

## PARALLEL HISTORY PROJECT ON NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT (PHP)

### The Future Tasks of the Alliance: NATO's Harmel Report, 1966/67

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[Pierre Harmel, former Belgian Foreign Minister, at the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Report in 1987.  
Source: [NATO](#)]

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**Please note:** This issue of the PHP Publication Series offers highlights from a much larger online document collection. Please consult the PHP website for all the documents in their original language and other features: [http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/collections/coll\\_harmel.htm](http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/collections/coll_harmel.htm).

The PHP has published a number of document collections on various aspects of the security-related history of the cold war: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php>.

## 1) Preface

The series of NATO files found on this site are of unquestioned significance. Most importantly, these records represent a major moment in the life of the North Atlantic Alliance, a critical change in course. [Andreas Wenger in his essay](#) captures clearly the import of this period for NATO and the development of détente.

However, beyond the obvious historical significance, these files have another importance for NATO. They are the first subject files in the [NATO Archives](#) to have undergone the process of declassification and public disclosure. When they were made available in Brussels during 2001, the member nations and NATO staff had already been working for ten years to make available the formal NATO Documents of the first 16 years of the alliance. In the case of formal documents, all member nations have in principle an equal share in the documents and, therefore, there is a sense of common purpose in their disclosure. However, the so called Harmel files represented a different sort of challenge, being comprised of more varied material, including bilateral correspondence and national opinions. For these national documents, all of which had to undergo individual review for disclosure, there was the additional challenge represented by the variations in national law on the release of government documents. In short, these differences were overcome because the member nations were able again to achieve this sense of common purpose and to make these documents available based on a shared understanding of their historical importance.

The [NATO Archives](#) hopes to maintain this sense of purpose and welcomes the cooperation of the Parallel History Project in hosting these documents, thereby making them available to a wider community of researchers.

## 2) Introduction, by Andreas Wenger

### **The Multilateralization of Détente: NATO and the Harmel Exercise, 1966-68**

#### **NATO in December 1967: Strategy, Force Levels, and Nuclear Sharing for the Fourteen**

The successful conclusion of the trilateral negotiations saved NATO as a military structure—at least in the short term. In the Agreed Minute on Strategy and Forces of 9 November 1966 Washington, London, and Bonn agreed on basic guidance for NATO's flexible response strategy. In their April 1967 agreement, however, they defined force levels that matched available financial resources. These agreements would achieve their purpose only if they were properly integrated in NATO's strategy and defense planning mechanism. The three countries therefore took pains to inform and consult the other NATO members about the progress of the negotiations. The establishment of new force-planning and nuclear-consultation machinery at the December 1967 NATO meeting went a long way toward deflating the "ghost of a tripartite directorate" that had marked McCloy's first informal briefing of the fourteen permanent representatives the preceding October.<sup>1</sup> [1] By the end of the year, Ambassador Cleveland could report back to Washington that "nobody objected to the trilateral talks."<sup>2</sup> [2]

The most urgent task of the NPG in 1967 was "to begin to fill in [the] great void which surrounds [the] question of the role of [the] 7,000 nuclear warheads in Europe and their proper relation to external and conventional forces."<sup>3</sup> [3] In the process, the West European allies were informed about how difficult it was to imagine circumstances in which NATO would find it feasible to initiate the use of tactical nuclear weapons.<sup>4</sup> [4] It was therefore all the more important to redress the imbalances of NATO's conventional forces that were oriented toward "massive attacks mounted with minimum warning" rather than toward "less extreme and far more likely nonnuclear contingencies."<sup>5</sup> [5] The rotation and dual-basing of some U.S. forces in Europe allowed McNamara to initiate some modest force restructuring and modernization, despite the opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In May 1967 NATO's DPC approved a new strategy that stressed

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flexibility and the idea of escalation, and by September the Military Committee had endorsed MC 14/3.<sup>6 [6]</sup>

After the DPC met again in December 1967, Rusk reported back to Washington that “the Fourteen now have in being a set of institutional arrangements enabling them realistically to tie together nuclear and conventional strategy, force planning and available resources.”<sup>7 [7]</sup> On 12 December the DPC formally adopted MC 14/3 and the new doctrine of “flexible response” and agreed on force commitments for 1968 and a five-year force plan. If de Gaulle’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated commands had unblocked the debate on strategy in NATO, the trilateral talks subsequently forced a compromise between the remaining big three. In the end the reshaped institutional structures of NATO proved instrumental in forging a convergence of West European and U.S. views on the military importance of NATO in a time of détente.<sup>8 [8]</sup>

Yet NATO’s consensus on force levels and burden sharing was bound to be only a temporary achievement. Expectations of détente in early 1968 stimulated public debate in West Germany and other countries about possible defense reductions, which, if carried out, could lead to a steady decline of national commitments. When Johnson met with NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio in February 1967, they jointly announced that “[t]hey considered the maintenance of NATO’s strength, including the U.S. commitment, as necessary to continuing stability and security in the North Atlantic area.”<sup>9 [9]</sup> Further problems were posed by the arrangements to offset the balance of payments for U.S. and British troops in NATO. Secretary Fowler warned Johnson that a sound financial basis for the alliance was still missing.<sup>10 [10]</sup> In view of rising sentiment in the U.S. Congress in favor of substantial troop reductions in Europe, McNamara’s successor as Defense Secretary, Clark Clifford, told his NATO colleagues in mid-1968 that he did not believe it was “realistic to assume that the United States will maintain the same level of ready forces deployed in Europe indefinitely into the future.”<sup>11 [11]</sup>

At the Reykjavik ministerial session in June 1968, NATO called on the Soviet Union to prepare for discussions about the possibility of mutual force reductions in Europe. No member government expected Moscow to be receptive to the idea at an early date, but the allies hoped that their emphasis on reciprocity would demonstrate that NATO was seriously pursuing arms control—a perception that, as it gained hold, would ease pressures to cut defense budgets and would forestall unilateral cuts.<sup>12 [12]</sup> Nevertheless, Rusk was not sure that this would help much.<sup>13 [13]</sup> Not until the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces would the allies seriously consider increasing NATO’s military strength.

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### **The Harmel Report: NATO's Political Role in a Time of Détente**

The withdrawal of France from NATO's integrated military structure and de Gaulle's trip to Moscow had led to increased public questioning of the relevancy of NATO. The alliance, Rusk told his colleagues in June 1966, had to expand its political functions and increase its role in enhancing East-West contacts. Later that year, Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel approached Washington with the idea of a major study on the future of the alliance in light of international developments since 1949. Rostow and Harmel agreed that the aim of such a study would be to underscore the continued relevance of NATO beyond 1969. Rusk was delighted that the initiative had come from a small European partner, because this would support the view that NATO was moving toward less hegemonic and hierarchical structures.<sup>14 [14]</sup>

At the December 1966 ministerial meeting, Harmel, recalling ideas put forward by Canada two years before, proposed to his colleagues that the NATO Council "analyze the political events which have occurred since the Treaty was signed" and "study the future tasks which face the alliance, and its procedures for fulfilling them, in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for durable peace."<sup>15 [15]</sup> Two key questions were at the heart of the study, one related to substance, the other to NATO machinery: First, what political roles could and should the alliance take on in the interest of détente? Second, should the alliance improve its political consultation machinery, and if so, how should it do this? The report evolved in two phases. A special group of representatives was established under the secretary general, and four subgroups, chaired by rapporteurs, were each assigned a broad subject of interest to the alliance. The work of the sub-groups started in April 1967 with a focus on substantive issues. The written reports went through several stages and were finalized in late September. The political phase of the study began in October, after the last meeting of the rapporteurs at Ditchley Park. While the secretary general consulted key alliance members, the International Staff Secretariat drew on the sub-groups' reports in drafting a summary document that was presented to foreign ministers in December 1967.<sup>16 [16]</sup>

### **Convergence on Substance**

The first task of the main special group was to define broad fields of work for the sub-groups. By 20 March 1967 the special group had come up with a subjects for each sub-group: 1) East-West relations; 2) inter-allied relations; 3) general defense; and 4) developments in regions outside the NATO area.<sup>17 [17]</sup>

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At the same time, the special group had to decide on the rapporteurs and the composition of the group. Brosio's original idea was to choose the rapporteurs from the smaller member-states. However, most of these countries signaled that they did not want to take the lead and preferred to await the results of the trilateral talks.<sup>18 [18]</sup> The United States, Britain, and the FRG filled the void by presenting a list of high-ranking officials, with special emphasis on working groups 1 and 3.<sup>19 [19]</sup> Eventually, the following rapporteurs were chosen: J. H. A. Watson from the British Foreign Ministry and Karl Schutz from the West German Foreign Ministry for sub-group 1; Minister of State Paul-Henri Spaak from Belgium for sub-group 2; U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of State Foy D. Kohler for sub-group 3; and C. L. Patijn, a professor of international relations at the University of Utrecht, for sub-group 4.

