



NO RELIEF

SURVEYING THE EFFECTS OF GUN VIOLENCE ON
HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT PERSONNEL

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“*hd*”

Centre for
Humanitarian
Dialogue



ABOUT THE REPORT

What is the impact of weapons availability and misuse on the work of relief and development agencies?

Are attacks on workers on the rise, as is commonly assumed? Where do the gravest dangers lie – from political or criminal violence? Are these agencies adequately preparing their international and national staff to meet the security threats arising?

No Relief aims to answer these and many other related questions, drawing on the results of the largest victimisation survey ever undertaken of development and humanitarian personnel, based on over 2,000 questionnaires, involving staff from 17 UN and NGO agencies in 90 countries.

Its key findings include that one in five workers face serious security incidents; that workers are cut off from assisting large numbers of people in need because of armed threats and the misuse of guns, that agencies are increasingly turning to private security to protect staff and supplies and that the biggest threat appears to be criminal violence, from civilians armed with handguns.

No Relief makes a number of recommendations that deserve close attention. They are targeted at agencies and governments, for steps that can be taken to address gun violence and to better regulate the arms trade. This is particularly crucial in the lead up to the 2006 UN Review Conference to evaluate progress made on the UN Programme of Action on small arms and next steps for global action.

COVER IMAGE

Rebel SPLA soldiers of the Nuba Mountains guard United Nations relief supplies, 16 May 1998, Sudan.

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ABOUT THE PROJECT PARTNERS

The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre) is an independent, Geneva-based foundation whose purpose is to prevent human suffering in war. Our humanitarian approach starts from the premise that preventing and resolving armed conflict is the surest means of doing so, and to this end we promote and facilitate dialogue between belligerents.

Through our work, we seek to contribute to efforts to improve the global response to armed conflict. Our operational engagements are complemented by policy and analytical work focused on civilian protection, mediation techniques, transitional issues and arms and security matters.

HD Centre's work on small arms control, began in 2001, includes several projects that aim to draw attention to the human cost of small arms availability and misuse, and to identify policy options for action by governments and other actors.

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The **Small Arms Survey** is an independent research project located at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. Established in 1999, the project is supported by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, and by contributions from the Governments of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. It collaborates with the United Nations, international organisations, and with various research institutes and non-governmental organisations in many countries including Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Georgia, Germany, Israel, Kenya, Norway, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

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TERMS AND ACRONYMS

In the Line of Fire – The Security and Risk in Humanitarian and Development Action Study, also known as the *In the Line of Fire* project.

Phase I – A large-scale project co-ordinated by the Small Arms Survey and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue involving nine partner agencies from November 2001 to August 2003. The primary instrument was a victimisation survey as well as support for the Johns Hopkins study on the mortality and morbidity of humanitarian workers taking place between January 2002 and August 2003. The *In the Line of Fire* report is available at www.smallarmssurvey.org and www.hdcentre.org in French, Spanish and English.

Phase II – Expanded to involve over 17 partner agencies, from September 2003 and July 2005. The largest victimisation survey of relief workers yet undertaken. The *No Relief* report is available at www.smallarmssurvey.org and www.hdcentre.org in multiple languages.

Reporting period – The distribution of questionnaires as part of Phase II took place between February and November 2004 and involved over 2,000 respondents in 90 countries.

Focal points – At least 17 individuals in partner agencies who were responsible for liaising with the project co-ordinators, distributing the questionnaires within their own agencies, ensuring their return and providing agency-related information. Focal points are listed in the acknowledgements.

Focus countries – Afghanistan and Angola were selected because they are countries in different phases of transition from protracted armed conflicts. Both nations have had or are in the process of official dis-

armament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes and gauging the impact(s) was an additional factor in focussing on these countries. In addition, the majority of partner agencies were working in these two countries.

Focus regions – The Great Lakes (particularly Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, DRC and Congo-Brazzaville) and the Middle East (particularly Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Palestine and Israel) were selected because they are regions with various forms of ongoing violent conflict, as well as different issues and approaches when it comes to tackling small arms control. In addition, the majority of partner agencies have operations and programming in these two regions.

Programme of Action – The 2001 UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. The full text is available at disarmament2.un.org/cab/poa.html.

Small arms and light weapons – Though no consensus-based definition for small arms and light weapons exists, ‘small arms’ generally refer to grenades, assault rifles, handguns, revolvers, light machine guns. ‘Light weapons’ include anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, heavy machine guns, and recoilless rifles. These two categories do not include heavy artillery, other large conventional weapons, or anti-personnel land mines. See the 1997 Report on the UN Panel of Experts definition (available at www.un.org/sc/committees/sanctions/a52298.pdf). The terms guns, firearms, weapons and small arms are used interchangeably throughout this report.

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FOREWORD

An alarming trend has been noticed in recent years: deliberate attacks against relief and development workers and agencies are on the rise, from Chechnya to Haiti, from Iraq to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This is making the work of agencies increasingly precarious. But worse than that, every time workers are targeted or cannot operate for fear of attacks, it is civilians who pay the price.

Whether the violence they face is a result of conflict or crime, the proliferation of small arms is a major contributor to their perceptions of insecurity.

No Relief greatly increases our understanding of the multiple ways in which personnel and operations are affected by the ubiquity of weapons. The survey has provided useful insights into how agencies respond to this threat, and what more we can do to increase the safety of all of our staff. In shedding such light on the specific tools of violence, this study also draws our attention to an area where humanitarian and development agencies can collectively make a difference: tackling the arms trade and the negative impacts of gun violence.

This report shows that more attention is urgently needed to ensure that weapons do not flow to areas

of violent insecurity. By focusing the lens on affected countries such as Afghanistan and Angola, it also notes that where arms are in ready supply, they must be rapidly and comprehensively removed and destroyed. Relief and development agencies need to add their voice to the international debates on small arms control and make sure the reality their workers face daily is better understood by policy makers and governments. Rather than a new area of work, I believe such involvement is an integral part of efforts to protect civilians.

I commend the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the Small Arms Survey for this powerful documentation of a particular human cost of the unregulated arms trade. The onus is now on development and relief agencies – and all governments – to take these findings on board and draw, and act on the appropriate conclusions.

Denis Caillaux
Secretary General
CARE International
June 2005

INTRODUCTION

Humanitarian and development personnel are increasingly facing intentional violence, intimidation and evacuations. Between July 2003 and July 2004 at least 100 civilian UN and NGO personnel were violently killed. The consequences of gun violence on the security of workers and their access to civilian populations has been profound. The recent attacks against humanitarian workers in Iraq and Afghanistan have sent shockwaves through the international community – and the after-shocks will be felt for some time to come. As a measure of its seriousness, the 2004 *UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes* strongly condemned the increasing dangers facing relief and development workers.¹

The human toll of gun violence – including both conflict and crime-related violence – is severe. For every relief or development worker who is fatally or even non-fatally wounded, thousands of people can potentially suffer. Armed violence triggers suspensions and evacuations, thereby halting the critical flow of livelihood assistance and essential services. Moreover, if presence can contribute to protection, as many believe, absence can facilitate renewed armed violence. While civilians in crisis situations draw upon a set of coping systems to deal with stress, there is no doubt that the sudden collapse of humanitarian and development interventions can greatly exacerbate their risks and insecurity.²

There is a belief that most armed insecurity has been concentrated in a comparatively small group of countries emerging from protracted wars: Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). But other countries have also witnessed an upsurge in intentional armed violence directed against civilians, including humanitarian and development workers. In Uganda, Papua New Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire personnel have been directly targeted, and agencies are withdrawing their staff and closing down their projects and operations. As this report went to press, large numbers of UN and NGO relief

workers were being evacuated from Haiti and Western Darfur due to threats from militia there.³

No Relief details the findings of an action-oriented research project undertaken from 2003–2004 referred to as the *In the Line of Fire* project. It constitutes the largest victimisation survey of humanitarian and development workers ever undertaken. It drew on an array of partner agencies from the UN and NGO sectors as well as academics, practitioners, public health specialists and media representatives. The project aimed to highlight the scale and distribution of guns in areas where agencies work; review the impacts of arms availability on the quality and quantity of relief and development assistance; and document the human cost of gun violence on personnel *and* civilians.

The project also aimed to generate concrete recommendations and entry-points for agencies to improve the security of their personnel, and to promote greater respect for the rights and well-being of ordinary people caught up in situations of armed violence. In this way, it has advanced a people-centred perspective on the human toll of the arms trade. Such an approach is vital as the UN process on small arms control moves towards an important Review Conference in 2006. While *No Relief* acknowledges the many gains made with respect to improving security management, many of these in response to changes in the contexts where relief and development workers are based, more needs to be done.

No Relief makes for sober reading. It finds that workers are increasingly treated as soft targets, and are exposed to escalating risks to their security. But this is not all. Due to their vulnerability and the resulting efforts to increase their protection, sacrosanct and fundamental humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality are being compromised. Operational strategies to strengthen humanitarian access and ensure impartiality through the promotion of *acceptance* are also increasingly threatened.⁴ Yet it is *criminal* violence committed with firearms – not attacks by

armed combatants – that remains the most significant threat facing workers. *No Relief* finds that due in many cases to *civilians armed with guns*, agencies are regularly forced to evacuate and suspend their activities.

The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre) and the Small Arms Survey urge governments, international organisations, and NGOs to consider the findings carefully. We call on donors and agencies to quickly adopt concrete measures to better protect their staff, including a combination of guidelines, security training regimes, early warning and incident monitoring systems, and effective communication mechanisms to strengthen the security of personnel in order to prevent them from being caught in the line of fire.

Notes

1. “The ability of the United Nations to protect civilians and help end conflict is directly related to United Nations staff security, which has been eroding since the mid-1990s. To be able to maintain presence, and operate securely and effectively, the United Nations

needs four things: the capacity to perform its mandated tasks fully; freedom from unwarranted intrusion by Member States into operations; full respect by staff of United Nations codes of impartiality; and a professional security service, with access to Member States’ intelligence and threat assessments. The Secretary-General has recommended the creation of such a service, headed by a Director who will report directly to him. Member States should support and fully fund the proposed Directorate of Security and accord high priority to assisting the Secretary-General in implementing a new staff security system in 2005.” UN Secretary General’s Report on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004), para 74

2. For a discussion of “coping strategies” in situations of human or natural emergencies, see Donini et al (2005) and the work of the Tufts Humanitarianism and War Project at www.hwproject.tufts.edu/.

3. See for example, BBC (2005) “Threatened UN staff leave Darfur” 16 March at www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4354933.stm.

4. OCHA defines *acceptance* as being “based on the premise that local communities and power structures will allow and even support humanitarian activities if these activities are well understood. The acceptance approach requires that those in a position to undermine humanitarian work must see it to be consistent and believe it to be independent”. See the December 2004 Statement by Under-Secretary General Jan Egeland at the Security Council Open Debate on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.

KEY FINDINGS

No Relief has generated a number of findings that pose important challenges for the policies and practices of humanitarian and development agencies. Drawing on a sample of 2,089 respondents from more than 17 international agencies in 96 countries and territories, it finds that humanitarian and development workers are the explicit targets of criminal violence and, to a lesser extent, of intentional violence from state and non-state actors. It also finds that while fatalities among workers have remained comparatively stable since the all-time high in the mid-1990s, perceptions of insecurity and victimisation appear to be on the rise. As a result, access to beneficiaries and a secure humanitarian space are increasingly constrained – particularly where the prevalence of small arms and light weapons is high.

Specifically, *No Relief* finds that:

1. *The most significant threat facing workers is civilians armed with guns – often with handguns.* Almost one in five respondents reported being involved in a security incident in the previous six months. In addition to threats from armed conflict, civilians with guns, particularly criminals and petty thieves, are a primary cause of insecurity for humanitarian and development personnel. While much is made of the deliberate targeting of humanitarian and development actors by armed groups and warring factions, by far the biggest risk emerges from the threat of criminal violence. Weak or outdated approaches by governments to regulate civilian access and possession of small arms could be regarded as a significant contributing factor in many locations.

2. *Armed violence prevents humanitarian and development workers from accessing beneficiaries.* There is a direct correlation between the perceived availability of small arms and the presence of armed violence, and access of workers to beneficiaries. In fact, more than one-fifth (21%) of all respondents claimed that 25% or more of their beneficiary target groups was

rendered inaccessible in the previous six months due to the occurrence of routine armed threats.

3. *Suspensions of operations due to war-related or criminal violence involving guns are common.* One-third of all respondents (33%) reported having had operations or projects suspended in the previous six months due to armed conflict, as compared to 26% who reported having suspended operations due to armed crime. This represents a higher proportion than was reported in Phase I, in which only 13% of respondents indicated a suspension or delay due to armed crime or conflict in the previous six months. As *No Relief* is based on a more robust sample and distribution of respondents than Phase I, its conclusions can be considered to be more reliable.

4. *Agencies are turning to armed guards to protect themselves from violent insecurity.* There appears to have been a significant increase in the use of armed guards by participating agencies since Phase I, with up to 32% of all respondents reporting the use of guards in *No Relief*. It appears that the *hardening of targets*, particularly through the contracting of private security, is an increasingly common response to mitigating insecurity.⁵

5. *Security training for staff appears to be comparatively widespread, but is still more common among expatriates than nationals.* It is still the case, however, that fewer than half (44%) of all respondents indicated that they had received training from their current agency (although this appears to represent an improvement of the 15% who reported receiving such training in Phase I of the study). *No Relief* confirms earlier suspicions that expatriate workers are still more likely to have received security training than national staff. This trend was also reflected in *No Relief's* two focus regions – the Great Lakes and the Middle East. Alarming, one's origins (expatriate or national) appear to be a more accurate predictor of receiving security training than the reported levels of violence in a given country.

6. *Responses from the study's two focus regions – the Great Lakes and the Middle East – revealed differences in the way workers perceive the insecurity arising from weapons availability.* Respondents in the Middle East were more likely to report working in an environment characterised by “high violence” than workers in the Great Lakes region.

7. *Victimisation rates in Afghanistan and Angola are especially high, compared to the global baseline.* In both Afghanistan and Angola, the proportion of national staff (as opposed to expatriates) who reported having been personally victimised is higher still. *No Relief* finds that national respondents from Afghanistan are three times more likely than their expatriate counterparts to report having been personally victimised in the past six months.

8. *No Relief* finds that respondents reporting the highest levels of armed violence, prevalence and misuse of weapons, and perceived threats are clustered in relatively small

number of countries. The most acute levels of violence were reported by personnel in Guinea, Nepal, the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), Uganda, Kenya, and Iraq. Moreover, respondents from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Iraq, Côte d'Ivoire, Congo-Brazzaville, and Uganda registered the highest levels of prevalence and misuse of small arms and light weapons. Further, personnel in OPT, Iraq, Afghanistan, Uganda and Nepal appear to record the highest levels of threat perception. According to these criteria, *No Relief* finds that the OPT, Uganda and Iraq appear to be the most dangerous places to work.

Notes

5. The concept of hardening the target refers to methods of increasing the physical security of workers. This can include restrictions on movement, the use of perimeter fences and the screening of visitors. It can also include the hiring of private security guards to dissuade would-be aggressors. In this context, however, it bears little relation to the protection of civilians or “humanitarian protection”.

SECTION 1 MEASURING THE THREAT OF SMALL ARMS AVAILABILITY AND MISUSE

Despite growing concern over the attendant threats of armed violence, humanitarian and development agencies continue to under-value the importance of collecting and analysing data on the distribution, types and impacts of firearms. *No Relief* finds that the establishment of robust and reliable indicators of risk and insecurity arising from weapons availability and misuse could yield a number of direct and indirect benefits for agencies. At a minimum, raising awareness of the nature of the security environment in which agencies work, the prevalence, location, and types of guns in use, national firearms legislation and insights into the effectiveness of security mechanisms, are first steps to improving the protection of civilians and staff alike.

But senior managers in the humanitarian and development sectors have been slow to respond to the small arms crisis partly because they have lacked compelling evidence of the dimensions of the problem. While some empirical studies have highlighted the human security consequences of gun violence on livelihoods and entitlements,⁶ the global documentation of intentional violence directed at staff in these sectors remains uneven and inconsistent. There is little accounting of the total financial and productivity costs of fatal and non-fatal injuries – or their implications on issues ranging from the quality of programming, the provision of insurance, or recruitment policies.

But even if the political and institutional will to respond has been slow, the risk of gun violence is nevertheless widely acknowledged. For example, the UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Co-ordinator argued that the humanitarian community's capacity to "protect and deliver humanitarian assistance to civilian populations in need is undermined by blatant attacks and threats against our unarmed humanitarian staff . . . Attacks by any armed group will only serve to paralyse the large and effective humanitarian operations."⁷

Agencies are now being forced to respond to the insecurity crisis. Whether a function of armed conflict or crime, the deliberate targeting of relief and devel-

opment workers has catalysed a surge in evacuations and closures, many of which have featured in media headlines. In Afghanistan, for example, at least 29 workers were shot to death in the first six months of 2004. After almost 24 years of operating in the country, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) evacuated its operations from the country after losing at least five personnel to violence-induced injuries. CARE, World Vision and other agencies suspended Iraq operations indefinitely in late 2004 due to the real and perceived threats against their employees. Following the killing of four Save the Children staff in 2004, the agency also reluctantly evacuated its employees from Darfur at the end of the year.

The humanitarian community's capacity to protect and deliver humanitarian assistance to civilian populations in need is undermined by blatant attacks and threats against our unarmed humanitarian staff.

However, as Figure 1 below indicates, far more violence directed against workers occurred in 2004 than was reported in the news headlines. Victimisation is not restricted to intentional violence leading to death. It is more subtle – ranging from armed assaults and robbery to sexual harassment and intimidation. Many agencies aim to document the security incidents experienced by their staff, if only in an *ad hoc* fashion. Unfortunately, however, most organisations are unable to gather disaggregated statistics because definitions of what constitutes a "security incident" are incompatible, their organisational capacities are limited, or because employees themselves are reluctant to report having been victimised. The table below

(Figure 1) highlights a number of the more common incidents reported by a sample of agencies that do collect reasonably detailed information on the victimisation experienced by their personnel.

