THE EUPHRATES TRIANGLE

Security Implications of the Southeastern Anatolia Project

by Frederick M. Lorenz and Edward J. Erickson
Cover photo: The Atatürk Dam is the largest irrigation and hydropower dam ever built in Turkey, and a key structure in the Southeastern Anatolia Project. Photo courtesy of Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration, Ankara, Turkey.
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with the collaboration of
Brian R. Shaw, Aaron T. Wolf, and John F. Kolars

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THE EUPHRATES TRIANGLE

Security Implications of the Southeastern Anatolia Project
For more than 4,000 years, lands irrigated by the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers have been the scene of violent conflict. History has been shaped by geography and, in particular, by access to water. The Southeastern Anatolia Project (Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi, or GAP) is a major reclamation and hydropower project that has been a Turkish Government priority since 1961. When complete, the 22-dam project will irrigate an additional 1.7 million hectares (about 4.2 million acres) in southeast Turkey.

The GAP has direct consequences for Iraq and Syria. Both countries are heavily dependent on the waters of the Tigris and the Euphrates, and the impact of the project could ultimately reduce the flow of fresh water to Syria and to Iraq. These transboundary water issues have the potential to further destabilize an already tense region as the GAP approaches full development in the next 20 years. A 1988 article in *U.S. News and World Report* described a frightening scenario:

**November 12, 1993.** War erupted throughout the Middle East today in a desperate struggle for dwindling water supplies. Iraqi forces, attempting to smash a Syrian blockade, launched massive attacks on the Euphrates River valley. Syria answered with missile attacks on Baghdad.

The envisioned scenario has not materialized some 10 years after its dire prediction, but security conditions in the Tigris-Euphrates basin are unstable and the potential for "water wars" is still present. Resource scarcity is an important factor in any security analysis, and the realm of environmental security is subject to renewed debate in the United States.

This book explores the relationship between regional security and the river environment of the Tigris-Euphrates basin. The focus will be on Turkey, because a review of Turkish history, politics, and military capability is central to an understanding of the security issues concerning the GAP. This three-part analysis looks at issues that affect regional instability:

- Historical patterns of water use in the region, in agriculture, and in development of hydroelectric power, to include a description of the GAP in terms of geography, engineering, power capacity, and irrigation potential.
- The security relationship between Turkey and Syria and Iraq, to include the balance of power, the recent history of bilateral relationships, the current state of Turkish politics,
and Turkey's special role in the NATO alliance in view of its strategic position. The question of Kurdish nationalism and the relation of the conflict to regional water issues are also considered.

Regional security implications of current Turkish policy and proposed actions in completion of the GAP. Part of this is a review of international law as it applies to transboundary water use.

Relationships and external issues in the Tigris-Euphrates basin are substantially defined by water. While the Euphrates River connects all three riparian states, political and historic relationships remain bilateral. These three bilateral relationships can be seen as a triangle that is linked by the river. The Euphrates connects these bilateral relationships into a series of conflicts and rivalries that can be visualized in the following way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bilateral Relationship</th>
<th>Principal Characterizing Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey and Iraq</td>
<td>Oil vs. water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq and Syria</td>
<td>Regional ascendency</td>
</tr>
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<td>Syria and Turkey</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While in many ways oversimplifications, these relationships form the basic framework for any potential water-management regime.

Issues between Turkey and Iraq are centered on the concept that water and oil are resources distributed by God (Allah), and this distribution reflects endowment. Turkey sees Iraq's demands in terms of a regional *quid pro quo* of oil for water. If Iraq is willing to provide equivalent resources of oil, water can be provided in return. The basic principle of the Harmon Doctrine, whereby the upstream riparian owns the water and controls its distribution, is often cited by Turkey. Iraq claims prior appropriation rights to historical use of the Euphrates and sees no ties whatsoever with oil resources.

Issues between Iraq and Syria are historical competitions over regional strength and authority. The political systems and leaders of both are striving to represent a Middle East agenda. The 1975 escalation and tensions over the reduction of the Euphrates flow devolved to a Syria-Iraq conflict that reflected a struggle over power and control much more than over water itself. While Turkey controlled a significant part of the flow quantity, it was noticeably absent from the conflict.

Finally, Syria has been an active supporter of several insurgency groups directed at the destabilization of the Turkish state. The most visible and successful of these groups, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), has had Syrian shelter and support for many years. The tensions over Kurdish nationalism and Turkish sovereignty dominate the relationships between Turkey and Syria. Arab and Israeli issues dominate the regional relationships and provide an impediment to an agreement on water. In the region of the Euphrates River and the GAP project, support of destabilizing elements dominates the relationship.

Security in the Tigris-Euphrates basin is complex, and a casual analysis often raises more questions than it answers, as there are dramatically different positions on water questions. This study’s approach is to attempt to answer critical questions that flow from six major issues. The first five issues are discussed in chapter eleven, while the discussion of U.S. policy is reserved for chapter twelve. The six issues are:

- **Effect of GAP completion.** When will the GAP be fully developed, and when will it begin to take a toll of downstream neighbors? As part of this question, will the GAP, as designed and fully constructed, cause a downstream water shortage during normal use or in times of drought?
- **The GAP as an instrument of Turkish foreign policy.** What is Turkey's real ability to use the GAP as an instrument of foreign policy? Can the flow of water leaving Turkey be manipulated? If so, how quickly and what impact will it have on hydropower generation and irrigation systems in the region? Under what conditions might the Turks take this action?
- **Potential agreement on allocation of waters.** What is the potential for an agreement on allocation of the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates? Will international law provide guidance or assistance in reaching an agreement?
- **The GAP as a potential cause of war.** What is the potential for Iraq and Syria to use the GAP as a *cause celebre* or *causus belli*? What is the likelihood of these countries developing a united front toward Turkey? Would Iraq or Syria act unilaterally? In other words, what is the potential for conflict? Militarily, what is the likely outcome of a conflict?
- **Alternative scenarios.** What are the alternative scenarios for regional tension and instability over water, looking ahead to the year 2010? Considering all the factors cited above, what is the most probable scenario in 2010?
- **U.S. policy.** What should be the direction of U.S. foreign policy in support of peace in the region and a basin-wide water allocation arrangement?
History is said to have begun in the Tigris-Euphrates basin. Some even believe it to be the location of the original Garden of Eden or the ancient cradle of civilization in the Middle East. The Tigris and the Euphrates are born in modern Turkey, in the highlands where rain and snow are plentiful. The Euphrates is longer than the Tigris, flowing through Syria and Iraq to the head of the Gulf, where it joins the Tigris as the Shat-Al-Arab. The Tigris has a greater total volume and flows directly from Turkey to Iraq, where it obtains additional flows from the Zagros Mountains of Iran (see map, page 25).

The Tigris and the Euphrates lie in a transition zone between humid continental and desert climates. Like the Nile, they are “exotic rivers,” which derive their waters from outside the region through which they flow. The source of the Tigris/Euphrates system is in the highlands of eastern Anatolia (modern central Turkey), which receives large amounts of rain and snow. Most of the downstream region (modern Syria and Iraq) receives insufficient rainfall to sustain rain-fed agriculture, but the rivers convey surplus water to zones of deficit. Farming first developed in the more humid zones but then moved to river valleys in the arid zone, where crops could be grown under cultivation with the benefit of irrigation.

As early as the fourth millennium B.C., agricultural settlements and basic irrigation networks were part of the Mesopotamian landscape. The Sumerians and Babylonians used the water of the Euphrates, and documents from the time of Hammurabi the Babylonian lawgiver refer to maintenance of the irrigation systems. The Bible provides early history of conflict over water in the “land of Canaan.” One of the first references is in Genesis 21, when Abraham reproaches Abimelech because his servants had taken a well from Abraham’s servants. There is also a description of the dispute over Isaac’s wells (Genesis 21), and many of the names of wells in this region have been retained as place names in Israel today.

The early inhabitants of the region revered water. The springs of water seemed to be alive and inspired divine and animistic associations. The Mesopotamians had a creation myth based upon a battle of the gods to create a firmament from the sea. Arab culture arose out of life in the desert, where competition over a limited resource is fundamental. Water is often associated with the myth of the amniotic fluid that nurtures life. Water is a major theme in the Koran, with
numerous references to the words water, river, fountain, spring, and cloud. The use of fresh water for ceremonial ablution and purification prior to prayer is essential to Muslim religious practice.

The early history of the basin included major environmental setbacks. Agricultural success was often followed by an insidious cycle that was probably unavoidable. Infertile land was irrigated, which produced high yields, and irrigation was continued to maintain production, which led to salination and degradation, which, with further excess irrigation, led back to infertile soils. This soil degradation was caused by silting, waterlogging, and salination. The process was particularly apparent in southern Mesopotamia (modern Iraq) in the time of the ancient Sumerians and Babylonians. We owe much to these civilizations—the Sumerians invented writing and developed sailboats and wheeled vehicles, for example—but the Sumerians brought about their own decline by causing the degradation of their soils. Deforestation and overgrazing caused increased runoff, resulting in a destabilization of riverbeds and clogging of irrigation works. A greater problem was salination, caused by the increased use of irrigation water and return flows into groundwater. The result was waterlogging, the unnatural rising of the water table that destroys crops in poorly drained lands. The loss of agricultural lands ultimately contributed to population movement and an overall decline in Sumerian civilization.

Much of the Euphrates irrigation system was destroyed during the 13th-century Mongol invasion. In the following years, the system was rendered useless by neglect, abandonment, and the breakdown of central government administration. Large tracts of land that had been productive returned to desert. By the 19th century, much of the neglected land had been reclaimed, because of government controls and rebuilding of irrigation works. This effort continues today, with ambitious irrigation plans throughout the Tigris-Euphrates watershed. However, poor drainage in modern Syria and Iraq has led to salination, thus continuing the cycle.

In the 20th century, during the period of the British and French mandates, there were consultative committees established over the use of the two rivers, but water use was not sufficiently competitive to raise the potential for conflict. France and Turkey signed a series of treaties between 1921 and 1926, but the terms were vague, and neither party seemed intent on developing the waters of the two rivers. Iraq was the first of the three countries to seek development of the waters of the basin. Two treaties were developed between Iraq and Turkey, one in 1930 when Iraq was still under the British, and another in 1946, after independence. Turkey consented to Iraq’s construction of dams in Turkey to regulate the flow of the rivers in Iraq, but they were never built. Iraq might argue today that the effect of these treaties was Turkish acceptance of Iraq’s vested right to receive its established uses.

Water resource investigations in southeastern Turkey were initiated with establishment of hydrometric stations on the Euphrates River in 1936 and on the Tigris in 1947. In the following years topographical and hydrologic surveys were conducted. Reconnaissance studies were completed in 1958, and initial plans were developed for three dams on the lower Euphrates and five dams on the Tigris, for a total irrigation area of 20,000 hectares. In 1963, the State Hydraulic Works Department (DSI) prepared studies to assess the energy potential, and the first major dam (Keban) began operations in 1974. This was the beginning of the GAP program.

In the past 10 years, the conflict related to oil in the Middle East has largely obscured a much older and more acute problem of resource scarcity. Although some countries in the Middle East are oil rich, they are all water poor and getting poorer. Water scarcity is compounded by serious environmental problems that are renewing the ancient cycle of deforestation, desertification, soil erosion, salination, and the contamination of water supplies. Increased water demands for hydropower and irrigation in the years ahead may reach crisis proportions without an allocation agreement among riparian nations. This is particularly true in the Tigris-Euphrates basin, where population growth and projected demands on the rivers will eventually exceed capacity.
Chapter Three

The GAP Vision

Turkey is divided into seven geographical regions. Of these, the poorest and least developed is the southeastern Anatolia region, which comprises the provinces of Adiyaman, Gaziantep, Batman, Diyarbakir, Mardin, Siirt, and Sirnak. The heart of southeastern Anatolia is a uniformly stark and wild landscape, within which are nestled the teeming cities of Diyarbakir, Urfa, Gaziantep, and Mardin. Except for the western areas of the region, history and progress seem to have bypassed both the inhabitants and the land.

The Ottoman Turks were not noted for their economic abilities, and President Kemal Ataturk’s early constitutional republic, founded in 1923, was saddled with crippling debt and failed economic policies. Much like their Communist neighbors to the north, the early Turkish republicans chose to develop their country in economic and social terms with structured government programs. The Turkish Five-Year Plan of 1934 was designed to set up light industry near the base areas of native raw materials; the plan of 1939 focused on heavy industry. In the 1950s, the government’s economic policies attempted to revive agriculture by bringing mechanization to Turkey. The results of these policies were generally successful in moving the primitive Turkish economy into the 20th century, but, in practical terms, these economic and agricultural plans tended to develop the western areas of the country. And so, while Thrace, the Aegean areas, and the Anatolian heartland of Turkey gained much, the southeastern Anatolian region fell farther behind, as did the expectations and hopes of the populace.

The Ottoman Dream

The Turkish Government in Ankara was aware of what was happening in the rural southeast and of the limited opportunities facing the inhabitants. The solution was a long-held dream dating back to the Ottoman Empire. In the 1930s, Ataturk proposed the construction of series of dams with the idea of harnessing the mighty Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. Both these rivers originated in the rugged mountains overshadowing southeastern Anatolia and poured millions of gallons of cold, clean water through the area. However, a lack of money combined with the rigid structure
of the existing 5-year plans made such a project seem impossible. Politicians periodically attempted to secure funds for development but failed in the face of more pressing economic priorities. It was not until the 1960s that the idea of developing these two rivers became politically viable.

By the second half of this century, Turkey was looking for sources of electrical power and at the same time was reaching the limits of agricultural development. The time had finally come to convert the Ottoman dream into a viable concept for development. The realization itself was the child of longtime Turkish leader Suleyman Demirel, a member of the intellectual elite of Turkey who was perennially in the government, either as Prime Minister or as President, for more than 40 years. A trained engineer, he worked on Turkey's hydroelectric dams and, after entering politics, maintained an active interest in Turkey's water projects.

 Atatürk's vision for taming the Tigris and Euphrates was uncomplicated and predicated on a series of dams that would produce hydroelectric power and unlimited water for irrigation. For 50 years, these dams were the central and immutable intellectual bedrock of the vision. Under Demirel's leadership, however, the transition from a limited-scope hydroelectric project to a unified, multiagency plan for regional and national development achieved its own identity. The modern vision, now inseparable with the name of Demirel, is more than just dams and irrigation ditches—the GAP symbolizes hope for the future for Turkey.

The development of the GAP has universal political appeal within Turkey and represents a source of great national pride—it is financed without the benefit of international financial organizations or the World Bank. This self-sufficiency has led to a heightened sense of national pride, a focus for the industrialization of the nation, significant influence in the region, and a great degree of independence of action and control over the project. The GAP is intended to bring industrialization and growth to a poor region of the country. It sends electricity to population centers and adds to the agricultural export base of Turkey. Not the least in importance, it provides hope to the large Kurdish minority in that area. There is something in this vision for almost every citizen of Turkey. Discussions with residents of Ankara, Adana, and southeastern Anatolia in July 1997 elicited few negative comments. The attitude is best summarized by Atatürk's words, emblazoned across the Atatürk Dam curtain in huge letters: "Ne Mutlu Turkum Diyene"—"Lucky is the one who says he is a Turk."

**Scope**

The GAP is a large-scale, multisector regional development project with major implications for the region. One of the major river basin development projects in the world, it is certainly the largest and most comprehensive project ever carried out in Turkey. The southeastern Turkey project includes eight provinces covering an area about the size of Kentucky (see map, page 25) and includes 10 percent of Turkey's total population as well as surface area. The project area includes 41 percent of the total watershed of the Tigris and Euphrates River within Turkey and, when fully developed, will irrigate 1.7 million hectares, 20 percent of the irrigable land in Turkey. The GAP Master Plan indicates the areas currently under development (see map, page 26).

