Neutrality and non-alignment in Europe today

Hanna Ojanen (ed.)
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Introduction

This publication is the result of a round-table seminar organised at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs on 26 September 2003 on the initiative of the Swiss embassy in Helsinki. There was a general feeling that it had been quite a while since the neutral or non-aligned European countries had met with each other to discuss the current shape of their policies and the future of neutrality and non-alignment in general. Moreover, for those that are members of the EU, the rapid steps towards a common security and defence policy within the Union have opened up new questions. How would the four position themselves as to the new proposals of the draft constitutional treaty? Does the EU pose a threat to their policies – or do they themselves pose a threat to the EU’s policy?

In some respects, neutrality and non-alignment have receded into the background, particularly since the three non-aligned countries that joined the EU in 1995 have not wanted to place great weight on this particularity of theirs, but rather to show constructivism in the domain of EU foreign and security policy. Given this, and their involvement in NATO co-operation, one might have thought from the outset that the topic was outdated: neutrality and non-alignment can be seen as relics of the past, and the differences between the five countries as much greater in importance than the similarities in foreign policy profile. Was there anything new to be said on the subject?

To address this question, representatives from each of the five countries – from ministries and the academic community – were gathered for a debate based on presentations by the participants. The presentations, published here, were devised through a special questionnaire that was sent to the contributors beforehand. The questions covered the definition and understanding of neutrality and non-alignment in the country in question and major
changes in its interpretation, as well as the motivations and goals of the policy and the eventual emergence of national debate on changing it.

Above all, the participants were invited to reflect on the latest developments in the EU. Thus, they were asked about the perception of the development of the EU’s common foreign and security policy (ESDP) and its compatibility with their policies, particularly the new forms of security and defence co-operation mentioned in the Draft Constitutional Treaty, co-operation with NATO, and the draft EU Security Strategy.

The seminar turned out to be a success. During the course of the debate, it was discovered that there actually was a need to bring these countries together as they did face similar problems. In many respects it was illuminating to hear how the people in these countries regard neutrality and non-alignment today, and how the foreign policy decision-makers handle the simultaneous requirements of continuity and change in the demands and expectations of public opinion and the EU, international organisations and co-operative frameworks.

On behalf of the organisers, I would like to thank all the participants of the seminar, particularly those who contributed the papers published here, for their open-mindedness in considering and reconsidering a question that might be dismissed by many as obsolescent, and which therefore might even risk being misunderstood, overreacted to, or underrated. I hope that this publication serves the needs both of those wanting a glimpse into what is going on today in these countries’ foreign policies, and of those wanting to deepen the debate, and argue and challenge the interpretations. For the latter, the report also contains a short bibliography of suggested further reading.

Helsinki, October 2003
Hanna Ojanen
Austria

Martin Krüger

The Austrian Security and Defence Doctrine which was adopted by Parliament on 12 December 2001 is the key document setting out the guidelines for Austrian security policy. The Doctrine contains “General Considerations” which describe Austria’s security environment and its current international status (see from neutrality to solidarity) and a “Resolution by the Austrian Parliament” which defines the principles on which Austrian security policy is based (see Austria and the ESDP, Austria and NATO).

From neutrality to solidarity

When the Neutrality Act was adopted in 1955 the “permanent neutrality” of Switzerland was the role model. However, Austria departed from this model by joining the United Nations that same year and developing the concept of the policy of “active neutrality”. Until the end of the Cold War Austria was of the opinion that the Security Council of the United Nations would be required to respect Austrian neutrality and would not ask Austria to participate in any measures under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The international response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1991 led Austria to the legal view that the obligations under the Charter of the United Nations would take precedence over Austria’s status of neutrality.

Upon joining the European Union in 1995, the complete body of legal and political rules and procedures – the acquis – of the European Union was incorporated into Austrian law. The Treaty of Maastricht and in particular its clauses concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which formed part of the ac-
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quis when Austria joined the EU, did foresee the perspective of a Common Defence Policy (Art. J 4 Treaty of Maastricht) which could eventually lead to a common defence. In 1994 two thirds of the Austrian electorate voted in favour of joining the European Union under the conditions outlined above. The Austrian Parliament decided to add special provision to the Federal Constitution (Art. 23f) which stipulates that Austria’s participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy would not be impeded by the Neutrality Act. After the ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Austrian Parliament added another clause to the constitution which allows Austria to participate in the full range of the so-called Petersberg tasks, which include military action in the framework of a crisis management or peace-making operation. Austria’s participation in the outlined tasks requires a corresponding European Union decision as well as the consent of the Austrian Parliament.

While the Neutrality Act remains in force it has been reduced by the developments outlined above to its core substance, namely that Austria will neither join a military alliance nor permit the stationing of foreign troops on its territory. In an international context the core substance of the Neutrality Act equals the status of a non-allied country. Therefore the Austrian Security and Defence Doctrine concludes that the international status of Austria corresponds to that of a non-allied state, such as Finland and Sweden. This should also make it clear to its EU partners that Austria remains committed to its obligations under the CFSP and ESDP.

Austria and the ESDP

While the definition of Austria’s international status as non-allied inter alia underscores its commitment to the ESDP, the “Resolution by the Austrian Parliament” in the Security and Defence
Doctrine contains the following specific recommendations to the Federal Government:

- “Support of EU reforms, especially with a view to developing the CFSP/ESDP and safeguarding the Union’s security policy interests”.
- “Active participation in the ESDP in the spirit of solidarity, since the ESDP is currently pursuing the aim of giving the EU the necessary means and capabilities as well as efficient decision-making structures for civil and military crisis management. Austria will make an appropriate contribution in terms of quantity as well as quality to the headline goal and capability goals of the EU”.
- “Priority support to any future efforts to realise the possibility of a common European defence envisaged in Article 17 of the EU Treaty”.
- “Close co-operation between the EU and NATO in the spirit of a strategic partnership is regarded as a prerequisite for the success of the ESDP”.

These recommendations, which enjoy support across the political spectrum, not only make it clear that Austria’s participation in the ESDP as it is now is compatible with the Neutrality Act but also determine Austria’s position in the further development of the ESDP. Hence Austria supports the provision in the draft Constitutional EU Treaty which provides for closer co-operation on mutual defence, which should be open to all Member States. In the interest of safeguarding the efficiency of the ESDP, Austria is also in support of the provisions on structured cooperation which allow countries that fulfil certain criteria to enter into more binding commitments provided that the criteria for participation shall be defined by all Member States and that the principles of openness and transparency shall be assured. An Austrian consent to the implementation of the perspective of a collective European defence as foreseen in Art 17 of the EU Treaty would require a qualified decision by Parliament.
Austria and NATO

The Doctrine states that Austria’s foreign and security policy should be shaped *inter alia* in accordance with the following principles:

- Consistent further development of Austria’s relations with NATO within the framework of the tailored co-operation programme. (The tailored co-operation programme was agreed between Austria and NATO in 2000 and it offers the possibility of an intensified exchange between Austria and NATO in the framework of a bilateral political dialogue and the PfP’s military and civil co-operation.) Full usage of the possibilities for co-operation and dialogue offered within the framework of the Partnership for Peace programme.
- Austria will continuously assess the value of NATO membership for its security and defence policy and the option of joining NATO will be kept open. Accession to NATO would only take place after prior consent of the Austrian people (via a referendum).

The debate of the Austrian Security and Defence Doctrine in Parliament

On 7 December the Austrian Security and Defence Doctrine was debated in the Plenary before adoption by the Austrian Parliament.

The main speakers for the Peoples Party (ÖVP) and the Freedom Party (FPÖ) underlined the high degree of convergence of views between their governing parties and the opposition in the eight months the Doctrine was discussed by Parliament. The ÖVP speaker pointed out that the Doctrine takes account of the radically altered environment for security policy and of new threats. Furthermore, the Doctrine opens the perspective of a common
European defence. The FPÖ speaker made it clear that his party is in favour of maintaining national sovereignty over national armies and national defence.

The main speaker for the Social Democrats (SPÖ) explained that his party was not in a position to support the Doctrine since the SPÖ continues to regard Austria as neutral and not just non-allied. Neutrality and the policy of neutrality would have the support of a majority of the Austrian people. The accession of Austria to NATO would not increase the security of the country. As far as an Austrian participation in ESDP operations is concerned the SPÖ would continue to insist that the EU mandate should be based on a decision by the UN Security Council. Neutral Austria could assume an important role in the field of security policy within the EU as an advocate of the rule of law, democracy, social justice and equality of nations. The political Union of the EU should be deepened, European Defence should become a Community competence. The main speaker for the Green Party also saw a role for a neutral Austria as a contribution towards the global rule of law.
The permanent neutrality of Austria: The longevity of an increasingly empty shell

The fact that Austria is unlikely to abandon its neutrality in the foreseeable future is due, above all, to the continuous strong support for this status by public opinion, which can in turn only be understood against the backdrop of Austrian history in the 20th century. After the fall from great-power status in the First World War, the politically divided small state in the throes of economic crisis in the inter-war period, the Anschluss in 1938 and the disaster of the Second World War, followed by the occupation and partition of the country in 1945, its rebirth as a permanently neutral state in 1955 ushered in the first success story for Austria in the 20th century. Neutrality apparently placed Austrians in the best of all possible worlds: geographically in the centre, politically and economically in the West, and militarily outside Europe, since neutrality was expected to keep the country out of armed conflict despite its vulnerable geostrategic location. In the constitutional act in which it was declared in 1955, permanent neutrality was defined as a means to maintain political independence and territorial inviolability. However, many Austrians have come to perceive neutrality as a superior value, as an end in itself, even as part of their national identity. Wrongly, neutrality is associated with Austria’s economic success story, the Wirtschaftswunder, after the Second World War. Moreover, for some Austrians, permanent neutrality permitted their country to assert its own identity vis-à-vis and to distance itself from (West) Germa-
Austria, which became a member of the EU and NATO during the Cold War.