The evidence base: Workers' exposure to gun violence

There is widespread belief that intentional violence against humanitarian and development workers is at an all-time high.⁸ *No Relief* finds that while fatal and non-fatal injuries among workers may have stabilised or even declined in comparison with the mid-1990s, there is a *perception* that victimisation is nevertheless on the rise.⁹ In the words of one UN security specialist,

“what has increased may not be the figures, but the fear.”¹⁰

No Relief finds that data collection by agencies on the exposure and impacts of gun violence on humanitarian and development workers is not yet routine. Nevertheless, important antecedents to the present study exist. The Small Arms Survey and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), for example, have highlighted some of the negative costs of widespread misuse of small arms and light weapons for humanitarian and development agencies, including the frequent interruption of operations and inaccessibility of beneficiary populations, and the pervasiveness of intentional violence directed at civilians and workers alike.¹¹ These studies, however, were unable to deter-

Figure 1 Violent incidents reported by a sample of agencies: 2003–2004

	UN		Concern		IOM		IRC		SCF	
	No.	Rate/ 1,000	No.	Rate/ 1,000	No.	Rate/ 1,000	No.	Rate/ 1,000	No.	Rate/ 1,000
Deaths	24	0.34	3	0.81	1	.0.24	2	0.29	7	1.76
Hostage-Taking	12 ^A	0.17	1	0.24	4	0.58	0	0
Assaults	388 ^B	5.54	15	3.64	8 ^J	1.17	5 ^L	1.26
Harassment	307 ^C	4.38	29	7.05
Bomb Threats	34 ^D	0.48	6	1.45
Violence directed at Agency(ies)	698 ^E	9.97	7	1.89	32	7.77	26 ^K	3.80	2	5
Theft	1,806 ^F	2.58	27	6.56
Evacuations	...		10	2.70	1	0.24	5	0.73	10 ^M	2.52
Attacks on Convoys	7 ^G	0.1
Total Staff (denominator)	70,000 ^H		3,700 ^I		4,115		6,835		3,964	

Notes:

- A. Includes 7 hostage-taking incidents with 14 staff in 2003 and 5 in the first six months of 2004.
- B. Includes 258 assaults in 2003, 130 in the first six months of 2004.
- C. There were 168 incidents of harassment reported in 2003, 139 in the first six months of 2004.
- D. Approximately 30 bomb threats were reported in 2003, 4 in the first six months of 2004.
- E. Some 270 incidents of violence against the UN were reported in 2003, 428 in the first six months of 2004.
- F. At least 550 incidents of theft were reported in 2003, and 1,256 in the first six months of 2004.
- G. There were 7 attacks on convoys in 2004 – Iraq, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Pakistan, DRC and Afghanistan.
- H. It is currently impossible to determine the precise denominator of UN personnel – though current estimates are approximately 70,000.
- I. This number does not include 300 staff based in UK offices.
- J. This rises to approximately 18 if all injuries are included.
- K. Includes both “direct” and “indirect” violence.
- L. Includes assaults leading to intentional injury.
- M. All temporary relocations.

People’s lives are being needlessly lost at the very time when they are working to save lives. We need action now to stop this double tragedy.

Ramiro Lopes da Silva, WFP Sudan Country Director, commenting on the death of two staff on 8 May 2005¹²

mine absolute numbers or rates of death and injury because of uneven data collection capabilities and the absence of denominator data.

In addition to these early investigations, a retrospective survey administered by researchers at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health reports that intentional violence was the leading cause of death for workers of 32 agencies between 1985 and 1998.¹³ It observed that age, gender and experience alone did not significantly influence risk of intentional violence. Dennis King has also found that most workers were killed in the past few years during ambushes on aid convoys – usually in remote and rebel-controlled areas when delivering supplies or conducting assessments.¹⁴ King’s non-exhaustive review of multiple

Figure 2 Countries with highest reported number of relief workers killed: 1997–2003

Country or Territory	Fatalities
Angola	58
Afghanistan	36
Iraq	32
Sudan	29
Democratic Republic of the Congo	18
Rwanda	17
Somalia	16
Burundi	11
Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)	7
Uganda	7
Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo)	5
Liberia	5

Source: King (2004a)

Figure 3 Reported humanitarian and development workers killed in acts of violence: 1997–2003¹⁵

	National staff	Expatriate staff
1997	12	10
1998	24	23
1999	22	13
2000	36	11
2001	18	10
2002	27	9
2003	49	27

Source: King (2004b)

sources shows that the majority of these reported deaths were concentrated in Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East (see Figure 2).

This recent accumulation of evidence also suggests that it is local or national staff members who are the primary victims of intentional violence, and not expatriates.¹⁶ According to one analyst, “[N]ational staff security should not be seen as just another headache we have to deal with. Instead, they are the prime resource in developing appropriate and effective security strategies for all staff”.¹⁷ Drawing on a review of archival media reports since 1997, King has observed that overall rates of violence against workers – particularly national staff – has increased.¹⁸ *No Relief* finds that this picture is largely accurate, though trends vary from region to region.

*It is local or national staff members that are primarily victims of intentional violence, and not expatriates.*¹⁹

A number of recent initiatives promise to deepen our understanding of the present mortality and injury trends among relief and development workers. For example, an ongoing US-based project examining the mortality and morbidity of humanitarian workers seeks to systematically document security incidents prospectively reported by more than twenty-one NGOs, as well as the ICRC, IFRC, UNHCR, UNICEF, and

WFP, from 2003 to 2008.²⁰ Though the project is still in its early days, a number of trends are already emerging from the data, such as the presence of guns in more than half of all reported incidents involving intentional violence, and the overwhelming presence of weapons in fatal injuries.²¹

Building on these and other *quantitative* studies, the first phase of *In the Line of Fire* sought to focus on the “subjective” dimensions of insecurity. Specifically, drawing on a set of qualitative tools, the project aimed to explore the perceptions and behavioural responses of humanitarian and development workers to their own security situation. A self-administered victimisation survey, designed in consultation with a wide bandwidth of actors, aimed to privilege the voice of workers, and probe untapped issues. The findings from Phase I are summarised in Box 1 below.

Box 1 Summary of findings from Phase I

Phase I of the “In the Line of Fire” project, conducted in 2002–2003, was the first systematic survey of perceptions of humanitarian and development worker insecurity due to small arms availability and misuse. Based on more than 600 responses from workers in 39 countries and two territories, the key findings included:

Respondents report working in a variety of security environments: from “little” or “no” violence to “widespread armed conflict”. A strong factor related to individuals’ assessments of their security environment is the estimated level of gun violence.

Regardless of the security context, humanitarian and development workers reported a large number of groups to be in possession of weapons. In addition to the military, police, and private security forces, a majority of respondents report many other groups to be armed, including organised criminal groups, insurgent groups, and civilians.

Operations are also adversely affected by the availability and use of guns. Frequent obstacles – such as evacuations, suspensions or delays, and inaccessible beneficiaries – are associated with violent security environments and with higher estimates of small arms prevalence and misuse. Nearly three-quarters of personnel working in areas with “very high” levels of weapons availability reported recent suspensions or delays in operations.

Civilians are also frequently the victims of small arms use. Targeting of civilians, unintentional death and injury, and frequent use of guns for criminal or coercive purposes were all noted. Overall, the highest proportion of firearms-related death and injury among civilians were attributed to handguns. In areas characterised by widespread conflict or war, assault rifles surpassed handguns as the leading cause of weapons-related death and injury among civilians. Respondents also appear to routinely encounter a variety of small arms – mostly handguns and assault rifles – in and around “programme” areas.

Parameters of In the Line of Fire: Phase II

The core instrument of the *In the Line of Fire* project is a victimisation survey. From the very beginning, agencies were selected to participate in the survey according to their global reach, the diversity of their activities and contexts in which they worked.²² Phase II advanced a similar process as in Phase I, and elaborated a robust survey distribution system to ensure widespread dissemination of the questionnaire (see Annex 1).

As in Phase I, two regions were identified to generate a more focused understanding of the dynamics of arms availability and misuse and their impacts on relief and development workers.²³ The Great Lakes (particularly Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, DRC and Congo-Brazzaville) and the Middle East (particularly Iraq, Iran,

Many staff feel personally threatened by guns. Perceptions of personal threat are heightened not only in areas characterised by higher levels of violence or conflict, but also in areas where civilian possession of guns is seen to be more prevalent. In addition to perceptions of personal threat, a large number of respondents report that they or their colleagues have experienced serious security incidents, including armed intimidation, armed robbery, armed assault, detention and kidnapping. Many respondents report colleagues having suffered either non-fatal or fatal firearms-related injuries.

Despite working in dangerous environments, personnel indicated that they have not received any security training within the organisation for which they currently work. The frequency of reported security training does not always correspond to the level of violence in a given environment, to the estimated prevalence and misuse of small arms, or to the level of personal threat expressed by respondents. Potentially more disconcerting, national staff are half as likely as expatriate staff to receive security training in many organisations.

Those that have received security training, however, typically view the training or awareness as being “helpful” in dealing with the availability and misuse of small arms. Security training or awareness is also associated with an increased tendency for individuals to take security precautions, such as walking with others or limiting local travel. The vast majority of respondents were unfamiliar with basic safety procedures associated with guns and ammunition, such as applying safety locks or the safe storage of guns. Those who received security training, however, were no more knowledgeable about gun safety than those who had not undertaken security training.

Source: Beasley et al (2003)

Jordan, Palestine and Israel) were selected because they are regions suffering from protracted violent conflict. In addition, the majority of partner agencies have operations and programming in these two regions.

The number of partners increased dramatically between Phase I and Phase II. A total of ten international NGOs and seven UN agencies participated in 2004 – a 35% increase. Participating agencies included: CARE, Concern, GTZ, the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Médecins du Monde (Mdm), Oxfam-GB, Registered Engineers for Disaster Relief (RedR), Save the Children, World Vision, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the Organisation for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),

the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Security Co-ordinator (UNSECOORD) and the World Food Programme (WFP). Agency participation rates are provided in Figure 4 below.

Based on consultations with participating agencies throughout 2003 and 2004, a number of amendments and improvements were introduced to the questionnaire.²⁴ It was agreed that the criteria and conditions for inclusion be kept deliberately broad and flexible so as to ensure the widest participation possible. As a result, the number of countries represented almost tripled from 39 in 2002 to at least 96 in 2004 (see Annex 2i).²⁵ The number of respondents also tripled from just over 600 respondents in 2002 to 2,089 in 2004.

**Figure 4 Answering the call:
Agency participation rates in 2004**

	Frequency	Percent of total responses
CARE	433	21.0
Concern Worldwide	171	8.3
GTZ	56	2.7
IFRC	113	5.4
IOM	42	2.0
IRC	89	4.3
MDM	5	0.2
OCHA	31	1.5
Oxfam	91	4.4
Red-R	10	0.4
SCF	95	4.6
UNDP	151	7.3
UNHCR	117	5.6
UNICEF	112	5.4
UNSECOORD	18	0.8
WFP	154	7.4
World Vision International	173	8.4
Other local NGO/agency	198	9.6
Total	2,059	100
System (unidentified)	30	
	2,089	

Notes

6. See, for example, Beasley et al (2003), SAS (2002), Muggah with Griffiths (2002), and ICRC (1999).
7. See, for example, OCHA (2004)
8. See, for example, the work by King (2004b; 2002a), which is based on a review of IRIN and other reports documenting isolated security-related incidents.
9. But despite this widespread perception of increased insecurity, the few statistics that are available are unable to confirm the trend. As noted in a study by ECHO, “[c]onclusions cannot easily be drawn from available statistics, because of inconsistencies in definitions and lack of information about the overall number of humanitarian workers” (ECHO 2004) pp. 1–2.
10. See, for example, OCHA (2004).
11. See, for example, ICRC (1999); Muggah with Griffiths (2002); Muggah and Berman (2001); and Small Arms Survey (2002). Other studies, such as Sheik et al (2000) and Seet and Burnham (2000), have appraised longitudinal trends in mortality and morbidity among humanitarian workers and peace-keeping personnel. These studies draw on existing agency-level reporting systems and lack denominator data.
12. ‘Sudan: Two aid workers killed in Darfur,’ IRIN News, 12 May 2005
13. See Sheik et al (2001). Vehicle accidents and illnesses came second and third respectively. The study included any death between 1985 and 1998 occurring among workers in the field or as a result of them having worked in the field during emergency or transitional periods.
14. See King (2004a). Investments in vehicle protection and defensive driving could arguably contribute to reducing these fatal injuries.
15. The King (2004a) study did not discriminate by discrete “cause” of intentional death – whether gunshot, stabbing or otherwise. It did observe, however, that the types of attacks leading to death included ambushes, murder (not in vehicle), car/truck bombing, landmines, anti-aircraft attack and aerial bombings.
16. The term “national staff” covers a number of situations, varying from nationality, relationship to the local population or the beneficiary group, level of responsibility and so on. It is used

here to connote any humanitarian or development worker who was born in the country in which he or she currently works. See, for example, ECHO (2004).

17. See, for example, InterAction (2001), p. 2.

18. See King (2004a; 2004b).

19. See OCHA (2004).

20. Rowley, Elizabeth and Gilbert Burnham (2005). The project is based at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and was supported by the HD Centre and the Small Arms Survey over 2002–2003.

21. Between January 2003 and February 2005, some 114 cases were reported to the project – of which 26 were deaths, 68 medical evacuations, and 20 hospitalisations. Overall, more than 57% of the 26 deaths (15) were due to intentional violence, while an additional 27% were due to unintentional violence and 4% to coincidental illness. While the majority of cases were in Africa (over 70%), intentional violence was well distributed. Deaths resulting from intentional violence were concentrated in Angola, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Haiti, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. Intentional violence resulting in medical evacuations (medivacs) took place in Afghanistan, Iraq and Zimbabwe. Small arms were present in over half of all 28 cases involving intentional violence (53.5%), and more than 70% of cases leading to a fatal outcome. Though the information is still preliminary, two trends appear to be

emerging. First, intentional violence, while accounting for a quarter of all reported incidents, tends to be lethal. Second, lethal and non-lethal intentional violence appears to register a higher frequency among national staff as compared to expatriates. Further research will determine whether the rates are different or whether this is a reflection of the demographic profile of participating agencies.

22. The perceived security environment in which respondents lived and worked varied. About 31% perceived there to be “little or no violence”; about 46% “moderate” levels of violence and the remainder, 23%, said they were operating in environments of “high” violence levels.

23. In Phase I the focus regions included a selection of countries and territories in Southeast Asia and the Balkans.

24. Some of the refinements identified through consultations led to changes to specific questions. When changes to questions are relevant for comparisons between Phase I and Phase II findings, it is noted (see Annex 1).

25. In addition to the 96 countries identified in returned questionnaires, a small number came back without a country of origin specified. Attempts were made to clean the data, fill in gaps and follow-up inconsistencies. Despite these attempts to clean the data, and as with all self-reported data, errors of reporting or recall, under/over-reporting and validity/reliability are possible.

SECTION 2 FINDINGS

In order to generate a meaningful sample of expatriate and national staff and to capture a wide variety of opinions, the survey was distributed in seven languages, including Farsi, Arabic, Khmer, Portuguese, Spanish, English and French. Responses were received back in all languages. Space was also allocated for structured and unstructured inputs from respondents.

Respondent profiles


The respondent profile appears to be representative of the humanitarian and development sectors. A review of the 2,089 responses reveals that:

- Three-quarters (74%) were *nationals* of the country in which they were working, while 25% were *expatriates*, with a small number unspecified;
- The *average age* of all respondents was 37, ranging from 18 to 67;

- More than 66% of respondents were male, 30% female, and the remainder were unspecified;
- More than two-thirds (67%) of respondents reported being *married* or with a partner, some 32% indicated being *single*, and the remainder were unspecified; and
- Some 69% of all respondents reported having children with them *in situ*, and 30% claiming that this was not the case.

The employment and experience profile of the respondents was also broadly representative. Respondents averaged approximately six years of experience, though the range was broad: from less than a month to well over forty years. Approximately one-third of all respondents indicated having worked for less than one full year. The average number of years of service at the headquarters level was just over 1.5, ranging from zero to seven years. The majority (95%) of personnel

Figure 5 Respondents to In the Line of Fire: 2004



Source: Annex 2i

reported being full-time employees, with only a small proportion of individuals reporting part-time status (4%). Moreover, among those indicating, the vast majority (63%) were fixed-term, while fewer indicated short-term (16%), consultant (6%), volunteers (2%), or other (3%).

As Figure 6 demonstrates, respondents reported working in a wide variety of job categories. These include administrators (7%), advisors/consultancies (1%), directors/country directors/heads of mission (6%), drivers (4%), development, agriculture or engineering specialists (1%), emergency field officers (4%), health care and nutritional specialists (3%), logistics-related staff (3%), programme managers (11%), project officers/managers (9%), radio operators (0.5%), security staff (3%) and others (43%).

Participating agencies exhibit a diverse array of statutory mandates, organisational cultures, and chains of administrative accountability and activities. Some UN agencies and NGOs undertake both relief and development programming while others restrict their activities to a single focus. Various organisations are involved in integrated missions with military and political components, while certain agencies seek to distance themselves from ostensibly security-oriented

activities in order to maintain their independence. A number of agencies have defined and circulated protocols and procedures on when, how, with whom, and on whose behalf they intervene, while others advance a more *ad hoc* approach. Some agencies are highly centralised while others have adopted a decentralised institutional structure. Ultimately, the diversity of these agencies mirrors the complex realities and debates among humanitarian and development actors.

Guinea, Nepal, the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), Uganda, Kenya, and Iraq experienced the most acute levels of violence, while the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Iraq, Côte d’Ivoire, Congo, and Uganda appear to register the highest levels of prevalence and misuse of weapons.

Figure 6 Employment profiles of respondents



Source: Annex 2ii

Appraising the risks of arms availability and misuse

A central objective of Phase II was to better understand the cause-effect relationships between the presence and availability of small arms and perceived risk. Though interlinked, *No Relief* advances three interconnected approaches to interpreting risk:

- by discerning *levels of violence*,²⁶ based on the frequency of reported attacks witnessed or experienced by respondents;
- by reviewing the *prevalence and misuse of guns*,²⁷ which can be determined by creating a composite index from several questions (see box 2 below); and
- by determining the *threat perception*,²⁸ according to how respondents appraised their security environment on a quantitative scale.

These three approaches are contrasted below (Figure 7).

No Relief contrasts these three conceptions of risk in specific countries where *In the Line of Fire* participants are active. Figure 7 below compares a number

Box 2 What is the Prevalence and Misuse Index?

The prevalence and misuse (P&M) variable combines a number of questions included in the questionnaire.²⁹ It is comprised of several factors, including:

- Respondent reporting of the frequency with which they have seen various types of small arms;
- Respondent reporting of the number of groups (excluding the military, police, private security, international organisations) they have actually seen in possession of guns;
- Respondent reporting of the variety of locations where guns are reportedly encountered;
- Respondent reporting on the incidents of small arms misuse against civilians; and
- Respondent reporting of personal and colleague victimisation by individuals using guns.

of countries that accumulated 20 or more respondents. When examining risk at the country level, the survey finds that Guinea, Nepal, the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), Uganda, Kenya, and Iraq experienced, in that order, the most acute levels of violence. Moreover, DRC, Iraq, Côte d'Ivoire, Congo, and Uganda appear to register the highest levels of prevalence and misuse of weapons. Finally, personnel in the OPT, Iraq, Afghanistan, Uganda and Nepal appear to record the highest levels of threat perception.

Insecure spaces:

Reviewing security environments

In order to establish an understanding of how respondents perceived their own security environment, they were asked to “describe the security environment (based on the numbers of intentional deaths, injuries, and levels of criminal violence witnessed)” of the location in which they worked using a 5-point scale ranging from “little or no violence” to “widespread conflict/war” (see Annex 1, question 12).

More than one-third (34%) of those responding indicated a moderate or very localised level of social or criminal violence, and some 15% indicated high or widespread levels of social or criminal violence.

