This publication is part of a publications series by the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP). The PHP provides new scholarly perspectives on contemporary international history by collecting, analyzing, and interpreting formerly secret governmental documents. Since its establishment in 1999, the project has collected thousands of pages of material on security-related issues of the Cold War, published a large number of online documentaries on central issues such as mutual threat perceptions and alliance management, and organized several major international conferences on war planning, intelligence, and intra-bloc tensions. Further information is provided at the PHP Website: www.isn.ethz.ch/php.
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Please note: This issue of the PHP Publication Series offers highlights from a much larger online document collection. Please consult the PHP website for all the documents in their original language and other features: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/collections/coll_wapa.htm.

The PHP has published a number of document collections on various aspects of the security-related history of the cold war: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php.
1) Introduction

The following 193 documents have been published in English translation in the PHP book *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991*, ed. Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (Budapest: CEU Press, 2005), which appeared as the fourth volume in the *National Security Archive Cold War Reader* series. For reasons of space, virtually all of them have been excerpted. All the documents can be consulted in their original language and in their entirety in this documentary companion to the book. The book and this documentary companion are the product of the PHP's multi-year research effort aimed at bringing together formerly secret records from the archives of the member states of the Soviet-led Cold War alliance. Top-level communications between the Warsaw Pact leaders, verbatim transcripts of multilateral summit meetings, and lively discussions inside the various party politburos are among the many previously unavailable materials in the collection. Topics covered in depth include:

- The evolution of the pact from stage prop to full-fledged military alliance;
- The surprisingly dynamic relations between Moscow and the other capitals of the "fraternal countries," particularly during times of crisis when the Kremlin was pulled in different directions by allies espousing more aggressive or cautious points of view;
- The turmoil - this time induced by the Soviet leadership itself - of the late 1980s, which led to the virtually simultaneous vanishing of the Cold War and the Eastern alliance.

Readers are invited to explore the book *A Cardboard Castle*, which offers three more components in addition to the English translation of excerpts of the following documents. *First*, Vojtech Mastny's 74-page introductory essay traces the evolution of the Warsaw Pact from its origins to its demise between the downfall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. *Second*, "headnotes" prepared by Malcolm Byrne in cooperation with Vojtech Mastny, introduce each document and present item-specific context that explains the significance or special relevance of every entry. *Third*, additional research aids include a chronology of relevant events, a listing of key officials, a glossary of acronyms found in the documents, and a selective bibliography on the Warsaw Pact. The book can be ordered at CEU Press.
2) Preface and Acknowledgements, by Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne

This volume is the first to gather in one place a comprehensive documentary record of the elusive and controversial history of the Soviet-led Cold War alliance from the inside. The product of a multi-year research effort, the book brings together formerly secret records from the archives of every member-state of the communist military grouping. Top-level communications between the alliance’s leaders, verbatim transcripts of multilateral summit meetings, and lively discussions inside the various party politburos are among the many previously unavailable materials in this collection. Topics covered in depth include the evolution of the pact from stage prop to fullfledged military alliance; the surprisingly dynamic relations between Moscow and the other capitals of the “fraternal countries,” particularly during times of crisis when the Kremlin was pulled in different directions by allies espousing more aggressive or cautious points of view; the upheavals in Eastern Europe in 1953, 1956, 1968 and 1980–81; and the turmoil—this time induced by the Soviet leadership itself—of the late 1980s, which led to the virtually simultaneous vanishing of the Cold War and the Eastern alliance.

The principal catalyst behind this volume is the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP). An innovative, multinational research endeavor, the PHP was established in 1999 to encourage increased military transparency in the former Warsaw Pact as well as NATO countries by enlisting research institutes, military historians and archivists throughout Europe to promote the opening of historical records that would yield a broader understanding of our recent shared experience in international security. The PHP’s primary institutional sponsors are the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, the National Security Archive at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., the Institute for Strategy and Security Policy at the Austrian Defense Academy in Vienna, the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies in Florence, and the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies in Oslo. Readers are invited to explore the PHP website, maintained by the Swiss Center for Security Studies, at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/index.htm.

As a cooperative undertaking of more than 20 partner institutions, the PHP has collected thousands of pages of material on security-related issues of the Cold War, published a large number of online documentaries on central issues such as mutual threat perceptions and alliance management, and organized several major international conferences on war planning, intelligence, and intra-bloc tensions. Project Coordinator Vojtech Mastny has helped to spearhead these efforts, including visiting all of the relevant archives, negotiating with NATO and former Warsaw Pact officials and organizing research and collection activities. Playing a crucial role have been the dozens of scholars, archivists and former officials who make up the PHP network.

Having already established a major Internet repository of historical records, the PHP decided to produce a traditional printed volume consisting of recently released Warsaw Pact documentation as a way to further disseminate the raw materials necessary for developing a more complete understanding of this important phenomenon of the Cold War. For reasons of maximum distribution, all of these documents have been translated into English. For reasons of space, virtually all of them have been excerpted. While the editors and Project partners believe this effort represents a significant contribution in itself, the PHP has also posted all of the original documents, in their native languages, and in full on the Project’s web site, to be available to anyone who would wish to consult them in their entirety. This amounts to thousands of pages of
important primary source material made accessible through the most democratic medium of
information storage and retrieval ever devised. Beyond merely simplifying the task of researching
these materials by collecting them in one place, this measure will guarantee the permanent
availability of these records by removing them from the political or bureaucratic whims of
governments that may choose to reimpose access controls at any time.

This volume appears as part of the National Security Archive Cold War Reader series under the
CEU Press imprint. The Archive is the book’s other main contributor, in addition to being a PHP
partner. As part of its own mission to help uncover the hidden history of the Cold War and
broaden public access to it, the Archive established this reader series under the umbrella of its
Openness in Russia and Eastern Europe project. The series represents a culminating phase of
the project which, in partnership with scholars based in Central and Eastern Europe since 1992,
has helped to pry loose new historical materials and organize ground-breaking international
conferences to bring the latest analysis—and further public exposure—to the ever expanding
record. Previous volumes in the series cover the Soviet bloc crises that occurred in 1953 in East
Germany, in 1956 in Hungary and in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, with additional titles forthcoming on
the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989. The current volume is a perfect
complement to those compilations since the Warsaw Pact

As with other volumes in this series, this one has several basic components. One of them is the
documents. The majority of these have never been published in English before; many have not
appeared even in their own language. Together they comprise a unique, multi-archival resource
that affords a variety of perspectives from inside the once-closed Eastern alliance. The only
notable gap is on the former Soviet side. Persisting restrictions on access to Soviet military
records are an exasperating obstacle that the PHP, among others, continues to contest. Still, the
relative availability of Eastern European records, while uneven, helps to compensate to a
considerable degree.

To provide an analytical and interpretive framework for the materials, another main component of
the book is the introductory essay by Vojtech Mastny, widely recognized as an expert in the field.
The essay traces the evolution of the “Cardboard Castle” from its origins to its ignominious
demise between the downfall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the
disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. The narrative is linked directly to the
documentary part by providing footnote references to individual documents. The extensive
footnotes provide numerous further avenues for research in virtually all the languages of the
alliance. The third component are “headnotes” that introduce each document, presenting item-
specific context that explains the significance or special relevance of every entry. They were
prepared by Malcolm Byrne in cooperation with Vojtech Mastny. A fourth component consists of
additional research aids—a chronology of relevant events, a listing of key officials, a glossary of
acronyms found in the documents as well as those used to identify the archival source of each
record, and a selective bibliography on the Warsaw Pact.

A great deal of effort and cooperation by a number of individuals has gone into the preparation of
this volume, for which the editors are deeply grateful. First, we would like to thank Magdalena
Klotzbach of the National Security Archive who toiled on a wide range of tasks from translating
Polish documents to helping research and write the chronology and glossaries, to organizing and
copy-editing the text. Jason Roberts, also of the Archive, energetically pursued research
assignments relating to the front matter. In another capacity, Archive Executive Director Tom Blanton, who helped forge the Archive’s connection to and support for the PHP network, was the first to raise the idea of publishing this volume as part of the Cold War reader series with CEU Press.

Enthusiastic support for this project has also come from the other PHP partners and associates, particularly Andy Wenger, Chris Nünlist and Anna Locher in Zurich, Csaba Békés in Budapest, Jordan Baev in Sofia, Wanda Jarzabek in Warsaw, Sven Holtsmark in Oslo, Oldřich Tůma in Prague, Petr Luhák in Brussels, Matthias Uhl in Berlin, and Svend Aage Christensen in Copenhagen.

Additional scholars, researchers and archivists played a critical part in this process, identifying, locating and bringing to light many of the records from which this selection was made. A number of documents were originally published by the Cold War International History Project, a PHP associate and one of the leading sponsors of international Cold War research. CWIHP is directed by Christian F. Ostermann and assisted by Mircea Munteanu and Dee Beutel.

Another major group of individuals to thank are the translators. Several items were previously translated under the auspices of other programs, including CWIHP and the National Security Archive. But most of the materials were translated especially for this book. For that, the editors, knowing the demands that were placed on these talented individuals, are particularly grateful. In alphabetical order, they are: Andreas Bocz, Viorel Nicolae Buta, Jan Chowaniec, Greg Domber, Ursula Froese, Małgorzata Gnoińska, Thomas Holderegger, Anya Jouravel, Greta Keremidchieva, Magdalena Klotzbach, Mark Kramer, Marian Kratochvíl, Anna Locher, Jiří Mareš, Stan Mareš, Mircea Munteanu, Catherine Nielsen, Christian Nünlist, Vania Petkova, Sergey Radchenko, Karen Riechert, Jason Roberts, Svetlana Savranskaya, Bernd Schaefer, Douglas Selvage, Karel Sieber, Lena Sirota, Paul Spitzer, Rebekka Weinel, Vladislav Zubok.

Special gratitude to Karen Riechert and Bernd Schaefer for their extra efforts on our behalf, and to Oldřich Tůma and Jordan Baev for facilitating expeditiously the excellent work of their colleagues.

The editors, and their home institutions, wish to express their abiding gratitude to the foundations that have provided the support necessary for this book and allowed their other work to move forward. Funding for the Openness Project over the years has come primarily from the Open Society Institute, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Smith Richardson Foundation and the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

Finally, we are grateful to CEU Press for its continued interest in and support for this series. Their generous underwriting of many of the translations was vital. Thanks to István Bart, Péter Inkei, Linda Kunos, Krisztina Kós, Martin Greenwald and their colleagues.

The Editors

Washington, 29 September 2004
3) Endorsements

“This ‘inside’ history of the Warsaw Pact is a remarkable achievement. It is a product of a multinational team of able researchers and translators who have extracted vital documents, each with illuminating headnotes, from the archives of the members of the bloc. The collection is made all the more valuable by the insightful introductory essay of Vojtech Mastny, the preeminent authority on the Warsaw Pact. Exposing conflict as well as consensus over the Pact's forty-six year life span, this pioneer effort will be an indispensable resource for Cold War scholars.”

Lawrence S. Kaplan, former director, Lemnitzer Center for NATO Studies, Kent State University, author of NATO Divided, NATO United

“Combining more than six hundred pages of fascinating, hitherto secret documents with a long, wonderfully trenchant introductory essay by Vojtech Mastny, this invaluable volume illuminates not only the ‘inside history’ of the Warsaw Pact, but, as reflected in that story, the history of Soviet-East European relations, of the decline and fall of Communism, of East-West relations in Europe, and of East bloc planning (if that is the word to describe a process rife with misjudgments) for both war and peace.”

William Taubman, Amherst College, Pulitzer Prize-winning author of Khrushchev: The Man and His Era

“This volume opens the door to one of the most important yet largely neglected chapters of the Cold War in Europe -- the Warsaw Pact. Mastny's provocative overview of its history should fire the interest of general readers as well as specialists; only a scholar with his breadth of knowledge of Eastern European history and languages could execute such a project. He and Byrne are to be congratulated for producing this monumental volume, with a trove of translated documents that is a major boon to both scholars and teachers.”

