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Intra-state conflicts have been the predominant type of conflict in the recent years with a combination of “identity” and “distribution” being the key powerful elements. Imbalances in the distribution of economic, political and social resources coupled with the mobilisation of groups around commonalities and sometimes differences of language, race, and religion, readily increases the potential for conflict. The persistence of this type of conflict on the African continent has created more avenues for opportunistic leaders and has increased the difficulty in attempting to manage these conflicts.

The United Nations (UN) and now the African Union (AU) continue to face the task of keeping the peace on the African continent and dealing with the multiple root causes of these conflicts. July 2006 was the grimmest month for conflict prevention around the world in three years as reported by the International Crisis Group (ICG) in their 36 months of publishing CrisisWatch. Without a doubt these conflicts manifest themselves significantly at a regional and global level, and such a breakdown is a sign, perhaps, that our efforts at peacekeeping and peacebuilding need to be reoriented outside of the age-old response to wars between states and the Cold War. Interests and positions that attach themselves to these conflicts require greater flexibility in how we choose to or attempt to transform, manage or resolve African conflicts.

The articles in this edition reflect on the deep-rooted seeds of conflict by bringing closer together the void between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and understanding the importance of human security within the context of state security. The planning and implementation of peace missions is no simple exploit, but the combination of significant role players in an integrated effort will possibly yield greater results. The question of integration still exists as a challenge for the process of peacekeeping, but this is not to suggest that there are no alternative approaches toward achieving security on the continent. The articles on developmental peace missions, the significance of public information through the United Nations and the impact of local capacity in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) all point in a direction that emphasises long-term sustainability in an environment that is primarily focused on short-term stability.

This is also one of the many challenges that the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has to endure, as explored in the article on the mission in Darfur. The determination to keep the peace in an extremely volatile situation and in the wake of a humanitarian crisis, where protocols and mandates offer even less authority, short-term stability and long-term sustainability, becomes seriously questionable. The responsibility of the AU to protect in Sudan has been marred by many challenges and will prove to be a great test and institutional learning curve in the years to come.

If anything has been learnt to date, it is that the situation in Darfur, like many other conflicts in Africa, requires a global partnership and responsibility to create positive shifts for peace and security. In dealing with issues of identity and distribution, and consolidating efforts to bring about peace, institutions and resources on this continent need to be greatly improved to serve as the primary building blocks for long-term and sustained achievements.

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While Western foreign policy, security and media attention has been focused on Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans over the last decade, Africa emerged as the major arena for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. Of the 18 peace operations currently managed by the UN, eight are in Africa, and six of these are large complex peace operations. This explains why 75% of the approximately 88 000 military, police and civilian UN peacekeepers currently deployed can be found in Africa. The emphasis on Africa is also reflected in the UN peacekeeping budget. Of the approximately US$5 billion budgeted for 2005/2006, around 77% is budgeted for operations in Africa.

Peacekeeping is also a dominant theme for the African Union (AU). Over the last half decade, the AU has undertaken two major peacekeeping operations of its own in Burundi and Sudan. These operations have involved 10 000 peacekeepers at a total cost of approximately US$600 million. Africa is, of course, also a significant troop contributor to UN peace operations, with 34 African countries contributing 28% of the UN’s uniformed peacekeepers.

In comparison with the peacekeeping missions in Africa of the mid- to late 1990s, the new trend towards large complex peace operations represents a significant shift in the political will of the international community to invest in peace operations in Africa. This trend should not, however, be interpreted as signifying a new interest in the UN or in Africa. Rather, the willingness to invest more than US$5 billion in UN peace operations was generated in, and will be sustained by, the post-9/11 belief that failed states are ideal training, staging and breeding grounds for international terrorists.

In this context, a kind of informal peacekeeping apartheid has come about, whereby most European...
and American peacekeeping and offensive forces are deployed in NATO or European Union (EU) operations in Europe and the Middle-East, whilst most UN peacekeeping troops are contributed by the developing world and deployed in Africa.\(^5\) Whilst this division of roles reflects the macro-pattern, it masks an interesting sub-trend that has emerged over the last three years. Almost a decade after the debacles in Somalia and Rwanda resulted in the West withholding its peacekeepers from Africa, there is now a new willingness to consider deploying European peacekeepers to Africa.

In 2003, the EU deployed Operation Artemis in Bunia, in the north-east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The success of this kind of focused but robust intervention encouraged the EU to follow up with further such missions. In June 2004, the EU deployed military, police and civilian observers and advisors in support of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). And earlier this year, the EU approved a new mission to the DRC, this time in support of the elections scheduled for 30 July 2006. These developments have opened up debate around Europe’s future defence and security policy towards Africa, and have stimulated the discussions around a possible NATO role in, for instance, Darfur.

Troop contributions, however, reflect only one facet of the geo-political reality. The financing of UN and African peace operations reveals another. Through the assessed contribution system, the United States of America (USA) is responsible for 26% of the UN peacekeeping budget, while Europe’s combined contribution represents approximately 43%. Together, America, Japan and Europe are responsible for approximately 88% of the UN peacekeeping budget.

America and Europe are also major financial contributors to African peacekeeping. In 2004, the EU contributed approximately €25 million to the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), and it has contributed approximately €162 million to AMIS since its inception in 2004.\(^6\) Bilateral contributions by individual EU member states amount to approximately an additional €30 million. The USA has contributed approximately US$220 million to AMIS since the mission’s inception.\(^7\)

From a UN and African perspective, the USA and Europe thus have a major political and financial influence on, and stake in, the future of peacekeeping in Africa. It is also anticipated that they will have a continued interest in supporting the development of a balanced capacity to manage conflicts in Africa that will ensure that there is robustness at all levels – international, regional and sub-regional – in the system.

**United Nation Peace Operations**

Contemporary UN complex peace operations are in effect peacebuilding operations, in that they have mandates that combine political, security, humanitarian, development and human rights dimensions in the post-conflict phase aimed at addressing both the immediate consequences and root causes of a conflict.

The UN’s capability to undertake such system-wide peacebuilding operations is what sets it apart from NATO and the AU. The EU is the only other multilateral body that has the potential to develop such a complex peacebuilding operations capacity in the mid- to long-term, and it is the only multilateral body that has the potential to integrate a sixth dimension, namely trade.

Combining such a diverse range of functions under one institutional framework has proven to be a daunting task for the UN. In order to manage these interdependencies in the field, the UN has developed the Integrated Missions model that is essentially aimed at enhancing coherence between the UN Country Team, that is humanitarian and developmental in focus, and the UN peacekeeping operation, that is peace and security focused. The current UN missions in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia and Southern Sudan all have Integrated Mission management structures.

As with any innovation, this model has not been without its detractors. Furthermore, it has highlighted various technical, administrative, organisational and budgetary challenges that need to be overcome before all aspects of the model can be fully implemented. A comprehensive study\(^8\) was commissioned and completed in May 2005, and as of December 2005, the Integrated Missions model has now been officially accepted as the mission structure of choice.\(^9\) It will be the dominant management structure for UN complex peace operations in the near to mid-term, and it is likely that the EU, AU and others will try to apply its core features to their own future missions.
Another trend is the new more robust approach to the use of force that has become a defining characteristic of contemporary complex UN peace operations. Although contemporary UN complex peacekeeping operations in Africa are still grounded in and characterised by the core principles of consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force, the interpretation and application of these principles, in practice, have undergone significant development.

Consent still implies that the parties to the conflict must agree to the UN’s peacekeeping role, but it is now recognised that strategic consent at the level of the leadership of the parties to the conflict does not necessarily translate into operational and tactical consent at all levels in the field.

Impartiality still implies that the UN peacekeeping mission will not take sides in the conflict among the parties to the conflict, but does not imply that the UN will stand by when civilians are in imminent threat of danger, nor that it will not record and report (for instance to the International Criminal Court) human rights abuses that may have occurred or are still taking place, including by the parties to the conflict.

Minimum use of force still implies that the UN peacekeeping mission will use the minimum use of force necessary to protect itself and others covered by its mandate, but it is now understood that it should have the capacity and mandate to prevent or counter serious threats to itself or those it has been mandated to protect.

It is unlikely, for the foreseeable future, that the UN Security Council will deploy new complex peace operations in Africa, or elsewhere, without mandates that reflect this new interpretation and contain elements of Chapter Seven’s enforcement authority.

One of the innovations that emerged out of the nexus between peacebuilding and robust peacekeeping in the context of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) is collaborative offensive operations. MONUC is operating alongside, and in support of, the integrated brigades of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the FARDC), in offensive operations aimed at protecting civilians and forcefully disarming armed groups.

Some of these collaborative offensive operations have had the desired effect in that they have resulted in larger numbers of combatants entering the disarmament process. However, these operations have also raised various technical, budgetary and administrative challenges. The most serious concerns relate to the unintended consequences generated by these
UN-directed and supported actions, including the impact of the predatory behaviour of some of the FARDC troops on the populations where they have been deployed, and the human rights abuses and internal displacements that have come about as a result.

Another interesting example of the trend towards greater synergy and cohesion across the traditional security and development divide is the way in which protection is emerging as a common theme for both the humanitarian and peacekeeping community. Since 1999, seven UN peace operations – in Burundi, Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan – have been mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence. Civilian protection is set to become one of the dominant themes of UN peace operations in the short- to medium term.

**African Peace Operations**

Over the past half decade, the AU and regional economic communities (RECs) like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) have significantly increased their capacity to undertake and manage peace operations. The AU, in particular, has played a leading role by deploying its first two peace operations, AMIB in Burundi and AMIS in Darfur.

One of the most significant developments in the African context is the informal division of roles that has emerged around the sequencing of peace operations. The pattern that is taking shape is that the AU, or one of the RECs, first deploys a stabilisation operation, followed by a UN complex peacekeeping operation within approximately 90 to 120 days.

This pattern was established in Burundi, where the AU deployed AMIB in 2003 followed by a UN operation (ONUB) in 2004; and repeated in Liberia, where ECOWAS deployed ECOMIL in 2003, followed by a UN operation (UNMIL) later in the same year; and it is set to be repeated again in Darfur where AMIS, first established in 2004, is likely to be replaced by a UN mission later in 2006.

This sequencing of operations appears to work well because it plays on the respective strengths of the UN, AU and RECs. The UN is averse to deploying peace operations in situations where a comprehensive peace agreement is not yet in place, and when it does receive the green light to deploy, it needs approximately 90 days to muster the political process necessary to plan, organise and deploy a complex peace operation.

African regional organisations, on the other hand, seem more ready and willing to undertake stabilisation operations, especially when they have been involved in brokering a ceasefire, and feel obliged to build on that momentum. Although the AU and some of the RECs are capable of deploying military forces, they generally lack the staying power and multi-dimensional capability of the UN.

It is anticipated that this pattern of sequencing will continue into the mid- to longer term. It will be very useful for all concerned, however, if this unofficial division of labour could be formalised through some form of cooperation agreement between the UN and the AU, as this would then enable us to conduct a much more focused capacity-building effort. Africa now has a more comprehensive peace and security architecture in place than at any other time since the Organisation of African Unity was founded in 1963. Many of the new structures, however, still need to become fully operational.

One of the most important shortcomings of the AU is the lack of institutional capacity, especially the human resources, to adequately develop policy, and plan and manage peace operations. The AU only has a handful of staff dedicated to managing peace operations, significantly less than their UN and EU counterparts. It would be important for donors interested in investing in African peacekeeping capacity to understand that the investment in training and equipping peacekeepers will be
unsustainable if it is not matched by a proportionate investment in developing an appropriate headquarters capacity.

One of the most significant developments in the African peacekeeping context is the initiative to develop an African Standby Force (ASF). It is significant because, for the first time, Africa now has a common position and action plan for the development of its peacekeeping capacity. This means that the various disparate donor initiatives to enhance Africa’s peacekeeping capacity can be positively channelled to support one coherent effort.

Although considerable progress has been achieved since the ASF concept was approved in 2004, the operationalisation of the ASF has been slower than anticipated, and has been predominantly focused on the military aspects of peace operations. One of the key remaining challenges is the need to equally develop the civilian and police dimensions of the ASF framework so that the multidimensional nature of contemporary peace operations can be fully integrated into the AU peacekeeping concept.

The single most important factor when considering the future of peacekeeping in Africa is financing. The AU experience is that even relatively small unarmed military observer missions have proven too costly to be financed solely from its own budget or from the African Peace Fund. Instead the AU, like the OAU before it, has to rely on donor funding to finance its peace missions.11

The AU’s first peace operation, AMIB, had an approved strength of just over 3 000 troops and an operational budget of approximately US$130 million per year. This was a significant expense in the African context. For instance, in comparison, the budget of the AU Commission for 2003 was approximately US$32 million. The AU’s second peace operation, AMIS, is even larger still with around 6,700 personnel and an annual budget of approximately US$466 million. AMIS is also donor funded, and as indicated earlier, the EU and the USA have contributed the bulk of the mission’s budget.

As can be seen from these two examples, it is clear that, for the foreseeable future, the AU will be dependent on donor support for its peace operations. This is problematic, because the AU’s dependency on external resources denies it the freedom to independently take decisions on some of the strategic, operational and even tactical aspects of the peace operations it may wish to undertake. Finding the appropriate balance between African and partner interests will, therefore, probably be the dominant feature of the relations between these partners over the short- to medium term.

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Endnotes
1 This paper will use the term ‘peacekeeping’ operations in its generic form, i.e. to refer to the whole spectrum of operations (Chapters 6, 7 and 8) authorised by the United Nations to monitor ceasefire agreements and/or to support the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements, including those aspects of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction that fall within the domain of the UN’s new Integrated Missions concept.
5 The top ten troop contributing countries to UN peacekeeping operations as of April 2006 were: (1) Bangladesh – 10,228; (2) Pakistan – 9,431; (3) India – 9,057; (4) Jordan – 3,648; (5) Nepal – 3,523; (6) Ethiopia – 2,780; (7) Ghana – 2,561; (8) Nigeria – 2,445; (9) Uruguay – 2,411; and (10) South Africa – 2,012. See DPKO Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations as of 30 April, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/apr06_2.pdf>, accessed on 20 May 2006.
The United Nations (UN) is transforming itself in order to play a more coordinated role in peacebuilding activities in post-conflict societies. In December 2005, the organisation established the Peace-Building Commission (PBC) as an inter-governmental body, which will convene representatives of the UN's major organs, financing institutions, troop contributors, the governments in question and other relevant stakeholders in order to better coordinate activities and marshal resources for post-conflict peacebuilding activities in the world. In undertaking this initiative, the UN is informed by the experience that nearly half of all countries slide back into conflict within five years of signing a peace agreement. This has been attributed to several factors, among them a lack of sustained commitment, poor financing and funding gaps, and poor coordination of peacebuilding activities. This article analyses the Peace-Building Commission and highlights how it will, or will not, function and various ways in which the civil society groups can contribute to its success.

The Structure and Composition of the Peace-Building Commission

The recommendations for a PBC were first presented to the UN in the 2004 report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, a Commission convened by the UN Secretary-General to assess the greatest threats to global security. The High Level Panel reported that the UN suffered a “key institutional gap” in this area: “there is no place in the United Nations system explicitly designed to avoid State collapse and the slide to war or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace”. The panel recommended the creation of a peacebuilding commission within the United Nations.

