South Africa’s bantustans (SIAS 1991)

ERRATA

1. Page 6: The quote from Wellings & Black (bottom of page) covers the whole of the last paragraph, and ends with the last line on that page.

2. Page 12: The quote is from Bantu Holomisa, and not from Financial Mail. Thus, text lines 3-4 on page 12 should read:

   But, he said, how it should be done has not yet received an answer:

3. Page 15: The reference in the last paragraph "(see above)" should read "(see below pp.23ff)".

4. Pages 19 and 27: Map 1 and 2 have been exchanged. The map on page 19 belongs to the text on page 27, and vice versa.

5. Page 22: Column headings in Table 4 are incomprehensible. Replace with new Table 4 overleaf.
Table 4. Population, migrants and commuters in the bantustans 1976, 1980 and 1985 (thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bantustan</th>
<th>Population (excl.migrants)</th>
<th>Migrant workers</th>
<th>Commuters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transkei</td>
<td>2,623</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>355.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bophuthatswana</td>
<td>1,511</td>
<td>1,721</td>
<td>218.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venda</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciskei</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBVC Total</td>
<td>5,162</td>
<td>5,931</td>
<td>664.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazankulu</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KaNgwane</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaNdebele</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu</td>
<td>3,483</td>
<td>4,382</td>
<td>261.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebowa</td>
<td>1,756</td>
<td>2,157</td>
<td>175.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QwaQwa</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGT Total</td>
<td>6,385</td>
<td>8,102</td>
<td>621.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

South Africa
excl. TBVC/SGT     | 17,949 | 19,477 |
South Africa total | 29,496 | 33,510 | 285.1 | 1534.0 | 532.0 | 631.7 | 761.0 |

SOUTH AFRICA'S BANTUSTANS
From Dumping Grounds to Battlefronts

Bertil Egerö

Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 1991
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Abbreviations

ANC  African National Congress of South Africa
Contralesa  Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa
COSATU  Congress of South African Trade Unions
DBSA  Development Bank of Southern Africa
IMF  International Monetary Fund
MDM  Mass Democratic Movement
NUSAS  National Union of South African Students
R  Rand (the South African currency)
RSA  Republic of South Africa
SAAWU  South African Allied Workers' Union
SADF  South African Defence Force
SANAC  South African Native Affairs Commission
SAP  South African Police
SGT  The "self-governing territories", ie the six non-"independent" bantustans
TBVC  The "independent" bantustans of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei
UDF  United Democratic Front
WM  Weekly Mail (Johannesburg)
Introduction*

The current tide of events in South Africa is like a river when the rains come. Fed by rapidly growing tributaries, it swells into a mighty force, spreading to affect life far beyond its normal river bed. Today, the South African bantustans are part of the river, brought there by internal forces of their own. The bantustans, or homelands as Pretoria prefers to call them today, have long been seen as peripheral to the mainstream of political current in South Africa. Ever since the famous Cosmas Desmond exposure of South African resettlement of *The Discarded People* (Desmond 1971), followed by the equally shocking report from Dimbaza (*A Place called Dimbaza* 1973), the predominant vision outside South Africa of the bantustans is that of a kind of dumping ground for those beyond migrant work, a barren land on whose meagre harvests the women and their children try to survive. From such a perspective, the bantustans could easily be expected to hold little more political life than what emanated from its chiefs and other bearers of “tribal” traditional values.

Today, however, even a superficial observer of events in South Africa would notice the tension surrounding the bantustans and the intensity of the political struggles carried out within them against a backdrop of pre-negotiation softness from Pretoria. The forerunners to this process, the successful 1986 state coup in Transkei and the 1988 coup attempt in Bophuthatswana which was aborted only through direct SADF intervention, were certainly much more than internal power squabbles within ruling bantustan elites. In December 1989 a worried Lennox Sebe, president of “independent” Ciskei, confidentially urged South Africa president F.W. de Klerk to find a solution to the “independent” bantustans which would save them from complete reintegration in a future negotiated settlement (Work in Progress No. 64, Jan. 1990; SouthScan 2.2.90). By early March 1990, Sebe himself was swept away from power. A month later, his counterpart in “independent” Venda, Frank Ravele, too late in seeking to survive through some anti-bantustan pronouncements, met the same fate.

In both cases, the removed bantustan leaderships were corrupt, inefficient and oppressive. Their replacement paved the way not only for contacts with the anti-apartheid movement, but for an open challenge to the bantustan construction as such. Transkei, the oldest and most important of the bantustans, had already in 1989 put the bantustan issue on the

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*This text was finalised in May, 1990*
agenda. Only in the fourth of these so-called "independent" bantustans, Bophuthatswana, did the president, Lucas Mangope still hold his own amidst increasing resistance, asserting that his bantustan "will remain an independent state one hundred years from now..." (Weekly Mail, 6.3.90).

Meanwhile in KwaNdebele, which had escaped Pretoria’s “independence” moves in the early 1980s only through an unusually broad-based resistance, a peaceful change-over to a more progressive government (SouthScan 4.5.90) finally removed any hopes Pretoria might still have entertained to add this naughty bantustan to the others.

As if acknowledging final defeat, the de Klerk government announced in May 1990 that the policy of granting independence to more bantustans had now been abolished.

Most of the bantustan leadership changes have taken place with the tacit acceptance, if not active participation, of Pretoria. Even so, they represent an adaptation to the fact that bantustan leaderships are no longer obedient watchdogs of their people, licking the hand of the Pretoria government. Either they change their alliance in favour of the anti-apartheid movement and people in the bantustans, or they are in serious risk of being swept away by the strength of change blowing through the bantustans.

This development confirms the hypotheses which originally motivated the present work. One, that the “barren land/dumping ground” vision of the bantustans, though probably correct at the time for large parts of the territories, is nowadays seriously misleading as a framework for analysis. Two, that the bantustan strategy as such would turn out to be self-defeating for the apartheid government because the necessary vesting of power and financial resources in reactionary local leaderships prepared to accept the patronage of Pretoria, with no reforms in the structural conditions of bantustan subordination, could only intensify the contradictions of the system to the level where local defence against repression widened into a general anti-apartheid opposition.

A note on terminology may be appropriate at this point. Although “homeland” is the official designation of the territories under discussion, I will use the term “bantustan” throughout. Wellings and Black (1986, 28) put the case very well:

“Bantustans”—These refer to areas designated by the South African government as “homelands” for the country’s African ethnic groups.... In government circles, they are now known as “national states” or “black states”. Four of these are officially “independent”.... The others ... have either received, or are about to receive, “self-governing status”. The use of such terms, however, is to concede an ideological victory to the apartheid regime.... The term “bantustan” is therefore used to indicate that the political system that created these territories is rejected and opposed by the authors.
The South African bantustans are generally regarded as the cornerstone of separate development under apartheid. Built on the "reserves" of the early years of this century, the bantustans were prepared during the 1970s for transformation into "independent homelands"—a title four of them have been assigned up to today. Six more have been defined, and are currently labelled "self-governing states". Their transition into "states" has been accompanied by fairly substantial financial inputs in the building of the state apparatuses. In addition, Pretoria has used a stick-and-carrot policy to stimulate industrial investment in favour of employment for bantustan inhabitants. These policies are not without their social effects.

Firstly, the creation of a bantustan bureaucracy and the stimulation of petty-capitalist activities by the bantustan Africans has led to class differentiation in the bantustans. The question is how far it has gone, and how it will influence the negotiations for a post-apartheid South Africa.

Secondly, no-one who is acquainted with the recent military coups in Transkei and Ciskei, and the attempted coup in Bophuthatswana, would deny the importance of the bantustan military today. Even the police force is exerting its weight in local politics, at times in contradiction to its own bantustan government.

Thirdly, although the natural resources for agriculture are strained—as they were already in the 1940s—to eke a living out of the barren lands may no longer be the occupation of the majority of bantustan inhabitants. A process of concentration or urbanisation of the population has taken place, which challenges the conventional wisdom of trying to restore small-holder agriculture within the economic restructuring that may come with the dismantling of the bantustan construction.

Fourthly, apart from the contract labour migration, a pattern of dependency the bantustans share with, for instance, Lesotho, an increasing numbers of people have industrial employment on or even inside the borders of the bantustans. Border-urbanisation and vast commuter streams have grown in response to government-subsidised industrial de-location, not least of foreign industries eager to ripe profits from ultra-cheap labour and subsidies. A post-apartheid state wanting to dismantle this system of distorted industrial decentralisation will face serious problems as it would throw thousands of workers in the bantustans out of work.
The bantustans today

The "homelands" or "bantustans" are ten different units covering an area currently estimated to 13.8 per cent of the total land area of South Africa (Survey 1987/88, 877). Originally they consisted of a large number of scattered, smaller and larger tracts of land. Consolidation of the land structure has in all but two cases reduced the number to seven or less separate areas per bantustan (Table 1).

