

A strategic conflict assessment of Zambia

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Monograph 158
April 2009

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Acknowledgements

This monograph is part of a larger series of strategic conflict assessments of Southern African countries.

I would like to thank my interview partners in Zambia as well as the authors of the field reports for their contribution. I am also grateful to the peer reviewers for constructive criticism. The generous support of the United Kingdom's Department for International Development and the Swiss Federal Government that made this study possible is gratefully acknowledged.

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Introduction

With the transition from a one-party state to a multiparty democracy in the early 1990s, Zambia was initially considered a poster child for Africa's development. However, during the two legislative periods of Frederick Chiluba's presidency, a culture of authoritarian rule and neopatrimonial governance was established. Since the constitution prohibited him to serve a third term in office,¹ Chiluba handpicked a successor, Levy Mwanawasa, who went on to win the 2001 presidential elections. Shortly after Mwanawasa came to power, he turned against his mentor, for some time effectively dividing the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) into a Chiluba and a Mwanawasa faction.

Unlike many of its neighbours, Zambian political history has been relatively stable since it gained independence in 1964. Despite a number of failed attempts by the military to overthrow the government, conflicts have generally been resolved through non-violent means, mostly through the courts, whose decisions are generally accepted. However, Zambian politics is based on systems of patronage. Leaders reward their supporters with jobs and contracts to secure their loyalty and power base, thus public funds are used for private purposes. Moreover, political insecurity ensues whenever there is a change of government since it is generally based on the establishment of new patronage networks and the necessary disruption of existing ones. Fearing prosecution, those on their way out are reluctant to leave. The associated looting of state assets by the political elite has resulted in electoral apathy, visible in low voter turnouts in past elections; and even the anti-corruption campaign spearheaded by Levy Mwanawasa upon his assumption of office in 2001 has not curbed public discontent, as he has failed to limit the patronage system.

Currently, political stability rests on a fragile foundation, with widespread poverty and glaring social inequalities simmering below the surface. Thus,

political and social harmony may not be sustainable in the long term without a genuine and determined effort to promote political and social justice. Broad-based economic growth and equitable sharing of benefits are imperative to the prevention of violent conflict in Zambian society. In other words, if left to escalate, the widespread poverty and social inequalities that characterise present-day Zambian society constitute deep-seated structural threats to the future of democracy and economic development.

The purpose of this study on Zambia is to present an overview of current trends, risks and opportunities for conflict mitigation. The study highlights potential areas of concern, and will conclude with recommendations to guide strategy aimed at mitigating any potential resort to violent conflict.

Seven qualitative indicators serve as the primary categories for establishing the causes and potential remedies of conflict. These are:

- Governance and political institutions
- The role of civil society
- The security sector
- Social and ethnic relations
- Economic structure and performance
- Natural resources and national development
- External factors

In identifying conflict dynamics and actors, specific attention will be paid to:

- The nature and causes of conflict in Zambia, including its structural and institutional features
- The linkages between security, economy, traditional society and political processes
- The influence of regional and international factors
- The current and potential impact of conflict on poverty reduction and achievement of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) goals

Conflict is inherent in all societies. Differences in interest and opinion between groups are natural, and the means of expressing and managing such differences determine whether conflicts manifest themselves in primarily non-violent or violent ways.

Thus far, conflict in Zambia has generally been resolved without the resort to violence. This study aims to identify factors that may counteract this trend in order to ensure that conflict continue to be managed peacefully.

Before focusing on the seven indicators for identifying the causes and potential solutions to conflict, this study provides a basic definition of the terminology used. The lack of consensus on the definitions and descriptions of conflicts among scholars necessitates an initial distinction between the terms ‘conflict’, ‘violence’ and ‘crisis’ (see ‘Conflict, violence and crisis: a clash of terminologies’ in chapter 2). This is followed by a short overview of the theories on the causes of conflict.

Chapter 3 sets out with a brief outline of the historical foundations of peace and security in Zambia, which provides the basis for an analysis of the various conflict indicators highlighted above in chapter 4.

1 Human security

The 1990s witnessed the emergence of new security concepts such as human security, indicating the paradigmatic change from the dominance of national (and international) security to the growing importance of transnational, subnational and individual security.²

Whereas previously security had been defined as national security, understood as the state's ability to defend itself against external threats, it had now come to encompass the broader notion of human security which moves away from the state-centric approach to focus on the protection of *individuals*. Despite consensus regarding this primary goal of human security, proponents of the concept disagree on the scope of the concept, that is, the types of threats from which individuals need protection.³ The narrow understanding of human security confines it to violent threats to individuals. According to former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, it is the 'protection of communities and individuals from internal violence'.⁴ Others advocate for a broader understanding of the concept to move beyond the protection from violence to include protection from hunger, disease and natural disasters as well as from economic insecurity and threats to human dignity.⁵

In its guidelines on 'helping prevent violent conflict', the OECD Development Assistance Commission (DAC) notes that security is 'increasingly viewed as an

all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the governance of their countries, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and the basic necessities of life, and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and wellbeing'.⁶ This broader view of human security has many adherents, particularly as it acknowledges the interrelatedness of such societal threats. However, from a methodological and pragmatic perspective, the current study focuses on the narrow understanding of human security which in turn focuses on violent conflict. Methodologically, a concept that groups together threats as diverse as genocide and affronts to personal dignity runs the risk of becoming *diluted*. For, as has been noted elsewhere, 'once a concept is defined so that it encompasses all the incidents that are members of a given category ... it ceases to enhance one's ability to explain'.⁷ Moreover, such concepts, though useful for advocacy, do not facilitate policy analysis. This certainly explains, to some extent, why the broad definition of human security developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its often cited Human Development Report of 1994 has rarely been used to guide research programmes.⁸

From a pragmatic perspective, the narrow definition of human security as the *protection of the individual from physical harm* serves a very practical purpose. In turn, the *narrower*, or more concise a concept, the easier it becomes to pinpoint its distinguishing features and hence pose questions which respondents can answer in a few words.

2 On conflict

Definitions and selected theories

The literature on conflict and conflict theories reveals a lack of consensus on the definition and description of conflicts among scholars which has led, among others, to the misuse of the related terms ‘conflict’, ‘violence’ and ‘crisis’. This chapter therefore begins with a brief elaboration of these terms, which is followed by a historical overview of the major conflict theories. This leads on to the next section, which deals with the theories on the causes of violent conflict. An elaboration of approaches in dealing with violent conflict – that is, resolution, transformation, management and prevention – concludes this section.

CONFLICT, VIOLENCE AND CRISIS: A CLASH OF TERMINOLOGIES

Several authors draw attention to the need to distinguish between the related yet distinct terms ‘conflict’, ‘violence’ and ‘crisis’.⁹

Conflict is often mistakenly used as a synonym for violence. Conflict is generally understood as a social phenomenon which results from the differences in the social circumstances and/or disparate interests of at least two parties (individuals, groups, states, etc).¹⁰ Violence, on the other hand, is the execution

of physical or psychological force of one party on another. Trutz von Trotha defines violence ('Gewalt') as the employment of physical force.¹¹ According to him, the starting point for any analysis on the sociology of violence lies in the recognition that violence is the infliction of bodily harm and physical suffering.¹² With regard to the concept of conflict, violence is defined as a mode of execution or the (physical) manifestation of an acute, persistent and intense level of conflict.¹³ In essence, since violence can never be based on common consensus, it occurs in social situations which are marked by conflicts between various parties. Violence always entails that one party, whether intentionally or not, comes to harm. As a rule, the victim opposes this use of violence. Therefore, the resort to violence can either mark the onset of a conflict or it can be a measure adopted in an already existing conflict which until then, had been non-violent.¹⁴ Conflict may not necessarily be destructive, whilst violence is. Another important aspect highlighted by Bonacker and Imbusch is the 'exclusive' character of violence. The resort to violence inevitably implies the exclusion of other means of shaping social relations. Violence negates the diverse possibilities of dealing with, communicating and understanding each other.¹⁵

Just as conflict is frequently confused with violence, crisis is often perceived tantamount to conflict. However, crises are structurally differentiated from conflicts. In the context of this study and in keeping with Idowu's exposition, the term crisis refers to the persistent manifestation of conflicts and/or violence.¹⁶ In other words, a single incidence of conflict or violence does not signify a state of crisis.¹⁷ The main focus of this study is to identify why those involved in disputes in the given societies resort to violence to settle their disputes and grievances. The focus is therefore not on conflicts within the communities *per se*, but on those conflicts which exhibit a violent character, in other words where physical force is used as a coercive means of attaining one's objectives. Regardless of the actors involved and the various motives which justify their actions, the actions are always violent and in the following will be referred to as 'violent conflicts'.

CAUSES OF CONFLICT: AN OUTLINE OF ANALYTICAL APPROACHES

Earlier attempts at identifying the root causes of conflict define it in terms of the creation, maintenance and ideal use (or exercise) of power; differentiating,

among others, between scarcity and organisational necessity as root causes of conflict.¹⁸

More recent attempts at identifying the root causes of conflicts focus on various types of conflict. Kieh and Mukenge, in their work *Zones of conflict in Africa: theories and cases*, define *civil* conflict as a dispute between domestic actors – government and private groups – over economic, political, social, cultural or any combination of these issues.¹⁹ Kieh identifies three major theoretical frameworks on the causes of civil conflicts – the primordial, class and eclectic theories.²⁰ The primordial theory emphasises ethnic cleavages, the class (Marxist) theory focuses mainly on conflict between subordinate and superordinate groups defined by their control of scarce economic resources and collateral political power. The eclectic approach considers civil conflicts as the products of a confluence of multiple factors.²¹ They may be cultural, economic, historical, political, social, and so on. Recognising that civil conflict is rarely over a single issue, this theory acknowledges the complexity of civil conflicts.²²

Various theoretical approaches have categorised the causal factors for civil or violent conflict into one, two, three or four types of causes. Among the most prominent attempts at defining the root cause and hence initiation of civil war is Collier's work on 'greed vs grievance', which is based on the 'political economy of war' approach.²³ According to Collier, these types of conflict are either exclusively or primarily economically motivated. The basis of this generalisation lies in the presumption that the key actors' rational behaviour is predictable in all the various contexts. Collier's 'greed vs grievance' approach tends to ignore the significance of other causal factors of violent conflict such as political, social, ethnic or historical issues by either negating their importance or subordinating these factors beneath economic motives.

The UK's Department for International Development (DFID),²⁴ in their typology of the causes of violent conflict, categorise the long-term structural factors that underlie a conflict into security, political, economic and social causes. Once these have been determined, the actors who influence and are affected by conflict at the international/regional, national, state and local levels are examined.²⁵ Although this categorisation allows for the overlapping of types of causes – a security issue may well have political aspects – it disregards other possible categories such as environmental causes of conflict – as in the case of the Niger Delta where environmental degradation and land scarcity have played a decisive role in the prevalence of violent conflicts.²⁶

Kieh, in his work on the theories of conflict and conflict resolution, prefers to use a different approach. He speaks of long-term deeply rooted conditions that date back to the very formation of the society as well as ‘trigger mechanisms’ for the outbreak of civil conflict.²⁷ Other authors construct an even more appropriate typology of the causes of violent conflict by subdividing them into three categories:²⁸ root causes, accelerating factors and trigger incidents. This method is widely accepted and used in the field of conflict prevention and early warning research.²⁹

The *root causes* of a conflict refer to structural tensions within a society that may lead to violent conflict. These background or structural conditions may include a history of state repression, exclusionary ideologies, increasing population pressures, dramatic economic decline, high levels of disparities among demographic groups, and low and worsening levels of human development. The *accelerating or dynamic factors* are those factors which exacerbate the underlying conditions. Again, this refers to variety of issues such as arms acquisition, low-intensity violence, new discriminatory and repressive policies, decline in the rule of law, deterioration of food security and so on.³⁰ Finally, *trigger incidents* provide what Harff has aptly characterised as ‘the equivalent of a match thrown onto a combustible pile [structural conditions], whereas accelerators are the gasoline poured on the pile making it combustible’.³¹ Hence trigger incidents are those that are the immediate cause for violent outbreaks. Examples would include changes in political leadership, declarations of states of emergency as well as external actions or interventions.³²

Another important aspect of conflict analysis is highlighted by Dan Smith in his four-part typology on types of causes of armed violent conflict, where he places emphasis on agency through what he terms ‘mobilisation strategies’.³³ In addition to background conditions,³⁴ catalysts,³⁵ and triggers³⁶ he recognises the need for identifying the mobilisation strategies of the key political actors, that is, their objectives and the way in which they attempt to fulfil these objectives. Smith’s typology, which he prefers to call an organising rather than a causation theory, allows for a dual focus both on the causal factors and the actors involved.³⁷

For the purposes of this study, causes of conflict for will be defined as those factors that contribute to people’s grievances, and will be grouped into three categories:

- *Structural causes*: These are pervasive factors that have become built into the policies, structures and the fabric of society and may create the preconditions for violent conflict
- Proximate causes*: These comprise factors contributing to

a climate conducive to violent conflict or its further escalation, sometimes apparently symptomatic of a deeper problem

- *Triggers*: These indicate single key acts, events or their anticipation that will set off or escalate violent conflict

The mobilisation strategies of key political actors – as specified by Smith – will also be considered.