The U.S., British, and West German roles in the Harmel exercise became even more important in the summer of 1967. Once it had become clear during the trilateral talks that the West German government was willing to pursue environment improvement over reunification, the key question was how Bonn would move ahead with *Ostpolitik*. Would it be in consultation with NATO, unilaterally, or at the side of France? The Harmel exercise had to demonstrate whether and to what degree the East-West dialogue on European security could be anchored in NATO's multilateral structures. The permanent representatives were quite critical about the progress of the exercise when they met Brosio in a private meeting on 12 July 1966, describing the procedure as "somewhat chaotic." In addition, "[t]wo of the four Rapporteurs had been acting in a highly personal manner," while the other rapporteurs "were more governmental." Sub-group 2, dominated by Spaak, was addressing the issues in a "rather theoretical way" and causing tensions with the French. The rapporteur of sub-group 4 had put forward a number of concrete proposals that did not adequately take into account "political realities."<sup>20 [20]</sup>

The work of subgroups 1 and 3 under the leadership of their U.S., British, and German rapporteurs also posed important challenges. The main task for sub-group 1, on East-West relations, was to balance Britain's optimistic outlook on détente with the FRG's views on the German question. The debate focused on three related questions that accentuated differing viewpoints. Watson's first paper immediately raised a central question: What was the nature of détente and, in particular, what did the Soviet Union hope to gain by seeking détente? Watson claimed that "Soviet policy aims to maintain the status quo in Europe" and added that "Soviet aggression . . . has become unlikely." Various needs and pressures, he argued, had driven the Soviet authorities "not only to limit their objectives in Europe and in the rest of the world, but even to make certain concessions."<sup>21 [21]</sup>

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Conversely, West German representatives stated that “détente was a fact only to a limited extent; to a large extent it was simply an illusion.”<sup>22 [22]</sup> The West Germans also believed that Moscow was “trying to isolate the German problem.”<sup>23 [23]</sup> Kohler in his paper agreed and warned that the Soviet Union hoped, “by relaxing tensions selectively, to weaken the cohesion of the Alliance, divide the states of Western Europe, and in particular, to isolate the Federal Republic and open up differences between Western Europe and the US.” In the end the more skeptical position won out. Relaxation of tension was “not the final goal but a step on the way toward a European settlement”; it was “a fluctuating process” that would “have to be comprehensive and must include everybody” to be effective.<sup>24 [24]</sup>

The West German delegation’s first paper broached the related issue of what a lasting European settlement should look like. The paper outlined a series of fundamental principles for relations among European countries, an idea that later would be taken up in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.<sup>25 [25]</sup> At the time, however, the idea could be interpreted as working into the hands of the Warsaw Pact Declaration of July 1966, which called for a continental European security arrangement. Brosio warned that the aims of this initiative were “crystal clear: a multilateral European conference leading to a multilateral European security pact ending the Atlantic alliance and possibly weakening, if not ending, the Western European communities.” Such a general system of security, he added, “would lead to the eventual supremacy in Europe of the strongest continental power, which is the Soviet Union.”<sup>26 [26]</sup> Both Kiesinger and Brandt had at times raised the possibility of dissolving NATO and the Warsaw Pact as an alternative model for achieving German and European unity, a prospect that stirred considerable anxiety in Washington, London, and elsewhere.

The sub-group agreed with Brosio’s comments and drafted a report arguing that NATO and a policy of détente were not contradictory. The report stressed that the U.S. presence in Europe was vital to a peaceful order and that any European settlement, once achieved, would require the continuing support of the United States. At the same time, the sub-group recognized that the Soviet Union could effectively block a European settlement. The aim of NATO should therefore be “not to set Eastern Europe against the Soviet Union but rather to involve both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in more constructive forms of cooperation.”<sup>27 [27]</sup>

The third and most disputed question was NATO’s position on the German problem. The attempt “to extract from the Federal Republic a statement of policy on the German problem drew a blank.” The West German representative merely repeated the official position of the coalition government that “détente should not be pursued in any way which would prejudice reunification.” Until a final settlement was reached, the legal

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position of the FRG's claim to be the sole legitimate representative of Germany had to be maintained. Although Brandt seemed more flexible in his statements, "Bonn had only recently begun to experiment with a new policy based on détente."<sup>28</sup> [28] The key problem was that the new West German government could not agree on a more concrete statement of policy. Faced with this obstacle, the United States and Britain sought at least a statement regarding the principles that the FRG thought should guide relations between NATO and the Soviet bloc.

On 18 and 19 September 1967 the sub-group convened to discuss the draft FRG paper, which adhered to the traditional position on the German question, emphasizing the right to self-determination, the responsibility of the four powers, and non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Consequently, it was up to the West Germans to make life more bearable for the East Germans by establishing contacts and facilitating the participation of the East German population in international life. The allies could assist these efforts to relax the tension between the two parts of Germany by making clear that the GDR was not legitimate. NATO should be instrumental in harmonizing and coordinating the policies of the FRG and the other allies.<sup>29</sup> [29] There was considerable disappointment among the other sub-group members regarding the language of the draft. Delegates from Canada, the Netherlands, and Belgium said the paper represented a step backward from the public statements of Brandt and Kiesinger and suggested that something more positive, dynamic, and concrete be included. The Netherlands, in particular, expressed disappointment with the West German government's apparent desire to maintain "a sort of exclusivity for FRG in contacts with East Germany" that did not tally with the "facts of life."<sup>30</sup> [30] The sub-group acknowledged the report as a personal statement of the two rapporteurs but called upon them to revise the text, particularly the part on the German problem.

The sub-group also spent considerable time discussing whether preference should be given to bilateral or multilateral steps. The only point of agreement, however, was that both bilateral and multilateral contacts were needed. Although bilateral steps, in isolation, posed the risk of a selective détente—an outcome favored by the Soviet Union—multilateral approaches stirred concerns in West Germany that they would perpetuate the division of Europe. The members of the sub-group all agreed that NATO "offers an excellent forum for establishing . . . harmonization on our side, and for maintaining a necessary degree of coordination in our bilateral and multilateral dealings with the East," but they did not agree on whether the allies should adopt a "concerted" position in multilateral East-West negotiations, as suggested by the FRG, or merely a "fully discussed" position, as favored by the British.<sup>31</sup> [31] The paragraph was eventually dropped from the report.

Sub-group 3, under the original heading of "general defense," achieved a remarkable degree of consensus. Its final report was the most substantive of the four and was met

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with widespread approval. The report contributed to the Harmel exercise in three ways: First, it introduced the term “security policy” to indicate an expanded definition of security, covering not only defense issues but also arms control and disarmament. This widening of the concept of security was suggested by West Germany on 18 May 1967.<sup>32</sup> [32] It reflected the experience of the trilateral talks and was summarized aptly by Kohler in his memorandum for the rapporteurs of 18 July 1967: “While our principal objective remains the security of the North Atlantic area, this now involves, to a greater extent, questions of political tactics and actions as well as military issues.”<sup>33</sup> [33]

Second, it established NATO's future two-pillar security strategy, a phrase that was first mentioned in Kohler's memorandum and then expanded to read in the final report:

Security for the members of NATO rests on two pillars. First, the maintenance of adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of the NATO countries if aggression should occur. Second, realistic measures to reduce tensions and the risk of conflict including arms control and disarmament measures.<sup>34</sup> [34]

On 1 September 1967, Kohler submitted a paper to the subgroup that drew praise as a balanced statement of the continued need for an integrated defense effort.<sup>35</sup> [35] Starting from the premise that détente was limited and that the Soviet leadership still hoped to derive political influence in Europe from its military power, the paper stressed the importance of having military capabilities that covered the full spectrum of potential conflict. Military strength, according to the report, would deter aggression and counter the political influence of Soviet military power, paving the way for détente. Simultaneously, NATO should explore the possibility of achieving lower force levels and lower costs through arms control agreements that would limit Soviet forces as well. The report called on NATO to strengthen and expand the existing machinery to deal with arms control.<sup>36</sup> [36]

Third, the paper integrated into the Harmel exercise the consensus on strategy, force levels, nuclear planning, and crisis consultation that had been reached in the DPC and the NDAC/NPG. The United States initially had believed that the Harmel exercise “should not attempt to deal with force requirements or the strategic concept for NATO Defense which are currently being reviewed in other bodies of the alliance.”<sup>37</sup> [37] U.S. officials were worried about possibly slowing down the work of the fourteen. But after the DPC and NDAP/NPG talks led to the reaffirmation of NATO's military structures in December 1967, the inclusion of additional language on defense in the Harmel report provided a welcome opportunity to gain support for the alliance's new military strategy.

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### Compromises on Political Consultation

When the rapporteurs convened for their final meeting in Ditchley Park on 11 October 1967, the secretary general declared that “the Rapporteur phase of the Harmel study was now closed” and that “[t]he political phase was about to begin.”<sup>38 [38]</sup> The work of the sub-groups had generated widespread agreement that the role of the alliance in pursuit of détente should be affirmed in the final report, but it was not yet clear how far the French would be willing to go in linking NATO and détente. The “difficulty started when we turned to the question of machinery,” as Wilhelm Grewe, the West German ambassador to NATO, noted in a talk with Brosio and Brandt.<sup>39 [39]</sup>

The United States had indicated during the sub-group phase that it regarded the improvement of consultation procedures as a key aim of the exercise. Kohler told the other rapporteurs that in an environment of limited and selective détente, “maintenance of the NATO organization as a locus for consultation is more important than it has ever been.”<sup>40 [40]</sup> The existing institutions of NATO, which had already been adapted and strengthened by the fourteen, provided a point of departure for a comparable strengthening of NATO’s political machinery. Accordingly, sub-group 3 proposed a “permanent Arms Control and Disarmament Committee of NATO and a unit of the International Staff to support this Committee.”<sup>41 [41]</sup> Earlier, during the work of subgroup 1, Brzezinski had introduced the idea of a “continuing and permanent” body that would “study East-West relations.”<sup>42 [42]</sup> Building on the precedent of the Kohler proposal, Britain and the FRG made the suggestion “to create a permanent body to deal with the question of European security and Germany.” Rostow and Cleveland, in a talk with Brosio, reacted enthusiastically: “This may turn out to be a major result justifying the whole exercise.” They discussed whether such a body should take the shape of a four-power (or three-power) group like the NPG or a seven-power group with rotating members. In addition, they proposed “some kind of a body for permanent study of a common political strategy” for the Mediterranean and Middle East—a proposal that was prompted by the Mideast War in June 1967.<sup>43 [43]</sup>

