Et tu Brute!
Finland’s NATO Option and Russia

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Contents

Finland’s Perceived Threats ........................................................... 6

The Security Dilemma between the “West” and Russia ............. 9

The Security Dilemma between Finland and Russia ............... 15

Military Non-alignment .............................................................. 19

The Role of the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy .................... 22

The Northern Dimension as a Security Strategy ...................... 26

Russia’s Democratisation as a Security Strategy ...................... 28

The NATO Option and Russia .................................................. 30

Finland and the Baltic States’ Future NATO Membership ........ 36

Swedish Military Non-alignment and Finland ......................... 40

Conclusions: Military Non-alignment or NATO Membership? ... 43

Notes ........................................................................................... 49

Annexes ..................................................................................... 52

Abbreviations ............................................................................. 60
Summary

In the post-Cold War world Finnish NATO membership could be an instrument to promote cooperation between Russia and the “West”. As a non-aligned country, Finland indirectly maintains the idea that Russia and NATO are each other’s possible opponents. With increasing cooperation and the mutual dissolving of perceived threats between Russia and NATO, Finland should also reconsider its security policy thinking.

For the past decade, a lively debate has taken place over Finland’s possible NATO membership, even though the country’s official line is that military non-alignment serves Finland’s security interests best. However, in the official statements, NATO membership is presented as an “option” that cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, the situation in which this option could be exercised remains unspecified. The next occasion to reconsider Finland’s security policy will be in 2004 when the government will present a new White Paper on Security and Defence policy. At the present time popular support for NATO membership is low, even if the domestic debate in Finland seems to have intensified as a result of the improving NATO–Russia relationship.

This report contributes to the debate, in particular from the perspective of Finnish–Russian relations. There are many reasons for opposing or supporting NATO membership that are not directly connected to Russia. However, the fact that Russia is Finland’s neighbour makes the latter’s NATO membership particularly difficult even if other factors supported the membership. Although according to today’s views, Russia has no right to specify the security policy solutions of Finland (or any other country), its actions and views still have a significant impact on the Finnish foreign, security and military environment, from the perspective of both decision-making and public discussion.

This report presents a more detailed description of Russian attitudes towards Finnish foreign and security policy options and the foreseeable impact of Finnish NATO membership on the relations between Finland and Russia. The conclusion of the report acknowledges the risk-averse nature of Finland’s current policy-line, as well as the risks involved in NATO membership from the perspective of Finnish–Russian relations. The report presents the views of the Russian foreign policy leadership and expert organisations on Finland’s possible NATO membership, which are all negative.
Nevertheless, the conclusion of the report is that from the perspective of Finnish–Russian relations, Finland’s current line is not the best of the options. With the increasing cooperation and mutual dissolving of perceived threats between Russia and NATO, Finland’s NATO membership would offer better opportunities for the country’s policy towards Russia. Finnish NATO membership would also benefit Russia. However, acknowledging and recognising these opportunities requires new thinking in both Finland and Russia.

Finland’s NATO membership would not increase instability in the strategic environment in Northern Europe. On the contrary, the current NATO option is the most unstable of the available alternatives: alignment or strict adherence to the status of a neutral buffer zone. In the current situation, Russia is in any event prepared for Finland’s NATO membership or close co-operation with NATO in a crisis situation. Therefore Finland is already paying for the military-strategic costs of NATO membership, without enjoying its possible benefits. From this perspective NATO membership would be the most obvious alternative, regardless of the development of Russia–NATO relations.

The current line is not without problems from a wider foreign and security policy perspective, either. Traditionally Finland has aimed to improve its security by advancing the dialogue and creation of common institutions between Russia and the “West”. It is in Finland’s interests that the cooperation between Russia and NATO continues, increases and becomes institutionalised.

NATO membership would offer Finland a new channel for advancing Russia’s integration into Western institutions. By staying outside of NATO, Finland cannot influence the development of Russia–NATO relations and loses a major channel for influencing a factor crucial to its own security. As a member of NATO, Finland could promote the development of the organisation’s role, especially in Northern Europe, in a direction that would benefit Finland’s interests and which also Russia could feel as constructive.

However, as a non-aligned country, Finland indirectly maintains the idea of a Europe in which Russia and NATO are each other’s possible opponents. While Russia’s initial reaction to Finland’s NATO membership would probably be negative, Finland’s policy as a NATO country would in the long term specifically indicate a change in the nature of NATO towards an organisation not directed against Russia.
Finland’s Perceived Threats

The Government’s White Paper on Security and Defence Policy of 2001\(^2\) states that the changes initiated by the end of the Cold War in the security policy situation in Europe are profound and permanent. This means that the threat of a wide military conflict in Europe remains small. Especially in the Baltic region, it is said, military factors and military confrontation are not in the foreground as much as they were during the Cold War.

However the White Paper also states that despite the positive overall development, there are factors of uncertainty in and outside Europe that affect the security of Finland and its citizens, which have to be taken into consideration in the country’s security policy. Such factors include regional and local conflicts that may also affect Finland, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the uncontrolled spread and use of small arms, increasing international criminal activity, terrorism, telecommunications security and various threat factors that have traditionally been part of civil crisis management.

According to the White Paper, in the foreseeable future Finland is not expected to become the target of any specific military threat. However the paper emphasises that regardless of this situation, Finland must be able to secure the integrity of its territory under all circumstances and, to prevent and, if necessary, repel, any foreign state’s attempt to use force or threat thereof to control Finland or use Finnish territory against a third party.

The perceived military threats described in the paper include crises that involve the use of force or threat thereof. The worst imaginable scenario is a strategic military strike against Finland in a tense international situation, aimed at paralysing Finland’s national leadership and the functioning of the society.

Naturally the paper does not refer to Russia as such a hypothetical threat. It does however, state that Russia maintains a major military force and preparedness in the Leningrad Military District that covers both the Kola Peninsula and the St. Petersburg area, and that Russia’s objectives in Northern Europe are above all related to opposing NATO’s enlargement, maintaining a strategic nuclear deterrent and protecting the St. Petersburg area and the Baltic Sea trade route.

In addition, the paper mentions that in security and defence policy planning, Finland must also prepare for unfavourable development. According to the paper, in the future the development and politics of Russia may lead to, or provide ingredients for, a crisis that affects Northern Europe and the Baltic region especially. The three most likely crisis-scenarios are suggested as: 1) technology-based environmental catastrophe, 2) increasing tension in relations between Russia and the
Baltic States, and 3) failure of Russian reforms, Russia’s isolation and a major change in foreign and security policy. The latter two scenarios are related to military security.

In other words Finland’s security and defence policy planning is based on the logic of “preparing for the worst”. This logic, which is connected to military security and the threat of a war between nations in Northern Europe, is concretely visible in Finland’s defence solutions, and it is also reflected in the country’s international activities. The threat of a traditional aggressive war explains, for example, why Finland has refused to sign the CFE Treaty restricting the use of conventional weapons, or the Ottawa Treaty banning antipersonnel mines.

Although in principle Finland supports the idea of security based on cooperation, it does not voluntarily sign agreements that are felt to weaken its own security. Nevertheless Finland considers the CFE Treaty as a cornerstone in European security and stability and appreciates Russia’s commitment to this system of military information exchange and arms control especially. However, as the White Paper states, Finland’s observation of the information exchange and verification requirements of the CFE Treaty would require changes in Finland’s mobilisation system, which would have a significant impact on the country’s defence credibility and costs.

Correspondingly, Finland supports the effective and worldwide ban of antipersonnel mines and participates in the EU’s activities aimed at advancing the objectives and worldwide implementation of the Ottawa Treaty. Nevertheless, Finland refuses to sign the Ottawa Treaty because it does not currently have the economic or technical resources to commit itself to destroying the mines banned by the Treaty and replacing them with alternative methods within the four-year timetable required by the Treaty. If Finland were to destroy the mines without replacing them with other means, it would weaken the country’s defence capability considerably. Finland plans to use the mines only to repel aggression and even stockpiled mines function as a threat against such aggression. Since the nature of Finland’s security measures are purely defensive, the Finnish Government expects other countries to understand and accept these decisions.

The logic of preparing for the worst in Finland’s security and defence policy planning is clearly related to calculations concerning...
Russia. Why is Russia still considered a – however hypothetical – military threat to Finnish security? This starting point can only be understood in connection to a basic doctrine in international politics, the security dilemma.

Why is Russia still considered a – however hypothetical – military threat to Finnish security?
The Security Dilemma between the “West” and Russia

Central to the concept of the security dilemma is the idea that its existence does not necessarily require aggressive intentions by any state. The logic of the international system alone maintains a need for states to prepare for the worst. The security dilemma dominated during the East–West confrontation of the Cold War. It still characterises relations between Russia and NATO, and it is also reflected in the arguments over NATO’s enlargement. The security dilemma of Finland and Russia is related to this wider security dilemma between Russia and the West.

The security dilemma refers to three interrelated factors. First, if a state aims to improve its security through the build-up of arms or joining an alliance, it also unintentionally reduces the security of other state(s). Second, a state will feel insecure because there is uncertainty of present or future intentions of other states. Third, following from these two factors, a state will feel insecure if it does not prepare for the worst and insecure if it does.

The security dilemma can be examined from the perspective of three schools or worldviews, each of which offers its own strategy for managing the dilemma. Despite their partial controversy, we can notice that the practical policies of nations are based on different applications of the three strategies. The historical development of relations between Russia and the West from the Cold-War era until today contains all three strategies.

The tradition of realpolitik emphasises the inevitability of the security dilemma in international relations – at least as long the international system is based on states or competing groups of states, rather than, for example, the UN or a global government. However the security dilemma can be regulated through a balance of power and statesmanship. This view on the security dilemma can be called the balance of power strategy.

A balance of power ensures that the security dilemma does not exacerbate due to overreaction – for example, in the form of threats, pressuring or pre-emptive military strikes. However, the maintenance of a balance of power easily leads to a spiral development, as suspicious nations react to each other’s actions like mirror images, or try to anticipate future developments. The arms race represents a typical example of the problems related to regulating the security dilemma. As a result the maintenance of a balance of power, through arms build-up and/or mutual alliances (great powers) or adjustment (small nations), must be attached to conciliatory diplomacy – the strategy is to aim for the best, but prepare for the worst. Alignment and non-align-
ment are only means for achieving and maintaining a balance of power. Different international institutions and agreements only reflect the current balance of power.

During the Cold War, the security dilemma between the West and the Soviet Union was regulated mainly through the balance of power strategy. The fact that the Soviet Union voluntarily surrendered its position at the end of the Cold War can be interpreted as an inevitable adjustment resulting from the lack of resources, which in this historical situation lead to several unexpected events, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union itself.

In the post-Cold War era the balance of power strategy continues to have a strong position in the strategies of both the West and Russia. NATO’s enlargement can be interpreted as an attempt by the West and NATO candidates to create security via adjustments to the new balance of power. NATO candidates experience a “deficit of security” because they feel themselves located in a “grey zone”. On the other hand, Russia aims to maintain a balance of power with the West mainly by retaining a balance in nuclear weapons with the United States. Paradoxically, this objective requires a restriction and reduction in the number of nuclear weapons in order for Russia to have the economic resources to maintain the balance. In other words, Russia is using the disarmament institution to maintain a balance of power and thereby regulate the security dilemma.