It was under Chancellor Bruno Kreisky in particular that Austria played an international role as a neutral “bridge-builder” which exceeded its material power resources. Vienna became the headquarters of international organisations and hosted numerous international meetings. Austria has also been a major contributor to UN peacekeeping operations. At the same time, with the exception of membership of military alliances, neutrality did not prevent Austria from participating in international co-operation and integration, as it joined, inter alia, the UN, the CSCE process/OSCE and, in 1995, the EU.

The Austrian approach to neutrality is more “legalistic” than that of other European neutrals. The circle between legal neutrality obligations and international involvement has been squared by adapting Austrian law to new challenges. Legislative measures, including constitutional amendments,² have made neutrality compatible both with participation in UN sanctions and the various stages of the CFSP/ESDP³, including the Petersberg tasks.⁴ There is surprisingly little discussion, in Austria and other EU member states, about these military missions, including the third Petersberg task. “Peacemaking” has not been officially defined, but apparently includes the non-defensive use of armed force; moreover, it is unclear whether the Union will only take such action with the authorisation of the UN Security Council or whether it is ready to act on its own. Such “auto-authorisation” of the EU would be unlawful under the UN Charter.

Moreover, contrary to the prevailing view during the Cold War, the legally binding character of Austria’s neutrality under international law has been denied. This legal basis was seen in the notification of the constitutional law on neutrality to, and its recognition by, the states with which Austria had diplomatic relations. These acts were generally believed to have created a contractual relationship between Austria and the recognising states
which Austria could not modify or terminate at will. However, according to the official position held today, Austria may unilaterally modify or abolish its “permanent” neutrality.

The substance of Austrian neutrality has gradually been reduced to its hard military core, above all to non-membership of alliances and non-participation in international armed conflicts. The new Security and Defence Doctrine adopted only by the Lower House of the Austrian Parliament (“Nationalrat”) in 2001 declares Austria, like Finland and Sweden, “alliance-free” (“bündnisfrei”). Moreover, it has been suggested not to apply neutrality in Austria’s relations with EU partners. Consequently, the Austrian government may support the inclusion of a security guarantee in the TEU; although this commitment would transform the EU into a military alliance, Austria’s “Bündnisfreiheit” would not rule out membership.

Austrian foreign and security policy experts at least realise that this continuous “adaptation” makes a mockery of the country’s neutrality. It no longer serves any useful geostrategic purposes. During the Cold War, Austria constituted a buffer between East and West and, together with Switzerland, a neutral wedge that split NATO and made Austrian neutrality particularly attractive to the Soviet bloc. Today, Austrian neutrality has become a nuisance factor that interrupts NATO transit routes. The possibility that Austria may neglect its defence even more than in the past, because it will soon be surrounded almost completely by NATO members, will hardly be appreciated by the latter. The same is true of the prospect that neutral states are less likely to be chosen as targets for terrorist attacks than members of the alliance led by the United States. The demand for neutral “bridge-building” has also declined, although the neutrals’ role as hosts offering their “good offices”, mediators, etc., was never as important as they tended to believe – and wanted other countries to believe.

Most importantly, there is an inherent contradiction between neutrality and the solidarity which may be expected from EU
members. The logic of genuine European integration requires the states involved eventually to speak and act jointly in the Union’s external relations. Consequently, the EU as a whole either remains neutral or decides to become involved in a conflict; individual members would not be allowed to remain on the sidelines, arguing that their impartial good offices and mediation may be needed later on, while the other partners would bear the brunt of taking sides, including possible human casualties.

However, even the two governing parties, the Christian-democratic Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) and the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), which consider neutrality obsolete and called for NATO membership in the past, are refraining at present from proposals to abandon Austria’s neutral status for fear of playing into the hands of the Sozialistische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ) and Green opposition, which is supported on this issue by opinion polls. All parties emphasise the further development of the ESDP. The popularity of NATO in Austria has suffered after the “humanitarian intervention” by members of the alliance against Yugoslavia in the Kosovo crisis of 1999. Sympathy for the Atlantic Alliance further declined more recently as a result of “Operation Iraqi Freedom”, although this was not an operation of NATO whose members were divided over the use of force against Iraq.

Neutrality was “rediscovered” in Austria on this occasion even by its critics, including the government, and permitted the country to lie low. Austria could point out that its hands were tied by the legal obligations stemming from its special status which had been recognised by the international community. Therefore, it was barred, in particular, from permitting the overflight of military aircraft to members of the coalition of the willing, led by the United States against Iraq. Issues of international security, with the exception of the purchase of interceptor jets, are not high on today’s political agenda or among the main issues of the domestic debate in Austria.
References


2 Article 23 f of the Federal Constitution (*Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz*).


5 However, only the two governing parties voted in favour of the new doctrine while the social democrats and the Greens opposed it.

6 The programme of the coalition government that took office in late February 2003 calls for “active participation and co-operation of Austria in a future military assistance guarantee within the European Union”. There is an inherent contradiction between neutrality and alliance membership, but these proposals again show the desire of Austrians to have their cake (*Sachertorte* or *Apfelstrudel*) and eat it.

7 After the forthcoming admission of Slovakia and Slovenia to NATO in 2004, the only neighbouring states not belonging to the Atlantic Alliance will be Switzerland and Liechtenstein.

8 However, it should be noted that its neutrality has not protected Austria from Middle Eastern terrorism in the past.

9 Thus Norway, a NATO member, was involved in the efforts to settle the Middle East conflict and the Sri Lankan civil war, and the Hague in the Netherlands, another NATO member, hosts the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the organisation monitoring compliance with the chemical weapons ban of 1993 and the International Criminal Court.

10 They are supported by public opinion. According to the Eurobarometer, the percentage of those in favour of the ESDP in Austria rose from 57 % in October/November 2001 to 62 % in March/April 2003, still below the EU 15 average of 73 % and 74 %, respectively, but higher than in Ireland (50 %, 51 %), Finland (48 %, 51 %) and Sweden (54 %, 56 %).
Finland

Hannu Himanen

From neutrality to engagement

Since the Second World War, Finland’s policy stance has been one of a small state trying to adapt itself to its external environment to maximise its security and freedom of movement. During the Cold War, Finland embarked on a policy of neutrality aimed at clarifying and strengthening its international position. This turned into a more activist policy of engagement, based on independent defence and military non-alliance, which then led to EU membership in 1995.

In the post-war years, through a proactive stance in its international relations and a policy of neutrality, Finland hoped to compensate for the fuzzy and compromising legal basis of its neutrality. It insisted on its sovereign right and obligation to defend its own territory, as recognised in its bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union¹, and maintained as strong a territorial defence as was possible in the situation. It was constrained by limitations enshrined in the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty on the number of troops and certain kinds of weapons systems (including submarines, marine mines and missiles) and had to develop a defence system based on conscription and a large reserve.

Of at least equal importance was the way Finland conducted its foreign policy. Finland sought to demonstrate consistent behaviour which would be recognised as neutral and which would appear, despite fundamental differences in the genesis and legal foundations of their policies, somewhat similar to the neutrality of its western neighbour, if not to Switzerland.

All through the Cold War, Finland pursued a policy of neutrality, in contrast to the more legalistic but idiosyncratic neutralities
of Sweden, Switzerland and Austria. In the wake of the Second World War, Finland could not therefore claim to have remained neutral in the sense of international law, i.e. staying outside armed conflict. In fact, Finland’s war experience from 1939 to 1944 had become part and parcel of its identity during the Cold War and beyond.

The Finnish policy of neutrality had at times to be pursued differently from that of the other neutrals. With Moscow constantly on the alert and keen to remind Finland of Soviet expectations, it did not come naturally for Finland to maintain equal distance from the two protagonists of the Cold War. Finland often successfully anticipated Soviet reactions and proactively introduced initiatives designed to keep the potential menace at bay. Finland also made its good offices available to both East and West when they might benefit from the services of a go-between.

Post-Cold War change

The end of the Cold War marked a significant new opening for Finland in its relations with the outside world. Neutrality was not perceived by the Finns as an integral part of their national identity, as may be argued in the Swedish and Swiss cases. Thus, the transformation of foreign policy in the early 1990s was seen more as an expression of continuity in adapting to change than a break from tradition.

In 1990, Finland was quick to denounce those provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 which restricted its sovereign rights. Neither did it lose time in agreeing with the disintegrating Soviet Union, in 1991, that the FCMA Treaty had run its course. As a consequence, immediately upon the end of the Cold War, Finland’s relationship with Russia was put on a firm European footing with a modern bilateral treaty drafted on the basis of contemporary European standards. Finland started approaching the
then European Community through the EEA arrangement with no external political problems on the table.

In its White Paper to Parliament in 1992, the Government coined a policy then described as the “hard core of neutrality”: independent defence and military non-alliance. Finland would accept the EU defence dimension as formulated in the Maastricht Treaty but had no intention of joining the North Atlantic alliance. This move freed Finland from using neutralist vocabulary when it negotiated membership with what would become the European Union. The aim, however, was not to abandon the idea of non-membership of military alliances.