Figure 7 Ranking levels of violence, P&M and threat perception

Levels of Violence (0–2)		Prevalence and Misuse (0–5)		Threat Perception (0–2)	
Guinea	1.40	DRC	3.73	OPT	1.08
Nepal	1.40	Iraq	3.60	Iraq	1.04
OPT	1.30	Côte d'Ivoire	3.59	Afghanistan	1.01
Uganda	1.28	Congo	3.58	Uganda	0.98
Kenya	1.24	Uganda	3.57	Nepal	0.97
Iraq	1.19	OPT	3.48	Guinea	0.90
Côte d'Ivoire	1.16	Guinea	3.42	Kenya	0.89
Colombia	1.15	Somalia	3.30	Philippines	0.78
Honduras	1.15	Philippines	3.17	Colombia	0.77
Afghanistan	1.07	Kenya	3.17	Côte d'Ivoire	0.76
Philippines	1.03	Honduras	3.16	Honduras	0.67
Somalia	1.00	Nepal	3.05	Liberia	0.67
DRC	0.97	Afghanistan	2.85	Somalia	0.63
Liberia	0.96	Liberia	2.81	Thailand	0.58
Thailand	0.93	Colombia	2.60	Cambodia	0.52
Congo	0.92	Cambodia	2.48	Angola	0.47
Serbia & Montenegro	0.75	Indonesia	2.40	Serbia & Montenegro	0.46
Indonesia	0.68	Sierra Leone	2.38	DRC	0.43
Cambodia	0.68	Angola	2.30	Indonesia	0.37
Sierra Leone	0.58	Rwanda	2.30	Congo	0.32
Angola	0.53	Jordan	2.12	Jordan	0.28
Jordan	0.46	Thailand	2.00	Rwanda	0.26
Rwanda	0.41	Serbia & Montenegro	1.96	Sierra Leone	0.25

Note: Level of violence, prevalence and misuse (P&M), and threat perception for countries with at least 20 respondents.

Though the majority of respondents worked in areas affected by armed violence, “social” or “criminal” violence was reportedly more common than “violent conflict” or “war”. More than one-third (34%) of those responding (with 11% not responding) indicated a moderate or very localised level of social or criminal violence, and some 15% indicated high or widespread levels of social or criminal violence. In contrast, 11% of those responding indicated moderate violent conflict or war, and six per cent indicated working in a location characterised by widespread violent conflict or




war (see Annex 3i). These trends are virtually identical to that those emerged during Phase I.

If looking strictly at “levels of violence” reported by respondents – regardless of whether it was conflict or crime-related³⁰ – about one-third (31%) indicated that they worked in an area characterised as having little or no violence. Almost half (45%) identified moderate levels of violence, while more than one-fifth

(22%) reported working in areas marked by high levels of violence. In other words, well over two-thirds of respondents indicated working in areas marked by moderate or high levels of violence (see Figure 8 and Annex 3i). These findings are consistent with the responses from Phase I.

Figure 8 Perceived security environment



Source: Annex 3i

Guns at the local level

It seems clear that relief and development personnel encounter small arms and light weapons in virtually every facet of their work. Guns are so ubiquitous that they are overlooked by many on the ground and excluded in risk assessments and security training manuals. The pervasiveness of small arms – legal or illegal – was corroborated by answers to four related questions:³¹

- Who is known to possess weapons?
- What types of weapons are observed in the possession of different groups?
- What are the specific locations where guns are seen?
- What is the prevalence of small arms possession among the civilian population?

With respect to who is perceived to possess guns, the most frequently noted groups included the military

(87%), police (86%), rebels, private security organisations, and organised criminals (all under 50%). Informal criminal groups, paramilitaries and male civilians were perceived to hold guns by between 30–40% of all respondents. International organisations (9%), women (5%), and children (5%) were regarded as least likely to be holding weapons. Some four per cent claimed that they did not know of any groups possessing small arms or light weapons, though this is most likely due to their work location and remoteness from the so-called “field”. The proportion of respondents citing these groups closely mirrors Phase I findings.

“The concern is the inappropriate use of arms, which includes non-organised criminals who somehow have easy access in obtaining them; to children committing suicide with guns because unconcerned parents or guardians did not safely hide them”

Woman working for UNDP in Namibia, expatriate staffer

Estimating the level of civilian possession of small arms was made difficult by the high percentage of respondents indicating “don’t know” (23%) to the question. More than half (51%) of respondents indicated the level of civilian possession of small arms to be either “very low” or “low”, while 11% of respondents indicated possession to be “high”, “very high”, or “all households”. Approximately nine per cent indicated civilian possession levels to be “moderate” (see Annex 3ii).

In order to determine the types of arms most commonly seen, respondents were provided with graphic representations of particular types of weapons, and asked the most common type of small arms seen


Some 60% of the world’s 640 million small arms and light weapons are in the hands of civilians: Children, sport shooters, criminal gangs, target shooters, collectors, security guards amongst others.³²

(Annex 1, question 9). Among those responding, some 48% observed assault rifles frequently, followed by pistols (31%), machine guns (19%), rifles and revolvers (15% each), hand grenades and rocket-propelled grenade launchers (14%), and sniper rifles (4%). Man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) were observed by fewer than two per cent of all respondents.

When asked where guns were most commonly seen, a substantial number of respondents indicated having personally seen small arms and related munitions in one or more specific locations. These included official checkpoints (73%), personal residences (29%), businesses (25%) and unofficial checkpoints (24%). Other areas where weapons were occasionally observed included civilian households (20%), recreational areas (20%), and other spaces. Guns were only seldom observed in “aid delivery” areas and refugee/internally displaced people’s (IDP) camps (12% and 10% respectively). Only 11% of respondents claimed that they had not seen weapons in any of the areas listed (see Figure 9).³³

Figure 9 Here, there and everywhere: Where weapons are seen

Percentage of respondents



Source: Annex 3iii

Impacting civilians

Awareness of the relative exposure of civilians to violent insecurity is a core aspect of understanding the broader security context in areas where agencies operate.


Establishing a baseline of how civilians are affected is also important in helping agencies determine the potential effectiveness of preventive actions. Several questions were designed to assess the situation of civilians with regard to their exposure to the misuse of firearms, such as the types of guns most likely to contribute to civilian death and injury, the frequency with which beneficiaries were made inaccessible due to armed insecurity, and the extent to which weapons are used coercively by different groups against civilians.³⁴

“With increasing numbers of small arms, the risk for the escalation of the existing conflict is increasing, while the chance for a peaceful settlement is being reduced. In Nepal’s situation there is the difficulty to distinguish whether victims are civilians or rebels.”

Woman working for an NGO in Nepal, expatriate staffer.

Handguns were cited as the most frequent cause of civilian death or injury by 57% of all respondents, followed by blunt instruments and knives (48%), assault rifles (45%), landmines (34%), hand grenades (25%) and machine guns (24%). Other types of weapons contributing to civilian death and injury included home-made weapons, rocket-propelled grenade

Figure 10 Doing harm: Weapons contributing most to civilian death and injury



Source: Annex 3iv

launchers, major weapons systems and mortars.

Roughly ten per cent of all respondents indicated that they did not know which weapons were most frequently the direct cause of civilian death or injury in the country in which they were working (see Figure 10).³⁵

Handguns were cited as the most frequent cause of civilian death or injury by 57% of all respondents.

A considerable proportion of beneficiaries were reportedly inaccessible to agencies due to the perceived presence of armed insecurity. For example, more than one-fifth (21%) of all respondents claimed that over 25% of their beneficiary target groups were inaccessible due to the presence of armed threats in the previous six months. An additional 22% observed that between 0–25% of their beneficiaries were inaccessible due to the presence of such threats. Only one-third (34%) claimed that none of their beneficiaries were inaccessible, and some 21% simply did not know. Predictably, there is a strong relationship between the “prevalence and misuse” of small arms, and the proportion of beneficiaries who are rendered inaccessible (Figure 11 and Annex 3v).³⁶


Some 59% of respondents were aware of the use of guns coercively against civilians for criminal or military purposes – with only some 18% claiming they were not aware of such activities. More than four in ten (43%) were aware of civilians being targeted with assault rifles, and almost one-third (31%) of these respondents claimed this was a daily or weekly occurrence. Some 46% of respondents knew of accidental deaths and injuries occurring as a result of assault rifles, with 26% remarking that this was a daily or weekly occurrence. One in five respondents were similarly aware of mortar/artillery fire purposefully targeting civilians, with almost one-third of these same respondents claiming that this took place on a daily or weekly basis.

Under the gun: Impacts on workers

The survey presented a series of questions designed to appraise perceptions of personnel toward their own personal safety, sense of threat, and security prepared-

Figure 11 Does the prevalence and misuse of arms affect access to beneficiaries?

Percentage of respondents reporting 25% or more inaccessible




Source: Annex 3v

ness.³⁷ It also explored the extent to which respondents felt operations were affected by gun violence and misuse on the ground and ways in which this reduced access to affected populations.

Almost one in five respondents reported having been personally the victim of a “security incident” (e.g. assault, robbery, intimidation, harassment, kidnapping, sexual violence, etc.) in the six months prior to being surveyed (see Figure 12). Though the profiles and backgrounds of respondents differ considerably, this is a significant increase on rates reported in Phase I (i.e. one in 10).³⁸ Just over one-third (35%) of those reporting having personally been a victim of a security incident also indicate that the incident involved a small

Figure 12 Have you been a victim of a security incident?

Percentage of respondents



Source: Annex 3vi

arm or light weapon (Annex 3vi).³⁹ Moreover, some six per cent of all respondents indicated that they had been threatened at gunpoint, four per cent robbed at gunpoint, three per cent had a weapon fired in their presence, two per cent victims of an armed assault, and one per cent kidnapped in the previous six months. Significantly, fewer than one per cent of all respondents claimed to have been exposed to a landmine-related incident.⁴⁰

The profile of victimisation provides some illuminating and unexpected findings. For example, there does not appear to be a statistically significant relationship between gender and personal victimisation. Moreover, when controlled for age, being a national, and the levels of violence in areas where respondents work, it appears that women are less likely to report being personally victimised than men.⁴¹ The most significant predictor of victimisation, however, is reported levels of violence, with more violent areas increasing the probability of reporting of being a victim (Annex 3vi).


Some four per cent of all respondents reported having received an injury from gun violence during the reporting period. Some 30% of these did not require hospitalisation or serious first aid treatment. However, just under 16% did receive significant first aid treatment, a further nine per cent were hospitalised and some eight per cent were hospitalised with life threatening injuries. Some 17% of this group considered that they themselves had been “traumatised”, though clearly additional research is required to verify how trauma is interpreted.

“During my stay in Angola (about 14 months) I never saw directly a small arm but many friends were threatened or injured due to armed assaults. These situations occurred very frequently, all roads/streets being targeted by non-organised criminal groups of desperate people looking for a means of survival.”

Man working for UNICEF in unspecified country, expatriate staffer.

Another way of measuring the scale of overall victimisation is by asking respondents whether they know of a colleague or associate who had been targeted or injured in the previous six months. Approximately 31% of all respondents indicated that they knew of a colleague who had been victimised in the previous six months. More than half (55%) of all reported incidents of colleague victimisation reportedly involved

Figure 13 Levels of personal threat associated with weapons



Source: Annex 3vii

a weapon. Incidents ranged from robbery and armed threats (45% each) to the firing of guns (23% of all reported cases of colleague victimisation) and armed assault (22%). Only nine per cent of all reported cases reportedly entailed the existence or presence of landmines (see Annex 3vi).⁴²

In terms of those responsible for victimisation, criminal groups (organised and non-organised) were almost twice as likely to be mentioned as the source of the incident as military, police or insurgent groups. Indeed, crime appears to be the biggest contributor to insecurity – and not direct threats presented by armed combatants, whether government or rebel. This indicates that while much is made of the “targeting” of humanitarian actors by combatants, by far their biggest risk is tied to criminal violence.


Many respondents expressed some sense of personal threat arising from armed violence in general, and

guns in particular. Almost 45% of all respondents felt “somewhat” personally threatened on a day-to-day basis, while an additional nine per cent felt “very threatened” (and 41% felt no personal threat). In other words, more than half of all respondents feel either “somewhat” or “very” threatened by armed violence on a daily basis.⁴³ Respondents indicated a greater sense of threat to their personal safety and security in areas marked by “high levels of social or criminal violence” than in other types of security environments, including “widespread conflict/war”. More than one in ten respondents indicated that they had become more concerned over the past six months about getting hurt or injured due to armed violence.

When asked what locations were most insecure, respondents felt especially exposed to the threat of small arms and light weapons in “the field” (26%), followed by unofficial checkpoints (25%), en route to aid delivery areas (24%), at official government checkpoints (23%), their personal residences (21%), and recreational areas (21%). Participants did not feel particularly insecure when in contact with civilian households and refugee/internally displaced persons (IDP) camps and settlements – even though some are reportedly militarised.⁴⁴

In order to gauge behavioural responses to insecurity, respondents were asked several questions about their personal reactions to their security environment, existing security protocols and procedures, and the effectiveness of trauma counselling. For example, respondents were asked whether they were now accompanied when they travelled, whether they had limited or reduced their travel, whether they had hired a

Figure 14 Behavioural responses to insecurity



Source: Annex 3viii



World Food Programme staff in al-Fasher, North Darfur, Sudan, 31 August 2004. © AP Photo/Amr Nabil.

security guard, whether they had acquired a gun, whether they had terminated their job, sought trauma counselling, undertaken security training, and/or increased security measures. The types of responses to perceived security risks are described in Figure 14. Most of these coping strategies rely primarily on increasing protection and deterrence rather than promoting acceptance, which raises a number of important policy-related questions regarding appropriate responses to mitigating risk.

Less than five per cent of all respondents indicated that they themselves had sought trauma counselling, despite the fact that almost one-third (33%) claimed their organisation offered it (with 39% claiming their organisation does not offer it and 25% admitting that they did not know). The use of trauma counselling and related services might be more actively pursued by workers if its services were more widely available or better publicised. Indeed, well over half (56%) of all respondents reported that trauma counselling would be useful (see Annex 3ix). Though further investigation is required, it appears that there is a tentative correlation between the availability of trauma counselling and perceived threats; those who have

availed themselves of it appear to have a more nuanced perception of insecurity (see Figure 15, Annex 3x).

“Every day, we leave the station not knowing what we will face. Being an emergency medical technician I always have to show the people I am helping that I am strong so that they can feel safe, but what many of them do not know is that I am also a human being and I get scared.”

Staff member of the Palestine Red Crescent Society⁴⁵

No Relief finds that agencies also appear to have begun responding to the insecurity expressed by their personnel.⁴⁶ For example, more than one-third (36%) of all respondents indicated that their agency offered mandatory security procedures. A further 32% observed that their agency had reduced or limited their travel, and at least 27% noted that their agency required escorts for certain types of local travel. An additional 16% noted that they were required to travel in convoy to the ‘field’. One in ten respondents observed that staff had either been relocated or armed guards introduced to *harden* targets in the previous six months. Only five per cent of respondents observed that projects had been shut down as a result of perceived

insecurity. An additional 31% of respondents claimed that security precautions and measures were not relevant to them.

A disturbing finding is the persistent lack of basic awareness on gun-related issues among staff on the ground. Although respondents are understandably focused on their specific responsibilities, they nevertheless demonstrated a disconcerting lack of basic knowledge of the types of guns in circulation, their safety mechanisms, and the means to render guns inoperable. Only five per cent of respondents reported knowledge of all arms-related questions in the survey, while almost two-thirds (63%) reported knowledge of “no items”. In response to an open-ended question, several respondents specifically suggested that they would find training in weapons identification and safety procedures invaluable. The extent to which agencies are prepared to support this kind of training, however, remains an open question.⁴⁷

Impacts on operations

A number of questions were designed to assess the impact of weapons availability and use on the activities of organisations.⁴⁸ As previously noted, a significant proportion of all personnel reported operational suspensions and delays during the last six months due to “security threats” involving small arms.⁴⁹ Respondents frequently experienced suspensions, evacuations and relocations due to these security threats, with more than one in five respondents (21%) reporting that they had been evacuated and some 61% reporting that they had not. Respondents reporting suspensions in the last six months were common. One-third of


all respondents (33%) reported that their activities had been suspended in the previous six months due to war or fighting. One-quarter (26%) reported having suspended their operations due to social conflict (e.g. civilian crime or banditry, but not conflict).

When testing the relationship between the “prevalence and misuse” of guns and the frequency of reported operational obstacles, such as an ability to travel or transport goods and medical supplies, the findings are not entirely surprising. Where the availability and misuse of guns is regarded as most acute, the frequency of reported obstacles and delays increases dramatically.⁵⁰

Respondents reporting suspensions in the last six months were common.

One-third of all respondents (33%) reported having had their operation suspended in the previous six months due to war or fighting. One-quarter (26%) reported having suspended their operation due to social conflict.

Figure 15 Trauma counselling availability and threat perception




Source: Annex 3x

Security training

Respondents were asked whether they had received security training and, if so, how useful that training had been in helping them cope with gun violence and the availability of small arms. Almost one-third of all respondents reported having received security training “internally” with their agency, compared to only 16% in Phase I.⁵¹ Fewer than half of all respondents (44%) reported that they had received security training with any agency with whom they had worked (see Figure 16).⁵² Of those who claimed to have received such training, more than three-quarters claimed it was mandatory.⁵³ Some 55% claimed the security training was either “helpful” or “very helpful” (compared to 48% responding the same way in Phase I) while 17% claimed they did not know. One in five respondents (20%) claimed it was somewhat helpful (31% in Phase I) and some four per cent found it unhelpful (as compared to 11% in Phase I) (see Annex 3xi).⁵⁴ More research is required to understand

Figure 16 Have you received security training with your agency or a previous employer?



Source: Annex 3xi

precisely why this latter category found the training to be of little use.

“The training [we received] was mostly focused on group violence for political reasons. I would like to suggest that security trainings that helps in criminal situations should be given.”

Man working for WFP in Afghanistan, national staffer.

A key finding from Phase I was that access to security training by personnel varies tremendously, particularly between expatriates and national staff. This trend continued in Phase II. For example, more than 74% of expatriates were trained, while less than 25% claimed not to have received security training. Alarming, only 43% of national staff claimed to have received analogous training, and more than 56% of all national respondents were not provided with such security training.


Regression analysis reveals there to be no clear relationship between training and respondent perceptions of threat, even when controlling for factors such as their perceptions of their security environment, gender, age, attitude towards weapons, or the prevalence and misuse of small arms and light weapons.⁵⁵ In other words, the exposure to security training does not appear to alter the respondent’s perception of his or her own security environment.

Importantly, however, there appears to be a relationship between perceived insecurity and the levels of training received by all staff (see Figure 18 and Annex 3xiii). Additionally, differences in training between expatriates and nationals persist, even increasing somewhat in areas where insecurity is perceived to be high. Indeed, across all security environments, there appears to be considerably higher levels of training



Switzerland, 4 September 2002: Aid workers of the International Committee of the Red Cross are trained near Geneva to behave in dangerous situations. © REUTERS/Jean-Marc Ferre.

Figure 17 Proportion of national and expatriate staff receiving security training



Source: Annex 3xii

for expatriates. However, this relationship does not appear to hold for national staff. Rather, there are correspondingly low levels of “trained” nationals, regardless of the security environment in which they find themselves (see Figure 19 and Annex 3xiv).

