing hospitals, providing facilities to orphanages and equipment to schools.\textsuperscript{42} In general terms this kind of activity creates few major or lasting problems and can smooth relations between the military and the civilian population.

However, this has been increasingly institutionalised and the concept of ‘humanitarian protection’ has led to military support to humanitarian relief efforts not only during conflict but also during peace enforcement. These peace support operations (PSOs), for much of the 1990s at least, have had an explicit humanitarian
agenda and have been conducted through Civil Affairs officers in the US Army or Civil–Military Cooperation (CIMIC) programmes. During conflict, such operations can be regarded as a poor substitute for achieving political solutions or even for waging war to end genocide.\(^{43}\) US troops sent to the Zairean border with Rwanda in 1994 were engaged in engineering work to facilitate humanitarian efforts, rather than in much-needed security tasks, for example. All the same, peace enforcement to engender a secure environment for rehabilitation is, to some extent, a continuation of the concept of humanitarian corridors and the right of victims to receive humanitarian assistance.

Whether the right to humanitarian assistance should be enforced in conditions of international social conflict when consent is absent or disintegrates, is a dilemma that has led military establishments to plan for ‘grey area’ peace support operations (PSOs). In this respect, the British Army was extremely successful in exporting its own guidelines to other participating states. There is, of course, great value in having a doctrine at all, but from the humanitarian perspective it is vital to note that the doctrine accepts that peacekeeping, peace enforcement and war can overlap with the possibility of escalatory movement between them. This follows a military logic to protect the force from the kind of kidnapping that occurred in Somalia and Bosnia. It envisages an increased need for ‘peace enforcers’ prepared for war as the most appropriate navigation through complex emergencies when the situation is volatile, not least when protagonists have stopped fighting.\(^{44}\)

The relatively higher risk, compared to peacekeeping, of being engaged in combat leads to serious consequences that can affect the coherence of international crisis management.\(^{45}\) For a start, robust military ‘grey area’ interventions are unlikely to recur on the scale of the past because of the combat risks. For the purposes of this paper, the important consequence of a combat-oriented approach is bound to sway perceptions of impartiality and to associate ‘humanitarian protection’ with military solutions to problems. As agents of government or intergovernment policy, PSO forces cannot be incorporated into the classical humanitarian tradition unless they maintain the status of UN-controlled, blue beret peacekeepers and abide as far as possible by principles of neutrality, impartiality, consent and low-enforcement capability.

However, the IFOR and SFOR units in Bosnia-Herzegovina were mandated to undertake humanitarian support and have been quite open about the political and
strategic bias of their involvement in the humanitarian dimension of rehabilitation. BiH has been divided into three sectors for military operations, led respectively by the UK, United States and France. Within these sectors, the Canadian, Dutch and Finnish battalions also focus development assistance where their troops are located.

The use of the British Army to distribute development as well as relief aid in its ‘enforcement’ capacity in Bosnia further illustrates the point. The UK’s post-Dayton CIMIC programme had disposed of £9.25 million by May 1997 to fund some 600 low-cost, high-profile civil aid projects in the British-led South West Division. Contracts were issued to local companies and the work managed by IFOR, to restore water, power, sanitation, refuse collection, clinics, veterinary surgeries, schools and emergency services. The funds were provided by the Overseas Development Agency (now Department for International Development, DFID) on the basis of projects identified by IFOR troops in the field and ODA’s own personnel. The United States eventually sent a Civil Affairs battalion to Bosnia with a full colonel on the IFOR Commander’s personal staff. Its tasks include:

- assistance to displaced persons, control and distribution of humanitarian aid, civil control, local infrastructure restoration, dissemination of news and information, liaison with the local media, foreign-nation/host-nation support, passive collection and evaluation of civil intelligence and liaison between the military and local, international and voluntary aid organisations.

The US Agency for International Development (USAID) had a budget for such civil projects in the Northern Division of Bosnia amounting to $52.5 million in 1997. The sum is modest compared to the $5 billion anticipated for assistance to post-Yugoslav countries from international donors as a whole in 1996-99; and rather smaller than the $400 million earmarked by the United States for the ‘Train and Equip’ programme for remilitarising the region. Nevertheless, it is significant when concentrated on a few towns and villages to get rehabilitation under way quickly.

Such militarisation in the humanitarian dimension has had several justifications. The logistic network, available manpower and machinery are extensive and speedy (claiming delivery in about five days from project approval, compared to five months for the EU and UN). It has a strategic and political purpose, to give the military commander a ‘carrot’ to complement his military ‘stick in gaining compliance of agreements such as
the Dayton Peace Accords.\textsuperscript{49} It delineates peace enforcers from forces of occupation, showing a constructive face to the local communities, improving soldiers’ morale and the prospects for acceptability of the foreign troops.\textsuperscript{50}

There are, however, disadvantages. The activities of the military can be counterproductive, or compromising to civilian actors. Of course, aid workers are quite capable of compromising themselves: they also have political and economic impacts, sometimes manipulated by local elites. But this does not invalidate the precept, that they strive to follow, of providing aid according to need. The military agenda may be at odds with the humanitarian imperatives of aid agencies because military involvement in humanitarian tasks does not derive from purely humanitarian impulses but from non-humanitarian agenda, possibly even the need to justify levels of defence spending.\textsuperscript{51}

Further, troops are not necessarily well suited to humanitarian tasks and they cannot affect the underlying social, political and economic dynamics of an environment.\textsuperscript{52} Their comparative advantage lies in maintaining security and their expertise and ethos is designed to accomplish political-military goals. Indeed, from a military point of view, combat readiness and the soldierly ethos are degraded by humanitarian ‘distractions’. The military chain of command and its hierarchical structure is unlikely to accord with the principle of accountability to the local population or to promote long-term attempts to build local capacities for relief and regeneration. The civilian effort can become associated in the minds of local communities with enforcement.

A note of caution is in order. The work of enforcers and aid agencies needs to be harmonised so that they remain both distinctive and complementary. Multinational forces outside UN control, which are engaged in enforcement rather than peacekeeping or which are equipped for escalation, ought perhaps to distinguish between (a) the formal management of programmed aid that is properly the sphere of civilian agencies, and (b) the informal, public relations assistance that has traditionally been conducted by peacekeepers. The association of enforcement with programmed rehabilitation and welfare provision sends a mixed signal to war-torn communities – given that these communities are being simultaneously cajoled to demilitarise and establish civil societies.

