

Raport OSW / CES Report

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**Turkey after the start of negotiations
with the European Union – foreign relations
and the domestic situation**

Part I

Warsaw June 2007

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Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia /

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Part I

Introduction

The start of accession negotiations between Ankara and the EU is vital for the future of both Turkey and the Union, including Poland as its member state, as well as for the geopolitical situation in Eurasia (the Black Sea region, Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East). Appreciating the significance of these issues, the Centre for Eastern Studies in early 2005 decided to launch a project entitled ‘Turkey after the start of negotiations with the European Union – foreign relations and the domestic situation’. The goal of this project is to present, within the context of accession negotiations, Turkey’s greatest internal challenges as well as Ankara’s relations with its neighbour regions, the EU and the USA. This Report is the first of three which will be published as part of the project. The Report includes texts on Turkish-US relations since 2003, major political and social challenges on Turkey’s path towards the EU and the current condition of the Turkish economy. The Report was developed between July 2005 and November 2006, over which time CES workers and associates searched for publicly available materials in Poland, Turkey and EU countries, and went on three research trips to Turkey, where they met local researchers, analysts, politicians and officials. The authors of the Report would like to express their gratitude to everyone who have shared their opinions with them, and to the Polish Embassy in Ankara, especially to Ambassador Grzegorz Michalski and Minister Andrzej Ananicz for their expert support and assistance in the authors’ work on this Report. This Report does not present the official stance of the Polish government on the issues discussed therein; instead it reflects the personal views of its authors, who have made their best efforts to ensure that their work is reliable.

Theses

1. Turkey is an important element of the foreign policies of the EU and the USA because of its demographic, military and economic potential, as well as its strategic location in the basins of the Mediterranean and the Black Seas, on the frontiers with the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans, and because of its NATO membership and the opening of EU accession negotiations. After Russia, Turkey is the EU's second most significant neighbour.

2. Relations with the EU and the USA are essential elements of Turkey's foreign policy, considering their intense and asymmetric economic, political and military ties, and the fact that tightening bonds with the West is deemed to be the most important strategic goal of Turkish foreign policy. Relations with the EU and the USA have also greatly affected the internal situation in Turkey, considering the requirement of democratisation which is connected with the criteria of EU membership, together with the US' very active engagement in the Middle East (especially regarding the Kurdish issue).

3. The prospect of EU membership has been the key booster of democratic reform in Turkey. Nevertheless, in the case of Turkey – in contrast to other EU candidates – this prospect cannot serve as a lasting stabiliser for the domestic situation because Turkey has more serious internal problems and greater tension in relations with the EU and the Union's individual member states than the previous candidates had. In effect, it is highly probable that negotiations between Ankara and Brussels will be significantly extended, and possibly even periodically withheld. A scenario in which negotiations are deadlocked for good cannot be excluded either.

4. Since 2001, Turkey has managed to carry out changes which significantly strengthen its economy. The prospect of integration with the European Union has given extremely strong encouragement to improving the economic policy and reforms in other sectors. Doubts about the path of accession negotiations, which are already appearing now, may yet damage these strong me-

chanisms which have so far mobilised the public and the political class to reform their country.

5. Turkish-US relations have cooled since 2003, principally due to the US intervention in Iraq, which resulted in an alliance between the USA and the Iraqi Kurdish population. This has in turn has made it more difficult for Turkey to combat Kurdish separatism, and has posed a risk of Iraq disintegrating as one effect of a possible large-scale civil war and the subsequent emergence of an independent Kurdistan. Although relations between Ankara and Washington have to a certain extent gradually improved, a definite thaw can hardly be expected for some considerable time. The shape of US-Turkish relations depends on the situation developing in the Middle East, while stabilisation of the region is highly unlikely in the nearest future.

6. A scenario of Turkey's relations of with the EU and the USA cooling at the same time seems possible for the first time in Turkey's modern history. If this does in fact come about, Ankara will be brought closer to Russia and other Muslim states, and cause a regression of the democratisation process. However, considering the scale of relationships between Turkey and the West, Ankara seems unlikely to adopt a radically anti-Western line in its foreign policy.

The hurdle race. The greatest political and social barriers in Turkey's path to the European Union

Adam Balcer

Theses

1. Although accession negotiations started in October 2005, it is still uncertain whether Turkey will be accepted as a member of the European Union. In its relations with EU member states, Turkey has more serious internal and external problems than previous candidates to EU membership had.

2. The greatest challenges on Turkey's path to the EU include:

- the unenthusiastic attitude of most EU residents towards Turkey's potential membership;
- the ambivalent attitude of Turkish society towards the EU and the West;
- cultural differences;
- the Kurdish issue;
- problems with respecting human rights;
- the role of the army in the Turkish political system;
- tensions between the secular establishment and the governing party, which has an Islamic base;
- the need to regulate Ankara's relations with Cyprus and, to a lesser extent, with Greece;
- references made by some EU member states to the deportations and massacres of the Armenians committed during World War I by the Young Turks' regime as genocide, and the related issue of improving relations with Armenia; and
- rising nationalism in Turkey, provoked by the Cypriot, Kurdish and Armenian issues, which translates into Euroscepticism.

3. Those problems are very likely to cause significant extension of the negotiation period between Turkey and the EU, and even a temporary suspension. The possibility of breaking off talks completely cannot be ruled out either.

Box 1. The historical background of relations between Turkey and Europe

Turkey is a unique candidate for EU membership. The vast majority of its population is Muslim (nearly 97%), while the societies of all EU member states and other candidate states are predominantly or mostly Christian, or identify themselves with Christianity in terms of cul-

ture. Since the seventh century, the Mediterranean Sea area has been the scene of confrontation and coexistence at the same time, which contributed to cultural diffusion between Christians and Muslims. Experiences linked to conflicts and feelings of mutual incompatibility played a greater part than those of coexistence in developing the image of Muslims among Christians, and vice versa. In effect, Turkey's religious distinctness, combined with the numerous wars fought in the past between Ottoman Turks and Christians, gave rise to feelings of mutual strangeness, anxieties and negative stereotypes between Turkish and European societies. As a consequence, the cultural diffusion from the best-developed Western European countries into Turkey happened later than had been in the case of other European regions inhabited by Christians. At the beginning of the modern era, Muslim communities in the Mediterranean region and in Europe proper (with the exception of Russia) were predominantly poorer, more conservative, patriarchal and authoritarian than Christian ones, mainly for non-religious reasons. For this reason, in the modern period some elements of Western culture (such as the emancipation of women, the separation of religion from the state and liberal issues) were extremely difficult to adapt to Muslim countries, including Turkey. On the other hand, geography and history deemed that the West would influence Turkey much more strongly than other Muslim countries in the Mediterranean area. Ottoman rule in the Balkans and Anatolia, which had lasted for several centuries, contributed to the development of numerous common cultural elements shared by both Christian and Muslim residents of the regions.

The Republic of Turkey emerged in 1923 out of the Ottoman Empire, which as a result of its conquests of a significant part of Europe (the Balkans and Central Europe) and areas of Asia which had had special historical ties with Europe (Anatolia) had become a part of the European system of international and economic relations, fighting numerous wars, making alliances and signing trade treaties¹. (The Ottoman expansion had a religious aspect (*jihad*) and the state had been founded on the Islamic tradi-

tions. However, the Ottoman state had also inherited the traditions of the Byzantine state.) From the end of the seventeenth century, as a result of military defeats, the Ottoman Empire lost vast territories to the Western powers & Russia, as well as to Ottoman Christian nationalities, supported by the former. Its sovereignty was significantly limited. Numerous massacres and ethnic cleansings committed by Christians against Muslims and *vice versa* during the conflicts in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Anatolia gave rise to mutual prejudices, which are still alive in various forms today.

Under the treaty of Sèvres (1920), the Empire became a protectorate of the Western powers, cut down to the size of a part of Anatolia. The struggle against the treaty's provisions and the memory of the loss of vast territories and complete sovereignty as a consequence of the separatism and expansion of European powers in pre-republican times became the founding grounds for the Republic of Turkey and the main reference points for the modern Turkish national identity. This phenomenon is referred to as the Sèvres syndrome.

The loss of vast territories and complete sovereignty contributed to the Empire's decision to reform, using the legacy of Western civilisation. Turkey's desire to join the EU is perceived in Turkey as a continuation of the nearly 300-year-old tradition of pro-Western transformation. The establishment of a secular national state, the Republic of Turkey, by Kemal Atatürk in 1923 was a breakthrough. Atatürk's intention was to build a homogeneously national, decidedly secular and modern society based on equal rights for men and women and close ties with Europe. The implementation of that radical and very ambitious programme had to be carried out against the will of most of the country's population. In effect, the Republic of Turkey carried on some of the authoritarian elements of the political model which had existed in Ottoman times. The greatest consequence of the changes initiated by Atatürk is that Turkey is different from the other Muslim states in the Mediterranean region. This has been manifested by Turkey's membership in all the Western world's organisations (with the excep-

tion of the EU), its status as a candidate for EU membership, its functioning as a democracy (although not free from imperfections) since the 1940s, the positive perception of the separation of religion and state by Turkish society, the smaller percentage than usual of religiously active people, the greater role of national identity as the basis of social identity, the better social and legal position of women and the smaller technological gap between it and Western Europe. On the other hand, Turkey is still much poorer and less democratic than Western states are. Turkish society is also more patriarchal and conservative (especially the fundamentalist minority) and much more poorly educated and less urbanised than societies in Western Europe.

Box 2. A brief outline of relations between Turkey and the European Union

Turkey started making efforts to sign an association agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959, two years after the organisation had come into existence. The association treaty was signed on 12 September 1963². On 14 April 1987, Turkey officially submitted its candidacy for EEC membership and adopted laws that expanded the scope of democracy in the country. The European Commission rejected Turkey's application in December 1989. However, the Commission deemed Turkey as a potential candidate, i.e. a European country³. The Commission's major reservations included the issue of the Turkish army's occupation of Northern Cyprus, territorial disputes between Turkey and Greece (the latter being an EEC member), large-scale violations of human rights (tortures, assassinations and violations of the rights of religious and ethnic minorities), the insufficiently democratic nature of the Turkish political system (especially the unusually prominent position of the army) and the problems of the Turkish economy. A Turkish-EU customs union came into force on 1 January 1996⁴. At the Luxembourg summit in December 1997, EU member states granted the status of a candidate to all those countries which had declar-

ed a will to join the European Union, with the exception of Turkey. The main reason was the same as in 1989. After that summit, Turkish-EU relations plunged into the worst crisis in their history; diplomatic relations were even suspended for some time. A breakthrough in relations between Ankara and the EU happened in December 1999, when Turkey received candidate status at the Helsinki summit. However, this did not happen because the human rights situation in Turkey had significantly improved. What really decided the matter was the different distribution of political forces inside the EU than that which had existed in 1997. Germany, the most powerful EU member state, since 1998 had been governed by the Social Democrats, who were favourably disposed towards granting the status of candidate to Turkey. Additionally, relations between Turkey and Greece improved in 1999. Had the Union rejected Turkey's candidacy, the integration process would have been inhibited for a long time. New, more realistic hopes for EU membership had contributed to initiating unprecedentedly deep democratic reforms in Turkey, which started in late 2001. The EU determined at the Copenhagen summit on 12–13 December 2002 that Turkey was not ready to start negotiations. However, it decided to reconsider the issue by the end of 2004. Between 2002 and 2004, Turkey implemented eight legislation packages, which significantly broadened the scope of democracy and brought the Turkish legislative system closer to EU standards⁵.

On 17 December 2004, the European Council positively evaluated the reforms, and set a start date for negotiations of 3 October 2005. Negotiations could start on condition that Turkey signed a protocol to extend the customs union to the 10 new EU member states – including Cyprus – which had not been recognised by Ankara, and that it adopted a new criminal code complying with EU standards. In its conclusions, the Council presented its framework for negotiations with Turkey. Unlike previous Negotiating Frameworks, this one included a provision which enabled permanent exclusions (derogations) by member states⁶. The exclusions, according to the Council, should be revised for

impact on the operation of the EU internal market. The Framework stated that the shared objective of the negotiations was Turkey's accession. However, it was explicitly laid down for the first time in EU history that the negotiations were open-ended by nature, and that the outcome was not a foregone conclusion⁷. Pursuant to the Framework, in case of a serious breach of human rights by Turkey, the negotiations would be suspended if a motion to that effect forwarded by either the Commission or one-third of the member states is supported by a majority of EU member states⁸. In practice, a veto by one country may cause a negotiating deadlock, since closing and opening each negotiating chapter requires approval by all the EU member states. On 29 June 2005, the Turkish parliament adopted a new criminal code. On 29 July 2005, the Turkish government signed a protocol to extend the customs union to the 10 new member states. The negotiations between Turkey and the EU were put on track on 3 October 2005, following the dramatic half-day-long talks between the United Kingdom (which then held the presidency) and Austria⁹. The EU amended the Negotiating Framework to state that the possibility of absorbing new members was one of the criteria necessary for Turkey's accession¹⁰. In January 2006, the European Council adopted the document entitled 'Accession Partnership', which had been prepared several weeks earlier by the European Commission. The document was also accepted by Ankara¹¹. The EU will evaluate Ankara's fulfilment of the Accession Partnership's undertakings at the end of 2007, and decide on the nature of its further relations with Turkey on the basis of the evaluation. In June 2006, regardless of Cyprus's attempts to thwart the beginning of negotiations, Turkey opened and closed the first chapter, concerning science and research. Between October 2005 and October 2006, the Turkish legislation was screened for compliance with the community's law legacy (the *acquis*). In December 2006, the EU decided to suspend eight negotiation chapters, due to Turkey's failure to extend the customs union to Cyprus. In March 2007 the EU opened the second chapter of Turkish accession negotiations (enterprise and industrial policy).

1. Turkey's accession as seen by EU societies

European societies' support for Turkey's membership in the EU is vital for the success of the process of this country's integration for the following reasons:

- Turkey's accession agreement has to be ratified by the parliaments of all EU member states and in a referendum by the French public. When voting on the accession agreement, Europe's political elites will take into consideration their societies' opinions on Turkey's accession to the EU;
- the negative attitude towards Turkey's membership shown by European societies, and the realistic prospect that the EU member states or their societies will reject Turkey's accession, regardless of the possible outcome of the negotiations, has reinforced Eurosceptic sentiments in Turkey;
- due to the uncertainty of EU membership, its prospect in the case of Turkey does not play the role of an 'anchor' stabilising transformation to the same extent that it did in the case of those candidates accepted to the EU in 2004, and latterly Romania and Bulgaria.

None of the previous candidates or the potential candidates (in the Western Balkans) has raised such serious reservations in the EU as Turkey does. According to surveys conducted in 2006, a majority – either absolute or relative – of EU residents are against Turkey's membership¹².

Opposition to Turkey's EU membership prevails in most countries where numerous emigrant Muslim communities live (France, Germany, Austria, Belgium and Denmark). The societies of a definite majority of those countries which negatively perceive future EU enlargement also show a negative attitude towards Turkey's accession (in addition to the aforementioned countries, Finland and Luxembourg). Turkey's accession is also seen in negative terms by the societies of most countries which joined the EU in 2004 (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Cyprus). Fear of competition in the allocation of EU funds may be one reason for this. The unwelcoming attitude of the Greek and Cypriot societies to Turkey's accession is strongly linked to their serious problems in bilateral relations with Ankara. Most societies who have a positive stance on further EU enlarge-

ment are also positive about Turkey's accession. European political elites, most of whom support accession, are less sceptical about Turkey's EU membership. The circles which do not want Turkey in the EU include the radical right, a significant part of the right wing and a small part of the left wing (such as the socialists in Austria). The key reason usually presented against Turkey's membership is the cultural difference of Turkish society as Muslims, with Islam often being described in radical terms¹³. According to opponents of Ankara's European aspirations, if Turkey joined the EU, this would upset the European Union's internal integrity, which should be based on a common cultural and religious background. This feeling of difference has intensified since the September 11 terrorist attacks. This is also linked to problems with the integration of Muslims in Western Europe, resulting from the unwillingness of significant groups of Muslims to adapt to the European system of values, European societies' prejudices against them, and integration policies which have been either bad or completely absent. Emigrants from Turkey constitute the most numerous group among the Muslim diaspora in the EU¹⁴. Other weighty arguments used by opponents of Turkey's accession include the fact that 97% of Turkey's territory is located in Asia, its borders with the Middle East and the Caucasus, its problems with respecting human rights and the functioning of democracy, a fear of mass Turkish emigration and of the costs of accepting a poor country with a large agricultural sector. Many opponents of Turkey's membership believe that

opening negotiations with Ankara was pointless because Turkey's internal problems and cultural & religious differences will not allow it to meet the Union's requirements. Moreover, the negotiating process itself may destabilise the internal situation in Turkey because democratisation will bring radicals to power. For a large group of opponents to Turkey's EU membership, the country's internal problems are more important than the religious difference. According to surveys, many of them declare they could change their opinion on Turkey's accession if the country achieved sustainable economic stabilisation and democratisation. Supporters of Turkey's membership believe that Islam is not an impediment to Turkey meeting EU criteria. They emphasise the historical and cultural ties existing between Turkey and Europe. Their arguments for Turkey's integration are mainly geopolitical, and are as follows:

- as a result of the integration process Turkey will become stable and democratic, which will have a positive impact on the neighbouring regions (the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia), improve the efficiency of the EU's policy towards them, and reduce the pressure of Turkish migration to the EU;
- Turkey will serve as a model for the Muslim world and a bridge between it and the West;
- the negative consequences of rejecting Turkey (intensifying anti-Western sentiments in Turkey, worsening relations with EU countries, holding back the democratisation process and raising tension between the state and the Kurds and religious communities);

Table 1. Review of European societies' attitudes to Turkey's accession to the EU

Attitude to Turkey's membership	Countries	Forecast
Absolutely negative (all polls)	Austria	No chance of changing the society's attitude.
Negative (a definite majority of polls)	France, Germany, Greece, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Finland, Latvia, Estonia and Cyprus	Small or moderate chance of changing the society's attitude.
Indefinite (mixed poll results)	Italy, Holland, Lithuania, Malta	An open-ended issue
Moderately positive (all or a definite majority of polls)	Spain, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, United Kingdom, Hungary; Bulgaria and Romania (EU members since 2007)	Probable loss of societies' support

Source: Eurobarometer, institutions for analysing public opinion in member states

- Turkey will serve as a transit country for transport of oil and gas to Europe and a guarantee of the Union's energy security (diversification of energy sources);
- its accession will guarantee illegal migration and drug smuggling from Asia to Europe through the territory of Turkey will be combated more efficiently;
- Turkey's contribution, owing to its military potential, to the development of European security policy.

The role of public opinion in relations between Turkey and the EU has significantly grown since the French parliament amended the French constitution in March 2005, imposing the obligation to hold a referendum on each enlargement of the EU after Bulgaria and Romania's accessions. It cannot be ruled out that other EU member states will also impose such an obligation.

2. Turkish society's attitude to the EU; differences in culture and values

The attitude of Turkish society to the EU and the European system of values is an important issue for Turkey's integration with the Union for the following reasons:

- the Sèvres syndrome, widely shared by Turks (namely a fear of partition of the country by external forces supporting separatism), may in a crisis undermine support for EU membership;
- public support for membership is essential, considering the need to implement the controversial reforms required by the EU;
- the Turkish society is much more conservative than other EU societies, and as a result of their conservatism Turks may have problems accepting some EU standards in the social sphere;
- the strong devotion to sovereignty may make it difficult to accept the limitation thereof which is connected with the integration process.

In autumn 2006, approximately 55% of the Turkish public supported Turkey's membership of the EU, and around 35% opposed it¹⁵. People support accession because they believe it will contribute to improving their financial situation and the democratisation of the country¹⁶.

Turkish society's support for the EU is greater than their identification with the West and Europe. Public opinion polls have indicated that a majority of Turkish society perceives Turkey as a part of the West and Europe, and Turks as Europeans. Nevertheless, a significant part of the society do not identify themselves with the West or Europe, and some of those who identify themselves with Europeans have a rather moderate sense of this identity. A clear sign of Turks' alienation in Europe is the belief shared by a large part of Turkish citizens that the European Union is a Christian club, which has no place to offer for Muslim Turkey¹⁷. More than 50% of Turks consider being a Muslim as a condition of being a Turk. Additionally, most Turks share a negative opinion of Christians, although they perceive individual European nations in different ways¹⁸. Public opinion polls indicate that most Turks perceive democracy as the best possible system and generally support basic human rights and, as a consequence, the main pro-EU reforms in the political

sphere. On the other hand, Turkish society is only moderately ready to take over the Western system of values in the cultural and social spheres. Turkish society is much more conservative than EU societies are¹⁹. The conservatism of Turkish society is based on the major social role of the family, which is perceived as the foundation of an individual's identity, more important than the state, nation or religion²⁰. EU accession raises serious fears among Turks of negative cultural changes (moral decay, crisis of the family and weakening religiousness) and a loss of cultural identity.

Turks, unlike European societies, are exceptionally strongly attached to the sovereignty of their homogenous national state; they have the feeling that they are deprived of allies in the international arena²¹ and a strong anxiety of loss of territorial integrity. Such tendencies are the effects of the traditional state control, the Sèvres syndrome and such modern factors as long-lasting bad relations with almost all their neighbours as well as the lengthy and bloody struggle against Kurdish separatism. The struggle, combined with the devotion to the national homogeneity of the state, leads to a majority of the Turkish society opposing the granting of cultural rights to Kurds, and to declaring its readiness to accept some restrictions to democracy in an emergency situation in order to guarantee the state's security. Moreover, a significant minority support the authoritarian rule of the army. A clear majority of Turks believe that the EU member states are sponsors of Kurdish separatism and intend to partition Turkey.

Turks commonly share the belief that the European Union employs double standards with regard to their country. Although this belief is not groundless, signs of inconsistencies in the Union's policy are often exaggeratedly perceived in Turkey²².

In sociological terms, Turkey's accession is most strongly supported by the Kurds, both the religiously conservative and the liberal middle class, the intelligentsia and big business. These social groups are interested in expanding the scope of political and economic freedom (the conservative middle class and the Kurds), and they identify themselves most in cultural terms and have ties with the West (the liberal middle class and big business). Support for accession is the weakest among the nationalist section of those secular social groups who are tied to state structures (the

military, the bureaucracy, the judiciary and some academic staff), religious fundamentalists and the nationalist-conservative Turkish population of central Turkey (which strongly adhere to Islam as the basis of national identity). The urban population shows greater support for accession than do residents of agricultural areas.

Of the key political parties, Turkey's EU membership is supported most strongly by the ruling Islamic-democratic Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) and to a similar extent by the centrist Motherland Party of Turkey (ANAP). The opposition centre-right True Path Party (DYP) is a cautious supporter of Turkey's accession, although it continues to emphasise the need to treat sovereignty and interests of the country as top priority issues. The left-wing nationalist Republican People's Party (CHP), the largest opposition party, represents a Euro-sceptic point of view²³. The radically right-wing Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the fundamentalist Saadet (Felicity) Party are staunch opponents of Turkey's EU membership.

Social sentiments clearly changed in Turkey between 2005 and 2006. Support for EU membership fell from nearly 75% to nearly 55%. Opponents increased from 15%–20% to around 35%. Confidence in the EU and the perception of accession as a necessity and a good thing have clearly weakened. The lessening support for EU membership means weaker identification with the West and Europe. Dislike of Christians and fears of the consequences of accession have become stronger. Such negative trends have arisen for the following reasons, among others:

- the escalation of the Kurdish rebellion in autumn 2004;
- the disillusionment of the Turkish public with the EU's stance on Turkey as presented at the summit in December 2004 (e.g. the contents of the Negotiating Framework, the failure to keep the promises made by the European Commission to the Turkish Cypriots, accompanied by the demand that Turkey should extend the customs union to Cyprus);
- resolutions on the Armenian genocide passed by the parliaments of some EU member states and the European Parliament (see Appendix 2);
- imposition of the obligation to hold referendums on each subsequent enlargement by the French parliament, and declarations by politicians from

other countries that similar laws should also be adopted in their countries; and

– tensions in relations between Muslims and Christians (such as the publication of the caricatures of Mohammed or the fragment of the lecture on Islam delivered by Pope Benedict XVI in Regensburg).

There is a correlation between the government's ability to carry out controversial reforms or make concessions regarding the Kurdish, Cypriot and Armenian issues required by Brussels and the likelihood of the membership prospect. The less realistic the prospect of EU accession seems, the weaker Turkish society's support for accession, and hence the smaller the probability that they will accept the most controversial decisions as a lesser 'necessary' evil.

3. The Kurdish issue

The Kurdish issue is the most vital for the prospects of Turkey's integration with the EU, for the following reasons:

- Turkey's most serious internal problem is its military conflict with the Kurdish guerrilla forces, which has lasted for more than two decades, has claimed the lives of over 37,000 people and has cost US\$150 billion in direct expenses;
- the Kurdish issue is strongly linked to numerous economic, political and social problems (poverty, conservatism, fundamentalism, patriarchy, human rights, the position of the army and developing of the so-called 'deep state', a shadowy network of security structures), which are at the same time serious reasons for some EU communities' reluctance towards Turkey's accession;
- conditions of accession include guarantee of the cultural rights of ethnic minorities as well as decentralisation of the administration, while meeting such conditions will arouse concern about the integrity of the state among a great majority of Turks, and will entail the need to revise the definition of the state (national homogeneity), which is one of the fundamentals of the Republic of Turkey;
- the prospect of EU integration has played a key role in Ankara modifying its policy on Kurds;
- a definite majority of Turks accuse EU member states of supporting Kurdish separatism and the division of their country; the EU requirements regarding cultural rights and the activity of Kurdish separatist circles in EU member states are perceived by Turks in this context;
- the support for accession is much stronger among Kurds than among ethnic Turks. A clear weakening of likelihood of accession will undermine Kurdish nationalists' support for the continued territorial integrity of Turkey;
- the serious losses inflicted by the Turkish army on the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the truce declared by Kurdish separatists created favourable conditions for implementing pro-EU reforms between 2001 and 2004. The re-eruption of fights against the Kurdish guerrilla forces in 2004 was the main reason for the growing nationalism in Turkey, weakening support for accession, and consequently, a slowdown in the implementation of reforms. The conflict puts the continuation of reforms in jeopardy.

Box 3. Basic information on Kurds

Most Kurds live in regions where they are a minority. This tendency has been reinforced by the large-scale migration of Kurds to metropolises (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Damascus, Tabriz, Tehran and Baghdad). This has been happening on the largest scale in Turkey. Turkey also differs from the other countries in terms of its linguistic assimilation of its Kurdish population.

It is difficult to precisely determine the number of the Kurdish population due to the lack of accurate statistical data and the complicated nature of national and religious identity in the Middle East. The importance of religious identity in the Middle East (Kurds often present a higher level of religious activity than their non-Kurdish neighbours), strong family structures, the religious and linguistic diversity among Kurds, their minority status in the countries which apply the policy of assimilation and use the 'divide and rule' principle with regard to Kurds, violent conflicts inside the Kurdish community, the complex ethnic structure of the territories inhabited by Kurds, their coexistence with other ethnic groups (numerous mixed marriages) and the underdeveloped nature of the Kurdish modern national identity cause the following:

- many Kurds hold religious and tribal identity in higher esteem than a national identity;
- some of them identify themselves with other national groups than the Kurdish one;
- identification with the state is very important for them (especially in Turkey).

Consequently, treating Kurds as a uniform national community is a simplification, while it is

more reasonable to use the term 'people of Kurdish origin' to define the whole Kurdish population.


According to estimates by the Turkish polling centre KONDA, which conducted the largest survey on identity of Turkish citizens in the history of the country (around 45,000 respondents), nearly 15% of residents of Turkey indicated Kurdish and Zaza (1%) as their mother tongues, and over 10% declared themselves to be Kurds and Zaza (0.5%). Nearly 10% of respondents who declared themselves as Kurds and Zaza indicated Turkish as their native language. In turn, 20% of residents of Turkey who indicated Kurdish and Zaza as their respective mother tongues admitted that they used Turkish more often than they did their mother tongues. Mixed Kurdish-Turkish families account for almost 4% of all marriages entered into in Turkey. It can be estimated that a certain percentage of Turkish residents who identify themselves as Turks and indicate Turkish as their native tongue are of Kurdish origin.

The Kurdish problem in Turkey includes the following five interrelated aspects; **(1)** the political dispute between the Kurdish elites and the Turkish state about the definition of the state and the status of Kurds, **(2)** the military conflict with Kurdish separatists, **(3)** the clear socioeconomic backwardness of the region predominantly inhabited by Kurds, **(3)** the trans-border nature of the Kurdish community, which resides in four countries, and **(5)** the link between the situation of the Kurds in Turkey and Ankara's relations with the EU.

Table 2. Population of Kurdish origin in the Middle East

Country	Population number	Percentage share	Main religions	Languages	Alphabet	The most numerous ethnic-religious group
Turkey	12–15 million	15–20%	Sunni Islam, Alevism (nearly 25–30%)	Kurmanji, Turkish (a large part), Zaza (a minority)	Latin	Sunni Turks (nearly 65–70%)
Iran	6–7 million	10%	Sunni Islam, Shia Islam (25–30%)	Sorani (the largest group), Kurmanji, Gurani, South-Eastern dialects, Persian	Arabic	Shia Persians (nearly 50%)
Iraq	5 million	20%	Sunni Islam and Shia Islam (small minorities)	Kurmanji, Sorani	Arabic	Shia Arabs (nearly 60%)
Syria	1,6–2 million	8–10%	Sunni Islam	Kurmanji	Latin	Sunni Arabs (nearly 60%)

Distribution of the population of Kurdish origin in the Middle East



a) The Turkish state's policy on Kurds and their response thereto

The Republic of Turkey, which was founded in 1923 by Kemal Atatürk, defined the Turkish nation as a community based on culture, the Turkish language and citizenship. This definition excluded the possibility of other ethnic communities functioning in the public sphere²⁴. Every resident of Turkey was automatically identified by the state as a Turk²⁵. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds have undergone ethnic assimilation. For many of them, even though they have preserved their ethnic identity as Kurds, the Turkish language has become their mother tongue²⁶. However, the process of assimilation never had a chance of being fully successful. Kurds constitute a populous minority concentrated in one region which has a clear Kurdish character. The population growth rate among Kurds is much higher than it is in the case of Turks²⁷. On the other hand, most Turkish Kurds do not identify themselves with Kurdish nationalism²⁸. Kurds usually vote for Turkish parties, especially for those close to Islamic tradition. According to independent public opinion polls, the vast majority do not support secession, and most of them do not sympathise with the idea of transforming Turkey into a bi-national Turkish-Kurdish state. The confrontation of the Turkish army against the separatist guerrillas and terrorists has not erupted into an open ethnic conflict. Many more Kurds serve in the village militias and

in the Turkish army than in the PKK. Desertions happen rarely.

The military and autonomy-related traditions of highlander Kurdish communities, the unpreventable development of nationalist ideology among Kurds (the concept of their own state), favourable geographic conditions (mountains) and external support from countries hostile to Turkey (such as the USSR and Syria) were among the reasons why the Turkish state's assimilation policy has met with armed resistance from Kurdish guerrilla forces. The Turkish army quashed many local Kurdish uprisings in the 1920s and the 1930s²⁹. In the 1960s and 1970s, urbanisation, secular education and the influence of Kurdish autonomy in Northern Iraq led to a developing Kurdish national identity in Turkey. The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), with Abdullah Öcalan as its dictatorial leader, was established in 1978. The PKK started terrorist activity, which erupted into full guerrilla warfare in 1984. Its main goal was to unite all Kurds into one state, which distinguished it from other Kurdish groups in the Middle East. The Turkish army & police forces and the PKK violated human rights on a massive scale (tortures, killing civilians and prisoners of war, more than a million people displaced)³⁰. The state radically restricted the Kurds' rights and imposed antiterrorist laws, which strongly restricted human rights, freedom of speech and democracy. A ban on speaking Kurdish in public places was in force between 1984 and 1991. A state of emergency (OHAL) was declared in south-eastern Turkey in 1987.