No Relief confirms the disturbing discrepancies between access to security training among expatriate and national staff.

It should be emphasised that training varied tremendously from agency to agency and country to country. Fortunately, security training appears to be spreading. In countries such as Afghanistan, Kenya, the Philippines, Indonesia, Iraq, DRC, Nepal, Rwanda, Guinea, Congo, Serbia, and Côte d’Ivoire, most respondents had received some form of security training. A sample of training profiles by country is provided in Figure 20 below.

Privatising security

The use of private security to respond to rising levels of insecurity is a contentious and sensitive issue in the humanitarian and development communities. While private security guards can facilitate access of workers to populations in need, the use of such security actors can also alter how agencies themselves are perceived locally.⁵⁶ Moreover, despite being prevalent in some


settings, there are few guidelines or regulations conditioning their rules of engagement, the use of force, or relationship with project beneficiaries.⁵⁷ At the very least, the complexities and potential controversies of how private security can be locally-interpreted is not being adequately considered by those agencies who often engage it.

Non-state armed actors operating for profit create unique problems for humanitarians . . . But with private security elements, who is responsible? Who can be held to account? The shareholders?

Kenny Gluck, director of operations, Médecins Sans Frontières – Holland⁵⁸


Of particular concern is the potential for the misuse of force by private security officers, given that they are often poorly regulated by either the host state or the agencies. Though exceptions exist, many agencies appear to have guidelines expressly prohibiting the use of armed guards, or even allowing armed individuals to enter areas where workers live and work. Nevertheless, when humanitarian and development workers on the front line are queried directly, there is strong evidence that private security is in use, and that it is on the increase. This suggests that the growing trend of civilians turning to private security companies

Figure 18 Security environment and training




Source: Annex 3xiii

Somali militiamen ride a vehicle as they protect the delegation of U.N. Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland during the visit in Wajiid, south central Somalia, 5 December 2004.
© REUTERS/Radu Sigheti.



over three-quarters of respondents noted that they did not use armed guards. But where there is perceived to be high levels of violence, almost half of all respondents noted that they used armed guards (see Figure 21 and Annex 3xvii). Thus, it appears that the deployment of armed guards is positively associated with the perceived security environment.

Figure 21 Levels of violence and the use of armed guards



Source: Annex 3xvii

Notes

26. Levels of violence is a cross-tabulation combining questions 6a and 12 of the questionnaire.

27. In Phase I a similar “index” was employed. The main difference between the two is that the first included “level of civilian possession” instead of #1 above (q9 seen one or more weapons “frequently”). There are four reasons for this change. First, q9 is a “first person” estimate, meaning that the question asks about the personal experience of the respondent, rather than asking the respondent to estimate something about another actor (civilian possession). Thus, the answers are likely to be a more accurate reflection of the actual prevalence of small arms. Second, a sizeable percentage of respondents did not answer the “civilian possession” question (q15 in Phase II) or answered “don’t know” (combined 26%). Thus, using this variable in creating the “index” would remove over one-quarter of the respondents from any analysis. Third, Phase I did not ask a “frequency” question about weapons observed. In general, “frequency” seems to be a better indicator of “prevalence” than “civilian possession”. The change is warranted on conceptual grounds. Fourth, the civilian possession question for Phase II has been modified in two important ways: the number of response categories has been increased (including a “no households” option and an “all households” option), and, more importantly, examples of the meaning of each response category have been added so that respondents are given some “objective” sense of what, say, “moderate” means (i.e. “about half of all households”). This potentially dramatically changes the distribution of responses on this question from that of Phase I. Indeed, examination of the responses to this question reveals a marked change from those

observed in Phase I. As in Phase I, each factor is weighted equally. The two elements of the P&M index are: prevalence and misuse. Prevalence relates to the first three bullet points (range 0 to 3; none, low, moderate, high). Misuse relates to the last two bullet points (range 0 to 2; low, moderate, high).

28. Levels of threat is a cross-tabulation combining questions 4, 6a and 34 of the questionnaire.

29. Namely questions 9, 10, 14, 21, 26 and 33a,c,e. The index is scored on a scale of 0 to 5, with 0 = "None"; 1 = "Very low"; 2 = "Low"; 3 = "Moderate"; 4 = "High"; and 5 = "Very high".

30. This is generated from question 12 by coding a = little/no violence, b&c-d = moderate violence, c&e = high violence – that is, collapsing the two moderate violence categories together and the two high violence categories together. Hereafter, this variable is referred to as "level of violence" or "overall level of violence".

31. See questions 9, 10, 14, and 15 in Annex 1.

32. Small Arms Survey (2002), p. 79

33. These findings are broadly similar to those from Phase I, with the exception that "checkpoint" was added to the list of possible responses in Phase II, and the number of gun sightings "in the field" decreased by more than ten per cent.

34. See, for example, questions 13, 32, 33, and others in Annex 1.

35. Although the relative ranking of these weapons is similar to the responses from Phase I, the proportions were slightly different, and "machine gun" was added as a defined category in Phase II.

36. These findings mirror similar relationships analysed in Phase I.

37. Results reported in this section refer to the following questions: 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41. Consult Annex 1 for details.

38. This supposed increase in personal victimisation rates could be due to the increased sample size, country distribution and questionnaire design, and requires additional empirical investigation.

39. This rate is lower than that reported in the aforementioned Johns Hopkins mortality and morbidity of humanitarian workers study. Specifically, of the 28 cases of intentional violence reported since 2002, some 53.5% involved the use of small arms. Of the 15 small arms-related events, 10 (67%) resulted in death. The types of weapons identified included machine guns (in 7 cases), rocket-propelled grenade launchers (in 4 cases) and handguns or unspecified (in 3 cases). The report notes that the majority of intentional violence cases have occurred to staff while they were en route to project activities (Rowley and Burnham 2005).

40. *No Relief* documents a considerably lower proportion of landmine incidents associated with personnel victimisation than have previous analyses. For example, King (2004a) observed a comparatively higher number of landmine incidents in his retrospective review of various agencies. Similarly, according to the Johns Hopkins "mortality and morbidity of humanitarian workers" study, some 25% of all 28 reported intentional injuries were a result of landmines, as compared to 36% due to crime and banditry, 32% organised armed groups, and seven per cent undetermined (Rowley and Burnham 2005). The comparatively high rate of landmine injuries reported could be attributed to the lethality of the vector (the low incidence of non-fatal outcomes), though this issue requires urgent research.

41. This finding correlates strongly with the Johns Hopkins "mortality and morbidity of humanitarian workers" study which notes that males were most commonly killed, associated with medivacs and hospitalised due to intentional and unintentional violence, (Rowley and Burnham 2005). Future surveys should further interrogate the gendered impacts.

42. It is also likely that these responses overestimate the rate of victimisation, either as a result of double counting or recall bias. Further investigation could usefully shed more light on the issue.

43. The reporting period for the questionnaires was February–November 2004. Because the reporting period occurred during the same period as the well publicised bombing of the UN compound in Iraq, extensive killings in Afghanistan and ongoing violence in Darfur, it is possible that some findings were biased by media reporting.

44. The Small Arms Survey, the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) and UNHCR have together prepared a comparative study on refugee and IDP militarisation in Guinea, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda. See Muggah (2005) and www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2574 for more on the findings of the study.

45. Palestine Red Crescent Society Report, (January 2001–December 2002), p. 9

46. The extent to which humanitarian and development agencies have adequately invested in improving security policies and structures continues to be debated. For example, one study finds that "[m]any NGOs have not established adequate security policies and procedures. Where they exist, security procedures are not routinely developed in consultation with all groups of staff, and do not always respond to identified threats in the context. This reduces the chances of these procedures being relevant, respected and, ultimately, put into practice by staff". ECHO (2004) p. 3

47. Even so, these findings echo the observations of a recent report on the security of humanitarian personnel where "staff competence" was identified as the most significant weak point in current security management practices (ECHO 2004).

48. See, for example, questions 16, 17, 18, 19 in Annex 1.

49. A discussion of the categories of "suspension", "evacuations" and "delays", and the conflicting definitions among different relief agencies, is included in latter sections of *No Relief*.

50. See, for example Figure 11 and Annex 3v which highlights the relationship between prevalence and misuse and access to beneficiaries.

51. This could be partly attributed to the dramatic increase in security training introduced by UNSECOORD in 2003 and 2004, though it is also likely due to the improved reporting rates of the survey in 2004.

52. Even though the overall rates of training increase to 50% of all respondents when combined with previous training, this nevertheless indicates that fully 47% of all respondents have not received any security training at all.

53. It should be noted that it is mandatory for all UN staff to receive security training.

54. Training does appear to have some effects on behaviour, however. For example, regression analysis indicates that training is associated with a tendency to limit or reduce local travel (question 38b), controlling for a number of factors such as perceived levels of violence, prevalence and misuse of small arms, sex, age, nationality, attitudes toward weapons.

55. Regression analysis is a statistical technique applied to data to determine, for predictive purposes, the degree of correlation of a dependent variable with one or more independent variables, in other words, to see if there is a strong or weak cause and effect relationship between variables. See, for example, Annex 3xv.

56. See ECHO (2004); Macrae and Harmer (2003)

57. See Van Brabant (2000)

58. Keilthy, Paul (2004), *Private security firms in war zones worry NGOs*, 11 August, Reuters Alert-Net.

59. Approximately 65% said guards were not used, and the rest did not know.


SECTION 3 FOCUS REGIONS: GREAT LAKES AND MIDDLE EAST

Two regions, the Great Lakes and the Middle East, were selected to shed light on the regionally specific risks facing workers and agencies on the ground.⁶⁰ Roughly 46% of all respondents in Phase II were located in one of two focus regions: 20% from the Middle East and another 26% in the Great Lakes. A further 20% of all respondents were based in the two focus countries, Afghanistan and Angola. The remaining respondents were spread widely and constitute a global baseline from more than eighty countries.

Security context in the focus regions


No Relief finds that Middle East respondents perceived somewhat higher levels of violence in their work environments than did respondents from the Great Lakes (see Figure 22 and Annex 3xviii). Surprisingly, however, perceived violence in the Great Lakes was similar to that registered in the global baseline. Related, overall levels of perceived threat varied between the two focus regions. For example, respondents from the Middle East registered higher levels of “threat” than did those responding from the Great Lakes (see Figure 23 and Annex 3xix).

Figure 22 Perceived levels of violence in the Great Lakes and Middle East



Source: Annex 3xviii

Figure 23 Perceived level of threat by focus region




Source: Annex 3xix

“Taking into account the . . . security problems in the Congo and the difficulty to know exactly who has hidden arms and why, as well as the high level of poverty that puts security at risk, a humanitarian organisation such as Concern Worldwide has the obligation to strengthen its staff members in terms of strategies to detect the danger and to avoid it.”

Woman working for Concern in Rwanda, national staffer


Perceived threat levels varied among respondents in each of the two regions. For example, national staff

Figure 24 Perceived level of threat: Nationals and expatriates in focus regions



Source: Annex 3xx

Figure 25 Perceived level of threat: Males and females




Source: Annex 3xx

across all countries appear to register less threat than do expatriates in these same areas (see Figure 24 and Annex 3xx). Both women and men appear to register slightly higher rates of threat in the Great Lakes when compared to the global baseline, though they report comparably higher levels of threat in the Middle East (see Figure 25 and Annex 3xx). It appears that in addition to nationality, personal attitudes toward guns (favourable or unfavourable) are associated with nominally reduced threat perception.

Effects on civilians and operations

Respondents from the Middle East registered higher levels of overall civilian possession of guns than did those from the Great Lakes (see Annex 3xxi).⁶¹ Indeed, in the Middle East, more than one in four respondents claimed that civilian possession was either “high”, “very

Figure 26 Operational obstacles in the Great Lakes and Middle East



Source: Annex 3xxii

high”, or “all households”. And while no respondents from the Great Lakes claimed that all households possessed weapons, only one in ten claimed that civilian possession was “high” or “very high”. Respondents from both regions indicated higher overall civilian possession than the global baseline.

“In my country, Kenya . . . it is highly risky to walk around or even drive, especially at night. Criminals and police in our country unfortunately end up shooting civilians. You are never sure whether it is better to be in the hands of the police or criminals.”


Woman working for WFP in Kenya, national staffer.

Due to the presence of both higher levels of armed violence, as well as civilian gun possession, it appears that operational obstacles were more commonly reported in both the Great Lakes and the Middle East than the global baseline (see Figure 26 and Annex 3xxii). For example, almost two in three (63%) respondents from the Great Lakes reported that they had experienced one or more operational obstacles in the previous six months, and almost three-quarters of respondents from the Middle East reported one or more operational obstacles (71%) compared to roughly half (51%) of respondents from the remaining countries.

Victimisation

Victimisation rates are comparatively high in both the Great Lakes and the Middle East. Specifically, personal victimisation was marginally higher in the

Figure 27 Have you been victimised in the past six months?



Source: Annex 3xxiii

Figure 28 Personal victimisation by nationality and region



Source: Annex 3xxiii

Middle East (22%) than among respondents in the Great Lakes (19%). Additionally, almost half of all Middle East respondents (46%) and approximately one-third of Great Lakes respondents (31%) noted that a small arm or light weapon was involved in the incident.


While victimisation rates appear to be moderately higher in the Great Lakes and Middle East than the global baseline, there are also differences between regions when considering nationality and gender. For example, it appears that Middle East national staff are more likely than expatriates to be victimised, whereas expatriates more frequently report being victimised in the Great Lakes (Figure 28 and Annex 3xxiii). What is more, men are slightly more likely to report having been victimised than women in both the Great Lakes and the Middle East (Figure 29 and Annex 3xxiii); while in other regions *No Relief* reports that they have roughly equal chances of victimisation. When regression analysis is applied, it appears that men are more likely to report being a victim than women, independent of age, nationality, and reported level of violence (see Annex 3xxiv). Given the well-known tendency for

Figure 29 Personal victimisation by region and gender



Source: Annex 3xxiii

Figure 30 Perceptions of the effectiveness of security guards



Source: Annex 3xxv

under-reporting of sexual and gender-based violence, clearly more investigation of these and other related trends is required.

Security guards

In order to protect staff from armed violence and ensure continued distribution of goods and services on the ground, many agencies in both regions have enlisted private (full-time or part-time) security guards. Though views differ about whether or not they should be used, it appears that security guards are widely perceived as improving security of respondents in both the Great Lakes and the Middle East (see Figure 30 and Annex 3xxv). Worryingly, however, a number of respondents from the Middle East and the Great Lakes nevertheless believe that security guards actually decrease their safety.


“The armed guards that are provided . . . are just young men doing their national service. I don't know if they would actually use the assault rifle they carry in a situation when it was needed.”

Man working for WFP in Iraq, expatriate staffer.

Security training

Security training has been introduced by many agencies, ostensibly to bolster staff capacities to deal appropriately with their own protection. Though the majority of respondents who received training claimed that guns were not explicitly addressed in their training, at least half emphasised its importance in qualitative segments of the questionnaire.

Figure 31 Security training by region: Expatriate versus national staff



Source: Annex 3xxvi

Encouragingly, security training appears to be fairly consistent and above average among respondents in the Great Lakes and Middle East. For example, more than half of all respondents from the Great Lakes (55%) and the Middle East (53%) claimed to have received security training as compared to 48% reported in the global baseline (see Annex 3xxvi). However, some

differences emerge when other variables are considered. For example, while there appears to be equitable gender balance in training, expatriates are still vastly more likely to have received training both in the Great Lakes and the Middle East than have nationals. Whether controlling for gender, age, or level of violence, being a “national” of the country in which one is working is significantly related to being “untrained” (see Figure 31 and Annex 3xxvi). Indeed, being a national or not is a better predictor of having received security training than the reported level of violence in the country. The relative balance of training between expatriates and nationals is an issue that requires urgent consideration (see Annex 3xxvi).

Notes

60. Great Lakes – Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, DRC and Congo-Brazzaville were the countries that were primarily targeted. Middle East – Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, and the Occupied Palestinian Territories were the countries that were primarily targeted.

61. The culture of weapons ownership in the Greater Middle East is well known, and has been assessed in various editions of the *Small Arms Survey* (2003; 2004; 2005).

SECTION 4 FOCUS COUNTRIES: ANGOLA AND AFGHANISTAN

Both focus countries, Angola and Afghanistan, registered comparatively high response rates with more than 200 responses each. Though reported levels of violence and perceived threats were twice as high in Afghanistan⁶² than in Angola,⁶³ respondents nevertheless reported a number of surprising commonalities.⁶⁴ Both countries are wracked by traumatic, but different, types of violence and insecurity. Moreover, a considerable number of illegal weapons are believed to be circulating in Afghanistan and Angola.

Victimisation

Victimisation rates among respondents in Afghanistan (23%) and Angola (15%) are higher than the global baseline (13%). But in both Afghanistan and Angola, the proportion of nationals reporting personal victimisation (as opposed to expatriates) is higher still (see Figure 32). Indeed, national respondents from Afghanistan are almost three times more likely than their expatriate counterparts to report having been personally victimised.⁶⁵ What is more, males tend to be more likely to be victimised in Afghanistan, while the rate appears to be more balanced in Angola (Figure 33).

“For the last year [in Angola], security incidents (robbery, armed assault, intimidation in the home by ‘immigration officers’, harassment when walking or parking cars)

Figure 32 Personal victimisation by focus country: Expatriates and nationals



Source: Annex 3xxvii


Box 3 Angola

Angola was mired in a protracted civil war between 1975 and April 2002. More than 300,000 people are estimated to have been violently killed and one-third of the country’s population was displaced in the first 16 years of the conflict. Following the rejection by the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) of a 1994 peace accord, hundreds of thousands more civilians are estimated to have perished despite the presence of UN peacekeepers for at least nine years. A peace agreement – the Luanda Accords – was signed with the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in 2002 following the death of Jonas Savimbi, the long-time UNITA leader. Though the country has enjoyed an “official” peace since 2002, and despite recent agreements signed in 2004, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) has still not been fully implemented. In 2003, the UN registered some 105,000 UNITA ex-combatants – each with an estimated six dependents – living in cantonment sites after having voluntarily disarmed. The future of these ex-soldiers has serious implications for the future stability of the country. They remain soldiers without guns and the causes of the conflicts are still alive.

involving expatriate staff (UN and NGO) are on the increase. The big problem is that even if these incidents are reported, the police does absolutely nothing. Consequently, staff members must protect themselves (security guards at home, etc.), but also end up restricting their movements within Luanda where there is already not much to do.”

Man working for Concern in Angola, expatriate staffer.

Figure 33 Personal victimisation by focus country and gender




Source: Annex 3xxvii

Operational obstacles

Operational obstacles arising from the threat or incidence of armed violence were common in both Afghanistan and Angola. In Afghanistan, almost three out of four (72%) respondents reported one or more operational obstacles in the previous six months. In Angola, well over half (53%) of all respondents reported encountering operational obstacles due to the presence of armed violence in the previous six months (see Figure 34).

“We hear daily incidents which involve all forms of weapons are used. Warlords in Afghanistan have a lot

Figure 34 Respondents reporting one or more obstacles due to armed violence



Source: Annex 3xxviii

of weapons which destabilise the situation. In addition to its physical impact, it has a very negative psychosocial impact.”