2.3 Persistence of Guerrilla Economies
In situations where war elites remain powerful, and where civil regulation has historically produced corruption and market distortion, then neo-liberal economic models do not necessarily result in the equitable distribution of economic benefits or political power. The goals of structural adjustment (market efficiency and growth) can be readily thwarted. The challenge for external actors is that policies of economic regeneration, intended to counteract the venalities and distortions in statism, may assist those who have already developed critical assets, infrastructures and experience through their manipulation of war economies. Such economies are sustained either by predatory and rapacious plundering of local resources or by market-based criminality. Corruption and inequalities persist over the intended benefits of marketisation, privatisation and development assistance. In the spring of 1998, for example, it was noted that Bosnia and Herzegovina had:

failed to finance its common institutions or service its external debt on time, implement common policies on foreign trade, apply a common customs tariff, issue common bank notes, achieve transparency and good governance in the use of public funds, and establish effective institutions to curb corruption and revenue evasion. The lack of an economic policy framework [was] preventing an IMF Standby Arrangement and World Bank adjustment lending and renders the country vulnerable to financial crisis.

This should be hardly surprising because central government hardly functions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there being no strong consensus for it. Incentives to stop fighting are not incentives to implement an externally-wrought political system. Conflict-prone areas may have had their sustainability undermined by the growth of local and national debts, by structural adjustment programmes that reduce the ability of local communities to provide welfare needs, by IMF monetary stabilisation programmes that have adverse effects on social stability, by the economic distortions caused by arms imports and systems of arms export credits, and by the activities of big business and their local agents. Currently the UNITA rebels in Angola command a sixth of the world’s the diamond market. In effect, these actors become stakeholders in perpetuating the guerilla model.

In Central America, as Jenny Pearce has shown, external agencies are failing to coordinate their agendas and failing to exercise leverage over internal elites so that
they assume greater responsibility for rehabilitation and development. The policies of the main international financial institutions (IFIs) can also have the effect of restricting welfare services. The role of global capital in minimising state activity interferes with national capacity building and engages elites in global economic activity that discourages income redistribution and attention to community welfare. War-torn communities may thus be driven to seek welfare from armed factions and unscrupulous blackmarketeteers, and the safety net of external organisations.

3.4 The Project-centred, Donor-driven, Hierarchy Paradigm

In rehabilitation, humanitarian activities continue to display the fragmented, donor-driven and hierarchy paradigm of emergency relief work. In the first place, funding is crucial to the creation of relationships between donors and project partners. Implicit within such relationships is the ‘recognition’ of actors in the process and their direction into certain tasks, though not in a cohesively planned way. The pattern of relations is hierarchical, and funding mechanisms and donations can be used as political tools to direct peacebuilding in directions that suit the interests of funders.

Because rehabilitation does not fit neatly into the distinctions between relief and development, an initial problem for humanitarian organisations is the lack of recognition for ‘transition’ from war to relative peace. Although major donors offer reconstruction funds as an incentive to reach or abide by peace deals, this tends to be a one-off or short-term provision trumpeted in a blaze of publicity. USAID does have an Office of Transition Initiatives for bilateral aid (which for example, funds quaisi-independent media in republika Srpska). But in general, donors are reluctant to fund non-emergency activities.

They assume that relief and development are distinct categories with different funding criteria. Within the EU for example, ECHO concentrated on the traditional relief sectors of food, medicine and agricultural infrastructure to improve food supplies in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but was reportedly uncomfortable with rehabilitation and preferred other donors and the Directorate-General responsible for assistance to central and eastern Europe (DG1A) to make a link between aid and development. ECHO does not use the term ‘peacebuilding’. Its policy on post-emergency activities is that, with some exceptions, they must be funded from the NGO’s own equity. NGOs attempting to
distinguish criteria in their applications during the process of transition confront a significant problem that leads to gaps in follow-up funding. The DG1A’s Essential Aid Programme (EAP) was designed as a transitional step between ECHO’s humanitarian aid and longer-term reconstruction arrangements. Financial allocation of 125 million ecu (mostly Phare funding) was in place almost as soon as the ink was dry on the Dayton Accords. Its priority was the supply of essential materials, equipment and spare parts for various sectors of the economy, as identified by the IMG. But the speed of contracting was slower than planned and the inadequacy of needs assessment and implementation structures on the ground led to about a third of uncommitted funds being reallocated from supplies to reconstruction projects.

Funding for the NGO ‘safety net’ can also reinforce dysfunctional localism. The project-oriented, short-term approach to funding ensures that applicants not only have to try to separate out relief and development programmes, they also tend to bid for discrete community projects. Consequently, neighbouring villages get differential treatment. Loans may be offered to local communities at different rates of interest, or transport facilities to a health centre may be provided to one community but not its neighbour. It is also worth noting that the level of sustainability is different in the entities in Bosnia. Many rural Bosniacs live in the most inhospitable, unsustainable part of the country and are denied the cross-subsidisation from the wealthier areas that they received in the past – whereas Croat dominated areas and Republika Srpska are subsidised by Croatia and Yugoslavia respectively.

The hierarchy is dominated by donor power. Donors delineate a field within which external actors operate and also set some of the implicit and explicit rules for their operation. Donor interests are thus in a position to manipulate the peace. In Bosnia, 87.5% of all USAID funding has to be spent in the US SFOR sector and Sarajevo. In the summer of 1997, the United States exerted pressure to postpone a donors conference that was to discuss future funding, a political act that reversed a function–outcomes relationship through which financial functions achieve political ends. It is characteristic of donor-driven pressure that control is exercised politically for economic purposes.

Similarly, the EU is commonly said to be very slow to make decisions and is more concerned with what is going on in Brussels than what is being done on the ground, its
responses reflecting the domestic agendas of member states. In particular, ECHO was influenced by Germany to emphasise repatriation programmes to expedite the removal of refugees on its territory. Repatriation is the zeitgeist of the rehabilitation process. Paradoxically by its very nature it is destabilising because the policy of minimum security to assist returns does nothing to calm minority fears, sort out property entitlements or reduce the leverage of extremists. Nor is it a component of a broad and strategic rehabilitation or peacebuilding process. Rather it has become a stripped down goal of EU domestic interests, a goal that requires post-conflict regeneration to build the conditions necessary for returns. Indeed conditionality also creates a shortage of funding because it has been linked to returns: these have been disappointing as refugees overwhelmingly join majorities rather than where municipalities are offered incentives to attract minorities. Such difficulties might be further compounded by the shift in responsibility for safety netting, described above, that appears to have the aim of creating the conditions necessary for a reduction in international effort and expenditure.