At the start of the political phase of the exercise, the United States indicated that it would prefer to “stand firm and to go ahead, on the basis of the open endedness and of the empty chair, leaving to France the responsibility of drawing the ultimate formal consequences.”<sup>44 [44]</sup> Rusk told Harmel that “we should not let ourselves be blackmailed.”<sup>45 [45]</sup> Robert Bowie, a senior State Department official, commented at

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Ditchley Park that “the French were already effectively out of the Alliance,” adding that as far as the U.S. government was concerned, “the Alliance would in no way be weakened if the French were totally out.”<sup>46</sup> [46] Nonetheless, the other members of the fourteen were reluctant to risk a final break with France over the Harmel exercise. The British “did not want to see a report that was unacceptable to the French.”<sup>47</sup> [47] Instead, they preferred to work for a paper “that was neither too difficult for the French to swallow nor so weak that it would undermine the Alliance.”<sup>48</sup> [48]

The West Germans faced a particularly complex dilemma on the question of machinery. In a talk with Brandt, Brosio said that French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville had warned that “any antagonistic attitude under the Harmel Study, and which would tend to isolate France, would force the French to react.” Brosio was therefore inclined to arrive “at a minimum agreement on détente with the French,” leaving “the machinery to a later date.” Brandt agreed that “it would not be wise to have a clash with the French in connection with the Harmel Study,” but he added that “Germany also had a particular problem: it would be of greatest importance, not for the German man in the street but for informed public opinion, that the East/West discussions should go on within the framework of the alliance.”<sup>49</sup> [49] Brandt, however, soon realized, from subsequent talks with Couve de Murville, that the French would not accept an expansion of four-power responsibilities within NATO.<sup>50</sup> [50]

Despite these obstacles, a compromise started to take shape when the special group met in November. The fourteen, led by Denmark, Norway, Canada, and the FRG, with support from Britain and the United States, showed unity and resolve in arguing that the exercise should culminate in a report of the Council in December. This left the French with little choice but to accept the proposal favored by the other members instructing the secretary general to draft a report to the NATO ministers. The French did not want to sacrifice their position as a member of the fifteen and therefore reached a compromise with the United States on the question of machinery. France accepted the “general concept of political consultation” and the “necessity for Alliance consultation in three areas in particular: European security including the German question, disarmament, and the Mediterranean area.” In effect, Paris accepted the substantive work program on détente as outlined in the reports of sub-groups 1 and 3. The United States, for its part, “stressed its desire to increase political consultation in NATO, but [was] seeking no new commitments by any ally and [did] not contemplate an ‘integrated political command structure’ in the Alliance.”<sup>51</sup> [51]

## The Final Report

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On 14 December 1967 the NATO Council approved the Harmel Report, formally titled “The Future Tasks of the Alliance.” This highly visible public statement—a statement that would endure over time—enabled the alliance to strike a new balance between its military and political functions. NATO’s future security policy was to rest on two pillars: military security and a policy of *détente*.<sup>52 [52]</sup> Harmel, speaking to his colleagues in a ministerial session, said the study had “highlighted that the Alliance had developed stabilising effects vis-à-vis the outside world and amongst its own members.” Rusk declared that the exercise itself had reaffirmed the validity of NATO’s political role: “[T]he most important thing had been the process of the Study itself involving intense consultations among governments.”<sup>53 [53]</sup>

The Harmel Report codified the results of the trilateral talks on NATO’s military structures and anchored them in a multilateral political dialogue on the future of East-West relations and the German question. The alliance had weathered the French accusation that in a time of *détente* NATO had become an anachronism in Europe. As long as France resisted British membership in the European Community (EC) and opposed the transformation of the EC into a political union, its position as a leading European power lacked legitimacy. Moreover, because Paris could not offer a military counterweight to the Warsaw Pact and was not prepared to share control of the *force de frappe* with the FRG, its drive for hegemony also lacked credibility.

The Harmel study reflected Johnson’s conception of a less hierarchical and more political NATO and was understandably well received in Washington. Rusk cabled from Brussels that the “full agreement reached on [the] text of the report, embracing both a set of agreed principles and [a] work program for political consultations, is highly satisfactory to us.” Yet he was realistic enough to add that “the big problem now is to begin carrying out the Alliance’s political work program.”<sup>54 [54]</sup> On 17 January 1968 the NATO governments decided to follow up on the Harmel exercise by upgrading the NAC’s Committee of Political Advisers to work on European security, the German question, and disarmament.<sup>55 [55]</sup> Political consultations within NATO in the month leading up to the Reykjavik meeting of late June 1968 went better than expected, particularly with regard to arms control and disarmament.

NATO consultations on the proposed mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) proved instrumental in containing public pressure for sharp cuts in defense budgets, bolstering the December 1967 consensus on strategy and force levels.<sup>56 [56]</sup> These efforts gave Moscow greater incentive to begin talks on MBFR rather than simply waiting for NATO countries to reduce their forces unilaterally.<sup>57 [57]</sup> The NATO consultations also proved instrumental in forging a consensus on the NPT, a consensus that was

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supported on the military side by the NPG meeting in April 1968.<sup>58 [58]</sup> The NPG endorsed political “guidelines” for the tactical use of nuclear weapons and defined topical leadership among the group’s four permanent members. These deliberations effectively answered complaints about national participation in nuclear-weapons planning. In addition, the U.S. defense secretary used the opportunity to reassure the allies that the NPT “would not interfere with NPG.”<sup>59 [59]</sup> Last but not least, the NPG agreed “to the general principle that in nuclear consultations special weight should be given to the views of those countries ‘most directly affected.’”<sup>60 [60]</sup> This was in recognition of West German concerns that “the selective release of nuclear weapons employed from or on German soil” would be “subject to confirmation by the FRG Government.” Rusk and Clifford had told President Johnson that they considered this a “relatively modest request for sovereign rights in the nuclear field” that would ease Bonn’s anxiety about the NPT.<sup>61 [61]</sup>

Although progress was somewhat slower on East-West relations and the German question, NATO institutions played a key role in monitoring the debate within the FRG on the progress of *Ostpolitik*. Brosio, in a talk with Cleveland, “put great emphasis on [the] central importance of Germany in NATO consultations,” not least because of the “crossfire between CDU and SPD as they jockey for positions before [the] 1969 elections.”<sup>62 [62]</sup> In Washington, as well, considerable uneasiness about West German unilateralist tendencies and an eventual deal with the Soviet Union persisted.<sup>63 [63]</sup> Although new approaches to East-West relations and the German question were more likely to develop within individual governments or smaller groups of governments than within NATO as a whole, intra-alliance consultations on these matters were of significant value, as a U.S. State Department memorandum accurately predicted in December 1966:

[Consultation] enables NATO members to be confident that initiatives they may wish to take toward Eastern Europe are consistent with the activities of the other Allies. The existence of a “habit of consultation” means that member governments are less likely to ignore the interests of their Allies than they would be if the habit did not exist. The smaller countries can have some confidence that a larger country is not negotiating away its interests behind its back. The larger powers, in turn, can monitor the activities of smaller countries and dissuade them from unrealistic or inappropriate initiatives. The effects of this “habit of consultation,” as they accumulate over time, can be seen in the mutual confidence, intimacy and sense of community of interest that are often a part of NATO deliberations.<sup>64 [64]</sup>

### **Conclusion: The Preservation of the Alliance**

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By the summer of 1968 the alliance was no longer in danger “of developing into a sort of ‘shell with no real spirit left in it,’” as Kiesinger had warned in March 1967.<sup>65 [65]</sup> The successes of the trilateral talks and of the Harmel exercise had effectively reversed the slow process of disintegration that had beset NATO since the late 1950s and that came to the fore with de Gaulle’s challenge to the *raison d’être* of the alliance. Shortly before the NATO ministers convened for a final time during the Johnson administration, Rusk was able to write to Johnson that the meeting would “represent a watershed in the recent history of the alliance. The past two years have seen major improvements in NATO’s defense and consultation arrangements.”<sup>66 [66]</sup> In the wake of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, even the French were willing to display greater cohesion on key political issues.<sup>67 [67]</sup>

Indeed, the outcome of the Czechoslovak crisis provided a sobering contrast to NATO’s reconfiguration. At the very time that the Soviet Union was bringing its Warsaw Pact allies more firmly under its control, U.S. alliance management was increasingly based on consultation and leadership by persuasion. Faced with de Gaulle’s challenge, Johnson was willing to put in the effort to achieve a consensus within the alliance and to avert further fragmentation. NATO, unlike the Warsaw Pact, resolved its internal crisis by promoting common norms, institutions, and procedures and by transforming itself into a more political and participatory alliance.

The military component of NATO remained crucial, however. Although France was gone, the military structures gained new life from the successful outcome of the trilateral talks and the consensus that was forged by the fourteen member-states at their December 1967 meeting. During the trilateral negotiations, the desire to preserve NATO in the face of the Gaullist challenge helped the three sides to cope with domestic political interests and to balance their defense and economic priorities.<sup>68 [68]</sup>

The Gaullist challenge also ended up consolidating the political role of NATO. The Harmel Report strengthened the alliance’s political-consultation machinery and laid out a program for East-West relations, including the German question and arms control. The essence of NATO’s transformation in 1966–1968 was essentially political. Starting from the constructed yet limited peace of the early 1960s, U.S. and West European views gradually converged on a new European order, based on agreement and a stable balance of power between Western and Eastern Europe—including the Soviet Union—anchored in the West’s multilateral structures, and guaranteed and supported by the United States and Canada.