The liberal tradition in international politics relies more on international institutions and the possibilities offered by international cooperation. This approach can be called the institutional strategy. Although the security dilemma cannot be removed entirely, it can be mitigated through interdependency and common security regimes – in other words, norms and rules.

Institutionalised cooperation changes the calculations of states by creating interactive and reliable relations through a learning process. Institutions extend the “shadow of the future” by helping states to overcome obstacles in cooperation that are caused by suspicion, and to give up their short-term interests in the spirit of reciprocity. Confidence-building measures – such as the rules on advance notice concerning the relocation of troops or arms – ensure that not every move made by a state is considered a possible preparation for aggression.

Arms control agreements and their verification systems ensure that all parties are aware of each other’s level of arms build-up and that
no party exacerbates the security dilemma by overreacting unnecessarily in its arms build-up. Cooperation can lead to arms control agreements and general alleviation of tension. In principle, the same logic can be used to mitigate the security dilemma in a softer way – by creating economic relationships and institutions of interdependency, which move the traditional security dilemma into the background.

During the Cold War, the institutional strategy was part of the strategy of the West, which aimed to mitigate the security dilemma between the two blocs through institutions involved in disarmament and cooperation. Towards the end of the Cold War and thereafter, the institutional strategy has become perhaps the most important one in security relations between Russia and the West.

Issues related to traditional military security, such as disarmament, arms control and confidence-building measures are especially for the West, a means to implement the institutional strategy; from Russia’s perspective however, they are often related to maintaining a balance of power. There are factors in NATO’s policies that aim to mitigate the security dilemma between NATO and Russia through institutions.

NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme (PfP), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and especially the bilateral institutions between Russia and NATO (PJC and the new NATO–Russia Council, NRC) aim to convince Russia of NATO’s qualitative change from a confrontational defence alliance towards an organisation that enables broad cooperation with Russia.

In addition to the traditional security institutions, Russia’s membership of Western political and economic institutions (for example, membership of the Council of Europe, future membership of the World Trade Organisation, a planned free-trade area with the EU) and the establishment of entirely new common institutions, such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Arctic Council (AC) and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), all in Northern Europe, promote economic and political interdependency and reduce the dominance of traditional security issues.

The idealist school of international relations acknowledges the fact that the security dilemma can be regulated through a balance of power and mitigated through institutions. However this school differs from the above two in that it also believes that the dilemma can be solved through changing of identities and threat perceptions. This approach can be called the identity strategy. According to this model, the security dilemma is controlled more by a mutual understanding between actors than by power relations or geopolitical positions. It is possible, although often difficult, to create security communities based on cooperation. National interests may develop to correspond with inter-
national interests and one state’s security can be interpreted as the collective security of all states.

During the Cold War, ideological confrontation prevented any broad application of the identity strategy. The Gorbachevian concept of “universal values” from the end of the Cold War can be considered a failed, rhetorical and idealistic attempt to bury the perceived threats arising from opposing identities.

The identity strategy has acquired real substance only after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Marxist-Leninist ideology. The convergence of Russian and Western identities – in other words, seeing Russia as part of the Western security identity – is visible especially in Western views of the future. The convergence of identities would solve the traditional security dilemma. In principle, there are two roads leading to this point, which in the best situation would complement each other.

On the one hand, Russia is expected to create – as stated in the EU Common Strategy on Russia (1999) – a stable, open and pluralistic democracy, governed by the rule of law and underpinning a prosperous market economy. In essence, Russia should change its political and economic system to comply with Western systems. This thinking is clearly based on the so-called democratic peace theory, according to which democratic states do not wage war against each other. The security dilemma between Russia and the West would be solved if Russia’s political and economic system resembled “Western democracy” enough and Russia was thus felt sufficiently similar to the West.

A quicker road to a common security identity would be the discovery of a common enemy or commonly perceived threats. The latter alternative has been realised in the form of rapidly increasing cooperation between Russia and NATO in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 2001, when the United States and its European allies committed themselves to a war against global terrorism. The development of a common security identity that is based on commonly defined threats would not mitigate, but actually solve the security dilemma.
### Figure 1: The Security Dilemma

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of the security dilemma</th>
<th>Strategies for managing the security dilemma</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Results from the &quot;anarchic&quot; structure of the international system.</td>
<td><strong>Balance of power strategy</strong>&lt;br&gt;The security dilemma is regulated through a balance of power (and statesmanship).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The security dilemma is not necessarily an intentional outcome, i.e. resulting from another country’s aggression; it is most often unintentional.</td>
<td><strong>Institutional strategy</strong>&lt;br&gt;The security dilemma is mitigated through mutual dependence and common security regimes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One country’s feeling of security decreases as the other attempts to improve its security e.g. through alliances or arms build-up.</td>
<td><strong>Identity strategy</strong>&lt;br&gt;The security dilemma is solved through changing of identities and the subsequent change in perceived threats.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uncertainty about the present or future objectives of other countries.</td>
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<tr>
<td>A country feels unsafe, if it does not act according to the logic of the security dilemma by &quot;preparing for the worst&quot;; however, if the country acts according to this logic, it maintains the idea of a possible military threat.</td>
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<td>The result may be a spiral, e.g. arms race or exacerbation of the situation, which no one necessarily wants.</td>
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Figure 2: Strategies and Instruments for Managing the Security Dilemma between Russia and the “West”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cold War 1947-1989</th>
<th>Balance of power strategy</th>
<th>Institutional strategy</th>
<th>Identity strategy</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989-91</td>
<td>Maintaining a balance of power through alliances and arms build-up (nuclear weapons), spheres of interest</td>
<td>Détente (arms control regimes, CSCE)</td>
<td>Gorbachev’s &quot;universal values&quot;</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-Cold War 1992-2002</th>
<th>Balance of power strategy</th>
<th>Institutional strategy</th>
<th>Identity strategy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adjusting to the new balance of power (NATO enlargement), stressing of nuclear weapons and simultaneous limitation of their number to maintain parity (Russia)</td>
<td>Continuing disarmament and arms control</td>
<td>Russia’s democratisation and market economy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NATO’s qualitative change, PIP, Russia-NATO Founding Act</td>
<td>Finding a common enemy (terrorism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Russia joins Western political and economic institutions (CE, future membership in WTO)</td>
<td>Russia’s &quot;almost&quot; NATO membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Advancing mutual economic dependence (promised free-trade area with the EU, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Creating new common institutions (e.g. CBSS in Northern Europe, AC, BEAC)</td>
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The Security Dilemma between Finland and Russia

The security dilemma between Finland and Russia is organically connected to the security dilemma between Russia and the West. Finland itself is no threat to Russia and no one is threatening Finland for its own sake. However, as long as the West – in practice meaning NATO – is seen in Russia as a possible opponent, this general setting characterises Russia’s attitude towards Finland.

From the Russian perspective, Finland’s security policy dimension is as a geopolitical buffer state, whose main task is to deny access to its territory to Russia’s possible opponents. For this reason Russia opposes Finland’s possible NATO membership. On the other hand, Russia’s view strengthens the Finnish belief that the country must prepare for Russian political and military pressure, which could actualise under possible international tension between Russia and the West.

When we examine the history of Finnish–Russian relations, we can see that Finnish foreign and security policy actors have done their best to use both balance of power and institutional strategies: they have attempted to both regulate and mitigate the security dilemma.

In the post-World War II situation, the balance of power strategy meant adjusting to the new bipolar world. There were basically three instruments for implementing this strategy. The most important one was the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA Treaty), which defined Finland militarily and partly also politically as belonging to the Soviet Union’s sphere of interest. Finland was to defend its territory against a potential aggressor – in practice NATO – whose objective was to use Finnish territory against the Soviet Union.

The agreement defined the mechanisms according to which Finland had to accept “mutual assistance” from the Soviet Union after consultation, if the latter did not trust Finland’s capability or willingness to defend itself in the event of a mutually acknowledged threat.

Another factor in the balance of power was Finland’s own defence capability. In this, the Finnish Defence Forces had a dual role: on the one hand they showed that Finland was capable of defending its territory without the Soviet Union’s assistance, and on the other, and although this threat was left unspoken, they would defend against...
possible aggression on part of the Soviet Union.

The third instrument in the balance of power strategy was the policy of neutrality that Finland adopted, which was mainly aimed at extending the leash imposed by the FCMA Treaty, which Finland had been forced into signing due to the hegemonic situation. By using the policy of neutrality, Finland was able to remain outside immediate military cooperation, without giving the Soviet Union any reason to fear that Finland would slide into the Western camp.

The institutional strategy of the Cold War era meant that Finland occasionally attempted to build bridges between the Soviet Union and the West, with the objective of the establishment of institutionalised cooperation and interdependency, and thereby indirectly improving Finnish security. One of the first such endeavours was propagating the Soviet-initiated idea of a Nordic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NNWFZ) to the other Nordic Countries.

However, this idea was unrealistic from the perspective of Denmark and Norway, since it would have eliminated much of their NATO-based deterrent but would not have affected the Soviet Union’s nuclear deterrent in practice. A more successful instrument of the institutional strategy was the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), where Finland acted as a “midwife”. Although the climate of détente that surrounded the beginning of the CSCE process soon gave way to exacerbated international tension, the CSCE offered a permanent forum in which Finland could advance the dialogue between East and West and thereby do whatever it could to mitigate its own security dilemma.

These two strategies – the balance of power and institutional strategies – remain the basis of Finland’s policy towards Russia, although the instruments and policy-choices of the strategies have changed since the end of the Cold War. The ingredients of the earlier balance of power strategy did not correspond to the post-Cold War situation. In February 1992 the FCMA Treaty was replaced with a new agreement between Finland and Russia. By joining the EU in the beginning of 1995 and by signing the Maastricht Treaty, Finland de facto ceased to be a neutral country. Also the terms “neutrality” and “policy of neutrality” disappeared gradually from the vocabulary of Finnish foreign policy.

The Defence White Paper that the Government presented to the Parliament in June 1995 stated that after the end of the division between the East and the West, the policy of neutrality which Finland observed during the Cold War was no longer a useful course of action. In addition the paper noted that with the end of the division in Europe, Finland is no longer located between the East and the West in a security policy sense.

Nevertheless Finland remained militarily non-aligned. From the perspective of the security dilemma, Finland has once again adjusted
to changes in the balance of power. The new balance of power – or in more diplomatic terms, stability – is formed by a combination of credible defence, military non-alignment, political alignment, active participation in the development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme and development of capability for operational cooperation with NATO.

For Finland the institutional strategy of the post-Cold War era has meant participating in attempts to tie Russia to Western or cooperative political and economic institutions. The objective of this policy is to promote economic and political interdependency and at the same time move traditional security issues into the background.

The post-Cold War situation has also given Finland opportunities to improve its security through the third strategy. This strategy is based on the idea that Russia becomes fully integrated into Europe, which removes the security dilemma between Russia and the West through changing of identities and the elimination of mutually perceived threats. Finland’s task in the strategy is to do whatever it can to advance this development, since realising this objective would also resolve the security dilemma between Finland and Russia.