"In 2002 in Prague, at the NATO Summit, when I banged down the gavel on the proposal that we invite seven new countries into NATO, a whole world changed. Practically all of the Warsaw Pact was now to be in membership of the Alliance created to face down that very Pact.

This remarkable book documents in fascinating detail the rise and fall of the Warsaw Treaty organisation - an alliance of unfree nations press-ganged into military collaboration over forty years. How it came about, did its business, and eventually imploded is the story of my lifetime - and that of many others who were affected by it. This is therefore not just a story for experts or historians - it is a chronology of significance and an era we must never forget".

The Rt Hon Lord Robertson of Port Ellen
4) Sample Documents
1) General Provisions of the Warsaw-Treaty

Armed Forces Joint Command

PART I

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

The Supreme Commander chairs the joint armed forces of the members of the Warsaw Treaty agreement on friendship, cooperation and mutual aid adopted on May 14, 1955.

The responsibilities of the Supreme Commander are:

To carry out resolutions of the Political Consultative Committee, which deal directly with the joint armed forces.

To supervise and direct operational and combat preparation of the joint armed forces and to organize the joint-exercises of troops, fleets and staff under the command of the Joint Armed Forces;

To have a comprehensive knowledge of the state of troops and fleets under the command of the Joint Armed Forces, and to take all necessary measures in cooperation with the Governments and Ministers of Defense of the respective countries in order to ensure permanent combat readiness of the forces.

To work out and present the Political Consultative Committee with constructive proposals on further improvement of the qualitative and quantitative state of the available staff.

The rights of the Chief-of-Staff:

to evaluate the fighting trim, strategic and fighting readiness of the Joint Armed Forces and to give orders and recommendations based on the results of the evaluations;

address the Political Consultative Committee and the Governments of the Warsaw-Treaty countries with any questions regarding his activities;

to call for meetings with his deputies representing their governments within the Armed Forces, in order to discuss and solve the occurring problems.

PART II

The Deputies of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

The Deputies to the Supreme Commander carry the full responsibility for:

combat and mobilization readiness, as well as operational, combat, and political preparation of the troops under the command of the Joint Military Forces;

for making of troops and fleets under the supervision of the Joint Military Forces; for the available personnel; for supplying armaments, technical equipment and other military items; as well as for the accommodation arrangements and service of troops;

The Deputies to the Supreme Commander are obliged to report the state of the military and mobilizing readiness as well as the state of the political, strategic and combat instruction of troops and fleets at the disposition of the Joint Command.

PART III

The Staff of the Joint Armed Forces

The Chief of Staff supervises the activities of the Staff subordinated to the Supreme Commander of the Joint Armed Forces.

The composition of the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces:

permanent representatives of General Staff from the Warsaw-Treaty countries;

special bodies responsible for the strategic, tactical and organizational issues;
2) Memorandum on the Warsaw Treaty and the Development of the Armed Forces of the People’s Republic of Poland, 10 January 1957

The Warsaw Treaty agreement, adopted in May, 1955 (especially its military provisions), as well as different bilateral agreements signed by the representatives of the USSR and People’s Republic of Poland prior to the Warsaw Treaty and ratified after the adoption of the Treaty require a thorough analysis and revision. This mostly concerns Polish obligations regarding organizational, quantitative and technical supplies of the Armed Forces, in the production of military equipment and the strategic positioning of the country.

The need to revise earlier agreements is caused by the political and economic conditions of our country. The earlier agreements and the ensuing obligations do not correspond to the policy of independence and sovereignty of our country pronounced by the Party and the Government of the People’s Republic of Poland. Despite the constant changes of obligations acquired by Poland on the basis of the bilateral agreements, their implementation would not be feasible without considerable financial expenditures assigned to the Armed Forces and military industry. Such a policy would be inconsistent with the course of the Party and the Government aimed on constant improvement of the living standards of the Polish people.

Taking into consideration above mentioned situation, the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces has analyzed the obligations and provisions deriving from bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union as well as the Warsaw Treaty and our obligations deriving from them. Our proposals are listed below:

Military obligations originating from the Warsaw Treaty.

The present balance of power in the world, our strategic position as well as our ideological ties with the socialist camp prove the importance of the Warsaw Treaty and of the unification of the military efforts of the member-countries for the further protection of our common interests.

Nevertheless, we believe that the military protocols originating from the Treaty require radical revision.

The organizational concept of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces foresees the allocation of the part of the member countries’ Armies under a Joint Command.

The above mentioned concept is similar to the structural concept of NATO. Some parts of the Armies of the United States, Great Britain, France and other countries are placed under the Joint Command.

Nevertheless, the structural position of the NATO countries is somewhat different to the position of the Warsaw-Treaty countries. The only exclusion to the rule is the Soviet Union.

The strategic interest of the major participants of NATO is applied to the numerous theaters of war operations, therefore the specific theater of war would require only part of the Armed forces of the respective countries, with the remainder of the forces allocated to different pacts, the Baghdad
The conditions under which the Warsaw Treaty was created are completely different. Our interest is in the European War Theater that involves all the participants of the Treaty, excluding the Soviet Union (the interests of the latter are only partly in Europe). Therefore we believe that the total composition of our Armed forces should participate in our common defense initiative in Europe.

The above mentioned facts illustrate the superficiality of the partitioning of the Armed forces by the participants of the Warsaw-Treaty; namely, the structure in which one part of the Armed forces is under the joint command and other part is under the command of the national armed forces. In the current situation, Poland cannot allot one part of the Armed forces under the joint command due to the unrealistically large number of divisions required (see part II of the memorandum). Despite the recent reduction of 5 divisions in Polish Armed forces, the number of required divisions for the joint command was only reduced by 1.

The organizational structure of the Joint Command of the Armed forces is based on a single authority. The collective decision-making process bears only a formal character (it is not mentioned in a treaty). The process of the Supreme Commander's subordination to the international political body is not clear.

The above mentioned determines the supra-national character of the Supreme Commander and his Staff, which does not correspond to the idea of independence and sovereignty of the Warsaw-Treaty participating countries. The supranational positioning of the Supreme Commander and of his Staff is illustrated in "Statute" in the chapters dealing with the rights and responsibilities of the Supreme Commander and his Staff.

The authority of the Supreme Commander in questions of leadership in combat and strategic training is incompatible with the national character of the armies of the corresponding states. This imposes the introduction of common rules and regulations determining the order and conditions of military life (for example, the Garrison Duty Regulations, Drill Regulations, Disciplinary regulations, etc)

The Supreme Commander has widespread rights in the sphere of control. The volume of the report information required from the General Staff is tremendous. The Staff of the Joint Armed Forces is not an international body in a full sense. The rights and responsibilities of the representatives of the corresponding armies are not stated clearly. The existing practice demonstrates the formal character of their functions.

The relations between the Staff of the Joint Command and the General Staff are based on the complete subordination of the latter to the former.

Current events prove continuously the unilateral character of the obligations acquired by the People's Republic of Poland. No international agreement dealt with the judicial state of troops located or passing through the territory of the Warsaw-Treaty country.
The above listed questions should be regulated in a spirit of the Declaration of the Soviet Government issued on October 30, 1956.

In order to correct the above-mentioned organizational and structural concepts, we suggest the following changes to the military articles of the Warsaw Treaty agreement:

a) the Warsaw Pact countries are interested in using all their armed Forces for defense purposes; the Soviet Union would agree with other member countries on the quantity of Soviet troops to be allotted to the Warsaw Treaty common actions in Europe;

b) the involvement of troops of any of the Warsaw Pact countries in military operations would require the prior approval by the appropriate body in its home country according to the Constitution;

c) In peacetime the Armed Forces of each of the countries are subordinated to their national command.

d) we recognize the need for close cooperation of all Warsaw-Pact countries in the following areas:
   in strategic plans and tactical issues;
   in logistics prior to tactical moves;
   in standardization of the major types of weapons;
   in regulations of military production and deliveries in times of war and peace;
   in joint strategic training on the territory of one of the countries.

e) we recognize the need to create a "Military Consultative Committee" for the implementation of the above mentioned proposals. The Military Consultative Committee would consist of the Ministers of National Defense and the Chairmen of the General Staff of the Warsaw-Pact Countries. The Chairman of the Committee would be one of the members of the Committee elected once a year.

f) the working body of the Military Consultative Committee would be the Permanent Staff Committee. It would consist of the officers and generals of the Warsaw Treaty countries. The Supreme International Political Body would stipulate the number of the officers allotted to the Permanent Staff Committee by each country.

g) the Supreme International Political Body would determine location of the Military Consultative Committee.

h) all proposals concerning the issues listed in part b must be approved by the Supreme Political Body. They become compulsory to all Warsaw-Treaty countries if approved.

i) the Permanent Staff Committee can present its recommendations regarding the issues in part d to the General Staff.

The implementation of these recommendations depends on the decisions of the responsible
parties of the national government of Warsaw-Treaty countries.

In the situation of war the International Political Body can appoint the Supreme Command of the Joint Armed Forces.

The Staff of the Supreme Command will consist of officers and generals of the respective states, and their appointments will be confirmed by the Supreme International Political Body.

[...]


3) Copy of letter, Yu. Tsedenbal, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Mongolian People’s Republic, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People’s Republic, Józef Cyrankiewicz, 15 July 1963

Marking at top: “On the Orders of Comrade Cyrankiewicz, sent to the members of the P.B. [Politburo] and Secr.[etariat] on 19 July 1963.” Stamped: “With a request to return to the Chancellory of the Secretariat of the CC.”

Dear Comrade Chairman,

With the authorization of the Presidium of the Supreme National Council of the Mongolian People’s Republic [MNR], I have the honor to address to you, as Head of State of the Polish People’s Republic, the custodian of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the European socialist states of 14 May 1955, the following:

In the interests of further strengthening the MNR’s cooperation along all lines with the member states of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the government of the Mongolian People’s Republic, attaching great importance to the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which in fact stands guard for the achievements of all the socialist states; completely approving of the goal of the Treaty — to secure the peace and security of nations; taking into consideration the development of events in numerous parts of the globe, in particular the Far East, where the American imperialists are undertaking measures to equip Japan with new weapons of mass destruction; [and] realizing in this regard the need to strengthen the defensive capabilities of the MNR; hereby announces its desire to accede to the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of 14 May 1955 in accordance with Paragraph 9 of the said Treaty.

By joining the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which bears a defensive character and has been called upon to serve the important interests of safeguarding collective security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations Organization, the Mongolian People’s Republic, along with the fraternal socialist member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, will strictly fulfill all the responsibilities arising from the said treaty.

The Government of the MNR asks the Government of the Polish People’s Republic to request the consent of the Governments of the Warsaw Treaty Organization for the Mongolian People’s Republic’s accession to the Treaty.

The Government of the MNR expresses its thanks in advance to the Government of the PRL for rendering assistance in bringing its application to the attention of the other participant-states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

With deep respect,

Yu. Tsedenbal
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Mongolian People’s Republic

Ulan Bator, 15 July 1963

[Translation by Douglas Selvage]


marked, “Secret, Special Significance, Copy No. 1.” Stamped: “On the Orders of Comrade Rapacki, sent to the members of the P.B. [Politburo] and Secr.[etariat] on 20.VII.1963” and “With a request to return to the Chancellory of the Secretariat of the CC.”

Secret, Special Significance Copy No. 1

Beyond the letters of Cde. Tsedenbal and Cde. Khrushchev, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not possess any information further clarifying the arguments to be made at the current stage of this measure.

In this situation, it is difficult to accept as politically warranted the proposal regarding the MNR’s accession to the Warsaw Treaty.

The military significance of such a decision for the security of Mongolia and the interests of the Warsaw Pact seem to be practically indiscernible. The political consequences for the short and the long term are dubious and risky.