NATO’s crisis and its ensuing transformation were instrumental in the shift from the bilateral superpower *détente* of 1963 to the multilateral European *détente* of the 1970s. The relaxation of tension was accompanied by risks and opportunities for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. From the West’s perspective, the emerging polycentrism in

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Eastern Europe threatened to undermine the unity of NATO. The Soviet Union, it was feared, would relax tensions selectively in order to isolate Germany and minimize U.S. influence in Europe, thereby weakening the two most important political functions of the alliance. On the more positive side, détente offered new opportunities to support the evolution of Eastern Europe in a way that would be acceptable to the Soviet Union. The difficulty with bridge-building was that Soviet leaders tended to perceive it as a European means of sowing fissures within the Warsaw Pact—a concern that, in Moscow's view, was borne out by events in Czechoslovakia.

The key to NATO's transformation was the member-states' success in balancing these new opportunities with the well-known risks. The Johnson administration's approach proved highly successful in this regard. Rather than sticking with the bilateral superpower détente based on the territorial and nuclear status quo in Europe, the United States sought to strengthen multilateral (military and political) cooperation and consultation within NATO and simultaneously to engage the Soviet Union and the East European states in talks that would lead to a wider European détente and promote gradual change in the Eastern bloc.

No country could achieve this alone, however. The United States, as the military hegemon in the West, could take the lead and could try to shape the process through bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral initiatives. But success ultimately depended on a number of factors that required the participation of all NATO countries: the political and coordinative functions of allied institutions, the flexibility and adaptability of those institutions, and the willingness of key European allies to take the initiative.

On matters of substance, NATO had to resolve three major dilemmas. The first dilemma was how to square nuclear sharing with the goal of nonproliferation. The NPT shifted control of West Germany's nuclear policy from an intra-NATO setting to an international context, reducing Soviet and East European fears of an independent West German nuclear capability. This outcome was accompanied by a strengthening of the NPG, a step that not only increased West Germany's role in allied nuclear planning but also reduced U.S. hegemony within the alliance.

The second dilemma—the need to ensure military security without endangering economic prosperity—was exacerbated by the financial problems confronting the United States and Britain. In consultation with the West European allies, the United States proposed to hold talks with the Warsaw Pact states on mutual force reductions that could lead over time to lower defense costs. Moreover, the United States worked with Britain and West Germany to forge a wider understanding of security that would facilitate a consensus among the fourteen on strategy, force levels, and burden-sharing.

The third dilemma was whether to focus on German reunification or on improvement of the European environment. Ultimately, NATO came down in favor of the latter, though without explicitly abandoning the former. The United States worked closely with its European allies to engage the Soviet Union and the East European countries in bilateral and multilateral exchanges, seeking over the long term to facilitate the reunification of Europe and of Germany. NATO's decision to emphasize environment improvement over

reunification had to be balanced by a strengthening of the political role of NATO and by the recognition that Germany would determine the pace of *Ostpolitik* itself.

The transformation of NATO, based on the resolution of these three dilemmas, led to the multilateralization of détente in Europe in the 1970s. NATO was able to provide for the nuclear defense of the FRG in a way that was acceptable to Bonn, its allies, and the Soviet Union. At the same time, the enhancement of NATO's political role enabled the West Germans to take the initiative in consolidating the Central European status quo without alienating the United States or other NATO allies. Brandt's *Ostpolitik* paved the way for a mutually acceptable framework of values and principles in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, but it did not weaken the structures of NATO on which those values and principles were based. Hence, the United States (and Canada) welcomed the emergence of a new European order—an order symbolized not only by the multilateralization of détente but also by the continued integration of the EC.

In pursuing détente, the Western powers decided to encourage the evolution, rather than the fragmentation, of the Communist bloc. No European settlement, it was thought, could be stable if it failed to accommodate Moscow's legitimate security interests. The NPT met this criterion by alleviating Soviet anxiety about the sensitive question of West German nuclear control. When the United States and the Soviet Union signed the NPT on 1 July 1968, they announced that they would soon begin discussing limitations on strategic nuclear weapons and antiballistic missile systems. Although the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia prevented an early start to the talks, movement toward strategic arms control was revived shortly before Johnson left office. Within Europe as well, the reorientation of NATO gave rise to new forms of cooperation and dialogue. The inception of MBFR permitted the allies to cope with domestic economic and political pressures without detracting from their collective military security. The Helsinki process, including its provisions for human rights, became possible after Brandt's *Ostpolitik* led to a formal recognition of the post–World War II borders in Central Europe.

By accepting the Harmel Report, the alliance overcame the most severe crisis in its history, a crisis that had broken out at a time of a fledgling East-West détente in Europe. The differences of opinion in NATO revolved around two issues that seem equally relevant in the post–Cold War era. Should NATO continue to exist? If so, what functions should NATO play in a European environment marked by increasing cooperation and integration? It is not surprising that the Harmel Report attracted considerable attention in 1989–1991, when the Cold War ended. A close look at the debate of the 1960s helps explain why NATO did not suddenly collapse after 1989–1991 and why the alliance continued to develop from an integrated defense pact into an organization that can deal with the broader management of security.

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- 2 Telegram from the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State, 10 December 1966, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIII, p. 509.
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- 10 Memorandum for the Record, 19 June 1968, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIII, p. 718.
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65 Telegram from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Johnson, 6 March 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XIII, p. 543.

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68 On the importance of transnational coalitions for alliance politics, see Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies*.

### 3) Archival Description

#### Archival Descriptive Entry

**Title:** Future Tasks of the Alliance

**Outside Dates:** 1966 December – 1967 December

**Extent:** 0.3 m.

#### Administrative History:

In late 1966, the approaching 20th anniversary of NATO and the changes made necessary by the French decision to withdraw from the integrated military structure prompted the North Atlantic Alliance to re-examine its relevance and adaptation to the existing political context.

At the December 1966 NATO Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers, Pierre Harmel, Belgium's Foreign Minister, tabled a proposal calling for a joint analysis of the major events of the past twenty years. He recommended the study be used to determine the effect of events on the objectives and methods of the Alliance and to decide whether it was necessary to improve consultation within it. The Foreign Affairs Ministers responded favourably to Harmel's proposal and empowered Manlio Brosio, NATO Secretary General, and the Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) with a comprehensive mandate to develop procedures for the study and to determine its scope.

In February 1967, the NAC decided to constitute an open-ended special group of representatives designated by governments, under the Chairmanship of the Secretary General. The NAC gave the Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance (also known under the reference AC/261) the task of studying: "(a) the development of political events as it affects the purposes of the Alliance;" and "(b) the consequent future tasks of the Alliance." The Special Group was to establish such special procedures, sub-groups and rapporteurs, and request such staff work from the NATO International Staff, as it deemed necessary." (See reference C-M(67)11.)

During the month of March 1967 the Special Group met on five occasions in private session to encourage wide ranging discussions. It was during these meetings that they decided on the framework for the conduct of the study. The Special Group created four sub-groups, each working on a broad subject of interest to the Alliance and under the guidance of a rapporteur of repute. The sub-groups and rapporteurs were as follows:

Sub-Group One, East/West Relations: Mr. K.Schütz, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Germany and Mr. J.H.A. Watson, Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom;

Sub-Group Two, Inter-allied Relations: Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, Minister of State, Belgium;

Sub-Group Three, General Defence Policy : Mr. Foy Kohler, Deputy Under Secretary of State, United States;

Sub-Group Four, Relations with other Countries: Dr. C.L. Patijn, Professor of International Relations, University of Utrecht, Netherlands.

The NATO International Staff provided secretarial support and was tasked with gathering background material for the sub-groups.

The sub-groups met several times to prepare a draft interim report which was approved by the NAC in late May 1966. (See reference C-M(67)33.) Following some amendments it was noted by the Foreign Ministers at their meeting of 13-14 June in Luxembourg.

Following this initial phase, the sub-groups began to address the substantive issues. Although the reports were prepared under the responsibility of each rapporteur, a meeting of all the sub-groups took place in July to harmonise the work and avoid duplication. After having gone through several stages, the reports were reviewed and their findings compared during a last meeting in October at Ditchley Park (UK). The following month, the Special Group held a high-level meeting over two days during which the substance of the Report was discussed. The Secretary General circulated a draft Report which was discussed and amended by the Special Group on 22 November 1967. The Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance was presented at the NATO Ministerial Session and after some further amendments was approved by Foreign Affairs Ministers on 14 December 1967 and subsequently released to the press. (See reference C-M(67)74(2nd revised) and M4(67)3, respectively.)

#### **Scope and Content:**

This series of files consists of the records created or received by the NATO International Staff and related to the study on the Future Tasks of the Alliance between December 1966 and December 1967. It includes formal and informal documents of the Special Group and of its four Sub-groups as well as documents from the Council, the Secretary General, summary records of private meetings of Permanent Representatives, internal notes and national contributions.

It should be noted that the meetings of the Special Group and of its sub-groups were held in private session. No official minutes of the meetings were issued under the reference AC/261.