The struggle between the army and the PKK led to informal relations being created between the security structures and the criminal underworld, leaders of Kurdish clans loyal to the state, and Turkish radical nationalists³¹. Secret structures acting outside the law (whose methods included assassinations, attacks and kidnappings) were created inside the armed forces. These structures are referred to as the 'deep state' (*derin devlet*). On the other hand, the conflict produced connections between Kurdish organised crime and the guerrillas³².

The first Kurdish political party linked to the PKK was established in 1990. It has been delegalised and has changed its name three times. Since October 2005, it has been operating under the name of the Democratic Society Party (DTP). Kurdish parties usually have a more moderate programme than the PKK (autonomy rather than independence). However, they cannot enter the national parliament due to the high election threshold of 10%³³. Several offensives launched by the Turkish army in the second half of the 1990s seriously weakened the PKK, which declared a truce at the end of 1998. Clashes became significantly less intense. A breakthrough came with the arrest of Öcalan in 1999, who was sentenced to death, although this was thereafter commuted to life imprisonment. Although the PKK leader is in a high-security prison, he still has a great influence on the military & political Kurdish movement. In April 2005, at his initiative, the PKK adopted a new programme for a 'democratic Kurdish confederation', which provides for setting up Kurdish republics in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria that will be united in a confederation while at the same time formally remaining integral parts of the aforementioned countries. The end of the fight against the PKK and the requirement to change the status of Kurds, which was set as a condition for opening negotiations by the EU, led to an extension of Kurds' cultural rights. However, the PKK decided these rights were insufficient. On 1 June 2004, the PKK withdrew from the truce, which caused an escalation of armed clashes. The conflict between the PKK and the army in south-eastern Turkey was accompanied by violent demonstrations by Kurdish nationalists between 2005 and 2006, during which demonstrators engaged in clashes with the police and the army. The bloodiest riots, the biggest since the mid-1990s, broke out in late March/early

April 2006; 14 people were killed during the riots. An equally dangerous tendency was demonstrated by street fights between Turkish and Kurdish nationalists and attempted lynchings. Such tensions between ordinary citizens had been rare in the 1990s³⁴. Following the re-eruption of fights, the PKK became more radical. The Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK), which plotted many terrorist attacks between 2005 and 2006, including on tourist resorts, left the party. The PKK announced a cease-fire on 1 October 2006, and clashes between the army and PKK have become rarer since that time.

b) The regional aspect (Iraq)

The development of Kurdish guerrilla forces in Turkey was strongly linked to the existence of their bases in neighbouring countries, especially Iraq, as well as to the support offered to them by Syria, and to a lesser extent Iran. In 1998, the threat of a military intervention by Turkey made Damascus change its policy on this issue. Iran gradually changed its policy after the election of the moderate president Khatami. Turkey's relations with these two of its neighbours clearly improved after the US intervention in Iraq in 2003. It significantly strengthened the Iraqi Kurds, which was seen as a serious threat by Syria and Iran. South-eastern Turkey has especially strong geographical, historical and economic ties with northern Iraq. Iraqi Kurdistan has been the most independent and politically & culturally autonomous Kurdish region for over 50 years. In fact, it is reasonable to state that an independent Kurdish state has existed in northern Iraq since 1991. The region has been used as a logistical base by Kurdish separatist organisations from Turkey and Iran. In the 1990s, Turkey, using the internal conflicts existing among Iraqi Kurds, managed to convince some of them to engage in a common struggle against the PKK. Serious losses were inflicted on the PKK owing to the Turkish army's ability to carry out raids deep into Iraq and its co-operation with Iraqi Kurds. The situation radically changed in spring 2003, when the Turkish parliament voted against the agreement with the USA which provided for launching US attacks on Iraq from Turkish territories and for the durable deployment of Turkish troops tens of kilometres deep into northern Iraq³⁵. As a consequence, Iraqi Kurds have become the key US ally in the region, and the Turk-

ish army cannot carry out large-scale operations in northern Iraq. Iraqi Kurds have significantly expanded the area territory under their control thanks to the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime and to their alliance with the USA. They have never been as strong as they are today. They do not want to fight their compatriots from the PKK, who pose no threat to their interests, and they oppose Turkish intervention in northern Iraq³⁶.

c) The socioeconomic aspect of the Kurdish issue

Kurdish nationalism has also developed due to the dissatisfaction of a significant part of the residents of south-eastern Turkey with the socioeconomic situation in the region, which is characterised by exceptional socio-cultural backwardness (the low social position of women, religious and social conservatism, low levels of education and the high illiteracy rate)³⁷ and by a low level of economic development. In this context, the Kurdish issue has a direct link to EU accession, since these phenomena cause many Europeans to oppose Turkey's membership in the EU.

The slow process of socio-cultural modernisation is in the first order an effect of the feudal and family-based structure and the conservative religiousness prevalent in the region³⁸, which have preserved their significance for the following reasons:

- the limited openness of the region to external influence³⁹;
- concessions by the state, which does not have sufficiently effective institutions and economy⁴⁰;
- social needs resulting from military conflicts and accelerated urbanisation; and
- poverty⁴¹.

Regardless of such negative phenomena, the Kurdish community in Turkey is not a static and archaic monad. Some social changes took place in the second half of the twentieth century. Currently, most Kurds in Turkey can read and write, live in cities and do not treat family identity as the main point of reference. Their religiousness has become less orthodox, and their women have been emancipated to a limited extent. The most important sign of the modernisation process is secular Kurdish nationalism.

d) The EU's influence on Ankara's policy on Kurds

In the early 1990s, Ankara's efforts to gain candidate status for the EEC/EU contributed to the liberalisation of its policy on the Kurdish issue. The ban on speaking Kurdish in public places was lifted in 1991. Since that time, Kurdish newspapers and books have been regularly published (albeit with great problems until recently) and records in the Kurdish language have been issued. A Kurdish cultural centre was established in Istanbul in 1991. The serious weakening of the PKK, the arrest of Öcalan and conferring EU candidate status on Turkey in 1999 provided grounds for the greatest changes to the Kurdish policy in the history of the Republic of Turkey. Brussels made setting the negotiation beginning date conditional on these changes. In August 2002, the Turkish parliament passed amendments to legalise the usage of non-Turkish languages on TV and radio, and on education in languages other than Turkish. The amendments were brought to practice two years later. In June 2004, public radio and television started broadcasting short programmes in Kurdish. Before 2006, the Kurdish language appeared only sporadically in local private media. The first programmes appeared in March 2006, and they cover a much wider scope than those broadcast by public television⁴². The first Kurdish daily newspaper in Turkish history has been published since August 2006.

The first private Kurdish language course, following lengthy efforts, was made available in March 2004⁴³. Gradually, more courses were launched. However, all the courses were closed by mid-2005 due to the lack of people willing to attend them⁴⁴. A new Kurdish course was opened in November 2006. The AKP party, which has ruled Turkey since late 2002, has been making attempts to improve the socioeconomic situation in south-eastern Turkey by measures including promoting girls' education and improving the infrastructure (building roads)⁴⁵. The process of paying compensations to Kurds who had been forced to migrate to border regions by the army during military actions has also begun, yet its implementation has been rather slow⁴⁶. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has also initiated a discussion on the national definition of Turkey, supporting the concept of po-

litical identification as the principal one (*Türkiyeli*) after the American fashion, and recognising the Turkish identity as one of the sub-identities⁴⁷. Political freedom has also been enhanced. The state of emergency in south-eastern Turkey was lifted in late 2002/early 2003. Kurdish political leaders who had been sentenced to imprisonment in 1994, including Leyla Zan, were released in June 2004. Between 2005 and 2006, the government granted consent to the gathering of signatures for petitions to transform Turkey into a Turkish-Kurdish federation and expressing support for Öcalan. However, the usage of non-Turkish languages in political activities (meetings, congresses and posters) is still banned. The local government reform, which was blocked by the president's veto in 2004, has not been carried out.

Minority cultural rights were introduced only slowly due to the resistance shown by nationalist circles in bureaucracy and justice authorities, and by limited public support for the reforms⁴⁸. Gradually, many Turks, considering their support for EU accession, 'forgave' the AKP for giving Kurds cultural rights, and have accepted this as a 'necessary evil' on their road to opening the negotiations⁴⁹. However, this public forbearance has significantly lessened as a consequence of the intensifying clashes between the Turkish army and the Kurdish guerrilla forces.

e) The EU aspect

Nearly one million Kurds, the great majority of who come from Turkey, live in EU member states. They are both economic and political emigrants. The largest Kurdish communities are in Germany, France, Holland, Sweden and Denmark, where they live close to Turkish emigrants. The diaspora has played a very important role in developing Kurdish nationalism since the end of the nineteenth century. It is a melting pot which unifies Kurds from various regions. Ideas of modern Kurdish national identity have had the liberty to develop in exile thanks to the wider scope of freedom and the opportunities to use Western ideas. Currently, Europe is the main place where books and magazines in Kurdish are published. Numerous Kurdish radio and television stations, associations and parties operate in EU countries. Some of them have connections with the PKK, which gathers funds in Europe, including by means of

criminal activities (drug trafficking). The fact that circles linked to the Kurdish guerrilla organisation exist in European countries has led to deep dissatisfaction on the part of the Turkish government and society and reinforces the Sèvres syndrome. The conflict between Turkey and the PKK also directly affects EU member states. This is manifested in tensions between Kurdish and Turkish nationalists, Kurdish attacks on Turkish embassies, anti-Turkish demonstrations held by the Kurdish diaspora and the involvement of some PKK supporters in criminal activities⁵⁰. Additionally, European tourists have become a target of terrorist attacks staged by the TAK organisation since 2005.

f) The prospects for resolving the Kurdish issue

A durable settlement of the armed conflict with the Kurdish guerrilla forces cannot be achieved by military means alone. The sources of the conflict are deeply rooted in social, economic and political problems, and can only be resolved by clearly improving the position of the Kurds in Turkey. The major impediments on the path to ending the conflict include:

- a lack of any clear prospect of Turkey's membership in the EU, without which the implementation of pro-Kurdish reforms and the resultant marginalisation of extremists is rather unlikely;
- serious differences of opinions between the state and the Kurdish elites⁵¹;
- the existence of circles opposing a peaceful resolution of the conflict on both sides⁵²;
- growing support for Kurdish nationalists⁵³;
- the lack of any strong Kurdish political forces unconnected with the insurgents⁵⁴; and
- the strengthening position of the Iraqi Kurds following the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003⁵⁵.

On the other hand, Kurdish guerrilla forces will not regain the position they used to enjoy in the 1990s because the Turkish army has inflicted too heavy losses on them. The membership of the PKK has significantly decreased. The organisation has become internally divided following Öcalan's arrest, and the PKK can no longer count on Syria's and Iran's assistance. Currently, the support for armed struggle is much smaller among Turkish Kurds than it was ten years ago. Any further re-

duction of PKK's combat capacity in the present geopolitical situation depends on Ankara's co-operation with the Iraqi Kurds, who could successfully cut off the organisation's supply routes. However, the Iraqi Kurds will co-operate with Ankara against the PKK only if further pro-Kurdish reforms are implemented in Turkey⁵⁶. Internal pressure on the Turkish government will intensify because the population growth rate is higher among Turkish Kurds than among Turks.

4. Human rights (torture and ill-treatment, freedom of speech, freedom of religion and the position of women)

The question of improving human rights in Turkey is linked to the country's pre-accession efforts for the following reasons:

- political criteria are of key significance and are given priority over economic ones when the EU decides on a candidate country's status;
- Turkey has greater problems in this area than all previous candidate members have had;
- any clear worsening of the human rights situation in Turkey will cause negotiations with the EU to be broken off.

a) The impact of pro-EU reforms on the human rights situation and the development of civil society

Dozens of constitution amendments, new laws and codes to significantly expand the scope of freedoms of speech, peaceful assembly & associations, to combat the usage of tortures and to limit the possibilities for delegating political parties were passed in Turkey between 2001 and 2006. The process of implementing the new regulations to be used in practice has lasted since 2004. This is being done in a difficult situation, considering the military conflict with Kurdish separatists, which has been ongoing uninterruptedly for over 20 years now.

The government launched the policy of 'zero tolerance of torture' in 2004. In effect, some policemen have been accused of and sentenced for using tortures and ill-treating inmates, which has happened on such a scale for the first time in Turkey's history. Although the number of lawsuits against policemen on charges of abusing powers has increased, the great majority of the trials still end in collapse or with suspended sentences being imposed. According to the leading Turkish Human Rights Association (IHD), the most brutal forms of tortures have been almost totally eliminated. Pursuant to the European Commission's reports for 2004 and 2005 and the Council of Europe's report for 2006, the usage of torture is not systematic and is in decline⁵⁷. Turkish human rights organisations believe that torture and the

Table 3. Data from the Human Rights Association (Insan Haklar Dernegi)⁵⁸

Type of human rights violation	2003	2005	2006
Murder committed by unidentified perpetrators	160 (2001)	1	20
Demonstrators killed by law enforcement agencies during riots	2 (2002)	7	12
Individuals killed during interrogation	5 (2002)	5	4
Cases of law enforcement agencies using tortures and ill-treatment	over 1200 ⁵⁹	over 630 ⁶⁰	over 640
Publications banned and confiscated (posters, tapes, books, newspapers, magazines)	285	29	22
Radio & TV stations and programmes punished by the Radio and Television Board with a temporary broadcasting ban	22 stations	1 station 46 programmes	2 stations
Delegalised social organisations, political parties, cultural centres and publishing houses	nearly 150 (2001)	none	4
People sentenced for expressing their views	over 450	50	over 226
People sentenced under the demonstrations and assemblies act ⁶¹	over 170	9	over 170

Source: Insan Haklar Dernegi, <http://www.ihd.org.tr>

ill-treatment of prisoners do have a systematic nature, since most perpetrators go unpunished.

In 2006, the positive tendencies slowed down, and the human rights situation worsened. The main reasons for this were the escalation of the conflict between the army and the PKK and the large-scale riots in spring 2006⁶². Between 2005 and 2006, most of those sentenced for expressing their views were Kurds, who were charged mainly with praising or supporting the PKK and spreading separatist propaganda⁶³. Regarding the other sentences, charges of slandering the army and (in fewer cases) other state institutions, influencing court proceedings and propagating radical religious views prevailed.

The problems with respecting human rights in Turkey arise from the fact that the Turkish legislation, regardless of reforms, fails to meet EU standards. The new criminal code which came into force in July 2005 was described by the European Commission as adopting 'modern European standards in line with criminal law in many European countries'⁶⁴. However, some of the code's articles met with reservations from the EU as posing a threat to the freedom of speech. The most controversial is article 301, which concerns insulting 'Turkishness', the republic and state institutions⁶⁵. The removal or amendment of article 301 was

one of the most serious EU demands made with regard to Turkey in 2006. As a consequence of the escalating conflict with the PKK and the serious riots in spring 2006, a new antiterrorist law was passed. The law, which extends the definition of terrorism and the powers of security forces to use arms during antiterrorist operations, and introduces regulations which provide for the possibility of limiting the rights of detainees and for punishing publications accused of supporting, spreading and praising terrorism, may be conducive to human rights violations⁶⁶. President Ahmet Sezer appealed against the articles regarding the freedom of the press to the Constitutional Court. Trials which violate human rights do not only happen because of the excessive rigorousness of the law another reason is the strict interpretation of the law by the judiciary system, which represents authoritarian and nationalist views⁶⁷.

Developing civil society has been the main practical effect of passing reforms to expand the fundamental freedoms. Between 2004 and 2005, the participation of Turks in non-governmental organisations grew by 45%, to 7 million (10% of society)⁶⁸. Regardless of these positive trends, however, civil society in Turkey is much weaker in comparison with Western Europe⁶⁹.

b) Freedom of religion and conscience

Turkey is a secular state where the activity of religious structures is regulated by the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet)⁷⁰. No reservations against this system have been made in the European Commission's reports; the most criticised issues include the situation of religious minorities, religious culture and ethics as an obligatory school subject (which in fact teaches religion⁷¹), and the space for entering religion in identity cards.

Turkey has over 10 million Alevi (nearly 15% of the country's population), who are followers of a strand of Islam which is more liberal than Sunnism and has numerous common theological elements with Shi'ism⁷². For centuries Alevi had been treated as second-class subjects in the Ottoman Empire, which was based on the primacy of Sunni orthodoxy. In effect, they became staunch supporters of left-wing politics, including radical left, and Kemalism in the twentieth century. Their social liberalism and their tradition of concealing their religious identity arouse prejudice among many Sunnis. Many Alevi were killed in the massacres in 1978 and 1993 in central Turkey. In 1995, bloody clashes between Alevi and the police broke out in Istanbul. Alevi have different ways of defining their own identity; some of them perceive it only in cultural terms, and others believe that they constitute a religious minority and as such should be entitled to certain rights. The religious Alevi are dissatisfied with the fact that the state does not treat them as a separate community.

Alevi have a very sparse representation at the Presidency of Religious Affairs. Their places of worship (*cemevi*) are not treated as temples, and receive much smaller money from the Ministry of Culture instead of state subsidies from the Diyanet⁷³. As of 2006, the principles of Alevism have been presented in the classes of religious culture and ethics. However, Alevi do not like the way their religion is presented in textbooks for this subject⁷⁴.

The AKP represents only the Sunni electorate (and to a great extent their more conservative part), and so this government cannot be reasonably expected to significantly improve the status of the Alevi community. Admittedly, the Education Ministry in July 2006 promised that it would introduce classes on Alevism in the religious culture and ethics syllabus, and government representatives took part in ceremonies held by Alevi orga-

nisations in summer 2006. Nevertheless, the central government and the AKP-controlled local governments do not want to recognise *cemevi* as places of religious worship.

Nearly 200,000 followers of religions other than Islam (mainly members of the Armenian Church, Orthodox Christians, Catholics and Jews) live in Turkey. There are also groups of Protestants. Generally, the situation of non-Muslims in Turkey is much better than that in many Muslim states, yet it is still worse than that of religious minorities in western Europe. Armenians, Jews and Orthodox Greeks enjoy the best legal situation. The state recognises their right to religious and cultural education⁷⁵. Foundations of religious communities, which represent the vast majority of religions, report to the state General Directorate of Foundations, which includes a Foundation Board. The nature of the foundations is not religious; they play an administrative role (managing the real estate of religious communities). Turkish law does not permit the founding of associations which have openly stated religious goals⁷⁶. The lack of any legal identity and of possibilities to educate priests in Turkey are the greatest problems which non-Muslim religious communities have⁷⁷. Ankara does not recognise the ecumenical nature of the Orthodox Patriarchy of Constantinople. Local authorities often cause problems in building and repairing non-Muslim places of worship. Prosecution authorities also (though rarely) launch proceedings against those who celebrate religious ceremonies outside their places of worship. In 2005, missionaries were verbally attacked by public institutions⁷⁸. Several incidents targeted against non-Muslims happen every year. These are mainly acts of vandalism and threats, sometimes beatings. The attacks on Istanbul synagogues in 2003, in which mainly Muslims were killed, the murder of a Catholic priest in Trabzon in February 2006, and the deaths of three German Protestant missionaries in Malatya in April 2007 have so far been the most serious assaults against non-Muslims.

The problems encountered by non-Muslims result from the strong prejudices of the Turkish authorities and society against followers of other religions than Islam, and their dislike of Christian proselytisation⁷⁹. These prejudices originate from numerous wars against Christians, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the bad relations modern

Turkey has with countries linked to some of its non-Muslim minorities (e.g. Armenia). The problems of non-Muslims in Turkey are also connected with the rigorous interpretations of the principle of separating religion from the state and of sovereignty employed by the authorities.

However, pro-EU reforms have contributed to the improvement in the situation for non-Muslims in Turkey. In October 2002, the parliament voted for amendments to the act on religious foundations, enabling them to buy real estate⁸⁰. They were deprived of this right in 1974 during the intervention in Cyprus. In November 2006, the Turkish parliament accepted amendments to the foundations act, which gave the following guarantees to religious communities: **(1)** the right to regain previously nationalised real estate, **(2)** protection against arbitrary interference by the state administration with the foundation's internal affairs and against nationalisation, **(3)** autonomy in managing their real estates, **(4)** representation on the Foundation Board, and **(5)** facilitations in setting up foundations⁸¹. The law has not yet come into effect, since some of its articles have been vetoed by the president.

A law introducing new identity cards in which the entry indicating the holder's religion can be removed at the holder's request came into force in April 2006 as part of legislation adjustments to satisfy EU requirements regarding the freedom of religion. An Alevi who did not want his child to attend the obligatory religion and ethics classes won a lawsuit to that effect in November 2006. If the award is deemed final and binding by a court of higher instance, it will set a judicial precedent.

c) Women's rights

Improving the situation of women in comparison to other EU human rights requirements poses a special challenge to Turkey. In this case, adjustment to EU standards requires serious changes in the mentality of Turkish society. A woman's role in the family is perceived by the great majority of Turkish society in a traditional way⁸². Most residents of Turkey identify family honour with the good reputation of the wife, sister or daughter (the cult of premarital virginity and marital fidelity)⁸³. The attitude to the role of women is one of the foundations of conservatism in Turkey which makes it different from EU countries.

The level of women's education, albeit consistently improving, is much lower than in the EU⁸⁴. Just over 25% of women in Turkey are legally employed. They are clearly overrepresented among people working in the underground economy, which is significantly larger in Turkey than in the EU⁸⁵. On the other hand, women in Turkey have a relatively good representation in prestigious professions in comparison with some EU member states⁸⁶. Women make up less than 5% of members of the Turkish parliament, and their representation is even worse at the local government level⁸⁷. However, the situation is much better in the state administration and the judiciary system⁸⁸.

The usage of violence against women, which occurs on a much larger scale than in EU countries, is the most radical manifestation of the poor social position of women in Turkey. Another serious problem is the fact that a large minority of the population, including women, accepts home violence⁸⁹. Murders of and suicide by women happen much more frequently in Turkey than in the EU. Many of them are considered as honour killings; these are committed against women accused of 'promiscuous' behaviour (which may include simple flirting) and blemishing the honour of the family⁹⁰. Murders and violence against 'immoral' women are linked to the fact that the society employs double standards to the erotic lives of males (acceptance of premarital sex) and females⁹¹.

Numerous adjustments to Turkish law aimed at improving the legal status of women have been adopted since 2001 as part of pro-EU reforms. The amendments to the civil code introduced in late 2001 and the new criminal code adopted in mid-2005 were especially important⁹². In autumn 2006, the government prepared legislation to improve the legal protection of female victims of domestic violence and imposing stricter penalties on perpetrators of home violence. According to Turkish women's organisations, these reforms are insufficient and their implementation has encountered numerous problems⁹³. Women's organisations have been demanding further legal changes, such as introducing quotas (guaranteeing places) for women in public life and in the labour market, and adopting a wider definition of honour killings⁹⁴. The AKP, which is a conservative party, treats such demands with a reserve, and is rather unlikely to embark on a very active policy to emancipate women⁹⁵.

5. The position of the army and relations between secular & conservative religious circles

The role of the army in Turkish political life and the relations between the secular establishment, which is mainly based on military officers, and conservative religious circles are significant for the prospects of Ankara's integration with the EU for the following reasons:

- civilian control over the army is one of the key conditions for Turkey's accession, and the army in Turkey has always had the exceptional position of being the guarantor of the political system's stability, a situation which the generals do not want changed;
- the secular establishment is in dispute with conservative circles over the form of separation of religion and the state; these tensions distract the main political forces' attention from the process of integration with the EU, antagonise them and put any consensus on accession at risk;
- the support of the governing AKP party for EU membership is to a great extent connected with their hope of lessening the influence of the army on public life, and liberalising the rigorous rules of separating religion and the state.

a) The status of the army in the political system

The significance of the army in Turkey's modern socio-political life originates from the important role the institution played in the process of modernising the Ottoman Empire and building the modern Republic of Turkey. The republic founding fathers, including Kemal Atatürk himself, were either retired or active generals. Until 1989, all the presidents of Turkey, with the exception of Celal Bayar, had been former military officers. The army perceives itself as the main receptacle of Atatürk's legacy and the guarantor of the exclusively Turkish and secular nature of the state. Since the establishment of political pluralism in Turkey in 1946, the army has staged four coups (in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997). Each time, following intervention, democratically legitimate civilian authority has been restored. The army is an institution which enjoys the highest public confidence, and its exceptional position in the political system is

supported by a significant part of the society. This special position of the army, which is of course a non-democratic institution, has become one of the main reasons for the inherent weakness of the Turkish democracy, a key sign of which is the lack of complete civilian control over the army. The army was granted powers to monitor the political situation under the 1961 constitution as a consequence of establishing the National Security Council (MGK), most of whose directors and members were military officers. The government was obligated to pay due respect to its opinions under the 1983 constitution⁹⁶. Since 2001, the political role of the army has been reduced as part of the process of Turkey's adjusting to European standards, and the powers of MGK have been significantly reduced. Officially, civilians have gained the leading position in the Council⁹⁷. Civilian control of army expenses was introduced in September 2006⁹⁸. The number of press articles and publications of reports criticising the views and activities of military officers and appealing for further reforms has increased in the last period⁹⁹. The generals perceive Turkey's membership in the EU as the crowning achievement of the country's Westernisation. However, at the same time they fear any limitation of sovereignty, and are convinced that the integration process is contributing to the increasing popularity of Kurdish separatism and Islamic fundamentalism. In effect, they are much less ready for the concessions required by the EU. According to Hans-Jörg Kretschmer, the EU's ambassador to Turkey from 2002 to 2006, not one of the lowest-ranking Turkish generals and admirals had ever responded to his numerous invitations for meetings. The fact that a moderate and pro-European General, Hilimi Özkok, was nominated chief of staff in August 2002 contributed to the process of reducing the role of the army. Özkok maintained correct relations with the government and, despite some reservations, supported the process of Turkey's integration with the EU. His support was very important for the government's conciliatory policy on the issue of Cyprus. Regardless of the changes, the position of the army in Turkey's political system still significantly differs from solutions used to that end in the EU. The general chief of staff reports directly to the prime minister. The specific position of the Turkish Military Forces is connected with the Supreme

Military Council's (YAS) legal status. The members of the council are the prime minister, the minister of national defence, the chief of general staff, force commanders, the commander of the armed forces, the general commander of the gendarmerie, the commander of the navy, the generals and admirals of the armed forces. In addition to its legal duties, the YAS decides on promotion, retirement and disciplinary measures regarding armed forces personnel. Decisions in the YAS are made by simple majority vote. In consequence, the YAS – which is constitutionally under the government's authority – can take disciplinary measures against prime minister's vote. However, its decisions should obtain the confirmation of the president. The army has also strong influence on the preparation of the National Security Policy Document. This document, which formulates national security strategy is determined by the Council of Ministers within the views put forth by the MGK. Practical issues are also important. Turkish generals often comment on the political situation, in compliance with the broad definition of national security. Officially, the budget of the armed forces is prepared by the parliament, which has the right to make amendments. According to the EU, however, the Turkish parliament is not engaged in any serious debate on the army's budget.

b) Relations between the secular establishment and conservative religious circles

Reforms limiting the powers of the army have been carried out by the government led by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which (considering its Islamic roots) is most interested in lessening the influence of the military on politics, and is the most independent of all the parties from the generals' influence. On the other hand, the roots of the AKP make the generals especially suspicious of its efforts to introduce civilian control over the army. The army is the key element of the secular establishment, which includes a major part of the judiciary, bureaucracy, academics, media and the intelligentsia. The establishment supports maintaining the *status quo* of separating religion from the state. Their opinion on this issue differs from that shared by most of the society, which is conservative and religious and supports a separation of religion and the state on different

terms (see Appendix 2). The determination of the Kemalists to preserve the *status quo* substantiates the existence of the fundamentalist religious minority, which includes groups of extremists who resort to violence¹⁰⁰.

Box 4. Relations between religious and secular circles between 1923 and 2002

The government of Kemal Atatürk (1923–1938), who removed religion from public life by force (instituting very limited religious education at university level, removing lessons on religion from school curricula and banning the wearing of headscarves in public institutions), had a great impact on the shape of the separation of religion from the state. However, the establishment of democracy after World War II made the state depart to a certain extent from the original Kemalist version of secularism. Firstly, public religious middle and secondary schools (*imam hatip*), which used the programmes of secular schools extended by religious curricula, were established. Their intention was to prepare future candidates for theological studies. However, the number of *imam hatips* soon radically exceeded the Religion Ministry's personnel demand, and continued to grow until 1997¹⁰¹. Girls also started attending *imam hatips*, although women did not have right to perform the duties of an imam until 2004. Extra-curricular religion classes were introduced to schools in 1949. Courses of Koranic study started developing. The softening of the state's approach was manifested in 1970 through the emergence of the first Islamic party, which supported introducing some elements of *sharia* into the Turkish legal system, opposed the process of Turkey's integration with the EEC, and proposed an alliance with Muslim states as an alternative. Its ideology was named *Milli Gorus* (the National Vision). This Islamic party has been banned four times. In the 1990s, at the peak of its popularity, it operated under the names of Refah (Welfare) and Fazilet (Virtue). The presence of religion in public life reached its apogee after the 1980 coup, when the government and the army decided that Islam had to be treated as an important element of

Turkish national identity. The policy was intended to neutralise Kurdish nationalism, radical left- and right-wing tendencies and Islamic fundamentalism. As part of it, obligatory religion and morality classes were introduced, and the number of *imam hatip* schools and Koranic courses was significantly increased. These policies, the general increase in popularity of religious integrationism in the Muslim world, the difficult financial conditions of millions of Turkey's residents caused by the lack of economic stability and mass migrations from villages to cities, disillusionment with corrupt and inefficient politicians and the intensifying feeling of not belonging to the Turkish state which many Kurds shared during the armed conflict between the army and PKK, have all contributed to the increasing popularity of Islamist circles, who are seen as the only trustworthy alternative anti-system opposition. Refah won the parliamentary election in 1995, gaining over 20% of the votes. The party's leader Necmettin Erbakan headed the government coalition as the first Islamist prime minister in the history of the Turkish republic. This was unacceptable to the army, who forced the dismissal of the government on 28 February 1997. The new cabinet liquidated *imam hatip* middle schools, imposed scoring rules at university entry examinations, which made it very difficult for graduates of *imam hatip* secondary schools to enrol on other courses than theology, and set more restrictive rules for opening Koranic courses. As an effect, the number of course participants and *imam hatip* pupils sharply decreased. The army's intervention sharpened the previously existing conflict between the moderate and conservative factions inside Refah, which effectively split into two parties, Saadet (Felicity) and the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The latter set Turkey's accession to the EU as the main goal of its foreign policy, and discontinued efforts to introduce elements of *sharia* into Turkish law. The AKP, unlike Saadet, supports the free market, an alliance with the USA and correct relations with Israel together with simultaneous rapprochement with the Islamic world. The AKP ideology was named *Muhafazakar Demokrasi* (Conservative Democracy).