Table 1. Area, population (excl. migrants) and density 1985 of the bantustans in South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bantustan</th>
<th>Area (thous. km²)</th>
<th>No. of pieces</th>
<th>Pop. 1985 (thous.)</th>
<th>Persons per km²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transkei</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>69.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bophuthatswana</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,721</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venda</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciskei</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBVC Total</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5,931</td>
<td>59.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazankulu</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>82.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KaNgwane</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>114.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaNdebele</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>286.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4,382</td>
<td>137.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebowa</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2,157</td>
<td>97.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qwaqwa</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>348.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGT Total</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>8,102</td>
<td>120.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

South Africa excl. TBVC/SGT* 1055.0 ** 19,477 18.5
South Africa Total 1221.0 ** 33,510 27.4


*i.e. the so-called "white South Africa", exclusive of the "independent" Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei (TBVC), and the other bantustans, the "self-governing territories"
** = not applicable

These bantustans today house around half of the total population of South Africa. The vagueness in available population estimates is in itself an indication of the problems involved in obtaining any kind of data on the
bantustans. One source (S.A. Barometer 2:23, 2.12 1988, quoting the Hansard and Africa Insight) gives a 1988 bantustan total of 17.4 million out of 37.2 million for the country as a whole. Another (Survey 87/88, 10-11, quoting Central Statistical Service) gives the 1987 population as 19.6 million for bantustans and 35.2 million for the country. There is no indication in either source whether migrant workers are included in the bantustan population or not.

There is, however, no doubt that the bantustan population has grown rapidly in both absolute and relative terms. According to one calculation, in 1960 the bantustans accounted for 39 per cent of the total African population. Twenty years later the proportion had grown to 53 per cent (Platsky & Walker 1985, 18). This is largely accounted for by the forced relocation of people to the bantustans. Simkins (1981, 4f) estimates the net "migration" to bantustans during 1960-80 to around 2 million people, mainly from resettlement but also to a minor extent from boundary revisions. Liebenow (1986, 4) cites another source, according to which "at least 4,000,000 Blacks had been relocated into the ten homelands between 1951 and 1980." Of the bantustan inhabitants, more than 1.5 million are at any one time working as migrant labour in the non-bantustan areas of South Africa.

The "independent" bantustans (TBVC)

The "independent" bantustans are Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei.

Transkei, between Lesotho and the coast, has been regarded as a separate political entity ever since it was made part of the British Cape Colony. The first to be allocated "independence" status, in October 1976, Transkei today has some 3 million inhabitants on an area one-third larger than that of Lesotho. It was for many years ruled by the rather despotic brothers Matanzima, until they were replaced in 1986 by General Bantu Holomisa is officially classified as the homeland of the Xhosa.

Bophuthatswana, bordering on Botswana northwest of South Africa, was the next to get "independence" in December 1977. Sometimes called the Casino Homeland because of Sun City and other entertainment centres. It is almost the size of Transkei, but with the land spread over many geographically separated pieces. Some economic advances have been made since "independence", but the image of political stability was shattered by a military coup in 1988. Only the direct intervention of South African troops prevented the success of the coup. Officially classified as the homeland of the Tswana.
Venda, a tiny bantustan of about half a million inhabitants, made “independent” in September 1979. It bordered on Rhodesia until the latter’s independence as Zimbabwe, when Pretoria redrew the frontier to create a corridor of “South African” land between the two. Officially classified as the homeland of the Venda.

Ciskei, a small bantustan about the same size as Venda but with around 800,000 inhabitants. Created in part as a measure to reduce the size and potential power of Transkei, it lacks historical identity. Nevertheless, Ciskei was made “independent” in December 1981 and since, under the despotic regime of Lennox Sebe, has tried the road of industrialisation. In a military coup early in 1990, Sebe was finally replaced by a military commander, Brigadier Oupa Gqozo. Together with Transkei, it is officially classified as the homeland of the Xhosa.

The “self-governing territories” (SGT)

Gazankulu, a number of small areas close to the border with Mozambique, with some 700,000 inhabitants. Like KaNgwane, Gazankulu has received many refugees from Mozambique. Officially classified as the homeland of the Tsonga and the Shangaan.

KaNgwane, some small pieces of land just north of Swaziland, with half a million inhabitants. Under its leader, Chief Minister Enos Mabuza, the KaNgwane government is well-known for defying Pretoria. It has “established a rapport with the African National Congress, ... has fiercely resisted attempts to resettle people evicted from white farmland and has stubbornly defied Pretoria’s plans to make the region ‘independent’” (Weekly Mail 16-22.9.88). It has good relations to the government of Mozambique, and receives official British support to take care of tens of thousands of Mozambican refugees. Officially classified as the homeland of the Swazi.

KwaNdebele is one of the smallest of the bantustans, with a population of only about 300,000. Located in Transvaal, its main labour market is the Pretoria region. KwaNdebele workers suffer under endless commuter journeys. Still the bantustan inhabitants have for years put up very strong resistance to “independence” plans. Violence has been rampant, led by the Mbokotho vigilantes allegedly closely linked to the ruling clique. Officially classified as the homeland of the Ndebele.

Kwazulu is perhaps the bantustan that is most heard of outside of South Africa. Composed of almost 30 separate pieces of land, altogether the size of Lesotho, Kwazulu has some 4.5 million inhabitants. It is led by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, a serious contender to the post-apartheid national leadership of South Africa. To this end, Buthelezi has persistently rejected
the notion of "independence", and has recreated the 1920s' Inkatha movement into today's infamous Inkatha, a mixture between party, popular movement of the Zulu and a military machine. Officially classified as the homeland of the Zulu.

**Lebowa** consists of well over 2 million people spread over a dozen bits of land in the north, altogether equal to two-thirds of the size of Lesotho. Officially classified as the homeland of the North Sotho.

**Qwaqwa** is the smallest of all the bantustans, located on the northeastern tip of Lesotho. With only around 200,000 inhabitants, even this little enclave has been considered for "independence". Officially classified as the homeland of the South Sotho.

The above distinction between two kinds of bantustans should not be allowed to overshadow the fact that, whether "independent" or "self-governing", they are all an integral part of South Africa. But they are more than simple branches or apparatuses of the central South African state. Two observers state that "in the degree of autonomy and the complex multi-functional nature of their administrations ... bantustans duplicate, in miniature, the functions of the central state." (Maré and Hamilton 1987, 83).

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**Table 2. Bantustan GDP and GNP 1986 (Rand mill.); percentage annual growth 1980-86 at constant 1980 prices**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transkei</td>
<td>1683</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3713</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bophuthatswana</td>
<td>1423</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2843</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venda</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciskei</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>1063</td>
<td>9.3</td>
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<td>Gazankulu</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>159</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaNdebele</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>19.4</td>
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<td>14.3</td>
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<td>KwaZulu</td>
<td>1517</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>4922</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebowa</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2026</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qwaqwa</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: According to AI Bulletin 1988, for the TBVC bantustans, on average, about half of GNP is derived from the earnings of migrant workers and commuters, and these earnings reflect only to a limited degree the production capacity of each bantustan. A more accurate measurement of the latter is provided by the GDP.
"They cannot be wished away"

In 1989 Transkei's leader Bantu Holomisa declared himself prepared to put the question of Transkei's "return to South Africa" to a referendum. But how it should be done has not yet been answered. Financial Mail is probably right when they point out that

The ANC, OAU and other international organisations say 'away with the bantustans' and are talking of a unitary country. The question is where we are going to fit the homelands in—and how. There is not an outright answer to that question because the homelands comprise structures which cannot be wished away overnight. They need to be accommodated in a future South Africa. (Financial Mail/SA 17.11.89)

Pretoria's strategy for black independent states has resulted in the construction of apparatuses for the running of these states: governments, administrations, police and military. A legal framework has been erected which, in the case of the "independent" states includes constitutions and bills of rights. It is this framework that today regulates the life and environment of bantustan citizens.

In order to cement the character of "independence" or "autonomy" of the bantustans, Pretoria has created the semblance of donor/receiver relation in its economic relations to the bantustans. These are handled by the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA). The financial transfers are given such labels as "budgetary aid", "development aid" and "technical assistance". The Africa Institute of South Africa falls in line with the official position as it in its Bulletin (No. 8, 1988) deplores the lack of international recognition of the "independent" bantustans, suggesting that "It was precisely to underscore the sovereign independence of these states that their financial blunders were ignored by the authorities in the RSA for so many years." (ibid, 5).

The economic mess in the bantustans, added to the deterioration in the South African economy as a whole, has now led Pretoria "to abandon their laissez faire policy" in favour of a 'reform programme' that 'can be compared to the /World Bank-IMF/ Structural Adjustment Programmes..." (p. 5).

This is not just a matter of rhetoric. It is through this web of relations that the central government determines the growth of economy and society in the bantustans—to change them would affect the lives of millions of bantustan inhabitants.

The bantustan "independence" concept has met with total international rejection. But the lack of political recognition has not prevented foreign governments and private capital from collaborating with the bantustan regimes. As a corollary to its investments in various bantustans, Taiwan gives aid for instance to QwaQwa. The British connections with bantustans indicate a wider spectrum of motives (Rogers 1980, 124). British political relations to KaNgwane chief minister Enos Mabuza, supple-
mented with government aid schemes, amount to a virtual *de facto* recognition of his government (*Weekly Mail* 16-22.9 1988, 9).