1. From the point of view of the interests of the socialist camp:

a/ The acceptance of Mongolia into the Warsaw Pact at this time will of course be discerned both in the socialist states of Asia and in the West as a step whose thrust is directed
against the PRC [People’s Republic of China].
In a situation in which the PRC, continuing its policy of deepening divisions, is making attempts to push the responsibility onto the USSR and the other states supporting its stance, an initiative with regard to Mongolia might in a certain sense play into the hands of the PRC and be used to blame our side for carrying the dispute into the area of military alliances and moving along the path of dividing the [socialist] camp along military lines.
Imperialist propaganda on the other hand will try to exploit this fact with the goal of bringing into further relief the divergence within the [socialist] camp and questioning the superiority of socialism over capitalism by telling the masses all the more that such is the peaceful substance and internationalist policy of the socialist states.
b/ Cde. Tsedenbal’s letter underlines the point of the imperialist threat to Mongolia. Even if we could count on the fact that the Chinese comrades would accept this assertion with good will, it would also become a real basis for harmful interpretations: “The Warsaw Pact represents for Mongolia an additional security guarantee in the event of imperialist aggression, but at the same time it [the Warsaw Pact] is not giving such an additional guarantee to Vietnam, Korea, and the PRC, which are even more directly exposed to the danger of American/Japanese aggression.”
c/ The Warsaw Pact is a pact of the European socialist states directed against imperialist activities in Europe ([see] the preamble — attached) and providing for an automatic military reaction by the participants in the event of aggression in Europe (art. 4).
These provisions of the Treaty would have to be changed. The very political scope and character of the Treaty would have to be changed.
Such a basic change of the Warsaw Pact would have an unmistakable and serious meaning, because it would lead to an actual transformation of the alliance into a general security pact for the socialist camp with the participation of all the states of the camp. Against the backdrop of the particular policy of the PRC, such a solution is unrealistic. If it is, such a change in the character of the Treaty would be more likely to weaken the anti-imperialist activity of the Treaty in Europe than to strengthen it in Asia.
d/ It can be counted on that the problem of Albania in the Warsaw Pact will be brought to a sharp climax. The acceptance of a new member and a change in the contents of the Treaty requires the unanimous acceptance of the participants.
A change in the Treaty would require the acceptance of a relevant Protocol, which would have to be ratified by every signatory to the Treaty in order to come into force. Albania, which has in fact disassociated itself from the Treaty, remains nominally a member of it. Its opposition would thus have a legal basis.
e/ The possibility of a negative stance on the part of Romania regarding Mongolia’s accession should also seriously be counted on, and a discussion on this issue might further inflame existing differences.
f/ In terms of the international effects of Mongolia’s accession to the Warsaw Pact, it should also be taken into consideration that Mongolia has established a [certain] position for itself among the Afro-Asiatic states (it participates in the Afro-Asiatic group at the UN). It should be considered whether Mongolia, by participating in a military pact, would not diminish the political credibility that it possesses in this group and its possibilities [for influence], which well serve the [socialist] camp as a whole.
2. From the viewpoint of Mongolia’s interests:

Mongolia’s security is guaranteed by an alliance with the Soviet Union from 1946. It would thus be an abstraction to conceive of a situation in which — in the case of aggression against Mongolia — the other socialist states would remain disengaged. If, on the other hand, certain technical-military interests on the part of the Warsaw Pact are established with regard to the territory of Mongolia, or if [there is] a desire on the part of Mongolia to exercise influence over the activities of the Pact, an agreement of a secret nature – based on the principle of consultation between the Warsaw Pact and Mongolia – could be supported.

It could also be that the main motivation behind the Mongolian comrades’ proposal is their assessment of their internal situation. We do not know of such an assessment, and we do not have any information that would permit us to form our own opinion on the subject. Such an assessment could be found out in direct talks.

The issue is fundamental and will of course be discussed in Moscow with the Mongolian comrades.

In any event, from this point of view, the risk arising from an eventual further sharpening of the conflict in the socialist camp should also be taken into consideration. The accession of Mongolia to the Warsaw Pact might very well represent a stepping stone for various moves by the PRC with regard to Mongolia — moves that would not have a military character and would have practically no significance in terms of Mongolia’s membership in the Warsaw Pact.

If there are internal difficulties, other methods for granting and demonstrating assistance and support for Mongolia should be weighed.

For example, all the CMEA’s planned economic assistance to date for Mongolia and [other] possible assistance that could still be initiated could be harnessed in a special action program for the sake of Mongolia’s development as the economically least-developed country within the CMEA. This would also have a broader political sense for the world.

Master copies produced at the MSZ [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]

MR/KM

[Translation by Douglas Selvage]
5) Proposal by Foreign Minister (János Péter) re: the Strengthening of the Political Structure of the Warsaw Pact, 19 January 1966

I request authorization from the Politburo to present the following organizational proposals at the meeting of the foreign ministers of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty, which aim at strengthening and developing the political system of the Warsaw Treaty.

I.

1. The highest body of the Warsaw Treaty is the Political Consultative Committee (henceforth PCC) both in a political and in a military sense.
2. The participants of the meetings of PCC are: the first secretaries of the Communist and workers' parties, the prime ministers, the ministers of foreign affairs and the ministers of national defense of the member states.

The PCC may also invite observers to its meetings.

3. The PCC holds one regular meeting annually that lasts usually for one or two days. The invitations to attend the regular meeting of the PCC must be sent out 14 days before the time of the session. The preparation of the regular sessions of the PCC is done by the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Military Council, the Permanent Secretariat, and the Unified Command. The agenda of the meetings is decided by the PCC. The meetings of the PCC do not have a fixed place or time. It is always the given regular meeting that decides on the place and time of the next session.
4. The PCC hold a special meeting in case it is proposed by any of the member states because of some internationally significant situation or for some other important reason, and the member states endorse this proposal. The member state that makes the proposal also volunteers to organize the special session. The agenda of this special session includes only that issue because of which the meeting was convened. Otherwise the same principles apply to a special session that are valid for a regular session.
5. The functions of the chairman and the deputy chair of the meetings of the PCC are filled by the leaders of the delegations of the member states in rotation following the order of the Russian alphabet. The meetings are chaired by the chairman, or in case of incapacitation, by the vice chairman.
6. At its meetings the PCC may adopt a resolution and issue a joint communiqué. A unanimous decision is needed for the adoption of a resolution and the approval of a joint communiqué.
7. The working language of the sessions of the PCC is Russian. While simultaneous
interpreting is provided, the representatives of the member states may also speak in their own native language.

8. Generally the meetings of the PCC are confidential. The joint communiqué adopted at the meeting is made public.

9. The keeping of the records of the sessions is ensured by the Permanent Secretariat of the PCC.

II.

Subordinated to the Political Consultative Committee the following political bodies must be established:

1. The Council of Foreign Ministers, whose main task is to make preparations for the upcoming meeting of the PCC and attends to all other matters which are relegated to its scope of authority.

2. The Permanent Secretariat, which is a permanently functioning political body of the Warsaw Treaty. The Secretariat is headed by the first secretary. The costs of establishing and maintaining the Permanent Secretariat is provided by each of the member states in proportion to their national income.

Budapest, January 19, 1966.

János Péter

[Translation by Andreas Bocz]

6) Memorandum by Thirty Scholarly Associates of the Military Political Academy and Military Technical Academy for the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee, 4 June 1968

Formulation and Constitution of Czechoslovak State Interests in the Military Area

The draft of the action program of the Czechoslovak People’s Army poses with a particular urgency the question of elaborating the state military doctrine of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. In our opinion, the point of departure ought to be the state interests of Czechoslovakia in the military area which, however, have not yet been formulated and constituted.

The signatories of this memorandum, who are scholarly associates working for the Czechoslovak armed forces, wish to contribute to the scientific examination and formulation of those state interests. In sections 1 and 2, they express their position concerning the present state of our military doctrine and military policy. In sections 3 and 4, they outline the procedure for a theoretical examination of the data aimed at the formulation of doctrinal conclusions. In section 5, they justify the necessity of using scientific methods to solve these problems.

They are sending this memorandum to provide the basis for an exchange of opinion. They consider a dialogue necessary for the development of scientific research.

Prague, May 1968.
1. Political and Military Doctrine

1.1. The political doctrine of a socialist state is primarily influenced by the choice of wider goals within the international community and its relationship with the diverse forces representative of social progress. The principle of socialist internationalism is organically linked with the national responsibility of a sovereign state. This is normally the more important as well as more difficult the smaller is the physical power of the state. The choice cannot solely depend on "national interest," which cannot be defined in a pure form-either as an interest of one's own state, nor as an interest of the leading state of a coalition. Decisive is the interest of the societal movement, of which sovereign states are part, specifically the interest of European socialism and its dynamic development. Mere defense of what has been accomplished fosters stagnation and degeneration; wrong choice of an offensive strategy has destructive effect on the progress of the whole societal movement.

1.2. Military policy as an aggregate of actions in military matters implements military interests and needs through a chosen strategy. In regard to national interest, the military doctrine of the state can be described as a comprehensive formulation of its military interests and needs. The doctrine is a binding theoretical and ideological base for the formulation of military policy and the resulting measures as well as for negotiations with the alliance partners. It amounts to a compromise between the maximum requirements and actual resources, between the dynamics of the evolving military knowledge and the findings of the social sciences, between the development of technology and the requirement of an effective defense system corresponding to the military circumstances at any given time.

1.3. The formulation of the state's military doctrine influences retroactively its political doctrine and strategy. It substantially affects its capability to project itself internationally by nonmilitary means. Giving up one's own military doctrine means giving up responsibility for one's own national and international action. A surrender to spontaneity, this entails depoliticization of military thought, which in turn leads to a paralysis of the army. It is the fundamental source of crisis of the army organism by tearing it out of society. It disrupts the metabolism between the army and the society. It deprives the army of its raison d'etre for the national community by limiting the interaction between national goals and the goals of the socialist community.

2. The Past, Present, and Future of Czechoslovakia's Military Policy

2.1. The foundations of Czechoslovakia's present defense systems were laid at the beginning of the nineteen-fifties, at which time the responsible political actors of the socialist countries assumed that a military conflict in Europe was imminent. It was a strategy based on the slogan of defense against imperialist aggression, but at the same time assuming the possibility of transition to strategic offensive with the goal of achieving complete Soviet hegemony in Europe. No explicit reassessment of this coalition strategy by taking into account the potential of nuclear missiles has ever taken place.

2.2. The Czechoslovak army, created with great urgency and extraordinary exertion, became a substantial strategic force by the time when Europe's political and military situation had fundamentally changed. Although in 1953 we noted a relaxation of international tension and in 1956 introduced the new strategy of peaceful coexistence, no formulation of Czechoslovakia's own military doctrine or reform of its army took place. Invoking the threat of German aggression, the alliance continued to be tightened up. Increasingly the threat of German aggression has taken on
the role of an extraneous factor employed with the intent to strengthen the cohesion of the socialist community. Once the original notions about the applicability of a universal economic and political model had to be revised, military cooperation was supposed to compensate for insufficient economic cooperation and the inadequacy of other relationships among the socialist countries.

2.3. In politics, there is a lack of clarity about the probable trends of development in the progressive movement to which we belong. There is a prevailing tendency to cling to the obsolete notions that have become part of the ideological legacy of the socialist countries. There is a prevailing tendency to try to influence all the segments of the movement, regardless of the sharply growing differences in their respective needs resulting from social and economic development.

In 1956 and 1961, we proved by our deeds that we were ready to bear any global risks without claiming a share of responsibility for the political decisions and their implementation. By doing so, we proved that we did not understand even the European situation and were guided not by sober analysis but by political and ideological stereotypes. (Hence also the surprise with regard to Hungary in 1956 and the inadequate response in 1961.)

2.4. Our military policy did not rest on an analysis of our own national needs and interests. It did not rest on our own military doctrine. Instead it was a reflection of the former sectarian party leadership, which prevented the party from conducting a realistic policy of harmonizing the interests of different groups with national and international interests for the benefit of socialism. The development of the army was deprived of both rational criteria and an institutionalized opposition. Military policy was reduced to the search for optimally matching our resources with the demands of the alliance. Devoid of principles, it was bound to create contradictions and crises within the army.

Inevitably the twenty years of deformed development affected the ability, or rather inability, of the cadres to overcome the deformations. Theoretical backwardness in military theory and the formulation of a military doctrine has been a great obstacle to the overcoming of the past errors.

