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**Different Lenses on the Future:
U.S. and Singaporean Approaches
to Strategic Planning**

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ABSTRACT

In an age of accelerating global change, effective strategic planning is increasingly a survival imperative for national governments. Singapore has long proven adept in this area, institutionalizing foresight in governance through programmes like interagency scenario planning and, more recently, a Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning network. Yet Singapore's approach is enabled as much by cultural, historical, and geographical factors as it is by government willingness to invest in organizational innovation. The aim of this working paper is to compare government strategic planning in Singapore with that of a large country—the United States—and examine the contextual differences that give rise to their divergent approaches. It concludes with an assessment of what the two countries can learn from each other.

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Different Lenses on the Future: U.S. and Singaporean Approaches to Strategic Planning

Justin Zorn¹

Size is typically seen as an asset in international affairs. Behemoths like the United States benefit from widely held currencies, extensive natural resources, the power to set global norms and the depth to withstand major catastrophes. But size—whether measured in square miles or national product—can promote a perception of invulnerability, leading policymakers to take future survival for granted. Worse, it can create an illusion of control in a world in which an ever-greater number of variables shape outcomes. Owing to its city-state status, Singapore has come to epitomize a different kind of mindset. Singaporean policymakers' keen awareness of their nation's vulnerability has nurtured a culture of long-range planning, which has been institutionalized through programmes like government-wide scenario planning and, more recently, a Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning network. But Singapore is a unique political context, marked by a relatively high degree of consensus and a powerful professional civil service. It remains unclear what larger, more politically diffuse states can learn from the Singaporean approach to thinking about the future. This chapter will compare government strategic planning in Singapore with that of a large country—the United States—and examine the differences in political culture and organization that give rise to their divergent approaches. It will conclude with an assessment of what the two countries can learn from each other.

THE SINGAPOREAN WAY OF STRATEGY

“... being surprised in small ways over a long time rather than in a big way all at once.”

– Peter Bishop

Singapore has long been on the leading edge of public sector strategic planning. Taking cues from successful private sector initiatives such as the Shell Scenarios

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Group, civil servants in the 1980s began drafting scenarios on issues including export demand volatility and declining birth rates. In the mid 1990s, scenario planning was approved as a tool for national strategy formation and a new outfit, the Strategic Policy Office, was established to conduct comprehensive and issue-specific scenario exercises and facilitate cross-agency collaboration in planning. Some contend these initiatives allowed Singapore to anticipate and thus respond faster and more effectively than neighbouring governments to the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998.² Still, the aim of Singapore’s strategic policy programmes has not been exclusively to identify contingencies. Scenarios can, in the words of futurist Pierre Wack, “help change assumptions about how the world works” and “compel people to reorganize their mental models of reality”.³ The programmes have therefore been useful for a government seeking to continually reorient its analysts to a rapidly changing world.

Despite this, a series of shocks around the turn of the millennium revealed that traditional scenario programmes would not be sufficient as the solitary tool for government foresight. Several thwarted terror plots, new data about climate change and the Indian Ocean tsunami seemed to portend a great acceleration in the rate of onset of major events. While scenario planning could be a useful way to analyse alternative futures, resultant products, which were often based on extrapolation of current trends or lessons learned from recent history, seemed insufficient to navigate a global scene marked by profound discontinuities. The SARS outbreak in early 2003 revealed an additional need for enhanced information networks to link government agencies. A proactive response to a future public health emergency of such magnitude would require government analysts to “connect the dots” between intelligence signals collected from immigration authorities, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and others. No single entity existed to identify and interpret “weak signals” in intelligence gathered from throughout the government.

Officials in the Prime Minister’s Office reacted to these novel and urgent requirements by conducting a comprehensive review of the national security apparatus, which culminated in the release of a new strategic framework for national security in 2004. This proposed that new initiatives apply diverse methods to detect

² Habegger, Beat. “Horizon Scanning in Government.” Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2009, p. 17.

³ Fukuyama, F. (ed.). *Blindside: How to Anticipate Forcing Events and Wild Cards in Global Politics*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2008, p. 110.

possible “strategic surprises” and enhance inter-agency cooperation by “fostering an instinct to share”. What has emerged is not a single approach to replace scenario planning but a set of laboratories—both physical and virtual—for the creation of new technologies and methods to augment strategic planning in the Singapore Government. The umbrella programme, termed Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS), undertakes several tasks: (i) collecting and organizing data, (ii) detecting emerging trends and identifying anomalies, (iii) building models, and (iv) linking a diverse range of government analysts in a classified network. It comprises an operational hub (the Horizon Scanning Centre), a technical research and development unit (the RAHS Experimentation Centre), and a policy coordination office (a division of Singapore’s National Security Coordination Centre).