The GAP includes 13 major irrigation and hydropower schemes that involve the construction of 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric power plants on the Tigris and the Euphrates. The GAP will eventually double the hydroelectric capacity that existed in 1984 and is expected to generate 22 billion kilowatt hours. In July 1997 the GAP hydroelectric production was estimated to be at about 90 percent of capacity, but the irrigation infrastructure was estimated to be less than 10 percent complete. The immediate economic benefit of power generation was a strong motivation to keep those aspects of the project on track. Because the GAP is internally financed, limits on financial aid for the irrigation projects required a scaling back of completion plans. A recent local newspaper report estimated that the GAP irrigation system could take another 70 years to complete.

**The Three Euphrates Riparian Nations**

While 28 percent of the Euphrates basin lies in Turkey, 17 percent in Syria, and 40 percent in Iraq, approximately 89 percent of the Euphrates mainstream water originates in Turkey; Syria contributes 11 percent and Iraq, none. The consumption of Euphrates water is inversely proportional to contributions; Syria and Iraq are using 21 percent and 44 percent, respectively, with Turkey using only 35 percent (figures 1 and 2).
addition, water flow is highly seasonal, with the flow concentrated during April and May. July through November are low water months, and in dry years the river flow can all but cease (figure 3).

Turkey approaches its water resources from a position of strength. It relies on a principle similar to the Harmon Doctrine, which views water as a natural resource. Both Syria and Iraq argue that the amount of water released by Turkey is inadequate. They rely on claims of prior appropriation and seek to enforce the requirement that Turkey not do “significant harm” to its downstream neighbors. Turkey refuses to agree with this approach and argues that the quantity of the water needed for irrigation should be determined by applying identical criteria to all of the three countries. Syria and Iraq believe that each country must be free to choose the criteria it will use to determine its own water needs and these statements should not be questioned by the other riparian States. All three nations are pressing ahead with plans to increase the burden on the rivers. It should be noted, however, that the total amount of planned water utilization by the three riparian countries exceeds the total flow capacity of the Euphrates. Syria and Iraq have consistently opposed all water installations planned for and implemented on the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers by Turkey. Their objections have all focused on the perception that those installations would reduce the quantity of water flowing to their countries. A clear example of such attitudes can be seen in Turkey’s construction of the Keban and Karakaya dams in the 1960s and 1970s. Both Syria and Iraq challenged the projects from their inception on the basis of loss of downstream water flow.

**Figure 1.** Country Contributions of Water to the Euphrates River

- **Syria:** 11%
- **Turkey:** 89%

**Figure 2.** Current Country Utilization of Euphrates River Water

- **Syria:** 21%
- **Iraq:** 44%
- **Turkey:** 35%

**Figure 3.** Seasonal Variations of Flow in the Euphrates River
Syria and Iraq have regularly accused Turkey of not notifying them in advance about planned water installations, as required by the proposed “Convention on the Non-navigational Uses of the Transboundary International Watercourses.” This agreement has not been signed by Turkey. It is apparent that Syria, in large part as political leverage in response to the water policies of Ankara, has been supporting the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a Marxist Kurdish militant group. The PKK has conducted both terrorist and military actions in eastern and southeastern Turkey and, according to Ankara, has claimed more than 6,000 lives through tactics of intimidation and attack on civilians.

From Turkey’s point of view, all necessary data pertaining to Turkey’s planned water scheme have been conveyed to Syria and Iraq during Joint Technical Committee meetings. This mechanism, foreseen as a forum to discuss regional water matters, was set up with the Protocol of the Joint Economic Committee meetings, held between Turkey and Iraq in 1980. Syria joined this group meeting in 1983.

Turkey asserts that the purpose of the existing and planned dams on the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers is to contribute to its own energy and irrigation needs. These will also control the variance in water flows, avoid floods, and prevent surge conditions downstream. As mentioned before, the seasonal flow of these rivers fluctuates greatly, ranging between 150 and 200 cubic meters per second (CMS) in summer months to spring surges reaching levels of 5,000 CMS or more (see figure 3, page 7). Turkish dams on the Euphrates River are generally excellent water-management installations, because of their effective reservoirs, low evaporation losses, and geographical and topographic characteristics. The large fluctuations have been regulated by the construction of dams on the Euphrates River in Turkey. Turkey argues that this will benefit the downstream nations, which will receive a more consistent flow.

In 1987, during the filling of the lake behind the Ataturk Dam, Turkey agreed with Syria to provide a minimum of 500 cubic meters per second (CMS) at the point where the Euphrates enters Syria. This was designed to be a temporary measure only but has assumed greater importance absent a comprehensive agreement concerning water allocation. Turkey has stated its commitment to providing the 500 CMS flow, and considerably more has been flowing for the past 3 years (see diagram, page 27).

In terms of water quality, no comprehensive study has ever been completed, and Turkey maintains that the GAP will have no significant environmental impact on the downstream neighbors. There is great concern, however, about water quality in the Arab countries, where the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates are considered the life blood. If the Arab countries have data to support their claims of deteriorating water quality, they have not made it available to interested parties outside the Arab world. This contributes to an atmosphere of charge and denial, with little hard evidence available to support the positions of either side.
Chapter Four
Politics

The regional political climate of the riparian nations in the Tigris-Euphrates basin can be described only as complex. The area seems to act as a magnet for diverse forces of democracy, totalitarianism, religious fundamentalism, and militarism. Additionally, the cast of important regional leaders runs an equally full gamut of diversity. The exploitation of natural resources is a matter of government policy, and there is little of what could be described as an environmental ethic. This volatile combination provides an obstacle to regional cooperation and dialogue. Following are the main issues fostering the preservation of the current political climate of mistrust, doubt, and hate:

- Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq continues to act as a destabilizing influence in the region. The embargo on Iraq impedes economic development and has a direct economic impact on Turkey. This particularly affects southeastern Turkey, through which vital petroleum flowed westward before the Gulf War. The Iraqi Government continues to pit Kurd against Kurd in Northern Iraq and also to support the PKK. The active enforcement of the no-fly zone over northern Iraq by the United States is unpopular with some Turkish political parties.
- The Syrian Government’s long-standing support for international terrorism and its quest for regional ascendancy, especially the provision of training and safe havens for the PKK, continue to affect regional security. While Turkey enjoys civil relations with Syria, support to the PKK overshadows all dialogue. Syria’s recent military cooperation with Greece also complicates matters. While not directly linked to the Tigris and Euphrates water issue, the Middle East Peace Process exercises a significant effect on the willingness of Syria to deal with Western countries.
- Turkey’s membership in NATO and its friendship with the United States continue to alienate that country from its Arab neighbors. This alignment, combined with Turkey’s geographic position and desire to gain entry into the European Union, serves notice on its Middle East neighbors that Turkey is clearly in the European and Western camp. While the Refah, or Welfare, Party seeks to change these positions, this is the most likely direction for Turkey in the near future.
- Islamic fundamentalism continues to affect the political climate in the region. The challenge of reactionary Islam to secular government cannot be ignored by any of the region’s countries, including those governed by totalitarian regimes. Revival movements are growing in strength and stature and pose a challenge to modernization and cooperation.
The growing military strength of the countries in the region tends to destabilize the area. The continued quest by Syria, Iraq, and Iran for weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear and chemical weapons deliverable by intermediate-range missiles, is deeply disturbing to countries of the region, particularly Israel.

The absence of an effective economic, political, or military regional framework of any kind works to obstruct dialogue. The isolation and restrictions imposed by both internal and external forces combine to make international solutions to regional problems difficult. Political progress and dialogue in many cases are conducted in a bilateral or trilateral forum.

While not directly affecting the Tigris-Euphrates basin, the issues of Greece and Cyprus are part of almost every interaction between Turkey and its neighbors. The ever-present problem of Aegean Sea territorial questions and that of the Turkish minority on Cyprus clouds the Turkish perception of the world and reciprocally taints the world view of Turkey. In September 1997, Turkey withdrew (for the first time in the history of the alliance) from an annual NATO Exercise because of a disagreement on Greek participation in the exercise.

Iraq is essentially a dictatorship, with no practical opposition to the government of Saddam Hussein. Iraqi politics are dominated by Saddam Hussein and his Ba'thist regime, which represents the Sunni Muslim population of the country. Hussein's internal policies have been aimed at the suppression of the majority Shi'ah Muslim population and at the containment of Kurdish separatism. Eventually, Hussein seeks to regain complete control of the country and to reestablish Iraq as a regional power. In economic and political terms, the Baghdad regime aims at the continued survival of the state in the face of international sanctions and embargoes.

Because of the unpredictability and aggressiveness of Saddam Hussein, Iraq is classified by the United States as a rogue regime. In response, the United States is identified by the regime as imperialist and anti-Iraq. This polarity makes diplomatic relations between the United States and Iraq problematic. Turkey, on the other hand, enjoys limited but practical relations with Iraq. This is based in large measure on the availability of Iraqi oil, badly needed by energy-poor Turkey. The trend in relations between Turkey and Iraq seems to be moving toward the re-establishment of functional relationships.

Syria remains firmly in the hands of President Hafiz al-Assad and his Ba'thist Party. Throughout Syria in July 1997, pictures of Assad and his sons could be observed everywhere, and every car had large posters of Assad on the back window. Assad is committed to responding to the Israeli challenge, with Syria as the dominant leadership force in the Arab world; Syria actively supports Hizbollah and Palestinian attacks on Israel and in Lebanon. Assad's hardline positions have preoccupied U.S. diplomats for many years and have worked to obstruct the Middle East Peace Process. Presenting a challenge to Israel continues to dominate Syrian politics. While Syria has somewhat strained relations with Turkey, interest in the northern frontier clearly takes a much lower priority in Syrian foreign policy.

It is important to note that Syria joined the 1991 coalition against Iraq and sent troops to fight in the liberation of Kuwait, reflecting the poor bilateral relations between the two countries. Assad and Saddam Hussein may be seen as competitors in the struggle for regional ascendancy and leadership on the Arab world, and there are reported to be deep personal animosities between the two. It is doubtful that this level of conflict will change in the near future, at least not before there is a change in the current regimes.

Turkish Politics

Turkey's heritage of secular democracy results from the reforms of Ataturk and enables Turkey to be an integral part of European and NATO affairs. The Turkish people vote in overwhelming numbers (approximately 70 percent) in favor of center or rightist parties that support pro-European positions and westernization. Since the death of Prime Minister Ozal, these parties have been in a state of disarray, and internecine political strife makes them unable to form a workable coalition capable of effective government. This situation not only cripples progress but gives strength to the growing minority of Turks who desire to return to pre-Ataturk times of Islamic law and tradition. The recent fundamentalist government led by Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan of the Refah Party attempted to move Turkey toward an easing of the restraints put on religion by the Ataturk constitution. The two moderate political leaders, Tansu Ciller and Mesut Yilmaz, have long been at odds in the struggle for the reins of power and seem incapable of forming a coalition government that can successfully implement their agendas. Both 1996 and 1997 were marked by strong signals from the
Turkish General Staff against the desecularization of the Turkish state advocated by Erbakan. The Turkish General Staff regards itself as the guardian of the Turkish constitution and the continuation of the Turkish state as created by Ataturk.

In spring 1999, Turkey's 56th government is at the helm in Ankara, led by a minority coalition under Bulent Ecevit. The Ecevit government replaced the Yilmaz government, which succeeded the government of Erbakan, who unsuccessfully attempted to steer Turkey toward a return to traditional Islamic mores. A military coup by the Turkish General Staff was thought to have been narrowly avoided by his resignation.

Turkey is a republican parliamentary democracy that has enjoyed civilian rule for the better part of this century. Most Turks are conservative and secular and regard themselves as Europeans. Turkey's political parties reflect these beliefs accordingly. Almost all Turks believe in the fundamental strength of the Ataturk constitution and in the need for a strong military defense. The principal differences among parties relate to economic, social, and religious issues. The principal parties active in the Turkish political process are:

- The True Path Party, or DYP, led by the American-educated Tansu Ciller. The party inherits the intellectual concepts of Turgut Ozal, who led the country out the military coup of 1980. The DYP platform rests on private enterprise, the deregulation of the economy, a strong defense, the maintenance of excellent relations with the United States, and accession of Turkey into the European Union. In the mid-1990s, charges of corruption and mishandling of government funds seriously weakened the effectiveness of DYP
- The Motherland Party, or ANAP, under Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz, currently heads the Turkish Government. A pro-western, pro-democratic party closely akin to DYP, ANAP supports privatization of the economy, improved human rights, organized labor, and land reform. While supporting NATO, ANAP also supports the development of ties to the Middle East and other Muslim nations.
- The Social Democratic Populist Party, SHP, is a left-leaning party that supports a planned and controlled economy, rural development, and social projects. SHP favors the maintenance of ties to NATO and the United States and posits that Turkey's interests are inherently tied to Europe. In the left center of the spectrum is the Republican People's Party, or CHP, which sees foreign policy as inseparable from defense policies and favors political reform.
- The Virtue Party, or FP, is the successor to the now-banned Refah Party and is increasingly the party of the jobless and poor, who wish for a return to precepts of Islamic law and state support for Islam. FP supports collective working arrangements between employers and employees, the prioritization of rural and agricultural policies, gathering financial investment and support from other Muslim countries, developing an awareness of Turkey's Islamic heritage and culture, and government incentive plans for industry. Its predecessor, the Refah or Welfare Party, was closed by the Turkish Constitutional Court on January 16, 1998, and its leaders are prohibited from engaging in politics for 5 years.

Of significance to the Turkish military, most pro-western Turks, and the United States and Europe was the Refah Party's public position on the role of Islam in government and the cultural fabric of society. Many in the West fear the establishment of an Islamic government akin to that of Iran. This is not necessarily the position of the FP. The FP would like to see state support for Islam and a return of the people to more traditional Islamic values. The FP does not advocate the overthrow of the constitution nor does it advocate the setting up of a fundamentalist Islamic republic. It does support an increase in Koranic schools, a reduction in European cultural influence, and state support for the Islamic clergy. The FP also favors the development of strong ties to Turkey's Islamic neighbors, with Turkey fulfilling the leadership role. The FP must tread cautiously to avoid any overt suggestion that it intends to carry on the Welfare Party's struggle to desecularize Turkey. To a degree, the new FP is more liberal than the defunct RP and must publically demonstrate moderation and cooperation.

The Role of the Military in Turkish Society

The role of the military in Turkish society cannot be overemphasized. All Turkish men serve an obligatory period of national service, which may last up to 18 months. This aspect of Turkish life, coupled with highly visible military garrisons in all Turkish cities and towns, serves to reinforce the Turkish consciousness with a constant awareness of the nation's military forces. The Turkish military is a part of mainstream Turkish life and society in a way that is unique among the member states of the NATO Alliance. Likewise, the
importance of the role of the military in Turkey’s
Government cannot be overstated:

The mission of the Turkish Armed Forces is to defend
and to protect the Turkish land and the Turkish
Republic, the characteristics of which are defined in the
constitution, against all internal and external threats.\(^5\)

This broad-based mission is derived from the
section of the Turkish Constitution on national
defense. Any internal or external threat to the Turkish
Republic falls within the interest and the authority of
the military.

The most powerful man in Turkey is the
Chief of the Turkish General Staff (TGS). Although the
President of the Turkish Republic is nominally the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, in practical-
ity this role falls to the Chief of the TGS, who ranks
third on the official protocol list in Ankara, directly
behind the President and the Prime Minister; the civil-
ian Minister of Defense is ranked a lowly 13\(^{th}\). Unlike
his American counterpart, the Turkish Chief of the
TGS directly commands the nation’s land, sea, and air
forces, as well as the General Command of the
Gendarmerie. Turkey has a Ministry of Defense, but
this office fills a procurement and fiscal function
rather than exercising oversight over structural, opera-
tional, or strategic matters.

