PARALLEL HISTORY PROJECT ON NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT (PHP)

Records of the Meetings of the Warsaw Pact Deputy Foreign Ministers

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Meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers in Budapest on 7 March 1986
(MTI Fotó: Kovács Attila)

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Table of Contents

1) Introduction, by Csaba Békés ................................................................. 1
2) Documents .................................................................................................. 13
3) Document Highlights .................................................................................. 29

Please note: This issue of the PHP Publication Series offers highlights from a much larger online document collection. Please consult the PHP website for all the documents in their original language and other features: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/collections/coll_3_DepFM.htm.
The PHP has published a number of document collections on various aspects of the security-related history of the cold war: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php.
1) Introduction, by Csaba Békés

The records of the meetings of the Warsaw Pact Deputy Foreign Ministers

The History of the “DEFOMIN” Collection

The collection of the documents of the Warsaw Pact deputy foreign ministers from 1964 to 1989 is the result of a several-year-long joint research project of PHP and the Cold War History Research Center in Budapest (www.coldwar.hu). [1] The documents have been collected from several collections in the Hungarian National Archives including the different leading bodies of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Besides the author, Gusztáv Kecskés and Attila Kolontári took part in the research project. [2] The present collection contains the relevant documents of 40 meetings of deputy foreign ministers. [3] Although this material has been gathered as a result of long and extensive archival research, the collection is not yet full and represents the present state of research. [4] We expect to find documents of a few more meetings especially from the nineteen-eighties, when this kind of foreign policy coordination in the Warsaw Pact became even more intensive than before. So, unlike the other Warsaw Pact collections of leading bodies (Political Consultative Committee, Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Committee of Ministers of Defense), this one has been an “open” material that will be enlarged by new documents in the future. [5] The bulk of the materials published here include reports on individual sessions. Most of these reports were prepared by the participating Hungarian deputy foreign minister, and in general they give a true picture of what happened at the meetings. Each report gives a concise summary of the position of the representatives of each member state and outlines in some detail the speech of the Soviet deputy foreign minister that was regarded as authoritative in every case. These sections of the reports are especially valuable historical sources, for they truly reflect the changes in current Soviet foreign political thinking and the developments in strategic and tactical priorities. In general, the reports also note if there was a dispute on some issues among the participants, so in most cases they record the Romanian position as a fact that is often markedly different from that of the “closely cooperating countries”. In many cases, if the session was held in Moscow, A. Gromyko, and later E. Shevarnadze also met with the deputy foreign ministers and gave them detailed information about current Soviet foreign policy. In such a case, a separate report was prepared on their contribution.

The length of the reports prepared by the Hungarian deputy foreign ministers participating at the sessions is generally 5 to 10 pages. In accordance with general practice in the Warsaw Pact, official records were not kept; occasionally a brief protocol was prepared, containing the list of participants and the issues discussed. One important exception is the material of the Budapest meeting held in June, 1970, which was extremely important from the point of view of working out the position of the Warsaw Pact on the European Security Conference. A 73-page detailed report was prepared on the five sessions of this meeting; the materials of three sessions are published here in English translation.
In many cases the report is supplemented by the text of the contribution of the Hungarian deputy foreign minister, which in general is published in English in full. These contributions are also important historical sources, for the Hungarian position reflects a special middle-of-the-road view in the Warsaw Pact: on the one hand Hungary was a loyal ally of the Soviet Union all along and supported the current Soviet political line unconditionally in most cases at multilateral meetings, often on the basis of preliminary coordination and a mutually accepted scenario (e.g. in the case of the meeting in Prague on 30-31 October 1969 [6]). However, due to its open economy, Hungary was the most interested in a smooth development of economic relations with the West – along with Romania – among the countries in the socialist camp, and this ambition – which was also in the interest of the entire block – is very well reflected in the Hungarian position put forward at each meeting of the deputy foreign ministers. Therefore, within the framework of the special Soviet-Hungarian preliminary coordination mentioned above, the Hungarian leaders took pains to drive the Soviet position in this direction, often with considerable success. Another special aspect is that although Hungary supported the current deviant Romanian position only very rarely in an open way, since its interests often coincided with those of Romania, the Hungarian leaders often took a benevolently neutral stand with respect to the Romanian position at several sessions, and at times they even tried to put some pressure on the Soviets in support of the Romanian position at the preliminary conciliatory talks (e.g. before the PCC meeting in Budapest in March 1969 [7]).

The reports on 40 meetings of Warsaw Pact deputy foreign ministers and their supplementary documents are also published in English, so this is the first PHP collection on leading bodies that contains not only annotations and selected documents but the original versions in full also in English. [8] This will make it considerably easier to use the documents for research and teaching purposes all over the world. Covering the expenses of translating huge amounts of texts was made possible by the cooperation of the Open Society Archives in Budapest and PHP. The collection is annotated by the main topics discussed at each meeting.

The collection of reports on the meetings of Warsaw Pact deputy foreign ministers is closely related to another collection that is posted on the website of PHP, the Records of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (CMFA). Anna Locher’s thorough and comprehensive introduction to the CMFA collection is an excellent analysis of the activities of this body. [9] The topics discussed at the meetings of deputy foreign ministers were in most cases fully or partially identical with those raised at the meetings of ministers of foreign affairs and later CMFA sessions, so the present introduction does not intend to comment on and analyze the materials of the 40 meetings. At the same time, once the collection of reports on the meetings of deputy foreign ministers becomes complete, the author plans to investigate the meetings of CMFA and deputy foreign ministers and make a detailed analysis of the mechanisms involved in the coordination of foreign policy in the Warsaw Pact, to be published on the PHP website and elsewhere.

Therefore, what is presented below is essentially aimed at the following two things:

- On the basis of the most recent archival research the history of foreign policy coordination is outlined as it has become institutionalized in the Warsaw Pact from the beginnings to the establishment of CMFA.
- The main characteristic features of the collection of deputy foreign ministers' meetings are outlined, such as the role and function of this forum in the mechanisms of the Warsaw Pact's foreign policy coordination, the publicity, the frequency, the venues and the participants of the meetings.
The Evolution of the Institutionalization of Foreign Policy Coordination in the Warsaw Pact

As is well known, no structure of any kind was set up for the military-political alliance of the Soviet bloc – except for formally establishing a Political Consultative Committee – when signing the Warsaw Treaty in May 1955. [10] While the future function of the new organization was to be clarified for the Soviet leaders themselves during the years to come, in the course of the year of the „spirit of Geneva“ it became obvious that a more effective model of foreign policy coordination had to be established in the Bloc.

At the beginning of January 1956, less than a month before the 20th Congress of the CPSU an important summit meeting was held with the participation of the European Communist states’ leaders in Moscow. [11] At the meeting Khrushchev emphasized in a very explicit way the importance of the new foreign policy doctrine, the so called „active foreign policy“: „All countries of the socialist camp have to make their foreign policy efforts more active, they have to strengthen their international relations. In this field we do not sufficiently exploit the possibilities. What usually happens is that the Soviet Union takes action as the main force of our camp and then the countries of peoples’ democracies support her. It is true that the Soviet Union is the great force of our camp but if we organized our work in a more flexible way, the Soviet Union would not always have to be the first to take action. In certain situations one or another country of peoples’ democracies could take action and then the Soviet Union would support that country. There are issues where the countries of peoples’ democracies could take action better in a more effective way.” [12] While until that point no such initiatives had been made, from this time on and especially from the mid-sixties quite until the collapse of the Communist regimes in East Central Europe this strategy became an effective model for cooperation among the Soviet bloc states in the field of foreign policy. (China was also represented at the summit meeting as an observer, just like at the session where the Warsaw Pact was established in May 1955.)

It was thus not by chance that at the first session of the Warsaw Pact PCC held in Prague in late January 1956, just a few weeks following the Moscow summit, a decision was made that the Council of Foreign Ministers and a Permanent Secretariat should be established as a subsidiary organ of the PCC. As is well known, no such bodies were actually formed within the Warsaw Pact in 1956, or indeed, not up until exactly twenty years later, in 1976. While it is clear that from the mid-sixties the opposition of Romania blocked such plans, further research will be needed to show why the Soviet leadership did not implement these resolutions in the period between 1956 and 1961 when they were still “plenipotentiary” masters of the Soviet bloc. This is all the more interesting as we now know that in this same period an intensive process of policy coordination never seen before took place in the Soviet Bloc – true, mostly using the traditional channel: the party “line”.