At the September 2005 World Summit, heads of states and government agreed to establish a PBC as an inter-governmental advisory body. The Summit Declaration called for the PBC to do the following:

- bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery;
- focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict;
- support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development;
- provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations;
- develop best practices, help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and extend the period of attention by the international community to post-conflict recovery.

The High Level Panel recommended that the PBC be mandated with helping to “avoid state collapse” which meant a role in prevention as well as rebuilding. This recommendation was not heeded, though, largely due to concerns that such a body would be interfering with the internal affairs of states. The PBC was then officially created through concurrent resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council in December 2005. According to these resolutions, the PBC will meet in two configurations:

- The PBC Organisational Committee, which is composed of 31 member states selected from the major UN bodies (the Security Council, Economic and Social Council, and the General Assembly) and from the largest contributors to financial and troop commitments. The Organisational Committee is not expected to meet frequently, but will consider the selection of countries for advice and the organisation of the Commission’s work.
- The country-specific meetings of the PBC, which are the configuration in which most of the PBC’s work is conducted. They are expected to be held on an ongoing basis in accordance with the needs of the country. The country-specific meetings will also include, as members, many of the relevant stakeholders involved in peacebuilding for the specific country: the country under consideration, countries
in the region involved in post-conflict processes, regional and sub-regional organisations, major financial, troop and police contributors, senior UN representatives in the field, and regional and international financial institutions.³

The PBC’s role and resources are limited, however. The organ will not be operational on the ground and it will not be a major funding source for projects. The Commission will be supported in this work by a peacebuilding support office made up of 15 staff and a small peacebuilding fund (with a budget of $250 million made up of voluntary contributions) tasked with addressing critical gaps, particularly after a peace agreement is signed, until long-term support is made available.⁴

While the basic framework has been set since December 2005, it took several more months for governments to agree on which member states should sit on the commission. PBC members also needed to decide on rules of procedure for its conduct prior to beginning its work. Unlike the very elaborate systems for electing members, the PBC Organisational Committee only agreed on minimal, provisional rules. Many of the questions about how the PBC will operate remain unanswered. For example, the rules do not decide how often the country specific meetings will be held, or whether they will have an opportunity to meet in the subject country. No criteria have been established to guide the selection of countries for consideration. Another question is how the body will interact with the civil society organisations. No formal arrangements were made, although the provisional rules of procedure call for the PBC to develop further modalities.

The Peace-Building Commission in Practice

The first two cases for the PBC were selected in June 2006. Among the many cases that were raised as needy candidates, including Afghanistan, Haiti, Timor-Leste, and Somalia, the two chosen were Burundi and Sierra Leone. With no criteria in place to determine how that selection should be made, there were no clear reasons why these should be the first cases. One explanation was that these two cases submitted themselves for consideration. It is also likely that these are cases where the PBC thought it could make an impact, unlike other needy cases which would be less manageable.

Moreover, since governments agreed to form this body, it has not yet produced any recommendations. The first country-specific meetings are planned for October 2006. On 19 July 2006, the PBC convened briefings on Sierra Leone and Burundi where government officials, representatives of the UN country team, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund made presentations on the current status of peacebuilding for the two countries and identified challenges ahead. This was an opportunity to understand the strategies under consideration, peacebuilding activities to be emphasised, and how the PBC would interact with other stakeholders.

In the case of Burundi, the Ambassador of Burundi to the UN, Mr Joseph Ntakirutimana, stressed the needs of health care and education. The Acting Special Representative to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in Burundi, Mr Nureldin Satti, described the overall situation as fragile. He mentioned programmes in place, security sector concerns and the need for building capacity. A representative from the World Bank focused on the needs and opportunities for resource mobilisation.

The Sierra Leone meeting included Sierra Leone’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation,
Mr Momodu Koroma. He emphasised progress made in governmental programmes in governance reform, resource management and accountability, security sector reform including retraining programmes, and national reconciliation including the truth and reconciliation commission. Among the challenges he identified were youth unemployment, perceptions of corruption, weak infrastructure, implementing poverty reduction strategies and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The Executive Representative of the Secretary-General for the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) identified challenges in the security system, including a weak justice system, capacity within the police and the limited resources for the armed forces. He emphasised the need for an infrastructure for peace, including increased capacity for mediation.

In their questions to the panel, members of the PBC sought further clarity as to the value the PBC could add to the country. Member states expressed hope that the PBC would help to convene donors and ensure sustained support. The issue of how to ensure national ownership over peacebuilding was also highlighted. A PBC member noted that differences in priorities identified by the government officials differed from those of the UN country team. The meeting focused on the urgent question of the two countries’ needs. It ended with questions about how the PBC would interact with other stakeholders in peacebuilding activities.

Contributions of Civil Society to the Peace-Building Commission

Civil society organisations are not included in the list of possible members for the country specific meetings of the PBC, nor were they included as panellists in the first country specific briefings. Yet the founding resolution “encourages the Commission to consult with civil society, non-governmental organisations, including women’s organisations, and private sector engaged in peacebuilding activities, as appropriate”.5

Civil society organisations should be recognised as critical partners for the PBC in the coordination of peacebuilding activities and the development of best practices:

- Central to successful peacebuilding is local ownership of the peacebuilding process and engagement in the development and implementation of strategies for rebuilding. Civil society organisations are uniquely equipped to mobilise individuals in peacebuilding activities and may be some of the few remnants of social networks in post-conflict situations.

- Additionally, civil society organisations may be able to provide a valuable link between the PBC and local populations both in identifying local priorities in peacebuilding and transmitting information about the coordinated peacebuilding strategy. Civil society organisations can be important resources for local knowledge and expertise in various sectors related to rebuilding societies after conflict and should be utilised as such.

- Finally, civil society organisations are often engaged in providing goods and services as part of humanitarian relief and coordinating other essential activities, including justice mechanisms.6

Complementary Civil Society Activities

In-country civil society forums. The Global Partnership for Prevention in Armed Conflict (GPPAC), for example, is working with national and regional civil society partners to facilitate civil society consultations on the PBC. These meetings are locally and regionally driven and ensure that civil society knows the work of the PBC, and is prepared to give timely and informed recommendations to the PBC. Two civil society processes are currently taking place in Sierra Leone and Burundi. From 19 to 20 July 2006, GPPAC’s regional initiator for Western Africa, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) in partnership with its national network, Network on Collaborative Peacebuilding NCP-SL, organised a civil society consultation in Sierra Leone with participants from civil society representing many thematic issues of concern, and representatives from government agencies, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and UNIOSIL. Seven priority areas or issues where identified as crucial for consideration by the PBC during the in-country meeting:

1. Implementation and dissemination of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the poverty reduction strategy documents;
2. Building effective partnership among government, civil society organisations (CSOs), inter-governmental organisations and donors;
3. Human resource development: skills training for youth, economic empowerment for women;
4. Gender mainstreaming in peacebuilding;
5. Establishment of research unit;
6. Strengthen the capacity of national CSOs and public institutions;
7. Establish a monitoring and evaluation mechanism.

A working committee was set up to follow up on the recommendations, and to serve as a platform for interaction with governments and UN. A pre-meeting consultation was organised in the last week of July in Burundi to assess the level of understanding of the PBC’s related needs of civil society. These consultations identified several areas of discussion that should be explored further in the larger meeting: the need for more coordinated collaboration, mutual sharing of information, and to review the perception that the Commission
is presenting new sources of funding for the possible implementation of peacebuilding.

**Regional consultations**: In June-August 2006, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung held regional consultations in Islamabad, Pakistan; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and Maputo, Mozambique on the PBC. The aim was to solicit perspectives from practitioners, scholars and civil society activists on issues such as how the PBC relates to other regional mechanisms and how countries in their region could benefit from the work of the PBC. Each meeting identified concerns and yielded a set of recommendations from the region’s perspective.7

These types of meetings are another important avenue for ideas from policy makers and advocates on how to improve the work of the PBC. For example, the Maputo meeting included the following recommendations about the PBC’s work in Africa: African actors must identify priorities for the PBC and take ownership of peacebuilding initiatives; the PBC must adopt a regional approach when working with Africa’s regional economic communities and civil society; close partnerships are needed between the PBC, AU/NEPAD and regional economic communities; and gender should be mainstreamed throughout the PBC’s work.8

The inclusion of civil society early in the commission’s work is important. However, the PBC has not yet decided how it will interact with members of civil society. Many civil society organisations working locally, nationally and internationally on peacebuilding have been consulted about possible methods for interaction with the PBC. There are certain avenues of interaction between CSO and PBC though. These include:

**Early and effective interaction with civil society in the country concerned**

Such early and effective engagement could foster local buy-in for the peacebuilding strategy, build confidence in the new PBC by demonstrating its commitment to addressing local realities, pave the way
for better governance by connecting local and national governments with civil society, and capitalise on existing peacebuilding efforts.

The country-specific meetings of the PBC should consult with representatives of local civil society. An in-country civil society forum (such as that established in Sierra Leone), supported by the peacebuilding fund, could be held soon after a country is selected for the PBC. The forum could provide the PBC with a review of existing peacebuilding activities with a particular focus on those that are conducted by civil society and produce recommendations to submit to the PBC. Any national process must be self-organised and a sustained process within civil society to feed into the country’s long-term peacebuilding strategy. Access to documents and reports of the PBC and the peacebuilding support office in local languages will be essential.

Mechanisms for consultation with NGOs at UN headquarters in New York and Geneva

The PBC should develop formal and informal mechanisms for consultation with relevant international NGOs and representatives from civil society from the countries under consideration by the PBC. Relevant arrangements, based on existing practices of CSO interaction with the UN, include: access to the provisional agenda of PBC meetings; right to attend public meetings; and right to submit written statements relevant to the work of the commission.9 The Organisational Committee of the PBC should invite representatives of local civil society to participate at UN Headquarters in the country-specific meetings of the PBC.

Annual dialogue with NGOs

The PBC could host an annual dialogue with NGOs and the PBC Organisational Committee, ideally at a time to coincide with a scheduled meeting of the PBC. A regular consultation would allow for the necessary arrangements to be made to bring relevant actors from around the world to New York and for NGOs to self-organise and prepare contributions in advance of the set meeting.10

Though, some governments criticise civil society as unaccountable, lacking transparency and serving special interests,11 the activities outlined above as conducted by national, regional and international civil society organisations show an eagerness to contribute to the success of the PBC and should bring them credibility as effective partners.

Conclusion

Reactions to the new body have generally been positive, but expectations about what it will achieve are modest. This is in part due to the length of time taken for the PBC to begin its activities. A year after governments agreed to create the PBC, it still has not issued any recommendations. Moreover, the tasks undertaken by the body in its start-up phase are limited: it will focus on only two cases, Burundi and Sierra Leone. Substantial uncertainty remains as to how this body will function, and what it will be able to deliver. Nevertheless, if in these two cases the PBC succeeds in convening the relevant actors, contributing to the development of integrated peacebuilding strategies and helping to ensure support for peacebuilding activities, the UN will be building a much stronger foundation for a role in sustaining international attention to the special needs of countries emerging from violent conflict towards lasting peace.

Nicole Deller is a Programme Advisor for the World Federalist Movement – Institute for Global Policy.

Endnotes

2 UN General Assembly, World Summit Outcome Document, paragraph 98.
3 UN General Assembly Res. 60/180, para. 7.
4 The terms of reference for the Peacebuilding Fund, adopted by the General Assembly on 8 September 2006, are contained in a report of the Secretary-General, UN General Assembly Doc. A/80/984.
5 UN General Assembly Res. 60/180, para. 21.
7 For reports of the regional meetings on the PBC held in Islamabad, Rio de Janeiro and Maputo, see <www.fesny.org>.
9 See ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31.
11 For a description of member states regarding NGO participation at UN meetings, see Report to the President of the 60th General Assembly, The United Nations: The relationship between member states and civil society, including non-governmental organizations, July 5 2006.
Introduction

Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the United Nations (UN) Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, once remarked, "we have [UN] peacekeeping operations that succeed, only to lapse back into conflict. Successful operations, as it were, in which the patient dies."

These comments are particularly true in Africa where cease-fires are fragile, peace efforts often fail to disarm and demobilise combatants or reintegrate former ones, and post-conflict societies often relapse into conflict in the face of continued poverty, famine and disease. Evidently, an alternative approach to the planning and implementing of UN missions and responses to violent conflict is needed.

Because the underlying causes of conflict are so complex, this alternative approach should, in theory, achieve sustainable human development through the integrated application of security and developmental efforts. Indeed, two enduring lessons that the UN has learned through years of experience in responding to conflict is that, first, successful operations require integrated efforts, not separate tracks that do not converge, and secondly, that speed and momentum do matter in peace missions. These lessons are especially relevant if one considers that there is strong evidence of recidivism in theatres where UN troops have been stationed, as witnessed in Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and more recently in Côte d’Ivoire and Sudan.

Above: A central tenet of the concept of developmental peace missions is that security and development are mutually reinforcing processes.
In response to the UN’s mixed track record, the former South African Deputy Minister of Defence, Ms Nozizwe Madlala-Roudledge, on one occasion proposed that the UN’s failures in Africa could partly be attributed to its preoccupation with state security, whereas this effort should run concurrently with an equally vital aspect of an overall peace plan, which is the commitment to human security (i.e. reconstruction and development). Madlala-Roudlege argued that an alternative approach to end violent conflict demands filling the institutional and programming void between security (peacekeeping) and development (peacebuilding) – more precisely, that these two veritable pillars of all UN operations are, first, bridged and then ‘rolled-out’ as mutually reinforcing processes.

While the principle behind bringing peacekeeping closer to peacebuilding is hardly new, there is still much to learn institutionally and operationally about how the two activities can best be applied in practice. In this regard, in 2004 Madlala-Roudledge, together with the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), pioneered the concept of developmental peace missions, a concept based on the premise that security can only achieve permanent benefits if vital peacebuilding activities are rolled out within a reasonable time.2 Reasonable, in this sense, means the provision of critical humanitarian assistance and reconstruction capabilities immediately after – and preferably in concert with – military operations so that security can dynamically reinforce and influence the effectiveness of development (i.e. the one activity must be applied without losing sight of the other).

Certainly, the precise time frame for immediate reconstruction will depend on many factors. Even so, experience has shown that the window between the end of military action and the start of development is very narrow: the first few months – if not weeks – following an intervention are perhaps the more critical period for laying the groundwork for peace and establishing the credibility of foreign intervention forces. (‘Groundwork’ is the operative word as short-term interventions must always complement long-term commitments.) Conversely, legitimacy and political momentum lost during this critical period can be difficult to regain, especially if foreign forces are unable to deal satisfactorily with systematic threats against individuals, intimidation, rioting, looting, and attacks on property.