The TGS exercises enormous influence over
Turkish foreign policy, especially in areas affecting sov-
eignty or territorial rights issues. Cases in point are
the Aegean Sea disputes and Cyprus, which directly
reflect TGS military positions. There is almost no
doubt that the TGS would influence any future ripar-
ian agreement regarding the Tigris and Euphrates
Rivers. All Turkish Governments have been dependent
upon the good will of the military and especially on
the TGS interpretation of that government’s execution
of its constitutional responsibilities. During the course
of the Turkish Republic, there have been three military
coups, after which the government was been returned
to civilian control. The recent demise of the Erbakan
government bears testimony to the seriousness of the
Turkish military’s faithfulness to its mission to safe-
guard both the republic and the constitution.
Chapter Five

Economics

Economic Potential of the GAP

While the GAP is primarily a regional plan, in its secondary and tertiary effects the GAP is designed to contribute to the solution of many of Turkey's problems. The project has near-term as well as long-term rewards, some of which will not be realized until well into the next century. According to the GAP Action Plan, there are six objectives:

- Revive regional economies, while speeding up land development and agricultural expansion, in order to increase employment
- Prioritize completion in major cities of infrastructure projects designed to improve the quality of life and infrastructure, with a view toward attracting industry and investment
- Build the infrastructure necessary to support the agricultural industry, including small-scale industrial projects
- Improve the physical capabilities of education and public health facilities and services
- Improve main transportation arteries from east to west, including regional roads and airport development
- Extend maximum support to control erosion and enhance forestry and pasture improvement works.

For the people in southeastern Anatolia, completion of the GAP means direct employment opportunities for up to 200,000 persons, the irrigation of huge areas of cropland, clean drinking water, modern schools and hospitals, a new university, an international airport, a vastly improved infrastructure of roads and railways, and an electrical grid. This process, a proposed long-term solution to regional problems, will occur over an extended time and in incremental steps. In the near term, the area shows evidence of a bustling and developing economy as money pours into the building of the complex of dams, hydroelectric plants, and regional population centers of Turkey.

For the larger question of the benefits to Turkey as a whole, the GAP offers a great deal of potential good:

- The project will eventually provide as much as 25 percent of Turkey's hydroelectric power. This is an important cornerstone for the continued development of Turkey's industrial base and is a critical consideration for the energy-poor country.
• Turkey is poised on the brink of becoming a major regional economic power, and the development of the southeastern Anatolia region potentially forms a conduit to markets in the Middle East. This conduit has obvious value if, in the future, relations with Iraq, Iran, and Syria normalize.
• Because the GAP is a planned endeavor, the agriculture corps and industrial plants being established in the region should complement, rather than compete with, the rest of the Turkish economy. Optimally, this will self-balance an economy geographically and structurally concentrated in restricted areas.
• Enlarged opportunities in the region may alleviate or halt the flow of the region's rural poor to the already dangerously overcrowded cities in the western parts.

Turkey and the European Union

As Turkey enters the 21st century, its chances for a place in the queue for European Union (EU) accession appear almost dead. Recent European dissatisfaction with the Turkish human rights record, political repression, and the continuing PKK rebellion continues to provide the EU with enough reasons to keep Turkey out. Regardless of the validity of these issues, they will continue to be used as reasons to deny Turkey even a conditional or associate member status in the economic architecture of the new Europe. Recent pronouncements from Rauf Denktas promising the union of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus with Turkey, should the internationally recognized southern Cypriot State gain EU accession, add fuel to the fire and complexity to the problem. This overall situation is not likely to change in Turkey's favor in the reasonably foreseeable future. In spite of this, Turkey remains committed to greater economic ties with Europe.

The question must surely be asked whether Turkey's alignment toward the United States, or toward any other country for that matter, will shift as a result of repeated EU rejections. As a matter of official policy and practicality, it probably will not, because Turkey's security concerns will remain largely independent from any military link to the EU (in its present nonmilitary form). As long as the United States and NATO continue to pour military assistance into Turkey's military machine, without many restrictions attached, Turkey will likely maintain its current friendly posture toward the United States and the West and its present security posture and security strategy.

Although many Turkish politicians have tied their parties to the EU wagon, failure to gain EU accession will not result in a failed Turkish economy. Many of the economic reforms put into place to support the EU entry criteria will ultimately work to Turkey's advantage by enhancing the privatization and self-sufficiency of the Turkish economy. While nonaccession to the EU will limit and slow Turkish economic development, it can neither halt nor cripple it. With or without the EU, Turkey will create a stable modern market-oriented economy that will prosper regionally. After saying for 15 years how important EU accession is to Turkish economic development, the real difficulty now will be for the politicians to explain what sacrifices Turkey must endure to compensate for nonaccession. Because the government will want to minimize and delay the harmful consequences of nonaccession, there may be increased opportunities for American involvement in future projects. Whether or not there will be increased opportunities for U.S. political influence in the Turkish Government remains problematic.

Syria

In 1990–93, Syria's state-dominated economy benefited from the Gulf War, increased oil production, good weather, and economic deregulation. Economic growth averaged about 10 percent per year. The Gulf War provided Syria an aid windfall of nearly $5 billion from Arab, European, and Japanese donors. However, the benefits of the 1990–93 boom were not evenly distributed, and the gap between rich and poor widened. A nationwide financial scandal and increasing inflation were accompanied by a decline in GDP growth to 4 percent in 1994. For the long run, Syria's economy is saddled with a large number of poorly performing public sector firms, and industrial productivity remains low. Oil production is likely to fall off dramatically by the end of the decade. Unemployment will become an increasing problem as those under 20 years of age—more than 60 percent of the population—enter the labor force.

Syria has an agriculture-based economy heavily dependent on the waters of the Euphrates. In the last 10 years, Syria has devoted nearly 70 percent of its agriculture budget to irrigation.11 Government subsidies have encouraged digging of wells and a depletion of available groundwater. Eighty percent of the newly exploited land in Syria since 1987 has been irrigated by
wells supported by government subsidies for fuel used to operate pumps. More land has been put into production, although it is of only marginal value in sustained crop production. For example, in Syria, critical levels of gypsum cover 21 percent of the total area and 50 percent of the fertile Euphrates basin. Soils in the middle and lower Euphrates terraces and adjoining areas are composed of more than 50 percent gypsum.

Both from a political and economic perspective, food security is a vital strategic goal for Syria. There is a direct link among water, food, and industrial expansion, all of which are necessary to support a growing population. In Syria, as with most of the developing Mediterranean countries, much water is wasted through low water-use efficiency and unrestricted demand. There is no useful system of permits or fees for water use in Syria, and the small fees that are charged do not reflect the scarcity of water or the real costs of investment in irrigation structures. Once a farmer is able to dig a well, the water is virtually a "free access" resource. Subsidies for water are provided to offset low farm income brought about by controlled producer prices and an overvalued currency.

Even with its inefficiencies, in the past years, Syria has become a net exporter of grain, but growth in this area has generated problems, one of which is the lack of proper storage facilities. A trip to Syria in July 1997 revealed thousands of tons of grain stored in sacks in the open, subject to the effects of weather and pest contamination. Commerce between Turkey and Syria has been light in recent years, driven in part by poor relations between the two countries.

**Iraq**

Economic ties between Turkey and Iraq historically have been strong. During the 1980s, the revenue from Iraq's oil pipeline through Turkey was more than $1 billion per year. Unlike the water issue, the oil pipeline has tied Turkey and Iraq and proven to be a more reliable outlet for Iraq than the previous pipeline through Syria. Economic cooperation between Turkey and Iraq was temporarily broken by the Gulf War and the imposition of U.N. sanctions, as were cooperation and commerce at the border between the two countries by Turkish participation in Operation Provide Comfort.

Water problems based on construction of the GAP project have been serious but not sufficient to disrupt the economic dependency between the two countries. Given the bilateral nature of relationships in the region, it is important to note that most of the blame for diminution of Euphrates water flow has been directed by Iraq toward Syria. The potential for increased oil revenue, once the U.N. sanctions are lifted, places Iraq in a better position than Syria, which is more heavily dependent on agriculture and the waters of the Euphrates.

Dependence on oil revenues in Iraq resulted in major changes in the economy. In the past three decades, Iraq's agriculture has declined, mainly through neglect, especially after the Iran-Iraq war. Between 1960 and 1989, agriculture slipped from 17 to 5 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). Apart from the problems with water quantity from the Euphrates and Tigris, reviving agriculture will be difficult and expensive because of overuse of the land and extensive salination. Iraq's oil potential places it in a strong position to resist Turkish leverage on water resources, although its geographic position as the lowest riparian on the Euphrates complicates the issue. This is partially offset by Iraq's control of a number of tributaries of the Tigris and its ability to transfer water from the Tigris to the Euphrates channel.
Chapter Six

Security and Military Factors

Regional Military Balance

Turkey maintains the largest standing military force in NATO after the United States—639,000 active-duty personnel. The army is organized into four operational land armies: the First Army deployed in Thrace to guard the Turkish Straits; the Second Army, deployed in South East Turkey to guard the Hatay province and the Greater Anatolian Water Project (GAP); the Third Army, stationed in the east to watch the Caucasus and the approaches; and the Aegean Army, facing Greece and the Aegean. At the tactical level, the Turkish Army is organized into 33 heavy brigades, 13 light infantry or commando brigades, and approximately 13 border-defense regiments. In NATO divisional equivalents, this represents a force structure of about 19 NATO divisions. The regular forces are backed up by a 180,000-man gendarmerie, or National Guard, that is heavily armed and thoroughly trained in internal security tasks. The continuous campaigns against the PKK are conducted by a special and separate command combining army and gendarmerie assets. The First Army enjoys the bulk of modernization efforts involving heavy or armored equipment, and the anti-PKK forces receive the lion’s share of high-mobility and air assets. Turkey’s Air Force is increasingly capable in both quality of equipment and pilot proficiency and is centrally positioned. The Turkish Navy, the smallest of the services, is focused on the defense of the Turkish Straits and denial of the littoral waters surrounding the country. Turkey is building a national defense industry that currently produces F-16 aircraft, Meko class frigates, and FMC armored personnel carriers and will shortly begin producing Abrams main battle tanks.

The Turkish Armed Forces enjoy a large and modern inventory of equipment, which includes 4,300 main battle tanks and 4,000 other armored vehicles, 2,400 towed and self-propelled artillery pieces, 434 combat aircraft, 43 attack helicopters, 21 principal surface combatant ships, and 15 submarines. Although much of the equipment dates to the 1960s, it is modernized and qualitatively competitive with neighboring military forces.

Syria possesses large and quantitatively well-equipped armed forces numbering 421,000 active-duty personnel. The army is organized into three corps, with six heavy divisions, a Republican Guard Division, and a number of heavy and light
brigades. The bulk of the army, including its most modern assets, is deployed against Israel. Long considered to be a client state of the former Soviet Union, Syria remains a major recipient of Russian military assistance. However, because of Russia's internal and fiscal problems, this program has diminished over the past 7 years, leaving Syria with increasingly obsolete material. The Syrian tank inventory and combat aircraft fleet, critical elements in fighting a modern war in a desert environment, are fast becoming liabilities rather than assets. The Syrian Navy is minuscule and limited to coast-defense tasks. The armed forces contain a preponderance of combat heavy units, with little back up from logistical and support organizations. As a conscript military force, the Syrian military suffers from the lack of a professional noncommissioned officer corps. Syria produces no equipment on its own and relies almost 100 percent on foreign suppliers.

In confrontations with Israel, Syria has performed poorly. Notable disasters include Israeli brigades annihilating complete Syrian armored divisions in the Golan Heights and a single-day aircraft loss of 60 modern jets over the Bekka Valley against the Israeli Air Force. However, in each case the Syrian military recovered its strength and remained a regional power. The Syrian force now includes some 4,600 main battle tanks, 3,000 other armored vehicles, 2,000 towed and self-propelled artillery pieces, 579 combat aircraft, 100 attack helicopters, 2 principal surface combatants, and 3 submarines. Syria also maintains about 50 SCUD and FROG missile systems.

Although shattered in the Gulf War of 1991, Iraq remains a regional power with a large military machine and reserves of equipment. The Iraqi Armed Forces contain 382,000 active duty personnel, of whom 350,000 are in the army. The army is organized into seven army corps, including 4 heavy divisions, 13 infantry divisions, and 6 Republican Guard Force divisions. The conscript mass of the army is poorly trained and equipped, and the main striking power of the army remains the Republican Guard, which is equipped and trained on a more lavish scale. The army has reconstituted itself after the humiliating disaster in Kuwait and remains a force of regional consideration. In the past several years, the army has shown itself capable of division-sized operations in Northern Iraq and major deployments to areas adjacent to Kuwait. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that its fighting efficiency has improved. There are about 45,000 additional personnel dedicated to internal security functions. The Republican Guard remains concentrated in the Baghdad area and central regions of Iraq. The Iraqi Air Force possesses a mixed inventory of Soviet and Russian types and, because of no-fly zones enforced by coalition air forces, may fly over only approximately 40 percent of the land area of Iraq. This restriction, combined with a severe spare parts shortage, results in very little training opportunity for Iraqi airmen. The Iraqi Navy is nonexistent as a fighting force.

Iraqi military performance during the last two decades has been poor. Iraqi armored divisions sent against Israel were rapidly destroyed. Against the Iranians, Iraq enjoyed huge quantitative and qualitative superiority in equipment but was capable of conducting only localized attacks against the predominately infantry forces of Iran. Iraq, however, did display great determination and a total disregard for losses, which enabled it to continue the war against Iran for 8 years. The abysmally poor record of the Iraqi Armed Forces in Kuwait is well known, but the Iraqi high command did show some skill in withdrawing large elements of the Republican Guard out of the Kuwaiti cauldron in the face of absolute allied air supremacy during Operation Desert Storm. Major equipment holdings of Iraq include 2,700 main battle tanks, 3,000 other armored vehicles, 2,000 towed and self-propelled artillery pieces, 350 combat aircraft (with an operationally ready rate of about 55 percent), 120 armed helicopters, and one principal surface combatant ship. Iraq also maintains about six SCUD missile systems.17

Turkish Military Capability

Turkey is the only major NATO nation that has dramatically increased its military spending during this decade. In 1995 constant prices, Turkey increased its defense spending from a 1985 level of $3.13 billion to a 1995 level of $5.4 billion. Turkey restructured its army during the 1990s by eliminating (with some exceptions) the maneuver division from its force structure and replacing it with highly mobile independent brigades. These brigades are placed directly under corps control with a view toward increasing the agility required to wage modern air-land campaigns. This was combined with a modernization program aimed at matching the organizational structure with more lethal, mobile, and longer ranging systems. The Turkish Air
Force also acquired F-16 fighter aircraft and KC-135 aerial tankers. Constant combat action against the PKK has honed the proficiency of both services, particularly in air-ground operations and fire support coordination. Turkey also participated in the U.N. operation in Somalia and maintains a mechanized brigade in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The cumulative effect of these factors is that Turkish proficiency in tactical and operational techniques is improving annually.

Such sophisticated weaponry and tactical techniques are heavily reliant on an educated and professional force; therefore, Turkey's ability to conduct complex military operations *en masse* is fragile. There is a growing awareness in the Turkish military of the necessity to transition the force from reliance on conscription to one that relies on a professional corps of noncommissioned officers and a long-service soldiery. The current conscripted mass of the Turkish Land Forces is fiercely patriotic and, if history gives any indication of military prowess, is imbued with a fierce fighting spirit. The Turkish military can field a capable modern force in support of national objectives.

In military terms, Turkey is not totally self-sufficient. Although possessing many of the resources necessary to wage war, Turkey produces almost no petroleum products and is heavily reliant on foreign sources for major end items of equipment. This condition will continue into the foreseeable future and constrains Turkey's ability to unilaterally wage war. Finally, with interior lines of communications and a central geographic position, Turkey enjoys the potential to shift land and air forces rapidly between regions over well-developed transportation systems should an active threat develop. This is less true for the Turkish Navy, which must deal with the Turkish Straits chokepoint and the narrow Aegean Sea. Overall, in fighting a one-front war, Turkish geography is a distinct asset.