Woman working for UNICEF in Afghanistan, national staffer.

Box 4 Afghanistan

Afghanistan has been in a state of near permanent war since 1979. The first period, from 1979–1988, entailed rural resistance backed by the US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to a Soviet-backed regime in Kabul. Following a peace agreement in 1988 and the withdrawal of Soviet troops, an internal war began between Afghan factions backed by various external parties that lasted until the victory of the Mujahideen in 1992. Factional war then broke out and the Taliban took Kabul in 1996. Though the country faced intermittent US air strikes and factional violence in the interim, it was again invaded by the US in 2002 and a new government installed in 2003. Afghanistan’s recent conflicts have roots going back before even the early wars of 1979. Cumulative losses have been tremendous – at least a million violently killed, six million displaced across borders, and the impoverishment of the vast majority of the population. In a bid to contain the warlords and Taliban who continue to terrorise the country, a national DDR programme was launched in July 2004.⁶⁶ The DDR is voluntary and “incentive packages” were introduced to enable those disarmed to support their families during the transitional phase until they can fend for themselves. According to one informant “ex-combatants will receive a compensation and severance package including USD 200, clothing and livelihood assistance”.⁶⁷




Officials of the Afghan Red Crescent Society attend the burial ceremony of one of the two Afghan aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan, 14 August 2003. © AP Photo/Amir Shah.

Security guards

Despite the ongoing debate over the merits and demerits of private security, a considerable proportion of respondents in both Afghanistan and Angola reported using security guards at various locations. But while a good proportion of respondents felt that such guards “improved” their safety, respondents in both Afghanistan and Angola reported lower than

Figure 35 Perceptions of the effectiveness of security guards



Source: Annex 3xxix

average (positive) “security effects” of security guards (see Figure 36).

Notes

62. Reported levels of violence were 1.07 out of 2 and perceived threat rated 1.01 out of 2.

63. Reported levels of violence were 0.53 out of 2 and perceived threat rated 0.47 out of 2.

64. Intriguingly, respondents rated prevalence and misuse to be relatively average, however, at some 2.85 and 2.3 respectively (on a scale of 1–5).

65. See ANSO and CARE (2005). There were 12 NGO fatalities in 2003; 24 in 2004; and 5 people killed up to 1 May 2005. Fatalities for the period 1997 to September 2001 cover the entire country, including areas under the control of the Taliban, the Northern Alliance, and others. The average number of fatalities per year during this period was 2.6.

66. Prior to the launching of DDR, at least six pilot projects targeting approximately 6,000 people for disarmament were established from October 2003 onwards in Kunduz, Gardez, Mazar-e Sharif, Parvan (Kabul), Kandahar and Bamiyan provinces. According to UN’s Afghanistan New Beginning Programme these pilots were intended to inform the main event – the DDR of 100,000 ex-combatants.

67. The Small Arms Survey is undertaking a comprehensive baseline review of the DDR process in Afghanistan together with local partners. The final publication should be completed by early 2006. See also HD Centre’s work on justice and the rule of law in Afghanistan available at www.hdcentre.org

SECTION 5 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The *In the Line of Fire* project has evolved considerably since its inception in 2001. In order to prepare for an expansion of the victimisation survey, partner agency headquarters were contacted by project members in late 2003 and the goals, methodology, timeline and relevance of the second survey were explained to them. New agencies were approached to join the effort. A workshop was held with focal points in Geneva in November 2003 to review the questionnaire and methodology.⁶⁸

A critical lesson from Phase I was the importance of making direct contact with regional and country offices. To better communicate projects goals and logistics, a series of visits to the focus countries and regions were undertaken throughout 2003 and 2004⁶⁹ including:

- Kenya – September 2003
- Uganda – September 2003 (Kampala) and October 2004 (Gulu)
- Sri Lanka – October 2003
- Angola – November 2003
- Israel and the OPT – November 2003
- Philippines – February 2004 (Manila) and March 2004 (Mindanao)
- Cambodia – February 2004
- Indonesia – March 2004
- Thailand – April 2004
- Burundi – April 2004
- Rwanda – April 2004
- DRC – April 2004 (Kinshasa) and October 2004 (Goma)
- Israel and the OPT – April 2004
- Solomon Islands – April 2004
- Papua New Guinea – May 2004
- Afghanistan – May 2004
- Mali – May 2004
- Sierra Leone – June 2004
- Liberia – June 2004

Some gains

The project made a number of important strides in Phase II. Demonstrated improvements included the

significant expansion of the overall number of participating agencies – from nine (in Phase I) to 17; a considerable increase in the number of responses – from 602 (Phase I) to 2,089; an increased number of demographic, security, and victimisation-related questions, allowing for a more sophisticated appraisal of the risks associated with gun violence and misuse than in previous iterations⁷⁰; the determination of more accurate response rates and risk factors due to the provision of denominator data; and the tripling of geographic coverage – from 39 countries and 2 territories (Phase I) to 96 countries and territories.

As in Phase I, questionnaires were made available on-line to respondents on the HD Centre and Small Arms Survey websites. In addition, a CD-rom with all seven language versions was delivered to focal points, as well as electronic and hardcopy questionnaires.⁷¹ Focal points and country office representatives were responsible for distributing, collecting and sending back questionnaires to the project team – a process that inevitably led to certain geographic and sectoral biases.⁷²

The countries providing the highest response rates were those visited by the project team. The fact that almost half of the overall responses (from all agencies) came from these regions and/or countries once again underlines the importance attached to personal and face-to-face contact with personnel on the ground – as well as the attendant difficulties of undertaking a project without adequate senior-level support or full-time co-ordination, monitoring and follow-through from agencies themselves. All the focal points stressed the difficulties they encountered in securing buy-in from their country offices, a challenge they face regularly.

And some setbacks

Despite the application of lessons learned from Phase I, the project team encountered a range of set-backs. These related to the method by which questionnaires were distributed and disseminated to prospective respondents, the *representativity* of the survey and the response rate.

A major concern to the co-ordinators was ensuring a far-reaching and efficient distribution of the questionnaire through focal points. While it was recognised that “survey fatigue” among participating agencies was unavoidable, efforts were made to ensure a smoother communication chain between participating agencies, establish sharper deadlines, and improve outreach to country offices. Unfortunately, with the exception of a small selection of partners, these efforts did not yield the desired outcomes. In some cases questionnaires were not sent to country offices by agreed deadlines (delaying the translation, data-entry and analysis later in the process), incomplete or draft versions of the questionnaires were distributed (affecting coherence) and “sensitive” questions removed (affecting comparability), despite commitments made during meetings and workshops.

As in Phase I, the project team was unable to ensure a representative sample from all participating agencies who were ultimately responsible for distributing questionnaires to their country offices, and for pressing for as wide a participation rate as possible. Though regular outreach efforts were launched by the *In the Line of Fire* co-ordinators to ensure targeted dissemination to the focus countries and regions, there was insufficient oversight of the distribution of the questionnaire. Moreover, due to staff turn-over within some participating agencies, continuity in communication and distribution was difficult to maintain.

As with any survey research, the response rate can be low due to exogenous factors such as the physical means available to fill-in questionnaires (on-line or on hard copies), the time available to respondents, the level of interest of participants in filling-in a voluntary questionnaire and the like. Regardless of the topic, self-administered surveys are impersonal, and often yield low response rates or under-represent a phenomenon – particularly when treating sensitive issues. As noted in the Phase I report, “methodologies employing more personal contact and face-to-face interaction – such as focus groups, interviews or participatory appraisals – may in some ways be better suited for eliciting responses to such issues.”⁷³

Although the self-administered questionnaire was made available in several languages and generated voluminous information, it suffered from certain limitations:

- Despite being shortened (in comparison to Phase I) and taking approximately ten to fifteen minutes to complete, it was still considered too long for a number of (actual and would-be) respondents. Follow-on surveys would likely benefit from a shortened questionnaire.
- A number of questions allowed too much margin for error or misinterpretation. For example, cumulative ranking (e.g. question 36) or disaggregated percentage questions (e.g. question 32) were easily confused by a wide sample of respondents.
- In some cases, questions were considered overly general or vague by respondents – as was noted by one respondent: “some of the questions asked in the questionnaire need to be more explicit for the analyst to get the appropriate responses” (e.g. question 50). Some of the questions are not relevant”. Others urged for more feedback as a condition of filling-in a questionnaire: “I personally recommend that a feedback be sent to us and be made available to every staff.”
- Finally, definitions and concepts were sometimes contested or questioned (e.g. “evacuation” versus “relocation”) and the listing of standardised definitions and a glossary of terms is likely required in future iterations of the survey.

Notes

68. The questionnaire was first prepared, tested and piloted in 2001 with Oxfam-GB (Muggah 2001b). It was later expanded and refined by participating agencies and a group of survey specialists in November 2001, and implemented in 2003. The questionnaire was again reviewed and amended and implemented between February and November 2004.

69. In addition, between June and August 2004, phone contact was made with country offices otherwise unable to be visited or unavailable for meetings.

70. For example, silhouettes were added for weapons identification purposes, additional open-ended questions were included to gather more qualitative data, and still other amendments were made to strengthen the specificity of responses (see Annex 1).

71. Due to the low response rates associated with the on-line submissions in 2002, this option was not made available in 2004.

72. After the initial deadline set for mid-2004, the project team maintained regular contact with all agencies, advising them of their specific response rates and encouraging the completion of outstanding questionnaires. A lower-than-anticipated response rate among certain agencies resulted in an extension of the deadline.

73. Beasley et al (2003), p. 37

SECTION 6 DISCUSSION

A human security perspective on disarmament

The findings of *No Relief* provide compelling evidence that relief and development personnel encounter an array of weapons-related challenges in the course of their work. Above and beyond their direct physical impacts on personnel, arms availability and misuse can have perverse effects on programming – from the recruitment of competent employees to the tricky negotiations accompanying access and engagement with military actors in unsafe areas.⁷⁴ There can be little doubt that humanitarian and development action was made precarious by perceived levels of armed violence reported in 2003 and 2004 – violence perpetrated in large part with small arms and light weapons.

Fortunately, there appears to be a growing awareness within agencies of the impacts of small arms availability and misuse on personnel and operations. It appears that institutionally, agencies are responding by increasing staff security training and – more controversially – turning to private security. A smaller number of agencies are also becoming active in generating political advocacy and building public awareness. A striking example is the energy that Oxfam-GB has committed to the *Control Arms* campaign, co-sponsored with Amnesty International and the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA).⁷⁵ Similarly, the importance that UNDP attaches to raising awareness of small arms collection and destruction in relation to sustainable human development is another indicator of how humanitarian and development actors are taking the issue on.⁷⁶ However, many agencies still have considerable latitude for additional engagement on such matters.

Efforts to improve security need to focus both on improving awareness of and compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law, and also with strengthening norms associated with arms control – at both their sources, and in and around operations. To be sure, when comparing multilateral and bilateral action on small arms control with nego-

tiations to contain nuclear, biological, chemical, and other conventional weapons, there is reason for cautious optimism. Encouragingly, since the mid-1990s, an array of norm-building and institutional activities on small arms control have taken place.

Since the 2001 UN *Conference on Small Arms* and agreement to the non-legally binding *Programme of Action* to control illicit flows of guns, there has been one UN Biennial Meeting of States (July 2003) to review progress on implementation.⁷⁷ Over the same period, numerous regional-level conferences have taken place, and national action plans have been developed to put the *Programme of Action* into motion. State compliance with the *Programme of Action* appears to be growing.⁷⁸ International donors, multilateral agencies and NGOs have simultaneously launched arms collection, destruction and DDR-related interventions with varying degrees of scope and ambition.⁷⁹ These activities are contributing to the growth of incipient norms around arms control, with specific actions devoted to the marking and tracing of weapons, collection and destruction of guns, and regular reporting on the implementation of the UN *Programme of Action*.

Critics however question the extent to which these rhetorical commitments have led to meaningful changes, particularly in those parts of the world where relief and development agencies are most active. Although there have been some gains in the arms control community to increase attention to the toll of gun violence, the human dimensions are still largely absent from the international debate.⁸⁰

Despite the best efforts of like-minded States and the continued inputs of several hundred NGOs, loopholes remain in the UN *Programme of Action*. It is precisely for this reason, then, that humanitarian and development actors cannot afford to be complacent when it comes to small arms control. Because of their durability and the complex motivations associated with their acquisition and use, guns are intractable tools. Engaged and concerted action from affected communities – including humanitarian and development agencies – is urgently required.

Box 5 'Putting Guns in Their Place': A resource for agencies



A primer on small arms issues is available for the humanitarian community. "Putting Guns in Their Place: A Resource Guide for Two Years of Action by Humanitarian Agencies" includes specific recommendations on thematic issues ranging from the relationship between weapons and

displaced persons, youth violence and gender. It also offers background on the UN small arms control process and how agencies can themselves get involved in efforts to reduce insecurity not only locally in affected regions, but also in the multilateral arena. "Putting Guns in Their Place" can be obtained in French, Spanish and English at www.hdcentre.org

There are several critical issues in the multilateral small arms control process that concern all humanitarian and development agencies. For example, there has been little action, much less serious debate, on regulating the civilian possession of weapons at the national level, controlling transfers of guns and ammunition to non-state armed groups, the provision of assistance to survivors of gun violence, or the importance of effects and demand-reduction in multilateral negotiations.⁸¹ But it is precisely these issues that matter most to humanitarian and development workers and the individuals and communities they work to protect and assist. Without adequate controls on the transfer of weapons to paramilitary, militia and insurgent groups, more stringent regulation of the possession of guns, and more effective rehabilitation, treatment and care for those non-fatally injured, development work in particular will continuously yield less than adequate results. *No Relief* provides an entry-point for humanitarian and development agencies to raise their voices on these critical issues.

Most importantly, *No Relief* provides a preliminary road map for agencies to reflect on their security management priorities. The provision of security is often about rendering concrete decisions. Ultimately, senior management and directors must make difficult decisions about how best to provide security for their personnel, balancing concerns about their safety against the rights and needs of beneficiary populations. Such decisions frequently rely on information provided by individuals on the ground. But all too often, reliable surveillance data is missing. As security officers know, the source of information and intelli-

gence is important. What they must increasingly recognise is that workers may themselves be best situated to discern the various ways in which their security can be improved.

Institutional responses


No Relief arrives at an opportune moment to inform the debates in the UN Security Council, the media, and agencies themselves about the legitimate security concerns of humanitarian and development workers. In addition to UN agencies, an unprecedented number of NGOs are pulling out of countries in the absence of adequate security guarantees from international, regional, and national actors. Since the tragic attack on the UN in Baghdad in August 2003, the UN's approach to security management has been severely criticised.⁸³

No Relief finds that top-down formulaic approaches to security management are not likely to respond to the needs of highly divergent contexts. It has also identified a range of contrasting approaches adopted by the UN and NGOs – emphasising alternately centralised and decentralised approaches to security management. But whether adopting a centralised or decentralised approach, *No Relief* notes that most agencies still lack a robust evidence-based approach to measuring risk. What is more, despite numerous efforts to improve intelligence sharing, they are also inhibited by a systematic inability to continuously share appropriate information between agencies. This is particularly disconcerting, as while a comparatively wide range of security incidents were reported in 2003–2004, the real occurrence of such events is likely to be under-reported. While regular meetings in some countries encourage information sharing, there are few unified or rigorous approaches to gathering and analysing data. As documented in Phase I, approaches continue to be disparate and uncoordinated and treated as a low-priority.

UN reporting and recent action

The UN, for its part, has recently made important efforts to improving its approach to measuring and responding to the security of its personnel. Monitoring capabilities are slowly improving.⁸⁴ Even so, *No Relief* finds that weaknesses remain. Though the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS,

Figure 36 Reported UN peacekeeping and civilian fatalities: 1990–2004



Source: DPKO (2004), various UN General Assembly and Secretary General Reports (1997–2004) – See Annex 4.

previously UNSECOORD)⁸⁵ compiles and centralises statistics on UN civilian staff, and the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) registers fatalities among peacekeepers, these are not necessarily maintained on a regular basis, nor do they always account for all *national* employees. Both the UNHCR and IOM have evolved separate systems to track security incidents, though these are not always rigorously updated. As a result, it is likely that the UN under-reports the severity of specific threats – including those emanating from gun-related violence.

During the 1990s, there was a rise in the annual death and injury toll of UN personnel due to malicious acts (see Figure 37).⁸² Where UN personnel were explicitly targeted (as in Iraq in 2003, West Timor in 2000 or Rwanda in 1994, for example), it was usually interpreted as isolated events. Yet, while not necessarily borne out in existing statistics on fatal injuries, the security environment for personnel appears to have become qualitatively more threatening in recent years. It is true that the mandates of many UN missions have evolved, resulting in increased deployment of staff members from multiple agencies on potentially hazardous missions. Peacekeeping missions are also increasingly being established in areas of high risk, with civilian staff and peacekeepers deployed side by side. But there is also evidence that workers are being exposed to increasingly hostile environments.

Due in part to the deteriorating social environment in which it finds itself, the UN is taking the bolstering

of security training more seriously, as are NGOs and other consortia. The former UN Security Coordinator issued a series of training manuals, established a 24-hour emergency communication centre, and initiated more than 75 training sessions between 2002 and 2004.⁸⁶ It is expected that UNDSS will build on and expand these activities. While firearms-specific issues continue to be under-represented in such initiatives, they do figure occasionally. Recent developments in international humanitarian law ensure promising entry points for improving security.⁸⁷ A host of UN Security Council and General Assembly reports, resolutions and reforms between 1994 and 2004 have emphasised and re-articulated the importance of ensuring the safety and security of personnel.⁸⁸

In 2004, the Inter-Agency Security Management Network also addressed a range of security-related issues and enhancements that have been made across the UN. For example, as of early 2004, UNICEF, WFP, UNDP, UNHCR, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) had programmed additional security expenditures for the next biennium totalling some USD51 million. Following the issuance of a Secretary-General Report to the General Assembly (A/58/756), the Assembly authorised additional expenditures to reinforce security to the order of USD85.9 million (UN A/59 2004).

A number of challenges remain. A key constraint relates to funding and donor will. Though a *Trust Fund for the Security of UN Personnel* has been created and special staff security programmes included in annual Consolidated Emergency Appeals, funding for security nevertheless remains scarce.⁸⁹ Another obstacle is the poor application and enforcement of minimum standards of protection. New benchmarks and standards (UN Minimum Operation Security Standards, MOSS) were created to increase the security consciousness of UN personnel, but they have been slowly and unevenly applied at the country level.⁹⁰

NGO responses

There are many areas where NGOs can improve their response to ensuring the security of their personnel. In fact, a number of efforts have recently been launched by participating agencies in the *In the Line of Fire* project. At the very least, agencies are agreeing that they must evolve an organisational culture that supports good security management.⁹¹ As in the UN, the impor-

tance of security guidelines or policies and adherence is gradually being acknowledged from senior management to the sub-offices in the field. A basic assumption driving the process is that, as the quality of security management within the NGO sector rises, many more beneficiaries will receive assistance and protection from competent and secure workers.