The programme seeks to close a gap in the strategic planning process: as individual agencies typically only scan for trends and events related to their own issues of concern, RAHS scans for patterns that span across, or fall between, existing jurisdictions. Officials at the Horizon Scanning Centre distribute listings of interdisciplinary future contingencies through published materials and receive feedback through questionnaires and consulting requests. They facilitate inter-agency information sharing through online platforms and meetings and distil best practices for analysts through extensive case studies. RAHS aims, through a variety of methods, to automate tedious aspects of foresight research in order to allow analysts to focus on their comparative advantage over machines: interpreting, analysing, questioning, visioning and creative problem solving. It also seeks to augment the minds of analysts through morphological models and visual tools like systems maps and timelines.

While some have compared the RAHS programme to Total Information Awareness (TIA), the defunct intelligence coordination and data-mining programme in the United States, the system does not probe private citizens for information. Nor does it enable analysts to retrieve information on demand from any place in the government records.⁴ It differs further from TIA in scope. Although RAHS is a national security project, it operates under an exceptionally broad definition of the term. Its domain transcends traditional defence to encompass technological, economic, environmental and even social aspects of security.

⁴ Gavin Chua, personal communication, 28 April 2009.

RAHS is intentionally a work in progress. It is meant to be subject to continuous research and development, and, in addition to technology updates, there are a few areas for improvement. First, while the programme seeks to draw strength from harnessing a great diversity of perspectives, it has only begun to engage business and university communities, and has negligible links to non-governmental organizations or the broader public. It remains unclear whether private sector organizations will provide information—gratis—to the network. It is moreover unclear whether established non-governmental organizations with adversarial positions towards government policies will be free to contribute. Second, there is no mechanism through which RAHS examines potential long-term impacts of proposed Singaporean policies. While RAHS explicitly aims to be apolitical, it could likely benefit from new tools to analyse possible effects of proposals across a range of disciplines (for instance, how the procurement of additional military hardware could affect long-range environmental, economic or foreign political considerations). The focus remains exclusively on the impacts of exogenous trends on Singapore rather than Singaporean policy impacts on the nation and the world. Finally, while RAHS has clear support from within the civil service and one or two members of the political leadership, it is unclear whether the programme has widespread buy-in from national political leaders. Horizon scanning programmes need especially broad political support because they operate near the margins of current thinking and often generate challenging ideas. The network must be seen as a trusted authority if it is to ultimately highlight policy trade-offs necessary for national sustainability and survival.

RAHS nonetheless remains one of the most ambitious efforts in public sector strategic planning in the world today. While it is difficult to fully assess the impact of the young programme without delving into counterfactuals or classified data, it has been successful in offering early warning of developments including the 2008 spike in food prices and retrospective analyses of crises, including the melamine export scandal.⁵ In assessing RAHS, it is essential to remember its mandate: not to predict discrete events but to highlight emerging trends and challenge mindsets.

⁵ Gavin Chua, personal communication, 28 April 2009.

SOCIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ORIGINS OF SINGAPORE'S APPROACH

“Do your homework or our nation will fail.”

– Cliché regarding the pressures placed on Singaporean youth

While many factors account for Singapore's interest in foresight studies and risk management, the foremost is evident from just a cursory glance at a map. A single catastrophe—whether geological, biological or man-made—could decimate the country. This lack of “strategic depth” has given rise to a high level of interest in future contingencies as well as a culture of preparedness, which includes compulsory national service for all able-bodied males (typically done with the military, police or civil defence), omnipresent public safety advertisements and extensive public health monitoring. Without hinterlands to grow food or mine raw materials, Singapore is moreover highly sensitive to changing trends in Southeast Asia and the broader world. The country's multi-ethnic character further reinforces this outward orientation. As a majority-Chinese society, Singapore is also culturally predisposed to emphasize risk management. Great importance is often placed on “saving face”, which is to say that there are generally high social costs associated with failure.