A positioning and evaluation of various causal factors into a hierarchy of importance and urgency permits the analyst to distinguish those issues which need to be addressed immediately to avoid further escalation from those which require long-term planning.

Mehler's model on the problem areas of violent conflicts, which was developed as an analysis tool for the practitioner, seems to meet this requirement. The model arranges conflict root causes into problem areas³⁸ and, according to Mehler, should enable the analyst to identify the components of the 'cocktail'.³⁹

Table 1 Problem areas of violent conflict

Root Cause 1	Root Cause 2	Root Cause 3	Root Cause 4
Disparity between various identity groups in terms of their political, economic, social and cultural opportunities	Illegitimate, undemocratic and inefficient government leadership	Lack of prospects/ options for peaceful compensation of group interests and for overcoming differences between identity groups	Absence of an active or well-organised civil society
Socioeconomic inequity	Legitimacy deficit of government and public institutions	Absence of effective mechanisms to resolve conflict	Weak civil society organisations
Exclusive ruling elite	Insufficient/deteriorating public services	Absence of pluralism and open debate	Absence of professional and independent media
Violation of political group rights	Criminality, social and political violence	Distrust between identity groups	Lack of economic peace interests
Destabilisation through refugees and internally displaced persons	Partial interpretation and application of laws by justice administration and security forces	Weak or damaging external commitment	
Demographic pressure			

Source Andreas Mehler, *Alles Krise oder was?* In Brigitte Fahrenhorst (ed), *Die Rolle der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in gewalttätigen Konflikten*. Dokumentation einer Fachtagung in der TU Berlin vom 3.-5.12.1999, SID-Berlin-Berichte 11, Berlin, 2000, 26, own translation.

For lack of space, each individual component will not be elaborated on here; instead an example of a possible escalation pattern should exemplify Mehler's model on the problem areas of violent conflicts.

The first root cause of violent conflicts has been identified as disparities between various identity groups in terms of their political, economic, social and cultural opportunities. The issue of *socioeconomic inequity* has been isolated as one of the associated problem areas, which suggests that the most important identity groups within a country do not enjoy an equal standard of living (especially pertaining to basic needs such as food, housing, employment, health and education). In other words, certain groups are constantly denied access to goods and services while other groups enjoy privileged access. Certain forms of inequity may be a result of historical developments and hence socially accepted. However, if it suddenly becomes more difficult for certain groups to gain access to social and economic benefits, political entrepreneurs may exploit the situation to secure support from these groups against the 'privileged' ones.

Mehler describes the following scenario as a possible escalation pattern: first, in order to sustain the disproportionate pattern of distribution, measures are taken to institutionalise them.⁴⁰ The dominant and marginalised rival identity groups establish political parties in order to safeguard and enhance their interests. Initially, the disadvantaged groups practise passive resistance. Later, resistance becomes increasingly violent. The dominant groups now have the option to either accommodate the interests of the disadvantaged groups or to become an *exclusive ruling elite*. More and more, secession is considered as a feasible solution. Violent battles flare up between the various groups and pogroms are conducted against the wealthy minorities.

Similarly, this problem area (exclusive ruling elite) can cause the radicalisation of political actions. If key positions of decision-making within the presidency, cabinet, parliament, military and judiciary do not include representatives of important identity groups, these may decide to overthrow the existing government. The situation may escalate as follows. At first, one group may only enjoy privileged access to strategic positions. Then, the public sector gradually becomes more homogeneous to include only the one group. During elections, the marginalised groups vote for opposition parties led by the excluded elites who then join the underground and prepare for armed resistance. Increased unpatriotic behaviour leads to further polarisation resulting in pogroms and ethnic cleansing. In like manner, the other problem areas may exhibit specific escalation patterns.⁴¹

3 Historical foundations of peace and stability in Zambia

Zambia gained independence on 24 October 1964 under President Kenneth Kaunda, a nationalist leader who had fought against the colonial Federation of Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi). A brief coalition between Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP) and Harry Nkumbula's African National Congress had collapsed in 1963 with the former subsequently winning an outright victory in the elections that followed.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Zambia was instrumental in the liberation struggles in neighbouring countries, for which it paid a high price in the form of reprisal raids by Rhodesian, South African and Portuguese forces. In 1972, Kaunda instituted a one-party state, barring multiparty politics for the next two decades because he feared his support base was not stable enough to withstand opposition.

In the 1970s, the regional instability and economic crisis resulting from Zambian attempts, among others, to isolate South Africa's apartheid regime as well as plunging world copper prices in the mid-1970s led to increased borrowing and left Zambia with one of the world's highest rates of debt per capita. The state-controlled economy deteriorated, as Kaunda resisted the economic

reforms demanded by international financial institutions. With accelerating economic decline came the intensified criticisms of Kaunda's government by business and trade unions.

Following a failed coup attempt by disgruntled members of the Zambian army and Katangese rebels in 1980, as well as a series of strikes in 1981, the economic situation deteriorated further, with the government seeking IMF assistance. Though such assistance was forthcoming, it did not solve Zambia's problems. In fact, IMF policies exacerbated the crisis. The removal of the maize subsidy, in particular, provoked riots and led the government to eventually abandon their partnership with the IMF⁴² in 1987 to implement its own (ultimately unsuccessful) economic recovery programme.

As one of the early 'casualties' of the multiparty wave that swept through parts of Africa in the 1990s, Kaunda eventually bowed to domestic and international pressure for democratic reform and lifted the ban on opposition parties in December 1990. After 27 years in power, Kaunda and his party lost the 1991 presidential and parliamentary elections to a broad-based opposition coalition, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) led by former trade unionist Frederick Chiluba. The MMD government instantly embraced donor-advised structural adjustment programmes entailing, among others, a comprehensive privatisation programme.⁴³

In a bid to secure power, the Chiluba government in 1996 proceeded to amend the constitution, which weakened the powers of the judiciary and effectively excluded Kaunda from contesting the elections by imposing new requirements on persons seeking to hold the office of president, namely that the person be a Zambian citizen born to Zambian parents. Kaunda's parents were Malawian. The new constitution was vigorously challenged by opposition parties as well as civil society and six opposition parties, among them the United National Independence Party (UNIP), subsequently boycotted the November 1996 general election, resulting in the re-election of the MMD and Chiluba. An attempted coup and 1997 led to the imposition of a state of emergency, with the arrest and detention of senior politicians including Kaunda.

During the two legislative periods of Frederick Chiluba's presidency, the culture of authoritarian rule and neopatrimonial governance persisted. After a decade in power, tension with Western donors over mounting corruption and a problematic human rights record led to an aid freeze, and Chiluba's attempt at a third term was thwarted by an unprecedented coalition of civil society groups,

opposition parties and senior members of his own party. Levy Mwanawasa, a former lawyer and one of the early leaders of the MMD, was surprisingly handpicked by Chiluba to run as the party's candidate in the 2001 ballot. He won narrowly in a poll condemned as flawed by international monitors. On assuming power, Mwanawasa launched an anti-corruption probe that targeted Chiluba and senior members of his former administration, winning the backing of Western donors and a measure of local popular applause (he declared his government to be 'a government of laws, not of men'). Mwanawasa faced an election challenge in 2006 from former MMD stalwart and populist politician Michael Sata, who scored well in Lusaka and the Copperbelt but fared poorly among rural voters. The latter subsequently accused the MMD of rigging the result.

Despite three attempted coups - all unsuccessful - Zambia has escaped the civil wars that have scarred its neighbours. Political violence is a feature of election campaigns, and unrest briefly flared in October 2006 in the capital, Lusaka, and the Copperbelt, the country's economic hub, when Mwanawasa was declared the victor in a close-run poll.

Patronage politics played a key role in Mwanawasa's re-election in 2006. Aimed at augmenting and securing his power base, this form of patronage cost him his political credibility and efficacy as it interfered with his anti-corruption campaign.⁴⁴ Whether the system of patronage will persist with the newly elected government under President Rupiah Banda remains to be seen.

4 Conflict indicators

GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

As far as potential conflict factors within the realm of governance and political institutions are concerned, two issues have proven to be the areas where political conflicts are most intense: the constitutional review process and the electoral system.

Constitutional review

Zambia is a constitutional republic. As mentioned earlier, the current constitution dates back to 1996 and was passed by legislators amidst protests from opposition parties, human rights groups, churches, trade unions and lawyers' associations, to name but a few. Cause for these outcries was the circumscription of the powers of the judiciary and an expansion of the executive powers of the president to remove High Court judges.

The drafting and adoption of a new constitution has been a source of tension between the government, the opposition and civil society groups since 2003. The current constitution awards a great deal of power to the president and lays down an electoral system that favours the incumbent.

Prior to the 2006 elections, Mwanawasa effectively sidetracked demands for constitutional revision. One particular constitutional amendment was considered a key bone of contention: the condition that an absolute majority (50%-plus-one system) was required to win the elections, as opposed to the existing rule whereby a single majority could secure the presidency. Mwanawasa, who had won the previous election with only 29 per cent of the total vote cast, was keen to avoid a situation that may have put him at a disadvantage. He was expected to be more willing to implement reforms once it was clear that he would no longer compete in future elections. President Rupiah Banda, as the incoming president, may be less willing to make such concessions, thus further prolonging the review process.

Since independence, Zambia has had four constitutional reviews. The most recent review was headed by Willa Mun'gomba, former African Development Bank president (1980-1985). Appointed in April 2002 and operational as of August 2003, the Mun'gomba Commission completed its work and mandate in December 2005. Despite initial scepticism from civil society, the final report and draft constitution was considered to be progressive. Unlike earlier reviews, the commission recommended the extension of the Bill of Rights to include economic, social and cultural rights. Furthermore, it recommended that the new constitution be adopted through a constituent assembly, a constitutional conference or any popular body that would represent a cross-section of Zambian society.⁴⁵ The commission argued that Parliament was not representative of the various interests within society and that the formulation of a new constitution should be inclusive and broad-based, encouraging the participation of citizens in the process. Civil society and the opposition welcomed this recommendation, as they believed that an MMD-dominated parliament would approve a constitution that served party-political instead of general needs. As mentioned above, the recommendation to amend the voting system from a first-past-the-post to a 50%-plus-one system is thought to have played a central role in stalling the adoption of the constitution.

Instead of the proposed constituent assembly, the executive installed a National Constitutional Conference, which was to comprise 'interested parties', effectively enabling the ruling party to remove or modify those parts of the new constitution it was not in favour of.⁴⁶ The National Constitutional Conference (NCC), which began its deliberations on 19 December 2007, is the forum for the examination, debate and adoption of the Mun'gomba Commission's proposals.

The NCC-adopted draft constitution is to be submitted to Parliament, with those provisions where no agreement could be reached submitted to a referendum. The Act leaves it to the discretion of NCC members to decide whether the entire draft constitution shall be submitted to a referendum, a process which currently appears unlikely.