2.5. Czechoslovakia's military policy will continue being built upon the alliance with other Warsaw Treaty partners, above all the U.S.S.R. At the same time, however, it will be a policy based on state sovereignty, and designed to provide our input into developing the alliance's common positions. A modern conception of the Warsaw Treaty can only have one meaning: increased external security of its member states to foster the development of both the socialist states and the states of Western Europe. Our military policy will not shun global risks, but only in the role of a partner rather than of a victim of a development that it cannot influence.

It will essentially be an European security policy, supportive of international d'Etente in Europe, all-European cooperation, and Europe's progressive forces. It will serve as an instrument of a broader, but not self-serving policy. A military policy that needs to construe and exaggerate an enemy threat fosters conservative tendencies in both socialism and capitalism. While in the short run it may seem to "strengthen" socialism, in the long run it weakens it.

2.6. Czechoslovakia's military policy must rest on a scientific analysis of a whole range of possible war situations in Europe, formulate its own sovereign interests and needs accordingly, estimate its military capabilities in particular situations within the framework of the coalition, and act on its own scientifically elaborated strategic doctrine.

3. The Contemporary War-Peace Situation

3.1. The naively pragmatic realist approach considers relations among sovereign states from the point of view of either war or peace. In actuality there is a whole range of situations whose common denominator is the availability of instruments of armed violence but which differ in the manner of their use. As a result of substantive social and political changes and the scientific-technological
revolution in military affairs, such a range of situations is considerably more complex and diverse not only in comparison with the situation before World War II but also with the situation in the early fifties.
Yet, at this very time of incipient gigantic transformations of social and political as well as scientific and technological nature, our military policy and doctrine applied the Soviet model as universally valid.

3.2. The above-mentioned range of possible situations may be summarized as follows:
- absolute war (in different variations),
- limited wars (of several types),
- situation between war and peace resulting from the long-term legalization of an originally temporary armistice as a result of which the adversaries are no longer fighting but peace treaties have not been concluded either,
- potential war, i.e. indirect use of instruments of armed violence as means of foreign policy,
- peace among potential adversaries,
- peace among allied sovereign states,
- peace among neutrals,
- absolute peace through general and complete disarmament.
- This description is a distillation of specific situations, which are in turn combinations of an indefinite number of possible situations that make sovereign states and military coalitions implement their foreign and military policies.

4. Possible Formulation of Czechoslovakia’s Military Interests and Needs Related to the War-Peace Situation in Contemporary Europe
The doctrinal formulation and constitution of Czechoslovak military interests and needs first requires a substantive analysis of particular war-peace situations, especially in Europe. Our own military interests and needs should then be formulated accordingly. This should be the point of departure for practical measures in accordance with the doctrine. Following is a brief outline of how one might proceed in some of the basic situations.
4.1. Absolute war in Europe
Given the accumulation of nuclear missiles by both major military coalitions, the possible outbreak of such a war in Europe is wrought with catastrophic consequences for most of its European participants. At the same time, the permanent lead time in the offensive rather than the defensive deployment of nuclear missiles, as well our unfavorable geographical position, make it impossible to substantially limit the destructiveness of enemy first strikes against our territory to an extent.
compatible with the preservation of our national and state existence. It must be said openly that the outbreak and conduct of a global nuclear war in the European theater would be tantamount to the national extinction and demise of state sovereignty especially of the frontline states, including Czechoslovakia. The futility of such a war as a means of settling European disputes, as demonstrated by the development of the so-called Berlin crisis of 1961, of course does not exclude its possibility.

In such a situation, we consider it appropriate to formulate Czechoslovakia's military interests and needs as a matter of primary existential importance:

- preventing the conduct of a nuclear war on our territory is a fundamental existential need of our society;
- Czechoslovakia has a strategic interest in actively contributing to the reduction of the real possibility of absolute war in Europe.

Our fundamental needs and interests in the event of such a war should determine a foreign policy aimed at limiting the possibility of a nuclear attack against Czechoslovakia. The appropriate measures are, for example, the conclusion of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, and supplementary guarantees of the status quo in Europe.

4.2. Limited war in Europe

The analysis of the possible scenarios in Europe obviously starts with the recognition of a growing danger of such a war and its growing strategic and political significance.

In recognizing the futility of limited war as a means of Czechoslovak foreign policy and in emphasizing our interest in eliminating it as a means of settlement of European disputes, we assume the necessity of purposefully waging war against an attack in a fashion conducive to limiting its destructive effects on our territory and population.

The formulation and constitution of Czechoslovakia's particular interests and needs will determine the practical measures to be taken:

- Preparation of Czechoslovakia's armed forces and its entire defense system within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty for the different variants of enemy attack with the goal of repelling it, defeating the adversary, and compelling him to settle peacefully.
- Reduction of the real possibility of war by reciprocal military and political acts of peaceful coexistence aimed at eliminating the use of force as a means of the settlement of disputes.

4.3. Situation between war and peace in Europe

This is the situation resulting from the failure to conclude a peace treaty with Germany and from the great-power status of Berlin inside the territory of the GDR. Herein is the possibility of a sudden deterioration leading to severe military and political crisis. At the present time, such a crisis would have catastrophic consequences for our economy, as had happened during the 1961 Berlin and 1962 Cuban crises. This would substantially worsen our strained economic situation, with too negative consequences for our development in a progressive direction.

These characteristics determine our approach to the formulation of Czechoslovakia's interests and needs, namely:

- our primary strategic and political need to prevent such a military and political crisis at the present time,
- our interest in reducing the possibility of a transition from the absence of war to a limited war while searching for a solution of the German question as the key question of contemporary Europe.

This further postulates measures to be taken in both military and foreign policy, above all through the Warsaw Pact, with the goal of normalizing relations between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany.

4.4. Potential war in Europe
At issue is the indirect use of the potential for armed violence as an instrument of foreign policy, as implied in the policy of deterrence, practiced especially by the nuclear powers. Czechoslovakia cannot use deterrence against the Western powers. Its deterrence posture is declaratory and politically ineffective if it is not supported by strategic measures against potential adversaries geographically distant from us. At the same time, the use of deterrence against Czechoslovakia by some of its potential adversaries forces us to respond in kind. These characteristics determine the formulation of Czechoslovakia's needs and interests, namely:
- our temporary need to use the potential for armed violence against the adversary that uses it against us,
- our lack of interest in using it as a matter of equivalent reciprocity, i.e. our interest in its exclusion as an instrument of foreign policy.

In this situation, we aim at the conclusion of legally binding agreements with potential adversaries that would ban the use of the threat of force in mutual relations. This can be realized in the relations between Czechoslovakia and Austria, Czechoslovakia and France, and Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany.

4.5. Peace among potential adversaries in Europe
This is the situation obtaining in Europe among potential adversaries who have no mutually exclusive interests and do not apply the policy of deterrence against one another. Here Czechoslovakia's interests and needs lay in the legal codification of the state of peace with a growing number of potential adversaries.

Our practical goals should be the conclusion with such partners of non-aggression treaties and arms limitation agreements. In this way, we can contribute to the reduction of tensions between potential adversaries, the growth of peace in Europe, and the reciprocal gradual neutralization of instruments of armed violence.

4.6. In other possible peace situations in Europe, as enumerated earlier, military interests and needs represent a share in Czechoslovakia's overall interests and needs. The closer the peace, of course, the lower the share. Absolute peace entails the abolition of the material and technological base for war, and thus also of the base for the military interests and needs.

In view of Czechoslovakia's current foreign and military policy predicament, our main task is the formulation and constitution of its military interests and needs pertinent to the situations referred to in points 4.2 through 4.5.

If the formulation of Czechoslovak military doctrine is to be more scientific, the main question is that of choosing the right approach and avoiding the wrong ones.

5. Systems Analysis and the Use of Modern Research Methods
5.1. In constituting a Czechoslovak military doctrine, the most dangerous and precarious approach is the one-sided use of simple logic and old-fashioned working habits.

If Czechoslovakia is to be preserved as an entity, giving absolute priority to the possibility of a general war in Europe that involves the massive use of nuclear weapons makes no sense, for this entails a high probability of our country's physical liquidation regardless of how much money and resources are spent on its armed forces and regardless even of the final outcome of the war.

5.2. For each of the variants under 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, systems analysis and other modern methods of research allow us to determine the correlation between, on the one hand, the material, financial, and personnel expenditures on the armed forces (assuming perfect rationality of their development) and, on the other hand, the degree of risk of the state's physical destruction and the loss of its sovereignty, while taking into account the chances of a further advance of socialism, or
even the elimination of the threat of war.
At issue is the attainment of pragmatic stability in national defense and army development, corresponding to political needs and related to foreign policy by striving to avert war by increasing the risks for the potential adversary while preserving the sovereign existence of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, thus giving substance to its contribution to the coalition in fulfillment of its internationalist duty.

Managing the development of our armed forces solely on the basis of simple logic, empiricism, and historical analogy, perhaps solely in the interest of the coalition without regard to one's own sovereign interests, is in its final effect inappropriate and contradicts the coalition's interests. Besides the reconciliation of our own and the coalition's interests in our military doctrine, we consider it necessary to utilize systems analysis and all other available methods of scientific prognosis, including model-building. Thus the preparedness of our armed forces in different variants can be assessed and related to the evolving political needs and economic possibilities. This concerns not so much tactical, operational, and organizational issues as the confrontation of political and doctrinal problems with the reality.

We regard systems analysis as the new quality that can raise the effectiveness of our armed forces above the current level.

5.3. At the most general level, we can see two possible ways of managing our army's development:
- The first way is proceeding from the recognition of the personnel, technological, and financial limitations imposed by society upon the armed forces toward the evaluation of the risks resulting from the failure to achieve desirable political goals under the different variants of European development described in the preceding section. The decision about the extent of acceptable risk must be made by the supreme political organ of the state.
- The second way is proceeding from the recognition of the acceptable risk as set by the political leadership toward the provision of the necessary personnel, technological, and financial means corresponding to the different variants of European development.

Either of these ways presupposes elaboration of less than optimal models of army development for each of the variants, applying the requirements of national defense regardless of the existing structure of the system. Confrontation of the model with the available resources should then determine the specific measures to be taken in managing the development of the armed forces and their components.

The proposed procedure would not make sense if we were to keep the non-systemic, compartmentalized approach to building our armed forces without being able to prove to the political leadership that the available personnel, financial, and technological means are being used with maximum effectiveness to prepare our armed forces for any of the different variants of European development rather than merely show their apparent preparedness at parades and exercises organized according to a prepared scenario.

5.4. Increasingly strategic thought has been shifting away from seeking the overall destruction of all enemy assets to the disruption of the enemy defense system by destroying its selected elements, thus leading to its collapse. In some cases, such as in the Israeli-Arab war, the theory proved its superiority in practice as well. Its application in developing our army, elaborating our strategy, and designing our operational plans can result not only in substantial military savings but also increased effectiveness of our defense system. In case of a relative (but scientifically arrived at and justified) decrease of those expenditures, it may help limit the consequences of the exponential growth of the prices of the new combat and management technology. Most importantly, it may help impress on the armed forces command and the political leadership the best way of discharging their responsibilities toward both the state and the coalition.
5.5. The proposed procedures and methods toward the constitution of Czechoslovak military doctrine can of course be implemented only through a qualitatively new utilization of our state's scientific potential. We regard science as being critically conducive to working methods that practitioners are inhibited from using because of their particular way of thinking, their time limitations, and for reasons of expediency. We regard science as a counterweight that could block and balance arbitrary tendencies in the conduct of the armed forces command and the political leadership. In this we see the fundamental prerequisite for a qualitatively new Czechoslovak military doctrine and the corresponding management of our armed forces.