**Turkish Military Potential**

The 1974 American arms embargo imposed on Turkey in the wake of the Cyprus invasion brought home an important point: reliance on military assistance packages can seriously impair unilateral action. Because of this event, Turkey is rapidly becoming self-sufficient in developing the industrial base necessary to produce the spare parts and logistical support to keep sophisticated weapons systems operational. The advancing Turkish industrial base will probably be able to overcome this deficiency sometime in the first quarter of the next century.

It is doubtful whether Turkey will be able to transition from a conscripted military to a professional force at any time in the near future. The need to maintain large numbers of troops in the southeast, in Thrace, and in the Caucasus makes this a difficult task. The American experience in the 1970s was expensive and time consuming and took place in a period of a relatively low direct threat to national security. Fielding a professional force is too expensive for Turkey to afford now or in the next several decades.

Turkey has no plan to develop a rapid reaction force, but it certainly has the capability to do so. Almost every major European nation has one, including France, Great Britain, Russia, and Greece. Now that the war against the PKK seems to be winding down, and an accommodation with Greece may be on the diplomatic horizon, Turkey may well find itself with excess military capacity. The geography of Turkey favors the development of a centrally positioned reserve force and a high-quality, corps-sized force equipped with the latest NATO weapons could be fielded.

**The Kurdish Problem**

The Kurds are a mountain people ethnically and linguistically different from their neighbors. At various times in history, a semiautonomous state known as Kurdistan has existed; however, the loosely organized and tribal Kurds usually lived under the yoke of the more militarily powerful Persian, Byzantine, Arab, or Ottoman empires. The area inhabited by the Kurdish peoples overlays southeast Turkey, northern Iraq, northern Syria, and northern Iran. Of country populations, Kurds account for 17 percent in Turkey, 15 to 20 percent in Iraq, 9 percent in Syria, and 9 percent in Iran. In an era of easily obtainable weapons and micronationalism, the Kurds are a restless and vocal minority in all four of the modern states controlling the area known as Kurdistan and are a source of regional instability.

The total population of Turkish Kurds is about 10 million; perhaps half live in southeastern Turkey. Unlike their fellow Turkish minority people, the Armenians, most Turkish Kurds remained in Turkey during the formation of the modern Turkish state,
although there is a substantial Kurdish immigrant worker population in Europe, especially in Germany.

In Ataturk's Turkey, all minority citizens enjoy the same rights as Turks, all serve in the armed forces, and all are politically enfranchised. However, no minority has the right to insist on its own official language, advocate a separatist state, or teach and practice principles incompatible with the Turkish Constitution. Although all Kurds in Turkey are both Turkish citizens and speak Turkish, there is a strong sense of cultural identity among the Kurdish people; this is especially true among those living in the underdeveloped villages in the southeast areas of Turkey. This is not so among the millions of Turkish Kurds who live in the western industrialized and prosperous regions of the country. The Turkish Government asserts that Kurds enjoy the same rights and opportunities as Turks; indeed by some estimates a quarter of the membership of the Turkish parliament is of Kurdish extraction.

It is a cornerstone of Turkish national policy that Kurds must assimilate into mainstream Turkish society, and herein lies the heart of the Kurdish problem in Turkey. A small percentage of Turkey's Kurds refuse to acknowledge this fact and want to establish either a separate Kurdistan (which would also include areas of Syria, Iraq, and Iran) or, as a minimum, a semi-autonomous region inside Turkey. Within such an area, the Kurds would be free to use their own language and reestablish their own cultural identity. This extreme position is an anathema to most Turks, and strong opinion pushes for some solution. Little progress has been made to date. Although it is no longer illegal to speak Kurdish in Turkey, government efforts to satisfy Kurdish demands remain inadequate.

Within the southeastern Anatolia Region, the Kurdish problem is compounded by the problem of land ownership. Many Kurdish farmers rent or share-crop land owned by one of the small number of families that own huge tracts of the arid but usable land. For this reason, many Kurds have left the small villages where their families have lived for centuries. Because of the lack of economic opportunity and political autonomy, the separatist Kurdish movement, PKK, established itself in the region. Initially the PKK was a legitimate political party operating within the legal framework of the Turkish electoral process. The party is now outlawed because of its advocacy of separatism. The PKK has emerged as a military organization and engaged in guerrilla war and terrorism in southeastern and eastern Turkey. The Turkish Government instituted emergency rule in these areas on July 19, 1987; civil rights are still suspended, and in these regions Turkish security forces enforce martial law. Turkey reports that since 1987, over 18,000 PKK separatists have been killed, as well as 4,000 civilians and 4,000 Turkish security forces.

The PKK is led by Abdullah Ocalan—nicknamed APO—who openly resided in Syria until his capture by Turkish intelligence agents in February 1999 in Kenya. The movement receives funding, training, and support from both Syria and Iran. Further support certainly comes from immigrant Kurds living abroad. The current political voice of the Kurds in the Turkish parliament is the People's Democratic Party, which holds a tenuous legitimacy. In the first half of 1997, criminal charges were brought against party leaders, resulting in the conviction of 31 on subversion charges. By summer 1997, the PKK had been largely rendered ineffective, the result of continuous pressure from the Turkish Army and cross-border operations into their strongholds. Attacks within Turkey from the PKK have steadily declined, and they have been relegated to isolated mountainous areas along the southeast border.

Continued fighting among Kurdish factions in northern Iraq is likely to prevent any real progress toward statehood or autonomy. The suppression of the nationalist ideals of the Kurds is the one common policy linking the four nations that have Kurdish minorities—Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.

The War Against the PKK

Prosecution of the war against the PKK is directly under the control of the Turkish General Staff (TGS). After instituting emergency rule in the southeast in 1987, a special and separate military command combining army and gendarmerie units was established. In the early stages of the counter-PKK campaign, search-and-destroy operations, similar to those conducted by the United States in Vietnam, were carried out. While large numbers of the PKK were killed, the PKK infrastructure remained intact. The Turks then set up a system similar to the protected-hamlet concept used in Viet Nam, which employed local men as village guards. Rural populations were also moved into villages for both the ease of protection and to remove local PKK sympathizers from offering assistance to the rebels.
With the tacit cooperation of Iraq, Turkey conducted small-unit, localized, cross-border operations to eliminate PKK camps in Iraq. These measures were only partially successful. By the early 1990s, the international community, human rights organizations, and the international news media responded to the situation by publicizing the fight against the PKK in an extremely negative way. In most cases, Turkey was portrayed as a country with a flagrant disregard for both human rights and the law of land warfare. Within Turkey itself, the press became critical of the government and the military.

The war was going poorly and appeared not to have a favorable outcome in sight. As losses mounted and morale dropped, the Turkish Army began a personnel rotation system of its professional officer and NCO corps into units fighting the PKK. By 1994, it was apparent that the war against the PKK was at stalemate. The frustrated TGS approved a much more vigorous campaign plan against the guerrillas. More modern military equipment with enhanced lethality and higher mobility was deployed to the theater, including German armored cars and American attack helicopters. The PKK infrastructure itself was targeted for destruction, and determined efforts to cut the PKK off from friendly local villages were instituted. A sophisticated campaign of public information, for both internal and foreign consumption, was developed and put into operation. The TGS also picked up the operations tempo of the war to put the PKK under continuous assault. In a major change of significant importance to the successful prosecution of the war, Turkey began large-scale, cross-border operations against the PKK base camps structure in Iraq. These operations involved up to 35,000 troops armed with tanks and artillery advancing over 50 kilometers into Iraq and conducting tactical operations in Iraq for up to 3 months before withdrawal. These multidivision operations were decisive and resulted in the near total destruction of PKK safe havens and base-camp structures in Iraq.

The cumulative effect of these measures was near eradication of the PKK from most of the southeast, rendering it incapable of all but extremely small-scale operations. In summer 1997, the official TGS position concerning the state of the PKK rebellion in Turkey is that the Turkish military has inflicted a crushing defeat on the PKK. The TGS doubts that the PKK can recover from this disaster, because the hard core of trained PKK leaders and soldiers that existed in the early 1990s has been all but destroyed. Recruitment of motivated and quality recruits into the PKK movement appears to have ceased.

**Turkey and Syria**

Turkey retains a decisive military advantage over Syria. The effectiveness of the Syrian military continues to degrade as fewer resources are invested in the force over time. This is compounded by the inability of the Russians to continue the massive Soviet military assistance program that delivered huge quantities of up-to-date weapons. In 1995 constant prices, Syrian defense expenditures over the period 1985 to 1995 fell dramatically, from $4.8 billion to $2.1 billion. This stark reality particularly affects the modernization and readiness of the force. In particular, the aging tank park, almost one-half of which are T54/T55 variants, constitutes a very serious weakness in warmaking potential. The Syrian Air Force has received priority in the battle against obsolescence and enjoys a force with a higher percentage of modern weaponry but remains dependent on large numbers of the MiG–21. On paper, Syria remains a regional power, but the reality is that Syria has grave military weaknesses.

Syria has almost no industrial base and a mostly uneducated population. Additionally, the restrictive policies of the government hinder development and initiative. Syria is now forced to concentrate its scarce resources in essential areas at the expense of others national needs. The future is not bright for the Syrian military, and little potential for improvement appears in its operational posture.

The decreasing conventional military capability of Syria drives its quest to obtain cheap weapons of mass destruction. The existing inventory of SCUD and FROG missiles is easily adaptable for delivery of both chemical and biological weapons. The development of such a capability would dramatically improve Syria’s ability to threaten the densely populated state of Israel or the concentrated industrial areas of Turkey.

It is likely that Syria will choose to continue to invest in high-profile weapons systems such as modern aircraft and surface-to-surface or surface-to-air missiles, which will lend the appearance of a capable military force. The mismatch of a small number of modern systems overlaid on a foundation of more numerous older weapons will also continue to afflict
the Syrian military machine. The most probable loser in such a case will be the infantry, artillery, and tank arms of the Syrian Army, which will become less capable over time.

**Turkey and Iraq**

Turkey retains a significant military advantage over Iraq, but the impact of the Gulf War on the Iraqi military is diminishing. Iraq's military expenditures, in 1995 constant dollars, did drop from $17.5 billion in 1985 to $2.7 billion in 1995, because of the effects of the U.N. embargo, which impedes Iraq's ability to export oil. This severely limits the ability to purchase and import weapons. Overall, however, the Iraqi military machine has regained a certain amount of prestige by simply surviving the Desert Storm onslaught of overwhelming coalition forces. In choosing to fight, it retained its self-respect, and this has certainly been an important factor in rebuilding the force.

The Iraqi military has been allowed to rebuild itself after the devastating defeat suffered in Kuwait on 1991. In particular, the successful withdrawal of large elements of the Republican Guard enabled the Iraqis to maintain a hard nucleus around which to reconstitute their military capability. They have maintained the basic structure of a conscript regular army and the more lavishly equipped and better trained Republican Guard. The severe losses suffered in Kuwait have probably widened the gap in capability between the regular army and the Republican Guard, with the army coming off the poorer.

The return of the Iraqi aircraft inventory from its wartime refuge in Iran has allowed Iraq to reconstitute its air forces, but pilot proficiency and operational readiness of aircraft remain weak. In political terms, Iraq suffers under a U.N. embargo, restrictive no-fly zones enforced by coalition aircraft, and a rigid U.N. inspection regime aimed at its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. While this detracts significantly from overall military readiness, these international restrictions act as an assault on national pride and serve as a rallying point for Iraqi nationalism. It is matter of some debate whether these actions actually strengthen Saddam Hussein's regime, rather than weaken it. In any event, Iraq does not lack evidence of hostility by the international community toward the government and the people. The Iraqi military's deployment is multifaceted and reflects the instability of the regime. In addition to guarding the frontier and quelling resurgent Kurdish rebels in the north, a portion of the armed forces is deployed for internal security purposes in or near large cities and population centers. Even during the Gulf War, a portion of the Republican Guard was withheld in the Baghdad area for this purpose. The real striking strength of the Iraqi military is therefore not deployable in its entirety, and any assessment of its potential must weigh this fact.

Iraqi military strength is now relatively stable. All gains made since the Gulf War have been organizational and involved restructuring or cross-leveling available weapons systems. Tactical training is minimal because of the shortage of replacement parts and systems. The Iraqi military machine is more of a force-in-being rather than an operational capability that can be employed to further national aims. The Iraqis are probably at the limit of their capability with existing stocks of weaponry, and further improvements in military capability are doubtful. Although close international inspection and scrutiny, as well as combat losses in the Kuwaiti theater, have dramatically reduced inventories, Iraq almost certainly retains some form of chemical capability that could be employed by missile, artillery, or aircraft systems.

It is doubtful that the international community will normalize relations with Iraq in the near future. In the event this were to occur, Iraq would again have access to the world arms market and would again enjoy the benefits of oil revenues. Iraq would certainly take immediate steps to upgrade and increase its decaying military capability and would probably seek to rebuild its military force, integrated air defense system, and main battle tank inventory.

**The 1975 Incident Between Syria and Iraq**

In the mid-1970s, both Turkey and Syria completed several dams on the Euphrates River and began filling the reservoirs. Beginning in late 1973 and reaching maximum fill rates in 1975, the flow of the Euphrates River was significantly reduced as it entered Iraq. The filling of the Keban Dam in Turkey and the Euphrates (Ath-Thawrah) dam at Tabqa in Syria occurred during severe drought conditions. While Iraq protested the constriction of river flow, it wasn't until mid-1974 that Syria agreed to an additional flow of 200 CMS.
However, the following year the Iraqi Irrigation Minister protested that the Euphrates River flow reached a record low-flow rate, at one point reaching 197 CMS. In March 1975, land under cultivation in the basin was only 4 percent of its previous total. The Iraqi News Agency reported that the Iraqi Federation of Peasant Associations and Agricultural Cooperatives sent cables of protest to leaders in Syria and Iraq. Their communication was a call for “swift action” by their country to prevent the death of crops and livestock and hardship for “millions of peasants.” The perception was that Syria was withholding additional water from Iraq’s allocation.

The Syrian Government then denounced an Iraqi request for an Arab League meeting to discuss a charge that Syria was withholding this Euphrates water from Iraq. The Syrians said the water question was technical in nature and did not require discussion by Arab ministers. At this point Iraq requested Arab League intervention. Syria countered that less than half of its flow was coming from Turkey and pulled out of the committee formed by the League. In response to threats from Iraq, Syria closed the Iraqi consulate in Aleppo and expelled its personnel.

In July 1975, Iraq protested to the Arab League against “continued Syrian encroachments” on the Iraqi border. The government also charged that Syrian border forces ambushed Iraqi traffic and tried to obstruct the building of an Iraqi frontier post. Iraq demanded that the Arab League seek an immediate end to the “Syrian violations of Iraqi territory.”

In response to the assassination of Syria’s military attaché in Baghdad, Syria expelled Baghdad’s military attaché from Damascus and closed the office, saying the killing was carried out by Iraqi agents. In August, demonstrations were held in Aleppo to protest water shortages; these were followed by a 2-week campaign by Syria charging Iraq with causing a water shortage in Aleppo by demanding too much water from Syria. Iraq indicated that the Syrian shortage was “part of a political game” and said the real problem in Syria was the buildup of sediment behind the Euphrates Dam. It was asserted that Syria lacked the technology to remove silt from reservoirs and therefore had to compensate by keeping the water level behind dams at a level higher than agreed with Iraq.

The Iraqi Government issued a protest to Syria, charging that Syrian warplanes were violating Iraqi airspace in both August and September. Syria closed its airspace as both countries mobilized troops and equipment to positions near the Syrian/Iraqi border. Only mediation by Saudi Arabia with the assistance of the Soviets prevented armed conflict. While the tensions were diffused, the management of the Euphrates River system has not been formalized and remains, at best, bilateral. The resolution of this incident addressed only river flow amounts between Syria and Iraq during this reservoir-filling episode and did not involve the uppermost riparian state, Turkey.