Much debate has surrounded the work of the NCC, with some civil society organisations protesting against the manner in which the review process had taken place following the Mun'gomba Commission recommendations. Most notable among these is the Oasis Forum comprising five Zambian institutions including three Christian church mother bodies as well as the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ). The forum argued that the composition of the NCC would see the process dominated by political parties. They were further concerned that the NCC would not consider the recommendations relating to socioeconomic issues – that is, the inclusion of all elements of the Bill of Rights, including those relating to socioeconomic rights. The Oasis Forum was also concerned that public resources were being squandered on matters that had already been dealt with by the Mung'omba Commission and that, in this manner, attention was being diverted from other crucial matters. The legitimacy of the NCC was further drawn into question by the hefty allowances awarded to the NCC delegates.⁴⁷ Critics were of the opinion that cabinet ministers, in particular, should not be paid for such a service.⁴⁸ Patriotic Front (PF) leader Michael Sata at a later stage pulled out of the constitutional review process, barring party members to participate in the process. This has led to divisions within the party as more than 20 of its members of parliament defied the party ban and attended the NCC, leading to their expulsion from the party.⁴⁹

Since the inception of the NCC, a number of former opponents to the process have altered their stance. The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the All People's Congress (APC) Party in September 2007 declared their support for the NCC.

Established under the National Constitutional Conference Act, 2007 (Act 19 of 2007), the NCC is expected to complete its work within a period of twelve months from the day it came into effect. The Act also stipulates that this timeline excludes the period when the National Assembly is sitting, allowing NCC members to request an extension of this period from the president should they deem it insufficient to complete their work. At the time of writing, the NCC appeared confident that it would complete its work by December 2009.

According to civil society representatives such as the Catholic Church and Transparency International Zambia, the key shortcoming of the NCC is that it has failed to address the need to include a new Bill of Rights – fully incorporating social, cultural and economic rights – into a new constitution. Moreover, there is no guarantee that agreements reached at the NCC will in fact be enacted by Parliament exactly as it finalised by the NCC, further calling to question the utility and efficacy of the work currently being conducted by this government-sponsored body. This could eventually create tensions between the NCC and Parliament, but most importantly, a constitution that does not meet the expectations of Zambians could be a cause for political conflict, perhaps even trigger large-scale protests.

The electoral system, process and voter behaviour

A key area of political conflict involves the elections. Although Zambia's elections have generally been conducted in a relatively peaceful manner, with only minor outbreaks of violence between small groups of opposing party supporters,⁵⁰ there are issues related to the process of electing representatives that could pose a risk to peace and stability.

Given the fact that there is a correlation between ethnic affiliation and voting patterns, the potential for politicians to politicise ethnicity is a key concern. As early as the 1960s/70s, the Bemba-, Tonga-, Lozi- and Nyanja-speaking people were identifiable as political identities.⁵¹ These groups have well-established strongholds, as shown in a recent study on ethnicity, voter alignment and political party affiliation in Zambia.⁵² Based on evidence from data gathered in an extensive opinion survey in Zambia, Erdmann shows that ethnic membership plays a role in voter alignment and party affiliation. In other words, certain persistent voting patterns cannot be explained by a voter's 'evaluative assessment' of the performance of individual candidates.⁵³

It has been noted elsewhere that politicians have been the main culprits when it comes to inflaming ethnic passions.⁵⁴ This is not a new phenomenon, but has been part of Zambia's political landscape for decades. In the early 1970s, former Vice-President Simon Kapwepwe resigned from the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) to form his own party, the United Progressive Party (UPP). Kapwepwe's argument for resigning from UNIP and forming the UPP was that politicians from his Bemba ethnic group were being

victimised because of him. It therefore came as no surprise that the majority of UPP leaders were from the Bemba ethnic group, a fact which Kaunda's ruling UNIP exploited in order to discredit the UPP as a sectional party. More recently, the United Party for National Development (UPND), which emerged as the largest opposition group in Parliament in the 2001 elections, was also depicted as a 'tribal' party because its founding leader, Anderson Mazoka, came from Southern Province. The party won all parliamentary seats in that province.

The configuration of the National Assembly changed again in the 2006 general elections, with Michael Sata's Patriotic Front (PF) replacing the UPND as the largest opposition party. Sata is known for his attempts to fuel ethnic and racial tensions in the country. During the height of the election campaigns, Sata repeatedly argued that the MMD under Levy Mwanawasa was deliberately out to suppress the Bemba-speaking ethnic group. Sata also claimed that Mwanawasa's anti-corruption crusade was selectively targeting Bemba politicians from the Northern and Luapula provinces, including the former second republican president, Frederick Chiluba. Such sentiments when aired by influential public figures inevitably inflame ethnic tensions. Sata's xenophobic campaign against the mostly Chinese immigrants, in particular, can be said to have contributed greatly to the overwhelming support he received from the electorate in Lusaka and the Copperbelt towns. Elsewhere, Sata's campaign was interpreted in a more positive light. Larmer and Fraser argued that the PF leader's attacks on (particularly Chinese) foreign investors for their alleged corrupt relationship with the ruling MMD and their abuse of the Zambian workforce resonated well with the urban population, who were already disgruntled by the negative impact of economic liberalisation.⁵⁵ The anti-Chinese sentiments still run deep in the country, two years after the elections.

Persistent poverty and social inequality exacerbate the problem as it allows opportunistic politicians to exploit grievances and politicise inter-ethnic relations in the struggle over who gets what, when and how much. Since the return to competitive politics in 1991, problems of deprivation and inequality have become mobilising issues for politicians competing for power.

The electoral defeat suffered by the ruling MMD in the major urban centres of Lusaka and the Copperbelt provinces in the September 2006 general elections can be interpreted as a indication of the population's dissatisfaction with the ruling party's inability to effectively combat poverty and social inequality. Though Mwanawasa had succeeded in improving economic performance, this

has not yet trickled down to the ordinary citizens.⁵⁶ There is no guarantee that the population will always express displeasure in non-violent ways. Authorities should be concerned that localised protests by groups of the deprived, be they unpaid retirees or evicted squatters, have now become a common feature of the Zambian social landscape and could one day engulf the whole society.

In addition, elections have been characterised by allegations of vote rigging. In the past this has led to petitions of both presidential and parliamentary elections. For instance, petitions were lodged in the Supreme Court against the results of the 1996 and 2001 presidential elections, though judgment went against the petitioners. In both presidential election petitions the Supreme Court ruled against the complainants.

On 16 September 2003, the government constituted the Electoral Reform Technical Committee (ERTC) to consider measures for the reform of the electoral system. The underlying problems in the electoral process have, however, not been addressed by the revised Electoral Act that became law on 12 May 2006. Legislation was hurriedly passed with minimum public input and there appears to be little consensus on its content. As long as the electoral process does not inspire public confidence, there is a risk that dissatisfied parties may resort to extrajudicial remedies for resolving electoral conflicts.

Taking a closer look at the 2006 elections as an indication for the unscheduled presidential elections held in October 2008 following the death of President Levy Mwanawasa in August of that year, the incidence of isolated cases of post-electoral violence that ensued as a result of the victory of Mwanawasa in 2006 should be observed carefully. In the forefront of the 2006 presidential and legislative elections, both the ruling MMD and the main opposition parties faced internal difficulties. The MMD was fragmented and six months prior to the elections, the leading candidate, Mwanawasa, suffered a stroke. Michael Sata, the Patriotic Front candidate, used these health concerns surrounding the incumbent president as a campaign issue during the elections. Then the largest opposition party, the United Party for National Development (UPND) suffered from the death of its leader and runner-up in the 2001 elections, Anderson Mazoka, in early 2006. Having formed an alliance known as the United Democratic Alliance (UDA) with the second and third largest opposition parties prior to the election with Mazoka as its intended presidential candidate, the key opposition was extremely weakened. Although a replacement was found in Hakainde Hichilema, dissent with

this particular candidate led some of the UDA to deflect and form their own party, effectively weakening their position and chances at ousting the ruling party. Sata, however, benefited greatly from this development, with some pre-election opinion polls identifying him as the favourite to win. Mwanawasa's subsequent win – with a clear margin of 43 per cent to runner-up Sata's 29,4 per cent, closely followed by Hichilema with 25,3 per cent⁵⁷ – triggered some riots in the PF strongholds in the capital Lusaka and parts of the Copperbelt region, where opposition supporters claimed the vote had been rigged. Riots spread for two days following the announcement of the election results, with disgruntled voters taking to the streets, looting shops and burning car tyres. The military was called in to assist the police, but the riots only ended after Sata called on his supporters for an end to the violence.

Table 2 General elections 2006, presidential results by candidate

Candidate	Political party represented	Votes	Votes (%)
Levy Mwanawasa	Movement for Multiparty Democracy	1 177 846	42,98
Michael Sata	Patriotic Front	804 748	29,37
Hakainde Hichilema	United Democratic Alliance	693 772	25,32
Godfrey Miyanda	Heritage Party	42 891	1,57
Winwright Ken Ngondo	All People's Congress	20 921	0,76
National total		2 740 178*	-

* Excludes 48 936 spoiled ballots. Source: Electoral Commission of Zambia 2006.

These developments are important as they reveal the influence of a politician such as Sata over his followers and his ability to mobilise his supporters should he wish to destabilise the country in the event of losing the battle for power.

Notwithstanding Mwanawasa's comfortable victory, the election results damaged the incumbent and his party. MMD might have expected an easier victory, given the country's advancement in recent years, such as its progress in bringing about macroeconomic stability, for example. Their poor performance in the Copperbelt, previously an MMD stronghold, was certainly a big blow. The loss of Lusaka, though traditionally an opposition stronghold, was felt heavily due to the substantive ratio with which it had been won by the opposition.

Following the death of President Mwanawasa due to complications from a stroke he suffered on the eve of the African Union Summit in July 2008, Zambia was obliged by Article 38 of the 1996 Zambian constitution to hold an election 'to the office of President ... within ninety days from the date of the office becoming vacant'.⁵⁸ Thus, on 30 October 2008, Zambians went to the polls to elect a new president. Four candidates contested in the presidential elections: acting President Rupiah Banda ran for the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), while Michael Sata was the candidate for the leading opposition party, the Patriotic Front (PF). Haikande Hichilema from the United Party for National Development (UPND) and Godfrey Miyanda from the Heritage Party were also presidential hopefuls.

Despite having to leave office at the end of his second term in 2011, Mwanawasa had not made any provisions for a successor. Succession battles were therefore raging within the MMD even before the recent developments. These became most visible with the announcement of the candidacy of the First Lady, Maureen Kakubo Mwanawasa, for the presidency. Lameck Mangani, former Eastern Province executive of the MMD's National Executive Committee, had openly rejected her candidacy. Mangani was believed to be endorsed by the then vice-president, Rupiah Bwezani Banda, who was considered to have secretly worked towards securing the presidency. As early as February 2008, four other ministers voiced their interest in vying for the top position: Mike Mulongoti (Information), Ronnie Shikapwasha (Home Affairs), Ngandu Magande (Finance) and Dr Brian Chituwo (Health). At the time, Mwanawasa threatened that ministers who focused on campaigning and not on their duties faced dismissal. In order to avoid internal rifts within the party, compromise candidates had also been proposed, such as the head of the most recent Constitutional Review Commission, Willa Mun'gomba.⁵⁹

In the end, however, it was acting president Rupiah Banda (age 72) who was nominated to run as the MMD presidential candidate. Banda, often noted as being an MMD outsider, having joined the MMD only in 2002 following his departure from Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP), was appointed as Mwanawasa's deputy in 2006. Moreover, Banda is considered by some observers to be a friend of 'old-style leaders' such as Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe and Angola's José Eduardo dos Santos.⁶⁰ Now that Banda has taken over the reins, the official approach towards regional crises such as that in Zimbabwe might change dramatically. The President was quoted to have said

that the Zimbabwe crisis was a complicated matter that dated back to colonial times and required all leaders to exercise caution.⁶¹ Previously, Mwanawasa had been outspoken in his criticism of President Robert Mugabe. Judging from President Banda's recent statement one could expect Zambia's role in regional conflicts and crises to perhaps be less confrontational.