#### **Custodial Note:**

The nine file volumes in this series are not organic, in that they have been assembled by the International Staff Archives Unit from files initially created by the Political Affairs, Defence Planning and Policy Sub-registries of the International Staff and the Private Office of the Secretary General. This compilation was part of a process which was developed following a NATO management survey in 1971 which had recommended that a programme be established by which subject files would be withdrawn from divisional sub-registries, weeded of duplications and unimportant papers and rationalised into one system of historical files. It was felt at the time that these procedures would lead to a reduction of the total documentation and storage space required, as well as easier access to important historical records.

In some cases the outside dates of the files differ from those of the documents created or accumulated during the Harmel Report Exercise (1966 –1967). Instances of this are found in volume 4/10/3, documents dated 1959, 1961 and 1963 were reissued to the sub-groups as background information; volume 4/10/5 contains documents dated 1992 which were added to the file to shed light on the absence of a corrigendum to AC/261 –N/13 (Revised); and volume 4/10/ includes a document dated February 1968 “Note à l’intention des conférenciers” SN/1 which was used to brief groups of visitors at NATO Headquarters.

At the time of their compilation, the Archives Unit divided the volumes into sections, with each heading summarising the main decisions or events recorded in the documents. Within each file, items have been indexed in the language of the document.

**Arrangement Note:**

The documents are arranged chronologically. Most of the formal documents exist both in English and in French. The informal documents and national contributions exist in the language in which they were drafted.

**Conditions of Access and Use:**

The documents in this series have been declassified and approved for public disclosure under the NATO Public Disclosure Programme.

The documents have been made available for research purposes only, Copyright is retained by NATO and any non-research use of the documents requires the written permission of NATO.

## 4) Documents (Subject Files)

**North Atlantic Council Resolution on Pierre Harmel's Proposal and Subsequent Discussions, and Establishment of the Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance (December 1966 - February 1967, NATO Archives, NISCA 4/10/1)**

### Section 1: Proposal by Harmel and Approval of Resolution on the Study

Letter from Belgian Ambassador	<b>13 December 1966</b>
Extracts of Council Meeting, 15 December 1966 (C-R(66) 68 & C-R(66)69)	<b>27 January 1967</b>
Projet de Résolution du Conseil Atlantique	<b>15 December 1966</b>
Déclaration de M. Fanfani (SQS(66) 165)	<b>15 December 1966</b>
Extracts of Council Meeting, 16 December 1966 (C-R(66) 71)	<b>30 January 1967</b>
Press Release/Communique (M3(66)3)	<b>16 December 1966</b>
"Resolution of Future Tasks of the Alliance"/"Résolution relative aux tâches de l'Alliance" (C-M(66)145)	<b>17 December 1966</b>

### Section 2: International Staff consideration of scope and procedures for Study

Memo des Affaires Politiques	<b>28 December 1966</b>
"Resolution on Future Tasks of the Alliance" (GAS(67)7)	<b>3 January 1967</b>
"Follow-up of the December Ministerial Meeting" (RS(67)2)	<b>6 January 1967</b>
"Resolution of Future Tasks of the Alliance" (RS(67)4)	<b>9 January 1967</b>
Extract of Council Meeting, 11 January 1967 (C-R(67)1)	<b>11 January 1967</b>
"Council Resolution on Future Tasks of the Alliance" (Memo from Acting ASG/PA to Secretary General) (GAS(67)5)	<b>13 January 1967</b>
"Belgian Resolution on Future Tasks of the Alliance" (GAS(67)6)	<b>13 January 1967</b>

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Record of a Meeting of Secretary General with International Staff Members	<b>16 January 1967</b>
Record of a Meeting of Secretary General with International Staff Members	<b>20 January 1967</b>
Contribution by Mr. Bacchetti, Director of Private Office of Secretary General	<b>17 January 1967</b>
"Reasons and Circumstances Leading to the Signature of the North Atlantic Treaty" (RS(67)12)	<b>19 January 1967</b>
Projet de Memo des Affaires Politiques "Situation Mondiale en 1948"	<b>31 January 1967</b>
Etudes de Propositions de Réformes (Memo des Affaires Politiques)	<b>13 February 1967</b>

### **Section 3: Proposal of Secretary General and procedures for the Study**

First version of memorandum from Special Adviser for Political Planning to Secretary General "Council Resolution on the Future Tasks of the Alliance"	<b>31 January 1967</b>
Revised versions of memorandum from Special Adviser for Political Planning to Secretary General "Council Resolution on the Future Tasks of the Alliance"	<b>8 February 1967</b>
Final Version of memorandum from Special Adviser for Political Planning to Secretary General "Council Resolution on the Future Tasks of the Alliance" (PO(67)89)	<b>10 February 1967</b>
"Preliminary Suggestions Concerning Resolution on the Future Tasks of the Alliance" (PO(67)89)	<b>10 February 1967</b>

### **Section 4: Secretary General informs Council of discussions on Resolution**

"Council Resolution on Future Tasks of the Alliance" (PO(67)54)	<b>27 January 1967</b>
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### **Section 5: National contributions on Resolution**

Aide Mémoire du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et du Commerce Extérieur de la Belgique	<b>25 January 1967</b>
Letter from US Delegation	<b>2 February 1967</b>

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Letter from Norwegian Delegation	<b>9 February 1967</b>
Letter from United Kingdom Delegation	<b>10 February 1967</b>
<b>Section 6: Special Meeting of Council, 15 February 1967</b>	
Opening Statement by Secretary General for Council Meeting (Briefs)	<b>15 February 1967</b>
Remarks by Mr. George Thomson to the North Atlantic Council	<b>15 February 1967</b>
Exposé du Ministre Belge des Affaires Etrangères	<b>15 February 1967</b>
Statement Made by Herr K. Schütz State Secretary of the German Foreign Office	<b>15 February 1967</b>
Verbatim Record of a Meeting of the Council, 15 February 1967 (C-VR(67)8) 2 3 4 5 6 7 [Entire Document, 3'861 KB]	<b>15 February 1967</b>
"Réunion du Conseil du 15/2/67 - Résumé des Débats par le Président" (RDC(67)55)	<b>15 February 1967</b>
<b>Section 7: Meeting of Council, 22 February 1967</b>	
"Future Tasks of the Alliance" (DPA(67)45) (Includes RS(67)41)	<b>21 February 1967</b>
"Background Note on the Forthcoming Council Discussion on 22nd February 1967 - Future Tasks of the Alliance" (DPA(67)47)	<b>21 February 1967</b>
Draft DPA to Secretary General "Notes on the Forthcoming Council Discussion on 22nd February 1967 on the Future Tasks of the Alliance"	<b>21 February 1967</b>
Record of Council Meeting, 22 February 1967 (C-R(67)9)	<b>1 March 1967</b>
"Decisions about Procedure on the Future Tasks of the Alliance" (Approved by Council on 22nd February 1967) (C-M(67)11)	<b>24 February 1967</b>

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**Series of Private Meetings of the Special Group relating to the Organisation and Scope of the Study, Establishment of the Four Sub-groups and the Appointment of the Rapporteurs (February - May 1967, NATO Archives, NISCA 4/10/2)**

**Section 1: Designation of national representatives to Special Group**

"Future Tasks of the Alliance" (PO(67)132)	<b>27 February 1967</b>
Letter from Icelandic Delegation 9.N.5	<b>28 February 1967</b>
Lettre de la Délégation de l'Italie	<b>1 March 1967</b>
Letter from UK Delegation	<b>2 March 1967</b>
Letter from Norwegian Delegation	<b>3 March 1967</b>
Country representation at meeting of Special Group (FCM(67)47)	<b>3 March 1967</b>

**Section 2: Meeting to examine aim, purpose and procedures for the Study**

Record of Meeting in the Office of the Secretary General "Procedures of the Study of the Future Tasks of the Alliance"	<b>25 February 1967</b>
Record of Meeting in the Office of the Secretary General "Aims and Purposes of the Study on Future Tasks of the Alliance"	<b>25 February 1967</b>

**Section 3: Information for meeting of Special Group, 6 March 1967**

"Meeting of the Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance on 6th March 1967" (PO(67)133)	<b>27 February 1967</b>
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**Section 4: Meetings of Special Group March 1967**

Draft Agenda for the Meeting of the Special Group on 6th March 1967	<b>23 February 1967</b>
Terms of Reference of the Special Working Group	<b>1 March 1967</b>
Special Group: Some Initial Suggestions by the UK Representative	<b>4 March 1967</b>
Draft Text of an Opening Statement of the Secretary General at the Meeting of the Special Group on Monday 6th March 1967	<b>2 March 1967</b>
Text of an Opening Statement of the Secretary General at the meeting of the Special Group on Monday 6th March 1967	<b>6 March 1967</b>
"Groupe Special sur le Futur de l'Alliance - Préparation de la Prochaine Réunion"	<b>9 March 1967</b>

**Documents from Sub-Group 1: East-West Relations  
(April - October 1967, NATO Archives, NISCA 4/10/4/1)**

**Section 1: First Meeting of Sub-Group 1**

UK Delegation - Preliminary Paper by Mr. Watson, Rapporteur of Sub-Group 1	<b>14 April 1967</b>
German Delegation 20-02-5/1420/67 VSV Political Aims of the Alliance with Regard to European Security, the German Problem and the Nature of a European Settlement	<b>14 April 1967</b>
Première Réunion du Sous-Groupe 1 (IS(67)60)	<b>18 April 1967</b>
Working Group 1 on the Future Tasks of the Alliance - Meeting of 18th April 1967 (GAS(67)45)	<b>20 April 1967</b>