7) Stenographic record of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, March 18, 1969


Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu:
Let me inform you in a nutshell, comrades, about what happened in Budapest. In fact, you have read the communiqué and the appeal, so this is the whole result.
The discussions were held within the framework of the committee, especially with the comrades who were there before, and - to some extent - in the evening; then Monday morning with some of the delegations.
The main concern was that of the Soviet delegates, and also of some of the other delegates, wanted to include as a first issue in the communiqué the incidents with China and reach solidarity against China. Besides other expressions in the communiqué, which referred to the increase in the aggressiveness of imperialism, in the number of aggressive actions, and the imminent danger of war, there was also the necessity of strengthening the fighting force of the Warsaw Treaty so that it can crush any aggressor on any frontier. Isn't it so? The last formulation was something to that effect.
The appeal was somewhat better but again with many such tendencies. Let's call for the achievement of security, but if you don't come, they'll beat the living daylights out of you. The meaning of the appeal was something like this: you'll get into hot water whether you come or you don't! [smiling].
Those persons who were more active in the committee, in the sense of their having adopted harsh positions, were the Poles, who really had the harshest positions.
The comrades said nice words to one another at about 2 o'clock at night but it seems that these words also were some good eventually.

Cde. Emil Bodnăraș:
Afterwards they entered into the zoological field.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu:
You see, [Mircea] Malița was the speaker there. And this in the following way: if people don't help one another in all respects, then what kind of an alliance is that if you don't act in both the East and the West, in both the South and the North?
Naturally, something was obtained, especially due to the appeal in the commission, but practically nothing was obtained until the delegations came, and an understanding was reached.
We arrived there the day before yesterday. The reception was correct, as it was with all the others; nobody was received differently. We went to the hotel on the Margaret Island, where all the delegations - except for the Soviet one - were accommodated. The Hungarians told us that no program had been envisaged for Sunday evening, that each delegation was free to do as it wished.
We set about playing chess, and agreed to pay a visit to the embassy.
[Ion Gheorghe] Maurer went downstairs to go for a short walk, and in the meantime the Soviets came and the discussions began. We went downstairs, too, and stopped. Among other general topics for discussion, [the Soviets] raised the main issue. Let's discuss serious things to see what we have to do. They said they wished the meeting to yield good results, and a unity [of opinion] be achieved. We told them that we wanted the same thing. But, as they surely knew, it was difficult to reach a result as regards the communiqué.
Dear gentlemen, to our knowledge the appeal is in a more advanced form and maybe a short communiqué would be good, but it should reflect all of the points of view.
They said: Vietnam should be.
We answered: we also agree that it should be.
They said: European security?
We answered: we agree for it to be.
They said: what about the Middle East?
We answered: we agree for it to be, but let's not start making history.

At any rate, the first discussion went something like that.

They said: then let's talk with the other delegations and issue a communiqué, where all of these issues would be raised. We'll go and talk with the other delegations as well, and then we'll come back again and talk with you.
We went to the embassy and at about twelve at night they finished the discussions with the others and came to us - Brezhnev and Kosygin- and told us: we held discussions with all the others. Of course, everybody has his own opinion, and everybody wants a more comprehensive communiqué.
We have to take a stand. The main point, however, is that we cannot help taking a stand and include in the communiqué the issue of border incidents with China, that this is the main issue.
[They added] that it would be inconceivable for us to meet and discuss else and not discuss the most serious issue.
After they repeated their story again, that we have to raise the issue of European security, that we have to raise the issue of the Middle East - things that they had repeated the day before - they told us: look what Nixon did, he demanded the strengthening of NATO, of course, in a form or other; he
declared for the fact that Germany could not remain divided for ever, and it would have to be united [in the long run], and then he declared for the peaceful solution of issues, but only in general terms. [They added] that [the Western countries] were strengthening NATO, and we have to factor in this fact.

[Later] they spoke about Vietnam again, the Middle East, the FRG, and the last outstanding issue was China.

We listened in silence, and did not interrupt them at all.

The main issue is China and we have to discuss it.

Cde. Emil Bodnăraș :
This was as a result of the consultation with the others.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu :
I listened to them in silence, I did not interrupt them at all, I let them finish what they had to say, and I briefly told them all the issues, and it was also with the European security issue that I began.

It is just, we must speak about European security, and we take the view that we must include this [on the agenda of our discussions] and we commit ourselves to act for strengthening European security.

It is true that Nixon paid this visit but we must not forget that Nixon's partners in NATO declared for laying emphasis on the ways of understanding with our socialist countries, and for taking the road of peace not of tension, and especially France and even other partners, and we have to take this into account when we collaborate, in our policy.

As regards the FRG, I said we agreed that there were revanchist and neo-Nazi forces, but it was also true that there were progressive forces wanting a different policy, that there the trade unions, the youth, consequently the working class get stronger. [I also told them] that, nevertheless, the communist party was created and it was functioning legally, which means that these forces have their say in the FRG. In addition, one has to take into account the outcome of the elections, the fact that Gustav Heinemann was elected president and that - after the elections - he declared that the FRG leaving NATO had to be considered. We must take all these facts into account and encourage these force to act for the purpose of dissolving this aggressive block, as we have always agreed.

Concerning Vietnam, we told them we agree.

Concerning the Middle East, we agree. Obviously, there is no point in our making the history of the Middle East, but concern ourselves with what we have to do now.

As far as China is concerned, of course, we told them that we were worried by these events but we did not think they could be discussed within the framework of the Political Consultative Committee, and that we did not gather there for that purpose. Moreover, we told them that if they wished - outside the meeting and on a bilateral basis - we were ready to listen to them, we were willing to let them know our considerations if they were interested in them.

They said: OK.

[We said]: we are in full agreement with everything, only with [the China issue] not. All the outstanding issues are OK with us.

They said: how can we go home and tell our Political Bureau that we came here and did not speak about this issue, that we get information every two hours that the situation changes, that {so and so} took over the command of the troops, that [the Chinese] mobilize their agricultural communes etc. Why do we keep discussing about the FRG…I can spit on FRG, but China is the main danger.

I was about to tell him, my dear sir, you are smart - it is true - but you cannot spit on the FRG any time you feel like it, but I did not.
I told them: we do not agree to discuss [the China issue].
[They said]: what, are we not going to discuss anything, is this issue so…?
Here [Ion Gheorghe] Maurer cut in to clarify things: however, we agree to discuss. We can discuss anything but, let it be clear to you, we will not sign any communiqué and will not tackle this issue!
Whereupon we parted company.

They said: now we go to speak with the Hungarians - because we have not discussed with them today - and we will think it over and tomorrow we will see.

This is how we parted; then we went to bed without a worry in the world.
We did not sleep very well, it is true… [laughs].

Cde. Emil Bodnăraş :
What time did you leave?

Cde. Nicolae Ceauşescu :
It was 2.00 a.m.
I also called them (the comrades who had participated in the meeting), and told them not to waste their time there any longer. Then they said that they would see the following day [what to do].
Meanwhile, Kirpichenko came, too. [He said]: you see, we did not understand, we do not want to include this issue in the communiqué at any price, however, we want to discuss this issue about China, because Kosygin made a mistake when he said he did not mean to touch on the issue otherwise than in the communiqué. Naturally, this would create a bad impression (he told the boys), would be detrimental to the bilateral and multilateral relationships.
They discussed all morning long, to all appearances with the Poles and the Germans; they also discussed with the Czechs for a short while.
In the meantime, the comrades worked on this appeal.
Eventually, only the discussion of an amendment of ours and of one of the Poles' was still outstanding, and the Poles asked us for a meeting. We went downstairs, in a hall there, and they raised the issue of their amendment. It was an amendment dealing with the recognition of the boundaries. We had something clearer, but ultimately they proposed a formulation/wording which we accepted, however without West Berlin, because they wanted to put down in writing in the amendment that FRG's claim on Berlin should be rejected, a formulation which we could not accept as this would have meant that we were the ones to decide who Berlin belonged to. But this was something we could not decide there. We could only say that Berlin had a special status and it was not part of FRG. With that we agreed. The rest…more…we should decide who belonged Berlin to…this would be established when we arrived at peace.
And there was also our proposal, whereby we requested that - in the interest of peace - an end had to be put to demonstrations of force and military maneuvers. [The Soviets] did not agree with it. We did not cherish any illusions that they would accept it but they had the Poles reject it on their behalf.
Then we proposed an acceptable formula: one should act to increase trust or one was to abstain from undertaking any actions that could poison interstate relationships. We add to the interpretation: including no maneuvers are to be performed any longer. With this the communiqué was ready.
In the meantime, the Soviets worked on a shorter communiqué which they did not show to anyone and proposed to us to meet at 2.00 a.m. - Budapest time - but only the first secretaries and the presidents of the Councils of Ministers, before the official meeting began, because [that meeting] was postponed till 15.00 hrs.
We met, they showed us the communiqué, and we had only one observation to make: that it was not the Political Consultative Committee that decided to adopt the documents but the participating states. We agreed with the appeal and went to the conference.

Cde. Emil Bodnăraș:
The Chinese issue did not appear any more.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu:
It did not appear in any way whatsoever although Kosygin had said that if we gave up, others would raise this issue because they were very much upset. The Soviets said that no one was to take the floor at the conference. We gathered together and listened for about twenty minutes to the supreme commander who gave us an exposé about the documents had been drawn up for a year, and told us how good was the work of the defense ministers, and then we passed to the signature of the documents. I asked: my dear sir, we have not clarified things in the draft decision yet (because they had maintained the old formulation, where it was stipulated that it was the Consultative Political Committee that decided on the adoption of documents, not the participating states). I said that we did not agree with the old formulation, and instead we should say: the participating states. We all agreed but since the documents had been already typed, [I pro-posed] to sign them in that form and afterwards to have the respective page retyped (they had had the document tied with a string/"laced up", and showed up with it ready). When they brought the document for us to sign, to be sure that that page would be retyped, I crossed it out with a pen to cancel it (laughter). Well, what was I to do if they acted like that?

Cde. Emil Bodnăraș:
That is why you were laughing when you signed?

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu:
We had decided in advance that the respective page would be retyped but to be sure that they would not forget to do so, I crossed it out.

Cde. Emil Bodnăraș:
Well done, very fine.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu:
Then I signed. Afterwards, in the end, we remembered that - in fact - the pages should have been initialed so that none of them could be changed. That is why I/we requested that the documents be initialed.
We all agreed and this operation was performed right away.
Then this appeal was brought in, and I signed it, but - as there were no photographers around - I waited till the photographers came.
With this we finished. We congratulated one another for having done a good job. Brezhnev thanked us.
When I went [out of the hall] with Brezhnev, he said he thanked me because we had succeeded in having a very good result, and this was a very important thing.
He said we should find the right moment to sign the Treaty since they did not have more
amendments. I told him we did not have any amendments either.
With this all was finished.
We had dinner there, without problems.
[János] Kádár made a speech, a general one, and proposed a toast.
There was not any other problem and we said goodbye and came home. We parted company last night in a fairly good atmosphere.
That was about all.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer:
And a conclusion: when people face a firmly supported position, they cave in.

Cde. Nicolae Ceauşescu:
This is a just conclusion.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer:
They have no other choice, so they give in. They do not give in because they are wise but because this is what the situation requires.
This is an especially important thing to remember.

Cde. Nicolae Ceauşescu:
With the Czechs, we discussed a little longer. Over dinner we discussed to some extent with János Kádár, and we arranged to have a meeting. We discussed with Todor Zhivkov, too; he remembered that the works at the hydroelectric power station on the Danube were behind schedule, and that we had to meet [for discussions].

Cde. Emil Bodnărăș:
How glad were all the others the morning after!

Cde. Nicolae Ceauşescu:
It seems that the Hungarians were a little concerned. The Czechs told us that they did not see either but I do not know whether they told this to the Soviets. With the others we did not discuss this issue.
During the discussions last night, when the conversation inadvertently digressed to Yugoslavia, Fock said we had to start getting rid of it.
We think that both the communiqué and the appeal are good.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil:
Everything is good.

Cde. Nicolae Ceauşescu:
It is good that we did not accept to discuss the issue of China because this would not have been of any help and would have contributed, in a way, towards the aggravation of the situation.

Cde. Emil Bodnărăș:
We cannot but express our admiration for the way our delegation presented itself, including the crossing out of that page. It was a formidable initiative.
Cde. Nicolae Ceauşescu:
It was Maurer's initiative.