Consequently Finland simultaneously uses three strategies at different levels towards Russia, hoping that together they will improve Finland’s security. The question concerning Finland’s NATO option should be put in this context: is the current security policy line the ideal one and how would NATO membership affect Finland’s overall strategy and each of the three strategies singly?
**Figure 3: Strategies and Instruments for Managing the Security Dilemma between Finland and Russia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Balance of power strategy</th>
<th>Institutional strategy</th>
<th>Identity strategy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cold War 1947-1991</strong></td>
<td>FCMA Treaty</td>
<td>NNWFZ initiative</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent defence capability</td>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Policy of neutrality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Post-Cold War 1992-2002</strong></td>
<td>&quot;Credible&quot; defence</td>
<td>Northern Dimension</td>
<td>Supporting Russia’s democratisation and market economy within the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military non-alignment</td>
<td>Advancing Russia’s integration into Europe and the world economy within the EU</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU membership</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(political solidarity, CFSP, developing defence dimension)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NATO cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(PfP, capability for operational cooperation, membership option)</td>
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Military Non-alignment

A key factor in Finland’s current security policy line is the guarantee of credible defence based on military non-alignment, nevertheless without reference to a policy of neutrality and most often without reference to an attempt to remain neutral in the event of a war. In the “worst case” scenario, in which Finland is attacked, the country would have its independent defence but it would also be able to receive the available outside assistance. This defence “credibility” aims on the one hand to provide a sufficient threat effect and on the other hand to allow for a political solution in a hypothetical conflict situation through a combination of Finland’s own defence and possible outside assistance. At a political and security policy level, this type of military non-alignment allows for nearly everything except NATO membership.

How does Russia feel about this type of military non-alignment? Russia’s overall view on Finland’s current military non-alignment is clearly positive. However, from a Russian perspective, slightly controversial or competing interpretations have been made about the nature of Finland’s military non-alignment. With respect to Finland’s current line, the vagueness of the concept is a problem, should Russia in some situation aim to define the contents of military non-alignment and thereby of Finnish politics.

According to a report completed in late 2000 by the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS), an official research institute close to Russian security agencies, Finland’s non-alignment is viewed in Russia as a new confirmation of Helsinki’s political pragmatism, but at the same time Russians understand Finland’s aim to expand the framework of this concept. RISS supports the type of non-alignment practiced by Finland and Sweden especially because this policy has turned out to be active and imaginative, and because it can be used to influence the mechanisms and results of the EU and CFSP.

Thus flexibility in non-alignment is welcomed at least in principle, but it also has its weak points. The RISS report stated that: on the one hand, the flexibility of Finland’s non-alignment appears to promote broadness in security and defence activities in Northern Europe. On the other hand, it presents certain concern for Russia (and the case of Sweden is even more convincing than Finland’s in this respect, the report argues) since this development is seen as another demonstration of NATO approaching Russia’s borders. According to the RISS report, this pragmatic way of defining the country’s
non-alignment in fact moves the traditional neutrality model and the non-alignment model further away from one another.

While RISS can be seen to represent a relatively official expert opinion, the RAU research institute represents a more traditional Russian line and “national-patriotic” alternative to the current foreign and security policy line. In a RAU report completed in late 2000,\(^5\) Finland’s line is seen as a consistent extension of the earlier policy of neutrality: “We strongly consider that Finland’s current foreign policy line, which has its roots in the Soviet–Finnish agreement of 1948 and which is best characterised by a policy of neutrality and non-alignment with respect to military alliances, corresponds best with Finland’s national interests.”

In its historical review, RAU views that Finland’s policy of neutrality “has been practised officially since 1955”. The report acknowledges that currently Finland uses terms such as “military non-alignment” and “credible defence capability” to describe the country’s status, but “for the sake of simplicity” RAU uses the term “neutrality”.

According to the report, Finland’s policy of neutrality has nevertheless changed in the current situation in such a way that it now allows membership in the EU, more extensive participation in economic sanctions agreed upon in the UN, participation in peacekeeping activities under UN Security Council or OSCE mandates, as well as participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme. European countries and Russia view this development as “understandable”.

From RAU’s perspective, non-alignment or neutrality does not prevent even rather close military-technological cooperation with Russia. According to the RAU report, there are “objective factors” which speak for close military-technological relations between Finland and Russia: 1) historical heritage and connections; 2) experience from long cooperation and similar views on many European security issues; 3) shared negative attitude towards the creation of a unipolar world order; 4) the long border shared by the two countries; 5) expansion of mutually profitable economic and trade relations. The report also considers it rational to “continue” the training of Finnish soldiers in Russian institutes of military education, as well as the training of production-technology personnel in companies run by Russia’s Ministry of Defence.

The report nevertheless is critical of the fact that Finland’s current
arms purchases are affected by “political factors”, which leads to discrimination against cheaper Russian alternatives. According to the report, it is not in Finnish national interests to favour US, German and French technology.

The Russian opinions described above represent different emphases in expert organisations. A survey conducted at the end of 2000 interviewed Russian rank and file officers about their views on issues related to Finland’s security policy. Nearly all of the officers who answered thought that the best line for Finland’s own security was military non-alignment. Many officers also added that joining NATO would increase military activity in the region and would create new security threats. The typical answer, which reflects a rather traditional view on neutrality or non-alignment, was as follows: “Joining any military alliance has accompanying military obligations. The best alternative for Finland is to remain completely independent, both economically and with respect to its foreign policy.”
The Role of the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy

Finland’s detachment from its special relationship with Russia in connection with the termination of the FCMA Treaty in early 1992 meant that Finland was gradually moving from bilateral to multilateral relations with Russia. The new agreement signed between the two countries included no security policy commitments that would go beyond those already binding all European states on the basis of agreed-upon general conventions, for example within the CSCE framework. Finland’s EU membership sealed the creation of this multilateral relationship between Finland and Russia.

Adjusting to the new role has not been without problems. Immediately after joining the EU, Finland was put to the test and forced to re-evaluate its relationship with Russia. At the beginning of 1995, it became clear that Russia had started a large military campaign in Chechnya and had committed serious human rights violations by bombing civilian targets. The EU was one of the key international actors criticising Russia and it even considered imposing sanctions.

In this matter Finland kept to the EU line. From the Finnish perspective the situation was a historical turning point since throughout the Cold War Finland had refrained from criticising the Soviet Union. However Finland quickly adopted its new role, even to the extent that it has consciously emphasised its EU status in relations with Russia since the beginning of its membership. Correspondingly, within the EU, Finland has represented a line according to which EU countries should not only form a common EU strategy with respect to Russia, but that they should also harmonise their bilateral relations with Russia.

The question whether Finland continues to have – or should have – its own national policy towards Russia that would be independent of the EU, became a key topic in public discussions during the autumn of 2000. President Tarja Halonen commented on the discussion by turning the question upside down: she thought that Finland had not changed its policy towards Russia, but that the EU has adopted Finland’s policy. According to this view, Finland has its own national strategy and policy towards Russia in principle, but since there are no conflicts between the policies of the EU and Finland, the same policy can be observed in both bilateral and multilateral relations.

Russia does not seem to object to the fact that Finland’s EU membership has changed the relations between the two countries from
bilateral to multilateral. The reason for this is that Russians no longer see the EU as a military threat and do not associate it with NATO. This has not always been the case. One could say that the Soviet Union’s view of the EEC/EC, primarily as a promoter of US interests and the economic backbone of NATO’s European pillar and Germany’s remilitarisation, did not change until the end of the Gorbachev era. In 1989, there were still echoes of the earlier negative attitude, especially towards combining neutrality and EC membership, when the Soviet Union presented an official note protesting against Austria’s EC membership application. Sweden’s application in 1991 no longer aroused negative reactions. The new Russia did not protest against Finland’s EC membership application of 1992 either.

During the 1990s the relations between Russia and the EC/EU mainly focused on the development of trade and political relations – Russia’s official aim being integration with Europe. While in the early 1990s, Russia’s relations with Europe were mainly built on traditional relationships between Russia and European nation states (especially the large states), at the end of the decade Russia also began to see the EU as a relatively unified foreign and security policy actor. The EU’s more active and visible development of its own security policy and crisis management capability has been largely viewed as a positive development in Russia.

Russia’s positive attitude has at least partly been affected by the idea that the growth of the EU’s security policy role strengthens Europe’s independent role and correspondingly weakens the influence of NATO, and thereby of the United States, in Europe. Russia’s 1999 strategy on the EU states: “[Russia should] develop political and military connections with the WEU and consider it an integrated part of the EU, and develop practical cooperation in security issues (peacekeeping, crisis management, arms control, disarmament, etc.) that would balance, for example, the emphasis on NATO in Europe.”

This basically positive and cooperative attitude towards the EU is also in the background in assessments of Finland as part of the EU. The RISS report mentioned above, states that the reasons behind Finland’s EU membership application are well known in Russia. According to the report, there are three reasons. First, the changes in Eastern Central Europe during 1989–91 ended the earlier political
partition of Europe and this had a major impact on Finland’s policy of neutrality, both in its meaning and nature.

Secondly, since 1992 Finland felt that it had to join Sweden, Norway and Austria in applying for EC membership in order to become part of the integrating Europe. Thirdly, the report states that there was a clear understanding in Finland that EC membership would increase Finland’s importance both politically and economically, and that Finland would in fact maintain its independence in foreign and security policy issues.

According to RISS, most Russian experts see Finland’s EU membership as helping Russia’s integration into Europe, and that Finland’s EU membership is important to Russia, particularly for three reasons. First, Russia hopes that Finland’s EU membership will eventually increase understanding of Russia in other EU countries. This in turn would lead to increasing economic support and multilateral cooperation. Second, Russia sees the bilateral economic cooperation between Finland and Russia as gaining added value from Finland’s membership in a larger European structure. Third, Finland’s EU Presidency in 1999 showed that Finland’s membership improves Russia’s position in the EU’s foreign and security policy agenda and strengthens the view in Europe that the planning of European security structures requires a realistic dialogue with Russia.

As stated earlier, the RISS circles especially, also appear to value the active role of Finland and Sweden in the development of the CFSP. With respect to the EU’s developing military or defence dimension, the RISS report views Finland’s line as being active participation in the implementation of the EU’s common defence strategy. This will lead the country further away from traditional neutrality. The RISS report nevertheless indicates an understanding and approval of the fact that Finland and Sweden cannot remain outside the planning of the EU’s future security policy solutions.

As a result, the conclusion of the RISS report is that everything depends increasingly on what kind of strategy the renewed EU finally decides to adopt with respect to its defence policy. If the EU decides to commit to NATO, Finland will probably have to re-evaluate its current policy of non-alignment. Otherwise, Finland will most likely gradually strengthen its ties to NATO but nevertheless will not become a member of NATO.

The report of the more traditional RAU has a more critical view of the fact that membership of the EU may in practice limit a country’s independence and ability to practice a policy of neutrality. Consequently, the development of the EU into a military-political construction is a “(so far a latent) danger to the neutral Finland.” In this context, the report refers to definitions of neutrality in international law, which are related particularly to a state of war, and questions how “genuine neutrality” could be realised under such circumstances. According to the report, Russia is interested in seeing Finland continue its line of “genuine neutrality”. The report states that Russia is happy to notice that the Finnish leadership does not consider it necessary to tie the country to any strict defence obligations with respect
to the EU.

During the 1990s, there were very few articles and analyses in Russian newspapers on Finland’s security policy. However, during the recent years, the Finnish NATO debate has been reflected also in the columns of Russian newspapers. Andrei Fedorov, the director of political programmes in the unofficial Council on Foreign and Defence Policy (SVOP), which represents the elite of Russian foreign policy community, wrote an extensive newspaper article published in August 2001, in which he defined the connection between the EU’s defence dimension and NATO membership. According to the article, although Finland’s NATO membership is currently an unrealistic possibility for the majority of Finns, its supporters aim to take Finland “into NATO, not through the front door like Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in 1999, but through the back door – by strengthening military cooperation within the EU.” On the other hand, Fedorov states rather controversially that EU membership – when compared to NATO membership – is in itself a sufficient solution to Finland’s security policy problems. According to Fedorov, EU membership does not only mean an economic alliance, but also “a collective [defence] guarantee from the EU.”