The rationale for, and modus operandi of, the donor regime is ‘project-ism’. Partners are funded to implement not to exist. Projects become the main conduit for funding. They offer a formalised process for allocating generally fixed sums for specific tasks to be completed during an agreed time frame and which can be audited in a particular way. Informants in Bosnia and Croatia consider this to be a special problem for smaller ‘local’ organisations, because they were frequently founded around sets of principles for being in existence such as a dedication to human rights, rather than with activities in mind. Other organisations have suffered because they were founded to do a particular task and lost funding when international donor priorities changed. Corridor was founded as a psychosocial aid organisation by local people but found that, although the need continues to grow, funders became less interested in psychosocial work after Dayton. Project-ism therefore reinforces a donor-centred, top-down approach to needs assessment and evaluation. Implementing partners generally write proposals for specific projects that they believe will fit in with the funding priorities of donors. Project evaluations are couched in terms of the original aims of the proposal and with keen regard for the priorities of the donor.

Project-ism reinforces the bureaucratisation of peacebuilding processes. Since so
many organisations are dependent for their survival on a more or less continuous and cyclical process of application and evaluation, they have to develop the bureaucratic mechanisms necessary to maintain this. This in turn limits the communication between donors and implementers to one of bureaucratic exchange. As in all modern public institutions, at each level of authority resources are directed towards attracting, allocating and accounting for funds rather than the delivery of services. In the world of relief and rehabilitation this ‘is like having takers all the way down the line….a percentage goes at every stage….shedding of money all the way.’

The system also generates fierce competition, in which UN agencies often have to fight for funds on the same terms as NGOs. This not only polarises relationships between implementers, but also between donor and implementing partners. Project-ism becomes the channel and medium for negotiating that relationship. The ad hoc nature of the process is not completely chaotic but represents a form of institutional adaptation to the absence of coherent strategies.

Lying at the base of the hierarchy are community organisations, or in post-Yugoslavia, citizens associations (self-administered, support networks based on trade unions, gender groups, peasant associations and cooperatives). Some of them, like the Bosnian Committee for Help, become LNGOs. But many LNGOs are actually founded or infiltrated by *deracinés* from outside who are often charismatic and extremely effective rehabilitators – though in ways that fail to impress accountants. Such organisations as the Osijek Centre for Peace, Non-violence and Human Rights receive training, guidance and financial support from outside and are quickly influenced by the international culture of assistance.

The essential point is that this division reflects the dominant external perspective and the distribution of power in the political economy of regeneration. The externals can operate the bureaucratic complexity necessary for managing the donor driven funding cycle, have experience of dealing with primary donors, and the resources to head-hunt skilled, local individuals. LNGOs are often trained in a formal sense by INGOs, and not vice versa (sometimes with a view to developing and testing methods and concepts that can be used later in other contexts). LNGO workers do not have a strong understanding of, or presence in, INGOs, whereas the reverse is often the case. Thus, while they themselves employ international experts for their knowledge, they do not remunerate
local people and LNGOs on the same basis – for contacts and expertise – but for what they can deliver in measurable outcomes based on generally short-term projects. Unlike INGOs, LNGO networks are sometimes not hierarchical, ‘non-membership indigenous professional organisations engaged in service delivery, advocacy, policy research, etc.’ Because of external funding, international organisations are able to dictate the working practices of LNGOs while the reverse is generally not true.

Most INGOs make efforts to empower LNGOs through training and hiring local project officers. And, as noted by Stubbs with regard to work among refugees, they encourage the creation of LNGOs in their own professional, middle-class image, thereby maintaining influence among them. This also selects and bureaucratises the grassroots social capital for professional aggrandisement rather than harnessing local clubs and associations, let alone raising the voices of the underprivileged, especially in rural areas. The accountability of rehabilitation is generally a one-way street leading towards the primary funders.

From the project implementer’s perspective, the importance of sustainability appears to be poorly understood in the donor community. Rehabilitation requires a different time-scale to relief, and there is a lack of political interest in long time scaling. Short-termism is evident particularly in the funding and contract cycles that commonly last from 3 to 12 months. Short-term staff are always in fear of being sent away and often do not know until the very end of the contract whether they are staying or not. As NGO workers remark: ‘even when forced by the system to work short-term, we have to and want to do long-term planning, as rehabilitation is a long haul and could take a generation’. This is considered vital in human rights programmes where success should be measured ‘by the degree to which field presence contributes to a sustainable improvement in the human rights situation. That end is not achieved by social engineering through external solutions – but rather by engaging with, and facilitating, the host society’s efforts.’ In Bosnia-Herzegovina, postponement of the 1997 donor conference to decide funding was calamitous for the population because it meant that funding would only filter through only when winter froze many operations anyway. The political willingness to allow further suffering directly contradicts the purpose of rehabilitation and good humanitarian practice. In this instance the influx of opportunistic NGOs arriving after the Dayton Agreement, without attempting to integrate with existing
programmes or consult with existing institutions, complicated the donor’s assessment of needs and priorities.

If wealthy states continue to exert control through funding, whilst divesting themselves of direct responsibilities in the humanitarian field and delegating to NGOs, they also check the pretentions of non-state actors by their encouragement to, and recognition of, emergent state forms. Thus transnational solidarity forged between INGOs and LNGOs cannot easily challenge statism, partly because of the unequal partnership and hierarchical paradigm just mentioned, and partly because rehabilitation involves the reassertion of official administrations or quasi-state forms, through elections for example. NGOs may become bureaucratised in their quest for project funds, but maintaining a bureaucracy is a constant struggle, even for the larger NGOs such as Oxfam, which in the late 1990s have to cut back on staff. It is thus difficult for civil society projects to counter the discourses of revived or unreconstructed local elites ‘who didn’t do too badly out of the war’, or to forge transformative relations with official institutions.

3.0 Rehabilitation as the Transformation of Societies

A particularly weak feature of current rehabilitation and regeneration policy at the international level is the limited attention given to, and funding for, so-called ‘soft programmes’. Yet these are critical humanitarian activities for any long-term transformation of society, especially for transformation based on local ownership.