Singapore's legacy institutions are well tailored to the mindsets described above. As a former British crown colony, the country inherited a Westminster style of government that is arguably more amenable to long-term risk management programmes than other Western systems. Like the United Kingdom, Singapore vests its professional civil service with considerable power to set as well as execute policy. As civil servants have no need to achieve short-term electoral gains, they are free to focus on long-term challenges and opportunities. Likewise, as executive administrations are not subject to term limits, a prime minister can often set and stay with initiatives that take upwards of a decade to complete. Of course, the presence of a single dominant party in Singapore translates into an unusually high level of consensus regarding national objectives, if not the means of achieving them. Yet the nation's overwhelmingly pragmatic or “empiricist” governing creed seems to stretch well beyond the upper ranks of the People's Action Party. Singapore is a decidedly non-ideological place, which makes it fertile ground for foresight programmes that require openness to change.

OVERCOMING THE U.S. AVERSION TO PLANNING

“Americans accept the inevitability of evil but not disaster.”

– *Richard Posner*

Writing in the *New York Times Magazine* in 2004, author Ron Suskind cited a senior U.S. official denying the importance of paying attention to trends in the external world. “When we act,” the official said, “we create our own reality.”⁶ While the insurgencies, climactic shifts, economic shocks, pandemics and piracy of the ensuing years have largely discredited this worldview among Washington leaders, part of the sentiment remains: the United States is the prime mover in world affairs. At the end of the day, no other entity is so dominant in setting the global agenda. Since World War II, this mindset has been a key obstacle to establishing means for the disciplined study of long-range global trends in the U.S. government.

But there are other historical, sometimes well-founded concerns about foresight programmes in the United States. First, government planning is sometimes perceived as being contrary to free markets of both goods and ideas. At worst, it is reminiscent of the Soviet central economic planning and the infamous five-year plans. At best, strategic planning brings to mind the balance-of-power politics that U.S. leaders from Washington to Wilson loathed. Second, some fear that foresight programmes lock in policy, leading to the institutionalization of a particular set of plans. This is seen as potentially disadvantageous for two reasons: rigid strategy reduces the responsiveness of government to events not anticipated by planners, and long-range planning by any one organization is likely to threaten the authority of others. Finally, key decision makers in the United States are term-limited and government frequently switches hands. Long-term planning can seem like fiction writing when an ideologically antithetical administration can, after any four-year interval, win election and change the course of national policy. In spite of these aversions, the United States has developed and maintained several policy foresight programmes since the end of the Second World War. The following sections outline the histories, problems and prospects of initiatives in three areas of government.

⁶ Suskind, Ron. “Faith, Certainty, and the Presidency of George W. Bush.” *New York Times Magazine*. 17 October 2004.

The State Department Policy Planning Staff

General George Marshall was a strong believer in the potential of long-range planning and, as Secretary of State in 1947, instructed one of his brightest staffers, George Kennan, to establish a strategic planning shop within the department.⁷ The initial mandate of this Policy Planning Staff (PPS), articulated on 7 May 1947, was far-reaching and included: (i) formulating and developing, for the consideration and approval of the Secretary, long-term programmes for the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives; (ii) anticipating major problems the department may encounter; (iii) undertaking studies on the broadest politico-military problems; (iv) independently evaluating current foreign policies and recommending changes; and (v) coordinating all planning activities within the department.⁸ As former Secretary of State Dean Acheson explained:

General Marshall conceived the function of this group as being to look ahead, not into the distant future, but beyond the vision of the operating officers caught in the smoke and crises of current battle; far enough ahead to see the emerging form of things to come and outline what should be done to meet or anticipate them. In doing this the staff should also do something else—constantly reappraise what was being done.⁹

This was no easy task, chiefly because of the need to remain relevant, juggling long-term concerns with the pressing business of the day. The unprecedented questions of the earliest years of the Cold War made this challenge doubly immense. Still, Kennan fared well. His staff examined, as their first act, the question of American aid to Western Europe, and their analysis of the immediate and strategic implications of a large-scale reconstruction effort formed the foundation what later became the Marshall Plan.¹⁰ Kennan, widely considered the “Father of Containment”, was extraordinarily influential in Marshall’s State Department. As Director of Policy Planning, he largely shaped U.S. policy on Turkey and Greece as well as historic decisions to exploit the rift between Moscow and Tito’s Yugoslavia and to warm

⁷ *State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers, 1947–1949*. New York: Garland Press, 1983, p. 6.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Haass, Richard. “Remarks at the Kennan Institute.” Washington, D.C. 22 May 2003.

