It’s the Taking Part that Counts
The new member states adapt to EU foreign and security policy

Kristi Raik & Teemu Palosaari
It's the Taking Part that Counts
The new member states adapt to EU foreign and security policy

Kristi Raik &
Teemu Palosaari

Kristi Raik
The Finnish Institute of International Affairs
kristi.raik@upi-fiia.fi

Teemu Palosaari
University of Helsinki
teemu.palosaari@helsinki.fi
It's the Taking Part that Counts:
The new member states adapt to
EU foreign and security policy
FIIA Report 10/2004

The Report is part of the FIIA project on EU enlargement which is
co-funded by the European Commission.

The reports can be ordered from
the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, tel. +358 9 4342 0718
erja.kangas@upi-fiia.fi
The reports are also available for downloading at
http://www.upi-fiia.fi

English translation: Pilvi Riikka Taipale
Editing: Kristi Raik
Cover and design: Vesa Tuukkanen
Layout: Maarika Toivonen

Ulkopoliittinen instituutti/
The Finnish Institute of
International Affairs
Mannerheimintie 15 A
FIN-00260 Helsinki
Tel. +358 9 4342 070
Fax +358 9 4342 0769
http://www.upi-fiia.fi

ISSN: 1458-994X
Otamedia Oy, Espoo
Abstract

In the EU, enlargement has aroused concern as to whether the new member states will put a brake on the development of common foreign, security and defence policy. The Report indicates that such concern is unwarranted: the primary objective of the new member states is to become closely integrated into the EU’s foreign and security policy, which should be as uniform and effective as possible. Although these countries are not among the most enthusiastic supporters of closer integration, they do not wish to take on the role of brakeman. The newcomers’ desire to become full and equal member states creates pressure for active participation in all areas of integration, including the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Hence they participate, for example, in the EU’s crisis management operations in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina initiated in 2003, and they also intend to take part in the Union’s planned new battlegroups. Because of their limited resources and relative unfamiliarity with the EU’s ways of functioning, the new member states are likely to have only a minor influence on the CFSP over the next few years.

The Report’s second key argument is that relations with the United States will not create a dividing line between the new and old member states; nor will enlargement have a significant effect on relations between the EU and the United States. The new member states are European Atlanticists whose values and interests imply active participation in the CFSP. The issues causing friction between the EU and the United States also estrange the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) from the US and add to the EU’s weight in the national foreign and security policy of these countries. Participation in integration also has a Europeanising influence on the newcomers.

The third point made in the Report is that the most significant effects of Eastern enlargement on the CFSP are to be found in the East, in relations with Russia and the CIS area. Relations with and attitudes towards Russia distinguish the new member states
It’s the Taking Part that Counts

from the old. The importance of and problems associated with Eastern relations explain the significance of both the transatlantic partnership and a strong CFSP for the CEE countries. Relations with Russia have now become even more significant and complex for the EU, and the need to develop a common and consistent policy towards Russia has increased. Some of the challenges reveal the dark side of European history: security questions arising from the legacy of the Second World War and the Cold War, such as the situation of the Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia and the lack of border treaties between these two countries and Russia, have now become part of the EU’s agenda.

In the area of EU external relations, one of the most important priorities of the new member states is the Eastern dimension of the new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). These countries wish to avert the various threats emanating from their Eastern neighbourhood, such as political and military conflicts, economic crises, cross-border crime, the drug trade, illegal immigration, nuclear material and environmental threats, and to pass on their own experience from the period of transition to other post-communist countries. Poland and the Baltic States in particular wish to support political and economic reforms and integration into the West of the CIS countries. This creates tensions in relations between the EU and Russia, because Russia – and also the new EU countries – tend to view the situation as a struggle between the EU and Russia over spheres of influence.

The new member states do not form a group within the EU, and they do not wish to act as a distinct group, even though there are similarities in their international positions and their attitudes towards the CFSP. The relationship with the US is a uniting factor, but not one that distinguishes these countries as a separate group in the Union. The relationship with Russia does distinguish the new member states from the old, but there are also important differences among the new members in this regard. For all the newcomers, it is important to find partners amongst the old members. Among the new EU countries, Poland stands out most clearly: it is one of the six large member states, and is aiming at a leverage in the CFSP proportional to its size. When it comes to the EU’s Eastern relations, Poland has been more active than other new member states; and in comparison with the latter, its Atlanticism is somewhat stronger.
There are many similarities between the position of Finland and the new member states, the most important being their proximity to Russia and their location on the EU’s border. Thus Finland can function as a bridge between the new and old members and balance the EU’s relations with Russia. The increased importance of the Eastern dimension in EU external relations provides Finland with new opportunities to promote its own goals in the East. In order for Finland to benefit from the opportunities arising from enlargement, it should take active part in developing the EU’s relations with Russia and the Eastern neighbourhood policy. The Northern Dimension (ND) initiative should be linked together with the EU’s Russia policy and the ENP, because in future, it is unlikely that there will be a niche for the ND as a separate EU policy.
Introduction: the new member states — a dispersed and changing group*

In the EU, enlargement has given rise to concerns regarding the future of integration and the unity of the Union. One of the key questions is whether the enlarged Union will be capable of strengthening its international actorness. Over the last ten years, common foreign, security and defence policy has been one of the fastest developing areas of EU activity, but the member states continue to strive for closer cooperation. There have been fears that the new member states1 will act as a brake on this development. The accession of ten new members certainly increases the Union’s size and leverage in global politics, but there have been suspicions that the newcomers may support the international activities of the United States rather than those of the EU. Other expected negative effects of enlargement include greater difficulties in common decision-making, the scant resources of the new member states and their limited interest in the Union’s global activities. It has also been assumed that enlargement will complicate relations between the EU and Russia, as the new member states bring the burden of history and their own problems in relations with the East to the Union’s table. On the other hand, one may also claim that enlargement is in fact being used as an excuse by the old member states in order to explain the tangled and ineffective functioning of the CFSP.

So are the new member states a new resource for the advancement of an independent EU foreign and security policy, or are they rather a threat? Prejudices abound, but for the time being information

1 Our warm thanks go to the ambassadors and officials of the new member states who were interviewed for this Report at their countries’ missions in Brussels and the Czech and Estonian Foreign Ministries. We are also grateful to the FIIA research assistant Jukka-Pekka Strand for his outstanding help in collecting materials and in the final revision of the Report, and to other colleagues who commented on earlier versions of the Report.
Introduction

concerning the new members’ objectives and commitments in the area of the CFSP is fairly limited. This is partly due to the fact that EU policies of these countries are still at an early stage of formulation. Their future direction is shaped by two sets of factors: on the one hand, the general international position of the countries, their historical background, and previous relations with their neighbours and partners; and on the other hand, the earlier experiences concerning the adaptation of new member states, the changes brought about by EU membership in the new countries, and the logic of integration. The importance of the latter set of factors should not be underestimated, as the previous enlargement proves. Before the accession of Finland, Sweden and Austria in 1995 there were fears that progress in foreign and security policy – already difficult as it was – would be further complicated by the new members. The military nonalignment that then distinguished the new member states from the old has not, however, imposed considerable limitations on the participation of these countries in common EU policy.

This Report examines the position of the new member states in common foreign and security policy mainly with regards to two key partners of the EU: the United States and Russia. At the same time, it directs attention to two dividing lines - Europeanism-Atlanticism and East-West - which help in identifying the foreign-policy stances of the member states. It has been suggested that the first dividing line has replaced Europe’s old division into East and West: according to this view, what now primarily divides the countries of Europe is their relationship with and attitude towards the United States. The new member states that, especially in security policy, give priority to the United States are commonly labelled as “Atlanticist”, as distinct from the old EU countries that support a more independent “European” foreign and security policy. There are even fears that the Eastern Europeans will act as a US “Trojan horse” within the EU.

This Report shows the opposite, however: the new member states do not differ fundamentally from the old as far as their views on relations between the EU and the United States are concerned. Their Atlanticism is eventually quite European. Partnership with the United States is important to them, as it is to other European countries, but the Europeanism of the new EU countries is deeply embedded in their views on
It’s the Taking Part that Counts

the international order. Positions taken by the new members manifest a value-based Europeanism on issues which divide the transatlantic partners, such as multilateral international cooperation and the use of force and its justification. EU membership further increases the Union’s importance in their foreign and security policies. Integration Europeanises.

By contrast, the dividing line between East and West continues to hold an important place in the foreign policies of the new EU members which formerly belonged to the Eastern bloc. For these countries, Russia still has great significance as a possible threat. This fact distinguishes the new member states from the old and especially from the large EU countries, for whom Russia is not so important and who do not view it as a threat to their own security. The relationship with Russia is a key reason for the Atlanticism of the new members. Nonetheless, this relationship also supports the reconciliation of Atlanticism with a strong EU foreign policy, since these countries expect support from the EU in their own Eastern relations. One of the most important goals of the new members – especially Poland and the Baltic States – in the EU is thus to participate actively in the formulation and implementation of the EU’s relations with Russia and of the Eastern neighbourhood policy.