**Turkey Against a Hostile Alliance?**

A possible alliance composed of Syria and Iraq or, alternatively, Syria, Iraq, and Iran aligning against Turkey is sometimes hypothesized. Based on the current ill-will between Baghdad and Damascus, and the historical burden and mistrust created by the 1975 incident and the 1991 Gulf War, an alliance between these countries is highly unlikely. To add Iran to such a strategic Arab partnership is even less probable. Iran is not part of the Arab world, and Iran and Iraq recently fought a bloody war. The issues between them are by no means settled.

It has been suggested that there is some measure of popular support within these countries for an alliance. But there is also much mistrust, and under their current political leaders, it is unlikely that these countries would unite. This is not to say the countries may not have common foreign policy objectives, especially with regard to Turkey, Israel, and the West. An article in Arabic News in July 1997 discussed a potential alliance among Baghdad, Tehran, and Damascus, the purpose of which would be to confront growing military cooperation between Turkey and Israel. However, as an Iraqi opposition leader said, “Tehran and Damascus have no faith in the Iraqi regime, which deals with this issue only as a tactic.”

The possibility of Syria, Iraq, and Iran forming a common military alliance is even less likely. The requirements to link command and control assets into an effective combined arms effort are currently beyond the capability of these three nations. Turkey has a far superior military establishment and is backed by the NATO alliance, including the United States. Turkey’s geographical position presents a distinct advantage to the Turks, with centralized lines of communication and a mobile reaction capability. The formidable logistic
requirement to sustain a force beyond their own borders presents another deterrent to an attack by the nations from the south. There is currently no credible threat of coordinated military action against Turkey from its neighbors to the south.

**Vulnerability of the GAP**

*Acts of War*, a Tom Clancy novel, is based on a scenario in which Syrian Kurds hijack a Turkish military helicopter and blow up the Ataturk Dam with dynamite, in an effort to achieve political objectives. The result is a huge flood that brings the Middle East to the brink of a regional war. The problem with this story is that the Ataturk Dam is an earthen structure so large and dense that it would take a tremendous amount of conventional explosive, properly placed, to inflict any damage, and the dam is guarded by two companies of Turkish Army commandos. Even with the technical and military expertise of a “first world” power like Russia or the United States, the obstacles of doing serious damage to the massive structure of the Ataturk Dam are formidable. By way of comparison, the British experience during the World War II offers some concept of what it takes to bring down a large dam.

In early 1943, the British Air Staff was seized with the idea that the sudden destruction of the Ruhr dams would result in catastrophic downstream flooding while simultaneously crippling Germany’s hydroelectric power system, which was vital for the production of war materials. To accomplish this objective, Number 617 Squadron, Royal Air Force, later famously known as the “Dam Busters,” was chosen for special training in low-level night attacks on dams. The huge bombs, each containing 9,250 pounds of RDX high explosive and shaped like depth charges, were designed to sink 40 feet below the surface of the water before detonating. At the bottom of the dam, these bombs would explode with irresistible concussive force, magnified by the incompressibility of water, forming what was called a *water-hammer*.

The British planned to attack the dams at the end of the spring runoff when the dams were at their fullest. The first target was the Mohne Dam, which was constructed of limestone rubble with a concrete apron on the front face. The dam was 7.6 meters wide at the top and 34 meters wide at the base. On the night of May 16, 1943, four of the huge bombs, delivered to the same point on the rear side of the dam in immediate sequence, were required to open a breach in the structure. Later that night, multiple bomb hits were also required to open a similar breach in the Eder Dam. The 16 four-engine Lancaster bombers, each carrying a single huge bomb, expended all their weapons in these two attacks. The squadron was unable to execute its third attack planned for that night on the Sorpe Dam. Eight Lancasters were shot down.

The British experiences dramatically show the inherent structural strength of dams in relation to the power of huge volumes of explosives dropped on or adjacent to them. It is unlikely that any such attack would significantly damage a structure such as the Ataturk Dam, which is 15 meters wide at the top and over 800 meters wide at the base (figure 8, page 28) and contains a hardened center. In volume of construction material it is at least 10 times the size of the Mohne Dam. It is unlikely, for the foreseeable future, that precision-delivered munitions such as cruise missiles or smart penetration bombs would be acquired by a potential enemy for use against the Turkish dams. The tremendous earthen volume of the Ataturk Dam would present a formidable obstacle to even the most sophisticated weapons.

Perhaps the most likely threat against the GAP or any of its components is sabotage or a small-scale attack directed against a technical facility, such as a power generation station, a water tunnel, or a portion of an irrigation complex. A *U.S. News and World Report* article described possible efforts of the PKK to sabotage the Birecik dam now under construction in Turkey. While many of these facilities currently lack publicly visible security measures, it is logical to assume that responsible authorities in Turkey have developed security plans for key asset and site protection, and recent publicity will likely contribute to heightened Turkish security measures. The threat of an effective terrorist attack against the GAP infrastructure is low, and Turkish security is likely to deter small-scale sabotage.
Figure 4. The Middle East

Figure 5. Turkey and Outline of the GAP Area
Figure 6. The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP)

Source: Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) Action Plan (Ankara: Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry, Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration, 1995).
Figure 7. Projected Depletions of the Euphrates, 1990–2040

Figure 8. Views of the Ataturk Dam

**General Situation Plan**
1. Euphrates River
2. Dam Face
3. Dam Top
4. Lake
5. Water Intakes
6. Spillway
7. Outlet Tunnel
8. Hydro Tunnels
9. Central Generators
10. Switching Station
11. Injection Galleries
12. School
13. Mosque
14. DSI Administration Building
15. DSI Observation Site

**Cross Section View**
Chapter Seven

International Law

Contemporary international law governs relations between states and international organizations, as well as certain relations between states and individuals. The conduct of states is governed by many factors, and international law is only one of them. Social, political, economic, military, or other factors may be determinative, and states may take action even when contrary to international norms. As a general rule, international courts do not have compulsory or automatic jurisdiction to deal with international legal disputes. For example, jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague is dependent upon acceptance of jurisdiction by the parties to the dispute. Further, international law is not relevant solely in international courts. States rely upon it in diplomatic relations, negotiations, and policy making. States defend their actions and policies by reference to international law, and any challenge to the conduct of other states relies on it. In reviewing the positions of the riparian states in the Tigris-Euphrates watershed, it is important for policy makers to understand the applicable law; in the event of conflict the parties are certain to rely on the law to justify their positions. There are four fundamental sources of international law, and a summary can be found in the rules applied in the International Court of Justice:

- International treaties and conventions
- International custom or “customary international law”
- General principles of law recognized by civilized nations
- Judicial decisions and teachings of highly qualified writers of the various nations.

General principles developed by advisory bodies have no direct legal effect and are referred to as “soft law.” Customary international law develops over time as the practice of nations and eventually becomes binding on all, whether or not the respective nations are party to a formal agreement. Treaties and conventions, on the other hand, are the primary evidence of international law when there is a dispute and will generally be given precedence when in conflict with a provision of “customary” law.
**International Water Law**

International water law with respect to rivers is of relatively recent origin. Prior to World War I, the law developed primarily to resolve disputes concerning freedom of navigation. Since that time, a number of attempts have been made to provide a framework for increasingly intensive water use, focusing on general guidelines that could be applied to the world’s watersheds. The concept of a “drainage basin,” for example, was accepted by the International Law Association in the Helsinki Rules of 1966, which also provide guidelines for the reasonable and equitable sharing of a common waterway. Article IV of the Helsinki Rules describes the principle:

> Each basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin.

Article V then lists 11 factors that must be taken into account in defining what is reasonable and equitable. There is no hierarchy to these components of reasonable use; rather, they are to be considered as a whole. One important shift in legal thinking in the Helsinki Rules is that they address the right to beneficial use of water, rather than to water per se. The Helsinki Rules have been used only once to help define water use—the Mekong Committee used the Helsinki Rules definition of “reasonable and equitable use” in formulation of their Declaration of Principles in 1975, although no specific allocations were determined.

When the United Nations considered the Helsinki Rules in 1970, some states (Brazil, Belgium, China, and France) objected to the prominence of the drainage basin approach, which might be interpreted as an infringement on a nation’s sovereignty. Finland and the Netherlands argued that a watershed was the most “rational and scientific” unit to be managed. Others argued that, given the complexities and uniqueness of each watershed, general codification should not even be attempted. On December 8, 1970, the U.N. General Assembly directed its own legal advisory body, the International Law Commission (ILC), to prepare a draft Codification of the Law on Water Courses for Purposes other than Navigation.

It is testimony to the difficulty of marrying legal and hydrologic intricacies that the ILC, despite an additional call for codification at the U.N. Water Conference in 1977, took 21 years to complete its draft articles. Problems both political and hydrological slowed the process. In a 1974 questionnaire submitted to member states, about half the respondents supported the concept of a drainage basin (e.g., Argentina, Finland, and the Netherlands), while half were strongly negative (e.g., Austria, Brazil, and Spain) or ambivalent. “Watercourse system” connoted a basin, which could be viewed as a threat to national sovereignty. In 1994, more than two decades after receiving its charge, the ILC adopted a set of 32 draft articles. In 1997 the articles were adopted by the U.N. General Assembly as “The Convention on Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.” The Convention includes language very similar to the Helsinki Rules, requiring riparian states along an international watercourse in general to communicate and cooperate. Provisions are included for exchange of data and information, notification of possible adverse effects, protection of ecosystems, and emergency situations. Allocations are dealt with through equally vague language. “Equitable and reasonable use” within each watercourse state, “with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits therefrom” (Article 5), is balanced with an obligation not to cause “significant harm” (Article 7). Reasonable and equitable use is defined similar to the Helsinki Rules, to be based on seven relevant factors:

- Hydrogeology and meteorology
- Existing and planned uses
- Environmental sensitivity
- Quality control requirements
- Socioeconomic implications
- Water conservation practices
- Artificial recharge potential
- Comparative costs and implications of alternative sources of supply.

The text of the ILC articles does not mention a hierarchy of these factors, although Article 10 provides that, “In the absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no use... enjoys inherent priority over other uses,” and “In the event of a conflict between uses... [it shall be resolved] with special regard being given to the requirements of vital human needs.”

Problems arise when attempts are made to apply ILC language to specific water conflicts. For example, riparian positions and consequent legal rights shift with changing boundaries, many still not recognized by the world community. Furthermore, the rules provide a balancing test more appropriate for the courtroom than the politically charged atmosphere of international
water disputes. A balancing test requires some third party, such as an arbitrator, watermaster, or court, to resolve the issues. In water basins without such a regime, balancing tests are not particularly useful.

The uncertainty in international water law is compounded because cases are heard by the ICJ only with the consent of the parties involved, and no practical enforcement mechanism is available. A state with pressing national interests can therefore disclaim entirely the courts jurisdiction or findings. Considering these limitations it is hardly surprising that the ICJ has only recently decided its first case regarding international water law.

**Rights-Based Criteria: Hydrography versus Chronology**

Certain water law principles have been claimed regularly by riparians in negotiations, often depending on geographic location in the watershed. Claims for water rights are based either on hydrography—from where a river or aquifer originates and how much of that territory falls within a certain state—or on chronology—who has been using the water the longest. National positions are usually extreme, and the “doctrine of absolute sovereignty” is often initially claimed by an upstream riparian (the Harmon Doctrine). The downstream extreme riparian nation often asserts the extreme “doctrine of absolute riverain integrity,” which suggests that every riparian is entitled to the natural flow of a river system crossing its borders. This principle has reached acceptance in the international setting as rarely as absolute sovereignty. In an arid or exotic (humid headwaters region with an arid downstream) watershed, the downstream riparian often has older water infrastructure that must be defended. The principle that rights are acquired through older use is referred to as “prior appropriation,” that is, “first in time, first in right.”

These conflicting doctrines of hydrography and chronology clash along many international rivers, with national positions usually defined by relative riparian positions. Downstream riparians, such as Iraq and Egypt, often receive less rainfall than their upstream neighbors and have historically depended on river water for the life of the nation. As a consequence, modern “rights based” disputes often take the form of upstream riparians such as Ethiopia and Turkey arguing in favor of the doctrine of absolute sovereignty, with downstream riparians taking the position of prior appropriation.

**The International Law Commission**

In transboundary water negotiations, extreme positions leave very little room for bargaining. Under the right conditions, and through good faith effort of the parties, positions become moderated and most states eventually accept some limitation to both their own sovereignty and to the river’s absolute integrity. One of the few international water cases—the Lac Lanoux dispute—led to the disavowal of the legal principles of absolute sovereignty and absolute riverain integrity. In the early 1950s, France, citing absolute sovereignty, proposed diverting water from the Carol River, which crosses from the French into the Spanish Pyrenees. The water would flow across a divide toward the Font-Vive for hydropower generation, and there was an offer for Spain to be compensated monetarily. Spain objected, citing absolute riverain integrity and the existing irrigation needs on its side of the border. Even when France agreed to divert back first the water needed for Spanish irrigation, then all the water being diverted, through a tunnel between the divide, Spain insisted on absolute riverain integrity, claiming it did not want French hands on its tap. Both absolute principles were effectively dismissed when a 1957 arbitration tribunal ruled in the case that “territorial sovereignty...must bend before all international obligations,” effectively negating doctrine of absolute sovereignty, while admonishing the downstream state from the right to veto “reasonable” upstream development, negating the principle of natural flow or absolute riverain integrity. This decision made possible the 1958 Lac Lanoux treaty (revised in 1970), in which it is agreed that water may be diverted out of basin for French hydropower generation and a similar quantity is returned before the stream reaches Spanish territory.

A concept of limited territorial sovereignty reflects rights to use the waters of an international waterway reasonably, yet with the acknowledgment that one should not cause harm to any other riparian state. In fact, the relationship between “reasonable and equitable use” and the obligation not to cause “appreciable harm” is the more subtle manifestation of the argument between hydrography and chronology. As noted before, the “The Convention on Law of the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses” includes provisions for both concepts, without setting a clear priority between the two:

**Article 5: Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation**

1. Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an international watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse.

**Article 7: Obligation not to cause significant harm**

1. Watercourse States shall exercise due diligence to utilize an international watercourse in such a way as not to cause significant harm to other watercourse States.

**Article 10: Relationship between different uses**

1. In the absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no use of an international watercourse enjoys inherent priority over other uses.

2. In the event of a conflict between uses of an international watercourse, it shall be resolved with reference to the principles and factors set out in articles 5 to 7, with special regard being given to the requirements of vital human needs.

Not surprisingly, upstream riparians have advocated that the emphasis between the two principles be on “equitable utilization,” because that principle gives the needs of the present the same weight as those of the past. Likewise, downstream riparians have pushed for emphasis on “no significant harm,” effectively the equivalent of the doctrine of prior appropriation in protecting pre-existing use. The World Bank, which must follow prevailing principles of international law in its funded projects, recognizes the importance of equitable use in theory but, for practical considerations, gives “no appreciable harm” precedent—it is considered easier to define—and will not finance a project without the approval of all affected riparians. This was the reason that Turkey was required to finance and construct the GAP development using its own resources.

As legal principles for sharing scarce water resources evolve over time, they can eventually reach the status of customary international law. But in the realm of transboundary waters, the general lack of acceptance and the use of a balancing test make the process more difficult. In the absence of a treaty or basinwide agreement, the arguments still emphasize the rights of each state and rest on the fundamental dispute between hydrography and chronology. The parties’ positions are driven more by geography, economics, and politics than refined legal principles. Use of the terms “reasonable,” “equitable,” and “significant” guarantees that each riparian party will have a legal theory to support its position, even when extreme. One author, an attorney who has studied the situation in the Tigris Euphrates basin extensively, has stated that the Turkish position is “flatly wrong” and believes that the weight of legal authority supports the Arab downstream riparians. But a fair reading of the draft ILC rules supports the Turkish position that the downstream riparians cannot put the waters to equitable use, at least in comparison to Turkey. Of course the equation could change in the future in the event of a water shortage and “significant harm” to the downstream users. The fact that Turkey has not signed the ILC draft makes no significant difference, because it probably reflects customary international law. The failure to sign provides at least one advantage to Turkey: it reduces the chance that a dispute will become internationalized and that some outside agency will have control over what the Turks consider to be their own natural resource.