¹⁰ *Policy Planning Staff Papers*, 15

diplomatically to Franco's Spain. He supported each of these positions on the basis of long-term considerations.¹¹

Comparing the Policy Planning Staff of George Kennan with its later incarnations reinforces a point made earlier in this chapter: that long-term planning thrives only with active support from the top-tier decision makers. As interest in long-range planning diminished among Secretaries of State, so too did the effectiveness of the PPS. Consider Dean Rusk's standard criticism that "providence has not given us the capacity to pierce the fog of the future with accuracy".¹² During his tenure, the staff evolved from a vital policy organ into something of an academic think tank.¹³ The unit now undertakes analytical studies of U.S. foreign policy, offering a second opinion on policy questions requiring a big-picture perspective. It occasionally takes on tasks related to the assembly of international coalitions and the coordination of tasks for policy groups in the regional bureaus. It also now handles the management of policy dissent within the U.S. Foreign Service and speechwriting for the Secretary of State.¹⁴

Aside from the abovementioned points of ideological opposition to planning, two factors may have contributed to the decline of the PPS from its golden age under Kennan. First, long-range global issues are increasingly interdisciplinary. As the Secretary of State lacks jurisdiction over defence, environmental or economic policy, a strategy articulated by her Policy Planning Staff would likely require an unattainable degree of inter-agency cooperation. Second, the rise of external think tanks, particularly in past two decades, may have diminished the role of in-house strategic planning. A case in point is the Project for a New American Century, which designed much of the Bush Administration's long-term strategy in the Middle East.¹⁵ However, there are signs of a resurgence of PPS. In July 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the launch of a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review—a process based on the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review—to assess current trends and provide guidance for how best to allocate resources to programmes

¹¹ Ibid, 60

¹² Smith, Allen, Stewart, and Whitehouse. *Creating Strategic Vision*. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1987, p. 9

¹³ Smith, 28

¹⁴ "The Policy Planning Staff." U.S. Department of State. 13 June 2006. <http://www.state.gov/s/p/>

¹⁵ Weisman, Steven. "Pre-emption: Idea With a Lineage Whose Time Has Come." *New York Times*. 20 March 2003, A11.

advancing the country's long-term foreign policy interests. The new initiative, spearheaded by Policy Planning Director Anne-Marie Slaughter and Deputy Secretary of State Jacob Lew, takes a step in the direction of greater inter-agency collaboration. It aims to provide operational and budgetary recommendations on how the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development can support mutual medium- and long-term goals. It may eventually provide a stronger foundation for strategic collaboration between civilian and military agencies.

Strategic Planning in the Air Force

The U.S. Air Force, like much of the military, has had a steadier though more specialized interest strategic planning. In January 1978, Secretary of the Air Force John Stetson instructed members of his staff to conduct a three-part study: (i) to survey long-range planning methodologies used by corporations to determine whether they could be feasibly adopted by the Air Force; (ii) to design a compatible long-range planning institution; and (iii) to use some of the proposed methodologies to forecast possible threats and opportunities 20 years into the future.¹⁶ Stetson, who had used forecasting methodologies as a partner at the consultancy Booz Allen Hamilton, believed strongly that failure to think strategically left the service unacceptably vulnerable to surprise.¹⁷ A group led by Brigadier General James Albritton examined the methodologies employed by General Motors, IBM, Texas Instruments, Ford and Michigan Power, a public utility company. While the initial corporate survey was disappointing (only Michigan Power planned seriously more than seven years into the future), the group, with assistance from the RAND Corporation, distilled a set of essential rules for planning. Among these were: (i) the most senior leaders must be engaged or the bureaucracy will not follow; (ii) senior leaders should regularly intervene in the process to prevent products from becoming politically infeasible and thereby non-actionable; (iii) key objectives must be clearly articulated in order for planners to develop an adequate point of reference.¹⁸ Their forecast, which examined aviation technology, investments, Latin America, NATO and the Pacific Rim, was well received as were their institutional recommendations.¹⁹

¹⁶ Smith, 32.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid, 33.

¹⁹ Ibid.