The Government explicitly stated it believed military non-aliance and independent defence would retain their importance for Finland even if the country were to join the EU. This policy, the Government argued, would guarantee freedom of action and would keep different options open should a new defence arrangement be contemplated.

Public opinion: No to NATO

Even though security as such did not figure prominently in the pre-referendum debate in 1994, it was obvious that voters at large thought the Union would provide a security bonus. Paradoxically, to allay apprehensions that EU accession might have military implications, the Government emphasised that the Maastricht Treaty did not contain provisions on common defence, beyond the long-term vision. Finland developed an approach whereby EU membership would provide “existential” security in a Union whose members are brought together by mutual identity and solidarity. Even though it can be argued (as Möttölä does in his 2001 article) that, after the Cold War, Finland did not have a security or identity deficit, it is a widely shared view that Finland’s membership of the EU was significantly connected with
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identity and security.

In opinion polls conducted between 1996 and 2001, 60 to 80 per cent of the respondents opposed the idea of NATO membership. The Iraq war has only further intensified the opposition. It is interesting that despite opposition to the idea of military alliance, approximately one half of respondents believe Finland will eventually join a military alliance. Equally interestingly, the prospect of European defence is not seen in such negative terms in the polls.⁵

Against this backdrop, it is inevitable that the issue of arranging referenda on defence-related matters is highly divisive. The Government maintains that it sees no reason to arrange a referendum on the new EU treaty unless the IGC radically changes the convention draft. There is vocal opposition to this view, mainly amongst those who believe the new treaty changes the basic construction of the EU. Furthermore, some less alliance-friendly politicians also openly favour putting eventual NATO membership to a popular vote.

The policy coined in 1992 has continued, with minor reformulations, to guide subsequent Finnish governments. The Government presented White Papers on security and defence policy to Parliament in 1997 and 2001. The three key elements of policy were described as (1) maintenance of a credible defence capability, (2) remaining militarily non-allied “under the prevailing conditions” and (3) participation in international security co-operation. What is significant is that participation in military crisis management operations was seen not only as compatible with this policy but actually supporting the maintenance and further development of national territorial defence.⁶

It came as no surprise, given the anti-NATO opinion, that parties across the political spectrum excluded the issue from the campaign debate prior to the March 2003 parliamentary elections. They even went so far as to declare that there was no need to reconsider the policy during the four-year parliamentary period
(i.e. 2003 to 2007). Hence the programme of Matti Vanhanen’s government in June 2003 conspicuously omitted the words “under the prevailing conditions” previously modifying military non-alliance, a euphemism for keeping the NATO option open. The Government announced it would present a White Paper on security and defence policy to Parliament in 2004. Originally seen as an opportunity to announce a policy change on the question of military alliance, it is now generally assumed that next year’s White Paper will contain no surprises in this regard. There is, however, a belatedly spurred but lively debate underway on the provisions for the European security and defence policy (ESDP) of the draft constitutional treaty produced by the EU Convention. The underlying question, obviously, is how the provisions of the draft treaty might influence Finland’s policy of military non-alliance.

**The dilemma of the ESDP**

It has been suggested by a number of politicians that Finland would have ample time, maybe towards 2006–2007, to consider its defence policy options after the EU Intergovernmental Conference and the ensuing constitutional treaty. Prominent views have recently been expressed, however, to the effect that Finland would have to consider the full implications of European defence policy sooner than previously thought, i.e. already in the context of the IGC. This would render, these views suggest, the 2004 White Paper useless, as the Government would have to arrive at definite positions on essential elements of defence policy in the course of the IGC.

The Government itself presented a Report to Parliament on the outcome of the work by the EU Convention and on preparations for the Intergovernmental Conference, outlining basic positions on key proposals. The Government rejected the suggested provisions for structured co-operation and mutual defence. In
both cases, the Government saw the danger of the formation of closed groups of member states, leading to a less unified and less credible Union.

In the case of structured co-operation, the Government stressed that co-operation in the areas of crisis management and military capabilities must be based on joint action by member states and on jointly agreed objectives. If a smaller group of member states were to take it upon themselves to act in the interests of the Union as a whole, provisions concerning enhanced co-operation should be applied rather than the proposed protocol model.

Similar considerations are relevant, in the Government’s view, as regards provisions concerning common defence. The procedure suggested in the draft treaty, giving the possibility for a group of member states to establish closer mutual defence co-operation, would split up the Union’s security identity. If a sufficient number (i.e. a minimum of one third) of member states wished to proceed to mutual defence, the procedure should fully comply with the provisions for enhanced co-operation, instead of the proposed declaration procedure.\(^{10}\)

In broader terms, Government representatives have emphasised the importance of avoiding duplication of military assets and arrangements between the EU and NATO. Accordingly, the Berlin Plus agreement was welcomed as a way of ensuring complementarity between the two organisations in military crisis management.

In a recent speech, the Chief of Defence, Admiral Juhani Kaskeala, wondered if it would be logical to accept EU common defence as the next step in the process of deepening integration. If this were the case, he argued, the connection between memberships of the EU and NATO should be recognised. In the Admiral’s words, Finland should not \textit{a priori} exclude participation in European common defence.\(^{11}\) This is not the Government’s position but was indicative of the tone of public debate on the eve of the IGC.
Conclusions

Finland’s security policy, as has been mentioned, reflects continuity in the sense of a pragmatic policy of adjustment to external pressures, with active use of opportunities offered. It is anchored to an institutionalist vision of a rules-based international order in which lack of power can be compensated by a proactive policy. By making itself useful, if not indispensable, in conflict situations, a small state could substantially strengthen its international position.

In the Finnish case, this belief in institutions is complemented by a strong realist tradition in the security field. An independent and credible defence capability is seen, across the political spectrum, as an effective and continuously relevant insurance policy. As the security environment changes and presents new challenges to national security, the military establishment and the policy community see growing utility in active participation in international crisis management, both military and civilian. This activity is seen as strengthening and usefully complementing national territorial defence.

However, the 2003 IGC and the subsequent development of the ESDP may well put Finland’s pragmatic and incremental policy to the test. For instance, while insisting that the rules for structured co-operation should be left open for all member states to participate, Finland may be hard pressed to actually contribute to distant crisis management operations with enforcement mandates.

References


2 The English translation of the Finnish term liittoutumattomuus (which comes close to the Swedish alliansfrihet and the German Bündnisfreiheit) led to a separate
discussion amongst officials in 1992 and 1993. The word *non-aligned* was seen as politicised and contaminated by the Non-Aligned Movement. After consultation with linguistic specialists, the word *non-alliance* was chosen and has since been the preferred term.

3 The Government Bill no. 135/1994 to Parliament on the agreement concerning the membership of Finland, Austria, Norway and Sweden in the European Union.


5 Information on defence and security-related polls is available (in Finnish) on the website of the Advisory Board for Defence Information at http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml/page_id/175/topmenu_id/6/menu_id/175/this_topmenu/141/lang/1/fs/12.


8 “NATO through non-aligned eyes; The case of Finland”, in *NATO Notes* Vol. 5 no. 6b (17 July 2003).

9 See e.g. a column by Editor-in-Chief Janne Virkkunen in *Helsingin Sanomat*, 21 September 2003.


Ambassador Himanen’s paper is written in the best Finnish tradition. It stresses the pivotal role of geopolitics and historical experiences in the formation of the Finnish foreign and security policy. Geographically, Finland has been exposed to the Russian/Soviet interests, located as it is in the shatter belt between East and West. The combination of strategic exposure and vulnerability has taught the Finns to be vigilant and to bolster their security, as far as possible, by indigenous means without placing too much confidence in the availability of external help.

Himanen correctly points out that the Finns do not believe as theologically in security guarantees the way some other nations do. In fact, the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Assistance (1948) contained positive security assurances of sorts, but they were considered more a part of the problem than a part of the solution.

Himanen’s view differs from the conventional wisdom which states that Finland joined the European Union in 1995 because of the implicit security guarantees contained in the membership. On this score, I tend to agree with him; in Finland’s pursuit of EU membership, the interests of business and the fears of agriculture were decisive. While security motives obviously played a role even at that time, they were elevated to a key incentive only after joining the EU.

The geopolitical-historical perspective is in some ways too static, however. It is not able to account in detail for the processes of foreign policy and different approaches pursued by various political groups. While the policy of neutrality, and subsequently of
non-alignment, provided an umbrella under which all domestic political forces gathered, their ideological and operational choices differed considerably in attitudes towards the Soviet Union, the Nordic countries, and NATO. In effect, the Cold-War history of Finnish foreign and security policy can be described as a dynamic field in which different political groups coalesced, evaded, and vetoed each other.

Contradictory tensions in Finnish politics had already emerged immediately before and during the Second World War when political parties adopted different stances vis-à-vis Nazi Germany. However, the war with the Soviet Union imposed a certain unity on the politics of the country. In a similar manner, the need to manage relations with Moscow after the Second World War created a policy framework that limited party choices. This did not eliminate domestic struggles, though, and different emphases on the conduct of foreign policy continued to be everyday reality, at least until the late 1960s. One reason for this may be that Finland has not had the same historical and legal underpinnings for its neutrality as Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland.

It is somewhat paradoxical that the period of détente in East-West relations since the late 1960s ushered in a new phase of uniformity in Finnish thinking on foreign policy. It is not far-fetched to argue that the political changes engendered by détente made Moscow nervous about its potential consequences, especially with regard to its allies. Therefore, it was important to keep the official policy of Finland stable and predictable as its emancipation might have resulted in a spill-over effect to Eastern Europe, a kind of reverse Finlandisation.