In the above-mentioned survey conducted on rank and file officers, roughly one half of those who answered had positive views about the EU’s more active participation in humanitarian and crisis management operations, about one third had a negative view of the development, mainly because of the experience of Kosovo, and the rest had no clear opinion about the issue. When they were asked how Finland’s EU membership had affected the security policy relations between Finland and Russia, about one third considered Finland’s new attitude harder and less friendly. The rest had no opinion on the issue or did not believe that Finland’s EU membership had affected its security policy relations with Russia.

The objective of both Russia and the EU is to increase mutual cooperation in security policy issues such as peacekeeping. This means that in principle the EU and Russia are involved in the same process as NATO and Russia. The main problem is that the EU’s own operations, and resources for security and military policy operations that fall under the “second pillar”, are still quite modest or only taking shape. Therefore without clearer unification of EU and NATO resources, the EU cannot rapidly develop into a strong independent security actor that would significantly reduce NATO’s role in Europe from either Russian or Finnish perspective. It thus appears that Finland’s relationship with NATO will inevitably become closer with the country’s EU membership and the development of the EU’s military and defence dimension. This development is likely to maintain and strengthen the vagueness of Finland’s international status as a non-aligned country.

The Finnish NATO debate has been reflected in the columns of Russian newspapers in recent years.
The Northern Dimension as a Security Strategy

From the Finnish perspective, mitigating the security dilemma means promoting closer relations between the West and Russia. One could say that when Finland has been particularly active or resourceful in its foreign policy, most often this resourcefulness has been related to building bridges and thereby indirectly improving Finland’s security. During the Cold War, Finland’s role in the wider East–West cooperation was limited, and sometimes – like during the NNWFZ initiative – the results were poor despite Finland’s activeness. However Finland did succeed in offering “good offices” to the superpowers in the CSCE and in promoting the spirit of détente between them. After the Cold War, Finland has continued with the same basic line, although now more clearly as part of the West. Finland has aimed to advance Russia’s integration into Western political and economic institutions and to promote mutual economic and political dependence between Russia and especially the EU and Northern Europe. The most visible example of this role is Finland’s initiative on the Northern Dimension.

The Northern Dimension has gradually become an established part of Finland’s foreign policy vocabulary and administration. It became the EU’s common policy in December 1998, when “Finland’s initiative on the Northern Dimension” was added to the agenda of the Vienna Summit. The initiative has been emphasised as covering a wide geographical region and as focusing on non-military issues: economic cooperation, development of infrastructure, energy cooperation, environmental issues, nuclear safety, border control cooperation and combating organised crime. However the main objective, at least from the Finnish perspective, is related to integrating Russia into Europe through “positive interdependency” and institutions. Therefore the initiative also involves a security dimension: interdependency and multilateral institutionalisation are expected to lead to increased stability and security in the region.

Also from the Russian perspective, the initiative involves, or at least should involve, increasing security in Northern Europe. According to the RISS report, the initiative on the Northern Dimension is a concrete example of Finland’s aim to promote regional cooperation that is in Russia’s interests. However, from the Russian perspective, it would be beneficial if the Northern Dimension developed into a well-functioning regional programme that has a clear “security agenda”. According to
RISS, the Russian Foreign Ministry and independent Russian experts think that the Northern Dimension should be seen as an attempt to create a new, functioning security system based on mutual gain and multilateral cooperation.

The demand to include traditional security policy issues at least partly in the Northern Dimension agenda is present especially in the above-mentioned RAU report: “[...] Russia believes that in addition to economic and environmental issues, the Northern Dimension should contain a political framework aiming to maintain peace and security in the region, on the basis of the CSCE and previous experiences from non-alignment. From this perspective, the aim of the Baltic States to join NATO could damage the practice of non-alignment.”

Thus, the Northern Dimension has been viewed positively in Russia, but this attitude also involves at least theoretically the idea of the Northern Dimension as some kind of regional system, which essentially involves the concept of non-alignment and which would or could be a security policy alternative to the NATO membership of the Baltic States and possibly of Finland and Sweden. This type of thinking can be traced back to Russia’s traditional desire to localise or regionalise security policy systems in its nearby regions. With respect to the Baltic States, Russia has even presented alternatives to NATO membership that involve Russia’s security guarantees.

Finland and Sweden have consciously kept at a distance from this type of thinking. Regional security systems are seen as inevitably hegemonic, if Russia participates in them. The future of the Northern Dimension is therefore mainly related to its success as a tool for economic and political integration in the region, and as coordinating institution for other international cooperative organisations and activities. At best it can be used to alleviate the security dilemma between Russia and Finland or other countries in Northern Europe, by raising non-military cooperation above various military threats, but it cannot be used to solve the security dilemma or replace traditional security policy actors.
Russia’s Democratisation as a Security Strategy

The possibility of solving the security dilemma between Finland and Russia is related to the idea that the security dilemma between Russia and the West would be solved through changing of identities. One way to achieve this is by Russia’s political and economic systems becoming essentially like those of the Western democracies. A speech by the former President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, in Moscow in November 1997 reflects democratic peace theory: “The common basic values of the members of the European Union and Russia are united in democracy”, after which Ahtisaari stated that “democracies do not wage war against one another”.

From the perspective of this strategy, Finland’s main task is thus to promote the democratisation of Russia. Finland’s own resources are naturally limited with respect to this issue, and the central channel for a policy supporting democratisation is work via the EU Common Strategy on Russia. The EU’s attempt to strengthen democracy in Russia is focused on two areas. First, the EU aims to strengthen the structures of the rule of law and public administration by providing funds for institutional reforms, by developing training programmes for young politicians and civil servants, by providing assistance in arranging elections and by supporting Russia’s efforts to implement its human rights commitments. Second, the EU aims to strengthen Russia’s civil society by supporting connections between Russian and EU politicians at all levels, and by promoting cultural and educational exchange programmes, independent non-governmental organisations and the freedom of the media.

Finland naturally supports these aims. Although the illusions of a more or less automatic democratisation of Russia, and especially the impact of the EU or other external factors on the development of Russia’s political system, were shattered during the last decade, Finland’s official statements have remained quite optimistic.

When we review the current situation, we can indeed notice that a certain minimum model of representative democracy has been established in Russia. The return to a clearly authoritarian political system does not seem probable. The situation is significantly more stable than even at the end of the 1990s. Nevertheless, a truly representational executive, independence of main media from the executive, practical implementation of the rule of law,
possibilities for critical civil society action and influence, as well as human rights and the rights of minorities are all areas in which Russia does not meet the characteristics of a European democracy.

It seems likely that Russia will not be recognised as an established democracy for at least a few years in the West in general or within the EU, and with respect to these issues, Russia will not meet the criteria set, for example, for EU members, for a long time. Consequently, the resolution of the security dilemma through the “coming together” of political systems remains a long-term rather than a short-term strategy.
The NATO Option and Russia

The security dilemma between Finland and Russia is a direct reflection of the general security dilemma between Russia and the West. Currently the relations between Russia and NATO are the most important indicator for examining this security dilemma. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the development of Russia–NATO relations has been characterised by two apparently opposite features. On the one hand, the relations have been shadowed by several crises; these have been related to Russia’s sometimes strong opposition to the enlargement of the alliance and also to NATO’s actions outside its own area. On the other hand, despite these crises – or even through them – institutional cooperation between the two parties has strengthened continuously (Annex 1). Also public opinion in Russia – despite the perceived threats still connected to NATO – is clearly supportive of closer relations, and one third of Russians even supports Russia’s full membership of NATO (Annex 3).

The last stage in the institutional rapprochement began in September 2001, when the war against “global terrorism” became the primary area of cooperation. In an agreement signed in May 2002, cooperation between Russia and NATO changed from the earlier cooperation model of 19+1 to a more equal cooperative model of 20. The cooperative body NATO–Russia Council (NRC) established for this purpose handles anti-terrorist activities especially on an equal basis, but also plans common policies with respect to peacekeeping, anti-missile systems and the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. According to NATO representatives, Moscow will nevertheless not receive a right of veto over NATO’s activities and the new cooperative relationship does not change the obligations related to the alliance’s collective defence, according to which an attack on one member country is considered an attack on all members of the alliance.

However one would not be exaggerating in saying that Russia is now in a much closer relationship with NATO – although in one tailored specifically for Russia – than, for example, Finland. Should the relationship between Russia and NATO develop further, it would mean that an associate or special membership of NATO is being prepared for Russia. Eventually, the official agenda and common goals may also include Russia’s full NATO membership.

NATO’s enlargement and the NRC are often viewed to mean that the alliance is moving towards becoming a more political entity. There is no consensus within NATO on the future role of the organisation,
but it is commonly agreed that NATO is at a turning point. There is strong support, particularly in Europe, for this kind of “OSCE+ type” of NATO that has emphasis more on common values. However NATO has constantly underlined that it is not giving up its primary role as a military alliance. Nevertheless, even this position argues that NATO’s role will change in the future. There has been major changes in NATO’s military planning. The planning is moving from territorial defence towards more global thinking. In Northern Europe, NATO forces are not necessarily preparing so much to Russian aggression towards NATO countries’ territory but to peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations anywhere in the world.

How does Finland’s NATO option appear in the light of the recent rapprochement between Russia and NATO? Despite the cooperation with NATO, Russia has stated – although with more cautious emphasises than before – that it still opposes NATO’s enlargement. The new NRC aims to avoid discussing NATO enlargement so that the issue will not disturb the processing of other issues.

Finland’s NATO option has not been present very strongly in Russian discussions. Except for quite recent comments, nearly all Russian statements on Finland’s NATO debate have originated from Russia’s ambassadors to Finland and certain Russian politicians, officials and high-ranking officers, when they have been specifically asked to comment the issue by the Finnish media. Consequently the majority of Russian views have been available in Finnish newspapers.

These statements, interviews and comments reflect a rather coherent and unchanging view of Russia’s line, although there have been some exceptions with respect to sharpness or moderation. Between 1991 – May 2002, there do not appear to be exceptions to Russia’s official negative attitude towards Finland’s NATO membership, although some statements emphasise that the decision is Finland’s own affair. However at least the Finnish media has presented some sharp comments made by military representatives particularly, which reflect the deep distrust towards NATO’s true intentions (Annex 2).

The more detailed analyses made by Russian research institutes provide nothing new to this overall image. The above-mentioned RISS report states that Russians are aware of the facts both for and against Finland’s NATO membership, as they are generally presented in the Finnish debate. Supportive facts – that is the facts the Finnish supporters of NATO membership present, according to the RISS report – include the following statements: 1) NATO membership protects Finland from Russian pressure, 2) Military non-alignment leaves Finland in a vulnerable position – as politically part of the West but militarily alone, 3) As a member of NATO, Finland will participate in the key
security organisation in Europe, 4) As a member of NATO, Finland will be able to remain in the core of the EU 5) Finland cannot defend itself alone, 6) NATO membership is less expensive, 7) Finland cannot manage regional crises alone.