At this point let me just list the most important phases of this process: the 20th congress of the CPSU (including participation of East European leaders at the secret session about Stalin’s crimes), the Communist summit meeting in June 1956 in Moscow where information was given to the allies on Tito’s recent visit to the Soviet Union and on Moscow’s rapprochement with Yugoslavia, the emergency summit meeting in Moscow on 24 October 1956 on the Polish and the Hungarian crises, the Soviet leaders unprecedented “blitz”-visit to offer on the spot information to the satellite leaders on the forthcoming invasion of Hungary on 1-3 November 1956, (including consultation with Tito), the special Communist summit held in Budapest on 1-4 January without
Poland where the fate of the Imre Nagy group was determined, and the conference of the communist and workers’ parties held in Moscow in November 1957. And then, as if the Warsaw Pact had been discovered as a new vehicle for the Soviet leadership, policy coordination during the turbulent period of 1958–1961 (that is, the years of the second Berlin crisis) took place mostly in the framework of the Warsaw Pact: meetings of the PCC were held in Moscow in May 1958, and in February 1960, and then in March 1961, just a few months before the erection of the Berlin wall, the first (and until 1966: the last) meeting of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers was held in Warsaw in April 1959.

In this period three “traditional” high level meetings were held as well: the Communist summit in Bucharest in June 1960, the conference of the communist and workers parties in Moscow in November-December 1960 and the “last minute” Communist summit in Moscow in the beginning of August 1961. This period of very intensive policy coordination within the Warsaw Pact created the illusion that the East Central European leaders were now important – even if not equal – partners of Moscow. Therefore, the Soviet policy of “zero information” concerning the Cuban missile crises in 1962 caused a real shock in the Soviet Bloc.

The Warsaw Pact member countries suddenly had to realize the extent of their defenselessness. It was especially hard for them to understand that if the Soviet leaders had considered the Berlin crisis, which had generated significantly lower international tension, important enough to hold regular consultations with the allies, then how it could have happened that a third world war had nearly broken out while the members of the eastern military bloc just had to stand by and wait for the resolution of the situation without any substantial information. It was the Romanian leadership that drew the most radical conclusion from the case: in October 1963, the Romanian foreign minister, requesting utmost secrecy, informed his American counterpart that Romania would remain neutral in the case of a nuclear world war. [13]

The lack of consultation by Moscow in important issues of world policy affecting the Warsaw Pact member states created serious concerns in other allied states as well, most notably in Poland and in Hungary. The Polish leadership was especially indignant at the Soviet behavior. Among other things, the Polish leaders objected to Moscow’s lack of consultation with the Warsaw Pact member states concerning the nuclear test ban treaty, especially since they had to sign it as well after the contract had been concluded. During his negotiations in Budapest in November 1963, Gomułka stated that Cuba intended to join the Warsaw Pact, which would pose a significant threat to the security of the eastern bloc as well as world peace. Therefore he firmly stated that should the request be officially submitted, Poland would veto Cuba’s admission. The Polish leaders saw the solution in intensifying preliminary consultation within the Warsaw Pact, and significantly boosting the political role of individual member states. [14]

The Hungarian leadership was much more cautious in criticizing the Soviet behavior than the Poles; nevertheless it basically agreed with the Polish views pertaining to the nature of the future cooperation within the Warsaw Pact. This was clearly indicated by the fact that János Kádár, first secretary of the Hungarian party, during his visit in Moscow in July 1963, proposed to establish a Council of Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers, long before the plans to reform the Warsaw Pact were officially placed on the agenda in 1965 – 1966. The clear objective of the initiative was to place the Soviet leadership under the pressure of necessity for consultation and information provision as well as to enforce the multilateral nature of the decision making process in the Warsaw Pact. Kádár clearly stated to Khrushchev that “the point is that there must not be a case when the Soviet government publishes various statements and the other governments learn about them in the newspapers… I thought of preliminary consultation. I have also told [Khrushchev], that experience shows it is better to dispute issues sooner rather than later”. [15]
It is interesting that the Soviet leaders, who actually suggested this idea already at the cradle of the Warsaw Pact in January 1956 and supported it later too, from 1965 on, at this point flatly rejected the proposal. Krushchev's argument was based on the pretext that at a time when a "sovereignty disease" broke out in the camp, (referring to Romania's position) the reaction of the member states would be wrong, and they would only misunderstand this intention. Romania, however, opposed only the institutionalization of foreign policy coordination and in fact was herself pressing for preliminary consultations as it was clearly presented at the meeting of deputy foreign ministers in Berlin in February 1966. [16]

The pressure for regular consultation by the allies, eventually turned out to be stronger than expected, so hardly half a year after Kádár's intervention, on 2 January 1964 – referring to such demands for consultation from "individual sister parties", that is, those of the Hungarian and Polish parties –, Krushchev himself made a proposal for the organization of regular meetings of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers or their deputies. [17] This was the first reference to the possibility of establishing foreign policy coordination in the Warsaw Pact at a level lower than the originally designated Council of Foreign Ministers, e.g. at the level of deputy foreign ministers. The first meeting of deputy foreign ministers took place in Warsaw in December 1964 and from that time on they held sessions more and more regularly. These meetings gradually became the most important working forum of foreign policy coordination within the Warsaw Pact until the dissolution of the alliance in 1991.

By the mid-sixties it became obvious that the operational efficiency of the Warsaw Pact was satisfactory neither for the Soviet leaders nor for the member states, therefore – especially after the Cuban missile crisis – the efforts to reform the Warsaw Pact appeared more and more resolutely. Thus those member states of the Warsaw Pact that were ready for the modernization of the organization and strengthening cooperation – especially Hungary and Poland – were interested in the development of a more effective and democratic structure in which the countries may obtain a significantly more serious role. These countries were thinking along the lines of such semi-reforms for the implementation of which the Soviets showed at least some willingness. The idea of forming a Council of Foreign Ministers in the Warsaw Pact now offered Moscow's loyal allies a chance for regular preliminary consultation on foreign policy issues – exactly the practice they had been lobbying for.

The issue of the organizational transformation of the Warsaw Pact [18] was placed on the agenda in official form at the PCC session of January 1965 in Warsaw. [19] As a result of the resistance of the Romanian leaders opposing the transformation without any prior consideration, no real decision was made at this time besides the discussion of the issue, although the Soviet proposal to form the Council of Foreign Ministers was supported by all parties but the Romanians.

The transformation of the political organization of the Warsaw Pact was discussed again in the session of the deputy foreign ministers in February 1966 in Berlin. At a subsequent summit meeting of the party first secretaries held on 7 April, at the time of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in Moscow, it was decided that the issue should be submitted to the next session of the Warsaw Pact PCC. A two-week long meeting of foreign ministers, held in Moscow in June, was charged with reaching an agreement on the definitive proposals. The closely cooperating parties proposed holding the sessions of the PCC at regular intervals and establishing the Council of Foreign Ministers as well as a Permanent Secretariat with headquarters in Moscow. These proposals were all rejected by the Romanians who were trying to preserve the Warsaw Pact as loose an organization as possible.

Thus at the 1966 June Bucharest PCC – in order to work out a unified position concerning a call for the convention of a Pan-European conference on European security, – the issue of the
organizational transformation was taken off of the agenda as a result of a last minute deal between the Soviet and Romanian leaders. Thus the plan for the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers was buried for several years. The Soviet bloc's project on working for a European security conference unfolding after the PCC session in Bucharest – while blocking the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers at the outset – eventually, in the long run, contributed to the establishment of much more intensive foreign policy coordination within the Warsaw Pact than ever before. Especially following the issuance of the Budapest Appeal in March 1969 frequent coordination of the Warsaw Pact's position concerning the proposed security conference became inevitable. While the Romanian leaders further objected to the institutionalization of foreign policy coordination, in the bloc they were the most serious advocates of opening to the West since the mid-sixties, so they were truly interested in the success of this project. Thus Bucharest became willing to take part in the coordination process at all levels.