The AKP differs from the secular establishment in the way it perceives separation of religion and the state. Its priorities include lifting the ban on wearing headscarves at universities, removing the barriers at university examinations for *imam hatip* graduates who want to enrol at other departments than theology, and removing limitations on opening Koranic courses¹⁰². These issues, especially the ban on headscarves, are of great symbolic significance for both secular and conservative circles, and constitute the basis of their respective political identities. The headscarf issue is in a way linked to the prospect of Turkey's integration with the EU. The AKP supported Turkey's EU accession among other reasons because it counted on the Union's support for revising the rigorous separation of religion and the state. The European Union supported the secular establishment in the dispute over headscarves, because the European Court in Strasbourg declared in 2004 and 2005 that the ban on wearing headscarves at universities in Turkey did not violate human rights. Many observers claim that these awards have made EU membership less attractive to the elite of the AKP, which is the strongest and most pro-EU party in Turkey.

Being unable to implement its main three objectives, the AKP has been trying to find some 'substitute' topics such as the penalisation of adultery and limiting the sale and consumption of alcohol¹⁰³. It cannot change the *status quo* mainly because of the firm stance which the judiciary has taken. Court awards have blocked the laws passed by the AKP regarding *imam hatip* schools, headscarves and Koranic courses. The present composition of the most senior judicial institutions (the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and the State Council) will change significantly for the next decade at least¹⁰⁴.

Tension between the secular establishment and the conservative religious circles clearly increased in May 2006 as a consequence of the murder of a judge of the State Council (Danistay) and the wounding of several others by a religious fanatic. The judges had approved a judgement forbidding a teacher who wore a headscarf in her private life outside of school to practice her profession. Mass demonstrations in support of the secular nature of the state were held in response. The demonstrators were led by generals, opposition leaders, judges and professors. The government, wish-

ing to avoid an open confrontation with the army, refrained from any disputes. As a result, the situation calmed down. General Yasar Büyükanit, who is said to be a staunch supporter of maintaining the *status quo* of the secular state, was nominated as the new general chief of staff in August 2006. In turn, the AKP is likely to win the parliamentary election in 2007 and will rule the country for another five years. This composition of forces will uphold the tension between the conservative religious circles and the secular establishment, a tension which may periodically increase.

A significant cooling of the dispute over values is unlikely in the longer term. Social conservatism will maintain its influence because of the higher population growth rate among the more traditional and religious part of the society. Their conservatism will however be moderated by the rising education level and the improving economic situation.

6. The Armenian issue

The 'Armenian issue' refers to the dispute between Turkey and some EU member states over the matter of recognising the deportations and massacres of Armenians committed by the Young Turks regime during World War I as genocide, and the lack of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia. It has affected Ankara's EU accession-related efforts for the following reasons:

- the demand made by many European politicians that the Turkish government should refer to the deportations and massacres as genocide. The uncritical acceptance of the Armenian interpretation of those events by many European media provide reasons for growing nationalist and Eurosceptic sentiments in Turkey, and strengthen the conviction that EU elites are employing double standards;
- it is highly likely that some EU countries will make Turkey's accession conditional on Ankara's recognising the events as genocide, a condition that neither Turkish society nor its elites will accept;
- the demand to acknowledge genocide is often linked to claims made by many Armenian circles to territorial compensation, which in effect means that when the EU raises this issue, Turkey's 'Sèvres syndrome' is strengthened;
- the guarantee of an open debate on the deportations and massacres on Turkish territory is an important condition stipulated by the EU;
- one of the EU's membership prerequisites is that the candidate should have correct relations with its neighbours.

a) The Armenian issue in Turkey's relations with EU countries and as an internal affair

The issue of referring to the Armenian deportations as genocide arose for the first time in Turkey's relations with the EEC/EU soon after Turkey applied for candidate status in 1987. In June of that year, the European Parliament determined that the deportations and massacres of Armenians had been genocide, and that Turkey's failure to admit that was an impediment to considering the possibility of Turkey's accession to the Community.' In September 2005, the European Parliament adopted a resolution by a clear majority of votes

stating that recognising the deportations and massacres of Armenians as genocide was one of the prerequisites for Turkey's accession to the EU. The European Parliament's resolutions are not binding, and neither the European Commission nor the European Council has set such a requirement for Turkey. However, the recognition issue severely affects Turkey's relations with some EU countries. The Armenian deportations and massacres have been recognised as a case of genocide in various declarations by the parliaments of nine EU member states (Belgium, Cyprus¹⁰⁵, France, Greece, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden and Italy). Six of the declarations were adopted after Turkey was granted EU candidate status in 1999¹⁰⁶. Turkey's refusal to recognise the Armenian genocide affects the country's relations with France especially strongly, as one of the most numerous and most influential Armenian diasporas in the world is found there. Turkey's negative response to the demand to refer to the deportations as genocide significantly increases the probability that French society will reject Turkey's EU accession in any referendum. In October 2006, the lower house of the French parliament adopted a law which provided for penalisation of the view that the Armenian deportations and massacres were not a case of genocide. The law is unlikely to take effect because it would have to pass through the Senate and be approved by the president, while both the government coalition and the president oppose it. However, it has caused great dissatisfaction among the Turkish elites and public. The demands by some European political elites that the Turkish government should acknowledge the Armenian deportations and massacres as a case of genocide are perceived in Turkey as hypocrisy and double standards. Both Turkish elites and the society at large believe that the same should be demanded from other candidate and member states in the cases of other crimes¹⁰⁷. A free discussion on the Armenian deportations and massacres was impossible for many years in Turkey due to strict legal regulations, a situation which was criticised by the European Union. The first publications by Turkish and Western historians which challenged the official version of those events, which were published in Turkey in the mid-1990s, encountered many legal problems. As a result of expanding the freedom of speech as part of the pro-EU reforms after 2001, the issue

of the Armenian massacres has been discussed in Turkey on a hitherto unprecedented scale. More than ten books and hundreds of articles and interviews challenging the official version of events have been published in Turkey since 2001¹⁰⁸. Some of them have been written by Armenian historians. Foreign historians have found it much easier to gain access to the state archives, although they still encounter some problems. A scientific conference on the situation of Armenians during World War I, which was organised by three prestigious Istanbul universities, was held in late September 2005. Over 40 researchers, representing a critical approach to the official version of the Turkish historiography on those events, took part in the conference¹⁰⁹.

In 2003, the prestigious foundation Tarih Vakfı, whose members include hundreds of historians and a group of liberal intellectuals, prepared a petition in protest against the negative stereotypes of Armenians presented in Turkish history school textbooks. Discussions on the deportations and massacres have been approved by most of the society, although a smaller part of the Turkish public (nearly 30%) are against it¹¹⁰. However, the vast majority of the Turkish population does not accept that their country's accession to the EU depends on the recognition of Armenian genocide by their government. A regulation according to which referring to the deportations and massacres as genocide was an example of a crime against the fundamental interests of the state was removed from the new criminal code in July 2005¹¹¹.

Although opportunities for discussing the deportations have significantly increased, nationalist circles use the regulations of the criminal code (specifically article 301) on the protection of national dignity to bring suits against intellectuals who criticise the official version of the country's history during World War I. So far, one such suit ended in sentencing the defendant to imprisonment (which was replaced with a fine), and the others have been discontinued¹¹². Nevertheless, an open discussion on Armenian massacres still encounters serious hurdles in Turkey, a glaring example of which was the January 2007 murder of Hrant Dink, a Turkish journalist of Armenian origin who was accused by radical right-wing circles of denigrating national values.

b) Turkey's relations with Armenia and the Armenian diaspora

Turkey keeps correct relations with all its neighbours, with the exception of Armenia. The two countries recognise one another, although Turkey does not have a diplomatic representation in Armenia and vice versa. Turkey has maintained a blockade of the Armenian border since 1993¹¹³. The main reasons for that is the Armenian occupation of nearly 14% of the territory of Azerbaijan¹¹⁴, which is officially recognised by Turkey as the second state of the Turkish nation, as well as the demands by the Armenian government and diaspora¹¹⁵ that Turkey should recognise the crimes committed against Armenians as genocide. According to Armenia, modern Turkey is responsible for the Armenian genocide¹¹⁶. Some Armenian elites and a clear majority of the Armenian public insist that the recognition of the genocide by Turkey should automatically entail territorial compensations. However, the Armenian government has been avoiding any unambiguous declaration that it would waive the claims¹¹⁷. Yerevan is ready to establish diplomatic relations with Turkey without any preconditions. Agreement is additionally impeded by influential and uncompromising nationalist circles in both countries. The Armenian diaspora, which provides Yerevan with significant financial support, has a great influence on the country's policy on Turkey. Nationalism is stronger among the diaspora than in Armenian society. On the Turkish side, anti-Armenian attitudes are represented by adherents of Pan-Turkism, nationalists living in Eastern Turkey (which had previously been inhabited by Armenians), and descendants of emigrants from the Caucasus¹¹⁸. The standpoints presented respectively in Turkish and Armenian historiographies (the latter concerning both Armenia proper and its diaspora) completely differ in their evaluations of the Armenian deportations and massacres. In Armenian historiography, discussion of the dark sides of their own history is more poorly developed than in Turkey. Political tensions and the living memory of the harm translate into the mutual prejudices of Armenians and Turks, which are stronger on the Armenian side¹¹⁹. Regardless of the lack of formal diplomatic relations, however, trade exchanges and economic migration from Armenia to Turkey develop¹²⁰. Improving Turkish-Armenian relations

would undoubtedly bring a solution to the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia closer. However, it is almost impossible that Armenia could give up its demands that Turkey recognise the genocide, just as Turkey is unlikely to accept the condition¹²¹.

7. Cyprus and relations with Greece

A settlement of the conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, establishing Turkish-Cypriot trade relations, recognition of Cyprus and settling the territorial disputes between Greece and Turkey are vital for Ankara's relations with the Union. This is for the following reasons:

- Greece and Cyprus have been members of the European Union, since 1981 and 2004 respectively, and their consent is necessary to open and close every chapter of negotiations;
- the fact that Greece and Cyprus are EU member states makes it difficult for Brussels to play the role of an unbiased and efficient mediator in resolving the problems;
- Turkey's accession to the EU will be impossible unless the aforementioned problems are resolved;
- the issue of Cyprus and the EU's stance towards it are major sources of nationalism and Euroscepticism in Turkey¹²²;
- since 1974, Turkey has not recognised Cyprus and has impeded its membership in international organisations; such a situation has not taken place so far in relations between any EU candidate state and EU member state.

Box 5. An outline of relations between Greece and Turkey and the Cyprus issue

Modern Greece and Turkey have defined themselves through mutual opposition, trying to marginalise any of the common cultural elements which have arisen from a nearly millennium-long period of mutual relations¹²³. Four Greco-Ottoman wars were fought from the beginning of the nineteenth century (1821–1829, 1897, 1912–1913, 1917–1918 and 1919–1922). Greek rebellions supported by Athens (such as the Cretan rising)¹²⁴ also happened in the Ottoman Empire. These conflicts were accompanied by massacres, ethnic cleansings and forced displacements. However, temporary improvements of Greco-Turkish relations were also a fact. The longest period over which relations between Turkey and Greece were good lasted from 1930 to 1955. They worsened due to the issue of Cyprus, a former British colony

inhabited by communities of Greeks (nearly three-quarters of the residents) and Turks (nearly a fifth of the residents)¹²⁵. This has been the greatest problem in Greco-Turkish relations until today. The Greek population of Cyprus wanted unification with Greece, to which Turkish Cypriots responded by dividing the island¹²⁶. The United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey concluded a treaty in London in 1960, pursuant to which Cyprus gained independence as a binational state, having no right to unite with Greece or to divide the island. The signatories reserved the right of military intervention in case of a gross breach of the constitution. The political system was based on the very extensive veto powers granted to the Turkish community. The veto right was the main source the Greek community's dissatisfaction; they proposed changing the system to transform Cyprus into a Greek national state and grant minority status to the Turks. The Turkish Cypriots feared that unification of the island with Greece would be the next step. This led to ethnic clashes recurring at intervals of several years¹²⁷. Radical Greek nationalists took over power in a coup in 1974 and promised unification with Greece. They also committed a massacre against the Turkish population. As a result Turkey, using the powers granted under the London Treaty, carried out a military intervention¹²⁸. This ended in the Turkish army's occupation of nearly 37% of the island¹²⁹. The international community recognised Turkey's invasion of the northern part of Cyprus as an act of occupation. Soon after the invasion, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was set up, which in 1983 proclaimed independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC), which was unrecognised by any state with the exception of Turkey¹³⁰. Numerous efforts by the international community to find a compromise between the conflicting communities has failed to produce a solution.

As a consequence of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, relations between Turkey and Greece were very bad for the subsequent 25 years. In the 1980s and 1990s, Athens maintained close ties with countries which were Ankara perceived as enemies or rivals (such as the USSR to 1991,

communist Bulgaria, Armenia, Syria and Russia). The process of improving Turkish-Greek relations started in spring 1999. Its symbolic beginning was marked with a meeting of the foreign ministers of Turkey and Greece, the first in forty years. The main reasons for changing the relations between Athens and Ankara were the following:

- the clear rapprochement of Turkey and the USA, and a simultaneous weakening of the international position of Greece as a consequence of the negative stance taken by Athens on the NATO intervention in Kosovo and its giving shelter to the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in the Greek embassy in Kenya;
- the prospect of Greece entering the euro zone (1 January 2000) and the related conviction by the Greek government of the need to cut its defence expenses in order to adjust the macro-economic indexes to meet the euro zone requirements;
- Ankara's strengthening position in the EU upon the electoral victory of socio-democrats in Germany, who support Turkey's EU accession;
- the appointment of Ismail Cem, a supporter of improving relations with Greece, to the post of Foreign Minister of Turkey in 1999;
- mutual aid offered after the earthquakes (August – September 1999);
- the upcoming EU Helsinki summit in 1999, at which time a decision on the possible granting of candidate status to Turkey was expected to be taken. Ankara wanted to improve its relations with Athens because this would add strength to its position¹³¹.

a) An outline of relations between Greece and Turkey and the Cyprus issue

Greece supported granting Turkey candidate status at the Helsinki summit in December 1999. Since that time, all serious political forces in Greece have supported Turkey's accession to the EU. This support is based on the conviction that having Turkey as a democratic, stable EU member state is in Greece's long-term interest¹³². The support offered for the first time by both states to the most serious plan to resolve the Cyprus problem, which was devised by the UN Secretary General Kofi

Annan following the EU Copenhagen summit in 2003, was the most significant consequence of the improvement in Turkish-Greek relations.

Box 6. The Annan Plan

The plan provided for establishing a United Republic of Cyprus as a loose confederation of two component states, the Turkish Cypriot State (the former KKTC) and the Greek Cypriot State (the former Republic of Cyprus). The main common institutions were to be the bicameral parliament (including the Senate, in which both republics would have equal representations), which would elect the Presidential Council (4 Greeks and 2 Turks) which would elect the president and the vice president by rotation, as well as the Supreme Court, the panel of which was to consist of equal numbers of both communities' representatives as well as three foreign judges. The constitution could be amended only by a majority of votes cast by representatives of both component states. The federal authorities' tasks were to cover foreign, fiscal and customs policies and communications. The Greek part would be increased in three years by 8% of the island's territory controlled by the KKTC and over 1% of the British sovereign base areas. The border in the central part of the island would significantly reduce the territory of its Turkish part. Both component states were given the right to impose limitations on the permanent residence of citizens of the other ethnic origin in case their number reached 18% of their respective populations within the period of 19 years, or until Turkey's accession to the EU. This solution was especially important for the smaller Turkish community. Refugees were offered the right to regain one-third of the value of lost property, and to compensation for the remaining two-thirds within a period of three to five years. The plan also provided for granting Cypriot citizenship to a majority of settlers from Turkey within four years. The military contingents of Turkey and Greece were to be reduced by 2011 (to 6,000 personnel each), by 2018 or until Turkey's accession to the EU (3,000 personnel each) and after that date (650 personnel in the Turkish contingent and 950 in the Greek contingent).

During that summit, Turkey's support for the settlement of the issue of Cyprus was determined as one of the key conditions for setting the date to open negotiations with Ankara and for holding a referendum on this issue¹³³. This was held on 24 April 2004¹³⁴. Nearly two-thirds of Turkish Cypriots and less than 25% of Greek Cypriots voted in favour of the plan¹³⁵. Soon after the referendum, the European Council (without Cyprus at that time) declared it was determined to lift the isolation of the KKTC and obliged the European Commission to prepare a concrete proposal. In July 2004, the European Commission came up with the proposal to offer 259 million euro in aid to the KKTC for the period between 2004 and August 2006, and to open the EU market on preferential conditions for exports from the KKTC, which was to be the first step towards lifting the international embargo. The EU accepted the transfer of 200 million euro to the KKTC as late as October 2006, although the Union has still not agreed to open its market to goods from the KKTC as of today¹³⁶. This situation is principally a result of the stances taken by Greece and Cyprus. Their behaviour may be motivated by the fear that ending the economic isolation of the Turkish part of Cyprus will lead to an improvement in its economic situation, in effect strengthening its negotiating position. Their stances found favourable conditions in the situation of a lack of definite support for Turkey's accession from EU member states. In July 2005, the Turkish government signed a document to extend the customs union to Cyprus¹³⁷. However, the protocol on extending the customs union has to be ratified by the Turkish parliament. At the same time, it made a declaration stating that signing the protocol did not mean the recognition of Cyprus by Turkey. On 21 September 2005, the EU responded with a counter-declaration, which rejected the Turkish government's declaration and stated that in 2006 Ankara should bring the customs union into effect with regard to all EU member states, that is, opening Turkish air and sea ports to Cypriot planes and ships. Pursuant to the European Union's declaration, Turkey's failure to carry out this demand will adversely affect the negotiating process, and Turkey must recognise Cyprus before joining the Union¹³⁸. This declaration is not binding on Turkey. Nevertheless, the condition of extending the customs union to Cyprus by the end

of 2007 is provided for under the Accession Partnership signed by Turkey and the EU. In January 2006, Turkey presented a plan to simultaneously lift the trade embargo imposed on the KKTC and open Turkish sea and air ports to Cypriot ships and planes. This plan met with a cold reception from Greece and Cyprus. In September 2006, Finland (which held the EU presidency at the time) suggested lifting the trade isolation of the KKTC by opening the port of Famagusta under UN supervision and bringing the small town of Varosha, located in the Turkish part of the island, under UN control. Turkey was to open several ports to Cypriot ships in exchange for that. However, the Turkish-Cypriot talks ended in failure. As a consequence, the European Union decided in December 2006 to exclude 8 chapters from negotiations until Turkey extended the customs union to Cyprus.

b) Disputable issues in the Aegean Sea region

The issue of borders in the Aegean Sea is a source of a serious dispute in Greco-Turkish relations. In June 1995, Greece signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (not ratified by Turkey), which set 12 nautical miles as a top limit of territorial waters. 148 states and the EU ratified UNCLOS by 20 September 2005¹³⁹. Turkey did not because it opposed the expanding of Greek territorial waters from 6 miles, a zone respected by Athens since 1936, to 12 miles. According to Ankara, this regulation increased the area of Greek territorial waters in the Aegean Sea from 44% to 71%, and reduced the scope of international waters from nearly 49% to less than 20%. Soon after Greece's ratification of the convention, the Turkish parliament adopted a resolution, according to which Greece's expansion of the borders of its territorial waters to 12 miles was a *casus belli*. Since the intervention in Cyprus (1974), Turkey has also started challenging the 10-mile distance, which was determined by Greece as the scope of Greek air space in 1931. This means that incidents between both countries' military aircraft often happen in the disputed zone. In the 1990s, Turkey and Greece twice found themselves on the brink of war over the ownership of tiny islands in the Dodecanese archipelago¹⁴⁰. More than 30 Greco-Turkish meetings have been held since 2002 to

discuss the territorial disputes linked to the Aegean Sea, and still no solution has been found. A positive event was the establishing of a government telephone 'hot line' in June 2006 between Ankara and Athens to alleviate tensions in case of incidents in the disputed zone. Joint manoeuvres by the Turkish and Greek navies were held in early October 2006 for the first time in history.

The status of minorities is also a source of misunderstandings in Turkish-Greek relations. Nearly 5,000 Greeks live in Turkey, while the population of Greece includes between 100,000 and 120,000 Turks. Both parties, pursuant to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 which marked the end of the Turkish-Greek war, recognise them not as ethnic but religious minorities. However, neither Athens nor Ankara fully respects the treaty's provisions regarding the two minorities' cultural and religious autonomy.

Problems in bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey are of secondary importance in comparison with the issue of Cyprus. If the latter was resolved, compromise on other Greco-Turkish disputes would become significantly easier. The EU had little chance of success at linking Cyprus' accession with the regulation of Greco-Turkish relations on the island because of the firm resistance to such moves by Greece, which has been a member of the EEC/EU since 1981. As an EU member state, Greece could veto any EU decision. Another reason why European integration could not be used as a tool in the process of regulating Greco-Turkish relations in Cyprus was the lack of any clear support by European elites to Turkey's membership in the EU. As a result, Brussels conferred candidate status on Cyprus (1997), conducted membership negotiations with it (1998–2002), and then accepted its membership (2004) without trying to reunite the island before that.

c) Conclusions and forecasts

The prospect of EU membership, which has been the main driving force for initiating democratic reforms in Turkey, cannot effectively and durably stabilise the internal situation. The country has to cope with more serious problems, both internal and external, in its relations with the EU and the Union's individual member states than any other previous candidate has had to. As a consequence, negotiations between Ankara and Brussels are li-

kely to be significantly prolonged and even temporarily withheld. The possibility that the negotiations will finally be broken off is also real.

Currently, opening Turkish sea and air ports to Cypriot ships and planes is the key issue in Turkey's relations with the European Union. Pursuant to the Accession Partnership, the Turkish parliament has to ratify an additional protocol to extend the customs union to Cyprus and provide Cypriot ships and planes with access to all its ports and airports by early 2008. Turkey has made the ratification dependent on a total removal of the trade isolation of the KKTC. The Turkish parliament will certainly not vote for the customs union unless the EU simultaneously lifts its isolation of the KKTC. Reaching an agreement with the EU on this point will not mean that the Cyprus issue will stop being one of the biggest problems in Turkish-EU relations. The issues of Turkey's refusal to recognise Cyprus and the unification of the island will remain unresolved. Cyprus will continue making its consent to open or close a subsequent chapter on the recognition of its statehood by Ankara, which in turn will not make such a decision unless the island is unified. Nicosia will probably demand unification of the island on more favourable conditions than those provided for under the Annan Plan. Ankara is very unlikely to make any significant concessions regarding this issue. Therefore, the stance of the key EU members and the USA on the unification of Cyprus will be of key importance in this case.

A crisis in Turkish-EU relations may be provoked at the beginning of 2008 by a possible insufficient implementation of the Accession Partnership by Ankara. The main impediment to its implementation will be the conflict with the Kurdish guerrilla forces. The situation may be additionally complicated by the possible disintegration of Iraq and the emergence of an independent Kurdish state in its northern territories. Strong nationalist and Euro-sceptic sentiments will have a detrimental effect on the government's readiness to satisfy the European Union's requirements. In 2007, the government's determination to do so will also be reduced due to upcoming elections¹⁴¹ as well as possible tensions between the new general chief of staff and the prime minister over the definition of the secular state. The parliament's election of a new president will be a very sensitive issue. The secular establishment does not want a politician

whose wife will wear a headscarf to be nominated to the post. The prime minister, whose wife wears a headscarf, did not initially rule out running for the post, although it now appears that his most likely replacement, the former foreign minister, is also married to a woman who wears a headscarf.

US intervention in Iran, which would lead to Turkey's greater engagement in Middle Eastern affairs at the expenses of European issues, and to an intensification of anti-Western sentiments (the conflict will be perceived in religious terms), cannot be ruled out in the immediate future.

Reforms will not be put on a faster track after the elections, if nationalism and Euroscepticism remain popular ideas in Turkey. Ending the military conflict with Kurdish guerrilla forces and improving the EU's attitude to Turkey's candidacy could contribute to reducing public support for them. However, to achieve success in the fight against Kurdish guerrillas, apart from military actions, it is necessary to take brave and difficult political decisions (such as declaring an amnesty for Kurdish prisoners). Radical changes in Ankara's policy towards the Kurds are highly unlikely, as the prospect of EU membership has become less real. In turn, the possibility of accession will not become more real unless the support of European societies and political elites for Turkey's membership rises. Existing tensions between the West and Muslims, economic, political and social problems in individual EU member states, and problems with defining the political system of the Union itself and a possible lack of improvement of Turkey's internal situation¹⁴² all lessen the probability of reversing Europeans' negative attitude to Turkey's candidacy. Even if the perception of Turkey's accession improves in the EU and the negotiations end in success, its membership will be uncertain until the last moment because Turkey's accession has to be accepted by all member states. In turn, some member states and communities in the EU present a sceptical or very sceptical attitude to Turkey's possible membership of the EU.

If the European Union decides to suspend negotiations, because of Cyprus or a negative evaluation of the tempo of Turkish reforms, this will give rise to a crisis in relations between Turkey and the Union. Its probable consequences will include: – a regression of the democratisation process in Turkey;

- growing tension between the army and the AKP;
- a smaller chance for any peaceful solution to the Kurdish conflict;
- intensifying anti-Western sentiments among the Turkish society and elites, which will accordingly affect foreign policy;
- impediments to political and economic co-operation between Ankara and the EU countries;
- problems with integrating the Turkish minority in the EU (the Turkish government's support for anti-integration tendencies in the diaspora);
- worsening relations between Turkey and Greece; and
- Turkey's rapprochement with Russia and Muslim countries.

On the other hand, the scale of economic and political ties existing between Turkey and EU countries makes it highly unlikely that Turkey will adopt a radically anti-Western foreign policy.

Adam Balcer

Appendix 1

Public opinion poll results

1. Attitudes to the West and Europe

In the survey entitled *NATO and Turkish Foreign Policy*, conducted in June 2004 by Pollmark research centre, 47% of Turks declared that Turkey was a Western country and 36% stated it was an Eastern country (Asia), 54% had a positive attitude to the West and 29% had a negative attitude. The proportions of the answers to the questions whether Turkey should be a Western state were almost identical.

According to the survey *Euroscepticism in Turkey* conducted in late 2003 by Hakan Yılmaz, 52% of Turks believed that Turkey was historically a part of Europe. In *Eurobarometer* no. 63 (spring 2005), 58% of Turks declared that Turkey was to some extent a part of Europe in historical terms. 29% were of the opposite opinion, including 16% who were radically opposite.

At the end of 2003, 48% of Turks were proud of being Europeans, and 24% were somewhat proud of that. At the end of 2004, the number of Turks who defined themselves as somewhat proud fell to 15%. In *Eurobarometer* for candidate countries no. 2003.4 (autumn 2003), 41% of Turks declared they felt dedicated or very dedicated to the notion of 'Europe', 26% felt slightly dedicated and 31% were not dedicated at all. In spring 2005, the first group reduced to 30%, and the proportion of respondents who declared a slight dedication to Europe had risen to 36%. A lack of dedication was declared by 29% of Turks.

There are no more up-to-date surveys, although identifications with being Europeans, Europe and the West have probably lessened due to the EU's reducing support for Turkey's membership.

2. Attitude to the European Union

In the survey *Türk Dis Siyaseti Arastirmasi* carried out in late 2003 by Pollmark, to the question of which countries Turkey should co-operate with in the long term, over 50% of respondents chose the EU, 23% the Turkish republics, 13% the Middle East and 6% the USA. In the poll conducted by ANAR centre in November 2006, the following answers were given to the question of 'With

which countries should relations be given higher priority by Turkey?': nearly 32% answered with the EU, 23% with the Turkish republics, 21% with Muslim countries, 15% with neighbours and 3% with the USA.

The fact that Turkish society treats EU membership as a matter of priority was proven by the survey conducted by Pollmark company in 2004 before the EU summit in December, when the decision to open negotiations with Turkey was expected to be taken. 56% of Turks answered that if a date was not set, Turkey should continue its efforts to attain EU membership. 37% were of the opposite opinion. At the present moment, the majority of those supporting a continuation of the membership-related efforts would probably be significantly smaller.

According to *Eurobarometer*, 60% of Turks had a positive attitude to the EU and 20% had a negative attitude in autumn 2005. In mid-2006, *Eurobarometer* (no. 65) showed that 43% of respondents presented a positive attitude and 26% a negative attitude to the European Union. The 2004 *Transatlantic Trends* survey revealed that 70% of Turks believed that EU membership was a good thing, and less than 10% thought it was a bad thing. According to the same survey carried out in 2006, 54% of Turks were of the opinion that Turkey's EU membership would be a good thing and over 20% thought it would be bad. The *Eurobarometer* survey at the end of 2005 showed that 35% of Turks distrusted the EU and more than half trusted it. The same survey in 2006 showed the reverse proportion.

According to the A&G centre's survey in autumn 2004, 67% of Turks believed that Turkey's EU membership was a necessity. 9% were of the opinion that Turkey should not join the EU. In autumn 2006, the former opinion was supported by 32% of respondents and the latter by 25%. The most numerous group presented neutral views.

3. Attitude to democracy

Surveys conducted by World Value Survey, Gallup International, the Pew Research Centre and Turkish public opinion research centres have shown that a vast majority of Turks perceive democracy as the best system. According to the survey entitled *Türkiye'de Muhazakarlık – Aile, Din, Devlet, Bati* conducted by Hakan Yılmaz in 2006, nearly

75% of respondents declared that tortures and censorship could not be used in any situation.

On the other hand, in the public opinion poll carried out by Ali Çarkoslu and Ersin Kalayicoglu *Türkiye'de Sosyal Tercihler Arastirmasi* in 2006, more than a half of respondents stated that disrespect of human rights was permissible in a situation of serious threat to state security and that, if necessary, a strong leader should be able to rule unrestricted by any legal limitations.

A great part of Turkish society is sceptical about the possibility of building democracy in Turkey. In the Pew Research Centre survey conducted in summer 2006, nearly 40% of Turks stated that democracy could not operate in Turkey as a purely Western invention.

4. The feeling of cultural difference

In the Gallup poll in 2001, 45% of Turks said that the West had a bad influence on Turkish culture. Sexual permissiveness, pornography and drug abuse were the most frequently mentioned examples of negative Western influence on Turkey. On the other hand, 73% of Turks admitted that the West made good films and music. In that survey, Turks stood out among other polled Muslim societies (such as Indonesia and Pakistan) as they emphasised democracy and human rights and not technological development as the advantages of the West.

In *Eurobarometer* no. 63 (spring 2005), 57% of Turks (33% of whom were totally in favour) agreed with the opinion that the cultural differences between Turkey and Europe were so great that they would prevent Turkey's accession to the EU. According to the survey *Türkiye'de Muhazakarlik – Aile, Din, Devlet, Bati*, conducted by a team led by Professor Hakan Yilmaz at the end of 2005, between 35% and 40% of respondents believed that Turkish society should rely only on its own traditions in the field of culture, between 30% and 35% supported limited Westernisation in this area, and between 20% and 25% firmly supported copying Western cultural models. In the same survey, respondents stated that Turkey's EU membership would have a detrimental effect on religious values (63%), young people's morality (61%) and the family structure (52%). In comparison to the 2003 *Eurocepticism in Turkey* survey, these fears had increased by 5% to 10%. According to the Trans-

atlantic Trends 2005 survey, 42% stated (including 24% firmly) that the EU was a Christian club, where no place for Turkey could be found. 52% were of the opposite opinion.