Facts raised by RISS that speak against NATO membership in the Finnish debate include the following: 1) NATO membership damages Finland’s special relations with Russia, 2) NATO membership provokes Russia and destabilises the balance in Europe, 3) Military non-alignment keeps Finland outside a possible crossfire between Russia and the West, 4) Military non-alignment allows Finland to act as a mediator during periods of international tension and conflicts, 5) As a member of NATO, Finland will become a pawn of Western powers, 6) NATO no longer has anything to give, 7) EU membership is enough, 8) NATO membership would draw Finland into regional crises of the West, which would be handled best regionally, 9) NATO membership makes Finland dependent on Western assistance, 10) NATO membership develops the wrong kind of defence capability, 11) NATO membership is too expensive, 12) NATO membership detaches the people from national defence.

In case Finland – and Sweden – still decide to join NATO against Russia’s wishes, RISS reiterates the earlier Russian descriptions of countermeasures and stresses that Russia’s line remains the same. The rather moderate references are to the re-evaluation of arms regulation treaties and redeployment of troops, yet in accordance with the CFE Treaty. Instead of rebuilding a “Europe of blocs”, RISS stresses that a better direction would be to build a “Europe of regions” in the spirit of the Northern Dimension.

The report states that any turn by Sweden and Finland towards a real and not merely verbal NATO membership could seriously damage the regional balance and would lead to NATO approaching Russia’s borders, thereby destroying the whole idea of regional non-alignment. The RISS report reflects the idea that NATO would gladly strengthen its relations with Finland. According to the report, the aim of the Finnish armed forces to become compatible with NATO, and participation in the Partnership for Peace programme and EAPC make Finland a particularly desirable partner for NATO, and not least because of its position next to the strategically important Russian border.

Earlier analysis published in 2000 by RISS researchers draws a quite
clear image about how Finland and Sweden are already closely committed to a NATO-based security solution in Northern Europe: “Although they are not members of the alliance de jure, [Finland and Sweden] have already become de facto mediators of NATO’s military-political strategy in the region, which gives reason to discuss their gradual slide into the sphere of NATO’s politics and later, perhaps after 2002, into the alliance itself.”

According to RAU, which draws a more traditional line, the fact that Finland has no potential enemies in the vicinity of its borders, as well as the “half a century of economic, political and military cooperation with Russia” define a single overall foreign policy line for Finland at least for the next ten years: “Close cooperation with the EU and OSCE and refusal of NATO membership.” The report also mentions that: “the Soviet Union and Russia have not demonstrated any hostility towards Finland during the past five decades, but have instead fully respected Finnish neutrality”.

Thus, according to the RAU analysis, defence policy reasons do not support NATO membership. The report draws the same conclusion from the analysis of economic consequences. According to RAU’s rather detailed calculation, NATO membership would be a considerable expense for Finland, starting from the fact that Finland would be required to increase its defence budget to approximately two percent of its GDP. In addition RAU raises the possibility that NATO’s enlargement could also allow the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons or related infrastructure on the territory of the new member states – in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty – although this is not discussed openly within NATO. Therefore the RAU report suggests that when the Finnish public is consulted about possible NATO membership, it should be clearly informed about this issue. The report mentions that in the event of a possible conflict between NATO and Russia, as a member of NATO, Finland could become the target of Russia’s pre-emptive measures, such as military and nuclear strikes.

The above-mentioned newspaper article from autumn 2001 by Andrei Fedorov who works within SVOP, is on the other hand one of the clearest and sharpest recent Russian comments against Finnish NATO membership. The article begins with history. According to Fedorov, Finnish and other Western historians had already discarded by the 1960s or 1970s, the so-called driftwood theory about Finland’s accidental drift to the side of Hitler’s Germany and into the attack against the Soviet Union. Instead the author suggests that Finland had made careful preparations and plans for a war of conquest to be waged together with Germany.

From this historical introduction, Fedorov proceeds to the analogy
of the current Finnish NATO debate. According to the author several facts show that a similar development is underway with respect to NATO membership. The author states that the Hornet purchase of 1992 was connected to this process. “Gradually it became clear that the fighters would be purchased for a battle fought against Russia.” This development accelerated considerably during Martti Ahtisaari’s presidency, with Finland joining NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme and Planning and Review Process (PARP). At the same time NATO compatibility appeared on the agenda. According to Fedorov, in the current “third stage” of this development, the compatibility of Finland’s ground, air and naval forces are ensured, and a “secret agreement on cooperation at sea has been implemented”.

Fedorov repeats the earlier warnings and reasons speaking against Finland’s NATO membership, but he also raises Russian public opinion as a new factor: “There is no reason to underestimate the reaction of the Russian society to Finnish membership, which would be seen as a sign not only of an unfriendly country but perhaps also of a treacherous one, considering the image the Russians have formed of Finland during the post-war decades.”

In the above-mentioned survey conducted on rank and file officers, the development of relations between Finland and NATO – at least if Finland remains within the boundaries of the current Partnership for Peace agreement – arose sharply negative reactions in only one third of those who answered. Many thought that the main danger of a full NATO membership was that once a member of NATO, Finland would present official territorial claims on Russia. The RAU report also showed concern over the Finnish Karelia debate, an issue addressed from time to time in the Russia media with critical commentary.

Finland’s NATO debate has also been discussed in the Russian press in connection with the most recent stage of rapprochement between Russia and NATO, especially in connection with comments criticising NATO. For example in March 2002, Marina Kalashnikova, a Nezavisimaia Gazeta journalist, wrote that it appears as if the West had a common goal of reducing Russia’s influence. In this connection, Kalashnikova also wrote about Finland’s “sharp turn” in its attitude towards NATO. Kalashnikova assumed that Finland would apply for NATO membership by 2004.

In the light of the above comments, it appears that the Russian reaction to the actualisation of Finland’s NATO membership would clearly be a negative one.
reaction to the actualisation of Finland’s NATO membership would clearly be a negative one. It is difficult to find a single comment or analysis that supports Finland’s NATO membership. From the perspective of Finland’s current line, it is somewhat problematic that Finland’s official emphasis on the NATO option, in addition to action within the framework of military non-alignment appear more and more frequently as a conscious but concealed preparation for NATO membership. Thus military non-alignment with a NATO option does not create the desired stability in the strategic situation in Northern Europe, but instead gives reason to speculate about the distance between Finland’s de facto and Finland and the Baltic State’s Future NATO Membership
Finland and the Baltic State’s Future NATO Membership

Of Finland’s neighbours, the Baltic States have consistently aimed to join NATO and have considered it the only basic solution sufficient to guarantee their security. It seems likely that all Baltic States will be accepted into NATO in the Prague Summit of November 2002. Although relations between Russia and NATO are developing, Russia’s line is still negative when it views its own interests in connection to the possible NATO membership of the Baltic States.

There has been no official Finnish comment on the consequences that NATO membership for the Baltic States would have on Finland. From Finland’s perspective, the key issue is that NATO membership of the Baltic States does not lead to Russia’s overreaction and that it does not exacerbate other difficulties in the relations between Russia and NATO.

What is the relationship between the NATO membership of the Baltic States and Finland’s security policy from the Russian perspective? The RAU report of 2000 states that Finland’s attitude towards NATO membership for the Baltic States, is that it stresses the right of each country to choose its own security solutions. The report notes that there are also people who argue that NATO membership of the Baltic States would be a considerably less complicated issue, if Finland and Sweden were also to join NATO. According to the report, this would give NATO a unified northeastern zone limited to Russia. The report states that this prospect is one of the particularly serious reasons why Russia opposes NATO’s enlargement. On the other hand, the RAU report suggests that in the Nordic Countries, the Baltic States are seen as a particularly weak link in the stability and security of Northern Europe, and that their NATO membership or merely their applications are a factor that reduces stability.

According to the RAU report, Russian military experts would consider it the best solution that the Baltic States assumed and applied a version of Finland’s security solution. Membership in the EU and actions on part of Finland and Sweden to develop the defence of the Baltic States are crucial elements in the development of this solution. Referring to the warnings of President Tarja Halonen, “the unwavering defender of Finland’s neutrality,” about the possible consequences the NATO membership of the Baltic States could have in the region, RAU concludes that “[…] clearly NATO membership of the Baltic States is not in Finland’s interests, especially since the country already has one member of the alliance (Norway) across its northern border. Currently, Finland ‘cuts’ NATO’s northeastern front and is thereby an impediment for the NATO aspirations of the Baltic States.” Also the
RISS report of 2000 states that NATO membership of Finland and Sweden would strengthen the NATO aspirations of the Baltic States, which would be entirely against Russia’s national interests.

In a report of Russia’s Council on Foreign and Defence Policy (SVOP) published in February 2001 on the security situation in Northern Europe, the NATO aspirations of the Baltic States are addressed as the most serious problem in Northern Europe. According to the report two processes have been ongoing simultaneously in the Nordic Countries with respect to this issue. On the one hand, especially Denmark has hurried the NATO membership of the Baltic States. On the other hand, Finland and Sweden have attempted to assure especially Estonia and Latvia about the importance of having good relations with Russia. On the whole, however, the report states that at least in the long run, the Nordic Countries have a common interest in securing the accession of the Baltic States to both the EU and NATO, and simultaneously in preventing a sharp reaction from Russia to NATO membership of the Baltic States.

According to SVOP it is in Russia’s interests to delay NATO membership of the Baltic States as long as possible or prevent it altogether. In this context, although aware of the limits of the influence of Northern European countries with respect to NATO membership of the Baltic States, SVOP advises Russia to “fully utilise the constructive attitude of those officials in Northern Europe who understand the full meaning of the possible consequences of the NATO membership of the Baltic States.” The report states that countries in Northern Europe should understand that by accepting the Baltic States as its members, NATO is forcing Russia take political and military measures that affect the whole region.

Also the above-mentioned article by Fedorov addresses the NATO aspirations of the Baltic States extensively. The aspiration itself is criticised on familiar grounds and the author notes that the problems between Russia and the Baltic States are not ones that could be solved via NATO membership. Instead, EU membership would be a sufficient basic security policy solution for the Baltic States as well as for Finland. Fedorov believes, unlike the above-mentioned RAU analysis, that the military cooperation between Finland and Estonia, i.e. mainly the training of the Estonian army, supports NATO’s interests in Northern Europe and also advances Finland’s own NATO membership. Also the RIIS analysis especially saw Sweden’s defence cooperation with the Baltic States as a “source of concern for Russia”.

The survey conducted on rank and file officers showed that nearly
all officers had a strongly negative and emotional attitude towards the NATO membership of the Baltic States. A majority expected the membership to lead to the rise of nationalism and aggressiveness in the Baltic States, and of politics that are negative towards Russia and demand border changes. In addition, most officers saw Finland’s support in improving the defence capability of the Baltic States as a highly negative phenomenon. Many also felt that this type of support had an anti-Russian tone.

Since NATO membership for the Baltic States seems inevitable despite Russia’s dismay, the argument that Finland’s NATO debate could have an influence on NATO’s enlargement to the Baltic States loses its meaning. In the new situation, the key question is how Russia will react to the future membership of the Baltic States, and what implications this has for Finland.

From the Finnish perspective, the problem is that the Baltic States clearly aim to join the “old” NATO. The primary motive of their NATO aspirations is the lack of security related to the Russian threat. This means that the situation involves a clear security dilemma, which could lead to a spiral development. In improving their own security and aspiring to join NATO, the Baltic States are unintentionally weakening Russia’s feeling of security. However, Putin’s comments in late June 2002 affirmed that – even if Russia does not believe that the NATO membership for the Baltic States will increase security in the area – Russia is not going to take political or military measures against the enlargement.