Neopatrimonialism and corruption

As mentioned previously, patronage politics played a key role in Mwanawasa's re-election in 2006. Aimed at augmenting and securing his power base, it cost him his political credibility as well as having undermining his anti-corruption campaign. Though patronage under Mwanawasa was less severe than under his predecessor, Chiluba, political patronage had become entrenched in Zambia's political landscape.⁶² This notwithstanding, Mwanawasa was generally seen in a favourable light by the donor community, particularly as a result of the economic changes he initiated after coming to power in 2002.⁶³

Besides patronage politics, Mwanawasa also employed tactics of compromise and confrontational politics to secure his power base. Thus, neopatrimonialism persisted as political support remained closely linked to corruption and administrative inefficiency.⁶⁴

Elsewhere, neopatrimonialism has been presented as an explanation for state weakness, economic crises and defective democracy in several African countries, including Zambia.⁶⁵ Neopatrimonialism describes a situation in which the formal institutions of the state are permeated by the 'informal, particularistic politics of the rulers', effectively erasing the separation between the public and private sphere.⁶⁶ In a recent study conducted on the affects of neopatrimonialism on the African state, von Soest applies three features identified by Bratton and van de Walle as indicators for assessing neopatrimonialism in Zambia: systematic concentration of political power; award of personal favours; and use of state resources for political legitimation.⁶⁷ Von Soest clearly demonstrates that all of Zambia's post-independence rulers have, without fail, employed all three features of neopatrimonial politics.

- Political power rests with one patron, the president, who subsequently remains in power for a long period of time while at the same time regularly replacing the political elite in order to avoid any potential contenders from

developing a significant power base to challenge his power. It is this combination that signifies a concentration of political power. Zambia has had only four presidents since independence in 1964 – Kenneth Kaunda (27 years in office), Frederick Chiluba, Levy Mwanawasa and, most recently, Rupiah Banda. In addition, the average duration of service for key cabinet ministers is only 2,4 years, about half a legislative period.⁶⁸

- As noted above, Mwanawasa employed patronage politics as a tactic to secure his power base since coming to office in 2001. His predecessors did much the same, with the effect that the ministerial cabinet expanded from 14 ministries in 1964 to a current total of 23 ministries. For example, Kaunda's policy of 'tribal balancing' led the then president to create additional posts.⁶⁹ While this may have curbed the emergence of ethnic rivalry and so curtailed political and/or violent conflicts arising from the politicisation of such rivalry, it did not necessarily serve to erase political or other conflict completely. In fact, conflicts arose on other issues, such as access to state resources.
- Finally, Zambia's big men have consistently misused state resources. Von Soest assesses this feature by verifying the existence of special funds over which the respective president has sole discretion. Though Mwanawasa claimed to fight corruption, even going so far as to investigate his mentor and former president Chiluba, his anti-corruption drive has produced little results, leading observers to question its efficacy, particularly as state resources continue to be misused.⁷⁰

One striking observation from von Soest's deliberations is its demonstration of 'neopatrimonial stability' – despite regime transition in 1991, constitutional change has hardly affected neopatrimonialism.⁷¹

Thus, despite Mwanawasa's stated commitment to fighting corruption, there had been no major improvements since his incumbency. Corruption has become endemic in Zambian society, penetrating all spheres of public life, including those institutions intended to actually combat it, such as the law enforcement agencies and the Anti-Corruption Commission itself.⁷² A recent study conducted by Transparency International Zambia (TIZ) revealed that the Zambia Police Service topped the list of public institutions cited as having most frequently made demands for bribes.⁷³ TIZ's Bribe Payers Index also identified a number of other public institutions as engaging in this unlawful practice, namely Local Councils, the Passport Office, the judiciary and the Road Transport and Safety

Agency. The basic factor that motivated people to pay such bribes was the perception that they would not receive any service using conventional procedures. The amounts demanded ranged from K20 000 (Zambian kwacha) to K2 000 000 (between about US\$5 and US\$500) with the majority in the lower range up to K500 000 (approximately US\$120). Junior staff and supervisors in the public sector made the most demands, and they were demanding from the section of the population with a generally low disposable income, thus rendering the cost of bribery relatively significant in real financial terms.⁷⁴ According to TIZ, the top ranking of the Zambia Police Service is partly attributable to the fact that officers are among the worst-paid public officials and engage in extortion as a means of supplementing their income. They are also in day-to-day contact with the public, unlike public officials from other sectors.⁷⁵

Nor does a closer look at Mwanawasa's anti-corruption drive foster much confidence in the process. Some observers claim that the reason for the lack of visible results from this process is related to the protracted nature of the judicial process.⁷⁶ However, the proceedings appear to have lost their initial momentum and credibility. Though senior officials from Chiluba's administration were arrested and charged with theft, two of the suspects were released on bail, following which they disappeared.⁷⁷ In addition, charges against some suspects were dropped due to technical problems, presumably a lack of evidence. A trend appeared to be developing, with suspects being arrested and then released, only to be rearrested on different charges, yet never fully prosecuted and convicted. While it may well be that Mwanawasa was not serious about the process and merely intended it as a tool to curb Chiluba's influence, two other inhibiting factors may have contributed to the lack of progress, namely the prosecutor's poor handling of the process either deliberately or due to incompetence or the difficulty in securing substantial proof in the face of the silence of key witnesses.⁷⁸

Mechanisms for checks and balances: the disproportionate power of the executive

In Zambia it is the formal responsibility of the legislature, the executive and the judiciary to manage conflict through democratic conduct. There is, however, an imbalance of power among the three branches of government, with the executive dominating the other two. As mentioned above, the presidency offers great

scope for patronage, with the incumbent enjoying broad executive and discretionary powers. The presidency is therefore fiercely contested, overshadowing policy differences between parties.⁷⁹ The Zambian constitution provides for a presidential term of five years, allowing an incumbent no more than two consecutive terms in office. There has been one attempt by an incumbent to amend the constitution so as to enable him to extend his term in office. But former President Chiluba's attempt to run for a third term was defeated in 2001, thus the two-term rule appears likely to remain.

Although the constitution of 1996 strengthened the formal powers of the legislature – a unicameral National Assembly of 158 delegates – with the exception of majority opposition to Chiluba's bid to run for a third term, ruling party parliamentarians have rarely challenged their government. Despite the absence of a clear majority for the ruling MMD after the 2001 elections, the opposition parties had not managed to unite in order to obstruct or control the government's legislative programme. It was only a matter of time until the government secured a majority in Parliament for its policies, effectively neutralising the potential threat the National Assembly had posed to its position.

The president can, for example, use his powers of appointment to bolster his position and to dispense favours. The recently deceased former president, Levy Mwanawasa, illustrated the value of this particular tool. Coming from a position of weakness – at his assumption of office he had a weak support base – Mwanawasa managed to garner more support among the political elite and could thus secure his position in power. The Ministry of Finance and National Planning is the second most powerful position in government. It drives economic policy as well as donor relations and during Mwanawasa's tenure, was heavily regulated by the incumbent himself. As for the other ministries, problems with capacity and high staff turnover – ministerial terms tend to be brief – policy implementation remains weak.⁸⁰ Moreover, the competence of civil servants varies between ministries, with the Ministry of Finance and National Planning perceived as being the most competent. Another factor that inhibits the effectiveness of government is the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS throughout government sectors, with skills transfer becoming more difficult to implement.

As a result of this imbalance in power and dominance of the executive branch of government, the independence and effectiveness of the other two branches are undermined. This in turn leads to inefficiency in the delivery of

services while at the same time promoting a culture of patronage. The imbalance of power among the three branches of government can thus be considered a structural cause of conflict in society.

Turning to the role of the judiciary, it is worthwhile to note that, under the current constitution of 1996, the powers of the judiciary were circumscribed whilst those of the president were increased enabling the incumbent to remove High Court judges. Although the judiciary has been able to remain relatively independent of the executive and the legislature, its powers and independence have been tested by trials of high-profile political cases, particularly the graft case against former president Chiluba, with many observers concerned that the judicial system cannot handle politically charged cases properly.⁸¹

Moreover, the responsibility for the appointment and removal of judges is allocated to the president and the National Assembly. This, again, reinforces the dominance of the executive and opens avenues for political patronage.⁸²

As for the legislature, there is a general perception that it passes laws that protect and preserve the interests of the ruling party only and not the interests of the country. Parliament does not legislate according to public demands and although the MMD government does not enjoy the two-thirds majority it did during the 1990s, the opposition parties have little leverage in influencing the course of lawmaking.

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Zambia has a vibrant civil society comprising a relatively close-knit network of interest groups. The Christian churches and trade unions dominate this arena, although the unions have forfeited a measure of the status they enjoyed in the 1980s, partly as a result of loss of membership. These groups challenge the government on a number of issues (economic, social and political) and in so doing perform their function as watchdog, strengthening transparency and control of government policy. The debate on the constitutional reform process, as mentioned above, has been a key area of concern for these civil society bodies. The fight against electoral misconduct and the perpetration of human rights violations also forms part of their agenda.

Notwithstanding these positive elements, these organisations have a distinct urban bias and are thus not rooted within rural-based society. Moreover, their ability to effectively help hold government accountable remains questionable.

THE SECURITY SECTOR

After the demise of the one-party system in 1991, Zambia's second president, Frederick Chiluba, transferred all military matters from the party to the control of central government, although the exact manner in which this was operationalised was closely guarded and kept secret. President Mwanawasa subsequently published a defence and security policy on 15 June 2006.⁸³

The 2006 defence policy contextualised the military within Zambia's current multiparty dispensation and provided the requisite transparency and accountability. The new policy sought to demystify defence strategies. Its objectives were to:

- Preserve Zambia's sovereignty, territorial integrity and defence
- Foster harmony and understanding between defence forces and the civilian population
- Enhance transparency in the conduct of defence matters
- Ensure a climate of international peace and cooperation along Zambia's borders

The policy reaffirmed that defence personnel were accountable and subordinate to the people through the executive, legislature and judiciary; committed the military to cooperate with civilian authorities in emergencies and natural disasters; reaffirmed the earlier position that defence personnel were barred from engaging in political activity or holding political office; and reaffirmed Zambia's adherence to international law on armed conflict and to other international instruments to which Zambia is party. It further committed Zambia as an active participant in subregional, regional and international peacekeeping operations.

The Zambian army: the Kaunda influence

Zambia's army is comparatively small, numbering between 24 000 and 27 000 men. The defence forces have to a large extent adhered to the provisions of the defence policy adopted under former President Mwanawasa. The military have not interfered in politics, and have enjoyed very good relations with the civilian population. Aside from the three failed coup attempts, the defence forces have largely remained neutral and professional.

The military has also responded positively to the challenges of good governance, which demand a defence force that is both transparent and accountable. In this regard, the military, since 1991, has been subjected to stringent parliamentary oversight compared to many other African militaries. A number of parliamentary committees, mainly the Committee on National Security and Foreign Affairs and the Public Accounts Committee, as well as the office of the Auditor General, have carried out this oversight role.

To achieve this professionalism, neutrality and cordial relationships with the civilian population, Kaunda instituted two key practices that continue to be applied today:

- Deliberately housing members of the defence forces in civilian urban housing areas, which brought the army close to the people⁸⁴
- Quick promotion through the ranks and then early, well-packaged retirement⁸⁵

Despite these positive changes, the problem of politicisation has also permeated the military, as is apparent in the practice of each incoming president retiring the army leadership and appointing his own senior officers to ensure the service commanders' allegiance to the commander-in-chief.

Through these policies, Zambia has been able to retire twenty-odd generals. Some have now joined the political arena, some making it to the top as party presidents, ministers, ambassadors or successful farmers. Zambia has therefore been able to keep the army in check by not allowing any one general enough time to grow 'too big'.

At the same time, and in part thanks to its small staff complement, Zambia has looked after its army rather well in terms of equipment, free foodstuffs, numerous recreation facilities, staff training opportunities, and so on.

Deployment to UN peacekeeping missions has been another way to keep the armed forces occupied and content. Zambian forces have been deployed on peace missions to East Timor, Yugoslavia, Angola, Burundi, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Sudan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Peacekeeping has provided Zambia's armed forces with an opportunity for international exposure, as well as providing a compelling comparison between conflict areas and the peace prevailing in Zambia.

Police corruption and brutality

Unlike the Zambian army, the police service is highly politicised, because the executive has on many occasions directed it for political expediency. Likewise, security organs such as the Anti-Corruption Commission and the Drug Enforcement Commission have to a large extent been used or directed by the executive. Currently, the Drug Enforcement Commission's director general is on suspension for alleged corrupt practices, a case which was tabled by Transparency International Zambia and subsequently taken up publicly by the private media. As noted above, it is this particular sector of the government that appears to have the most problems with incidents of corruption and extortion.⁸⁶

The Zambia Police Service has faced numerous allegations of corruption, especially in its traffic and criminal investigations departments. It is also unable to disprove allegations that it is technically and professionally incompetent at investigations, and frequently impotent in prosecuting obvious cases. In the past, police confessions were more likely arrived at through intimidation and coercion, sometimes using brute force.⁸⁷ Today, the police no longer command the respect of the citizenry and are instead regarded with suspicion. Quite often, ordinary citizens ignore police commands, or publicly argue with police, ready to physically challenge them. Thus, there has appeared to have been an erosion of public confidence in and respect for the authority of the police, a development that could contribute to future insecurity.