5. Attitude to sovereignty

Eurobarometer surveys carried out between 2003 and 2005 showed Turkish society as being very sceptical about the possibility of subordinating the Turkish armed forces to a hypothetical European defence ministry. On the other hand, the Turkish public supported a common European defence and foreign policy, often more readily than people in some EU countries. Due to worsening relations between Turkey and the EU, in 2006 the number of respondents who did not have an opinion on the issue significantly increased, while the number of supporters of such policies decreased. The *Transatlantic Trends* 2005 poll showed that readiness to use force to defend the interests of their state was quite widespread in Turkey; it is stronger than in Europe and similar to that in the USA. However, Turkish society's devotion to their state's sovereignty does not mean that Turks totally reject any compromises in foreign policy; this was best illustrated by their views on the plan for the unification of Cyprus in April 2004. In a poll conducted at that time in Turkey by Pollmark centre, 47% of respondents supported the plan and 38% were against it.

6. Fears of threats posed by the West and Europe to the country's integrity

The *Eurocepticism in Turkey* survey conducted by Hakan Yilmaz in 2003 showed that 36% of Turks feared that Turkey's EU membership would cause their country to split up along ethnic lines. According to *Türkiye'de Muhazakarlik – Aile, Din, Devlet, Bati* poll led by Hakan Yilmaz in the beginning of 2006, between 65% and 70% of Turks were convinced that European countries supported Kurdish separatists and wanted to divide Turkey. In the same poll, over 45% of respondents stated that the conditions imposed by the EU on Turkey reminded them of the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres signed in 1920, pursuant to which Turkey had lost most of its territories and sovereignty. In 2003, this opinion was supported by 36% of respondents. In the case of both surveys

a significant part of the respondents did not have an opinion on this issue. In the survey *Türkiye'de milliyetçilik* carried out in spring 2006, 50% of respondents claimed that the EU wanted to divide Turkey, and one-third stated that the European Union's requirements were no different from the provisions of the Treaty of Sevres.

7. Conservatism and views on the secular state

According to the survey *What the World Thinks in 2003* conducted by Pew Research Centre, 73% of Turks fully supported the separation of religion and the state, and 15% supported it to a great extent. Similar results were shown by Ali Çarkoğlu and Binaz Topak in their survey *Degisen Türkiye'de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset* carried out in 2006, in which over 76% of Turks opposed introducing *sharia* law in Turkey and 8% supported the idea. Surveys in 1999 showed over 20% support for introducing *sharia*. In the survey *Türkiye'de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset* in 1999, nearly 15% of respondents supported introducing into Turkish law new rules regarding divorce, marriage (polygamy) and inheritance which were based on *sharia* and discriminated against women. In the same poll, over two-thirds of Turks declared that publishing books which denied the existence of God and selling alcohol during the holy month of Ramadan had to be banned. In the same poll, 7% of respondents stated that marital infidelity should be punished by execution, 1.5% would impose the lash, 17% imprisonment and nearly 16% would impose a more lenient penalty (such as a fine). In the Pollmark survey in 2004, in a debate on the penalisation of marital infidelity, 37% of respondents supported introducing a regulation to penalise adultery in the criminal code, even if that would cause breaking off relations with the EU. In the survey *Türkiye'de Sosyal Tercihler Arastirmasi* conducted in 2006, over 30% of Turks declared that boys and girls should be educated separately.

According to the poll *Türkiye'de Muhazakarlik – Aile, Din, Devlet, Bati* carried out in 2006, over 40% of respondents claimed that a woman who declared herself a Muslim should cover her head. 25% admitted they felt uncomfortable seeing a woman without a headscarf, while 35% claimed they did not fast during Ramadan. More than

half felt uncomfortable at the sight of 'scantily' dressed women and nearly two-thirds felt uncomfortable about unmarried couples. On the other hand, nearly 40% of Turks felt uncomfortable at the sight of women wearing *charshafs* (black robes covering all the body) and of bearded men wearing religious headgear. In the survey *What The World Thinks in 2003* (Pew Research Centre), 25% of Turks fully agreed and 12% partly agreed with the opinion that limitations on common work of women and men should be imposed. According to the survey *Is Yasami, Üst Yönetim ve Siyasette Kadin* carried out in 2004 by Binnaz Toprak and Ersin Kalaycioglu, over 20% of respondents believed that common work of men and women was improper.

8. Views on the social position of women

According to the survey *Türkiye'de Muhazakarlik – Aile, Din, Devlet, Bati* carried out in 2006, nearly 90% of Turks believed that women should have absolutely equal rights as men in all areas of life. At the same time, two-thirds agreed with the opinion that if a woman could not combine her professional work with her home duties, she should give up work because taking care of her home and husband was her natural duty.

Additionally, in a special *Eurobarometer* entitled *Social Values, Science and Technology* (conducted in early 2005), 58% of Turks stated that men were generally better political leaders than women. This was the highest coefficient among all the EU member and candidate states. 51% presented this view in the survey *Is Yasami, Üst Yönetim ve Siyasette Kadin* held in 2004. 36% of men would not agree to their wives' involvement in political activity. On the other hand, the same survey showed that 78% of Turks did not mind having a woman as president. 74% supported guaranteeing women places on lists of candidates in general elections. According to the survey conducted in 2006 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), over three-quarters of respondents supported the guaranteeing of a certain number of parliament seats to women.

According to various surveys, between 30% and 45% of Turks agree with the statements that university education is more important for boys than girls. On the other hand, in the poll *Is Yasami, Üst*

Yönetim ve Siyasette Kadın, 83% of respondents admitted that the lower level of women's education has inhibited Turkey's development. In turn, 64% declared a readiness to accept additional taxes for the benefit of women's education.

In the poll on the sexual life of Turks carried out for *Hürriyet* newspaper in summer 2005 by TNS–Pinar, nearly half of the respondents were fully convinced that men should marry virgins. More than a half claimed that a daughter's virginity was a token of her husband's or father's honour. A small minority of parents declared permission for their daughters to engage in premarital sex (the percentage was much higher in the case of sons). A significant minority accepted premarital erotic experiences which did not cause loss of virginity. Young people were more liberal on these issues.

In the Turkish Demographic and Health Survey carried out regularly for decades by the Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, nearly 40% of Turkish women stated that their husbands had the right to hit them in certain situations. Nearly a quarter of respondents agreed with this opinion in the survey *Türkiye'de Muhazakarlık – Aile, Din, Devlet, Bati*.

9. Religiousness

Turkish society is less religious than most Muslim societies. Still, Turks are much more religious than residents of the West. According to surveys carried out in 2006 by Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak, 64% of women in Turkey wore headscarves (some of them were compelled to do so by their families); the number of women wearing headscarves had decreased by almost 10% since 1999. According to the survey by A&G in 2003, 32% of Turks prayed regularly five times a day, 39% quite often, 5% only on important holidays and 20% never. In another survey, conducted by the Pew Research Centre in 2002, 33% declared they did not pray at all or prayed only on important holidays. According to Ali Çarkoğlu's survey in 2003, 43% of Turks went to mosques at least once a week. A survey carried out at the end of Ramadan in 2003 by Pollmark showed that 65% of Turks had fasted regularly during the whole of Ramadan, 15% on some days of Ramadan and 20% had not fasted at all. All the polls prove the existence of differences between the generations;

young people adhere to religious rules to a lesser extent. Public opinion polls indicate that over 60% of residents of Turkey support lifting the ban on wearing headscarves by students and (to a slightly smaller degree) by public servants. More than half of Turks also support changing the university examination rules, which pose a serious barrier to *imam hatip* secondary school graduates who want to enrol at departments other than theology. On the other hand, a clear majority of the society do not consider the existence of these restrictions as discrimination against religious people. On the other hand, although the ban on wearing headscarves is believed to be discriminatory, this issue is not a serious problem for most Turks. The conviction that religion is important in their lives has strengthened among Turks over recent years. In the survey carried out by Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak in 1999, 25% of respondents declared to be religious and 6% identified themselves as very religious. In 2006, the proportions were 46% and 13% respectively. In 1999, 36% of respondents identified themselves as Muslims first, and in 2006 the percentage grew to 45%.

Appendix 2

Armenian deportations and massacres during World War I

According to Turkish school textbooks, a great rebellion broke out during World War I among the Armenians, who were collaborating with Russia against the Ottoman Empire, and the state was forced to deport them as a result. Reportedly, 300,000 Armenians (nearly a quarter of the population) died. Most of them were killed by disease, hunger and exhaustion. At the time of the deportation, massacres were also committed by Kurdish tribes, recalcitrant army units and paramilitary troops. Armenians committed numerous crimes against the Muslim populations. There were more Muslim victims in absolute numbers, yet proportionately they were less numerous than the Armenians

According to Armenian history textbooks, the genocide claimed the lives of one and a half million Armenians (nearly three-quarters of the population). Armenians were defenceless victims of the Ottoman government's policy, which was aimed at the physical eradication of the entire nation. Armenian historians often compare the Armenian genocide to the Holocaust against the Jews in World War II. They even claim it was a paradigm for all the genocides committed in the twentieth century, and call it the first genocide of the century. Some believe that the genocide was planned before the outbreak of the war. Both versions raise serious reservations.

The Tsar's army already included volunteer units consisting of Ottoman Armenians before the war. Caucasian Armenians, including senior military personnel, constituted a significant part of the Tsar's troops who fought against the Ottoman Empire. Over the period which lasted between the Ottoman Empire joining the war (autumn 1914) and the deportations (spring 1915), the following interlinked processes were taking place in Eastern Anatolia: a regular Ottoman-Russian war was being fought, Armenian guerrilla activity was developing behind the lines, Ottoman troops were pacifying Armenian villages and slaughtering the civilian populations, who were considered as a Russian 'fifth column', and Armenian guerrillas committed crimes against the Muslim population, albeit on a smaller scale. The massacres commit-

ted by the Ottoman army spurred on the activity of Armenian guerrilla forces. Thousands of Armenians deserted from the Ottoman army to join the guerrilla troops or the Tsar's army. In winter 1915, those Armenian conscripts who had remained were discharged from military service and transferred to labour battalions. Many of them died of hunger, diseases and fatigue. In spring and summer 1915, they were executed.

To sum up, a large group of Ottoman Armenians did join the struggle against the empire. However, this group was clearly a minority of the Armenian population. Armenian military activity, contrary to the official Turkish thesis, did not take the form of a mass uprising. Nevertheless, it was not a marginal issue, as the Armenian side would like it to be seen.

The deportations began at the time when the Ottoman Empire found itself in a very difficult military situation. The Ottoman army had suffered heavy defeats on all fronts, especially in the Caucasus. In spring 1915, the Russian army and Armenian rebels occupied the strategic city of Van, and the Entente forces landed in Gallipoli, close to the capital city of Istanbul, as well as in Kuwait, and were also marching towards Baghdad. The deportations, which had begun in the east, extended over several months to Central and Western Anatolia. A minority of those Armenians who did not leave the empire's territory between 1915 and 1918 survived the deportations. (Some Armenians performed public functions over the entire war period.) Tens of thousands fled in 1915 from the east of the country to the Russian-controlled Caucasus and Iran, where many of them died of hunger and diseases in subsequent years. According to some moderate Armenian historians (such as Ronald G. Suny) and Turkish historians who recognise the deportations as genocide (Taner Akçam and Halil Berktaş), over 800,000 Ottoman Armenians (nearly a half of the population) died during the war.

The deportations took different forms in the Eastern and Western areas of Anatolia, as well as in individual regions. In Eastern Anatolia, the Ottoman army, paramilitary troops and Kurdish tribes on one side were fighting against Armenian guerrilla forces and the Tsar's army on the other during the deportations. No railway network existed. In effect, Armenians from Eastern Anatolia were forced to walk long distances in un-

favourable climate and geographical conditions. Most of them died (due to diseases, hunger, thirst and fatigue) or were killed by Kurdish highlanders, Ottoman soldiers and members of paramilitary troops.

Armenians from Western Anatolia were deported by rail, avoiding massacres and long marches. All deportees were forced to settle in Syria, mainly in camps situated in the desert. The climate conditions, food and water shortages and diseases killed thousands of them. Several months later, subsequent massacres were committed in eastern Syrian camps, in which thousands of Armenians were killed. At the same time, the Tsar's army – supported by Armenian volunteers – occupied Eastern Anatolia, which was followed by retaliatory massacres of the Muslim population and by many Muslims fleeing to Central Anatolia. The course of the deportations and the fate of the deportees at the local level depended on the behaviour of the Ottoman personnel. Tens of middle- and high-ranking officers and officials treated Armenians in a humanitarian way or resisted the deportations.

These deportations were based on the principle of collective responsibility. The authorities deported a clear majority of Armenians, including from those regions where no military activity had been conducted. The deportation decree passed by the government gave the army the right to crush resistance by any means necessary. Women, children and old people were noticeably overrepresented among the deportees. The deportation was accompanied by a confiscation of Armenian property. Special regulations imposed very serious restrictions on regaining property and compensations. The authorities settled Muslims, mainly refugees, in place of the deported Armenians. Many thousands of Armenians were forced to convert to Islam. Most crimes against Armenians were committed by units which were linked, either directly or indirectly, to the state. The state imposed very lenient penalties on some of those who were guilty of the crimes, and it often used repressions against those officials and officers who had treated Armenians humanely or resisted their deportations. Even historians who do not recognise the deportations as genocide admit that the state treated Armenians during the war much worse (regarding such matters as supplies and protection) than Muslim refugees and the Otto-

man army. Some of them believe that the repressions against Armenians were clearly disproportional to the threat posed by them to the empire. The Ottoman war casualties would have been much smaller if the deportation had not been carried out. The number of Armenian victims killed by Muslims during the war exceeded the number of Turks and Kurds killed by Armenians by many times.

The term 'genocide' has a very wide scope. It is used in international law to define very different crimes, ranging from the Holocaust of the Jews through to the Srebrenica massacre committed by Bosnian Serb forces during the Bosnian War (1992–1995). In the opinion of most historians, researchers of Armenian affairs and experts on genocide (including the author of the term, R. Lemkin), the Armenian deportations and massacres do in fact meet the definition of genocide. Many experts on the history of the Ottoman Empire are of the opposite opinion.

¹ The Empire had also conquered Northern Africa and the Middle East, yet its centres were located in the Balkans and Western Anatolia. An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire 1300–1914, ed. D. Quataert, H. Inalcik, Cambridge 1994.

² In the course of the negotiations, the Turkish side fruitlessly tried to include a provision that would specify the date on which Turkey would be accepted into the EEC, provided that it had satisfied the required conditions. The Community did not want to agree to that, and as a result, article 28 was added to the agreement, which provided that if adequate conditions for Turkey's joining the EEC appeared, then both parties should consider the issue of Turkey's membership.

³ At the same time, Morocco's application was rejected, because the Commission deemed it a non-European state.

⁴ The European Parliament insisted it would ratify the union on condition that Turkey amended its constitution to expand the freedom of associations and trade unions, amended anti-terrorist legal regulations and released Kurdish party MPs from detention. In response to the requirement, the Turkish parliament passed 12 amendments, which convinced Euro-MPs to ratify the customs union. Its scope is broader than that of a typical customs union.

⁵ As a result of the amendments, the death penalty was abolished, the scope of the freedom of speech, gathering and associations was significantly enhanced, the possibility of education and broadcasting in languages other than Turkish was introduced, the legal status of women was improved and the position of the army in the political system was diminished.

⁶ Negotiating Framework, October 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/st20002_en05_TR_frame.doc.pdf

⁷ On the other hand, it has to be admitted that all negotiations are implicitly governed by such a rule.

⁸ Negotiating Framework, *ibid.*

⁹ Vienna claimed it would agree to start negotiations with Turkey on condition that an equivalent decision was taken with regard to Croatia, and insisted that a provision on privileged partnership (special relations) as an alternative to Turkey's membership in the EU should be included in the Negotiating Framework.

¹⁰ This condition was for the first time explicitly stated in the Negotiating Framework. Nevertheless, it was one of the Copenhagen criteria, adopted in 1993, which set the rules of EU membership.

¹¹ The key requirements under the Accession Partnership include guarantee of civilian control over the armed forces, related expenditure and the process of developing the security policy; adopting a 'zero tolerance' policy regarding torture and ill-treatment; ensuring the exercise of the freedom of expression, including freedom of the press; implementation of all reforms covering the freedom of associations and of peaceful assembly; adopting a law which comprehensively addresses all the difficulties faced by non-Muslim religious minorities and communities in line with the relevant European standards; adopting and implementing provisions concerning the exercise of freedom of thought, conscience and religion by all individuals and religious communities (removing the category 'religion' from identity cards and removing

the obligation to attend religion classes), and establishing conditions for the functioning of all religious communities, in line with the practice of member states. This includes legal and judicial protection (*inter alia* through access to legal personality) of the communities, their members and their assets, the teaching, appointing and training of clergy, and the enjoyment of property rights; implementing legislation relating to women's rights, pursuing measures against all forms of violence against women, including crimes committed in the name of honour, establishing shelters for women at risk of violence in all larger municipalities, in line with current legislation, further promotion of the role of women in society, including their education and participation in the labour market and in political and social life, and supporting the development of women's organisations to fulfil these goals; ensuring effective access to radio/TV broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, adopting appropriate measures to support the teaching of languages other than Turkish; abolishing the village guard system in the south-east; improving the economic situation in south-eastern Turkey; pursuing measures to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons to their original settlements, ensuring that those who have suffered loss and damage as a result of the security situation in the southeast are fairly and speedily compensated; implementing fully the Protocol adapting the Ankara Agreement to the accession of the 10 new EU member states including Cyprus; continuation of the efforts to resolve any outstanding border disputes in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes and unequivocally committing to good neighbourly relations, and addressing any sources of friction with neighbours.

Council Decision of 23 January 2006 on the principles and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey, http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=32006D0035&model=guichett

¹² In some countries, the results of surveys conducted at a similar time differed significantly. The results probably varied depending on whether the question regarded only Turkey or all candidates and countries aspiring to the candidate status. The countries which have joined most recently or will soon become EU members (Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania) presented a positive attitude towards Turkey's accession.

¹³ In the *Transatlantic Trends 2005* survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund, in nine countries, the total population of which constituted a majority of EU residents, 35% of respondents said that Turkey as a Muslim country could not become a member of the EU. In the *Eurobarometer 63* survey conducted in spring 2005, 54% of EU residents declared that the cultural differences between Turkey and Europe were too significant to enable Turkey's integration with the EU. 33% were of a different opinion. However, 42% of respondents believed that to a certain extent, Turkey was in historical terms a part of Europe; the same percentage of respondents shared the opposite view. *Eurobarometer 63*, spring 2005, pp. 366 and 369.

¹⁴ Over 4 million people originating from Turkey (Turks and Kurds) currently live in the EU. The most numerous Turkish communities live in Germany, Holland, Belgium, France and

Austria. Higher population growth, migration and the accession of Bulgaria, where 750,000 Turks live, will contribute to increasing the number of the Turkish diaspora in the EU. Members of the Turkish community in the EU predominantly come from poorer, less modernised (with low levels of education) and more conservative regions of Turkey. Over decades, the Turkish diaspora has undergone profound transformations; for example, it has become more liberal than the society in Turkey proper. However, the Turkish community is still more poorly educated, financially poorer and more conservative than European societies. The most serious problem the Turkish diaspora faces is the high unemployment level, which results from the fact that it is a young and worse-educated community. On the other hand, according to the OECD, the education systems in many EU member states do not provide sufficient educational opportunities for students who come from blue-collar workers' families.

¹⁵ The Turks' attitude to the EU has been shown by surveys regularly conducted by the Turkish research centre Pollmark. <http://www.pollmark.com.tr/>

¹⁶ Some cold calculation can also be noticed in Turks' attitude towards the EU. In public opinion polls conducted in autumn 2004 in the four largest cities by the Turkish International Strategic Research Organisation, 35% of respondents (the largest group) indicated EU member states, especially Germany, as ones which Turkey could rely on in case of an emergency (e.g. an earthquake or war). The United States was mentioned in the second place (over 25%). International Strategic Research Organisation, ISRO 2. Foreign Policy Perception, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/survey-tfpps.pdf>

¹⁷ Paradoxically, some respondents who supported this viewpoint declared at the same time a readiness to vote for Turkey's accession to the EU in a hypothetical referendum.

¹⁸ The negative perception of Christians, rooted in the legacy of numerous wars, has strengthened over recent years. In the 1990s, several wars were fought between Muslims and Christians in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Muslims, being the weaker side, sustained much heavier losses. These regions have historical ties with Turkey, and a significant part of Turks come from there.

Recently, the main reasons for this include the US intervention in Iraq in 2003, growing tension in Europe between Muslims and other Europeans after September 11, and tensions in relations between Turkey and the EU. In the Pollmark and Pew Research Centre surveys conducted between 2004 and 2006, the share of respondents' negative opinion on Christians ranged from over 50% to nearly 70%. Pew Global Attitudes Project, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/>

¹⁹ The conservatism of Turkish society is especially strongly manifested through patriarchal family and community behaviour, moral rigour (especially regarding the sexual life of women), a lack of acceptance of any criticism of fundamental religious truths, and the arrangement of marriages. A significant part of marriages in Turkey are still arranged, although these are in a minority now, in contrast to previous generations.

²⁰ The pivotal role of the family in Turkish society's system of values was proven by the *Türkiye'de Muhazakarlık – Aile, Din, Devlet, Bati* surveys conducted in early 2006.

The proofs of the strong position of the family include the proportionally smaller number of divorces, unmarried couples living together, persons living alone, nursing homes, children's homes and kindergartens, as compared to the EU. The family has maintained its great role in social life mainly because of the inefficiency of the state, the high rate of religious practice and the specific social structure (a high share of the population living in villages and small towns).

²¹ In surveys conducted in 2002 by Ali Çarkoğlu and Kemal Kirisci, over 40% of respondents either declared that Turkey did not have a best-friend state in the international arena, or were unable to indicate such a country. Ali Çarkoğlu and Kemal Kirisci, 'The View from Turkey: Perceptions of Greeks and Greek-Turkish Rapprochement by the Turkish Public', in *Greek-Turkish Relations in an Era of Detente*, ed. Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin, London 2005, p. 125.

²² Using double standards by Brussels does not consist in treating Turkey in an especially strict manner, but in excessive leniency in dealing with other countries, which usually fail to satisfy EU standards to a lesser extent than Turkey. Examples of such an approach by the EU:

- very lenient criticism of Greece, which rejects any cultural rights to Macedonians, Roms, Vlachs and Albanians (who do not come from new emigration), and discriminates against religions other than Orthodox Christianity. Ill-treatment and torture are not rare in Greece, and the perpetrators usually go unpunished;

- failure to require from any member or candidate state to determine certain crimes as genocide (e.g. the extermination of between 5 million and 10 million of people at the turn of the twentieth century in the Congo, which was governed at the time by the Belgian King Leopold, and the killings of nearly 300,000 Serbs, Jews and Roms in the fascist Independent State of Croatia, a satellite of Nazi Germany), while at the same time demanding that Turkey call the Armenian massacres committed during World War I genocide;

- Turkey's different treatment compared to other countries which started negotiations before Ankara; the situation does not concern Turkey alone (referendum on every new enlargement in France and the text of the Negotiating Framework);
- proportionally much smaller financial aid from the EU for Turkey in comparison to that offered to the Central European candidates;

- the EU's failure to fulfil some promises (such as the failure to end the isolation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in exchange for support to the Annan Plan, which many EU politicians had promised before the referendum was held in April 2004).

²³ Between 2002 and 2004, the CHP voted in favour of most pro-EU reforms. However, it firmly opposed the government's conciliatory policy on the key issue of Cyprus. In September 2006, the CHP declared it would not support any further amendments to Turkish laws as required by Brussels.

²⁴ Three religious minorities, Jews, Orthodox Christians and Armenians, were treated as an exception.

²⁵ Erik-Jan Zürcher, 'Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish nationalists: identity politics 1908–1938', in *Ottoman past and today's Turkey*, ed. Kemal H. Karpat, Leiden 2000, 150–179.

Ahmet Yildiz, 'Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene' Türk Ulusal Kimliği'nin Etno-Seküler Sınırları (1919–1938), İstanbul 2004.

²⁶ The most vivid example is the leader of the Kurdish separatist movement, Abdullah Öcalan, whose native language is Turkish. It is used, along with Kurdish, by the media which sympathise with the separatists.

²⁷ In 2000, every woman living in south-eastern Turkey, where Kurds are in the great majority, had 5 children on average; the national average was 2.5. Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, Bölgesel İstatistikler <http://www.tuik.gov.tr>

²⁸ In the *Türkiye'de milliyetçilik* survey in spring 2006, nearly 7% of respondents stated they felt they were Kurds first of all. The respondents in the survey were only legally mature people, while Kurdish identity is stronger among young people. In surveys conducted at the same time among people who could vote for the first time, the support for the Kurdish party was higher by 70% as compared to general surveys. Public opinion polls show that a definite majority of the Turkish society identify themselves first as Muslims and citizens of the Republic of Turkey.

'Terörün sonu milliyetçilik', *Radikal*, 6 April 2006, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=183584>

Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924), the major ideologist of the Turkish national philosophy, was of Kurdish origin. Three Turkish presidents have had Kurdish ancestors. Currently, Kurds are present in all state institutions. They are also represented among intellectual elites and business circles.

²⁹ These were fights in defence of autonomy and against secularisation rather than national uprisings.

³⁰ Kemal Kirisci, Gareth Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: an Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict*, London, 1997.

³¹ These relations were brought to light in 1996, when a police officer and a local crime boss who had links with the Grey Wolves ultranationalist organisation were killed in a car accident in Susurluk. Their companion, a Kurdish member of a right-wing party, who was the head of one of the militias, survived. The investigation and trials failed to convict the main suspects.

³² Such factors as the trans-border nature of the Kurdish territories, which are located along the main heroin smuggling route running from Afghanistan to Europe, the family structure and the Kurdish diaspora in Europe contribute to the development of Kurdish organised crime.

³³ Theoretically, Kurdish nationalist candidates could enter the parliament if they sought election as independent candidates.

³⁴ It is worth emphasising that information on fights is currently much more available to public opinion, considering the improvement of the freedom of speech, than it was in the 1990s.

³⁵ Kurdish members of the governing AKP party were especially against this. Some of them voted against the agreement in religious solidarity with the Sunnis, and some in ethnic identification with the Kurds in northern Iraq.

³⁶ Trade exchange has been developing on a mass scale (mainly exports from Turkey) between Turkey and Kurdish northern Iraq since 2003. Turkish investments have also been growing. Numerous construction contracts have been implement-

ed by Turkish firms. Pipelines from oilfields in northern Iraq run through Turkish territories. There is no other country with which Iraqi Kurdistan has such extensive economic ties. Turkey's stance on the political system of Iraq (centralisation), which had been uncompromising at the beginning, has been revised. In 2005, Turkey accepted the federal system of Iraq and established intensive diplomatic relations with Iraqi Kurds. The status of Kirkuk, where rich oilfields are situated and Turkmen supported by Ankara live, is still a disputed issue. According to Turkey, Kirkuk should not be made part of the Kurdish autonomous area. Turkey is afraid that control over them will make Iraqi Kurds more independent of Ankara. According to the Iraqi constitution, a referendum on the status of Kirkuk has to be held by the end of 2007. The lack of precise voting rules (constituency borders and rights to vote) may create tension between Turkey and the Kurds. In the future, Ankara will have to face the challenge of the possible establishment of an independent Kurdistan in the Northern Iraq, which may secede if the civil war in the central part of the country intensifies. Probable support from the USA and Israel for an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq, the self-rule of Iraqi Kurds (who are aware of the negative attitude to Kurdish separatism presented by such stronger countries as Iran, Syria and Turkey), Ankara's need to unite efforts together with Iraqi Kurds against the PKK and the economic dependence of northern Iraq on Turkey may result in good relations being established between Turkey and Kurdistan.

International Crisis Group, 'Iraq: Allaying Turkey's Fears Over Kurdish Ambitions', *Middle East Report* N°35, 26 January 2005, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east__north_africa/iraq_iran_gulf/35_iraq_allaying_turkey_s_fears_over_kurdish_ambitions.pdf

International Crisis Group, 'Iraq and the Kurds: The Brewing Battle over Kirkuk', *Middle East Report* N°56, 18 July 2006, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east__north_africa/iraq_iran_gulf/56_iraq_and_the_kurds__the_brewing_battle_over_kirkuk.pdf

³⁷ The Kurdish population is more patriarchal, conservative, religiously active and fundamentalist than Turks. Kurds are clearly overrepresented in the Islamic terrorist organisations (which are incomparably weaker than the PKK) which were responsible *inter alia* for the Istanbul attacks in November 2003. On the other hand, proportionally more Kurds than Turks are Alevi, these being a more liberal branch of Muslims than Sunnis. Violence against women (including murders) is more common among Kurds than among Turks. The illiteracy rate is higher, and the professional activity of Kurdish women is very low. Compulsory marriages happen more frequently among Kurds than among Turks. They commit incomparably more honour killings. Failure to send girls to school is practiced almost exclusively by Kurds. According to the government's estimates, 25% of girls did not start education in south-eastern Turkey in 2004.

³⁸ South-eastern Turkey follows the Shafii legal school of thought, which is more rigorous than the Hanafi school found in the rest of the country.

³⁹ South-eastern Anatolia is a limited to external influence by its geographical nature, where mountains and desert

predominate, and its unfavourable climate. It has been a peripheral region of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey for centuries.

⁴⁰ Examples of rotten compromises between the state and the pre-modern social structure include alliances with Kurdish tribes in fights against rebels, i.e. village militias, and the co-operation of political parties with the tribal aristocracy (either whole tribes vote for a candidate indicated by the sheik, or the sheik himself is engaged in politics), and the lack of agricultural reform. David MacDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, Oxford 2004, pp. 395–401.

⁴¹ South-eastern Anatolia was much poorer than the Western part of the country even under the Ottoman Empire, and the disparity widened in the twentieth century. Between 1914 and 1928, with some breaks, south-eastern Turkey was the scene of very bitter clashes between the Ottoman and Russian armies, between the Kemalists, the French and the British supported by Armenian and Assyrian guerrilla forces, and then between Turkish troops and Kurdish insurgents. These battles brought death, displacements and migrations of millions of people, and vast economic losses on a scale incomparable to the other regions of Turkey. D. MacDowall, *ibid.*, pp. 21–109.

Nowadays, poverty is a consequence of the large role played by backward agricultural practices and shepherding in the regional economy, the family-based and feudal structure of land ownership (currently, nearly 10% of landowners own almost half of the land), the high rate of population growth, the war against the PKK, which has lasted for more than 20 years and scared away private investors, and insufficient public investments due to the centralisation of the administrative system. Between 1990 and 2001, public investments in this region, which is inhabited by nearly 10% of the country's population, accounted for 7% of the state budget. Between 1994 and 2004, Ankara allocated slightly more than 3% and less than 5% respectively of the public funds designated for investment in those sectors to education and healthcare in this part of the country. It must be added that such unequal distribution of public spending also affects regions of the country inhabited by ethnic Turks. On the other hand, the economic disparities inside Turkish society have been reduced over the whole country during the last decade. Özsel Belevi, 'Regional policy and EU accession: Learning from the GAP experience', *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol.4, no.3 2005, pp 7–8. http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_37.pdf

⁴² The Radio and Television Board imposed time limitations on information, political commentary and educational programmes, and an obligation to use Turkish subtitles in the other programmes. Kurds mainly watch Kurdish channels broadcasting from Europe and Northern Iraq. Turkish authorities have made attempts to block broadcasting by stations linked to the PKK.