A basic requirement to improve security management is information management and the preparation of appropriate guidelines. Though their approaches differ markedly, NGOs are gradually improving their capacities to monitor trends, with the establishment of incident-monitoring systems, extensive documentation and debriefing with victimised staff, monitoring of trends in collaboration with host governments, and the establishment of mechanisms to respond to insecurity in a decentralised fashion. Guidelines have also been elaborated by most humanitarian agencies, along with the dissemination of various codes of conduct.⁹² Though subtly different from the UN, there is a consensus among most NGOs that responsibility for security is ultimately vested in their employees.

The importance of ascertaining staff competence to manage their own security has been repeatedly highlighted by NGOs. There is a growing recognition of the importance of not only getting security management systems and norms in place, but ensuring that staff are fully trained and cognisant of how to manage their own risks. At the very least, NGOs are now integrating security management into their administrative and programme management processes. They are also delegating individual senior staff members with defined roles and responsibilities in overseeing security. These roles are in some cases being supplemented with funding to set-up security monitoring and early-warning systems monitored by senior supervisors. *No Relief* finds that there is a growing belief that NGOs have effectively mainstreamed security, with planning and decisions often taken by managers closest to the ground, and final decisions approved by executives.⁹³

Where staff competence is lacking, a number of co-ordination bodies and agencies have introduced robust security training packages and programmes to bring relief workers up to speed. Organisations such as InterAction, VOICE, RedR and the IRC have developed comparatively sophisticated training programmes and security coordination systems – but these are difficult to sustain due to the persistent

Box 6 Security management in the NGO Sector: OCHA's view

A 2004 OCHA review highlighted a number of important factors that are believed to influence the security management of non-UN agencies. Though not backed up by evidence of their effectiveness, these can be summarised as:

Interventions based on knowledge – an approach that relies on shared understandings of activities, and requiring good knowledge of the local context and perceptions as well as active and sustained relationships with those locally in power.

Integrated and decentralised management – delegation of responsibilities for decision-making and response to line and programme management levels, as well as the introduction of a culture of accountability and compliance with standards and rules.

Appointment of technical advisors – experienced advisors are appointed from existing staff with additional responsibilities to “enable” risk reduction actions – monitoring upkeep of equipment, behaviour and planning.

Introduce risk management strategies in programming – broader information gathering and analysis leading to improved knowledge of the local context is vital.

Increased involvement of national staff – many NGOs have primarily national staff at senior levels involved in all aspects of planning, intelligence-gathering and training. Improved training in data collection and situational analysis is critical.

Source: OCHA (2004)

under-valuing of security training, problems with securing funding for security, and the challenge of timely analysis and sharing of intelligence information between and within agencies.

Some NGOs have already proactively identified and taken steps to address the discrepancies between security training for nationals and expatriates. For example, InterAction commissioned research on the practices and policies of its membership regarding the security of its national staff.⁹⁴ InterAction now actively promotes increased involvement of national staff in the formulation, review and implementation of security policies and plans, and dedicates resources to identifying threats to national staff on an ongoing basis, establishing clarity on security procedures, and integrating national staff into preparedness, training, and human resource management processes.

A good example of NGO efforts to monitor and improve staff security at the national level is ANSO, the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, established in early 2003 by a consortium of NGOs with financial assistance from ECHO. ANSO assists NGOs in

Afghanistan by providing timely and current security information, coordination and communication support as well as training, advice and general logistical assistance. This includes reviewing security procedures on the ground and supporting the development of improved security capabilities. Such activities help NGOs increase their access to beneficiaries and establish an enabling environment for reconstruction and the delivery of aid.⁹⁵

Notes

74. In some countries, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Philippines, Indonesia and Somalia, it appears that humanitarian workers are also increasingly being targeted as part of a more general insurgency strategy, though it is too early to judge whether the problem extends beyond these countries (ECHO 2004: 25). See also Macrae and Harmer (2003).

75. For more information on the *Control Arms* campaign see www.controlarms.org.

76. See Muggah and Batchelor (2002).

77. The findings of the first Phase of *In the Line of Fire* were launched at the first UN Biennial Meeting in 2003. The next Biennial Meeting will be held in July 2005, followed by a Review Conference in July 2006 to assess the implementation of the five-year programme and agree on the next phase of multilateral work.

78. See Kytömäki and Yankey-Wayne (2004).

79. See the Small Arms Survey (2005; 2004; 2003; and 2002) for a review of some of these interventions which range from international and bilateral protocols to practical disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR).

80. See, for example, www.odihpn.org/pdfbin/newsletter021.pdf; Muggah with Griffiths (2002); Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (2003) and other HD Centre small arms publications.

81. See, for example, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (2004); Small Arms Survey (2002); Muggah and Griffiths (2002), and Muggah and Brauer (2005).

82. See, for example, King (2004; 2002a; 2002b) and Martin (2001).

83. A recent independent panel established in the aftermath of the Baghdad bombing of a UN compound in August 2003 found that the UN's security management system was dysfunctional and lacked accountability in its decision-making. A major recommendation from the report was that the entire UN security management system be reformed.

84. A concerted effort has been made across the UN system to improve and strengthen security arrangements, particularly following the attack on the UN compound in Baghdad. The Secretary General has launched a DPKO survey of compliance with minimum operating standards in missions; the development of a system-wide procedure for threat and risk assessment; the upgrading and independent evaluation of baseline minimum operating security standards to deal with new threats; and other measures.

85. Formerly the UN Security Coordinator's Office, it changed its name to UNDSS in December 2004. UNSECOORD emerged following the agreement on a Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (January 1999) and its budget increased substantially between 2003 and 2004.

86. UNSECOORD introduced an "interactive" CD-ROM course entitled "Basic Security in the Field: Staff Safety, Health and Welfare" that is available in English and French. Approximately 6,000 copies have been distributed since 2002. It is also available on intranet and UN websites allowing staff member access. Arabic and Spanish versions are forthcoming. In addition, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and UNSECOORD have provided country-specific security training for humanitarian staff working in high-risk areas in 2003 and 2004. See, A/59 Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and Protection of United Nations Personnel (2004). UNSECOORD itself has added 383 new uniformed security officers and 121 other security-related positions.

87. For example, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court makes the murder of humanitarian personnel a war crime. No cases have been prosecuted at the national level.

88. See, for example, statements by the UNSC on the safety and security of UN forces and personnel deployed in countries of strife (1993; 2/25493); a UNSC condemnation of attacks on UN personnel (1997, S/PRST/1997/13); the UNSC resolution on the use of force against refugees and civilians in conflict situations (1997, S/PRST/1997/34); the UNSC resolution on the protection of humanitarian assistance to refugees and others in conflict situations (1998, S/PRST/1998/30); UNSC Resolution 1265 (1999); UNSC 1502 (2003); various statements of the President of the UNSC (S/PRST/2000/4); as well as UNGA Resolution 54/192 (1999) on the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of UN personnel.

89. By July 2003, contributions to the Trust Fund totalled USD1.27 million. Additional funds were also generated through consolidated appeals of approximately USD4 million. The Trust Fund has been used to fund training activities and to enable the UN to provide increased security at short notice in areas of increased risk. It has financed the establishment of a UN security operations information centre in Iraq, as well as the short-term recruitment of a number of additional field security officers, communication equipment, vehicles and associated support. See UNSC A/58/344 (2003).

90. Even so, UNSECOORD estimates that some 90% of all 150 UN "duty stations" have reported partial or full compliance with the standards.

91. See ECHO (2004).

92. For example, many NGOs not only self-regulate, but they also seek to promote compliance with the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief.

93. This is not an observation shared equally by independent evaluations of the NGO approaches to security management (ECHO 2004). Other issues related to competence include effective strategic planning, full briefings to senior management at the headquarters and national level, ensuring effective hiring of security personnel, ensuring security briefings to all new staff, introducing evaluations and performance evaluations to measure security procedures, and ensuring effective recording of all security-related information in data-management systems.

94. See, for example, InterAction (2001)

95. Since late 2004, RedR has had a staff member in Afghanistan working closely alongside ANSO (and based in their office) providing a focussed training and learning function.

SECTION 7 RECOMMENDATIONS

Armed violence is likely to be a persistent feature of humanitarian and development landscape for years to come. This reality needs to be confronted head on. Creative advocacy strategies, the elaboration of security guidelines, improvements in training regimes and strengthened co-operation in intelligence gathering and sharing represent a minimum response to the problem. Ultimately, *No Relief* finds that solid evidence should form the cornerstone of any intervention.

Formulaic and top-down approaches to improving security such as the *hardening of targets*, whether through the introduction of higher fences, security manuals and outlays on training, may not adequately change how workers *feel* about their own security. More can *and* must be done. At the very least, donors, policy makers and senior managers must acknowledge how violence is perceived in areas where their employees work, how the prevalence and misuse of guns inhibits access and protection, and how focusing on behaviour and perceptions can enhance the effectiveness of guidelines, codes of conduct and discrete mechanisms to promote protection on the ground.

No Relief is not the final word on the security of humanitarian and development personnel. Indeed, a number of important initiatives that have been launched from New York to Kabul highlight the growing importance attached to the subject. As the *In the Line of Fire* project comes to a close, it is important to reflect on some of the core findings that have emerged:

1. *The opinions of workers are an extremely useful and cost-effective resource in shaping the policy and practice of humanitarian and development agencies.* While quantitative data on fatal and non-fatal injury is vital, subjective interpretations of insecurity, the diffusion of small arms and light weapons, and awareness of how civilians are affected by armed violence are potentially invaluable in designing and revising threat assessments, security planning and programming efforts to reduce violence. *No Relief* shows that these voices must be channelled upwards in order to guide policy development by agencies and governments to

mitigate gun violence and more effectively regulate the trade and possession of small arms.

2. *Accurate, comparable, and reliable information is a precondition to the design of appropriate and robust responses.* External studies and assessments cannot substitute for rigorous and regular internal data collection efforts. *No Relief* highlights the importance of routine data collection on workers' perceptions of gun violence and misuse. It also shows how simple and low-cost surveys, combining measurable indicators and semi-structured questions, can generate useful information for shaping policies and practices. If improvements in security management are to be realised, agencies must begin immediately to collect baseline information.

3. *Initiate a simple and implementable monitoring mechanism to document security incidents and the impacts of gun violence.* *No Relief* has provided an accessible and tested instrument that can be replicated and adapted by humanitarian and development agencies. Other approaches to monitoring trends include regular incident monitoring, reviews of insurance claims, or sporadic surveys. It is imperative that agencies adopt appropriate tools to measure real and perceived risks on the ground. The *In the Line of Fire* project has provided a model (to which other foci could be added) with which agencies could undertake annual or biennial surveys of their staff.

4. *If real gains are to be made in ensuring the protection of workers, agencies must be more engaged in shaping global, regional and national norms around armed violence prevention and small arms control.* *No Relief* highlights the many ways in which armed violence and guns undermine the efforts of humanitarian and development agencies. But to date, few agencies have made their own voices heard in disarmament and small arms control debates. These agencies must play a greater role in influencing and shaping negotiations associated with reform of national firearms legislation, the reduction of surplus or excess stockpiles,

community-based approaches to taking guns out of circulation, restricting the trade and transfer of arms to non-state armed groups, and post-conflict disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration efforts.

5. *Redress the disparity between expatriate and national security training.* *No Relief* amply demonstrates that national staff are more exposed to gun violence than international personnel. It also registers the persistent and unequal access to security training between both categories. It is incumbent on agencies to reflect on these imbalances, the reasons for their persistence, and identify strategies to rectifying and improving the quantity and quality of security training available to all staff.

6. *Introduce a demand-driven and responsive security training and trauma counselling agenda.* While many agencies, particularly those within the UN system, have introduced mandatory training, efforts should be made to test its effectiveness, its breadth and appropriateness. *No Relief* calls on agencies to develop security policies that acknowledge how people interpret and respond to their security environment – particularly in relation to performance and the achievement of mandated objectives. Agencies need to adapt training to respond to criminal as well as political violence. Increased attention on post-incident debriefing and trauma counselling services is also encouraged.

7. *Provide support for coordinated NGO security initiatives.* It is important that multilateral and bilateral donors assist NGOs in developing coordinated security initiatives and encouraging greater investment in effective monitoring, evaluation and rapid reaction mechanisms. The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office provides a valuable example of an initiative worth replicating in other locations.

8. *Present practical and concrete suggestions on improving small arms control efforts at the multilateral and national level.* A key mechanism for regulating small arms availability is the UN Programme of Action on small arms. In the lead up to the July 2006 Review Conference, there are several entry points for a more concerted voice from the humanitarian and development communities. As *No Relief* has shown, if people-centred approaches are to be acknowledged in this vital UN disarmament process, principled and strategic engagement from the humanitarian and development communities is urgently required.

9. *Increase awareness of civilian gun laws and become engaged in strengthening them.* Given that gun violence – including armed criminal violence – can undermine the sustainability of relief and development activities, agencies should develop a greater awareness of national firearm legislation in the countries where they work. Where such laws require strengthening and updating, agencies could be instrumental in facilitating consultations to encourage community participation and expert input, identifying pathways to reform or harmonisation, and supporting violence prevention initiatives already underway.

10. *Emphasise responsive security management policies that speak to local realities.* *No Relief* finds that different regions and countries present widely divergent security environments and risks. Top-down and formulaic guidelines and protocols administered from headquarters, while potentially instructive, may not be appropriate to local dynamics. Thus, security procedures should be tailored to match the heterogeneous conditions in which humanitarian and development workers find themselves. Moreover, these should be regularly updated on the basis of evidence.

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ANNEXES

Annex 1. Questionnaire Template

Questionnaire: Assessing the Relationships between Weapons Availability and Humanitarian and Development Effectiveness.

As part of a global study assessing the impact of small arms and light weapons availability (weapons such as handguns, assault rifles and machine guns) on the humanitarian and development community, we are asking you to take some time to fill out the attached questionnaire. This questionnaire was developed through collaborative efforts between Johns Hopkins University, the Small Arms Survey, and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, in consultation with a wide variety of NGOs and UN Agencies. Specifically, the questionnaire aims to appraise the impacts of armed violence and arms availability and misuse on personnel safety, operational security and effectiveness in the fields of either humanitarian assistance or development programming.

A better understanding of the impacts of small arms abuse on civilians, including humanitarian and development personnel, is vital if international action is to be taken to reduce the availability of such weapons. This survey, now in its second phase, contributes to building this crucial evidence base. The findings from the first phase (2001–2002) are presented in the report, *'In the Line of Fire'*, and can be downloaded from www.hdcentre.org/Programmes/smallarms/sasurvey in French, Spanish and English. The perceptions of and attitudes toward weapons availability and misuse of over 600 respondents working in 39 countries provided information confirming the previously poorly documented impacts of the pervasiveness of arms availability and misuse.

Your participation in the second phase is crucial to assess the threats posed to the safety of personnel and the civilian population where you work and to identify constructive interventions and reporting mechanisms to reduce these threats. With your responses, we aim to contribute to the evidence base for calling governments to action on the small arms crisis.

The questionnaire was designed to solicit your impressions and perceptions – and does not require specialist knowledge. Completing the form should take no more than 20 minutes of your time. By filling out and returning the questionnaire, you are agreeing to allow the project organisers to use your responses as data. Your individual responses will be kept *completely confidential*. In order to ensure confidentiality, all completed questionnaires will be processed in Geneva by the project organisers. Furthermore your name and organisational affiliation will be removed once all responses have been collected and analysed. All data will be presented in aggregate. The organisation you work for will receive feedback about the results of this study within six months of you completing this form. Although the organisation you are currently working for has agreed to participate in this study, your individual participation is strictly voluntary, and there will be no consequences should you choose not to complete the survey.

Contact Point: If you have any questions, please contact Cate Buchanan at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue by phone (+ 41 22 908 1153), by fax (+41 22 908 1140) or by e-mail (cateb@hdcentre.org).

For more information on the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the Small Arms Survey go to www.hdcentre.org and www.smallarmssurvey.org

Part 1 Respondent information

1. Name (optional): _____

2. Sex: Male Female

3. Age: _____ years

4. Citizenship: _____

5. Family

5a. Marital status: single married/ with partner

5b. Do you have children? yes no

5c. Is your family (partner and children) with you? yes no

6. Current station

6a. Country in which you currently are stationed: _____

6b. Beginning date of service in above country: _____ (month-year, e.g. 09-1996)

6c. Full name of the organisation you work for: _____

6d. Your job title:

6e. Years of service in this organisation: _____ (years in field)
_____ (years in headquarters)

6f. Type of service for this organisation: full-time part-time
 fixed-term short-term
 consultant volunteer
 other (specify) _____

7. What sector or programme best describes your work (place an "X" next to one or more of the following classifications)?

_____ (a) Protection, Human Rights/Rule of Law

_____ (g) Education

_____ (b) Food Security

_____ (h) Mine Action

_____ (c) Agriculture Development

_____ (i) Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

_____ (d) Shelter and Non-Food Items

_____ (j) Economic Recovery and Infrastructure Development

_____ (e) Health (including nutrition)

_____ (k) Security

_____ (f) Water and Sanitation

_____ (l) Other (please specify): _____

8. Total years of service for humanitarian and development organisations: _____ years

For all of the following questions in this confidential survey **answer for the country and time period you have indicated under questions 6a–6f above**. For all questions below, **unless otherwise marked**, please mark an "X" as your answer next to only **ONE** choice. If you take the time to complete this, we want to ensure that all responses can be used.

9. Which of these weapons have you seen and how often do you see them?

Please clearly circle ONE answer for each weapon



9A (pistol)

• Frequently • Sometimes • Rarely • Never • Don't know



9B (revolver)

• Frequently • Sometimes • Rarely • Never • Don't know



9E (rifle)

• Frequently • Sometimes • Rarely • Never • Don't know



9G (rocket propelled grenade launcher)

• Frequently • Sometimes • Rarely • Never • Don't know



9I (MANPAD)

• Frequently • Sometimes • Rarely • Never • Don't know



9K (mortar)

• Frequently • Sometimes • Rarely • Never • Don't know



9C (assault rifle)

• Frequently • Sometimes • Rarely • Never • Don't know



9D (hand grenade)

• Frequently • Sometimes • Rarely • Never • Don't know




9F (sniper rifle)

• Frequently • Sometimes • Rarely • Never • Don't know



9H (machine gun)

• Frequently • Sometimes • Rarely • Never • Don't know



9J (recoilless rifle)

• Frequently • Sometimes • Rarely • Never • Don't know



9L (heavy machine gun)

• Frequently • Sometimes • Rarely • Never • Don't know

Part 2 Security context

10. To the best of your knowledge, which of the following groups possess small arm weapons as listed in #9 above: (Place an “X” next to all those that apply)

- | | |
|---|--|
| _____ (a) military forces | _____ (h) international organizations |
| _____ (b) police and law enforcement | _____ (i) business people and politicians |
| _____ (c) rebel or insurgent forces | _____ (j) civilians (children) |
| _____ (d) organised criminal groups | _____ (k) civilians (women) |
| _____ (e) non-organized criminal elements | _____ (l) civilians (men) |
| _____ (f) paramilitary groups | _____ (m) other (please specify): _____ |
| _____ (g) private security groups | _____ (n) I do not know of any groups that possess weapons |

11. Please indicate the kinds of weapons you have seen being held by the following groups in your area of work. Use an “X” in the appropriate box in the table below.

	a) Handguns	b) Rifles	c) Assault rifles	d) Machine guns	e) Hand grenades	f) Rocket-ropelled weapons	g) Mortars	h) Major weapons (1)	i) Other (home made, etc)
For further reference See question 9:	9A,B	9E, F	9C	9H, L	9D	9G, I, J	9K		
a) Military									
b) Police									
c) Rebel									
d) Organized Crime									
e) Non-organized Crime									
f) Para-military									
g) Private security									
h) Civilians (children)									
i) Civilians (women)									
j) Civilians (men)									
k) Other specify _____									

(1) “major weapons” are conventional weapons such as tanks, aircraft or artillery

12. How would you describe the security environment (based on reported or witnessed numbers of intentional deaths, injuries and criminal violence) of the location where you operate?