**Section 2: Questionnaire and Paper on Soviet Foreign Policy in Europe**

UK Letter to Secretary General re Consultations with other Groups	<b>18 April 1967</b>
Draft Letter and Questionnaire to Rapporteur of Sub-Group 1 (GAS(67)41)	<b>18 April 1967</b>
Letter to Mr. Watson (Questionnaire above Attached) (PO(67)275)	<b>19 April 1967</b>
Letter from Mr. Watson to Secretary General	<b>24 April 1967</b>
Letter to Mr. Watson (PO(67)293)	<b>27 April 1967</b>
Future Tasks of the Alliance: Sub-Group 1 Soviet Foreign Policy and Europe (SG(67)168) 2 [Entire Document, 1'714 KB]	<b>5 May 1967</b>

**Section 3: Second Meeting of Sub-Group 1**

Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance Sub-Group 1: "The Political Aims of the Alliance" (Ulrich Sahn & J. H. A. Watson) 2 [Entire Document, 1'186 KB]	<b>9 May 1967</b>
(Enclosure: Comments on the Proposal for an Outline by the German Delegation Incorporated in the Paper "The Political Aims of the Alliance" of 6 May 1967) (PO(67)316)	<b>11 May 1967</b>
Report on Second Meeting of the Sub-Group Held on 11th May 1967	<b>12 May 1967</b>

(LLS(67)32)

Second Meeting of Sub-Group 1 Held on 11th May 1967 (GAS(67)56) **16 May 1967**

#### **Section 4: Sub-Group 1 Progress Report**

Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance - Progress Report by the Rapporteurs of Sub-Group 1 (AC/261-D/23) **18 May 1967**

#### **Section 5: Third Meeting of Sub-Group 1**

Note de la Délégation Belge aux Rapporteurs du Sous-Groupe 1 du Groupe Spécial pour l'Etude des Tâches Futures de l'Alliance **20 June 1967**

Danish Comments to the Questions on the Soviet Union in Annex 1, pp 13-14 in the Rapporteur's Paper of May 6th, 1967 - Annex to Letter of 22nd June 1967 to Ambassador Watson **24 June 1967**

Netherlands Comments on the Paper Submitted on May 6, 1967 by the Rapporteurs of Sub-Group 1 **19 June 1967**

Note on the Attitudes of East European Governments to Improve Economic Relations with Western Europe, J.H.A. Watson **23 June 1967**

(Enclosing a Note by the German Delegation on Yzvestiya Article on European Security dated 27 June 1967) (GAS(67)66) **27 June 1967**

Third Meeting of Sub-Group 1 on 27th & 28th June 1967 (LLS(67)39) **30 June 1967**

Third Meeting of Sub-Group 1 on 27th & 28th June, 1967 (RS(67)85) **3 July 1967**

Documentation of Sub-Group 1 (RS(67)86) **4 July 1967**

#### **Section 6: Fourth Meeting of Sub-Group 1**

Some Comments of Personal Character in Relation with the Paper of the Rapporteurs of Sub-Group 1 on "Political Aims of the Alliance" (Turkish Delegation to NATO, SC/7-2-58) **7 July 1967**

Measures towards a Peaceful Order in Europe (UK Paper) **12 July 1967**

Draft Report by Sub-Group 1 on Future Tasks of the Alliance **11 September 1967**

Report of Meeting of Sub-Group 1 on Monday, 18th September, 1967 (GAS(67)96) **19 September 1967**

Meeting of Sub-Group 1 on Parts II & III of Draft Report (RS(67)109)	<b>20 September 1967</b>
Letter to Mr. J.H.A. Watson (PO(67)709) from Secretary General	<b>22 September 1967</b>
Report of the Discussion in Sub-Group 1 on Part I of the Draft Report (RS(67)107)	<b>25 September 1967</b>
Letter from Mr. Watson to Secretary General	<b>27 September 1967</b>
Letter from Netherlands Deputy Permanent Representative to UK Ambassador	<b>21 September 1967</b>
Note from German Delegation (20-2-5/3382/67 VSV)	<b>28 September 1967</b>
 <b>Section 7: Summary and Final Report of Sub-Group 1</b>	
Future Tasks of the Alliance: East-West Relations including the German Question Summary	<b>9 October 1967</b>
Final Report of Sub-Group 1 (subsequently issued in AC/261-N/13(Rev)) 2 [Entire Document, 1'490 KB], see main file	<b>Undated</b>

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**Documents from Sub-Group 2: Inter-Allied Relations  
(April - October 1967, NATO Archives, NISCA 4/10/4/2)**

**Section 1: Preliminary Discussions**

Troisième Réunion du Sous-Groupe 2, le Vendredi 5 Avril 1967 (IS(67)80) **5 April 1967**  
2 [Entire Document, 1'109 KB]

**Section 2: First Meeting of Sub-Group 2**

Première Réunion du Sous-Groupe 2, le Lundi 17 Avril (S&A(67)39) **17 April 1967**

Memo regarding comments made at first meeting **Undated**

**Section 3: Questionnaire submitted by rapporteur, P-H Spaak**

Text of the Questionnaire Circulated by Belgian Delegation (S&A(67)40) **21 April 1967**

Record of a Meeting in the Office of the Secretary General **24 April 1967**

Quelques Observations Préliminaires sur le Questionnaire du Sous-Groupe 2 par le Secrétaire Général **26 April 1967**

Preliminary Observations of the Secretary General on the Questionnaire of Sub-Group 2 (SG(67)166) **2 May 1967**

**Section 4: Second Meeting of Sub-Group 2**

Deuxième Réunion du Sous-Groupe, le 26 Avril 1967 (S&A(67)46) **27 April 1967**  
2 [Entire Document, 1'471 KB]

**Section 5: Third Meeting of Sub-Group 2**

Letter from US Mission Enclosing a Letter of 4th May from Mr. R.R. Bowie to Secretary General **5 May 1967**

UK Contribution **5 May 1967**

Troisième Réunion du Sous-Groupe 2 (S&A(67)50) **9 May 1967**

**Section 6: Progress Report**

Rapport d'Activité du Rapporteur de Sous-Groupe 2 du Groupe Spécial sur les Tâches Futures de l'Alliance **24 May 1967**

**Section 7: Fifth Meeting of Sub-Group 2**

Représentation des Etats-Unis à la Réunion du Sous-Groupe 2, le 4 Juillet 1967 (IS(67)119) **28 June 1967**

Schéma du Rapport que Pourrait Faire sous sa Responsabilité le Rapporteur de Sous-Groupe 2 **3 July 1967**

Suggested Outline Draft for a Personal Report by the Rapporteur of Sub-Group 2 **3 July 1967**

Cinquième Réunion du Sous-Groupe 2, le 4 Juillet 1967 (IS(67)124) **5 July 1967**

Note pour le Secrétaire Général de M. Bacchetti (Directeur du Cabinet) **6 July 1967**

Letter from Danish Delegation on the Suggested Outline **12 July 1967**

**Section 8: Sixth Meeting of Sub-Group 2**

Prochaine Réunion du Sous-Groupe 2 (IS(67)149) **5 September 1967**

Prochaine Réunion du Sous-Groupe 2 (IS(67)154) **8 September 1967**

Date of the Next Meeting of Sub-Group 2 of the Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance (FCM(67)150) **11 September 1967**

Extract of Council Meeting on Date of the Next Meeting of Sub-Group 2 (C-R(67)38) **13 September 1967**

Note indicating Iceland not being able to send a representative (FCM(67)166) **22 September 1967**

Les Bases Idéologiques et l'Unité de l'Alliance - Rapport du Rapporteur du Sous-Groupe 2 **19 September 1967**

The Ideological Basis and the Unity of the Alliance - Report by the Rapporteur of the Sub-Group No 2 **19 September 1967**

Sixième Réunion du Sous-Groupe 2, le 26 Septembre 1967 (IS(67)160)

**Undated (26  
September 1967)**

**Section 9: Final Report of Sub-Group 2**

Les Relations Inter-Alliées - Rapport du Rapporteur du Sous-Groupe 2

**4 October 1967**

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**Documents from Sub-Group 3: General Defensive Policy of the Alliance  
(April - October 1967, NATO Archives, NISCA 4/10/4/3)**

**Section 1: First Meeting of Sub-Group 3**

Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance - Meeting of Sub-Group 3 (AC/261-N/3)	<b>7 April 1967</b>
Letter from US Delegation Circulating Rapporteur's Preliminary Outline	<b>17 April 1967</b>
Report of Meeting of 18th April of Sub-Group 3 (LT(67)36)	<b>18 April 1967</b>
Proposals by the German Delegation to US Draft	<b>5 May 1967</b>

**Section 2: Second Meeting of Sub-Group 3**

Suggested Change of Date for the Meeting of Rapporteurs and of Sub-Group 3 (FCM(67)76)	<b>5 May 1967</b>
Postponement of the Next Meeting (LT(67)59)	<b>8 May 1967</b>
Future Tasks of the Alliance - Sub-Group 3 - Comments by the Secretary General (FDP(67)20)	<b>12 May 1967</b>
Letter from US Delegation Circulating a Revised Outline on Future Defence Policy	<b>15 May 1967</b>
Letter US Delegation Circulating Draft Status Report	<b>16 May 1967</b>
Report on Meeting of Sub-Group 3 on 18th May 1967 (LT(67)68)	<b>19 May 1967</b>
Summary Report of Meeting of 18th May 1967 (RJV(67)2)	<b>19 May 1967</b>
Letter from German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	<b>6 June 1967</b>
Letter from ASG/DPP to Dr. T.W. Stanley, Director, NATO Force Planning Group, US Delegation (APH(67)168)	<b>8 June 1967</b>
Letter from Foy Kohler to ASG/DPP	<b>23 June 1967</b>