For instance, the inability of the Anglo-American coalition to stabilise Iraq more quickly has highlighted the dangers of being unable to begin reconstruction promptly following the military defeat of opponents. The argument that Iraq was not a peace mission *per se*, and hence post-Iraq lessons could be ignored by conflict prevention and resolution practitioners, is valid. However, there is an emerging school of thought that maintains that some lessons may lend themselves to the broader international peace and security agenda, chief among these that a bridge to long-term development and democratisation is required to stabilise security environments and begin reconstruction promptly. This concept of operations has been labelled by US officials as ‘stabilisation and reconstruction’ (S&R) and proposes ways to target the gap “between the end of major combat operations and the beginning of nation-building”.4

In this regard, the philosophy behind S&R and developmental peace missions is encouragingly similar. Both concepts seek to directly challenge the traditional, and questionable, dichotomy between providing short-term military security and long-term development in conflict environments. The concepts dramatically differ in terms of their purpose, however. On the one hand, S&R was developed in reaction to the debacle of post-war planning for Iraq and the threat posed by failed states and international terrorist groups. Ostensibly, such a formulation seems primarily driven by concerns of national security and can thus be construed as being a counter-insurgency strategy that uses developmental tools.

On the other hand, the concept of developmental peace missions was formulated in reaction to UN troops struggling to establish a safe and secure environment for peacebuilding. The concept essentially represents an African effort to ensure that reconstruction and development begin immediately after, or ideally concurrently, with the end of major combat action. In sum, it seeks to challenge the trend of recidivism through the integrated mobilisation and application of military and civilian resources in peace missions. For the armed forces, this means establishing a critical window of opportunity for civilian teams to deploy in environments where the mix between conflict and peace is likely to shift back and forth. For civilians, it implies rapidly deploying to the area of operations to meet critical humanitarian needs and set up temporary infrastructure, and progressively

THE CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENTAL PEACE MISSIONS WAS FORMULATED IN REACTION TO UN TROOPS STRUGGLING TO ESTABLISH A SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR PEACEBUILDING

achieve permanent benefits if vital peacebuilding activities are rolled out within a reasonable time.2 Reasonable, in this sense, means the provision of critical humanitarian assistance and reconstruction capabilities immediately after – and preferably in concert with – military operations so that security can dynamically reinforce and influence the effectiveness of development (i.e. the one activity must be applied without losing sight of the other).

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repair damage to essential services (power, transportation, sanitation, and communications) and catalyse local skills capacity and public administration.

Certainly, early action will not be sufficient for success. Ultimately, the transfer of power, resources and capacities to local actors will define the effectiveness and sustainability of peacebuilding on the ground. A disconnect exist between policy and practice despite lip-service paid to local ownership.

Civilian Reconstruction: The Missing Face in Peace Missions

The idea of advancing socio-economic development into conflict resolution is an important consideration for two reasons. First, unwinding armed conflict and the elaborate networks sustaining it means not only going after those involved (difficult enough as this is anyway) but also finding – and funding – alternative livelihoods. After all, peace cannot be imposed; rather, complementary efforts need to be put in place to help peacekeepers prevail over armed combatants and to create sufficient demand for peace and reform at the grass-roots level. Secondly, front-loading civilians with soldiers in unstable theatres does not only apply to providing better humanitarian assistance but also in the area of immediate assistance for reconstruction to begin.

Despite the increased quantitative and qualitative demands for civilian capabilities in peace missions, few UN-contributing states have paid sufficient attention to enhancing their civilian capacities in a systematic way. Unsurprisingly, peace missions lack adequate civilian experts – especially in reconstruction. According to Guéhenno, the armed forces tend to play a more dominant role in UN missions because they are so much easier to deploy – that is, unlike civil servants, they work under a common strategic framework, operate under a permanent budget, and have systems in place that allow for rapid deployment. Accordingly, military troops have been saddled with a disproportionate share of the post-conflict burden, even though they lack formal training to provide essential socio-economic services, and have battled to produce a tangible peace dividend to host populations.

Apart from extensive reliance on the myriad of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to carry out peacebuilding-related activities (their track record, however, is mixed), a significant outcome of the ‘civilian
gap’ in peace missions has been an increasingly strong international shift towards private sector contracting. For some, the participation of private contractors in peace operations is a negative development in the realm of peace and security. Typically, individuals and companies are blamed for instigating and intensifying wars, selling weapons to warring factions, or providing logistical support to actors in conflicts for purely economic ends. Others believe that private companies are reliable, effective and rapidly deployable, and hence capable of curting the malicious activities of insurgents and creating the ideal conditions for economic recovery and democratization. Nonetheless, contractors will continue to be hired in the global market, especially by actors that depend on donor countries, which, in turn, regularly outsource private companies to provide logistical support. It is more effective to draw on the relative capabilities of both the public and private sectors and recognise the complementary benefits of using both from the outset of a peace mission.

Addressing this challenge requires tackling the problem of independent action in the field and ensuring that all actors – UN and non-UN – in the mission area work together under an overall political-strategic framework. To this end, the UN has already taken significant steps towards improving in-house coordination of military and civilian assets on the ground in line with the emerging ‘integrated missions’ concept.

Secondly, the civilian component of peace missions must be bolstered to improve rapid response capabilities. In this regard, the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is exploring ways of improving in-house rapid deployment for mission start-up and reconstruction, inter alia through the development of a roster of approximately 1 000–1 500 career officials that would provide DPKO with a reliable pool of experienced personnel, able to deploy at short notice to fill core mission positions. To support this drive for improved rapid deployment, DPKO’s roster initiative also includes attempts to draw experts from member states and agencies to complement UN staff in the field. Unfortunately, this process has been met by uncertain commitment and insufficient buy-in, not least because the majority of member states do not have any systems in place to systematically identify experts from within or outside government. In fact, one can only doubt whether the UN will be able to field a reliable civilian capacity for peacebuilding if member states themselves lack appropriate standby or permanent arrangements.

The reasons for this lack of investment are not hard to find. The more obvious of these, perhaps, is that protecting the national interest has always been more
important than responding to international humanitarian crisis. In other words, why bother developing or enhancing national capabilities for peacebuilding when outside humanitarian concerns do not directly threaten the national interest? When such concerns threaten national security, a basic operational principle underpinning peacekeeping has been to achieve military stability. That is, if security is a prerequisite for development, why should state institutions concern themselves with providing humanitarian and developmental assistance when donor agencies can probably do a better job? The net effects of these and other issues can be summarised as follows: first, reconstruction has not been regarded as a core function of government; second, accumulated expertise has been dissipated, important lessons forgotten, and experienced personnel not retained for future missions; and third, civil servants – that is, apart from the military – have lacked mechanisms to study prior peace efforts, to draw appropriate lessons, and to integrate these into future planning.

To be fair, the urgency to strengthen the level of civilian capacity deployed in peace missions has of late gained currency amongst states and regional organisations. Arguably, Iraq has been the primary catalyst for increased strategic debate concerning improved civilian capabilities. More specifically, Iraq has shown the importance of increasing institutional capacity and investing in appropriate skills and technologies that would enable the rapid deployment of qualified civilian personnel abroad.

Thirdly, the need for civilians to match military capability and deployment should also be accompanied by the need to correctly sequence and synergise military and civilian tasks. On the ground, different agencies and institutions will invariably play different roles and take priority across the spectrum of conflict. The armed forces will necessarily play a lead role in providing initial security in a state. As security improves civilian agencies will progressively move to the forefront of the reconstruction process. This begs the question: after major military operations, when is the ‘golden’ period for reconstruction? Although this is a particular issue that requires further analysis, it suffices to say that planners must consider two interrelated points: first, safe security environments are a necessary but not sufficient ingredient for enduring stability; second, persistent conditions of insecurity prevent sustainable reconstruction and development. Invariably, no amount of mediation or coercion will win the peace if ordinary citizens have limited access to essential services – water, electricity, and health – and little prospect of formal employment.

The current security situation in the DRC is a case in point. Soldiers inside the so-called ‘reintegration’ camps – responsible for providing security in this year’s elections in July 2006 – often rampage nearby villages for food and money because they do not get regularly paid. And while these camps seem to offer little but starvation and sometimes a wage, rebel groups are offering the same men US$60 dollars a month to carry on fighting. Meanwhile, the 17 000-strong UN mission is trying to help the DRC’s fledgling army pacify Congo’s lawless east, where militia groups continue to roam and terrorise locals. This situation, coupled with war-related hunger and poverty, has resulted in continuing abuses against the general public and may even place the DRC’s transition period at risk.

So, both the maintenance of law and order and the restoration of basic socio-economic services are critical pre-conditions for successful transition periods and long-term development. In this context, the concept of developmental peace missions seeks to challenge the traditional notion of providing peacekeeping first and then peacebuilding by mainstreaming civilian capabilities to augment the military security function and, at the same time, to properly address the unique challenges of peacebuilding and wider reconstruction efforts.

**Institutional Prerequisites**

To meet the implementation challenge of integrated or hybrid missions, UN-contributing states, like South Africa, cannot continue their ad hoc, piecemeal, and fragmented response to complex emergencies, piecing together makeshift committees or teams for each new crisis. What is needed is an overall political framework and institutional base, backed by permanent staff, for developing plans and procedures for integrated civil-military efforts. Currently, the absence of any specific coordinating entity for reconstruction within Africa’s peace and security architecture contributes to the clouding of priorities, the inefficient use of resources, and the reactive nature of responses. As such, it would be important to establish lead agencies that can provide clear strategic direction, and identify key gaps and clarify roles and responsibilities for responding to conflict and assisting with reconstruction.

To improve integration, such agencies should be endowed with sufficient authority to bring together all the relevant military and civilian agencies when a crisis emerges. In this regard, the establishment of a standing civilian corps for reconstruction will require conducting an inventory of existing capabilities and supporting technologies to determine human resource, organisational, and technical gaps for civilian reconstruction-related activities. Gaps for stability operations will invariably be addressed as Africa has many trained and experienced military peacekeepers but very few civilian experts. Nevertheless, African armed forces should transform and be ready to field the resources required to secure stability and create an enabling environment for reconstruction.
Operational Prerequisites

While the civilian reconstruction dimensions of preventing a return to conflict are increasingly acknowledged, the challenge remains to translate lofty policy commitments into effective, practical tools that can enhance Africa’s reconstruction capacity. A perennial theme for intervening forces will be to help build legitimate and sustainable local capacities and a minimally capable state. This will require, first of all, having a capacity to make assessments of reconstruction and development needs. This is important for two reasons. Up to now, needs assessments have been prepared by international agencies with limited, if any, participation of African institutions (Sudan’s Joint Assessment Missions is case in point). As a result, reconstruction frameworks have been more inclined to serve the interests and priorities of outside actors (not least the financial requirements of international private contractors) as opposed to catalyse local institution and capacity building. Secondly, assessments provide a basic starting point for considering what needs to be done, how it should be done, and who should do it. In so doing, they allow decision-makers to determine priority, precedence, timing, appropriateness, cost, and execution of reconstruction tasks. Since needs assessments determine the nature and scope of reconstruction processes, they are a key entry point for African participation in peace efforts.

Developing a capability to actually do reconstruction will invariably take more time to set up. Even so, the development of a group of civilian ‘first-responders’ will be crucial for planning as they will be able to inject greater on-the-ground realities into needs assessments. In this regard, a key task of civil-military operatives will be to decide as to the length of the time interval between initial military response and full-scale developmental assistance. An interval too short might place the lives of civilian reconstruction teams in too excessive a danger; one too long might well negate the benefits derivable from the initial military intervention. However, it is clear that an over-protective view of civilian personnel is bound to dangerously lengthen the gap between security and developmental efforts and possibly place the whole mission in jeopardy.

Conclusion

To overcome the mantra of ‘African solutions for African problems’, Africa needs permanent institutions, and not makeshift committees, plug-and-play forces, and rosters of experts, to improve integrated planning and action in peace missions. This effort will not be easy to implement on the ground, however. It will require, first, taking risks to demonstrate early tangible results in operational theatres where the mix between conflict and peace is likely to shift back and forth. Secondly, it will demand the unity of effort of the diverse military and civilian actors involved in a mission. Thirdly, it will demand establishing dedicated institutions at the national, regional, and/or continental levels to improve coordination and planning among departments and agencies (including the military) in order to mobilise the appropriate resources required for international peace missions in a timely and more consistent manner. Lastly, and this is a critical point, it will demand the creation of a standby or standing civilian reconstruction capacity that can rapidly deploy with the military to make assessments of reconstruction needs and fast-track the delivery of basic services and essential infrastructure.

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Endnotes
3 Binnendijk and Johnson, ‘Transforming for stabilisation and reconstruction operations’, op cit., p. xv. It is worth noting that US officials are increasingly using the term ‘Stability Operations’ (and Reconstruction) rather than ‘Stabilisation’ – an effort, perhaps, to underscore the military nature of trying to restore the rule of law.
4 Remarks made by Jean-Marie Guéhenno, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, at a workshop on ‘State-building and strengthening of civilian administration in post-conflict societies and failed states’, 21 June 2004, New York, hosted by the Crises Management Initiative (CMI) and the International Peace Academy (IPA).
5 On the issue of utilising private contractors on the battle-field see, for example, Peter W. Singer, ‘Outsourcing War’, Foreign Affairs, 84/2, March/April 2005, pp. 119-132.
**Introduction**

Most of the literature dealing with civil-military coordination (CIMIC) has been concerned with the relationship between humanitarian actors and their military counterparts. In the United Nations (UN) peace operations context, however, the humanitarian-military interface is only one of several civil-military relationships. Many other civil-military relationships, such as those among the military and human rights officers, electoral advisors, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) coordinators and development workers, continue throughout the life of a peace operation.

Through the years a body of policies and principles that guide civil-military relations have been developed in the United Nations and beyond. These policies and principles deal almost exclusively with civil-military coordination in humanitarian emergencies. This article analyses the question of whether a different set of principles and guidelines is required for civil-military coordination in UN peace operations, or whether the existing guidelines for civil-military relations in humanitarian emergencies can remain relevant beyond the humanitarian context.

Above: Within a peacebuilding operation, the military interacts and coordinates with a number of civilian counterparts whose character and functions are not humanitarian in nature.
UN Civil-Military Coordination

During the Cold War, most UN peace operations were ceasefire monitoring missions. Since 1989, starting with the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, the scope and complexity of peace operations have considerably broadened. In most cases since 1989, peace operations have been mandated to support the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements. This has resulted in many new tasks, aimed at assisting the host country to sustain the momentum of the peace agreement. Most of these new tasks, and the new components that have been added to carry them out, are intended to prevent the re-emergence of conflict by addressing the root causes. Thus, most new peace operations since the 1989 have been, in effect, peacebuilding operations.

In order to ensure that all these different new components work together as one coherent mission, there is a need to establish dedicated mechanisms and structures to facilitate coordination and cooperation. Several specialised coordination functions developed through the years, and within the UN military component the civil-military coordination function emerged as the focal point for coordination between the military and civilian components. UN peacebuilding operations differ from most Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), European Union (EU) and coalition operations in that: 1) they are typically consent-based operations, i.e. they are deployed after a ceasefire or peace agreement has been signed, at the request of the parties to the conflict, to support them with the implementation of the peace agreement; and 2) the military unit is deployed as part of an integrated civilian-military-police peacebuilding operation under overall civilian direction.

In the UN context, the civil-military relationship among the various multidimensional components of the peacebuilding operation and between the operation and the rest of the UN system will be pre-determined, to a large degree, by existing UN policies, and by the mandate and organisational structure of the specific UN peace operation.