Despite the central political dimension of the bantustans in the *apartheid* project of Grand Apartheid, and the importance of the bantustans as the home of half of South Africa’s population and much of its migrant labour, social science research appears not to have given them much priority. This may simply reflect the fact that research on and in South Africa is still very much the domain of the white society. In addition, research motivated by the contradictions of *apartheid* society is likely to focus primarily on urban-industrial society and the urban-based struggles.

Many studies have been made on particular aspects of bantustan society. Some provide important general insights into the internal dynamics of bantustan development, for instance the recent writings on chief Buthelezi of KwaZulu and the Inkatha movement (Maré & Hamilton 1987; Mzala 1988). There is also important research on other themes, such as industrial relocation, where bantustans may come into focus. There is, however, a lacuna of research on links between the behaviour of state and capital on the macro-level and the internal transformation of bantustans. It may, for instance, be expected that the reality of bantustan borders and regimes imposed from above has, over time, resulted in a certain social identity since social institutions are formed and social relations—antagonistic or not—unfold within the space defined by these borders. The strength of this social definition of the bantustan as a distinct society or nation, for the different classes which make up bantustan society, is a dimension of direct relevance for the anti-apartheid movement in today’s struggle as well as in the planning of tomorrow’s united South Africa.

Dismantling of the *apartheid* institutions and structures is a watchword in this process. But what is the exact meaning of the term, in the context of each bantustan? On the politico-administrative level, who are the agents of this transformation? What alliances are required in order to avoid chaos and ensure the replacement of *apartheid* institutions with others? And what concessions are the potential allies going to require in order to cooperate rather than distort or sabotage the reforms?

Despite the strength displayed by the opposition in many bantustans, it is hard to conceive of any case where the opposition alone could substitute a dismantled bantustan administration. ANC and its partners may well find that they will have to include the interests of the ten *apartheid* administrations in its negotiations of a post-apartheid state, whether they are represented at the negotiation table or not.
From reserves to bantustans

The bantustan development draws its origins from the work of the South African Native Affairs Commission (SANAC) established in 1903, and the subsequent 1913 Land Act. The aims of SANAC’s work have been summarized (NUSAS 1983, 3) as:

*Firstly*, to create a cheap, controllable African workforce for the farms and mines. Mafeje (1989) stresses the significance of the 1913 Land Act as “not, as is usually supposed, about land but rather about labour”. In the aftermath of the so-called Boer war, most of the African workers had “vanished” to their homes. Up to 50 000 Chinese were “imported” to alleviate the shortage, but “it was obvious that the problem could not be solved without regaining most of the lost African labour. They had to be driven off the land” (idem, 40).

*Secondly*, to crush the independent peasantry outside the reserves and restrict its size inside the reserves. This was to prevent a class developing which would threaten the interests of white farmers and which could provide leadership to the African masses. Again, Mafeje (1989, 42) refers to “overwhelming evidence that during the latter half of the 19th century African middle peasants were the most dynamic agriculturalists in South Africa. The Afrikaner farmers, especially, could not compete with them. This explains why the white state found it necessary to bring them to a halt by extra-economic means after the unification of Boers and Britons in 1910”. It bears reminding that the Africans had demonstrated their abilities even in other fields outside of agriculture. According to Etherington, “by the time of the Anglo-Zulu war, African Christian communities ... had also embarked upon entrepreneurial capitalist ventures on a significant scale.” (Etherington 1985:265).

*Thirdly*, to prevent an alliance developing between the “poor white” rural and urban workers and the dispossessed Africans.

The Land Act of 1913 restricted African land ownership or occupancy to the 7 per cent of South Africa set off as Reserve land. The Act thus eliminated the embryonic African farmer class and restricted Africans to mere subsistence reproduction (one person one plot) in the bantustans. In this
way, it also prevented the formation of a large landless class and created the conditions for the migrant labour system. Politically, the reserves were intended to divide the Africans and to resuscitate the old tribal authority in new forms of indirect rule, "... replacing the chiefs who led their people in resistance against the invaders with renegade ‘chiefs’ in the pay of the rulers and setting them up over a territory, the people of which they were to control on behalf of their employers" (Molteno 1977:16).

Increasing political concerns

If labour had been a dominant theme in the creation of the reserves, the Bantustan Strategy of the 1950s reflected increasingly pressing political concerns. In the bantustans, the overcrowding on poor land and extremely low wages for paid workers had already in the 1920s led to overgrazing and land deterioration. The additional land allocated to the Reserves through the 1936 Development Trust and Land Act, bringing the reserve land to 13 per cent of the total, did not substantially change things. Conditions in the urban areas were no better, and a broad opposition against apartheid had been formed, showing its strength in the mass campaigns of the 1950s.

The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 was the final blow against African political rights in the national context. The National Party government saw the bantustans as a way to avoid political concessions by creating them as tribal or ethnic-based entities within which struggles for political participation would be allowed to unfold. The aim was to replace the South African nationalism with a nationalist conception based on ethnic identity (Molteno 1977; NUSAS 1983).

The bantustan strategy contained two essential ingredients. One was the creation of bantustan administrations, through the revitalisation of tribal authorities and their incorporation in the de facto white rule of the reserves. The other, running counter to the Reserve strategy, was to open the door for African class formation in the bantustans. A petty-bourgeois elite with vested interests in the bantustan would be required as a support if the chiefs should be able to maintain political control over the bantustans (Molteno 1977, 24; Glaser 1987, 33).

The Bantustan strategy is a serious attempt to apply indirect rule, leaving the domination and control of the African people to their own “tribal” or “traditional” rulers. This objective has become increasingly important with the forced relocation of millions of Africans into the bantustans over the last decades. It has influenced the policy of industrial decentralisation (see above), and it has justified large and increasing allocations from the central state coffers to bantustan administrations as well as to subsidies to industry. It has led to reforms in land ownership and lease, as a part of the deliberate fostering of class stratification in the bantustans.
In this balancing act of “social engineering”, Pretoria is not only encouraging but also setting the limits for class polarisation. Capital investment is organised in such a way that independent bantustan capital accumulation is minimised. The petty-bourgeoisie and “aspirant bourgeoisie” strata would be composed of shopkeepers and traders, administrators and clerks, perpetually dependent on external powers. Peasant-farmer agriculture on individual land holdings is similarly circumscribed. And a semi-proletarianised working class, increasingly concentrated to border-towns, is part of the bantustan urbanisation.

The bantustan state

The internal bantustan administration is no small thing. Close to twenty million people lead their daily lives under the immediate administrative and political responsibility of bantustan governments. To this end, state apparatuses have been erected which, especially in the bigger bantustans, resemble the state machinery in an average African country.

Public employment is an important sector in the bantustans. Beginning with 20,000 in 1960, employment in this sector grew to close to 200,000 around 1980 (Standish 1987, 10, 77). Liebenow (1986, 4) estimates that the ten bantustans “have accounted for the creation of some 156 governmental departments.... Collectively, the Homelands have also spawned an additional 1,190 members of ‘parliaments’—each enjoying salaries, perquisites, and relatively unrestrained access to any largesse available for economic ‘development’.”

These establishments are made possible in large measure through the transfer of funds from the central government (Tables 5 and 6). Of total bantustan revenue in 1987/88, 54 per cent or over R7 billion (Survey 1987/88, 865) was a direct transfer while 7 per cent were loans from Pretoria. Of the remainder, about half was generated outside the bantustans under headings such as tax compensation for migrant workers, customs union payment, etc. Only around one-fifth of the revenues was thus generated internally.

The corruption which goes with these subsidies may for Pretoria be an inevitable part of the costs of the bantustan strategy. However, it also serves the function of tying local interests to the bantustan administrations: “... a substantial portion of the loans and grants provided by Pretoria had [by 1986] gone into the private bank accounts of bantustan political leaders and their cronies in the private sector, or had been diverted to South African businesses through so-called ‘development incentive schemes’ ” (Southern Africa Online 1, 17, 2.6.88, citing the Simon Brand report on bantustan finances).

It is a double-edged measure however. Economically, the R5 billion unsecured debt of the bantustans is preoccupying the government to the degree that a “World Bank solution” of financial stabilisation programmes
is now being sought for each of the TBVC states (*Weekly Mail* 25.9.87, 22.4.88, 23.12.88). In Bophuthatswana, the situation had grown so grave that in 1986, the central government intervened and took direct control of the department of finance and treasury—a measure said to have caused a 60 per cent increase in the budget of South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs (Keenan & Sarakinsky 1987, 590. See also Survey 1987/88, 873).

Corruption undoubtedly contributed to the 1988 military coup against Bophuthatswana's Chief Lucas Mangope which led the South Africa military to intervene and thus openly expose the illusions of bantustan "independence". Similar factors contributed to the recent downfall of the Transkei leaders, the Matanzimas brothers. In February 1986, Pretoria forced the Transkei regime to accept the establishment of an official commission of inquiry into corruption. At about the same time, all the four "independent" bantustans were forced to accept central government supervision of their accounts through a "Joint Financial Adjustments Committee" (*The Transkei coup d'etat...* 1988, 7).

