

THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER

Confidence-Building Measures
in Latin America

A joint project of the Henry L. Stimson Center and FLACSO-Chile.

Edited by
Augusto Varas, James A. Schear, Lisa Owens

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Pragmatic steps toward ideal objectives



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The Henry L. Stimson Center
21 Dupont Circle, NW
Fifth Floor
Washington, DC 20036
tel 202-223-5956 *fax* 202-785-9034
e-mail info@stimson.org
<http://www.stimson.org/pub/stimson/index.htm>

Preface

With the ebbing of cold war-era confrontations, the international community has witnessed an upsurge of regional diplomacy aimed at promoting stability, arms control, and conflict resolution. In regions such as the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific, old barriers are being broken down and new structures of peaceful cooperation are emerging. But nowhere is this trend more prominent than in Latin America and its various subregions, especially the Southern Cone states.

Though more tranquil and democratic than at any point in its recent past, Latin America faces many challenges. The states of the region continue to wrestle with the problems created by extremes of wealth and poverty and by ongoing disputes over territorial claims, resource exploitation, border demarcation, and uncontrolled flows of populations across borders. There are also lingering suspicions created by years of hostility, isolation, and military rule. It is therefore very encouraging that the states of the region are making major efforts to engage each other in new diplomatic efforts aimed at creating a more cooperative basis for international security in this hemisphere. Other regions in which tensions are rife could profitably review the progress made in Latin America.

Confidence-building measures (CBMs) are an important part of the current diplomatic dialogue. CBMs are agreed military or non-military measures to enhance mutual understanding, convey non-hostile intentions, define acceptable norms of behavior, and allay excessive fears and suspicions. CBMs, above all, are flexible instruments and are best tailored to local conditions. They were very successful in helping to shape Europe's emergence from the shadows of the cold war. Other regions have begun to explore the utility of CBMs and, where practical, to adapt them to specific needs and challenges.

As this volume makes clear, Latin America generally is an auspicious venue for CBMs, and a number of states in the region already have considerable experience in CBMs of certain types. The core principles of CBMs—greater openness, transparency, and communication—not only are intrinsically attractive to many, but they also accord with the general trend favoring democracy and cooperation that is so clearly evident in the region. Yet, the test of CBMs, as with any negotiated measures, is in their implementation and impact. How best can confidence be built? What are the larger implications of CBMs for civil-military relations in the region as well as for restraint in the acquisition of weapons and dual-use technology? How should the benefits and burdens associated with CBMs of various types be weighed?

The Henry L. Stimson Center, working together with the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences—Chile (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, FLACSO), co-sponsored a conference of leading academics and military officers to investigate the applicability of CBMs to the security problems faced by Latin American states. This event, held in Santiago, Chile, in August 1992, was notable for the dialogue it inspired and for a number of highly informative papers by regional experts on various aspects of the CBMs issue. These papers, in updated form, were published in mid-1994 by FLACSO-Chile under the title *Medidas de Confianza Mutua en América Latina*. In this volume, we present a

cross-section of the papers, in excerpted form and translated into English, for a readership in North America and other regions.

I wish to take this opportunity to thank Dr. Augusto Varas, the Research Director of FLACSO-Chile, and his staff for organizing and hosting the Santiago meeting. James Schear assumed most of the burden of editing these papers for a North American audience. The editing work of Lisa Owens was also instrumental. Steve Wolfe, Jill Junnola, and Jane Dorsey assisted in the preparation of the finished product. We also appreciate the work of Katty Kaufmann, who assisted us as a consultant to the Stimson Center in the translation of these essays.

Finally, I wish to absolve all the authors from any inaccuracies that may have crept into their papers as a result of the process of translating and editing their written work.

Michael Krepon
President
Henry L. Stimson Center

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List of Abbreviations

AMAS	South Atlantic Maritime Area
ANAU	Argentine Southern Naval Area
CBMs	Confidence-building Measures
CONJEFAMER	Annual Conference of American Air Force Chiefs
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
FLACSO	Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences–Chile
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
MERCOSUR	Common Market of the South (Economic Bloc of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay)
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
OAS	Organization of American States
ONUSCA	United Nations Observer Group in Central America
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SICOFAA	Cooperation System Among American Air Forces
START	Strategic Arms Reductions Talks
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

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Security and Cooperation in Post-Cold War Latin America

Augusto Varas

As the cold war drew to a close, many analysts predicted that the strategic changes taking place around the globe would soon make themselves felt in Latin America. They believed that a new global strategic order could be extended throughout the Western Hemisphere in a balanced and synchronized manner—in step with emerging economic and political trends—leading to a reduction in regional tensions.

Several broad changes made it possible to think along these lines. First, the abatement of ideological tensions meant that the nations of Latin America were no longer forced to choose sides in the East–West conflict, i.e. to support the superpowers in conflicts beyond the scope of their own national and regional interests. Second, as authoritarian and totalitarian regimes gave way to democratic systems of government, the region as a whole saw a dramatic reduction in political tensions. Currently, the vast majority of Latin American governments are democratic—undoubtedly generating a more positive climate for regional understanding.

Third, along with these political changes, the countries of the region became more heterogeneous in their geo-economic systems, manifested through broad differences in economic development strategy. This contrasts with the uniform geo-strategic economic policies typical of the cold war period. Many believed that the de facto “continentalization” of North America (Mexico, Canada, Caribbean) and bilateral free trade agreements between countries in the region would result in a “post-Hispanic” Latin America, characterized by a greater diversity of interests but united by common economic activities. Within this context, additional weight was given to the argument for establishing a new regional order, particularly in the political-strategic field. Fourth, new issues emerged, such as environmental protection and the fight against drug trafficking. Although these new concerns affect regional security, they should nonetheless be treated separately from military issues.

Despite the global easing of tensions and the aforementioned changes, these trends have not been manifested in Latin America to the extent forecasted at the end of the 1980s. In addition, contrary to projections, recurrent outbreaks of inter- and intra-state conflict have occurred in the post-cold war period. Examples include the protracted conflicts in the former Soviet republics, the Balkans, the Middle East, Asia and, to a lesser extent, Latin America. In fact, the level of concentration of military force has increased at the regional level as a result of nuclear proliferation, the development of strategic ballistic weapons, the expansion of the arms industry in various regions of the world (as in Southeast Asia), and the increased pressure to transfer overstocked weapons from the arsenals of the major powers as they disarm.

Overly optimistic projections as to the impact of the end of the cold war on the Western Hemisphere, coupled with the belief that Latin America was less prone to military crisis than other areas, led to the faulty conclusion that peace was at hand in the region.

Although the end of the cold war brought drastic reductions in the military budgets of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and former Warsaw Pact nations, these changes have not been duplicated in Latin America. With the exception of the 1952–1960 time period, Latin America was never involved as a major force in the cold war. Thus, the “thaw” has not affected fundamental regional interests or local defense policies; any changes have been due to other factors. Furthermore, the lack of explicit threats has not led to the elimination of tensions and crises, which in the recent past would have required an indirect show of military force for the achievement of diplomatic solutions.

Furthermore, the foreign policy strategies of the Latin American countries, with the exception of Argentina and Brazil, do not reflect an interest in European-style integration. In light of this, such a system cannot be considered as an efficient framework for managing the complex interactions of cooperation and conflict among the nations of the region.

In addition, for a variety of reasons, the axiom that democracies do not wage war against each other does not apply to Latin America. First, a corollary to that axiom notes that wars between democracies and non-democracies (common in the region) are more violent; second, democratic stability is not permanent; third, the region’s democracies have indeed faced off militarily (Ecuador–Peru); and fourth, despite the harmony we seek to achieve, *malgré nous*, democracies must practice deterrence against other democracies. Thus, the region clearly needs to rethink its strategic-political attitudes and to attain a perspective which recognizes the reality of conflict, but seeks to resolve it through the necessary and desirable relations of cooperation.

Steps Toward Cooperative Security

One such area of cooperation can be found in regional security. It might be argued that peace within the region is limited in its definition by the possibility of collective action against a common enemy. However, this theory fails to consider that there is no history of collective action in the region; that current market conditions encourage a spirit of individualism among nations; and that with the end of the cold war, a common enemy no longer exists. Substituting drug trafficking or other social ills for communism only serves to aggravate—rather than resolve—the problem.

Given that military capability—among other factors—is a fundamental component of national defense, regional arms limitation agreements are a necessity for the nations of Latin America. First, no economy can support an uncontrolled expansion in military spending. The impact of such expenditures in the former USSR and the United States is a case in point. Second, technological modernization is a functional necessity of defense. Finally, levels of regional military equilibrium are dynamic; each nation has a natural tendency to develop its military capacity, while also taking into account the military strength of neighboring countries. Compared with that of other regions, however, the limited scale of Latin America’s military industry has meant that its impact on overall levels of equilibrium has been minimal.

Nonetheless, expansion in military-oriented industries can affect perceptions of the regional status quo. Initiatives and regional systems aimed at limiting weapons are therefore needed. These serve primarily as a mechanism for controlling the “arms race” among countries, while preventing equipment modernization programs from disturbing

existing balances of power and from provoking negative reactions abroad. Such systems also permit an ongoing process of technology transfer, conducted in a stable and low-cost fashion through specific arms control agreements.

Given that peace in the region must depend on international systems of cooperation, an important step toward that goal can be taken by increasing professionalism within the military. Today's emerging conceptual and political frameworks place a premium on initiatives that are limited rather than all-encompassing, more functional than geographic, and more *ad hoc* than systematic. Coordination of government policies (including those of the United States) with these shared perspectives is the only guarantee for a lasting peace in the hemisphere. However, to ensure that this professionalization does not translate into tensions and inter-state conflict, non-confrontational mechanisms for military interaction in the region must be devised.

This means supplanting the present rigid, inefficient, obsolete system of hemispheric security institutions with flexible, sub-regional systems in line with the new interests of Latin America. The obsolescence of the Rio Treaty (TIAR), the absence of an appropriate relationship between the Inter-American Defense Council and the Organization of American States (OAS), the lack of effective mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of regional conflict, and the shortage of means for monitoring the levels of military equilibrium in the region call for new solutions.

To resolve these problems, some analysts have proposed maintaining or expanding the existing system of hemispheric security. However, reliance on these same mechanisms does not promise a future any more peaceful than the past. Moreover, broadening the definitions and objectives of hemispheric security to include political and social topics would only serve to overburden an already inefficient system, and, in addition, would grant the armed forces an excessive role in matters beyond the scope of their professional responsibilities. As a result, new forms of defensive-deterrent alliances must be found which effectively address common interests in light of contemporary threats.

One such option is to develop specific systems for sub-regional security among nations confronting particular situations or threats. Such constellations of agreements—in conjunction with already existing systems found to be successful—would permit the implementation of a variety of strategies: for example, to support joint inter-American operations in other regions of the world within the framework of the United Nations (UN); to develop proposals for an inter-American navy to patrol jurisdictional waters and for joint naval forces in territorial seas; or to reduce the armed forces' participation in the struggle against drug trafficking to a secondary role.

These sub-regional groupings should be supported by an inter-American system for the peaceful resolution of conflict. This would entail: strengthening the inter-American legal system and the OAS; increasing confidence-building measures (CBMs) between neighboring states; and fostering ongoing sub-regional military cooperation. With these measures, the Latin American nations, the United States, and Canada could create a strategic order for the hemisphere in accord with the new economic and political trends emerging with the advent of the 21st century.

The factors mentioned above—along with the development of crisis situations and the need to avert an exponential growth in conflicts—have led to an increased tendency

toward the peaceful resolution of controversies. The rapidly expanding role of the UN in fostering and building peace, through its observation, peacekeeping and supervisory missions in Somalia, Cambodia, the Persian Gulf and El Salvador, bears witness to this phenomenon.

Furthermore, a variety of multilateral efforts have been implemented to control, limit, and eradicate weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, biological, and nuclear arms as well as ballistic missiles. Considerable support has been generated within the international community for world-wide disarmament and arms control treaties. Since 1987 the number of signatories to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has risen from 136 to 166, while the number of nations adhering to the Biological Weapons Convention has increased from 107 to 131, and the number of signatories to the Convention on Inhumane Weapons has risen from 25 to 41.

In Latin America, a similar phenomenon has taken place. The Mendoza Commitment prohibits the production, development, storage, and transfer of biological and chemical weapons; the Declaration of Cartagena renounces the possession, production, development, use, and transfer of all weapons of mass destruction; and the amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which encouraged ratification by countries who had not yet approved the accord, constitute significant steps toward strengthening peaceful cooperation in the region. In fact, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, longtime hold-outs, have each brought the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force, and Cuba has announced that it will sign the treaty. In addition, negotiations on disputed borders have led to agreements on long-standing controversies.

Despite this progress, the potential for intra-Latin American conflict has not decreased significantly as a result of the end of the cold war. On the contrary, as the apparently common terms for hemispheric strategic unity have disappeared with the demise of global military bipolarity, the traditional geo-strategic interests of the Latin American nations have reemerged. Within this context, the potential role of CBMs in averting conflict and reducing the intensity of potential crises is greatly enhanced.

Confidence-building Measures and Their Application in Central America

Jack Child

This chapter examines confidence-building measures (CBMs) both from the theoretical perspective as well as in terms of their application to the Central American peace process from the early 1980s to date.¹ It is important to note from the outset that CBMs cannot resolve the basic causes of a conflict, nor will they lead to a utopian state of total disarmament. But they can make the breakout of conflict less likely by diminishing the chances that an accident, a misunderstanding, or the misreading of a potential adversary's intentions will lead to military confrontations.

In the context of hemispheric security, one should also note that CBMs have existed probably since the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when most of the larger nations of the continent obtained their independence. Interstate relations between neighboring countries in the Hemisphere have not always been smooth, and one can trace CBMs that have helped avoid conflict during the last century and a half. What is new in the last decade or so is the explicit application of CBM concepts, techniques, and vocabulary to certain conflict situations, and most especially to the Central American one. Somehow these concepts, techniques, and vocabulary were, for the first time, transferred (with appropriate modifications) from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-Warsaw Pact environment—to which, until the 1980s, they were largely confined—to a very different conflict situation in the Western Hemisphere. One can imagine the Central American peace negotiators in the late 1980s running down a checklist of possible CBMs they might use in drafting the instruments for establishing and verifying the Central American peace accords.

Furthermore, the apparent success of the peace process in Nicaragua, and its extension into El Salvador (and possibly Guatemala), has served as a powerful example to those who would try to negotiate or mediate other conflict situations in the Hemisphere. The Central American peace process itself has left a rich legacy of CBMs, which continue to appear in varied documents, such as the 1991 Honduran proposal for an overarching Central American security treaty, and in the many documents and reports of the Esquipulas Security Commission.

Throughout the Hemisphere, one finds examples of CBMs. The Organization of American States (OAS) itself, at its June 1991 General Assembly in Santiago, passed a resolution on security matters that contains implicit and explicit CBMs; the OAS Perma-

1. This chapter draws on the author's prior work in this area, especially the chapter "A Confidence-building Approach to Resolving Central American Conflicts," in Jack Child, *Conflict in Central America: Approaches to Peace and Security*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), and Jack Child, *The Central American Peace Process, 1983-1991: Sheathing Swords, Building Confidence* (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992). The support of the International Peace Academy and the US Institute of Peace in this process is gratefully acknowledged.

ment Council's Working Group on Cooperation for Hemisphere Security has expanded on many of these ideas in its proposals.² In addition, numerous examples exist at the bilateral level in which CBM theory and practice have been applied between pairs of states that have had strains, and even wars, in the distant and recent past: Venezuela–Colombia, Ecuador–Peru, Peru–Chile, Chile–Argentina, Brazil–Argentina, and Argentina–United Kingdom.³

At the same time, some confusion and lack of understanding remains about what CBMs are and what they can do. Some over-enthusiastic proponents label almost anything (be it economic, social, cultural, or tourism-related in nature) that increases interstate contacts as a “CBM.” CBMs also have their detractors, including important segments of the military, who sometimes view CBMs as the thin edge of the wedge of attempts by civilians to diminish their role, their budgets, or their arms purchases.

These considerations suggest that a systematic examination of the origin, nature, promise, and limitations of CBMs, and their use in Central America, would be a fruitful and worthwhile endeavor.

The Nature and Origin of CBMs

CBMs originate in an international environment in which tension and mistrust exist between potential adversaries who lack adequate information on their enemy's intentions and even their military capabilities. In these circumstances the instinctive reaction of the strategic planner is to use “worst-case” analysis, in which the adversary's capabilities are usually exaggerated and its intentions are assumed to be aggressive. This leads the planner to recommend increasing forces and taking equally, or more, aggressive stances. This response in turn may be read by the adversary as a threat that must be matched by further buildups. If unchecked, this cycle spirals upward in the face of strong incentives on both sides to improve one's own capabilities and surround these capabilities (and their intended use) with secrecy. With weapons available, and with leaders informed by pessimistic, worst-case scenarios, there is an increased possibility that some accident, irresponsible act, or random event may lead to an outbreak of hostilities owing to misperceptions or misunderstandings by one or both adversaries.

In this type of hostile environment the role of CBMs is to reduce the risk of conflict by making capabilities obvious, by signaling intentions, and by moving back down the

2. For example, in February 1992 an OAS draft committee document revealed the nontraditional nature of its focus by defining a broad security concept that would include such items as cooperation for security; confidence-building mechanisms to strengthen security; democratic stability; human rights; economic security; protection of the environment; reduction of critical poverty; non-proliferation and control of unconventional weapons; transparency in arms transfers; nonintervention; and cooperation in the struggle against drugs. The specific references to “confidence-building mechanisms” and “transparency in arms transfers” are clear indications of the significance of CBMs in contemporary Latin American thinking on security issues.

3. An illustration of how the language of CBMs has penetrated the discourse of diplomacy is found in the words of President Carlos Menem of Argentina on his signing a joint nuclear cooperation agreement with Brazil: “A lack of transparency made us dangerous and untrustworthy (in the past) on nuclear matters.” Cited in *Chicago Tribune*, 3 May 1992, 21.

mutually reinforcing spiral of mistrust, secrecy, and tension. If successful in these endeavors, CBMs can also contribute to a reduction in levels of armament by reducing threats and threat perceptions. It is necessary to stress, however, that CBMs cannot by themselves lead to total disarmament—or to levels of force so low that a surprise attack or unforeseen contingency could endanger the security of a nation. This latter aspect can become a sore point in the internal domestic debate between a nation's civilian and military institutions, especially in the Latin American context. When the nation involved is one that has recently returned to an elected democratic government after years of de facto military rule, CBMs may be interpreted by the military as a vehicle for reducing its budget and influence to the point where the military might no longer be able to perform its basic mission of defending the sovereignty of the state. In this situation it is not unreasonable to argue that a necessary step is to build confidence between the military and civilian institutions involved so as to permit a healthy examination of appropriate force levels and arms purchases.

Historical Development

CBMs of some kind have probably always existed, but the specific use of the term dates back to the 1950s and the early days of the cold war between the Western Bloc (NATO, led by the United States) and the Eastern Bloc (the Warsaw Pact, led by the Soviet Union). Notions of "Open Skies" and other types of inspections dominated these early days of CBMs. During and after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the need for better communications between the superpowers was seen as an essential element in reducing the risk of a nuclear war resulting from misunderstanding. Consequently, a permanent, direct "hot-line" teletype and phone link was established between Washington and Moscow. Much more elaborate and detailed CBMs emerged from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The 1975 Helsinki CSCE agreements, for example, laid out complex and precise requirements for notification of certain types of troop movements and maneuvers. In more recent years the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Talks (START) also included CBMs and verification provisions.

As mentioned earlier, the transfer (and adaptation) of these cold war superpower CBMs to the conflict situations of Central America, situations much less devastating militarily, took place in the 1980s. Only in the last few years has their demonstrated applicability to such low-intensity conflicts made their use attractive in other Hemisphere security situations.

The potential value of these CBM techniques was highlighted in the seminal June 1992 special report of the United Nations (UN) Secretary General.

Measures to build confidence. Mutual confidence and good faith are essential to reducing the likelihood of conflict between States. Many such measures are available to Governments that have the will to employ them. Systematic exchange of military missions, formation of regional or subregional risk reduction centers, arrangements for the free flow of information, including the monitoring of regional arms agreements, are examples. I ask all regional organizations to consider what further confidence-building measures might be applied in their areas and to inform the United Nations of the results. I will undertake periodic consultations on confidence-building

measures with parties to potential, current or past disputes and with regional organizations, offering such advisory assistance as the Secretariat can provide.⁴

Features of Successful CBMs

CBMs should have the following features, regardless of the level at which they operate, in order to be effective:

Transparency and openness. The message CBMs convey should be obvious and unambiguous; the possibility of hiding or deceiving others about a military capability or intention should be minimized. A powerful related argument is for the presence of a neutral and credible verification system that would convince both parties that little would be gained by attempting to hide or deceive, since the verification system would eventually find them out. To be effective, such monitoring might involve high-technology detection, the means of which might reside with third party neutral states or international organizations.

Predictability and reliability. The parties involved should be convinced that aggressive actions on their part, or on the part of their adversary, will be revealed quickly and accurately in a predictable way. CBMs should inspire the parties with confidence that they will have sufficient time not only to respond adequately in their own defense but also to bring to bear the full weight of international public opinion.

Reciprocity and balance. Measures taken by one side should logically and naturally lead to similar measures on the other side in a mutually balanced and symmetrical manner. One side's commitment to a given CBM should be matched by the other side as a quid pro quo to avoid a perception of imbalanced concessions by either side.

Adequate communications. CBMs require, in the technical sense, an appropriate number of communications channels between potential adversaries, with built-in redundancy in case of interruptions. In the psychological sense CBMs require the existence of a mental "pigeonhole" that is ready and willing to accept the message transmitted. In other words, the message must be expected, credible, and logical to the recipient.

The Analogy of the Two Swordsmen

One analyst⁵ has proposed a useful analogy to illustrate some of the salient features of CBMs: that of two swordsmen who do not wish to fight but who find themselves face to face, with swords drawn. Neither is willing to back down in such a way that might mean submitting, or accepting defeat. As a result, the process of backing off involves a series of small, slow, verifiable, and mutually symmetrical steps that are silently and openly communicated to the adversary in the expectation that each cumulative step will elicit a positive response. The first step is crucial: it may only be a minimal move

4. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General, United Nations, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy & Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, A/47/277, 17 June 1992.

5. Jonathan Alford, "Confidence-building Measures," *Adelphi Papers*, no. 149 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979).

backward, but it must be unambiguous and responded to in kind. Both swordsmen still have their guard up and can immediately move to an attack position if circumstances warrant. Given that the second swordsman has responded with a movement backward of approximately equal distance, then the process can be repeated until the adversaries are out of striking range. At this point the swords can slowly be lowered in a mutually verifiable way. Should either individual move to attack, there is enough time and space for the other one to recover his "on guard" position. After a suitable time has elapsed, the swordsmen can sheathe their weapons, unbuckle their scabbards, and lay their weapons on the ground, if they so desire, since they can also constantly watch the potential adversary to see if a hostile action needs to be countered.

This analogy to international relations and interstate tensions is, of course, imperfect, but it does capture some of the essential elements of successful CBMs: transparency, openness, predictability, reliability, mutuality, symmetry, balance, communication, and verification.

The Relationship of CBMs to Other Conflict Resolution Approaches

Confidence-building measures must be examined in the context of other approaches to conflict prevention and resolution. One such approach involves the use of an outside military force to impose peace, to separate warring parties, to verify a treaty, or to observe. This type of approach is described below (and in Figure 1, p. 13) by means of the definitions of peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peace verification, and peace observation. A second approach tries to resolve the immediate or basic causes of the conflict, and attempts also, through CBMs, to make the outbreak of conflict less likely. This second approach is described below (and in Figure 2, p. 14) by means of the definitions for peace-building, peacemaking, and CBMs.

The interrelated nature of these various components is the essential key to effective conflict resolution. Interposition by outside military force can serve only as a short-term step to gain the time needed by diplomats and other "helpful fixers" to negotiate, arbitrate, mediate, or conciliate between the parties in conflict; it alone will not guarantee enduring peace. A basic element in the establishment of a lasting peace is a development effort (peace-building) to eliminate the fundamental economic and social causes of many of the conflicts involved. Present throughout all of these steps towards peace is the need for CBMs that lower the likelihood of conflict breaking out owing to misunderstandings or misreadings of intentions and capabilities, as described above.⁶

Peace enforcement is the employment of major military units, under the aegis of the United Nations or another international organization, to impose peace by overpowering one or more of the parties involved in the conflict. Chapter 7 of the UN Charter provides for peace enforcement in a situation that is a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression." Article 42 of the charter authorizes the Security Council to

6. Major-General (ret.) Indar Jit Rikhye, *Strengthening UN Peacekeeping* (Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace, 1992), especially 25-26.

take necessary military action to restore or maintain peace and security. The related Article 43 provides for UN member states to make available military forces for UN use, under the control of the UN Security Council, acting with the advice of the Military Staff Committee. In practice, the only use of this provision came in 1950, during the Korean War, when the temporary boycott of the Security Council by the Soviet Union permitted the remaining members to vote to approve such a force. Throughout the rest of the cold war, the reality of a veto by one or more of the five Security Council powers blocked the possibility of peace enforcement under Chapter 7. The UN came close to peace enforcement during the Gulf War, but stopped short, choosing instead to permit a coalition of member states to act on the UN's behalf to force Iraq out of Kuwait. A number of states, since the disappearance of the Soviet Union and perhaps in consideration of the lessons of the Gulf War, have proposed that the UN take a more aggressive stance on issues of peace and security, to include the invoking of Article 42 and Article 43 of the charter and perhaps even the establishment of standby military forces available for immediate use by the Security Council. In a far-reaching report of June 1992, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali explored this possibility and discussed the notion of using such forces as an adjunct to preventive diplomacy.⁷ He also emphasized the need for CBMs, at the global, regional, and bilateral levels.

Peacekeeping involves the prevention and termination of hostilities through the peaceful presence of a neutral third party. The peacekeeping contingent (which can include military and civilian personnel) does not seek to enforce peace or impose solutions to the conflict by sheer power. Instead, it attempts to create the conditions that would lead to dialogue and eventual resolution of the conflict. In short, its mission is to create space and time in which to allow the combatants to cool off and to permit the diplomats to do their work. Thus, peacekeeping is *not* the settlement of a dispute by an overwhelming supranational force intent on imposing an outside solution to a conflict. Nor does it stem from collective security sanctions in which an alliance's military response is triggered by an act of aggression. The definition of peacekeeping based on the peaceful presence of a third-party neutral is more specific than the rather loose usage under which almost any military action intended to produce peace is called "peacekeeping." In recent years this looser definition has been applied in, for example, the 1992 UN effort in the former Yugoslavia, the intervention in Liberia by a group of neighboring countries (ECOMOG, the military arm of the Economic Council of West African States), the ill-fated US Marine presence in Lebanon in 1983, and President Ronald Reagan's naming of an intercontinental ballistic missile "the Peacekeeper."