The biggest challenge to the police is its alleged brutality against suspects or rioters and the reaction that this could instil. In the first and second republics, the Zambia Police Force sometimes used AK-47s, resulting in casualties that caused an uproar among civil society and human rights bodies. With democratic practices taking root, the police have now turned to less aggressive forms of crowd control, such as the use of batons and teargas, rather than guns. In addition, the Zambia Police Force was renamed the Zambia Police Service to shake off the memories of colonial police brutality and oppression. Another positive change was the establishment of the Police Complaints Commission as a means to foster accountability and transparency, enabling citizens to lay charges against police guilty of misconduct. Community policing efforts are also under way, placing police within local communities by encouraging citizen participation in police work.

The extent to which these efforts are effective, however, rests with the individual police forces operating in the respective communities. In other words,

whilst community policing activities may be successful in certain areas, there may be no effective collaboration between the police forces and members of the community in others.

Although a target of 20 000 servicemen and women to boost the ranks of police has been set at the beginning of 2008, low morale, poor pay and poor conditions of service have impacted negatively on the Zambian police, partly explaining their poor performance.

Petty crime

High crime levels, especially in urban areas, pose a serious threat to security. Although there is national peace and security, there is latent personal insecurity, especially in urban areas and urban compounds, where curfews have had to be imposed on numerous occasions. There has been an overall increase in petty crime such as car theft and isolated incidents of violent riots by urban vendors have become a common occurrence. The latter is certainly partly attributable to the economic hardships faced by the majority of the population. With the economic crisis and the restructuring of the economy came the increased recourse to the informal sector. These vendors frequently run into difficulties with the urban planning authorities and with the police, who are repeatedly called in to clear them out, usually in a violent manner.⁸⁸ Whether this threat is permanent remains to be seen, because the fundamental problems associated with urbanisation, job insecurity and inadequate social safety net provisions for the jobless masses in urban areas is at the core of this issue.

SOCIAL AND ETHNIC RELATIONS

Ethnic relations

Ethnicity has been defined as the cultural practices and outlooks of a given community of people that set them apart from others.⁸⁹ The set of characteristics that are used to often distinguish ethnic groups from one another include language, history or ancestry, religion and styles of dress or adornment. Scholars have emphasised, however, that ethnic differences are wholly learned. Giddens, in particular, has argued that 'there is nothing innate about ethnicity; it is a purely social phenomenon that is produced or reproduced over time'.⁹⁰

Besides South Africa, Zambia is one of the most urbanised African countries south of the Sahara. Just under 40 per cent of the population live in urban areas. This has had a profound impact on the evolution of ethnic relations in Zambia. Zambia is said to consist of 73 indigenous ethnic groups in addition to a number of immigrant groups, most of whom are of Asian and European descent. By and large, Zambia has since independence enjoyed stable ethnic relations. In the urban areas, two local languages - Cinyanja and Cibemba - are widely spoken, in addition to English.


This urbanisation has perhaps contributed toward mitigating ethnic tensions, with indigenous Zambians living peacefully side by side in the various towns. Kaunda's deliberate policy of social engineering during the 1980s has certainly contributed to the lack of ethnic tensions.

Notwithstanding this apparent state of ethnic bliss in Zambia, there are some threats to ethnic harmony in the country. There is a level of latent resentment of the prosperity of immigrant groups of Asian and European origin, but this has never assumed virulent proportions, despite politicians' attempt to exploit xenophobic sentiments to garner more support for their campaigns. Michael Sata's xenophobic campaign against the mostly Chinese immigrants, which appears to have contributed to his 2006 victory in Lusaka and the Copperbelt, is a case in point. However, the fact that Sata was at all able to manipulate xenophobic tendencies for his campaign indicates that the politicisation of ethnicity does pose a potential threat to the hitherto relative stability of ethnic relations.

Attempts by politicians to create ethnic tensions have thus far not found any resonance in the general public. This, however, is no ground for complacency. Sata's electoral victory in the Copperbelt and Lusaka reveals that the opposition enjoys wide support from the urban population and may be able to mobilise disgruntled voters to serve their political needs. It is not that ethnicity is irrelevant in Zambia's public and political domain, but violence 'caused' by ethnicity has generally been absent.

Poverty and social inequalities

Zambia's pervasive poverty belies the relative stability which the country has enjoyed since independence 1964. At the time, Zambia's gross domestic product (GDP) compared favourably with that of South Korea. After more than four decades, Zambia has descended into an economic quagmire from which

Figure 1 National trends in incidence of poverty (1991-2006)

Source Central Statistical Office Zambia, <http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/lcm.php> (accessed 20 August 2008).

it has been unable to extract itself. Since then, Zambia has shifted from being a middle-income country to one of the least developed low-income countries that is heavily reliant on donor funding. Until the cancellation of its debt under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)⁹¹ initiative in 2005, Zambia was ranked as one of the most indebted countries of the world as a result of years of massive external borrowing.

Poverty in Zambia is pervasive and multidimensional. According to the most recent Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS) of 2006, no less than 64 per cent of the country's population live below the national poverty line.⁹² This figure represents a marginal improvement on the figure of 73 per cent recorded in 1998 and 2004.

Characteristics of income poverty in Zambia reveal that poverty is greater in rural than urban areas. The incidence of poverty is higher among small-scale farmers than any other social stratum. In terms of geographical distribution, the highest incidences of poverty are associated with more remote provinces such as Western Province (84 per cent), Eastern Province (79 per cent) and Northern Province (78 per cent).⁹³ Comparing figures from previous surveys, it becomes apparent that there is an uneven development of the various regions.

For instance, whereas figures for Lusaka and the Copperbelt have improved, the poverty rate in other provinces has increased.

The incidence of poverty also tends to be higher among female-headed (69 per cent) than male-headed households. Households headed by elderly people are also more likely to suffer from poverty than those whose heads are between 24 and 45 years of age. Again, poverty is inversely related to the level of education of the household head. Poverty among households headed by persons with no education is about 80 per cent while it falls to less than 25 per cent among households headed by people with tertiary education.

Table 3 Incidence of poverty compared

Provinces	Incidence of poverty					
	1991	1993	1996	1998	2004	2006
Central	70	81	74	77	76	72
Copperbelt	61	49	56	65	56	42
Eastern	85	91	82	79	70	79
Luapula	84	88	78	82	79	73
Lusaka	31	39	38	53	48	29
Northern	84	86	84	81	74	78
North Western	75	88	80	77	76	72
Southern	79	87	76	75	69	73
Western	84	91	84	89	83	84

Source Central Statistical Office Zambia, <http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/lcm.php> (accessed 20 August 2008).

A particularly worrying poverty trend in Zambia is the skewed pattern of income distribution. Figures from the 2004 LCMS report show that the bottom 50 per cent of the population share a paltry 15 per cent of the total income, while the top 10 per cent claims 48 per cent of the total income. The Gini coefficient, which defines the level of income inequalities,⁹⁴ reveals that Zambia had a Gini index⁹⁵ of 50,8 per cent in 2006, an insignificant improvement from the ratios of 61 per cent for 1996 and 66 per cent for 1998. Such coefficients are indicative of uneven income distribution in Zambia.

Table 4 Key indicators for Zambia

Population	mn.	11,7	HDI	0,41	GDP p.c.	\$	910
Population growth ¹	% p.a.	1,6	HDI rank of 177	1,65	Gini Index		50,8
Life expectancy	years	38	UN Education Index	0,63	Poverty ³	%	87,2
Urban population	%	35,0	Gender equality ²	–	Aid per capita	\$	81,1
1 Average annual growth rate 1990–2005		2 Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)		3 Percentage of population living on less than \$2 a day			

Source UNDP, Human Development Report 2006; The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007; OECD Development Assistance Committee 2006

Reducing child and maternal mortality and reversing the loss of environmental resources, and halving poverty by 2015, the population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation, have been particularly singled out as examples of Millennium Development Goals that Zambia is unlikely to attain by 2015.

Social indicators of development also reveal the depth and severity of poverty and social inequalities in Zambian society. The Human Development Report of 2007/08 (HDR) ranked Zambia 165th out of the 177 countries surveyed on the basis of the Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is a composite index that reflects life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate, school enrolment and GDP per capita for countries worldwide.⁹⁶ Unlike GDP per capita, the HDI offers a more complete picture of the socioeconomic circumstances within any given country as it takes into account more than one variable. This poor ranking reveals grave poverty and serious social inequalities found only among the poorest of the poor countries. Not surprisingly, the 2005 Millennium Development Goals Progress Report is pessimistic about Zambia's prospects of attaining some of these goals by 2015.

Reducing child and maternal mortality and reversing the loss of environmental resources, and halving poverty by 2015, the population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation, have been particularly singled out as examples of MDGs that Zambia is unlikely to attain by 2015.


Despite some improvements in education indicators in recent years, there are still many areas of concern in this sector. The adult literacy rate, for example, has remained stagnant at 68 per cent since 1990.⁹⁷ Moreover, the provision of education services is unevenly distributed in favour of urban households. The health sector is another source of major concern. The decline of infant mortality

Table 5 Zambia's Human Development Index 2005

HDI value		Life expectancy at birth (years)		Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and older)		Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (%)		GDP per capita (PPP US\$)	
1	Iceland 0,968	1	Japan 62,3	1	Georgia 100,0	1	Australia 113,0	1	Luxembourg 60,228
163	Benin 0,437	175	Swaziland 40,9	105	Guatemala 69,1	128	Lao People's Democratic Republic 61,5	163	Mali 1,033
164	Malawi 0,437	176	Zimbabwe 40,9	106	Lao People's Democratic Republic 68,7	129	Kenya 60,6	164	Myanmar 1,027
165	Zambia 0,434	177	Zambia 40,5	107	Zambia 68,0	130	Zambia 60,5	165	Zambia 1,023
166	Côte d'Ivoire 0,432			108	Cameroon 67,4	131	Cambodia 60,0	166	Yemen 0,930
167	Burundi 0,413			109	Angola 67,4	132	United Arab Emirates 59,5	167	Madagascar 0,923
177	Sierra Leone 0,338			139	Burkina Faso 23,6			174	Malawi 0,667

Source United Nations Development Programme. *Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting climate change: human solidarity in a divided world*. Available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Complete.pdf (accessed 20 August 2008).

Figure 2 Zambia - Human Development Index and GDP per capita compared



Source United Nations Development Programme. *Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting climate change: human solidarity in a divided world*. Available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Complete.pdf (accessed 20 August 2008).

from 123 deaths per 1 000 live births in 1990 to 102 deaths per 1 000 live births in 2005, for example, is an encouraging sign, but the figure nonetheless remains too high for comfort.⁹⁸ Moreover, when compared to the figure for 1970, where 102 cases of infant mortality per 1 000 births were recorded, progress has been minimal. Similarly, the mortality rate for children under the age of five declined little - from 197 deaths per 1 000 live births in 1996 to 152 deaths per 1 000 live births in 2005.⁹⁹ More worrying is the increase in maternal deaths from 649 per 100 000 live births in 1996 to 830 per 100 000 live births in the period 2001/02. The health sector has also suffered a serious exodus of doctors and nurses who have migrated abroad. As in other cases, the rural areas have borne the main brunt of these problems.

Zambia has also been ravaged by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. It is estimated that 17 per cent of the population between the ages of 15 and 49 are HIV positive, amounting to a total of approximately one million Zambians.¹⁰⁰ The incidence of HIV/AIDS is exacerbated by widespread poverty, stigma, gender inequality, high prevalence of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and high-risk sexual practices. Mother-to-child transmission at birth or while breastfeeding is responsible for about 20 per cent of all cases reported. In Zambia everyone is either infected or affected by HIV/AIDS, meaning that there is no aspect of life or family that has been spared from the disease. The productive capacity of society has been severely weakened by the deaths in the segment of the population in its prime productive and reproductive years.