In this perspective, President Kekkonen was an important asset for Moscow as he had demonstrated since the 1940s that he understood the Soviet concerns and took them into account in the conduct of foreign policy. As we can now see from Kekkonen's diaries, he co-operated closely with the KGB as well as with some Western intelligence agencies. These contacts supplied him with
a great deal of pertinent information and an inside track in competition with the domestic political adversaries.

The Finnish foreign and security policy has been dictated by the international environment to a greater extent compared with other non-aligned countries. For this reason, the systemic change in international relations has opened up new options for the Finnish policy. So far, the Finnish decision-makers have refused to exercise these options, and have been content to develop practical military cooperation both within the EU and with NATO. As a result, Finland has standardised its armed forces both in terms of operations and infrastructure with NATO.

Up to now, the prevailing Finnish argument has been that non-alignment serves our interests just fine. As we are not facing any security deficit, so the reasoning goes, there is no need to contemplate military alignment. This thinking seems to be changing, however, and there is a growing awareness that in 2004 at least, some choices will have to be made in relation to the non-alignment versus alignment conundrum.
Ireland

Keith McBean

Overview

The foundation of Ireland’s approach to international peace and security is set out in Article 29 of the Constitution of Ireland, in which the State “affirms its devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly co-operation among nations founded on international justice and morality”, “its adherence to the principle of the pacific settlement of international disputes” and “international law as its rule of conduct in relations with other States”.

In a White Paper on Foreign Policy, published in 1996, the Government of the time asserted that “the majority of Irish people have always cherished Ireland’s military neutrality, and recognise the positive values that inspire it, in peace-time as well as in time of war. It has embraced the policy of the State in the event of armed conflict and has provided the basis for Ireland’s wider efforts to promote international peace and security.” This assessment is as true now as it was then.

The defining characteristic of Ireland’s policy of military neutrality is the non-membership of military alliances. Ireland is not however a “permanent neutral” or “neutralised state”, in that this policy is not set out in any international treaty, nor has it a specific domestic constitutional or legal basis. Rather, Irish neutrality reflects a policy choice adopted by successive Irish governments.

This paper has been prepared as a contribution to this meeting. It has not been submitted to the Government of Ireland for approval and cannot therefore be interpreted as an authoritative statement of government policy.
In recent years, a number of Irish governments have made political commitments not to join a military alliance without consulting the people first. This commitment was given concrete form in October 2002 when, at the same time as giving their approval for the Treaty of Nice, the Irish people backed a Government proposal to amend the Constitution so as to make it impossible for Ireland to take part in an EU defence without obtaining public approval in a further referendum.

**Historical context**

Following the achievement of independence in 1922, non-participation in military alliances was seen as an important expression of sovereignty. The decision of the Irish Government to declare its neutrality on the outbreak of the Second World War derived from a number of factors, including the desire to demonstrate Ireland’s newly won sovereignty and the situation in Northern Ireland.

While Ireland was able to maintain its neutrality during the Second World War, it was only natural that, as a strong supporter of the League of Nations, Ireland should be strongly attracted to the initiative of the Allies in seeking to establish a new global organisation, the United Nations, dedicated to maintaining international peace and security, including, where necessary, by use of force. The circumstances of the Cold War delayed Ireland from joining the UN until 1955, but since then Ireland has been a committed member of the Organisation.

**UN dimension**

Ireland regards the UN as the foundation of the international system of collective security. As a non-member of any military
Neutrality and non-alignment in Europe today

Since joining the United Nations, Ireland has demonstrated its readiness to deploy its armed forces overseas in the service of international peace and security. It has done so in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions, both in UN service and as part of multi-national forces authorised by the UN.

Ireland has consistently held to the view that the use of military force against another state, other than in self-defence, should be authorised by the United Nations Security Council. It is the entire membership of the United Nations, comprising almost two hundred States, that has vested their authority in the Council. It is with this support that the United Nations maintains its primacy in terms of international collective security.

Post-Cold War Context

Ireland’s policy of military neutrality, embodied by non-membership of military alliances, continues to remain viable and relevant in a post-Cold War situation where the emerging defence and security challenges have moved away from traditional defence towards crisis management and dealing with international terrorist organisations. In upholding Ireland’s policy of military neutrality, the Government has been conscious of the complexities in the international security environment stemming from the end of the Cold War.

Ireland’s policy should be seen in the positive perspective of Ireland’s outlook and engagement on international issues. Successive Irish governments have made it clear that Ireland is not ideologically neutral. Neither was Ireland politically or ideologically neutral between Western democracy and Soviet Communism during the Cold War. For example, in 1981, the then Government, while supporting Irish military neutrality, opposed calls
for Ireland to follow a sweeping policy of “neutrality in international affairs”, the effect of which may have been to distance Ireland from European and North American countries.

Through the United Nations, and now also through regional organisations such as the European Union, Ireland has sought to play a proactive role in preventing and managing conflicts and keeping peace. This has reflected the view that military neutrality on its own is not enough to maintain conditions of peace and security internationally, and that it is also desirable to play a constructive role internationally.

The context in which Irish governments shape their security policy continues to evolve. It is possible to identify three major developments in the last decade which have had a major impact on Ireland’s security environment:

First, the Cold War has ended. The space which exists for neutral states to position themselves between two military power blocks has disappeared. Threats to international peace and security are increasingly random and varied, even involving non-state actors like Al-Qaeda, and at times requiring the international community to intervene effectively at an early stage.

Second, the European Union has become an increasingly coherent economic, financial and social entity based upon common values and common citizenship. With this has come increasing demands that the Union develops a common foreign security and defence policy and even, in time, a common defence.

Third, the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, which provides an agreed framework for a new beginning in relations in Northern Ireland, on the island of Ireland, and between Ireland and Britain, has been approved by the Irish people, North and South.

Do these changes demand a rethink of Ireland’s policy of military neutrality? The short answer is that they do not, at least not until the European Union reaches the stage that it intends to establish a common defence. Should that day arrive, it will be for the Irish people to decide whether they wish to be a part of such
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an arrangement.

In the absence of such a decision, Irish governments can be expected to continue to uphold Ireland’s traditional policy of military neutrality. Ireland will not join a military alliance, but it will remain fully and actively engaged in the pursuit of international peace and security, both through the UN and the European Union. It will continue to commit its Defence Forces in support of UN-authorised peacekeeping missions. It will play a full and active part in the elaboration of the EU’s common foreign and security policy.

Role in international affairs / EU dimension

Political neutrality in international relations has never been part of Ireland’s foreign policy tradition. The new threats to international peace and security from international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, HIV/AIDS, bad governance, on top of widespread poverty and injustice, demand that Ireland and other neutral countries play a more active role than ever in international affairs.

Ireland’s membership of the European Union gives us a particular advantage in seeking to influence a meaningful response to these threats. Participation in the European Security and Defence Policy is seen as being entirely consistent with the country’s long record of contributing to United Nations peacekeeping missions. For example, the challenges raised by the situation in the Balkans brought into sharp relief the outmoded Cold War approaches to security and defence. This was accompanied by a growing realisation that inclusive strategies of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and crisis management are key aspects of ensuring stability and security in Europe. European Security and Defence Policy is widely seen as the next logical step in the evolution of peacekeeping and crisis management operations.
Following the failures on the part of the international community during the 1990s and the resulting genocides of Srebenica and Rwanda, the United Nations itself sought to review its operations and the manner in which it approaches such situations. A clear and ongoing outcome has been greater United Nations reliance upon the capabilities and resources, both civilian and military, of organisations like the European Union. The recent EU Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was an excellent example of the EU coming to the assistance of the United Nations. Ireland contributed five military officers to the headquarters of Operation Artemis.

**EU Security Strategy**

Ireland has welcomed the proposals that have been presented for an overall European Union strategy in the field of foreign and security policy. The proposals for an EU Security Strategy, as presented by Secretary-General/High Representative Javier Solana at the European Council in Thessaloniki on 19–20 June 2003, represent a sound basis for future work. It is also the Government’s view that the ideas contained in the document are fully consistent with Ireland’s policy of military neutrality.

Ireland welcomes the clear acknowledgement of the need for a holistic approach to security, going beyond purely military matters. It is encouraging that the centrality of the United Nations and conflict prevention have been highlighted. Priority is correctly given to a rule-based international order. The Government will contribute actively to the pursuit of the objectives contained in the draft strategy. It is, for instance, very much in keeping with the role that Ireland would wish to exercise to help to support conflict prevention, promote justice, sustainable development, and to help to secure and defend stability in our region and globally.


**Draft EU Constitutional Treaty**

Similarly, the proposals for a draft European Union Constitutional Treaty recently published by the Convention on the Future of Europe need not call into question Ireland’s traditional policy of military neutrality. Ireland has been open on the proposals to modernise the Petersberg tasks and the proposals in this area could create additional opportunities for Ireland to play a constructive role in the peacekeeping and crisis management area.

The proposal for a solidarity clause is welcome. It is intended to facilitate the mobilisation of all instruments at the European Union’s disposal to assist a member State which has suffered a natural or man-made disaster, or which has been the victim of a terrorist attack. However, it needs to be clearly understood that it is for each member State to determine the nature and extent of its own contribution to such operations.