Peace observation shares the same basic purpose as peacekeeping but is usually a much smaller effort, a characteristic that in turn affects its techniques and functions in the field. Peacekeeping contingents may range from several hundred to several thousand troops. Peace-observing missions are much smaller and may consist of only one or two persons whose function is to serve as the eyes and ears of the international organization or ad hoc group that sent them to the scene of the conflict. Their ability to

7. Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*.

interpose themselves between the opposing sides is obviously very limited, and their function is usually only to investigate, observe, and report.

Peace-building is the development effort that attempts to ameliorate conflict by improving social and economic conditions and meeting fundamental human needs. The assumption is that economic and social injustices must be addressed in order to provide the basis for a permanent solution to conflict. Although peace-building has traditionally focused on economic and social conditions, it also has a security dimension (military, political, and diplomatic) in the sense that cooperative development efforts will increase mutual trust, and build confidence, thereby making future conflicts less likely.

Peacemaking, frequently called “peaceful settlement of disputes,” is that collection of diplomatic techniques and institutions available to resolve conflicts through negotiation, mediation, amelioration, arbitration, and conciliation. This field belongs more to the statesman and international jurist than to the military or civilian peacekeeper in the field.

Confidence-building measures, as already indicated, are certain techniques that are designed to lower tensions and make the breakout of conflict less likely owing to a misunderstanding, mistake, or misreading of the actions of a potential adversary.

The Contadora/Arias/Esquipulas peace process in Central America from 1983 to date has emphasized two additional notions stemming from the Latin American response to this regional problem. These two ideas, described below, have become so integral to the diplomatic search for a Central American peace, as well as to the academic analysis of that process, that they merit consideration as Latin American contributions to conflict resolution theory and practice.

Peace verification is that effort by a third-party neutral contingent to assure an international organization or ad hoc group of peacemakers that the conditions of a signed peace treaty are being complied with. The scope of peace verification and monitoring is broader than simple peace observation because of the magnitude and complexity of the geography and forces involved; peace verification is also a more aggressive process than peace observation, which passively reports on events. It implies frequent and unpredictable movement and patrolling, supplemented by technological means to broaden the area and the targets of the process. It is, however, less intrusive than traditional peacekeeping because there is no effort to interpose the contingent physically between the possible adversaries, and the size of the verification and monitoring group is substantially smaller than a traditional peacekeeping group. The Latin American sensitivity to the terms “peacekeeping” and “peacekeeping force” makes the use of “peace verification” a much more attractive concept and helps explain why this usage predominated in much of the debate over the Central American peace process.

Zones of peace are extensive geographic areas in which explicit CBMs have succeeded to the point that the various parties in the region have significantly lowered their levels of arms, while external military powers have been persuaded to reduce their military influence in the area to a minimum. The concepts of disarmament, interdependence, and integration are closely related to the notion of a zone of peace, as is the idea of keeping external influences out and letting the nations of the region work out their own destinies. Some zones of peace can also be considered “CBM regimes” because of

their reliance on CBMs as their foundation. Metaphorically, the Central American zone of peace has been described as one seeking to build "peace dominoes," in a pointed contrast with the notion of "conflict dominoes."⁸

The Hemisphere already has two other zones of peace, established by the Tlatelolco Treaty, which proscribes nuclear weapons in Latin America, and the Antarctic Treaty, which has succeeded in keeping the continent of Antarctica (one quarter of which is closely associated with South America) demilitarized for more than thirty years. The 1982 Anglo-Argentine war over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands led to several proposals (including UN General Assembly resolutions) for the South Atlantic to be declared a zone of peace, but this idea was more hortatory than real and was opposed by the United States on the grounds that such a zone would be inconsistent with generally accepted principles of freedom of navigation and innocent passage.⁹

Recently some very original Latin American strategic thinking has focused on building new security arrangements based on zones of peace. These new geopolitical concepts would give the region greater autonomy in its own defense based on disarmament, withdrawal of outside powers, and CBMs. Although primarily arising from the work of an unofficial "South American Peace Commission," this new strategic thinking has also focused on Central America and on a proposal to make the Caribbean a "Sea of Peace."¹⁰

These semantic considerations of peacekeeping and associated concepts can perhaps be better appreciated in the graphical representations that follow. Presented in Figure 1 is a spectrum of third-party interposition roles (with historical examples), from the minimal one-person peace observer through a larger peace verification mission, a traditional peacekeeping mission, and finally a massive peace enforcement intervention. It should be noted that there is a quantum leap (indicated by the broken line) when one crosses over into peace enforcement, because at this point the peace enforcers themselves become potential adversaries in the conflict, and the chances for long-term peaceful resolution diminish markedly.


Depicted in Figure 2 are the different levels at which one can address the basic causes of conflict once the keepers, verifiers, or observers of peace have been interposed to act as third-party neutrals. At the surface level the process of peacemaking attempts to find a diplomatic solution to the specific conflict at hand. At an intermediate level, CBMs try to reduce the likelihood of conflict owing to misunderstanding or accident. At the most profound level the development process of peace-building tries to resolve the fundamental socioeconomic causes of injustice and conflict.

8. The idea of "peace dominoes" is used in Fernando Cepeda, *Democracia y Desarrollo en América Latina* (Buenos Aires: GEL, 1985).

9. *The Washington Post*, 15 November 1988, A27.

10. Juan Somavía and José Miguel Insulza, *Seguridad Democrática Regional: Una Concepción Alternativa* (Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, 1990); Augusto Varas, *La Política de las Armas en América Latina* (Santiago: FLACSO, 1988); Carlos Portales, "Zona de Paz: Una Alternativa a los Desafíos Estratégicos de América Latina," *Cuadernos Semestrales* 15 [1984].

Figure 1: A Conflict Resolution Spectrum




Source: Jack Child, *The Central American Peace Process, 1983-1991: Sheathing Swords, Building Confidence* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992).

The Limitations of CBMs

A realistic assessment of the limitations and problems associated with CBMs is important because without it there is a risk of expecting too much from CBMs—and of then becoming disillusioned with the whole notion when they seemingly fail to deliver. A basic limitation is that CBMs themselves cannot solve conflict. This is especially true if the conflict has deep underlying economic, political, and social causes. At most, as explained earlier, CBMs can lower the likelihood of conflict breaking out. CBMs are, after all, an element of what conflict resolution specialists call “negative peace,” in that they are associated with the absence of war and not with the resolution of the basic roots of tensions. To reach their full effectiveness, CBMs must be accompanied by diplomatic efforts to lower tensions (peacemaking), and, fundamentally, by the “positive peace” development effort aimed at the basic root causes of the conflict (peace-building).

A second, and related, limitation of CBMs is that they depend on a genuine desire for peace by all concerned. At the rhetorical level almost all parties to a conflict publicly proclaim their wish for peace. However, CBMs and other conflict resolution approaches have little chance of success if even one of the parties involved believes in the cost-effectiveness of aggression, or is compelled to act in accordance with uncompromising ideological beliefs, or envisions conflict as a zero-sum game in which its chances of benefiting are significant. CBMs are also subject to potential manipulation by aggressive states that wish to cloak their intentions through controlled transparency and limited verification access to some of their capabilities. While proclaiming peaceful intentions and permitting verification and access to only a portion of their deployed forces, they could gain time to prepare for a surprise aggressive act.

Figure 2: Addressing the Basic Causes of Conflict



Source: Jack Child, *The Central American Peace Process, 1983-1991: Sheathing Swords, Building Confidence* (Boulder, Colo. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992).

CBMs also have limitations related to pace and speed. The swordsmen's analogy suggests that the pace of effective CBMs is slow because each step must be observed and verified by the other party before a corresponding next step is taken. The success of these first steps in the CBM process is enhanced if the measures involved are relatively simple and nonthreatening, such as social contacts or mutual visits. Critics of CBMs are tempted to describe these as meaningless moves with little impact on the conflict and to argue impatiently that more basic and overarching measures should be taken, and quickly. Such an approach, however, would be unlikely to lead to lasting results and might undermine the whole CBM process.

The effectiveness of CBMs is also delimited by the prevailing international situation and by tensions (or détente) among major powers, as well as by the relationship between the immediate parties to the conflict. Thus, during the cold war any CBMs between pairs of Hemisphere states were influenced by their relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union. Once again, the caveat must be issued not to expect too much from CBMs if tensions are rampant in other aspects of global international relations.

CBMs inevitably involve military and intelligence personnel whose training has deeply conditioned them to mistrust potential adversaries and to take "worst-case" planning approaches toward the adversaries' capabilities and intentions. At the same time, these individuals have a strongly protective approach toward their own capabilities and limitations, to the point where revealing them is tantamount to treason. In extreme cases this felt need for secrecy will keep military and intelligence personnel from effectively communicating with their own civilian leadership. In cases where the military controls the government, indirectly or directly, this sense of secrecy may also be very strong, and is likely to keep the general public from knowing much about the capabilities, intentions, and plans of the military. Thus, a basic CBM is effective communication

between a nation's own military-intelligence apparatus and its civilians, be they political leaders or common citizens.

In the contemporary Latin American context CBMs confront the military establishment's historical resistance to civilians prying into its inner workings. There are relatively few Latin American academics (and even fewer US ones) with meaningful access to the military, to its discussions of "war hypotheses," or to its consideration of geopolitical factors involved in strategic planning. The Latin American military's fairly rigid hierarchical structure, and its general insistence that the only way to achieve key officer positions of senior rank is through a single military academy, makes it difficult for civilian academic and political leaders to engage in a meaningful dialogue with their military colleagues. If this limitation is to be overcome, the military's activities must become more "transparent" (to use a CBM term) to its own national civilian leadership, and the civil-military dialogue must be more open and frank through military advice to civilians as well as through the development of civilian experts who can work closely with the military.¹¹ The sending of military officers to civilian universities for graduate degrees, and attendance by civilians (both government and private sector) at national defense colleges, would also contribute to this goal.

In the 1990s the changing dynamic of civil-military relations in the Western Hemisphere has created another limitation for CBMs: They are seen by many military officers as a thinly disguised way of allowing the civilian political leadership to reduce military budgets and influence by arguing that the cold war is over and that, therefore, the military does not need as many weapons or troops. Unfortunately, much of the rhetoric that has emerged from discussions on disarmament and the cold war "peace dividend," as well as eloquent speeches at many UN forums, has stressed this link between reduced tensions and the reduction of military budgets, thus reinforcing the suspicions of the military establishment that this will be used as a rationale to limit its power and perquisites.

Apart from these suspicions, many professional military officers are unenthused about CBMs because these measures along with other conflict resolution approaches (such as peacekeeping, treaty verification, and peace observing) are not seen as part of the military's "heroic" mission of defending a nation's sovereignty. Indeed, CBMs are frequently perceived to be contrary to this tradition and as heading toward the "denaturing" of the military by making it less aggressive and by folding it into some sort of a supranational force that will weaken its ability to repel aggressors. To those military officers inclined toward conspiracy theories, CBMs and peacekeeping are sometimes seen as part of a neo-Marxist plot to weaken the military and facilitate the victory of the revolutionary Left.¹²

11. Paper (and subsequent discussions) by Rut Diamint, "Medidas de Confianza Mutua: Realizaciones y Propuestas para la Argentina" (Santiago: FLACSO-Stimson Center Conference, 11 August 1992) especially 4 and 18.

12. See Child, *The Central American Peace Process*, 161-62.

Many professional military officers dismiss CBMs as well-meaning public relations gestures by uninformed civilian diplomats and politicians who do not really understand the nature of military threats and strategic planning. The theory may be attractive, they would argue, but the reality is that threats and hostile neighbors do in fact exist and that no amount of CBMs can eliminate the possibility of conflict against which the military instrument must guard. CBMs that are linked to utopian schemes of disarmament, they would add, will eventually weaken the military and the state, lead to instability, and thus ultimately reduce confidence.

Finally, in the current context of Hemisphere relations, the fact that many new suggestions regarding CBMs are coming from US sources is seen as suspect. These ideas are sometimes perceived as yet another attempt by the “gringos to the North” to sell the Latin Americans another new concept on how to shape and control their military establishments. Senior professional military officers are especially resentful of this process, having endured successive US attempts over the past three decades to sell them the notions of Hemisphere security, civic action, counterinsurgency, counter-narcotics campaigns, and US-style civil-military relations. In a sense, therefore, there is also a need for CBMs between the United States and Latin America, and between the US and Latin American militaries. The old military-to-military relationship, never very deep-rooted at its best, has been undercut by human rights restrictions on arms sales, by the 1982 Malvinas/Falkland Islands conflict, and by attempts to shape the missions of the Latin American militaries by giving priority to the anti-drug effort. A typical response from the Latin American military establishment to CBMs, one that reflected these views, might be: The principal responsibility for improving the relationship (and creating greater confidence) lies with the stronger party (the United States). Further, in the specific case of the drug war the United States has a great many faults and weaknesses of its own to correct before accusing the Latins of being lax in their phase of the counter-drug wars.

CBMs in the Central American Peace Process

The presence and importance of CBMs in the Central American peace process can be tracked from its beginning at the Contadora meeting to the present.¹³

The historic first Contadora meeting of the foreign ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela, held on the Panamanian island of Contadora on 8–9 January 1983, dealt with general statements of concern and principles that would lead to a peaceful resolution of Central America’s several conflicts. The Contadora Declaration itself made an urgent appeal to the countries of Central America to engage in dialogue and negotiation so as to reduce tension and lay the foundations for a permanent environment of peaceful coexistence and mutual respect among states. Because of the very general nature of the meeting, the issue of verification was not discussed at Contadora. Thus, the CBMs at the first Contadora meeting were not at the specific and military level, but rather at the more abstract and broad level of calls for greater trust, contacts, and involvement among the various parties to the disputes.

13. This section draws extensively on the author’s *The Central American Peace Process*.

Six months later the presidents of the four Contadora nations met at the Mexican resort of Cancún to expand on the work of their foreign ministers. The 17 July 1983 Cancún Declaration was more specific and included several recommendations that explicitly incorporated CBMs as well as several other approaches to conflict resolution (for example, international third-party peacekeeping and verification). Security was a major concern of the Cancún Declaration, which focused on effectively controlling the arms race, ending arms trafficking, eliminating foreign military advisers, creating demilitarized zones, prohibiting the use of one state's territory to destabilize another's, and prohibiting other forms of interference in the internal affairs of countries in the region. The issue of verification was also given greater specificity in that the declaration mentioned the need to establish "appropriate supervisory machinery" to verify the security commitments.

CBMs also appear in the Cancún Declaration in the form of recommendations for joint boundary commissions and direct communications between governments, as well as in the recognition of the need to give prior notice of troop movements near frontiers when the contingents exceeded certain limits. The use of the phrase "commitment to promote a climate of détente and confidence" also reflects an increasingly specific appreciation of the utility of CBMs.

The Panama foreign ministers meeting of 7–9 September 1983 produced the "21 Objectives" Document which should be viewed as the foundation on which the subsequent draft treaties were built. The security objectives were the most controversial and were fairly specific. They included stopping the arms race (and initiating negotiations for the control and reduction of weapons and troops); eliminating foreign bases and foreign military advisers; establishing internal mechanisms to control arms trafficking; and preventing the use of national territory to destabilize other states or support acts of terrorism, subversion, or sabotage. The problem of effective verification remained unsolved by the 21 Objectives, and consideration of CBMs was more implicit than explicit.

The next significant meeting, at Panama on the first anniversary of Contadora (8–9 January 1984), produced the Principles for the Implementation of the Commitments Undertaken in the Document of Objectives, which contained greater specificity on issues of verification and confidence-building. Those principles that involved security issues were the most controversial at this meeting. These included inventories of arms, bases, and troops; the subsequent control and reduction of same; and a census of foreign military advisers ("with a view toward elimination"). One item that was dropped was a call for a moratorium on new arms acquisitions. There were several CBMs, some carried over from prior documents. One was "to establish direct communications mechanisms for the purpose of preventing and resolving incidents among states."

The years 1984 through 1986 saw the drafting of several Contadora acts, none of which succeeded in breaching the gap between the Nicaraguan position and that of the other Central American nations (especially those close to the US position). However, all of these drafts included CBMs and increasingly showed the impact of the advice and suggestions being provided by the Canadians. Many of these provisions dealt with verification and were also linked to the need for impartial third-party neutral treaty verifiers. The Canadians, reflecting their long experience with UN peacekeeping, strongly recommended that this issue be left in the hands of the UN, which could provide a credible

political mandate as well as a coherent logistical structure. The various Contadora drafts in these years tended to be incremental and included all (or most) of the verification and confidence-building provisions mentioned in the earlier declarations, draft treaties, and supplementary implementation documents. The CBMs involved communications links (hotlines), provisions for notification of troop movements, ceilings on certain types of weapons and troop units, exchange of information, arms and troop registries, and observation posts and joint patrolling along sensitive borders.

Most of these CBMs and verification provisions were picked up by the drafters of the so-called Arias Peace Plan in 1987, when at two key meetings (15 February and 7 August) the weakening Contadora process gave way to the Central Americans' own Esquipulas (Arias) peace plan. The Esquipulas approach included a Security Commission, which was charged with matters dealing with security, verification, control, and limitation of weapons. This commission, made up of civilian and military personnel from the five Central American nations (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua), had a sporadic existence until it was reactivated at the April 1990 Montelimar presidential summit meeting. From that point on it met (albeit sometimes irregularly) to discuss arms reductions, force levels, and the international military presence in the region. In the process it laid important foundations for CBMs and a possible zone of peace in Central America.

The process of demobilizing the Contras inside Nicaragua involved frequent applications of a variety of CBMs. In early and mid-1990 the UN peacekeeping presence, ONUCA (with significant military contributions from Canada and Spain, and its battalion of Venezuelan paratroop infantry)¹⁴ employed CBMs in its attempts to persuade the Contras to disarm and to keep communications open between the Contras, the Sandinistas, and the incoming Violeta Chamorro administration.

As the Contra demobilization process wound down in mid-1990 and the Chamorro government settled in, the Esquipulas Security Commission continued its work of attempting to establish an inventory of troops and arms and encouraging a broad range of multilateral CBMs. In parallel with the disarmament work of the Security Commission some progress was being made in developing bilateral CBMs. Some of these involved greater contacts between neighboring militaries, and in August 1990 General Daniel Ortega, president of Nicaragua, and General Arnulfo Cantarero, armed forces commander of Honduras, met in Managua as part of "the friendly rapprochement" between the two military institutions. They discussed support for the plan for proportional reduction and balance in the Central American armies, as well as security issues, such as disputes over the Gulf of Fonseca and fishing activities. This was followed by a November agreement to conduct joint operations to fight arms trafficking, contraband, and other criminal activity along the border. Nicaragua and Honduras also exchanged information on troop deployments to avert accidents.¹⁵

14. General de Brigada Alvaro R. Barboza Rodriguez, "El Ejercito Venezolano y el Proceso de Paz en Centroamerica," *Military Review* (September-October 1991): 39-45. For a Spanish perspective, see "España inspira confianza," *Revista Española de Defensa* (December 1991): 20-21.

15. Managua Domestic Service, 29 August 1990, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 30 Au-

Another CBM that was gathering momentum in this period was the Central American “peace parks” which would straddle borders and have ecological, economic, and security functions. The first was launched on the border between Costa Rica and Panama, and others were planned for Belize–Guatemala, Mexico–Guatemala, and Costa Rica–Nicaragua. These parks were supported by Conservation International (a US organization) and by the OAS. The parks tended to be located on international rivers, which was a logical choice, since what happened to the river in one country could be vitally important to the other. Many of these international rivers, such as the San Juan along the Costa Rica–Nicaraguan border, had been traditional routes for smuggling, drug and arms trafficking, and guerrilla operations.

CBMs tended to be heavy on symbolism—for example, using scrap metal from destroyed Contra weapons to make prosthetic devices. In late November 1990, ex-President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica attended a ceremony in Managua in which 10,000 rifles surrendered by the Contras were buried in cement to form the base of a monument. President Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua was present and announced the creation of a National Disarmament Commission, with Arias as honorary president. The commission was to include army, government, Contra, church, and political party representatives, with OAS and UN observers.¹⁶

By late 1990, with the Contras demobilized, ONUCA was shrinking in size as its mission was reduced to the increasingly token one of watching the borders to prevent illicit movements of weapons and awaiting further developments in the Salvadoran peace process that might give ONUCA a role in El Salvador similar to the one it played in Nicaragua. This “flag-showing” mission of the UN was defined in terms of its contribution as a confidence-builder in the sense that it was remaining in the region to assure all concerned of the continuous support of the international community for the Esquipulas peace process.

The significance of CBMs in Central America in the early 1990s was highlighted at the July 1991 San Salvador presidential summit, when the Hondurans floated their comprehensive disarmament and confidence-building proposal (a Central American security treaty), which would set ceilings on military inventories and troops. The Honduran proposal heavily emphasized CBMs as a way of diminishing the possibility of interstate conflicts. These CBMs would include a pledge by the Central American nations to forsake the use of force to settle disputes and a commitment from the United States not to support irregular movements in Central America. The proposal also suggested new tasks for the armed forces, such as involvement in the control of drugs and protection of natural resources. Some of the Honduran ideas found an echo in the speeches made at the Ibero–American summit that followed immediately afterward, including a proposal by President Alberto Fujimori of Peru for a disarmed Latin America.¹⁷

gust 1990, 23-24; Panama, ACAN, 9 November 1990, in FBIS, 14 November 1990, 31.

16. Managua Domestic Service, 27 and 28 November 1990, in FBIS, 29 November 1990, 15-16, 27-28.

17. *The Washington Post*, 20 July 1991, A16; *Times of the Americas*, 7 August 1991, 1.

By 1991 the notion of CBMs was firmly imbedded in Central American thinking about disarmament and lowering of tensions. A number of such measures were included in the Honduran security proposal, and the Security Commission mentioned several others in its various reports to the Central American presidents. For example, in June 1991 plans were announced for the establishment of a formal hot line that would provide secure and immediate telephone links between the presidents of the five Central American nations plus Panama.¹⁸

Thus, one of the features of the long Contadora/Esquipulas process was the way in which it greatly increased communication between the Central American countries, and especially its presidents, foreign ministers, and senior military officials. This CBM, along with many others, was an important legacy of the peace process of the 1980s.

Conclusions

The Contadora process was an important milestone for Central America in introducing the concepts of CBMs and zones of peace to that geographic area. Although the notion of Central America as a zone of peace is still utopian and very remote as a reality, it is now deeply rooted in the ideals and aspirations of those who have intimately lived for so long (and died) with Central American conflict. Until the day when the goal of a zone of peace is achieved, the CBMs that began with Contadora can help the Central Americans work in practical and immediately achievable ways to lessen the likelihood that conflict will break out again owing to misunderstandings, accidents, or miscommunication of intentions.

The Central American peace process also allowed the Latin American nations to develop further and to apply their special notion of a zone of peace. Linked to the broader Latin American push for zones of peace in Antarctica, the South Atlantic, and the Pacific, as well as the Caribbean, it potentially could be one of the most significant legacies of the process.

In the long run the ultimate CBM and guarantor of a zone of peace in Central America is the venerable ideal of Central American integration in all its important dimensions: economic, cultural, and strategic. No treaty can make this happen at the stroke of a pen, and the logic of functionalism suggests that more important than the overarching formal agreements are the small things of daily life that tie individuals and nations together.

As discussed, the notion of a zone of peace relies heavily on the contribution made by CBMs, to the extent that authors have spoken of the Central American peace process as creating "a confidence-building regime" or "an arms control regime."¹⁹

18. Managua, *La Prensa*, 17 June 1991, 5.

19. Child, "A Confidence-building Approach;" H.P. Klepak, *Security Considerations and Verification of a Central American Arms Control Regime* (Ottawa, Canada: External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, 1990): especially 34-37.

Although CBMs had long existed in traditional Western Hemisphere diplomacy and military-to-military contacts, the Contadora process marks the beginning of the deliberate use of CBM terminology, theory, and practice. From 1983 on, it became increasingly common to see confidence-building ideas appear in many articles, speeches and proposals dealing with international and inter-military relations in Latin America. Academics and practitioners writing on the Central American peace process²⁰ have noted this phenomenon, and have prepared extensive lists of actual or possible CBMs that could be applied to Central America or other conflict situations in the Western Hemisphere.

The sweeping scope of these topics makes clear the utopian nature of many of the proposals for a zone of peace, proposals whose goals have to be seen as hortatory rather than as immediately achievable objectives. Nevertheless, the lesson of the Central American peace process is that something that started out in the early 1980s as a collection of vaguely and imperfectly formulated ideals did in fact achieve many of its objectives, and continues to show promise. CBMs have played an important role in this process and should be considered in future attempts at conflict resolution in the Hemisphere.

20. Child, "A Confidence-building Approach," 125-29; Hugo Palma, "Cooperation and Confidence-building Measures in Latin America and the Caribbean," *Disarmament (UN)* (Autumn 1989): especially 92-94.

Regional Security and Confidence-building Measures: The Argentine Perspective

Rut Diamint

The rapid increase in the use of peaceful means for resolving international controversies has led to the development of a new framework of security cooperation within the international community. Confidence-building measures (CBMs)—known in Spanish as “confidence-fostering measures” (MFC) or “mutual confidence measures” (MCM)—are currently a central component of that framework. Developed initially by the most powerful states to promote stability and avoid sudden military maneuvers, CBMs are a crucial resource in the development of a new world order. CBMs also have figured importantly in Argentina’s efforts to restructure its security policies in line with prevailing international conditions.¹

Generally, the Argentine government seeks to strengthen its rapprochement with Western powers and multilateral organizations, to reduce tensions which might lead to confrontation, and to overcome erroneous threat perceptions, all within the framework of international accords. In this regard, Argentina has expressed its willingness to establish stronger ties with other nations in the region, promoting cooperation on security matters and the predictability of military maneuvers. Argentina has participated in a series of initiatives and has devised proposals which, to varying degrees, may be considered confidence-building measures.

In implementing CBMs, the domestic aspects of confidence building must be kept in mind. Military activities must be made more transparent and the routines used within nations made more visible. To achieve this goal, the role of political authorities in the design and control of defense policy must be legitimized. The sphere of uniquely military affairs notwithstanding, increased contact between the military officers and civilian officials in designing and implementing security policy is imperative. The Argentine government has taken a series of measures aimed at bolstering the role of the administration in the design of defense and military policy. That coordination—based on an outline devised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and various suggestions formulated by Congress—has meant that political-military planning is increasing in Argentina. This process has yet to include the Ministry of Defense in an operational fashion which, in the long run, will be responsible for training a highly specialized civilian force capable of adapting the Armed Forces to suit current requirements. The Decree reforming the Ministry of Defense,² dated July 1992, constitutes an important step in instituting appropriate civilian control over security policy. This will not only provide the international community with greater assurances as to our military activities, but also provide a broader view, domestically, of the need to modernize and reform the Armed Forces.