Another Warsaw Pact member state very much interested in developing economic relations with the West was Hungary, so it is not surprising that resuming the plan to form the Council of Foreign Ministers was raised by the Hungarian leadership. The Hungarian strategy was based on the firm belief that only a Warsaw Pact operating in unity can successfully keep the proactive role in this historical process, so further endeavors were made to foster the political transformation of the organization. In order to improve political coordination in the Warsaw Pact in the forthcoming crucial period Foreign Minister János Péter once again made a proposal for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers at his meeting with Gromyko in Moscow in December 1969. On 5 January 1970 a positive reply was received from Moscow, authorizing the Hungarian leaders to conduct bilateral talks with the Warsaw Pact member states. With the exception of Romania, all countries responded positively to the Hungarian initiative. However, the suggested proposal had already reckoned with the Romanian refusal, so a “lightened version” was elaborated, and according to the new proposal foreign policy coordination should be institutionalized at the level of deputy foreign ministers, if the Romanian opposition dashed any hope of setting up the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, in January 1970, Deputy Foreign Minister Frigyes Puja paid a secret visit to Bucharest to discuss the plan, but his mission eventually failed.

Thus, coordination became officially institutionalized only as of 1976, when Romania gave its consent and the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was eventually set up. The idea raised again in the Hungarian proposal that foreign policy coordination might be more successful in the Warsaw Pact at the level of deputy foreign ministers – a proposal that had already appeared in Khrushchev’s letter of January 1964 cited above – finally met with success, for from 1970 the meetings of deputy foreign ministers took place on a regular basis every year and from 1975 even more frequently (in 1986 alone 8 such sessions were held!), so this forum was undoubtedly the most successful of all coordination forums. (It is worth noting that between 1970 and 1985, that is, during the 16 years before the Gorbachev era, there were 9 PCC sessions and 14 CMFA meetings, or meetings of ministers of foreign affairs, and during the same period of time 23 deputy foreign minister meetings were held!).

Thus the project of setting up the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs failed again at the beginning of 1970, yet the Soviet leadership did not give up the idea. In the four years between 1970 and 1974 they came back to the plan again and again and finally, with persistent efforts, they managed to persuade Romania to agree to the establishment of CMFA at the 1974 April meeting of PCC. Official decision on the establishment of CMFA was made at the Bucharest
meeting of PCC in 1976 and the first meeting of the new body took place in Moscow in May 1977.

The Main Characteristics of the Collection of Meetings of Deputy Foreign Ministers

Role and Function

"The role of the meetings of the deputy foreign ministers is obscure." [25] This is how Neil Fodor characterized this Warsaw Pact forum in 1990 based on having publicly available information of 17 such meetings. The once top secret records of the 40 meetings published in this collection shed much new light on the role and the function of this series of meetings in the foreign policy coordination mechanism of the Warsaw Pact. True, further research is needed to prepare a comprehensive analysis on this field, but the basic functions of this forum can be identified with considerable certainty.

As has been seen before, since the end of the sixties the meetings of deputy foreign ministers had become a regular forum for consultation within the Warsaw Pact, though never formalized and working in an ad hoc manner all along. The Romanian leadership did not object either because it also believed that regular consultation – without any obligation – was in fact useful. For them the meeting of deputy foreign ministers was an adequately flexible form of consultation and the level of representation was also low enough for them not to be too much concerned if a problematic issue was raised, since they could easily say that a higher forum was needed to make a decision on that particular issue. The relative efficiency of the meetings of deputy foreign ministers was essentially due to the fact that they did not have a decision-making role and served all along as a forum for the exchange of information, coordination and preparation of decisions. It could not make any decisions, only recommendations at best, whose implementation fell within the competence of the highest leadership of each member state. Perhaps it is not too far-fetched to say that this institution was the most useful for the “closely cooperating” allies of the Soviet Union – among them especially for Poland, Hungary and the GDR – since they, unlike Romania, did not take the risk of open confrontation with the Soviet Union, so they had to bear the possible negative consequences of Soviet steps anyhow. However, in return to their cooperation at the meetings of deputy foreign ministers they rightly expected the Soviet leadership to provide up-to-date information for them on issues of foreign policy that affected the Warsaw Pact even at times when there was no PCC session or a conference of ministers of foreign affairs held for years. The meetings of deputy foreign ministers played a key role in the Warsaw Pact foreign policy coordination mechanism all along, and the documentary value of the reports on the meetings is greatly enhanced by the fact that real disputes emerged much more openly at this level than at higher forums. Several proposals and initiatives launched by the Soviets as well as other member states were first tested at this level too.

Maintaining the appearance of unity in the Warsaw Pact was of utmost importance for the Soviet leadership all along, even when Romania openly started to follow a separate political line in the middle of the sixties. This ambition was not without some success, for while the differences of opinion within NATO surfaced more or less at the time they emerged, it is only now, more than a decade after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact that the public can see how serious internal disputes took place behind the scenes despite the pretended unity – and this does not only concern the Romanian attitude.

Therefore, it was especially important for the Soviet leadership that the highest forums, the conferences of the ministers of foreign affairs and especially the PCC sessions, should, if
possible, only discuss issues on which the members had already arrived at some sort of a consensus. This was the point at which the meetings of deputy foreign ministers assumed a key role in that, on the one hand, the desired consensus was reached at this forum, and, on the other, issues on which there was no hope for a consensus, often did not make it to higher forums at all. At the beginning this “filter function” was used mostly at the meetings of deputy foreign ministers held right before a PCC meeting or a conference of the ministers of foreign affairs, but later, starting in the mid-seventies, the two processes became totally separated in time too, and the meetings of deputy foreign ministers preparing higher-level coordination were often held several months before the higher forum was convened.

Thus, the meetings of deputy foreign ministers gradually became a routine-like organ of foreign policy coordination within the Warsaw Pact that could be used in a more flexible and efficient way than any other forum, including, for that matter, the conference of the ministers of foreign affairs. Efficiency did not mean that an agreement was made on every issue raised at the sessions; rather, it meant that through the testing function mentioned above in most cases it became clear what should not be pressed at all and what could eventually be adopted by all the member states, perhaps after “working on” some of them – e.g. by means of direct Soviet-Romanian coordination. The flexible nature of the meetings of deputy foreign ministers was further enhanced by the fact that the participants attending this forum were often different, for there were 3 or 4 deputy ministers working at the ministries of foreign affairs of the member states. Initially it was mostly the first deputy foreign minister who attended the meetings, but later, especially since the beginning of the seventies, the member states were represented by their deputy ministers responsible for a particular field. In this way the mechanism of foreign policy coordination became more and more refined, which was further enhanced by the frequent meetings of Central Committee secretaries responsible for foreign affairs and conferences attended by heads of departments responsible for various different fields at the ministries of foreign affairs.

The tasks that the meetings of deputy foreign ministers performed can be put into the following four categories:

- Preparing the meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs, later the meetings of CMFA, coordinating the agenda of the meetings, preparing the text of the documents to be accepted by the meetings, preparing a draft of the communiqué to be issued after the meeting (if any).
- Preparing the meetings of PCC, coordinating the agenda of the meetings, preparing the text of the documents to be accepted by the meetings, preparing a draft of the communiqué to be issued after the meeting – right before the PCC session (e.g. The meetings of deputy foreign ministers sessions held in March 1969, November 1976 and November 1978).
- Preparing the meetings of PCC, coordinating the agenda of the meetings, preparing the text of the documents to be accepted by the meetings, preparing a draft of the communiqué to be issued after the meeting – often several months before a PCC session.
- Independent consultation on some important issue that affected the Warsaw Pact. Some of the early meetings belonged to this category, including February 1966 (Reform of Warsaw Pact) and February 1968 (Non-proliferation Treaty).

Between 1969 and 1975 the meetings of deputy foreign ministers assumed an even more important role. In this period several sessions were held to coordinate a joint Warsaw Pact policy
in the various preparatory phases of the European Security Conference. While between 1969 and 1975 there were four conferences of the ministers of foreign affairs, the deputy foreign ministers met nine times!

As of 1980 consultations became regular (for the deputy foreign ministers in charge of international organizations) preceding the annual UN General Assembly session to coordinate a joint Warsaw Pact position.