Other proposals in relation to further defence cooperation will be considered in the Intergovernmental Conference. What is clear, however, is that Ireland cannot and will not take part in an EU common defence unless the Irish people decide that it should do so. In any event, the continued attachment of the majority of EU members to the NATO alliance makes it most unlikely that there will be any move towards a common EU defence in the near future.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, the Irish Government believes that Ireland’s policy of military neutrality remains appropriate and viable in the contemporary international environment. Moreover, it reflects the policy preference of the overwhelming majority of the Irish people. The Government will continue to maintain that policy
while ensuring that Ireland remains fully engaged in the pursuit of international peace and security and the development of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.
Comments on the Irish positions

Patrick Keatinge

Allowing for differences of nomenclature, Ireland’s current policy of “military neutrality” shows strong similarities to other national positions represented here. However, Ireland’s membership of the club of European neutrals has not always been so clear-cut. During the Cold War, especially from 1961, Ireland diverged from the emerging orthodoxy of European neutrality in two fundamental ways. Membership of the EEC (an economic imperative) was the most obvious, but a minimalist approach to national defence policy was also evident. Geography reduced the need to play expensive war games in order to sustain credibility.

The end of the Cold War made such distinctions less relevant. Had Ireland’s permissive practice of neutrality policy now become the norm? Most of the neutrals joined Ireland in the European Union (facilitated by an Irish contribution to the Maastricht Treaty). All engaged in institutional adaptation to the new European order, yet it was Ireland, ironically, which was the most reluctant to adapt to a significant element of that order, NATO’s Partnership for Peace. In 1996 the largest party, Fianna Fail (then in opposition), claimed any association with NATO fatally compromised neutrality. Returning to power, they reversed this position and reneged on a promised referendum. The negative effects of this controversy persisted, particularly in the first referendum on the Nice Treaty in 2001.

The dynamics of the Irish approach to neutrality are thus found as much in domestic as in international politics. Perhaps it is because the external constraints of the state’s security policy have been less acute than in continental Europe that politicians have
often adopted an approach to neutrality which owes more to general rhetoric than to reflection on military strategy.

The word “neutrality” can be a powerful metaphor, evoking an appeal to national identity as much as to security policy. In the frequent referendums on European integration (six in 31 years, including four in the last eleven) the “threat to neutrality” has been one of the main themes of Irish Eurosceptics. In 2001 it was deemed to be a significant element in the unexpected No vote.

Consequently the government, without changing the substantive policy, gave military neutrality a measure of constitutional protection in order to win the second Nice referendum. That in turn, by emphasising the requirement of a formal UN Security Council mandate for the deployment of Irish troops, had the effect of precluding Irish participation in the first ESDP operation, in Macedonia.

The prospect of the next integration referendum (2005?) sets the horizon for the government’s consideration of the future of neutrality. Its approach to the IGC – as described in Keith McBean’s contribution – is clearly predicated on the basis that neutrality policy, however it is labelled, has a future, however vaguely envisaged. The Common Security and Defence Policy will be more of the same but a Common Defence is for another negotiation. The major opposition party, Fine Gael, has recently taken a radical position against neutrality, on the grounds that Ireland should participate fully in the ESDP in order to influence its future development. However, they stop short of an orthodox, “automatic” defence guarantee. Although some opinion polls suggest a majority in favour of the principle of EU mutual defence, no other Irish party has yet supported Fine Gael and their proposal will not necessarily survive in the formation of any alternative government.

“Events”, of course, can always disturb such calculations. For example, the Iraq war threw up an awkward dilemma for the
Irish government when it exposed the longstanding practice of Ireland’s facilitating US military overflights and stopovers. However, advocates of a more rigorous concept of neutrality, arguing *inter alia* that such concessions were incompatible with it, failed in their legal attempt to constrain government policy.³

The policy of military neutrality thus has its critics, but whether they seek more “neutrality” or less they do not seem likely to change the *status quo* in the foreseeable future.

**References**


³ See *The Irish Times*, 3–5, 9–10 and 29 April 2003.
Sweden

Anders Bjurner

A changed environment

For the last decade the world around us has been changing in a dramatic way. The Swedish defence review has stated that a military attack on Sweden is highly unlikely in the coming decade. Russia and the former Warsaw Pact countries have gravitated towards democracy and market economy. Our relations to Russia are arguably better than ever before, while Moscow has developed good working relations towards the European Union and, not least, towards NATO. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have made their own security policy choices and are becoming members of the EU and NATO. Sweden has supported them in this endeavour, enabling them to make their choices. Poland is free from foreign troops, Germany is united, and the situation in the Baltic Sea region is today characterised by stability, security and co-operation in an unprecedented way.

The last decade has witnessed the enlargement of the European Union, NATO and the Council of Europe. The EU is simultaneously deepening its relations to Russia and NATO, and to its new neighbours, while the institutional network is becoming increasingly dense. The conditions for peace and stability in Europe through co-operation are very promising – the European peace project has deepened and has been successfully enlarged. All-European security is becoming a reality with mutually reinforcing institutions, and the OSCE has moved from a conference to an operational entity based on the principle of co-operation and comprehensive security.
New threats

Yet, in tandem with this highly positive development we have experienced new global threats which are more complex and much more difficult to confront, and which impel us to regard security in a much broader sense. International terrorism, poverty, the violation of human rights, human trafficking, and organised crime are now viewed as threats to our security in addition to the “traditional” armed conflicts.

Sweden’s security policy

The new threats are often global and transnational and can only be met in co-operation with other countries and by adjusting our instruments and institutions accordingly. In 2002, a broad political agreement was reached on the following description of Swedish security policy:

*The aims of Sweden’s security policy are to preserve our country’s peace and independence, contribute to stability and security in our vicinity and strengthen international peace and security.*

*Sweden pursues a policy of non-participation in military alliances. This security policy, making it possible for our country to remain neutral in the event of conflicts in our vicinity, has served us well.*

*Looking to the future, it is more apparent than ever that security is more than the absence of military conflict. Threats to peace and our security can best be averted by acting concertedly and in co-operation with other countries. The primary expression of this conviction at the global level is our support for the United Nations. As a member of the European Union, we are part of a community based on solidarity, whose primary purpose is to prevent war on the European continent.*

*An adequate defence capability is a central component of Swedish security policy. Sweden is making active efforts to promote disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.*
Opportunities

The end of the Cold War transformed the geo-political landscape rather dramatically for Swedish security policy, and the new realities ushered in new opportunities. We were able to enter into new forms of commitment and co-operation, which would have been out of the question under our then policy of neutrality. We could apply for full membership of the European Union and participate fully in the ESDP without any restrictions based on our non-participation in military alliances. Not only were we able to participate in the peacekeeping operations led by NATO today, retaining our policy of non-participation in military alliances, but we could also co-operate with NATO within the framework of the Partnership for Peace and extend military support to our new neighbours – the Baltic states. Hence, Sweden’s policy of non-participation in military alliances is correspondingly one of active participation in building international security and, as such, affords us new opportunities to be an active participant in most facets of building the new European security architecture. The underlying conviction here is that these efforts concurrently further Sweden’s national security interests.

Our policy of military non-alignment does not hinder active participation – in principle we do not formally exclude any other security co-operation other than binding agreements on mutual security guarantees. Co-operation and common security are the key words as far as Swedish security policy today is concerned. Furthermore it is my Government’s view that our policy of military non-alignment has greatly facilitated, and is still contributing to, an independent and active policy in certain fields of international security, such as disarmament, non-proliferation and conflict resolution.

Membership of the EU is of crucial importance to Sweden. This political alliance is the main tool for our foreign and security policy. We are active participants in building the EU’s com-
mon security and defence policy and welcome the EU resolve to
develop a clear strategy for its defence and security policy, to
increase its civil and military crisis management capabilities, and
to strengthen its influence on international issues. For its part,
Sweden has participated with troops in the EU’s first military
operations, in FYROM and the DRC, not only in support of EU
crisis management and development efforts but also for our own
security.

We are optimistic concerning the work within the IGC. In our
view there are at present no proposals in the convention that will
impede us from pursuing a policy of non-alignment. On the con-
trary, we support many of the proposals to strengthen the ESDP.
The Union’s ability to influence issues concerning international
peace and security can and should be improved. The common
foreign and security policy, including the ESDP, is of paramount
importance to Sweden’s international role in security. We wel-
come the development of the so-called Petersberg tasks – this is a
natural process in advancing the ESDP in response to changing
global threats and security problems. We also embrace the soli-
darity clause, which we see as a natural development that stresses
the solidarity that already exists between the member states. We
are concerned, though, regarding suggestions on “flexible inte-
gration” between groups of member states in the defence field as
this might increase divisions within the Union, which would be of
particular damage in the field of security policy. Our primary
concern is to see the EU strengthened as one unified actor.

Sweden strongly supports establishing an EU security strate-
gy. It will add value to the Common Foreign and Security Policy
and contribute to fostering a common European strategic cul-
ture. The process exposes on the one hand the Union’s existing
instruments and, on the other hand, the need for new capabilities
to meet security threats. In this process Sweden stresses the need
for a broad approach and the wide range of EU instruments at
hand: aid, trade, justice and home affairs and a crisis manage-
ment capacity in both civil and military aspects. We also emphasise multilateral co-operation and the primary responsibility of the UN for international security.

Sweden has maintained, and wishes to continue to maintain, close co-operation with NATO. We have allocated troops to NATO operations, currently ongoing in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Furthermore, we have an interest in the continued development of the PfP, and have, together with Finland, taken initiatives with a view to its enhancement. Simultaneously, the EU’s relationship with NATO is also advancing – we welcome this and view close relations between the EU and NATO and their strategic partnership in crisis management as crucial for global security, not least when it comes to the use of NATO assets in EU peace-support operations.