Time and again implementing organisations have pointed to the relative ease of obtaining funds with visible outputs, and the considerable difficulty in obtaining funds for ‘soft programmes’. It is hard to get money for ‘democracy-building’ because it is not glamorous. A notable exception has been the OSCE’s support for alternative, non-nationalist citizens’ movements in Bosnia-Herzegovina and their involvement in the special committees set up by the High Representative. But there is relatively little money for human rights, which is, after all, a major purpose of democracy, and some critics in Bosnia have argued that external funders wasted two years before getting to grips with support for anti-nationalist civil projects.

The dominant funding culture, expressed by the largest donors, is to prefer concrete projects, often literally, because these are more open to bureaucratic means of
communication – reports and standardised formats. The United States, according to one observer’s characterisation: ‘likes to go for big visual proof – doing up things along the road and then putting stickers on.’ The EU also prefers hard reconstruction to social mediation. NGOs in Bosnia have expressed a common view that the EU ‘is big on accountancy’, doing lots of auditing but having little concept of the social impact of the process. Scandinavian governments are perceived as more supportive of social and human rights programmes that do not provide physical outcomes or commercial advantage, and take a view of the whole picture that includes qualitative changes to communities. One major evaluation found that it takes two years for such programmes to show an impact.

As John Lederach and Betts Featherston have argued, local empowerment, capacity building and accountability have the potential to transform societies. Such a requirement has long been acknowledged, notably in the pioneering work of Mary Anderson. Nor can one fault the rhetorical commitment of international organisations to public participation in development programmes. Agenda 21 of the 1992 UN Rio Conference on Environment and Development, stressed the value of a people-centred approach, and the Secretary-General’s subsequently opined that: ‘In order to fulfil their potential, people must participate actively in formulating their own goals, and their voices must be heard in decision-making bodies as they seek to pursue their own most appropriate path to development.’ The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee is committed to national ownership of the development process in post-conflict recovery and to ‘political dialogue on such critical issues as governance and participation, [in which] all groups, including the marginalised, should be encouraged to express themselves’.

Communities have a right to ownership of the transformation of their societies. Without active participation people will not become ‘stakeholders’ in the ventures and enterprises ostensibly generated to assist them. Without it the political ownership of rehabilitation will remain with the external agencies. This is as true of the field human rights, in which one might imagine all kinds of inhibitions about putting local communities at risk of persecution, as it is of economic and infrastructure regeneration. As pointed out by the International Human Rights Trust (IHRT), whose work is supported by the European Commission and Irish Department of Foreign Affairs:
Discussions of human rights operations internationally have not included the constituency most qualified to speak on the subject – the societies which have played host to them. There continues to be a near total absence of input from those who have hosted, or are hosting, operations. This not only excludes a vital source of information for assessing the merits of such operations but is symptomatic of a more structural weakness of current approaches which see the host society as something of an afterthought, or somehow outside of, the process. In traditional diplomatic manner, a rather statist approach has been applied.\(^8\)

Axiomatically, the rationale for external human rights activities and empowerment of local communities must be established in each circumstance. But as a general principle, argues the IHRT, hosts should be involved in ‘planning, designing, setting priorities for, and evaluating the impact of human rights operations’. This calls for a new discourse: ‘The terminology proposed to encapsulate such future fieldwork is Human Rights Support Programmes. This is because «support»conveys the fundamental shift in attitude towards a constructive partnership based on the primacy of the host society. It conveys assisting and reinforcing rather than replacing local efforts.’\(^8\)

Of course, mobilising public opinion carries a considerable risk. We can take it for granted that interventionists have to work within particular peace agreements, international law and treaties, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But what if public opinion is impervious to such constraints? The ‘primacy of the host society’ could become a blank cheque to re-empower extremists; yet conditionality on participation and parameters on policy options will contravene the principle of host primacy. So coherent strategic planning requires interventionists to agree upon common criteria for influential voice. Participation should be packaged with clearly understood rules and responsibilities that balance competing interests. In all aspects of rehabilitation the ideal of support and constructive partnership encounters genuine obstacles that need to be recognised, in addition to those posed by the prevalent donor-driven paradigm of humanitarian action.

3.1 Obstacles to participation

If popular participation levels are variable in non-violent development contexts, participation seems even more mutable in war-torn societies, though the need for it is
greater.

First, the human costs of conflict disrupt or destroy existing social patterns of decision-making. By 1995 the conflict in Angola was estimated to have claimed 750,000 lives, the genocide in Rwanda up to 500,000 (in three months in 1994) and the civil war in Sudan 1,500,000. But other impacts, including injury, psychological disorientation and displacement is regarded as diminishing the capacity of communities to participate proactively in rehabilitation and deprive people, temporarily perhaps, of an organised voice.

Second, guerrilla war economies disrupt social-economic patterns of bargaining and decision making. Damage to physical infrastructures and the existence of minefields disrupts the economic networks that build up around trade and agriculture. Transforming society by tackling social, educational and attitudinal barriers to peace has to confront elites who are engaged in manipulating subsistence, not to influence social attitudes or to promote ideologies but to satisfy particular market mechanisms, often illegally and affected by the dynamics of globalisation. New corrupt elites may establish themselves as essential to people’s existence, creating a counterfeit legitimacy by providing the means for ordinary people to ‘get by’ in an economy distorted by grave shortages.

Third, political and ideological patterns in decision-making will be affected by continuing hostility towards former enemies. Where established ideological links, say between rural and urban interests, previously infiltrated the political process, these may now be shattered by non-ideological fault lines and the politics of relative exposure to nationalism. New physical borders disrupt the lines of communication and control, not necessarily for the worse. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, there are few common institutions in the health sector, but this has provided opportunities to revitalise health governance. By contrast, the survival of bureaucratic forms that deny participation can be problematic, too, though the phenomenon is not of course confined to war-torn societies. In the Sarajevo area a mental health centre for adolescents which began in 1994 with foreign medical workers and practitioners from the hospital was originally governed on authoritarian lines by a Steering Committee of professionals. It was replaced after 18 months by a Coordination Board, which had bottom-up links with the Centre itself, giving the staff a stake in its progress.
Fourth, misperceptions on the part of external actors about the general and particular social capital, which they arrive to support, is liable to inhibit participation. In the general sense, there is a tendency to see entire peoples who were recently at war with each other either as traumatised victims who lack the ability to make decisions about the future, or as people driven by a destructive psychosis that renders them incapable or morally unworthy of positive contributions to rehabilitation. In Croatia, even domestic observers have argued that peacebuilding should be externally owned because the bulk of their compatriots do not deserve to determine the help they get from outside. Lack of interest in local views is reinforced when a peace process is seen to be forged not by a war weary population but imposed from outside on potential recidivists. There may also be a perceived risk that the activation of a local community in decision-making could re-ignite tensions or might result in highly politicised projects aimed to strengthen one group at the expense of another. Some authorities in Bosnia appeared to act as though health problems were ethnic in origin and solution, and Médecins du Monde had to discover the prewar political dimensions of health in order to better assess conflicting interests.