1. R. Diamint, “Cambios en la política de seguridad: Argentina en busca de un perfil no conflictivo,” in *Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad* (FLACSO-Chile, January-March 1992).

2. See Decree, “Reform to the Ministry of Defense,” *Official Gazette*, July 15, 1992.

Generally, disparities in power and size are a source of perceived threats. Increased contact among states and the formulation of bilateral accords are tremendously helpful when focusing on specific aspects of those differences. Furthermore, diplomatic contact and the elimination of certain secrets, which contribute to uncertainty and accentuate tensions, constitute important first steps in the search for solutions in situations of potential conflict. As discussed below, Argentina has taken steps in a variety of areas to reduce tension and promote confidence with other countries.

Measures Taken with Great Britain

Following the breakdown in diplomatic ties with Great Britain in the wake of the Malvinas War, the first democratic Argentine government initiated bilateral negotiations with the British government in the belief that a set of topics existed on which a consensus could be reached. However, Argentina's domestic situation and prevailing international conditions kept much progress from being made. When Carlos Menem took office, advances were achieved in re-establishing confidence between the two nations through a series of accords in which Argentina—the aggressor nation in the war—demonstrated its desire for peace to the international community. Both sides agreed to “freeze” discussion of the issue of sovereignty and reached agreement on initial steps for limiting potential conflict in the South Atlantic.³ These steps included:

- Establishment of a provisional system of information and bilateral consultation;
- Establishment of a direct communications system between the islands and the continent;
- Creation of a system for exchanging information on security and the control of maritime and air navigation;
- Agreement on norms for reciprocal actions; and
- Formulation of procedures for emergency searches and maritime rescue.

On matters of military concern, both sides agreed to:

- Increase mutual awareness of military activities in the Southwestern Atlantic;
- Provide notice of naval maneuvers involving four or more vessels, air force maneuvers involving four or more planes, or exercises involving over 1,000 men or over 20 takeoffs;
- Provide advance notice of amphibious or air transport exercises involving over 500 men or over 20 takeoffs;
- Avoid any action which might be interpreted as hostile; and
- Provide written notice of maneuvers 25 days in advance.

3. See “Joint Declaration of the Governments of the Republic of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,” October 19, 1989; and the “Joint Declaration of the Governments of the Republic of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,” February 15, 1990.

In the field of airspace cooperation, commercial and military flight corridors were established, as was a code for radio communications to determine when a plane is to make contact with ground control. Agreements were also reached on measures aimed at promoting and protecting investment, the elimination of visa requirements, and the protection of fishing activities.

As a result of the increased confidence gained, the declaration of February 15, 1990, strengthened the ties between the two states. In September 1991, a bilateral agreement was signed—without the participation of external observers—to intensify cooperation and to introduce greater flexibility into existing arguments. The changes included the following:

- Retaining the direct communications system under the supervision of both Foreign Ministries;
- Establishing a radio-telephone and telex communications system open 24 hours a day;
- Adding an alternate means of communication coordinated directly by military officials;
- Identifying the diplomatic means to be utilized to arrange for reciprocal visits to military bases and naval units;
- Eliminating the requirement that all ships within a radius of 50 miles of the coast report in, while requiring vessels with strong attack capabilities to do so when coming within 15 miles of the coast;
- Establishing close-to-normal regulations within the radius for reporting on maneuvers;
- Agreeing to provide written notice of maneuvers 14, rather than 25, days in advance; and
- Calling for the annual review of the agreements at meetings of the Argentine-British Working Group.

Security and cooperation in air navigation was increased by agreeing to:

- Supply necessary information to the Argentine Centers for Flight Information in support of air traffic control services, alerts, search and rescue operations, communications and meteorological data;
- Accept emergency landings at alternative airports; and
- Exchange aeronautical information on airports belonging to both parties.

To date, there have been no problems or misunderstandings in connection with this agreement. Furthermore, joint search-and-rescue operations have been conducted on more than one occasion.

South Atlantic Maritime Area (AMAS)

The South Atlantic Maritime Area, known by its Spanish acronym AMAS, is based upon an agreement on maritime traffic concluded by Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentina. Although the system was first established in 1967, fluctuating political conditions in each nation, a changing international context, as well as specific issues and technological advances in naval operations, have led the agreement to undergo modifications.

The origin of this agreement must be understood within the context of the post-World War II period, when the control of maritime traffic was influenced by the breakdown in traditional alliances. Control of such a large expanse of ocean was difficult and burdensome for resource-poor nations suffering from an "equipment paralysis" in the wake of the war. Furthermore, security in the Atlantic formed a minor—but not inconsequential—security concern under the system devised by NATO. Following the Conference on the Sea sponsored by the United Nations in 1982, 117 member states signed UNCLOS (United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea), which extended territorial waters from 3 to 12 miles and established exclusive economic zones of 200 miles. The difficulties inherent in patrolling these extended territorial waters served to breathe new life into AMAS.

Maritime officials have indicated that AMAS, through its broad, four-party structure subordinated solely to NATO's rules of arbitration, provided an important opportunity for negotiation. In addition, the agreement provided greater assurances to other states as to the nature of peaceful action in the South Atlantic (the agreement of all four signatories was required for any activity or military maneuver) and reduced the probability that other states could provoke conflict in regional waters. The current trend toward focusing on economic aspects was not reflected in this system, and it is precisely on such issues as fishing and petroleum development that future confrontations may occur. An example of such a conflict occurred recently with the unilateral oil policy devised by the British for the Malvinas Islands.

The AMAS arrangement provides for an officer of the Brazilian or Argentine navies to serve as coordinator; the post rotates biannually, with the approval of member countries. The title of coordinator was expressly chosen over that of commander to indicate that the agreement would function as a joint control mechanism rather than a potential platform for war. Nonetheless, should conditions so require, the coordinator can be invested with the rank of commander. The primary activities of the coordinator's office are the exchange of information and daily communications. It serves as an instrument of policy coordination among the navies, strengthens relationships, and enhances familiarity with the procedures used by each institution. Each Local Operative Communications Command (COLCO) prepares its own reports and communicates them to the others. Once a year, joint military exercises are organized, followed by a critical review session. Biannually, when coordination responsibilities are transferred, a five-day meeting of the COLCOs is held to discuss command operations, propose modifications, and formulate agreements within the group.

Daily communications have made it possible to develop a common vocabulary. Information on commercial and military traffic on the South Atlantic (from the middle

of its diameter) is compiled and sent by computer to member countries. Operational regulations have changed over time to reflect legal considerations, government policies, and specific operational procedures. The system has not been used to monitor drug trafficking or fishing-related activities because, while the infrastructure would clearly suit these functions, the agreement was not designed with these purposes in mind.

Similar agreements have been signed, bilaterally, with the United States, Spain, South Africa, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, and negotiations for such an accord are currently underway with both India and Canada. The information code has been standardized, thereby simplifying communications with these nations. Although Argentina is equipped to track and control maritime traffic quite precisely, these latter countries do not have access to the joint network of activities and information-sharing established among AMAS members. Argentina has argued that the inclusion of these countries would increase the efficiency of these systems and provide for fluid contact with nations actively involved in maritime traffic in the region.

Meetings of the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces

Initially, meetings were held between the Chiefs of Staff of Argentina and Brazil in recognition of the spirit of the 1985 Declaration of Iguazú that "the destiny of Brazil and Argentina in achieving a strategic stature capable of averting any threat to regional peace and tranquility is based on a joint, participatory effort at cooperation."⁴ Uruguay was invited to participate as an observer at the third symposium, in an effort to broaden the encounter. The fourth symposium included Paraguay as an observer and saw the full incorporation of the Uruguayan Chief of Staff into the discussions. The integration process was thus underway and, prior to the signing of the Mercosur Treaty, this group was already calling itself a "Strategic Mercosur."⁵ Chile participated as an observer nation at the sixth meeting, held in 1992, and is expected to become a full member in 1993. On each occasion, progress was made in the discussion of security issues, from technological considerations to deployment techniques and collective regional security.

It is important to note, however, that no agreement has yet been reached on a mechanism for collective security. Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay have expressed their conviction that domestic conflict should be resolved by the armed forces of each nation. Nonetheless, there is growing consensus as to the vulnerability of Southern Cone states and the impact, in each nation, of the issues and problems which extend beyond individual borders. Such topics include the defense of democracy, economic integration and regional cooperation, efforts to improve social conditions, respect for territorial integrity and self-determination, rights to technological innovation, the maintenance of peace, and the protection of natural resources. Consensus has also been achieved to gradually introduce confidence building measures while respecting each nation's "internal clock."

4. See "Second Symposium on Strategic Studies," organized by EMCFFAA Argentina and EMFA Brazil (Sao Paulo, Brazil: April 1988) 9.

5. For an analysis of the symposiums, see Gustavo E. Druetta y Luis E. Tibiletti, "Cooperación regional para la paz," in *Nuevo Proyecto* (Nº 7-8, Buenos Aires, 1992) 59.

Argentine and Chilean Arrangements in the Beagle Channel Area

In the Treaty on Peace and Friendship between Argentina and Chile,⁶ the operations of both sides in the southern seas were described in detail. In addition to indicating the passageways through which Argentine warships may travel, the Treaty called for such ships to be piloted by a Chilean through the Beagle Channel and for notification to be given if Argentine vessels were forced to drop anchor unexpectedly. It also included a series of regulations to be followed in the event of incidents such as embarkation or disembarkation of persons, "hydrographical relief," or any other action which might be interpreted as affecting the security and communications of the Chilean state. The level of detail in the Treaty—carefully drafted to avoid any possible misinterpretation—can be understood as a reflection of mutual anxiety and mistrust.

Since the Treaty was signed, however, advances have been made in acknowledging its spirit, and friendly meetings of the two navies have taken place. These encounters are held alternately in Puerto Williams and Ushuaia between the 3d Chilean Naval Zone and the Argentine Southern Naval Area (ANAU). Information is exchanged regarding naval units and personnel controlling activity in the Beagle Channel. Commanders are empowered to resolve minor complaints. However, although the annual meetings tend to be cordial, contact during the rest of the year is sporadic. Thus, the contribution of this process to greater confidence and understanding is limited. With this foundation in place, however, it would be relatively simple to intensify this relationship and engage in joint activities of benefit to both nations.⁷

These activities are supplemented by a permanent communications system between the Chilean Air Force based in Punta Arenas and the Argentine Air Force operating out of Río Gallegos, aimed at coordinating communications and air traffic control in Puerto Williams (Chile) and Ushuaia (Argentina)⁸. This agreement, in which both Foreign Ministries participated, establishes a greater level of detail in procedures for communications between the bases. Flight permits, which are *requested* and must be authorized at least 48 hours prior to departure, specify the type of airplane, authorized flying altitude, itinerary, and departure and arrival times; they also contain meteorological reports. In addition, the agreement calls for the equipment used for these measurements to be modernized in an effort to increase safety and security.

It would be useful for these periodic meetings aimed at avoiding incidents between Argentina and Chile, or third parties, to be held more frequently. Joint maneuvers could also be instituted to establish greater interaction between these two forces.

6. "Treaty on Peace and Friendship with Chile," January 1984.

7. For example, conversations were held with Chile and Brazil to facilitate the transit of a Japanese submarine carrying plutonium-contaminated toxic waste through the Channel. See *Página 12*, September 29, 1992.

8. See "Acta de la Carta de Acuerdo Operacional CHA N° 6/87," October 29, 1987, and the subsequent "Convenio de Ratificación," November 13, 1987.

International Symposium of Fighter Pilots

Thirteen nations of Latin America and Spain have participated in biannual meetings of pilots to share information on combat experiences and attack training. While the primary objective is to disseminate military information, the meetings indirectly have served to promote confidence. The friendly contact among officers has helped to smooth over areas of confrontation between neighboring nations, thanks in part to an intensive schedule of social activities in addition to the formal working sessions. It is interesting to note that this initiative was instigated by mid-rank officers. While such meetings cannot be considered CBMs, several Argentine officers who have participated indicated that the personal contact helped generate confidence and curtail suspicions. Furthermore, the information transferred at the symposium may serve as a foundation for joint security measures in the future.

Cooperation System Among American Air Forces (SICOFAA)

This agreement emerged at the initiative of the US government as part of its cold war strategy following the Cuban missile crisis. In 1961, the US Air Force Chief of Staff called a meeting of his counterparts throughout the Americas to establish a system of cooperation and a forum for discussion which would gather on a yearly basis. In 1965, a document was drafted formulating the guidelines for the operations and periodic meetings of the Conference of American Air Force Chiefs (CONJEFAMER), with the participation of 17 countries.⁹ An additional six nations sent observers.¹⁰

According to its initial charter, SICOFAA is a voluntary, inter-American organization which seeks to promote ties of friendship, coordination, and cooperation among air forces. The location of its headquarters rotates, and its organizational framework has been altered in the 30 years since its establishment to reflect political and technical changes. The most recent modification took place in May 1992, when a new Charter was approved. A series of committees has been charged with handling specific topics, some of which are clearly rooted in the concerns of the 1960s: information sciences and telecommunications, mutual logistical support (including a large database), meteorology, and inter-American military mail. In the mid-1970s, new concerns emerged which led to the formation of committees on Mutual Air Support for Disasters, Training (including classes, scholarships, etc.), Accident Prevention, and Medicine. In 1991, a committee on Low-Intensity Conflict and Anti-Drug Trafficking was formed to exchange information and coordinate activities in these two key areas.

The system is based on a model of relationships imposed by the United States, as the champion of closer hemispheric ties, in the 1960s and 1970s. Although its objectives

9. They are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, the United States, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, and Venezuela. *Charter of the Cooperation System Among American Air Forces* (Tegucigalpa, Honduras, May 28, 1992).

10. At the time the document was signed, those nations were: Canada, Costa Rica, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, and Mexico.

differ from the criteria of cooperation which are emerging in the post-Cold War period, it can be considered an acceptable framework for cooperation among the region's air forces and can serve as an appropriate instrument for strengthening mutual confidence.

Security Forces

Although the issue of security forces diverges somewhat from the matters discussed thus far, there are several aspects to consider which deal with both confidence building measures and situations of confrontation with the potential to trigger conflict. Both the Chilean and Argentine police forces (*Carabineros* and *Gendarmería*, respectively) have implemented confidence building measures along the Argentine-Chilean frontier. These measures include giving advance notice of troop movements and strengthening communications between patrols to avoid disputes or erroneous perceptions by one party or the other. These initiatives must be maintained and enhanced, given that increased confidence is a gradual process which favors heightened dialogue between the parties.

Confidence-building Measures with Chile

In recent years, relations between Argentina and Chile have improved, and progress has been made in overcoming perceptions of mutual threat which long dominated bilateral relations. The Treaty on Peace and Friendship, signed by Presidents Alfonsín and Pinochet, which aimed at resolving differences in the area of the Beagle Channel, stressed "the obligation to resolve our controversies, without exception, through peaceful means and to renounce all threats or the use of force in our mutual relations." Both sides agreed to hold periodic consultations to examine any situation which might alter the harmony between the signatories or to resolve discrepancies which could lead to controversy. However, despite these good intentions and a substantial improvement in ties between the two countries, mistrust is still present. Some sectors of the Chilean population—and to a lesser degree, Argentine society—continue to sustain conspiratorial beliefs and refuse to recognize the benefits to be obtained through greater cooperation. Nonetheless, stepped-up integration policies have resulted in improvements in security cooperation and the efficient use of often scarce resources.

To a degree, Argentine-Chilean security has been improved by the participation of both sides in multilateral undertakings. The Mendoza Commitment, which prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons (initially signed by Chile, Brazil and Argentina), generates security benefits for the three states and serves as evidence to Western powers of the region's commitment to non-proliferation. Furthermore, the agreement requires participant nations to sign the global Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a longstanding priority of the United States. Inspections and verification, the backbone of the agreement, have yet to be authorized and implemented. Recent developments in nuclear issues, as witnessed by amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco presented jointly by these three states, are an additional indicator of the progress achieved in non-proliferation. The tripartite document presented in Mexico in August 1992 indicates that Latin America is abandoning "geopolitical competition" and proclaims that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is "a direct enemy of peace, security, cooperation and

progress.”¹¹ The ratification of the Treaty extends additional protection to industrial secrets, expands the policy of nuclear cooperation to include additional countries, and considers new markets.¹²

Similarly, on the issue of border disputes, the Argentine government has opted for a moderate solution which emphasizes the need to enhance understanding with its Chilean neighbors. Argentina has had difficulty, however, in managing its internal affairs in this area. Domestic controversy over specific steps cast a chill over the presidential summit of August 1992. Closer ties between the two joint chiefs of staff have been slow to develop. According to Foreign Minister Di Tella: “Economic relations are advancing well. There was no protest against Chilean investment in electrical utilities in Buenos Aires. But a persistent border conflict doesn’t help.”¹³

The Minister’s words indicate that Argentina is willing to continue the integration process, albeit at a slower pace than originally planned. Civilian governments seek to establish more cooperative relationships and integrate their economies. In 1992, for example, investment between the two nations amounted to around \$1 billion. Trade relations continue to improve. Cooperation extends beyond official relations to include the private sector. During 1992, progress was made in the areas of communications, border and migration controls, unresolved agricultural disease control issues, mining cooperation, etc.

Contact between the two Foreign Ministries seeks to consolidate the interest in integration. Chile should strive to limit its isolation from its neighbors in the Southern Cone. The Council on Economic Complementation, formed in August 1991, lays the groundwork for Chile’s inclusion in Mercosur. An attachment to that document, known as the Treaty on Investment Guarantees, assures equal treatment for investments in both nations.

Chile’s foreign market orientation must be closely evaluated. Although Chile maintains significant advantages compared to its neighbors in terms of focusing its production on the export market and attracting foreign investment, the impact of agreements between the US, Canada, and Mexico (such as NAFTA) on the Chilean economy has yet to be seen. The worldwide trend toward integration and the formation of trading blocs—in which commercial accords must be supplemented with political agreements—should serve to raise a warning flag to Chile not to lose touch with other nations in the region. The nations of North America have established an agreement in a region of significantly greater strategic importance than a country such as Chile. Although the formation of common markets is not necessarily based on geographic proximity, certain elements of the negotiation process are undoubtedly affected by such factors. The trend toward regionalization seems to indicate that Chile should take care

11. See *Página 12* (August 27, 1992) 9.

12. For example, see the nuclear cooperation agreements signed with the United States on September 3, 1992, and with France on September 25, 1992.

13. Article on Dr. Guido Di Tella, *Clarín* (August 16, 1992) 12.

not to neglect the Latin American market, a market in which it is poised to place products with greater aggregate value than those it sells to the North.

Some Chilean entrepreneurs have recognized the importance of this market and have invested in the region. Undoubtedly, these investments have had the ancillary effect of strengthening cooperation and generating common interests. The impact of economic integration as a catalyst for increased political integration must not be overlooked; trade, communications, natural resources, and the environment extend beyond geographic boundaries, and attention to these areas fosters increased interdependence.

Tension occasionally arises in the perception of each nation when situations are interpreted differently. The matter of the sale of military aircraft by the United States to Argentina led to a series of complaints and warnings that contributed little to the reduction in potential conflict between neighbors. Argentine defense officials and air force officers were disappointed with the offer made for Skyhawk A4M planes, no longer in use in the US, which were to be sold at a discount price. The planes were intended to replace those lost in battle during the Malvinas War. As representatives of the Ministry of Defense explained, the acquisition could hardly be interpreted as generating an arms race, especially since the country was making intensive efforts to reduce conflict. They depicted the purchase as a training necessity for Argentine officers. This position was confirmed by the fact that Argentina sought to acquire these planes—which permit pilots to gain a basic understanding of weapon functions—rather than more modern F16s. The purchase took regional balance into consideration while maintaining control over the arms market and respecting the requirements of the United States' NATO partner, Great Britain, so that a disequilibrium would not be generated in the Malvinas area.

Chile has protested publicly and complained to the United States on the grounds that the equipment introduces competition into the region which mars the balance of power. Chile views the purchase as a tension-generating maneuver leading to an escalated buildup of armaments. Moreover, Chile has alleged that the sale forms part of US efforts to reduce the technological capabilities of the region's air forces so that they are equipped almost exclusively to combat drug trafficking.

To resolve these differing perceptions, progress needs to be made on a conventional forces agreement along the lines of the European model,¹⁴ to provide an accounting of each nation's planes, their type, year, and weaponry. Moreover, information on the location of bases and military regiments, the type of activities conducted, and the number of men and arms at each site could be compiled and a verification system designed to ensure the accuracy of the data provided. Argentina has demonstrated its willingness to build confidence with Chile over border discussions and to work toward greater transparency in strategic issues. However, these steps need to be expanded to avert perceived threats and ensure that military movements are unambiguous. Thus, more bilateral and regional measures should be encouraged, such as more frequent periodic meetings between commanders responsible for border areas, the preparation of a public report on

14. "Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," Paris, November 1990, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Vienna: Regional Program Office, United States Information Agency, 1990).

national security strategy (such as the one prepared by the US government), the publication of military budgets,¹⁵ the preparation of joint seminars and topics of discussion on technical and strategic issues, an increase in contacts between the armed forces of Chile and Argentina, invitations to the press to observe and participate in military maneuvers, and the formulation of a press corps specializing in defense issues.

As a gesture of goodwill and good intentions for achieving closer cooperation and confidence, as well as demonstrating to the international community Argentina's willingness to prevent conflict, a demilitarized zone could be created along the border. In the past, such peace zones were the result of agreements achieved following conflict. The idea here is to create an area free of military presence to deflect any potential conflict between the two parties. To minimize tension in the area, the zone could be controlled by civilians from the customs service.

Concluding Observations

In order for CBMs to function, a durable foundation must be established for these proposals in nations lacking a strong tradition of civilian control over the military apparatus. Civilian institutions need to be strengthened, and mistrust between civilians and military officers within the same country must be overcome. The waning of the Cold War should help to facilitate these processes. Without the institutionalization of civilian control, the confidence building model is unlikely to advance beyond diplomatic declarations, and military autonomy will continue to prevail over national policy. Democracy means more than revitalizing institutions—it involves creating new networks to promote education and a way of life that values the peaceful solution of conflict through dialogue. Efforts aimed at devising a common vocabulary and declarations expressing shared points of view take time. Resistance to such change can be immense. Nonetheless, these limitations can be flexible and dynamic; any advancement of cooperation and diplomatic negotiations constitutes an important step toward the achievement of military agreements and progress in effective measures.

In his public statements on military policy, President Menem has stressed the important role the nation's armed forces have played in implementing foreign policy through their participation in UN peacekeeping missions, and he has called for the creation of a collective security system which would strengthen international peace. He notes that such a prospect is not intended to repudiate the defense of national interests, but rather sought to reorient the armed forces toward a less aggressive model, one more open to developing confidence building measures.

Thus, the armed forces are no longer to be used as "arbitrators" in political and social conflict. Their role in defense is accompanied by negotiation on both military issues and political coordination. Hemispheric and regional mechanisms, such as the Organi-

15. The Argentine government is implementing transparency in the defense budget for the first time. The Minister of Defense expected to implement the new policy in 1993 and make available the data for 1994 by eliminating special accounts and regrouping line items currently charged to other accounts under the headings of Defense and Security so that a more realistic view of the use of such funds can be obtained.

zation of American States and the Rio Group, can provide means of defending human rights, advances in intra-regional cooperation, and the maintenance and strengthening of the peace by pressuring regional governments not to stray from the peaceful, democratic path.

Argentina has planned its growth and future security on the basis of multilateralism and the regulated transfer of technology. The favorable climate for CBMs will expand as other nations in the region come to perceive this framework of cooperation as a basis for their own prosperity and stability. Regional accords, free of Washington's participation, such as those concluded in Central America,¹⁶ suggest models for the devising of cooperation mechanisms *relevant* to the region's specific interests. Thus, as the United States' controlling influence is reduced, a greater responsibility for security is generated within each state. This in turn results in a security arrangement which differs from that traditionally proposed by the United States.¹⁷

These advances, however, require intensive effort: They require that Third World nations which make effective efforts at security and transparency should no longer be held to a double standard. Specifically, confidence-building measures cannot be implemented while confusion and controversy persist over the sale of conventional weapons.¹⁸ The five largest conventional weapons suppliers have indicated their willingness to move toward greater transparency and consultation, but projections for US expenditures on research and development are expected to reach record levels, moving from \$72 billion in 1991 to \$76 billion in 1992. Given the types of conflicts which have taken place over the last few years—that is, low-intensity conflicts—this type of weaponry should be subject to the strictest controls, while keeping in mind the difference Latin America perceives between demand and the action undertaken by key powers.¹⁹ The proposals put together by the major industrialized countries on this area, however, must reflect commitments based on mutual benefit between North and South and not as impositions issuing from North to South.

16. See Francisco Rojas Aravena, "¿Súbditos o Aliados?, La Política Exterior de los Estados Unidos y Centroamérica," *Editorial Porvenir* (San José, Costa Rica: FLACSO, 1988) 75ff.

17. See Jack Child, *The Central American Peace Process, 1983–1991: Sheathing Swords, Building Confidence* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992).

18. See Paul C. Warnke, "Rompre avec les vieilles habitudes," *Paix et Securite* (N° 4, Winter 1991–1992, Ottawa, Canada).

19. Michael Morris, "Confidence-building Measures in South America" (Paper presented at the International Seminar on Confidence-building Measures in South America, Santiago, Chile, August 11, 1992) 16.

The Concept of Confidence Building: A Brazilian Perspective

Thomaz Guedes da Costa¹

With the end of the cold war, profound changes are taking place in the international system. The changes now underway are leading nations to formulate new foreign policies and new ways of thinking. It is also true, however, that the nature and scope of international change are unclear. In fact, individuals are striving to adjust new images and theories to cognitive processes in order to comprehend the new pattern of international relations. From an optimist's perspective, new inter-state relationships will tend to reinforce the prospects for cooperation, solidarity and international peace.

The term confidence-building measures, or CBMs, among many others, has become a new buzzword among international political analysts, and it has been applied to governmental policy as well as to academic research designed to evaluate those policies. The purpose of this paper is to explore the CBMs concept and its usefulness as an auxiliary theme in Brazil's policies on international security.

The Concept of Confidence Building

The historical foundation for CBMs in Europe were established as the result of the cooperative initiatives during the 1970s. These included efforts at disarmament and the neutralization of "misperceptions" between the two primary forces in Europe utilizing the Helsinki accords of 1975 and the opening of a variety of areas of diplomatic actions (both today and in the past) that could be termed CBMs even though their architects were not thinking specifically along these lines at that time.