Publicity
While all the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers', CMFA and PCC meetings held between 1956 and 1991 were made public at the time, most of the consultations of the deputy foreign ministers were secret meetings. Neil Fodor identified 17 meetings of the deputy foreign ministers based on examining contemporary press releases published in the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact member states' leading newspapers. Further research may present public information on a few more meetings, nevertheless, at the moment we can conclude with considerable certainty that 27 of the 44 meetings were unannounced consultations. Those meetings listed in Fodor's book are the following: Berlin, 26-27 February 1968; Berlin, 21-22 May 1969; Sofia, 26-27 January 1970; Moscow, 21-22 May 1973; Moscow, 29-30 January 1975; Warsaw, 19-20 March 1975; Berlin, 21-22 February 1977; Prague, 8-9 July 1980; Berlin, 19-20 January 1981; Bucharest, 27-28 January 1983; Warsaw, 20-21 December 1983; Warsaw, 3-4 May 1984; Moscow, 1 March 1985; Budapest, 7 March 1986; Berlin, 27 June 1986; Warsaw, 2 September 1986; Berlin, 20-21 January 1987. [26]

Frequency
Between 1964 and 1968 meetings of deputy foreign ministers were held every second year. As mentioned before, the Soviet Bloc's project on working for a European security conference gained increasingly great importance following the issuance of the Budapest Appeal in March 1969, therefore frequent coordination of the Warsaw Pact's position concerning the proposed security conference was now inevitable. The most appropriate forum for such coordination became the deputy foreign ministers' meetings, especially in the early stage of the process: in 1969 and 1970 altogether five conferences were dedicated to that topic. During the seventies meetings were held basically annually, while from 1980, in the era of post-Helsinki conferences, foreign policy coordination at this level became increasingly intensive: the deputy foreign ministers were convened generally twice a year, but in 1983 alone there were four such meetings. Gorbachev's new policy line further enhanced this process, reaching its peak in 1986 when eight (!) conferences were held in the course of one year.

Venues
In the Warsaw Pact meetings of the leading bodies were held in the capitals of the member states by a rotation system since 1965. This resulted in a more or less balanced distribution of PCC and CMFA conferences, however, this was different in the case of the deputy foreign ministers. While it is not really surprising that the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow hosted the greatest number of meetings (11), it is more than interesting that the venue of 10 of the 44 meetings was Berlin. At the same time only three of the 26 CMFA (with forerunners) and two of the 24 PCC conferences were held in the East German capital. The other states were represented as follows: Warsaw 7, Sofia 5, Budapest 4, Bucharest 3, Prague 2, Minsk 1, Vientianne 1 meeting.
Participants
Between 1964-1979 only the member states participated at the meetings of deputy foreign ministers. From September 1980 on, at several conferences dedicated to coordinating the Soviet Bloc’s position prior to the annual session of the UN general Assembly, representatives of other Socialist countries took part as well. [27] Besides Byelorussia and Ukraine, the two additional “Soviet UN member states”, Cuba, Laos, Mongolia, North Korea and North Vietnam were represented at these meetings.

Conclusion
The meetings of deputy foreign ministers proved to be the most frequent and in many ways the most effective coordination forums in the Warsaw Pact. This series of consultations, however, was never institutionalized; that is no “leading body” of this kind was ever set up. There were also no official rules for the summoning of such meetings that could be initiated by any member state at any time, so this Warsaw Pact institution was working practically in an ad hoc manner all along. The flexibility, due to this ad hoc character was in fact the key to the success of this forum. The relative efficiency of the meetings of deputy foreign ministers was guaranteed by the fact that they did not have a decision-making role and served all along as a forum for the exchange of information, coordination and preparation of decisions. Thus the meetings of deputy foreign ministers played a key role in the Warsaw Pact foreign policy coordination mechanism all along, and the documentary value of the reports on the meetings is greatly enhanced by the fact that real disputes emerged much more openly at this level than at higher forums. Therefore the collection of the meetings of deputy foreign ministers will hopefully significantly contribute to the better understanding of the structure, the mechanism and the overall history of foreign policy coordination in the Warsaw Pact as well as to the general history of the Cold War.

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Notes


[2] For their CVs, see: www.coldwar.hu


[4] Even now this collection contains documents of the largest number of meetings among the leading bodies of the Warsaw Pact: from 1955 to 1991 there were 24 PCC meetings, 26 meetings of the foreign ministers and 25 meetings of the ministers of defense.


[8] Translations for the meetings held between 1986 and 1989 will be added to the collection during the fall of 2005.


[16] See the records of the meeting of deputy foreign ministers in Berlin on 10-12 February, 1966 in this collection. The summary of the Polish record on the meeting is published in Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle?, pp. 212-214.


[19] For a multiarchival collection of the records of the Warsaw Pact PCC sessions, with introductions by Vojtech Mastny see the PHP web site at www.isn.ethz.ch/php


[27] For the list of these meetings please, consult the collection overview.
2) Documents

The following documents have been selected and compiled by Csaba Békés (Cold War History Research Center, Budapest) for the Parallel History Project.

**Records of the Meetings of the Deputy Foreign Ministers:**

**Documents I: 1964-1970**

### Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Warsaw

- **Report** to the HSWP Political Committee on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (8 pages)
  
  *Topics discussed:* preparations for the forthcoming session of the Political Consultative Committee; coordinating WP policy towards the Western plan for a multilateral nuclear force (MLF), Romanian suggestion for the invitation of Albania to the PCC meeting.

10 December 1964

Language: Hungarian, English Translation

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)
Call Number: M-KS-288.f. 5/354. ó.e.

### Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Berlin

- **Report** to the HSWP Political Committee on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers [and on the meeting of the deputy ministers of defense in Moscow] (5 pages)
  
  *Topics suggested by the Soviet delegation:* a) status of the WP Political Consultative Committee, b) establishment of a Permanent Committee for Foreign Affairs and c) a Permanent Secretariat. Romanian opposition.

10-12 February 1966

Language: Hungarian, English Translation

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)
Call Number: M-KS-288 f. 5./388. ó.e. and XIX-J-1-j, 1966, 128. doboz [Box No. 128], VI-1, 005954/1966
### Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Berlin

- **Report** to the HSWP Political Committee on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers preparing the forthcoming session of the Political Consultative Committee (3 pages)
- **Appendix**: draft treaty regarding the preventing of the proliferation of the nuclear weapons (7 pages)
- **Minutes** of the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (17 pages)
  
  *Topics discussed:* a) non-proliferation treaty, b) Vietnamese situation, c) military questions discussed by the deputy ministers of defense in Prague, d) topical issues of European security, especially the dangers of Nazism appearing in the FRG

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)
Call Number: M-KS-288 f. 5./448. ö.e. and XIX-J-1-j, 1968, 100. doboz, VI-1, 001289/19/1968

#### 26-27 February 1968

Language: Hungarian, English Translation

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### Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Budapest

- **Note** on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (4 pages)
  
  *Topics discussed:* a) Warsaw Pact, b) issues of European security, c) Vietnamese question and Middle Eastern issues, d) Hungarian proposal regarding an addendum concerning the Member states' collective action in case of provocation threatening the frontiers of any member states

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)
Call Number: XIX-J-1-j, 1969,106. doboz, VI-1, 001547/63/2/1969

#### 15-17 March 1969

Language: Hungarian, English Translation

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### Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Berlin

- **Note** on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (7 pages)
  
  *Topics discussed:* a) Conference on European Security, b) the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)

#### 21-22 May 1969

Language: Hungarian, English Translation
Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Prague  
30-31 October 1969

- Report to the [Hungarian] Revolutionary Workers and Peasants’ Government on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (5 pages)
  Language: Hungarian, English Translation

- Appendix 1. Draft of the essential points of the Final Document on the renunciation of the use and the threat of force in the relationship of the European states (2 pages)
  Language: Hungarian, English Translation

- Appendix 2. Draft of the essential points of the Final Document on the broadening of the commercial, economic and scientific-technological relations between the European states which serves the development of political cooperation and is based on equality (2 pages)
  Topics discussed: WP initiatives concerning a Conference on European Security
  Language: Hungarian

Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Sofia  
26-27 January 1970

- Report to the HSWP Political Committee and to the Government on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (9 pages)
  Language: Hungarian, English Translation
  Topics discussed: issues of the Conference on European Security