Cde. Emil Bodnăraş:
This is something we must remember: that if [the Soviets] come to face a just and firm position, they are compelled to cave in; they have no other options.
This is also valid for cde. Niculescu-Mizil, who is about to leave for Moscow.
As regards the communiqué, we have to see [what to do].

Cde. Nicolae Ceauşescu:
We can at most make recommendations regarding the state of readiness, and take measures for the equipment (of the armed forces).

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer:
The only trouble you can have here is the fact that it forces you to make expenses.

Cde. Emil Bodnăraş:
I think that this fact, [namely] that it is the participating states [that decide on the adoption of documents] not the Political Consultative Committee, has a qualitative aspect. This is valid as it extends to any relationships.

Cde. Nicolae Ceauşescu:
They said: the states participating in the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee. We proposed a different formulation, but afterwards we agreed.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil:
In 1956, after an hour and a half of discussions, [the Soviets] said they did not understand what this issue was all about.

Cde. Nicolae Ceauşescu:
Now they understand. They said they had nothing against, and the others said the same thing.

Cde. Emil Bodnăraş:
And we saved the other socialist states from having to commit them-selves.

Cde. Nicolae Ceauşescu:
I do not know whether we saved them [from that] because they can commit themselves.

Cde. Emil Bodnăraş:
I am sure that as in our country the Executive Committee was beforehand informed about the issues to be discussed, so - with certitude, given the scope of the issues - all of the Central Committees or the central organs were informed that the communiqué was to be signed, and what the position on the Chinese issue was. Now they will go back home and will have to explain why they did not sign.
Cde. Nicolae Ceauşescu:
Brezhnev said: how can I go home and say that I did not discuss this issue?

Cde. Emil Bodnăraş:
And when they arrive home, many will breathe freely. Here the adventurous spirit was stopped. [But not only this spirit but also] the formulations about Europe, which were very bellicose, and the spirit of European security built on the spirit of August 21.

Cde. Nicolae Ceauşescu:
With this we can finish the meeting, comrades. In the minutes of the meeting it must be written down that the Executive Committee agreed.

Several comrades:
Not only that, but also that the Executive Committee highly appreciated [the activity of the Romanian delegation at the meeting in Budapest].

March 18, 1969
[Translated by Viorel Nicolae Buta]
8) Stenography of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party's meeting of 25 June 1971

Participants:


Comrade Andrei Stefan, first deputy of the chief of the International Section of the CC of RCP, was invited to the meeting.

The meeting began at 11.10 and ended at 14.20.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:

We have convened this meeting to inform you about what we did in these four countries of Asia and to see what the opinion of the Executive Committee is, especially because next week we will go abroad again and then it will be too late.

[ . . . ]

In Mongolia the reception was good and the first toasts were good, there were no problems. The communique issued was good. The meeting was not so good because they inserted in their speeches, although we had agreed that they should not, a remark that the imperialists wanted to divide the socialist countries, that for this purpose they were using the ideological weapon, and that the duty of socialism was to fight back with all the means available.

During the talks they told us about China, about their historical relationships with China, about the fact that Manchuria had oppressed them for three hundred years, and that China now wanted to swallow them, that Mao Zedong himself had said that Mongolia belonged to China. In fact, in 1924, the Soviet Union signed a secret agreement with Chang Kai-shek, where it was stated that Mongolia belonged to China. We told them that we had our history, too, that we were under the Turkish yoke, the tsarist yoke, and the Austro-Hungarian yoke. We also told them about our gold in Moscow. We told them that as we were sure they would inform [Moscow] accordingly.

Afterwards they told us about Czechoslovakia, that the imperialists had wanted to occupy it and that the five countries had saved Czechoslovakia. Then I asked him [my interlocutor]: where do you know it from? He told me that he knew it from the Poles. I retorted: I did not come here to listen to your lecture about Czechoslovakia, for you to give me lessons, because we know better.

Afterwards, [he spoke] about the fight against imperialism, about China - the same old story all over again.

I told them a few things about the situation in our country, I spoke to them about the bilateral relationships. They said they would think it over and then would see [what to do].

Then the meeting took place. Except for the first part, he kept speaking about the Soviet Union: when it was born, that it was the bastion of peace and so on and so forth. I told him: this question
9) Information from the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Mladenov) to the Politburo of the CC of the BCP regarding the Bulgarian Position on the Romanian Proposal for the Reduction of Warsaw Treaty Armed Forces, 22 September 1996

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

01-05-10

To: Politburo of CC of BCP

Comrades,

In his statements at Warsaw Pact forums, the RCP Secretary-General and President of Romania, Nicolae Ceaușescu, had several times proposed that Warsaw Pact countries should unilaterally freeze and reduce their force levels and military expenditures.

At the PCC Sofia meeting (1985), the Romanian party laid out this proposal as a term for signing the closing documents. As a result, at the Warsaw meeting (19-20.03.1986) it was decided that the CMFA had to create an Expert Group for examining this possibility.

At the Third Congress of the Working People [trade unions], held in the beginning of September 1986, Ceaușescu called upon all European states to reduce their armaments by at least 5%. The Congress adopted a decision for 5% reduction of Romanian armament, forces and military expenses till the end of the year, following a referendum.

On 11 and 12 September 1986, the allied countries' Working Group held a meeting in Bucharest. The Warsaw Pact delegations succeeded in avoiding the discussion delegated by Romania regarding the above-mentioned reduction. They stated that it was not possible to take unilateral actions because they would harm their security, having in mind the existing fragile equality between NATO and WTO. The Soviet Army General Staff representative proved with facts that USA and NATO military programs aim at military superiority over the Warsaw Pact. The coordinated position for strict keeping of the equality principle as the only possible base for disarmament agreements was confirmed.

As a result of the efforts of the six allied countries, the Romanian proposal was neutralized to a great extent. That's why the Romanian representatives insisted on a second session of the Group before the meeting of CMFA in Bucharest, set for 16 and 17 October 1986.

In this connection I consider it expedient that the Bulgarian experts delegation, which shall participate in the second session of the Working Group, should express the official statement of PR of Bulgaria. At the present it is not in our country's interest to accomplish the proposed one-sided 5% reduction of forces, armament and military expenses. Such a step would invalidate the Budapest proposal to NATO for simultaneous and considerable reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe.
With friendly greeting,

[signed]

P. Mladenov

22 September 1986, Sofia

CC of BCP "Foreign Policy and International Relations" Department supports the proposal and puts forward a project for making a decision.

29 September 1986

Senior Deputy Head of CC BCP "Foreign Policy and International Relations" Department:

K. Atanassov

[Source: Bulgarian State Security Archives, AMVR, Fond 1, Opis 11a, a.e. 353, p. 33. Translation by Vania Petkova]

10) Speech

of comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, President of the Socialist Republic Romania, at the working meeting of the general secretaries and first secretaries of the Central Committees of the communist and workers' parties of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty

May 29, 1987

Esteemed comrades,

I also positively assess the proceedings of the Consultative Political Committee. I told cde. Gorbachev as well that we should, however, think about improving the activity from a military point of view. The practice of listening at the end of the conference to a report about the military activity, and taking a decision that goes against the grain of the general orientation, is not the best one. For example, it was said in the Report that until 1990 we would have to double the military expenditures and the armaments. We, however, discussed an altogether different orientation. In actual practice, each [socialist] country has a different orientation. Frankly speaking, this time I put my signature on the document in spite of the fact that I did not want to sign it I did it, however, so as not to give rise to discussions on this theme, but this decision does not correspond to our general orientation. We will also have to establish the orientations in the field of armament development from both a qualitative and a quantitative point of view as this issue should not remain a strictly military one.

In actual fact, we do not have such a plan; we have decided to maintain the expenditures at the
present level - we have approved the five-year plan and we will not develop the armaments further. Consequently, we signed a decision, which we know - right from the outset - that we will not be able to fulfill. That is why I think that we should mobilize; we should make a number of improvements, actually to better our collaboration not only in this field, but also in all of the fields.

I agree that we have to act for the development of collaboration between the socialist countries with a view to fulfilling the economic development programs, of international policy, in all of the fields of activity.

As to us, next month we will have the Plenary Session of the Central Committee, the plenary session of the Great National Assembly, other plenary sessions of the democratic organisms - the Council of Agriculture, the Council of Working People - where we will debate the issues of the general development of our country, and take a decision regarding the convening of the Party's National Conference, which will take place this fall - in the second half of November - or in the beginning of December. At the National Conference we intend to make a general balance of the way we have carried out - in the last twenty years - the decisions regarding the improvement of the economic system, the development of socialist democracy, and the application of the new economic system, of self-management and self-leadership, as well as a number of issues relating to the ideological activity of the party. In addition, we will raise the issue of drawing up or justifying, improving the party's Program, which expires in 1990, mandatorily taking into account the situation that was created.

We deem the anniversary celebration of seventy years from the Great October Socialist Revolution to be of great significance. We expect that this celebration will present the great achievements obtained by the Soviet Union, by socialism in general - naturally, also including a criticism of some shortcomings and deficiencies, but presenting the superiority of socialism and giving a new perspective to socialist development and the advancement towards communism. In this sense, I received the direct invitation, and here the invitation has been renewed, to take part in this great celebration, which I look upon as a general celebration of the socialist countries, of the whole mankind which declares for socialism and peace. I have no intention of addressing here some of the issues in Romania because I do not have the time. Actually, I met some of the comrades; the day before yesterday I wound up my discussions with cde. Gorbachev. We are going to discuss some issues here as well. Naturally, we have both results and issues, especially those relating to the fulfillment - in the best conditions - of the programs of upgrading and fulfilling the new technical-scientific revolution, and to the issues of cooperation and specialization in production between our countries. But, nevertheless, things are going well generally, and we have good results.

As far as COMECON is concerned, I agree for the relevant session to be postponed. There are really important issues, and we have to discuss them. However, we must start from the fact that COMECON had, and still has, an important role. There were a number of shortcomings, and we have to improve it, but let us not throw away everything that is good. On the contrary, let us keep the basic principles, the orientation aiming to extend the collaboration, including some organizational forms that proved to be viable and necessary, naturally acting for their improvement and a better activity in fulfilling the programs and plans that we have.

The issues of a financial nature or which are related to prices are very important issues that really
need a very serious analysis and an appropriate solution, and we cannot set out to take measures that are not ready yet and do not correspond to the current stage of development of our countries, and I am referring to prices, the convertibility issue, and in general to economic relationships.

Taking all of these issues into account, I take the view that maybe it would be better to consider a certain improvement of our activity in regard to the meetings of the general or of the first secretaries. As a rule, we hold a meeting more on military and international issues, having also in view the attributions of the Consultative Political Committee, but - in my opinion - it would be better to hold a general meeting focused on the issues of socialist development, and of the general political, economic, as well as military collaboration. It is within this framework, therefore, that we have to consider certain military aspects, letting the respective authorities take action. I think that much more important is the problem of development, of general activity, much more important are the economic issues, consequently it is these issues that we are to be concerned with, not only the military and international issues as we are now. In a short meeting, of two to three hours, we practically cannot discuss anything seriously. We must be realistic, we now discuss only very general issues, we cannot say that now we are discussing and considering certain issues in depth.

That is why I am raising the issue of drawing a conclusion relating to the necessity of holding annual meetings on general issues - a meeting only of the general secretaries and the party leaderships - where to debate these issues. This does not exclude the possibility of also holding special meetings on the occasion of the conferences of the Consultative Political Committee, but in my view the issues raised now - including restructuring and general development - make it highly necessary to discuss so as to increase the role of our parties and develop our collaboration in the general field. Let us take a look at the activity of the seven so-called industrialized countries - they meet yearly and discuss the general issues of the economic and financial situation. We will also have to discuss these issues. I suggest, therefore, that we discuss not only our issues but also other, more general, issues. Our countries cannot ignore the international economic situation. The present financial system does not correspond to reality. The issue of the world economy is a very serious issue for our countries as well.

We will have, therefore, to change a little the way of approaching the issues, starting from the issues of a more global nature, more general, of the development of our society. By doing this we will have only to gain.