In the search for a common understanding of the meaning of CBMs, the results of a working group formed by the United Nations serve as a guideline, even while full consensus among participating academicians has not been achieved.² As some observers have noted, the spectrum of initiatives and activities between two actors which "cause" an increase in confidence can be very broad.³ In general, two types of questions emerge.

1. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs.

2. *Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures*, A/36/474 (New York: United Nations, 1982). In the conclusions of this document, note is made that CBMs can "...eliminate the causes of mistrust, fear, tensions and hostilities...facilitate the process of arms control and disarmament negotiations, including verification, and facilitate the settlement of international disputes and conflicts;...[and] lead to greater rationality and stability in international relations," 6.

3. See Hugo Palma, "Medidas de Confianza en América Latina," in *Paz y seguridad en América Latina y el Caribe en los Noventa* (Lima: Centro Regional de las Naciones Unidas para la Paz, el Desarme y el Desarrollo en América Latina y el Caribe) 328-333, and Igor Scherbak, *Confidence-building Measures and International Security: The Political and Military Aspects: A Soviet Approach*, UNIDIR/91/36 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1991) 1-13.

First, the concept of CBMs, from an operational perspective, appears to be valid solely in strategic situations between actors when the nature of their relationship is highly antagonistic or conflictive. When relations are peaceful and are conducted through negotiations, the sources of mistrust are neutralized naturally. This is not to say that such mistrust does not exist, but it generally does not reach the point of a violent conflict. Second, there is the question of whether CBMs are limited solely to the technological-military field or whether they should also be included in the political sphere, keeping in mind that military power is manifested as a symptom of political antagonisms. In Igor Scherbak's view "these measures are inseparable, given that technical-military confidence-building measures (mutual notification, military observers, local inspections, and other forms of verification) cannot offer in and of themselves the level of confidence necessary in a state's military activities nor can they be dealt with in an isolated fashion through policies designed to eliminate suspicions."⁴ Scherbak further suggests that CBMs can be divided into three areas of applications: (a) measures applicable at the strategic level; (b) measures dealing with conventional weapons; and (c) measures aimed at averting armed conflict and regional crises.⁵

Scherbak's model, however, excludes other types of measures that clearly have a strong impact on the establishment of enhanced confidence in normal, proper relations among parties. Social, cultural and economic contacts among states strengthen mutual understanding not only with respect to their intentions but also to their capacity for political action.⁶ Yet, while the inclusion of any variable capable of generating confidence among the actors would seem desirable, the categories of CBMs may, as a result, become so large as to be theoretically unworkable. The purposes of CBMs are most relevant in terms of understanding intentions and capabilities in an antagonistic relationship, where armed conflict, crisis situations, hostilities, and consequent political behavior, are possible. CBMs are linked to an increase in security, estimates of predictable behavior, and the evaluation of real capabilities, as well as to the possible use of force.

A Brazilian Perspective

The ideas expressed in this paper can be described as one of several Brazilian perspectives on the concept of CBMs. In Brazil, however, there is no procedure for open debate or systematic consultation among the public or governmental agencies on the formulation and implementing of international security and defense policies. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is charged with managing the government apparatus responsible for conducting the country's strategic relations as an aspect of foreign policy. The consultations conducted, under the aegis of the Ministry, serve more to legitimize policy than to provide an exchange of views between the government and society.⁷ Within this context, there are several aspects which warrant analysis.

4. Scherbak, 4.

5. Ibid, 8.

6. Palma also discusses this situation. Palma, "Medidas de Confianza en América Latina," 333-341.

7. See R. Saraiva Guerreiro, *Lembrança de um emprego do Itamaraty* (Sao Paulo: Siciliano, 1992): passim.

First, in terms of the “status” of Brazil’s foreign relations, it is important to stress that there are no international antagonisms or conflicts in which the armed forces would play a key role. In recent decades, as Brazilian diplomat Gelson Fonseca has noted, Brazil’s foreign policy has had to adapt to exponential growth in size and geographic coverage as well as to the ever-greater importance placed on economic issues, to the detriment of international security, on the nation’s foreign policy agenda. Given this situation, it is difficult to say what role CBMs would play in the country’s strategic behavior. Neither recent history in Brazil, if considered as a unitary actor, nor current conditions, reflect significant concern over the possibility of an armed conflict with other nations. Conflicts in the region and abroad, moreover, have a limited impact on the country’s decision making process. Neither domestic policy nor speeches by government officials show any indication of potential conflict with other countries, be it over border demarcation or the permeability of boundaries, access or control of natural resources, environmental affairs, or hegemonic aspirations over continental or maritime claims.

This is not to say, however, that security issues are unimportant within the Brazilian government. A realistic view of international politics guides the agencies responsible for planning the country’s long-term international security. Risks of confrontation can always lurk in the uncertainties regarding the future. This concern generates initiatives aimed at increasing Brazilian strategic power, although such endeavors are not explicitly linked to pre-defined interests, as has been the case in the development of a nuclear submarine, the advancement of the space program, or the preservation of the remaining weapons industry. It is also true, however, that the objective of bolstering Brazilian capabilities to provide greater security for Brazil may generate unexpected repercussions. The continuity of such programs, whose justifications are unclear, may generate backlash among other states, creating a negative image for Brazil and inopportune political reactions, thereby disturbing the tranquil “status” of Brazil’s international security.

The second point to consider in regard to CBMs has to do with Brazil–Argentine relations in the recent past. Although some analysts say that, historically, mistrust has dominated relations between the two nations—due to mutual perceptions of hegemonic ambition—the situation has changed. Intensive negotiations and contact between the two states over the last 10 years have led to modified perceptions of each other and have diminished controversy and mistrust. It can be said that by eliminating discrepancies on both the use of hydro resources in the River Plate Basin and the development of strategic technologies—especially in the area of nuclear capability—from the bilateral agenda, MERCOSUR, formalized in the Treaty of Asunción of 1991, was able to emerge.

Following the Declaration on Joint Nuclear Policy, signed at Iguazú Falls in 1990, the two nations created an oversight agency for nuclear issues, established a joint agreement on safeguards with the International Agency on Atomic Energy (IAEA),⁸ and initiated efforts aimed at ensuring full compliance with the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

8. See the text of the letter by President Collor in “Mensagem de Collor e Menem a Salinas,” in *Gazeta Mercantil*, February 17, 1991, 11.

At the same time, the two nations began to develop an intensive cooperation program in the field of aeronautics, crowned by the development of the CBA-123 aircraft. Despite financial problems, which arose at the program's inception in 1986 and have practically paralyzed the project in its current stage (marketing), the experience has served to provide an extensive exchange of information and individuals, eliminate mistrust between the countries, and create common technological and commercial interests. The perspectives for surmounting the financial difficulties hampering the project are linked not only to the economic situation of each country, but also to the commercial and political incentives of each partner.⁹

Within this context, the Mendoza Commitment between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, prohibiting chemical and bacterial weapons in the region, takes on added importance.¹⁰ This agreement should be perceived as an initiative aimed at preventing future mistrust and confrontation. The accord marks a new type of cooperation among these nations, anticipating and establishing parameters for relations with other nations within the framework of chemical weapons control, such as the Australia Group. This example has also served to increase transparency in the flow of information, thereby prompting greater confidence among signatories and permitting third parties to reevaluate their perceptions of Brazilian and Argentine intent.¹¹

The third point of relevance for CBMs concerns the search for a solution to Brazilian relations with the First World in terms of the transfer of sensitive technologies, especially in the field of aerospace. To help ensure strategic technological cooperation, Brazil maintains strong relations with the United States, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the Peoples Republic of China. For several decades, Brazil has engaged in a space program aimed at providing domestic production capabilities for the development of rocket and satellite launchers, that is, capable of establishing basic conditions for full space missions. Meanwhile, this capability attains a dimension of "dual-use," that is, it can be used for peaceful, civilian purposes and also holds the potential for military use at the strategic level.

This dual-use issue is a complicated one. At certain levels, Brazil could become a competitor in the commercial market, or a potential challenger in the strategic field. The vague justifications proffered for developing this technological capability, combined with the image formed during the previous "Brazil Power" stage, Brazil's refusal to automatically align itself with the United States in international affairs and, as Professor Celso Lafer has noted, the need to ". . . rethink our insertion in the world in light of the new international agenda," may be generating ambiguity in Brazilian intentions.¹² Brazil's place in the international system is not clear, to either Brazilians themselves or to the international community, and the country's intentions in acquiring full ballistic missile

9. "Brasil tenta convencer a Argentina a reativar o projeto do CBA-123 Vector," in *Gazeta Mercantil*, June 24, 1992, 14.

10. Signed September 5, 1991, with the support of Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia and Ecuador.

11. See, for example, *Comunicado Final de la Segunda Reunión Ministerial Institucionalizada entre la Comunidad Europea y el Grupo de Río*, Santiago, May 29, 1992.

12. "Preocupação com o desgaste em Washington," in *Gazeta Mercantil*, June 5, 1991, 6.

capabilities—with the ensuing capacity to export “know how” to “unreliable” nations—is at the center of the mistrust expressed by leading nations in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), particularly the United States.

As this mistrust can hamper access to technology for civilian use, modifying these perceptions is one of the primary efforts of Brazilian diplomacy.¹³ In fact, a new approach is being considered by Minister Celso Lafer. “In the area of sensitive technologies, those with military applications, Brazil has rethought its entire history. The country admitted having participated in the control regimens in place today, while seeking access to technology in return.”¹⁴ The question remains, however, what is the relationship between participation in these systems and the guarantee of access to technology? Apparently, this is one of the questions Brazilian authorities seek to answer before coming to a final agreement. Since a favorable response to Brazil’s request cannot be based on future action, the impasse remains. Another question, as complex as the first, has to do with the interest of any nation mindful of the MTCR in participating effectively in the decision making process. Are the leading exporters of missile technology willing to receive new members on an equal footing in monitoring MTCR, even though their technological capability may be different? What about access to commercial satellite and launcher markets? If Brazil adheres, for example, to the MTCR, what margin of freedom will it have to acquire technologies from the First World and then compete commercially with the leading powers?

The fourth aspect of the CBMs issue concerns the attitude of Brazilian military officers. When questioned about the idea of CBMs (as initiatives in the military field), many officers respond that Brazil has already achieved satisfactory levels of interchange with its primary Latin American neighbors, the United States, and some European nations. Changes in various consultation mechanisms, the cultural exchange of personnel, joint exercises, and an extensive network of military attachés appear to be “sufficient” to the military under their perception of CBMs. Their position may be explained, hypothetically, on the grounds that this perception of “sufficiency” is associated with relations with nations which are not hostile or antagonistic to Brazilian interests, thereby confirming the general observation made earlier. Thus, any proposals aimed at initiating CBMs fall into a void.

This does not mean that the military “establishment” is uninterested in new initiatives. The participation of a Brazilian government expert in a recent study for the Secretary General of the United Nations on the registry of the transfer of conventional weapons, as well as the formulation of a bill in February 1992 aimed at controlling imports and exports of sensitive technologies, constitute indirect signals of a commitment to control systems, without abandoning the official line of flexibility.¹⁵ The armed forces are also studying, through meetings at home and abroad, the political impact of

13. Former General Secretary of Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja, “A diplomacia brasileira e a nova ordem internacional,” in *Gazeta Mercantil*, December 4, 1991, 3.

14. Interview with Celso Lafer, “Nova ordem ambiental a vista,” in *Jornal do Brasil*, May 31, 1992, 12.

15. Brazil, Chamber of Deputies, “Bill 2530 of 1992.”

the economic integration process on the military, given that the coordination of foreign policy among members of a regional group is a natural trend, as shown by initiatives such as MERCOSUR. How will this coordination affect the formulation of Brazilian defense policy? What will the strategic impact be if based on the hypothesis of labor and structural adjustment within the armed forces?

The obstacles to a broad understanding of confidence-building measures and access to sensitive technology occur at all levels and affect comments by Brazilian military officers in their official statements. Be they the result of institutional training or the dominant "mind set" among the armed forces, the interpretations of the military of the international environment reflect significant concerns. Adopting the thesis of Jean-Christophe Rufin¹⁶ a typical official document noted:

Nothing more ostentatious and overwhelming for the other nations in which the unabashedly "richer" countries seek to settle their differences in terms of maintaining a worldwide "status quo" and whose images are multiplied to the rest of the planet by the international media.

It is not a matter of subscribing to a conspiracy theory which seeks to attribute all of our problems to deliberate, evil intentions by the wealthy nations, but there can be no doubt that the egotism and arrogance present in the majority of their decisions explains a good portion of their difficulty in solving the foreign debt problems of the lesser developed countries, the barriers which keep technological "apartheid" in place, the artifice of dictating rules for "civilized behavior" for nations perceived as less responsible and therefore, less reliable.¹⁷

Lastly, it is important to note that the concept of CBMs is not present in statements by Brazilian authorities. Thus, official comments will be of no assistance in identifying positions compatible with CBMs. This can be associated with the view of sufficiency held by the military with regard to CBMs, given that international security issues are not a priority on Brazil's foreign policy agenda under the Collor administration. Officially, government authorities have sought to avoid stating their impressions on critical cases of international politics, such as the civil war in Yugoslavia and US pressure on Iraq. Nor has Brazil demonstrated a trend toward leading any significant revision of hemispheric international security. For a country facing portentous domestic issues, both political and economic, the tranquility of Brazil's international "status" is the antithesis of its internal setting. How then, do these elements fit in to Scherbak's analytical model?

In terms of measures applicable at the strategic level, the Brazilian position is driven by domestic interests. It is quite cautious and uncertain regarding the transformation of hemispheric security systems and the global orientation of the UN Security Council. In the area of strategic technologies, the country seeks to achieve a harmonic

16. Jean-Christophe Rufin, *O Império e os Novos Bárbaros* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1991) 125-201.

17. Brazil, Escola Superior de Guerra, *A modernização das forças armadas do Cone Sul, em face das respectivas políticas de desenvolvimento e as restrições do acesso as tecnologias sensíveis* (Rio de Janeiro: ESG, 1992), document presented by the Brazilian delegation at the VI Symposium on Strategic Studies-1992 in Buenos Aires, July 1992.

balance between support for the precepts of the MTCR, London Club, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), etc., without neglecting the correlative advantages to be obtained by adhering to the "status" of a full member in the decision making process and in access to markets.

From the perspective of measures dealing with conventional weapons, the effort to maintain a domestic industrial base for weapons in association with foreign firms, primarily from First World nations, creates naturally transparent mechanisms for domestic projects and generates commercial results which affect international policy. Brazil's position on registering conventional weapons transactions also suggests receptivity to control systems which are balanced by the transparency of the larger powers.

On measures aimed at averting armed conflict and crisis situations in the region, Brazil continues to support its position of fostering negotiations and the neutralization of potentially delicate situations. Ongoing transparency and strategic arms control measures at the regional level (South Atlantic Nuclear Free Zone, Tlatelolco, Mendoza, etc.), coupled with traditional principles such as the negotiation of disputes, are indicators of Brazilian attitudes and behavior on issues of international security.

Conclusion

The lack of an explicit acceptance of the concept of CBMs in official Brazilian discourse does not mean that the government is opposed to exchanging and identifying information which strengthens confidence with other actors. The experiences in relations with Argentina and the instruments, activities, and ongoing bilateral negotiations in the area of sensitive technologies, contribute to the gradual development of new international security perspectives in Brazil, maintaining secure margins of intention predictability and transparency in the country's capabilities. If growth in CBMs does not emerge unilaterally, Brazil may react favorably to multilateral initiatives arising from nations which look to CBMs as a theme for reorganizing their security.

Peaceful Cooperation and Confidence-building Measures in Chile

Isaac Caro

During the last five years, the world has seen its most significant transformation since World War II. The disintegration of the USSR and the virtual disappearance of the “communist menace” from Europe has profoundly reduced the risk of nuclear war which just a few years ago threatened not only the European continent but the entire world.

Profound changes have also taken place in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. The process of democratic transformation in South Africa and the dismantling of apartheid have led to that nation’s gradual re-entry into world affairs. In Asia, internal struggles within the borders of former Soviet republics, along with problems of cultural and political identification, threaten to expand from local to regional conflicts and have helped to fuel a surge in the Islamic movement. In the Middle East, one outcome of the Gulf War was a favorable climate for dialogue between Arabs and Israelis. The chance for success of these negotiations has been increased by the advent of a new Israeli government. In the Maghreb nations of northern Africa, stubborn economic and political problems threaten an outbreak of Islamic fundamentalism which, if united with the movement in Central Asia, could become a powerful source of instability for the Western capitalist economic system led by the United States.

Latin America has not been untouched by the changes occurring throughout the world. Spurred on by East–West conflict, as well as the presence of military governments and unresolved border disputes, an arms race characterized by intensive stockpiling of weapons and increased military expenditures has arisen. With the breakdown in blocs and spheres of influence—the greatest impact has been on Cuba thanks to the island’s economic and military dependence on Moscow—new challenges are emerging in the region. First, there is the challenge of reducing the risk of military confrontation between countries with unresolved border disputes (Colombia–Venezuela, Chile–Argentina, Ecuador–Peru, etc.) Second, a process needs to be initiated to control conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction, to limit further acquisition of weapons and military equipment, and to curtail military expenditures. Third, military, political, and economic cooperation must be increased to provide for mutual security, the relaxation of tensions, and the future development and integration of Latin American states. The application of confidence-building measures (CBMs) can help achieve these three broad objectives.

The Global Context

The first landmarks in the development of CBMs at the global level came within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and from the United Nations (UN). In 1975, the CSCE met in Helsinki with the aim of reducing the possibility of armed conflict between the superpowers—which would primarily affect the European continent. An agreement was signed there outlining certain measures aimed at security, disarmament, and fostering reciprocal confidence among participating states. For example, the agreement includes a provision that calls for the prenotification of military maneuvers of more than 25,000 troops, 21 days in advance.

Subsequently, during the early 1980s, as the cold war intensified with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the advent of the Reagan administration in the United States, the CSCE agreed, in Madrid, to convene a special meeting in Stockholm to devise specific CBMs to reduce the risk of conventional and nuclear war in Europe. The Stockholm document (1986) established, among other criteria, the obligation of CSCE participant nations to comply with the agreements reached concerning the regulation of military activities, the presence of observers, the exchange of annual schedules of military maneuvers, and the verification of accords.

In the atmosphere of reduced tensions which emerged toward the end of the 1980s, the CSCE developed, in Vienna (1990), an extensive document calling for annual exchanges of military information, consultation and cooperation mechanisms to reduce risk, inter-military liaison, advance notification of military activities, the presence of observers from participating nations, annual schedules of military activities, verification techniques, communications networks, and an annual meeting on the implementation of the agreed-upon measures.¹

The implementation of CBMs within the framework of the CSCE generated a negotiation process whose short-term effect was to minimize the risk of armed conflict and reduce the level of conventional armaments held by the superpowers on European soil. In these negotiations, given the explicit interest in averting all military conflict—and given the high concentration of conventional and nuclear weapons in the region—the prevailing view limited the use of confidence-building techniques to the military sphere.

The UN was also active in the development of the concept of confidence building; the 10th Special Session of the General Assembly, dedicated to disarmament (1978), noted the need to adopt measures aimed at strengthening international peace and security and at building confidence among states. A recommendation was put forward that mistaken or accidental attacks could best be averted by improving communication between governments.

Subsequently, in 1981, a group of UN experts drafted a document known as the “Broad Study on Confidence-building Measures” which described CBMs in very general terms, including political, military, economic, social, and cultural measures.² Among the CBMs dealing specifically with military and security-related affairs, the document described the following: information, communication, and exchange on military activities; reduction of military expenditures; advance notification of military maneuvers; admittance of foreign military observers; the formulation of a consultation mechanism to implement the accords; measures aimed at reducing military tensions; the establishment

1. “Vienna Document 1990 of the Negotiations on Confidence and Security-Building Measures Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,” Vienna, 1990.

2. Hugo Palma, *Confianza, desarme y relaciones internacionales* (Lima: Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales [CEPEI], 1991). Attachment: “Estudio amplio sobre medidas de fomento de la confianza,” (New York: United Nations, 1982).

of nuclear-free zones, demilitarized zones, and peace zones; and the verification of the accords.

In the political, economic and social arenas, the UN study mentioned the following CBMs: respect for the sovereignty, territorial independence and integrity of all states and non-intervention in their internal affairs; renouncing policies of aggression and colonialism; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; establishing a new international economic order; and conducting joint economic development projects, especially in border areas.

Over the past five years, the UN has intensified its efforts in confidence building through the creation of the Commission on Disarmament and a series of specialized seminars on the topic. In May 1988, the commission defined confidence building as "the step-by-step process of taking all possible concrete, effective measures which express political commitment, are militarily significant and are designed to strengthen confidence and security... and contribute to arms control and disarmament."³

At a seminar entitled "Multilateral Confidence-building Measures and the Prevention of War" held in Kiev in September 1989, the coordinator of the event, Derek Boothby, noted that, recognizing the dangers to world peace deriving from the presence of large arsenals of nuclear weapons, it is vitally important to negotiate bilateral and multilateral accords aimed at reducing the risk of misperceptions in times of crisis. In Boothby's view, the discussions on CBMs and the prevention of war reveal broad differences of opinion which are frequently linked to specific situations in each regional context. Thus, he argued, the policies applicable in Europe may not necessarily be valid in other regions of the world.⁴

In June 1990, the UN sponsored a seminar in Denmark on "Confidence-building Measures in the Maritime Domain," which focused on the growing importance of the world's oceans and seas as a means of transport and a source of resources. A series of treaties were noted, such as the incident-prevention agreements between NATO and the USSR, as well as the 1989 agreement between Moscow and Washington on hazardous military activities. Two areas for rapprochement in the maritime area were described: "One is the negotiation of effective measures dealing with nuclear and conventional weapons; the other could be for naval forces and capabilities to contribute actively to the effective administration of the use of the oceans for peaceful purposes."⁵

A few months later (February 1991), a UN seminar was held in Vienna on "Confidence- and Security-building Measures." At the invocation of the meeting it was noted that the primary objective of the event was to consider the applicability of the US and

3. Davidson L. Hepburn, "Cooperation and Confidence-building Measures in Latin American and the Caribbean," *Disarmament (UN)*, XII, 3 (Autumn 1989): 79.

4. "Multilateral Confidence-building Measures and the Prevention of War," *Disarmament (UN)*, XIII, 1 (1990): 119.

5. Jan Prawitz, "Confidence-building Measures in the Maritime Domain: Application of Confidence-building Measures to a Nuclear Naval Environment," *Disarmament (UN)*, XIII, 4 (1990): 108.

European experiences to other parts of the world, particularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.⁶

The Regional Context

Latin America has been acutely aware of the role played by the United Nations in the field of CBMs. At the "Experts' Conference on Strengthening Cooperation in Latin America," held in Lima, Peru, in 1988, the close relationship between cooperation and confidence building was discussed. Agreement was reached that, in order to take full advantage of CBMs, the region should strictly follow the principles established in the UN Charter, especially those dealing with threat aversion or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state.

Beyond the achievements of this conference, other important instruments are in place in the region which can serve as a launching pad for confidence-building efforts. These include the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which created the first populated denuclearized zone on the planet; the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS); the Treaty on Amazonic Cooperation, which calls for economic collaboration among member states; the Andean Pact; and the Declaration of Ayacucho, together constituting the Latin American framework for the formulation of specific measures aimed at fostering confidence among states.

In the Andean area, in addition to the pact bearing the region's name, the presidents of member countries signed the Declaration of the Galápagos (in the late 1980s), proclaiming their support for all of the principles contained in the charters of the UN and the OAS, especially those dealing with the peaceful solution of conflict and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. The declaration called for increased integration among Andean countries within an environment of growing mutual confidence. Two years later, the same nations signed the Declaration of Cartagena, expressing their commitment to renouncing the development, production, possession or use of weapons of mass destruction.

Furthermore, in the mid-1980s, Argentina and Brazil initiated a cooperation process which culminated in the Declaration of Iguazú, establishing inspections of both nations' nuclear programs. Later, in the Declaration of Ezeiza (1988), the two countries reiterated their commitment to the peaceful use of their nuclear capabilities. The Mendoza Commitment, signed by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile and supported by Uruguay, wholly prohibited the development, production, storage or transfer of chemical or biological weapons.

In Central America, both the Contadora Agreement of June 1989 and Esquipulas II (1987) established mechanisms for confirmation and verification aimed at preventing the acquisition of additional armaments or the introduction of new weapons and at dismantling foreign military installations.

6. Statement by Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Undersecretary-General for Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations seminar on Confidence- and Security-building Measures, Vienna, February 1991.

Chile and Confidence Building

In the case of Chile, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Declaration of Ayacucho form the core of the multilateral instruments available for fostering confidence. The former, ratified by Chile in 1974, is the keystone of mutual confidence in the region. The Treaty establishes a zone free of nuclear weapons and calls for nuclear energy to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. With this treaty, coupled with the Mendoza Commitment of 1991 on chemical and biological weapons, Chile agrees to refrain from the development, production, storage, transfer or use of weapons of mass destruction.

Furthermore, the Declaration of Ayacucho, signed by the governments of Chile and other nations in 1974, expresses a commitment to the creation of conditions favorable to arms control, calls for purchases of weapons for aggressive purposes to be stemmed and decries the use of nuclear energy for non-peaceful ends. Following the signing of the Declaration, five meetings of Andean Pact experts were held in 1975 and 1976 (two plenary meetings in Lima and Santiago and three working group meetings in Santiago, Lima, and Caracas).

At the first meeting of experts, a recommendation was made that participating governments encourage "measures designed to create a climate of confidence and mutual respect among the public; foster cooperation between military institutions; and exchange information on [military] topics." At the second meeting, held in Santiago, agreement was reached to expand cooperation among Andean Pact military forces through an exchange program between military academies. Furthermore, the experts called for the armed forces of Bolivia, Chile, and Peru to cooperate in strengthening the peace through the establishment of procedures for consultations and annual meetings.⁷ Clearly, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Declaration of Ayacucho, and the Mendoza Commitment are important starting points for the establishment of confidence-building measures between Chile and her neighbors.

Chile-Argentina

Confidence building between these two nations, in the sphere of security, covers primarily the following areas: military cooperation (naval, air and land); integration of border areas; and negotiations and agreements on boundaries. The signing of the Treaty on Cooperation and Friendship in 1984 (addressing mutual concerns in and around the Beagle Channel) was a watershed event in furthering reciprocal confidence and trust.