The existing social network may not be regarded as conducive to participation. One should distinguish between societies that have had some tradition of NGO activity that NGOs feel able to link into, those which have little or no such tradition, and those where only 'official NGOs' that are highly dependent on governments are tolerated. For example, Tudjman's Government in Croatia is perceived as hostile to dissident NGOs and to outside involvement in humanitarian and human rights issues unless it can be controlled. However, more urbanised Croatia has a relatively solid legacy of civil society and potential for sustainable NGOs compared to Bosnia–Herzegovina. A few, such as Suncokret, the Society for Psychological Assistance and the Croatian Helsinki Human Rights Committee had large-scale external funding. The quest to patronise or create NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina misses the point that interest clubs and citizens associations have played some role in social networks. The re-registration of associations as NGOs is a costly and time-consuming process, through relevant for obtaining official recognition and having the right to raise and manage funds.

Fifth, the conditionality adopted by external actors to manipulate participation by creating or empowering only local institutions that demonstrate a commitment to
externally-determined goals may be a strategy resulting in social exclusion. In the case of former Yugoslavia, external support to communities on condition that they subscribe to a participatory interpretation of inter-ethnic governance (rather than governance open to all) does risk dismissing opportunities for social development where ethnic homogeneity happens to be a social reality or where ethnic cleavage is irrelevant as a pivot on which to balance a budget. By the same token, empty promises by local leaders to fulfill conditions, may get rewarded. Attempts to exert leverage through conditionality point to the limits of social engineering.

3.2 Limits to Social Engineering

Even if we ignore post-structuralist ethical issues about relative social values, and concentrate on practical outcomes, the manipulation of political, economic and social forces by outsiders is unlikely to have a lasting impact. Monitoring and ensuring compliance of imposed conditions requires a degree of authoritarian control that not even a UN High Representative can hope to wield. It is therefore relatively easy for domestic actors to resist external pressure, to pay mere lip-service to conditionality and to out-last the will of the external architects of the good life.

According to Roland Paris:

War-shattered states are typically ill equipped to manage societal competition induced by a political and economic liberalization, not only because these states have a recent history of violence, but because they typically lack the institutional structures capable of peacefully resolving internal disputes. In these circumstances, efforts to transform war-shattered states into market democracies can serve to exacerbate rather than moderate societal conflicts.94

The answer that Paris offers, however, is not very far-reaching. His response to the problem of liberal internationalism is to mitigate its deleterious effects through a more gradual approach to democratisation and marketisation – by promoting moderate politicians, for example. It is questionable whether the normative framework of democratisation and a free market will provide stability, certainly in regard to Africa. There, as Patrick Chabal points out, ruler legitimacy has been sustained in ways more complex than ‘multiparty rituals’. Oppositions can be suppressed after elections, and assemblies and elections are no substitute for accountability. It is more important that
people believe rulers are accountable in ways they believe to be legitimate rather than focusing on the cosmetics of democracy. In effect support for social development through systems of participation with accountability are more likely to have an effect than social engineering.

Some current work does reflect the importance of accountability and ownership and suggests that the above mentioned structural and cultural obstacles can be challenged. Under the IFRC’s leadership and with the support of UN agencies, the Sphere Project, has brought European NGOs and the US umbrella group InterAction together to develop a Humanitarian Charter and Reference Manual, based on assistance rights and best practice which includes stakeholder accountability. The War-Torn Societies Project in UNRISD has explored the implementation of public participation in its studies, and its own analysis has involved interaction with local people. The World Bank has now included participation criteria (i.e. public debates with popular, gender and NGO involvement) in its lending policy, mainly for small-scale social development projects. But the evaluation of the viability of such projects rests securely with the Bank’s own experts who are imbued with its neo-liberal determination to privatise and reduce state welfare. Moreover, infrastructure projects, which are often led by private enterprise and therefore beholden to commercial principles, focus on environmental impact assessments, which may amount to little more than a procedural consultation for the sake of political correctness.

Can the humanitarian community shift the level of participation beyond procedural correctness into interactive participation? NGOs such as the National Democratic Institute of Washington DC, and Conflict Resolution Catalysts of Vermont, have successfully overcame such problems by empowering existing social associations in Bosnia–Herzegovina. Also, in the villages around Travnik in Central Bosnia, a resettlement grants scheme managed by nationals and involving the UNDP, an INGO and an NGO, explicitly links interest associations with integrated social development.

3.3 A participation/accountability framework

Without the space here to unpack the various concepts associated with capacity building, we can at least consider the relevance of accountability and the basic right to
participation. As already implied, accountability takes three main forms. First, there is the accountability of external actors upwards to donors, which is often generated by the implementers in the form of in-house reportage. It needs greater systematisation and transparency. Second, there is the accountability of donors and implementers towards local communities. This is an essential component of social development and local ownership of peacebuilding – more honoured in rhetoric than practice. Finally, there is accountability within local communities that needs to be addressed by ‘soft’ civil society development. All three are affected by the basic right to participation.