- Guiding principles for the Hungarian diplomatic missions on the preparations for a conference on security in Europe in accordance with the Sophia meeting of the deputy foreign ministers (5 pages)
  Language: Hungarian, English Translation
  Topics discussed: issues of the Conference on European Security

Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Budapest  
19-21 June 1970

- Minutes of the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers, part 2, 3 (73 pages)
  Language: Hungarian, English Translation
  Topic discussed: preparation of the Conference on European Security
• Draft of the Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister, Frigyes Puja’s speech for the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (12 pages)

Topic discussed: preparation of the Conference on European Security

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)
Call Number: XIX-J-1-j-VSZ-VI-1-SZU-1969, 105. doboz
Records of the Meetings of the Deputy Foreign Ministers:
Documents II: 1972-1980

Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Moscow
15 November 1972

- Report on the consultation of the Deputy Foreign Ministers
  (11 pages)
  
  Topics discussed: political issues, especially tactical and practical questions of
  the Helsinki multilateral consultation preparing the Conference on European
  Security

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)

Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Moscow
21-22 May 1973

- Report on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (19
  pages)
  
  Topic discussed: preparation of the Conference on European Security (Helsinki
  consultation preparing the Conference, common statement on economic and
  cultural cooperation)

Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Moscow
24 October 1973

- Memorandum on the friendly reconciliation discussion in
  Moscow before the disarmament negotiations commencing
  in Vienna on 30 October (4 pages)
  
  Topics discussed: 1.) What measures should first be devised in order to start the
downsizing? Should it really be downsizing, or should it be various forms of what
is know as trust-building measures? 2.) Which states should be involved in the
military downsizing measures? 3) Which units of the armed forces will be
affected by the measures? 4) How should the execution of the downsizing measures be monitored? 5) What should our relationship with the other states be during the negotiations? 6) What should be our tactic during the negotiations?

Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Moscow

- **Report** on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (3 pages). This document is in the appendix of a Proposal for the PCC of the HWSP on 7 February 1975
  
  *Topics discussed:* a) preparation of the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact, b) Polish proposals on the improvement of the mechanism of the political cooperation in the Warsaw Pact

- **Protocol** of the Joint Secretariat to the Politburo for the preparation and execution of the celebrations marking the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact Treaty, on the basis of the April 1974 session of the Warsaw Pact Treaty's Political Advisory Council. This document is in the appendix of a Proposal for the PCC of the HWSP, 7 February 1975 (8 pages)

Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Warsaw

- **Information** to the Hungarian Embassy in Stockholm on the consultation of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (5 pages)
  
  *Topic discussed:* northern countries (Scandinavian states and Iceland)

Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Bucharest

- **Telegrams** on the consultation of the Deputy Foreign Ministers preparing the Bucharest session of the PCC (6 pages)
  
  *Topic discussed:* preparation of the Bucharest session of the PCC. (Regional cooperation of the European countries, the tasks of the Council of Foreign
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Berlin</th>
<th>21-22 February 1977</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Report</strong> on the consultation of the Deputy Foreign Ministers on the northern countries (5 pages)</td>
<td>Language: Hungarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix: a) <strong>Speech of the Hungarian participant</strong> (11 pages); b) <strong>Summary by East-German deputy foreign minister, Moldt</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Topic discussed</em>: North-European countries (2nd meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers concerning this subject). [entire document, 384 KB]</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Moscow</th>
<th>16-17 November 1978</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Report</strong> of the Hungarian deputy foreign minister, István Roska on the preparatory meetings with his counterparts of the WP member states on the preparation of the Moscow session of the PCC (3 pages)</td>
<td>Language: Hungarian, English Translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Topic discussed</em>: preparation of the Moscow session of the WP Political Consultative Committee. (a/ further steps for the stopping of the arms race, elimination of the danger of nuclear war, reinforcement of détente and the resolution of the forthcoming problems of European security; b/ report of the commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Berlin</th>
<th>3-4 December 1979</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Telegram</strong> on the consultation of the Deputy Foreign Ministers preparing the Berlin session of the CMFA (4 pages)</td>
<td>Language: Hungarian, English Translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Topic discussed</em>: preparation of the Berlin session of the CMFA (NATO plan)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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concerning the deployment of medium range missiles, planned multilateral consultation on the preparation of the Madrid meeting)

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)
Call Number: XIX-J-1-j, 1979, 160. doboz, VI-1, 005282/30/1979

Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Bucharest

- **Note** on the meeting of the socialist countries' (WP member states, Mongolia, Vietnam (Ambassador), Cuba and North Korea) Deputy Foreign Ministers in charge of international organizations (10 pages).

  *Topics discussed: issues of the 35th session of the General Assembly of the UN (e.g.: general analysis of the international situation, disarmament, situation in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Korea, Zimbabwe)*

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)
Call Number: 005133/2/1980

Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Warsaw

- **Note** on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers before the session of the CMFA (3 pages)

  *Topics discussed: harmonizing the declaration to be published on the session of the CMFA (the only issue discussed after the consultation of experts was the venue of the following all-European meeting)*

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)
Call Number: 005232/9/1980

Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Vientiane
18-19 December 1981

- **Report** on the consultation of the Deputy Foreign Ministers having recognized the People's Republic of Cambodia (9 pages)

- **Speech** of Hungarian deputy foreign minister Vencel Házy (13 pages)
  
  **Topics discussed:** situation in South-East Asia (e.g.: the internal situation in Cambodia, cooperation among Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, rapprochement between the USA and China, the policy of the Indochinese countries towards the US and Chinese actions).

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)

Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Bucharest
27-28 January 1983

- **Report** on the consultation of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (6 pages)

- **Speech** of Hungarian deputy foreign minister István Roska (6 pages)
  
  **Topics discussed:** issues of the forthcoming resumption of the Madrid meeting.

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)

Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Moscow
30 August - 2 September 1983

- **Report** on the meeting of socialist countries’ (WP member states, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Cuba, Laos, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam,) Deputy Foreign Ministers (and the representative of the COMECON Secretariat) before the 38th session of the UN General Assembly (10 pages)
  
  **Topics discussed:** strategy of the socialist countries on the 38th session of the UN General Assembly. Issues: arms control and disarmament, local crises (the Middle East, Nicaragua and the Caribbean region, growing American military presence in the Far East, Cyprus, Iraqi-Iranian war, Namibia and the Republic of
South Africa, Puerto Rico etc., increase of the efficacy of the UN, economic problems, social questions and issues regarding human rights and international law, budget of the UN, work in relation with the developing and the capitalist countries, IPU's conference.

- **Note** on A. Gromiko's meeting with the Deputy Foreign Ministers discussing the agenda of the 38th session of the UN General Assembly
  
  **Topics discussed:** strategy recommended by Soviet diplomacy for the socialist countries at the 38th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)

**Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Sofia**

- **Report** of Hungarian deputy foreign minister István Roska on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (2 pages)
  
  **Topics discussed:** harmonization of the communiqué of the Sofia session of the CFMA, (nuclear disarmament, recent session of the UN General Assembly, Soviet-American summit meeting).

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)

**Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Warsaw**

- **Report** on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (10 pages)
  
  **Topics discussed:** preparation for the Stockholm conference.

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)
Call Number: 004465/55/1983

**Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Warsaw**

- **Report** on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers preparing the Stockholm conference on 3-4 May 1984 in Warsaw (4 pages)
  
  **Topics discussed:** preparation for the second session of the Stockholm conference.

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)
Call Number: XIX-J-1-j, 1984, 002655/3/1984

**Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Berlin**

- **Report** on the meeting of 14 socialist countries' (WP member

Language: Hungarian,
states, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Cuba, Laos, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam,) Deputy Foreign Ministers (9 pages)
Topics discussed: analysis of the development of the international situation, main questions on the agenda of the 39th session of the UN General Assembly, cooperation of the socialist countries.

- Report on the session of the economic working group of the consultation of the socialist states' Deputy Foreign Ministers before the 39th session of the UN General Assembly (5 pages)
  Topics discussed: strategy of the socialist countries in the 2nd Committee at the 38th session of the UN General Assembly, economic problems of the developing countries etc.