Although the Report deals with the new EU countries as a group, it also attempts to stress the problematic – and to some extent misleading – nature of this approach. The new member states do not function as a group within the EU, and there are considerable differences in their priorities. Most clearly distinct are Cyprus and Malta, which were not members of the former Eastern bloc. The Report does not deal in detail with these two countries which strengthen the EU’s Mediterranean dimension, but concentrates on the new Eastern members. In the case of the latter, it is easy to find unifying factors related, for example, to their recent past and geographical location; but even these countries do not constitute a uniform group in EU foreign policy. Their common features and differences are brought up in various connections throughout the Report. One common feature worth emphasising is the fact that for all the new members it is of primary importance to find partners from among old member countries. From the perspective of their own adjustment and also the Union’s coherence, this is most welcome. Another common feature of
the new members is their fairly small size. In this respect, however, Poland is a significant exception: it is one of the enlarged Union’s six large member states and has already shown that it is aiming for a degree of leverage proportional to its size – for example, in the field of the EU’s Eastern relations. The Report shows the differences among the new member states most clearly with regards to their relations with their Eastern neighbours.

The last chapter of the Report examines the impact of enlargement on the CFSP from the perspective of Finland. Since enlargement affects above all the Eastern dimension of EU external relations, this is an important issue for Finland. The changes are primarily positive or at least create new opportunities. Finland has acquired new partners with which it shares many goals and concerns. In addition, Finland has good prerequisites to serve as a bridge between old and new members in the field of the EU’s Eastern relations. At the same time, it can promote its own objectives in this area. The viability of the EU’s Northern Dimension – initiated by Finland – will to a large extent depend on the ability of Finland to adapt the ND to the development of the EU’s relations with Russia and the Eastern neighbourhood policy.
Atlanticists becoming Europeanised

The rise of the EU on the applicant countries’ agenda

If one looks at the ways in which the views of new member states on a common European foreign and security policy have been formed, one may classify the starting points as follows. Firstly, the ‘twin-track’ strategy espoused by the applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe (the CEE countries) – whose goal was membership in both the EU and NATO – contained a clear idea of the division of roles and order of importance as regards the security policy of the EU and NATO: membership in NATO offered genuine ‘hard’ security guarantees, while EU membership was intended to promote the general development of the economy and society, as well as ‘soft’ security. The significance of this aspect is increased by the fact that membership in both organisations became a goal as soon as it became a possible alternative in practice after the disintegration of the Eastern bloc. A second important background factor is a general broadening of the concept of security and security policy. This can be seen in the CEE countries’ production of new security strategies after the fall of the Berlin Wall. At least superficially, these countries adopted a new, modern terminology, according to which security policy consists not only of hard, military security but of other dimensions as well.

Thirdly, another factor which has influenced the positioning of the CFSP on the agendas of the new member states has been general global developments; this has also resulted in these countries participating in the US-led “war on terror”. A fourth starting point has its origins in recent history and the legacy that it has left behind in these countries’ relations with the East. Also involved here are the collapse and reform of their national political and administrative systems. At the end of the Cold War, socialist-
era structures immediately became obsolete, and the need to update them was obvious. In the case of the states that gained their independence in the early 1990s – the Baltic States, Slovakia and Slovenia – a national security system was completely lacking, and it was necessary to start building one up from scratch. In the following section we shall consider in more detail the significance of these starting points from the perspective of an enlarged EU.

The role of foreign and security policy in European integration has changed over the decades: by way of the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, the Schuman Declaration has led to the Helsinki Headline Goal and to an EU security strategy. In recent years, the direction of developments within the 15-member EU has been towards enhancing the military dimension and the effectiveness of the EU’s foreign and security policy. Development has been rapid, despite the fact that there have been differences of opinion among the old EU countries, especially over the development of a common security and defence policy (ESDP)\(^4\). As part of this process the Union has moved towards the construction of a more powerful and efficient ability to act in the military sphere. Alongside the securing of stability, economic growth and prosperity within the EU area, the Union’s agenda has grown to include crisis management beyond the EU’s borders, the creation of rapid deployment forces and plans for joint defence. Hard, military security has increased its importance in the EU’s understanding of security, despite the fact that priority has constantly been given to non-military means of promoting security. Justifications for this development have included the responsibilities involved in the EU’s international role and activities, new and unstable neighbouring areas, and more traditional reasons for integration – the peace and stability of the continent\(^5\).

In some respects, the enhancement of a common foreign and security policy, which has occurred in recent years, may also be viewed as an advance precautionary measure aimed at securing the progress of integration in this area despite enlargement. Accordingly, the enlargement of 1995 was also preceded by efforts to strengthen the CFSP, so that the process of closer cooperation would not suffer from the accession of new – and in this case militarily non-aligned – countries. Some of the starting-point factors mentioned above have led the new members’ views in the
opposite direction from mainstream EU developments. A frequently presented assessment of the effect of the 2004 enlargement on the EU in the area of security policy has been that enlargement will bring with it an “Atlanticist” group which is locked into its opinions, and that this will prevent – or at least slow down – the development of a common foreign and security policy, not to mention opportunities for building up a common defence system and armed forces for the EU. But the effects of Eastern enlargement are not so simple: closer inspection reveals that the stances of the new member states are not particularly “anti-European”. These countries’ alleged Atlanticism turns out to be one of a new type: one which has been refined – or watered down – and which can be incorporated into a European stance. The Europeanisation of opinions is also supported by the logic of integration and by history, i.e. by the experience gained through the adjustment of former newcomers to the Union. After the last four enlargements, new member states have for the most part blended in and adjusted to the development of a common foreign and security policy. The enlargement of 2004 hardly constitutes an exception in this respect.

After the end of the Cold War, discussions concerning a common European foreign and security policy appeared quickly and unexpectedly on the political agendas of the countries which had formed the now defunct Eastern bloc. However, reorientation towards the West did not turn out to be as simple as had been anticipated: the break-up of the Eastern bloc meant the disappearance of the strongest guarantor and constructive factor maintaining the unity of the Western camp. A return to the West and to the “European family” was thus rendered difficult by the fact that there was no longer such a family in the old sense. When the Cold War ended, the Western countries were suddenly forced to seek new grounds for their foreign and security policy – as was NATO for its *raison d’être*. The reason for this was that the “East” no longer consisted of a united bloc posing a clear-cut threat against which it was necessary to be on one’s guard. At the same time, European integration was turning in new directions. During the Cold War, with its antithetic relationship between the great powers, Western Europe had neither the opportunity nor the position to play a role as an independent actor in the field of security policy, so integration concentrated mainly on the area
Atlanticists becoming Europeanised

of economic policy. Thus the EU – which was seeking, amongst other things, new directions and incentives for integration in the field of foreign and security policy – became a moving target for the applicant countries, and this complicated the process of accession and attitudes adopted towards it.

The official routes to the placement of the CFSP on the agendas of the applicant countries were provided by the membership negotiations, and also by the debate on the future being waged in the European Convention and by the preparation of a treaty on a European constitution. In neither forum did the CFSP become a significant issue of dispute. This is partly explained by the fact that the position of an applicant country is different from that of a member state: the applicant’s priorities are the progress of membership negotiations and the adoption of EU legislation (acquis), so it may be wiser for the applicant not to take a stand on controversies or moot points which affect member states. In the CFSP area cooperation is mainly intergovernmental, and there is no actual common legislation. As far as applicant countries are concerned, the main expectation is that they should support common positions and joint actions and adapt national policies in such a way as to conform to the CFSP. In this respect the accession of new members did not cause an appreciable strain on the budgets of the EU or the countries joining it. The matter was thus dealt with quickly and smoothly during membership negotiations, but the instruction of the new countries in the “house rules” actually began during the accession process, when the applicants gave official support to the development of the CFSP. It was only after accession – when the CFSP rhetoric became a reality for the new member states – that unqualified attitudes gave way to the formation of genuine opinions. In contrast to the rest of the CFSP, the situation with regard to the EU’s security and defence policy (ESDP) was more complicated, but this did not affect membership negotiations to any appreciable degree. At the Convention, the countries’ stances were discernibly influenced by their NATO membership (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland) or by their being in the final stages of the NATO accession process (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia): the fact that a common security and defence policy should not endanger NATO was a matter of concern to all of them. The applicant countries did, however, give their
support to closer cooperation in the area of security and defence, at the same time pointing out that this did not replace or threaten the transatlantic alliance.

**A “hard NATO” and a “soft EU”**

From the EU’s perspective, security policy in a broad sense had a key role in the Eastern enlargement: at issue was “The extension of the zone of peace, stability and prosperity in Europe [, which] will enhance the security of all its peoples”. The latest enlargement has been compared to the 1980s, when Greece, Spain and Portugal joined the Union. Then, too, the stated goal was to extend peace, security and democracy to new areas of Europe. As far as foreign and security policy are concerned, any comparison is naturally made difficult by developments in the notion of security within the CFSP and the EU, as well as by the diversity of everyday global politics. Countries are now joining a Union different from the EU of earlier rounds of enlargement at a time when security is perceived differently than it used to be.

The above-mentioned two-track strategy prioritised NATO in the security policies of the Eastern European countries. Despite the EU’s nascent attempts to extend its significance to the area of hard security as well, EU membership was viewed as enhancing security only indirectly and in the less important areas of soft security. The countries’ central objective was a “full and credible guarantee of security and the possibility to participate in collective defence”. The importance of NATO is indicated by the way in which the CEE countries’ reform of their armed forces has followed the requirements of NATO membership: for example, in the areas of the air force, the navy, military logistics, training systems and the acquisition of armaments and other equipment, emphasis is being placed on standardisation and compatibility with NATO. NATO requirements have created pressures to shift from general military service to a paid professional army and to concentrate on the creation of small well-equipped special units rather than general national defence.