Keenan (1986, 10f) sees corruption operating at three distinct levels. "The first is the large-scale embezzlement of public funds by the bantustan political leaders and their accomplices." This directly affects the budgets of government departments and their means to attend to the needs of the people. The second level is that of ensuring support from various politically important strata. "This makes for an enlarged and more affluent petit-bourgeoisie which is increasingly dependent on, and necessarily supportive of the bantustan authorities." The third level relates to the maintenance of local administrative control. Lack of central (bantustan) funding means that "Local authorities are encouraged to contribute to their own funding", through illegal levies or taxes, bribes and various forms of theft.
Bantustans—rural or urban?

Far from the peasant hoe-in-hand based agricultural economies that may have characterised the bantustans before homeland reforms were started, most of them today display distinct economic diversification. Urban occupations occupy a fair share of total employment in all but a few bantustans. In fact, their economies are sufficiently diversified to attract professional staff from crisis-ridden countries far away from South Africa, in particular Uganda and Ghana (Prah 1988).

Statistical reporting on bantustans is fragmented and unreliable. The general quality of data on bantustans appears to be uncertain. Even the authoritative "Development Information Files" on the bantustans produced by South Africa’s Development Bank of Southern Africa, have been systematically evasive on the subject of smallholder or peasant agriculture, unemployment and the like (Dev. South. Afr. 3,2, May 1986; 4,1, Feb. 1987). Independent research reports relying on official data inevitably reflect this lack of precision. Any description of the conditions of living, employment, etc., in the bantustans, based on these sources, will therefore be approximative.

Bantustans certainly do not hold the most fertile land in South Africa. Between 8 and 17 per cent of their areas are regarded as arable land. With an average family size of six persons, this gives each family about 0.8 ha for its agriculture and livestock (Tapson 1985, 237, updated with 1988 population estimates). However, the land is unevenly distributed. A study in Kwazulu showed that almost a quarter of rural households had no access to land and 16 per cent had neither land nor livestock (May 1987, 6).

One study, quoting "numerous income and expenditure surveys in the homelands", finds that the contribution of agriculture to the average rural household income nowhere exceeded 20 per cent. The author concludes that "any meaningful agricultural activity has effectively ceased for larger proportions of the homelands populations than was previously thought". (de V. Graaff 1987, 47). Existing employment statistics, however unreliable, lend some support to this thesis: in only one of the TBVC-states does employment in agriculture exceed 10 per cent of total local employment (S.A. Barometer 1:11, 31.7.87, 169-70).
Map 1. The bantustans, "the growth points", and major industrial centres in South Africa.
The paradox of uncultivated land

Probing deeper into the question, Cobbett (1987, also Table 3) argues that in Transkei and Venda, two bantustans with low levels of urbanisation, agricultural earnings (commercial as well as subsistence) do exceed 20 per cent of the average household earnings. That agricultural earnings go down where urbanisation is higher (Table 3) should surprise no-one. But the picture is by no means simple: even where urbanisation is not at its highest and arable land is scarce, as in Kwazulu, Transkei, Ciskei and Lebowa, "a large proportion of available arable land is not cultivated. In the extreme case of Ciskei, only 20 per cent of potential rainfed cropping land is cultivated." (Tapson 1985, 237).

Table 3. Proportion urban population, agricultural earnings and arable land per household in the bantustans 1980, 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bantustan</th>
<th>% Urban a*</th>
<th>% Urban a+b</th>
<th>% Urban a+b+c</th>
<th>% Agric. earnings</th>
<th>Ha arable land/hh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transkei</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bophuthatswana</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venda</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciskei</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBVC Total</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazankulu</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KaNgwane</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaNdebele</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebowa</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qwaqwa</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGT Total</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantustan total</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Urbanisation—Graaff 1987; other data Cobbett 1987.

*Graaff’s distinction
(a) urban areas; (b) peri-urban or fringe areas; (c) semi-urban areas.
Graaff’s data refer to 1980, Cobbett’s to 1985. They should be treated as indicative only.

What could be behind this apparent paradox? Wilson & Ramphele (1989, 40) suggest “insufficient labour, insufficient capital, and the high risk of much toil yielding little fruit... In many cases people are too poor to farm; they cannot afford protective fencing or even to buy seed and fertiliser. Tractors may be too expensive to hire and oxen too weak to plough.”

The impoverishment of the many goes hand in hand with gains for the few. Rogers (1980, 49) notes that in 1970 less than one-third of Transkei’s own needs were produced locally, though it has been estimated that the
land of Transkei could produce almost enough maize for the whole of South Africa. Since 1970, the value of commercial production has increased. Land has gradually been turned over into private ownership, including "foreign" or white capital investments. The effect is a widening polarisation in the bantustans (see for instance, de Wet 1980, Danaher 1986, Keenan 1986, Keenan & Sarakinsky 1987, Cobbett 1987).

The bantustan urbanisation thus reflects the adverse conditions for smallholder agriculture. At the same time, urban employment in the bantustans is far from sufficient for the new urban settlers. Many of them have to seek employment outside the bantustan borders, in the growth points where industrial development is nurtured by Pretoria's decentralisation or dispersal programmes and the access to ultracheap bantustan labour. Thus large settlements are formed inside the bantustan borders of workers prohibited from settling closer to their worksite and therefore obliged to commute on a daily basis. In all, three-quarters of a million workers spend several hours a day commuting (Table 4).

This settlement pattern has little to do with urbanisation in the normal sense. Murray (1988) proposes the term "displaced urbanisation" to describe "the concentration of black South Africans, over the last ten to fifteen years in particular, in huge rural slums which are politically in the Bantustans and economically on the peripheries of the established metropolitan labour markets. ... What has happened, in summary, is massive 'urbanisation' in the bantustans, in terms of the sheer density of population now concentrated there. ... most of the concentration has taken place in huge rural slums which are 'urban' in respect of their densities but 'rural' in respect of the absence of proper infrastructure or services." (Idem, 116).

The number of commuting workers has grown rapidly since the early 1970s. According to one estimate, they were 290,000 in 1970, increasing to 638,000 by 1979 (Unterhalter 1987, 80). In most of the bantustans it is still considerably less than the number of migrant workers, which—in all—is believed to be around 1.7 million. The importance of this labour export, whether as commuters or as migrant labour, can hardly be overstated. The total earnings of the migrants are, on average, over 15 times that of the homelands agricultural sector (Cobbett 1987, also Table 3). Even if an estimated two-thirds of migrant labour earnings never reach the bantustan households, the remainder is still close to five times the agricultural earnings.

The data should be treated with some caution. No adjustment was made for the costs of commuting, which may be considerable (cf. Swilling 1987; Unterhalter 1987), nor do they include earnings from wage employments inside the bantustans themselves.
Table 4. Population, migrants and commuters in the bantustans 1976, 1980 and 1985 (thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bantustan</th>
<th>Population workers</th>
<th>Migrant (excl. migrants)</th>
<th>Commuters</th>
<th>Absolute % of lab. force</th>
<th>Absolute % of lab. force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transkei</td>
<td>2,623</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>355.1</td>
<td>412.0</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bophuthatswana</td>
<td>1,511</td>
<td>1,721</td>
<td>218.0</td>
<td>246.0</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venda</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciskei</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBVC Total</td>
<td>5,162</td>
<td>5,931</td>
<td>664.1</td>
<td>763.0</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazankulu</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KaNgwane</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaNdebele</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu</td>
<td>3,483</td>
<td>4,382</td>
<td>261.0</td>
<td>308.0</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebowa</td>
<td>1,756</td>
<td>2,157</td>
<td>175.0</td>
<td>207.0</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QwaQwa</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>45.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGT Total</td>
<td>6,385</td>
<td>8,102</td>
<td>621.0</td>
<td>771.0</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa excl. TBVC/SGT</td>
<td>17,949</td>
<td>19,477</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa total</td>
<td>29,496</td>
<td>33,510</td>
<td>285.1</td>
<td>1534.0</td>
<td>532.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Industrialisation reaches the bantustans

Behind the official image of the bantustans as the embodiment of rural African society, their development has been intimately linked to the politics of the central government. For instance, the issue of industrial dispersal has been linked to bantustan development and control of African migration to the (white) urban areas of South Africa ever since it was first raised. Already in the 1930s, proposals were made for industrialisation in the reserves (Glaser 1987; Wellings & Black 1986, 1). It took nearly twenty years before the government responded, by which time the crisis in agricultural production in the reserves forced an urgent search for solutions.

By then, as revealed by the Tomlinson Report in 1953/55, "African agriculture had deteriorated to an ‘alarming extent’. The ‘reserves’ were overpopulated by 66 per cent .... The rate of landlessness in some districts was as high as 33 per cent and up to 25 per cent of the households had no cattle at all. Up to 55 per cent of the land in the ‘reserves’ was reported as ‘moderately to seriously eroded’" (Mafeje 1989, 41).

The Tomlinson Commission report foresaw the inevitable proletarianisation of large portions of the reserve inhabitants and recommended steps to allow "white" capital investments in the reserves. This was rejected, not least because it might hold back the African class formation. Pretoria already at this time saw as one objective of the bantustan strategy (Glaser 1987, 33).