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)
Call Number: 002660/24/1984 and 002660/23/198

Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Sofia

- Reports (3) of Hungarian deputy foreign minister István Roska on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (3 pages)
  Topics discussed: preparation of the PCC session to be held in Sofia in January, 1985 (the meeting was cancelled). Main issues: Romanian proposals (WP-NATO meeting, WP consultative committee for the discussion on the topics of Soviet-American talks, an unilateral freeze of the WP states' military budget for the years 1985-1986, modification of the nature of the PCC), prolongation of the operation of the Warsaw Pact, deployment of missiles in Europe etc.

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)
Call Number: XIX-J-1-j, 1985, 0052/16-17

Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Moscow

- Report on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers. (8 pages)

- Speech of Hungarian deputy foreign minister István Roska (4 pages, and in Russian - 5 pages)

- Report of Sándor Rajnai, Hungarian Ambassador in Moscow on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (10 pages)
  Topics discussed: Soviet-American talks in Geneva starting on 12 March 1985 (prevention of the militarization of space, Soviet proposals etc.).

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)
Call Number: XIX-J-1-j, 1985, 001445/1/1985 and 0052/21
Records of the Meetings of the Deputy Foreign Ministers:
Documents IV: 1986-1989

Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Berlin

- **Report** on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers in charge of the developing countries (7 pages)
- Draft speech of Hungarian deputy foreign minister, Gábor Nagy (11 pages)
  
  *Topic discussed:* policy towards the non-aligned movement

28-29 January 1986
Language: Hungarian

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)
Call Number: M-KS-288.f./32.1986, 20.doboz, 86/g , 00968/1986

Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Budapest

- **Report** on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (5 pages)
  
  *Topics discussed:* information given by V. P. Karpov, head of the Soviet delegation at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva (Soviet disarmament program, prevention of militarization of space, winding-up or radical reduction of nuclear weapons, prohibition of nuclear experiments), the 27th congress of the CPSU, etc.

7 March 1986
Language: Hungarian

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)
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<tr>
<th>Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Moscow</th>
<th>24 July 1986</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Report</strong> on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (6 pages)</td>
<td>Language: Hungarian</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Topics discussed:</strong> the situation in the South African region: crisis caused by the racist policy of the South African Republic. Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, the socialist countries and the South African region, proposals regarding the increase of the influence of the socialist states in that region</td>
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Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)
Call Number: 003907/1/1986

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<th>Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Moscow</th>
<th>27 August 1986</th>
</tr>
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<td>• <strong>Report</strong> on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (6 pages)</td>
<td>Language: Hungarian</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Topic discussed:</strong> coordination of the socialist countries’ political and propaganda steps concerning the prolongation of the Soviet unilateral moratorium for nuclear blast</td>
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Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)

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<tr>
<th>Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Warsaw</th>
<th>2 September 1986</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>• <strong>Report</strong> on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (8 pages)</td>
<td>Language: Hungarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Topic discussed:</strong> coordination before the forthcoming CSCE conference in Vienna</td>
<td></td>
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Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)
Call Number: M-KS-288.f./ 32, 1986, 20.doboz, 86/g, 004386/1986

<table>
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<th>Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Moscow</th>
<th>26 November 1986</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>• <strong>Report</strong> on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (6 pages)</td>
<td>Language: Hungarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Topic discussed:</strong> analysis of the summit meeting of the non aligned movement in Harare, possibilities of the cooperation of the socialist countries with that movement</td>
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</table>

Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Berlin

- **Report** on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (9 pages)
- **Topics discussed:** coordination before the Geneva disarmament conference, socialist initiative for the establishment of a complex international security system

20-21 January 1987

Language: Hungarian

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)

Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Sofia

- **Report** on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (7 pages)
- **Speech of Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister, József Bényi** (7 pages)
- **Topics discussed:** cooperation of the socialist countries at international forums concerning human rights and humanitarian issues, development of democracy in the socialist countries, the possible role of the social organizations dealing with human rights in the socialist states, Preparations of the planned "Socialist declaration on human rights"

18 February 1987

Language: Hungarian

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)
Call Number: M-KS-288.f./ 32, 1987, 26/d., 662/Bé

Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Moscow

- **Report** on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (WP states, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Mongolia) (6 pages)
- **Topics discussed:** coordination concerning the socialist initiative for the establishment of a complex international security system

13 May 1987

Language: Hungarian

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)
Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Warsaw  
30 June 1987

- **Report** on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (7 pages)
- **Speech** of Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister, József Bényi (7 pages)  
  *Topic discussed:* survey of the work of the third session of the CSCE conference in Vienna


Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Sofia  
1-2 September 1988

- **Report** on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (without Romania) (7 pages)  
  *Topics discussed:* internal developments in the USA, their prospective consequences on US foreign policy, prospects of the relations between the socialist countries and the USA - in light of the approaching presidential election

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)  
Call Number: XIX-J-1-j, 1988, 004001/1988

Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Moscow  
7-8 June 1989

- **Report** on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (4 pages)
- **Abstract of the speech** of the Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister (2 pages)  
  *Topic discussed:* analysis of the activity of the non-aligned movement since the Harare summit meeting and possibilities of the cooperation with that movement

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)  
Call Number: XIX-J-1-j, 1989, 002321/1/1989

Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers: Minsk

- **Report** on the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (and the representatives of the COMECON Secretariat) (8 pages)  
  *Topics discussed:* strategy of the socialist countries at the 44th session of the UN General Assembly. Issues: regional conflicts (Afghanistan, the Middle East,
Cambodia, Central America, Namibia, peacekeeping, international security and disarmament, economic problems, issues regarding human rights and humanitarian questions.

Source: Hungarian National Archives (MOL)
3) Document Highlights
Report

To the [HSWP] Political Committee

On the meetings between the Warsaw Treaty deputy foreign ministers in Berlin and the Warsaw Treaty deputy defense ministers in Moscow

I.

On a mandate from the HSWP’s [Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party’s] Political Committee, the Chief of Staff, General Károly Csémi, took part in a conference held from 4 through 9 February 1966 in Moscow; and deputy foreign minister Károly Erdélyi attended a meeting held from 10 through 12 February 1966 in Berlin; both conferences had been initiated by the Central Committee of the CPSU.

At both conferences, the deputy ministers represented the viewpoint approved by the Political Committee.

II.

With the exception of the Romanian deputy foreign minister, all the delegates in Berlin agreed to a discussion of the issues raised by the Soviet comrades.

With the exception of the Romanian representative, every delegate voiced similar views, save a few insignificant details.

The Romanian delegate declared that he was against holding a discussion on the points suggested by the Soviet comrades. In his opinion, the main flaw in the operation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization so far derived from the fact that the principles of the Treaty had not been put into practice. Among others, the principle of consultation was violated. As an example, he mentioned the case of the shipping of missiles during the Cuban crisis, along with the submission
to the United Nations of draft proposals about general disarmament and an agreement to prevent
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The principle of equality was again violated in August
1961, when the Albanian delegation was excluded from the concurrent session of the Political
Consultative Committee for failing to send delegates at the highest level. The Romanian delegate
demanded that the resolution be withdrawn and the Albanian People’s Republic be notified.
According to the Romanian representative, further violations of the fundamental principles took
place, when the PCC exceeded its authority on several occasions in the past, pretending to be
above the heads of the member states; as an example, he brought up the point that the
Commander in Chief of the Unified Armed Forces had to report to this organization.

The Romanian delegate stressed the point on several occasions that every party and every
government should take sole responsibility for its foreign policies both in the eyes of its own
people and in the face of world opinion. Consultation between the parties was necessary only in
questions, which also involved the responsibility of the other members. Such consultations could
be held even within the existing framework – the visits of party and government delegations,
bilateral meeting of ministers, consultations during the UN sessions - , implying that the PCC
sessions only constituted one form of consultation. There was no need to put the meetings of the
Warsaw Treaty Countries’ Political Consultative Committee on a regular footing. The level of
representation should be up to the individual countries to decide. The Council of Foreign
Ministers was unnecessary. The consultation within the framework of the PCC provides the
guidelines for the actual form of the consultations between the foreign ministers or their
deputies. There is no need for a Permanent Secretariat.