Although the CEE countries hope that, under the leadership of the United States, NATO will continue to carry the main responsibility for European security, they view the EU’s common
Atlanticists becoming Europeanised

security and defence policy as a better alternative returning defence to the national level ("re-nationalisation of defence"). The latter alternative is possible if US interest in NATO – and with it, the importance of NATO – declines. As the CEE countries are uncertain about US attitudes towards the future of NATO, they may view the EU’s common security and defence policy as a kind of stopgap or safety net. Another important point for the future of the CFSP is the fact that the new member states are more adaptable than many of the old ones as regards even radical steps towards the unification of military capacities and towards specialisation, the complementation of other countries’ armed forces, and joint acquisitions. In addition to the national military reforms now underway, this adaptability is also of course a product of boundary conditions set by the economy: specialisation and cooperation help to utilize the limited resources as effectively as possible.

The new member states’ attitudes towards the CFSP are also influenced by the modernisation of their concepts of security and thus of their national security strategies as well. This reflects a trend in the broadening of general global security policy. Environmental security, economic security and the security of citizens at an individual level have taken their place alongside purely military and national security. In this way, the terminology and approach adopted by the new member states are similar to those used by other EU countries. However, because of the new members’ recent history and geographical position, they are placing considerable emphasis on traditional regional defence, and at least for the time being the EU is in no position to provide guarantees for this. Although the EU is striving to develop its activities militarily as well as in other areas of security, the strengthening of Europe’s ability to act in line with the current trend (i.e. involvement in crisis management outside the EU) does not lead to fundamental changes in this respect. The burden of recent history can also be seen in the fact that some of the new member states’ security problems originate in unresolved issues resulting from the Second World War – issues that remained buried during the Cold War. Within the Eastern bloc there were officially no mutual claims regarding, for instance, border issues or minorities, so that it is only now that these are being raised.

The sharp edges created by the CFSP are being rounded off by the fact that it is important to the new EU countries to have
a presence in the integration process as full and equal member states. Their aim has been full EU membership, with no place for any peripheral positions or exclusion from any core bodies. The antidote for marginalisation in simple: active participation in all aspects of the EU – including its foreign and security policy. In order to demonstrate its support to CFSP in a practical – not just theoretical – manner, in 2003 the applicant countries sent participants to the operations launched in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina\textsuperscript{16}. Although the involvement of the new members is relatively small compared to that of e.g. Finland, their presence is symbolically important. All the new member states also plan to contribute to the EU’s new battlegroups, which are currently being planned.

Generally speaking, however, the new member states are not among the most enthusiastic supporters of closer integration\textsuperscript{17}. Their attitude towards an intensification of cooperation in the area of the CFSP is neatly summed up in the comment “in principle yes, in detail no”. In other words, there is support for the development of the CFSP at a general level, but constructive attitudes have a habit of disappearing when the question of reducing national powers of decision arises – by abolishing veto rights, for example. Of course, a corresponding attitude is no alien phenomenon among old members either.

**Integration waters down the Atlanticism of new members**

Traditionally, Atlanticism has been understood as a transatlantic orientation towards the United States in European foreign policy. The classic example is provided by Great Britain. France on the other hand, with its habit of stressing European values and models for solutions and emphasising the independent development of a common European foreign and security policy which does not rely on US resources is regarded as exemplifying the opposite pole from an Atlanticist orientation. Sometimes the term “Gaullism” has been used to describe this attitude\textsuperscript{18}. At the level of practical EU politics, the Atlanticists speak in favour of a division of labour between the EU and NATO, and against
Atlanticists becoming Europeanised

The “duplication” of the two organisations’ activities, equipment and facilities. The Gaullists meanwhile support the creation of EU-specific, autonomous structures in the security and military policy areas. Adherents of the former view regard European security and defence as requiring a considerable contribution by the United States; in contrast, those taking the latter view trust in Europe’s ability to take care of its own security. The new central and Eastern EU member states – all of them NATO members – wish to preserve the role of the United States and NATO as cornerstones of European security and they consider the duplication of defence structures as a waste. Can one then claim that they are Atlanticists, who will turn the development of the EU’s foreign and defence policy in the direction of the United States and will hinder the strengthening of the Union’s role as an actor on the international stage?

Firstly, there is reason to doubt whether – from the viewpoint of the CFSP – the difference between the European and Atlanticist orientation is really any more significant than the views which unite the EU countries. All the member states (and in fact, with reservations, the United States as well) support the strengthening of the CFSP. There is also a consensus on the preservation of some sort of partnership with the United States. Correspondingly, views on the development of the EU into a counterweight to the United States within the international scheme of things are cautious as to the development of a relationship of opposition between the New Continent and the Old. Nor does their understanding of the international system divide member states in any significant way: rather, it brings out differences of emphasis compared to the United States. Within the EU, European foreign policy has plotted its course with the United States as its main reference point, and attention is directed towards differences of opinion between the EU and the United States with regard to such matters as multilateral international cooperation or the use of force and its justification. But although the United States is indeed an irreplaceable partner with which Europe shares many values and interests, it has also become the counterpart to the EU as an actor on the international stage; that most important “other”, against which one’s own activities are measured.

On issues dividing Europe and the United States, the new EU countries are taking a European line; but instead of stressing
It’s the Taking Part that Counts

divisive factors, they are emphasising common values and transatlantic partnership. However, the starting points for the CEE countries’ foreign and security policies in 21st century Europe are different from those of traditional Atlanticists. Thus these countries should not be over simplistically labelled Atlanticists – or countries which always give uncritical support to the United States. Their Atlanticist orientation is not in doubt, but it should be noted that their Atlanticism contains certain special features, and for that reason they might be called “Atlanticists becoming Europeanised”. The most important basis of their Atlanticism the need for guarantees against the Russian threat – will be examined in more detail in the next chapter. Here we wish to present some of the factors that point to a weakening of the new member states’ Atlanticism.

One important factor leading to an emphasis on transatlantic partnership has been the debt of gratitude felt by the countries of the former Eastern bloc. The countries concerned have wanted to express their gratitude to the United States for the support it provided during the Cold War and for its contribution to the collapse of the Soviet system. While the official support that many Western European countries gave the CEE countries’ struggle for independence during the last few years of the Soviet period was rather unsubstantial and invisible, the United States’ support and encouragement was overt. The CEE countries’ wish to soon be welcomed into NATO was an expression of the concrete nature of their support for defence policy too. The new EU countries’ active participation in the US-led coalition in the war against terrorism is also based, amongst other things, on the repayment of this debt. However, debt repayment arrangements have a habit of ending at some point; if the United States were to launch a new operation as part of the war against terrorism somewhere in the world it would by no means be a matter of course for the CEE countries to participate in a new “coalition of the willing”. The war in Iraq has changed attitudes towards the United States in these countries: popular perception has become notably more negative, and demands for a withdrawal from Iraq have grown in strength. Many people feel that the debt of gratitude has now been paid.

At the same time, there are discussions concerning what is required for the continuation of US and NATO security guarantees: does the price of partnership also include partici-
Atlanticists becoming Europeanised

Pation in any future US-led operations? Is partnership worth this price? And would even this ensure US support in future, given the fact that the emphasis in the United States’ foreign and security policy has shifted geographically away from Europe? The CEE countries also have misgivings about the question of whether future relations between the United States and Russia will be based on economic policy and cooperation in the war against terrorism, as this could undermine the security guarantees given by the United States. In light of these considerations, the EU’s policy towards Russia is becoming an increasingly important matter for the new member states. Further, like other European countries, the new EU countries are worried about the effects of US policy on the international system, including the weakening of the international legal system and multilateral cooperation.

In discussions concerning the new EU countries’ relationships with the United States and their position within the CFSP, very little attention has been paid to their outlook on the international order. This, however, is a point that defines the new member states as clearly European. Talk of “new” and “old” Europeans has been much ado about nothing.

The dilution of Atlanticism is also indicated by the above-mentioned importance of full and active EU membership to the new member countries. There is also good reason to look at the history of integration; the fear that European integration might threaten the Atlantic Alliance is no new phenomenon. However, this point does not define the new member states as a group of their own, set apart from the old members. Looking at integration during different decades, one may pick out a number of cases in which the above-mentioned fear has emerged in a concrete fashion for varying reasons. For example, in the very first years of the integration process, the Netherlands, one of the founding members, attempted to keep political and economic integration separate. The aim of this was to prevent the country from becoming involved again in intercontinental power struggles like those it experienced during the Second World War. The Netherlands abandoned its opposition to the creation of the European Defence Community (EDC) in the 1950s only after the United States gave the project the green light. 23

Although enlargements have sometimes brought Atlanticists and countries with a history of neutrality into the EC/EU, steady
progress in the development of a common European foreign and security policy has continued. In the theoretical literature on the EU, this has been regarded as an indication of the socialisation and social learning which accompanies integration24. Certainly, at least to a certain extent, such learning or Europeanisation means only the superficial adoption of the “correct” rhetoric, but e.g. the fact that applicant countries’ and EU countries’ UN stances have become closer during the membership process has already been noted as a feature of several enlargement rounds25. Thus, if the lessons that can be learned from the history of integration or assumptions about the logic of integration are to be trusted, membership will serve to Europeanise the newcomers this time round as well.