Finally, it might be added that in our view any security policy has to be based on popular support and the view of the majority of the people has to be respected. The policy of military non-alignment enjoys a strong majority support in Sweden, duly confirmed in a number of opinion polls. In Parliament there is only one political party (the Liberals) that today actively advocates that Sweden should now abandon this policy. Simply put, the great majority of people in Sweden see no compelling reason to abandon this policy.

All things being considered, the Swedish policy of military non-alignment has served us well. Sweden has enjoyed peace for almost 200 years. We are able to participate actively, fully and in solidarity in international peace-support activities and to extend security in solidarity with countries in our own region. We have no plans to abandon this path.
Swedish neutrality has no mystical qualities to it – even though there were efforts in the 1960s and 1970s to make it more “profound” by introducing notions of a higher moral ground occupied by the neutrals. There is no mystery in small states seeking to stay out of harm’s way, trying to avoid being either attacked or too enthusiastically defended by one major power or several. The uniqueness of the Swedish case is that it has worked so well and for so long while many others found themselves trapped – and some subsequently also chose to seek security from and put their faith into alliances (see Annette Baker Fox, *The Power of Small States*, 1958). However, Sweden’s unique track record, above all during the Second World War, has made it virtually impossible for any Swedish government to think in terms of anything but a continuation of this singularly brilliant formula. Herein lies both strength and weakness.

The neutrality/non-alignment policy could be said to have served its strategic purpose (but also its domestic function of keeping the people behind its rulers) during two World Wars and the Cold War. What it could not do quite as well was protect Sweden against the peace that broke out in 1989–91, and against the new challenge: European integration.

The great project for reconstructing Europe starting with the Coal and Steel Community in the late 1940s was little understood in the North, as few here saw any connection between the eternal Franco-German quarrels, and their final solution, and the Nordic states. The inability to fathom the historical drama involved in the European integration process also became a prob-
lem when the Swedish public, proud of Sweden’s past success, gradually came to understand that the European Union was ante portas.

The outcome was the unceremonious dumping, in the autumn of 1990, of thirty years of neutrality-related “doctrine” concerning Europe. Parliament decided in favour of membership of the yet to be European Union and in the 1994 referendum a narrow majority secured this outcome. “Neutrality” did not dominate the debate but a great number of other arguments related to sovereignty, to the Swedes taking their own decisions, to old Swedish ways vs. Brussels (and Frankfurt) dominance did. Swedish identity was certainly at stake. In the end, economic concerns probably secured the yes-vote.

The crucial term now became “military non-alignment”. It was first used by the non-socialist Bildt Government (1991–94). Combined with this new terminology was a concerted effort by that Government to get the word “neutrality” out of the public discourse. The most recent statement of Swedish policy comes from Prime Minister Persson’s speech at the opening of Parliament on September 16, 2003, actually quoting from the late Foreign Minister Anna Lindh’s speech in February of that year: “With our military non-alignment as the base we contribute actively to common security in our neighbourhood, within the EU and the UN.”

This version certainly represents continuity with the Cold War past. Sweden’s neutral stance in peacetime contributes to stability and “common security”, the implication being that by standing free of (military) alliances, Sweden makes a unique contribution to the North, to Europe and presumably also to the world. There is also emphasis on the active elements of the policy – military non-alignment is the base for such an active stance but also seen as a necessary condition.

When Sweden submitted its EU membership application in 1991 it was without any formal exceptions and caveats. In the
Swedish parliamentary debate it had been made clear that Sweden assumed that it would be able to continue its non-aligned policy as before. This was therefore something which the Union and its members had to accept (no protests were heard), but no special status was formally declared.

From the Swedish perspective, peacekeeping was a traditional Swedish forte and Swedish participation in UNPROFOR, IFOR, SFOR and KFOR became, almost without effort and debate, a matter of course and a self-evident Swedish contribution to international peace and security. The specific relevance of military non-alignment as a limiting factor for Swedish international cooperation in this situation became a non-issue – at least as long as there was some form of UN mandate or consent, Swedish troops would also serve under NATO command, even under Chapter VII conditions.

In a way, one might say that the military activities, clearly seen as the national prerogative for the militarily non-aligned state, had become a major element in the European socialisation process of which Sweden was now a part.

The Swedes also provided a list of military resources that might, in an emergency, be placed at the service of the Union or of the UN. An important difference, however, between Finland and Sweden was that the Swedish commitment also involved enforcement operations. What is obvious, however, is that membership of military alliances in the form of permanent, pre-agreed commitments – such as in the case of NATO – would not fit the Swedish policy, however reformulated today.

Even though the term military non-alignment is now used, it is obvious, given the “passions” of the 1994 and 2003 referenda on the Union and EMU that “neutrality”, in a wide and vague sense, still colours positions on issues well short of the military field for many a non-aligned Swede. Much of the attitude towards EU “federalism” and “supranationalism” reflects a Swedish attitude to problems which “non-alignment” is still supposed to protect
us against – in the eyes of the Swedish citizenry. An unspecified “nolli me tangere” attitude among the Swedes, unrelated to specific military issues, is thus a repository for that old-time neutrality. Again, “identity” plays a role.

The arguments now made for continuing along the established neutrality/non-alignment path, albeit with the new “military” emphasis, are not thought of as sentimental and backward looking but as fully rational. Thus, according to the doctrine, Sweden, as a militarily non-aligned country, can still perform special services which it would not otherwise be able to provide. One such type of activity pertains to the Third World, to conflicts and territories beyond Europe. Here, the tradition goes back to the Palme years and Sweden’s “active foreign policy” in the 60s and 70s. While this argument still has substance, it is increasingly open to debate as other countries which are not non-aligned – such as Norway, the Netherlands and Canada – are at least as successful and often more prominent (as in the case of Norway) as mediators in Third World conflicts.

The changing composition of Union membership will inevitably have consequences for the power and interest balances among the membership. Sweden has consistently argued for an as wide and generous enlargement process as possible. Its focus has been directed at the neighbouring states, Poland and the three Baltic states.

There is certainly a debate in Sweden about the future orientation of the country’s policies as to European security-building. Among the non-socialist parties (Christian Democrats, Liberals and Conservatives – but not the Centre (formerly Agrarian) Party) there are strong voices in favour of dropping the neutrality/non-alignment policy totally and “declaring for the West”. This would mean NATO membership which, however, arouses very limited enthusiasm among the electorate; the figures tend to show some 40 % or more against, some 20–30 % in favour and some 10–20 % undecided. The figures have been pretty stable for
a long time but with a noticeable increase for membership during the successful IFOR/SFOR operations, and a clear decline during the Kosovo War.

What is probably more important is the character of the media debate which is now totally open and with no holds barred on these subjects. During the Palme years it was still possible to describe an open NATO-membership discussion as off limits. Today, such efforts would not be taken seriously. Still, even with an ongoing debate and with Cold War fundamentals collapsing, the NATO issue does not feel very urgent. The internal NATO debate – the US with the New Europe and against the “Old” – is no doubt a major reason for this. Why NATO now?

What might then, conceivably, move the Swedes to reconsider their position?

A major international crisis and “rupture” in the expected development of Russia and its relations with the West? The traditional Swedish way to respond to such crises is to dig in where we stand – not to engage in innovations. Sweden’s armed forces are today designed to fit into a NATO-led operational framework. All forms of co-operation, schooling and training are involved – it is difficult to see what immediate added value in an acute crisis could be produced by NATO membership. The advantages of the latter would most likely be in the longer term.

I would judge it unlikely that a sudden change in the international milieu would change Swedish attitudes. It is more probable that the realisation would be gradual that the present arrangement is not enough (just as happened in the late 1980s with the free trade agreement with the EC and the negotiations over the European Economic Space/Area) and that there are no longer any good reasons for staying outside. All this, however, would also depend on “what kind of NATO” develops. As with EMU, a perceived dramatic fall in Swedish influence and international leverage could force a reconsideration.

The notion of an EU core group, the original six countries
perhaps with some additions, moving ahead with European defence is not likely to be a Swedish preference, even though the Swedes at an early point stated that they would not try to hinder those who wanted to move ahead. What might be a concern for the Swedish general public today is less a “breakout” by a core group, as much as a step-by-step “NATO-isation” of the whole, under the direction of one or several major actors.
Switzerland

Philippe Welti

Definition, content

Swiss neutrality is a strategic concept, which has preserved Switzerland from getting involved in wars for two centuries. It is usually referred to by government and politicians as a set of rules, rights and obligations, defined by the Hague Conventions of 1907.1.

At the heart of the obligations is the absolute abstention from joining any military alliance and the policy, during times of armed conflict between states, of refraining from supporting either side in the conflict – unless Switzerland itself becomes the victim of military aggression. In times of peace, the neutrality policy requires the Federal Council, as a general rule, not to take any steps that would make it impossible to remain neutral in case of military conflict between states.

Traditionally, a distinction is made between the law of neutrality (legally binding rules of international law) and the policy of neutrality (political behaviour of government, aimed at keeping the status of neutrality credible in view of potential interstate armed conflict). Today, Swiss neutrality consists of refraining from taking sides, militarily or politically, in case of armed conflict. More and more, however, the Swiss public and government have grown accustomed to the distinction in international law and in international politics between war on the one hand (i.e., military action undertaken by one state against another state in contravention of the UN Charter) and peace-keeping or peace enforcement on the other hand (i.e., military action of one or several states based on a United Nations Security Council resolution under chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter). The differ-
ence is that in the first case neutrality applies, whereas in the second it does not.