Instead, the government established an incentive system to attract investment to a number of border area "growth points". Bantustan policies at this time included forced resettlement and rapidly growing construction of African townships in the bantustans. Through this policy was created the embryo of "new metropolitan-centred urban economic complexes cutting across the boundaries between ‘white’ areas and portions of Bophuthatswana, KwaZulu and Ciskei—a phenomenon that would influence regional planning and constitutional thinking from the later 1970s" (idem, 36). But it fell far short of achieving job creation on a scale that could reduce the pressure for job and housing in the "white" urban areas.

In 1967/68 Pretoria decided to open the door for white capital investment in the bantustans, and at the same time put pressure on capital to comply through new regulations restricting further industrial expansion in the major metropolitan centres of South Africa. It appears that a major factor behind this break with separate development was the deteriorating economic conditions in the bantustans—in part caused by resettlement programs and overcrowding—and the rapidly eroding political authority of bantustan leaders. The efforts to spread investments to many growth points, rather than to limit them to fewer with favourable conditions, reinforces the impression of the primacy of political objectives.

The economic adviser to the Prime Minister in the late 1970s, Professor Simon Brand, stated at the time:
If you ask what the basic motivation is for certain policies like decentralisation, then the basic motivation is a political one. As I understand it, the objective is to give sufficient economic content to the policy of homeland development so that the governments which are created in those states are not simply fictitious governments but that they have an economic base to create their own sources of tax revenue to enable them at least in some respects to act independently from the South African central government... (NUSAS 1983).

In one respect, the policy can be said to have met with success: the Pretoria government could set in motion its independence plans for the bantustans, beginning with Transkei in 1976. Most of the bantustans experienced economic growth during the decade, from migrant and commuter earnings and, to a minor degree, from agriculture and mining. But the major objective, to reduce the pressures on African urbanisation in “white” South Africa, was not achieved. It has been suggested that only one-quarter or less of decentralised jobs between 1960 and 1981 were the results of the policy itself. Further, the jobs created within or on the borders of the bantustans amounted to an annual average of 7,500, to be compared with the over 100,000 bantustan blacks entering the labour market each year (Wellings & Black 1986, 4).

**Towards economic rationality?**

In 1981, the same year that the last of the TBVC-states, Ciskei, was made “independent”, a new regional development strategy was agreed on between Pretoria and the private sector. It departed from the recognition that the bantustans in fact had failed to develop as autonomous economic—and political—entities (Glaser 1987, 43). The decentralisation programme still favours industrialisation within bantustans, as reflected in the incentive schemes it offers. However, its stated intention is to focus on a more limited number of growth points with better conditions for economic development. Further, the programme aims to assist the development needs of nine new “development regions”. In the maps of DBSA since about 1987/88, the new regions on the whole embrace the individual bantustans, although their boundaries divide one bantustan into two parts and spread the areas of another bantustan over three different regions.

Some students see these changes as “a significant relaxation of the political objectives of the program, heralding a possible shift away from the obsession with industrializing the bantustans at any cost and a corresponding move towards a sense of economic rationality” (Wellings and Black 1986, 6). The qualification “possible” may need to be underlined. None of the fundamental political and economic problems of the bantustans has yet been resolved. The survival of apartheid requires that the many millions of Africans remain in their reserves, under conditions which minimise the risks of uncontrollable resistance to the system. Commuting daily or as migrants to industrial sites outside the bantustan bor-
ders is possible for a fraction of the labour force—the others must be given the means for their survival within the bantustans themselves.

This concern is reflected both in the government subsidies to the bantustan administrations and in a remarkable incentives package for industrial decentralisation. Described in a 1984 Financial Mail advertisement as "possibly the world's best industrial concessions" (Wellings & Black 1986, 6), the incentives allow even for inefficient or badly managed companies to make substantial profits. It has been suggested that employers who produce nothing or trade at a loss may still make a profit. What makes this possible are: a relocation allowance of up to Rand 0.5 million plus 20 per cent of cost; up to 95 per cent of the total wage bill refunded; transport rebate of 40 per cent; housing subsidy the same; 70 per cent subsidy on investment interest or rent of land and buildings—i.e. substantial reductions on virtually every item of expenditure (Keenan & Sarakinsky 1987, 595).

A new type of development region

With this type of subsidies, the industrial dispersal policies are expensive for the government. In the mid-1980s the annual bill is said to exceed Rand 500 million (Glaser 1987, 47). What then are the effects on the bantustan economies and labour markets? The most important effect, according to many observers, is the emergence of a new type of development region:

Much of this growth /in industrial employment/ appears to have taken place in deconcentrated industrial growth points and medium-sized towns rather than the remoter growth points located within or near to the bantustans. One crucial result of this process of industrial dispersal has been the integration of commuter populations into metropolitan-centred labour markets, thereby dissolving and rendering economically spurious political boundaries which demarcate bantustans from the rest of South Africa. (Hindson 1987, 83. See also Glaser 1987, Wellings & Black 1986, Cobbett et al. 1987, Coetzee 1986).

The incentives are sufficiently attractive to generate investments even inside the bantustans. Among the investors are some from the Third World, notably Taiwan whose investments are found in at least seven of the ten bantustans (Rogerson 1987, 302f). Taiwanese participation in sanctions-busting is presented for instance in Business Week (May 30, 1988). SouthScan (4:31, August 1989), reports that there are probably almost 100 Taiwanese factories in South Africa. In Transkei they also operate as front companies for Japanese firms. Transkei is currently offering citizenship to Hong Kong businessmen anxious to leave before China takes over in 1997. So far, two Hong Kong firms have investments in Transkei, while according to SouthScan "eight other Hong Kong manufacturers moved to Kwa-Zulu in the last five years...".
Given the general conditions for the investors, such as political risks, poor infrastructure, lack of skilled labour in the bantustans, and returns coming more from incentives revenue than from market profits, industrial development is hardly to the advantage of the bantustans. Most initial investments are directly dependent on incentive returns, and will last only as long as the incentives scheme continues. For the same reason, branch plants of industries are a more likely establishment than autonomous new industries. Such industries have their linkages outside of the local bantustan economy, and do not stimulate internal economic development.

Employment creation through decentralisation is minute compared to the number of adults from the bantustans who join the labour force each year. Besides, there is a lack of skilled workers and a predominance of women in the bantustan workforce. All this contributes to keep wages at extremely low levels. And those workers who have the choice tend to place their consumption in “white” border towns rather than in local shops with their less abundant supplies. In sum, very little filters down to the rural areas surrounding the industrial parks (Wellings & Black 1986, 22).

The dispersal policy has given post-apartheid planners a complex issue to deal with. They may chose to maintain the incentives programme, in which case the costs are likely to skyrocket through foreseeable demands by the commuting workers for better wages. In addition, they will have to finance the provision of housing for many workers closer to the worksites, and to improve the transport for the others. In effect, this means that investment priorities will be directed to the new “development regions”, leaving residual rural bantustan areas in ever worsening impoverishment.

The alternative is to scrap an unsound incentives package in favour of a more market-oriented industrial development. The short-term effect can only be a real boost to unemployment in the bantustans. Even in a longer perspective, it is highly improbable that market conditions will create an internal economic development encompassing the majority of the bantustan inhabitants. A new interventionist policy is required, but with what content?
Map 2. Location of grow points in Natal, KwaZulu, Transkei, Ciskei, and the Eastern Cape.
The Pretoria/bantustan web

Even the most candid central planner and bureaucrat in "white" South Africa would have reason to sigh at the effects of the apartheid regime's preoccupation with the bantustan project. In official South African publications the Republic no longer exists. According to official terminology, the country today consists of five independent states: the four "independent" TBVC-states, and the remainder of South Africa. All statistical data are presented separately for each of these states. Often, even the other six bantustans, the so-called self-governing territories of South Africa, are similarly singled out for separate presentation.

Table 5. Pretoria contributions to the "independent bantustans"
(Rand mill.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transfer payments</th>
<th>Transkei</th>
<th>Bophuth.</th>
<th>Venda</th>
<th>Ciskei</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tax compens.</td>
<td>82/83</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>87/88</td>
<td>134.8</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>82/83</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>185.0</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>87/88</td>
<td>350.5</td>
<td>411.6</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>156.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rand monet. union</td>
<td>82/83</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>87/88</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proj. loans grants etc</td>
<td>82/83</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>87/88</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgetary aid etc.</td>
<td>82/83</td>
<td>202.5</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>142.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>87/88</td>
<td>539.9</td>
<td>358.5</td>
<td>228.1</td>
<td>334.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>82/83</td>
<td>406.8</td>
<td>278.0</td>
<td>103.6</td>
<td>243.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>87/88</td>
<td>1,085.0</td>
<td>880.0</td>
<td>336.3</td>
<td>554.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other loans (approx.)</td>
<td>82/83</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>87/88</td>
<td>190.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>188.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandtotal</td>
<td>82/83</td>
<td>429.6</td>
<td>336.0</td>
<td>118.1</td>
<td>295.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>87/88</td>
<td>1,275.0</td>
<td>980.0</td>
<td>398.3</td>
<td>742.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Official statistics provide a good picture of this relation between Pretoria and the TBVC-states. Defined as independent, the latter are de facto members of the Rand Monetary Union and the Southern Africa Customs Union (van Eeden 1984, 127-9), which make customs revenues an important part
of bantustan state incomes. Financial transfers from Pretoria are in the form of loans or grants, i.e. the type of aid relations that exist between developed and developing countries, and South African “advisers” oversee the use of the aid funds. Needless to say, the TBVC-states have their independent constitutions (Vorster et al. 1985), in terms of which all the institutions that belong to a sovereign state have been created, including defence.