The Romanian delegate strongly urged for the compliance with the basic principles of the
Treaty in the future, demanding consultation in every issue that concerns the member states. To
this effect, improvements must be made in the preparations for the PCC sessions. A non-
permanent secretariat of a technical nature should be set up for the task of preparing the sessions,
and the task should be carried out by the foreign ministry of the country, which has been
designated to organize the next session. The PCC sessions should be held in the member states
on a rotational basis.

It became clear at the Berlin conference that the Romanian side had no intention to
engage in a discussion about the issues raised by the Soviet comrades. At the same time, the
Romanian delegate made it clear that in future they would be willing to participate in discussions
at the Political Consultative Committee’s sessions about issues that had interest to them. At the
meeting, the delegates agreed to brief the central committee and the party of their respective
country about the exchange of views taking place.

III.

The specific items that were on the agenda of the meeting of deputy defense ministers
included the legal status of the Commander of Chief of the Unified Armed Forces and the
definition of the authorization and organizational structure of the office of the Commander in Chief of the Unified Armed Forces (CCUAF).

As a result of the consultation, the delegates came to a rough agreement about the following points:

- the legal authority of the Commander in Chief should be based on the strategic planning of the armed forces under the command of the CCUAF, along with the work of coordination of the joint maneuvers;

- the establishment of either a Military Consultative Council under the PCC or a Military Council under the High Command;

- the appointment of the deputies of the Commander in Chief selected from the armies of the member states;

- the establishment of the staff of the CCUAF selected from the generals and the officers of the armies of the member states both in peacetime and in war;

- the establishment of a Technical Committee for coordinating development work in military technology;

With regard to the role and authority of the CCUAF, several delegates proposed that in peacetime the CCUAF should be planning the strategic employment of the troops under its command, and in war it should actually conduct the military operations.

According to the Soviet position, the CCUAF should play an auxiliary role, acting as a liaison between the Soviet staff and the armies of the other member states, and therefore it can only have a coordinative function.

Against the majority view shared by most of the delegates, whereby the establishment of a Military Consultative Council under the PCC would be desirable, the Romanian delegation proposed that the Military council should be subordinated to the CCUAF, and that, on the principle of parity, it should make collective decisions in every questions within the authority of the CCUAF. The Romanian delegation was also adamant that the plans and measures originated at the CCUAF should only take effect after the approval of the government of the member states.

Against the opinion shared by the majority of the delegates, whereby the Commander in Chief and the Chief of Staff should be selected from the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, the Romanian delegation firmly held the view that the army officers of other member states should also be eligible for the posts of both the Commander in Chief and the Chief of Staff, and that the two officers should not belong to the same armies.

The delegations’ opinion was split on the question whether the Commander in Chief should be allowed to assume a post in his army, too, or whether he should be truly independent.

With regard to the number of deputies the Commander in Chief should have, together with the issues concerning the number of staff officers and the organizational structure the joint
staff, and also the precise figures of the member states’ contribution to the staff, the position of the various delegations differed.

In the course of the debate – and actually going beyond the preset agenda of the meeting – another problem emerged in connection with the political/military direction of a coalitional war, which also divided the delegates’ views. According to the Soviet position, the ultimate command of the war should rest with the Supreme High Command, which should effectively be based on the working apparatus of the Soviet Chief of Staff. In the Romanian delegation’s opinion, such a command would be irreconcilable with the sovereignty of the member states. The delegates agreed that the question of military command in war posed a serious problem, which would definitely require clarification and could only be resolved at the highest level of decision-making.

At the end of the conference, the approved principles to form the basis of further work were recorded in the “Minutes” authenticated by Marshal Grechko. The delegates were to report the content of the meeting to the leaders of their party and government. Members of the conference all agreed on the point that the work should continue in the interest of resolving the debated issues.

IV.

The overall conclusions drawn from the work of the conference is as follows:

1/ The proceedings at the Berlin conference made it clear that at the moment there is little hope for convening a session of the Political Consultative Committee to hold a discussion about the points raised by the Soviet comrades. Therefore, it seems sensible that we should use the bilateral talks with the Romanian side to persuade them to give up their position, which is unacceptable for us. This issue should be added to the agenda of the Hungarian party and government delegations for their forthcoming Romanian visit.

2/ Although at the conference of the deputy defense ministers, the Romanian delegate admitted the need to strengthen the Unified Armed Forces, and he even made concrete proposals to resolve the problems on the agenda, as a whole, these proposals were not aimed at the strengthening of the joint military command; on the contrary, to some extent they seemed to be steps in the wrong direction in relation to the existing practices. Nevertheless, the Romanian delegate himself concurred in the continuation of the negotiations.

Therefore, some of the military issues hold out the prospect of further talks, and so it would be wise to continue the work started at the conference. We should nevertheless anticipate the existing differences of opinion between the political bodies also to pose difficulties in the resolution of the fundamental military issues.

Budapest, February … 1966

János Péter

Lajos Czinege

[Translated by Ervin Dunay, Central European University]
Memorandum

Subject: Friendly reconciliation discussion in Moscow before the disarmament negotiations commencing in Vienna on 30 October

On Soviet initiative, the delegates of the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense of the countries belonging to the Warsaw Treaty held a friendly reconciliation meeting in Moscow on 24 October 1973, preceding the Central European negotiations about downsizing the armed forces starting on 30 October in Vienna.

János Petrán from the Foreign Ministry, Tibor Vadászi from the Ministry of Defense, and Comrade István Monori on behalf of the Moscow Embassy participated in the friendly reconciliation meeting.

The Soviet side released the confidential information that, in view of the Romanians, the reconciliation meeting was to take place in two steps. On 23 October delegates of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of Poland, GDR, and the People's Republic of Czechoslovakia, in other words, those countries, which were directly involved in the activities, held a meeting. They justified this by wishing to discuss explicitly military issues only with the delegates of those countries, which were directly involved.

The topics of the friendly reconciliation meeting on 24 October included the discussion on the position and the related tactics of the Warsaw Treaty countries participating at the negotiations to be started on 30 October in Vienna, as well as the organizational and technical aspects of beginning the negotiations.

Comrade Hlestov, who was to head the Soviet delegation during the negotiations in Vienna and in the meantime had become the member of MID Collegium, pointed out that we were facing very difficult negotiations and the western powers would try to undermine the unified and harmonized position of the socialist countries. They themselves thought this consultation necessary in order to present a united position at the negotiations.

During the friendly reconciliation meeting the following concrete questions were discussed:

1) What measures should first be devised in order to start the downsizing? Should it really be downsizing, or should it be various forms of what is know as trust-building measures?
The socialist countries will strive for a real downsizing of the armed forces. In their opinion this is the main purpose of the negotiations. The attempts and experiments devised to divert the participants from this aim during these negotiations must be fended off. It is on the agenda of the conference on security in Europe to examine issues related to the auxiliary, so-called trust-building measures.

2) Which states should be involved in the military downsizing measures?
This issue has been decided. During the consultation that took place in the Spring in Vienna the circle of the states which would potentially participate in the military downsizing was defined; this, at the same time, also implies the scope of these measures.

3) Which units of the armed forces will be affected by the measures?
These will be the foreign troops, as well as the national armed forces, which are stationed on territories affected by the downsizing. In other words, not only the Soviet and the American army. The Soviet party considers this unacceptable, even as a first step. The military downsizing measures should affect the ground, air and nuclear forces. The western countries will try to exclude the latter; nevertheless, the Soviet side considers the inclusion of that category very important.

The Soviets accept the downsizing of armed forces of the same category and type, whether in terms of percentage or in terms of volume. Naturally, they take into consideration the fact that the NATO members will try to achieve parity in armed forces by the downsizing measures; by contrast, we must preserve the existing balance of power and maintain it regardless of the downsizing.

The NATO members will probably conceal their aims behind their definition of the purposes of the military downsizing negotiations; we must firmly oppose these attempts.

4) How should the execution of the downsizing measures be monitored?
In this respect the Soviets have the traditional standpoint, in other words, the monitoring of the military downsizing measures should involve the national institutions only. Later the method of national monitoring can be more concretely defined, for example by making the execution of the measures public and by informing the involved states, etc.