⁴³ Zihni Erdem, 'Kürtçe yayında sınırlar kalkıyor', *Radikal*, 16 June 2006, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haber-no=189892>

Courses could be held only on weekends. Age limitations were imposed in order to exclude a significant part of young

people. A non-Turkish language could not be the language of instruction.

⁴⁴ The main reasons for the closures were rigorous regulations on opening courses, high prices, illiteracy, many Kurds' assimilation into Turkish culture, and the lack of support by Kurdish nationalists, who believed the courses were an insufficient concession by the government.

⁴⁵ More roads were built in south-eastern Turkey over a period of two and a half years (2003–2005) than in the entire period between 1923 and 2002.

⁴⁶ 216,000 applications were submitted by September 2006. The authorities responded positively to 33,000 of them. European Commission, *Turkey 2006 Progress Report*, p. 21.

⁴⁷ In August 2005, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated during his visit to the south-east that the Kurdish problem did exist, it had to be resolved through further democratisation, and that the state had made numerous mistakes with regard to the Kurds. In his subsequent speeches, Prime Minister Erdogan said that Turkey was an ethnic mosaic and proposed America as a model to be followed. According to the prime minister, residents of Turkey shared a 'higher' political identity (as citizens of the republic), as part of which various 'lower' value-related and ethnic identities operated, including the two major ones, Turkish and Kurdish. In response to allegations that he was pushing Turkey closer towards a Yugoslavian scenario, Prime Minister Erdogan replied that the residents of Turkey shared a common religion, which was the strongest substance cementing the ethnic mosaic together. Erdogan was again criticised for emphasising the role of religion. These declarations by Prime Minister Erdogan have failed to produce constitutional changes. Erhan Selen, 'Kürt sorunu benim sorunum', *Yeni Safak*, 13 August 2006, <http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2005/agustos/13/p01.html>

⁴⁸ In a survey conducted by the Turkish public opinion polling centre Pollmark at the end of 2003, 58% of respondents declared they were against using Kurdish as the language of instruction at schools (31% were for). The percentage of respondents opposing Kurdish-language courses was only slightly smaller. Nearly 50% of respondents displayed a negative attitude (40% were in favour) towards Kurdish broadcasts in the media. The polls showed very clear differences of opinion between Turks and Kurds (who showed great support). In a survey conducted in mid-2004, over 46% of residents of Turkey declared a positive attitude to programmes in Kurdish broadcast by public television. However, nearly 45%, including a majority of ethnic Turks, were of the opposite opinion. Pollmark, <http://www.pollmark.com.tr/arastirmalar>.

⁴⁹ In the Pollmark survey conducted in mid-2004, over 60% of Turks declared they did not think Kurdish TV programmes posed a threat to the state integrity, and nearly 30% of respondents claimed the reverse. In spring 2005, following the riots during Nevruz, which is the most important holiday for Kurds, over 30% of respondents stated the riots had been sparked due to excessive democratisation, while a majority of respondents were of the opposite opinion. Pollmark, *Ibid.*

On the other hand, in the survey conducted by the KONDA centre in October 2006, 80% of respondents stated that combating terrorism was the only way to resolve the Kurdish issue. Two-thirds did not agree with the opinion that treating Kurds differently from other citizens was a cause of the conflict with the PKK, and 75% believed that the war in the south-east was an effect of the Kurds' desire to set up their own state.

'Kürt sorunu yabancı kiskirtmisi', *Milliyet*, 24 March 2006. <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/03/24/guncel/agun.html>

⁵⁰ Martin van Bruinessen, Transnational aspects of the Kurdish question, 2000, http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/transnational_Kurds.htm

⁵¹ The maximum imaginable concessions by Turkish authorities, to be implemented against the will of most of society and realised over a certain time span – extracurricular Kurdish lessons at schools, liberalising the rules of broadcasting Kurdish information and educational programmes, lowering the election threshold to the level of 5%, and amnesty for all excluding the PKK's leaders – may still be insufficient for Kurdish nationalists, who want Kurdish to be recognised as the second official language, to be used to the same extent as Turkish in the media, schools & offices, and who demand deep decentralisation. Another problem is the support expressed by many DTP leaders and junior party members for amnesty for Öcalan and for recognising the PKK, as the IRA was in Britain, as a partner in negotiations covering the status of Kurds. İhsan D. Dagi, 'Kürtler ne istiyor?', *Zaman*, 31 March 2006, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/?hn=271416&bl=yorumlar&trh=20060331>

⁵² Many PKK fighters, who have been engaged in military activity for years, do not recognise any other methods than violence. The Kurdish terrorist organisation called the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK), which chooses uncompromising struggle using any possible means, has been operating for more than two years now. A part of the army, which is interested in preserving the *status quo* and continuing the hard-line approach on Kurds, are ready to fight them using terrorist methods. In early November 2005 a bombing happened in the town of Semdinli. The bombers appeared to be officers of the military gendarmerie wearing civilian clothes. They were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment in June 2006. According to many commentators, those who had ordered the bombing remained unpunished because they had higher positions in the hierarchy. 'Susurluk Semdinli'de', *Radikal*, 11 November 2005, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=169672>

⁵³ Regardless of the PKK's defeat in 1999, the ethnically Kurdish party is today much more popular than it was ten years ago. In the 1990s, Kurdish nationalism became stronger, especially among young people. Judging from previous historical developments, further urbanisation, the change of the status of Kurds in Iraq and progress in education will reinforce Kurdish identity in Turkey. The development of Kurdish nationalism does not necessarily mean only negative consequences for Turkey, since its secular nature contributes to the emancipation of women and the weakening of social conservatism.

⁵⁴ Apart from the DTP, which maintains contacts with the PKK, other Kurdish political forces are weak and are often intimidated by radicals (by means of assassinations).

⁵⁵ The *de facto* independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq is used as a model by Turkish Kurds and as a base for the PKK. Its existence adversely affects the readiness of the Turkish side to conduct reforms for fear of escalating Kurdish demands.

⁵⁶ The declaration of halt military actions was made by the PKK on 1 October 2006 under pressure from the USA and the Iraqi Kurds. The latter probably see this move as an encouragement for Turkey to accept a referendum on the status of Kirkuk.

⁵⁷ According to IHD statistical data, in 2003 not a single case of ill-treatment and tortures was reported in nearly 65% of the administration units (*il*). The remaining 35% cover big cities (Adana, Ankara, Bursa, Izmir, Konya and Istanbul) and the south-eastern part of the country. The great majority of the victims were individuals of Kurdish origin. İnsan Hakları Derneği (IHD), <http://www.ihd.org.tr>

⁵⁸ Turkish human rights organisations present different data on the violation of these rights.

⁵⁹ In 2003, over a third of the cases were beatings. IHD, *ibid*.

⁶⁰ Obviously, not all cases of using tortures and ill-treatment are registered by human rights organisations. However, they admit that the number of victims who have asked them for help has significantly increased.

⁶¹ Some of those sentenced were punished just for participating in demonstrations, and some for assaults against policemen and acts of vandalism.

⁶² Hundreds were detained after the riots. Many of them were tortured and ill-treated.

⁶³ In some cases similar sentences, considering the tightening of antiterrorist laws in Europe, could also have been imposed by courts in some EU member states.

⁶⁴ European Commission, Turkey, 2005 Progress Report, November 2005, p.15.

⁶⁵ The prime minister declared in autumn 2006 that this article could be amended. However, AKP politicians are afraid that this decision could lead to a drop in support from the nationalist part of their electorate.

⁶⁶ The law authorises the police to use arms without hesitation during an antiterrorist operation in the situation when the person pursued does not react to the request for surrender and is ready to use a weapon. Public prosecutors have been given the right to notify only the closest family of the person suspected of terrorism of their detention. According to the law, the suspect detained on charges of terrorism can have only one defence counsel. The court may impose a 24-hour ban on the detainee's contacts with the lawyer. However, the police and prosecution authorities cannot interrogate the suspect over the duration of the ban. 'Mahkemeye gidecek: Terör yasasına 'serhli' onay', *Radikal*, 18 July 2006, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=193223>

⁶⁷ Provisions under article 301 provide for a less rigorous interpretation. Clause 3 states that if the goal of the statement is criticism, such a statement shall not be punished. The surveys Türkiye'de İnsan Hakları ve İfade Özgürlüğü conducted by Metin Toprak and İhsan Dagi in late 2002 showed

that judges were less liberal regarding human rights and tend to notice fewer human rights violations than the rest of society. Baskin Oran, 'Bu kafayla AB gerçekten zor', *Radikal*, 2 July 2003, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=80055>

Hukukçu Birliği (the Union of Lawyers), led by Kemal Kerinçsiz, is an organisation which very often brings suits 'in defence of Turkishness'.

⁶⁸ '7 milyon Türk dernek üyesi', *Radikal*, 26 October 2006. <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=202655>

⁶⁹ The opinion that the key weaknesses of the non-governmental organisations in Turkey are their fragmentation, heterogeneity and elitism stated by C. Rumford in 2002 is still relevant. C. Rumford, 'Placing Democratisation within the Global Frame: Sociological Approaches to Universalism and Democratic Contestation in Contemporary Turkey', *Sociological Review*, vol. 50, no. 2, 2002, p. 273.

⁷⁰ This model subordinating religious structures to secular authorities originates from the Byzantine and Ottoman traditions.

⁷¹ In the survey conducted by Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalayıcıoğlu *Türkiye'de Sosyal Tercihler Arastirmasi* in June 2006, more than half of Turks supported replacing the obligatory religion lessons with extracurricular classes. Pinar Aktas, 'Türkiye saga kaydi', *Milliyet*, 14 June 2006. <http://www.milliyet.com/2006/06/14/guncel/agun.html>

⁷² In Turkey also live several hundred thousand Shia Twelvers and followers of the other non-Sunni varieties of Islam (such as the Alawi), whose status is identical to that of the Alevis.

⁷³ In June 2006, the local government in a district of Istanbul for the first time recognised the *cemevi* as a place of religious worship, and granted land for building the temple to a local association of Alevis.

⁷⁴ Before 2006, Alevis brought suits against the state to the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, accusing the government of violating human rights through the obligatory classes in 'religious culture and ethics', which did not present the rules of Alevism. Some suits have been brought by secular circles, who generally oppose the obligatory nature of this school subject.

⁷⁵ The authorities claim that these privileges are based on the Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923. However, Turkey has failed to meet its provisions because the treaty provides for guaranteeing cultural and religious rights to all non-Muslims. Otmar Oehring, 'Human Rights in Turkey-Secularism = Religious Freedom', http://www.missio-aachen.de/Images/MR%20T%C3%BCrkei%20englisch_tcm14-11238.pdf

⁷⁶ Roman Catholics and members of Protestant churches do not have their own religious community foundations; they have only private foundations.

⁷⁷ Non-Muslim clergymen have been deprived of the possibility of religious education in Turkey since 1971. The Turkish government emphasises that it is necessary to find a solution that will include the possible education of priests in the general system of higher education, so as to avoid setting the precedent of separate religious educational institutions. Pursuant to Turkish law, priests of all religions, with the ex-

ception of Roman Catholicism and some branches of the Protestant Church, must have Turkish citizenship. Although Turkish law allows missionaries to conduct their activity, they still encounter many administrative problems. Currently, over 1,100 missionaries operate in Turkey. US Department of State, 'International Religious Freedom Report 2005, Turkey', <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51586.htm>

⁷⁸ In spring 2005, Diyanet prepared an exhortation for imams which attacked missionaries for their alleged connections with foreign powers and their desire to 'take possession of young Turks' souls', and published a book which stated that Christian missionaries (unlike Muslims, who limit themselves to explaining the principles of Islam) use all possible methods, including violence, in their proselytising activity. US Department of State, *ibid*.

⁷⁹ Public opinion polls indicate that most of society shares a negative opinion on non-Muslims, although they accept their right to religious practice. However, they are in favour of curtailing proselytising activity (see in Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalayıcıoğlu, *Türkiye'de Sosyal Tercihler Arastirmasi*). Pinar Aktas, 'Türkiye saga kaydi', *Milliyet*, 14 June 2006. <http://www.milliyet.com/2006/06/14/guncel/agun.html> Public dislike of missionaries has historical roots. Many nineteenth-century missionaries represented the interests of foreign powers and minorities.

⁸⁰ In January 2004, the Minorities Subcommittee, which monitored minorities' activity, was liquidated. The state has legalised several Protestant associations and temples over recent years. In 2004, the authorities accepted nominations of Greek citizens to the council of patriarchs supervised by the Patriarch of Constantinople. Until then, Turkish authorities had not agreed to foreigners performing religious functions, with the exception of the Roman Catholic Church and religious communities linked to diplomatic agencies. In mid-2005, non-Muslim places of worship received the same rights as mosques regarding the usage of water, power supplies, etc.

⁸¹ Foundations will be able to open branches abroad. Foreigners will be allowed to establish foundations and hold executive posts in them. Foundations will have right to receive foreign aid. Religious minorities are dissatisfied with the imposition of the 18-month deadline for submitting applications to regain real property, and with the failure to unambiguously determine the status of real estate which has been bought from the state by third parties.

⁸² In the survey conducted in 2002 by E&G, nearly 67% of respondents stated that the person whose opinion was most important at home was the husband, 27% both spouses, and less than 6% that of the wife. The poll also revealed significant regional differences between the Western part of the country and the more patriarchal East. 'Ege erkegi light, Karadeniz maço', *Radikal*, 11 September 2002. http://www.radikal.com.tr/veriler/2002/09/11/haber_49517.php

⁸³ On the other hand, the declared conservative perception of women's sexuality differs from the social reality, which is proven by the fact that the average age of female sexual initiation is lower than the average age of marriage.

⁸⁴ In 2000, 19% of women and 6% of men were illiterate. In the 2003–2004 school year, girls accounted for 43% of secondary-school pupils and nearly 42% of university students.

In 1990, the number of female secondary-school pupils corresponded to 65% of male pupils, and in 2003 the proportion rose to 74%. In 1990, the number of female university students was equal to 53% of males; in 2003 it was 74%. The most extreme difference between the EU countries and Turkey is that every year nearly 10% of girls are not sent to school by their parents, almost exclusively in the south-eastern part of Turkey, which is inhabited by Kurds. *Toplumsal cinsiyet göstergeleri*, pp. 18–20; <http://www.kssgm.gov.tr/toplumsal-cinsiyet.pdf>

⁸⁵ In the surveys conducted in 2004 by Binnaz Toprak and Ersin Kalayicoglu Is Yasami, *Üst Yönetim ve Siyasette Kadın*, nearly 20% of non-working women stated they did not work because their husbands did not allow them to.

⁸⁶ According to data from the Turkish State Institute of Statistics (DİE), in 2000 women constituted 32% of economists, 28% of legal sector workers and 27% of financial consultants and accountants, over 25% of professors and nearly a third of PhDs. *Toplumsal cinsiyet göstergeleri*, p. 8. <http://www.kssgm.gov.tr/toplumsal-cinsiyet.pdf>

⁸⁷ Women constitute only 0.5% of mayors and 2.4% of councillors at the community (*ilçe*) level, and 1.8% at the province (*il*) level.

⁸⁸ In 2001, women constituted 18% of judges and public prosecutors. In 2002, they accounted for nearly 21% of medium- and higher-level state administration officials, including 5% of undersecretaries, 17% of heads of government agendas, 7% of directors general and 13% of deputy directors general. *Ibid.*, pp. 9–11. It must be added that women's representation has been slowly, albeit consistently, growing in the parliament and local governments.

⁸⁹ According to the survey conducted in March 2003 by the Human Rights Centre of Bilgi University, over 30% of women stated their husbands had used physical violence against them. 'Dayak kadının alin yazisidir', NTV, 8 March 2003, <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/207773.asp>. It is worth adding that the survey has demonstrated a link between violence against women and low education level.

⁹⁰ According to statistical data from the Human Rights Association (İHD), 44 women were victims of honour killings and 116 women were killed by a family member in 2005. There were 30 suicides by women, often committed under family pressure. Imposing stricter penalties for honour killings has caused a significant increase in the number of suicides by women forced by their families. 79 suicides by women, 38 honour killings and 126 murders committed by family members were reported in 2006. <http://www.ihd.org.tr> The number of suicides committed in Turkey is much lower than the European mean. On the other hand, the number of male suicides in Turkey is slightly smaller than that of female suicides, whereas in Europe women commit suicides much more rarely than men do.

⁹¹ Such double standards mean that marital infidelity is frequent in Turkish families (this mainly concerns husbands), which indirectly contradicts the desire to maintain the status of the family as the most important social institution. In the Global Sex Survey 2005, nearly 60% of Turks (women and men) stated they had had extramarital sex. This was the highest result (much higher than in 'libertarian' Western

countries) among the 41 states surveyed. The vast majority of them were men. At the same time, a great majority of Turks condemn marital infidelity, and a significant part of them support its penalisation.

⁹² The amendments to the civil code adopted in November 2001 abolished the provisions which stated that the man was the head of the family and consequently its legal representative, which gave him the right to decide the place of residence, among other matters, and required that both spouses had to grant mutual consent in case one of them sought employment. The new code also determined that the unpaid housework done by women constituted their financial contribution to the family budget, and in effect granted women equal rights to property acquired after marriage, the ownership title to which was held by one of the spouses. In the previous code, individual ownership title had been given priority.

In July 2004, the parliament voted for a law which imposed an obligation on each municipality with a population exceeding 50,000 to establish a shelter for women exposed to domestic violence.

The new criminal code imposed penalisation of rape in marriage, imprisonment for holding medical virginity tests without a court's consent and penalties for sexual harassment at work. It abolished regulations discriminating against unmarried women and the article which made avoiding a penalty for rape possible if the rapist and the victim got married. The code also abolished the general rule of applying mitigating circumstances in the case of murders committed in the name of honour against women who were accused by their families of bringing disgrace on them (although it provided for the possibility of making exceptions from this rule by imposing the obligation on the court to consider the individual context of each murder), and included a new provision that murders 'in the name of custom' should be punished by stricter penalties than ordinary murders. Women for Women's Human Rights, <http://www.wwhr.org>

⁹³ For example, although the number of shelters for female victims of home violence grew between 2004 and 2006, their quantity is still much lower than necessary.

⁹⁴ In autumn 2005, a division of the Supreme Court applied the definition of murder 'in the name of custom' only to murders decided by family councils. According to the court, in the case of a murder of a woman by a man it is possible to apply the principle of mitigating circumstances (a crime of passion). On the other hand, strict sentences imposed in cases of honour killings in 2006 prove that judges have ceased treating the defence of honour as a mitigating circumstance.

⁹⁵ The AKP, proportionally, has half as many female MPs than the opposition left-wing CHP. In the internal AKP elections held in March 2006, contrary to the prime minister's pressure to guarantee 30% of representation by women, only 10% of places in the decision-making structures of the party at the level of municipalities were won by female candidates. As few as 5 women are among the 850 party heads at the municipality level.

'AKP'de kadınlar liste disi kaldı', *Milliyet*, 28 March 2006, <http://www.milliyet.com/2006/03/28/siyaset/siy05.html>

⁹⁶ The position of the army in the Turkish political system is sometimes overrated. Turkish politicians are often said to be totally subordinated to military officers. However, strong politicians have been able to successfully implement policies against the wishes of the army. The late President Turgut Özal pushed through his nomination of a candidate to the position of the chief of staff, although he resigned some time later in protest against the president's foreign policy.

⁹⁷ In October 2001, as part of the 'National Programme', the Turkish parliament adopted amendments which introduced an equal number of civilians and military officers onto the National Security Council, and abolished the provisions which had determined opinions presented by the Council as binding. In 2003, representatives of the council were removed from other public institutions. In July 2003, the power to choose the secretary was taken from the general chief of staff and granted to the prime minister (proposing a candidate) and the president (approval). In August 2004, the council was chaired by a civilian. In October 2006, the parliament adopted amendments to the act on military courts, which deprived them of the possibility to try civilians.

David Greenwood, 'Turkish Civil-Military Relations and the EU: Preparation for Continuing Convergence', November 2005, Centre for European Security Studies, Istanbul Policy Centre, pp. 8–10. <http://www.cess.org/publications/occasional/pdfs/occasional3.pdf>

⁹⁸ In May 2004, one of the amendments to the constitution removed the provision which excluded defence expenses from control of the Audit Court. It came into force in September 2006. A public finance law was introduced in December 2003 which included the Foundation of Turkish Armed Forces and the Arms Industry Support Fund in the defence minister's budget. The law came into force in January 2005. Both institutions are to be liquidated by 31 December 2007. *Ibid.*, 32–35.

⁹⁹ The most important report is *Almanak Türkiye, Güvenlik Sektörü ve Demokratik Gözetim*, published in summer 2006 by the TESEV foundation. <http://www.tesev.org.tr>. It was sharply criticised by the generals.

¹⁰⁰ The main Islamic terrorist organisations are Hizbullah and the Great Eastern Islamic Raiders' Front (IBDA-C). They are responsible for tens of deaths. Numerous detentions have very seriously undermined their combat capacity. According to surveys conducted by the Pew Research Centre between 2002 and 2006, between 20% and 25% Turks believed that in certain situations, killing civilians in defence of Islam was justified (such as suicide attacks), and nearly 10% said it was justified only in exceptional situations. The same surveys indicated that confidence in Osama bin Laden was at the very low level. Pew Global Attitudes Project, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/> Another survey, *Degisen Türkiye'de Din Toplum va Sigaset*, conducted in 2006, showed that less than 10% of Turks supported suicide attacks against civilians.

¹⁰¹ 14 *imam hatip* schools with less than 900 pupils existed in 1952. Over 1,200 such schools, attended by over 500,000 pupils, i.e. nearly 10% of all middle and secondary school pupils in Turkey, were operating in 1996. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, Oxford 2003, pp. 122–129. In the survey by Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalayıcıoğlu, *Tür-*

kiye'de Sosyal Tercihler Arastirmasi, published in June 2006, almost half of Turks stated they had considered sending their child to an imam hatip.

¹⁰² In June 2004, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan suggested a compromise solution offering private universities the right to decide on whether their female students could wear headscarves. University teachers, supported by the army, responded negatively to the proposal.

In December 2003, the AKP government suggested introducing regulations to facilitate the opening of Koran courses. The government gave up this idea under pressure from the army. However, the authorities extended the duration of the courses from three to five days a week. In February 2005, the State Council deemed that regulation illegal, and applied to the Constitutional Court for the possibility to eliminate holding summer and weekend Koran courses for younger pupils as being contrary to the constitution. The application was granted by the Constitutional Court.

In May 2004, the AKP voted for abolishing the scoring system used in university entry examinations, which seriously reduced the chance of *imam hatip* graduates' enrolling to other departments than theology. The amendments were vetoed by President Ahmet Sezer. The government decided it would not repeat the vote on them. In December 2005, the education ministry passed a decree which enabled transfers of pupils from vocational secondary schools, including *imam hatips*, to general education secondary schools, and in effect omitting the high thresholds at university examinations for graduates of vocational secondary schools. Facilitations for *imam hatip* secondary school pupils were especially favourable. However, the State Council deemed that decree unconstitutional in February 2006. Ahmet T. Kuru, 'Reinterpretation of Secularism in Turkey', in *The Emergence of a New Turkey*, ed. Hakan Yavuz, Salt Lake City 2006, pp. 136–159.

¹⁰³ After the AKP came to power, the prices of alcoholic beverages, rose, especially of wine. In November 2005, the AKP government adopted a decree which enabled local governments to limit alcohol consumption through setting special zones for holders of licences to sell alcohol. The State Council deemed the decree illegal in April 2006.

In September 2004, as part of work on the new criminal code, the government suggested amending the articles on the penalisation of adultery, which had not been applied under Constitutional Court awards as of 1996 and 1998. The old code provided for the possibility of prosecuting adultery *ex officio*. The amendment only authorised spouses to bring such charges. The government, under pressure from the secular establishment and the EU, gave up the introduction of this amendment to the new code.

Many commentators believed that the arrest of the president of Van University in April 2005 on charges of heading a criminal group responsible for corruption and embezzlements was a kind of revenge by the government on secular circles. The matter was discontinued following the lengthy detention of the university president.

¹⁰⁴ The constitution of Turkey gives the president the right to nominate judges to the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and the State Council. The AKP has been interested in amending the constitution so that it would authorise the

parliament to nominate a part of judges to the most important Constitutional Court. However, to do that, the AKP would have to get support from two-thirds of MPs (including the opposition) and also convince the generals to accept the amendment.

¹⁰⁵ The parliament of Cyprus adopted the resolution on the genocide in 1982, 22 years before the country joined the EU.

¹⁰⁶ All the declarations are very brief and fail to take into account Muslim victims. The statements of reasons for the declarations often uncritically present the Armenian outlook on the course of events during World War I.

¹⁰⁷ One example of the inconsistency of the votes by parliaments of European countries which Turkey has mentioned is the failure to recognise as genocide the ruthless exploitation of Congo (Kinshasa) by the administration of the Belgian King Leopold at the turn of the twentieth century, which was accompanied by large-scale massacres. The policy claimed the lives of between 5 and 10 million victims. Turkey also reproaches the West for failing to adopt resolutions to recognise the massacres and ethnic cleansing of Muslims from the Caucasus by Tsarist Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century as genocide.

¹⁰⁸ A classic publication as part of the 'anti-official' trend is the book by Taner Akçam, *Türk Ulusal Kimliği ve Ermeni Sorunu*, Istanbul 2001.

¹⁰⁹ Since that time more conferences have been held in Turkey where researchers, including Armenians, who believe that the 1915 events were a case of genocide have been able to present their point of view. However, most of the speakers have supported the official version promulgated by the Turkish government. One of the faults of the September 2005 conference was that researchers representing the opposite point of view were not invited. It is worth adding that some differences of views on the course of those events and of the putative Turkish responsibility for the crimes, can be noticed among Turkish researchers who do not recognise the deportations and massacres as genocide.

¹¹⁰ *Türkiye Gündemi Arastırması*, March 2005, p. 96. http://www.pollmark.com.tr/arastirmalar/gundem/Pollmark_TGA_Mart2005.pdf

¹¹¹ The fact that the book by G. Levy, *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey*, has won awards and has been promoted by Turkish embassies, proves that the Turkish official standpoint has evolved somewhat. The author does not recognise the deportations and massacres as genocide in terms of international law. Instead, he declares a readiness to use the word in the moral meaning (as a slaughter, a massacre). He also believes, in contrast to the official standpoint, that the Turkish repressions against Armenians were unjustified. He rejects the arguments of the civil war and the similar responsibility of both sides for the crimes. According to Levy, nearly 650,000 Armenians were killed during the war, twice as many as claimed in Turkish textbooks.

¹¹² The trial of the Turkish journalist (of Armenian origin) Hrant Dink, who received a suspended sentence of imprisonment for spreading an opinion on Turkish-Armenian relations which was not directly linked to the genocide issue, was an exception.

¹¹³ Turkey closed the border in response to Armenia's engagement in the conflict between Azeri citizens of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

¹¹⁴ The occupation is a consequence of the armed secession of Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian autonomous region which is an enclave inside Azerbaijan. The secession would not have been possible without the strong support offered by Armenia, the Armenian diaspora and Russia. The demand to make Nagorno-Karabakh a part of Armenia, which arose in 1987-8, was not made in response to any threat by Azerbaijan to limit the province's autonomy. During the war, which was fought between 1991 and 1994, Armenians occupied 7% of Azerbaijan's territory located outside the province's borders. 11,000 Azeris and 6,000 Armenians were killed in the war. 750,000 Azeris and 350,000 Armenians have been displaced. Officially, Armenia does not recognise the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. However, it is in fact a part of Armenia and is bound by strong political, military and economic ties with it. Thomas de Waal, *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War*, New York 2004.

¹¹⁵ The Armenian diaspora is proportionally the second largest in the world, after that of the Jewish people. As a consequence of its economic position, it has strong influence in some countries (e.g. USA, France and Russia).

¹¹⁶ The continuity between the Young Turks regime and the Republic of Turkey is a complex issue. On the one hand, Kemal Atatürk represented a different ideology than the Young Turks, and believed that the state founded by him was a totally new entity; he was even ready to recognise the crimes committed against Armenians. On the other hand, Kemalism did to a certain extent originate from the Young Turks movement, and some of the activists responsible for the Armenian massacres were offered high positions in Turkey. This issue has been investigated into by the Turkish historian Taner Akçam, who recognises the deportations as genocide. See T. Akçam, 'Sevr ve Lozan'nin Baska Tarihi', *Türkiye'de Etnik Catisma*, ed. Erik Jan Zürcher, Istanbul 2005, pp. 51-88.

¹¹⁷ Turkey wants Armenia to officially recognise the Kars Treaty, which was concluded by Turkey and Soviet Russia in 1921. The treaty delimited the present border between Turkey and Armenia. The Armenian government answers that the present Armenian state, being a successor to Soviet Armenia, recognises all the treaties concluded by its predecessor, and there is no need to make a special declaration. Ruzanna Khachatryan, a journalist in the Armenian section of Radio Free Europe, has stated that 'at the same time, Armenian authorities regularly reject Turkish demands to declare that Armenia will never make any territorial claims regarding areas currently located in eastern Turkey.' Armenia's president Robert Kocharian has stated, 'the issue of genocide recognition is on our agenda today. Any ensuing legal consequences of such recognition will be a task for future presidents and politicians.' Some Armenian politicians emphasise that the Kars Treaty was dictated to Armenia against the country's will, which challenges its legal status. Ruzanna Khachatryan, 'Dashnaks Insists on Territorial Claims to Turkey', 27 January 2006, <http://www.armenialiberty.org/>

armeniareport/report/en/2006/01/8a45c245-31e3-4ad2-ad80-8aee76832e8b.asp

Emil Danielyan, 'Turks Renew calls for Armenian Genocide Study', 13 April 2006, a4d65118d462.asp

¹¹⁸ Nationalist circles prevented an agreement which the moderate presidents, Turgut Özal of Turkey and Levon Ter-Petrosian of Armenia, had wanted to sign in the 1990s.

¹¹⁹ The common survey conducted in 2005 by the Turkish foundation TESEV and the Armenian centre HASA showed that 45% of Armenians did not want to have a Turk as a neighbour, and almost the same number would not like to work with a Turk. 67% would refuse medical care provided by a Turkish doctor, and 93% would not like their son to marry a Turkish woman. Analogous answers from Turkish respondents on Armenians showed results at the level of 25% in the first two categories and 63% in the latter category. Ferhat Kentel, Gevorg Poghosyan, Ermenistan ve Türkiye Vatandaşları Karsılıklı Algılama ve Diyalog Raporu, İstanbul 2005, p. 37, http://www.tesev.org.tr/etkinlik/Turk_ermen_i_raporu.pdf

In a Pollmark survey held in spring 2005, 30% of Turks declared themselves opponents of Armenians. Pollmark, <http://www.pollmark.com.tr/arastirmalar/>

¹²⁰ According to official statistical data, trade exchange between Turkey and Armenia in 2004 reached the level of nearly US\$47 million (over 2% of Armenia's trade exchange). Unofficially, the trade balance is close to US\$100 million, considering exchange via third countries. The local governments of South-Eastern Turkey support opening up the border with Armenia, as they are interested in developing trade. Nearly 37,000 Armenians visited Turkey in 2005. It is estimated that approximately 40,000 Armenians (nearly 1% of the population of Armenia) work, mostly illegally, in Turkey. The estimated number of their families is 30,000. Turkish Airlines has operated a link between Yerevan and İstanbul since autumn 2004, with frequent flights available. Foreign Trade of The Republic of Armenia 2004, http://www.armstat.am/Publications/2005/trade_2n/indexeng.html

¹²¹ In March 2005, Turkey suggested establishing a Turkish-Armenian historical commission to investigate the sequence of events of the Armenian deportations. The prime minister declared his readiness to accept all its findings. Armenia rejected the proposal, and suggested that an intergovernmental commission should be created instead to resolve current issues. Turkish and Armenian historians are highly unlikely to reach an agreement on the evaluation of the crimes committed against Armenians during World War I. Attempts to develop a common standpoint by the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission, which operated between 2001 & 2004 and consisted of political scientists and ex-diplomats, ended in failure.