**Section 3: Status Report**

Letter US Delegation Enclosing Status Report for Sub-Group 3 and Revised Outline for the Study of Future Defense Policy	<b>25 May 1967</b>
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**Section 4: Third Meeting of Sub-Group 3**

Letter US Delegation re an October Meeting in Washington	<b>24 May 1967</b>
Date of Meeting of Sub-Group 3 (APH(67)150)	<b>30 May 1967</b>

**Documents from Sub-Group 4: Developments in Regions Outside the NATO Area  
(April - October 1967, NATO Archives, NISCA 4/10/4/4)**

**Section 1: First Meeting of Sub-Group 4**

Meeting of Sub-Group 4, 18 April 1967	<b>Undated</b>
First Meeting of Sub-Group 4 Record of Meeting by Secretary	<b>18 April 1967</b>
Sous-Groupe No 4: Future Tâches de l'Alliance (SG(67)145)	<b>19 April 1967</b>
Compte Rendu de la Première Réunion du 4ème Sous Groupe sur les Tâches Futures de l'Alliance (SG(67)147)	<b>20 April 1967</b>
Report by Professor Patijn	<b>Undated</b>

**Section 2: Progress Report**

Progress Report to the Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance - Memo to Prof. Patijn from the Secretary of the Sub-Group	<b>25 April 1967</b>
Progress Report by the Rapporteur of Sub-Group 4 (AC/261-D/2)	<b>12 May 1967</b>

**Section 3: Second Meeting of Sub-Group 4**

Contribution au Sous-Groupe No 4 sur les Tâches Futures de l'Alliance Mémo du Directeur des Affaires Economiques (ED(67)38)	<b>9 May 1967</b>
Netherlands Delegation Letter No 2953 Circulating the "Introduction of the Draft Report of Prof. Patijn"	<b>11 May 1967</b>
Netherlands Delegation Letter No 2953 II Enclosing Part II of Draft Report by Prof. Patijn	<b>12 May 1967</b>
Draft Report of Professor Patijn, Rapporteur of Sub-Group 4	<b>19 May 1967</b>
Second Meeting of Sub-Group 4 on Developments in Regions Outside the NATO Area; Report by the Secretary of Sub-Group 4	<b>24 May 1967</b>

**Section 4: Report on visit to Washington and Ottawa**

Mission to Washington and Ottawa (DPA(67)138)	<b>26 May 1967</b>
Report on the Visit of Rapporteur to Washington D.C., Ottawa and New	<b>12 June 1967</b>

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York, 4th - 7th June 1967 (JV(67)287) 2 3 [Entire Document, 1'866 KB]	
Trip to Washington and Ottawa (JV(67)314)	<b>22 June 1967</b>
Trip to the United States and Canada - Mr. John Vernon (DI(67)315)	<b>4 July 1967</b>
<b>Section 5: Third Meeting of Sub-Group 4</b>	
Suggestions for Improving the Political Consultation in NATO; Memo from the Rapporteur (F/7250/67)	<b>23 June 1967</b>
"Reflections on the Role of NATO in World Affairs": Draft new Section for the Report by the Rapporteur (F/7249/67)	<b>23 June 1967</b>
Third Meeting of Sub-Group No 4	<b>30 June 1967</b>
<b>Section 6: Notes by Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs</b>	
African Interlude (RS(67)90)	<b>11 July 1967</b>
Notes by SG/PA on APAG, Committees of Experts from Capitals and POLADS (DPA(67)169) 2 [Entire Document, 1'332 KB]	<b>20 July 1967</b>
<b>Section 7: Fourth Meeting of Sub-Group 4</b>	
Netherlands Delegation Enclosing Draft Report by Prof. Patijn (F9525/67) 2 [Entire Document, 1'396 KB]	<b>31 August 1967</b>
Doc F 9525/67 (SQS(67)105)	<b>4 September 1967</b>
Fourth Meeting of Sub-Group 4 Report by the Secretary General	<b>Undated</b>
Netherlands Delegation Enclosing Final Version of Report by Prof. Patijn (F/10748/67) 2 3 [Entire Document, 1'599 KB]	<b>5 October 1967</b>

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**Interim Report from Special Group to Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg June 1967 and Subsequent Discussions with Permanent Representatives and Rapporteurs, and Final Reports of the Four Sub-groups  
(May - November 1967, NATO Archives, NISCA 4/10/5)**

**Section 1: Meetings of the Special Group**

Meetings of the Special Group, Rapporteurs and Sub-Groups for Two Weeks Following Whitsun (AC/261-N/8)	<b>12 May 1967</b>
Meeting to be Held at the Permanent Headquarters, on Friday, 19th May, 1967 (AC/261-A/1)	<b>12 May 1967</b>
Meeting to be Held at the Permanent Headquarters, on Friday, 19th May, 1967 (AC/261-A/1 (Revised))	<b>16 May 1967</b>
Draft Passage for the Ministerial Communique relative to the Exercise on the Future Tasks of the Alliance	<b>17 May 1967</b>
Draft Progress Report of the Council to Ministers Meeting at Luxembourg on ... relative to the Exercise on the Future Tasks of the Alliance	<b>17 May 1967</b>
Interim Report of the Council to Ministers Meeting at Luxembourg on ... relative to the Exercise on the Future Tasks of the Alliance	<b>24 May 1967</b>
Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance: Summary Record of a Meeting Held on 19th May 1967 (French Text) 2 [Entire Document, 1'125 KB]	<b>Undated</b>
Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance: Summary Record of a Meeting Held on 19th May 1967; Memo from Deputy Executive Secretary to Secretary General	<b>Undated</b>
Meeting of Rapporteurs of Sub-Groups of the Special Group on Future Tasks of the Alliance, under the Chairmanship of the Secretary General	<b>19 May 1967</b>
Meeting to be Held at Permanent Headquarters on Monday, 29th May, 1967 (AC/261-A/2)	<b>22 May 1967</b>
Draft Agenda for the Meeting of the Special Group on 29th May, 1967	<b>22 May 1967</b>
Redraft of the Interim Report to Ministers on Future Tasks of the Alliance (FCM(67)82)	<b>22 May 1967</b>
Délégation Française auprès de l'OTAN No 237 Observations concernant la Préparation du Rapport Intérimaire	<b>22 May 1967</b>
US Permanent Representative on the NAC Harland Cleveland to Secretary General	<b>22 May 1967</b>

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Redraft of Interim Report to Ministers (FCM(67)84)	<b>24 May 1967</b>
Groupe Spécial sur les Tâches Futures de l'Alliance - Projet de Rapport Intérimaire du Groupe Spécial sur les Tâches Futures de l'Alliance Destiné au Conseil en Session Ministérielle (AC/261-D/3)	<b>25 May 1967</b>
Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance - Draft Interim Report by the Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance to the Council in Ministerial Session (AC/261-D/3)	<b>25 May 1967</b>
US Proposal for new Wording of Paragraph 11 of Draft Interim Report (DPA(67)142)	<b>29 May 1967</b>
Brief for the Secretary General for Meeting of Special Group	<b>29 May 1967</b>
Les Tâches Futures de l'Alliance - Rapport Intérimaire du Groupe Spécial sur les Tâches Futures de l'Alliance Destiné au Conseil en Session Ministérielle (C-M(67)33)	<b>30 May 1967</b>
The Future Tasks of the Alliance - Interim Report by the Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance to the Council in Ministerial Session (C-M(67)33)	<b>30 May 1967</b>
Brief for the Secretary General Council Meeting, 31st May 1967	<b>Undated</b>
Record of Council Meeting, 31 May 1967 (C-R(67)24)	<b>18 June 1967</b>
Record of Council Meeting in Ministerial Session, Luxembourg, 14 June 1967 (C-R(67)29)	<b>10 July 1967</b>
Note for the File (Drafted by the Archives Section)	<b>Undated</b>
 <b>Section 2: Private Meeting of the Permanent Representatives</b>	
Dates for Submission of Reports and of Meetings of Sub-Groups	<b>Undated</b>
Memo to ASG/PA re his Meeting with the Secretary General (GAS(67)74)	<b>11 July 1967</b>
Memo from ASG/PA to Secretary General (DPA(67)159)	<b>12 July 1967</b>
Record of a Private Meeting of Permanent Representatives on the Harmel Exercise, 12 July 1967	<b>13 July 1967</b>
Analysis of Tendencies Revealed in the Discussion of Permanent Representatives on 12th July 1967, Draft Paper	<b>17 July 1967</b>
Analysis of Tendencies Revealed in the Discussion of Permanent	<b>18 July 1967</b>