Borrowing from a framework publicised by the Overseas Development Institute (London), it is useful to identify five levels of public participation before assessing their relevance to rehabilitation. With slightly different labelling they are:

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<th>Levels of Public Participation</th>
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<td>1. Information disclosure: people are merely informed ex post facto about matters that affect them, often on a need-to-know basis.</td>
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<td>2. Public consultation: people are given a voice about issues where external actors have defined problems and processes, control analysis and have no obligation to take people’s views into account.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Procedural participation: people are encouraged to engage in achieving project goals to reduce its costs and comply with procedural requirements.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Interactive partnership: people participate with external actors from an early stage in project design, implementation and assessment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Self-mobilisation: people take initiatives independently of external actors who in turn facilitate the achievement of goals defined by local communities.</td>
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According to the ODI points out, there is considerable divergence between the levels of participation in social development programmes and in major infrastructure projects. In social development public participation is often integral to the project at the level of procedural participation and above. In infrastructure projects participation is essentially external to the project and restricted to the level of information disclosure or consultation, and formalised through environmental impact assessments. Yet high levels of public interaction in such major projects can be instrumental in reducing potential for political opposition. They can increase cost effectiveness by fostering good relations with local labour and communities. For companies and their contractors,
participation can underpin the security of their investments and improve their public relations image.\textsuperscript{103}

Ideally, the process of rehabilitation should aim for high levels, not merely of public participation which may merely amount to interaction in public between elites, but of popular participation (that is to say, participation open to all), often in situations where people are not used to their own politicians being accountable. Patterns of decision-making are likely to be inherited from earlier, confused situations of emergency relief, and there may be little time or opportunity, even with the best will in the world, to establish formal mechanisms for participation. Research in Bosnia indicates that, broadly speaking, neither the donors nor implementing agencies and NGOs engage local populations formally and extensively in decision-making for needs assessment, project design and project evaluation.\textsuperscript{104} Foreign NGOs arrived in numbers in Croatia and Bosnia with their own ideological frameworks that turned the region into something of a social experiment. Dozens turned up expressing feminist solidarity, quite reasonably, to help female rape victims; but none to help the male rape victims. Similarly, it has been observed that hundreds of international experts in post-traumatic stress disorder arrived in former Yugoslavia to help stress victims but learnt more from local professionals.

During conflict, diagnosis and needs assessment is usually a product of observation and there is limited time to organise consultation or establish communications. Potentially, however, a significant change can occur when open conflict ceases, allowing assessment to go beyond step 3 (procedural participation) of the ODI framework to embrace interactive partnership.\textsuperscript{105} This sometimes happens, as illustrated in the box below. Nevertheless, there appears to be little effort by outside agents to facilitate the imaging of a future by local communities. As Lederach points

\begin{table}[h]
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\textbf{Examples of interactive partnership in needs assessment} \\
Local Red Cross societies work closely with representatives of families organisations to collate information about missing persons and the precise needs of locals which, of course, vary according to locality.\textsuperscript{106} \\
\hline
The International Council of Voluntary Agencies has a policy of trying to coordinate North and South NGOs, and organises the requests of local NGOs, and claims success in this respect in Guatemala and Bosnia.\textsuperscript{107} \\
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CARE International has a long-range empowerment strategy based on the mechanism of the Household Livelihood Survey. Household needs are assessed over a five-year period with the aim of reducing absolute poverty by trying to facilitate at least one breadwinner per family so that it gradually becomes self-supporting.\textsuperscript{108}

Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) undertakes thoroughgoing needs assessment, not only through observation, but also through the interactive participation of any local nurses and doctors who remain in post when official health systems collapse. In Bosnia, needs assessment was also evaluated in local discussion groups with professionals, something of a novelty and in contrast to the top-down system of the old Yugoslav regime.\textsuperscript{109}

In Eastern Slavonia, LNGOs are willing partners in human rights needs assessment and seek out UN Human Rights Officers who broadcast verified abuses.\textsuperscript{110}

out, capacity building is a process not an outcome, and communities can be encouraged not only to realise immediate survival goals but to envisage change, and to consider whether projects contribute to that change.\textsuperscript{111}

Project design, feedback and evaluation seem to be the least open to public participation and is not often available publicly. This can be characterised as a neo-imperial relationship, with implementers acting as the local agents of donors. The implementer effectively says to the community: ‘tell us what you know so that we can help, but we alone have the means and skills to design and evaluate’; whereas the message to the donor is: ‘this is what we have done, the auditor is welcome to call.’

Typically, evaluation is donor-sponsored and takes the form of reports by the implementing organisation. The process consists of a check on funding allocation and tends to be quantitative rather than qualitative. Formal external evaluation, when it occurs at all, involves a donor representative and an independent member of the INGO or agency community.\textsuperscript{112} However, there is a lack of consistency and standardisation among donors about evaluative reporting. Implementing organisations often have to be trained for working with each different donor.\textsuperscript{113} In spite of having contacts with the UN and some outside funding LNGOs in Croatia and Bosnia have felt very limited ability to influence the external power of humanitarian assistance. Donor evaluators have been known to enquire whether women’s social support groups have made a profit. The STAR civil society and democracy programme in Bosnia, part funded by USAID, and the Swedish-based Kvinna til Kvinna in Split, sponsored by SIDA, can be counted among the exceptional pioneers of formal, locally-initiated evaluation through a system of local advisory boards and questionnaires.\textsuperscript{114} In this respect the acceptance by
USAID of a local evaluator for the STAR project, Marina Skrabalo of the Zagreb Centre for Peace Studies, is a significant step in the right direction.

4.0 Conclusion

This paper has three main conclusions.

There is a paucity of strategic coherence in the work of external actors in the transition from war to relative peace. Peace agreements, such as the Dayton Framework Agreement, do not necessarily mean that a coordinated programme of funding and support for rehabilitation activities is in place. The rhetoric of strategic cohesion in the agendas of external actors is ubiquitous in the case of former Yugoslavia, and in practice the World Bank, USAID, ECHO and others have made some effort to harmonise policy. Indeed, greater strategic harmonisation can, of course, be counter-productive if it relies on short-term, technocratic fixes designed to facilitate a quick exit by external actors.

The second conclusion, therefore, is that there remains a lack of balance in the overall impact of international intervention. The imbalance between attention to, and investment in repatriation and tangible, macro-economic stability projects on the one hand, and ‘soft’, qualitative social programmes on the other is dysfunctional.

Third, there also needs to be a sensitive integration between external and domestic actors, essential for two major reasons: (a) long-term humanitarian work for social development could otherwise lead to the local population’s dependency on external aid; (b) the ownership of rehabilitation needs to be registered with local communities. This last observation is offered neither as a post-modernist predilection for leaving communities to their own devices on the grounds that external values are irrelevant, nor as a means to reduce international responsibility for supporting those in need. Rather, the aim of intervention in transitions is to go with the most promising conflict resolution aspects of local dynamics. The IFIs, OCHA, ECHO and project organisers give consideration, in theory, to empowering the communities that they are attempting to assist. But within the dominant hierarchy of humanitarianism, public participation tends to remain low, especially in the evaluation of projects.