Regarding the issue of the Vienna negotiations, the solution proposed by cde. Gorbachev will surely be the best one. It is my opinion, however, that it would be good to conclude [the negotiations] with a result, even with a very small one, which does not represent anything from the point of view of military parities. It would be good, therefore, for these negotiations to wind up with a result this year. A reduction of 10,000 troops - either more on our side or on the American side - represents nothing. But now, when the GDR and Czechoslovakia proposed taking certain measures in Central Europe, to wind up this conference - which refers to Central Europe - without any result whatsoever after twelve years of negotiations would have a negative effect. Consequently, I would make an appeal for us to review the situation and quickly conclude the negotiations this year, admitting some of the proposals made, because they are not issues of essence and do not affect in any way whatsoever either the situation in Central Europe or in
Europe in general.

Indeed, we must take the general issues into consideration in the general context of fulfilling the decision taken at Budapest. Now, however, we must conclude these negotiations with a result. This would have a great importance from both a political and a psychological point of view. From a military viewpoint, this has no importance. But you just cannot conclude the negotiations after twelve years merely by discontinuing them.

In regard to the relationships between the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and China, we salute this process of normalization, of improvement of relationships, and we deem it very important. We also salute the improvement of the relationships between the Soviet Union and China, and hope that a high-level meeting between them will take place in the long run. In fact, the Chinese comrades declared to be ready to go to Moscow. In my view, this is not difficult to be achieved, and the possibility exists of some positive results being reached. Cde. Deng Xiaoping told me that although it was difficult for him to travel to Moscow, he was willing to do so.

Cde. M. S. Gorbachev:
We must help [Deng Xiaoping], we can help him.

Cde. Nicolae Ceau·escu:
I am convinced that this can be arrived at.
As regards Kampuchea, now there are very reasonable proposals for a national reconciliation and the formation of a government of national union with all of the forces, including the coalition government, and with Norodom Sihanouk. This would solve the problem quickly.
I think that the position of the Vietnamese comrades and of the current government of Kampuchea, of Heng Samrin, is not realistic. A national reconciliation cannot be arrived at without the biggest force for the reason that it is Pol Pot's formation.

Cde. M. S. Gorbachev:
Of course, there is a question of personal relationships there.

Cde. Nicolae Ceau·escu:
I know this issue and the positions of some leaders in the present government and the other formation, but the issues must be solved in the general interest, ignoring any considerations of personal interest. Political solutions have to be found. In fact, one must have in mind the fact that China will not accept other solution than a coalition government for this issue. Generally speaking, many countries of the world and the nonaligned movement back the idea of a government of national reconciliation of all of the forces. This would have huge significance not only for the respective region but also for the relationships between the socialist countries, inclusively for the normalization of the relationships between the Soviet Union and China, for the general growth of the influence of socialist countries in the region. We take the view that we have to insist for [the adoption of] this solution.
I am now trying to raise, in a nutshell, the following issue. I discussed it with cde. Gorbachev, but I would like to raise it before you as well. This issue is about the relationships or, more to the point, the situation in the communist and workers' movement. It goes without saying that we do not have the time to discuss this issue here, but we are of the opinion that we will have to discuss it at a special meeting, even only at this level, naturally with other secretaries of the central
committees as well, but possibly only of these seven parties, to make an exchange of ideas on the issues of the situation in the communist and workers’ movement. We start from the fact that today the communist parties, especially the ones in Europe, do not have a front position in the fight for disarmament and peace, in approaching fundamental issues. Naturally, there are numerous causes, we do not have the time now [to discuss them], but I think the discussion of this issue is a "must". Being communists, being communist parties, we bear the responsibility - not only to our peoples but also to the world communist movement - of discussing and finding the ways of better acting in this field and in general, in the development of the collaboration with the socialists, the social-democrats, and other forces.

We stand for a broad collaboration, a broad front of peace, but we think we cannot dissolve, so to say, the communist movement in a front where the communists do not exist any longer. On the contrary, the communist movement should have an active role for the very fulfillment of the mission it has in uniting all of the forces and peoples. If our parties reached this conclusion, I would salute it.

With this final point, in view of the fact that time is short, I would wind up. I repeat, in my opinion it is necessary to think about improving our meetings as to both thematics and time since in three or four hours we cannot do something of essence. In Moscow, in November last year, we had more time. This kind of practice is very good as it gives us the opportunity to discuss in detail a series of general issues.

I have finished. Thank you.

[Translated by Viorel Nicolae Buta]

11) Letter from the CC of the BCP to the CC of the RCP regarding the Romanian Proposal for the Transformation of the Warsaw Pact Structure, 21.6.89

Draft!

To the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party

Dear Comrades,

The CC of the BCP has carefully examined your proposals of 04.07.1988 regarding the organization, improvement, and democratization of the Warsaw Treaty bodies and activities.

We share your opinion about the necessity of further improvement of the Warsaw Treaty's political and military cooperation mechanism, which at present is especially topical. At the PCC Warsaw meeting in July 1988, this question was put before our parties and states as a primary task.

We also believe that positive changes in international relations, arms reduction, confidence building, and European and world cooperation will create the necessary prerequisites for military-political groupings to simultaneously disband their military organizations. In the future
we will work toward achieving this aim. At the same time, realism requires admitting that conditions are not yet mature, as can be seen from the lack of any change in NATO's negative position in this respect.

In the present circumstances, the Warsaw Treaty provides a unique basis for cooperation among our socialist countries, an inseparable element and key factor for security and stability in Europe whose vitality and effectiveness have once again been confirmed with its renewal in 1985. Its unilateral demise would destroy this stability.

We have no doubt about the necessity of preserving the PCC as the main unit in the structure of the political and military cooperation within the Warsaw Treaty. Removing it from this structure would lead to disorganization of the mechanisms of cooperation.

We share the opinion that it is necessary to direct the PCC's activity towards a broader discussion among our countries in the spheres of the construction of socialism and multilateral cooperation. We should exchange our experiences in the socio-economic and ideological development of our people to foster the development of social democracy. This would fully conform to the current trends in international relations, including the increasing role of non-military factors in international security. We do not see legal or organizational difficulties in integrating these issues in the PCC's normal activities in accordance with our mutual expressed desire.

Dissolving the PCC would be contrary to our views regarding the most effective way toward the simultaneous disbanding of the military-political alliances in Europe by further strengthening the political element of their activities and establishing non-confrontational relations. Depriving the WTO of its main political organ would strengthen its military aspect and would undermine our efforts in that direction. The idea of creating a political body for multilateral cooperation among the European socialist countries could become topical in the future, once the international situation allows for the disbanding of the military-political groupings.

As you know, we have made several proposals for the strengthening of the political functions of these groupings and for their increasing cooperation while enhancing their democracy as well as effectiveness. In our opinion, the creation of a permanent working group would contribute to this process as well as the promotion of the coordinating functions of the PCC Secretary General, and improvement of the activities of the PCC and other working groups.

According to us, this practice has proven the vitality of the Committee of Defense as well as its structure, role, place and function as defined in the PCC's decision of 17.03.1969. At the same time, we share the opinion that it is necessary to further democratize the military cooperation mechanism within the network of the Treaty as well as the working style of the CMD, and ensure closer cooperation between the political and military structures.

In conclusion, we would like to express our hope that the exchange of opinion between our parties on the questions you posed will play a positive role in our joint efforts toward further improvement of political and military cooperation within the Warsaw Treaty and will give them an additional impulse.

We are convinced that by using a constructive approach and mutual respect, our parties and states will find mutually acceptable solutions to political questions. Holding a joint meeting of the Committees of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Ministers of Defense in the near future would be an important step in carrying out our decision of July 1988. We are ready to make the necessary effort to constructively contribute to the successful solution of these questions at the
upcoming PCC meeting in Bucharest.

/CC BCP/

[Source: Bulgarian Central State Archives, Fond 1b, Opis 35, a.e. 120-189. Translation by Vania Petkova]
5) About the Authors

**Vojtech MASTNY** is a Senior Fellow at the National Security Archive, where he coordinates the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP). He has been a professor at Columbia University, the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Boston University, and US Naval War College, among other institutions. He has written on European international history in the 20th century and his latest book, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*, won the American Historical Association’s George L. Beer Prize.

**Malcolm BYRNE** is Director of Research at the National Security Archive where he coordinates a program involving Russian and East European scholars in documentary research, conference preparation and publications relating to the Cold War. He serves as Editor of CEU Press’ National Security Archive Cold War Reader series, of which this volume is a part. Most recently, he co-edited the volume, *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, for the series. He has lectured at numerous universities in the United States, as well as in Europe and Russia.
5) Media Echo

**US News.com (30 May 2005)**

The Paper Trail. New details about Soviet Cold War intentions

By Alex Kingsbury

_This month marks the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Warsaw Pact. Newly declassified papers from former Communist states shed fresh light on the inner workings of the Soviet Union’s Cold War alliance with its eastern European satellites and its plans for war. U.S. News spoke with Malcolm Byrne, coauthor of A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact 1955-1991, about the finds._

What was most surprising about the papers?

These military plans and after-action reports show how unrealistic the Soviets were in planning for conflicts that included nuclear launches. Military planners assumed that cities like Munich, Vienna, and other major urban centers would be obliterated by nuclear weapons, yet within a matter of days they assumed that Warsaw Pact forces would be able to sweep through those areas with no ill effects. It's very clear that they completely glossed over the reality of what it would mean to be marching through a nuclear wasteland. It's only in 1987--after the Chernobyl accident--that a Polish leader was able to openly say to the Kremlin that "one shouldn't imagine being able to enjoy a cup of coffee in Paris six days after a nuclear exchange."

Did the Soviets expect a war?

They were not planning to overrun western Europe so it could fall under Communist domination, but their plans to initiate a nuclear strike were pre-emptive. In that hair-trigger environment, if your information isn't perfect, you may push the button before it is really justified. It was surprising to see that the potential for miscalculation and nuclear disaster was so high.

How good was their intelligence?

Penetration of the western military was unusually high, and they had a lot of very specific intelligence about NATO's thinking. That should have told them that NATO's planning was defensive, but their ideology predisposed them to assume that capitalist states were aggressive and that NATO was on the verge of a strike at any moment. Their ideology, in part, explains why they ignored the findings of their own intelligence establishment.

Where did the other pact states stand?

Over the years there was a tremendous amount of jockeying and maneuvering and outright dissension among virtually all the allied states, which wasn't as clear before. Some states were concerned about the financial burden; others were concerned about the Soviet strategy, which called for eastern Europe to be the central battleground for a conflict. The prime directive was to defend the Soviet Union and not the Soviet bloc.
That intention was very clear, and the allies weren't very happy about it. Keep in mind, the only time that these forces were used wasn't to fight the West but to crack down on its own people, in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in particular.

**Daily Times, Pakistan**

**Soviet Union had plans for first use of N-weapons in Europe**

*By Khalid Hasan*

WASHINGTON: The Soviet Union had plans to attack Western Europe that included being the first to use nuclear weapons, according to a new book of previously secret Warsaw Pact documents published at the weekend. Although the declared aim was to pre-empt NATO “aggression,” the Soviets clearly expected that nuclear war was likely and planned specifically to fight and win such a conflict. The documents show that Moscow’s allies went along with these plans but the alliance was weakened by resentment over Soviet domination and the belief that nuclear planning was sometimes highly unrealistic. Contrary to Western views at the time, pact members saw themselves increasingly at a disadvantage compared to the West in the military balance, especially with NATO’s ability to incorporate high-technology weaponry and organise more effectively, beginning in the late 1970s.

According to a news release by the National Security Archives that declassified the material on the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Warsaw Pact that makes up the 726-page volume, the shift began in the 1960s from defensive operations to plans to launch attacks deep into Western Europe. There were also plans to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, ostensibly to pre-empt Western firstuse. Soviet expectations were based on the assumption that conventional conflicts would go nuclear, and there should be plans to fight and win such conflicts. The documents make clear the deep resentment of alliance members, behind the façade of solidarity, of Soviet dominance and the unequal share of the military burden that was imposed on them.