¹²² In Turkey, the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 is seen as an act of self-defence in the process of Muslim massacres and displacements from territories of the Ottoman Empire which were conquered by Christians since the end of the 17th century.

¹²³ During the centuries-long Turkish expansion in Anatolia and the Balkans, military actions, hunger and diseases claimed the lives of many thousands of Greeks. Ottoman rule

caused major changes in the ethnic and religious structures of these regions as a consequence of Turkish colonisation, Islamisation, and the assimilation of the Greek population into the Turkish language and migrations. In the Islamic state, Christian Greeks became second-class subjects (they were forced to pay higher tax rates, banned from having guns (with numerous exceptions), banned from proselytising to Muslims, treated unequally by the law, and subject to restrictions concerning building churches and their way of dressing, among other measures). On the other hand, the 'infidels' in the Ottoman Empire were treated much better than those in Western Europe before the Enlightenment. The Orthodox Church received a guarantee of its legal status (extensive fiscal and administrative powers). Numerous Greek islands and highland regions were given autonomy or other privileges. Greeks had a dominant position in the Empire's economy and held important posts in the state administration (diplomacy and finance). (Before the early seventeenth century, a significant part of the Ottoman army consisted of Christian soldiers, including Greeks.) Until the end of the seventeenth century, the security level in the Ottoman Empire's lands (which then covered more of the Balkans than Anatolia) was much higher than in the pre-Ottoman period, or in then Western Europe. Moreover, the social and property status of peasants significantly improved after the Ottoman conquest, and was better than in many regions of Europe. The population of the Balkans and Anatolia grew as a result. The Empire's internal problems, which had been deepening from the late seventeenth century, caused a worsening of Greeks' situation (abuses by the local administrations, growing taxes, strengthening control of Muslim nobles over peasants and the activity of robber gangs). As a consequence, uprisings had become more frequent among the Greek population, who sought foreign support. Modern Greece emerged as an outcome of the largest anti-Ottoman uprising (1821–1829). Until the 1920s, the main goal of the Greek policy was the *Megali Idea* (Great Idea), i.e. the reconstruction of the Byzantine Empire by expanding their territories at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, including areas which at that time were predominantly inhabited by Muslims. J. Dalegre, *Grecs et Ottomans 1453–1923*. Paris 2002.

¹²⁴ R. Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge 2002.

¹²⁵ Cyprus has been inhabited predominantly by Greek people from antiquity to modern times. In 1571, when Cyprus was conquered by the Ottoman Empire, the process of Turkish immigration and Islamisation, and consequently the assimilation of part of the Greek population to the Turkish ethnicity began. Before the British took control of the island in 1978, the Muslim population was more numerous than it is today.

¹²⁶ The Turkish population used to live scattered around the whole island. There were larger Turkish enclaves in some regions.

¹²⁷ Violence was used much more frequently against Turks. 30,000 Turks were driven out or escaped from ethnically mixed regions to more homogenous ones. In effect, a system of *de facto* autonomous Turkish enclaves emerged. Tensions in the island caused tens of thousands of Greeks to leave

Turkey (such as the pogrom in Istanbul) and thousands of Turks left Greece after 1955. In effect, the Greek minority in Turkey was radically reduced, and the size of the Turkish minority in Greece decreased significantly.

H. Ibrahim Salih, *Cyprus Ethnic Political Counterpoints*, Lanham 2004, pp. 8–15.

W. Mallinson, *A Modern History of Cyprus*, London 2005, pp. 26–27., pp. 39–41.

¹²⁸ The Turkish intervention caused the collapse of the nationalist regime and led to Cypriot-Turkish talks on the political system of the state. Turkey set forth an ultimatum requiring the creation of either a federation or 6 Turkish cantons (either of which was to cover 34% of the island's territory). The new Cyprus government failed to provide an answer by the set deadline, which was very short, and the Turkish army resumed the offensive. N. Tocci, T. Kovziridze, *Cyprus*, <http://www.ecmi.de/jemie/download/1-2004Chapter2.pdf>

¹²⁹ Over 160,000 Greeks were driven out, escaped or emigrated from the north, and 70,000 Turks did so from the south during the fighting and over the next few years. Migration which was not forced by direct pressure happened more frequently in the case of Turks than among Greeks.

¹³⁰ Serious demographical changes have taken place in the KKTC over the period of more than 30 years since the Turkish invasion. Tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots have left Cyprus, and a more numerous group of settlers from Turkey has come in their place. Ahmet An, 'Günümüze Kıbrıs Türk Toplumunu', in *Kıbrıs Dün ve Bugün*, ed. Masis Kürkcügil, Istanbul 2003, pp. 341–372.

¹³¹ A. Evin, 'Changing Greek Perspectives on Turkey: An Assessment of the Post-Earthquake Rapprochement', in *Greek-Turkish Relations in an Era of Détente*, ed. A. Çarkoglu, B. Rubin, New York 2005, pp. 4–20.

¹³² Panayotis J. Tsakonas, Thansos P. Dokos, 'Greek-Turkish Relations in the Early Twenty-First Century: A View from Athens', in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, ed. Lenore G. Martin, Dimitris Keridis, Cambridge Massachusetts 2004, pp. 101–126.

¹³³ In the case of Turkey, the decisive events were the establishment in 2002 of a government led by the pragmatic Islamic-democratic Justice and Development Party (AKP) and support for the plan from the chief of staff of the Turkish army.

¹³⁴ *The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem*, http://unannanplan.agrino.org/Annan_Plan_MARCH_30_2004.pdf

¹³⁵ According to Greek Cypriots, the main faults of the plan were the regulations which provided for too slow a withdrawal by the military, the continuation of the system of guarantees given in 1960, too broad powers being offered to the Turkish component state, and excessive restrictions on the regaining of property and return of refugees.

¹³⁶ 'Turkey disappointed by EU aid deal on northern Cyprus', <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkey-disappointed-eu-aid-deal-northern-cyprus/article-152958>

¹³⁷ The government was bitterly criticised for accepting this condition at the EU summit in December 2004 by the Turkish opposition, who 'forgot' that regardless of the membership negotiations, Turkey was obligated under a separate

protocol to the Ankara Agreement (1970) to extend the customs union to all EU member states.

Mehmet Ugur, 'Müzakerelerden Üyelige: AB-Türkiye Gündemindeki Sorunlar', Istanbul 2005, pp.163–169.

¹³⁸ 'EU Enlargement: Turkey – Declaration by European Community and Member States' (21 September 2005: Brussels) http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_5045_en.htm

¹³⁹ For example, UNCLOS was not ratified by the United States.

¹⁴⁰ The archipelago belonged to Italy between 1912 and 1947. Turkey, indicating the lack of ratification of the 1932 agreement regulating the ownership of small islands in this region with Italy, claims that some of them belong to it. Turkey's standpoint on this issue is contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923, which states beyond doubt that the territorial waters of Turkey are limited to a distance of three nautical miles. On the other hand, Greece has created a military infrastructure in some islands of the archipelago, although under the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, the Dodecanese was to remain a demilitarised area.

¹⁴¹ According to poll results, the AKP will win the election and the CHP will take the second place. However, the MHP will probably also manage to enter parliament, and DYP is not without hope either. In such a case, there may be a problem with forming a government coalition. Generally, the future of Turkey's pro-European policy will depend on the existence of a stable pro-European majority.

¹⁴² This is a kind of a vicious circle, because an improving situation in Turkey depends on the EU's attitude to Turkey's membership. Turkey's chances will clearly lessen if the 2007 presidential election in France is won by Nicolas Sarkozy, who is a staunch opponent of Turkish accession.

The cold alliance. Turkish-US political relations after 2003

Rafał Sadowski

Theses

1. From the end of World War II, Turkey and the United States formed a close partnership – albeit with some periodical tensions arising – which was cemented by the threat posed by the Soviet Union. After Communism collapsed, their partnership was based on Turkey's strategic location, of bordering on instable regions (the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans), some of which had rich deposits of oil and gas (Central Asia and the Middle East).

2. The most serious crisis in Turkish-US relations happened in 2003, which was directly caused by the US intervention in Iraq and Turkey's negative stance towards it. Turkey did not agree to the opening of a northern front from its territory.

3. The greatest problems in Turkish-US relations include the following questions: **(a)** the alliance between the USA and Iraqi Kurds and Washington's ensuing passive approach to the existence in Northern Iraq of bases of Kurdish guerrilla forces, which fight against the Turkish army, **(b)** the emerging possibility of the creation or declaration of an independent Kurdistan in Northern Iraq as a result of a large-scale civil war in Iraq and the possible disintegration of the country, **(c)** the hard line adopted by the US in its Middle Eastern policy on Iran and Syria, while Turkey's relations with the two countries have improved, and those with Israel, the US' closest partner in the region, have worsened, and **(d)** the mutual crisis in trust since 2003 (the high level of anti-American sentiments among the Turkish public and elites, and dislike for the Turkish government among the US elites).

4. Turkey's strong sense of sovereignty and the improvement of its relations with Russia clash with American attempts to significantly increase US military presence in the Black Sea region.

5. Regardless of these significant disagreements, the US-Turkish partnership is still based upon solid foundations. The two countries also have some common interests, such as the long-term stabilisation of the regions neighbouring on Turkey (thus combating Islamic terrorism and preventing armed conflicts), support for Turkish accession to the

European Union, and military & energy security issues.

6. The future shape of US-Turkish relations greatly depends on the way the situation in the Middle East develops. The region is unlikely to stabilise soon. Therefore, the current cooling of relations will probably last for quite some time.

1. Brief description of the development of Turkish-US relations after World War II

a) The Cold War period

Turkish-US relations after World War II were shaped to a great extent by the bipolar geopolitical order which had come to exist at that time. From the point of view of Washington's interests, Turkey was a major player in the policy of 'containing Soviet expansion, which was the major reason for US engagement in developing relations with Ankara. Turkey was important because of its geopolitical location in the Black Sea region, in the area between the Soviet Union, the Middle East and the Balkans. It directly bordered on the Soviet Union in Caucasus. For Turkey, close co-operation with the USA was an essential element of its foreign and security policy, one of the key objectives of which was to counteract and prevent the serious threat posed by the USSR, which for its part was making territorial claims against Ankara¹.

There were better and worse periods in the Turkish-US relations during the 'Cold War'. Mutual relations developed without any problems in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Starting with 1946, Americans openly supported Ankara and, *inter alia*, assigned as part of the Truman Doctrine a sum of US\$400 million annually to support the military development of Turkey and Greece². In 1948, Washington started transferring economic aid to Ankara as part of the Marshall Plan. Close co-operation was strengthened as Turkey sent its troops to fight in the Korean War (1950–1953), and above all when it joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1952³. The Soviet threat invariably made the security issue the main area of Turkish-American relations, as a result of which the Turkish armed forces began playing a major part in relations between the two countries.

Relations nevertheless cooled in the 1960s. The first element to increase tension in mutual relations was the withdrawal in 1962 of the Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles by Americans from Turkey without consulting Ankara; this happened after the end of the Cuban missile crisis

and the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba⁴. Yet the key factor in the worsening of relations was the issue of Cyprus. In 1964, during the conflict between the Cypriot Greeks and Turks, in which Turkey supported its compatriots, the US President Lyndon B. Johnson wrote a letter condemning the actions taken by Ankara. He stated that the Turkish intervention would pose a threat of the Soviet Union becoming engaged in the conflict, and warned that in such a case the USA and other NATO allies would not be able to offer help to Turkey. The letter gave rise to resentment and upset Ankara's confidence in its NATO ally⁵. A subsequent crisis in mutual relations was provoked by the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974, to which the US reacted by imposing an embargo on arms sales to Turkey in 1975, which was lifted in 1978. Ankara reacted by suspending the Common Defence Agreement. During that period, additional tensions in Turkish-US relations were also caused by the problem of large-scale poppy cultivation in Turkey which was used for heroin production. The principles of operation of the US military bases in Turkey were another disputed issue. This crisis in relations with the USA gave to the development of a 'multi-directional' approach in Turkish policy in the 1970s. Turkey started taking a balance between Moscow and Washington, and when relations with the US had worsened, it established closer contacts with the USSR.

Relations improved markedly following the 1980 military coup in Turkey. The Turkish army was traditionally more willing to co-operate with the American partner than the civilian political elite had been. The USA supported the coup leaders. The election of the staunchly pro-American Turkish Prime Minister, Turgut Özal (who was afterwards elected president), together with the fact that Ankara gave up the 'multidirectional' approach to its foreign policy, greatly contributed to improving mutual relations also.

Turkish-American relations improved despite some differences in interests and standpoints, such as the US offering more funds in financial aid to Greece than to Turkey, the US imposing import quotas on Turkish goods, the opinion shared by the majority of American elites that the deportations and massacres of Armenians should be referred to as a genocide, and the influence of Armenian and Greek lobbies (unfavourably for Tur-

key) on the US politics⁶. For Americans, the alliance with Turkey acquired more significance after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and after the Islamic revolution in Iran in the same year⁷. Military co-operation, especially US military aid to Turkey, was crucial. It took various forms, such as financial aid, privileged credits, free supplies of weapons, contracts to sell military equipment and training Turkish soldiers. The amount of financial aid granted by the United States to Turkey for military purposes between 1980 and 1998 totalled US\$6.064 billion⁸. In addition to that, Americans trained over 3,000 Turkish officers between 1983 and 2000, which cost more than US\$40 million⁹. Since Washington had placed so much emphasis on the security issue, it criticised Turkey much more leniently for the violations of human rights which resulted from Ankara's conflict with the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in the 1980s and 1990s than the EEC and later the EU did.

b) The 1990s: new security challenges

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR marked the beginning of a new era in bilateral relations. The bipolar geopolitical structure and the threat from the Soviet Union, which had stimulated co-operation between the two countries, no longer existed. At the same time, new security threats appeared, first the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the emergence of new states in the post-Soviet area, and the conflicts in the Balkans and Caucasus. These events meant that Turkey, considering its geopolitical location, remained an important partner – from the perspective of American interests – and the security issue remained the most significant area of co-operation.

Turkey firmly supported the United States during the first intervention in Iraq in 1991, both politically and militarily. Ankara made its air space and air force bases available to the US and British armies and deployed nearly 100,000 of its troops along the Iraqi border, which tied Iraqi troops down in Kurdistan¹⁰. Moreover, Turkey joined the economic sanctions imposed on Baghdad, even though it sustained serious economic losses itself, principally from the cutting Iraqi oil supplies. The person who played a crucial role in Turkey's taking such a definitely pro-American stance, against

the opinion of most of the society and of the generals, was then-President Turgut Özal. He was convinced that such a policy would help his country to win EEC candidate status because Western European countries, in addition to the USA, were key members of the anti-Iraqi international coalition.

The Gulf War of 1990–1991 left many Turks disillusioned with US foreign policy. This feeling was caused by the financial losses Turkey sustained as a result of the international sanctions imposed on Iraq since 1991 and by the establishment (with Washington's consent) of the exclusion zone in Northern Iraq, which was controlled by Kurds and was independent of Baghdad. The establishment of Kurdish-American co-operation was regarded with great anxiety by Turkey since the Kurdish issue was of the utmost importance for Ankara, both in internal and in regional terms¹¹. The conflicts of interests regarding the Kurdish issue which then came into existence emerged during the Second Gulf War, and caused the worst crisis in bilateral relations in 2003.

Differences in the policies of the two countries towards Iraq under Saddam Hussein appeared in the 1990s. Ankara supported the policy of containment and control of Iraq's developing military forces; however it made some objections against American and British air raids attacking Iraqi targets (in 1998, 1999 and 2001). In the face of strong objections from Washington, Turkey intensified its trade exchange with Iraq. It also resumed flights to Iraq in 2000, following a nine-year break. In January 2001, it established full diplomatic relations with Baghdad and opened a second border crossing point. This policy was based on the belief that excessively weakening Hussein's regime would enfeeble the territorial integrity of Iraq and thus strengthen the position of the Iraqi Kurds. In the 1990s, regardless of discrepancies between Washington and Ankara over Iraq, Turkey tightened its relations with Israel, the US' most important ally in the Middle East. It also supported NATO enlargement (although it attempted to use the issue as a bargaining chip in its relations with the EU) and the American policy in the Balkans, which was demonstrated by the full engagement of Turkish forces in the operations in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999). In turn, the United States actively supported Turkey's attempts to be given candidate status for EU membership. American

diplomatic efforts helped Turkey obtain this status at the EU Helsinki summit in 1999. The US-Turkish relations reached their peak in 1999, when Turkish intelligence services, assisted by the CIA and under US diplomatic pressure, arrested Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). His detention seriously undermined the activity of Kurdish separatists. To emphasise the special nature of Turkish-US relations at that time, they were named as a 'strategic partnership' in September 1999¹². In early 2001, the United States played a major part in convincing the International Monetary Fund to help Turkey during an economic crisis. The IMF then granted an unusually large loan of US\$39.5 billion¹³. In 2001, soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11, Turkey definitely supported Washington in the 'war on terror' declared by the latter. It actively helped the Americans, offering them political and military support. This included sending its troops to Afghanistan as part of the NATO-led operation ISAF, taking command of the mission twice. During the US-led actions in Afghanistan, it agreed to the use of the US military base in the Turkish town of Incirlik. Additionally, it provided Americans with intelligence assistance and engaged in support for the Pakistani leader, General Pervez Musharraf, who co-operated with the USA in the war against the Taliban regime¹⁴. The Turkish government supported the US intervention in Afghanistan, although public opinion in Turkey was clearly against it¹⁵.

2. The 2003 crisis

The most significant event in American-Turkish relations, which has essentially determined the present shape thereof, was the 2003 US intervention in Iraq and the Turkish parliament's refusal to provide US troops with access to Turkish territory for that operation.

The 'war on terrorism' declared by the USA after September 11 offered the Turkish government an opportunity to internationalise the problem of Kurdish separatism and its fight against PKK guerilla forces, which had existed since the early 1980s. Moreover, Islamic terrorism was also a problem for the Turkish authorities. Although Turkish organisations of Islamic radicals (such as Hizbullah and the Great Eastern Islamic Raiders' Front (IBDA-C)) had had rather limited potential, subsequent attacks in Istanbul in November 2003, in which over 60 people were killed, proved that due to their connections with Al-Qaeda they were capable of plotting large-scale operations that could put Turkey's security at risk. However, from the very beginning of the 'war on terrorism' the Turkish government had raised serious objections to any military operation in the Middle East, especially in Iraq. They were anxious about the threat of destabilisation of the region on which Turkey bordered, and about the possible disintegration of Iraq and the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in the northern part of the country.

The breakthrough happened on 1 March 2003, when the Turkish parliament refused US troops access to Turkish territory, which they wanted to use for Operation Iraqi Freedom, and did not agree to the establishment on its territory of a northern front to attack Iraq in exchange for admitting Turkish troops into Northern Iraq¹⁶. The resolution fell only four votes short of approval.

Talks on the US troops' attack against Iraq from Turkish territory started in December 2002 and lasted until the end of February 2003. During that period, the government changed in Turkey; the democratic-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the elections in November 2002. The government was temporarily headed by Abdullah Gül, since the party's leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, had to wait until the parliament had voted for an amendment to cancel a ban prohibiting participation in political life for people who had

been sentenced by a court. This meant that until March 2003 the AKP was focused on forming a new government. At the same time, negotiations on the unification of Cyprus, which were very important for Turkey, were being conducted under UN auspices. Regardless of those problems, the talks with the US ended in an agreement, which was approved by the government on 25 February 2003 and supported by Erdoğan. However while negotiating, the AKP leaders failed to make efforts to convince their society that supporting the US was in Turkey's interest¹⁷. They did not do so because of the extreme unpopularity of the invasion of Iraq among the Turkish public. Many AKP members were also strongly opposed to the attack against Iraq. According to many observers, Erdoğan chose not to exert too much pressure on his party's MPs because he was afraid of a split. 264 AKP MPs (70%) voted were in favour, 250 MPs (some of the AKP and the entire opposition Republican People's Party, the CHP) were against the move. 19 AKP members abstained from voting. The agreement was nevertheless rejected as it had not received the necessary support from half of all MPs.

Those AKP members who voted against or abstained from the voting mainly came from the Kurdish south-eastern part of Turkey. Their stance could have been motivated either ethnically (MPs of Kurdish origin opposed the entry of Turkish troops into Iraqi Kurdistan) or religiously (objecting against the US invasion of a Muslim state). The opposition CHP, which imposed a party whip during the voting, mobilised as many of its MPs as it could. The nationalist CHP was definitely against letting foreign troops onto the country's territory. Moreover, the party leaders hoped that a rejection of the bill would cause relations between the AKP government and Washington to worsen.

The army's stance on the US opening a northern front was also unclear. The supreme command was in favour of Turkey's participation in the Iraq operation. However, they met with internal resistance from some military circles who were against letting foreign troops into their country, and feared that the Iraqi Kurds could become stronger and that Iraq might disintegrate. Some analysts highlighted the differences of opinions inside the supreme command, regarding the extent to which their troops should engage in co-operation with

Americans¹⁸. The military were trying to play a political game, as a result of which the parliament would be held responsible for taking a decision that would be very unpopular among the public. Therefore, the army adopted a very passive approach in the public discussion on making Turkish territory available to US troops, and did not exert any pressure on either the AKP's or the CHP's politicians. On 1 March 2003, shortly before the vote in the parliament, consent to the agreement with the USA was rejected at the meeting of the National Security Council (MGK), members of which included the highest-ranked commanders of the armed forces, the president and the prime minister.

Turkey tried to mitigate the negative consequences which the vote of 1 March 2003 had had on its relations with the USA. On 8 March, the Turkish parliament voted for a resolution permitting the US air forces to use Turkish bases and air space. American-Turkish talks to send Turkish forces to central Iraq started in summer 2003. An initial agreement on granting an US\$8.5 billion loan to Turkey was even signed in September 2003¹⁹. On 7 October 2003, the parliament in Ankara agreed to send 10,000 Turkish troops to act as peace-keeping forces in central Iraq. However, the decision was taken too early, before an agreement defining the rules of the Turkish troops' presence was achieved with the Americans, and the move met with determined resistance from all political forces in Iraq. In effect, the USA and Iraq chose not to accept the Turkish offer. The decision by the Turkish parliament was motivated less by an attention to good relations with the United States than by attempts to prevent the emergence of an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq.

Attempts to improve Turkish-US relations were unsuccessful due to the deep crisis of mutual trust. The negative result of the 1 March vote to allow US access to Turkish territory was sharply criticised by representatives of the US administration, who saw it as a sign of their ally's disloyalty²⁰. In turn, Turks' trust in Americans was undermined due to the detention of Turkish intelligence officers by US forces in Suleymaniyah in Northern Iraq on 4 July 2003. At that time nearly 100 American soldiers carried out an operation as a result of which 11 Turkish intelligence officers were captured. They were treated as terrorists (they were disarmed, handcuffed and their

heads were covered) and were accused of attempting to murder the Kurdish governor of the province. Information on that event was leaked to the press by Turkey, although the most senior state authorities do not seem to have had anything in common with the leak²¹. To many Turks this incident proved that the Americans were treating their NATO ally Turkey unfairly, and were clearly discriminating in favour of the Iraqi Kurds²².

3. Discrepancies in bilateral relations in the Middle East

a) Iraq

Ankara is in favour of ending the conflict in Iraq, setting up a stable state and preserving its territorial integrity. For this reason it can be believed that the Turkish government is interested in the success of the American mission in Iraq. However, Turkey has very serious objections against the methods used by the USA. These concern Washington's alliance with the Iraqi Kurds, whose position has been significantly strengthened since 2003; thousands of casualties among Muslim civilians caused by American actions; and the emerging threat of a massive civil war in Iraq, the disintegration of the country and the possible appearance of an independent Kurdistan²³. Therefore, any improvement of Turkish-American relations depends to a great extent on stabilising the situation in Iraq itself and on the US intervention succeeding.

The USA entered into its alliance with Iraqi Kurds as a result of the Turkish parliament's refusal to open a northern front on 1 March 2003. Iraqi Kurds, together with Israel, are currently the most pro-American nation in the Middle East. Military and political co-operation with Americans has definitely reinforced the position of Iraqi Kurds in the international arena, Iraq and the region at large. Thanks to this, the area under their control has been significantly expanded. Washington is currently playing the role of their protector. Never before in their modern history have Iraqi Kurds been as powerful as they are today. In exchange, their alliance with the Iraqi Kurds has given the Americans a guarantee of peace in a large part of Northern Iraq, where US bases may be set up in the future. The north of Iraq is strategically important for Washington, considering the proximity of Syria and Iran, which the USA perceives as its most serious regional opponents, as well as the large deposits of oil and gas located there. As a consequence of their common interests and the US' serious military engagements in other parts of Iraq, American troops have not undertaken any active military operations against Turkish Kurd units. The former PKK party, which is considered a terrorist organisation by the USA, has its bases on Iraqi Kurd territories and launch-

es its attacks from there against targets in Turkey. The US, fearing that a war could break out between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds, has not agreed to Turkish military expeditions entering deeper into Northern Iraq; the Turkish army used to do so, thus causing very serious losses to Kurdish separatists during Saddam Hussein's rule. The former PKK has benefited from this situation, and has been able to partly rebuild its potential. American passivity towards the PKK and the lack of permission for any Turkish intervention in Iraq are the most serious complaints made by Turks against the USA, and are the key causes of the high level of anti-American sentiments among the Turkish population. For over a year now Washington has been trying to adjust its policy towards the PKK by intensifying its co-operation with Turkish intelligence services. Washington has also supported Turkey's efforts to delegalise media and associations which support the PKK, as well as its financial bases in European countries. In summer 2006, according to the Turkish press, American intelligence materials were used for two successful operations conducted by Turkish security forces against Kurdish separatists²⁴. In April 2006, during Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's visit to Turkey, Ankara put pressure on Washington by deploying nearly 200,000 soldiers along the Turkish-Iraqi border.

In late August 2006, Washington appointed General Joseph Ralston as coordinator for countering the PKK. His task is to intensify intelligence and military co-operation between Turkey and the USA on this issue. A change in the US' approach to Turkey's fight against the PKK has also been confirmed by Kurdish media reports of bombardments of Northern Iraq by Turkish artillery and air forces²⁵. On 20 September 2006, the Iraqi government banned the activity of the PKK on its territory²⁶. On 1 October 2006, the Kurdish Workers Party announced a cessation of armed operations. However, the main problems (American passivity towards the PKK and the lack of permission for Turkish intervention in Iraq) remain unresolved.

Turkish elites are particularly anxious about the potential disintegration of Iraq and the possible emergence of an independent Kurdistan. Many Turkish politicians and generals see such a scenario as a beginning of the process of secession of Turkish Kurds and the building of a 'Greater

Kurdistan'. For this reason Turkey has long opposed the US-supported idea of transforming Iraq into a federation. Ankara finally accepted the federal system of Iraq in 2005. However, it has maintained its negative stance on including Kirkuk in the Kurdish region. Large oil and gas deposits may be found around the city. Turkey fears that if Kirkuk is made a part of the Kurdish region, this will increase the Kurds' independence from both Ankara and Baghdad.

Turkey's concern about the possible disintegration of Iraq is additionally strengthened by the number of casualties in the clashes between Sunni Arabs and Shiites, which has been growing rapidly since early 2006, thus increasing the risk of a massive civil war. Many Turkish politicians and military officers believe that mistakes made by Americans after the intervention in Iraq (such as the failure to dissolve religious militias) have contributed to the situation. To prevent war, Turkey has been trying to include Sunnis in the government structures.

Moreover, Turkey has reservations against the US' giving permission for Kurdish people to settle in cities inhabited by the Turkish-speaking Turkmen, which is happening simultaneously with the expansion of the Kurdish region in Northern Iraq²⁷. The problem especially concerns the city of Kirkuk, which is surrounded by oilfields.

Turkish-American relations have also been adversely affected by the deaths of many thousands of Muslim civilians caused by US activities. This has been very sharply criticised by many Turkish politicians. Especially severe criticism has been directed against the bombardments of towns supporting the insurgents, in which many civilians had been killed, and against US forces using torture against people suspected of involvement in the insurgency. Such criticism has often taken very harsh forms (one AKP MP called the assault on Fallujah an act of genocide; Americans in Iraq have also been compared to Nazis). The Turkish public, who are predominantly Sunni Muslims, feel more sympathy for Sunni Arabs, who are the main opponents of the American army there²⁸.

b) Iran, Israel and Syria

Although the USA and Turkey define their long-term strategic goals regarding the Middle East (democratisation; ending the Israeli-Palestinian con-

flict by building a Palestinian state; preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; the development of regional co-operation) in similar ways, there are still significant differences in the levels of implementation thereof²⁹. Turkey prefers the policy of persuasion and dialogue with the authoritarian elites, while the United States has chosen the policy of pressure. In effect, the stances and the actions taken by the two countries with regard to the region are often different and mutually contradictory. Such differences are most clearly apparent in the respective approaches the countries take towards Syria and Israel, and to a certain extent towards Iran.

As recently as 1998, Ankara very seriously threatened Syria with a military intervention because of the support offered by Hafez Assad's regime to PKK guerrillas. Also, relations with Iran were quite tense for several reasons: **(1)** Iran's support for Armenia in the latter's conflict with Azerbaijan, which in turn was supported by Ankara, **(2)** Turkish criticism of the position of the Azeri minority in northern Iran, **(3)** Iran's support for the PKK and Islamic radical circles in Turkey, and **(4)** Turkey's close co-operation with the USA and Israel. Since 2003, these relations have improved for both internal and external reasons, the most significant of which are the strengthening position of the Kurds as a result of the US intervention in Iraq, and the electoral victory of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, which sees Islam as an important point of reference and supports closer relations with the Islamic world³⁰.

Ahmet Davutoglu, international policy advisor to Prime Minister Erdogan, can be recognised as the initiator of the new Turkish policy towards the Middle Eastern neighbours. In his book named *Stratejik Derinlik (A Strategic Depth)* he presents a concept for strengthening Ankara's international position by improving and developing comprehensive co-operation with all the regions bordering on Turkey. As can be expected, this would make Turkey a more attractive candidate for the EU and could help Ankara become a better partner in relations with Washington. On the other hand, in the case of any problems in relations with the EU or the USA, close ties with regional partners could provide an alternative to a pro-Western line of Turkish foreign policy³¹. Cooling relations with the United States and tensions in contacts with the European Union have led to

voices urging Turkish foreign policy to reset its long-term priorities now by rapprochement with Russia, Muslim states and China³². However, such opinions currently have no place in Turkey's mainstream foreign policy.

The emergence of the common platform of interests as a result of the change in the balance of forces in the region following the US intervention in Iraq has been of key significance for Turkey's rapprochement with Iran and Syria, which has also been supported by Turkish public opinion. The common platform principally covered regional security and economic co-operation. The Turkish parliament's decision on 1 March 2003 not only caused a caesura in Ankara's contacts with Washington but also affected Turkey's relations with its Muslim neighbours. Turkey, Iran and Syria were critical of the US intervention in Iraq, since they shared a common anxiety about the possible emergence of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq.