**The Danube River Case**

An important transboundary river case was recently decided by the International Court of Justice in the Hague, and it may provide precedent for future international disputes in similar cases. The Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros dam project on the Danube River was the subject of a 1977 treaty between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The agreement provided for a joint system of dams along the portion of the Danube that forms a natural border between the countries. The Soviet Union supported the original agreement, in part to improve relations between the two countries. Conditions have changed since that time, including the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the breakup of Czechoslovakia into two republics.

Since the 1980s, the dam project has sparked controversy and protests over the threat to the Danube’s unique wetland ecosystem and to one of the largest high-quality underground water reserves in Europe.
Hungary backed out of the project, but Slovakia diverted the Danube into its own territory on an alternative "Variant C" project in 1992. The Danube flows at the diversion through a concrete canal, and at peak periods water flows through turbines at Gabcichovo. The Nagymaros dam was to have been the Hungarian portion of the project, downstream in Hungary.

As a result of the unilateral move by Slovakia, both Slovakian and Hungarian experts say that significant and possibly irreversible environmental damage has occurred on the Hungarian island and beauty spot, Szigetköz, and on Zitny Ostrov, an island in the Danube River on the Slovak side. The threatened area also provides 45 percent of Hungary's drinking water and a comparable amount for the Czech and Slovak Republics. Continued operation of the Slovak diversion threatens to pollute and deplete this supply. By diverting the Danube from its natural bed, water flow in the portion of the original river bed below the diversion has been reduced to 10 percent of its average 2,000 cubic meters per second. This has caused water levels to drop by 3 meters, narrowing the river and causing increased sedimentation. The chemical and biological nature of the river's dense side branch has also changed; the river is increasingly losing its ability to clean itself, posing problems in disbursing such pollutants as agricultural runoff.

A decision by the court was rendered September 25, 1997, but it is not expected to fully resolve the issues between the parties. The ICJ ruled that Hungary violated international law by abandoning the 1977 treaty with Slovakia to build the system of dams and hydroelectric power stations. But the court also said that Slovakia was wrong to press ahead with the project and diverting the waters of the Danube from Hungary into Slovakia.

Newly independent Slovakia has invested considerable resources and time in the project and will be reluctant to give up what is perceived as a symbolic achievement for a country that has limited energy resources. From the standpoint of Hungary, more than just environmental issues are at stake, and the Hungarian position before the court was to seek an order that would require Slovakia to return a substantial portion of the water to the natural riverbed. Even with a favorable ruling Hungary would not necessarily achieve its goals, because the ICJ has no direct mechanism to guarantee compliance.

**Law and Politics**

Political and economic factors heavily influence the positions of states on an important issue of international law. By July 1997, 103 nations had signed the 1994 ILC draft protocol, but Turkey was conspicuously absent. One of the principal objections of Turkey was the Article 7 provision not to "cause significant harm." It is certain that this provision would be used as a weapon by Syria or Iraq in the event of declining water supply or a deterioration in water quality. Syria signed the protocol, but it is much more difficult to determine the official Syrian position on the subject, in view of the tightly controlled and censored Syrian bureaucracy. During a visit to Syria in July 1997 it was very difficult to obtain information or to determine the official Syrian position on the water issue. Water information and policy are treated as state secrets; this is true even though there is a strong legal argument that could be made on their behalf.

In contrast to Syria, Turkey has a strategy and conducts a public information campaign on the subject. Foreign visitors are provided with two pamphlets that state the official position. These pamphlets make the point that Turkey is not "water rich," comparing the per capita per year amount available in some countries of 10,000 cubic meters to Turkey's 1,830 cubic meters, and argues that Turkey can make the highest "optimal" use of available waters for the benefit of the entire region. The pamphlets also contain a summary of International Water Law and why Turkey's position is reasonable under the current state of the law. These brochures provide a valuable insight into Turkey's position on a matter of national security.

Although the legal enforcement mechanisms are questionable, we should nevertheless look to international law to provide a framework for possible settlement of the dispute concerning the Tigris and the Euphrates. The rule of law can provide a basis for negotiations, and ground rules should be known by policy makers well before a crisis develops.
Chapter Eight

Information and Technology

Information confers power, and this inspires a strong tendency to own or control it. This is particularly true in areas of the world that are not water rich, where water information is treated as a state secret. Under these conditions, the potential for instability and conflict tends to rise. The solution begins with good information combined with an effective system for collecting, processing, and managing the information. 22

A lack of attention to the facts (in this case water data) can easily undermine any agreement on water allocation, even if the parties are able to sign the document. 23 There is one infamous example of this situation in the 1929 agreement among eight riparian states in the United States concerning the Colorado River. The framers of the pact assumed that the dependable yield of the river would exceed 16 million acre feet. It was later determined that the average annual yield is considerably less, requiring a re-negotiation of the river compact.

Most studies that address water resources technology focus on either enhancing supply or reducing demand, making recommendations for the use of desalination, pipelines, Medusa bags (giant bags filled with fresh water and towed by seagoing tugs), or drip irrigation. But technology can be used as a tool for international water management of entire watersheds, using a combination of remote-sensing techniques and radio-operated monitoring and control structures. This technology offers powerful options to help reduce the political resistance to shared management of international waters.

In 1995, the U.S. Department of Defense (Principal Undersecretary for Environmental Security) cosponsored a conference on the environment and national security with the intelligence community. It was determined that the intelligence community has the infrastructure to gather information and the ability to perform integrated analysis on the links between environmental problems and other instability factors, providing advance indications and a warning system. In a speech to the World Affairs Council in 1996, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director John Deutch discussed the importance of environment to the CIA:

National reconnaissance systems that track the movement of tanks through the desert, can, at the same time, track the movement of the desert itself, see the sand closing in on formerly productive fields or hillsides laid bare by deforestation and erosion.
Satellite systems allow us to quickly assess the magnitude and severity of damage. Adding the environmental dimension to traditional political, economic, and military analysis enhances our ability to alert policymakers to potential instability, conflict, or human disaster, and to identify situations which may draw in American involvement.

The intelligence community has produced maps for environmental purposes depicting environmental contamination at military bases. In a unique exchange, the United States and Russia produced maps showing environmental conditions at military bases. The Russians mapped Elgin Air Force Base in Florida and the United States mapped Yeysk Air Base in Russia. Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin exchanged these maps in January 1996 at a meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. These derived products were prepared exclusively from classified assets. This technology will support a system of warning mechanisms for potential crises, and the CIA recently announced the establishment of a section devoted to environmental matters.
Completion of the GAP would have enormous political, social, and environmental significance for Turkey and the entire region. For Turkey it offers a long-term solution to the Kurdish problem. Social issues notwithstanding, it is believed that the problems of the Kurdish minority are economic. Many Turks conclude that the completed GAP will finally equalize the economic imbalance that causes many rural Kurdish families to live in conditions of extreme poverty; it is hoped that these increased levels of prosperity will eliminate Kurd dissatisfaction. Improved opportunities for the region’s education, health, and employment services contained in the GAP Action Plan are the operative agents to begin this process. The final integration of economically empowered Kurds into a healthy Turkish economy may take centuries and represents long-term thinking in the extreme. Even if only partially successful, it will assist in an eventual solution to the region’s political troubles.

Dams and manmade diversions have profoundly affected the quality of waters throughout the river system. Water emerging from a dam is not the same as water entering a reservoir. Discharge from a dam may create significant temperature changes, sediment load variations, dissolved salt load, organic content, and more than any other effect, significantly different water volumes. All these conditions have the potential to affect the environmental quality and condition of the Tigris-Euphrates River system in Turkey as well as the downstream water systems in Syria and Iraq.

Changes in river flow alone can have drastic environmental consequences. Rivers deprived of significant sediment content will begin to scour and erode beaches and shorelines. The river channel changes, and the clarity of the water is greatly reduced, allowing significantly increased amounts of sunlight and subsequent algae growth. In other situations, as dams reduce peak flows, irrigation canals siphon off annual discharge and affect the ability of rivers to carry away silt and dissolved material, clogging channels and creating choked river systems with little or no flow. For example, because of decreased flow from diversion and confinement, the Rio Grande River has deposited enough sediment to elevate portions of its channel above the surrounding flood plain.

Water quality is a significant issue below dams. Both the structure itself and the associated applications of the impounded water can dramatically alter the
quality of the downstream resource. For example, the combination of reservoir evaporation and additional contributions of dissolved minerals in surface runoff can significantly increase salinity. Because the source of outflow commonly is derived from the deepest portions of the reservoir, dissolved oxygen critical for aquatic life is drastically decreased. Organic chemical concentrations, a result of intense agricultural activities, can abruptly rise as a result of surface runoff and return flow to the river. Riparian vegetation systems, on shore as well as in the river, can be altered, and existing ecosystems displaced or destroyed. Entire fisheries can be eliminated by simply altering the thermal profile of the river.

The development of the GAP and downstream river diversion systems has, and will continue to have, significant consequences along the entire reach of the river system. The GAP alone will initiate significant changes that will become even more apparent over time. In addition to the Turkish hydropower projects, it must be stressed that the Syrian and Iraqi development may have even greater impacts on water quality and associated ecosystems. As these dams are developed downstream in regions of little to no recharge, the effects will be pronounced. For example, the gypsum content of the substrata in Syria may contribute significant dissolved sulfates to water in reservoirs. In addition, the river system shape and form are strikingly different between Turkey and its downstream riparian neighbors. The resulting broad, shallow reservoirs and resulting high rates of evaporation will greatly increase the salinity of water leaving these systems.

There have never been, and it is highly unlikely that there will ever be, proper environmental impact statements (EIS) conducted for water control structures in any of these countries. The purpose of an EIS, at least in the United States, is to provide environmental information before the decision to proceed is made. There is no comparable legal requirement in Turkey. A lack of environmental planning may give rise to degraded quality of life, degraded agricultural performance, and heightened tensions in this volatile region. Past tension and military mobilizations have occurred over the quantity of water in the Euphrates River. As the quality of the water continues to degrade, the impact of the changes is likely to be widespread. The potential for large-scale impacts on Iraqi and Syrian populations is significant.

Because of the current lack of surface return flow along the majority of the cultivated reach of the Euphrates River, the water quality at the point of entry of the Euphrates into Syria is reasonably good and is likely to remain so for the near future. An accurate picture of water quality in the region, however, is currently unavailable. There are as yet no major factories or cities on the main stream of the Euphrates in Turkey. When Turkey reaches full irrigation of the Harran Plain and other irrigation units south and east of Sanliurfa, a significant amount of agricultural runoff will drain down the Balik and Kabur Rivers into the Euphrates below the Tabqa Dam in Syria. There is also the potential problem of movement of groundwater from Turkey into Syria as part of return irrigation flow. This is likely to increase problems of waterlogging in the region and increase the amount of dissolved organic chemicals. Water quality issues may eclipse those of water quantity in the years ahead.
Chapter Ten

Current U.S.-NATO Security Strategy

The security interests of the United States in this area of the Middle East, which includes Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, are described in *Strategic Assessment 1997: Flashpoints and Force Structure*:

- Ensuring a free flow of oil at reasonable prices
- Ensuring the survival of Israel and moderate Arab government
- Preventing a violent Arab-Israeli conflict
- Maintaining a regional balance favorable to U.S. interests
- Ensuring access to strategic lines of communications
- Maintaining the Middle East Peace Process
- Isolating rogue regimes
- Controlling the spread of weapons mass of destruction
- Defending humanitarian values
- Protecting Americans from terrorism and unconventional weapons
- Preserving stability in crucial regions.

American interests must be further defined because of Turkey's NATO and European connections that affect Turkey's place in the world. Relevant U.S. security interests in Europe identified by the Strategic Assessment are:

- Sustaining deep historic ties
- Avoiding redivision of Europe into hostile blocs
- Sharing with Europe the burdens of world responsibility
- Preserving the unity and effectiveness of the Western Alliance.

*Strategic Assessment 1997* also describes "flashpoints," which illustrate the diverse circumstances that could lead to conflict. Flashpoints are not probabilities but rather represent a calculation of risks and circumstances that can destabilize an area or situation. The highest prospect for an "intense military conflict" in the next decade is the outbreak of hostilities between regional powers. Flashpoints involving Turkey, Syria, or Iraq include:

- Turkey and Greece, especially in terms of a conflict damaging the NATO Alliance and Cyprus and Aegean sovereignty issues
- The Southern Rim, including radical Islamists, renegade regimes, demographic pressures, water rights, and terrorism
• Acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by Iraq or Iran or the rogue use of WMD
• Turkey under Islamist rule (emphasis added)
• Conflict in the Middle East over water scarcity (emphasis added)
• Instability exacerbated by land scarcity, soil erosion, and deforestation (emphasis added)
• Syrian-Israeli confrontation
• Iraqi military threat.

A National Security Strategy for a New Century defines three core objectives for the U.S.
National Security Strategy:

• To enhance our security with effective diplomacy and with military forces ready to fight and win
• To bolster America’s economic prosperity
• To promote democracy abroad. 26

The policy for the implementation of the first core objective (enhancing security) requires elaboration, because it directly relates to this study. The United States must be able to:

• Shape the international environment through diplomacy, international assistance, through arms control, nonproliferation initiatives, and military activities
• Respond to crises.

The foundation of the national security strategy of the United States is built upon two pillars: continuous engagement and implementation of a security strategy that strengthens and adapts security relationships with key nations, while creating new relationships when necessary. In relation to the area affected by this study, this means an active American interest in the Middle East Peace Process and American support for the enlargement and adaptation of NATO. It also means continued U.S. readiness to deter threats, demonstrable willingness to engage in crisis response, and leadership to exert international pressure to influence rogue states and de-escalate regional tensions.

A secure and stable Turkey is in the U.S. national interest. Turkey is the southern bastion of NATO and it borders three states that may pose a threat to the United States—Iraq, Syria, and Iran. U.S. strategy has been to preserve the unity of the NATO alliance, which has been difficult with the continuing difficulties between member states Greece and Turkey. U.S. policy in the region has been to maintain close ties to Turkey, shaping the environment with international assistance, arms control, nonproliferation initiatives, and isolation of rogue states that support terrorism or violate international law. The United States has not taken an active role in Euphrates water issues among Turkey, Syria and Iraq, despite the potential for conflict, perhaps because the Middle East peace process and resolution of the conflict over Cyprus provide higher priorities for U.S. foreign policy.

NATO Security Strategy

At the strategic level, the current NATO security strategy for Europe is to safeguard security and territorial integrity by political and military means. This includes mutual cooperation-operation among members and cooperation and dialogue with nonmembers. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO faces no threats capable of direct military confrontation with the Alliance. This absence of a threat has been replaced by the acknowledgment of regional instabilities and risks. The Alliance is moving forward with a triple-pronged strategic concept for the emerging world order that rests upon:

• Dialogue: The establishment of regular diplomatic liaison and military contacts with an exchange of views and information on security policy issues.
• Cooperation: Prevention of crises, but should they arise, assurance of their effective management.
• Collective Defense: Maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively with a common defense.

At the theater level, Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), NATO headquarters in control of the Southern Region, is assigned an area of responsibility, to include the Mediterranean basin, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, as well as to an area of interest, to include the Middle East, North Africa, and the Caucasus and Caspian regions. The commander in chief (CINC) of the southern region views regional instability as the primary enemy of peace in the area. With this in mind, AFSOUTH bases its regional strategy on readiness to meet all Article 5 contingencies, increasing military-to-military contacts and partnership programs and maintaining core competencies as NATO adapts and enlarges.