**Motivation, goals**

Neutrality is based not only on the resolve to keep Switzerland out of international wars, but also on a domestic consideration - to prevent the country from dividing along cultural and linguistic lines. It is Switzerland’s historical experience that wars between our neighbours would have threatened national cohesion if Switzerland had chosen sides. I would remind the reader, in this context, that Switzerland is a multi-cultural, multi-lingual and bi-confessional state. Officially taking sides with one belligerent party or another would automatically have alienated one part of the nation and jeopardised national cohesion. Strategic security interests and national cohesion are thus linked to deep-rooted positive collective experiences with neutrality. Unlike other European countries, Switzerland managed to stay out of both World Wars, and this is attributed by many Swiss to the legal, political and emotional aspects of Swiss neutrality. As far as Switzerland is concerned, neutrality is less a freely chosen position of government, but rather an essential part of national identity.

**Achievements, problems, limits**

Surviving the First and Second World Wars unscathed is, in the national view, seen as the fundamental benefit of neutrality. Historical judgements about the benefits of neutrality during the Cold War are more difficult to form since the whole of Western Europe survived that period unharmed.

An obvious, albeit only temporary, problem encountered because of neutrality was the Allies’ reluctance to welcome Switzer-
land to the all but founded Organisation of the United Nations right after the Second World War. This unpleasant experience triggered a decade-long domestic debate on whether joining the UN would be compatible with neutrality.

Apart from military alliances and coalitions, there are no forums of international co-operation which would genuinely be incompatible with Swiss neutrality. The largely positive historical experiences, however, were probably one of the major reasons why the Swiss government and the Swiss public remained reluctant, after the Second World War, to join international bodies. This reluctance often proved to be an obstacle to an effective foreign policy.

**Major changes**

Switzerland went through a decisive period when, after 1991, Yugoslavia started to disintegrate and war-like situations broke out in large parts of the Balkans. Vast numbers of refugees seeking asylum in Switzerland were one of the effects of the conflicts. They brought home to the Swiss people the fact that crises outside their immediate neighbourhood could have a similar impact on Switzerland as those that happened closer to home. When the international community started to intervene politically and militarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it soon became obvious that strict neutrality would not serve Switzerland’s interests. The Swiss government recognised the need to support the international action, first by opening the air space for transit flights of AWACS aircraft needed to supervise the no-fly-zone in Bosnia, and in the end by even authorising transit by land for military supplies needed for the implementation of the Dayton Accord. Thus, government had adapted within three years – between 1992 and 1995 – the practice of Swiss neutrality policy without changing the overall profile and status of Switzerland as a neutral state. On this
basis, further steps in the interest of Switzerland, such as participation in the multi-national peace support operation Kosovo Force (KFOR) were no longer seriously challenged in domestic politics. In international relations, Switzerland had proved that its status does not prevent it from taking an active part in common efforts to stabilise crisis areas. Ultimately joining the United Nations as a full member in 2002 was the conclusive sign that Switzerland recognises the Security Council authority for the determination of what constitutes a breach of peace and violation of public international law.

Debate on abandoning neutrality

There is, in domestic politics, no sustained debate on abandoning neutrality, although now and then individual voices can be heard (mostly from social-democratic circles) stating that neutrality has become obsolete. Compelling reasons for abandoning the policy of neutrality are difficult to find in the current situation, since the political and military situation in Switzerland’s environment would have to change dramatically indeed to transfer any discussion about the need to join a military alliance from the realm of the purely hypothetical to the domain of real politics.

On the other hand, bearing in mind that neutrality is, so to speak, very much a part of the national identity, every debate on international involvement, even if it is limited to taking a position without intervening in a conflict, is based on the assumption that the political margin left to Government is narrower than for other countries.
European Security and Defence Policy

As a non-member of the EU, Switzerland is obviously not a party to the ESDP. In fact, not belonging to any particular group (such as NATO states which are not members of the EU, or EU membership candidates) and not being mentioned by the EU as a potential third party (such as is the case for Russia and Ukraine), Switzerland has no institutional link with the ESDP. Should Switzerland decide to offer a specific contribution to any ongoing or upcoming ESDP operation, the EU might contemplate this offer.

An interesting example is the case of the formerly UN-led International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia, which included four Swiss policemen. When this mission was taken over by the European Union as of July 2002, Swiss participation was upheld and is now a continuing contribution. This example illustrates the pragmatism on both sides, which will most probably characterise the future development of the co-operation between the EU and Switzerland in the field of peace support operations.

From a neutrality point of view, such participation would be possible for Switzerland, provided that the operation were based on a United Nations Security Council mandate.

Should the ESDP develop in such a way that it also included an obligation for mutual military assistance in case of armed conflict, this would render neutrality incompatible with EU membership and would hence require Switzerland to give up the substance of Swiss neutrality should it wish to join the Union. At present, the option of joining the EU does not carry a majority neither in government nor with the Swiss electorate, and it would be even harder to find a majority for EU membership were the EU to become a real defence alliance.
Changes in NATO

Institutionalised relations between Switzerland and NATO are defined by the framework of the Partnership for Peace. The Swiss Government decided in 1996 to join the Partnership and signed the basic documents on 11th December that same year. Possible changes in NATO are therefore of direct relevance to Switzerland to the extent that they change the framework or substance of the Partnership. Switzerland welcomes the open process of integrating Russia and former Warsaw Pact countries into European security structures. As long as these structures remain open to diversity – as they are today – neutrality will not be an obstacle to participating in common efforts for stability, security and peace.

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Comments on the Swiss positions

Fred Tanner

During the period up to the end of the Cold War, Swiss armed neutrality was in the interest of the whole of Europe. This is no longer the case today with the emergence of a unified and democratic Europe, global governance and the global threat of terrorism. Swiss neutrality today is reduced to its non-participation in armed conflicts and defence alliances. However, a ‘culture of neutrality’ continues to exist in Swiss society where foreign relations are concerned. Also, the official policy discourse retains neutrality as a key component in Swiss Foreign and Security Policy. For instance, Switzerland joined the UN in 2002 with an explicit neutrality proviso, and Swiss President Villiger positioned neutrality in his speech to the UN General Assembly (GA) within the same group of core values as peace, democracy, human dignity and solidarity. The GA accepted this neutrality reservation with “silent” assent.

The international and internal debate of the 1990s about the role of Switzerland during the Second World War has had a sobering effect on the myth of neutrality. In parallel, with the disappearance of the bipolar system, neutrality as an expression of “Sonderfall” (i.e. as a policy of exceptionalism) has been increasingly questioned on moral grounds. Major changes in the political handling of neutrality and the application of neutrality law have occurred in four domains.

- Sanctions: As a matter of routine, Switzerland adjusts its sanction policies to those of the UN and the EU. This also includes sanctions in the absence of military conflicts. The principle of adopting EU-led sanctions even if they are not based on
UN SC Resolutions has been endorsed by the 1993 Report on Swiss Foreign Policy. Practical examples include EU sanctions against Yugoslavia (with the exception of oil and air embargoes) and the sanctions against Myanmar in 2000. The Swiss adoption of EU-led sanctions can also cut the other way: When the UN lifted the arms embargo against Libya in 2003, Switzerland could not follow suit as long as the EU arms embargo persisted. A biased application of neutrality law was practised by Switzerland during the Kosovo crisis in 1999, when it did not enact sanctions against NATO states that were engaged in the illegal bombardment campaign (“Allied Force”). In 2003, in turn, Switzerland assumed an explicitly neutral position on the war in Iraq and it also imposed a “courant normal” against the US and the UK.

- Terrorism: How is it possible to remain neutral in the global effort to fight terrorism, particularly if this fight takes the form of counterinsurgency? President Bush made this point very clearly when he argued that there “is no immunity, and there can be no neutrality.”

- Globalisation and the blurred distinction between internal and external security: The G-8 Summit in Evian (2003) has epitomised problems related to the external/internal security dichotomy. How relevant is neutrality when internal security requires foreign security assistance (1000 German anti-riot police officers and a French military air control unit were deployed on Swiss territory for the summit)?

- Conditionalities in support of human rights and human security policies: The 1993 Report on Foreign Policy acknowledges the possibility of linking development assistance to the compliance with human rights standards. In practice, however, and this is certainly due to the Swiss culture of neutrality, the Foreign Affairs establishment has been very reluctant to speak out on specific cases of human rights abuse.

A further challenge to Swiss neutrality stems from the fact that
Switzerland has no institutional link with the ESDP, but should have one, particularly as far as civilian crisis management is concerned. The Swiss involvement in the Petersberg tasks would be compatible with Swiss neutrality if (1) it were on a voluntary and ad hoc basis, and (2) if the operation were under UN mandate.\textsuperscript{4}

With NATO enlargement set to cover most of Europe, and the uncertain future of the PfP and the declining importance of the OSCE, Switzerland risks becoming increasingly isolated in the military-political field. The neutrality question may become an issue if the enlarged NATO decides to consolidate the various PfP programmes under a NATO umbrella or if, should the current European division persist, an EU-type PfP emerges. In such a situation, Switzerland may have to explore the option of a politico-military relationship with the ESDP.\textsuperscript{5} Such an institutional relationship with the EU could require a political dialogue on crisis management and could include a Swiss presence at the Military Committee, CivCom, and EU Headquarters. Switzerland could also make a pledge for military or civilian personnel under the Headline Goals and, when called for, make its presence felt in the Committee of Contributors. Finally, how could Switzerland get rid of its neutrality without domestic upheaval and without violating international law? The best remedy would be to let it fade away over the coming years.

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\textsuperscript{1} 'Nostra culpa; Switzerland in the Second World War’, \textit{The Economist}, 30 March 2002, p. 37.