The Zambian government has formulated a national gender policy and is also a signatory to many international conventions on gender. The mainstreaming of gender in national development programmes, however, remains a big challenge. The often cited factors for the slow pace at which gender mainstreaming has proceeded include low levels of education, limited access and control to productive resources, and cultural norms and values which promote unequal power relations among men and women. The Central Statistical Office (CSO) reported that in 2002/03, poverty among households headed by females stood at 58 per cent compared to 43 per cent among households headed by males. The problem of poverty amongst women is compounded by the gender dimension of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Prevalence rates appear to be higher among females than males, with women bearing the burden of the epidemic in terms of risk of infection and as caregivers. The feminisation of poverty in Zambia is

further reflected in the lower level of adult literacy among women, 59,8 per cent compared to men at 76,3 per cent.¹⁰¹

Finally, Zambia has not done well regarding levels of women participation in decision-making structures. As at 2006, 14 per cent of the MPs elected to the National Assembly were women. A noticeable increase in women representation took place at cabinet level, rising from 7,3 per cent in 2000 to 23 per cent in 2008. Despite this effort, Zambia still falls below the 1997 SADC gender declaration of 30 per cent representation of women in decision-making structures.

Social inequalities in Zambia are also mirrored in the country's labour and land situation. According to the last national census that was conducted in 2000, Zambia has a population of just under 9,9 million.¹⁰² Labour statistics indicate that only 10 per cent of workers are employed in the formal sector, while 68 per cent work in the informal sector. This is not surprising given the economy's implosion since the mid-1970s. The resumption of growth in the new millennium has been driven mostly by mining, construction, forestry, manufacturing and agriculture. But current economic growth has not been accompanied by a corresponding growth in employment. In the mining industry, for example, employment is reported to have declined from the peak level of 62 222 workers in 1976 to 19 900 in 2004, four years after completion of the privatisation of the giant Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM).¹⁰³ The recapitalisation of the mines has gone to benefit suppliers from outside Zambia because of the multinational companies' preference for established supply chains overseas, coupled with lack of local capacity to produce the more complex and sophisticated mining machinery and equipment required for production.

The issue of employment must also be situated within the context of conditionalities imposed on the country by the international financial institutions. Government was forced to introduce the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP) in 1993, whose objectives included downsizing the public service. Government reports that the size of the Public Service was reduced substantially from 139 000 in 1997 to 104 000 in 2000, before increasing to 115 000 in 2004.¹⁰⁴ Given Zambia's high ratio of dependency, the paucity of the working population translates into inadequate incomes for families and exacerbates the poverty situation. The pervasive poverty in a country that once enjoyed middle-income-nation status is underpinned by deterioration in wages, poor conditions of work, and widespread job insecurity. Long gone are the days when workers were employed on a permanent basis and enjoyed guaranteed pension schemes. Employees in the

newly privatised firms have complained of slave wages and serious job insecurity. Permanent conditions of service have since been replaced by short-term contracts that absolve the employer of the responsibility of contributing to pension schemes and guaranteeing rights such as trade unionism. Deterioration has also been reported in occupational health and safety standards, while newly privatised firms have been linked to serious environmental degradation.

The issue of land is also problematic in Zambia's development process. The Fifth National Development Plan recognises a number of impediments to the full realisation of the potential of the land resource to contribute to poverty reduction in the country.¹⁰⁵ These include duality of land tenure, overcentralised land administration, inadequate empowerment of citizens (especially in customary areas), lack of land policy, abuse of the current system of acquiring land in both customary and state areas, ineffective land use planning, and ignorance of land alienation procedures. This situation favours the already well to do part of the urban population, thereby accentuating social inequalities.

The housing situation in Zambia also leaves much to be desired. According to government estimates, the total national housing stock in 1991 stood at 1 501 898. By 2001, this figure stood at 2 311 988. The main problem is that about 80 per cent of the national housing stock in Zambia consists of informal, unplanned settlements. The provision of services such as fresh water and sanitation in unplanned settlement areas is very poor or just not available. Not surprisingly, these are also the same areas prone to all kinds of perennial problems including floods and environmental diseases such as cholera and dysentery.

Since the return to competitive politics in 1991, estranged social relations of deprivation and inequality have become mobilising issues for politicians jostling for power. As a result the high levels of poverty and social inequalities are a dangerous powder keg which requires only a spark to flare up into a major conflagration. The electoral defeat suffered by the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in the major urban centres of Lusaka and the Copperbelt provinces in the September 2006 general elections should serve as a warning that more needs to be done to combat poverty and social inequalities. There is no guarantee that the population will always take recourse to democratic behaviour to register its displeasure. Authorities should be concerned that localised protests by groups of deprived populations, be they unpaid retirees or evicted squatters, that have now become a common feature of the Zambian social landscape could one day engulf the whole society.

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE

Besides patronage politics, Mwanawasa also employed tactics of compromise and confrontational politics to secure his power base. Thus, neopatrimonialism persisted as political support remained closely linked to corruption.¹⁰⁶ Owing to financial constraints and dependency on the approval of the IMF, Mwanawasa could not implement his development policy – the Transitional National Development Plan of 2002 – because it failed to comply with IMF structural adjustment policies. Thus the IMF/World Bank-inspired Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) was integrated into the Transitional Development Plan, effectively watering down all the ‘homegrown’ initiatives contained in the original plan. In this manner the ability of the government to address certain weaknesses in the system was hampered by externally imposed strategies.¹⁰⁷ The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative’s budgetary requirements as well as the structural adjustment programmes specified by donor countries and international financial institutions further shaped economic policy. Zambia’s Fifth National Development Plan of 2006 has a core focus on pro-poor economic growth, exchange rate and financial stability as well as the development of agriculture and infrastructure.¹⁰⁸

Zambia’s market economy is based on copper extraction and in recent years, also on food and agricultural products. The economic transformation from a state-controlled, planned economy into a market system began with the ushering in of a multiparty democracy and a change of government at the beginning of the 1990s. The new government desperately needed World Bank and IMF loans if it was to tackle the economic crisis effectively. To gain access to these loans, it was compelled to introduce significant economic reforms, most notably the privatisation of the copper mines, then and now Zambia’s prime export commodity.¹⁰⁹ At the time, the copper mining sector was no longer profitable as it had to contend with low market prices for copper, mismanagement and inefficiency.

Though Zambia may have faced and continues to face political problems, economically it has performed strongly for the most part of the 2000s. Inflation is projected to decrease from 8,9 per cent in 2007 to 5 per cent in 2010. Over the next three years, investment is estimated at 22,5 per cent of GDP, funded largely by domestic savings of 22 per cent of GDP. Compared to many of its peers, Zambia’s budget deficit is estimated to average a modest 5,3 per cent of GDP.

Between 2008 and 2010, owing to copper prices and increased production, the country will have a trade surplus of approximately US\$800 million annually.¹¹⁰

Despite positive developments in recent years, the economic environment still has serious shortcomings, particularly in terms of the extent to which economic improvements have had a positive impact on the standard of living of the majority of the population. It is this lack of a trickle-down effect that may threaten the stability that has been observed in the past decades - particularly if one were to take into account the number of young, educated individuals who remain unemployed upon leaving the education institutions. One local analyst even goes so far as to claim that 'Zambia is slowly losing out on a group of older, less violence-prone people' and that it would be the group of newly unemployed youth that could trigger the outbreak of violent conflict, for they are equipped with the skills to mobilise the population, for example.¹¹¹

Theoretically, this could pose a threat to the young democracy. However, since there appears to be no alternative to the democratic order, and there are no relevant veto players - whilst they may consider it flawed, civil society acts within the boundaries of the constitution - Zambia seems likely to continue on the bumpy road towards the development and consolidation of democracy.¹¹²

Zambia's estimated economic growth is 5,8 per cent (2006) with a per capita GDP of US\$1 026 (latest figure for 2005, HDI 2008) and an unemployment rate of 50 per cent (latest available figure, from 2000). The Zambian financial sector is characterised by high cost of borrowing, thin capital markets and absence of financial services in most of the rural and peri-urban areas. Consequently, the financial system has not played a meaningful role in national development. The fiscal policies are aimed at maintenance of macroeconomic stability, improving budget execution and strengthening the revenue base. A major development that has occurred in Zambia is that the country reached the completion point under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, which has resulted in debt cancellation. As noted above, Zambia's national debt has come down to around US\$500 million as a result of debt relief.

To summarise, there are two basic problem areas that continue to pose a challenge to Zambia's economic improvement:

- Over-reliance on the copper industry, which comprises three-quarters of exports, with the result that the economy is not diversified enough to survive any collapse in the market value of this particular commodity. Given the

Table 6 Economic indicators for Zambia

Economic indicators		2002	2003	2004	2005
GDP	US\$-million	3 697	4 327	5 423	7 270
Growth of GDP	%	3,3	5,1	5,4	5,2
Inflation (CPI)	%	22,2	21,4	18,0	18,3
Unemployment	%	-	-	-	-
Foreign direct investment	% of GDP	2,2	4,0	4,4	3,6
Export growth	%	6,8	10,1	12,6	12,3
Import growth	%	-5,9	3,7	10,9	20,6
Current account balance	US\$-million	-	-	-	-
Public debt	US\$-million	5 264,2	5 582,3	5 871,7	4 084,9
External debt	US\$-million	6 460,6	6 926,6	7 279,2	5 668,3
External debt service	% of GNI	6,4	13,5	8,5	3,5
Cash surplus or deficit	% of GDP	-	-	-	-
Tax revenue	% of GDP	-	-	-	-
Government consumption	% of GDP	13,0	13,5	12,7	
Public expenditure on education	% of GDP	-	-	2,8	2,0
Public expenditure on health	% of GDP	4,0	3,7	3,5	-
R&D expenditure	% of GDP	-	-	-	-
Military expenditure	% of GDP	-	-	-	-

Sources The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007; UNESCO Institute for Statistics; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *Yearbook: armaments, disarmament and international security*.

high demand for copper, it appears unlikely that such a development could occur in the near future.¹¹³ Despite the global financial crisis, copper prices will probably recover to earlier levels within the next 24 months. Moreover, the developments in the political arena with regard to the recently held presidential elections could have an effect on copper mining. For example, had Michael Sata (from the Patriotic Front) emerged as president, the Chinese mining companies may have halted their operations considering Sata's pledge to drive them out of the country if he were to come to power. With the recent inauguration of Rupiah Banda as elected president, it appears that Chinese relations and investment will remain stable.

- The neglect of key areas for overall sustainable development such as education, health and infrastructure. Though state spending on these sectors is improving, it remains inadequate.

EXTERNAL FACTORS

Zambia's government has remained focused on forging and strengthening ties with key Western donors. During Mwanawasa's presidency, the government also established good relations with China, which has now become a major investor in the country's copper sector. However, as Sata's successful manipulation of xenophobic tendencies during the 2006 elections reveal, there is a growing resentment among the indigenous population at the perceived exploitation by Chinese investors of Zambia's mineral resources and labour force. Small pockets of anti-Chinese protests may occur, although more widespread hostilities against foreign investment are unlikely.¹¹⁴ The political elite, Michael Sata included, are well aware of the economic and financial benefits brought about by foreign investment. During the most recent presidential elections, he carefully avoided any manipulation of the electorate that may have jeopardised Chinese investments in the country.

The crisis in neighbouring Zimbabwe is the most commonly cited external factor that poses a threat to the security situation in Zambia, particularly following Mwanawasa's public denouncement of the situation in Zimbabwe. As the former chairperson of SADC, Mwanawasa was very vocal about developments in the neighbouring country, likening the crisis to the sinking of the *Titanic*. While it must be said that Mwanawasa was quick to backtrack on his statements, sending then Vice-President Rupiah Banda to Harare to meet with

Robert Mugabe, all eyes are on Banda now that he has taken over the reins. Considering the recent reaction of Zambian authorities to ban a meeting of Zimbabwean civil society groups in Lusaka in August 2008, one should expect a much less vocal stance from the current Zambian leaders on the Zimbabwe crisis. Moreover, as mentioned above, as a friend of so-called 'old-style' leaders such as Robert Mugabe, Banda appears to be taking a more cautious approach towards the crisis in the neighbouring country.

5 Conclusion

Identification of key areas of conflict

Returning now to the framework for identifying causes of conflict and determining the extent to which each of the issues addressed above threaten to counteract the means of peaceful conflict resolution through dialogue and litigation that have been practised in post-independence Zambia. At the outset, four categories of conflict causes were identified – trigger incidents, accelerating factors, prolonging factors and root causes.