Turkey and the NATO Alliance

Turkey is a strategically important linchpin of the NATO alliance. For almost 40 years, the Turkish Straits (the Bosporus and the Dardanelles) were designated by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), as
one of the most important strategically vital points in Europe, the retention of which was essential for the prosecution of a successful defense against the Soviets. Turkey would also have absorbed the offensive power of Romania, Bulgaria, and perhaps up to as many as 40 Soviet divisions as well. As the alliance changed in the 1990s, so too did the definition of strategic interests. The long-standing NATO General Defense Plans for the conventional defense of Europe were replaced by Contingency Operations Plans and Reinforcement Plans. While the active threat of the Warsaw Pact dissolved, leaving the northern Alliance countries without a direct military opponent, the NATO southern flank, with Turkey in particular, still faced severe regional instability. For this reason, SACEUR designated southeastern Turkey as one of several areas within Allied Command Europe that would continue to receive priority military planning efforts.

NATO Collective Defense: Article 5

Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty is the operative agent for the collective and mutual defense of Alliance members. It posits that an attack against one represents an attack against all, and it binds members to come to the aid of another:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measure shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken measures to restore and maintain international peace and security.

When Turkey signed the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey in London on October 22, 1951, supplementary language included the following protocol amending Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty as follows:

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

—on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

—on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the treaty entered force or in the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

It is significant to note that Turkey is the only member state that has territory specifically mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty, other than the Algerian Departments of France.

While the leadership of the NATO Alliance is increasingly aware of, and is moving toward, non-Article 5 contingencies and out-of-area operations, the Article 5 paradigm remains constant throughout all NATO statements, documentation, publications, and planning processes. The alliance essentially revalidated the importance of collective defense guaranteed under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty by expanding NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in March 1999.

Would Article 5 be invoked to defend Turkey in the event of an attack provoked by Turkey’s monopolization of the waters of the Euphrates? Unless the actions of Turkey were clearly unjustified, or in violation of international law, it seems certain that Article 5 would apply. In view of these treaty obligations, it is important to develop an informed U.S./NATO policy concerning water issues among Turkey, Syria, and Iraq.
Chapter Eleven

Analyses

Over the past 10 years it has been popular for authors in the United States to write about “water wars,” which were presumably just around the corner. Others pursued the same theme and described the coming conflict. King Hussein of Jordan was quoted as saying that the only *causus belli* he could imagine that would involve Jordan would be water. What is the basis for these dire predictions? If they are right, why has not such a war already occurred? Are water wars inevitable?

The potential impact of Turkish water policies in the region presents a classic study in environmental security. Water has been the spring of life in this region since Biblical times, and scarcity will remain an issue in the years ahead. Fresh water—who has it, who needs it—could approach access to oil in its effects on U.S. and NATO security strategy. But water is just one factor in a complex web of relationships among the nations in the region. If nations go to war, water is unlikely to be the primary cause in the next 10 years.

While the Euphrates River connects all three riparian states, political and historic relationships remain bilateral, and a triangular relationship presents a useful analogy. The three bilateral relationships form a triangle centered on the river. The Euphrates connects bilateral issues into a series of conflicting and competing relationships. The parties have taken extreme positions on the water question, and a climate of distrust prevents a real dialogue.

Historical animosities between Arabs and Turks should be understood as part of this equation. Acts of repression and torture during the Ottoman occupation are not easily forgotten. The Turks often view their neighbors to the south as less industrious and wasteful of available water resources. The willingness or reluctance of the parties to enter good-faith negotiations over water must be viewed through this lens. In the Arab countries, the issue of water quality has assumed even greater importance than that of water quantity. There is a grave (and justifiable) concern that development of GAP will degrade water supplies in Syria and Iraq at a time of increasing population dependent on the water. But Syria and Iraq seem to be unwilling to provide water-quality data to support their objections, which weakens their position, and their plight is not widely known. The Turks have done a much better job in terms of international public relations on the water issues.
The question of who is "water rich" illustrates the difficulty in obtaining reliable data that can be agreed upon by all the parties. Turkey maintains that water-rich countries have more than 10,000 cubic meters (CM) per person per year available, and Turkey has only 1,830 CM per person, compared to Syria with 1,420 CM. In a document produced in Syria, Turkey is listed as having 3,520 CM per person per year and Syria only 610 CM per year. The disparity in the data can be explained by the different methods of computation. It is generally accepted that about 100 CM per person per year is the minimum essential for personal and domestic needs. But the parties base their "needs" in the basin on water required for irrigation and other uses that are very subjective. In many water-poor countries in the Middle East, the difference can be made up by importing food and running desalination plants. In some countries, oil revenue can be used to make up for the lack of water. In less developed countries like Syria, the agricultural economy and historical water dependency leaves them in a more vulnerable position. For Iraq, the period of unimpeded oil revenues resulted in neglect of agriculture, and it has been difficult to re-establish this sector since the imposition of the oil embargo.

Geographically, Turkey is in the strongest position to assert its sovereign rights over the waters of the Euphrates. Turkey has a reasonable level of support in the current state of international water law. The law is based on a balancing test that provides leeway to the riparian state to use and develop waters with a view toward "optimum utilization." Geography has endowed the Turks not only with physical control of the headwaters but also more arable land and superior geography for storing the water behind dams. In Syria and Iraq, the manmade lakes are more shallow and subject to greater loss through evaporation. The land irrigated in Syria and Iraq is less suitable for agriculture, and this could be a factor in a determination of equitable use. On the other hand, Iraq has the strongest legal argument in terms of prior use, with historic diversions dating back to antiquity, and Syria can rely on the principle of equitable sharing and the requirement to cause no significant harm. International law provides a theory for all the riparians.

Water plays a significant role in Arab-Israeli relationships. Part of the Oslo agreement that forms the basis for the current peace plan provides for Jordan River water allocation between Israel and its neighbors. Water issues in the Tigris-Euphrates basin are not directly tied to the Arab-Israeli peace process, but the current state of affairs between the Palestinians and Israel, with a heightened level of mistrust, can do nothing but poison the relationship between Turkey and its Arab neighbors to the south. In July 1997, official news focused on Syrian support of the Palestinians and the "Turkish-Israeli military alliance," referring to the defense cooperation agreement between the two countries.

In researching water issues in this region, the lack of reliable water-related data becomes apparent. Even in Turkey, the availability of modern data-management techniques is limited. In July 1997 a senior surveyor in the GAP administrative office in Ankara had no computer and was unfamiliar with satellite imagery or modern Global Information Systems. Without reliable data that can be shared by the parties, the prospects for an agreement on water allocation will remain out of reach. There is a growing consensus among water experts, the World Bank, and the U.N. Development Programme that a real-time hydrometeorological data system is essential. If nations could be persuaded to share stream flow, precipitation, groundwater level, and selected water-quality measurements, enormous collective benefits would accrue. The climate of mistrust in the region, however, is likely to hamper such an effort in the near term.

The current relationship between Syria and Turkey is burdened with the issues of state response to regional insurgencies and especially Syrian state support of the PKK. Will this continue well into the next century? If the Turkish Government is correct in its assessment that it has fatally wounded the Kurdish insurgency, the answer is no. The damage inflicted on the PKK movement is devastating and has the appearance of a military victory. Still, it is unlikely that the PKK will be entirely eliminated in the next 10 years.

How will water issues affect the Syrian-Turkish relationship? Unless there is a major change in Syrian leadership or foreign-policy objectives, Syria will likely continue to support terrorism and the PKK. If this is the case, then the PKK will quietly rebuild itself under Syrian protection until it is again ready to engage the Turkish military. The economy in the Kurdish areas of Turkey is about to change, however, as the near-term impact of the GAP is felt. The Harran Plain irrigation project should soon create more jobs and improve living conditions for the people of southeastern Anatolia.
As the standard of living of the predominately Kurdish local population increases, we can expect reduced support for Kurdish separatists. Without the support of the local population, the PKK cannot expect to operate successfully. This is not to say that the PKK as a strictly terrorist organization cannot continue to operate within Turkey, but the possibility of long-term success will certainly decrease. Because of its support for the Hizbollah and the Palestinians, Syria will likely continue its policy of state-sponsored terrorism.

For Syria, the goal of peace with Israel will require more than just the return of the Golan Heights; stability in the region requires economic dividends. In the past 10 years Syria has accelerated the process of economic reform in an effort to encourage foreign investment. Agriculture and irrigation are receiving top priority, and electrical power generation is crucial if these plans are to succeed. This underscores the importance of Euphrates water and the heavy dependence on the river. Total water supplies are adequate for now, but Syria is already facing a deficiency, particularly in the cities, because of inadequate delivery systems. Syria has a history of problems with irrigation and hydropower management; waste and inefficiency have been compounded by a tightly controlled central government. If the Middle East peace process stays on track, and PKK influence continues to decline, relations between Turkey and Syria are likely to improve. This could improve the climate for a possible water-allocation agreement.

For Iraq, geography has left the nation in a vulnerable position in terms of water supply. As shown by figure 7 (page 27), depletions from the Euphrates in Turkey and Syria projected through the year 2040 increasingly reduce water available to Iraq. In a "worst case" scenario, the flow of the river entering Iraq would be less than 200 CMS, less than one-sixth of the average estimated natural flow. This would also be less than one-third of the 500 CMS minimum tacitly agreed by Turkey for release into Syria. But history shows (the 1975 incident) that the blame for reduced water supply is directed more at Syria than Turkey, and the relationship between Turkey and Iraq has been defined more by oil than water. Iraq’s oil potential places it in a strong position to resist Turkish leverage on water resources, although its geographic position as the lowest riparian on the Euphrates complicates the issue. The situation is ameliorated somewhat by the fact that Iraq controls the left bank tributaries of the Tigris. Despite concern over water supply, indications point to an improved relationship between Turkey and Iraq in the next 10 years.33

**Effect of GAP Completion**

After a review of the political, economic, military, and environmental factors, tentative answers can be provided to the questions posed at the beginning of this paper. Some factual questions underlie the issues: When will the GAP be fully developed, and when will it begin to take a toll on downstream neighbors? Will the GAP, as designed and fully constructed, cause a downstream water shortage during normal use or under conditions of drought.

Of the many measures of GAP development, water-storage capacity, power production, and irrigation infrastructure are three of the most important yardsticks. The five main dams and their reservoirs are 99 percent complete in terms of storage capacity. In July 1997, during a site visit to the Ataturk Dam, it was reported that the lake was still below capacity because of settling of the earthen dam construction material. Power generation was then at about 95 percent capacity, and one power generation unit was still under construction at the foot of the Sanliurfa Tunnel. Irrigation and its infrastructure, however, are seriously behind schedule. Estimates during interviews with Turkish officials in July 1997 indicated that it is less than 10 percent complete. This was supported during a visit across the length of southeastern Anatolia, where visits to areas that showed green colors of “GAP irrigation” on the official GAP 1996 map were still dry or dependent on primitive groundwater pumping techniques.

The GAP has been developed almost entirely without outside funding, and Turkish economic difficulties have contributed to major delays in development of the GAP irrigation infrastructure. Without the potential for immediate economic return, there has not been the same emphasis as on power production. The Nippon Koie Company, which has been conducting GAP planning, estimates that the training of farmers in the proper use of water and equipment can bring only about 1,000 new hectares into development each year. Because there are approximately 1 million hectares scheduled for irrigation with Euphrates water, at that rate it could take a 1,000 years for the GAP to be fully developed. An article in an Ankara newspaper in July 1997 estimated that at the current rate of
investment, it would take 70 years to fully develop the GAP in terms of irrigation and agricultural production. Whatever the delay it could benefit the downstream riparians, because it will postpone the inevitable loss of water and slow the potential for downstream pollution from return flow.

The GAP itself is unlikely to cause a water shortage in the next 10 years, under conditions of normal and anticipated use. The impoundments have in fact improved year-round flow conditions to the benefit of Syria and Iraq. However, a combination of drought conditions, increasing demand, and other factors during the next 10 years could still create severe hardship on the downstream riparians. The most probable source of increasing demand would be independent, nonregulated, agricultural diversions, which are difficult to predict. For Syria and Iraq, water quality will become a more important issue as irrigation systems come on line and return flow to the rivers brings higher levels of contamination.

The GAP as an Instrument of Turkish Foreign Policy

During a field visit to the GAP in summer 1997 and in interviews with GAP officials, a number of statements were made indicating that Turkey would not have the ability to alter dramatically the flow of the Euphrates once the GAP is operational. This raises an important factual question: What is Turkey’s real ability to use the GAP as an instrument of foreign policy? Can the flow of water leaving Turkey be manipulated? If so, how quickly will it affect and what impact will it have on Turkish hydropower generation and irrigation systems? In actuality, Turkey will have only a limited ability to use the GAP as an instrument of foreign policy in the years ahead. Turkey will increasingly depend on the smooth, regulated, and efficient functioning of the GAP system and would have to disrupt its own economy and electric generation to punish the downstream riparians. Turkey is fuel short and highly dependent on the electrical power generation of the GAP. Imported oil and coal make up for much of the remaining power generation.

Turkey must maintain a careful balance of hydropower production against delivery of water for irrigation needs. This is particularly true for the Ataturk Dam, which generates a large quantity of electric power, which in turn is spread through a grid that supports the rest of Turkey. The irrigation water offtakes (exit pipes) are primarily through the Sanliurfa Tunnel to the Harran Plain. Excessive water removed for irrigation is unavailable for power generation at the Ataturk Dam. Also, excessive downstream release would lower the water levels below the Sanliurfa offtakes. Manipulation of water levels would have an immediate impact on power production, and the impact on irrigation and crops would be dependent on seasonal variables. There is normally an excess of water for crops in the early summer and a shortage in the autumn. Another factor would be any condition of drought or heavy precipitation.

An essential factor in any Turkish manipulation of water levels or downstream flow would be the requirement to impound water behind the dams within Turkey. This would require a reduced volume in advance; the three major reservoirs—Keban, Karakaya, and Ataturk—have a total capacity of 88.9 billion cubic meters (BCM). The two other dams, Biricek and Karkamis, are of little importance and serve mainly as surge controls for the Ataturk Dam. Of the 88.9 BCM main storage, 42.1 BCM (47 percent) are dead storage and can be ruled out of the scenario. The remaining 46.8 BCM of live storage (52.6 percent) are not necessarily available for “punishing” downstream users, because most of it has to be maintained for power production and irrigation offtakes. Any effort to manipulate water levels would require substantial advance preparation and would have direct internal consequences for Turkey. It is not simply a matter of “turning off the spigot.” If there were any attempt to hold back significant amounts of water, there would first have to be a significant drawdown of live storage, easily detectable by watching water levels within the reservoirs. This makes the availability of remote sensing and information technology even more important as a predictor of potential conflict.

Even if Turkey could manipulate water levels, under what conditions would it undertake such action? One scenario would be in response to terrorist activity originating in Syria or Iraq. If there were a major conflict between Turkey and its southern neighbors, water could conceivably be used as weapon in response to perceived aggression—but Turkey would have to weigh the use of the “water weapon” against the negative impact on its own economic, irrigation, and power capability. Water is only one factor in a complex web of relationships between Turkey and its neighbors.
Potential Agreement on Allocation of Waters

What is the potential for an agreement on allocation of the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates? Will international law provide guidance or assistance in reaching an agreement? Fundamental differences work against cooperation in the basin. The Turks maintain that there is a single basin of the Tigris and the Euphrates, thereby arguing that shortages on the Euphrates should be made up by diversions from the Tigris. Iraq is already conducting such a project, but the Arabs insist that there are two basins and demand their fair share of the waters of the Euphrates.

International law can provide some basic guidelines, but all the opposing parties can find a principle to their liking. A water allocation agreement is more a matter of political will than international law. Although the legal enforcement mechanisms are questionable, we should nevertheless look to international law to provide a framework for possible settlement of the dispute. The rule of law can provide a basis for negotiations, and ground rules should be known by policy makers well before a crisis develops. Reduced water supplies could ultimately be a factor in pushing the parties to the negotiating table.