Another point worth noting is the fact that opinion polls in the new member states show that the public is ready to accept EU defence. On average, these countries have a more positive attitude towards dealing with defence matters jointly with the EU than old members26. The new member states are also happy to leave the job of Atlanticist CFSP brakeman to Great Britain. These countries do not form a real Atlanticist camp together with Great Britain: e.g. in 2003 support for the war in Iraq was stronger and more genuine than in was in the new member states, where public opinion was more critical. This difference was no doubt influenced by the fact that these countries have neither a great-power heritage nor the national global goals in international politics that this heritage engenders. Thus the reasons for the CEE countries’ participation in the war in Iraq are to be found in the duties and interests of alliance rather than any conviction that the war was the correct solution as such, or any feeling that the situation constituted a direct threat or was of direct concern to themselves.
Eastern relations distinguish new members from old

The East-West divide in a new form

Whereas the division into Europeanist and Atlanticist countries does not in practice separate the new member states into a group of their own in EU foreign and security policy, the division into old and new members is significant with regards to Russia and other Eastern neighbours. At the same time, however, it should be stressed that the new EU countries do not form a uniform group on this issue (either). There are considerable differences between the new members, and these are growing in importance as their most important uniting factor – distrust of their former occupier – recedes into history. Simplifying matters slightly, one can say that the further East a country is situated, the more dominant and problematic the role of Russia is in its foreign policy: the most difficult cases are Estonia and Latvia; relations with Russia are also very important for Lithuania and Poland but not so much for the other Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) and even less so for Slovenia.

The historical background throws light on the new member states’ relations with Russia and helps to identify their position in the EU’s policy towards Russia. Their relations with and attitudes towards Russia distinguish the new EU countries that belonged to the former Eastern bloc not only from the old EU countries but also from the United States. For the latter the enemy of the Cold War period has become an important partner in the fight against terrorism. The small countries of Eastern Europe have attempted to become part of the “West” in order to free themselves from the Russian sphere of influence. For them, the East-West divide continues to function as an important basis for defining their place in the international system. An exception
among the eight members of the former Eastern bloc is Slovenia: as part of the former Yugoslavia, it was not directly subject to Moscow’s control. Also, because of its geographical location, Slovenia’s foreign policy and its goals within the area of EU foreign relations are above all oriented towards the Balkan and Mediterranean area rather than the East. Thus the relations with the East described below apply only to the EU’s other Eastern newcomers.

Moscow’s iron grip was felt most painfully by the Baltic states, which were annexed to the Soviet Union in 1940. The Soviet occupation wiped the Baltic states off the map for half a century until they succeeded in restoring their independence in 1991. Since then, relations with Russia have been plagued by many problems, which will be examined in more detail below, especially in the cases of Estonia and Latvia. The Visegrad countries – Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary – formally retained their independence during the Cold War, but in practice their experiences of the totalitarian Soviet system were almost as traumatic as those of the Baltic States. As far back as the second half of the 1980s, however, Moscow began to adopt a more compliant attitude towards a withdrawal of these countries from its sphere of influence. Thus their integration into the West has not required overcoming a similar Russian resistance as was encountered by the Baltic States. In the foreign policy of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary in particular, the importance of Russia has declined. This is explained to a large extent by geography – these countries are located in Central Europe, quite far from the Russian border, and the Czech Republic does not even have a common border with the CIS area.

Poland, by contrast, which shares borders with Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad places significantly more weight on its Eastern relations. Developments in Russia and neighbouring Eastern countries are regarded as having great significance from the perspective of Poland’s security and stability. Historical experience increases distrust of Russia – but also of other European great powers. Squeezed between its two great neighbours, Russia and Germany, Poland has over the centuries repeatedly been forced to submit to each of these states, or has been divided between them. It is from these bitter historical memories that Poland’s current opposition to the strengthening
of the French-German axis within the EU arises. The reverse side of this position is Poland’s Atlanticism, which is somewhat stronger than that of the other CEE countries. Distrust of the French-German axis is reinforced by the fear that the two leading powers might ally themselves with Russia against the United States in international politics. This fear was further strengthened during the Iraq crisis, when the leaders of the three European great powers together expressed strong criticism of US policy. The other East Europeans also followed with concern the tightening cooperation between the three countries, which was evidenced for example at the meeting of Presidents Chirac, Schröder and Putin in St Petersburg in April 2003. On that occasion, the three countries presented their common views on the Iraq crisis and also discussed relations between the EU and Russia.

At the same time the CEE countries gave assurances of their support to the United States. Although emphasising transatlantic partnership does not in itself distinguish the new member states from other European Atlanticists, there is a difference in the grounds of their Atlanticism: the East European countries regard the unity of the West as strengthening their own position as part of the Western community. From this perspective, the “West” continues to be defined essentially through its relationship with the “East”, even though the new threats brought up by the New York terrorist attacks have acquired a central place on Western security agenda. The Eastern border is of key importance in defining both the identity of the new EU countries and the content of their foreign policy. Membership in the EU and NATO has given them confidence that they are now situated on the Western side of the East-West border, but this does not diminish the importance of the border. The West represents freedom, stability and prosperity, and also safeguards the functioning of democracy, the rule of law and the market economy. To a large degree, the level of implementing these values defines the EU’s Eastern border and divides Europe, although the “East” is no longer attempting to construct a rival model of society and no longer constitutes a direct threat to the “West”. Huntington’s controversial view of the world divided into civilisations supports the Eastern Europeans’ understanding of today’s Europe, and – what is noteworthy with regards to the enlarged EU – the border drawn
by Huntington corresponds fairly closely to the Union’s present Eastern border. The new member states consider this dividing line more important than the old members do.

From the perspective of the new members, the EU’s Eastern border holds a central place in constructing the Union’s international actorness. Although terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and other global threats currently occupy an important position on their security agendas, one may say that their activity on these issues derives primarily from a need to meet the expectations of their Western partners. Only by participating in the management of global threats and crises can they prove that they are respectable partners and members of the Western community. By contrast, the security of their own surroundings and relations with their neighbours are truly perceived in the new EU countries as concerns of their own. In this field, they have clear interests of their own, self-defined goals, and also the expertise and the will required to promote these. Admittedly, this does not necessarily suffice to enable these countries to take an influential role in the ENP – we shall return to this matter below. Nonetheless, the interest and expertise of the old member countries with regards to the Union’s Eastern neighbours, especially others than Russia, is limited, and the new member states consider it their task and responsibility to promote this issue in the EU. By their activity they wish to prevent the EU’s Eastern border from becoming a new velvet or even iron curtain dividing Europe. Thus the emphasis they place on the continuing importance of the Eastern border does not mean that the new EU countries wish to preserve this dividing line; on the contrary, it is more important for them than for the old member states to promote the commitment to Western values and European integration of the Eastern neighbours. They are also much more aware of the need to support the desired development in the neighbourhood.

The new EU countries are particularly sceptical about Russia’s future prospects. As is well known, their attitudes towards Russia are more critical and negative than those of the old member states. Their official rhetoric has indeed been brought into line with the Western model: Russia is an important partner and is not regarded as a threat to one’s own security. Moscow’s former satellites are, however, disquieted by the Russian desire to protect
its own sphere of influence in neighbouring countries. In addition, Russia’s turn towards a more authoritarian leadership under President Putin, the increase in limitations of political freedom, human rights violations and the situation in Chechnya are arousing more concern and criticism in these countries than further in the West. Although the new EU countries do not perceive Russia as a military threat at the moment or in the near future, uncertainty about Russia’s future development keeps the big Eastern neighbour among potential threats.

The old EU countries have often viewed the critical stance and the fear of Russia of East Europeans as an unfortunate burden of history and have reproached these countries for anti-Russian attitudes and even paranoia. For their part, the new Eastern EU members have regarded their own view of Russia as more realistic. The optimistic belief of Western countries in the development of Russia towards a liberal Western democracy has appeared naive and dangerous in the eyes of the former Eastern block countries. In recent years critical voices have gained ground in the West as well. Still, there continues to be a clear difference between the attitudes of the Eastern and Western EU countries: further to the West, Russia is not perceived as a threat (despite the recent changes) but as a partner, while for Russia’s neighbours partnership conceals strong concerns about the country’s great power ambitions.

The EU and Russia: 
growing trade, growing tensions

The EU has stressed that it is building up relations with Russia on the basis of common values. The EU’s Russia policy is in many respects similar to its relations with Eastern applicant countries: partnership requires the adoption of EU norms and a commitment to democracy and the market economy. This is closely connected to the EU’s nature as a community of values in which integration is built on shared principles of democracy and human rights. The same values also occupy a central position within the EU’s common foreign and security policy, which obscures the boundary between domestic and foreign policy. Instead of values, Russia has emphasised practical benefits, hoping that its
EU relations will provide support for the promotion of its own political and economic goals. At no stage, however, has it been willing to accept EU intervention in its internal development and decision-making, but has fiercely defended its sovereignty. A fundamental hindrance to relations between the EU and Russia is the fact that these are two very different kinds of actors: the latter cannot accept sharing its sovereignty, which is one of the most characteristic features of the EU. Russia’s wish to keep its domestic and foreign policy strictly separate from each other has also made cooperation in international politics between the EU and Russia more difficult, even though the two agree over many foreign policy issues.

However, the EU has not had the means to implement a relationship based on common values and EU norms. The logic of enlargement, according to which the applicant countries have adopted the EU’s values and norms in order to become members of the community, cannot be applied to Russia, which is not seeking full membership. Talk of common values has not led to their consistent promotion, while the sought-after “strategic partnership” and practical cooperation has remained quite flimsy. The fuzziness and drifting nature of relations has been worsened by inconsistencies in the activities of EU member states and by contradictions between the Union’s common Russia policy and individual member states’ relations with Russia.

Even before enlargement, the EU was already aware of the need to reform relations with Russia. According to a rather critical report published by the Commission in February, the EU’s relations with Russia need a new approach which is “effective, realistic, balanced and consistent.” The report stresses that the protection of common European values is the starting point for relations. A “genuine strategic partnership” should come to replace previous political declarations and ad hoc agenda. The Commission expressed its concern that Russia’s commitment to common values has weakened, even though it views the increase in stability during Putin’s period in office as a positive development. The report also mentions many matters that concern the new member states in particular and cause tensions in cooperation between the EU and Russia. Such matters include a “more assertive stance” adopted by Russia towards a number of joining states and CIS countries, disagreements concerning
the extension of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) to cover new member states, as well as broader treaties with Latvia and Estonia which Russia has not ratified (for more on these, see below).