Military Cooperation. Beginning in 1986, a series of meetings have taken place between the countries' air forces and navies which, in later years, were expanded to include additional branches of the defense services, namely the army and border police. A joint communiqué issued by Defense Ministers Rojas and González in April 1991

7. Alejandro San Martín, "Las medidas de confianza y los procesos de limitación del gasto en armamentos: conceptos generales y su aplicación en América Latina después de Ayacucho," *Estudio Estratégico 1988* (Santiago, Chile: 1988) 82.

established annual meetings of the joint chiefs of staff to review institutional matters and devise plans for cooperation and coordination in defense areas.

Meetings between the two countries' navies, held primarily in the southern region, have led to close cooperation, including joint exercises in the area of the Beagle Channel. These maneuvers have primarily consisted of rescue and assistance missions for small ships. Furthermore, periodic meetings between Chilean and Argentine naval chiefs of staff have been held.

Cooperative measures between the air forces have included meetings of high-ranking officers from both nations; the participation of cadets from one country in military ceremonies in the other; and more general visits and meetings of air force officers. It is interesting to note that toward the end of 1988, information circulated that a study had been conducted on the feasibility of jointly placing a telecommunications satellite in orbit.

Cooperation between the nations' armies has consisted primarily of joint military expeditions into the Andes mountains, meetings of intelligence experts, discussion of potential joint activities in the southern region, and general military visits and meetings.

In the area of border control, worthy of special note are a study describing a joint system for patrolling borders designed to stem drug trafficking, as well as the signing of an agreement between Chilean *Carabineros* and Argentine *Gendarmería* to establish a framework for cooperation in fighting crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism.

Cooperation in security has also included an agreement signed by both nations' commissions on nuclear energy aimed at increasing collaboration on the peaceful use of nuclear energy within the framework of the 1976 agreement.

Integration of Border Areas. In August 1990, Presidents Aylwin and Menem signed the Chile-Argentina Integration Agreement, expressing their will to reinforce cooperation between the two nations and reiterating the importance of the Treaty on Peace and Friendship. The agreement calls for the opening of three border crossings, the construction of a new tunnel through the central Andes, complementary energy policies and measures aimed at combatting drug trafficking.

The following year, Aylwin and Menem signed, in Antofagasta and Bariloche, respectively, the charters of two border committees (one in the north and the other in the south) designed to promote, coordinate, and facilitate communications, exchanges and the movement of people, and to engage in a variety of tasks aimed at strengthening integration across national borders in these two geographic areas.

The Declaration of Punta Arenas (April 1992), designed to promote integration in the southernmost reaches of both nations and approved by ambassadorial signature, reiterated the commitment of both nations to furthering the integration process in the southern region. As part of that process, the Southern Border Committee agreed to initiate a study on the use of a common immigration card which would facilitate contact between residents of the cities of Río Grande and Porvenir on Tierra del Fuego and Ushuaia and Puerto Williams along the Beagle Channel.

In 1992, an additional agreement was signed exempting key personnel at border crossings from standard immigration procedures when entering the other nation. Furthermore, an arrangement between the regional Governor of Aysén and the Governor of the Province of Chubut, signed in September 1992, called for the creation of an inter-oceanic corridor to link the Argentine city of Comodoro Rivadavia with the Chilean port of Chacabuco.

In summary, the integration process that has commenced in the southern, northern and central regions is a clear indication of the high level of understanding achieved by both nations aimed at ensuring development for both countries in a climate of peace, democracy, and social justice.

Negotiations and Border Agreements. As of early 1991, persistent reports arose of unresolved demarcation disputes at various points along the border. The Joint Chilean-Argentine Border Commission compiled a list of 24 points of conflict. A parallel announcement was made by the Chilean Foreign Ministry that, in principle, agreements had been reached through meetings of the two nations' border directors on 22 of the 24 pending issues. The two unresolved items were the Laguna del Desierto and the area known as the Patagonian or continental ice fields.

The border agreement between the two nations, signed by Aylwin and Menem in August 1991, identified provisional solutions to both problems. The agreement called for the border in the area between Fitz Roy Mountain and Daudet Hill—known as the continental ice fields—to be demarcated on the basis of straight lines between hills emerging from the ice. Thus, 1,057 km² would belong to Chile and 1,248 km² to Argentina. The agreement was to be approved by the congresses of both nations.⁸

Regarding the question of the Laguna del Desierto (between border marker 62 and the Fitz Roy Mountain), the presidential agreement called for the issue to be submitted to arbitration by a court composed of five Latin American jurists: a Chilean, an Argentine, a Salvadorean, a Colombian, and a Venezuelan. The court was to function at the headquarters of the Inter-American Legal Committee in Rio de Janeiro but would not be formally linked to the OAS. The agreement noted that the arbitration did not require congressional approval because it fell under the precepts of the treaties of 1881 and 1984. The commitment to convene the court was to be signed within 90 days.

Thus, the Foreign Ministers met in November 1991—during a meeting of Mercosur—to sign an Arbitration Commitment which noted that the court's findings would be binding, definitive, and unappealable and should be issued prior to March 1, 1994. The Arbitration Court first met on December 17, 1991, in Rio de Janeiro, before the Brazilian Foreign Minister, and in October 1994 the court declared that Laguna del Desierto belonged to Argentina.

The presidential agreement of August 1991 also empowered the respective border commissions, functioning as a Joint Commission, to demarcate the remaining 22 pending

8. FLACSO, "De la reinserción a los acuerdos. La política exterior chilena en 1991," *Serie Política Exterior y Relaciones Internacionales*, 237.

points of dispute (including the passes at San Francisco, Nevado de Tres Cruces, Corrida de Tori, Cerro Tres Hermanos Sur, and Ventisquero del Plomo). Their decisions would not be subject to congressional approval.

Although the agreement on the Patagonian ice fields has yet to be ratified by Congress, the agreements achieved on border issues have been important. As President Aylwin himself has noted, solutions have been found, in principle, to 24 problems of border demarcation, many of which date back to the beginning of this century.

Chile-Peru

Confidence-building measures between these two countries include military cooperation—especially meetings of high ranking officers—negotiations and agreements on border disputes.

Military Cooperation. Invoking the Declaration of Ayacucho, the Foreign Ministers of Chile and Peru agreed in November 1985 to begin a process of consultation and negotiation leading to curtailed military expenditures and an increase in mutual confidence. Toward this end, they convened a series of meetings between ranking officers from both nations.⁹

Between June 1986 and August 1992, seven such encounters took place. The topics of discussion have primarily focused on the curtailment of arms acquisitions and military expenditures. In addition, agreement has been reached on the need to resolve border disputes as stipulated in the Treaty of 1929, coordinate efforts against terrorism and drug trafficking, exchange military information, and conduct joint instruction exercises and other joint military activities.

In the wake of the sixth meeting and following a gathering of the Ministers of Defense, a joint communiqué was issued highlighting the progress achieved in a variety of bilateral fields and in cooperation in the struggle against drug trafficking through the exchange of information.

Close collaboration has also arisen between the two police and air forces. Within the framework of the Joint Subcommittee on Peru-Chile Border Integration, an agreement was signed to combat drug trafficking by means of joint border operations in Arica and Tacna and by facilitating the exchange of information, such as the results of specific legislative efforts and data on individual drug traffickers. Subsequently, the scope of this agreement was broadened to include the efforts of the police forces of Arica and Tacna to fight crime and terrorism. Coordination between the heads of the intelligence services of the two air forces has also taken place to analyze drug trafficking and terrorism-related issues.

Negotiations and Border Agreements. In January 1992, Chile and Peru commissioned a group of experts to negotiate and resolve issues pending from the Treaty of 1929, dealing primarily with the use and administration of port facilities, customs, and

9. Augusto Varas, "Chile-Peru: Limitación de armamento o medidas de confianza mutua," in *Defensa y Desarme América Latina y el Caribe* (Chile), Vol. 1, N° 2 (Jan-April 1986): 3-5.

railroads constructed by Chile in Arica for Peruvian use. Two months later, a binational commission was established, headed by the former Peruvian Ambassador to Chile, Luis Marchant, and the Chilean Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Edmundo Vargas. The first meeting was scheduled for March 18, 1992, in Lima, to be followed by a second encounter 15 days later in Santiago.

At these meetings, Peru expressed its desire to reach an agreement, as soon as possible, on the use of a loading dock, a customs office, and a train station. The meetings were temporarily suspended, following Fujimori's *autogolpe*,¹⁰ until late 1992. In February 1993, a negotiating commission was established to review the pertinent clauses of the Treaty of 1929. Three months later, an agreement was reached. The accord was signed by the Foreign Ministers, providing a definitive solution to this issue.

Chile-Bolivia

Although Chile and Bolivia do not maintain diplomatic relations (due to Bolivia's long-standing demand for a land connection to the Pacific), progress has recently been made on several border disputes. In August 1991, the Bolivian Foreign Ministry filed a complaint alleging that border markers in the area of Llica had been placed in error and/or moved. The Bolivians also reported movement of Chilean troops along the border. The Second Division of the Bolivian Army engaged in reconnaissance, confirming that the markers were properly placed and that Chilean forces had not entered Bolivian territory.

While the Bolivian Foreign Minister expressed his hope that the next meeting of the Joint Border Commission would focus on unresolved demarcation issues, the Acting Chilean Foreign Minister noted that the Treaty of 1904 was not under discussion at those meetings. The meetings, he noted, were dedicated to technical aspects of treaty implementation in certain sectors. Thus, the commission's task consisted of placing additional markers in areas covering 65 km². In April 1992, the Joint Commission reached an agreement on 11 points of demarcation which continued to hamper relations between the two states. As part of the solution, Bolivia obtained 15 km² of Cerro Sillillica, while Chile received 4.5 km of Cerro Capitán.

Conclusion

New conditions on the regional and global levels, resulting from the shift away from cold war policies toward the relaxation of tensions, have created a favorable climate for confidence building among the nations of the world. A noteworthy example of this progress is the Middle East peace process which has successfully presented an opportunity for debate and negotiation, despite the profound cultural, political, and religious gap which has long separated Arabs and Israelis.

In Latin America, the existence of treaties and declarations on arms control and disarmament may be considered a launching point for the establishment of CBMs

10. *Autogolpe* literally means self *coup d'état*.

designed to resolve unresolved border issues and limit the acquisition of arms and military spending in general, as well as initiate and facilitate integration processes.

In Chile, important progress has been made in fostering increased confidence, as demonstrated by close military cooperation with Argentina and Peru and the significant advances already achieved toward the resolution of border conflicts with the country's three neighboring states.

Confidence-building Measures in the Maritime Domain

Michael A. Morris

Confidence-building measures (CBMs) have received worldwide attention because of their achievements in Europe in helping promote East–West confidence and wind down the cold war. Because of the cold war genesis of the recent rise of interest in CBMs, they have been predominantly conceived in military terms as a way of lessening the possibility of overt hostilities between implacable adversaries. However, Latin American and other Third World commentators, impressed by the positive results of CBMs, have called for a broader conception of CBMs more compatible with the distinctive setting of developing countries.¹

The argument for a broader conception of CBMs adapted to Third World realities is compelling, provided that military security remains the principal focus. Adaptation of CBMs to a post–cold war South American setting, for example, would have to respond to the important differences between that setting and the cold war European context. The latter was starkly militarized and polarized along East–West lines, which constrained application of CBMs to certain specific matters (such as advance notification of sizable troop maneuvers near East–West bloc frontiers). South America was never polarized along East–West lines during the cold war, and in important ways the regional security setting has become more benign over the past decade. Military dictatorships have been replaced almost entirely by democratic regimes; concerted efforts are being made to forge viable civil–military relations; significant progress has been made in resolving or at least defusing chronic regional disputes; and no country in the region remains the implacable enemy of any other. Even the Anglo–Argentine Malvinas/Falkland Islands dispute, which led to war in 1982, has become less confrontational.

Nevertheless, the legacy of mistrust that remains among South American states, and between these states and extra–regional actors, suggests an important role for CBMs in the region. Unfortunately, there has been a paucity of concrete suggestions about how CBMs might be applied to specific Third World settings such as South America. Many Latin American analysts tend to define CBMs broadly. This tendency, which risks vagueness and the possibility of wandering from core issues, nonetheless suggests the need for a definition of CBMs sufficiently flexible to account for local attitudes and conditions. Pragmatic application of military CBMs in South America must take particu-

1. A Brazilian diplomat, for example, has called for CBMs structured with the problems of developing countries in mind: "It is most disquieting, for instance, that enemy images are still commonly applied to portray endemic problems of the developing countries. There is indeed an obvious imbalance when it comes to debating issues like drugs and environmental protection, among others. This bias does not recognize the complexity of tasks facing the poorer countries. From their point of view, on the contrary, confidence-building measures cannot exist in isolation apart from economic development and social advancement." Fernando Simas Magalhaes, "The Impact of East–West Confidence-building Measures on Global Security: A View from the South," *Disarmament* (UN), No. 12 (1990): 160.

lar heed of change and continuity in the South American security setting over the past decade.² One area where change is keenly felt is the naval-maritime dimension. This article addresses the changing conditions of maritime security in the region and explains the possibilities for confidence building among states.

The Maritime Setting: The Impact of the Law of the Sea

On 10 December, 1982, 117 states signed the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Treaty. The United States and some other key developed states have not signed, particularly because of misgivings about the treaty's deep seabed provision. Non-signatories, including the United States, have generally objected to international control of the deep seabed, while accepting as customary law the new pattern of nationally controlled ocean zones set forth in the UNCLOS Treaty. The broad trend regarding nationally controlled ocean zones is toward allowing coastal states greater regulation through law of extended areas of ocean space adjacent to their coasts. The traditional narrow maritime bands under national control (the territorial sea and the contiguous zone) have been extended seaward, and new zones have been created, all of them largely subject to coastal state control. This trend has been termed the "national enclosure" movement.

National enclosure of the oceans, begun in the late 1940s along the west coast of South America, gradually gained adherents in the rest of South America and eventually throughout most of the Third World. Although the United States and other developed states long resisted this movement, they eventually accepted the portions of the UNCLOS Treaty setting forth more extensive national ocean zones as compatible with their own resource interests as coastal states.

The UNCLOS Treaty, then, embodies an important consensus over the basic nature of national ocean zones, long a source of North-South dispute. To this extent, a North-South framework of trust has displaced a legacy of North-South strife. At the

2. The following series of articles, written over the span of a decade, provide a vantage point for assessing regional change. In these articles I argue that CBMs need to be adapted to the specific reality of the Latin American region, since the Latin American situation is different from that prevailing Europe. I have catalogued CBMs undertaken in Latin America and proposed with a consistent focus building confidence on the military front; my proposed CBMs have been targeted and adapted not only to specific diplomatic quarrels but also to concrete uncertainties posed by the structure and deployment of national military establishments. Michael A. Morris and Victor Millan, eds., *Controlling Latin American Conflicts: Ten Approaches* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983). In this edited book, see especially Approach 3: Controlling Conflict through Confidence-Building Measures, Victor Millan, "Regional Confidence-Building in the Military Field: The Case of Latin America," 89-97, and Approach 10: Controlling Conflicts through Consensus-Building, Michael A. Morris, "Equity and Freedom in US-Latin American Relations," 215-244. Michael A. Morris and Victor Millan, "CBMs in Comparative Perspective—The Case of Latin America," in R.B. Byers, F. Stephen Larrabee, and Allen Lynch, eds., *Confidence-Building Measures and International Security* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987) 125-142. Michael A. Morris, "The 1984 Argentine-Chilean Treaty of Peace and Friendship," *Oceanus*, No. 28 (1985): 93-96. Also see a series of articles by the author in the mid-1980s reviewing annual developments in Latin American arms proliferation and arms control in successive yearbooks edited by Jack Hopkins, *Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record* (New York: Holmes and Meier).

same time, however, extended ocean zones have engendered new kinds of disputes between Great Powers and developing coastal states as well as between adjacent states. Two key ocean zones, the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), best illustrate these trends in the case of South America.

Consensus on a 12-mile territorial sea breadth in the 1982 UNCLOS convention has tended to shift disputes from a North–South axis toward neighboring Third World states. A case in point was the disputed Argentine–Chilean maritime boundary in the Beagle Channel area, where delineation of the territorial sea determined control of certain strategically located islands, which in turn determined the state that would control a large EEZ in a strategically located area. The 1984 Argentine–Chilean Treaty of Peace and Friendship that resolved this dispute contained important CBMs.³

Other maritime boundary disputes in South America have involved Colombia and Venezuela over the Gulf of Venezuela, Guyana, and Venezuela, and Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands. In all of these cases determination of national control over territorial sea areas would influence control over larger EEZ areas. Some CBMs have already been applied to these cases, and other kinds of CBMs appear to be strong candidates for application as well, as discussed below.

The Issue of EEZ Control

The exclusive economic zone is the most prominent example of the global trend toward more extensive national control of ocean zones. The EEZ includes the seabed, the water column, and the air space between 12 and 200 miles offshore, an area that generally includes the bulk of the continental shelf. EEZs have focused on natural resources, but important military issues are also involved.

When South American states first pressed for recognition of a 200-mile limit, their primary goal was to extend national control over offshore resources. The UNCLOS Treaty clearly allocates resources and associated rights to coastal states in the EEZ. The law is ambiguous, however, on the question of uninvited military activities within the EEZ. Though military activity by foreign states within EEZs is still generally allowed by law, the coastal state may restrict such activity when it believes that its rights are encroached upon or that abuse is involved. The coastal state is entitled to carry out any military activities within its EEZ and is given exclusive authority to protect resources in the EEZ.

The overlap with respect to military activities within EEZs resulted largely from the concept of the EEZ as an attempt to reconcile the basically contrasting concerns and preferences of Third World and developed countries, especially the maritime powers. It is questionable whether the EEZ consensus, as it finds expression in the UNCLOS Treaty, will be able to contain such differences in practice.

The maritime powers insisted that the new resource rights be carefully circumscribed so that other traditional freedoms might be safeguarded, including the right to military activities. The restrictive interpretation of coastal states' rights favored by the

3. Morris, "The 1984 Argentine–Chilean Pact of Peace and Friendship."

maritime powers would give free rein to military activities by foreign states within EEZs and prevent creeping jurisdiction by Third World coastal states (that is, the gradual, unregulated extension of coastal state powers into all offshore zones and perhaps beyond).

Third World states have generally favored a considerable degree of control by the coastal state over foreign military activities within EEZs while demanding exclusive rights over resources and related matters. An expansive or liberal interpretation of coastal states' rights favored by Third World countries would decide in favor of coastal state views when such claimed rights were disputed by foreign states. Creeping jurisdiction would tend to result and could lead to eventual national control of the EEZ for all purposes.

The history of US–South American maritime relations before and since the 1982 UNCLOS Treaty has been marked by continuing polarization of views regarding offshore rights and obligations. The United States has continued to emphasize freedom of the seas even after qualified endorsement of national enclosure; South American states have been inclined toward creeping jurisdiction in offshore zones and even beyond. The US concern about creeping jurisdiction is that expanding South American control out to 200 miles and even beyond could lead to eventual territorialization and militarization of enormous offshore areas. Since South American states together enclose huge areas of South Atlantic, South Pacific, Caribbean, and even Antarctic offshore areas, US concern about national control and foreign access to these areas is substantial. Furthermore, the United States has been concerned that just as South American states mobilized Third World support for national enclosure, the region might also encourage other developing countries to stretch UNCLOS limits on national control over ocean zones to the breaking point.

The Argentine Sea and Chilean Sea encompass, respectively, huge ocean areas to the east and west of South America far beyond the 200-mile limit and include the massive space between the southern tip of the South American continent and the Antarctic landmass.⁴

Claims about the degree of national control in these vast offshore areas have varied, but they clearly go well beyond the ocean zone limits established in the UNCLOS Treaty.

Extended national zones, particularly EEZs, require new boundary decisions, many of which have conflict potential. Disputes over EEZ boundaries have often been aggravated by the presence of significant natural resources in the extended national zones—such as the resource-rich zones off the Malvinas/Falkland Islands which aggravated the Anglo–Argentine dispute over sovereignty.

The 15 February 1990 joint statement restoring diplomatic relations after the 1982 war was explicitly intended “to increase confidence between the United Kingdom and Argentina.” Toward that end, it contained maritime and naval CBMs, including prior

4. Michael A. Morris, “EEZ Policy in South America’s Southern Cone,” in Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Norton Ginsburg, eds., *Ocean Yearbook 6* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press): 417-37.

notice of any military maneuvers conducted in the air and waters surrounding the islands and an agreement to lift a 150-mile exclusion zone imposed by the United Kingdom around the islands, so that Argentine military ships and aircraft would be allowed to approach the islands' shores.

Shortly thereafter, on 28 November 1990, both countries agreed to measures for fisheries conservation around the islands. A South Atlantic Fisheries Commission composed of delegations from both states was established, which is to meet at least twice a year. The commission will benefit from exchanges of information and joint scientific research work in managing fish stocks. Anglo-Argentine talks were initiated in late 1991 about the possibility of joint management of the islands' offshore resources, including both oil and fisheries.

In general, coastal states have begun to assume the enforcement burden of new EEZ rights, albeit unevenly and often with inappropriate methods and weaponry. South American coastal states are unique in Third World terms in having substantial navies and large EEZs but generally inadequate constabulary capabilities for EEZ patrol. South American maritime forces are generally more appropriate for offshore defense than for the constabulary responsibilities of EEZ surveillance.

Argentina and Brazil, for example, have two of the top three ranking Third World navies and have EEZs ranking, respectively, twenty-fifth and eighth in size in global terms. The Chilean and Peruvian navies rank among the top eight in the Third World, and the Chilean EEZ ranking is thirteenth in size in global terms. The Colombian and Venezuelan navies are impressive, if ranking somewhat lower in Third World terms, and their EEZs are fairly large. Ecuador's navy is more modest but still potent for inshore territorial defense and is on par with that of Uruguay; Ecuador's EEZ ranks twenty-sixth in global terms. Suriname and Guyana have only token navies; their EEZs are more modest in size but not insubstantial.⁵

(Excluded from this comparison are French Guiana, because of its colonial status and Bolivia and Paraguay, because of their landlocked status, although each has a small navy deployed in lakes and rivers.)

Fundamental decisions about future regional naval structure will likely be made during the 1990s, particularly if regional economies tend to stabilize and prosper. If new resources become available, a new generation of naval weaponry might be purchased or developed, including aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. This option would tend to accentuate the long-standing regional tendency toward large, war-fighting navies, which in turn would threaten to reactivate regional rivalries and arms races. An alternative, confidence-building approach would level off naval acquisitions and instead emphasize constabulary capabilities and needs.

5. Michael A. Morris, *Expansion of Third-World Navies* (London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987) 34-35, 136-142.

The Role of CBMs

Future naval and maritime directions of South America are important in their own right and in symbolic terms; they can have a considerable impact for good or ill on the rest of the Third World. US–Latin American relations will be directly affected as well. As already mentioned, some of the strongest navies and largest EEZs in the Third World are in South America, the region that initiated and sustained the national enclosure movement. As South America puts the EEZ into practice, it will receive close attention from the United States, Third World states, and others.

The consolidation by law of large offshore zones (*de jure* control), accomplished by the 1982 UNCLOS Treaty, has been followed up by efforts to regulate and manage the newly acquired, vast maritime areas (*de facto* control). Establishment of effective national authority over offshore zones poses fundamental decisions for South American states in the 1990s about the relative emphasis and relationship between constabulary and military capabilities. A big navy emphasis would tend to reinforce seeds of distrust between neighbors and with respect to the Great Powers. An alternative, smaller navy/constabulary course would tend to contain mistrust and facilitate confidence building.

In the negative scenario, South American states could move toward consolidation of control of EEZs and areas beyond through continued emphasis on big navies. Already impressive navies could continue to grow and modernize, and the leading regional navies could acquire a new generation of capital ships including aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. Regional rivalries might be reignited, and South American arms races might reappear. US concerns that South American coastal states were trying to territorialize and militarize vast offshore zones would add to tension.

Acquisition of nuclear submarines by either or both of the most likely regional candidates, Argentina and Brazil, would be especially unsettling. The two countries have made considerable progress in recent years in building confidence through CBMs that assure each side that the other will not develop nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, nuclear submarine research programs have continued in the region. In addition to contributing to an arms race at sea and escalation of tension, such a step would reopen fears of a South American nuclear arms race. As one author explains, “This is because nuclear submarine propulsion programs are exempted from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards inspections. Countries pursuing such programs could thus gain access to nuclear materials outside of international inspection which could then be used in nuclear weapons production.”⁶

A more positive scenario would increase the emphasis placed on policing, or constabulary, capabilities for EEZ patrol and enforcement while maintaining, but not significantly expanding, navies. The pull toward state-of-the-art weaponry would be resisted. Equipment for EEZ patrol and enforcement for purposes of resource control

6. Darryl Howlett, “Arms Control,” in Peter Calvert, ed., *Political and Economic Encyclopedia of South America and the Caribbean* (London: Longman Current Affairs, 1991) 33.

should consist of “something effective enough to demonstrate serious intentions without giving an impression of unseemly belligerence.”⁷ The patrolling and enforcement of EEZs with appropriate constabulary equipment—light forces and EEZ maritime patrol aircraft discreetly backed up with naval forces as required—could help contain mistrust by reinforcing respect for coastal state offshore jurisdiction recognized in law. In routine matters such light forces are “effective enough to demonstrate serious intentions” in establishing law and order out to 200 miles. In contrast, the use of large or heavily armed vessels for routine EEZ enforcement would give “an impression of unseemly belligerence.”

An upward cycle of naval expansion that emphasized the acquisition of ever more potent major warships for inshore/offshore territorial defense would have several unfortunate effects. Acquisition of such potent weaponry would appear threatening and because of the large cost involved, tend to defer the acquisition of more modest EEZ constabulary equipment. The particular relationship between EEZ policing and territorial defense will help to determine the extent to which enclosure out to 200 miles promotes consensus or conflict.

In general, South American coastal states could build confidence between each other and with respect to the Great Powers by respecting UNCLOS rights and obligations in offshore zones. Brazil presents a good example of a country that has moved pragmatically, within the law, toward control of its large EEZ during the past several decades. After initial problems with the maritime powers over its territorialist stance in the early 1970s, Brazil moved to moderate its ambition to assert sovereignty over adjacent seas out to 200 miles. Brazil has received assistance with the development of offshore resources and has procured weapons from numerous developed states without excessive dependency on, or confrontation with, any of them.⁸

Moderation in developing future force structure can also build confidence. Continuing naval buildups, by contrast, reinforce the impression of creeping jurisdiction with an intent to militarize and territorialize EEZs and even areas beyond. A South American confidence-building approach would assure neighbors and maritime powers that national naval capabilities would be limited to the provision of necessary offshore defense, and increasingly emphasize capabilities for EEZ patrol. Greater transparency or openness of military budgets and expected weapons acquisitions would also contribute to such a South American confidence-building process. A region-wide confidence-building process could elaborate agreements to abstain from purchase or development of sophisticated naval warships not currently deployed, such as new aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines; to stabilize naval weaponry purchases and match with this a leveling off and eventual decrease of naval budgets; and to pool regional resources for production and transfer of offshore constabulary capabilities. For example, Brazilian-produced patrol boats have already been exported and could constitute one focus for constructive

7. E. Young, “New Laws for Old Navies: Military Implications of the Law of the Sea,” *Survival* (November–December 1974): 264.