4.1 Recommendations
Various initiatives might be undertaken to redeem the weaknesses in the humanitarian dimension of rehabilitation.

- Rehabilitation is not properly covered by existing provision for relief or development and could be recognised by funders as a suitable case for treatment. Steps to improve strategic harmonisation of various peacebuilding activities could be taken through a more explicit and consistent approach to the incorporation of economic and political incentives and disincentives in peace agreements. To avoid the militarisation of peacebuilding, multinational military forces that are not controlled by the UN, that are engaged in coercion rather than peacekeeping or that are equipped for escalation, might be largely excluded from direct engagement in humanitarian post-conflict rehabilitation activities. NGOs and international agencies might be encouraged to adopt holistic security policies in situations where security risks persist.

- Civil society programmes, including citizens’ non-nationalist movements and human rights organisations, should be in the mainstream of international responses to rehabilitation. Glaring imbalances between short-term, project-centred funding for physical rebuilding, and funding for social and civil development where long-term qualitative change is made, could thus be avoided. The emphasis on elections as the test of democracy is often a cosmetic exercise. It overshadows the need to support civil society projects, such as Helsinki Citizens’ Assemblies, that promote political responsibility and accountability.

- The problems of transition arising from criminalised war economies and western policies of neo-liberal conditionality might be addressed by promoting transformation strategies that enhance capacity-building measures for local institutions and communities. In particular, higher levels of public participation might be incorporated into strategic plans to make external and local implementers more accountable to recipients. There might be a presumption that recipients should be involved in the needs assessment, design, management and evaluation of projects to balance the values that are brought to bear by external assessors and evaluators. Training for these purposes could be available and mechanisms for popular participation investigated.

As a final comment, it is as well for external actors to remember that the social standards to which they aspire for war-torn societies are not necessarily met in their own societies. Rehabilitation can become a laboratory not merely for conflict resolution
but for Utopian social engineering with tests and benchmarks that western democracies could not meet themselves. How healthy is civil society in western Europe? How many government projects are evaluated by ordinary members of the public? External humanitarian assistance to war-torn societies always comes with double-edged swords in just about every dimension. External strategists need to listen as well as explain, to support but not to expect more of war-torn societies than of their own. There is perhaps a useful basic principle that might be borne in mind. In the words of a field worker, the aim of external actors in rehabilitation is not only to provide security, return refugees or ‘reconstruct’ physical assets, but ‘to fund citizens to think about their own role and their right to ask someone to be responsible for their actions.’

NOTES


10 See R. Neil Cooper, ‘The international arms trade and its impact on warlordism’, in Paul B. Rich (ed.), *Weapons, States and Warlords: The militarisation of ethnic and sub-state conflict*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, forthcoming 1998. In weak states where government legitimacy is low and political tension between state and society or between factions within society are already high, the sale of arms has the potential to acutely exacerbate pre-existing tensions. This year’s recipient of arms can also become next year’s terrorist threat, as demonstrated by Osama bin Laden who was supplied by the CIA in the Afghanistan resistance against the Soviet Army in the 1980s. Supplying states have signed up to various agreements and guidelines. For example, the EU code requires states to take into account the human rights record of arms recipients, the impact on regional stability and the relationship between the level of weapons technology and the economic capacity of the purchasing country. However, the code lacks an agreed, objective measure of, for instance, the level of human rights abuse in a state.


15 STAR and the World Bank have worked on a micro credit initiative which was co-founded by the Bosnian Women’s Initiative and World Bank. Interviews with Cressida Slote, Sarajevo, 2 July 1997 and Sarah Foster, World Bank, Sarajevo, 6 July 1997.


18 Jenny Pearce, ‘From civil war to ‘civil society’;: has the end of the Cold war brought peace to Central America’, *International Affairs*, vol.74, no.3, 1998, p.590 & n.8; Christopher Louise, ‘MINUGUA’s Peacebuilding Mandate in Western Guatemala’, *International Peacekeeping*, vol.4, no.2, summer 1997, p.69.


Discussion with NGO Director, Sarajevo, July 1997.

29 Discussion with Brigitte Qvist, Director of Red Barnet (Danish Save the Children), Sarajevo, 5 July 1997.

30 The ‘structural violence’ identified in the 1960s by Johan Galtung can be modified in the post-structuralist context by reference to the creation of new transnational alliances that have the effect of generating violence within state borders.

31 Discussion with a UNDP official, Sarajevo, July 1997.

32 Pearce (see n.18 above).

33 Assembly of Western European Union, WEU police forces – reply to the annual report of the Council, Defence Committee, doc.1609, 44th session, 13 May 1998, p.15.


36 ICRC Council of Delegates, ‘Security and Safety of Field Staff’, ICRC and IFRC doc., for Seville meeting, 26-27 November 1997, CD 97/6.5/1, Geneva, Sept. 1997, p.3. In part the increase in casualties may be a function of an increase in the number of aid workers in the field. It is certainly the case that local personnel employed by external agencies are more at risk than expatriates.


38 Discussion with Phil Bloomer, Oxfam, 16 March 1998.


45 Troop contributors now lay more emphasis on: (a) meeting ‘national interests’; (b) protecting their own forces rather than local populations; (c) training peacekeepers for combat; and (d) arranging official deadlines for a quick exit.

46 See Peter Caddick-Adams, ‘Eyewitness, Civil Affairs Operations by IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia, 1995–


50 Caddick-Adams (n.46 above).


52 Marcus Cox, ‘Strategic Approaches to International Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, draft paper for the Centre d’Etudes Pratiques de la Negotiation Internationale, Sarajevo, July 1998.


57 Pearce (n.18 above).

58 Much of this section contains material from an unpublished report by John Carlarne for the Plymouth Peacebuilding Project. A donor is defined as an organisation that funds the activities of another. An implementing partner is an organisation funded by a donor. It is, of course, possible for a donor organisation to also be the implementing partner of a donor higher in the hierarchy. Thus an organisation can be simultaneously a donor and implementor.