The African Union (AU) and the regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), are in a somewhat similar position. The REC operations undertaken to date, for example the various operations undertaken under the auspices of ECOWAS in West Africa, have all been military operations in support of, but separate from, UN and other peace initiatives. The AU has deployed two fully fledged peace operations to date, namely the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003/4 and the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) which was deployed in 2004 and whose mandate expires on 30 September 2006. AMIB had a small political office but it was largely a military operation. AMIS has, apart from its military observers and protection force, a civilian police force and civilian units such as a humanitarian assistance and political affairs sections. The AU and RECs are developing the capacity to deploy multidimensional peace operations through the African Standby Force (ASF) initiative. Although the initiative is currently concentrating on the military and police dimensions of the ASF, it intends to add the civilian dimension in phase two of its implementation plan. The AU and RECs do not have a specific CIMIC doctrine at present.

Whereas CIMIC in NATO and EU doctrine is thus motivated by the need to establish cooperation between the military force as a separate legally mandated entity and the civilian actors in their area of operations, civil-military coordination in the UN peacebuilding operations context is motivated by the need to maximise coordination and coherence between the military component and the civilian components of the same integrated mission, between the military component and the rest of the UN system, and between the military component of the mission and other external and internal civilian actors in the same mission area.

UN Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC)

The focal point for UN humanitarian coordination policy and training in the United Nations System is the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). OCHA has, under the authority of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), facilitated the development of a series of civil-military coordination policies and guidelines. These include:
Guidelines on the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, the so-called Oslo Guidelines of May 1994;¹

The discussion paper and guidelines on the Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys of September 2001;⁴


In addition, in June 2004, the IASC adopted a reference paper on “Civil-Military Relations in Complex Emergencies” that complements and expands the principles and guidelines previously developed on the use of military and civil defence assets and armed escorts. It further provides guidance of a more general nature for civil-military coordination in humanitarian emergencies.⁶ The complex emergency guidelines and the reference paper also introduced a new abbreviation into the vocabulary, namely UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord).

From a UN peacebuilding operations perspective, it should be noted that the IASC and OCHA policies and guidelines are focused on the humanitarian dimension of civil-military coordination. Coordination between the military and humanitarian actors is one of the most prominent aspects of civil-military coordination during the humanitarian emergency. From a peacebuilding perspective, the humanitarian emergency usually occurs during the stabilisation phase and may, in some cases, even extend into the transitional phase. Civil-military coordination in the UN peacebuilding operations context can, however, not be limited to the humanitarian emergency. UN civil-military coordination takes place between the military component and all the civilian components of the UN mission and includes the civilian police (CIVPOL), other members of the UN system and all the other external and internal actors, and during all the phases (stabilisation, transitional and consolidation) of a peacebuilding operation.

**UN CIMIC and Humanitarian Assistance**

The traditional realm of civil-military coordination has been humanitarian-military coordination. As pointed out earlier, almost all the existing UN civil-military coordination policies and guidelines assume a humanitarian-military relationship and are concerned with maintaining an appropriate relationship between the two. There is a fundamental difference between humanitarian action, on the one hand, and development
action on the other, and this is a crucial distinction for the civil-military interface. Essentially, humanitarian action is focused on life-saving emergency assistance in the short to medium term, while development action is aimed at changing the structural causes of underdevelopment over the medium to long term. The former is indifferent to the causes of the humanitarian crisis. Humanitarian action is aimed at alleviating immediate suffering and mitigating future potential humanitarian emergencies. Development action is a conscious effort to address the causes of underdevelopment and is aimed at fundamentally altering the structural dynamics of the society. Development is inherently political and cannot claim to be neutral and impartial.

Humanitarian space is about protecting the former from the latter, i.e. protecting humanitarian action from political influence and interference. Humanitarian space protects the right of the victims to receive humanitarian assistance by protecting the right of humanitarian actors to have free access to the beneficiaries. If one does not emphasise and clarify this distinction then it becomes impossible to accurately delineate the role that the military can play in support of the humanitarian action. The principles and guidelines that steer the humanitarian-military interface during a humanitarian emergency that coincides with the stabilisation, and in some cases the transitional phase, of a peacebuilding operation are relatively clear. There are, however, no similar guidelines for civil-military coordination between the military component and non-humanitarian civilian actors in transitional and consolidation phases of peacebuilding operations.

UN CIMIC and Peacebuilding
Peacebuilding, like development, does not have the same neutral and impartial mandate that humanitarian action does. UN peacebuilding operations are neutral third-party interventions, in that they do not take sides among the former parties to the conflict when supporting the implementation of a peace agreement. As the peace process develops, this neutrality shifts away from a focus on the parties to a neutral guardianship of the peace process. In some exceptional circumstances, this may mean acting against one or more of the parties to safeguard the provisions of the peace agreement, but in general this implies working closely with the parties to the peace agreement in the implementation of the various stages of the peace process. This means working
closely with the newly elected government to support them in their efforts to consolidate the transition from war to peace. UN peacebuilding operations are thus not neutral and impartial in the same sense in which these concepts are used to define humanitarian action.

The use of military assets in the peacebuilding context differs from the use of military assets in the humanitarian context in that there is no assumption of independence, based on the neutrality and impartiality of the civilian peacebuilding partners. In the UN peacebuilding context, for example in a DDR or elections programme, both military and civilian partners are understood to be engaged in an activity aimed at bringing about a specific outcome that will fundamentally change the dynamics of the situation. Those opposed to an election, for instance, will be opposed to all actors that are involved in the electoral process, regardless of whether they are civilian or military. The close cooperation between military and civilian partners in the UN peacebuilding context thus does not have the same implications for the security of the civilian partners, or beneficiary population, as it would have in the humanitarian context.

Once this distinction with humanitarian action is established, it makes sense for the UN peacebuilding operation to integrate the overall management of the resources at its disposal, and in this context these kinds of military support are seen as leveraging the resources that exist within the different components of the mission, so that ultimately the UN peacebuilding operation can maximise the impact it can have on the peace process by mustering and focusing all of its available resources on a specific outcome, for example in the facilitation of a successful election.

Conclusion

We have to look beyond the existing humanitarian civil-military policies and guidelines to address the kind of UN CIMIC actions that occur alongside and beyond the humanitarian emergency phase. In the current policy vacuum, UN CIMIC action beyond the humanitarian phase is either ignored, or humanitarian-military policy guidance is erroneously applied, which has the effect of undermining the clarity and precision of the existing humanitarian policy and guidelines.

The UN should accept that military units deployed within a UN peacebuilding operation context will undertake such CIMIC-type actions, and engage them proactively so that these CIMIC actions can make a positive contribution to the overall peace process when channelled constructively. What is needed is clear policy guidance so that their resources, energy and goodwill can be positively channelled in support of the overall mission objectives and so that their UN CIMIC activities become complementary to the work undertaken by the humanitarian and development community.

These types of UN CIMIC actions should not be seen as isolated acts of community outreach by individual units, as they currently are, but rather as part of the overall mission effort in support of the peace process. They should be integrated into the larger mission effort and should be coordinated with all partners and stakeholders. The UN should develop CIMIC principles and guidelines for UN CIMIC in peacebuilding operations so that these kinds of UN CIMIC actions undertaken beyond the humanitarian realm can be positively channelled and integrated into the UN mission’s overall vision and strategy in support of the peace process.

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Endnotes

1 See for instance the UN Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) Guidelines on the Functioning of the Resident Coordinator System, 24 September 1999 and the UN Secretary-General’s Note of Guidance on Relations between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators, dated 11 December 2000.


CONFLICT OVERVIEW

Conflict in Burundi has been on-off, latent and open since the country attained independence on 1 July 1962. More than half a million people died in the years 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1991, and more than 300 000 have died since 1993 following the assassination of the democratically elected President Ndadaye Melchior. After protracted negotiations from 1996, the government of Burundi and the various armed and unarmed opposition parties signed a peace agreement in Arusha, Tanzania in August 2000. Later in 2003, the transitional government established by the 2000 Arusha Agreement signed a ceasefire agreement with the main armed opposition movement, Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie–Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD–FDD) after which this movement joined the transitional institutions. CNDD-FDD won the 2005 national assembly elections with a clear majority and its leader Pierre Nkurunziza became the president of the country.

FROM ONUB TO BINUB

The UN Mission in Burundi (ONUB) has been active since 21 May 2004, when the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, decided to authorise its deployment for an initial period of six months. ONUB is led by a Special Representative to the Secretary-General, who chairs the Implementation Monitoring Committee for the Arusha Agreement. From March 2004 through June 2006, the UN Secretary-General has submitted to the Security Council seven progress reports and one special report on the activities of the Mission and the developments in Burundi.

A report dated 21 June 2006 describes the results of collaborative planning with the government regarding future UN presence in Burundi, including plans for a downsizing of the mission’s military and civilian components. The report proposes a UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), following the end of ONUB’s mandate, which is due on 31 December 2006. BINUB (Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi) will be set up for an initial period of 12 months, commencing on 1 January 2007, and will be led by an Executive Representative of the Secretary-General, who shall also serve as the United Nations Resident Co-ordinator, Humanitarian Co-ordinator, UNDP Resident Representative and Designated Official for Security. Humanitarian and development activities of the UN Country Team would be consolidated under this integrated office.

BINUB’s Mandate

BINUB’s proposed mandate includes support to the government in ten areas. These include:

- Strengthening the capacity of national institutions to address the root causes of conflict.
- Developing a comprehensive plan for security sector reform (involving the Burundi national police, and the national army, and combating the proliferation of small and light weapons).
- Completing the programme for the demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants;
- facilitating the reintegration of returnees and internally displaced persons into their communities.
- Establishing a national human rights commission and establishing transitional justice mechanisms.
- promoting freedom of the press.
- Promoting economic growth and poverty reduction.
- Ensuring environmental protection and the prevention and management of natural catastrophes, including food security.
- helping to mobilise resources for both emergency and priority programmes.
- Longer-term activities within the framework of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.
The main challenges facing the country include rebuilding national unity and reconciliation, post-conflict reconstruction and negotiating successfully with the remaining armed movement, Partie de Libération du Peuple Hutu – Forces Nationales pour la Liberation (PALIPEHUTU-FNL). Other challenges include reforms of the security and defence forces and consolidation of national unity.

Map No. 4222   Rev. 12  
June 2006  
UNITED NATIONS  
Department of  
Peacekeeping Operations:  
Cartographic Section

ONUB STRENGTH

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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PROPOSED ADVISORY COMPOSITION OF BINUB

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<tr>
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Source: www.unburundi.org/home/docs/SG_report.pdf

Note: Figures reflect proposed international advisory officers, and it is to be complemented by an appropriate number of both national officers and UN volunteers.
The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) completed its mandate on 31 December 2005. Some of the benchmarks that were used to gauge its success included security sector reform, consolidation of state authority, reintegration of ex-combatants, and control over diamond mining, which was a financial source for the belligerents.

Following its success and subsequent termination of the mission, the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) was established by the UN Security Council on 31 August 2005 through resolution S/RES/1620. The office comprises the Executive Representative and five components targeting the key areas of the mandate. These are peace and governance, human rights and the rule of law, civilian police, military, and public information. These components are designed to assist the government of Sierra Leone in consolidating the gains already made, and in building the capacity of state institutions and developing a national action plan for human rights. They are also designed to assist in building the capacity of National Electoral Commission, strengthening the rule of law, good governance and the security sector as well as liaising with the special court for Sierra Leone. UNIOSIL represents an integrated approach in which the Executive Secretary-General’s Representative doubles as the head of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) country office.

Since the establishment of the United Nations Integrated Office, remarkable achievements have been registered in the country. These include stability, expansion of commercial activities, and progress in national reconciliation, building professional police, and the supervision of national elections which are due next year. In liaison with the UNDP, there have been initiatives to support and monitor the work of the National Electoral Commission. The peace and governance wing is also addressing the root causes of conflict in the country through its technical and financial support to the government in promoting and enhancing transparency and accountability as well as providing advice on anti-corruption measures, political and economic governance.

In matters of security, the international military advisory and training team continues to restructure and train the national armed forces in conjunction with the construction of barracks slated to be completed in early 2007. In response to HIV/AIDS, the Joint United Nations Programme has assisted the government in developing a national HIV/AIDS strategic framework for 2006–2010.

The mission is working tirelessly to ensure that the impending elections are credible and acceptable. Prior to that, there is an ongoing exercise to catalyse the slow decentralisation process in order to give the people a meaningful voice. In addition, special efforts are directed to addressing internal and external security risks as a way of strengthening the stability of the country. In the interest of the international community, there are modalities to track widespread corruption to avert situations that might derail the prevailing stability.

Reform of the justice sector has also been slow, and the structural weaknesses continue to pose a great challenge to the consolidation of peace. In spite of the trends, the United Nation has, and continues to facilitate the sector in training and deploying resident magistrates in various districts. This has led to the reduction of case backlogs and delayed and prolonged pre-trial detentions. Some improvements in infrastructure have resulted in the building of court houses and prisons.

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### UNIOSIL

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<th><strong>Duration</strong></th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cost</strong></td>
<td>US$ 23,3 million for 2006</td>
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</table>
**CHALLENGES**

Despite the positive developments in the country, Sierra Leone still faces the challenge of large numbers of unemployed youth, inadequate capacity in state institutions, extreme poverty levels with 68% of the population below the poverty line, and fragile security in the region. Illegal diamond mining and trading, and the intermittent encroachment of the armed forces of Guinea on land in the east and northern provinces of Sierra Leone pose a great danger to the security of the country.

**Endnotes**

1 Available at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/477/15/PDF/N0547715.pdf?OpenElement>.
4 First report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone.

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**UNAMSIL STRENGTH**

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<td>UN Volunteers</td>
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The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (in Spanish: Misión de las Naciones Unidas para la Organización del Referéndum en el Sáhara Occidental – MINURSO) was deployed into Western Sahara in 1991 to oversee a speedy settlement of the long-running dispute over the status of the territory. However, the Mission has been unable to implement key parts of its mandate. The conflict in Western Sahara stems from a disagreement over the status of the area, which Morocco sees as a part of its own territory. This claim has been opposed militarily and politically by the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), which waged a guerrilla war against Morocco until the early 1990s. In spite of the current ceasefire, both sides continue to be at loggerheads over the issue.

MINURSO was established by Security Council Resolution 690 (1991) to implement a settlement plan that had been previously accepted by parties to the conflict. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General was to organise a referendum that was to determine the final status of the territory. In this task, he was to be aided by MINURSO, a support team of civilian and military personnel.

At full strength, MINURSO was supposed to deploy almost 1,000 civilian, 1,700 military personnel and 300 police officers and the referendum was scheduled to take place as early as January 1992. However, the mission never fully deployed and the mandated tasks have been pursued with varying rates of success. While the ceasefire has been observed and prisoners of war have been exchanged, progress on other issues slowed down or foundered altogether for lack of cooperation by the conflicting parties. The last prisoners of war were released in 2005, and MINURSO has also made progress in locating unexploded ammunition. However, the referendum that was to settle the dispute has not been organised. The first stumbling block turned out to be the criteria governing eligibility to vote in the ballot. The voter identification process went through a number of setbacks and, in 1996, it came to a halt and the majority of civilian staff, including civilian police, were withdrawn. The process re-started in 1997 and was finally completed in 2004, 14 years after it began. However, the voter register is still in the UN compound in Geneva, and the parties are yet to agree on the options to be offered in the ballot. In April 2004, Morocco refused to consent to a referendum that would offer independence as one of the possible outcomes.