The new member states concur with the Commission’s criticism, also demanding from the EU a stricter and more realistic policy towards Russia. They have accused the EU of spinelessness and of adopting an overly compliant attitude towards Russian demands. On many occasions they have also expressed their indignation over double standards of the EU: the criteria for democracy and minority rights demanded of the smaller Eastern European countries have not been applied to Russia, which for its part has harshly criticised the minority situation in the Baltic States in particular, appealing to Western norms (more on this below). The strictness demanded by the EU’s Eastern newcomers means above all a clear definition of the EU’s policy line and strict adherence to it rather than compliance with Russian demands.

The new EU countries are particularly concerned about the tendency of large member states to determine the EU’s policy towards Russia at the expense of smaller countries’ interests, or to water down a common EU policy by their bilateral relations with Russia. In recent years there have been many examples of the large EU countries’ tendency to show more understanding for Russian views than for those of its small neighbours. In February 2004, for example, the French President Jacques Chirac paid a visit to Hungary with a purpose to try to repair relationships with the applicant countries which had been damaged during the Iraq crisis and to demonstrate his support for enlargement. However, his statements (yet again) caused irritation in Eastern Europe: according to Chirac, the EU should show more respect for Russia’s national interests and should, among other things, take into account its concern about the situation of the Russian minority in the Baltics. The large EU members have also indicated their willingness to make concessions to Russia on matters such as the transit of Kaliningrad residents through Lithuania and EU-Russia visa arrangements. The former issue was settled last year to the satisfaction of all parties, while on the latter question Russia is continuing negotiations with both the EU and individual member states, aiming at a gradual
transition to visa-free travel. Of the EU countries, France, Germany and some others have expressed their support for Russia’s objectives, whereas countries sharing a border with Russia – including Finland – take a much more reserved stance.

The new member states’ suspicions concerning cooperation between the great powers increased in May (shortly after the appearance of the Commission report) when France and Germany published a draft document on future development of relations between the EU and Russia. Among other things, the document proposed a gradual transition towards visa-free travel and suggested increased Russian participation in decision-making on European defence.

Regarding such issues, what worries the East European countries most is not necessarily the content of negotiations between large EU countries and Russia but rather the way in which great powers negotiate among themselves about matters which affect the smaller states situated between them – without listening to the views of the latter. Thus it is important to them that, as far as Russia is concerned, the EU should speak with one voice, delivering a message which all the member states have had an opportunity to influence. To some extent, the disagreements among EU countries reflect their different views on Russia’s position in Europe: Are we dealing with one of Europe’s historical great powers, which as a matter of course has a place at European negotiating tables, or the heir to the Soviet Union, which shoulders the blame for the horrors of totalitarianism?

The EU newcomers located close to Russia are particularly concerned about whether Russia respects the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and are demanding of the EU a more honest and critical assessment of the situation in Russia. Yet these countries are also sceptical of the EU’s opportunities to promote democracy in Russia. Many representatives of the new EU countries consider themselves realists in this matter: according to their opinion, it must be admitted that, at least at present, there is no will rising from among Russian citizens and society to build up a Western-style democracy, and that supporting stability in Russia may now be a more important goal for its Western neighbours than the promotion of democracy.

In addition to the tension between stability and democracy we are also faced here with a conflict between values and economic
interests: for the new member states, Russia is a fairly important trading partner (see Appendix 2), and it is estimated that its economic importance will increase in the future. It has to be noted that over two thirds of the new member states’ trade is with other EU countries, while the share of Russia is under 10 per cent in most of the cases. Russia’s relative importance is however increased by the dependence of these countries on the imports of energy, especially natural gas, from the East. The new member states’ exports to Russia are smaller than their imports from Russia (only in the case of Lithuania does the share of its Eastern neighbour in total imports amount to slightly more than five per cent), but they expect the import figures to rise in line with Russia’s current economic growth. Although, in accordance with EU policy, their official statements stress the primary role of common values, the new member states might be ready to turn a blind eye to questions of values and promote practical cooperation with Russia. It could be in the interest of the new EU countries to keep political values and economic interests separate from one another. Emphasising economic relations could also be advantageous to Russian economic interests, especially since the share of enlarged EU in Russian foreign trade is over 50 per cent. From the Russian perspective, the new member states are a significant gateway to the West and a route of trade with Western Europe.

The tensions between political values and economic interests, and between the promotion of democracy and stability require clearer solutions in the policy towards Russia of both new and old member countries and the EU as a whole. These tensions are now greater than ever before since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is due to the increased mutual economic dependency between the EU and Russia which results from enlargement, and also the watering down of value-based cooperation because of developments in Russia in recent years.

The new member states are eager to participate actively in the formulation of the EU’s Russia policy and consider their own familiarity with Russia to be an important resource which can benefit the EU as a whole. After all, it is one of the problems of EU-Russia relations that the parties do not speak the same language and do not always understand each other’s way of thinking. The Eastern EU countries are undoubtedly more skilled in speaking the same language with the Russians, and not just
because of their linguistic skills. However, there are many factors limiting their ability and their opportunities to influence EU relations with Russia. At least so far, the new member states have not formulated their vision of the development of EU-Russia relations, which could be applied as a common EU policy. Another hindrance is their bilateral relations with Russia, which are characterised by prejudice and negative attitudes on both sides, and particularly in the case of the Baltic states, unresolved disputes. These problems have now become an inseparable part of relations between the EU and Russia. It is also worth pointing out that during the first years of membership, the activities of all the newcomers in the EU are limited by their lack of experience concerning common institutions and procedures.

Although it is common in EU institutions and the old member countries to regard the new member states as a burden rather than a resource for the Union’s relations with Russia, enlargement is likely to have some positive effects as well in this area. Firstly, pressure to develop an EU strategy on Russia increases, since one cannot avoid the growing importance of Russia to the EU. Secondly, the new member states stress the need for a uniform policy towards Russia and are themselves willing to take care of their relations with Moscow to a large extent via Brussels. The EU’s common policy does indeed seem to be strengthening alongside national policies. Furthermore, as the new members gain experience in the Union, their ability to utilise their knowledge of Russia to the advantage of a common EU policy will gradually improve.

Russia’s shrinking sphere of influence: the Baltics as a sore point

A great deal of the problems (feared and actual) brought by enlargement to EU relations with Russia concern the Baltic states, especially Estonia and Latvia. It is first and foremost the Baltic countries that have been seen as the “troublemakers” in EU-Russia relations, as they have brought the problems of their own relations with Russia, such as the large Russian minorities and the lacking border treaties, into the Union. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has been one of Russian foreign-policy goals to maintain
its influence in the “near abroad”, i.e. primarily the area of the former Soviet Union. The detachment of the Baltic states from its sphere of influence has been experienced by Russia as a bitter indication of the weakening of its international status. For many years, the protection of Russian strategic interests in its neighbouring areas included rigorous opposition to the Baltic states joining NATO. Russia has never opposed EU enlargement in the same way as it has opposed the former Eastern bloc countries’ accession to NATO; but despite accepting it in principle, Russia has in practice made their accession to the EU more difficult. Russia’s assertive attitude, criticised by the EU Commission, has been aimed especially at Estonia and Latvia.

Russia has criticised in particular the situation of the Russian minorities: it has constantly called into question Estonia’s and Latvia’s EU accession, appealing to violations of minority rights in these countries, despite the fact that the EU and other international observers have found no evidence of systematic acts of discrimination against minorities. A particularly sharp dispute broke out at the beginning of this year, when Russia refused to extend the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU to cover all new member states. As a condition for the extension of the agreement, Russia presented a list of demands which would protect its special interests against the possible negative effects of enlargement. The EU agreed to most of Russia’s demands, the majority of which concerned trade. These were recorded in a separate protocol, which was appended to the agreement before the enlargement. As a result of prolonged negotiations, the protocol included no mention of the protection of Russian minorities. A contrary result would have put Estonia and Latvia into an odd special position – as if they belonged to the Union’s observation class. In Estonia and Latvia, the process aroused a minor political storm, during which the countries’ ability to defend their own interests in the EU, and the EU’s readiness to show solidarity towards its small border states and to protect them from Russian assaults were examined. In their public debate, a possible agreement between the EU and Russia on the protection of the Russian minorities, which had been a subject of the negotiations, was even compared to the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 which defined the division of the spheres of influence between Germany and the Soviet Union.
EU membership did not put an end to Russian criticism: a recent example is a speech given by the Russian Defence Minister, Igor Ivanov, in London in July, where he defined Estonia and Latvia as “sources of danger” which were not adhering to the norms of democracy and human rights and instigated military and political tension. In Estonia and Latvia the speech was viewed as part of Russia’s recently intensified propaganda war, the aim of which was to damage their international reputation and position. President Putin, for his part, has recently stressed the need to protect the rights of Russians in the CIS countries and the Baltics. Thus the Russian minorities are likely to remain an important instrument in Russia’s attempts to increase its influence in the neighbouring areas. The Baltic states are also concerned about Russian attempts to influence their domestic politics. Suspicions about growing Russian influence reached a peak last spring when the Lithuanian President, Rolandas Paksas, had to step down, being impeached among other things of connections with the Russian mafia.