The GAP as a Potential Cause of War

What is the potential for Iraq or Syria to use the GAP as a cause celebre or causus belli? What is the likelihood of these countries developing a united front toward Turkey with respect to water policy? In other words, what is the potential for regional conflict? Militarily, what is the likely outcome of any conflict? The following scenario is a hypothetical series of events based on unclassified portions of an annual NATO exercise.

Conflict Scenario 2010

The attention of the world focuses on southeastern Turkey and the crises brought about by regional water shortages. American and NATO security strategies have failed to achieve their desired objectives, and, as a last resort, the North Atlantic Council begins formal meetings to discuss NATO responsibility to honor its Article 5 treaty obligations. As diplomacy fails, a long-predicted flashpoint erupts involving water scarcity in the Tigris-Euphrates basin.

Iraq and Syria experience instability and internal crises. Both regimes experience problems in maintaining control and are challenged by internal opposition forces. This occurs against the backdrop of a severe 3-year drought, which ultimately reduced the flow of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers by as much as 50 percent. This is compounded by the effects of a fully functioning GAP system, which further reduces downstream water flow. After economic and political difficulties, Syria and Iraq use the riparian rights issue as a causus belli to plan and execute an invasion of Turkey. Although not actually allied, Syria and Iraq enjoy a cobelligerent relationship.

NATO intelligence assets detect hostile forces moving northward and massing in assembly areas that directly threaten Turkey. Turkey requests assistance under the provisions of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The North Atlantic Council authorizes the deployment to Turkey of Allied Reaction Forces. Turkish forces are brought to a high state of readiness, and NATO headquarters in Turkey is placed on a war footing. At this stage, deterrence is the primary NATO strategy.

After allied forces arrive in Turkey, the hostile states launch a massive armor-heavy attack northward into Turkey. The immediate enemy objectives are thought to be Gaziantep and Mardin, with follow-on attacks to seize the areas surrounding the Ataturk and Keban dams. Simultaneously, enemy air and missile strikes target the seaports of Iskenderun and Mersin and the Incirlik and Adana airfields. Enemy special forces also attempt to interdict the road and rail network leading into the operational area.

Turkey immediately transfers control of its forces to NATO. The Turkish Second Army defending southeastern Turkey commands two active corps, and arriving NATO reinforcements are placed under its command. Turkey begins to transfer interarmy reinforcements from the Turkish First and Third Armies to the southeast.

NATO air reinforcements and lightly equipped NATO immediate-reaction land forces pour into Turkey. The Second Army is badly battered but conducts an orderly fighting retreat, making the enemy pay dearly for each step northward. After a week of heavy combat, the reinforced Turkish Second Army stabilizes the front but leaves the enemy in control of a huge salient that includes the cities of Gaziantep, Urfa, and Mardin. The enemy also controls most of the Harran Plain. The enemy first echelon is now too weak to continue the advance, and relentless allied air attacks have successfully impeded the northward advance of additional enemy follow-on forces.
At this point, a holding action is underway for about 60 days, the time that it takes for the NATO ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) to prepare, move by sea and air, and deploy into assembly areas in Turkey. Fully assembled, the ARRC has combat forces roughly equivalent to the American Seventh Corps in Desert Storm. By this time, a U.S. Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is probably operational in Hatay province. In the Batman area, a corps-sized body of heavy Turkish brigades transferred from the other Turkish armies is assembled and operational. Planning and preparations for the NATO counterattack are completed with the objective of restoring the integrity of the Turkish border.

At about 3 months into the war, allied forces launch a massive encirclement campaign against the hostile force main body in Turkey. As Allied air forces isolate the battlefield, the ARRC and the MEF sweep in from the west, as Turkish forces sweep through Mardin from the east. The ARRC destroys the enemy operational reserve in a dramatic meeting engagement in the Harran Plain, shortly after which contact is made with Turkish forces, thus completing the encirclement. Utterly defeated, the hostile states ask for a U.N.-brokered cease-fire, as NATO forces restore the Turkish border and eliminate isolated pockets of resistance, including the last vestiges of the enemy armies in Turkey. It is a difficult and bloody campaign, but the allied forces prevail.

**Alternative Scenarios**

Considering all the factors cited above, and the triangular regional relationship, what is the most probable scenario in 2010? Under the best case scenario, we find a lessening of tensions in the Middle East, with an improvement in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Rainfall and river flow conditions remain stable, and the GAP development continues to lag behind in irrigation potential, reducing the short-term impact on water quantity and quality. Iraq without Saddam Hussein is welcomed back to the community of nations, and economic activity resumes with Turkey. The Syrian economy improves, and there are no incidents involving PKK terrorism that cause a major deterioration of relations with Turkey.

In a best case scenario, the three riparian nations would have a meeting of the minds diplomatically and politically. Increased pressure on the watershed can sometimes motivate the parties to realize that cooperation is in the best interest of all concerned. An external agency such as the Gulf Cooperation Council could become involved, particularly if there is a perception that the waters of the Gulf were threatened by diminishing flow or high pollution levels from the Tigris and Euphrates. Increased use of information technology could assist the parties in obtaining the necessary data to reach an agreement on water allocation.

In the most likely case, NATO and American security strategies support the current balance of power that the region currently enjoys. For an improved climate, the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein would probably have to be replaced by a moderate government willing to repair the diplomatic damage inflicted by its predecessor. There would also need to be some measure of success in the Middle East Peace Process, which would enable Syria to move toward a more moderate position in regional affairs. Finally, Turkey would have to display a new willingness to engage in diplomatic exchanges in which national sovereignty issues are discussed and at risk.

Turkey can be expected to remain a reasonably stable democracy despite periodic efforts by Islamic interests to regain power. The PKK will continue to decline in influence, and the beginnings of economic development will further reduce the PKK power base. Turkey's relations with Iraq will improve slowly, with or without Saddam. The delay in GAP development will give more breathing room to the downstream neighbors, but increasing demands on the waters of the Euphrates will contribute a degree of instability. The parties are unlikely to reach an agreement on water allocation, but except for a drought or some combination of destabilizing events, water is not likely to become the primary causal factor to ignite a conflict between the riparian states in the next 10 years. The United States should not ignore the problem, however, because U.S. interests are served by maintaining a proactive stance in the region.

Conflict over water in the region has been predicted for more than 15 years, but no war has occurred. One reason is simply the clear military advantage enjoyed by Turkey and its NATO allies. Conflict scenario 2010 describes the likely result of a major military conflict but does not take into account another potential destabilizing factor—the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which, with the necessary delivery vehicles, would greatly complicate the analysis. Looking beyond 2010 is more speculative. Increasing demands on the rivers and a shifting
military balance could make the Tigris-Euphrates basin a much more dangerous place.

**Conclusions**

Relationships in the Tigris-Euphrates basin in the years ahead will be continually influenced by water. While the Euphrates River connects all three riparian states, political and historic relationships remain bilateral. These three bilateral relationships form a triangle that is linked by the river. The Euphrates connects these bilateral relationships into a series of conflicts and rivalries.

Issues between Turkey and Iraq will be based on a number of issues, and water will be increasingly important in the next 10 years. Turkey and Iraq have many common interests, and there is a natural economic link based upon the delivery of oil and the potential for commerce. They also share a common desire to restrain the Kurdish nationalism that threatens to divide both countries. Water presents only one component of a complex relationship.

Issues between Iraq and Syria are historical competitions over regional strength and authority. Both political systems and leaders are striving to represent a Middle East agenda. The 1975 escalation and tensions over the reduction of the Euphrates flow devolved to a Syria-Iraq conflict that reflected a struggle for power and control much more than over the water itself. While Turkey controlled a significant part of the flow quantity, it was noticeably absent from the conflict. Another escalation between Syria and Iraq may occur before Turkey is threatened, but the strong military position of Turkey should continue to provide a deterrent.

Syria’s active support of several insurgency groups is an issue even more visible than water scarcity. The tensions over Kurdish nationalism and Turkish sovereignty dominate the relationships between Turkey and Syria. Arab and Israeli issues dominate the regional relationships and provide an impediment to an agreement on water. In the region of the Euphrates River and the GAP project, support of destabilizing elements continues to dominate the relationship. Security in the Tigris-Euphrates basin is complex, but some predictions can be made after reviewing the historical, political, economic, and military factors.

There will be a continuing effort by Iraq and Syria to use water in the basin as a *cause celebre*, and U.S. policy should recognize that the rhetoric is bound to increase. But it is unlikely that conditions will give rise to a “water war” in the region in the next 10 years, because water is only one of many factors that contribute to instability. Syria and Iraq have already learned to cooperate with respect to water. The bilateral agreement includes a 42 to 58 percent allocation of water flowing in the Euphrates from Turkey. Nevertheless, there are still significant animosities between the Syrian and Iraqi leadership that work against a real alliance. Turkey will retain the military advantage in any potential conflict, even in the case of a combined attack by its southern neighbors. Conflict scenario 2010 indicates the level of support available to assist Turkey can repel any aggression. Turkey's NATO membership and the threat of retaliation will continue to deter Syria and Iraq from military adventurism. The likely result of any conflict would be in favor of Turkey and the NATO alliance.
Chapter Twelve

Recommendations for Policymakers

The recommendations in this chapter seek to answer the question of what should be the directions of U.S. foreign policy in support of peace in the region and a basinwide water allocation arrangement.

The Need for Reliable Data

There is a serious deficiency in terms of reliable data on water supplies in the Tigris-Euphrates basin. There must be an increased use of intelligence assets and information technology to monitor and assess water shortage and potential conflict in the region. The United States should take the lead with a joint technical team, under the leadership of the State Department, to gather objective data on water flow, topography, irrigation, hydrology, and consumption rates for now and projected 10 years into the future. The technology is available, and it needs to be directed to this strategically important region.

Technical Assistance

The United States should offer to provide increased technical assistance to Turkey and Syria to assist in implementing improved methods of reclamation and irrigation. The nations of the Tigris-Euphrates are making the same mistakes that were made in the United States earlier this century. The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and other U.S. agencies have the technical expertise to assist, and U.S. efforts could provide major returns in environmental security. This type of foreign aid is nonthreatening and can help lay the foundation for a comprehensive water-allocation agreement.

Academic Exchange

Academic programs can often provide a basis for dialogue where official meetings are burdened by political posturing. There may be a higher probability of success at "second track" negotiations; an informal international network of water experts continues with unofficial dialogue. One example is the 1994 international meeting in Ankara. It had the financial support of a German foundation, and a volume of
academic papers was produced that included a wide range of perspectives. Academic or other second-track activities can pave the way for official meetings and a possible basinwide agreement.

A Single U.S. Coordination Authority

One of the difficulties in formulating U.S. policy for the Tigris-Euphrates region is that the rivers literally cut across major geographic areas of responsibility. Turkey is considered part of Europe and the West, Syria and Iraq are in the Middle East. For U.S. military planning, Turkey is within the geographic sector of the U.S. European Command, while Iraq is in the region assigned to the U.S. Central Command. Developing a coherent policy under these conditions is difficult. The same problem exists in the U.S. Department of State, where Middle East water issues receive great attention, justifiable in light of the importance of the Middle East peace process. However, Tigris-Euphrates water issues could very well move to center stage, and the United States should be prepared. A single coordinating authority could assemble the necessary data and make recommendations for the development of an informed U.S. strategy.

A New Security Strategy

NATO and the United States must develop a security strategy to evaluate and reduce the potential for regional conflict based on water shortage in the Tigris-Euphrates basin. There should be renewed diplomatic efforts to encourage the parties to reach a negotiated solution to regional water issues. Although separate from the Middle East peace process involving Israel, an agreement among the three riparian states of the Tigris and Euphrates would reduce tensions and provide a basis for further dialogue. The United States could play a pivotal role in breaking the impasse between Turkey and Syria on water supplies. In the absence of an agreement, Turkey deserves U.S. support because of its important position as a bastion of the NATO Alliance. Any assessment of the security implications of a potential water shortage must be viewed through this lens. A stable, prosperous, and secure Turkey is clearly in the U.S. (and NATO) strategic interest.

Military Considerations

In the event of a U.S. or NATO deployment to the region, political and cultural sensitivities to the water situation should not be overlooked. Dams and hydroelectric and irrigation facilities are viewed as sensitive security facilities. In addition, there should be no assumption that available water supplies are potable; there is little available information, but increasing salinity or other contamination may be present. With an informed and proactive U.S. foreign policy in the Tigris-Euphrates basin, we can hope that a large-scale deployment will not be necessary.
Notes


4 Named for the U.S. attorney-general who suggested this stance in 1895, regarding a dispute with Mexico over the Rio Grande. This theory holds that a state has absolute rights to water flowing through its territory. The doctrine was eventually rejected by the United States, itself a downstream riparian of several rivers originating in Canada. It was virtually never implemented in any water treaty, with the rare exception of some internal tributaries of international waters, and has never been cited as a basis for judgment in any international water case. It was explicitly rejected by the international tribunal (predecessor to the ICJ) in the 1957 Lac Lanoux case.


7 Ibid.

8 "Water Issues between Turkey, Syria and Iraq" (Ankara: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Regional and Transboundary Waters, 1996).


10 Ibid.

11 Abelardo Rodriguez, Challenges for the Agricultural Sector in Developing Mediterranean Countries (Aleppo, Syria: International Center for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas, 1996).

12 Ibid.


14 Ibid.


16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.


20 Ibid., note 244.

21 "Water Issues between Turkey, Syria and Iraq" and "Facts about Euphrates-Tigris Basin" (Ankara: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Regional and Transboundary Waters, 1996).


24 John F. Kolars, response to questions from the authors, September 1997.


28 Butts, 65.

29 "Water Issues Between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq" (Ankara: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Regional and Transboundary Waters, 1996).

30 Abelardo Rodriguez, Challenges for the Agricultural Sector in Developing Mediterranean Countries (Aleppo, Syria: International Center for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas, 1996).


34 John F. Kolars, response to questions from the authors, September 1997.

35 Dead storage is the amount of water stored below the level of the exit channels.

36 Marr, 45–69.

37 Kolars, "Defining the Political/Ecological Threshold."


40 John F. Kolars, response to questions from the authors, September 1997.

41 Ali Ihsan Bagis, Water as an Element of Cooperation and Development in the Middle East (Ankara: Hacettepe University, 1994).

About the Authors

Colonel Frederick M. Lorenz, USMC (Ret.), lectures as a Fulbright Senior Scholar in St. Petersburg, Russian Federation. During his military career with the Marine Corps, he served in a variety of assignments, including prosecutor, defense counsel, and military judge, specializing in environmental law. He was also a Staff Judge Advocate with the I Marine Expeditionary Force at Camp Pendleton, California, and the senior legal advisor for Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and for the Combined Task Force, United Shield. In 1996 Colonel Lorenz was assigned as Marine Corps Chair and Professor of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, where he presented the first course in environmental security at the University.

Colonel Lorenz received a Bachelor of Arts degree from Marquette University and completed his Juris Doctor degree at Marquette Law School. He also attended the Special Education Program at the National Law Center, George Washington University, where he completed his Master of Laws degree in Land Use Management and Control. He has lectured at a number of international conferences and published a series of articles and papers for professional journals around the world.

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ANOTHER MIDDLE EAST CRISIS?

A war over access to water? Unlikely say the authors of *The Euphrates Triangle*. But water is a strategic resource like oil or critical minerals. And it is a factor in the strategic calculus of the Middle East. Since ancient times land irrigated by the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers has been the scene of many conflicts. The region has been shaped by geography, particularly water which actually defines relationships among states in the Tigris-Euphrates basin. Inextricably linked by these rivers, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq constitute a triangle.

The Southeastern Anatolia Project—Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (GAP)—is a major reclamation and hydropower project that represents hope for Turkey as a modern prosperous state. GAP has direct consequences for Syria and Iraq, both of which depend significantly on water which flows through Turkey. This book explores the implications of water distribution for stability in the Tigris-Euphrates basin. It examines patterns of water usage, relations between Ankara and its neighbors, and the impact of plans to complete an ambitious national project.