Attempts to revive the peace process in the late 1990s and early 2000s by the UN Special Envoy, the former US Secretary of State, James Baker, proved unsuccessful. Increasingly frustrated with the continued impasse, James Baker resigned from his position as the UN Special Envoy to the region in 2004. The intractability of the situation was again confirmed in January 2006, when Peter van Walsum, the Secretary-General’s new Special Envoy, publicly stated that he was sceptical about the dispute being resolved within the coming 12 months.

The Security Council has been periodically prolonging MINURSO’s mandate for a number of years and by Resolution 1675 of 29 April 2006, the Security Council extended the mission’s presence until 31 October 2006. In his report of April 2006, the Secretary-General praised the mission’s ceasefire monitoring function as a significant stabilising factor. However, in the absence of political will to settle the dispute, MINURSO is unlikely to be able to fully execute its mandate. With the referendum remaining a ‘distant dream’, further extensions of the 14-year-old mission are more than likely.

### MINURSO STRENGTH

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<tr>
<td>UN Volunteers</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

MINURSO was mandated to:

- monitor the ceasefire;
- verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in the territory;
- monitor the confinement of Moroccan and Frente POLISARIO troops to designated locations;
- take steps with the parties to ensure the release of all Western Saharan political prisoners or detainees;
- oversee the exchange of prisoners of war (to be implemented by ICRC);
- repatriate the refugees of Western Sahara (to be carried out by UNHCR);
- identify and register qualified voters;
- organise and ensure a free and fair referendum and proclaim the results;
- reduce the threat of unexploded ordinances and mines.

References
UN News [http://www.un.org/News/]
MINURSO Website [http://www.minurso.unlb.org/]
BBC News [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news]
The United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) was established by Security Council Resolution 1528 of 27 February 2004 and subsequently developed by Security Council Resolution 1609 of June 2005. UNOCI and the French forces mandate which support it has been extended to 15 December 2006. With a total strength of 7,806 and a total budget of US$438.37 million for the financial year 1 July 2006 – 30 June 2007, the Mission’s mandate includes providing humanitarian operations support, implementing the peace process, and assisting in the area of human rights, dissemination of public information and humanitarian needs.

UNOCI has been contributing towards national consensus through facilitating political dialogue, a development that culminated in the Yamoussoukro meeting attended by the top Ivorian political leadership. The meeting aimed at removing impediments to the democratic route. The Mission has also been organising round table discussions aimed at ameliorating violence and human rights abuses as the nation prepares for the October 2006 poll. This programme, which involves a cross-section of political actors, aims to end all violent acts including summary executions, extra-judicial killings, and violence against women. Furthermore, the dialogues seek to facilitate consultation and consensus on major issues relating to the forthcoming elections as well as preparing political actors on post-conflict challenges. One such major multi-stakeholder dialogue has focused on the role and functions of an Independent Electoral Commission in a polarised society.

Outside the political realm, the Mission has undertaken various projects aimed at benefiting the communities. These include assistance to schools, access to the UNOCI compound’s hospital by the public, and reconstruction of more than 35 kilometres of road by the Mission’s engineers. These projects are benefiting Ivorians in the medium to long term. In the education sector, UNOCI has provided security and logistical support for the end of cycle school examinations in the north, where students lost the opportunity for the past three years. The Mission transported examination papers and scripts from Abidjan to various examination centres. In addition, UNOCI civilian staff and officials assisted as observers during the examinations period.

UNOCI troop patrols provide security to the population. In the zone of confidence, for instance, troop patrols average between 80 and 100 a day. The troops have also been visiting people in towns and villages, giving them confidence and informing them not only about the ceasefire, but also about their post-conflict life. In this way, the Mission has been contributing to the free circulation of goods and people. The security provisions benefit large segments of the population such as rural farmers, informal economic agents and formal economic entities. The Sucreivoire sugar factory, for example, has boosted its production capacity for the first time in three years while in some cases, soldiers share their daily food provisions with the local residents, a gesture that brightens citizens’ hope for “a possible post-conflict harmonious existence across the political divide”.

The professional civilian police, whose mandate is to assist authorities in implementing law and order in the country, have been closely working with their local counterparts to whom they offer expertise, practical advice and support. This gives confidence to the local police force as well as building capacity for future policing.

<table>
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work. Success in this respect has been determined by existing policing infrastructure. However, non-existent or damaged policing infrastructure coupled with absenteeism of officials in the zone of confidence has limited benefits to the local police force and the communities. In some cities, UNOCI police force has been involved in environment clean-up campaigns aimed at clearing mountains of rubbish.

UNOCI, however, continue to face security challenges relating to several thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs), some of whom are refusing to return home due to fear.
Introduction

In conflict and post-conflict societies, the media acts to socialise – complementing and often substituting for a lack of other capable institutions. In addition to its informational utility, the media is a source of entertainment; it has the capacity to integrate, amuse and offer continuity. This makes the media and public information (PI) a very powerful tool of conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding.

It is commonly accepted that programmes such as supporting the rule of law, reforming the security sector, and planning for democratic elections are mission critical to contemporary multi-dimensional peace operations. Such initiatives may well take precedence as core elements of the peace process or war to peace transition. However, peace operations have increasingly become dependent upon the derivation and perpetuation of the consent of local populations for a political process. The
ubiquity and utility of the media as a tool to promote, assist and implement such programmes is something that cannot be under-valued.

The Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations recently emphasised that “Peacekeeping is the culmination, not the replacement, of a political process. It can never be a reaction to a policy vacuum.” In contrast, the rationale underpinning PI within peace operations is often the need for a response to an information vacuum, or at least, a context where credible information is lacking. The political process at the heart of modern peacekeeping is inherently reliant on the support of the local population. It is, therefore, in deriving consent from this audience for a political process that PI has become a critical component of contemporary peacekeeping.

Due to the proliferation of intra-state conflict since the early 1990s, West Africa has become a prime training ground for peacekeepers in the field and a learning experience of equal, if not greater, magnitude for those tasked with the design and development of peacekeeping operations at the structural level. The role and development of PI in the United Nations Missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia (UNAMSIL and UNMIL respectively) epitomises this. The application of PI in these missions has been characterised by innovation and creativity – in what can arguably be considered a revolutionary period in the evolution of PI in peace missions.

**PI in UNAMSIL and UNMIL**

The media environment in conflict scenarios, such as in Sierra Leone and Liberia, is severely degraded. By the time the UN missions deployed, for instance, media infrastructure was largely destroyed. The constraints to output were exacerbated by economic constraints and centralised or partisan ownership and control as well as an absence of reliable electricity supply. The industry professionals also were mismanaged, disorganised and untrained. This created a climate where rumours and falsehoods were rife and enduring. The societies were characterised by high illiteracy rates, of 75-80%, and crippling unemployment in densely populated urban areas, whilst sparsely populated rural areas were inaccessible for mainstream media. This presented a huge information gap.

Drawing upon the most effective media approaches, it is such an informational gap that a PI component in a peace operation must utilise and work within. It is the design, management and implementation of PI that oils the peacekeeping machine, and establishes its credibility and legitimacy in the field and further abroad. The PI section has historically been a tool for a mission to manage its relations with UN Headquarters (HQ) and, via the world’s media, look outwards to international audiences. The most fundamental development in PI in UNAMSIL and UNMIL has been the extent to which the perception of its priority target audience has changed. Conflict in Sierra Leone and Liberia affected the majority of the population, and it is this majority that are at the centre of successful societal reconstruction. Hence, in its assistance role, it is essential that the mission has a means of accessing them. Although international audiences remain important to the life of the mission, it has become clear that PI’s priority function is to reach out to the local population and it is this realisation that has dramatically altered the way in which PI is processed.

Nevertheless, categorical support for the mission and the peace process remains the overarching goal and obligation for PI in peacekeeping. Maintaining and cultivating links with the spectrum of media actors is important for the continued recognition of the mission in the mass media, which in turn helps to derive and perpetuate the necessary consent and support from troop contributing countries (TCCs) and member states. The experiences of UNAMSIL preceding the hostage crisis of May 2000 highlighted how failing to manage
the local population’s expectations can exacerbate any negative perceptions of credibility and severely hamper the abilities of the mission to carry out its mandate. The reworked PI in UNAMSIL and subsequent application of those lessons in UNMIL showed how a proactive and context-sensitive approach to disseminating the mission’s purpose and mandate from the very beginning is likely to be significant in reaching the necessary audiences and supporting an environment conducive to mission success.

Many of the PI strategies employed in UNAMSIL and UNMIL are reminiscent of outputs visible in previous missions, tailored to suit the unique informational challenges inherent in these conflicts situations. However, the level of innovation and creativity shown within the parameters of existing concepts and methodology has been unprecedented since the inception 17 years ago.

**Radio Unit**

Since it was pioneered in the United Nations Transitional Authority Cambodia (UNTAC), radio has played an important role in PI’s ability to support peacekeeping missions. But the radio stations in UNAMSIL and UNMIL highlight how, given the lowest of literacy rates, the lack of access to other mainstream media and a thirst for information deemed credible, a mission radio station can be critical to the success of PI strategy – providing a fast, effective and economical medium for disseminating information over a relatively large geographical space. Existing radio stations based in Sierra Leone and Liberia use limited FM or short-wave transmission. Both UNAMSIL and UNMIL radios, however, utilise the technological advantage gained by FM transmission and frequency boosters situated around the country. This provided the missions with an increasing breadth of coverage, culminating in UNMIL radio currently covering approximately 95% of Liberian territory on FM frequencies which are of a good quality and are relatively easy to find.

The use of numerous local languages and dialects alongside official languages in programming has acted to swell audiences and produce a sensibility which indisputably aids the development of a relationship between the receiver and the sender. Operating for 24 hours a day and seven days a week has enabled PI-strategy to exploit the behavioural patterns of
ex-combatants congregating and listening to radio late at night and hence strategise a targeted sensitisation campaign on disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation during those hours.

**Community Outreach Unit**

The success of radio initiatives is fundamentally dependent on the ability to receive them. In both Sierra Leone and Liberia, there were significant donations of non-battery wind-up radios by various NGOs. Despite this, there were still many locations where a radio, wind-up or otherwise, remained a luxury and hence the wide reach of radio was at times not possible. Community outreach (CO) essentially describes the collection of techniques employed by PI components to target those groups indifferent towards or out of reach of radio programming and other media available to PI. It is easy to forget that:

People in conflict zones, even refugees, continue to go about their usual lives, perhaps in a more circumscribed way, but they still listen to and make music, dance, laugh at cartoons and TV comedies, tell stories and exchange ideas with a neighbour. They form their own opinions by sifting carefully through all the information and opinion gathered from these different sources. Life doesn’t begin and end with news and current affairs. In fact, in most conflict zones people quickly grow tired of political speeches, debates, and reports of more violence – the subject of the albeit very important current affairs programmes. Listeners tune out and lose hope, seeking solace in radio or TV drama and music programmes.²

The Community Liaison and Public Outreach Unit in UNAMSIL employed theatre groups, traditional dance troupes and musicians to perform dramas, comedies, dances and songs in local languages explaining the mission mandate, the areas of deployment and the workings of the DDRR programme to grassroots audiences across the country. These events produced some of the most symbolic turning points in the life of the mission. One of the most significant occasions was a peace concert organised by Community Outreach with famous Sierra Leonean musicians in Makeni, the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF) HQ and strong-hold, bringing together ten government ministers who were sitting side by side with RUF leaders. The climax saw representatives from the government, UNAMSIL and the RUF on stage singing and dancing together. As well as breaking some of the tension between these important actors, the symbolism for the people of Makeni and all those who saw media coverage of it after the event was clear.³

The UNMIL Community Outreach Unit built upon the successes in UNAMSIL, moving on to even greater accomplishment and support for the mission. In addition to the awareness raising events using theatre, dance, music and other traditional media, CO innovated further to devise football tournaments bringing together ex-combatants, peace concerts, the production of reconciliatory music albums as well as quiz competitions and high-school debates on peace and reconciliation.
A recent initiative pioneered in January 2006 was to link up with the mobile phone networks and send out SMS-text messages to Liberian mobile phone users on the issue of rape and gender-based violence. Of an estimated post-war population of 3 million, this method reaches approximately 500,000 people, 80% of whom are 18 years old and above. The persistent inventiveness in reaching target audiences is how CO maintains its currency and value.

One of the most interesting developments in CO is its propensity to engage with the population and work with civil society. It puts a human face to the mission and this engagement with civil society has helped to develop relationships with a wide range of community leaders such as local NGOs, religious institutions and youth networks. This has cultivated an inclusive process whereby the mission can overtly avoid prescription and allow civil society to take the initiative. In addition to facilitating outreach events and programmes, this opens up a host of informal networks, through which information is moved at a rapid rate.

Lessons

The experiences of UNAMSIL and UNMIL have established the status and worth of public information as a mission critical function, essential for the effective pursuit of wider mission goals and objectives. It is important to stress the value of synergy and unit complementarities to the results witnessed in UNAMSIL and UNMIL Public Information. For example, the CO team could not be so successful without taking along boxes full of message-emblazoned leaflets, fliers, posters and t-shirts produced through the Publications Unit; TV and Video Unit big-screens for showing civic education documentaries; the Radio Unit’s technical equipment; at a site arranged, planned and promoted by the Regional PI Officers; managed and overseen by the Media and External Relations Unit; based upon the demand for sensitisation and education derived from the work of the Media Monitoring Unit. It takes a comprehensive and holistic approach to make these things work and the development of management and organisational systems has significantly improved the efficacy of PI work.

Moreover, the transfer of human resources from UNAMSIL to UNMIL brought with it a level of experience and understanding of the regional media and informational context from a neighbouring West African country. There is great value in formalising and conceptualising what was bundled up in this transfer to ensure that the
successes of these missions are not simply lost with these personnel. It is essential that lessons are learned in this personality-driven area of output methodology and strategy of PI as well as noting the lessons learned with regard to pre-deployment planning, resource requirements and organisational structure.

Challenges and Opportunities

The PI components in UNAMSIL and UNMIL have pushed the envelope significantly in support of a broad range of mission objectives and the broader peace process. It is, however, important to recognise and appreciate the by-products, consequences and opportunities the expansion of PI has produced for the local media industry, the mission itself and the likelihood for sustainable peace. In the pursuit of socially responsible peacekeeping operations, it is important that missions aim to minimise the negative consequences that may result from the depth of the footprint left in their wake. The revolution in PI during UNAMSIL and UNMIL has undoubtedly improved the ability of the

A MISSION RADIO STATION CAN BE CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF A PUBLIC INFORMATION STRATEGY – PROVIDING A FAST, EFFECTIVE AND ECONOMICAL MEDIUM FOR DISSEMINATING INFORMATION OVER A RELATIVELY LARGE GEOGRAPHICAL SPACE

mission to address the existing obstacles to conscientious PI. It has, however, simultaneously exposed how the expanded function of PI in these missions has itself created new and diverse challenges.