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Representatives on 12th July 1967 (DPA(67)163)	
UK Delegation Draft Suggestions for Basic Ideas Underlying the Papers of All Rapporteurs, by A. Watson	<b>17 July 1967</b>
Future of the Alliance Study by Foy Kohler, Deputy Under Secretary of State	<b>18 July 1967</b>
Future Procedure (DPA(67)166)	<b>19 July 1967</b>
Record of Meeting of Rapporteurs of Sub-Groups of Special Group on Future Tasks of the Alliance in Königswinter, 21 July 1967 2 [Entire Document, 1'437 KB]	<b>25 July 1967</b>
Tâches Futures de l'Alliance (PO(67)559)	<b>4 August 1967</b>
Future Tasks of the Alliance (PO(67)559)	<b>4 August 1967</b>
Private Meeting of Permanent Representatives of Countries Furnishing Harmel Exercise Rapporteurs on 24th July 1967, EAM/RPD	<b>26 July 1967</b>
Private Meeting of Permanent Representatives of Countries Furnishing Harmel Exercise Rapporteurs on 24th July 1967, Short Version	<b>Undated</b>
Délégation Permanent de la Belgique no 2122: Projet de Schéma du Rapport Général du Groupe	<b>31 July 1967</b>
Lettre à M. Spaak (PO(67)580)	<b>3 August 1967</b>
Notes regarding circulation of outline for report (PO(67)583 to 587)	<b>3 August 1967</b>
Letter from UK Delegation	<b>4 August 1967</b>
Record of a Conversation between the Secretary General and Mr. Rostow and Mr. Cleveland on 10 September 1967	<b>Undated</b>
Distribution des Rapports des Rapporteurs à la Division des Affaires Politiques (DPA(67)192)	<b>15 September 1967</b>
Future Work Programme of the Council: Future Tasks of the Alliance (GAS(67)95)	<b>18 September 1967</b>
Council Meeting Held on 20th September 1967 (C-R(67)39)	<b>Undated</b>

### **Section 3: Circulation of Reports of Sub-Groups**

Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance - Provision of Additional Texts (AC/261-N/13) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 [Entire Document, 3'514 KB]	<b>2 November 1967</b>
Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance - Provision of Additional	<b>16 November</b>

Texts (AC/261-N/13 (Revised)) 2 3 4 5 6 [Entire Document, 3'255 KB]	<b>1967</b>
Rapport du Sous-Groupe 2 (PB(67)119)	<b>21 November 1967</b>
Note pour M. Synadinos par le Chef de la Section des Archives	<b>Undated</b>
Release of NATO Information: Corrigendum to one of the Sub-Group Reports Covered by the Request for Release Contained in PO(92)105 (EXS(92)150)	<b>2 July 1967</b>

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**Summary and Analysis by Special Group of Rapporteur's Reports and Discussion  
Leading to Approval by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session  
(October - December 1967, NATO Archives, NISCA 4/10/6)**

**Section 1: Summary and Analysis of Reports by Political Affairs  
Division**

Future Tasks of the Alliance (DPA(67)207) **2 October 1967**

Reports on the Future Tasks of the Alliance (DPA(67)206) **2 October 1967**  
2 3 4 [Entire Document, 3'149 KB]

**Section 2: Meeting with Rapporteurs**

Record of Meeting between the Secretary General and the German  
Foreign Minister at the Foreign Office, Bonn, 9th October 1967 **9 October 1967**

Meeting of Rapporteurs of Sub-Groups for Study on Future Tasks of the  
Alliance **11 October 1967**

Sommaire des Rapports sur les Tâches Futures de l'Alliance Projet 2 3  
[Entire Document, 1'740 KB] **11 October 1967**

Draft Summary of Reports on Future Tasks of the Atlantic Alliance 2  
[Entire Document, 1'308 KB] **9 October 1967**

Letter from Foreign Office **11 October 1967**

Examen des Tâches Futures de l'Alliance: Transmission de la Synthèse  
des Etudes des Rapporteurs (PO(67)770) 2 [Entire Document, 1'308 KB] **18 October 1967**

Study on the Future Tasks of the Alliance: Transmission of Resume of  
Rapporteurs Reports (PO(67)770) 2 [Entire Document, 1'096 KB] **18 October 1967**

German Delegation to the North Atlantic Council 20-02-5/3623/67 geh.,  
Enclosing a Letter from German Foreign Affairs Minister to Secretary  
General **23 October 1967**

### **Section 3: Private Meeting of Permanent Representatives**

Future Tasks of the Alliance: Study of the Issues (DPA(67)218) **20 October 1967**

List of Points to be discussed by the High-Level Meeting of the Special  
Group **26 October 1967**  
Draft Working Paper

Summary Record of a Private Meeting of Permanent Representatives Held  
on Wednesday, 25th October, 1967 **26 October 1967**

Groupe Spécial sur les Tâches Futures de l'Alliance - Liste de Questions  
(PO(67)796) **30 October 1967**

Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance - List of Issues  
(PO(67)796) **30 October 1967**

### **Section 4: Soviet Response to Harmel Exercise**

Soviet Comment on the Harmel Exercise and NATO (RS(67)124) **20 October 1967**

### **Section 5: Analysis of French Position**

The Position of French Representatives on the Harmel Exercise  
(SPA(67)1) **14 November  
1967**

### **Section 6: Secretary General Meeting with US Group**

Summary Record of a Meeting of the Secretary General with Panel Group  
from the United States Association from the United Nations **15 November  
1967**

### **Section 7: Meeting of Special Group**

Canadian Delegation Letter **2 November  
1967**  
Attendance at Meeting of Special Group

Lettre de la Délégation Italienne **3 November  
1967**  
Participation à la Réunion du Groupe Spécial

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Draft of Introductory Remarks by the Secretary General for the Meeting of Thursday, 7th November 1967	<b>Undated</b>
Statement Made by Under Secretary Eugene Rostow	<b>Undated</b>
UK Speaking Notes	<b>Undated</b>
Statement by Turkey	<b>Undated</b>
Déclaration de la Norvège	<b>Undated</b>
Statement by the Netherlands (F 12032/67)	<b>Undated</b>
Statement by Ranitz	<b>Undated</b>
Déclaration faite par l'Ambassadeur de Ferrariis Salzano	<b>Undated</b>
Compte Rendu de la Déclaration du Représentant de la Grèce	<b>Undated</b>
Statement by Germany	<b>Undated</b>
Déclaration de la France, le 7 novembre	<b>Undated</b>
Déclaration de la France, le 8 novembre	<b>Undated</b>
Déclaration du Danemark	<b>Undated</b>
Speaking Brief by Canadian Permanent Representative	<b>Undated</b>
Déclaration de la Belgique	<b>6 November 1967</b>
Lettre de la Délégation de l'Italie	<b>13 November 1967</b>
Lettre de Pierre Harmel au Secrétaire Général Faisant part de Réflexions et Remarques	<b>13 November 1967</b>
Lettre à M. P. Harmel (PO(67)836)	<b>16 November 1967</b>
Danish/Norwegian Notes	<b>Undated</b>
Draft Report, 7 Pages	<b>Undated</b>
Draft Report, 5 Pages	<b>Undated</b>
Draft Number 3 for Submission to the Special Group Meeting of 22 November 1967	<b>14 November 1967</b>
Draft Report, Belgian Version	<b>Undated</b>
Projet de Rapport à Soumettre au Groupe Spécial le 22 November 1967	<b>16 November</b>

(PO(67)832)	<b>1967</b>
Draft Report for Submission to the Special Group on 22nd November 1967 (PO(67)832)	<b>16 November 1967</b>

### **Section 8: Meeting of Special Group**

Draft Report for Submission to the Special Group on 22nd November 1967 with Amendments by Various Countries	<b>Undated</b>
Special Group Meeting of 22nd November (MJ(67)164)	<b>21 November 1967</b>
Brief for the Secretary General, Meeting of the Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance, 22nd November 1967	<b>Undated</b>
Summary of the Discussion of the Special Group on 22nd November 1967 Concerning the Report Submitted by the Secretary General	<b>Undated</b>
Draft C-M Report by the Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance to the Council in Ministerial Session	<b>24 November 1967</b>

### **Section 9: Approval of Report by Council in Ministerial Session**

Rapport du Groupe Spécial sur les Futures Tâches de l'Alliance au Conseil en Session Ministérielle (C-M(67)74)	<b>28 November 1967</b>
Report by the Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance to the Council in Ministerial Session (C-M(67)74)	<b>28 November 1967</b>
Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance (RS(67)133)	<b>28 November 1967</b>
Typing Errors in C-M(67)221 (FCM(67)221)	<b>29 November 1967</b>
Lettre de la Délégation Italienne Amendement au Paragraphe 17	<b>4 December 1967</b>
Circulation to all Permanent Representatives of Italian Amendment (PO(67)878)	<b>4 December 1967</b>
Lettre de la Délégation Portugaise Acceptant l'Amendement Italien	<b>5 December 1967</b>
Bracketed Version in Paragraph 10 of the Harmel Report (FCM(67)228)	<b>6 December 1967</b>

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Attitude de M. Harmel quant au Projet Italien d'Amendments à l'Article 17	<b>Undated</b>
Note regarding "Working Programme" and "Rationale"	<b>7 December 1967</b>
Future Tasks of the Alliance Report to the Council (Not Circulated) (C-M(67)74 (Revised))	<b>13 December 1967</b>
Tentative Draft Paragraphs for the Communiqué	<b>12 December 1967</b>
Council in Ministerial Session Held on 13th December 1967 (C-R(67)51)	<b>Undated</b>
Communiqué de Presse (M4(67)3)	<b>14 December 1967</b>
Press Communiqué (M4(67)3)	<b>14 December 1967</b>
Tâches Futures de l'Alliance, Rapport du Conseil (C-M(67)74 (2ème Révision))	<b>18 December 1967</b>
Future Tasks of the Alliance, Report of the Council (C-M(67)74 (2nd Revise))	<b>18 December 1967</b>
Proposed Corrections to the Text (RS(67)144)	<b>18 December 1967</b>
Corrigendum to Future Tasks of the Alliance, Report of the Council (C-M(67)74 (2nd Revise))	<b>20 December 1967</b>

#### **Section 10: Note for Briefers**

Notes à l'Intention des Conférenciers SN/1, Février 1968 2 [Entire Document, 832 KB]	<b>Undated</b>
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