5) What should our relationship with the other states be during the negotiations?
The NATO members strictly oppose the participation of European states who are not in the blocs in any form. The Soviet viewpoint is that in this respect we should continue campaigning for making some form of participation possible for any European country, which shows interest in the negotiations.

6) What should be our tactic during the negotiations?
Since the NATO members will probably attempt to engage us into abstract arguments about the principles of negotiations, the criteria of downsizing the armed forces, symmetries, balance, etc., we must try to steer the negotiations into a more concrete direction already at an early stage. There is no need for a detailed list of topics to be discussed, as those are essentially given, in the form, for example, that was outlined in the closing communique of 28 June.

In the question of the auxiliary organizations, as well as the establishment of working groups, we must be cautious. Although this was proposed by the socialist countries, we must be careful that they would be brought into existence by necessity.
With the exception of the Romanian delegate, Romania's Moscow Ambassador, all participants agreed in the above. The Romanian Ambassador essentially repeated the previously expounded Romanian views whereby the Vienna negotiations were limited, the downsizing must also involve the whole of Europe and other regions of the continent (sic!).

He criticized that the negotiations were between blocs, which in his opinion contradicted the previously accepted principles. He criticized the practice of one or the other delegation taking part in the negotiations on behalf of the other states. He gave voice to the need of preserving the openness of the auxiliary organizations and working groups. Finally, he demanded that the security of each European state must be taken into consideration when decisions were made about downsizing the armed forces. After this, the Romanian delegate formally announced that they were ready to consult and cooperate.

In private conversations, Comrade Hlestov informed those present that the Soviet side would develop a set of concrete plans regarding the downsizing of the armed forces and it would submit this for approval; however, the latter had not yet taken place. Therefore, further details will be discussed in Vienna during the negotiations, together with the further steps to be taken.

In relation to the organizational and technical preparations of the negotiations to be started in Vienna on 30 October, Comrade Strulak, the Polish Ambassador’s counselor who will head the Polish delegation at the Viennese negotiations, and who had been a Warsaw Treaty liaison during the negotiations about technical and protocol issues during the negotiations in the Spring, informed those present about the discussions which he had with the NATO members’ liaison in the Austrian Foreign Ministry.

1. He described the venue the Austrian provide for the negotiations.
2. The financial arrangements of the negotiations will follow the Helsinki model.
3. The members of the delegations, depending on rank, will enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunity.
4. The auxiliary personnel of the negotiations will be recruited by the Austrians, the persons applying from the attending countries will be given preference (e.g. interpreters).

The first opening session of the negotiations will be held on Tuesday, October 30 at 10:30 a.m. The Austrian Foreign Minister will give a short welcoming speech, which will be public. Later the heads of each delegation will make a short, general, political statement. The participants accepted the information given by Comrade Strulak, only the Romanian delegate commented that they, on their part, had never given anyone mandate for carrying out negotiations on their behalf. Although they agreed with the proposals of Comrade Strulak, they will announce their agreement themselves to the Austrian party and the NATO partners.

In a private conversation, one member of the Romanian delegation said that this comment was made due to principles.

The participants of the friendly reconciliation meeting agreed to hold another friendly reconciliation meeting on the day immediately before the start of the negotiation, on 29 October, in the building of the Soviet Embassy.

Mutual understanding and constructive concreteness characterized the friendly reconciliation meeting, with the exception of the Romanian comments.
Budapest, 27 October 1973

[Translated by Ervin Dunay, Central European University]

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Report

On the consultation of the Warsaw Treaty deputy foreign ministers in Warsaw in connection with the Stockholm conference
(Warsaw, 3-4 May 1984)

The deputy foreign ministers of the Warsaw Treaty held a consultation in Warsaw on 3 and 4 May 1984, discussing questions related to the Stockholm conference.

Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski, who is also a member of the Politburo of the Polish United Workers’ Party, received the participants.

After giving their assessment of the first round of the Stockholm conference, the delegates discussed the questions related to the next session due to begin on 8 May.

In assessing the international and European situation, Comrade A.G. Kovaliev, the deputy foreign minister of the Soviet Union, started out from the statements and conclusions of the Budapest session of the Foreign Ministers’ Committee. He underlined that we should expect the tensions existing in the European political situation to continue at the Stockholm conference. He took a positive view of both the position that the representatives of the socialist countries took at the conference and the overall activities of the delegations.

He concluded that the United States of America, along with the rest of the NATO members, still seemed unwilling to start the actual negotiations. This was borne out by the experience gained during discussions that took place in Moscow with the USA’s principal Stockholm delegation. These revealed a “belated realism” in the matter of the renouncement of the use of force on the one hand, and the Americans’ insistence on the NATO proposals on the other.

In connection with the renouncement of the use of force, the Western-European participants, including the FRG, France and Switzerland, showed a willingness to work out confidence and security building measures, so as to “crown” the principle, so to speak. According to the Italian, Belgian, Danish, Spanish and Dutch position, the issues of political nature should
be discussed parallel with the military/technical measures. During his negotiations in Moscow, the Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti reiterated that substantial negotiations should be held in Stockholm, leading to results that should improve European security in regards to both the military and the political aspect.

Comrade Kovaliev pointed to the positive reaction our initiatives addressing comprehensive and essential political issues generated among the neutral and non-aligned countries of Europe. He appreciated the Yugoslav, Finnish, Austrian, Maltese and Cyprian position, which gave backing to the idea of having parallel discussions about the various proposals submitted. He pointed out that the neutral and non-aligned countries’ proposal, regardless of the fact that in many ways it echoed the unrealistic western view in connection with the military/technical measures, did contain elements that could be utilized by us.

Unofficially, the neutral countries supported the socialist proposals, giving us to understand that they would be willing to endorse the principle of the renouncement of the use of force in an appropriate form.

Comrade Kovaliev emphasized that in the course of the hard negotiations that lied ahead of us we must keep the initiative. He mentioned the Budapest Call for the renouncement of the use of force, underlining the need to make good use of it at the Stockholm negotiations. He informed his audience about the Soviet Union’s intention to submit a written proposal at the start of the second round of talks. (It has been done.) At a bilateral discussion taking place before the start of the consultation, the Soviet comrades asked us to agree to the idea that – in order to avoid the situation of 6+1 in consequence of the Romanian proposals – the Soviet Union alone submit the proposal, with others’ giving their backing. I agreed to this, adding that later on, should the need arise, we might even agree to co-authorship.

The representatives of the other socialist delegations working in close collaboration spoke about the Stockholm conference, and the tasks ahead of us, in tune with the Soviet assessment. They approved of the step the Soviets were planning to take, assuring them of their support. On the subject of the Budapest Call addressed to the NATO countries, everyone apart from the Romanian delegate was of the opinion that it would be necessary to take advantage of this initiative at the Stockholm conference.

The speeches revealed that there was a fundamental unity in approaching the problem, with shades of difference in a few practical questions. For example, the Bulgarian representative laid stronger emphasis on the interconnections of the draft agreement about the renouncement of the use of force and the possibilities of the Stockholm conference.

On the one hand, the Romanian deputy foreign minister showed an interest in the step announced by the Soviets, and on the other hand he highlighted those elements in his own proposal, which coincided with the interests of the socialist-bloc countries. He supported the idea
of starting concrete negotiations as soon as possible, while at the same time failing to take into account a number of essential tactical elements in the joint socialist position.

In my own speech, the text of which I enclose together with the NBO copy, I explained our position.

* * *

The participants at the meeting were of the opinion that no concrete results were likely to emerge from the Stockholm conference in the immediate future. There was also a general agreement about the assessment that in the tense international situation the conference played a serious role in maintaining the east-west dialogue and in our attempts to bring about improvement in the current European situation.

The participants, who worked in close collaboration, appraised the significance of the communiqué and the Call issued by the Budapest session of the Foreign Ministers’ Committee; even the Romanian deputy foreign minister made references to it in a positive tone. The atmosphere at the conference was calm and constructive; even the Romanian comrades avoided any issue that was likely to generate a debate. However, it was still not possible to follow up the speeches with a joint summary or a conclusion acceptable to all. In this way, once again, the consultation sent an important message to the outside world, but contributed nothing towards the establishment of cooperation, which would be so badly needed at Stockholm.

Budapest, 10 May 1984

[Translated by Ervin Dunay, Central European University, Budapest]