If PI is increasingly visible and audible as a force for peace, then it is necessary for those who plan and develop the PI concept to appreciate the need for justifiable and accountable methodology amidst questions about the credibility, utility and morality of peace propaganda. It must also look to build the capacity for monitoring its own efficacy and making better use of the access PI initiatives provide to grassroots populations and the spontaneous feedback civil society provides.

The increasing involvement of PI in media development, training and the transition of some components from a PI vehicle to a communication tool has dramatically altered the way in which PI is used in peacekeeping operations. In the absence of a comprehensive collective approach to peacebuilding, PI components must continue to engage in partnerships with other actors in the field to optimise the support PI in peacekeeping can offer in the earliest days of post-conflict media development and laying the foundations for longer-term peacebuilding.

A PI component will inevitably have both positive and negative impacts on the local media infrastructure. What is vital is that there is a proactive and predictive approach to the potential effect and controlling the depth of the footprint. This will support the eventual process of moulding the contours of the post-mission PI legacy and the prospects for the post-conflict media environment. Just as people need information and continue to engage with media throughout conflict, the end of the mission is no different. If an information space has been created by the mission’s PI presence and then evacuated, it is inevitable that something else will fill it.

The emergence of UN radio and the development of community linkages through outreach demand a systematic approach to a PI exit strategy. The United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) will provide a good example of how the absorption by the political mission and eventual handover of the radio station works in the post-mission environment and, as has so often been the case; UNMIL PI will benefit directly from this experience. Although it is beyond the limit of

the peacekeeping mission by definition, it is prudent for the peacekeeping organisation to ensure the investment made by the mission in technologies, human expertise and networks is not lost or left to decay. The implementation of peace agreements and the realisation of durable peace go far beyond the withdrawal of the peacekeeping mission and the PI concept must learn from and formalise exit strategies which are of greatest benefit to the media environment which it leaves behind.

Conclusions

As the functions of PI expand and multiply, it is vital that the organisational concept keeps pace and that provisions are made for the increased responsibilities. Whilst accepting that its re-application will be unique, the evolution of peacekeeping is fundamentally dependent on learning lessons and maintaining progressive momentum as a result. As PI becomes increasingly mission critical, it is only by formalising and eventually institutionalising experience and PI wisdom that future missions, particularly those in the sub-region or displaying similar characteristics in the media and
THE APPLICATION OF PUBLIC INFORMATION IN UNAMSIL AND UNMIL HAS BEEN CHARACTERISED BY INNOVATION AND CREATIVITY IN WHAT CAN ARGUABLY BE CONSIDERED A REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC INFORMATION IN PEACE MISSIONS

information environment, can benefit and peacekeeping organisations can guarantee institutional learning.

Although two UN missions in West Africa have been the primary focus of analysis, it should be noted that many of the core lessons that have emerged are also applicable to the broader African peace support environment. In particular, the mission critical nature of PI should be accepted and embraced by those who are working to establish multi-dimensional African peacekeeping capabilities at the continental and the regional levels. In the pursuit of any mission’s end state – sustainable peace – and the concomitant goals of credible democracy, rule of law and economic development, it is clear that a socially responsible and fully capable PI component is a sine qua non for effective peace operations. Indeed, it must be considered as a mission critical component of all future operations.

The politics of peacekeeping may continue to restrict the extent to which there can be an integrated approach towards supporting the reconstruction and development of the post-conflict media environment. It is, however, by learning from previous experiences; pushing the envelope with each new opportunity; engaging in mutually beneficial partnerships and laying solid foundations that a PI component in a peace operation can credibly claim to strive for durable peace rather than an exit strategy.

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Endnotes


2 The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established under UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1270 of 22 October 1999 to cooperate with the government and other parties in implementing the Lomé Peace Agreement and to assist in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration plan. At its peak, on 31 March 2002, deployment represented the largest peace operation in the world and comprised 17,368 military personnel including 260 military observers; 87 UN Police; 322 international and 552 local civilian staff.

3 The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was authorised on 19 September 2003, under UNSCR 1509 to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the peace process; protect United Nations staff, facilities and civilians; support humanitarian and human rights activities; as well as assist in national security reform, including national police training and formation of a new, restructured military. As of 30 April 2006 there were 15,891 uniformed personnel, including 14,656 troops and 184 military observers; 1,051 police supported by 506 international civilian personnel, 747 local staff and 262 United Nations volunteers.

4 Interview: Mr Luiz De Costa, UNMIL Deputy Special Representative Secretary-General for Operations and Rule of Law, Monrovia, Liberia, 9 March 2006.


6 In May 2000, the mission nearly collapsed when the rebel RUF kidnapped hundreds of peacekeepers and renounced the ceasefire in a move that endangered the credibility of UN peacekeeping.


10 Interview: Mr Kingsley Ighobor, UNMIL Head of Community Outreach, Monrovia, Liberia, 9 March 2006. Kingsley was also Head of the Community Liaison and Public Outreach Unit in UNAMSIL.
Introduction

There is growing consensus that local institutions and abilities are important role players in the integrated disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants. Local institutions such as churches, traditional leaders, and civil society groupings may facilitate or hinder the process by their cooperation or opposition alone. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations (UN) agency that assists post-conflict polities with DDR through its wide array of country offices, states that: “Communities play a central role in the reintegration of ex-combatants as they are the main agent of its success. Ultimately it is communities that will, or will not, reintegrate ex-combatants. The DDR programme is a means to support communities in their efforts to reintegrate some of their members. It is good practice to involve families, traditional and religious leaders, women and youth groups, and other local associations in planning the return of ex-combatants.”

Above: A former rebel explaining the DDR process to his comrades in Bouake, Ivory Coast.

A PARTICIPATORY APPROACH TO DDR: EMPOWERING LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND ABILITIES

WRITTEN BY GWINYAYI ALBERT DZINESA
The UNDP endeavours to help design DDR processes within the context of its other local and national recovery and development strategies. It adopted the conflict-related development analysis (CDA) tool to craft and implement conflict-sensitive and sustainable programmes in partnership with local counterparts who have a strong understanding of the specific political and social contexts in which DDR pans out. This article assesses how comprehensive community-oriented DDR optimises opportunities for successful reintegration of former combatants alongside broader post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction. In the first part it locates local institutions and abilities in the post-conflict DDR process. It then draws on practical examples to demonstrate how effective involvement of local institutions has assisted the responsible management of weapons and sustainable reintegration of former combatants to substantially reduce the chance of armed violence recurring. An examination of how these institutions and communities can be enhanced to ensure the confidence and workability of DDR constitutes the third part. A brief summary of the main arguments rounds off the paper.

**Locating Local Institutions and Abilities in DDR**

DDR is a collective function that entails cooperation by a wide array of stakeholders throughout its lifespan. Internal actors include parties to the conflict (non signatories); beneficiaries (demobilised fighters, their dependents and war veterans’ associations); communities (civil society, community leaders, religious organisations and other local social networks); and local humanitarian development workers and nongovernmental organisations. Also included in internal actors are media (as information campaigns build public confidence in DDR processes and foster reconciliation); national and local authorities; national DDR bodies (existing security forces and existing police force or service); and the local business community. Included in the external actors are security actors; political and diplomatic actors (regional/international actors); the UN and its Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO); humanitarian and development actors, and the World Bank; and donor community. There is no “one-size-fits-all” DDR model and these actors have co-acted differently depending on country-specific contexts. Local institutions and communities are closest to and have a strong knowledge of the localised DDR operational environment. They are as important as the other stakeholders and their participation in the design and implementation of DDR strategies cannot be wished away. The UN recognises this as part of its “light footprint” approach that places great priority on the development of local capacities in peace support operations and by inclination DDR.
The Role of Local Institutions and Abilities in DDR

Local actors have a particular inherent comparative advantage over central government and the other external stakeholders. Where they have been called to productively assist with DDR they have not disappointed. DDR, and in particular the last “R” – reintegration – occurs in a localised setting. Communities, civil society and local population and media understand the local realities and their vital role in contextualising DDR should be examined by the implementers.

Local institutions have the advantage of proximity to the formerly warring parties. They are on the ground to help handle DDR problems at the local level in the broader post-conflict peacebuilding paradigm. In addition to their grassroots touch, local authorities also enjoy mutual communication with higher policy levels. The support of the local community can enable disarmament. In Sierra Leone, paramount chiefs helped local authorities to identify armed groups, locate arms and facilitate their voluntary surrender, thereby greatly assisting the disarmament process.

Effective disarmament is also reliant on the involvement of the local communities in addition to the political will and commitment of the parties to the conflict. Weapons may also have some legitimacy in certain localities entailing that some may need to be registered after initial surrender before their return to certain members of society. Local women have also been active agents for the location and surrender of weapons in the broader post-conflict disarmament context.

Local institutions and social networks such as churches, NGOs, veterans’ associations, farmers associations, and women’s and youth groups can provide contextualised post-discharge orientation at crucial phases of the former combatants’ inclusion into society. In Sierra Leone’s context the nationwide, community-based, informal education initiative – Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace (YRTEP) – established by concerned youths to act as a “go-between” between the youths and community elders greatly facilitated the hitherto ominous reintegration of former combatants and war-affected youth into their communities.

Traditional institutions have also assisted with psychosocial support, healing and reconciliation. Numerous examples abound where their capability to carry out irreplaceable rituals or rites of passage has assisted the reintegration stage in particular. In post-conflict Mozambique, traditional healing and reconciliation practices were employed to facilitate the reintegration of combatants, especially child soldiers, into their communities. The community-based traditional justice and reconciliation system known as gacaca was used in Rwanda to try perpetrators of the 1994 genocide, and to determine some reparations in efforts to facilitate their readmission into their societies as untainted members.

Land is usually one component of long-term reintegration assistance. Local communities and traditional authorities can intervene in the land allocation or resettlement process. In Angola’s latest DDR process, these were earmarked to play a role in the identification of land for the beneficiaries in an effort to make the process as representative as possible. Local authorities can thus assist the ex-combatants to become agents for local progress and change.

Developing Local Assets for DDR

DDR is just one of a broad collection of peacebuilding measures. It should be planned and closely coordinated with the broader political and reconstruction effort. Notwithstanding their appropriate location to support DDR, local institutions and capabilities are no means immune to the ravages of the preceding conflict. It is, therefore, important that they be rehabilitated to empower them with capacities to assist with the implementation of development activities at local levels as part of the integrated DDR that places greater emphasis on the long-term humanitarian and developmental impacts of the process.

Local institutions and abilities should be provided with optimal capacity to unlock their unquestionable
potential to assist in DDR. This is crucial for the long-term success of the process against the backdrop of the usually time-specific external engagement with the process. Reintegration localities facilitate or impede the process by socially accepting or denying the former combatants. Information is golden and local institutions and communities should procedurally be informed about the purpose and objectives of any DDR process for them to progressively support the process from the onset. Engaging the local population and structures from the outset also affords them the chance to give their input and influence the process and its outcomes. A public awareness and information campaign can deflate the chances of an aura of fear and insecurity gripping the communities. This can shore up support and confidence of the local institutions for DDR. In the end, local ownership of DDR breeds a certain legitimacy of the process.

Outreach to the local institutions and communities through a coherent publicity and sensitisation mechanism should extend throughout the process. For instance, the DDR implementers should communicate the erstwhile belligerent parties’ agreement to DDR in a timely manner, encourage the combatants to submit to the process, and transparently give progress updates. The local institutions and civil society organisations could also turn into focal points for providing information on or disseminating information to outlaying locations. Radio Okapi, established under the United Nations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) context, presents an example of how a logical public communications strategy can enhance the confidence of the ex-combatants and broader local population.

In order for the local authorities and institutions to effectively assist with DDR their legitimacy must not be contested in the eyes of the local population. This could be achieved by linking local elections with the broader political reconstruction. An elected or credible local administrative culture that has public support will stand in good stead to sustain any DDR related tasks. The United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) experienced short-lived success in developing disarmament alongside the restoration of local government structures after the peace agreement of March 1993. But the process stalled after General Mohamed Farah Aideed’s factional forces’ attacked Pakistani peacekeepers. The civil affairs component of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) assisted with restoring the war-torn country’s local governance infrastructure to facilitate credible governance and economic development.

War destroys the socio-economic base of communities thus undermining community services. Local capacity-building in DDR resonates with the progressive balancing of post-conflict support for the ex-combatants and the broader society which is also expected to host them. Also, in the context of long-term reintegration there should be a quick shift from former combatant specific programmes to community-based and broader national reconstruction and development programmes. This mitigates the dangerous perception of ex-combatants as a special group, which could create resentment from the wider community thus defeating the essence of DDR. The broader reconstruction efforts should embrace the rebuilding of essential local infrastructure such as schools, transport and communications, and religious and medical amenities.

LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS SUCH AS CHURCHES, NGOS, VETERANS’ ASSOCIATIONS, FARMERS ASSOCIATIONS, AND WOMEN’S AND YOUTH GROUPS CAN PROVIDE CONTEXTUALISED POST-DISCHARGE ORIENTATION AT CRUCIAL PHASES OF THE FORMER COMBATANTS’ INCLUSION INTO SOCIETY

The military skills of ex-combatants can also be harnessed in tandem with broader community-based post-war reconstruction efforts. DDR implementers could harmonise the DDR programme with the resettlement of returnees by elaborating on post-conflict landmine clearance strategies. For instance, while facilitating the return of displaced persons landmine clearance programmes could create employment opportunities for the militarily trained demobilised ex-combatants. This would also strengthen the bond and build mutual confidence between the local communities and the former combatants. The aggregate of the harmonised reintegration programmes would have positive impacts on the post-conflict peacebuilding process.

Local capacity building, including the support, empowering and training of local institutions and communities, should be planned and implemented. The development of manpower, skills and know-how should all form part of local capacity-building measures that DDR planners have to roll out. This training might productively contain specialised training for counsellors for the post-conflict peacebuilding process.
to strengthen local coping mechanisms for dealing with trauma. Former combatants would benefit from such initiatives alongside ordinary community members where intra-state violent conflict is localised.

Assisting local institutions to regain and maintain decision making and strong leadership capacity will facilitate the devolution of DDR roles in the long-term. Cultural regeneration, creativity and flexibility are also necessary to ensure longevity of local practices that foster DDR. UNAMSIL managed to innovatively create grassroots housing committees to deal with the delicate return of houses to their rightful owners occupied by former rebels as part of reconciliation and reconstruction efforts.

The strengthening of grassroots groupings like women, youth and umbrella organisations like veterans’ and farmers’ associations and local revolving fund schemes also helps to lay the groundwork for a stable and durable peace. This can be done by the implementers of DDR providing technical support to reinforce these local networks while encouraging former combatants to join up. It goes without saying that war veterans’ associations that emerge at the grassroots level within the context of the broader community are considered by the UNDP to be more responsive to the needs of former combatants than their top-down counterparts. The broader civil society should be encouraged to involve these ex-fighters’ voice-granting representative institutions in community decision matters. This augurs well for the restoration of democratic discourse that is essential for sustainable reintegration.