Structural causes are those root causes that have become entrenched into the policies, structures and fabric of society and that may create the preconditions for violent conflict. As Mehler's model indicated, one of the problem areas identified as a root cause to the possible outbreak of violent conflict is present in Zambia. It is clear that some of the ingredients required to mix the potent cocktail that can lead to the resort to violent means of resolving conflicts already exist. The disparity between various identity groups – not to be confused with ethnic groups – in terms of their political, economic and social opportunities may be a root cause that could apply to the Zambian case. There is marked socioeconomic inequity, with the majority of the population being denied access to goods and services (especially pertaining to basic needs such as food, housing, employment, health and education).

A second potential area of conflict, which one might consider a possible escalating factor or proximate cause, is the constitutional review process. Much acrimony has surrounded the process of constitution-making and several issues remain unresolved. The crucial issue that will determine the acceptability of the final document will depend on whether key stakeholders will perceive the process as having been participative and inclusive. Certain important sections of society continue to hold back their participation in the proposed National Constitutional Conference, but several other influential forces have already resolved to participate. Whereas it was expected that Mwanawasa, in his second and last term as president, would be more willing to implement reforms, the new incumbent, Rupiah Banda, might be more reluctant to concede any presidential powers. According to civil society representatives such as the Catholic Church and Transparency International Zambia, the key shortcoming of the National Constitutional Conference (NCC) is that it has failed to address the need to include a new Bill of Rights – fully incorporating social, cultural and economic rights – into a new constitution. Moreover, there is no guarantee that agreements reached at the NCC will, in fact, be enacted by Parliament exactly as it finalised by the NCC, further calling to question the utility and efficacy of the work currently being conducted by this government-sponsored body.

Elections are yet another potential escalating factor (proximate cause). There is the likelihood that politicians, identified as the main culprits in this regard, could inflame ethnic passions ahead of elections. As the recently held presidential elections show, Michael Sata, though he had not reignited xenophobic fears as part of his electoral campaign, had decried electoral fraud as election results from the rural areas trickled in. Sata's aggressive rhetoric gave credence to arguments around the likelihood of violent post-electoral disputes. However, experience has shown that although the contenders fought a highly charged battle for the presidency, Zambia did not become yet another example of elections that serve to destabilise an entire country. While political violence is indeed a feature of election campaigns in Zambia – violence flared briefly in October 2006 in Lusaka and the Copperbelt when Mwanawasa won the elections – the political leaders did not manipulate this willingness to resort to violence to further their political interests to the extent it has been done in Kenya and Zimbabwe, for example.

A structural cause of conflict is the lack of separation of powers between the three arms of the state: the executive, legislative and judiciary. While there are

no significant constraints on the basic functions involved in the separation of powers, the executive clearly dominates beyond the powers vested in it through the constitution. Parliament cannot effectively monitor government actions as it remains poorly equipped, thus enabling the political leadership to pursue short-term political benefits if it so desires. As noted above, the judiciary tends to be fairly free when dealing with non-political cases but its independence tends to diminish or entirely disappear in politically sensitive cases.

The prevalence of corruption is yet another structural cause of conflict. Despite Mwanawasa's stated commitment to fighting corruption, there had been no major improvements in this problem area during his incumbency. Corruption remains endemic in Zambian society, penetrating all spheres of public life, including those institutions intended to combat it. The fact that the Zambia Police Service happens to be one of the worst-hit public institutions in this regard only makes matters worse. With a reputation of intimidation, coercion and occasional brutality against suspects or rioters, the activities of this group within Zambia's security sector may escalate or trigger a violent conflict.

By and large, there are no irreconcilable social, ethnic or religious differences among various groups within Zambian society and hardly any incidents of violence are reported. Although existing gaps resulting from pervasive poverty cannot be closed, the political leadership generally tries to prevent any cleavage-based conflict from escalating. Religion has never been a source of conflict in Zambia, and ethnicity – though it plays a role in politics – has not been on the forefront of the agenda of the political parties to the extent that it has been politicised to create ethnic cleavages and thus gain more support.

In the best-case scenario, Zambia is likely to continue as a politically stable society in the foreseeable future. The recent election of Rupiah Banda did not lead to a repeat of what some have come to call the Kenya Syndrome. Opposition leader Michael Sata, a familiar face in Zambia's political landscape, may have expected that his turn had finally come to take over the reins. Yet Sata challenged the election results before the Supreme Court and did not surf on a wave of social discontent that could have triggered a violent outbreak. Given that political stability rested to a large extent on whether the result would be accepted by the losers of the race and that political parties, in their role as channels for political and social mobilisation, play a critical role in shaping the governance of the country, Zambia appears to be continuing towards consolidating its emerging democracy.

Zambia's stability will depend on how the country navigates its current development challenges. Abject poverty poses a major challenge. The country has begun to register positive economic growth, but the average GDP annual growth rate of 5 per cent is widely acknowledged, even by government itself, as inadequate to ameliorate the current high levels of poverty in the country. The challenge faced by government is to promote economic growth that will spread benefits broadly across all sections of the population, particularly the poor in rural areas. Both government and civil society share the understanding that Zambia needs broad-based pro-poor economic growth.

Zambia's continued reliance on donor assistance does not pose any threat to security nor does it appear to provoke any future political conflicts among the political elite.

Despite this positive outlook, there are areas of concern with regard to conflict escalation. Like many societies in the grip of poverty, there are various factors that might trigger serious social disturbances in the country.

In a society where the majority are poor and a substantial section of the population depend on the market for social provisioning, economic stability is crucial to maintenance of law and order. The macroeconomic indicators in Zambia have been improving over time and for the first time in many years, the inflation rate was reduced to single digits in 2006. This situation, however, can change very suddenly, as has been seen with the rapid fall in commodity prices over recent months. Copper traded at highs close to US\$9 000 per tonne only two years ago. The global recession, however, had driven the price below US\$4 000 by October 2008.¹¹⁵ In addition, erratic rainfall and ensuing crop failure can quickly cause food prices to rise beyond the reach of many. In the past, Zambia has experienced food riots because of price increases. Similarly, the country has had problems maintaining price stability in the energy sector, be it the price of petroleum products or electricity tariffs. Energy prices have a tendency to drive the general rate of inflation upward. In short, poverty and widening social inequalities constitute a time bomb that needs to be defused without delay.

Second, an impasse in the constitution-making process has the potential to result in street protests and provoke a draconian reaction from the authorities. This could exacerbate tensions in society and undermine peace and stability. Third, Zambia's high export revenue was dependent on the high copper prices on the world market. With the fall in commodity prices, Zambia is projected to

lose out on annual revenues equivalent to at least 2 per cent of total economic output, which it had hoped to channel into infrastructure investment.¹¹⁶ A glut in the world market as we are now witnessing can easily drive prices down and result in significantly reduced state revenue for development. Zambia needs to diversify its economy, particularly its export base, to hedge against fluctuations in government revenue which dependence on one commodity entails. This is not happening quickly enough and is a major factor contributing to limited employment opportunities.

In addition, if opposition parties continue to participate in elections that are perceived to be unfair, continue to lose their cases through the court system in a manner perceived to be unfair and continue to be excluded from government, they may, at some point, choose to rebel or use other means to address their grievances. The concerns of the Lozi people in Western Province, for example, should be addressed through targeted development activities that seek to accelerate their incorporation into mainstream politics. In the event that valuable natural resource wealth is discovered, every effort will have to be made to ensure that decisions regarding resource exploitation are made in a participatory and transparent fashion, and that benefits from resource exploitation are equitably distributed.

In sum, Zambia's conflict management and violence mitigating factors render an outbreak of violent conflict unlikely in the near future. In the short, medium and long term, Zambia faces a promising future as it consolidates its emerging democracy. This process may entail increased political conflict, but that in turn should nourish the democratic process.

Notes

- 1 There was controversy around a change of the constitution in order to allow for a third term of President Chiluba. Yet, strong civil society pressure (the Oasis Forum) prevented this constitutional amendment.
- 2 Heiner Hänggi, Making sense of security sector governance, in H Hänggi and T H Winkler (eds), *Challenges of security sector governance*, 2003, 5, DCAF, <http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=DCAF&fileid=0CD0E86D-F99B-3B67-0D75-2FFB3FB5CA3D&lng=en> (accessed 13 June 2006).
- 3 See for example Human Security Centre, *Human Security Report 2005: war and peace in the 21st century*, 2005, vii, <http://www.humansecurityreport.info/content/view/28/63/> (accessed 5 September 2007); Jakkie Cilliers, *Human security in Africa: a conceptual framework for review*, African Human Security Initiative, 2004, <http://www.africanreview.org/docs/hum-secjun04.pdf> (accessed 20 September 2005); Dan Henk, Security: relevance and implications, *Parameters*, Summer 2005, 91-106, 91f.
- 4 Kofi Annan, 'We the peoples': the role of the United Nations in the 21st century, United Nations, 2000, 43, <http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/full.htm> (accessed 13 June 2007).
- 5 Human Security Centre, *Human Security Report 2005*, vii.
- 6 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *DAC guidelines: helping prevent violent conflict*, 2001, 38, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/54/1886146.pdf> (accessed 13 January 2007).
- 7 Amitai Etzioni, *The moral dimension: towards a new economics*, New York: Free Press, 1988, 27.
- 8 Human Security Centre, *Human Security Report 2005*, vii; United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994: new dimensions of human security*, 1994, <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1994/en/> (accessed 17 March 2007).
- 9 See for example Thorsten Bonacker and Peter Imbusch 1999:74, Begriffe der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung: Konflikt, Gewalt, Krieg, Frieden, in Peter Imbusch and Ralf Zoll (eds), *Friedens- und Konfliktforschung. Eine Einführung mit Quellen*, Band 1. 2. Aufl. Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1999, 74; and William O O Idowu, Citizenship, alienation and conflict in Nigeria, *Africa Development* 24(1&2) (1999), 33-55, 34.
- 10 Idowu, Citizenship, alienation and conflict in Nigeria, 34.

- 11 Trutz von Trotha, Einleitung. Zur Soziologie der Gewalt, in Trutz von Trotha (Hrsg), *Soziologie der Gewalt*, Opladen/ Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 9-56, 26. [Sonderheft 37/1997, *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie.*]
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 Idowu, Citizenship, alienation and conflict in Nigeria, 34.
- 14 See for example von Trotha, Einleitung. Zur Soziologie der Gewalt, 9f; Bonacker and Imbusch, Begriffe der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 74f; and Idowu, Citizenship, alienation and conflict in Nigeria.
- 15 Bonacker and Imbusch. Begriffe der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 95.
- 16 For example, the repeated outbreak of violent conflicts in Warri in the Niger Delta can be designated as a crisis.
- 17 Idowu, Citizenship, alienation and conflict in Nigeria, 35.
- 18 James T Duke, *Conflict and power in social life*, Provo/Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1976, 256f.
- 19 George Klay Jr Kieh, Theories of conflict and conflict resolution, in George Klay Kieh Jr and Ida Rousseau Mukenge (eds), *Zones of conflict in Africa: theories and cases*, Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2002, 3.
- 20 Ibid, 9f.
- 21 African authors such as Imobighe have adopted this approach for the analysis of civil conflicts in Africa. Factors which may lead to civil conflict include inequities in access to power and resources, lack of moral and ethical standards in the management of public affairs as well as discrimination based on sex, religion, ethnic origin and socioeconomic status. Non-democratic and exclusive governance, denial of basic human rights and inefficient governmental institutions (executive, legislative and judicial) are also cited as factors which cause civil conflict (T A Imobighe, *Conflict in Africa: roles of OAU and sub-regional organizations*, Lecture delivered in February 1998 at the National War College in Nigeria, Abuja, 4).
- 22 Kieh, Theories of conflict and conflict resolution, 12.
- 23 See Paul Collier and Anke Höfler, *Greed and grievance in civil war*, 2001, www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/greedgrievance_23oct.pdf (accessed 30 May 2004); and Andreas Mehler, Major flaws in conflict prevention policies: the disrespect of conflict prolongation, local-to-sub-regional dynamics and the need of a peace order, Hamburg, unpublished article, 2003, 3.
- 24 DFID is the United Kingdom government department responsible for promoting sustainable development and reducing poverty. Its assistance is concentrated in the poorest countries of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, but also contributes to poverty reduction and sustainable development in middle-income countries, including those in Latin America and Eastern Europe.
- 25 Department for International Development, *Conducting conflict assessments: guidance notes*, 2002, 10f, www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/conflictassessmentguidance.pdf (accessed 9 October 2004).