Finland’s current line is based on the idea that Finland’s NATO membership would provoke Russia more and therefore it must be suppressed, for this reason, if not for any other. However this is not necessarily the best line for answering a heightened security dilemma. Finland emphasises that it is in a better position than the Baltic States, which suffer from the lack of security, and that as a result, Finland does not need NATO membership. In a certain sense, Finland thus participates in strengthening and maintaining the prevailing idea in the Baltic States that NATO’s role in Northern Europe is essentially related to the Russian threat and therefore membership is suitable only for countries that suffer from a lack of security and lack credible defence capability. Not being a member of NATO, Finland is like a bystander as it views the consequences that NATO’s enlargement will have in the Baltic region in this context. Especially from this
perspective, the current aim of Finland and Sweden to stress the development of the Partnership for Peace programme in the region is adjustment rather than an active effort to influence the development of NATO’s role positively in the region.

As a non-aligned country, Finland indirectly maintains the idea that Russia and NATO are each other’s possible opponents.
Swedish Military Non-alignment and Finland

From the Finnish security policy perspective, Sweden has traditionally had a special position and it remains considerably more important than the Baltic States in current security policy thinking and decision-making. Despite the apparent similarity of basic security policy solutions, Finland and Sweden are not in identical situations.

During the Cold War, Sweden was structurally in a quite different and more protected position than Finland with respect to the Soviet Union, although both observed a policy of neutrality. During the Cold War, Sweden’s security policy with respect to the Soviet Union was a combination of military non-alignment and massive investment in national defence. The aim was to remain neutral in the event of a war between the West and the East. However Sweden counted on direct or indirect Western assistance in the event that the Soviet Union attacked Sweden. To increase the likelihood and efficiency of the required assistance, Sweden made certain unilateral preparations. It was important for Sweden to simultaneously communicate to Moscow that it intended to remain neutral and was capable of doing so in the event of a large-scale war, but that it also had its own strong defence against an attack by the Soviet Union and were well capable and prepared for receiving rapid assistance from NATO.

It was understood in both Finland and Sweden that Sweden’s refusal of open and institutionalised cooperation with NATO was to alleviate Finland’s situation vis-à-vis the USSR. Sweden’s NATO membership or open cooperation with NATO would have lead the Soviet Union to attempt to establish military cooperation with Finland more aggressively. It would have also increased the Soviet Union’s political pressure in Finland and would have made the Soviet Union prevent Finland from participating in Nordic cooperation.

Today the policies of Sweden and Finland with respect to Russia are closer to one another than ever before. Finland and Sweden have similar basic foreign and security policy solutions and the countries have emphasised their cooperation and worked on a common line with respect to other security policy actors, especially Russia and NATO.

Sweden has recently changed the wording of its official security policy. Since 1992, the policy had been defined as follows: “Sweden’s military non-alignment, which aims to allow our country to remain
neutral in the event of a war in our nearby region, remains unchanged.” However in 2001, the defence policy statement called on the Parliament to discuss a new wording and the old wording only appears in the statement as a reference to the previously established wording.

In February 2002, Sweden’s social democratic Government finally reached an agreement on the new wording with three bourgeois parties in the Parliament, which was included in the official security policy statement. The change was not very significant; it mainly stressed the openness of military non-alignment during peacetime in security cooperation. It states that military non-alignment has served Sweden well. This is followed by “With respect to the future, it is now clearer than ever that security is more than the absence of a military conflict. Threats to peace and security can be repelled most efficiently with collective action and in cooperation with other countries.” NATO is not mentioned in this part of the statement, which only refers to the UN at a global level and the EU at a European level.

However, the exchange of words that followed the statement showed that the wording of a common security policy does not automatically mean a common interpretation. From the perspective of the social democratic government, the new wording does not mean preparation for NATO membership, but the bourgeois parties in favour of NATO membership, as well as the leftist party and the green parties strongly against it, declared that the statement was a clear turn in this direction. The Finnish foreign policy leadership only thought that Sweden was assuming the same position in its rhetoric that Finland had already adopted.

In Russia, the attitude towards Sweden’s security policy is based on similar argumentation as is the case with Finland. Russia, according to the above mentioned RISS report, thinks that “Sweden’s model of non-alignment has long-proven qualities as being an effective standard for maintaining stability on the Baltic Rim.” RISS also states that Russia fully understands Sweden’s motivation for active participation in NATO’s PfP programme “when it seeks better standards for interoperability in case of crisis management”. Nevertheless, Sweden’s NATO membership, as that of Finland, would “seriously damage the regional balance” and would destroy the idea of regional non-alignment appreciated by Russia as a stabilising factor.

In the above mentioned SVOP report from early 2001, the attitude towards Sweden’s security policy is a bit more critical. In a similar way as the Soviet Union never wholly trusted Sweden’s neutrality
and occasionally accused it for secret cooperation with NATO – rightfully as we know now – the SVOP report pays attention to the factors beyond the official declaratory line: “A discussion on Swedish NATO membership is going on in Sweden, although its level of activity is not very high. This is mainly due to Sweden’s policy of non-alignment with military blocs. Sweden and Finland’s current official positions do not leave any room for doubts or interpretations. But it should be kept in mind that Sweden is increasing its practical cooperation with NATO, and also that the ever-increasing dependence of the military-oriented sector of Swedish economy on international corporations will also lead to a certain narrowing of the country’s military-political neutrality.”

From a Finnish perspective, the Swedish-Finnish relationship today has led to a situation where if Finland was to remain outside of NATO whilst Sweden joined, it would be highly unsatisfactory for Finland, not only in terms of security policy calculations, but from the perspective of national identity. However, it is unlikely that the public opinion in Sweden will develop in favour of NATO membership faster than in Finland. If a change does take place in the situation, it is more likely that Finland and Sweden will later submit their NATO membership applications in a coordinated manner and at the same time, or that Finland will made its decision on the membership application sooner than Sweden. The latter alternative is based on the fact that during the past ten years, a certain independence from Sweden’s decisions has developed in Finland, of which the EMU decision stands out as the best example so far. Many people feel that Finland has no particular security policy reason to wait for Sweden’s decision, if membership in NATO appears advantageous and achievable to Finland.
Conclusions: Military Non-alignment or NATO Membership?

There are many reasons for opposing or supporting NATO membership that are not directly connected to Russia. Opposing Finnish membership may be a result of the opposition to NATO in general and especially to current US policy, and to an unwillingness to take part in actions that are felt to serve mainly US interests. NATO membership can also be seen as too expensive an option that is generally unnecessary in the current situation, where many non-military threats are considered more important. NATO is also often presented as an organisation whose significance is decreasing from the Finnish and even European perspective since the focus in global politics has shifted away from Europe.

On the other hand, statements in favour of Finland’s NATO membership are often related to the idea according to which Finland must be represented where decisions important to Finnish foreign and security policy are made – rather than merely adjusting to decisions made by others, or simply exploiting the collective benefits brought by NATO to European security. In this view, NATO is an organisation that is expanding, modernising itself, operating within an expanding concept of security and even strengthening as the key security organisation in Europe, whilst also preventing a political gap from forming between the United States and the EU. From the perspective of Finland’s EU policy, membership in NATO can also be seen as the only way in which Finland can stay in the “core” of the EU, particularly in the area of increasing foreign and security policy cooperation.

However, the fact that Russia is Finland’s neighbour makes the latter’s NATO membership particularly difficult even if other factors supported membership. This report has argued that the logic of the security relationship between Finland and Russia is connected to the security dilemma between Russia and the West. From the Russian perspective, Finland’s security policy dimension is as a buffer state, whose main task is to deny access to its territory from Russia’s possible opponents. On the other hand, this view strengthens the Finnish belief that the country must prepare for Russian political and military pressure, which could occur under possible international tension between Russia and the West.

According to this report, the security dilemma can be managed through the maintenance of a balance of power and stability, it can be
mitigated through common institutions, or it can perhaps be solved through the changing of identities and the subsequent change in perceived threats. The question concerning Finland’s NATO option has been put in this context: is the current security policy the ideal one in this respect and how would NATO membership affect the overall situation and each of the three strategies alone?

From the perspective of the balance of power strategy, the current combination of independent defence, military non-alignment, EU membership and NATO cooperation creates stability and balance, which satisfies the security needs of both Finland and Russia (with respect to Finnish territory), at least in the current international situation. Nevertheless it is in the nature of the security dilemma to consider hypothetical “worst case” scenarios and to view them from the perspective of Finland’s security policy.

In the Government’s Defence White Paper, a military crisis or tension in Northern Europe, which originates from development or politics in Russia, would be connected either to tension in relations between Russia and the Baltic States or a failure in Russia’s reform policies, the subsequent isolation and change of course in the country’s foreign and security policy towards anti-Westernism. In addition to these threat scenarios, one could add an anti-Western change of course in Russia’s foreign and security policy that results from a situation in which the interests of Russia and the United States/NATO are in deep conflict in an area that Russia feels as part of its military sphere of interest, such as the Caucasus or Central Asia. In all of the above situations, the crisis could affect the relations between Finland and Russia. As a militarily non-aligned country, Finland could be subjected to political pressure, which would be mainly aimed at prevent the realisation of Finnish NATO membership. From the Finnish perspective, the situation would thus be more stable if Finland was clearly a member of NATO.

The most common view in the Finnish NATO debate is probably that this type of hypothetical and currently quite far-fetched threat scenario based on a crisis between Russia and the West is not sufficient justification in itself for Finland’s NATO membership. In this respect, Finland is considered to be in a more secure position than the Baltic States, which are applying for NATO membership primarily because of its traditional guarantee of collective defence.

Finland could still wish to join NATO for the above reasons not related to Russia. How would this type of solution affect the situation
purely from the perspective of the balance of power strategy? A factor speaking against NATO membership is the pessimistic scenario supported by the above-mentioned Russian studies. Russia would respond to Finnish NATO membership in a manner that would weaken Finland’s security. Even if Russia believed that the motives behind Finland’s NATO membership did not involve perceived threats from Russia, the logic of the security dilemma would force Russia to prepare for the use of Finnish territory against Russia during a crisis situation. Consequently, Finnish NATO membership would unnecessarily trigger Russia’s counter-reaction, which would result in increased military activity in Northern Europe.

Both the logic of the security dilemma and the above-discussed Russian studies allow for an alternative interpretation, which is more optimistic or perhaps realistic from the perspective of the significance of NATO membership. The current NATO option is the most unstable of the available alternatives – alignment or strict adherence to the status of a neutral buffer zone. The current situation forces Russia’s military planning to prepare for the possibility of Finland joining NATO or at least for close cooperation between Finland and NATO in a crisis situation. Therefore Finland is already paying for the military-strategic costs of NATO membership, without enjoying its possible benefits. From this perspective, NATO membership would be the best option and the clearest statement of position, regardless of the development of the relations between Russia and NATO.

Similarly we can compare the current situation and possible NATO membership from the perspective of the institutional strategy. The current line assumes that Finland continues to work especially within the EU and its Northern Dimension to tie Russia to Western cooperation and institutions. This policy could be described as relatively successful from the perspective of the security dilemma. Through its initiative and actions, Finland has advanced Russia’s integration into Europe and has thereby increased its own security.