Sustainable societal mechanisms can be created through technical and training support. This capacity building should be linked to other external actors to facilitate sustainability. The regenerating local institutions must be linked with such support links as specialised agencies and regional organisations that are prepared to engage through the long haul. This is important for the formulation of quick-impact programmes that lay a firm foundation for long-term sustainable reintegration.

Local populations and their values have not always positively impacted DDR. This has been the case where the process was implemented against a conservative and patriarchal backdrop. In Zimbabwe female former freedom fighters faced stigma and discrimination in a society that generally expected them to revert to pre-war ‘feminine’ roles, making their post-conflict reintegration difficult. The implementers of DDR can sensitise local institutions to facilitate their reception of special target groups including female ex-combatants and ex-child soldiers. In the DRC, civil society worked closely with the UNDP and United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) to assist society’s dynamism and development of gender sensitive programmes. DDR programmes should similarly contain specific provisions for the ex-child soldiers’ sustainable livelihoods in a family-friendly and community-oriented setting.

The local communities also need to be empowered to deal progressively with the war-wounded. The society in which disabled ex-combatants reintegrates has to be involved in any psycho-social and physical rehabilitation programmes. Being disabled means anger for both the family and the ex-combatant. It raises questions whether parents, spouses and siblings will easily accept disabled ex-combatant sons and daughters and whether both parents and the disabled ex-combatants cope with their new situations. In all this there arises an expectation from both the parents and disabled ex-combatants for grassroots-based rehabilitation.

**Conclusion**

Decentralised DDR makes sense by involving the beneficiary former combatants and their communities. DDR is a collective function. Local institutions and abilities can certainly assist the macro-management of DDR. The community would not feel cut off from a vital post-conflict peacebuilding process while simultaneously lending immediacy to DDR. While they are a crucial component of any DDR project they are no substitute for the equally indispensable partner actors and have to be capacitated and operationalised in a coordinated, cooperative and sustainable way. Since local institutions and capabilities often emerge bruised from conflict, tools and capacities to support DDR – human, financial, technical and material – must be invested in them.

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**Endnotes**

1. UNDP, Practice Note: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants, p. 37.
3. See Ibid.
“United Nations peacekeeping is a noble calling and serves as an integral part of the world’s efforts to maintain peace and security. Sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping personnel must first be eliminated and then prevented from happening again” (UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan).

Introduction

In 2004 world media exposed cases related to sexual exploitation and other forms of abuses committed by the UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The reports were not new, however. The UN has received documentation detailing human rights violations perpetrated by peacekeepers in missions in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, and others.

Below: Gender-based violence is a violation of their human rights.
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Guinea, East Timor, Kosovo, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Somalia.

Since the end of the Cold War, the UN peacekeeping operations have been growing fast. The nature of the missions has also changed, from traditional to multidimensional peacekeeping. Nowadays, peacekeepers (including military personnel, civilian police and civilian staff) are deployed to post-conflict situations to provide protection to populations under threat and to safeguard their rights. The irony is that in many situations peacekeepers themselves violate human rights.

The UN has been aware of this problem for a long time but it has not been until recently that the pressure associated with media coverage made a real impact. The arguments that individual behaviours cannot be regulated or controlled are no longer valid and across the UN system various reports, resolutions and recommendation papers are trying to tackle the problem. However, immediate actions have to be taken to go a step forward.

**Defining Sexual Exploitation, Sexual Abuse and Gender-Based Violence**

Sexual exploitation as defined in a Secretary-General’s Bulletin of 2003 means any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another. And sexual abuse means the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions. Both terms are acts of gender-based violence. This includes acts of physical, sexual and psychological violence such as rape, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, trafficking of women and forced prostitution, or other acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion or other deprivations of liberty. While women, men, girls and boys can be victims of gender-based violence, women and children are usually the primary victims.

**Scope of the Problem**

According to Peacekeeping Watch, violations committed by peacekeepers against civilians – in particular women and girls – first began surfacing in 1997 in UN peacekeepers mission in Somalia”. Back in 1992/3, however, the UN mission in Cambodia had already received claims against its staff for sexual misconduct. At that time the Cambodian Special Representative to the Secretary-General, Yasushi Akashi, gave little importance to the issue.

In the year 2000, new abuses involving peacekeepers working in Kosovo were made public. Investigations in Kosovo resulted not only in new cases of sexual abuse but also in information referring, for instance, to the participation of peacekeeping staff in networks of trafficked women and girls forced into prostitution. While the purchase of sex from prostitutes by peacekeepers is widely recognised as a common act, the involvement of peacekeeping operations (PKO) staff in trafficking is less pronounced but more disturbing. As stated by Amnesty International “trafficking of women for forced prostitution is an abuse of human rights, not least the right to physical and mental integrity. It violates the rights of women and girls to liberty and security of person, and may even violate their right to life. It exposes women and girls to a series of human rights abuses at the hands of traffickers, and of those who buy their services”.

As the new scandals were reaching the media, Kofi Annan commissioned a report to assess the effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping efforts. Even whole the main causes of the assignment were related to the failures associated with Srebrenica and Rwanda, the information on violations of human rights by peacekeepers was also an element eroding the PKO image.

The results of the assessment were presented in August 2000, in the Brahimi Report. The study made several recommendations. However, it does not make direct reference to the violations of human rights by peacekeepers. It only “stresses the importance of training military, police and other civilian personnel on human rights issues and on the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law”. The Bulletin provides information on violations of international humanitarian law by members of the military personnel of a UN force. In Section 7, for instance, acts such as rape, enforced prostitution, any form of sexual assault and humiliation are prohibited. Nevertheless, the members of UN forces are not bounded by this Bulletin.

Two months after the release of the Brahimi Report the Security Council adopted the famous Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. This document required Member States, the UN Secretary-General and the parties involved in armed conflicts to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence and to prosecute those responsible.

That same year (2000), military members of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) faced charges for misconduct. Nationals from Italy, Denmark and Slovenia were expelled for having sex with minors. Meanwhile, in Kosovo, a number of US soldiers were disciplined for their role in abuses of ethnic Albanians during peacekeeping duty while U.S. civilians associated with the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) were investigated for trafficking in young women, a scandal that also implicated Jordanian, Pakistani and German military troops.
At the end of 2001, allegations of sexual exploitation of refugees by humanitarian workers in West Africa illustrated a new chapter of abuses. UN peacekeepers were accused of trading access to scarce relief supplies for sex. An investigation was conducted by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services and a report was submitted to the Secretary-General in October 2002. Although the report stated that “the stories reported by the consultants could not be verified” it also said that “the problem of sexual exploitation of refugees is real” and a Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Humanitarian Crises was set up. Following this, the General Assembly requested that the Secretary-General implement remedial and preventive measures for Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations “by issuing as soon as possible his bulletin on sexual exploitation and abuse”. The specific prohibitions were set out in a bulletin of October 2003. Among others, these define the terms “sexual abuse” and “sexual exploitation”; considers them as acts of serious misconduct; and prohibit sexual activity with children and the exchange of money, employment, goods, services or assistance for sex. However, some months later, new reports emerged, this time in the DRC. The “Congo scandal” forced the UN to adopt a new approach: zero tolerance to SEA.

Gender-based Violence as a Violation of Human Rights

As stated above, gender-based violence can be directed towards women, men and children. The same could be said about violations of human rights. However, when the violation is associated with sexual violence or sexual abuse women and girls are far more vulnerable. Gender-based violence is a transgression of the principles included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. According to the UN General Assembly the violation of the human rights of women is “not limited to acts perpetrated or directly condoned by Governments, but rather that Governments bore a social and political responsibility for acts committed by third parties if they had not taken the necessary measures to prevent, investigate and punish acts of violence”. Who is accountable for the acts committed by international peacekeepers deployed to post-conflict countries?

Acts of SEA may constitute violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law or both. However, “international instruments … are applicable only to the States that have ratified them and not to any intergovernmental organisations to which those States might belong”. In this sense, the UN is not bound by international treaties. Besides, PKO are mainly formed of international military personnel (troops and military observers). They comprise almost 75% of the staff deployed in the current 15 PKOs across the world. However, linking the abuses committed with the nature of the missions and the majority of mission military staff would be a mistake. Civilian police and civilian staff (two other components of PKO) have also been charged with different kinds of abuses against the local population. The difference is that the procedures followed by the UN to investigate and prosecute a case against military personnel and civilian police are different from those followed in cases against civilian staff.

For military personnel and civilian police, the
need of institutional building could be understood as a “green card” for the abusive exercise of that power.

c The deployment of personnel with little knowledge or understanding of the local cultures and situation of humanitarian crisis related to the mission does not favour empathy towards the local population nor sensitivity to its suffering.

The UN Response after the “Congo Scandal”

Many new measures were taken after the so-called “Congo scandal”. The most important was the request by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations to make available a comprehensive report with recommendations on SEA. In July 2004, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, Permanent Representative of Jordan, was appointed to undertake its preparation. The Zeid Report was released in March 2005. It was the first comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations following the revelations of serious misconduct of UN peacekeeping personnel. The analysis of the problem and the recommendations made, addressed to the Secretariat and the Member States, are related to four main areas of concern:

1. The current rules on standards of conduct;
2. The investigative process;
3. Organisational, managerial and command responsibility; and
4. Individual disciplinary, financial and criminal accountability.10

The Report was accepted by stakeholders in the field of human rights.11 The Security Council held its first ever public meeting on SEA where it expressed its deep concern over allegations of sexual misconduct by UN peacekeeping personnel and regretted that “the distinguished and honourable record of accomplishment in UN peacekeeping [was] being tarnished by the acts of a few individuals”.12

Thereafter, the General Assembly approved a draft Resolution urging action by Member States to eliminate SEA in peacekeeping operations. Through this means the Assembly “endorsed the proposals, recommendations
and conclusions found in section II of the Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group on its 2005 resumed session (document A/59/19/Add.1)".

In a general debate at the 2006 Session of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations commented on the developments in peacekeeping in 2005, whilst different States referred to the measures taken to combat SEA. These include the establishment of conduct and discipline teams at UN headquarters and in peacekeeping missions, the development of a revised model MoU between troop contributors and the UN as well as a comprehensive strategy to assist victims of sexual abuse and exploitation by peacekeeping personnel.13

Conclusion
Sexual exploitation and abuse committed by peacekeepers is not a new problem. However, there is a growing concern and new attention and treatment by

The effective implementation of Resolution 1325 could, therefore, be one of the means towards the elimination of SEA by peacekeepers.14 The Resolution advocates the incorporation of a gender perspective into PKO. How this perspective would translate into practice and how that would influence changes in the behaviour of mission staff is illustrated below:

1 PKO mandates outline the authority to act during a mission. Introducing gender sensitive mandates with reference to codes of conduct, and the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on SEA explicitly mentions respect for human rights and outline responsibilities and restrictions.

2 The attitude of the leadership influences the PKO as a whole. Senior managers effectively committed to equality, equal opportunities and the “zero tolerance” policy to SEA will affect the culture of the mission and their ability to address problems.

3 The inclusion of gender units in the missions would ensure assessment of the different implications for women and men of all the policies implemented by the PKO and it would allow for the systematic monitoring and reporting on violations of human rights.

4 Women have a role to play in PKO. Increasing their number would, for instance, promote an environment that discourages sexual exploitation and abuse (creating an environment similar to a normal situation), promote a more comfortable or trustworthy atmosphere for rape survivors seeking assistance, reporting, etc; and have a watchdog effect on male personnel.

5 Gender-sensitive training is needed before and after deployment but it should be linked to other types of trainings: HIV/AIDS, Codes of conduct, etc. This should be contextualised according to the mission, resulting in greater sensitivity to gender-based violence, understanding of its scope and knowledge of its prevention.

6. Easy-to-access and transparent reporting mechanisms and punishment systems should be set up within the UN assuring the availability

THE VIOLATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IS NOT LIMITED TO ACTS PERPETRATED OR DIRECTLY CONDONED BY GOVERNMENTS, BUT RATHER THAT GOVERNMENTS BORE A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTS COMMITTED BY THIRD PARTIES IF THEY HAD NOT TAKEN THE NECESSARY MEASURES TO PREVENT, INVESTIGATE AND PUNISH ACTS OF VIOLENCE
of complaint systems that are accountable to the local population.

7. Gender-sensitive requirements should be introduced in MoUs with contributing States as well as new norms regarding “welfare” of staff. This would assure clear and common understanding about what constitutes “proper behaviour”; the set up of misconduct monitoring mechanisms; the guarantee of accountability of perpetrators of violations and increased welfare of staff (decent salaries, recreational breaks, psychological support, etc.).

The international community depends on instruments to hold peacekeepers accountable in cases of sexual exploitation and abuse. As in most cases, however, documents and signatures are easier to obtain than the means to effectively implement the new policies. Political decisions are needed to strengthen the measures to prevent and punish violations of human rights. Nonetheless, this is not a political issue but a moral challenge. As such, there is a moral imperative to invest all available resources to succeed.

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Endnotes
3 UN Document A/57/465. Report of the Secretary-General on “Activities of the OIC. Investigation into sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers in West Africa” (11 October 2002). The investigation was requested in January 2002 by UNHCR after receiving the results of a report by two consultants who had been commissioned by UNHCR and Save the Children (UK) to study the question of sexual exploitation and violence in refugee communities of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.
5 UN Document ST/SGB/2003/13. The bulletin also discourages relationships between staff and recipients of assistance; obligates staff to report concerns or suspicions regarding violations of the provisions of the bulletin; and obligates UN staff to support and develop systems that create an environment free of SEA and establishes that these or other types of sexually exploitive or sexually abusive behaviour may be grounds for administrative action or disciplinary measures, including summary dismissal. It has to be said that the bulletin only applies to UN staff (not to troops from contributing countries, civilian police or independent contractors).
8 We are talking about men for three reasons. Firstly, because men represent 99% of military personnel, 96% of civilian police and 70% of international civilian staff in the current PKO (Data available as of March 2006 [UN DPKO Fact sheet]). Secondly, because even when abuses could also be committed by women, men are the most often mentioned in conjunction with SEA of local women and children. Thirdly, because a certain “hyper-masculine culture” is recognised among the staff of PKO.
10 Recommendations include: Rules against SEA abuse must be unified for all categories of peacekeeping personnel; a professional investigative process must be established and modern scientific methods of identification must be utilised; a series of organisational, managerial and command measures must be instituted to address SEA; a number of recommendations are made to ensure that peacekeeping personnel who commit acts of SEA are held individually accountable through appropriate disciplinary action, held financially accountable for the harm they have done to victims and criminally accountable if the acts constitute crimes under applicable law.
11 It has to be noted that NGO have an important role denouncing and documenting violations, monitoring the changes introduced, making recommendations and exercising pressure to end this kind of acts. Among others, Refugees International, Save the Children, Amnesty International and ACCORD have released reports related to this topic.
13 Other measures taken have been, for instance, the establishment of “off-limits areas” and enforcement of a midnight curfew for UN staff.; the appointment of a female Special Representative to the SG leading the mission in Burundi; the inclusion of gender advisors on assessment missions and within PKO or the strengthen of policies and guidelines about SEA in missions.
14 We are aware that more measures are needed in order to eliminate SEA by peacekeepers. We agree with the recommendations made in the Zeid Report (even when some of them would require further clarification in their implementation). However, for of lack of space we are just focusing on some measures that could be immediately taken.
The Darfur crisis immensely tested the African Union’s determination to keep peace and stop the excruciating destruction of human life on the continent. This paper argues that the AU has performed fairly well in Darfur, but the AU member states and donor community need a serious dialogue among themselves. It is argued that peacekeeping is a global responsibility and the lessons from the AU’s experience in Darfur have significant implications for the future of peacekeeping in Africa.