\textsuperscript{3} Announcement of "second stage in war on terror", Keesing’s Record of World Events, March 2002.

\textsuperscript{4} This applies to military contributions to peace missions. Civilian contributions to crisis management and disaster relief do not necessarily require an authorisation by the UN Security Council.
5 Igor Perrig and Bernhard Wigger, “Vor einem europäischen Integrations- schuss?” Neue Zürcher Zeitung 13 March 2002.
Concluding remarks

Hanna Ojanen

“*The five*: Similarities and differences

Lumping the five countries together under the heading of neutral or non-aligned countries and presuming that they would conduct similar policies and react similarly makes as little sense in practice as it would to talk about “the aligned countries” as a group of their own. Still, curiously enough, this is what is usually done – by countries other than the neutral and non-aligned themselves. The five neutral and non-aligned are indeed somewhat surprised to discover similarities in their reactions to ongoing events.

Two similarities strike one as particularly relevant. First, in all the countries, public opinion is in favour of continuing non-alignment. To some extent, one could speak about a culture of neutrality that at least in the case of Switzerland also includes a clear domestic component: there, neutrality is also about national cohesion. Second, all those that are members of the EU share a positive attitude towards the development of the EU’s security and defence policy – something that one might find contradictory – but also emphasise that it should be open to all and based on equality between member states. This, in turn, might be reminiscent of a sense of inequality stemming from the suspicions with which they were regarded as future members of the EU.

The EC/EU did have its difficulties in taking in the three non-aligned in 1995. When the formerly neutral Austria, Finland and Sweden applied for EU membership, they were perceived as a potential problem by many when it came to any plans for carry-
ing out a common foreign and security policy within the Union. These suspicions made the three eager to qualify as ‘normal’, putting all the more effort into constructive participation in the CFSP – to the point where they might even forget about their being non-aligned: as they do not themselves place clear limits on their participation, it is difficult indeed to see any precise lines being drawn as to what non-alignment permits or encourages. On the other hand, their image as “neutrals” still prevails. It seems very difficult to make the others recognise a difference between ‘neutrality’ and ‘non-alignment’.

Similarities apart, this report also shows that security discourses are very national in character. Each country is different as to the way and extent to which security political doctrines are debated, let alone settled by referenda. Currently, Finland seems to be the country where non-alignment is debated the most. Yet it is only in Ireland (thus far) that a referendum on the new EU constitutional treaty is envisaged. There have been numerous referenda in Ireland on the EU, and neutrality has played an important role in each of them. In Switzerland, it has been said, all debate is about neutrality, whereas there is no specific debate on neutrality. In Sweden, public debate has concentrated on EMU. Should NATO membership become an issue there, it would seem natural to organise a referendum on it as well. In Finland, conversely, some have argued that NATO membership would be too difficult or delicate a question to be decided by a referendum.

A cohesive reference group?

It is a long time since we have heard about the neutral and non-aligned actually acting together. Two reasons seem to account for this: their different interpretations and preferences, and the negative reactions of others to such ‘bloc building’.

Indeed, the countries do not proceed as a bloc. Membership of
the EC was seen as incompatible with Austrian, Swedish and Finnish policies, but not as far as Ireland was concerned. Now, mutual defence guarantees are seen as unacceptable for the majority, yet not necessarily for Austria, which has actually been among the first to promote their inclusion in the EU, yet probably not for Finland either, provided that a sufficiently vague formulation is found. Finnish non-alignment is quite flexible; Seppo Kääriäinen, Minister of Defence, recently defined it as “military non-alignment that keeps up with the times”. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Erkki Tuomioja, gave an example of what ‘keeping up with the times’ might imply when he wrote in The Financial Times that

[B]ut saying no to the proposed security guarantees does not rule out developing the constitution’s solidarity clause in a way acceptable to all.4

Finland – for whom associating with the correct reference group is of great importance – has certainly found more than occasional similarities with all the other non-aligned countries. With Austria, Finland has been actively gathering a group of small states to form a common front in the EU Intergovernmental Conference. The two also share similar ideas of raising their profiles in civilian crisis management, civilian-military co-operation, development of police forces, administration and the judicial system, and emphasis on the rule of law. On a visit to Ireland, the Finnish Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen noted that the positions of the two as to common defence were very similar: both prefer unity to a small group of countries acting in the name of the Union.6

With Sweden, Finland has, on a number of occasions, made joint initiatives, but clear differences can be found as well. Sweden – although by no means unanimously – has favoured the idea of a permanent EU Council President, a move which Finland has opposed. Their reactions to security guarantees in the
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EU also seem to diverge. Whereas Finland has been willing to wait and see what kind of security guarantees are being talked about before making up its mind, the Swedish position has been much more explicit: Sweden is militarily non-aligned and will thus not give or receive such guarantees – which are seen as the very essence of a military alliance.  

The second reason for not cultivating deeper links among the non-aligned is that anything resembling ‘bloc formation’ is subject to suspicion in the EU. Thus, in 2004, when two more non-aligned countries join the EU, it probably will not give rise to a happy family reunion, (either). While Cyprus is welcomed, having “shown a keen interest in the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as part of the CFSP” and as “Cyprus’s legislative framework allows for its effective participation in the CFSP”9, the characterisation of Malta is similar to that of the three non-aligned that joined the EU in 1995:

Although the government has stated its intention to support the objectives of the CFSP, the principle of neutrality and non-alignment set out in the Maltese constitution could lead to difficulties in future CFSP arrangements of the Union.10

Interestingly, as part of a larger deal, Cyprus and Malta are, as outsiders of NATO’s partnership structures, excluded from full participation in EU–NATO co-operation.11 The diversity within the group of non-aligned can but increase as a result; whether the two will get support from the others in the name of equality in the CFSP remains to be seen.

Changing roles of international organisations

The changes in the EU also impose increasing demands on the non-aligned members. The EU is becoming a global actor, a defence dimension is emerging, and the relations between the EU and NATO have become closer.
Organisations change. Today, even military alliances come in different forms. The traditional NATO gears itself to being directed against ‘enemies’ of a more diffuse and universal kind than during the Cold War. The WEU treaty provisions on mutual defence could for some be transferred to the EU, while others see them as unattainable for the non-aligned even if these countries would like to sign up. The EU is itself increasingly ready for more advanced military operations, perhaps even intervention, and to fill the solidarity clause in the constitutional treaty with mutual commitments regarding the military as well. This development is seen to lead to a contradiction between neutrality and solidarity.

The development in the EU might be compared with what took place earlier within the UN. The view on compatibility of neutrality and participation in UN operations also changed: for instance the Austrian Neutrality Act initially did not allow for participation in operations based on chapter VII of the UN Charter, but later on, a new interpretation was made according to which neutrality does not apply to them. UN membership would thus come first, neutrality second. Similarly, the EC was, at first, not compatible with neutrality – except for the Irish – but the non-aligned have since then gradually set aside their reservations as to what they see as compatible with non-alignment. Now practically whatever the EU does is, in the end, acceptable – perhaps even ‘common defence’. In the prolific world of definitions, ‘common defence’ might not necessarily equal ‘military alliance’.

\[5 = 4 + 1?\]

Every now and then, betting starts on who among the non-aligned will be the first to ally itself, and when. It is in Finland that the discussion seems the most lively for the moment, but it has for several years followed largely the same paths. Two main argu-
ments in favour of membership of NATO both relate to Finland’s external image: the fear of being marginalised from the EU’s “core” (assuming that Finland has had a place there in the first place), fear of being associated with the wrong kind of countries (Azerbaijan is one of the examples used; not many would be able to figure out why) – perhaps even fear of seeming too critical of the United States in rejecting NATO. A typically Finnish way of joining the Atlantic alliance would be to do so when there is no longer anyone paying attention. It would also stress continuity, no doubt hastening to declare that membership of the alliance is a logical continuation of the policy Finland has been following for the past decades, if not since its independence.

But there is another way in which the 4 + 1 formula is true even today. EU membership nowadays makes the most crucial division among the five neutral and non-aligned, making them more clearly than before “4 + 1”. As EU membership increasingly factors in the conduct of foreign and security policy, and as it arguably also renders the members more self-confident of their place in Europe, Switzerland appears increasingly odd and isolated. Yet, when it comes to solidarity, even Switzerland is tied to EU-Europe: when Europe is threatened, Switzerland is threatened, too.

What might remain as the essential question regarding the policy of non-alignment, valid for all five, is accountability to the people. The difficulty lies in interpreting correctly the thoughts of the two sides: what the domestic opinion actually expects from the non-alignment it holds so dear, and what the international opinion actually fears in it.

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countries may not want some of the smaller or neutral countries to be involved in every piece of military business.”

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4 “Europe needs to work as a whole on defence”, article by Erkki Tuomioja, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in The Financial Times, 27 October 2003.


6 See more on Nordic-Baltic pre-EU Summit meetings in Helsingin Sanomat 10 and 11 October 2003 and Hufvudstadsbladet 11 October 2003.


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Previously published in the series:


Neutrality and non-alignment in Europe today
Hanna Ojanen (ed.)

Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland are all neutral or non-aligned countries. What does it mean in today’s Europe? What are the positions from which these countries view the development of a common security and defence policy in the European Union?

In all the countries, public opinion is in favour of continuing neutrality and non-alignment. Yet, security discourses are national in character: each country is different as to the way and extent to which security policy is debated.

This report presents concise views on today’s situation as well as indications of where the countries might be heading, written by both central government officials and representatives of the academic community, from all the five countries.