The problems in relations between the Baltic states and Russia have undoubtedly become part of the agenda of EU-Russia relations, but the Baltic countries themselves do not wish to appear as troublemakers – they rather seek to avoid being cast in this role because they do not wish to damage their reputation or limit their opportunities to influence EU policies by being “difficult” with regards to Russia. However, constant Russian accusations and attempts to intervene in the situation of the Russian minorities continue to label Estonia and Latvia as countries which have problems with Russia. The official policy of Estonia and Latvia is to avoid the escalation of problems and heated reactions to Russian statements, and to try to improve relations. They do not wish to raise via the EU the conclusion of border treaties unless there is a genuine reason to expect progress from the other party. The reason for this is very pragmatic: thus far, the countries have managed well without border treaties, and there is no reason for them now to concentrate their energies on reviving the dispute. The position adopted years ago – that they have done everything in their power and that the ball is now in the Russian court – continues to work now that these countries are members of the EU. Despite the moderate official stance of the Baltic states, membership of the EU and NATO has
encouraged more critical and aggressive statements towards Russia concerning, for instance, the border treaties and demands for compensation for the damage caused by the Soviet occupation.

In light of the problems causing friction in relations between the Baltic states and Russia, one has to say that although these countries have perhaps the most experience and expertise of all the EU countries regarding Russia, they also have the worst preconditions for utilising them in the context of the EU’s Russia policy. Estonia and Latvia in particular hope for support from the EU in improving their relations with Russia and for protection from pressure and groundless accusations from their Eastern neighbour. The EU has indeed repeatedly responded to the Russian accusations by stating that Estonia and Latvia fulfil the political criteria for EU membership, including the protection of the rights of minorities, and that they adhere to international norms in this field.

**New neighbours: the EU and Russia on a collision course?**

The aim of Russia to remain a regional great power and a centre of power distinct from the EU has become more express during President Putin’s period in office. Having lost its grip on the countries of east central Europe and the Baltics, it is now attempting to strengthen its ties with the CIS countries and views EU integration as a model for cooperation in the CIS region. The boundary of Russian sphere of influence has not, however, stabilised, and several countries belonging to it see EU membership as a tempting alternative, which is a source of tensions in relations between the EU and Russia. These tensions take a more concrete form when it comes to the implementation of the new European Neighbourhood Policy.

The preparation of a European neighbourhood policy began in 2001 when the EU realised the need to prepare for the challenges related to the coming new neighbouring countries brought along by enlargement. A report by the Commission outlining the new neighbourhood policy was launched in March 2003, followed by a more detailed strategy paper in May 2004. The latter document
defines the general principles and goals on the basis of which the Union, in cooperation with its neighbours, prepares tailor-made bilateral action plans suited to the specific conditions of each country. The EU’s aim is to develop closer relations with the neighbours, including economic integration, but without offering the prospect of full membership. In all, the strategy covers 16 states, seven of these being CIS countries: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the Southern Caucasus countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

The new member states’ interest is focused on the CIS region, especially the Western CIS countries. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, the situation in their Eastern neighbourhood directly affects their own security. The threats which emanate from the East are manifold, including political and military conflicts, economic crises, cross-border crime, drug trade, illegal immigration, nuclear material and environmental threats. Thus, the threats involve questions of both hard and soft security, but on the whole the military security guarantee offered by NATO does not provide much help in averting them. The EU’s support in the control and prevention of threats emanating from the East is thus utterly necessary, even indispensable for the new member states. Many of the threats result from political instability, bad governance, poverty and the gap in the standard of living constituted by the EU’s Eastern border. There is thus a need for broad support for the development of these societies in order to counteract these threats. In light of their own experience, the new member states have reason to believe that, in the long run, the best means of promoting security and stability is integration based on European values.

The second major reason for supporting an active EU neighbourhood policy is related to the wider formation of spheres of influence. In the new EU states the Eastern neighbourhood policy is unambiguously regarded as a countermeasure to the Russian attempts to control its neighbours. From this perspective the EU and the CIS are mutually exclusive and competitive options. This corresponds with the Russian understanding of a zero-sum game being played with the EU. The strategic goal of the United States is also to prevent the supremacy of Russia in the CIS region, which easily lends support to the concept of competing spheres of power (although the official position of the US holds
that the CIS countries’ good relations with Russia and their integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures are not mutually exclusive options\(^47\). The tension between the EU and Russia is certainly not eased by the fact that the most vigorous advocates of the neighbourhood policy within the EU are now the former Eastern bloc countries. Having detached themselves from the Russian sphere of influence and successfully completed the transition to democracy and the market economy, the new EU countries are now eager to pass what they have learned on to other former Eastern bloc countries. This involves a strong symbolism and solidarity among the small nations which have been suppressed by Russia, dating back to the Soviet time and beyond.

The new members’ experiences of the implementation of political and economic reforms and the adoption of EU norms are definitely valuable for other post-communist states. In addition, the strengths of new EU countries in the area of neighbourhood policy include their good knowledge of and close contacts with the target countries. They are willing to harness their own experience and expertise in order to further democracy and economic development in their neighbouring countries, which are still struggling with problems similar to those the new EU countries experienced during their own transition. It is worth noting that Russia is viewed differently from other neighbouring countries: while the EU’s chances of promoting democracy in Russia are considered slim, there is considerably more optimism with regards to the other neighbouring countries. The aid directed to these countries is symbolically significant also because it demonstrates that the donors have reached a relatively high level of development, which obliges them to support the less developed countries. The development cooperation policy of the new EU countries – which has become part of their foreign policies mainly in response to EU requirements – is directed primarily towards the countries of CIS and former Yugoslavia. Directing the development aid to familiar Eastern neighbours is natural and sensible, but it also reveals the narrow scope of the foreign policy of new members.

The most active advocate of the Eastern neighbourhood policy has for a long time been Poland\(^48\). The then foreign minister Bronislaw Geremek suggested the creation of an Eastern
Dimension policy of the EU as early as 1998 in his inaugural speech of Poland’s membership negotiations. According to Polish analysts, the EU is indispensable for Poland’s relations with the East. “The execution of Poland’s security interests /.../ will be either executed as a part of EU Eastern policy developed with Poland’s participation or will not be executed at all”\footnote{49}. Poland has emphasised the need for a specific Eastern policy of the EU and has criticised the Union’s decision to lump all the neighbouring countries together under one common neighbourhood policy, the ENP. However, the Polish proposals have been criticised in the EU for being too narrowly focused on the promotion of Poland’s own national interests. The significance of Eastern neighbours to national security is emphasised for example in the Polish security strategy from 2000, which refers to neighbouring Ukraine and Belarus as a “region with excessive concentrations of military potential”, where political instability, economic collapse and internal crises demand international commitments with regards to arms control. The strategy also points to an increased risk related to weapons of mass destruction.\footnote{50} Poland’s interest in its Eastern neighbours is also strengthened by historical and cultural ties and considerable Polish minorities in Ukraine (approximately 400 000 – 700 000) and Belarus (almost 400 000) \footnote{51}.

An independent Ukraine oriented towards the West is of great importance to Poland, which considers Ukraine as a buffer against Russia. If Ukraine were to reject the ”European option” and strengthen its bonds to Russia, that would – according to the Polish point of view – considerably weaken Poland’s security. Poland has supported Ukraine’s demands for an ”open-door” policy of the EU, which would aim towards full membership. According to Poland, the same approach should also be applied to Moldova. This does not exactly mean support for membership; the countries should first provide strong evidence of their ability to fulfil the membership criteria. One factor that speaks in favour of the open-door policy is that the EU does not currently offer its Eastern neighbours a sufficiently tempting “carrot” as a reward for the implementation of reforms. One of the most essential instruments of neighbourhood policy is conditionality, meaning that benefits offered to the countries are conditional on their commitment to the common values and reforms agreed with the
EU. Conditionality policy can only be effective if it involves credible rewards and/or punishments. The dominant view in the EU, however, is that the Union’s capacity to enlarge has already been put to a severe test and it can therefore not offer the prospect of membership to CIS countries. Poland’s position has received some support from other new member states, but the matter is not as significant for them as it is for Poland, and they are thus unwilling to take a stand opposing the dominant EU position. Nevertheless, supporting Eastern neighbours through both bilateral relations and — as far as possible — the EU is a new and significant focus of their foreign policy. The emphasis varies from one country to another: Estonia is primarily interested in Ukraine and Georgia, Lithuania understandably aims to support especially its closest neighbours Belarus and Kaliningrad, and Slovakia also prioritises Belarus. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and in particular Slovenia emphasize support to the Balkan region.

The new member states emphasize the need to promote relations with their neighbours both politically, economically and at the level of civil society. New member states can provide an essential contribution to the ENP by supporting non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and local actors, as well as strengthening people-to-people contacts across the Eastern EU border. Civil society has had a significant role in the democratisation of the new EU members, and their experience is valuable for their Eastern neighbours. In addition to other difficulties of the transition period, NGOs in the new member states are acquainted with problems related to external aid such as the inflexible application of external models and conditions and the dependence on donors, and are hopefully able to avoid their repetition in the ENP. There is already encouraging evidence of NGO activity in the area of neighbourhood policy. Support to civil society is especially significant in the case of Belarus. Because of its authoritarian regime, Belarus is currently excluded from full participation in the ENP, but aid to civil society is to some extent possible. It is also one of the few methods by which the EU can assert pressure for democratisation. Another factor that speaks in favour of supporting civic activity is that progress can be achieved in this area with a fraction of the funding required for e.g. the development of infrastructure.