The dependence of the TBVC-states on Pretoria means that, like other ex-colonial metropoles, Pretoria defends its interests in the “independent” states through stationed military units and joint military exercises with the bantustan military. Reports on “joint military exercises” in Transkei, Venda and other bantustans are not uncommon (SouthScan 3:1988, 61; 4:1989, 68).

Cawthra (1988, 126) states that all “independent” bantustans are bound by formal nonaggression treaties with Pretoria. At the height of a dispute with Pretoria in 1978, Transkei’s Kaiser Matanzima announced that the non-aggression pact was no longer in force. These pacts do not prevent military interventions such as that in Bophuthatswana in 1988.

Although the TBVC-states have their own police, mass media reports provide frequent evidence that the South African Police (SAP) operates in practice unhindered by bantustan border restrictions. This would appear to be an understatement; the reality is probably more in the direction of straight collaboration on both sides of the borders (Weekly Mail No. 30 and 31, 1989).

Table 6. Pretoria contributions to the “self-governing territories” (Rand mill.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transfer payments</th>
<th>Gazankulu</th>
<th>KaNgwane</th>
<th>KwaNdebele</th>
<th>KwaZulu</th>
<th>Lebowa</th>
<th>Qwaqwa</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statutory amount</td>
<td>82/83</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional amount</td>
<td>87/88</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>187.7</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc. income</td>
<td>82/83</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>82/83</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>313.0</td>
<td>167.3</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87/88</td>
<td>270.6</td>
<td>161.8</td>
<td>126.7</td>
<td>950.9</td>
<td>744.4</td>
<td>135.1</td>
<td>2,389.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: van Eeden 1984 (for 1982/83); Financial Mail 1987 (for 1987/88)
Note: Here, as in Table 5, the figures vary according to source. For instance, Survey 1987/88 gives a total contribution to SGT 1987/88 as Rand mill 2, 488.4.

The relative illusion of autonomy is further underlined by Pretoria’s decision to create so-called Regional Services Councils, whose areas of jurisdiction may cut across bantustan borders. For Cobbett et al. (1987, 6),
they mark “a decisive break with the notion of the bantustans constituting independent economic and political units....” Murray (1988, 119) adds: “it may be inferred that the RSCs are intended to manage the putative incorporation of the rural slums into a loosely federal political framework without making any concession to the demand of black South Africans for a unitary democratic state.”

Whether the RSC policy will ever be fully implemented is unclear, as “they are fatally deficient in political credibility. They also conflict with, and are opposed by, the established administrative authorities of the Bantustans.” (loc. cit.)

Ruling through repression breeds resistance

The bantustan project as it was conceptualised by the apartheid architects, suffers from an inherent contradiction which is part and parcel of the project itself. In order to get it going, Pretoria had to buy off corrupt strata to replace the local anti-apartheid leaders as willing governments of the bantustans. The new bantustan leaders inevitably got involved in constant battles for political control. Without even the prospect of economic development, with a chronic lack of resources to provide the people with basic social services, let alone employment, ruling a society with glaring inequalities, their exercise of power would necessarily take the form of suppression and violence, fostering popular discontent which would lead to further repression. In this climate, conflicts starting over a single issue may well escalate into a spiral of violence, leading to administrative standstill and growing economic disruption, which in turn may radicalise the discontent into generalised anti-bantustan or anti-apartheid struggles.

The first generation of leaders, in some bantustans, had had some minimal degree of local credibility. When they gave way to new groups fighting for power, instability was likely to increase. What attracted these groups was the financial support from Pretoria:

Although ‘homeland’ authorities cannot meet the basic demands of their inhabitants, the leaders do command significant resources that come from Pretoria’s annual budget grants, aid funds from the /South Africa/ Development Bank and local income taxes and levies. Competition for these resources leads to a byzantine maze of patronage, regionalism and factions within the ruling cliques as small interest groups scramble for the pocket money handed out by Pretoria. (Weekly Mail 16-22.9 1988, 9).

Buthelezi’s rejection of bantustan “independence”

A variation of this development is provided by the more farsighted bantustan leader who recognises the likelihood of major changes in central power and has a domestic support which allows for a more autonomous anti-Pretoria stance. This leadership may reject “independence”, establish
contacts with anti-apartheid organisations and develop links to liberation movements. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and the KwaZulu Inkatha movement is a case in point, though with special features.

Buthelezi’s rejection of “independence” is linked to his ambitions for national leadership. As leader of KwaZulu, the most populous of the bantustans, he claims the heritage of the famous Zulu people who put up a very determined resistance to the Boer penetration of their country. His Inkatha movement, recreated in 1975 from the somewhat dubious Inkata of the 1920s (see eg Maré & Hamilton 1987, 46), was initially for Zulus only, at the same time as it has claimed to be the continuation of the “old” ANC before its banning in 1960.

Inkatha, with its complex, symbiotic relationship with the bantustan state of KwaZulu, has the role of mobilising support for Buthelezi and his regime. Herein lies the most important factor behind the Inkatha violence that has ravaged large areas of Natal/KwaZulu since about mid-1987. KwaZulu as a bantustan suffers the social and economic consequences of apartheid as much as any other bantustan. When the KwaZulu “state” cannot provide employment, education or health services to an impoverished people forced to pay rents and taxes to the same state, repression increasingly becomes the means to maintain control.

A general force behind the escalation of local violence is the economic crisis of the central South African state, which has made the state increasingly reluctant to finance corruption in the bantustans. The effect is that the internal system of patronage and control is weakened. In KwaZulu, the lowest level patronage which depends on direct extortion from the people, increasingly takes the form of “warlordism”, where local Inkatha vigilantes are being used to terrorise the population (Maré & Ncube 1989, 476). It would therefore be wrong to see the Natal civil war as only a conflict between Inkatha and progressive forces such as UDF and COSATU. While members and sympathisers of these organisations participate in the defence of the population, the root cause lies much deeper, in the contradictions of the bantustan strategy itself.

Resistance and the chiefs

In the bantustans turned “independent”, the granting of independence status did meet increasing resistance ever since Transkei became “independent” in 1976, in a voting exercise characterised by electoral fraud. To preempt the anticipated resistance, the Verwoerd government had in the 1950s and 1960s began to set up “legislative assemblies” in the bantustans, with built-in blocks of appointed chiefs (CEA 1988, 2). The chiefs, together with those selected to other appointed seats in the bantustan assemblies, have wherever needed secured a majority in the assembly to the new ruling clique.
The system gives the chiefs a vested interest in the upholding of the bantustan state. However, it also gives the chiefs a potential key role in the resistance to “independence”. In KwaNdebele, conservative tribal leaders, joined forces with youth and community representatives in an alliance strong enough to force Pretoria to an indefinite postponement of its 1986 “independence” plans (Murray 1988. See also Liebenow 1986 and Ritchken 1989).

KwaNdebele chiefs have since proceeded to form the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa) with an explicit antibantustan orientation. Supported by the Mass Democratic Movement, Contralesa was founded in September 1987 (Survey 1987/88, 922). Initially with a membership mainly from KwaNdebele, Venda and Gazankulu, the organisation expanded rapidly to include members from all regions in South Africa where chiefs still played a leading role in community activities (Weekly Mail No. 25, July 1989). Harassed by bantustan vigilantes and the South African police, Contralesa has continued to grow, and has established direct contacts with the ANC.

In August 1989, a Contralesa delegation visited Lusaka for talks with the ANC. In the delegation were five KwaZulu chiefs, including the Contralesa president Chief Maphumulo (the vice president is the advocate, Chief Patekile Holomisa, brother to Transkei’s military ruler Bantu Holomisa). The visit caused certain tensions in the Buthelezi government and Inkatha. The chiefs constitute Inkatha’s immediate power base in the KwaZulu legislative assembly, which Chief Maphumulo decided to quit last year. If more chiefs decide to follow him, it would create a political crisis for Buthelezi (SouthScan 4:31, Aug. 1989).

The role of the chiefs in Venda has been different from that in KwaNdebele. In the elections preceding the 1978 “independence”, the chiefs gave their support to President Patrick Mphephu’s minority party and thereby secured the carrying out of the “independence” plans. In 1988, mass resistance erupted in Venda which exposed the extreme corruption and power-abuse (including ritual killings) of a chief-dominated government.

Discussing the events in Venda, Koch & Ritchken (1988) subscribe to the general thesis of this paper, that “it is the corruption and oppression of bantustan regimes, and the backwardness of their economies, that has provoked widespread revolt” (Ibid, 57).