The pessimistic scenario resulting from Finnish NATO membership would be that Russia’s attitude towards cooperation between states, regions and civil societies in Northern Europe would become less positive. Finland’s accession to NATO could also be reflected more widely in the currently good relations between Russia and the EU. If the number of non-aligned countries in the EU were to decrease even more, Russia would associate the EU more and more with NATO. Thereby the development of relations between
Russia and the EU might suffer, particularly if the relations between Russia and NATO/the United States entered a crisis period. The comments of some Russian actors suggest this scenario is a possibility.

Another more positive scenario emphasises the innovative aspects of Finland’s NATO membership. It has been Finland’s traditional policy to improve its security by advancing the dialogue and creation of common institutions between Russia and the West. It is especially in Finland’s interests that the warming of relations between Russia and NATO continues and that the institutionalised cooperation strengthens.

NATO membership would offer Finland a new channel for advancing Russia’s integration into Western institutions. By staying outside of NATO, Finland also remains outside the development of Russia–NATO relations and thereby loses a major channel for influencing a factor crucial to its own security. As a member of NATO, Finland would undoubtedly aim to advance the kind development of NATO’s role in Northern Europe in which also Russia could easily participate. While Finland’s membership could further the development of NATO’s role in Northern Europe from territorial defence through to preparing for peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations anywhere in the world, this developing “Northern Dimension of NATO” would also be focused more and more on “soft” rather than “hard” security.

Within the expanded concept of security, NATO’s EAPC already includes institutionalised cooperation and coordination in the prevention of various catastrophes related to civilian and natural conditions. Also the Founding Act negotiated between NATO and the Russian Federation in connection with NATO’s previous round of enlargement defines the areas for consultation and cooperation as including literally all nuclear safety issues in all forms; defence-related economic, environmental and scientific issues; the development of civil crisis preparedness and fighting terrorism and drug trafficking.

In the agreement signed in May 2002, these areas represented by the “new NATO” were further strengthened. From this perspective, it is not impossible that specifically in Northern Europe and with Finland’s NATO membership, NATO’s role would be built increasingly on a security concept that is non-traditional, or at least much broader than the traditional concept. Thus the enlarging NATO could have a constructive regional role in Northern Europe, including from Russia’s perspective.

From the perspective of the identity strategy, the question is: would
Finland’s NATO membership hinder or advance the changing of identities between Russia and the West? Currently Finland is participating predominantly via the EU in projects that aim to stabilise and develop Russia’s democracy and market economy. Finland’s military non-alignment is seen as advancing the development that prevents new divisions from emerging in Europe, especially between Russia and other countries. However one could use a similar logic to state that by remaining militarily non-aligned, Finland on the contrary – and especially from the Russian perspective – maintains the old settings of the Cold War era. Finland is militarily non-aligned precisely because of possible confrontation between Russia and NATO.

How would Finnish NATO membership change the situation? A statement presented unexpectedly by Finland asking for NATO membership could strengthen anti-NATO opinions in Russia. Finland itself would undoubtedly at least in some Russian circles, be seen as having “betrayed” Russia: Et tu Brute! The enlargement of NATO into a unified zone from the Baltic States through Finland to Norway, all along Russia’s northwestern border could also raise emotional reactions to the perceived threats in Russia.

From the perspective of identity policy, the negative significance of Finland’s possible NATO membership for Russia should not be exaggerated, however. Russia’s interpretation would depend on the overall development of its relations with NATO. If the Finns believe that the security dilemma between Russia and NATO is impossible to solve, then the identity policy has no meaning and Finland should evaluate its NATO option through other strategies. However if they believe that the security identities of Russia and NATO could possibly approach one another, then an active policy on part of Finland would also mean constructive participation in this development rather than staying aside. In this context, the idea of Finland’s NATO membership could be accepted in Russia as a result of, and indication of, the change in NATO’s role from the previous East–West confrontation, towards a “new NATO”, into which Russia will also integrate.

This report acknowledges the risk-averse nature of Finland’s current policy as well as the risks involved in NATO membership from the perspective of Finnish–Russian relations. The views of Russian foreign policy leadership and expert organisations on Finland’s possible NATO membership as presented in this report and its annexes, are all negative. Nevertheless, the conclusion of the report is that from the perspective of Finnish–Russian
relations, Finland’s current line is not the best possible and certainly not the most innovative policy-option. With increasing cooperation and mutual dissolving of perceived threats between Russia and NATO, Finland’s NATO membership would offer better possibilities for the country’s policy towards Russia. Finnish NATO membership would also benefit Russia, just as Finnish membership of the EU is also benefiting Russia. However acknowledging and recognising these opportunities requires new political thinking in both Finland and Russia.

Figure 4: Effects of Finland’s NATO Line on the Security Dilemma Management Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current line</th>
<th>Finland's NATO membership Scenari I</th>
<th>Finland's NATO membership Scenari II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Balance of power strategy</strong></td>
<td>Balance, &quot;stability&quot;, which satisfies the security needs of both parties</td>
<td>Russia responds to Finland’s NATO membership in a manner that weakens Finland’s security; military activity increases in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional strategy</strong></td>
<td>Within the EU and its Northern Dimension, Finland continues to work and to tie Russia to the &quot;West&quot;</td>
<td>Russia’s attitude towards international cooperation in Northern Europe becomes less positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identity strategy</strong></td>
<td>Within the EU, Finland supports Russia’s democratisation and market economy</td>
<td>Finland’s NATO membership would strengthen anti-NATO opinions in Russia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes

1 This paper is the English version of the final report of a project commissioned by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and financed by the National Defence Support Foundation (Maanpuolustuksen kannatussäätiö). The results of the project have been presented earlier in several publications, which are also partly used in this report. The security dilemma theme has been discussed with a slightly different emphasis in, for example, Christer Pursiainen’s article ‘Finland and Russia,’ in Finnish and Swedish Security: Comparing National Policies, Bo Huldt, Teija Tiilikainen, Tapani Vahtoranta and Anna Helkama-Rågård (eds.), Swedish National Defence College, 2001. The unpublished reports on Finland’s (and Sweden’s) security policy commissioned specifically for this research project from Russian research institutes have been referred to earlier in Christer Pursiainen’s Finnish-language article ‘Finland as a Neighbour in the West. A Review of Russian Attitudes Towards Finland’s Security Policy,’ Ulkopolitiikka 4/2001. The relations between Russia and NATO have been examined in more detail in Sinikukka Saari’s Finnish-language article ‘A Brave New Beginning in Russia–NATO Relations?’, Ulkopolitiikka 2/2002. Several research and interview trips were made in connection with the project, and seminars and discussions were arranged in Finland and elsewhere. We would to thank everyone who participated in the production of information and exchange of opinions in the course of the project.


4 An expert opinion on Finnish and Swedish security policies commissioned by the authors: Reflections on Northern Security Policy: A Russian Expert View of Finland’s and Sweden’s Security Postures (Russia’s Institute for Strategic Studies, Moscow 2000), a 40-page manuscript in English (available at the Finnish Institute of
International Affairs). The report represents the collective view of RISS.

5 An expert opinion on Finnish security policy commissioned by the authors: *Finlandia, Rossiia i problemy evropeskoi bezopasnosti* (RAU-Universitet, Moscow 2000), a 40-page manuscript in Russian (available at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs). The report was written by Major General (Ret.) Iuri Lebedev, the Vice President of RAU, Major General (Ret.) Vladimir Belous, the Director of RAU’s Centre for International and Strategic Studies, and Colonel (Ret.) Vladimir Simakov, the President of RAU.

6 A written and oral survey commissioned by the authors on the views of officers who left active service in the Leningrad Military District during 1998-2000: *Rossiskaia positiia v otnoshenii politiki bezopasnosti Finljandii. Mnienie voenmosluzhashchih starshego pokoleniia*, October 2000 (available at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs). The survey was designed by Professor Andrei Pavlov. It was addressed to 29 senior officers (Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel, Major, Captain 1st to 3rd Degree) and 5 junior officers (Captain, Senior Lieutenant).

7 Urho Kekkonen lecture by President of Finland Tarja Halonen to the Paasikivi Society. The speech is available in English on the Internet at http://www.tpk.fi.

8 This document is available in English on the Internet at http://www.nnss.org.


10 Speech by President Martti Ahtisaari at the Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Moscow, 27 November 1997.


13 The original Russian language version of the SVOP report on

14 All documents referred to in this paragraph are available at http://www.nnss.org.
**Annex 1:**

**MILESTONES IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 1991</td>
<td>The Warsaw Pact is disbanded.</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 1991</td>
<td>NATO renews its strategic concept to correspond with the new political situation in the world. The new North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) is founded at the Rome Summit to develop cooperation with the former socialist republics of Europe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1991</td>
<td>The Soviet Union is officially dissolved in Alma-Ata.</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 1994</td>
<td>NATO invites European non-NATO countries to participate in the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP).</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 1994</td>
<td>Russian President presents a strong statement on NATO’s possible enlargement into countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Yeltsin states that Russia strongly opposes the accession of former Warsaw Pact countries to NATO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1994</td>
<td>Russia signs the PfP Framework Document. However, Russia will only join PfP once nearly all other former Soviet republics and former members of the Warsaw Pact have signed the agreement. Also the cooperation between Russian and NATO officials starts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1994</td>
<td>NATO decides to start the enlargement process at its summit. Russia protests and refuses to sign the individual partnership agreement related to PfP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1995</td>
<td>Russia finally yields and signs the individual PfP agreement and the document on relations between NATO and Russia. The document defines the central points of the cooperation between Russia and NATO. Russia continues to oppose NATO’s enlargement sharply, which partly paralyses the development of cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1997</td>
<td>Russia and NATO sign the Founding Act on mutual relations at the Paris Summit. In return for Russia’s concession on NATO’s enlargement, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) is founded. The PJC has a consultative nature. NACC is replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), of which PfP forms a separate part.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1997</td>
<td>In NATO’s Madrid Summit, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are invited to join NATO and the official membership negotiations begin. Russia states its opposition to the enlargement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1998</td>
<td>Russia’s representation at NATO is opened in Brussels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1999</td>
<td>NATO starts air strikes in Kosovo. As a result, the relations between NATO and Russia seriously deteriorate. The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary join NATO in Independence, Missouri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1999</td>
<td>The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary take part in NATO’s Washington Summit as full NATO-members. It is stated that the door is also open to new membership candidates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2000</td>
<td>The foreign ministers of Russia and NATO countries meet at PJC for the first time since the beginning of the Kosovo crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2001</td>
<td>NATO Secretary General George Robertson visits Moscow and opens the NATO Information Office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2001</td>
<td>Russia promises to support the United States in the war against terrorism, and broad-based cooperation ensues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2002</td>
<td>In the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Reykjavik, a new NATO-Russia Council (NRC) is agreed upon. At end of the month, Russia’s President and the Allied Heads of State and Government sign the agreement in Rome.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2002</td>
<td>At NATO’s Prague Summit, a decision is to be made on the enlargement of the organisation. In addition to the Baltic States, strong candidates include Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2:  
Russian Statements on Finland’s NATO Option 1992-2002

The following list of comments based on press material was gathered from the databases of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, and it provides a quite comprehensive image of Russian opinions concerning Finland that found their way to Finnish newspapers.