- _____ (a) little or no violence
 _____ (b) moderate or very localised levels of social or criminal violence
 _____ (c) high or wide spread levels of social or criminal violence
 _____ (d) moderate violent conflict/war
 _____ (e) widespread violent conflict/war

13. To the best of your knowledge which weapon is most frequently the direct cause of civilian death or injury in the country: (Place an “X” next to all that apply).

- _____ (a) blunt instruments and knives
- _____ (b) handguns
- _____ (c) assault rifles
- _____ (d) machine guns
- _____ (e) hand grenades
- _____ (f) landmines
- _____ (g) rocket-propelled weapons
- _____ (h) mortars (e.g. small enough to be transported by 1 or 2 people on foot)
- _____ (i) major weapon systems (e.g. tanks, aircraft or artillery too large to be transported by less than two people on foot)
- _____ (j) home-made guns
- _____ (k) don't know
- _____ (l) other, specify _____

14. Please indicate the location or locations in which you have seen small arms and related munitions. (Place an "X" next to all that apply).

- | | |
|--|---|
| _____ (a) personal residences | _____ (g) in the field (other than aid delivery areas) |
| _____ (b) business/organization offices | _____ (h) civilian households |
| _____ (c) aid delivery areas | _____ (i) recreational areas (playgrounds, hotels, restaurants, markets, malls, etc.) |
| _____ (d) en route to aid delivery areas | _____ (j) refugee/IDP camps |
| _____ (e) official government check points | _____ (k) other (please specify): |
| _____ (f) unofficial check points | _____ (l) I have not seen small arms in any locations |

15. In your estimation, what is the average level of possession of small arms in the civilian population?

- _____ (a) no households
- _____ (b) very low (i.e. almost no households)
- _____ (c) low (i.e. less than half of all households)
- _____ (d) moderate (i.e. about half of all households)
- _____ (e) high (i.e. more than half of all households)
- _____ (f) very high (i.e. almost all households)
- _____ (g) all households
- _____ (h) don't know

Part 3 Operational security

(In the following questions, place an "X" next to ONE choice unless otherwise noted.)

Security in the last six months

16. What proportion of the "beneficiary population" (your target group), in your estimation, were inaccessible as a result of armed security threats:

- | | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| _____ (a) 0% (all were accessible) | _____ (e) greater than 75% to 99% |
| _____ (b) greater than 0 to 25% | _____ (f) 100% (all were inaccessible) |
| _____ (c) greater than 25% to 50% | _____ (g) don't know |
| _____ (d) greater than 50% to 75% | |

17. How often were operations/programmes suspended or delayed due to war or violent armed conflict:

- | | |
|---|-----------------------------------|
| _____ (a) never | _____ (e) once per week |
| _____ (b) once in last 6 months | _____ (f) more than once per week |
| _____ (c) two - four times in last 6 months | _____ (g) daily |
| _____ (d) once per month | _____ (h) don't know |

18. How often were operations/programmes suspended or delayed due to social violence – such as crime or banditry.

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> (a) never | <input type="checkbox"/> (e) once per week |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b) once in last 6 months | <input type="checkbox"/> (f) more than once per week |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (c) two - four times in last 6 months | <input type="checkbox"/> (g) daily |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (d) once per month | <input type="checkbox"/> (h) don't know |

19. Has your agency evacuated/relocated staff from an area as a result of a security threat involving small arms or light weapons?

- (a) yes (b) no (c) don't know

Personal victimization

20. Have you, personally, been a victim of a security incident (e.g. an assault, robbery, intimidation, harassment, kidnapping, sexual violence, etc.) in the last six months?

- (a) yes (b) no (skip to #23)

21. If yes to #20, did the incident involve a small arm or light weapon?

- (a) yes (b) no (skip to #23)

22. If yes to #20, which type(s) of armed security incident occurred?

(Place an "X" by all that apply)

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> (a) firing of weapon in your presence | <input type="checkbox"/> (e) ongoing threat of landmines hindered operations |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b) armed assault | <input type="checkbox"/> (f) kidnapping |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (c) use of weapon to commit a robbery | <input type="checkbox"/> (g) other (please specify): _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (d) use of weapon to threaten, intimidate or harass | |

Personal injuries

23. Since arriving at your current location, have you ever suffered any injuries as a direct result of an incident involving small arms or light weapons?

- (a) yes (b) no (skip to #25)

24. If yes to #23, how extensive were your injuries? (Place an "X" by all that apply)

- (a) not requiring hospitalisation and requiring no or little first aid treatment
 (b) not requiring hospitalisation but requiring significant first aid treatment
 (c) requiring hospitalisation, but not life-threatening
 (d) requiring hospitalisation, and potentially life-threatening
 (e) trauma requiring counselling
 (f) I have been involved in more than one incident, with varying types of injuries
 (g) Other, specify _____

Colleagues victimized

25. In the last six months, have any of your staff or work colleagues been involved in a security incident (e.g. such as assault, robbery, intimidation, harassment, kidnapping, etc.)?

- (a) yes (b) no (skip to #29) (c) don't know

26. If yes, did these incidents involve a weapon?

- (a) yes (b) no (skip to #29) (c) don't know

27. If yes to #26, which type(s) of armed security incident occurred?

(Place an "X" next to all that apply)

- (a) firing of weapon at or near "agency x" personnel
- (b) armed assault
- (c) use of weapon to commit a robbery
- (d) use of weapon to threaten, intimidate or harass
- (e) ongoing threat of landmines hindered operations
- (f) kidnapping
- (g) other (please specify): _____

28. By whom: (place an "X" next to all that apply)

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> (a) military forces | <input type="checkbox"/> (g) private security groups |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b) police and law enforcement | <input type="checkbox"/> (h) civilians (children) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (c) rebel or insurgent forces | <input type="checkbox"/> (i) civilians (women) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (d) organised criminal groups | <input type="checkbox"/> (j) civilians (men) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (e) non-organized criminal elements | <input type="checkbox"/> (k) other (please specify): _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (f) paramilitary groups | <input type="checkbox"/> (l) I do not know |

Security guards

29. Does your office use armed security guards in any areas where you operate?

(Place an "X" next to all that apply)

- (a) no (skip to Part 4)
- (b) yes, at the office or field sites
- (c) yes, for staff transportation to and from the field
- (d) yes, for transportation of relief and/or materials to field sites
- (e) yes, at staff residence and/or staff dependents residence
- (f) other (please specify) _____
- (g) don't know

30. If yes to #29, why does your office use armed security guards?

- (a) organisational policy
- (b) country or local agency initiative
- (c) decision from agency headquarters
- (d) decision made by UN or other security organ(s)
- (e) decision by national or local government authorities
- (f) other (please specify) _____

31. If yes to #29, which statement do you feel describes best your opinion about the presence of armed security guards in your area of operation?

- The presence of armed security guards increases my personal safety.
- The presence of armed security guards has no noticeable impact on my personal safety.
- The presence of armed security guards decreases my personal safety.
- Other, specify _____

Part 4 Effects on civilian populations

32. Of the death and injury caused by small arms among the civilian population, please indicate below your estimate of the proportion caused by each of the following weapons. (Indicate an approximate percentage by weapon type in the table below. ***Note that the sum of all rankings (a-h) should equal 100%***)

Weapon type	Percentage
(a) handguns	
(b) assault/automatic rifles (including sniper fire)	
(c) hand grenades	
(d) landmines	
(e) mortars	
(f) artillery	
(g) major weapon systems (e.g. tanks or aircraft)	
(h) other, specify _____	
Total	100%

33. Please answer the following:

Are you aware of the following occurrences?	Response	If yes, how often did this occur?
33a) Targeting of civilians with assault rifles	(i) _____ yes (ii) _____ no (go to 33b) (iii) _____ don't know	(i) _____ daily (ii) _____ weekly (iii) _____ monthly (iv) _____ every 6 months or less (v) _____ don't know
33b) Accidental death or injury among civilians due to assault rifles	(i) _____ yes (ii) _____ no (go to 33c) (iii) _____ don't know	(i) _____ daily (ii) _____ weekly (iii) _____ monthly (iv) _____ every 6 months or less (v) _____ don't know
33c) Targeting of civilian areas with mortar or artillery fire:	(i) _____ yes (ii) _____ no (go to 33d) (iii) _____ don't know	(i) _____ daily (ii) _____ weekly (iii) _____ monthly (iv) _____ every 6 months or less (v) _____ don't know
33d) Accidental death or injury among civilians due to mortar or artillery fire:	(i) _____ yes (ii) _____ no (go to 33e) (iii) _____ don't know	(i) _____ daily (ii) _____ weekly (iii) _____ monthly (iv) _____ every 6 months or less (v) _____ don't know
33e) Use of small arms against civilians for criminal or coercive purposes:	(i) _____ yes (ii) _____ no (go to 33f) (iii) _____ don't know	(i) _____ daily (ii) _____ weekly (iii) _____ monthly (iv) _____ every 6 months or less (v) _____ don't know
33f) Use of small arms by military or state forces:	(i) _____ yes (ii) _____ no (go to 34) (iii) _____ don't know	(i) _____ daily (ii) _____ weekly (iii) _____ monthly (iv) _____ every 6 months or less (v) _____ don't know

Part 5 Impact on workers

34. At the current time, to what extent do you feel a threat to your personal safety and security due to the availability and use of small arms?

- _____ (a) I do not feel threatened at all
 _____ (b) I feel somewhat threatened
 _____ (c) I feel very threatened but am not considering leaving
 _____ (d) I am considering leaving because of personal safety

35. At the current time, indicate the location or locations in which you may personally feel most threatened by small arms and related munitions.

(Place an "X" next to all that apply).

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> (a) personal residences | <input type="checkbox"/> (g) in the field (other than aid delivery areas) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b) business/organization offices | <input type="checkbox"/> (h) civilian households |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (c) aid delivery areas | <input type="checkbox"/> (i) recreational areas (playgrounds, hotels, restaurants, markets, malls, etc.) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (d) en route to aid delivery areas | <input type="checkbox"/> (j) refugee/IDP camps |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (e) official government check points | <input type="checkbox"/> (k) other (please specify): _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (f) unofficial check points | <input type="checkbox"/> (l) I have not seen small arms in any locations |

36. Thinking back to your decision to take your current job, please rank your level of concern for each response listed below.

(Rank each response (a to f) from 1 to 5, where 1 = no concern and 5 = high concern).

- (a) being away from home, separation from family, or stress on family
- (b) money, costs, or lack of adequate income
- (c) getting sick or needing medical treatment
- (d) getting hurt or injured due to armed violence
- (e) having difficulty adjusting to your changed circumstances (institutional, cultural, physical)
- (f) other (please specify): _____
- (g) I had no significant concerns about taking my current job

37. For the same concerns listed in #36, have your concerns increased over the past 6 months?

Concerns	Circle yes or no for each concern listed		
37a) being away from home, separation from family, or stress on family	Yes	No	NA*
37b) money, costs, or lack of adequate income	Yes	No	NA
37c) getting sick or needing medical treatment	Yes	No	NA
37d) getting hurt or injured due to armed violence	Yes	No	NA
37e) having difficulty adjusting to changed circumstances (institutional, cultural, physical)	Yes	No	NA
37f) other (please specify):	Yes	No	NA

* NA = not applicable

Personal response

38. Have you felt it necessary to personally undertake actions, as a response to the availability or use of small arms? (Place an "X" next to all that apply).

- (a) tried to be accompanied during local travel (for example, walking in groups, staying near others)
- (b) limited or reduced local travel
- (c) hired personal security guards
- (d) acquired a weapon
- (e) planned to terminate your appointment early
- (f) sought trauma counselling
- (g) requested security training and increased security measures from your organization
- (h) other (please specify): _____
- (i) not relevant

Organizational response

39. Does your organisation offer trauma counselling?

- (a) yes (b) no (c) don't know

40. Do you think trauma counselling would be:

- (a) useful
- (b) should be mandatory
- (c) should be more easily available
- (d) not required

41. What action has your organisation taken in response to the small arms situation in your current station of work? (Place an "X" next to all that apply).

- (a) required staff to be accompanied during local travel (i.e. travel in groups, accommodation near others)
- (b) limited or reduced local travel
- (c) vehicular travel only in convoys
- (d) hired personal security guards
- (e) relocated staff
- (f) introduced mandatory security operating procedures
- (g) closed projects
- (h) offered trauma counselling
- (i) other (please specify): _____
- (j) not relevant

Security training

42. Have you had security training from your current employer?

- (a) yes (b) no (go to #44)

43. If yes, was the training mandatory?

- (a) yes (b) no

44. Did you have security training prior to taking this position? (For example, with another organisation)

- (a) yes (b) no

45. If you have had any security training was it carried out by your present organisation (internal) or by another agency (external)?

- (a) internal (b) external (c) both

46. If you have received training, to what extent has this training been helpful to you in coping with the security threat posed by the small arms situation in your current station?

- (a) not helpful at all
- (b) somewhat helpful
- (c) helpful
- (d) very helpful
- (e) don't know

47. Which of the following things do you know about, or would be able to identify about various small arms: (Place an "X" next to all that apply).

- (a) the effective range of various weapons
- (b) different makes and models of various weapons
- (c) types of ammunition for various weapons
- (d) how to apply safety locks to various weapons
- (e) how to safely store various weapons
- (f) how to render various weapons inoperable
- (g) none of the above

48. What additional training, if any, do you think might be valuable in dealing with the underlying security threat caused by the availability and use of small arms?

(Write your response in the space below, use the flip side of this page if additional space needed.)

49. Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being “not significant” and 5 being “highly significant”, please rate the following potential obstacles to the effectiveness of your operations or programs. (Place a number from 1 to 5 in the blank next to each of the following):

- _____ (a) poor quality or limited supplies
- _____ (b) difficulties in coordinating among various agencies conducting relief operations
- _____ (c) cooperation difficulties with the host government and municipal authorities
- _____ (d) personnel challenges (e.g. low staffing levels, capacity & administrative challenges)
- _____ (e) armed conflict between belligerents
- _____ (f) armed attacks on relief workers
- _____ (g) language and other communication difficulties
- _____ (h) other (please specify) _____

50. Overall, how would you characterise your personal attitude toward small arms?

- _____ (a) very negative
- _____ (b) somewhat negative
- _____ (c) neither negative nor positive
- _____ (d) somewhat positive
- _____ (e) very positive

51. Do you have any additional comments, concerns or issues about small arms/security, either related or unrelated to this questionnaire, that you would like to include?

(Write your response in the space below).

Thank you for responding to this questionnaire.

Please be sure that you have responded to all questions. If all questions are not filled in, this will invalidate your responses. We would appreciate your returning this questionnaire to your organisation’s Focal Point.

If in doubt, send back to Cate Buchanan at: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 114, rue de Lausanne, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland, or fax: + 41 22 908 1140.

Annex 2. Respondent Profiles

Annex 2i.

Questionnaires Returned by Country/Territory

Afghanistan	207	Macedonia	2
Albania	1	Malaysia	1
Armenia	1	Mali	6
Angola	210	Myanmar	2
Argentina	8	Mongolia	1
Azerbaijan	2	Malawi	2
Barbados	4	Mexico	1
Bangladesh	3	Mozambique	3
Burkina Faso	2	Namibia	2
Bahrain	1	Nicaragua	1
Burundi	14	Nepal	34
Benin	1	Panama	5
Brazil	2	Peru	7
Bhutan	6	PNG	2
Botswana	1	Philippines	69
DRC	49	Pakistan	5
Central African Republic	6	OPT	83
Congo	30	Romania	1
Cote d'Ivoire	27	Russian Federation	7
Cameroon	2	Rwanda	33
China	6	Saudi Arabia	1
Colombia	20	Solomon Islands	15
Cape Verde	1	Sudan	19
Ecuador	2	Sierra Leone	93
Egypt	10	Senegal	11
Eritrea	3	Serbia and Montenegro	29
Ethiopia	13	Somalia	20
Georgia	10	Sri Lanka	5
Ghana	2	Syria	1
Gambia	1	Swaziland	19
Guinea	33	Thailand	31
El Salvador	15	Tajikistan	5
Equatorial Guinea	1	Timor-Leste	5
Greece	10	Turkmenistan	7
Honduras	92	Turkey	1
Haiti	2	Tanzania	19
Indonesia	64	Uganda	69
Israel	12	United States	1
India	7	Uzbekistan	1
Iraq	64	Venezuela	2
Iran	1	Viet Nam	6
Italy	1	Yemen	10
Jordan	41	South Africa	5
Kenya	100	Zambia	3
Cambodia	221	Zimbabwe	1
Comoros	1	Unknown	54
Laos	3	Total	2089
Lebanon	2		
Liberia	72		
Moldova	1		
Madagascar	1		

Annex 2ii.

Employment Profiles of Respondents

Administration	7
Advisor/consultant	1.7
Dev/agril/engin specialist	0.8
Director/head of mission	6.1
Driver	1
Emergency field officer	4.5
Health care professional/specialist	3.3
Info, campaign, or policy officer	0.4
Logistics-related staff	2.8
Programme manager	11.2
Project officer/manager	9.4
Radio operator	0.6
Researcher	0.2
Security staff	3.5
Other	43.5

Annex 3. Data Tables

Annex 3i.

Perceived security environment

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Little/no violence	582	27.9	31.4	31.4
Moderate localized social violence	641	30.7	34.6	65.9
High/widespread social violence	296	14.2	15.9	81.9
Moderate violent conflict/war	207	9.9	11.2	93
High violent conflict/war	128	6.1	6.9	100
Total	1854	88.7	100	
System	235	11.2		
	2089	100		

Annex 3ii.

Civilian possession of small arms and light weapons

Q15 level of possession in civilian population

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No households	96	4.6	4.8	4.8
	Very low	545	26.1	27.2	31.9
	Low	479	22.93	23.9	55.8
	Moderate	185	8.8	9.2	65.1
	High	153	7.3	7.6	72.7
	Very high	68	3.2	3.4	76.1
	All households	16	0.76	0.79	76.9
	Don't know	464	22.2	23.1	100
	Total	2006	96	100	
Missing	System	83	3.9		
Total		2089	100		

Annex 3iii.