**Nature of African Conflicts**

Africa’s conflicts, as elsewhere, are expansive and devastating. According to the April 2005 peace and conflict ledger authored by Gurr and Marshall (2005), the African continent still remains in a precarious security situation. The continent has 17 ‘red-flagged’ African nations facing the danger of state failure, while another 19 were ‘yellow-flagged’ and are in a serious state of fragility.¹

Theoretically, the AU was to be the magic bullet for promoting human security and managing African conflicts if the member states failed to do so. Recognising continental security challenges and international insensitivity to the security needs of African nations as experienced in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, above: An African Union peacekeeper stands guard at the village of Gos Beina, Darfur.
the formation of the AU was seen as a dramatic step by the continent to take charge of its own affairs. In addition to this horrendous genocide, other serious war crimes were committed by various African regimes, while the AU’s predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), did not intervene.

From OAU to AU

On July 9, 2002, the AU was launched in Durban, South Africa, ushering in a time of deep reflections on the past, and a hopeful outlook to the future of a viable, democratic and peaceful Africa. The Constitutive Act adopted in Lomé in 2000 established and mandated the AU as the continental guardian of peace and stability in Africa. As stipulated in Article 3 of the AU Constitutive Act, maintaining continental peace and security is the principal role of the AU. Importantly, Article 4 lists various principles of the AU, notably the principle of “non-interference”. Although the AU retained the principle of non-interference in any member state’s internal affairs, Article 4 (h) makes a dramatic departure from the OAU’s approach to dealing with internal affairs of the member states asserting “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”.

Additionally, Article 5 mentions the key organs of the AU, notably the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the AU’s principal decision-making organ for conflict prevention, management and resolution, which was established by the PSC Protocol in 2002 and officially inaugurated in May 2005. Article 7 empowers the PSC’s Commissioner to recommend to the AU Assembly necessary AU interventions and the deployment of peacekeeping missions in member states when acts of genocide and other crimes against humanity are committed.

Furthermore, Article 5 (2) identifies five key bodies to assist the PSC: the African Standby Force (ASF); Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), with planning elements in each of the five African regions; the Panel of the Wise (POW); a Common Africa Defence and Security Policy (CADSP); and the Military Staff Committee (MSC) to formulate integrated continental security and defence policies.

Overview of the Darfur Crisis

To effectively discuss the AU’s lessons in Darfur, an understanding of the Darfur conflict is in order. The Darfur region has a history of resource-based inter-ethnic rivalries between nomadic Arab groups and the farming black African communities of Fur, Massaleet and Zagawa. Emerging in early 2003, the Darfur rebellion led by the two major rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), grew out of linked multiple causes within the Sudanese polity. The launch of the conflict was timed to coincide with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the government of Sudan and the south Sudan-based Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) led the late John Garang. Since 2003, 200 000 people have been killed, 200 000 are refugees and 3 million are internally displaced.

Some human rights organisations in the United States have termed the conflict genocide. But the United Nations (UN) and the AU have differed from this label, though they have asserted that war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed against black populations by the government forces and the Janjaweed militia. In April 2006, the UN Security Council imposed sanction against four individuals for committing war crimes in Darfur. These include a former Chief of the Sudanese Air Force, a leader of the Janjaweed militia and two armed opposition leaders.

The AU’s Experience in Darfur

In addition to humanitarian assistance, two intervention fronts have emerged. First, the AU initiated a peacekeeping mission. Secondly, the then AU Chairman, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, initiated peace talks in Abuja. In May 2006, the government of Sudan and the largest armed group, the SLM/A, signed a peace agreement. In the agreement, the government agreed to disarm the Janjaweed, channel resources to rebuild Darfur, and integrate the armed movements into the national army. The implementation of the peace deal has been rocky.

Initially, the AU established the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with a 120-person Ceasefire Monitoring Commission and more than 5 000 AU peacekeeping forces. The number of AMIS peacekeepers grew to 7 000 in September 2005, and is expected to reach 12 500 before the end of 2006. The AU is also working with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to provide logistical support and equipment, and the UN take-over of the mission is currently underway. Somini Sengupta of the New York Times commented that apart from the African nations no country has been willing to send its own troops to Darfur.

AMIS has also received high-level commendation. In July 2005, Jan Pronk, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Sudan, addressing the UN Security Council, reported, “the AU force has helped to establish more stability. They have done an admirable job, highly professional, with much dedication.”

Concurring, former the Clinton Administration Africa director, John Prendergast, observed, “The African Union has the chance, in its embryonic state, to demonstrate in a dramatic way that it can make a difference in Africa.”
After a 2004 visit to Darfur, Jon Corzine, a Democratic senator from New Jersey and Richard Holbrook, a former US Ambassador to the United Nations, commended the AU for the role it played in Darfur: “surprisingly, the strongest efforts to stop the fighting have come from the African Union, which is facing the first test of its viability as an organisation since it replaced the weak and ineffective Organisation of African Unity in 2000”.

Despite the monumental financial, logistical and territorial challenges facing it, AMIS has been credited with providing security and hope to some villages in Darfur. A UN official commenting on the impact of the AU peacekeeping force stated, “the AU has been very effective in decreasing violence in areas where it maintains presence in the Darfur region. It has also prevented some attacks from happening through local negotiations on the ground. However, it has not prevented general insecurity due to its inability to deploy in large numbers.”

Around the AU camps in Labado and Khor Abache in South Darfur, life is returning and villagers are slowly trickling in to rebuild their lives. Adam Mynott, a BBC correspondent, assessed, “there is no doubting the effectiveness of African Union peace monitoring troops in the areas where they are operating in Sudan's war-torn region of Darfur. The news report also states that of the 12,000 people displaced by the Janjaweed in the area, about 2,000 have returned. A Darfuri lady, Miriam confessed, “I am still scared of being attacked, but while the African Union soldiers are here I feel safe.”

Within its capacity, the AU has shown impressive leadership and pragmatism in confronting the Darfur challenge. But some analysts and diplomats familiar with African conflicts argue that despite African pride and the progress and commitment that the AU has shown in bringing stability to some areas in Darfur, it is still not well seasoned to keep peace in Africa by itself. Susan Rice, a former US diplomat, argued that the international community’s passing of the mantle of military peacekeeping to the AU is not appropriate:

The sum of this policy is to pass the military buck to the African Union. The AU guards this buck jealously and has done its best on the ground in Darfur. But the unfortunate truth is this: the African Union’s best is not yet enough. Where it has deployed, the AU has performed heroically and greatly increased security for civilians. But the AU force is critically undermanned and has an impossibly weak mandate, limited to monitoring rather than enforcing the nonexistent ceasefire and protecting only those people facing an imminent threat within the force’s immediate vicinity.

Similarly, Hussein Solomon and Gerrie Swart have cautioned the AU against developing overly ambitious structures and plans that it cannot effectively execute within its means. But peacekeeping, as the UN experience has shown, is a Herculean task requiring abundant financial and logistical support. In Africa peacekeeping is not an easy task: the AU is like a proud camel overloaded with continental conflict. Additionally, it should be noted that utopian visions are at times critical assets in the institutional development processes.

Challenges

The following challenges continue to plague the African Union.

1. Underdeveloped and evolving institutional structures

The various organs of the AU are still evolving and have not yet matured to the level where their effectiveness can be adequately felt. An institution like the PSC is still not yet seasoned enough to plan and execute a large-scale peacekeeping operation. The Darfur crisis prematurely engulfed the AU in a stressful peacekeeping operation, sucking its energy away from institutional development and strengthening.

2. Financial and logistical constraints

Content analysis of documentary sources reveals that financial and logistical problems are major obstacles facing the AU. The inability of the AU to airlift 300 soldiers to Darfur is a strain on the continent. The proposed collaboration with NATO and the UN might help alleviate this problem. But the AU needs to find a local solution to this problem.

The AU lacks the financial capacity to sufficiently carry out its continental mandates. The Union inherited a US$42 million debt from the OAU and cash flow problems have been endemic. One major challenge has been the lack of timely voluntary contributions from member states. As of December 2004, the AU Commission’s budgetary allocations had grown from US$43 million to US$158 million (of which US$75 million is allocated

Due to a fear of negative reactions from key member states, the AU leadership has not effectively dealt with the government of Sudan. This has significantly undermined the AU’s response to the crisis in Darfur.
to the PSC. It is estimated that the member states will contribute US$63 million, while US$95 million is hoped to be sourced from additional discretionary payments by member states and Western governments.14

Donor assistance has been erratic too. Currently AMIS’s budget is US$252 million annually. On 18 August 2005, an AU official stated that the AU would only be able to run AMIS for the next three months. The official reported that the mission was in financial crisis as only US$79 million had been pledged, leaving a critical short-fall of US$173 million. The official worried: “Everyone knows this mission is important and we think the international community will support us, but they need to do it soon because the money is fast running out. The international community, UN, European Union and NATO can’t ask us to increase our force in Darfur and then not come up with the money.”15

3. Member states’ internal and regional politics rear their ugly heads

The AU is still a captive of the internal politics of member states. Due to a fear of negative reactions from key member states, for instance, the AU leadership has not effectively dealt with the government of Sudan. This has significantly undermined the AU’s response to the crisis in Darfur.

4. Fragmented international assistance and donor rigidity

Documentary evidence shows that there is an abundance of global support for Africa’s peace support capacity building initiatives. These have ranged from the collaborative G8 Joint Africa Plan of Action to programmes such as the European Union’s Africa Peace Facility, France’s Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping, and the US Global Peace Operations Initiative.16 In the G8 Joint Africa Plan of Action, the G8 leaders agreed to strengthen the capacity of Africa’s peacekeeping support operations (APSOs). However, despite years of international capacity building for African institutions, the continent still has rudimentary structures and the capacity to effectively keep peace is inadequate.

Ramsbotham, Bah and Calder (2005) observed, “ten years of western capacity-building programmes in Africa have, to date, had a relatively moderate effect, while African regional organisations’ capacity to undertake and sustain PSOs remains similarly limited”.17 There are two major problems. First, the international
capacity building initiatives for APSOs reflect regional affiliations and are an expression of the international actor’s interests rather than sincere concern for Africa’s security priorities. Secondly, it has to do with the fragmentation of international assistance and the rigidity of donor funding mechanisms. The AU needs fast, practical and coordinated donor responses to support its peacekeeping missions.

Lessons Learned and Looking to the Future

In order to strengthen the AU’s future peacekeeping several lessons are relevant from the AMIS experience.

1. Peacekeeping is a global responsibility. Although there is talk of “African solutions to African problems”, the cultivation of strong global political will is a critical resource to effectively keep peace. The AU can play a critical leadership role in bringing together various peace actors from local, regional and international systems.

2. Taming member states’ politics could strengthen AU peacekeeping missions. Member states continue to have an immense influence on the effectiveness of the AU to promote peace. The success of the AU is a factor of the quality of political will it gathers from the member states. The development of pragmatic leadership both within the AU and the continent is needed to win political support from the global community to impartially manage continental crises.

3. Lack of financial and logistical support has a dampening effect on the political will. Financial constraints and logistical difficulties feed on each other and will remain a major obstacle to the AU’s peacekeeping efforts. In my view, as the Darfur challenge has shown, no organisation has the absolute leverage to keep peace in Africa. The focus should be on institutionalisation of collaborative global peacekeeping partnerships with a strengthened regional response capacity. The AU through the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiative and the PSC should proactively develop its capacity through a comprehensive continental fundraising plan and diplomatic strategy to marshal the resources from both within and outside the continent.

4. Muscular peacekeeping for the AU: By 2010, the AU plans to have the ASF, a force of 15 000–25 000 military and civilian personnel, fully operational to be deployed within 10 days following an executive order by the AU. To achieve this dream and make the process homegrown, it is imperative to share the continental responsibility to effectively staff and equip the ASF. All the AU member states should in their normal military recruitment,
planning and development, designate a unit or certain personnel as part of the ASF – something like a national taskforce for continental security.

5 Time to reduce international donor assistance fragmentation: The G8 needs to move beyond rhetorical promises and collaboratively support APSOs to better promote peace and stability in Africa. With the creation of the PSC, NEPAD and reinvigorated African leaders’ commitment to managing African conflicts, the G8 leaders should be lobbied and encouraged to intensify their efforts and commitment to building the capacity of APSOs.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the future of the AU to keep the peace is promising. However, despite its impressive progress and the experiences in Darfur and other AU peacekeeping missions, the AU is yet to prove itself. The AU needs committed and coordinated harmonised capacity building and positive political support from the member states and the international community that reflect continental needs, not donor countries’ national interests and regional priorities.

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Endnotes


3 Ibid., p. 5.


8 UN official, New York, personal communication with the author, 17 August 2005.


10 Ibid.


The Compendium of Key Documents Relating to Peace and Security in Africa is part of the evolving Series on Peace and Security in Africa published by the Africa Programme of the United Nations-affiliated University for Peace (UPEACE). The objective of the Compendium is to make available the main documents on, and act as a reference for, issues relating to peace and security in Africa. It will be of use to practitioners, academics and policy makers in the field of conflict prevention, transformation and resolution. It contains key documents on peace and security in Africa covering the period between 1963 and 2005. Reflecting the historical evolution of the peace and security agenda in Africa, is organised into five sections:

- Section one comprises documents generated between the launching of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 and the collapse of the Berlin Wall, associated with the end of the Cold War era, in 1989.
- Section two looks at the transitional period on the continent – characterised by an upsurge of conflicts and wars – that some analysts have described as the pangs of rebirth or the wave of the second liberation, identified with the expansion of democratic space.
- Section three turns to the new African vision embodied in the spirit of African Renaissance, the creation of NEPAD and the transformation of the OAU into the African Union (AU).
- Section four focuses on Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs), conceived as the building blocks of the African peace and security agenda.
- Finally, section five lays out key documents resulting from various international partnerships, such as Africa’s relationship with the United Nations, the European Union and the Group of major industrialised nations (G8), among others.

Each of these sections begins with an introduction that contextualises the documents and events of the period. The basic documents are reproduced but, in most cases, only relevant sections have been extracted. In addition, website citations have been provided where further references and texts can be found, especially decisions of the various African peace and security organs.

This Compendium can be used on its own but also in conjunction with the forthcoming Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa: A Reader. This publication has been developed by UPEACE as a package of study material in courses dealing with conflict and peace in Africa. The Reader contains reprints and extracts of seminal writings on the topic, and as such complements the texts in the Compendium of Key Human Rights Documents of the African Union, which has already been published by UPEACE.

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