8. Michael A. Morris, *International Politics and the Sea: The Case of Brazil* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), especially chapters 3 and 4.

regional paramilitary integration. Over time, naval build-downs might be possible; for example, reduction of submarine forces and de-escalation from frigates and destroyers to corvettes.

The long-standing series of naval exercises carried out between the US and Latin American navies, an outgrowth of the cold war codenamed UNITAS, had limited potential for building confidence between neighbors. The ultimate purpose was to heighten combat readiness of regional navies against a potential cold war threat. However, in comparison, joint naval exercises among South American navies—without US leadership against a hypothetical communist threat—have contributed more toward mutual confidence, as has collaboration between regional navies along the east coast of the continent for South Atlantic surveillance.

Constabulary collaboration between regional states is especially promising, since none of the parties need feel threatened. Joint patrolling in sensitive EEZ frontier areas would be a case in point and is under consideration for the Malvinas/Falkland Islands. Joint production and distribution arrangements for constabulary equipment have been mentioned. Regional training institutions and exchanges for offshore patrolling open another vista for mutually beneficial collaboration. The continent-wide sharing of information that is beginning to occur in the case of anti-drug efforts could be extended to the tracking of fisheries poachers, vessels suspected of pollution, and others suspected of violating EEZ regulations.

Effective constabulary sea and air surveillance for drug interdiction off the Caribbean coasts of Colombia and Venezuela could make an important contribution to a climate amenable to CBMs. New drug transit routes have been opened in recent years throughout the South American continent, but the Caribbean has been the major avenue for drug transit from South America to the United States. Effective constabulary action by Colombia and Venezuela would help build US confidence in its apparent recent policy shift toward greater emphasis on constabulary methods of fighting the drug war. Caribbean island states, vulnerable as way stations for drug transit between the South American continent and the United States and concerned that military-oriented, anti-drug strategies of larger neighbors might contribute to their own militarization, would also be assured by a constabulary approach endorsed by their large neighbors.

A relative increase in emphasis on constabulary forces and a relative decrease on naval forces would likely have interlocking confidence-building impacts domestically and internationally. Since naval expansion and modernization is capital-intensive, mounting budgetary pressures for ever-larger and more modern navies for the assertion of increasingly ambitious offshore claims have contributed to inter-service budgetary rivalries. An emphasis on a constabulary approach would not only make these rivalries less intense but also contribute to stabilization and perhaps an eventual decline of overall military spending. Such an example at home would encourage neighbors and others to follow similarly prudent courses of action.

Conclusions

The basic choices facing South American countries about a constabulary or military emphasis at sea have been somewhat sublimated in recent years, but dilemmas remain and may very well become more acute during the 1990s. In recent years severe economic

constraints and newly installed civilian governments have combined to restrain military spending. However, these constraints have been unable to generate a shift from a military toward a constabulary force structure. As South American economies begin to recover in the 1990s, pressures from military establishments for increases in military spending are likely to mount, and precarious civilian governments may not be able to resist. Budgets of all armed forces would likely expand—expansion of naval budgets at the expense of politically influential armies or even of air forces being unlikely. The return of authoritarian or military governments would certainly accentuate such trends. The early 1990s therefore appear to be a particularly propitious time to place greater emphasis on constabulary forces and to reinforce measures limiting militarization.

Extra-regional powers can contribute to a confidence-building approach as well. For example, although the United Kingdom and Argentina have been unable to resolve diverging views regarding sovereignty over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands, CBMs have played an important role in their rapprochement and presumably could continue to do so. Additional CBMs that might be contemplated would be joint resource exploitation and even patrolling of disputed waters off the islands; matching military and naval de-escalation by the United Kingdom in and around the islands, as well as by Argentina in the general vicinity that includes southern Patagonia (a step that might require Chile to become a CBM participant as well); and British assistance to Argentina for establishing a constabulary presence throughout the Argentine EEZ.

This Southern Cone CBM process involving Argentina and the United Kingdom could be extended to Antarctica by acquiring a tripartite character including Chile and, under the aegis of the Antarctic Treaty, a multilateral character. For example, tripartite cooperation could reinforce infrastructure facilities for Antarctic expeditions in the Malvinas/Falkland Islands and in the Argentine and Chilean portions of Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego; tripartite expeditions and scientific projects in and around Antarctica could be developed to include areas burdened by overlapping claims of the three countries; and resource exploitation in Antarctic waters, most particularly fisheries, might involve cooperation as well.

These suggestions for Southern Cone CBMs reflect changes in regional politics as well as the decline of the global cold war. During the height of the cold war, Richard Haass recommended another kind of CBM, which advised Great Power abstention on both the naval and constabulary fronts: "One possibility is a CBM of a different kind: arrangements between the super-powers limiting the direct involvement of their naval forces on behalf of other states for certain purposes [for example, to patrol the 200-mile EEZ] or in designated parts of the world."⁹

In a cold war context, superpower naval collaboration and even constabulary cooperation with developing coastal states threatened to polarize offshore areas. In a post-cold war context, British collaboration with Argentina and Chile in offshore areas may contribute to de-escalation of military tension. More broadly, the post-cold war

9. R. Haass, "Confidence-building Measures and Naval Arms Control," *Adelphi Paper*, No. 149 (1979) 28.

context opens up new kinds of constructive collaboration involving Great Powers in both the South Atlantic and the South Pacific.

Although the superpowers focused their attention on the South Atlantic during the cold war, they assign the region greatly reduced strategic importance since the cold war's conclusion. A contemporary confidence-building approach in the changed context would encourage Great Power assistance to South Atlantic coastal states for resource exploitation and even patrolling, if not for naval involvement. Continuing US naval ties with South American navies would decline in relative importance if a constabulary approach was adopted; in any event these ties are much less prominent than in the past, as regional navies have become more autonomous and have strengthened ties with other states within and beyond the region.

Finally, CBMs involving South Atlantic coastal states (and Chile) and Great Powers would complement and reinforce successive United Nations General Assembly resolutions declaring the Atlantic Ocean between Africa and South America as "The Zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic." This zone of peace has been oriented toward excluding the cold war from the area while increasing peaceful contacts between coastal states on both sides of the ocean basin. The end of the cold war should encourage Great Powers to move beyond exclusion to a role in helping build peace. In a post-cold war context South Atlantic coastal states must do more to build a peaceful order than just try and exclude Great Power military activities. Reciprocal naval build-downs by Argentina and Brazil that included CBMs not to develop or deploy nuclear submarines would complement this aim.

The Armed Forces and Confidence-building Measures in Chile: Three Essays

*Lieutenant General Sergio Covarrubias Sanhueza; Brigadier General Javier J. Salazar Torres; General Leopoldo Porras Zúñiga.*¹

I. Lieutenant General Sergio Covarrubias Sanhueza

In general, and in theory, confidence-building measures (CBMs) are useful and appropriate methods for improving relations on all levels. They are necessary in a wide range of human relations, including economics and politics as well as the realm of military affairs.

To be productive, treaties, agreements, and negotiations of all types must be based on mutual confidence. Openness, transparency, and goodwill are central to these processes and are essential to the credibility of CBMs. In military and political circles, CBMs are indispensable to the diminution of tensions and the establishment of regional peace and security. They are composed of a broad mix of public relations, marketing and diplomacy. These elements help keep the measures from being perceived as a threat and allow them to serve as a complement to deterrence.

Human beings and their nations have always feared the unknown, perceiving it to threaten them with instability and uncertainty. Such feelings can easily lead to insecurity about the vital interests of a nation or region. Throughout the world, the state assumes responsibility for the security which individuals cannot provide for themselves. As a result, the security of a nation or region is vital and indispensable to the people's ability to live independent lives and feel secure about their interests and future.

To secure that stability, states organize armed forces to defend the people against threats posed by potential enemies. Thus, a system of defense aimed at deterrence is created to discourage attack by the nation's adversaries, avert armed conflict and facilitate the resolution of differences through peaceful means.

However, the causes of mistrust and insecurity which may lead to tension, conflict, and even crisis are numerous, complex and often difficult to identify. Furthermore, these causes are different in each nation and region and are frequently closely linked to historical events and the desire for revenge against others on political, geographic, border, economic, ethnic, nationalist, or religious matters.

These potential causes tend to be molded into "myths," handed down from generation to generation, which help sustain the climate of fear and perceived threats.

1. The opinions expressed in these essays are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the National Ministry of Defense of Chile or the institution of the Chilean Armed Forces.

These myths are often deeply rooted in the population and generate deep mistrust, and even hatred, which can be particularly difficult to overcome.

CBMs are of particular importance when they seek to resolve, soften or ameliorate old antagonisms between peoples, dispel myths, or eliminate misperceptions which generate mistrust and insecurity. This apparently simple task is in fact a difficult political challenge. Confidence-building measures, at both the domestic and international levels, take time and require considerable effort.

Furthermore, papers and documents drafted on the topic frequently contain misinterpretations. The most frequent of these errors is to confuse causes with effects. Documents prepared by the United Nations (UN) and experts on these matters often suggest that the primary objective of CBMs is to facilitate the process of arms control and disarmament as a means of strengthening international peace and security. This is a serious error. The reasoning behind these statements, based on the concept that the presence of arms and military forces is the primary cause of tension and the threat of armed conflict, is faulty. In fact, arms are amassed as a response to the real causes of mistrust and fear.

Weapons, in the arsenal of a potential adversary, make threats more credible and generate fear of an attack. However, if those same weapons are in the hands of a trustworthy ally or friendly nation, they are considered a positive element which contributes to tranquility. Thus, arms themselves are neutral; the degree of danger depends not on their presence, but on the intentions of their owners. It has been said that "Nations do not distrust because they are armed. On the contrary, they arm themselves because they distrust each other." Pope John Paul II commented before the United Nations: "The most profound process of disarmament is that of the spirit and the heart." On another occasion he noted that "Disarmament alone is not the goal. The goal is peace, and there security is a fundamental factor."

The utopian belief that the threat of conflict could be eliminated by suppressing or reducing arms has been proven ineffective. Thus, arms control, as implemented to date, has been unsuccessful. Since the end of World War II, over 150 conflicts of various intensities have taken place in nations with limited stockpiles of weapons. During the same period, not a single American or Soviet soldier died in direct confrontation between these two superpowers, despite the largest concentration of arms in the history of the world—in terms of their destructive capability—held by these two nations. Clearly, the principle of deterrence operated effectively here. The simple truth is that as international tensions rise, nations tend to stockpile weapons.

Thus, CBMs should focus on the real causes of potential conflict in order to reduce tension, clarify misunderstandings, resolve often unfounded myths and fears, and seek to resolve crisis situations and avert open conflict. It is disingenuous and erroneous to rely on CBMs alone to resolve conflict and dispel all risk of a threat.

Unfortunately, unless the human nature of the inhabitants of our globe changes, there will always be wars and conflicts among peoples and nations. A simple look at the world today confirms this perception.

For CBMs to succeed on the domestic or international level, there are certain stages or fundamental prerequisites which must be met. The first is the development of domestic confidence and credibility, within each nation, stemming from agreements between political leaders and ranking officers of the armed forces. This is a "two-way" process, given that confidence building between the military and political sectors must be mutual and reciprocal in order to be effective. The presence of clearly defined, consensus-based national security and defense policies shared with the armed forces is of tremendous assistance in this process. Before real progress can be achieved, neighboring nations in the region must take similar steps.

Once domestic issues have been resolved, and increased confidence between military and civilian officials has been secured—through specific actions and unambiguous, verifiable behavior rather than rhetorical promises—mechanisms for negotiating with other nations can be devised.

In summary, security and confidence are constructed on the foundations of open, transparent, reliable, and verifiable actions. Thus, an excessive level of secrecy is harmful. The system must be capable of evaluating the confidence-building process as a whole and of tracking each individual step in that process. If accurate evaluation is not possible, the risk of error reemerges, and remedies for such errors are not easily found.

II. Brigadier General Javier J. Salazar Torres

In discussing CBMs, conditions around the world, throughout the Hemisphere, and in the region must be given due consideration. Such an evaluation can well produce contradictory results. My personal view is that emerging worldwide conditions favor a continuing reduction in the threat of nuclear war but not a reduction in the incidence of regional conflict. In only the last four or five years, the UN Security Council has established more peacekeeping operations than it did during the first four decades of the United Nations. This situation, among other indicators, has prompted the search for instruments, procedures or methods which can contribute to the preservation of peace and security.

We would like to take this opportunity to express our most fervent support for this cause: the preservation of peace and security. However, some qualifications must be placed upon this peace, as alluded to above, before advancing further on the subject of confidence-building measures. To be fully realized, peace must be compatible with vital national interests. If this is not the case, the peace will be merely imposed or forced and will lead to more serious instability in the future.

Thus, identifying vital national interests takes on central importance. Only if the interests of different countries can be harmonized in the most far-reaching sense, and if this process is accepted within each nation, can there be a relative degree of certainty that the possibility of conflict has been dissipated. If true peace is to be achieved, attaining such a consensus, however difficult, must be a primary objective.

While disarmament, arms control and confidence-building measures indirectly contribute to this goal, they are nothing more than short-term measures which defer the identification of real solutions to unresolved conflicts. In effect, these measures seek to

neutralize what historians call the “apparent causes of conflict.” The real causes for dispute—that is, the basis for future conflict—remain intact.

Nonetheless, a reduction of tensions in a conflict situation can be particularly useful when the feasibility of accommodating diverse interests or achieving a peaceful solution to the central conflict is limited. Proposals on tension reduction must bear in mind the state’s irrefutable responsibility to provide an adequate level of security.

In thinking of CBMs, analysts tend to focus immediately on military affairs, although current events are quickly changing that reaction. While it is true that the most serious threats come from the military environment, there are other areas of inter-state relations which can make a significant contribution to the reduction of tensions. Efforts should be made, therefore, to coordinate initiatives in various areas, so that appropriate confidence strengthening signals are transmitted.

Mistrust thrives on the perception of a threat. Furthermore, the sensation of mistrust will always be felt more strongly by the weaker party to a conflict. That party will make use of two tools in its defense: the support of collective security forces and the power of deterrence it can amass for itself. The stronger nation, on the other hand, will have a more limited perception of such a risk, either because its international stature so warrants or because it effectively constitutes a superior fighting force. Paradoxically, if the weaker nation feels more satisfied, in general, than the stronger nation, confidence-building measures may heighten the weaker nation’s sense of defenselessness.

The geostrategic factors present in such a situation—whereby opportunities and conditions play a key role in determining response to an opponent—merit special consideration. Thus, if the stronger nation mentioned above also has faster reaction capabilities, the perceived defenselessness of the weaker state will be amplified.

To avert these perceptions, CBMs must be designed in such a way as to provide real reductions in tension, demanding more of the party claiming superiority to ensure adequate balance. This goal, however, appears to be unrealistic; no nation will agree to reduce its capabilities further than its opponent. An example of the difficulties that can arise in such a process is provided by the arms reduction talks held between the US and former USSR during the 1980s.

For Chile, the question of implementing CBMs is particularly complex. Historical events dating back to the previous century reflect two cases of armed conflict with two of Chile’s three neighbors. Furthermore, relations with the third neighbor have not been devoid of controversy. Clearly, the prejudices and misinterpretations generated over so many years will not be resolved through a single round of CBMs. Nonetheless, we firmly believe in pursuing efforts to effectively reduce tensions, in the most effective manner as dictated by global or particular security situations.

Proposals on CBMs should guard against entering the realm of deterrence. This must be left to other mechanisms for preserving the peace, through arms control or alternate methods of disarmament.

The Chilean armed forces have implemented an extensive program of confidence building measures with neighboring nations with which Chile maintains diplomatic relations. At this time, to take only one example, discussions are currently underway

with Peru on a number of measures. Naturally, any actions resulting from these negotiations will have to be implemented gradually and in good faith. If this process is successful, new initiatives can be considered, if conditions seem to be favorable.

It is evident that confidence-building programs must be preceded by a strong degree of trust between the armed forces and the nation's political officials.

The strength of civil-military relationships is crucial to this trust. Let us focus on this topic for a moment. We agree with the role of the armed forces as an instrument in overall domestic policy. We are not seeking or hoping to engage in a "co-government" on issues of foreign policy. However, the idea of consultations with the military is wholly valid. The underlying problem is that sufficient trust does not exist among the political actors familiar with and responsible for designing the nation's security policies.

Decades of political management, during which issues of security and defense have continuously been excluded from the political agenda, have done little to generate confidence among men of arms that proper evaluations are being made of strategic affairs. We are not advocating the imposition of the military's view. However, we do believe that when all the components involved are fully understood, poor decisions are less likely to be made.

While we support confidence-building measures, a word of caution is appropriate which, far from contradicting our position, helps place it in a more realistic framework: the dictionary of the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language relates the noun "confidence" and the verb "to trust" with the adjective "trusting," defining the latter as "credulous and lacking forethought."

III. General Leopoldo Porrás Zúñiga

The situation in the region today is particularly favorable from the perspective of confidence building. Most of the governments on the continent are actively engaged in reorganizing their affairs, both domestically and internationally. There is widespread consensus that international controversies should be resolved, primarily, through diplomatic negotiations. Furthermore, near-uniform support has arisen for an economic model progressively open to trade and foreign investment, in which the state cedes its protagonist's role in business to the private sector.

These conditions have made a favorable contribution to security in the Latin American nations, except Cuba, Peru, and others facing conditions familiar to all. As a result, the region is benefiting from an upturn in economic and social development as the threat of armed conflict wanes.

Thus, it is only natural that the governments in the region are seeking to orient their efforts in security toward measures that are appropriate in the new context. This means a military strategy focused on defending the nation and deterring threats to territorial integrity and the well-being of its citizenry.

This type of strategy relies on the ability of the armed forces to detect expediently any violations of sovereignty or transgressions of rules regarding the entry of ships, aircraft, persons, and vehicles (civilian or military) into the country. On the ground, these controls are implemented in border areas through a variety of mechanisms,

depending on the level of international tension at the time. The navy oversees maritime traffic and patrols Chilean coastal waters. The air force utilizes sophisticated technology and specialized planes to monitor Chilean airspace. Naturally, the armed forces require terrestrial, naval and air bases throughout the country to conduct the monitoring described above, train personnel and react in times of crisis.

Throughout the 20th century, Chile has adopted a policy of strategic defense. This has encouraged the armed forces to study, design and test different procedures aimed at preventing overreaction to apparent threats during periods of tension or crisis. Thus, Chile's armed forces have accumulated considerable experience in identifying formulas for building confidence with their colleagues in neighboring countries. Such measures, naturally, are designed and implemented while relations are normal. Implementation and verification during times of tension would be prohibitively difficult.

The following examples, based on personal experience some years ago and information on other such measures, demonstrate this ongoing interest and concern. The views expressed here, however, are mine alone and may differ from those currently held by the Chilean Army and Navy.

Military Attachés

Military attachés, both Chilean and foreign, constitute an excellent source of direct communication through which a variety of activities aimed at bringing CBMs to fruition can be formulated. For example, during the conflict between Chile and Argentina over the islands in the Beagle Channel (1978–1979), I had the honor of serving as air force attaché in the Chilean Embassy in Buenos Aires.

At that time, our military attachés and diplomatic personnel engaged in an active campaign aimed at advising relevant Argentine officials of Chile's willingness to resolve the issue through diplomatic means, as well as our firm commitment to defending our legitimate rights over the islands in dispute. Efforts and overtures which had been made over the preceding years enabled us to make contact with key Argentine officials to state our position.

The network of communications and contacts resulting from relationships fostered by military attachés on behalf of their home institutions is an excellent tool for developing, maintaining, and implementing CBMs.

Direct Contact between Regional Military Commanders

Contact between military commanders in certain regions is particularly useful to the navy and the air force. The complexities in monitoring and controlling airspace are twofold. First, there is no way to demarcate boundaries in the air. Radar control panels show borders, but this data has not been standardized among neighboring air forces. Thus, differences of opinion or perception can easily occur as to the exact location of an aircraft, in terms of airspace.

The second complexity has to do with the flight speed of modern aircraft. The closer an air base is to the border, the further into the neighboring territory the line triggering the takeoff of planes used to identify unknown aircraft lies. Each time a plane with an unknown flight plan crosses the border, the air force in that nation will have to send

fighters out to meet it; otherwise, interception will occur after the craft has left the border area. This situation can lead to a series of regrettable mistakes, particularly during times of crisis or tension.

For example, this type of situation arose in the southern region during the period of papal mediation on the islands in the Beagle Channel. As a result of a night-time accident near the Argentine border, Chilean search and rescue teams were ordered into the air at dawn from the base at Chacabuco. Argentine aeronautic officials were naturally alarmed by this unusual movement toward the border. However, a timely call placed in accordance with a locally agreed-upon procedure cleared up the confusion.

Meeting of Commanders-in-Chief of American Air Forces. Since the 1960s, the Commanders-in-Chief of the region's air forces have met annually at so-called CONJEFAMERS. These gatherings have led to a series of agreements and actions designed, primarily, to bolster confidence. Specifically, the measures seek to keep tense situations from escalating as a result of faulty communications or the lack of procedures for communication.

Inter-American Junta and Inter-American Defense College. These organizations constitute excellent opportunities to exchange information and establish relations of tremendous value in implementing CBMs.

Neither of these organizations is designed to identify specific measures. However, the relationships which emerge following a year or more in this environment facilitate understanding among individuals who are likely to play key roles in the defense institutions of their nations.

Other Professional, Social and Sporting Activities. The objective and purpose of such gatherings is to create direct links among military officers in the region. Clearly, relationships developed through these activities make a valuable contribution to future discussion and agreement on specific measures aimed at reducing tensions and fostering confidence among nations.

Appendix A: A List of Confidence-building Measures for Hemispheric Security

Jack Child

(These confidence-building measures are suggested as being applicable to the Hemisphere states in general, although some would obviously be more appropriate for countries with close relations, and others would be more suitable for those states whose relations are tense.)

1. CBMs dealing with troop movements and exercises.
 - a. Notification of maneuvers (with different procedures and length of advance notice for different types and sizes of maneuvers).
 - b. Notification of alert exercises and mobilization drills.
 - c. Notification of naval activities outside of normal areas.
 - d. Notification of aircraft operations and flights near sensitive and border areas.
 - e. Notification of other military activities (in the "out of garrison" category) that might be misinterpreted.
2. CBMs dealing with exchanges of information.

Information exchanges, direct or through third parties, in the following categories:

 - a. Military budgets.
 - b. New equipment and arms.
 - c. Unit locations.
 - d. Significant changes in a unit's size, equipment, or mission.
 - e. The major elements of strategic and tactical doctrine.
3. CBMs dealing with exchanges of personnel.

Those personnel exchanges balanced both in number and duration, to include:

 - a. Extension of invitations for observers to attend maneuvers, exercises, and "out of garrison" activities. (The observers could be from neighboring states, from a third-party neutral nation, or from an international organization.)
 - b. Stationing of permanent liaison observers at major headquarters. (As in "a" above, the observers could be from neighbors, neutrals, or international organizations.)
 - c. Exchange of personnel as students or instructors at military academies, military schools, and war colleges.
 - d. Exchange of military attachés from all three services (land, sea, and air) among most of the Hemisphere nations. These attaché positions should be filled by highly qualified personnel and should not be used as "golden exile assignments" to get rid of officers who are politically undesirable.
4. CBMs dealing with the assembly, collation, and dissemination of data.
 - a. Establishment of a central registry (possibly under international organization auspices) to assemble, collect, analyze, and publish information on armaments, organization and disposition of military units.
 - b. Access to independent technical means (under national or international organization control) to verify this data. There should be agreement on the nature of these means and an understanding that there would be no interference with these means.
5. CBMs dealing with border tensions.
 - a. Creation of demilitarized zones in sensitive border areas. Depending on the sensitivity of the area and the tensions between the two countries, certain types of weapons and units (armor, artillery) could be excluded from these areas.
 - b. Establishment of joint patrols in these areas (with or without the participation of third-party neutrals).
 - c. Establishment of fixed observation posts in these areas, staffed by neutrals and representatives from the two border nations.
 - d. Setting up of sensors (ground, tower, air, and tethered aerostat) to supplement these patrols and observation posts.
6. CBMs dealing with actions that might be interpreted as provocative.
 - a. Agreement on acceptable and unacceptable military activities, especially in sensitive and border areas.

- b. Placement of clear limits on those military activities, such as mobilizations and the calling up of selected reserves, that could lead to misunderstandings. Notification procedures should be established for practice movements.
- 7. CBMs dealing with communications.
 - a. Establishment of direct (hot-line) communications systems between heads of state, chiefs of military forces (defense ministers), general staffs, and units in contact across a border.
 - b. Limitation of the use of coded military message traffic (on-line and off-line cryptography).
- 8. CBMs dealing with weapons.
 - a. Agreement on levels and types of weapons, with emphasis on the exclusion of high-performance and expensive weapons systems.
 - b. Agreement on levels of military arms budgets.
 - c. Accordance of preference in ceilings to defensive weapons (antiaircraft artillery, antitank weapons, mines) over offensive weapons (tanks, artillery, and aircraft).
- 9. CBMs dealing with extra-military contacts.
 - a. Encouragement of visits by military athletic teams.
 - b. Encouragement of social and professional contacts through the attaché network and the various elements of the Inter-American Military System.
- 10. CBMs dealing with training and education.
 - a. Teaching of CBM approaches in national military academies, staff schools, and war colleges, as well as in the multinational military schools (the School of the Americas, the Inter-American Air Force Academy, and the Inter-American Defense College in Washington).
 - b. Application of CBM techniques in command post and field exercises.
 - c. Encouragement of the development of military transnationalism (that is, a sense of military professionalism and mutual respect that transcends national boundaries).
 - d. Examination of primary and secondary school curriculums and texts for aggressive, hostile, or false information on potential adversaries.
- 11. CBMs dealing with the role of major outside powers.
 - a. De-linking of local issues from the security concerns of major outside powers.
 - b. Reduction of military ties between the Latin American nations and the major outside powers.
 - c. Compilation of lists of foreign military and security advisers and trainers.
 - d. Agreements on, and attempted reduction of, the levels of these advisers.
- 12. CBMs and the Inter-American Military System.
 - a. Examination of the institutions and activities of the Inter-American Military System to see how they can be used in support of a confidence-building regime. CBM support functions could include verification, contacts, a channel of communications, and a forum for the expression of a wide range of ideas. (The institutions of the Inter-American Military System include the Inter-American Defense Board, the Inter-American Defense College, multinational military schools, the Service Chiefs' Conferences, military attachés, joint exercises, communications links and so on.)
 - b. Consideration of a lowering of the presently high US profile in most of the institutions of the Inter-American Military System and of the possibility of moving key institutions (such as the Inter-American Defense Board and the Inter-American Defense College) to a Latin American country.
- 13. CBMs and functionalism.