Here, there and everywhere: places where weapons are seen

Q14 Location	Percent
Personal Residence	29
Place of Business	25
Aid Delivery Areas	12
En Route to Aid Delivery	21
Official checkpoint	73
Unofficial checkpoint	24
In the Field	25
Civilian Households	20
Recreational Areas	20
Refugee/IDP camp	10
Other	7
Don't Know	12

Annex 3iv.

Doing Harm: weapons contributing most to civilian death and injury

Q13 Type of Weapons	Percent
Blunt instrument/knife	48.7
Handgun	57.6
Assault rifle	45.8
Machine gun	24.8
Hand-grenade	25.9
Landmines	34.5
RPG	14.3
Mortar	10.7
Major Weapons	11.8
Home-made	18.6
Don't Know	9.7
Other	5.2

Annex 3v.

Does the Prevalence and Misuse of arms affect access to beneficiaries?

Prevalence and misuse (index)

* Q16 proportion of beneficiary population inaccessible because of threat. Cross-tabulation

		Q16 proportion of beneficiary population inaccessible because of threat							Total	
		0	>0-25%	>25-50%	>50-75%	>75-99%	100%	Don't know		
Prevalence and misuse (index)	None	Count	57	11	3	2	0	1	71	145
		% within Prevalence and misuse (index)	39.3	7.6	2.1	1.4	0	0.7	49.0	100
Very low	Count	114	34	12	3	9	2	94	268	
		% within Prevalence and misuse (index)	42.5	12.7	4.5	1.1	3.4	0.8	35.1	100
Low	Count	133	71	31	10	13	7	97	362	
		% within Prevalence and misuse (index)	36.7	19.6	8.6	2.8	3.6	1.9	26.8	100
Moderate	Count	167	81	56	31	16	3	88	443	
		% within Prevalence and misuse (index)	37.7	18.3	12.6	7.0	3.6	0.7	19.9	100
High	Count	165	158	59	43	21	3	62	511	
		% within Prevalence and misuse (index)	32.3	30.9	11.6	8.4	4.1	0.6	12.1	100
Very high	Count	37	86	53	44	13	3	13	249	
		% within Prevalence and misuse (index)	14.9	34.5	21.3	17.7	5.2	1.2	5.2	100
Total	Count	673	441	214	133	72	19	425	1978	
		% within Prevalence and misuse (index)	34.0	22.3	10.8	6.7	3.6	1.0	21.5	100

Annex 3vi.

Proportion of personnel reporting personal involvement in a security incident

Q20 have you been personal victim of security incident

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	326	15.6	16.3	16.3
	No	1662	79.5	83.6	100
	Total	1988	95.1	100	
Missing	System	101	4.8		
Total		2089	100		

Annex 3vi cont.

Testing the relationship between personal victimisation and other variables

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1	Q_2_SEX	0.295022	0.160623	3.373599	1	0.066249	1.343156
	Q_3_AGE	0.004453	0.008431	0.278899	1	0.597424	1.004463
	NATIONAL	-0.13226	0.16262	0.66143	1	0.416055	0.876116
	LVLVIOL	-0.79277	0.103385	58.79955	1	1.75E-14	0.45259
	Constant	2.262196	0.343632	43.3384	1	4.6E-11	9.604158

Variable(s) entered on step 1: Q_2_SEX, Q_3_AGE, NATIONAL, LVLVIOL.

Annex 3vi cont.

Proportion of personnel reporting a colleague involved in a security incident

Q25 in last 6 months have colleagues/friends involved in incident

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	623	29.8	31.2	31.2
	No	1171	56.1	58.7	89.9
	Don't know	202	9.7	10.1	100
	Total	1996	95.6	100	
Missing	System	93	4.5		
Total		2089	100		

Q26 did incident (Q25) involve weapons

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	458	21.9	55.4	55.4
	No	232	11.1	28.1	83.4
	Don't know	137	6.6	16.6	100
	Total	827	39.6	100	
Missing	System	1262	60.4		
Total		2089	100		

Annex 3vii.

Levels of personal threat associated with weapons

Q34 extent of threat to personal safety

		Valid Percent
Valid	Not Threatened	44.8
	Somewhat threatened	44.8
	Very threatened/not leaving	9.1
	Very threatened/leaving	1.3
	Total	100
Missing	System	
Total		

Annex 3viii.

Behavioural responses to insecurity

Q38 Types of behavioural responses

	Valid Percent
Seek accompaniment	31.3
Limit travel	31.25
Hire Security	6.3
Acquire Weapon	2
Plan/terminate job	6.5
Trauma counselling	4.8
Request training/security	21
Other	5.6

Annex 3ix.

Provision of trauma counselling and perceived utility

Q39 Does organization have trauma counselling

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	638	30.5	33.3	33.3
		1	0.04	0.05	33.3
	No	760	36.3	39.7	73
		Don't know	488	23.3	25.4
	Total	27	1.2	1.4	100
Missing	System	175	8.4		
Total		2089	100		

Q40 do you think trauma counselling will be

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Useful	988	47.2	56.1	56.1
	Mandatory	217	10.3	12.3	68.4
	More available	263	12.5	14.9	83.4
	Not required	288	13.7	16.3	99.7
	Total	1760	84.2	100	
Missing	System	329	15.7		
Total		2089	100		

Annex 3x.

A relationship between trauma counselling and threat perception?

* Q39 Does organization have trauma counselling. Cross-tabulation

		Yes	No	Don't know
Threat perception	No threat	27.9	43.2	28.8
	Some threat	37.8	38.2	23.8
	High threat	40.8	38.7	20.4
Total		33.7	40.5	25.7

Annex 3xi.

Have received training from past or current employer

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Trained	1007	48.2	50.9	50.9
	Untrained	970	46.4	49	100
	Total	1977	94.6	100	
Missing	System	112	5.3		

Annex 3xi cont.

Extent to which training has been helpful

Q46 to what extent has training been helpful

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not helpful	51	2.4	3.9	3.9
	Somewhat	294	14	22.7	26.6
	Helpful	348	16.6	26.8	53.5
	Very helpful	376	17.9	29.0	82.6
	Don't Know	225	10.7	17.3	100
	Total	1294	61.9	100	
Missing	System	795	38		
Total		2089	100		

Annex 3xii.

Training for expatriates and nationals

Has had security training (currently or previously)

			Trained	Untrained	Total
National	Nationals	Count	545	713	1258
		%	43.3	56.6	100
	Expatriates	Count	337	115	452
		%	74.5	25.4	100
Total	Count	882	828	1710	
	%	51.5	48.4	100	

Annex 3xii cont.

Training and perceived security

			Threat perception			Total
			No threat	Some threat	High threat	
Has had security training (currently or previously)	Trained	Count	374	491	109	974
		% within Has had security training (currently or previously)	38.3	50.4	11.1	100
	Untrained	Count	479	362	85	926
		% within Has had security training (currently or previously)	51.7	39	9.1	100
Total		Count	853	853	194	1900
		% within Has had security training (currently or previously)	44.8	44.8	10.2	100

Annex 3xiii.

Security environment and training

Level of Violence * Has had security training (currently or previously). Cross-tabulation

Level of Violence			Trained	Untrained	Total
			Little/no violence	Count	213
	% within Level of Violence		37.9	62	100
Moderate violence	Count		472	357	829
	% within Level of Violence		56.9	43.	100
High violence	Count		229	180	409
	% within Level of Violence		55.9	44	100
Total	Count		914	885	1799
	% within Level of Violence		50.8	49.1	100

Annex 3xiv.

Security environment and training among nationals and expatriates

Level of Violence * Has had security training (currently or previously) * National Cross-tabulation

National				Has had security training (currently or previously)		Total
				Trained	Untrained	
Nationals	Level of Violence	Little/no violence	Count	156	277	433
			% within Level of Violence	36	63.9	100
	Moderate violence	Count	228	240	468	
		% within Level of Violence	48.7	51.2	100	
	High violence	Count	107	126	233	
		% within Level of Violence	45.9	54	100	
	Total	Count	491	643	1134	
		% within Level of Violence	43.2	56.7	100	
Expatriates	Level of Violence	Little/no violence	Count	36	19	55
			% within Level of Violence	65.4	34.5	100
	Moderate violence	Count	185	63	248	
		% within Level of Violence	74.5	25.4	100	
	High violence	Count	94	29	123	
		% within Level of Violence	76.4	23.5	100	
	Total	Count	315	111	426	
		% within Level of Violence	73.9	26	100	

Annex 3xv.

Testing the relationship between training and other variables

	Un-standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	0.245934	0.081662		3.011607	0.002646
Q42 had security training from current employer	-0.03332	0.031982	-0.02557	-1.04179	0.297689
Level of Violence	0.289212	0.024525	0.320735	11.79264	1.17E-30
Q 2 Sex	-0.02021	0.033413	-0.01448	-0.60481	0.545407
Q 3 Age	-0.00251	0.001781	-0.03469	-1.40682	0.159703
National	-0.02377	0.037113	-0.01653	-0.6405	0.521956
Q50 personal opinions regarding small arms Prevalence and misuse (index)	-0.03018	0.01492	-0.04764	-2.02252	0.043314
Dependent Variable: Threat perception	0.104953	0.012684	0.233139	8.274214	3E-16

Annex 3xvi.

Training profiles by country

	Trained (n and %)	Untrained (n and %)
Cambodia	71 (35%)	130 (65%)
Angola	83 (43%)	108 (56%)
Afghanistan	118 (62%)	71 (37%)
Kenya	64 (64%)	35 (35%)
Sierra Leone	27 (29%)	65 (70%)
Honduras	20 (22%)	69 (77%)
Occupied Palestinian Territories	21 (26%)	58 (73%)
Liberia	19 (27%)	49 (72%)
Uganda	25 (35%)	40 (61%)
Philippines	38 (58%)	27 (41%)
Indonesia	53 (84%)	10 (16%)
Iraq	46 (74%)	16 (25%)
DRC	41 (85%)	7 (15%)
Jordan	14 (34%)	27 (66%)
Nepal	22 (64%)	12 (35%)
Rwanda	20 (64%)	11 (35%)
Guinea	24 (75%)	8 (25%)
Thailand	11 (35%)	20 (65%)
Congo	23 (82%)	5 (18%)
Serbia & Montenegro	16 (59%)	11 (41%)
Cote d'Ivoire	25 (96%)	1 (4%)
Somalia	3 (17%)	14 (82%)
Colombia	5 (25%)	15 (75%)

Annex 3xvii.

Levels of violence and the use of armed guards

	No	Yes
Little/no violence	76.3	23.6
Moderate violence	66.7	33.2
High violence	58.7	41.2

Annex 3xvii cont.

Levels of violence causes use of armed guards correlation

Correlations

		Level of Violence	q29ano
Level of Violence	Pearson Correlation	1	0.138522
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	3.71E-09
	N	1852	1797
q29ano	Pearson Correlation	0.138522	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	3.71E-09	.
	N	1797	1983

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Annex 3xviii.

Perceived Levels of Violence in the Great Lakes and Middle East

Focus region of country * Level of Violence. Cross-tabulation

% within focus region of country

		Level of Violence		
		Little/no violence	Moderate violence	High violence
Focus region of country	Great Lakes	34.5	43.9	21.4
	Middle East	24.1	43.4	32.4
	All others	32	48.2	19.7
Total		31	46.1	22.8

Annex 3xix.

Perceived Levels of Threat by focus region

Focus region of country * Threat perception. Cross-tabulation

% within focus region of country

		Threat perception		
		No threat	Some threat	High threat
Focus region of country	Great Lakes	47.7	43	9.2
	Middle East	26.7	51.3	21.9
	All others	49.5	43.7	6.6
Total		44.5	45	10.3

Annex 3xx.

Perceived Levels of Threat: Nationals and expatriates in focus regions

Focus region of country * Threat perception * National Cross-tabulation

% within focus region of country

National			Threat perception		
			No threat	Some threat	High threat
Nationals	Focus region of country	Great Lakes	51.3	40.1	8.4
		Middle East	28.3	50.4	21.2
		All others	52.1	42.1	5.6
	Total		47.8	43	9.1
Expatriates	Focus region of country	Great Lakes	25.8	61.1	12.9
		Middle East	19.5	54.6	25.7
		All others	42.9	50	7
	Total		33.1	53.4	13.4

Annex 3xx cont.

Perceived Levels of Threat: Males and Females

Focus region of country * Threat perception * Q 2 Sex Cross-tabulation

% within Focus region of country

Q 2 Sex			Threat perception		
			No threat	Some threat	High threat
Male	Focus region of country	Great Lakes	49	42.2	8.7
		Middle East	26.8	51.2	21.9
		All others	51.1	41	7.8
	Total		45.2	43.5	11.1
Female	Focus region of country	Great Lakes	44.4	46	9.5
		Middle East	27.1	51	21.7
		All others	47.4	47.6	4.9
	Total		43.5	47.8	8.5

Annex 3xxi.

Household possession of firearms in Great Lakes and Middle East

	No households	Very low	Low	Moderate	High	Very high	All households	Don't know
Great Lakes	6	26.4	23.2	10.8	7.7	2.3		23.2
Middle East	2.5	18.4	17.4	10.2	13.7	8.9	2.9	25.6
All others	4.8	30.7	27	8.2	5.3	1.6	0.3	21.9

Annex 3xxii.

Operational obstacles in the Great Lakes and Middle East

Focus region of country * One or more operational obstacles. Cross-tabulation

% within Focus region of country

		One or more operational obstacles	
		Yes	No
Focus region of country	Great Lakes	62.6	37.3
	Middle East	71.1	28.8
	All others	51	48.9
Total		58.1	41.8

Annex 3xxiii.

Have you been victimised in the past six months?

Focus region of country * Q20 have you been personal victim of security incident. Cross-tabulation

% within Focus region of country

		Q20 have you been personal victim of security incident	
		Yes	No
Focus region of country	Great Lakes	19.1	80.8
	Middle East	21.5	78.5
	All others	13	86.9
Total		16.3	83.6

Annex 3xxiii cont.

Personal victimisation by nationality and region

Focus region of country * Q20 have you been personal victim of security incident

* National Cross-tabulation

				Yes	No
Nationals	Focus region of country	Great Lakes		18.4	81.5
		Middle East		25	75
		All others		10.7	89.2
	Total		15.4	84.5	
Expatriates	Focus region of country	Great Lakes		23.8	76.1
		Middle East		17.6	82.4
		All others		17.6	82.3
	Total		18.7	81.2	

Annex 3xxiii cont.

Personal victimisation by region and gender

Focus region of country * Q20 have you been personal victim of security incident * Q 2 Sex Cross-tabulation

% within Focus region of country

Q 2 Sex		Q20 have you been personal victim of security incident		
			Yes	No
Male	Focus region of country	Great Lakes	19.5	80.4
		Middle East	22.6	77.3
		All others	12.7	87.2
	Total		16.9	83
Female	Focus region of country	Great Lakes	18.3	81.6
		Middle East	16.6	83.3
		All others	12.6	87.3
	Total		14.5	85.4

Annex 3xxiv.

Testing the relationship between male victimisation and other variables

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Q_2_SEX	0.295022	0.160623	3.373599	1	0.066249	1.343156
Q_3_AGE	0.004453	0.008431	0.278899	1	0.597424	1.004463
NATIONAL	-0.13226	0.16262	0.66143	1	0.416055	0.876116
LVLVIOL	-0.79277	0.103385	58.79955	1	1.75E-14	0.45259
Constant	2.262196	0.343632	43.3384	1	4.6E-11	9.604158

Variable(s) entered on step 1: Q_2_SEX, Q_3_AGE, NATIONAL, LVLVIOL.

Annex 3xxv.

Perceptions of the effectiveness of security guards

	% Increase safety	% No impact on safety	% Decrease safety
Great Lakes	60	28	12
Middle East	65	25	9
All others	61	33	5

Annex 3xxvi.

Security training by region

	Trained	Untrained
Great Lakes	55	45
Middle East	53.4	46.5
All others	48.4	51.5

Annex 3xxvi cont.

Assessing Expatriate versus national staff security training

		Has had security training (currently or previously)	National	Level of Violence
Has had security training (currently or previously)	Pearson Correlation	1	-0.27561	-0.14211
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	3.48E-31	1.41E-09
	N	1977	1710	1799
National	Pearson Correlation	-0.27561	1	0.204558
	Sig. (2-tailed)	3.48E-31	.	1.45E-16
	N	1710	1786	1599
Level of Violence	Pearson Correlation	-0.14211	0.204558	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	1.41E-09	1.45E-16	.
	N	1799	1599	1852

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Annex 3xxvii.

Personal victimisation by focus country

	Yes	No
Afghanistan	23	76.9
Angola	15.5	84.4
All Others	13	86.9

Annex 3xxvii cont.

Personal victimisation by focus country: expatriates versus nationals

Focus countries – Afghanistan & Angola * Q20 have you been personal victim of security incident

* National Cross-tabulation

% within Focus countries – Afghanistan & Angola

			Q20 have you been personal victim of security incident	
			Yes	No
National	Focus countries – Afghanistan & Angola			
	Nationals	Afghanistan	31	69
		Angola	15.7	84.2
	Total		21.9	78
Expatriates	Focus countries – Afghanistan & Angola			
		Afghanistan	13.4	86.5
		Angola	13.6	86.3
	Total		13.4	86.5

Annex 3xxvii cont.

Personal victimisation by focus country and gender

Focus countries – Afghanistan & Angola * Q20 have you been personal victim of security incident

* Q 2 Sex Cross-tabulation

% within Focus countries – Afghanistan & Angola

			Q20 have you been personal victim of security incident	
			Yes	No
Male	Focus countries – Afghanistan & Angola			
		Afghanistan	24.3	75.6
		Angola	15.4	84.5
	Total		19.8	80.1
Female	Focus countries – Afghanistan & Angola			
		Afghanistan	14.2	85.7
		Angola	16.6	83.3
	Total		15.4	84.5

Annex 3xxviii.

Respondents reporting one or more obstacles due to armed violence

Focus countries – Afghanistan & Angola * One or more operational obstacles. Cross-tabulation

% within Focus countries – Afghanistan & Angola

		One or more operational obstacles	
		Yes	No
Focus countries – Afghanistan & Angola	Afghanistan	71.6	28.3
	Angola	52.7	47.2
Total		62.1	37.8

Annex 3xxix.

Perception of the effectiveness of security guards

Focus countries – Afghanistan & Angola * Security guards affect safety. Cross-tabulation

% within Focus countries – Afghanistan & Angola

		Security guards affect safety			Total
		Increase safety	No impact on safety	Decrease safety	
Focus countries – Afghanistan & Angola	Afghanistan	58.1	34.8	6.9	100
	Angola	36.8	52.6	10.5	100
Total		54.2	38	7.6	100

Annex 4. UN peacekeeping and civilian fatalities: 1990–2004

	UN Peacekeepers	Cumulative	UN civilian	Cumulative
1990	24	24		
1991	15	39		
1992	60	99	11	11
1993	252	351	23	34
1994	167	518	64	98
1995	123	641	12	110
1996	51	692	11	121
1997	48	740	17	138
1998	31	771	29	167
1999	25	796	16	183
2000	52	848	15	198
2001	64	912	6	204
2002	64	976	7	211
2003	64	1040	5	216
2004	81	1121	24	240

Sources: DPKO (2004), various UN General Assembly and Secretary General Reports (1997–2004)