60 This explains why DG1A seemed to take time to make an impact. Discussions with an official, Sarajevo, July 1997. Also, aid was suspended to Republika Srpska when conditions were not met, and received only about 10% of the total instead of 30%, though it had better prepared needs assessment, delivery and installation systems than the Federation. European Commission, Directorate General 1A, ‘Evaluation of the PHARE «Essential Aid Programme» for Bosnia and Herzegovina’, nd, web site: europa.eu.int/dg1a/evaluation/b_h_ph_ess_aid_ex_sum.htm

61 Interviews with NGO workers, Sarajevo, July 1997.


63 For example, the International Rescue Committee had begun by funding psycho-social projects but dropped this in favour of an organisational project to make NGOs more self-sustaining and self-advocating. Interviews with member of Corridor and Stephanie Rust, NGO Development Project, IRC, Sarajevo, 8 July 1997.

64 Discussion with Senior IGO official, Sarajevo, July 1997.

65 Jon Bennett and Sara Gibbs, *NGO Funding Strategies: An Introduction for Southern and Eastern*


67 Bennett and Gibbs (n.65 above), p.2.


71 Discussions with Safet Husanovic, Co-ordinator for Reconstruction and Development, Municipality of Tuzla, 16 July 1997; Kevin Mannion, Head of Housing Task Force, IMG, Sarajevo, 8 July 1997. The EU has been singled out by NGOs for its lengthy response to applications and getting money flowing to projects. Implementers cannot apply for running costs in the interim.

72 Pasic and Weiss (n.22 above), p.221-3.

73 Usually urban and intellectual, these groups have made an impact on governance in Bosnia–Herzegovina, seeing their suggestion for common car number plates adopted for example. Interviews with Professor Vehid Sehic, President of Tuzla Citizen’s Forum, Tuzla, 7 September 1998; Baisa Baki, Director, Helsinki Citizens Assembly, Tuzla, 8 September 1998; Prof. Dolecek Vlatko, President, and other members of ‘Circle 99’, Sarajevo, 11 September 1998.

74 Interview with Mirjana Malic, Director, Helsinki Citizens Assembly, Sarajevo, 11 September 1998, and with several other NGO representatives, and also a UNDP official, in interviews in Sarajevo, Mostar, Banja Luka and Tuzla in 1997 and 1998.

75 Discussion with Danish NGO worker, Sarajevo, July 1997.


81 Kenny, ‘Towards a Human Rights Partnership for Effective Field Work’ (n.70 above).

82 Ibid. Original italics.


86 The former Yugoslav health system had been organised on three interdependent levels. At the top were regional and city hospitals, below that the local clinic complexes or *Dom Zratvia*, and below that the *Ambulata* or GP-based health centres. The war cut off many *Dom Zratvia* from regional hospitals and these could now seek hospital status. Interview with Isabelle Bouju-Malaval, Responsable Exécutif, Médecins du Monde, Paris, 1 July 1997. The local Red Cross network ceased to be involved in blood donation and lost its particular work in the health sector. The ICRC and IFRC also encountered a problem in developing and supporting a national movement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as there can only be one recognised Red Cross Society in each country. The Yugoslav Red Cross was replicated by national societies in independent Slovenia and Croatia, but Bosnia-Herzegovina developed cantonal societies. A Republika Srpska was formed a Society in 1992 and a Federation Society in October 1997 a Federation Society. However, in March 1998, an Inter-Entity Contact Group of representatives from each of the two entities was tasked to develop cooperation and to draft statutes for a future National Society. It is supported in its work by the ICRC and IFRC. A rival structure claiming legal continuity from the pre-war Yugoslav Red Cross in Bosnia-Herzegovina also exists. Interview with Antonella Notari, BiH Desk, ICRC, Geneva, 4 November 1997, and information via ICRC delegates in Pale, 19 August 1998.

87 Discussion with Isabelle Bouju-Malaval, 1 July 1997.

88 Mimica and Stubbs (n.27 above)

89 Discussion with a professional journalist working in Zagreb, May 1997.

90 Interview with Isabelle Bouju-Malaval, 1 July 1997.

91 Discussions with academics, Zagreb, May 1997. An example of a quasi-official NGO is Humanitarian Children’s Relief headed by Tudjman’s wife. CARE International seeks to convert its local country offices into fully-fledged national members, but political climates may make this impossible.

92 Tax and insurance barriers to employment in the ‘voluntary’ sector are also evident. Mark Duffield, ‘Social reconstruction in Croatia and Bosnia: An Exploratory Report for SIDA’, unpublished paper, November 1996, para.4.2.

93 Interviews with David Sip, Civic Programme Director, National Democratic Institute, Banja Luka, 5 September 1998; Nick Green, National Democratic Institute, Tuzla, 6 September 1998; Miriam Struyk, International Liaison Officer, Helsinki Citizens Assembly, Tuzla, 8 September 1998.


98 Interview with Goran Tjindic, World Bank, Sarajevo, 10 September 1998.

Conflict Resolution Catalysts empowered Youth Bridge, a community centre for young people in Bosnia. Youth Bridge separated from CRC which then established a Neighbourhood Facilitation Centre in March 1998, before its funding dried up. David Last, ‘From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: Conflict Resolution Theory and the Transition to Peace’, paper at ISA Annual Conference, Minneapolis, 17-21 March 1998; Paul Stubbs, ‘Peace Building, Community Development and Cultural Change’, May 1997, report available on Za Mir Transnational Network (Zagreb). Similarly, an American Refugee Council’s shelter and civic rehabilitation programme in the area around Novi Travnik used both Muslim and Croat companies to work on the same buildings to reestablish communities, leading to an element of self-regulation covering taxation, ownership rights and human rights. Interview with Jennifer Poole, Consultant, CARE Australia and Church World Service, Sarajevo, 30 June 1997.


Overseas Development Institute, Mainstreaming Public Participation in Economic Infrastructure Projects, Briefing Paper 3, July 1998.

Ibid.

Discussion with NGO workers and ICVA staff member, Bosnia, June-July 1997. On project evaluation, see also, Mimica and Stubbs (n.27 above). There have been exceptions including the Conflict Resolution Catalysts in Banja Luka and and the Star Project in Sarajevo.


For example, Banja Luka is the only area where winter wheat can be sown and seed was required by farmers there.

Discussion with Pauline Silvestri, ICVA Administrator, Geneva, 3 November 1997. However, there are diffuse interests and divisions with Southern members preferring an emphasis on sustainable development, whereas ICVA found it easier to get funding for humanitarian relief (from its chief funding sources: Canada, Nordic governments and the Ford Foundation).


Interview with Goran Todorovic, Project Director, CARE Sarajevo, 5 July 1997.


Interview with LNGO representative, Sarajevo, 5 July 1997.