Turkey's stance on Iran and Syria has been greatly affected by the change in those countries' approach to the PKK. Their governments, under some pressure from Ankara, have taken active measures against PKK guerrillas. Syrian and Iranian security forces have contributed to the liquidation of PKK bases on their territories, a step which has been welcomed by Turkey. In late 2003, Syria also helped Ankara capture the co-planners of the terrorist attacks on Istanbul. According to media reports, Turkish and Iranian armed forces have been sporadically engaging in tactical co-operation against the PKK³³.

Numerous diplomatic visits, during which many treaties and agreements were signed, have proved that Turkey's bilateral relations with Iran and Syria are improving³⁴. Syria has given up its territorial claims on Turkey (the Hatay region) and no longer criticises the building of a dam on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, which is also a token of warming relations with Ankara. The Turkish government has appealed to the Syrian regime for democratisation, co-operation with the UN during the investigation into the murder of the Lebanese prime minister and the withdrawal of troops from Lebanon, which was done under international pressure in 2005. However, Ankara has categorically refused to take a tough line on Damascus (such as sanctions or the threat of a military intervention).

Trade exchange between Turkey, Syria and Iran has also significantly grown over recent years³⁵. Nevertheless, its level is rather limited in comparison with Turkey's economic relations with EU member states and the USA. Co-operation on energy issues with Iran, the development of which has met with Washington's discontent, is important for Turkey. Thanks to gas supplies from Iran, Turkey has been able to reduce its dependence on Russian gas and renegotiate the disadvantageous gas contract with Gazprom in 2004. However, energy co-operation between Turkey and Iran has not been developing well, and many problems still exist in this area. Turkey criticises Iran for its unreasonable cuts to gas supplies and its habit of breaching contracts, and wants to renegotiate them since it has overestimated its demand for gas.

The clear improvement in Turkey's relations with Iran and Syria led to sharp criticism from Washington in 2005³⁶. However, regarding Turkey's policy on Syria, Washington has recently modified its stance, and has started to treat Turkey as an intermediary in communicating with Bashar Assad's regime³⁷.

The United States wants to bring about the complete isolation of those countries which it has branded as 'rogue states'. Iran was also classified as part of the 'axis of evil' in the strategy for the war on terror which George W. Bush announced in January 2002. In turn, Syria was accused by Washington of sheltering members of Saddam Hussein's regime, and supporting Iraqi insurgents and terrorists who destabilised the situation in Iraq. The Syrian regime was also sharply criticised by the Bush administration for interfering in the internal affairs of Lebanon (supporting Hezbollah) and its bad relations with Israel.

The USA perceives Iran as the most serious threat to the region, and America itself, because of Iran's officially stated desire to destroy Israel, supporting anti-American radical Shiite groups in Lebanon (Hezbollah) and Iraq, and in particular because of its nuclear programme, which Washington believes to be aimed at building a nuclear bomb. Turkey and the USA would not like Iran to have nuclear weapons. Currently, the United States and Turkey have given top priority to negotiations conducted by countries which belong to the UN Security Council plus Germany. Ankara has declared its readiness to support possible inter-

national sanctions that could be imposed by the UN on Iran, even though they would have an adverse effect on the Turkish economy. However, Ankara is definitely against any military intervention in Iran, which the present US administration has not ruled out. This sceptical approach by the Turkish government to a possible US attack on Iran results from its fear of Iranian counteraction (large-scale terrorist activity) which could destabilise the regions that border Turkey. Definite support for US actions by Ankara has been ruled out due to the strong anti-Americanism of the Turkish public and elites, as well as fear that Iran could support Kurdish and Islamic terrorism in Turkey.

In turn, the modification of approaches in the Turkish policy of warming relations with Muslim states has caused a cooling in Ankara's relations with Israel. This has been negatively received by Washington, which is a close ally of Tel Aviv. Good Turkish-Israeli relations had been based on military co-operation, the respective alliances of the two countries with the USA, common interests in the region (including conflicts and disputes with Syria and Iran) and dynamic economic co-operation³⁸. However, the AKP government, which relied on an Islamic electorate, has started distancing itself from Israel in its policy, a change which was welcomed by a majority of Turkish society. Turkey's stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict under the AKP government became more favourable to the Palestinian side. In spring 2004, following the Israeli attacks on Rafah, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused Israel of using 'state terrorism', withdrew Turkey's ambassador from Israel for consultations, and raised the rank of the Turkish diplomatic agency in the Palestinian Autonomy to that of an embassy. Information in June 2004 that Israeli intelligence had been training Kurdish troops in Iraq certainly contributed to the worsening relations between Turkey and Israel³⁹. The Israeli government denied the information, although a BBC report broadcast in September 2006 showed that former Israeli secret service officers employed by private companies had in fact worked as military instructors in northern Iraq⁴⁰.

From the point of view of Turkey, which takes a strong stance the Kurdish issue, these events undermined its confidence in its Israeli partner⁴¹. In February 2006, leaders of Hamas made a pri-

vate visit to Turkey. During the visit, the Turkish government appealed to Hamas to recognise the state of Israel and renounce the use of terror. The visit was very strongly criticised by both Israel and Washington. In turn, the Israeli interventions in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip in June and July 2006 were opposed by Prime Minister Erdogan, who claimed they were not a justified reaction. Many Turkish MPs left the Turkish-Israeli friendship group. Some of them suggested that Israel's actions reminded them of Nazi policy. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül criticised the USA for its unconditional support to Israel which, according to Ankara, made settling conflicts between Israel and its neighbours more difficult. Ankara, in contrast to Washington, supported France in its appeal to reach a truce as soon as possible. Regardless of these tensions, Turkey is still the country with which Israel has the best relations in the region. This has been proven by Israel's support for the participation of Turkish troops in the UN-led operation in Lebanon, which Tel Aviv has not granted to any other Muslim country.

c) Turkish anti-Americanism

One of the underlying reasons for the change in Turkish policy towards the United States is the intensifying anti-American sentiments among the Turkish society, including the political elites. This concerns not only Islamic circles, who are traditionally believed to be anti-American, but also a much broader group of nationalists, Kemalists and secular liberals⁴². Furthermore, the impact of public opinion on foreign policy has grown in connection with Turkey's ongoing democratisation as part of its adjustment to EU requirements. Turkish anti-Americanism has caused Americans to perceive Turkey in a less favourable way. Soon after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Turkey was presented by the USA as a model Muslim state, whose political system was based on secularism. At that time, the AKP was praised as an Islamic democratic party. However, as of 2003, the US administration has definitely ceased promoting Turkey and the AKP as models to be followed by the Muslim world. Representatives of neo-conservatives, such as Michael Rubin and Daniel Pipes, who provide the ideological base for the present administration, have started accus-

ing the AKP of Islamising the country in their publications.

Turkish anti-Americanism consists of a critical perception of the US foreign policy⁴³ as threatening the interests of the Turkish state, is unilateral and does not take into account the interests of Turkey or other countries, and is in general definitely anti-Muslim. Public opinion polls have shown that Turks clearly differentiate their sentiments on the United States, Americans and President George W. Bush. For example, polls conducted in June 2005 by the ARI Haraket institute showed that 27% of respondents had a very negative attitude towards Americans, 49% towards the United States and 71% towards George W. Bush⁴⁴. Answers given by Turkish respondents concerning the reasons for and consequences of US policy in the Middle East are similar to the opinions of the French or German publics, as has been indicated by polls conducted by Pew Research Centre between 2002 and 2005. However, Turks' dislike of Americans is much stronger than that felt by Western European societies⁴⁵. This is connected with a feeling of religious solidarity and, above all, with a negative opinion on Americans' relations with Iraqi Kurds and tolerating PKK bases in Iraq. However, the general dislike of Americans does not translate into hatred of individual Americans, which happens in some Arab communities⁴⁶.

In the late 1990s, a definite majority of Turks had a positive opinion of the USA and Americans. America's image among Turkish society started worsening due to the operation in Afghanistan, strong US support for Israel and the eruption of the second *intifada*. However, a turning point came with the US intervention in Iraq and preparations for it. In spring 2003, the amount of positive opinions on the USA reached its lowest level of 12% (at the end of 2002 it had been as high as 30%) and rose slightly thereafter⁴⁷. Surveys for *Foreign Policy Perception*, which have been conducted regularly since 2003 by the Turkish International Strategic Research Organisation, have shown that approximately 25% to 30% of Turks believe that the USA poses the most serious threat to the security of their country. In polls conducted by Pollmark in early March 2005, over 30% of Turks stated that the USA could attack Turkey in the near future. Polls conducted by the

same firm at the end of 2004 indicated that the United States was perceived by nearly 85% of Turks as a country which posed a threat to global peace (the highest result of all the survey-covered countries, including Russia and Iran, and giving a significant lead for the USA over other countries) and by over 30% as the country that posed the greatest threat⁴⁸.

The negative approach of Turkish society to US policy has also indirectly influenced the activities of the Turkish government. Out of respect for public opinion, the governing AKP party and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan will not take any actions that could adversely affect public support for his party. On the other hand, US politicians have reacted negatively to this passivity on the part of Turkish authorities in overcoming anti-American stereotypes and opinions among the Turkish population.

4. The platform of common interests

Regardless of existing discrepancies and negative opinions, Turkey and the United States share a broad platform of common interests. Ankara's reserve in its policy towards Washington has not fundamentally affected the activities undertaken by the USA with regard to Turkey. For the United States, a Turkey which is stable, democratic and integrated into Western structures (NATO and the EU) is a necessary precondition for stabilisation and democratisation of the Middle East, which is a top priority objective of US policy. The key areas of Turkish-US co-operation principally cover the process of Turkey's European integration. In this context, the issue of divided Cyprus can be used as a positive example, which plays an important role in mutual Turkish-US relations and is essential for the Turkey's prospects of joining the EU.

Security co-operation, which covers combating terrorism, preventing ethnic conflicts and military & energy collaboration, is still very important. Owing to the extensive field of common interests, the US-Turkish alliance still works, regardless of existing differences of opinion on the Iraqi issue.

a) Turkey's integration with the European Union

EU membership is a priority of the Turkish government's policy. The United States also sees the 'European anchor' as the most effective tool to guarantee Turkey's establishment in the Western world and for maintaining a democratic political system in the country⁴⁹. For this reason, Washington has for many years been the chief advocate of Turkey's EU membership. The intensified activity of US diplomacy can be proven by its engagement in lobbying among European partners (especially Germany) for establishing a customs union between the EU and Turkey (1995) as well as during the Helsinki summit in 1999, when Turkey was officially granted candidate status⁵⁰. The USA lobbied for Turkey in European capitals before each summit when the EU took decisions on future relations between Ankara and the Union (2002, 2004 and 2005)⁵¹.

However, Washington's ability to support Turkey's membership using political means was reduced as a consequence of the outbreak of the second war in Iraq, which led to a sudden worsening in trans-Atlantic relations. This was affected by the following two factors: **(1)** the crisis in relations between the USA and France & Germany, the countries which play a key role in the Union's decision-making process and **(2)** the cooling of US-Turkish relations and the increasing similarity of Turkey's position to that of its European partners.

Washington's support for Turkish membership may still turn into a disservice for Ankara. Many European politicians fear that American support for Turkey's accession stems from the US' desire to weaken the European Union by preventing its further internal integration, as a result of which Brussels could become a more equal partner in trans-Atlantic relations. In the opinion of these politicians, such support is also a manifestation of American arrogance. The negative reception to the US lobbying for Turkey in Europe was perfectly illustrated by a statement made by the French President Jacques Chirac in June 2004; 'It's a bit as if I told the United States how they should manage their relations with Mexico'⁵².

The US operation in Iraq posed a dilemma for Turkish diplomacy; whether to support the United States or the European Union, mainly France and Germany, which had adopted a critical stance on American activities. Turkey's negative opinion on US policy towards Iraq brought it closer to the EU's position. However, from the end of 2004, problems appeared in relations between Turkey and those EU member states which had become increasingly critical of Turkey's membership aspirations. As a consequence of the criticism, Turkey started feeling rejected by the European Union. This situation created a possibility of the worst-case scenario coming true, in which Turkey's relations with both the EU and the USA would clearly worsen⁵³. A dangerous effect of that could be a certain reevaluation of Ankara's foreign policy and closer relations with Russia, Iran and Syria⁵⁴. Although such a scenario is currently far from coming true, it still cannot be excluded. To sidestep this potential threat, Washington – regardless of the bilateral tensions – continues its efforts to maintain correct relations with Turkey and strongly supports Turkish membership in the EU.

However, the United States does see certain problems that may arise out of Turkey's rapprochement with Europe. If Turkey establishes closer relations with the EU, Ankara will have to harmonise its foreign policy activity with Brussels to a greater extent, and not with Washington, as has so far been the case. Differences of opinions and controversies existing between Americans and Europeans may provide another point of dispute in US-Turkish relations in addition to the current three major areas of disagreement, which are the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Turkey's support for the establishment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the stance on possible military intervention in Iran⁵⁵.

b) Cyprus

The unsettled conflict over the divided island of Cyprus is a major issue in Ankara's relations with both Brussels and Washington, and is one of the key problems in the process of Turkey's integration with the EU. In turn, from the United States' perspective, it is a significant factor in building stability in the Mediterranean region. Although Cyprus does not currently play a major role in Turkish-American relations it could still be a significant stimulant to improve relations between the two countries, thanks to the positive reception by the Turkish side of the US engagement in settling the conflict.

During the cold war period, the United States attached great significance to alleviating the negative consequences of the division of Cyprus. The main objective was to prevent a conflict between two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, for which this issue was the main point of dispute.

As of 2002, the United States, along with the UN and the EU, actively participated in developing a plan for the peaceful unification of the island, the so-called Annan Plan. It very warmly welcomed the constructive engagement by Prime Minister Erdogan in activities for a peaceful settlement of the problem of Cyprus; he played an essential role in convincing domestic Turkish public opinion to accept some of the concessions necessary for the conflict resolution. He backed the political forces which supported the Annan Plan (these were now ruling the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC)), and appealed to the Cypriot Turks to vote for the Plan in the referendum

on 24 April 2004. However, the Annan Plan did not come into force, as it was rejected by the Greek community in the Republic of Cyprus. Due to the rejection of the peaceful plan, the process of political settlement of the conflict was withheld. Thereafter, the United States concentrated its efforts on economic support for the Turkish part of the island and reinforcing democratic institutions. In 2005, the American programme of support for the KKTC economy was worth US\$30.5 million⁵⁶. The United States also activated contacts with representatives of the Turkish Cypriots. A US trade delegation made an official visit to Northern Cyprus on 17 February 2005. In turn, on 19 June 2005, the US and KKTC ambassadors in Turkey met in Ankara⁵⁷. The official visit in Washington on 28 October 2005 by the KKTC President Mehmet Ali Talat, who had been invited by the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, was a very important event. During her visit to Greece and Turkey in April 2006, the American head of diplomacy criticised the policies of Athens and the Cypriot Greeks and appealed to them to change their stance on the KKTC. Although the problem of Cyprus had not been settled, the efforts made to do so were positively received by the Turkish public. In Ankara's opinion, the position taken by Washington is much more constructive and favourable than the EU policy, which is believed to be insincere⁵⁸.

c) The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative

The US intervention in Iraq was part of a broader concept to democratise the Muslim world, which the Bush administration perceived as a necessary precondition for achieving a lasting stabilisation of the Middle East and eliminating terrorism. The concept was translated into the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENAI), which is a priority issue of US foreign policy⁵⁹. The project was initiated by the United States in June 2004 at the G-8 summit in Sea Island. Its objectives include socioeconomic reforms and the democratisation of Muslim states from Morocco through to Pakistan. Turkey has declared its support for the initiative. Ankara's engagement in the BMENAI may provide a significant stimulus to improving Turkish-US relations. Turkey believes that it can be helpful in the following three

areas⁶⁰. Firstly, it can act as a mediator between the West (including the USA) and Iran & Syria. Secondly, Ankara can play a similar part in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thirdly, it can contribute to fostering democratic processes in the countries located within the area covered by the BMENAI. However, Turkey's participation in the project is rather potential than certain at this stage, due to a number of limitations. Turkey is too weak an international actor to be able to play a major role in negotiations with Iran. It also lacks any instruments to influence the government in Tehran. Turkey has a greater potential for playing the part of mediator in the case of Syria, although an improvement of relations between Damascus and Washington primarily depends on the settlement of the Syrian-Israeli conflict over the Golan Heights. As for the conflict between Israel and Palestine, the Israeli side has lost confidence in Ankara as a result of worsening Turkish-Israeli relations, which makes it difficult for Turkey to act as a trustworthy mediator for both sides. Finally, in the context of engagement in democratisation in the BMENAI area, there are two major problems concerning Turkey. Firstly, the secular model of the Turkish state, which is presented as one to be followed by Muslim states, is not attractive to many of them and seems impossible to adopt. This is related to the special circumstances of Turkey's historical development. Secondly, Turkey focuses too much on stabilisation in fear of the negative consequences of overly hasty democratisation⁶¹.

d) Co-operation in the areas of security and economy

Security co-operation is still the main platform on which the alliance between Turkey and the USA is based. Although differences of opinions have somewhat weakened it, the existing threats – above all terrorism and destabilisation of the situation in Turkey and neighbouring regions, and common interests in the fields of energy and the arms industry – still form a solid basis for further co-operation. Turkey and the USA are co-operating especially intensively within the framework of NATO. Turkish and US armed forces participate in common operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, as well as in the Alliance's manoeuvres. The two countries co-operate as part of NATO's Part-

nership for Peace with Moldova, Ukraine and Caucasian & Central Asian countries. They both support Georgia's and Ukraine's NATO membership, and are especially engaged in modernising the Georgian army. The Incirlik Air Base has been of key logistic significance for the US operation in Iraq. Many of the supplies for US troops in Iraq are also delivered from Mediterranean ports by ground transport through Turkey.

However, Turkey's strong sense of sovereignty, together with improving Turkish-Russian relations since 2003, have given rise to certain problems in Turkish-US military co-operation, especially in the Black Sea region. Rapprochement between Turkey and Russia is an effect of the worsening relations of these two countries with the USA as well as tensions in Turkish-EU relations. This move is intended to expand the room for manoeuvre for both Russia and Turkey in their relations with Washington and Brussels⁶². Turkey does not want the American military presence in the region to grow significantly because it sees such a scenario as causing confrontation with Russia and diminishing Turkish influence. In April 2005, Turkey's abstention enabled Russia to prevent the USA from being granted the status of an observer in the Organisation of Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC), the most important regional organisation, although the USA finally received the status in September 2005 together with Belarus, which was accepted at Moscow's special request.

The American desire to increase their military presence in the Black Sea region was manifested in the idea of expanding the NATO-led antiterrorist operation Active Endeavour over the Black Sea. However, to do so, it would have been necessary to renegotiate the Montreux Convention (1936), which imposes a certain limit on the presence of warships of other countries than those bordering the Black Sea. The proposal was opposed by Turkey, which saw the Convention as a pillar of its national sovereignty. The US stopped pressing Turkey on this issue in May 2006. According to some analysts, Washington wanted to put off Ankara's closer co-operation with Moscow by recognising Turkish interests⁶³. As a result, in early June 2006, Turkey took part in the new pro-American regional initiative, the Black Sea Forum, which was ignored by Russia.

Another significant element to cement Turkish-US co-operation is the implementation of common energy projects⁶⁴. Turkey, after Russia, is the most important country for energy transit from Central Asia and the Caucasus⁶⁵. Ankara and Washington are interested in developing this role for Turkey, and effectively reducing the Russian domination of the energy market. The most important project in which Turkey and the USA currently participate is the start-up of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, which officially took place in July 2006. The BTC pipeline enables oil transit from the Caspian Sea region without involving Russia. This is one of the largest oil projects that have been recently implemented; its construction cost nearly US\$4 billion. The construction of the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum gas pipeline, planned to be launched in autumn 2006, is another project in which the USA and Turkey are strongly engaged. Since early 2006, Washington and Ankara have been trying to convince Turkmenistan to accept the idea of exporting gas *via* the Caspian Sea, Caucasus and Turkey, and skipping Russia.

As part of its plan to diversify its energy sources, Turkey is planning to build three nuclear power plants by 2015. Pursuant to an agreement with the United States, which was accepted by the Turkish parliament in July 2006, the nuclear technology will come from America.

Last but not least, the United States and Turkey are engaged in very close military co-operation, the key manifestations of which are the education of Turkish officers at US military universities and the purchase of US military equipment by the Turkish army. A great majority of weapons in its arsenal come from the USA⁶⁶.

For Turkey, the United States has been an important trade partner for many years (on average, it takes fifth place, and trade exchange with the USA accounts for nearly 5% of Turkish trade exchange) as well as a significant foreign investor (fourth place, nearly 10% of foreign investments). The USA is also a guarantor of financial aid granted via the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and to a lesser extent via the World Bank to the Turkish economy, which is still not exactly stable. Turkey is the most significant IMF debtor.

5. Conclusion and forecast

In 2006, three years since the emergence of the crisis, the greatest problems in US-Turkish relations have not been solved. These have mainly been caused by the lasting instability in the Middle East region, especially in Iraq. One can hardly expect that the main problems of the Middle East, the Kurdish issue, the stabilisation of Iraq, Iran's atomic programme and the conflict between Israel and the Arab world will be resolved soon. It must be taken into account that these issues may cause some problems in relations between Washington and Ankara for a long time to come. The status of the city and environs of Kirkuk may be an especially controversial issue in the immediate future. The Iraqi constitution provides for a referendum on the status of Kirkuk to be held by the end of 2007. Considering the problems with setting the borders between polling districts and designating the electorate authorised to vote, the referendum, if held, may cause tension between Turkey and the USA.

However, it is worth noting both sides' clear will to improve mutual relations. Neither the USA nor Turkey wants to escalate the disputes. Regardless of their existing differences of opinion, since 2003 many major Turkish politicians, diplomats and military officials have visited the USA, and *vice versa*. Both countries have been trying to take actions that will bring them closer to rapprochement. In early July 2006, during the visit by the Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül to Washington, both countries signed a document intended to revive the strategic US-Turkish partnership. The Strategic Vision document specifies areas of their co-operation (including the stabilisation of Iraq and the region covered by the BMENAI, Central Asia and the Caucasus; settling Arab-Israeli conflicts; combating terrorism and other threats such as smuggling, arms trafficking, etc.) and is aimed at intensifying the dialogue to carry out specific tasks⁶⁷. The United States has been trying to emphasise Turkey's significance as a key ally and partner during the visits. Events of this kind improve the atmosphere of mutual relations, even though they do not predetermine that the crises will be overcome.

The USA needs Turkey's favourable stance towards and support for its policy in the Middle East, especially on the issues of Iran and Iraq. A grad-

ual improvement of stability in Iraq would enable Turkey, the Kurds of northern Iraq and the USA to take more effective political and military action against the PKK, and thus to remove one of the greatest problems in their mutual relations. A further change of Turkish internal policy on the Turkish Kurds is equally important to resolve the problem, however. If the conflict between Iraq's Sunnis and Shiites escalates further and turns into a full-scale civil war, the country may disintegrate and another challenge, to wit the possible independence of Kurdistan, may arise in Turkish-US relations. Washington would have to take on the difficult task of finding a *modus vivendi* between Ankara and Irbil, without alienating any of the partners.

Turkey's favour for the American policy in the Middle East would certainly grow if the USA and the EU could reach a compromise in their talks with Tehran. Unfortunately, such an optimistic scenario is rather improbable. Possible UN sanctions on Iran will be supported by Ankara, which will not take the risk of being isolated by the international community. This policy will be unpopular in Turkey because of the financial losses it will entail. If the violent scenario is realised and the USA attacks Iran (bombardments, paratroops attacks by special units), Ankara's consent for the US Air Force to use the airbase in Incirlik will be a problem. Turkey will probably accept Washington's request, if the United States receives approval for its activities from the European Union. As was the case in the US intervention in Iraq, the great majority of the Turkish public will be against the American actions. Turkish-US relations may worsen as a result of Tehran's reaction to an American attack (such as large-scale support for terrorism), which would destabilise the situation in the region. If the international community grants only limited support for the attack on Iran, this may also lead to Turkey refusing the US access to the airbase in Incirlik.

Another development in the Turkish-American relations which would have grave consequences may be the potential vote by the US Congress on a resolution concerning the Armenian genocide. Such a motion has become even more likely as the Democrats, who enjoy close ties with the Armenian lobby in the US, secured a majority in the US Congress in the mid-term elections in November 2006.

The process of Turkey's integration with the European Union will also have a great impact on the further development of US-Turkish relations. A possible failure of the Turkish-EU negotiations may lead to anti-Western sentiments rising, and the Turkish government's search for compensation for such failures by developing relations with Muslim countries, Russia and China. Such a swing in Turkish policy would undoubtedly make it impossible to maintain a close alliance with the USA. A crisis in Turkey's relations with the European Union does not have to mean a collapse of its alliance with the United States, provided that a moderately positive scenario is realised in the Middle East. In such a case, the alliance with the USA could become an alternative for Ankara to its relations with the EU. In turn, the USA would gain an important ally in its possible political rivalry with Europe.

The 'worst-case scenario', i.e. open enmity between Turkey and the EU & the USA, and Ankara's rapprochement with anti-Western states is rather unlikely. Washington will try to avoid such a situation, as will some of the EU's member states. The scale of politico-economic relations between Turkey and the West is so great that an uncertain alliance with China, Russia, Iran and Syria is perceived by a majority of realistically-disposed Turkish elites as merely a sham alternative to the Western direction. However, it is possible that a prolonged period of colder relations between Turkey and the Western world is imminent.

Rafał Sadowski

Co-operation Adam Balcer

¹ F. Stephen Larrabee, Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, RAND, 2003, p.162.

² Çağrı Erhan, 'Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri mantıksal çerçevesi', in *Türk Dis Politkasi*, (ed.) Idris Bal, 2004 Ankara, pp. 139–150.

³ George Sellers Harris, 'Turkish-American Relations Since the Truman Doctrine', in, *Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, ed. Mustafa Aydın, Çağrı Erhan, London 2003, pp. 66–91.

⁴ F. Stephen Larrabee, Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, RAND, 2003, p.163.

⁵ Mehmet Y. Kalin, *Implications of EU Admittance of Turkey on Turkish-EU Relations and Turkish-US Relations*, U.S. Army War College, Carlise, 2005, p.16

⁶ In 1975, the US Congress passed a resolution on the issue of the Armenian genocide. 38 states (parliaments and governors) made declarations regarding this issue. The Greek and Armenian diasporas in the USA are much more numerous and wealthier than the Turkish community. The previously good relations between Turkey and the Jewish lobby have been weakened because of the worsening relations between Turkey and Israel. Suhnaz Yılmaz, 'Impact of Lobbies on Turkish American Relations', in, *Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, ed. Mustafa Aydın, Çağrı Erhan, London 2003, pp. 181–212.

⁷ Çağrı Erhan, *ibid.*

⁸ Çağrı Erhan, *ibid.*

⁹ Çağrı Erhan, *ibid.*

¹⁰ F. Stephen Larrabee, Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, RAND, 2003, p.166.

¹¹ Approximately 15 to 20% of Turkey's residents, i.e. 12 to 15 million people, are Kurds. They account for nearly half of the Kurds living in the Middle East. Kurds are also numerous among the populations of Turkey's neighbours (Iraq, Iran and Syria). In 1984, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a Marxist organisation of Turkish Kurds (which was not supported by most of Turkey's Kurdish community), started a rebellion in south-eastern Turkey, striving for setting up an independent Kurdistan. According to estimates, between 35,000 and 40,000 people have died so far in clashes between the PKK and the Turkish army.

¹² Mehmet Y. Kalin, *The Implications of EU Admittance of Turkey on Turkish-EU Relations and Turkish-US Relations*, U.S. Army War College, Carlise, 2005, p. 16.

¹³ Ömer Taspinar, *Changing Parameters in U.S.-German-Turkish Relations*, 2005, p.19.

¹⁴ Steven A Cook, *U.S.-Turkey Relations and the War on Terrorism*, 2001. The participation in the operation in Afghanistan was also expected to enable Turkey to reinforce its influence in the Central Asian region, which it has cultural and historical ties with.

¹⁵ In autumn 2001, two-thirds of Turks were against the US-led operation in Afghanistan. In turn, in 2004, nearly half of the respondents were against Turkish involvement in Afghanistan. See *Transatlantic Trends 2005*, p. 39. http://www.transatlantictrends.org/doc/2005_english_top.pdf

¹⁶ The Turkish parliament voted to decide on consent to deploy 62,000 US soldiers of the 4th Infantry Division, the 3rd Armoured Cavalry Regiment, 255 aircraft, 65 combat helicopters and an unspecified number of special and support

units to take part in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The deal also included permission to send Turkish troops to northern Iraq. Pursuant to arrangements with the Americans, Turkey could have sent nearly 60,000 troops to the 30-kilometre border zone, extended to 40 kilometres, and would have gained control over the roads to Mosul and Kirkuk. Additionally, the United States would have given Turkey US\$15 billion in financial aid and loans. It is worth adding that although a great majority of the Turkish public were against the American intervention, at the same time in March 2003, more than half of Turks supported the engagement of the Turkish army in northern Iraq, and a significant minority (nearly 40%) believed the rejection of the deal had been a mistake. Soner Arıkanoglu, '45 bin asker yolda', *Radikal*, 28 February 2003, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=67521>

¹⁷ Barak A Salmoni., 'Strategic Partners or Estranged Allies: Turkey, the United States, and Operation Iraqi Freedom', *Strategic Insights*, vol. II, issue 7, July 2003.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Gareth Jenkins, 'Turkish parliament votes to send troops to Iraq', *Al-Ahram Weekly Online*, no. 659, 9–15 October 2003.

²⁰ In May 2003, Paul Wolfowitz in an interview for CNN Türk sharply criticised the Turkish parliament's decision, and especially the passivity of the generals. Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz's Interview with CNN Türk, <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030506-depsecdef0156.html>

²¹ Michael Rubin, 'A Comedy of Errors: American-Turkish Diplomacy and the Iraq War', *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Spring 2005.

²² Soner Çağaptay, 'Whither the U.S.-Turkish Relationship?', *Middle East Quarterly*, 2004.

²³ For more information on the Kurdish issue, see the chapter *The hurdle race: The greatest political and social barriers on Turkey's way to the EU*.

²⁴ 'Rice Visit to Turkey: A New Turning Point for US-Turkey Relations', *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=30557

²⁵ The US policy adjustment may be a result of information on the tactical co-operation of Turkish and Iranian armed forces against the PKK. Ümit Enginsoy, 'US probes shelling of northern Iraq', 24 August 2006, *Turkish Daily News*.

²⁶ 'Irak PKK'yi yasakladı', *Milliyet*, 20 September 2006.

²⁷ Michael Rubin, 'A Comedy of Errors: American-Turkish Diplomacy and the Iraq War', *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Spring 2005.

²⁸ The great majority of Turks condemn suicide attacks. However, in some surveys, such as those conducted by the Pollmark centre, most Turks have expressed positive opinions about the anti-American resistance in Iraq. For the poll results see the Pollmark website; <http://www.pollmark.com.tr>

²⁹ Conversation with Sanlı Bahadır Koç, a specialist at the Centre for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM) in Ankara in July 2005.

³⁰ In June 2004, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, representing Turkey, was elected secretary general of the Organisation of Islamic States.

³¹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik*, Istanbul 2001.

³² As a matter of convention, we can assume that this trend began in March 2002, when General Tuncer Kiliç, the Secretary of the National Security Council, gave up efforts towards EU membership and established closer co-operation with Iran and Russia.