One year after the 1988 demonstrations, new large-scale conflicts were shaking the bantustan. Ritual murders continued under a state of emergency declared the same year, adding fire to the resistance. The resistance movement demanded the release of over 600 detained people and called for a complete boycott of the ten-year anniversary celebrations of the bantustan “independence”.

In a remarkably short time, the Venda protest, initially sparked off by the ritual murder of a teacher, had moved into opposing the whole “in-
dependence” project (Weekly Mail Aug.-Sep. 1989, esp. No. 35). It provides a good illustration of the not unusual case where local organisation starts in response to a particular problem, then broadens “to take on the general defence of the community and its organisation on a wider political front” (Keenan 1987, 118).

In a similar vein, The KwaNdebele general opposition to “independence” started with the inhabitants of Moutse district trying to resist a forced incorporation into KwaNdebele. Mbokhoto vigilantes, controlled by the bantustan government, tried to suppress the opposition in a wave of violence, which sparked off a broad opposition against “independence”.

Such incorporation of people and land has been used by Pretoria in order to straighten out the bantustan borders and reduce the number of scattered pieces of land belonging to each. Incorporation has also, as a softer method, gradually replaced the more openly brutal removals policy of turning unwilling South Africans into bantustan “citizens”. But even this method has met with organisation and resistance, including legal defence. Thus even incorporation backfires: In late 1989 eight communities, threatened with incorporation into various bantustans, formed a committee under the name of the Anti-Incorporation Campaign or AIC. In little over a month 45,000 signatories were collected from affected people objecting to their planned incorporation. The campaign has been promised support by UDF and Cosatu (New Nation 9-15.3, 1990).

Numerous other cases of resistance to removals, incorporations and resettlements are constantly reported, some of them less successful but all contributing to the isolation of bantustan regimes and the generalised resistance to apartheid (See for instance Platsky & Walker 1985; Platsky 1987).

In the same way, any new policy formulated within the limits of separate development generates new contradictions. Take the case of industrial relocation to “development regions”, described above, where workers have to commute from their bantustan residence to borderline industrial sites. Swilling (1987) describes how the transport system, “the Achilles heel of this spatial structure”, leads an emerging regional proletariat to demand solutions which involve the dismantling of the bantustans themselves. In the early 1980s, over 33 000 workers from the Ciskei town of Mdantsane commuted daily to East London. Bus services were unreliable and poorly maintained. The South African Allied Workers’ Union (SAAWU) formulated demands to the bus company, which were ignored. Instead a fare increase was announced, which led to a highly effective bus boycott. The violence with which the Ciskei authorities responded to the boycott, including an outright massacre of unarmed commuters, changed the boycott into “a protracted political struggle that had as its focus the illegitimate Ciskei regime and its apartheid designers in Pretoria” (Ibid, 146)
The boycott lasted from July 1983 to March 1985—almost two years of extreme strain on the commuting workers and their families. It led the workers to one central demand; that Mdantsane be reincorporated into a unitary South Africa. This would entail the dismantling of the Ciskei as a political entity. The boycott also gave ample proof of the politicised nature of commuter transport, in that neither local East London capital nor the East London Municipality was prepared to step in and resolve the cross-border transport problem. Ultimately, the conflict threatened the expected take-off that the 1982 regional development package was designed to initiate.

The entrance since 1977 of commercial agribusiness into bantustans is another development which has caused growing popular resistance. People dispossessed of their land, or agricultural workers exposed to the labour practices of the new companies, tend to direct their grievances against their own bantustan government for its complicity. When such companies resort to military protection, as in the case of a Lebowa fruit farm guarded by South African police (Keenan & Sarakinsky 1987, 591), popular resentment would easily turn into a rejection of the whole bantustan project and its local beneficiaries.

These examples serve to demonstrate that Pretoria’s bantustan policy is replete with contradictions, and that whatever changes are initiated from Pretoria, as long as they remain within the basic framework of separate development, new arenas of conflict will appear, and new forms of resistance. What kind of organisation grows out of a particular conflict, what alliances are formed, are important areas of further inquiry. Likewise, the repressive instruments created by the bantustan governments, in particular the vigilante groups, would need a clearer understanding in order to predict their roles in a future South Africa. The case of Inkatha, the organisation with the most pronounced potential for violent anti-government activities in post-apartheid South Africa, is particularly salient. Unless sufficiently neutralised and incorporated into post-apartheid society, it may well have the potential to become in post-apartheid South Africa what UNITA is in Angola, that is, a source of destabilising terror, with an air of legitimacy from its African support, but significantly subsidised and trained by anto-progressive forces abroad.
Which way post-apartheid unification?

"...the present situation is fraught with confusion and uncertainty not only to politicians and administrators, but to investors as well. Clarity of political authority and administrative process is required for stable and secure economic development." (Nkulu 1987, 42)

Uncertainty about the bantustans is bound to remain until and beyond the downfall of apartheid. Neither the Botha government nor its successor de Klerk have presented anything like a coherent policy on the bantustan project.

In May 1990 Pretoria formally retracted from the grand project of separate development. No new "independent" bantustans will be added to the list. Those which are "independent" are likely to retain their status through the negotiation for a majority-ruled South Africa. And, if the government position from late 1989 is anything to go by, the people in the four "independent" homelands should be out of the negotiation process—"those areas are not on the agenda", according to Gerrit Viljoen, Minister of Constitutional Development (Weekly Mail No. 46, Nov. 1989).

For the six self-governing bantustans, Pretoria has until recently entertained the idea that the bantustan inhabitants be represented in the negotiations by their own governments (idem). This requires that those governments are kept going, if necessary under slightly less compromised leaderships, right through the negotiations.

A different rationality seems to guide the reforms intended to facilitate planning and movements across bantustan borders. Nkulu (1987) comments:

The demarcation of Southern Africa /South Africa; author's comment/ into economic development regions which ignore political borders is the clearest indication of the fact that Southern Africa can best be developed as a single economic entity....

The steps taken represent an adaptation, if limited, to the rationality of capital. The harder the pressures on the South African economy, the more likely it is that this adaptation will continue. And it is also a way to maintain a level of foreign investments under international economic sanctions. Ciskei, as an example, has created a free enterprise zone which attracts investment at a rapid rate. Foreign investment is responsible for over a quarter of the 196 industries (Financial Mail /SA/ 20.10.89). Even Transkei has entertained plans to establish a free trade zone, outside the rand monetary area. Taiwan and the Philippines have expressed their in-
terest (Sun. Times /SA/ 26.2.89). The plans may be lacking in realism (SouthScan 4,31, Aug. 1989 reports that there is no prospect of a shipping transport business from the only port available, St Johns), but are certainly a good hint of the type of economic development that could take place in these huge reserves of cheap labour if the conditions of capital are met by a future post-apartheid government.

However, the economic rationality for South Africa of the bantustan project as it is run today, with billions of rands spent on “homeland development”, is increasingly being questioned (see for instance Tomlinson & Addleson 1987,70). The bantustans offer access to migrant (and commuter) ultracheap labour, but at high and growing central government costs which in actual fact are a huge subsidy to industry. The system is difficult to justify today, even on purely economic grounds. Tomorrow, under a post-apartheid government, it may have to go.

Whatever the composition of the post-apartheid government, the future of the bantustans may be the most complex of all problems in the dismantling of apartheid. The bantustan state and economic system is not dissimilar to those of some independent states in Africa. Four of the bantustans are larger in populations than countries such as Botswana, Lesotho and Namibia. Ciskei could be compared to Swaziland. The ruling strata of these societies, which include many chiefs appointed to bantustan parliaments, enjoy much better salaries and other privileges than would be attainable outside their borders. African officials have taken over most of the white-held posts in the administration, earning “lucrative salaries not easily available to Africans in the Republic.” (Josana 1989, 99).

Overstaffed and inefficient bantustan bureaucracies are a formidable force to handle. Encouraged by Pretoria, these bureaucracies have nurtured the growth of business and trade in the hands of Africans, creating a petty-bourgeois elite with vested interests in the bantustan as a support to the bantustan governments. Even if the weak economic base of this emergent business-class and its dependence on white capital effectively prevents its development into “a fully-fledged bourgeoisie” (Josana 1989, 101), its capacity to disrupt important sectors of bantustan society gives it a political power that can hardly be ignored.

Perhaps the the World Bank and IMF experiences in their search for recipes to assist poor state management and economies in shambles would be of interest to a post-apartheid government? The central dilemma of these institutions, and one still to be expressed in their recommendations for ways out of the crises, is that they expect their patients to carry out advanced surgery on themselves. In short, they continue to deal with the very same state apparatuses which in their analysis are responsible for most of the problems, and expect those very administrations to implement their recipes for recovery.
The resilience of property regimes

Neighbouring countries offer ample experience on the problems and possibilities of different political roads to egalitarian society. However, only Zimbabwe and Namibia provide a similar geopolitical structure in their still essentially race-based division between areas of large-scale commercial agriculture land and the bantustan counterparts.