- 26 For example, environmental pollution resulting from the extraction of oil by multinational oil companies in the region is a great source of tension as it threatens the livelihood of the inhabitants, many of whom are fishermen whose source of income has been depleted.
- 27 Kieh, *Theories of conflict and conflict resolution*, 13.
- 28 See for example John L Davies and Ted Robert Gurr (eds), *Preventive measures. building risk assessment and crisis early warning systems*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999; and Volker Matthies, *Krisenprävention. Vorbeugen ist besser als Heilen*, Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 2000, 37.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Barbara Harff, Early warning of humanitarian crises: sequential models and the role of accelerators, in Davies and Gurr, *Preventive measures*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999, 73.
- 32 Elsewhere, it has been noted that this classification should be extended to allow a detailed examination of the escalation patterns of a conflict. According to Mehler (Major flaws in conflict prevention policies, 3) protracted violent conflicts, which have become commonplace in Africa south of the Sahara, have escalated to such an extent that it has become equally important to identify the reasons for the continuation of a violent conflict as well as to pinpoint its origins, that is, causes.
- In other words, for a coherent understanding of the causes of violent conflicts, one also needs to consider factors which tend to sustain it. These prolonging factors may include issues such as the reinforcement of the military capacities of the parties involved or the acquisition of arms by means of royalties collected from available resources (such as oil), sustenance of illegal trafficking (of valuable resources) operations, proliferation of small arms as well as the adoption of war as a profession (ibid). Instead of deeming Collier's 'greed' motive – in other words the opportunities for predation such as the control of primary commodity exports – as the major cause of violent conflict, Mehler has aptly identified it as a prolonging or fuelling factor (ibid).
- 33 Smith's typology is an adaptation of Dessler's four-part typology of causes and types of causes of conflict. See Dan Smith, Trends and causes of armed conflicts, in *Berghof handbook for conflict transformation*, Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2004, 8; and D Dessler, How to sort causes in the study of environmental change and violent conflict, in N Græger and D Smith (eds), *Environment, poverty and conflict*, Oslo: International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), 1994.
- 34 He defines these as the political, social, economic or national cleavages found at the level of the group rather than the individual, that is, the basic elements of social and political structure (Smith, Trends and causes of armed conflicts, 8f).
- 35 Defined as the internal or external factors that affect the intensity and duration of the conflict, in other words Mehler's prolonging factors (ibid).
- 36 Smith also defines these as the factors which set off an armed conflict (ibid).
- 37 Ibid, 9f.

- 38 Note, however, that in practice these components overlap, that is, a given conflict may not necessarily have one root cause, and escalation patterns may include several components (Andreas Mehler, Alles Krise oder was? In Brigitte Fahrenhorst (ed), *Die Rolle der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in gewalttätigen Konflikten. Dokumentation einer Fachtagung in der TU Berlin vom 3.-5.12.1999*, SID-Berlin-Berichte 11, Berlin, 2000, 35).
- 39 Ibid.
- 40 Ibid, 26f.
- 41 For further reading on the various problem areas and possible escalation patterns see ibid 37f.
- 42 The extent to which IMF provision were in fact implemented remains debatable.
- 43 See for example Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country profile 2007: Zambia*, London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007; Lise Rakner, *Political and economic liberalisation in Zambia 1991-2001*, Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2003.
- 44 BertelsmannStiftung, *BTI2008-Zambiacountryreport*, Gütersloh: BertelsmannStiftung, 2007, 8, http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/fileadmin/pdf/Gutachten_BTI_2008/ESA/Zambia.pdf (accessed 20 August 2008).
- 45 Constitution Review Commission, *Final report on constitutional reform*, Lusaka, 29 December 2005, 729.
- 46 Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country profile 2007: Zambia*.
- 47 NCC delegates are entitled to a sitting allowance of K500 000 (about US\$130) per sitting and subsistence allowance of K650 000 (some US\$170) per day. There is also a transport allowance of K100 000 (US\$26) per day and transport refund of K300 000 (US\$80) for those who reside outside Lusaka.
- 48 See for example Dan Saluseki and Mwala Kalaluka, *Dialogue over constitution*, 2007, <http://maravi.blogspot.com/2007/06/dialogue-over-constitution.html> (accessed 20 August 2008); and interview with Reuben Lifuka, Lusaka, 2 August 2008.
- 49 See for example *Africa Confidential* 49(10), 9 May 2008, 4.
- 50 During the last elections in 2006, for example, there was a stand-off between the supporters of President Mwanawasa's MMD and the opposition Patriotic Front (PF).
- 51 Gero Erdmann, *Ethnicity, voter alignment and political party affiliation – an African case: Zambia*, GIGA Working Paper Series 45, March 2007, 11, http://vg02.met.vgwort.de/na/3763e2c4c447dd92b5b5150614b6bf?l=http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/wp45_erdmann.pdf (accessed 13 July 2008).
- 52 Ibid.
- 53 Ibid, 30.
- 54 Interview Fred Mutesa, Lusaka, 28 July 2008.

- 55 Miles Larmer and Alastair Fraser, Of cabbages and King Cobra: populist politics and Zambia's 2006 election, *African Affairs* 106(425) (2007), 611.
- 56 See for example Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country report June 2007: Zambia*, London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007.
- 57 On 2 October 2006, the Electoral Commission of Zambia reported that the number of registered voters totalled 3 941 229 of which 2 789 114 cast their vote in the presidential election. This represented a turnout of 70,8 per cent, the highest since the return of multiparty elections in 1991 (Economist Intelligence Unit, Country profile 2007: Zambia, 8).
- 58 Constitution of the Republic of Zambia, 1996.
- 59 Despite impeccable credentials, Mun'gomba lacked grassroots connections. He did, however, enjoy the backing of civil society and religious groups because of his lead in drafting the Constitutional Review Commission report currently under review by the NCC.
- 60 See for example *Africa Confidential* 49(16), 1 August 2008, 3.
- 61 Zimbabwe's problem complicated - Banda, *The Zimbabwe Guardian*, 26 January 2009, <http://www.talkzimbabwe.com/news/117/ARTICLE/4173/2009-01-26.html>.
- 62 Bertelsmann Stiftung, *BTI 2008 - Zambia country report*, 19.
- 63 Ibid.
- 64 Ibid.
- 65 Christian von Soest, *How does neopatrimonialism affect the African state? The case of tax collection in Zambia*, GIGA Working Paper 32, November 2006, 7, http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/wp32_soest.pdf (accessed 13 July 2008).
- 66 Ibid.
- 67 Von Soest, *How does neopatrimonialism affect the African state*, 8; Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic experiments in Africa: regime transitions in comparative perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 63-68.
- 68 Von Soest, *How does neopatrimonialism affect the African state*, 9f.
- 69 Sabine C Carey, A comparative analysis of political parties in Kenya, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, *Democratization* 9(3) (2002), 53-71, quoted in von Soest, *How does neopatrimonialism affect the African state*, 10.
- 70 Von Soest, *How does neopatrimonialism affect the African state*, 11f.
- 71 Ibid, 20.
- 72 Transparency International Zambia, Bribe Payers Index, Lusaka: Transparency International, 2007, 14.
- 73 Ibid.
- 74 Ibid, viii.

- 75 Ibid.
- 76 Interview Lifuka, Lusaka.
- 77 Erdmann, *Ethnicity, voter alignment and political party affiliation*.
- 78 Ibid.
- 79 See for example Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country profile 2007: Zambia*, 12.
- 80 See *ibid*, 10f.
- 81 The case of the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ) against the Attorney General is a further example of the difficulties faced by the judiciary in politically sensitive cases. The LAZ sought an injunction to restrain the President from announcing the date of election. The trial judge declined to issue the injunction against the state. Ironically, the Supreme Court on appeal also declined to make a pronouncement on the matter arguing, paradoxically, that it frowns upon making academic orders. Thus the Supreme Court, as the highest court of the law, failed to provide guidance on the point for similar cases in future and instead deferred the question to the National Constitutional Conference.
- 82 The President also has other discretionary powers. For instance, while the constitution dictates that judges from the High Court and Supreme Court vacate their offices upon reaching the age of 65, the President may, at his own discretion, override this rule and allow judges to remain in office. Similarly, although a minimum of ten years' experience is required for the appointment to High Court judge, the President can, at his discretion, appoint a candidate that does not possess the requisite experience.
- 83 Republic of Zambia, Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence, Lusaka, 2006.
- 84 *The Post*, 9 October 2007, 4.
- 85 Zambia probably has the greatest number of retired generals in Southern Africa, many of them retiring before the age of 50.
- 86 Transparency International Zambia, Bribe Payers Index.
- 87 Human Rights Watch, *Zambia: no model for democracy, continuing human rights violations*, 1998, <http://www.hrw.org/reports98/zambia/> (accessed 20 August 2008).
- 88 The Police Inspector General boasted that street crime had hit an all time low after street vendors were removed from Lusaka's streets in early 2007 but acknowledged that crime had correspondingly gone up in the residential areas.
- 89 Anthony Giddens, *Sociology*, 5th ed, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006, 487.
- 90 Ibid.
- 91 The HIPC programme was initiated by the IMF and the World Bank in 1996, following wide-scale lobbying by NGOs and other civil society bodies. Providing debt relief and low-interest loans to reduce external debt repayments to sustainable levels, assistance is conditional on the governments of these countries meeting a range of economic management and performance

- targets. Thus far, 27 countries have received a combined US\$54 billion in aid, among them Zambia, Malawi, Madagascar and Tanzania. For more detailed information on the HIPC programme, see the IMF website at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm>.
- 92 Central Statistical Office Zambia, Living Conditions Monitoring Survey, 2006.
- 93 Ibid.
- 94 The Gini coefficient is defined as a ratio with values between 0 and 1. A low Gini coefficient indicates more equal income or wealth distribution, while a high Gini coefficient indicates more unequal distribution. Zero corresponds to perfect equality, that is, where everyone has exactly the same income, and 1 corresponds to perfect inequality, that is, one person has all the income, while everyone else has zero income. The Gini coefficient requires that no one have a negative net income or wealth. Worldwide, Gini coefficients range from approximately 0,232 in Denmark to 0,707 in Namibia.
- 95 The Gini index is the Gini coefficient expressed as a percentage.
- 96 The basic use of HDI is to rank countries by level of human development, an indicator that stipulates whether a country is a developed, developing, or underdeveloped country.
- 97 Data refers to national literacy estimates from surveys conducted between 1995 and 2005. These are the latest figures available (United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2007/2008: fighting climate change: human solidarity in a divided world*, http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Complete.pdf (accessed 20 August 2008)).
- 98 Ibid.
- 99 Ibid.
- 100 Ibid.
- 101 Ibid.
- 102 Central Statistical Office of Zambia, Living Conditions Monitoring Survey, 8.
- 103 Alastair Fraser and John Lungu, *For whom the windfalls? Winners and losers in the privatisation of Zambia's copper mines*, Lusaka: Catholic Centre for Justice, Development and Peace, 2007, 21.
- 104 Government of the Republic of Zambia, *Fifth National Development Plan 2006-2010*, Lusaka: Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 2006, 227.
- 105 Ibid.
- 106 Bertelsmann Stiftung, *BTI 2008 - Zambia country report*.
- 107 Ibid.
- 108 Ibid.
- 109 Ibid.

110 Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country report August 2008: Zambia*.

111 Interview Lifuka.

112 Bertelsmann Stiftung, *BTI 2008 - Zambia country report*.

113 In fact, prices were expected to remain high during 2008, averaging 341 US cents/lb, but are likely to subside to 265 US cents/lb in 2009 as world supply increases and there is a moderation of hitherto high demand from Asian sources (Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country report August 2008: Zambia*).

114 See interviews Lifuka and Mutesa and Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country report August 2008: Zambia*.

115 Tom Burgis, Copper's fall takes shine off Zambia's ambitions, *Financial Times*, 18 November 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8ae82f74-b59a-11dd-ab71-0000779fd18c.html?nclick_check=1 (accessed 18 November 2008).

116 Ibid.

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