Although the new member states are in many respects qualified
to assume an active role in EU neighbourhood policy, there are also several obstacles to be overcome. Firstly, these countries have scarce resources and thus hope for the EU to fund their initiatives. This does not happen easily in the current situation where the Union’s budget can hardly bear other costs of enlargement. Secondly, the new members’ vision of the implementation of the neighbourhood policy and their own contribution to it is still unclear, although they are in the process of planning concrete activities. The mutual coordination between the countries poses a further challenge in this work. Thirdly, the position of these countries on the border of EU and Russian spheres of influence and their desire to expand the former are a source of irritation to Russia. Fourthly, it must be stated – once again – that the new members’ opportunities to influence the ENP are restricted by their apprentice position in the Union. Furthermore, both the Union and the new member states have several more important issues on their agendas, such as EU internal reforms, adaptation of the new members, and the next enlargement. These do not leave much space for the ENP. In the future, however, one may expect the new member states to actively lobby for EU accession of some CIS countries, should the development of the latter bring them closer to EU norms and membership criteria in the next few years – provided that the Union of 25 members will meanwhile prove to be functioning.
Finland between the old and new members

The positions of the new member states on the EU’s foreign and security policy are perhaps surprisingly similar to the positions Finland. First of all, the countries are united by a similarly ambivalent basic attitude towards the CFSP: on the one hand, active participation is considered of great importance, but on the other hand, there is concern over whether one’s own influence is sufficient. This gives rise to a contradictory attitude towards closer cooperation: although it is seen to be in the interest of both the smaller member states and the EU as a whole, the new members as well as Finland also wish to protect national sovereignty. None of the countries are willing to act as a brake on the common policy, but rather emphasise their desire to take an active and constructive role in order to enhance cooperation.

The most important factors that create similarities are the geographical location close to Russia and the historical experience coloured by the fight for national sovereignty. Finland, being a country which has succeeded far better in this fight and whose relations with Russia can be characterised as excellent, of course differs from the new members. Yet its own history and position make Finland more understanding than the other old members towards the problems and concerns of the new member states. It is important for Finland that positive solutions are being sought, as far as possible through the EU, to the problems that cause friction in the relations of the new EU countries with Russia. From Finland’s point of view the pressures generated by the enlargement to create a more unified EU policy towards Russia are also welcome. In addition, the Eastern EU countries (including Finland) are united by the fact that it is more important to them than it is to other member states to support stable and democratic
development of Russia and to promote commercial relations with the East. The Eastern trade is even more significant in the case of Finland than many new member states (see Appendix 2). In addition, the countries share the challenge of reconciling the mutually somewhat contradictory objectives: the promotion of both democracy and economic ties.

In the EU’s new neighbourhood policy Finland is, like the new member states, interested in playing an active role in its Eastern dimension. Coordination and cooperation between the countries would be essential, but it threatens to be overshadowed by a competitive situation where each member state is trying to win the largest possible share from EU funds for its own projects in the neighbouring countries. In addition, the new Eastern dimension has been seen in Finland as a competitor and even as a threat to the Northern Dimension, which was initiated by Finland in the late 1990s. Even though the new EU countries have tried to allay any fears on that score, Finland’s concern seems to be justified inasmuch as the visibility and relative importance of the Northern Dimension is doomed to diminish now that the new Eastern border sets massive new challenges for EU foreign policy.

However, Finland’s possibilities of promoting the goals which the Northern Dimension was created to serve do not necessarily diminish – on the contrary, especially when it comes to other than the northernmost, Arctic regions, they can even be improved. The goals of the Northern Dimension (such as the promotion of trade and investments, the development of infrastructure, the fight against crime, environmental protection and the improvement of nuclear safety) can well be linked together with the new Eastern neighbourhood policy. On the other hand they are connected with the EU’s Russia relations, which constitute a separate entity alongside the ENP. Finland has no reason to turn the defence of the Northern Dimension into an end in itself, and it is not necessarily sensible to preserve the ND separately from the EU’s Russia relations and the European Neighbourhood Policy. Instead Finland should make use of the new possibilities generated by the enlargement in order to promote the ND agenda. The ND can be considered as a predecessor to the ENP that functions as a model for the new Eastern neighbourhood policy. It is also positive from the Finnish
perspective that, as a result of the enlargement, the Baltic Sea has become almost entirely surrounded by the EU. This change promotes regional cooperation within the framework of the EU and lends more weight to supporting the development of Northwestern Russia.

From Finland’s point of view it is significant that eight out of ten new member states are members of NATO. After the enlargement, the group of militarily non-aligned/neutral EU countries is composed of Malta, Cyprus, Austria, Ireland, Sweden and Finland. The question to be raised is whether it is an odd group of marginalising and “albanising” countries of no significance or a group of countries that functions as a guarantee for the special nature of European security policy? An argument for the latter option is that the EU countries which are not members of NATO are a symbolically significant factor which distinguishes the CFSP from NATO – and thus promotes the development of an independent European Security and Defence Policy.

On the other hand it is worth emphasising that Finland is close to the new member states also with regards to transatlantic relations, which can be explained – once again – to a great extent by geographic position and history. All countries situated on the Eastern EU border – including Finland – are European Atlanticists that wish to protect their good relations with the United States and ensure the commitment of the latter to European security. Another unifying factor is the reserved attitude towards the EU’s own defence, although differently from the new members, Finland justifies this first and foremost by its own military nonalignment. Yet nonalignment as a differentiating factor tends to be overshadowed by the unifying factors, particularly in the future as the EU’s weight in the new member states’ foreign and security policy increases and Finland’s nonalignment is likely to become more and more “thin”.

Finland has good opportunities to serve as a bridge between the old and new member states and to balance relations with Russia in the development of both the EU’s Russia policy and the Eastern neighbourhood policy. It would be a very challenging task for Finland to attempt to promote the neighbourhood policy in such a way that it would ease the tension between the EU and Russia. One should find ways of supporting democracy, economic
development and relations with the West of Eastern EU neighbours without making Russia feel a threat to its own position. Paying attention to the Russian views and at the same time promoting the goals of the EU may turn out to be a very complex task, but Finland, as a good neighbour of Russia, is in a unique position to search for solutions. Instead of competition between spheres of power one needs to find ways of putting into practice the common interests that are tirelessly repeated in EU rhetoric: stability, security and prosperity in the Union’s neighbourhood.

In the new EU countries Finland is regarded as a natural partner and often also as a good example of a new member state that has successfully adapted to integration. The Northern Dimension is seen as a model of how a small, peripheral member state can put its own initiative on the EU’s agenda and promote its national interests within the framework of the Union. The new member states are willing to learn from the Finnish experience, while simultaneously emphasising that they do not wish to compete with the Northern Dimension. The most natural partners for Finland are obviously the Baltic countries, with which there are long traditions of close cooperation in various fields. Other new EU countries are less familiar to Finland, but contacts with them should also be strengthened. The unification of the resources of Finland and the new member states can produce positive results in the EU’s Eastern relations if Finland’s EU experience and good relations with Russia are combined with the fresh experience that the new member states have acquired from their own political and economic reforms and their knowledge of the EU’s Eastern neighbours.
Conclusion

Given the suspicions of the old EU the burden of proof is now on the new member states. The latter are willing to prove that they are good Europeans and full-fledged member states in all fields of EU activity, including the CFSP. Hence, it’s the taking part that counts: only by giving their support and contribution to the CFSP are the newcomers able to gain appreciation and authority in this field. Their ability to shape the CFSP, however, is likely to be limited over the next few years for various reasons, including their apprentice status and scant resources.

The Report leads to the conclusion that the enlargement does not bring any considerable change to the EU’s relationship with the United States. By contrast, the enlargement will significantly affect the EU’s Eastern relations. The new member states need EU foreign and security policy first and foremost to receive support in their relations with Russia and other CIS countries. A common voice and consistent policy towards Russia is now even more necessary than before given the problems and tension the new members have brought to the EU’s relations with Russia. The EU must aspire to balance the regional power ambitions of Russia, which are primarily directed at the CIS region, but are also reflected in Russia’s policy towards the Baltic countries.

One of the most far-reaching effects of enlargement is probably that European integration now extends further to the East. Even though enlargement of the EU to the CIS region is currently a non-issue, the pressure to offer the prospect of membership to the new Eastern neighbours is increasing. If the development of western CIS countries (primarily Ukraine and Moldova) brings them closer to fulfilling EU membership criteria over the coming years, the new member states can be expected to take a supportive stand on further enlargement to the East – provided of course
It's the Taking Part that Counts

that the Union of 25 members will in the meantime prove to be functioning. In any case, the EU should aim to make use of its new members’ expertise and their experience of transition in its Eastern neighbourhood policy. The new member states should for their part make an effort to ensure that their expertise is put to good use in the field of EU eastern relations. This requires taking the initiative, planning concrete forms of action, and the reconciliation of national interests with the goals of the EU as a whole.
**Appendixes**

*Appendix 1.* The participation of the new Eastern member states and Finland in EU operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Concordia (FYROM)</th>
<th>EUPM (Bosnia–Herzegovina)</th>
<th>Proxima (FYROM)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of participants in the operation</strong></td>
<td>400</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Concordia  EU’s military operation in FYROM  
EUPM      EU’s police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina  
FYROM    former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia  
Proxima  EU’s police mission in FYROM
Appendix 2. The trade relations of the new Eastern member states, Finland and the EU with Russia (data from 2002 unless otherwise mentioned).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Proportion of total exports (%)</th>
<th>Proportion of total imports (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>4,6</td>
<td>8,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>5,7</td>
<td>22,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>3,2</td>
<td>8,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1,0</td>
<td>12,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2,9</td>
<td>2,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>6,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia (2003)</td>
<td>3,9</td>
<td>8,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>6,6</td>
<td>9,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU15</td>
<td>2,1</td>
<td>4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU25 (2003)</td>
<td>4,4</td>
<td>7,6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References

1 Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the European Union in May 2004.