Also evident from them are East European views on the futility of plans for nuclear war and the realisation that their countries, far more than the Soviet Union, would suffer the most devastating consequences of such a conflict. The documents underline the “nuclear romanticism,” primarily of Soviet planners, concerning the viability of unconventional warfare. The papers include a retort by a Polish leader that “no one should have the idea that in a nuclear war one could enjoy a cup of coffee in Paris in five or six days.”

The documents also underscore ideologically the impact of Chernobyl as a reality check for Soviet officials on the effects of nuclear weapons. There was pervasive spying on NATO, mainly by East Germans. There is also data on the often disputed East-West military balance, seen from the Soviet bloc side as much more favourable to the West.
than the West itself saw it, with the technological edge increasingly in Western favour since the time of the Carter administration. The motives accounting for the Warsaw act’s offensive military culture included not only the obsessive Soviet memory of having been taken by surprise by the nearly fatal Nazi attack in June 1941 but primarily the ideological militancy of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine that posited irreconcilable hostility of the capitalist adversaries. The influence of the doctrine may explains the distorted interpretation of secret Western planning documents that were unequivocally defensive documents to which Warsaw Pact spies had extensive access. So integral was the offensive strategy to the Soviet system that its replacement by a defensive strategy under Gorbachev proved impossible to implement before the system itself disintegrated.

According to the news release, “The Soviet military, as the ideologically most devoted and disciplined part of the Soviet establishment, were given extensive leeway by the political leadership in designing the Warsaw Pact’s plans for war and preparing for their implementation. Although the leadership reserved the authority to decide under what circumstances they would be implemented and never actually tried to act on them, the chances of a crisis spiralling out of control may have been greater than imagined at the time. The plans had dynamics of their own and the grip of the ageing leadership continued to diminish with the passage of time.”

*Neue Zürcher Zeitung (14/15 May 2005)*

**Vor fünfzig Jahren gegründet: Die kurze Geschichte des Warschaupakts**

von Anna Locher und Christian Nünlist*

*Der Warschaupakt, vor fünfzig Jahren durch die Sowjetunion gegründet, war nur von aussen besehen das Pendant zur Nato. Es war kein freiwilliger Zusammenschluss demokratischer Staaten, und das war auch der Hauptgrund, weshalb er ein halbes Jahr vor dem Zusammenbruch der UdSSR sang- und klanglos aufgelöst wurde. Die Autoren zeichnen die kurze Geschichte des Paktes nach und verweisen darauf, dass sich schon in früheren Jahren innerhalb der Organisation Differenzen bemerkbar gemacht hatten.*


*Militarisierung und Kriegspläne*

*Die Sowjetunion gründete den Warschaupakt am 14. Mai 1955 in erster Linie aus politischen Gründen - als Reaktion auf die Integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die Nato Anfang*


**Rumäniens geheimer Deal mit den USA**


Die Folgen von Prag 1968


Technologischer Wettstreit mit der Nato


Die Solidarnosc-Krise in Polen kündete 1980/81 das Ende der sowjetischen Dominanz in Osteuropa an, stellte jedoch keine ernste Bedrohung für die Integrität des Warschaupakts dar. Zwar favorisierten Ostberlin und Prag eine Intervention, doch um die absehbaren hohen politischen Kosten einer Intervention zu vermeiden, verliess sich Moskau darauf, dass die polnischen Militärs die Opposition alleine unterdrückten. Die Einführung des Kriegsrechts durch Wojciech Jaruzelski demonstrierte nicht nur der Sowjetunion, dass die in Moskau ausgebildeten polnischen Generale die Paktinteressen auch gegen die eigene Bevölkerung durchsetzten. Die Gremien des Warschaupakts zeichneten sich jedoch durch bemerkenswerte Nichtbehandlung der polnischen Krise aus. In den achtziger Jahrennahmen die allianzinternen Differenzen


Die Auflösung des Pakts


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Notes

Lidové noviny, 14 May 2005

Varšavská smlouva jako virtuální pakt

Karel Sieber, historik

Před padesáti lety uzavřely země sovětského bloku vojenský pakt, který vstoupil do dějin jako Varšavská smlouva. První obsáhlá sbírka interních dokumentů této aliance ukazuje, že šlo do značné míry o fiktivní organizaci. Všechny páky držel vždy v rukou Sovětský svaz.


Představa dvou československých generálů (generálporučík Václav Prchlík byl před příchodem do funkce vedoucího oddělení ÚV KSČ náčelníkem Hlavní politické správy) diskutujících na chodníku před generálním štábem o obsahu Varšavské smlouvy má jistě svůj absurdní původ.

Otázka "co vlastně byla Varšavská smlouva" však neztrácí svůj smysl ani padesát let od 14. května 1955, kdy byla v polské metropoli tato "dohoda o půlání, spolupráci a vzájemné pomoci" podepsána představiteli Albánie, Bulharska, Československa, Maďarska, NDR, Polska, Rumunská a SSSR. Zatím bezkonkurenčně nejúplnější odpověď na ni poskytuje právě vycházející sbírka dokumentů A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact. Editoří publikace, koordinátor projektu Paralelní historie NATO a Varšavské smlouvy Vojtěch Mastný a pracovník amerického Národního bezpečnostního archivu Malcolm Byrne, soustředili výsledky výzkumů mezinárodní sítě spojující akademické instituce i jednotlivé badatele. V celkem 155 vícečetných tématických položkách jsou obsaženy protokoly z jednání Politického poradního výboru, zprávy ze spojenecích cvičení, operační plány a další když příslušně tajné dokumenty.

Vzhledem k postoji současně ruské vlády neměli editoři možnost využít archivů bývalého Sovětského svazu, řada unikátních sovětských dokumentů ale byla nalezena v archivech v Sofii, Budapešti, Bukurešti, Freiburgu, Berlíně, Varšavě a Praze.

Českému badateli se zde otevřou hned několik zdrojů. Kniha totiž obsahuje také ty československé dokumenty, které dosud nejsou v českém prostředí obecně známy a které ve výzkumu nikdo - s čestnou výjimkou Petra Luňáka a Vojtěcha Mastného, kteří si jejich zpřístupnění vyžádali -nevyužil. Vedle výzvy francouzským vojákům ke kapitulaci připravené v roce 1964 tu najdeme například dokument o předání skladů pro jadernou munici sovětské...

**NATO - náš vzor**


Poslední pokus Kremlu o pásučení - po zavážené technické výzbrojování, měl výbor usilovat především o unifikaci výzbroje. Díky nákladům na přezbrojení sovětského armádního kolosu ale nebyly menší členské země Varšavské smlouvy schopny prosadit do sovětské výzbroje svoje třeba i kvalitnější výrobky. Nemusely ale ani přebírat sovětský materiál.

Troubení k ústupu

Změny v sovětské doktríně v 80. letech odrážely narůstající technologickou převahu Západo, byly ovšem také výsledkem vývoje sovětské vojenské teorie. Varianta konvenční války postupně vyvstávala jako jediná myslitelná. V polovině 80. let bylo sovětské velení samo k sobě natolik upřímné, že do nových koeficientů hodnotících konvenční síly protivníka zahrnulo i lepší západní tankovou techniku nebo větší dostřel raket vzduch-vzduch. Nová metodika ocení protivníka způsobila pozdvihení - zhroutila se totiž tradiční představa o konvenční převaze. Personální obměna převzala ve stejně době funkci mladou generaci velitelů, které splíši než ideologické zanícení charakterizovala odborná kvalifikace.


"Vojtěch Mastný ve studii "Učení se od nepřítele" poukázal na skutečnost, že Varšavské smlouvě posloužilo NATO v řadě případů za vzor. Šlo však o napodobeninu nepříliš věrnou."

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A Cardboard Castle?
An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact


http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php

(Na této stránce lze nalézt plné znění dokumentů, které excerptuje předchozí kniha)

Learning from the Enemy: NATO as a Model for the Warsaw Pact

Vojtěch Mastný
Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung, č. 58

EVROPA V ROCE 1955

Čtrnáctého května 1955 uzavřely komunistické státy mimo Jugoslávie vojenský pakt známý jako Varšavská smlouva. Po celou dobu existence ho prostřednictvím svého generálního štábu ovládal Sovětský svaz. (Na snímku čestná přehlídková sovětského ministra obrany maršála Žukova na ruzýnském letišti 25. ledna 1956.)

Země Varšavské smlouvy
Země Severoatlantické aliance
Země mimo vojenské pakty
Fifty years ago, with great fanfare in the Soviet bloc, the Warsaw Pact came into being. During its 36 years, it became one of the most feared military machines in history, the embodiment of international Communist aggression, and the sword of Damocles threatening World War III.

But fearsome as it appeared in the eyes of the West - and indeed in the experiences of millions of citizens of the Communist countries - was the Warsaw Pact ultimately as dangerous as its image suggested? With the availability of new documents from the archives of the pact's former members, answers to such questions are starting to appear.

At its outset, the pact did not even have a military function. Conjured up by Nikita Khrushchev as a putative counterpart to NATO, its original purpose was, ironically, to disappear - in return for NATO's dismantling. Western observers at the time accurately dubbed the organization a cardboard castle.

With the climax of the Berlin crisis in 1961, the Warsaw Pact finally began to assume the features of a true military organization. Just as importantly, it soon began to implement a basic strategy characterized by significant offensive elements. Internal analyses of major military exercises starting in the early 1960s reflect a shift in emphasis from mere protection of the homelands to a full-scale thrust deep into Western Europe. This remained the dominant strategy until the time of Mikhail Gorbachev.

Moreover, as nuclear weapons became more widespread, Warsaw Pact plans incorporated their preemptive use against Western forces.

From these bits of evidence, it might appear that the alliance was everything its harshest enemies in the West believed it to be. But the picture is more complex. Rather than reflecting a commitment to aggression, the new documentation indicates a pervasive Soviet sense of insecurity, expressed in the consistent assumption by Soviet strategic planners that NATO would initiate hostilities, even against its better judgment.

The Warsaw Pact unquestionably possessed awesome military power, and Western governments were right to prepare for facing it. But the declassified record depicts an array of weaknesses that would have blunted that power in unpredictable ways that gave its managers reason to pause.

These weaknesses took several forms. For one, the alliance was hardly the monolith some outsiders assumed. The record is replete with accounts of sharp disagreements between Moscow and its allies on such matters as Soviet domination of the alliance, the unfair cost imposed on the smaller members and the significant imbalances in the risks they would assume in a war. Resentment simmered over Moscow's apparent willingness to sacrifice its allies' populations to protect its own interests.

Another weakness resulted from the warped Soviet view of the world. Ideological preconceptions, particularly ingrained among the senior military, presumed that the West was inherently aggressive because of its being capitalist. Such judgments nullified the benefit of having extraordinary access to Western military secrets, for which there is now clear confirmation.

Beyond ideology, a fundamental lack of realism undermined the pact's ultimate potential. Scenarios of military exercises repeatedly exalted the alliance's performance while underestimating that of the enemy. Moreover, Warsaw Pact scenarios entered the realm of fantasy by presuming that nuclear strikes powerful enough to incinerate Vienna and Munich, among other cities, would somehow not impede the sweep of Soviet-led forces through Western
Europe. Only in 1987 did the Polish leader Wojciech Jaruzelski remark to his Warsaw Pact colleagues: "No one should have the idea that in a nuclear war one could enjoy a cup of coffee in Paris in five or six days."

Repeatedly, the Warsaw Pact's managers felt compelled to admit that its military capabilities left much to be desired. They drew chilling lessons from the 1967 and 1973 Middle East wars. By the 1980s, there were reports of training deficiencies so substantial that, for example, the Czechoslovaks would no longer be capable of firing nuclear weapons if called upon to do so.

Clearly, the Communist alliance represented a formidable adversary, not to mention a tool of brutal internal repression. An attempt to put its reckless plans into effect would have created havoc in Europe, but could hardly have provided a reasonable chance of winning a war. Yet in the end, the Warsaw Pact disappeared with a whimper rather than a bang, thus offering a cautionary tale about the fragility of any modern military machine.