Namibia, at long last independent in March 1990, has taken its first steps in dismantling the eleven different “representative authorities” in the country and replacing them with a unitary state. Its experiences should be of extreme interest for the South African actors on both sides of the negotiating table. Early signals indicate some difficulties: Two months after independence the new government in Windhoek had not yet found the solution to Rehoboth’s, the Baster homeland, rejection of its authority and decision to go it alone. Meanwhile, the dismantling of the eleven ethnic administrations has run into some problems, as the Nujoma government has decided that most of their civil servants would have to be retained (SouthScan 18.5 1990).

Well-established property regimes or relations show a significant resilience to change, even under governments with radical policies of redistribution. In Mozambique for instance, all land was nationalised by independence, but the general trend was to keep large-scale commercial agriculture intact, under the control of the state. Today, under the pressure of war and economic crisis, much the same land is re-privatised with essentially the same pattern of ownership emerging as before.

In the negotiations for independence in Zimbabwe, the liberation front accepted a policy of reconciliation with colonial society. That meant, among other things, that the inherited property regime was left intact. The compromise was written into the Lancaster Accord of 1979, which for the first ten years of independence prohibited expropriation of land. Legal ways to land reform without violating the accord were in fact demonstrated in the first few years after independence, but they were never taken up by the government (Moyo 1987, 192; Stoneman 1988, 50). In 1990 the ten-year limit elapsed, drawing a great deal of political attention to the land question. However, the signs are that no significant changes in the prevailing distribution of land will emerge from the political rhetoric.

This development should be seen in relation to the importance of the land question in Zimbabwe, where high and rising numbers of unemployed people are forced out of the family-based smallholder farming. Employment creation in industry has been slow, covering only a minute fraction of needs. But even under this threat of a politically explosive development during the 1990s, the government seems hesitant to touch the issue of redistribution of land. Nor has there been any serious discussion about the future of the inherited system of two property regimes which still partition the country: private ownership in commercial lands,
coupled to widespread under-utilisation of land, and communal ownership in increasingly crowded communal lands.

Can bantustan impoverishment be avoided?

Would it be entirely unreasonable to expect a post-apartheid majority government to tread as carefully on the path of land reform as their colleagues in Namibia and Zimbabwe? Even South Africa will need economic stability and room for recovery from the effects of years of sanctions, not to speak of the need to begin to fill the enormous needs of housing and social services. To maintain production may be seen as more important than to redress a vastly unfair access to land.

This is what makes the question of agricultural revival in the bantustans so important. The transition to majority rule entails a series of difficult adjustments in the economy where the poor are likely to be even worse off than they are today. Public resources will be badly needed to support the worst affected. It is highly unlikely that the state will be able to provide improved levels of living for the country’s millions of poor people, at least in the short- to medium term. Improvements in housing, schooling, local infrastructure, etc., will depend on local finance. In the bantustans, a strengthening of local agriculture would seem the only way to generate finance through the use of the only two resources available: people and land.

Today, there seems to be little consensus among researchers on the land question and agriculture in South Africa’s bantustans. Cobbett is not alone in arguing that the need for land redistribution among the bantustan households is “essentially secondary in nature” (Cobbett 1986, 18). He bases his argument on the relative importance of non-farm income for bantustan households and the relatively high levels of urbanisation, which is taken to imply that “the vast majority of households living in the homelands have been agriculturally deskilled”, and so will demand a better living primarily in an urban context.

On the other hand, even the relatively high urbanisation in the bantustans (Table 3) still leaves the majority of their inhabitants in peri- or semi-urban locations where land is important both for residential and production purposes. The penetration of agribusiness into the bantustans is evidence that fears of a generalised land deterioration are at least in part unfounded. Land can be an economic asset for smallholders, under better conditions for their agriculture.

Keenan & Sarakinsky (1987, 593) are in fact convinced that many poor people still depend on their incomes from land. They see a risk that the privatisation of bantustan land based on free market principles, which is already underway, “will lead to an escalation of landlessness and an intensification of poverty...”.

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However, most observers would agree that bantustan smallholder agriculture is more marginalised than was the case in Zimbabwe in 1980. Public support to agricultural development is likely to benefit primarily a small group of African farmers, with close links to the bantustan government and capacity to get hold of land of good quality. Therefore, "a Zimbabwe-type small farm development strategy in South Africa would positively impact /only/ a small percentage of the rural population" (Weiner 1988, 492).

Zimbabwe's post-independence experience evidences the potential that is often present among agricultural smallholders, and which can be brought to fruition with improved conditions for production. As was the case in South Africa, warnings had been raised in colonial days that "overpopulation" and poor land management in the then Tribal Trust Lands were causing declining land productivity. Although undoubtedly true for certain areas, in other parts of the communal areas the predictions have been strongly contradicted by impressive increases in commercialised production during the mid-1980s.

The Zimbabwe experience certainly underlines the difficulties in estimating the population carrying capacity of the land, which so obviously is linked also to socio-economic conditions of land use.

The revival of smallholder agriculture in South Africa's bantustans is likely to meet a series of both structural and political problems. Should the government try the Zimbabwe way of maintaining usufruct rights to land under communal control? Or would privatisation of land be more consonant with de facto patterns of urbanisation and "agricultural deskilling"? What returns would come from land redistribution inside or outside of the bantustans, in favour of a viable African agriculture?

ANC has recognised the necessity to treat the question of land reform in the context of the overall economic and social transition from apartheid. Its legal affairs chief, Zola Skweyiya, expressed it this way: "Land reform is not conceived as a single policy objective to the exclusion of all others, but multiple objectives would be combined in varying arrangements of priority." (Work in Progress, Jan. 1990, 24). Economist Helena Dolny sees land redistribution to take various forms over an extended period. Claims for the repossession of land will have to "be tempered by the need to maintain agricultural production." (Ibid.)

To postpone a programme of radical land reform is to accept the risk that it will be put off for ever. Zimbabwe's experience is a good testimony to this. But is there another way to avoid crises in agricultural production, and impoverishment in the bantustans? It is imperative to assess the agricultural capacity of rural households dependent on male members who are away as labour migrants, on the degree of "agricultural deskilling" and on the potential effects of allowing those who have been forcibly removed from their land to return.
The alternative would be to accept the primacy of growth in bantustan agricultural production, at least in the early phases of a transition. What political compromises would this entail, and what are the consequences over time? Unavoidably, this policy would bring the central government into collaboration with existing groups of entrepreneurial farmers, with traders and with the local administration erected during the *apartheid* regime. Politically nothing less than a provocation, its gains would have to be measured in the possible material benefits that would reach the many: resources for schools and clinics, agricultural employment and wage improvements.
Concluding remarks: alliance with whom?

The peculiar feature of the bantustan construction of today is its dominant political rationale. Capital-labour relations unfold under distorting circumstances such as investment subsidies and bantustan border separation. Market-directed development is circumscribed by bureaucratic regulations aimed at upholding race discrimination. When the dismantling of the apartheid construction begins, new regulating mechanisms will be needed in order to avoid a chaotic if temporary transition to a united South Africa. The dismantling of apartheid in the national machinery will have to be done in stages. A similar development is likely to be attempted with the bantustans.

A difficulty for the liberation movement will be to identify the partners with whom the dismantling process can be defined and carried through. Despite the proved strength of local opposition in different bantustans, probably none has reached a stage of organisation where it could assume this role. Trade unions and community organisations have been suppressed by bantustan governments and would still require time to establish themselves in strength. Therefore, other alliances may be necessary, other partners accepted than today would seem compatible with the principled orientation of the liberation movement.

Is there a way out of this dilemma? In the bantustans, there are cracks within the ruling strata. In some of them the military has proved a progressive force. The chiefs organised in Contralesa are other potential allies. Neither of them, however, has access to an independent administrative apparatus besides that of the bantustan “state” itself.

For any more radical political strategy in the bantustans to stand a chance of succeeding, an organisationally strong ally other than the existing bantustan administration is necessary. Lacking this, the central government may simply have little option but to collaborate with the latter, and adapt the strategy accordingly.

There has been a tendency, not least among Western scholars sympathetic to the struggles in southern Africa, to idealise the leading movements of these struggles, and so to carry this idealisation into the independence period. Referring to Mozambique, Jacques Depelchin (1986) summarizes:

Analytically, there is something methodologically unsound and unscientific when a Marxist problematic is vigorously applied to dissect Mozambican colonial society,
and when this same problematic is used with mittens in order to confront the post-independent period.

His critique is acknowledged by one of the most important Western writers on Mozambique, John Saul (1985):

Those sympathetic to socialism have probably done themselves and the revolutions they support a singular disservice when they have presented the processes involved in an unproblematic manner. ...it has become apparent that a naive perspective virtually guarantees eventual disillusionment.

The South African liberation is no less problematic than the Mozambican. Already today, the issues of alliances and principles is high on the agenda of negotiated transition to majority rule. These issues will remain in the forefront even after majority rule is established, and the positions taken will reflect not only strategic considerations in the liberation movement but also the balance of class forces in the South African society, including the bantustans.

The bantustan problematic is the singularly most important in post-apartheid South Africa in that it affects profoundly the material and social conditions of a majority of the Africans. The institutions created in the bantustans are African—they may be dissolved through decree but their current upholders will remain a double-edged sword in their usefulness as trained manpower for new institutions and their own hidden motives for joining the winning side.
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