Assessment of certain functional areas of military-to-military cooperation for their possible value as confidence-builders, even between adversary nations. These include search and rescue missions for aircraft and shipping, disaster relief, hurricane tracking, civic action, and humanitarian projects.
- 14. CBMs related to the war on drugs.
 - a. Identification of ways to assure the Latin American military that its involvement in the counter-drug war will not "denature" it or divert it from its basic mission of defense of national sovereignty.
 - b. Exchange visits between Latin American and US military and civilian personnel involved in the counter-drug war.
- 15. CBMs dealing with ways of expanding CBMs.
 - a. Establishment of a regional or subregional mechanism, similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to study CBMs and ways to improve and increase them.
 - b. Discussion of CBMs at the periodic Service Chiefs' Conferences.
 - c. Exploration of the possibility of extending CBMs geographically to all areas of the Western Hemisphere, to include that quadrant of Antarctica that has historically been associated with South America.

Appendix B: OAS Document on Hemispheric Security

Organization of American States General Assembly

Twenty-Fourth Regular Session
June 6, 1994
Belém do Pará, Brazil

OEA/Ser.P
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27 May 1994
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Report of the Permanent Council on Hemispheric Security on Fulfillment of Resolution AG/RES. 1237 (XXIII-0/93) "Meeting of Experts on Confidence and Security-Building Measures in the Region"

The Permanent Council at its meeting held on May 27, 1994, considered the report of the Special Committee on Hemispheric Security on Fulfillment of Resolution (CP/doc.2492/94) May 18, 1994, and endorsed it for submittal to the General Assembly at its Twenty-fourth Regular Session, as background for consideration of the corresponding agenda item, together with a draft resolution prepared by the special committee (page 27).

Chapter I

Introduction

1. At its twenty-third regular session the OAS General Assembly adopted resolution AG/RES. 1237 (XXIII-0/93), titled "Meeting of Experts on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Region." It provided for the meeting to be held before the Assembly's Twenty-fourth Regular Session.
2. To carry out the General Assembly's mandate, the Permanent Council, through the Special Committee on Hemispheric Security, was entrusted with preparing the agenda and drawing up the working guidelines for the meeting.
3. The purpose of this report is to apprise the General Assembly at its Twenty-fourth Regular Session of the results achieved in fulfillment of AG/RES. 1237 (XXIII-0/93).
4. Chapter II of the report covers preparatory work for the Meeting of Experts carried out by the Special Committee, particularly the work at the preparatory meeting held in Washington, D.C. from November 17 to 19, 1993.
5. Chapter III covers the Meeting of Experts itself, which was held in Buenos Aires from March 15 to 18, 1994. Chapter III also deals separately with the various topics discussed at the Meeting of Experts.
6. Chapter IV presents, by way of illustration, a list of measures that could be taken to enhance confidence and security in the region.
7. Chapter V covers recommendations emanating from the Meeting of Experts, and includes a draft resolution on the matter to be presented to the General Assembly at its Twenty-fourth Regular Session.

Chapter II

Preparatory Activities for the Meeting of Experts on Confidence- and Security-building Measures in the Region

8. At its meeting on July 14, 1993 the Permanent Council entrusted the mandate contained in Resolution AG/RES. 1237 (XXIII-0/93) to the Special Committee on Hemispheric Security.
9. The Committee agreed that it was necessary to give priority treatment to the subject, and to hold a preparatory meeting for the meeting of experts in order to decide on its scope and methodology, and facilitate its development. As a result, the Committee presented a report to the Permanent Council on November 3, 1993, concerning the work procedures, the agenda items and the schedule of the preparatory meeting.
10. The preparatory meeting for the Meeting of Experts on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Region was held at the OAS headquarters from November 17 to 19, 1993. The meeting was chaired by the Chairman of the Special Committee on Hemisphere Security, Ambassador Hernán Patiño Mayer.
11. The agenda of the preparatory meeting included the following topics:
 - a. Establishment of the terms of reference for the meeting.
 - b. Confidence-building measures; different experiences.
 - c. Purposes and objectives of the Meeting of Experts (preparation of an annotated agenda).
 - d. Determination of the working methodology for the Meeting of Experts.
 - e. Elaboration of the draft agenda for the Meeting of Experts.
 - f. Agreement on terminology for the Meeting of Experts.
12. The preparatory session began with remarks by the OAS Secretary General, who emphasized that "...security has aspects that go beyond military security alone. At this time when the Organization has given priority to strengthening democracy in the Hemisphere, the concept of security is closely linked with strengthening the bases for democracy in the Hemisphere..."
13. In one of its two working groups, the preparatory meeting dealt with item 1 of the agenda, the establishment of terms of reference for the Meeting of Experts.

The working group was coordinated by the head of the Canadian delegation, Mark Moher, who said in his statement on the subject:

"...Canada's approach to building security is rooted in the concept of collective security, a definition of security which recognizes that the surest way of building peace and stability on our Hemisphere is through the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights—social and political—and sustainable economic development....Building cooperative security means moving ahead at the same time in all these areas. It also means putting in place frameworks, mechanisms, and instruments for guiding and managing relations between states and for preventing and resolving the tense situation. The best time to put such mechanisms in place is

when relations are stable and there is trust, or at least a certain degree of predictability in relations between states....”

14. The head of the U.S. delegation expressed these views:

“...Confidence-building encompasses a broad gamut of relations between states....It involves concrete, well-defined measures aimed at reducing and eliminating causes of mistrust, fear, and hostilities....The objective of confidence-building measures is to strengthen international peace and security and to help promote trust, better understanding and more stable relations among the nations....”
15. The second working group dealt with different experiences with regard to confidence-building measures. It was chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Special Committee on Hemispheric Security, Ambassador Patrick Lewis of Antigua and Barbuda. The group heard several presentations by the participating delegations.
16. Here are extracts of the main points of the statements received during the preparatory meeting on the range of experiences in this area. The full texts of the statements are appended to this report.

Argentina:

In its presentation titled “Argentina–Brazil: Bilateral Confidence-Building Measures” the Argentine delegation described the nuclear accords between the two nations as an example of rapprochement in this field for the clear purpose of eliminating any mistrust and precluding any possibility of a nuclear arms race in Latin America.

This rapprochement culminated in November 1990 when the Presidents of the two countries signed the “Declaration on Argentine–Brazilian Joint Nuclear Policy,” in which they opened their nuclear installations for inspection by each other and agreed on the following bilateral measures:

- a. a joint system of reciprocal control over all their nuclear installations;
- b. joint negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency for a comprehensive safeguards agreement for both countries;
- c. subsequent entry into full force of the Tlatelolco Treaty for both countries, after its text has been updated and improved.

These accords were fulfilled in short order by the establishment of the Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accountability and Control of Nuclear Materials, which has been operational since July 1992.

Concurrent with the verification work of this agency, the Permanent Committee on Nuclear Policy meets periodically to consider all aspects of the countries’ nuclear policies.

In its presentation on “Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Between Argentina and Great Britain” the Argentine delegation summarized the development of bilateral relations since the full resumption of those relations between the two countries in 1990.

Establishment of the Argentine–British Group on South Atlantic Affairs provided a mechanism for periodic meetings to evaluate and adjust the measures agreed upon. This group was replaced in May 1993 by the Temporary System for Information Sharing, in order to move toward a more normal situation in the South-west Atlantic. This is an integrated system comprising:

- a. a system for direct communication;
- b. confidence-building measures;
- c. verification;
- d. reciprocal visits.

At the same time, the first round of Argentine–British military contacts took place in May 1993 on the following topics:

- a. organization and structure of the Defense Ministries and Armed Forces,
- b. peacekeeping experiences under United Nations mandates,
- c. future contacts between the Defense Ministries and Armed Forces.

Finally, the delegation mentioned the operation of communication links between the continent and the [Falkland/Malvinas] islands, and the command structure and work procedures for the system.

Brazil:

In its presentation titled “Brazil–Argentina: Bilateral Confidence-Building Measures in the Area of Arms Control” the Brazilian delegation underscored measures taken by Brazil and Argentina in the last eight years on arms control as a unique process of confidence-building in a subregional context.

Critical factors permitting the process were identified as the re-establishment of internal peace in both countries and the return of civilian democratic governments after long periods of military regimes, in Argentina in 1983 and in Brazil in 1985.

Complementing the presentation by the Argentine delegation on the nuclear accords, the Brazilian delegation noted the following confidence-building measures worth emphasizing which the two countries adopted:

- a. the Mendoza Commitment, a tripartite declaration by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile for a total ban on chemical and biological weapons;
- b. a joint presentation to the Disarmament Commission on guidelines for international transfer of sensitive technology;
- c. participation by both countries in a data base of information on military expenditures and conventional arms (both of which are United Nations initiatives).

The presentation also emphasized that these measures are merely one part of a process in which the fundamental aspect is initiatives for economic integration and cooperation.

In its final observations it notes that confidence-building measures in the nuclear field and related areas help overcome mistrust and create opportunities for mutually beneficial and effective cooperation. In so doing, they play an undoubtedly important role in the process of integration under way between the two countries.

Central America:

In its joint presentation to the preparatory session, the Guatemalan delegation, speaking for the region, said that "...for Central America the problem of regional security does not arise in the context of an intellectual political exercise that seeks to define new regional standards in the light of transformations in the world context; it is rather an inescapable necessity in the light of a severe regional political crisis..."

Commitments for national reconciliation, cease-fires, democratization, and free elections stem from the need to eliminate the source of tensions within each country. Agreements to stop aiding irregular forces or rebel movements, and for negotiations on security, verification, control, and arms limits address the sources of tension among the countries.

In terms of eliminating military tension among the countries, Central America has created significant confidence-building measures, direct first at defusing the current crisis and subsequently at creating mechanisms that will prevent future crises.

The Tegucigalpa Protocol that established the Central American Integration System, signed by the six presidents in December 1991, states as one of its purposes: "...to create a new regional security model based on a reasonable balance of forces, strengthening of civilian authority, eradication of extreme poverty, promotion of sustained development, and elimination of violence, corruption, terrorism, drug trafficking, and arms trafficking."

Once the critical moment in the Central American crisis was passed, questions concerning confidence-building in the region were entrusted to the Security Commission, which set the following objectives:

- a. to ensure that the armed forces of the countries of the region are of a type to defend the sovereignty, territory, and internal order, and not of an offensive type.
- b. to ensure that the armed forces of the countries of the region are in reasonable or proportional balance in terms of weapons, equipment, and troops, so that they do not represent a threat to neighboring countries;
- c. to define a new model of security relations among the Central American countries, based on cooperation, coordination, communication, and prevention.
- d. to seek commitments concerning foreign military presence in the region.

Throughout its meetings, the Commission dealt with questions such as the guidelines for a reasonable balance of forces, the completion of inventories of weapons and troops, and establishment of procedures for control and verification of the accords reached.

Finally, the document points out that the agreements reached by the Security Commission reflect a broader process of regional political agreement, and can be explained by the success the countries of the region have achieved in agreements on trade, political, cultural, and other matters.

Chile:

In its presentation the delegation of Chile noted the following general points to be taken into account when analyzing confidence-building in the subregional area:

- a. consolidation of democracy, which is an indispensable factor for dialogue, rapprochement, and effective integration among the American nations;

- b. expansion and liberalization of trade, through the signing and entry into force of agreements for economic integration or cooperation, or free trade;
- c. increased cultural exchange and participation of nongovernmental actors, without limiting the efforts in the military and governmental spheres.

Among concrete bilateral measures it has taken, Chile noted:

- a. with Argentina, through the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1984, the armed forces have established high-level horizontal contacts, such as the annual meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Chilean and Argentine navies.

Other confidence measures with Argentina are the installation of a direct telephone line between the Defense Ministries, professional exchanges between the armed forces of the two countries, an increase in the number of students in courses of both armed forces, cadet exchanges, and the study of procedures for bilateral military cooperation to respond to natural disasters in the border region of both countries.

- b. with Peru, the relationship has developed mainly at the institutional level. The most important element has been the meetings between the senior officers of the Chilean and Peruvian armed forces. Confidence-building measures agreed upon include:

- joint naval maneuvers;
- exchange of military personnel for courses, training cruises, historical celebrations, and other professional activities;
- protocolary and professional meetings of commandants of border bases and naval zones;
- reciprocal invitations to take part in cultural, artistic, professional, and sports events;
- exchange of magazines and publications of interest to the armed forces;
- facilities for promotion of tourism by military personnel of both countries;
- technical and logistic cooperation.

- c. with the United States, Chile mentions in closing the meetings on matters of common interest held by the defense authorities of Chile and the United States. These consultation meetings dealt with topics such as cooperation for planning and execution of relief operations after natural disasters, planning for peacekeeping operations and cooperation for planning, configuration, and operation of crisis action teams.

Venezuela-Colombia:

The presentation entitled "Experience of Venezuela and Colombia with Confidence-building Measures" points to the various measures taken by Venezuela and Colombia in the past five years to establish a system of gradual approaches toward promoting integration and devising suitable mechanisms for the gradual and practical resolution of the problems existing between the two countries.

This began with the formation in February 1989 by the Presidents of Venezuela and Colombia of "specialized committees" to draft conventions and treaties on political, legal, economic, and security matters.

It was also decided that the two countries' presidents would hold periodic meetings, and that their foreign ministers would trade visits.

In terms of military cooperation, the following measures for building confidence between the two countries should be mentioned:

- a. Meetings between the ministers of defense and internal security, as well as coordination throughout the chain of command.
- b. Shared communications codes along the entire border and exchange of military plans.
- c. Bimonthly meetings and exchange of information between border-area military commands at every level.
- d. Joint military and naval maneuvers outside the border areas.

The presentation underscored the various coordination mechanisms devised to foster integration, prominent among which are the presidential specialized committees. One of these is engaged in the demarcation of marine and submarine areas. The other Committee deals with Colombian-Venezuelan border affairs aimed at strengthening and energizing cooperation mechanisms in the areas of economic and trade integration, customs, transportation, border integration, tourism, natural resources, energy and mines, education, culture and social welfare, environmental protection, and protection and aid for indigenous groups.

In conclusion, the document points out that not only are the governments and defense and security institutions strengthened, but civilian participation is also enhanced, thus ensuring the success of the programs.

- 17. As regards point 3 of the agenda for the preparatory session, "Purposes and objectives of the Meeting of Experts," after extensive debate the delegations agreed that the agenda should clearly reflect the

priorities assigned to the various aspects. To this end they approved the following draft agenda to be submitted to the Meeting of Experts.

1. Measures for building and strengthening confidence: significance and objectives.
 2. Catalogue and analysis of measures that can contribute to building and strengthening mutual confidence in the region:
 - military measures;
 - other measures;
 - measures for prevention, management, and peaceful settlement of disputes.
 3. Appropriate political context for application of measures to build and strengthen confidence in the region.
 4. The OAS and Hemisphere security
 - analysis and outlook;
 - mutual confidence measures;
 - cooperation with the United Nations on the matter.
 5. Latest developments on the subject in the United Nations.
18. To conclude its work, the preparatory session scheduled the meeting for March 15 through 18, 1994, accepting the offer of Argentina to host it in Buenos Aires.
- The Special Committee on Hemispheric Security was entrusted with following up on the work of the preparatory session, organizing the Meeting of Experts, and extending invitations to various experts to present papers for the information of the meeting.
19. In sessions held after the preparatory session, the Special Committee received the following presentations from experts of nongovernmental organizations with an interest in the subject:
- a. Presentation by Dr. James Schear, principal associate of the Henry Stimson Center, on confidence-building in the Hemisphere: alternatives and options for the Organization of American States.
 - b. Presentation by Professor Jack Child, professor of Latin American Studies at American University, on confidence-building measures in the Hemisphere with particular reference to Central America.
 - c. Presentation by Dr. Paul Stares, member of the Brookings Institution, on Hemisphere security, cooperative security, and confidence-building measures.
20. The Special Committee also agreed on the work plan for the Meeting of Experts. It decided there would be five working groups, one for each topic of the agenda, and following the statements of the various delegations views would be exchanged in working groups formed for that purpose.

Chapter III

Meeting Of Experts On Confidence- and Security-building Measures In The Region

21. In compliance with the mandate of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, the meeting took place in Buenos Aires from March 15 through 18, 1994, under the sponsorship of the government of Argentina and the Organization of American States.
22. The meeting was inaugurated by Argentina's Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Trade, and Worship, Guido di Tella. In his opening address, he said:
- “...By holding this meeting we are demonstrating our conviction that the regional organization must give serious and effective consideration to matters of hemispheric security....Our region is clearly a zone of peace, and in the last decade there have been important advances in the consolidation of democracy, respect for human rights, and cultural, political, and economic integration. Today the Hemisphere is prepared to move toward a new security system, based on prevention and cooperation, undergirded by confidence-building....Cooperation for peace and development of actions in the security field are indispensable to maintain the pace of progress in the social, economic, and political integration of the Americas...”.
23. The meeting then held a closed preliminary session chaired by Ambassador Hernán Patiño Mayer, Chairman of the Special Committee on Hemispheric Security, to agree on the officers of the meeting, the draft agenda, and the work schedule.
24. At the plenary session following the preliminary meeting, Argentina's Deputy Secretary for Foreign Policy, Ambassador Rogelio Pflinter, was elected chairman of the meeting.
- The following persons were elected as vice-presidents:
- First Committee: Ambassador David Peel, Canada.
- Second Committee: Ambassador Patrick Lewis, Antigua and Barbuda.

Third Committee: Mr. Jorge Burgos, Chile.

Fourth Committee: Mr. Norman Wulf, United States.

Fifth Committee: Ambassador Hugo Palma, Peru.

Brazilian delegate Paulo Cordeiro de Andrade Pinto was elected rapporteur of the meeting,

25. The work of the First Committee, chaired by the head of the Canadian delegation, Ambassador David Peel, dealt with measures for building and strengthening confidence: their significance and objectives.

26. In its presentation, the U.S. delegation stated:

"...Confidence-building measures are concrete, well-defined steps that contribute to reducing, or in some cases even to eliminating, causes of mistrust, fear, tension, and hostility through greater openness and clarity in the military area...The scope of the measures must respond to the specific needs and conditions of the region in question....The seriousness, sincerity, and security of a state's commitment to confidence-building can be demonstrated only through the constant, regular, and total application of measures and policies that encourage confidence..."

27. The delegation of Canada said in its presentation:

"...Our ability to create and consolidate mutual trust will depend not only on the mechanisms that may be developed to verify or register weapons or troops. It will depend fundamentally on the definitive consolidation of democratic institutions in the Hemisphere....This is the common starting point for the task before us: our commitment to strengthen democracy in the Hemisphere....As we take up questions concerning security we must be aware of the complexity of the concept and the diversity of the OAS member states....whose asymmetry in area, population, military and economic capacity may lead to confusion and erroneous interpretations....For this reason perception that the message transmitted is the same as the one received is a key element in confidence-building..."

28. In the document prepared by Ambassador Patiño Mayer, the Argentine delegation said:

"...Prevailing conditions in our Hemisphere make it possible to have confidence-building measures that go beyond prevention of armed conflicts to encompass cultural, social, political, or economic decisions that contribute to strengthening of cooperation among the states....We could say that confidence-building measures in the Americas are of an integral nature; the individual components do not engender credibility by themselves, but their interaction produces the desired effects....Confidence-building measures of a military nature, from the most modest to the most ambitious, contribute to a lessening of mistrust, fear, and error, thereby helping to consolidate efforts in the same direction that are undertaken in the social, economic, and political fields....Although they may not resolve all conflicts, by establishing certain mutually accepted standards of conduct with reciprocal obligations, which can be evaluated and verified, they contribute to rapprochement and reduce tension attributable to erroneous perceptions..."

In conclusion, he adds that: "...because they involve different situations, confidence-building measures do not present a single model. They emanate from practices and behavior conditioned by the historical reality in which they were born..."

29. The document presented by the delegation of Peru concerning point 1 of the agenda states:

"... Peru feels that now, as in the past, confidence-building measures to dissipate any type of threat to security whatsoever is a matter of interest to all the countries and should stimulate special concern and action by developing countries. They must give priority to their security, in the sense of defending their sovereignty, but also in the sense of making themselves viable, consolidating their democratic process, combating poverty and other scourges such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and protecting the environment and human rights....The current political context of hemispheric relations is conducive to identification and adoption of additional measures that are naturally encompassed in confidence-building measures..."

The document goes on to say: "...confidence-building, strictly speaking, is obviating the possibility of conflict. More broadly, it is creating conditions for reduction of arms and military expenditures and for disarmament....Confidence-building is an inducement to perceive the exact nature of a given fact or act, and

stimulates belief in a state's trustworthiness....It should therefore be directly linked to policies and practices that encourage peace, cooperation, good will, and joint action...".

30. The meeting also received a presentation from the government of Trinidad and Tobago in the following terms:

"...it is almost axiomatic that the definition of security, in the Caribbean context, cannot be limited to matters of military aggression or threats. The definition must be broad enough to include any threat to a state's ability to enjoy democracy or the functioning of democratic institutions. Furthermore, in the context of Caribbean security, priority must be accorded to economic security.

...In the military area we could consider, for example, the idea of a regional military component that would aid countries who face threats to their democracy and stability.

...the Caribbean region has historically been an unwilling strategic platform during periods of conflict between our neighbors of north and south.

...We are firmly committed to the concept of confidence- and security-building measures in the Hemisphere, and to that end some of the following points might be dealt with in the course of our deliberations:

- promotion of demonstrated political will to prevent or peacefully resolve conflicts;
- continuous bilateral and multilateral dialogue among the states, with a view to preventing and easing conflicts;
- promotion of specific hemispheric mechanisms to assess conflict risk and an agenda for timely action;
- subregional confidence-building measures to supplement regional ones;
- resolution of concerns over the role and mandate of the Inter-American Defense Board.

31. With respect to item 1 of the agenda, the document containing the statements made by the delegation of Mexico at the meeting indicates that "the Delegation of Mexico has a deeply held opinion that the principal and basic preconditions for confidence are a specific and formal commitment by each member state of the Organization to expressly renounce the threat and use of force, and to settle disputes peacefully in accordance with international law, as expected by all the countries of the Hemisphere and humanity itself.

These conditions are so essential that the absence of such commitments not only undermines confidence, but, in and of itself, negates whatever progress and contributions that might arise from other measures, however imaginative and novel they may be.

This confidence originates precisely in the desire to avert conflict; without it, other measures are merely complementary, and hence useless....in order to contribute to the efforts being made in this particular area, the delegation of Mexico considers that once a commitment is made and a decision taken to peacefully settle disputes, confidence-building measures, beyond those traditionally linked to all aspects of disarmament, must stem from express agreements among the parties directly concerned, since *a priori* measures rarely fit the precise requirements of a particular circumstance."

32. At the conclusion of the First Committee's deliberations, Ambassador Peel summarized them in these terms:

- a. confidence-building measures must be seen in a broad political context;
- b. confidence-building measures may form part of a security strategy of individual countries, but they must also reflect the security concerns of all participants;
- c. OAS member states have positive cooperative relations, and Latin America is one of the world's least armed regions;
- d. there is presently a high degree of confidence among the member states;
- e. there are definite possibilities for development of cooperation and regional integration.

In this context the OAS should consider confidence-building measures for the purpose of strengthening yet further the good relations among the countries of the region.

33. It was also recognized that the concept of security is not purely a military matter. The concept embraces various elements, including economic, social, and development-related topics, and the threats posed among other things by arms trafficking, drugs, and environmental problems.

34. There was a consensus that confidence-building measures cannot be imported from other regions. They must be developed within the Hemisphere or, at least, suitably adapted to respond to hemispheric

conditions. The measures can be of various types—bilateral, developed within subregional groups, or of a broader, multilateral nature.

35. It was finally noted that the work of the OAS should complement and not duplicate work undertaken by the United Nations.

36. The work of the Second Committee was chaired by Ambassador Patrick Lewis of Antigua and Barbuda, and began with an introduction by the Chairman of the Committee on Hemispheric Security, who recalled the presentations made during the preparatory session on the various experiences with confidence-building measures.

He also noted that the specific characteristics of the Hemisphere, especially its dedication to understanding and peaceful relations among countries, afford an opportunity to develop a regional catalogue without simply copying foreign models.

37. The Committee heard statements from the delegations of Peru, the United States, Brazil, Argentina, Canada, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Colombia, Bolivia, and Uruguay, and from the observers from Spain and France.

38. Among the presentations circulated regarding this agenda topic, the Peruvian delegation recalled that the Declaration of Ayacucho was the basis for holding in Lima the First Meeting of Experts on Arms Limitation, which was attended by experts from Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. It was later agreed to hold tripartite meetings. During these, the following agreements were reached:

a. Ratification of the Cooperative Agreement for Promotion of Peace and Friendship among the armed forces of Bolivia, Chile, and Peru, signed in 1976.

b. Draft procedures for the exchange of information, consultation, and meetings.

c. Sports, post-graduate, and academic exchanges among the military services of the three countries.

Following the severing of diplomatic relations between Chile and Bolivia in 1976 the meetings were bilateral, involving Peru and Bolivia.

The presentation also included a summary of confidence-building measures undertaken by Peru with Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Ecuador.

39. Another of the presentations on this topic was that of Bolivia, which contained the following points:

“...Side by side with regional policies for economic cooperation, military capabilities must be meshed in a collective security system that goes beyond individual states to function on a regional levelIn this regard, we think that confidence-building measures by our countries to dispel perceptions of interstate threat—in some cases unjustified and in others correctable—contribute to hemispheric unity and cooperation....We therefore believe that each country’s security consists in offering security to the rest, projecting the certainty that it will in no case resort to military force in interstate relations....To this end, the principal aspect of confidence-building is the correction of reciprocal perceptions that give rise in many cases to irrational competition and hostilities...”

40. Another presentation made to the Meeting of Experts on this topic was the one presented by the delegation of Colombia, titled “Colombia’s Experience: Colombia’s Commissions on Friendship and Integration with its Neighbors (Venezuela–1989; Ecuador–1989; Panama–1992; Brazil and Peru–1994)”

This document states: “...the mechanism of the Commissions on Friendship and Integration has been drawn up on the basis of identified bilateral interests, with instruments for prevention of and adequate reaction to situations that threaten shared values.

These instruments are various agreements on measures for binational action with a view to preventing and neutralizing situations that could entail risks shared in economic integration, increased trade, judicial cooperation, immigration control, etc.

41. The document describes the operation of the Friendship Commissions, chaired by the Foreign Ministers, which meet alternately in the two countries, with a frequency determined by the vitality of the process.