³³ Ümit Enginsoy, 'US probes shelling of northern Iraq', 24 August 06, *Turkish Daily News*.

³⁴ The most significant were the visits by the Syrian President Bashar Assad in January 2004, and by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in July 2004 to Iran and in December 2004 to Damascus.

³⁵ Iran is a major import partner for Turkey, and Turkey is a major partner in Iran's exports (in both cases seventh or eighth position in importance). It is estimated that the trade exchange between Turkey and Iran exceeded US\$5 billion in 2006. Turkey has an enormous trade deficit in its relations with Iran. Turkish exports to Iran constitute as little as under 20% of Iranian exports to Turkey. Syria is not an important trade partner for Turkey, while Turkey has become one of the key trade partners for Syria since 2004 (second or third in importance, over 10% of trade exchange). 'T.C. Basbakanlik Dis Ticaret Müstesarligi', <http://www.foreigntrade.gov.tr>

³⁶ The US Ambassador in Turkey, Eric Edelman, openly criticised President Ahmet Sezer's visit to Syria in April 2005.

³⁷ In November 2005, after Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül's visit to Syria, Damascus transferred those suspected of the murder of the Lebanese prime minister to the UN. Abdullah Gül visited Damascus shortly after meeting Condoleezza Rice at the Bahrain summit of the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative. In early July 2006, during a visit by Foreign Minister Gül, Secretary of State Rice thanked Turkey for its diplomatic mediation between the USA and Damascus.

³⁸ Turkey is one of Israel's major trade partners (seventh or eighth in importance, nearly 3% of Israel's trade exchange). Their co-operation in the arms industry is especially important. Apart from that, many Israeli tourists visit Turkey every year.

³⁹ Seymour M Hersh., 'Plan B', 30 June 2004, *The New Yorker*, http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/040628fa_fact

⁴⁰ One of the companies was directed by a former head of Israeli special forces. BBC, 'Kurdish soldiers trained by Israelis', 20 September 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/5363116.stm>

⁴¹ Brian Mahler, *Israel's Shifting Geopolitical Security Concerns Threaten its Relationship with Turkey*, 2004.

⁴² Soner Çagaptay, *Changing Turkish Public Attitudes toward United States: Premises and Prospects*, 2005.

⁴³ Ömer Taspınar, 'The Anatomy of Anti-Americanism in Turkey', The Brookings Institution, 2005.

⁴⁴ ARI Hareket, *Turkish Public Opinion about the USA and Americans*, p. 3, <http://www.ari.org.tr/arastirma/Turkish%20Public%20Opinion%20on%20the%20Americans%20&%20the%20United%20States.pdf>

⁴⁵ *Transatlantic Trends 2005* surveys concerning the attitude to the USA among selected NATO member states indicated that the attitude is the least favourable in Turkey. In the case of Turkey the rate was 28 points on the scale from 0 (very

cold attitude) to 100 (very warm attitude), while the next state whose society was negatively disposed to the USA was Spain, with the rate of 42 points. *Transatlantic Trends 2005*, p. 34. <http://www.transatlantictrends.org/doc/TTToplineData2005.pdf>.

⁴⁶ According to Pollmark surveys conducted in March 2005, a definite majority of Turks did not mind the possibility of an American receiving Turkish citizenship, or working and living together with an American. Most respondents also accepted the possibility of marriage of a close relative with an American woman.

⁴⁷ 'US Image up slightly but still negative', pp. 44-45. <http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/247.pdf>

⁴⁸ Pollmark, <http://www.pollmark.com.tr/arastirma.asp>

⁴⁹ Morton Abramovitz, 'An American Perspective on Turkey and the EU', *Zaman*, 30 December 2005.

⁵⁰ Ömer Taspınar, *Changing Parameters in U.S.-German-Turkish Relations*, 2005.

Morton Abramovitz, *ibid*.

⁵¹ On 2 October 2005, when Austria's resistance put the beginning of EU-Turkish negotiations in jeopardy, Prime Minister Erdogan asked Washington for help. Political pressure from American diplomacy was one of the reasons why Vienna changed its stance.

⁵² Joshua Chaffin, 'EU anger as Bush calls for Turkish membership', 30 June 2004, *Financial Times*.

⁵³ Soner Çagaptay, *European Recalcitrance toward Turkey: An Agenda for U.S.-Turkish Ties in Summer 2005*, 2005.

⁵⁴ Considering the fact that Turkey is competing with Iran and Russia in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East, such an alliance would be tactical and calculating in its nature.

⁵⁵ Morton Abramovitz, 'An American Perspective on Turkey and the EU', *Zaman*, 30 December 2005.

⁵⁶ John Siltides, 'The Road Through Brussels: Cyprus on the US-Turkey Agenda', *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 2005.

⁵⁷ Soner Çagaptay, *Turkey at a Crossroads: Preserving Ankara's Western Orientation*, Washington, 2005.

⁵⁸ Soner Çagaptay, *European Recalcitrance toward Turkey: An Agenda for U.S.-Turkish Ties in Summer 2005*, 2005.

⁵⁹ *Turkey on the Threshold: Europe's Decision and U.S. Interests*, ed. Morton I. Abramovitz, Richard R. Burt, Atlantic Council, Washington, 2004.

⁶⁰ Ömer Taspınar, *Changing Parameters in U.S.-German-Turkish Relations*, 2005.

Yakup Beris, Asli Gurkan, *Broader Middle East Initiative: Perceptions from Turkey*, 2004. TUSIAD, *Turkey in Focus*, issue 7, July 2004, <http://www.tusiad.us/Content/uploaded/TURKEY-AND-BROADER-MIDDLE-EAST-TURKEY-IN-FOCUS-ISSUE7-FINAL.PDF>

⁶¹ Turkey criticised the fixing of the parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan in 2005 much more mildly than Washington did. The latter has gradually softened its criticism of İlham Aliyev's regime. However, the USA and Turkey took a similarly critical stance on the Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan in 2005, for which Islam Karimov's regime was responsible.

⁶² Turkey and Russia do not want any significant enhancement of the US presence, especially military, in the Black Sea

region or in the Caucasus. They are sceptical about the US policy of putting pressure on some authoritarian regimes, for example Syria. They are critical of the US intervention in Iraq, a possible attack on Iran and Washington's unconditional support for Israel. Turkey and Russia claim they are willing to co-operate in the transit of Russian gas through Turkey to Europe and the Middle East.

However, Turkish-Russian relations are ambivalent in many fields, and the two countries' interests are often in conflict. Russia's approach to the US engagement in Asia is more uncompromising than that of Turkey. Ankara is interested in common activities with the USA, however on the understanding that it is treated as a partner, which means less direct involvement by the USA. Russia is Turkey's second biggest trade partner; however, this trade exchange is based on the enormous (and still growing) deficit on the Turkish side. Russia's key export commodity is gas, which Turkey depends on. Due to unfavourable trade contracts entered into during the 1990s, the gas prices are high and supplies exceed Turkey's demand. Ankara has for several years been trying in vain to convince Russia to renegotiate the contracts. Turkey is interested in diversifying its energy sources, and in the transit of gas and oil from Central Asia without Moscow's control. Russia and Turkey also have differing visions of the planned routes of pipelines to go around the straits. Ankara has curtailed the activity of supporters of Chechen separatists, and Russia that of the PKK sympathisers. However, Russia has not included the PKK in its list of terrorist organisations. In turn, some local AKP activists have supported Chechen separatists. Moscow is the patron of Armenia, which Turkey has very bad relations with, and supports Cyprus in the international arena, which has not been recognised by Ankara. Most importantly, Moscow is not interested in significantly increasing Turkey's influence in the Caucasus, the Middle East, Central Asia or the Black Sea region, or in Turkey's EU membership. According to Fionna Hill and Ömer Taspınar, 'As both sides will admit, there is not yet much political substance to their relations. The states are still more natural rivals than regional allies.' Fionna Hill, Ömer Taspınar, *Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?*, p.10. http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fhill/2006_survival.pdf

⁶³ Umit Enginsoy, 'US drops Black Sea plan, Turkey relieved', *Turkish Daily News*, 8 May 2006.

⁶⁴ Agata Łoskot, Turkey – an energy transit corridor to the EU?, CES Studies no. 17, 2004, <http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/epub/eptrace/17/01.htm>

⁶⁵ The Turkish armed forces' equipment includes over 1600 M60 tanks (some of them are older models which have been modernised), over 3300 M-113 armoured personnel carriers, 280 F-16 aircraft and over 150 F-4 aircraft, more than 70 Blackhawk helicopters and 40 Cobra helicopters, and 11 frigates built by the United States. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 2006*; <http://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance>

In January 2007, Turkey and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding for the U.S.-led F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, officially making Ankara one of the nine partner states in the production of the next-genera-

tion aircraft. Turkey announced plans to buy 100 F-35s worth nearly \$11 billion over the next 15 to 20 years. The F-35 program is the largest and most strategic defence procurement project in Turkey's history. On 7 February 2007, the Turkish state-owned TÜSAS Aerospace Industries (TAI) signed a letter of intent with a principal member of Lockheed Martin's F-35 Lightning II fighter aircraft team to be a second source for the aircraft's construction, a deal which was worth more than \$3 billion for TAI.

⁶⁶ Ümit Enginsoy, 'Turkey, US invest hopes in shared vision document', 7 July 2006, *Turkish Daily News*.

⁶⁷ Yüksel Söylemez, 'The first testing of Turkey's shared strategic vision with the United States', 23 July 2006, *Turkish Daily News*.

Chasing Europe: the Turkish economy at the onset of negotiations with the European Union

Wojciech Paczyński

Theses

1. Over the last four years, Turkey has managed to implement changes which have significantly strengthened its economy. This has been possible thanks to a coincidence of several external and internal factors, both economic and political. The prospect of integration with the European Union has played a pivotal role in improving Turkey's economic policy and its progress in other fields. Its effect may last into the future, provided that the prospect is real. Uncertainties about the accession negotiations, which are appearing now, may seriously weaken that same mechanism which has mobilised Turkish society and its politicians to carry out reforms. It is still unclear whether the social and political consensus necessary for further transformation can be achieved if the process of Turkey's integration with the EU finds itself in a serious crisis.

2. In terms of demographic and economic potential, Turkey is comparable to the bloc of 10 states which joined the European Union on 1 May 2004. The country's development level is still similar to, or even slightly lower, than those of Bulgaria and Romania.

3. For several decades Turkey has been strongly integrated with the European Union in terms of trade. The rapid growth in foreign direct investments noticeable since 2005 may be a significant factor contributing to the modernisation of the country.

4. The major challenges Turkey's social and economic policy will have to face include ensuring good conditions for creating new jobs for people who reach working age or have left agriculture; increasing employment; improving the education system; raising the levels of education & employment of women; and lessening the developmental differences between particular regions.

5. Short-term forecasts for Turkey's economic development are optimistic, although a risk of macroeconomic instability cannot be excluded.

1. A brief historical overview of the Turkish economy's development during the twentieth century

When the Republic of Turkey was established in 1923, it was a very poor and backward country. Between 80% and 90% of its inhabitants were farmers and could not read or write. Over the subsequent eight decades, Turkey has made a civilisational leap. Currently, nearly 30% of its population are employed in agriculture, and only about 13% of the country's residents are illiterate. Although the civilisational gap between Western Europe and Turkey has significantly shortened, it is still quite considerable. Since the 1920s, Turkey has been developing at an average rate of over 4% annually, yet its *per capita* GDP growth has been significantly lower (nearly 2.5%). This is an effect of high population growth¹, the rate of which has consistently been falling, as well as the considerable slowdown in the Turkish economy between the mid-1970s and the beginning of this century.

From the onset of the Republic until the early 1980s, Turkey's economic policy was state-controlled and protectionist. It yielded high economic growth, on the average at over 7% annually (with the exception of World War II), although in the 1970s, when globalisation of the world's economy expanded and the oil shocks took place (in 1973 and 1979), this policy proved inefficient². In the 1980s, Turgut Özal's government started free-market economic reforms (liberalisation of trade & finances and privatisation). However, political instability (the conflict with Kurdish separatist guerrilla forces) and the continuation of the populist economic policy by subsequent governments (including social expenses) caused high inflation (the average annual rate was nearly 90% in the 1990s), the development of the informal economy, high growth of public and foreign debt, and repeated economic crises (1994, 1999 and 2001). This led the economic growth to be smaller in comparison with the preceding periods (the average annual rate in the 1980s and 1990s was about 4%)³. The last of these crises was the worst in the Republic's history, although Turkey managed to overcome it thanks to support from international financial institutions (principally the In-

ternational Monetary Fund)⁴. Then Ankara, monitored by those institutions, carried out structural reforms (such as making the central bank independent, amending the banking laws and changing the system of agricultural subsidies), which created favourable conditions for an economic stabilisation for the first time in the last past 25 years.

2. General characteristics of the present condition of the Turkish economy

Turkey is now in a crucial moment of its economic history. As recently as six years ago, following a very serious financial crisis, its economy was in deep recession, the inflation rate reached 70% and the public debts exceeded 90% of the GNP. The depreciation of the Turkish lira by 50%, interest rates of nearly 100%, the serious breakdown in the banking sector and a wave of bankruptcies were elements of a rather sad picture. Nevertheless, recovery from the crisis has appeared to be rapid and successful. Beginning in 2002, Turkey showed fast economic growth and managed to restore its macroeconomic balance; for the first time in the past 35 years the inflation rate has dropped to single digits, and the proportion of public debt to the GNP has decreased from nearly 100% in 2001 to 55% in 2005.

Turkey owes its recent success to several factors; political stabilisation since the 2002 elections, the prospect of European integration and backing from international financial institutions have all helped it embark on an ambitious reform programme. Deep-seated changes in the operation of public finances, the institutional basis of the monetary policy and labour, commodity and financial markets offer an opportunity for Turkey to break out of the vicious circle of economic instability which the country has been trapped in for decades. On the other hand, further reforms, which are necessary to maintain the high pace of economic growth, reduce delays and bring the country closer to European standards of development will be hard, and successes in this field will not be easy to achieve.

The prospect of European integration still plays a key role in stimulating reforms. The European


Union's decision to start accession negotiations with Turkey in December 2004 and the beginning of the negotiations in October 2005 was an important sign for the government, society and financial markets. According to an optimistic scenario, the mechanism will work for many years as Turkey will slowly make progress on its way towards EU membership (which, however, will not take place any earlier than 2014). However, on the other hand, a positive outcome of the accession negotiations is not a foregone conclusion, and the idea of accepting Turkey into the EU remains very unpopular in many member states. Therefore, making a strong connection between Turkish reforms and the accession process can also be risky. If the process encounters serious impediments, either posed by the EU or arising internally in Turkey, confidence in the reforms could suddenly be undermined, which may cause serious unrest or a financial crisis.

3. Turkey as compared to Europe and the world

Turkey is one of the largest European countries in terms of territory and population number. In 2004, the number of Turkey's inhabitants (over 71 million) was equivalent to over 15% of the population of the entire European Union. Moreover, population growth is much faster in Turkey than in EU countries. Between 2003 and 2004, Turkey's population grew by as much as 1.5%, while the same rate was at 0.4% in the EU-15 and even lower in most of the new member states. Turkish society is very young; the share of people under 15 years of age in the total population reached 29.2% in 2004, as compared to 16.2% in the EU-15, 17% in Poland and 14% in Germany, the latter being the only EU country whose population is larger than that of Turkey.

Turkey's economic role in Europe is also significant, albeit definitely smaller than its demographic potential. According to data from the International Monetary Fund, Turkey's GDP in 2005, calculated according to market currency exchange rates (US\$362 billion), is the 19th largest in the world and 8th largest among the group of EU mem-

Figure 1. GDP per capita at purchasing power parity in 2000 and 2005 (EU-25 mean = 100)



Notice: Data for 2005 are forecasts.

Source: Eurostat

ber and candidate states, just behind Belgium. If the comparison is based on currency exchange rates which take into account the purchasing power parity (PPP), Turkey would rise to 6th in the group of EU member and candidate states, just in front of the Netherlands and Poland. In terms of GDP *per capita*, Turkey is the poorest country as compared to the current EU member states and the candidates to membership engaged in accession negotiations, although the differences between Turkey and Romania or Bulgaria are very small.

Other standard of living indices do not reach the levels that a developed country would normally have. In 2004, life expectancy in Turkey (71) was definitely lower than in any other country which belonged to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In the same year, Turkey's infant mortality rate was over three times higher than the highest in the European OECD member states, namely Slovakia, Poland and Hungary⁵.

According to the Human Development index published by the UN, Turkey is 92nd of the 177 countries for which the index has been calculated. For comparison, Poland is 37th, Bulgaria 54th and Romania 60th ⁶.

The vast gaps in the level of development between the western and eastern regions of Turkey (which are larger than those in EU member states) are a serious problem. This concerns both the GDP *per capita* rates and many other human development indices such as life expectancy, education, infant mortality, etc. Moreover, although the poorer regions are developing economically, the richer part of the country is developing even

faster, and so in some areas the differences have increased rather than lessened.

A characteristic feature that distinguishes Turkey from its European partners is its employment structure. Nearly 50% of professionally active Turks, including over 30% of non-agricultural workers, are employed in the informal sector. The underground economy generates more than a third of Turkey's GDP⁷.

The rate of professional activity in Turkey is much lower than in any EU member state. Moreover, some data indicates that the levels of professional activity and employment have fallen over recent years. According to Eurostat's data on economic activity in 2005 (data for the first three quarters), only 46% of Turkey's residents aged between 15 and 64 were employed. This was about 2 to 3 percentage points less than in the years 2000–2001. For comparison, the same survey indicated that the employment rate was at nearly 64% throughout the EU, 56% in Bulgaria and 58% in Romania. This disproportion is an effect of the especially low professional activity by women in Turkey which, at 27% in 2006, was less than half of the respective levels in the EU, Bulgaria or Romania. The low level of professional activity by women is principally a consequence of the patriarchal and conservative model of a major part of Turkish society, and the low education level, which seriously diminishes opportunities of employment in other sectors than agriculture or the informal economy. In effect, uneducated women who migrate from rural to urban areas are unable to find legal jobs, and work in the informal sector much more often than men do.

Table 1. Regional differences in Turkey in 2000

Category	East Marmara Region (Western Turkey)	North-Eastern Anatolia	South-Eastern Anatolia
GDP <i>per capita</i> (PPP) in US\$	9668	2881	3550
Total fertility rate	2,0	3,8	4,8
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births)	40	62	42
Hospital beds per 100,000 residents	228	184	134
Rate of illiteracy among the entire population	7%	16%	22%
Agricultural employment share (data for 2005)	19%	62%	30%

Source: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (Turkish Board of Statistics), <http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr>

Agricultural employment share, which was 29% in 2006, twice as much as in Poland and almost six times more than the average in the OECD, is very high⁸. However, the share has been dropping as a consequence of rural-urban migration; as recently as six years ago it exceeded 40%.

The aforementioned issues give a true picture of the vast challenges Turkey has to face, the need to provide conditions to ensure the very fast emergence of new jobs (mainly in the services sector) for legions of young people and emigrants from rural areas, and to reduce the informal sector.

In comparison to EU member and candidate states, Turkey has much poorer results in the fields of education and investment in human resources. Nearly 13% of its residents cannot read or write, and the illiteracy rate among women is even higher, reaching nearly 20%. Regardless of significant the progress which has been made in this field, pre-school education is at a level several times lower than in EU member states; nearly 10% of children between the ages of 6 and 14 (predominantly girls) do not go to school, and despite recent enormous changes the disproportion in the numbers of male and female students at secondary schools and higher education facilities is still significant. Improving the accessibility, universality and quality of education, especially women's education, is of key importance for many economic and social processes in Turkey. For example, the problem of the low professional activity by women in cities does not concern women with higher education at all, and affects female secondary-school graduates only to a limited extent.


4. Trade integration with the EU and direct foreign investments

Turkey is very strongly integrated with the European Union in terms of trade. In 2005, over 52% of total Turkish exports went to the 25 member states. Over 42% of its total imports came from the EU. Turkey also has quite strong trade relations with Romania and Bulgaria (nearly 4% of exports and 3% of imports), which are about to join the Union in 2007. Trade integration with the EU is not a recent issue; from as early as the 1950s, nearly half of total Turkey's foreign trade has been carried on with the 25 countries which now

make the European Union. For the EU, Turkey is now its sixth or seventh biggest trade partner. Turkey's other key trade partners, apart from the EU, are Middle Eastern countries, the USA, China and other Asian states, and Russia, from which Turkey imports a significant part of its raw energy materials, mainly gas. Russian gas supplies meet around 60% of Turkey's demand.


Since 1996, Turkey has been the only country with which the EU has a customs union. The customs union does not cover trade in agricultural or steel industry products (these areas of trade are regulated under separate agreements), or service ex-

Figure 2. Geographic structure of Turkish exports, percentage shares (2005)



Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey

Figure 3. Geographic structure of Turkish imports, percentage shares (2005)



Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey

change (this is not regulated under any agreement). The union has caused not only a significant growth in the trade exchange between Turkey and the EU but also a deepening trade deficit on the Turkish side. Practically, the customs union obliges Turkey to adjust its trade policy to that of the European Union. In the EU's opinion, Turkey has failed to meet all its commitments related to the operation of the customs union⁹. Turkey has also signed free trade agreements with EFTA and with several countries in the Mediterranean Sea region (including Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina).

Turkey mainly exports textiles to the EU (making up nearly 40% of its total exports), while the Union's key export merchandise to Turkey are machines and equipment (28%) and chemical products (16%). Turkish imports from Russia are dominated by raw energy materials (over 70%) and metals.

A relatively large part of Turkish foreign trade is officially unregistered, and so the statistical data quoted above should be seen as giving only an approximate picture of the trade structure. This obviously has a great impact on the operation of some commodity markets, as well as serious fiscal consequences. For example, liquid fuel smuggling is a big problem. As a consequence of very heavy tax levies, petrol and diesel oil prices in Turkey are higher than in most OECD countries¹⁰. The large-scale smuggling causes serious problems to oil sector companies, especially as this is happening while reforms intended to improve the operation of the sector are being conducted, and where the rapid growth of domestic demand should be contributing to new companies entering the refinery sector.

Exports of services, especially tourist services, are growing rapidly. Turkey has become a popular destination for European tourists. Between 2001 and 2004, sales of tourist services doubled. 21.2 million tourists visited Turkey in 2005, most of who came from the EU and candidate states. However, the latest statistical data indicates that the number of tourists for 2006 will be lower by nearly 20%.

In contrast to the new EU member states and candidates to membership, the level of foreign direct investments in Turkey was relatively low until recently. Comparison to other South-Eastern Euro-

pean countries also shows Turkey in a disadvantageous light. In 2004, Moldova and Greece were the only two countries to have lower FDI-to-GDP rates than Turkey. However, the results for the years 2005–2006 and forecasts for the immediate future are much more optimistic¹¹. In 2005 the FDI influx (including real estate) reached US\$9.8 billion. The amount for 2006 exceeded a record-breaking level of US\$20 billion. For comparison, the total value of foreign investments made in Turkey before 1999 was as low as US\$2.1 billion, and increased in the period 2000–2004 to US\$10 billion. Approximately 75% of the FDI flowing into Turkey between 2000 and 2006 came from the EU. In turn, the absolute majority of Turkish investments went to the European Union. Turkey is an important partner for EU investors in the strategic energy sector, since it can become a transit state, and thus enable the diversification of energy supplies for the EU. In May 2005, Austrian, Bulgarian, Romanian, Turkish and Hungarian companies signed an agreement to construct the Nabucco pipeline, to enable gas supplies from the Middle East and Asia to run through Turkey to the Balkans and Central Europe. At the same time, Turkish foreign investments were increasing; between 1999 and 2005, Turkey invested nearly US\$5.7 billion abroad.

It cannot be said that Turkey's lower FDI inflows are caused by the activity of foreign investors being hindered. Turkey has one of the most liberal regulations of the OECD countries concerning such investments. However, a real barrier is posed by problems which all enterprises, domestic and foreign, have to face, namely red tape, a weak judiciary authority, changing regulations, including tax regulations, and corruption. The factors which discouraged investors in the past were the rather unpredictable political situation and a lack of macroeconomic stability. In the World Bank's *Doing Business in 2007*, which ranked 175 countries according to the ease of doing business (regulations and practice), Turkey was 91st, a position that – in comparison with EU member and candidate states – was better only than that of Croatia, Macedonia and Greece¹². In the *Transparency International 2006* report, which presented the perception of corruption in 146 countries, Turkey received 3.8 points on the 1–10 scale, which put it ahead of Croatia, Macedonia, Poland and Romania. In the *Economic Freedom 2007* report prepared

by the Heritage Foundation, Turkey's economy was determined as 'mostly unfree'. The countries among EU member and candidate states to have received worse results than Turkey were Croatia, Greece and Poland. Only these four countries were ranked as countries whose economies are mostly unfree¹³. Therefore, eliminating these shortcomings is the key to increasing FDI inflows, which would contribute to the modernisation and structural transformation of the Turkish economy.

5. Current economic trends

Turkey has shown strong economic growth since 2002. Over that time it has managed to achieve macroeconomic stabilisation, which gives hope that these good trends will be continued in the future (Figure 4).


The structural change to the inflation mechanisms which enabled price stabilisation was possible *inter alia* thanks to fiscal reforms. After the period of double-digit deficits in the public finance sector in 1999–2003, the deficit was reduced to just under 2% of the GDP in 2005. The continuation of a responsible fiscal policy in the immediate future (regardless of the results of upcoming

parliamentary elections) is of key importance to minimise the risk of financial instability.

The institutional background of the monetary policy changed as of January 2006, when Turkey joined the group of countries which have adopted the direct inflation targeting strategy. The central bank announced target inflation levels at 5% for the end of 2006, and of about 4% for the end of 2007 and 2008. However, the significant reduction of the price of the Turkish currency in May and June 2006 is likely to raise inflation in the second half of 2006 and in 2007. Maintaining and reinforcing the reputation of the central bank as a successful inflation stopper and achieving a stable low level of inflation expectations are the hard tasks which the monetary authorities will have to handle.

The current high influx of capital to Turkey is a sign that investors believe that this country has good prospects. However, this influx also poses challenges to the country's economic policy due to the growing current account deficit (over 6% of the GDP in 2005) and the pressure of appreciation on the lira. In addition to a cautious fiscal policy, reforms must be undertaken which will increase the adjustability and competitiveness of the Turkish economy.

Figure 4. GDP growth and average annual inflation between 1999 and 2005



Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook database and Turkish Statistical Institute

6. Prospects

Short- and mid-term forecasts for Turkey are relatively optimistic. Strong domestic demand, including investments encouraged by low interest rates, makes it possible to continue the economic growth at the annual level of 4% to 5% in 2006 and 2007. Considering the weakening of the lira, inflation at the end of 2006 is likely to reach a higher level than that targeted by the central bank. Still, there is a chance that the inflation growth will only be temporary. The low public-finance sector deficit will enable further reduction of the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Nevertheless, the risk still exists of a financial destabilisation that may prevent this optimistic scenario from being realised (proof to this being the size of the current account deficit and the debt structure). Continuation of an ambitious and internally consistent reform programme is therefore vital.

The key goals of Turkey's economic policy are closely related to its ambition to join the European Union, and to the task of reducing the development differences and achieving a level similar to those of EU member states. The following four main areas of the country's developmental challenges can be distinguished:

- a stable and responsible macroeconomic policy,
- fair social and human resources development,
- a good business climate, and
- a system for managing natural environment and disaster responses¹⁴.

Limiting the state's role in the economy (by continuing privatisation) and reducing the scope of the informal economy appear to be the major tasks for the economic policy. It is estimated that as much as one-third of urban workers, and up to three-quarters of those working in rural areas, are not registered in the social insurance system¹⁵.

In the longer term, further improvement of the education sector is also a serious challenge, considering the role education plays in preparing young people to function in society, and in particular on the labour market. It is also essential to continue work on increasing social integration; contemporary Turkey is to a great extent divided on the one hand into traditional rural communities (mainly farmers), characterised by very weak ties with the state institutions and low standards of

living, and on the other, much more 'modern' urban communities associated with the services sector and partly with industry. Creating conditions for the better social integration of women is also a task that cannot wait.

The scale of the problems and the very ambitious goal of EU membership have obliged Turkish politicians and Turkish society in general to take on very difficult tasks. Previous reforms have been successful *inter alia* thanks to the existence of a clear goal, namely EU membership. The way Turkish politicians and the EU use the accession negotiations as a mechanism to mobilise reform efforts may decide on the prospects of the country's development in the next decade. The European Union is aware of this fact, at least at the level of official publications. The Communiqué from the European Commission of November 2005 notes that 'in Turkey, the effectiveness of conditionality in driving reforms depends on maintaining a credible political perspective for eventual integration into the Union. Aspirant countries can best sustain public support for bold and often painful reforms when the EU supports them, works with them, and keeps its own promises'¹⁶. (January 2007)

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¹ Turkey's population increased nearly six times, from 12 million to 72 million, between 1923 and 2006.

² Between 1970 and 1979, the average annual inflation rate grew from less than 10 percent in the preceding period to 25%. Turkey's foreign debt rose from US\$2 billion to US\$14 billion. The levels of public debt and the trade deficit significantly increased. Deniz Akagül, 'L'économie turque depuis l'avancement de la République: performances ou contre-performances', in *La Turquie*, ed. Samih Vaner, Paris 2005. pp. 463–464.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Ankara concluded three financial agreements covering as a total US\$40 billion with the IMF in 1999, 2002 and 2005. So far, it has borrowed over US\$30 billion from the IMF. <http://www.internationalmonetaryfound.org>

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ UNDP (2006), Human Development Report 2006, <http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/pdfs/report/HDR06-complete.pdf>

⁷ Teoman Pamukçu, Ahmet Hasim Köse, 'L'Économie grise', in *La Turquie*, ed. Samih Vaner, Paris 2005. pp. 468–470.

⁸ The agricultural sector (in contrast to Poland) also has a significant share in generating added value in the economy, up to almost 12% in 2003 (compared to 3% in Poland), although the values are not really comparable. In absolute values, Turkey has the largest agricultural population among all the other candidates to EU membership. On the other hand, the agricultural employment share in employment as a whole is higher in Romania than in Turkey. It is worth adding that as recently as the early 1980s, most professionally active people in Turkey worked in the agricultural sector. OECD, OECD in Figures 2005 Edition, Paris 2006.

⁹ A discussion of this subject has been presented among other documents in the European Commission's Turkey 2005 Progress Report; http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/report_2005/pdf/package/sec_1426_final_en_progress_report_tr.pdf

¹⁰ International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA Countries. Turkey 2005 Review, Paris 2005.

¹¹ US Department of State, 2005 Investment Climate Statement: Turkey, <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifa/2005/>

¹² Doing Business in 2007, <http://www.doingbusiness.org/EconomyRankings/Default.aspx?direction=asc&sort=1>

¹³ The ranking considers the following criteria: property rights, regulation, informal economy, prices and wages, banking and finance, foreign investments, fiscal policy, state interventionism, trade and taxes. Heritage Foundation, 2007 Index of Economic Freedom, <http://www.heritage.org>

¹⁴ World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report for the Republic of Turkey for the Period FY 2004 – 2007, 2005, World Bank, Turkey – Country Economic Memorandum, Report No. 33549-TR, 2006, <http://www.worldbank.org.tr>

¹⁵ World Bank, Turkey – Labor Market Study, Report No. 33254-TR, 2006, www.worldbank.org.tr

¹⁶ European Commission, Communication from the Commission. Enlargement Strategy Paper, COM (2005) 561, Brussels, 9 November 2005.