- In October 1992, Ambassador Iuri Deriabin thought that Russia presented no threat for which Finland should seek NATO membership. Deriabin’s statement was presented in an interview requested by Kainuun Sanomat, as a reaction to the speech by Jaakko Blomberg, Director General for Political Affairs at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which connected possible NATO membership and a possible Russian threat. Instead Deriabin said that Finland’s participation in the EC’s military-policy cooperation was entirely Finland’s own affair. (16 October 1992)

- In October 1993, Nykypäivä interviewed Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi, who had challenged Yeltsin and at the time already worked in the role of the shadow president of the Russian Parliament. According to Rutskoi, Finnish NATO membership would create serious problems, while Finland’s EC membership was a “natural process”. (1 October 1993)

- Also in October 1993, in an interview by Keskisuomalainen, Ambassador Deriabin advised Finns to consider the development of Europe and Russia in the NATO debate. Deriabin also thought that NATO would not ignore Russia’s opinion in accepting new members. The Russian threat could not be used as a basis for NATO or EC membership. Russia’s own interests were directed towards joint peacekeeping operations with NATO, while Russia’s own NATO membership was a thing of the distant future. (17 October 1993)

- Defence Minister Pavel Grachov visited Finland in October 1993 and stated that the possible NATO decision was Finland’s own affair. (18-20 October 1993)

- In April 1994, the Chairman of Russia’s Liberal Democratic Party, Vladimir Zhirinovski, stated during his visit to Finland (according Helsingin Sanomat) that NATO’s Partnership for Peace was as much against Russia as membership in the military alliance. The Partnership for Peace programme was only a decoy for small countries and a vestibule for actual membership. Finland’s NATO membership would be a hostile act towards Russia. According to Zhirinovski, Russia would be ready to guarantee Finland’s sovereignty and integrity, if Finland remained outside of military alliances. Zhirinovski did not expect Finland’s EU membership to produce any problems. (4 April 1994)
In May 1994, Russia’s views about Finland’s NATO debate got involved in an exchange of words in Finland’s domestic policy. The Chairman of SDP Paavo Lipponen, who had participated in the Foreign Affairs Committee’s trip to Moscow, stated in Demari that the European Union is not considered a threat in Moscow, but that NATO was an entirely different question. Helsingin Sanomat reported that Prime Minister Aho had commented that the discussion was unnecessary, since Finland had no intention of applying for NATO membership. The Chairman of the Green League, Pekka Haavisto, considered Lipponen’s “greetings from Moscow” as aggravated and purpose-oriented, and thought that it would be best for the management of Finland’s foreign policy that Finland evaluated its foreign and security policy decisions independently, instead of delivering messages from Moscow or Brussels. (30 May 1994)

During the following autumn (1994), the Mayor of St. Petersburg, Anatoli Sobchak presented his wish in Turun Sanomat that as a possible EU country, Finland would not join NATO, at least not unless NATO became a pan-European alliance in which Russia also participated. Sobchak referred to the neighbourly relationship between Finland and Russia as one basis for this view. (18 September 1994)

Again in March 1995, Ambassador Deriabin raised the issue of Finland’s NATO membership in Vasabladet, and “warned” Finland against joining NATO. He said that Finnish NATO membership would cause a major international problem, because it could lead to the isolation of Russia. (6 March 1995)

Finland’s Foreign Ministry replied to Deriabin’s statement, declaring that Finland’s policy was to increase peace and stability and improve cooperation in Europe. Deriabin, on the other hand, was surprised about the fuss his statement had raised and told Helsingin Sanomat that the “reaction of the Finns reminded me of the old days of Finlandisation.” (12 March 1995)

Later in May 1995, Helsingin Sanomat reported that an issue of the Russian Navy’s magazine ‘Morskoi Sbornik’ warned that a NATO naval base could be established in the Åland Islands, if Finland, Sweden and the Baltic States joined NATO. (15 May 1995)

In March 1996, Helsingin Sanomat reported that the Russian Foreign Ministry had issued a press release complaining about NATO’s ongoing military exercise in Norway, stating that “Moscow has noted NATO’s continuing military activity in Russia’s neighbourhood. The same applies to the exercise of the Finnish Defence Forces on 19-22 February in the Kymi province at Russia’s border.” Jaakko Blomberg, Director General for Political Affairs at the Ministry for Foreign Af-
fairs, commented that the exercise followed OSCE rules and that two Russian observers were present at the exercise. (2 May 1996)

- In May 1996 the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Karelia, Valerii Sliamin, had stated in Joensuu that if Finland joined NATO, the current cross-border cooperation would have to end and the relations between the two countries would be moved back by decades. (25 May 1996)

- In March 1997, President Boris Yeltsin stated in an interview with Helsingin Sanomat that he had a negative attitude toward Finland’s possible NATO membership, because it would weaken Russia’s geopolitical and geostrategic position and would force the country to take countermeasures. (16 March 1997)

- In December 1997, Deriabin’s successor, Ambassador Ivan Aboimov, gave a speech at the Paasikivi Society, in which he basically repeated Russia’s earlier arguments against NATO’s enlargement, without mentioning Finland separately in this connection. Instead, Russia showed a positive attitude towards the enlargement of the EU, because this means the increase of economic well-being. (9 December 1997)

- In February 1998, Helsingin Sanomat interviewed a high-ranking Russian officer, Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, Chief of the Defence Ministry’s Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation, who stated that Russia did not see any serious security threats in Northwestern Europe. However Russia would consider it a highly significant threat if Finland were to join the current NATO. According to Ivashov, in practice NATO acts “automatically”, and has a great military potential. (4 February 1998)

- In May 1998, Ambassador Ivan Aboimov commented in Keskisuomalainen that Finland’s military non-alignment promotes stability in the region and that is in Finland’s national interests. (9 May 1998)

- In November 1999, Aboimov’s successor, Alexander Pantsev, brought a bit of new colour to the NATO debate by stating in an article in Hufvudstadsbladet at the beginning of his term, that it was Finland’s affair, whether or not it decided to join NATO. He did add, however, that the good relations between Finland and Russia might deteriorate with Finnish NATO membership and that Russia would be forced to re-evaluate its policy towards Finland. On the other hand, Pantsev did not consider the EU’s foreign policy a problem, even if it included common defence or even the use of NATO’s military arsenal in connection with the common defence. According to
Pantsev, the question is not related to pure potential, but to who controls it. (4 November 1999)

• In June 2000, *Iltasanomat* interviewed Colonel-General Ivashov again. This time he was reported to be worried about the fact that despite its declared non-alignment, Finland was sliding closer and closer to NATO in the area of political and military cooperation. According to the newspaper, Ivashov called the Partnership for Peace programme a sort of a membership school, and that in some cases the exercises were only a front for practising military operations directed against Russia. (21 June 2000)

• In October 2000, the representatives of the Parliamentary Defence Committee visited Moscow, where they met with Leonid Ivashov’s deputy, Vice Admiral Vladimir Kuznetsov. *Iltasanomat* reported that the Vice Admiral had stated with an agitated voice that “It would foolish to join NATO now. Finland has no foreseeable threats. If you want problems (in the relations between Finland Russia) and want to join NATO, then go right ahead.” According to the members of the Committee, it became clear in Moscow that NATO was to Russia like a red rag to a bull. (26 October 2000)

• In early November 2000, Russian Ambassador Aleksandr Pantsev visited Oulu and stated in *Kaleva* that should Finland change its attitude towards NATO, Russia’s relations with Finland would also change. Russians were not convinced by the explanation that NATO would guarantee security in Europe. (2 November 2000)

• The newspaper *Helsingin Sanomat* referred to news presented by the Finnish News Agency, according to which a report by an unofficial foreign and security policy council (SVOP) that represented the elite of Russia’s foreign and security policy considers the Finnish NATO debate as worrying. The document encouraged Russian diplomats to influence Nordic actors who had understood the dangers of NATO’s enlargement. (16 February 2001)

• In September 2001, prior to his visit to Finland, President Vladimir Putin gave an interview to *Helsingin Sanomat*, in which he commented NATO’s enlargement, saying “We do not believe there is any objective factor to justify NATO’s enlargement”. “We believe that a better solution would be to create a common security architecture in Europe, one that would not create new divisions. What problems does NATO solve? Against whom does it protect? Today’s real threats are terrorism, drug trafficking, organised crime and arms trade. We must be prepared to work together against these threats.” (1 September 2001)
• In September 2001, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and President Vladimir Putin visited Finland. In a press conference, Ivanov stated that Finland decides the NATO membership question by itself. “However, we believe that under the current conditions, it would important to build a common security architecture in Europe, one that would mean common security for everyone.” Putin made a similar statement about the NATO membership of the Baltic States: “It is their decision, but we do not see any objective reasons for NATO’s enlargement.” (3-4 September 2001)

• In early October 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Brussels, where he met EU and NATO leaders. The discussions mainly involved the war against terrorism and increasing cooperation between NATO and Russia, as well as the NATO membership negotiations of the Baltic States. *Helsingin Sanomat* reported that Putin had been more positive than earlier about the NATO membership of the Baltic States. According to Putin, NATO should be viewed from an entirely new perspective. “It is becoming a political organisation, so I have been told by EU and NATO leaders. If this is so, the situation changes considerably.” (4 October 2001)

• In mid-February 2002, *Suomen Kuvalehti* published an article by Iuri Deriabin, in which he wondered why Finland has reservations on the NATO issue. According to Deriabin, positive development trends should not be overestimated. He also warned that the NATO membership of the Baltic States could have a negative impact not only on the relations between the Baltic States and Russia, but also in relations between Russia and its northern neighbours in general. According to Deriabin, “A key condition for maintaining security and stability in Northern Europe is that Sweden and Finland remain outside of military alliances”. Deriabin also suggested wider military cooperation in Northern Europe. (15 February 2002)

• At the end of February 2002, Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen visited Moscow, where he explained the common plans of Finland and Sweden on the development of NATO to President Vladimir Putin. *Helsingin Sanomat* reported that Putin had considered non-alignment a splendid basis for Finnish policy. (1 March 2002)
Annex 3: Russian Public Opinion on Russia–NATO Relations
(source: Fond “Obshestvennoe Mnenie”, http://www.fom.ru)

Do you think that NATO is an aggressive or defensive alliance?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February 1997</th>
<th>March 2000</th>
<th>September 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Is NATO’s enlargement a threat to Russia?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February 1997</th>
<th>July 1999</th>
<th>September 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Should Russia strengthen its cooperation with NATO?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>July 1999</th>
<th>September 2001</th>
<th>May 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Which of the following statements is closest to your own opinion?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>September 2001</th>
<th>May 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia’s NATO membership is desirable and possible</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia’s NATO membership is desirable but not possible</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia’s NATO membership is not desirable but possible</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia’s NATO membership is not desirable nor possible</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do you think that Russia should join a military-political alliance together with European countries and the United States? (November 2001)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abbreviations

AC  Arctic Council (founded in 1996)
BEAC  Barents Euro-Arctic Council (founded in 1993)
CBSS  Council of Baltic Sea States (founded in 1992)
CFE Treaty  Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (signed in 1990)
CFSP  The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy
EAPC  NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (founded in 1997)
EMU  European Monetary Union
FCMA  Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and Finland (in force 1948-1992)
INF Treaty  Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (signed in 1987)
PARP  Planning and Review Process included in Partnership for Peace programme
PfP  NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme (started in 1994)
PJC  Permanent Joint Council between NATO and Russia (founded in 1997)
NNWFZ  Nordic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Initiative
NRC  NATO–Russia Council agreed upon in May 2002, that replaced the PJC
SVOP  Unofficial Council of Russian Foreign and Defence Policy
WTO  World Trade Organization