2 With regards to Finland, see Tapio Raunio & Teija Tiilikainen, Finland in the European Union (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 129. Finland rejected the formulation of mutual security guarantees as suggested by the Italian presidency, and took the initiative in proposing a “softer” wording. The Finnish proposal was supported by the other non-allied member states, and led to redrafting the respective article of the treaty.

3 The relations of Malta and Cyprus to NATO are more complex: Malta is a neutral country, and in addition has reneged on NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, which Malta itself sought. The situation of Cyprus is influenced by the division of the island, by the southern part’s EU membership, by the presence of Turkish forces and UN peacekeepers, and by problems in relations between Greece (a member of NATO and the EU) and Turkey (a member of NATO and an EU applicant country). There are also signs that the island is striving towards the status of a demilitarised area.

4 Generally accepted milestones in this development include the joint St Malo Declaration (1998), the Cologne European Council (1999), the Helsinki Headline Goal (1999), the inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty on European Union (1999), the establishment of new organisations (the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee and the Military Headquarters), the EU’s first military crisis management operation in Macedonia and the drawing up of an EU Security Strategy (2003).


6 An exception is Denmark (joined in 1973), which has acquired special ‘opt out’ arrangements in matters concerning security and defence policy.

7 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union? (London: Macmillan, 1994), 130


10 Romano Prodi, Europe as I see it (Cambridge: Polity, 2000).


12 On reforms to the armed forces of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, see Jess Pilegaard, “Defence Reforms in Central Europe”, European Security 12:2 (2003):
It's the Taking Part that Counts

122-135. Plans aimed at the scrapping of general military service and at a salaried army have reached their most advanced stage in Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Timing goals vary: in the Czech Republic it is planned to abolish general military service as early as late 2004, and in Hungary, in 2005; Latvia's goal is to have a complete professional army in 2006; in Slovakia, the creation of a professional combat group by 2006 is part of a long-term plan (extending to 2010) to reform the armed forces. Http://www.nationmaster.com/.


14 Ibid.


16 See Appendix 1: The participation of new Eastern member states and Finland in EU operations.

17 Among the new member states, there are differences in this respect as well: Estonia represents the group’s most Eurosceptic wing, whereas Hungary, for example, has a considerably more positive attitude towards integration.

18 See, for example, Kai-Ofa Lang “Regeneration or Degeneration? EU Enlargement and the Future of Transatlantic Relations”, in Andreas Maurer, Kai-Ofa Lang & Eugene Whitlock (eds.), New Stimulus or Integration Backlash? EU Enlargement and Transatlantic Relations (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2004).


20 In different contexts, the term Atlanticism may also have other meanings. For instance, “the end of Atlanticism” may refer to the idea of a growing cleft between the Old and the New Continents, Europe and the United States. See for example Ivo Daalder, “The End of Atlanticism” , Survival 45:2 (2003): 147-166. And in the Russian and Chinese discussions, the term has its own special meanings — the terms “Eurasianism” and “Atlanticism” are sometimes used in opposition to each other.

21 The clearest example of this is the EU’s security strategy drawn up in 2003: to a large extent it was born of a need to react to US actions.

22 According to surveys carried out by the Gallup International polling organisation, a majority of citizens in the CEE countries have at no stage supported the participation of these countries in the Iraq operation. Polish attitudes towards the actions of the United States in Iraq have to some extent been more positive than those held in other CEE countries; but even there, the majority of the public has not supported the participation of Poland’s own forces (http://www.gallup-international.com/). Increased opposition in Poland is indicated by the fact that recently long petitions demanding a withdrawal from Iraq have been being collected.


25 Paul Luif (2003), EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly. EU-ISS Occasional Paper No. 49.


27 See for example Jacek Rostowski, “Spain and Poland should stand firm on
voting”, *Financial Times* 26.05.04.


30 For example, according to Robert Cooper (Director General for External and Politico-Military Affairs, Council of the European Union), “Russia has largely given up its empire, joining the rest of Europe as a post-imperial state. /…/ Russia seems to have abandoned its imperialist gains and its imperialist ambitions.” See Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations. Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century* (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), 54.

31 These basic assumptions are defined in the 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Russia; this is the most important document regulating relations.


33 As far as issues of international politics are concerned, Forsberg maintains that the only important value-based cleft between the EU and Russia is in the area of human rights. Tuomas Forsberg, “The EU-Russia Security Partnership: Why the Opportunity was Missed?”, *European Foreign Affairs Review* 9 (2004): 247-267, 263.


36 *Helsingin Sanomat* 25.02.2004, “Chirac hyvitteli Venäjää”.

37 The EU-Russia summit held in November 2002 agreed on a simplified procedure (Facilitated Transit Document) for travelling between mainland Russia and Kaliningrad. Subsequently, heated negotiations were held on the details of implementing the agreement, with Lithuania defending its right to control transit through its territory. The agreement came into force in July 2003 and has worked satisfactorily.

38 *EUobserver* 15.03.2004, “Franco-German plan sees visa free travel for Russians”.


41 The largest Russian minority is in Latvia, where it constitutes appr. 29 % of the population. The proportion of ethnic Latvians in the population is only 59 %; other important minority groups are Belorussians, Ukrainians and Poles. Of the population of Estonia, appr. 26 % are Russians and 68 % ethnic Estonians. Up to now, nearly half of the Russian population of Estonia and Latvia have been granted citizenship of their country of residence, almost the same number are stateless, and the rest are Russian citizens. In Lithuania the minority situation has not caused problems: Russian speakers account for only 7 % of the population, and the great majority of these are Lithuanian citizens.

42 Pakkas was charged with violating the Constitution and breaking his oath of office; legal proceedings are continuing. The presidential election held in June was won by Valdas Adamkus, who was president of the country also in 1998-2002. The fact
that the presidential crisis has been dealt with in accordance with the constitution is a notable indication of the vitality of Lithuania’s democracy.

43 Russian representatives have claimed that they are waiting for “a gesture of goodwill” from the Baltic countries, without, however, specifying their wishes (Postimees 2.7.2004, statement by the chairman of the Duma’s committee of foreign affairs).


45 Lynch, “Russia’s Strategic Partnership with Europe”, 104.


47 Michael Baun, “EU Neighbourhood Policy and Transatlantic Relations: Focus on “Wider Europe””, in Andreas Maurer, Kai-Olaf Lang & Eugene Whitlock (eds.), New Stimulus or Integration Backlash? EU Enlargement and Transatlantic Relations (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2004), 63–70, 64.

48 Polish views on the Eastern policy of the EU are outlined in more detail e.g. in the ‘non-paper’ published in 2003 by Foreign Ministry of Poland.


52 Several studies indicate that positive conditionality produces better results than negative, i.e. the carrot functions better than the stick. On the whole, there is little proof of the effectiveness of conditionality policy, but it seems that the prospect of EU membership would be the most effective instrument of conditionality. On EU conditionality policy, see Karen E. Smith, “The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU’s Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?”, European Foreign Affairs Review 3:2 (1998): 253–74.


56 On the effects of the EU and NATO enlargement in the Baltic Sea region, see Cooperation and Conflict 39:3 (2004), special issue on Baltic Sea politics, special editors Christopher S. Browning & Pertti Joenniemi.
DO YOU WANT TO KNOW MORE?

Marise Cremona’s (ed.) *The Enlargement of the European Union* (Oxford University Press, 2003) provides a good, versatile overview of the enlargement, as does Heather Grabbie’s *The Constellations of Europe: How enlargement will transform the EU* (London: Centre for European Reform, April 2004).

A fresh Finnish major work on the enlargement is Peter Ekholm’s *Tiivistyvä ja hajautuva Euroopan unioni* (Helsinki: Edita, 2003). A broad analysis of EU policy in the neighbouring region – including relations with the applicant countries and the new Eastern neighbours – can be found in Roland Dannreuther’s (ed.) *European Union foreign and security policy: towards a neighbourhood strategy* (London: Routledge, 2004).


The most recent documents outlining new member states’ security strategies are helpful in getting acquainted with their foreign and security policy,


The security strategy approved by the EU in 2003 can be found at http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.
Previously published in the series:


It's the Taking Part that Counts
The new member states adapt to EU foreign and security policy

Kristi Raik & Teemu Palosaari

During the last ten years, common foreign, security and defence policy has been one of the fastest progressing areas of European Union activity. The enlargement of May 2004 has aroused concerns over whether the ten new member states will act as a brake on this development. This Report argues that the concern is unwarranted; the new member states are willing to participate actively in EU foreign and security policy, and it is important to them that the Union operates as efficiently and coherently as possible in this area.

The Report analyzes the position of the new post-communist member states in EU foreign and security policy, particularly regarding the United States and Russia. It draws attention to two dividing lines – East-West and Europeanism-Atlanticism – and considers their significance for the enlarged EU. The Report indicates that, contrary to common concern, the new members' integration into the Union will have no significant effect on relations between the EU and the United States. By contrast, the enlargement places considerable new emphasis on the Eastern dimension of EU foreign policy and creates tensions between the EU and Russia. The increased importance of the Eastern dimension offers Finland new opportunities to promote its own objectives in the East, but both Finland and the new member states will have to work hard in order to be able to influence the development of EU eastern relations.

ISBN 951-769-167-X
ISSN 1458-994X