For greater efficiency, operational follow-up is entrusted to binational technical subcommittees that are organized in accordance with the various topics on the agenda.

42. In the document containing its statements, the delegation of Mexico referred to this point, indicating that “it is the view and position of this delegation that without a well-defined concept of hemispheric security, and without the old threats or clearly identified new ones, the measures, singly or as a group, become imprecise and blurred....Positive experiences with confidence-building measures employed in the peace process in Central America and in cooperative efforts toward integration between Brazil and Argentina suggest that such approaches are effective, and that they should be applied mutatis mutandis to similar situations as they arise and recorded in the annals of our Organization as a successful way to promote peace and confidence.”

43. After describing the operation of the commissions, the document notes these conclusions:
- a. Colombia has met the challenge of coherent configuration of its own security spaces;
 - b. The Friendship Commissions have medium- and long-range objectives of confidence-building in the region.
 - c. Decision-making in the Commissions is by consensus.
44. As a result of the various observations presented in the course of the meeting, it was agreed to establish a working group entrusted with drawing up an illustrative list of measures that could be used for confidence- and security-building.
- The resulting list is presented in Chapter IV of this report.
45. The work of the Third Committee on the political context for application of measures for strengthening and deepening confidence in the region was chaired by Deputy Secretary for War of Chile's Defense Ministry, Mr. Jorge Burgos.
46. The delegation of Mexico in its statement on this point said that: "Regarding a favorable context for confidence-building measures in the region, the resurgence and spread of democracy, of economic growth, and of trade activity in the region are in themselves reflections of confidence, not of a lack thereof."
47. In the course of its work, the Committee circulated a document prepared by the delegation of Argentina, which stated among other things that the following points are essential in defining the subject:
- a. the end of the cold war, international detente, and disarmament agreements;
 - b. shared values in the region, emerging from the prevalence of democracy, which are reflected in:
 - market economic policies and progress toward economic integration of countries of the region;
 - new perspectives in civilian-military relationships.
- In this regard, he added that: "...the political context resulting from the democratic consensus permits unprecedented advances in our Hemisphere, in the economic field as well as in security....The willingness to move toward new forms of regional security shows clear political vision consonant with the objective of consolidating democracy, building new cooperative security spaces in the region, and strengthening regional accords to contribute to global security and the objective of international peace and security..."
48. The Chairman of the Third Committee summarized the discussion of this topic, noting the following:
- mention was made of the European experience with confidence-building measures, although they cannot automatically be transplanted to our region.
 - identified as elements of the new political context were the end of the cold war, shared democratic values, the process of increasing economic and trade integration, and new perspectives in civilian-military relationships, which make it possible to develop truly permanent state policies.
 - concerning future measures in this regard, it was noted that it is necessary to take into account the current institutions and different situations in the subregions of the Hemisphere, as well as their effects on each of them.
 - among obstacles to this favorable context, the Committee participants mentioned factors such as social uprisings, drug trafficking, and terrorism, all of which can have even international repercussions.
 - it was considered desirable to distinguish between strengthening of confidence-building measures as such and the system of hemispheric security.
 - it was agreed that the region has a great wealth of contributions to the topic of security and confidence-building. What is needed is to analyze what we have and organize the set of initiatives to define the general framework for discussion of confidence- and security-building measures in response to the new international situation.
 - the democratization of our nations, bilateral and multilateral accords on free trade, and gradual resolution of border disputes are creating conditions for a legal and political framework conducive to mutual confidence.
 - intensification of the measures must take into account the multiplicity and complexity of the factors involved. Today's mission is to create an atmosphere of solidly based, lasting measures.
49. The Fourth Committee, which considered "The OAS and Hemispheric Security," was chaired by Mr. Norman Wulf, Assistant Director for nonproliferation and regional arms control of the ACDA (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency).
50. Delegations made oral and written contributions to the discussion of the topic. Some of the points raised are noted below.
51. In a document titled "The Role of the Organization of American States in Hemispheric Security" the representative of Antigua and Barbuda to the OAS, Ambassador Lewis, noted:
- "...the principle of multilateralism must be overreaching and all member states must commit themselves to that ideal. We must insist on the significance and importance of the principle of multilateralism in the operations of the OAS. The importance of

multilateralism can in truth only be appreciated if it serves the hemispheric community in times of crisis and tension....The problem of drug-trafficking would appear now to be the most destabilizing factor in the region....The problem undoubtedly demands a vigorous international response but it is up to the Americas to deal with it regionally before making global commitments.

...It will be necessary to design machinery for collective security very carefully. It could consist of subregional security systems linked in a broader general system.

...Positive collective action in the Hemisphere is the best vehicle for safeguarding the principle of multilateralism in matters of hemispheric security. The OAS is the only organ that can realistically follow this path. Therefore, it is up to the countries of the Americas to build on the progress achieved in 1991, ensuring that representative democracy is the indispensable condition for peace, stability, and development...".

52. For its part, in its consolidated statements the delegation of Mexico emphasizes, among other ideas:

"...we have as a starting point for our work an undefined and practically nonexistent 'new concept of hemispheric security.' Although reference has been made to some 'new threats,' by no means agreed upon by all, these threats are not military in nature or origin. The delegation of Mexico has some problems with the Meeting's approach to its topic, because it is proceeding to draw up a list, or catalog, of military confidence-building measures without having previously identified the military threats that must be reduced or neutralized.

The sensitive nature and importance of our work requires first that we ourselves understand why we must abandon the old concept of hemispheric security and, in such an event, why we must propose a new one, and, second, that we identify which threats we want to prevent, so as to devise specific measures to counteract current or potential threats and thus foster and build that confidence, which, by the way, the states in the region have themselves been trying to generate spontaneously for several years now.

...It is clear that the countries of the Americas, in unified fashion and working together through the OAS, will be prepared to observe developments in the region so as to react in a timely fashion to well-defined threats and risks. Nonetheless, we must vigilantly avoid being held responsible or even culpable by mere allegation, such as the charge that because a few of our countries have managed to reduce the burden of their foreign debt a little, and have thus increased their domestic product, that fact alone means that they are more interested in arming themselves than in raising their peoples' standard of living by increasing social spending.

We consider the double standard used in the drug and arms problem as being equally unfair. Regarding the drug problem, the primary opponent is the producer, and the trafficker, and the consumer is tolerated, even understood, while in the arms problem, the prosecuted parties are not the producer or the trafficker, but the buyer. In both cases, the responsible parties are in the same countries: the land of the destitute.

52. In its presentation on the subject, the delegation of the United States expressed these points:

"...The OAS, through the General Assembly, Permanent Council, and Special Committee on Hemispheric Security, has established a solid basis for consideration of hemispheric security and arms control, including confidence- and security-building mechanisms and cooperation with the United Nations in these areas.

The OAS can take advantage of this excellent work to go even further, by way of:

- a) a more complete contribution to world openness and transparency by participating in the United Nations Register of Conventional Weapons;
- b) the OAS can use the United Nations Register of Conventional Weapons and the United Nations Unified International Information on Military Expenditures as a starting point and take advantage of these existing measures to agree on their use as bilateral or regional confidence-building measures;

- c) study the feasibility of establishing a system of communication among member states of the OAS to facilitate exchange of information on confidence-building measures, installing a red telephone line for the purpose..."
53. In the document circulated by the Argentine delegation on the topic, Ambassador Patiño Mayer noted among other points that:
- "...The OAS faces the difficult but indispensable mission of updating its activities and institutions in the security area to reflect the changing and uncertain post-war context;
- ...Identification of common values and interests must be accompanied by the will to protect them through multilateral action channeled through the regional organization;
- ...This new system of genuinely hemispheric security must dovetail with the universal system of the United Nations and serve as a first instance of effective treatment of questions of peace and security that may affect the region;
- ...Relations of the regional organ to the world organization must be rooted in the provisions of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter;
- ...Progress and deepening of confidence-building measures must be a critical step in the process of reshaping the hemispheric security system;
- ...The system we envision is within the doctrinal framework of cooperative security, as the most appropriate concept for prevention and solution of conflicts through institutionalized multilateral action;
- ...This process should encompass, among others, the following possibilities:
- a. creation of a center for prevention, management, and resolution of disputes and conflicts, without prejudice to existing ad-hoc mechanisms which have shown their effectiveness;
 - b. convocation of an inter-American conference of Defense Ministers;
 - c. redefinition of the role and juridical-institutional structure of the Inter-American Defense Board;
 - d. restructuring of the Inter-American Defense College."
54. The presentation by the delegation of Venezuela included, among others, the following concepts:
- "...this Organization's top priority and most urgent task is the topic of hemispheric security: its definition, scope, and objectives are essential elements for a system that will govern peaceful relations among states and contribute to protection of their common interests.
- ...we must emphasize that this new concept of security must factor in the changes that have occurred in the term 'threat', giving priority to management of threats that most seriously affect the stability of our nations.
- ...building on what we have noted above, our delegation shares the view on the need to define the hemispheric security system, basing it on reciprocal confidence, mutual understanding, interaction of the armed forces, and defense of the common interests of our nations. We are convinced that this new scheme can strengthen cooperation and regional integration in the current regional and global context.
- ...it would be timely to insist on the urgency of formally defining the status of the IADB and its possible insertion in the inter-American system. The government of Venezuela is evaluating the future role of the IADB and the new functions it could carry out to benefit peace and hemispheric security."
55. In his summary of the discussions in the Fourth Committee the chairman said they had demonstrated the delegations' interest in the following aspects:
- a. The OAS is the principal multilateral organ in the Hemisphere. The UN is the universal multilateral organ. Both organizations should use their comparative advantages to confront challenges to hemispheric security and build regional peace and security.

- b. The OAS has among its purposes the preservation of the security of the states in the region and the region itself, the protection of human rights, and the promotion of economic growth.
 - c. Illegal traffic of drugs and weapons poses a critical security problem.
 - d. It is necessary to update the OAS machinery, including the Inter-American Defense Board.
56. In his summary Mr. Wulf mentioned some of the specific suggestions made for implementation of these conclusions.
57. The Fifth Committee, chaired by Ambassador Hugo Palma of Peru, considered the topic "Latest Developments in the United Nations on Confidence-Building Measures." The discussion was preceded by an introduction by the chairman of the Committee on Hemispheric Security, Ambassador Patiño Mayer.
58. The delegation of Peru circulated a document by Ambassador Palma, titled "Latest Developments in Confidence-Building Measures in the Sphere of the United Nations." In it he made these points, among others:

"...A broad examination of confidence-building measures in the sphere of the United Nations underscores the importance and priority of measures of a military nature, but notes that confidence cannot be based exclusively on measures of a military nature.

...At the request of the General Assembly ECOSOC took up the promotion of confidence-building in international economic relations.

...Although it could not establish a precise orientation to continue its work, it considered that three types of measures were needed:

- a) reaffirmation of the basic principles and standards, and instruments for governing international economic relations, such as the UN Charter,
- b) measures to reactivate international cooperation for growth and development, broaden trade, and establish financial and monetary relations, and progress in negotiations for reduction of military expenditures,
- c) new measures to promote mechanisms for consultation, negotiation, and settlement of economic disputes.

Through these substantive matters, the United Nations has dealt with confidence-building measures on various occasions and in various contexts.

...In 1993 the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the Agenda for Peace, with special reference to preventive diplomacy and related issues. The section on confidence-building invites the member states and regional organizations to transmit their experiences in confidence-building, supports the Secretary General's willingness to carry on consultations on the subject, and encourages him to consult with parties to disputes that could compromise the peace.

...In conclusion it would be noted that the United Nations currently has attached great importance to confidence-building and over the years has engaged in efforts to study and better understand the concept.

...The United Nations considers that the measures are desirable in the framework of confidence-building measures whose consistent and permanent application will be self-fulfilling and facilitate the creation of contexts for peaceful settlement of disputes.

59. In his summary of the work of the Fifth Committee, the Chairman summarized the principal points of the above-mentioned presentation, indicating that the Meeting of Experts had taken due note thereof.

Chapter IV

Illustrative list of measures that could be taken to build confidence and security

60. As noted above, as a result of the discussion in the Second Committee and the initiative of the Argentine delegation, a working group open to all delegations was formed to prepare an illustrative list of measures that could be taken to build confidence and security.
61. The working group was chaired by General Antonio Fichera of Argentina. After several working sessions it compiled the following list:

I. POLITICAL MEASURES

1. increase in joint policy planning at appropriate levels for consideration of matters of common interest;
2. promotion of legislative contacts for discussion of security questions;
3. study of appropriate measures to effectively honor the solemn commitments to peace, non-use of force in international relations, respect for international law, and peaceful settlement of disputes;
4. reiteration that representative democracy is the indispensable condition for peace;
5. political overtures that demonstrate the purpose of promoting peace and inter-American cooperation in its multiple facets;
6. closer cooperation for eradication of transnational criminal activities that affect peace and democracy;
7. strengthening of regional cooperation programs to respond to natural disasters, in coordination with existing organizations;
8. prioritization of joint development projects, particularly in border areas;
9. adequate access to technology for satellite sensing;
10. increase in cooperation on environmental issues.

II. DIPLOMATIC MEASURES

1. introduction of courses in foreign service institutes on disarmament, arms limitation, and related topics;
2. holding of academic seminars with participation of diplomats and military officers on various topics under the broad umbrella of security;
3. establishment of special offices or sections on these subjects in the foreign ministries, to which diplomats from other countries could be detailed for study tours;
4. increase current levels of exchanges in diplomatic training institutions.

III. EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL MEASURES

1. promotion of studies on disarmament, security, and development;
2. development of regional and international support for educational and cultural studies on peace and development;
3. studies and research, preferably done jointly with professional groups from other countries, on topics related to security and defense;
4. seminars on the responsibility of the media in forming and guiding public opinion on security questions.

IV. MILITARY MEASURES

A. Confidence- and Security-building Measures Relating to Troop and Army Deployment

1. advance notification of maneuvers that their own units or those of third countries undertake within a certain distance from coasts and borders;
2. advance notification of identification, planned route, and purpose of military units that are expected to be within a certain distance;
3. radio contact between border forces, through periodic communications, in order to coordinate activities undertaken by all organs at the border, thus obviating the possibility of tension through misunderstanding;
4. meetings of naval and air officials to deal with navigation issues;
5. invitations to armed forces of neighboring countries to send observers to maneuvers and troop exercises carried out in areas near the respective borders.

B. Confidence- and Security-building Measures Relating to Information Exchange

1. strengthening of machinery for information and cooperation on search and rescue operations;
2. periodic meetings of the general staffs of the armed forces;
3. exchange of information on military budgets;
4. exchange of information on production and/or purchase of new equipment and weapons;
5. exchange of information on military doctrine and organization;
6. more active participation in the United Nations Register of Conventional Weapons and the instrument for standardized international presentation of reports of military expenditures.

C. Confidence- and Security-building Measures Relating to Personal Exchange

1. personal exchange visits to military units.

D. Confidence- and Security-building Measures Relating to Communications

1. direct and frequent communication between authorities with a view to ensuring the exchange of information that will permit comprehensive reciprocal understanding of military activities.

- E. Confidence- and Security-building Measures Relating to Contacts**
1. normal safety procedures when naval and air units are in operation, in accordance with the international agreements in force;
 2. sharing of experiences on:
 - organization and structure of defense ministries and armed forces;
 - peacekeeping operations;
 - analysis of specific problems of mutual interest.
- F. Confidence- and Security-building Measures Relating to Training and Education**
1. exchange of military personnel of various ranks on diverse subjects, such as:
 - survival training,
 - confidence- and security-building measures training,
 - general staff and higher level courses,
 - military training and refresher courses,
 - exchange of basic information on confidence- and security building measures,
 - exchange of cadets, students, and advisers;
 2. joint activities of military academies;
 3. visits and exchange of chiefs and units of the respective armed forces;
 4. exchange of specialized military personnel in areas of personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, civil affairs, data processing, and other areas of interest;
 5. joint training exercises with armed forces of other countries.
- Finally, the working group expressed interest in considering the possibility and desirability of a follow-up study on verification of confidence-building measures.
62. It should be added that when discussing this matter the working group said it would be useful for the Special Committee on Hemispheric Security to add to this list a chapter on measures of an economic nature.
63. In this regard, the chairman suggested this draft list of economic measures for consideration by the member states and possible addition to the list approved by the Meeting of Experts:
- joint economic development projects, especially in the border areas;
 - establishment of free trade zones and processes of economic integration;
 - reaffirmation of the basic principles, standards, and instruments of international economic relations;
 - measures to reactivate international cooperation for growth and development;
 - establishment of mechanisms for consultation, negotiation, and settlement of economic disputes;
 - implementation of measures to liberalize and expand trade, eliminating trade barriers that may exist;
 - measures favoring free circulation of the factors of production.
 - Abstention from exercising policies, carrying out activities, and taking measures adversely affecting the development of other member states.

Chapter V

Recommendations of the Meeting of Experts on Confidence- and Security-building Measures in the Region

64. At its final plenary session the Meeting of Experts approved the following recommendations:
- “The experts agree to recommend through the Chairman of the Meeting to the appropriate entities of the Organization of American States that they consider the following points:
1. To have the Special Committee on Hemispheric Security continue studying confidence-building issues and other matters, including peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention.
 2. To recommend that the member states put in practice several confidence-building measures, at the appropriate level and in the way they deem best.
 3. To recommend to the member states that they regularly notify the appropriate entities in the OAS of the confidence-building measures they have taken.
 4. To entrust the Permanent Council, through the Special Committee on Hemispheric Security, with following up on the Buenos Aires meeting by compiling a comprehensive and systematic inventory of confidence-building measures in use in the Hemisphere, so that they can become more widely known, better understood, and more easily adopted at the bilateral, subregional, and hemispheric levels.
 5. To pursue consultations within the OAS with a view to holding in 1995 a Regional Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Region, which Chile has offered to host.

6. To strongly encourage application of the recommendations contained in resolution AG/RES. 1179 and other pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly.
65. After adoption of these recommendations, the provisional report of the Rapporteur of the Meeting of Experts on Confidence- and Security-building Measures in the Region was approved. The Meeting then held its closing session, which was addressed by the President of Argentina, Dr. Carlos Saúl Menem, and by the Secretary General of the OAS, Ambassador João Clemente Baena Soares, who made the following remarks: "...as evidenced by the deliberations of the past days, there are certain general factors to be taken into account in the context of security. First and foremost, it must be affirmed that security can only be based upon the absolute rule of international law. No measure or set of measures can more greatly contribute to enhancing trust among peoples and safeguarding their peace and security than the application of legal provisions agreed to by the states in participatory decision-making processes and ratified and put into effect by their governments.
- "The Hemisphere, like the world, has changed radically and extremely rapidly in recent years. Hence it is imperative to adapt the legal instruments to the circumstances of today. A model of such adaptation has been the updating of the OAS Charter, carried out through procedures devised and agreed to in advance, which has incorporated new aims and provisions. Amendment of international instruments by agreement among the parties thereto is the appropriate course. In this area it is not advisable to employ creative interpretations that might be suitable in other areas..."
66. The following text is a draft resolution that could be considered by the twenty-fourth regular session of the OAS General Assembly.

Draft Resolution

Confidence- and Security-building Measures in the Region

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, HAVING SEEN:

The report of the rapporteur of the Meeting of Experts on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Region, held in Buenos Aires in March 1994 (SEGRE/doc.42/94 rev. 1), and the Report of the Permanent Council on the fulfillment of Resolution AG/RES. 1237 (XXIII-O/93) "Meeting of Experts on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Region" (AG/doc./94);

RECALLING:

Its decision, contained in the Santiago Commitment, to initiate a process of consultation on hemispheric security in the light of the new conditions in the region and the world, from an updated and comprehensive perspective of security and disarmament, including the subject of all forms of proliferation of conventional weapons and instruments of mass destruction, so that the largest possible volume of resources may be devoted to the economic and social development of the member states;

Its resolutions AG/RES. 1121 (XXI-O/91) and AG/RES. 1123 (XXI-O/91) on the strengthening of peace and security of the Hemisphere, and Resolutions AG/RES. 1179 and 1180 (XXII-O/92) on cooperation for hemispheric security;

Resolution AG/RES. 1237 (XXIII-O/93), which convened the Meeting of Experts on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Region;

RECOGNIZING:

That the strengthening of peace and security in the Hemisphere is one of the essential purposes of the OAS, and that socioeconomic development and cooperation among the member states are essential for the attainment of that goal;

That the regional and subregional integration processes, as well as the sharing of information and experiences and the enhancement of consultation and cooperation mechanisms, encourage the promotion of security and stability in the region;

That security- and confidence-building measures work toward preventing potential sources of conflict and thus contribute to efforts to strengthen peace and security;

The contributions made by the states of the Americas to global and regional security through arms control measures and consultations, including the OAS Meeting of Experts on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Region, which was hosted by the Government of Argentina, and the generous offer made by the Government of Chile to host a Regional Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures in the Region in 1995, and

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the report and work done at the Meeting of Experts on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Region, held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, from March 15 to 18, 1994, which has identified a series of proposed confidence- and security-building measures which merit due consideration,

RESOLVES:

1. To note with satisfaction the report of the Permanent Council on the fulfillment of Resolution AG/RES. 1237 (XXIII-0/93) "Meeting of Experts on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Region," underscoring the positive work done at that Meeting which was held in Argentina, and to thank the Government of the Argentine Republic for its successful organization of the meeting.
2. To recognize the opportunity and the need for increased dialogue among the Hemisphere's nations on security and cooperation topics on this subject, in the light of the new international situation,
3. To continue, through the Special Committee on Hemispheric Security, the study of confidence-building issues; matters concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention, in accordance with the principle that international law should be fully effective; and of the existing bilateral, regional and subregional legal and political agreements.
4. To recommend to the member states that they implement confidence-building measures at the appropriate level, and in any way they deem adequate, and regularly report to the appropriate entities in the OAS offices on the implementation of the measures.
5. To instruct the Permanent Council to have the Special Committee on Hemispheric Security follow up on the Buenos Aires meeting, by compiling a comprehensive and systematic inventory of confidence-building measures used in the Hemisphere, with a view to disseminating and better understanding them, and facilitating their adoption and implementation at the bilateral, subregional, and hemispheric levels.
6. To pursue consultations within the OAS so as to hold in 1995 a Regional Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures in the Region, which Chile has offered to host.
7. To strongly encourage implementation of the recommendations contained in Resolution AGI/RES. 1179 and other pertinent General Assembly resolutions.
8. To ask the Permanent Council to report to the Twenty-fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly on the fulfillment of this resolution.
9. To transmit this resolution to the Secretary General of the United Nations.

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Contributors

Isaac Caro is a sociologist conducting research at the South American Peace Commission, a non-governmental, multi-national organization in Santiago, Chile. From 1983–93, he was a researcher at FLACSO (Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences).

Jack Child is a Professor of Spanish and Latin American Studies at the American University in Washington, D.C. He has done research on confidence-building measures for the United States Institute of Peace and the International Peace Academy.

Thomaz Guedes da Costa is a political scientist and researcher for the Center of Strategic Studies at the Brazilian Secretariat for Strategic Affairs for the President. He is also a visiting Professor of Strategic Studies at the Department of International Relations and Political Science the University of Brasilia.

Rut Diamint is an advisor to the Argentine Cabinet, Undersecretariat for Policy and Strategy. Previously, she was a Professor of Modern Political Theory and Sociological Thought at the National University of Buenos Aires.

Michael Krepon is the President of the Henry L. Stimson Center.

Michael Morris is a Professor of Political Science at Clemson University in South Carolina. On sabbatical for the year 1994–1995, he is currently a Mellon Fellow at the National Foreign Language Center at the Johns Hopkins University and recently taught in Chile on a Fulbright.

Lisa Owens is a Policy Analyst in the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation at the Department of Energy. In 1994, she was a research assistant at the Stimson Center concentrating on Latin American CBMs and nuclear cooperation in the Southern Cone.

James A. Shear is an ABE Fellow and a Resident Associate at the Carnegie Endowment. From 1993–94 he worked on the confidence-building measures project as a senior associate at the Stimson Center.

Augusto Varas is a Program Officer for Governance in the Southern Cone at the regional office of the Ford Foundation in Santiago, Chile. Previously, he directed the International Relations and Security Studies program at FLACSO.

Lieutenant General Sergio Covarrubias Sanhueza, Brigadier General Javier J. Salazar Torres, and General Leopoldo Porras Zúñiga are all members of the Chilean Armed Forces.

**THE GENDER AND ENVIRONMENT SEMINAR SERIES
BULLETIN BOARD**

FEBRUARY 1995

Funded by the Office of Women in Development, A.I.D.

The *Gender and Environment Seminar Series* is pleased to announce that the Seminar Series will be renewed in 1995. The intent of this note is to inform those of you who were previously on our mailing list to notify us of your interest in continuing to receive our mailings. It is anticipated that many of your addresses may have changed since the past Coordinator, Dr. Valerie Estes of GENESYS, updated the mailing list. Therefore, we would appreciate those of you who do receive this announcement to share this information with your colleagues who may be interested in the Seminar Series.

DESFIL and World Resources Institute (WRI) will continue to co-sponsor and coordinate the *Gender and Environment Seminar Series*. In addition, WorldWIDE (Women in Development and Environment) will join DESFIL and WRI as a co-sponsor. For additional information, please contact:

Dr. William Fiebig
DESFIL
1001 22nd St. N.W.
Suite 500
Wash. D.C. 20037
Tel. (202) 331-1860
Fax (202) 331-1871
bf@chemonics.com

Ms. Gretchen Bloom
c/o WorldWIDE Network
1331 H Street, N.W.
Suite 903
Wash. D.C. 20005
Tel. (202) 347 - 1514
Fax (202) 347 - 1524
gbloom@usaid.gov

Dr. Ann Thrupp
WRI
1709 New York Ave.
Wash. D.C. 20006
Tel. (202) 662-2598
Fax (202) 638-0036
ann@wri.org

The *Gender and Environment Seminar Series* would appreciate any information for the Bulletin Board on other events relative to Gender and/or Environment activities; such as conferences, seminars, publications or studies. An announcement is attached on the first *Gender and Environment Seminar* for 1995 to be held at DESFIL on **February 28** from **4:00-6:00 p.m.**. The speaker will be **Ms. Joan Martin-Brown**. The topic of her presentation will be **Rethinking Women and Environment: Strategic Approaches**.

The *Gender and Environment Seminar Series* is co-sponsored by DESFIL, a USAID/G/ENV/ENR project; WorldWIDE Network, Women in Development and Environment; and WRI's Center for International Development and Environment. For information, contact Dr. William Fiebig, DESFIL @ (202) 331-1860; Ms. Gretchen Bloom, WorldWIDE @ (202) 347 - 1514; Dr. Ann Thrupp, WRI @ (202) 662-2598.