Stetson created a long-range planning division that comprised 10 officers with direct access to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff. It was charged with creating an annual long-range planning guidance memorandum to be approved by senior staff and updated regularly. Within six months, the division had become an innovative clearing-house for ideas, and Stetson began monthly meetings with the young, well-informed officers who staffed it. While it is unclear how geopolitical insights from the group affected overall strategy, members did offer the key insight that computers and command communications would become integrated and interdependent over the following decade. Their detailed reports include some of the earliest articulations of the concept of network-centric operations, a precursor to the concept of networked governance.²⁰

While the long-range planning division did not survive organizational realignments in the early 1980s, the Air Force has maintained its commitment to strategic planning.²¹ Today's programmes are located primarily at the Air University within Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Working with RAND and researchers at the National Defense University, Air Force futurists have undertaken several major studies using alternative-futures scenarios, including an extensive and well-publicized *World in 2025 Report*.

The Goldwater Nichols Act

Hailed by former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin as “one of the landmark laws in American history”, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 amended the 1947 National Security Act to thoroughly rework much of the Pentagon's command structure. In addition to bolstering civilian and Joint Staff control and clearly defining the roles of combatant commanders, Congress intended for the act to improve strategic planning in national security through four major provisions: (i) requiring the President to annually submit a report on national security strategy; (ii) instructing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to prepare fiscally constrained strategic plans; (iii) requiring the Secretary of Defense to offer a written policy guidance for the creation and frequent review of contingency plans; and (iv)

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ *Air Force 2025*. Maxwell, AL: The Air University. 9 March 2002.
<http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usaf/2025/es/e-s.htm>

prescribing that the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy become chief assistant to the Secretary for work on contingency plans.²²

The most significant of these stipulations, the National Security Strategy (NSS), theoretically requires the Executive to engage in rigorous strategic planning. The President must annually produce a detailed explanation of U.S. global interests, the resources and abilities needed to secure these interests, a proposal for allocation of politico-military power over the short and long terms, and the estimated adequacy of American power to handle major challenges.²³ While well intentioned, these requirements have not resulted in much substantive change.²⁴ The document is produced every four years rather than every year, and it is rarely offered on time. Administrations from Reagan onwards have generally viewed the NSS requirement of Goldwater-Nichols as an opportunity to explain policies rather than undertake serious planning and report findings. This stands in contrast to the earlier mandated National Military Strategy (NMS) and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which are presented periodically by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense respectively. Each of these reports is built upon a genuine year-long process of forecasting and policy review. The QDR process, in particular, has been praised for its foresight as illustrated by its role as a driver of defence transformation.²⁵ While Defense is compelled by the Executive to undertake the NMS and QDR, the Executive itself lacks political incentive and potentially lacks institutional capacity to take up a similar task. Thus, even with the advent of the NSS through Goldwater-Nichols, there remains no established procedure for setting a comprehensive national strategy and estimating the resources and abilities needed to implement it.

WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN LEARN FROM SINGAPORE

As illustrated in the previous sections, many in the U.S. government have recognized the growing requirement for policy foresight and sought ways to overcome the “tyranny of the inbox”. Yet long-range thinking tends to be disjointed. Defense, State, Energy and Homeland Security use their own tools to plan for the

²² “Goldwater-Nichols: Ten Years Later.” *Joint Forces Quarterly Online*. June 1997.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0513.pdf

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Flournoy and Brimley. “Strategic Planning for U.S. National Security.” Princeton: The Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2006.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 10

future; each employs its own language to articulate risks and opportunities. The quadrennial review processes at State, International Development and Defense are steps in the right direction, but there are still few ways to assess long-range issues and priorities across disciplinary and jurisdictional boundaries—particularly when it comes time to develop a federal budget. The Cabinet is meant to be the key team for addressing this problem, yet its members typically meet in order to affirm policy rather than create it.²⁶ Moreover, the National Security Council (NSC) lacks the means (and arguably the mandate) to undertake risk assessment and horizon-scanning functions across a range of jurisdictions. Singapore’s use of its Strategic Policy Office and the RAHS programme for consultancy and training within the various public sector agencies could be a strong model for creating jointness between policy planning groups in different parts of the government. A working group from the NSC could similarly be vested with authority to identify best practices for scenario planning and strategy formulation, and offer advice to departments on the development of programmes to meet their needs.

The emphasis on training and consulting underscores the point that foresight in the Singapore Government is as much about cultivating new mindsets as it is about creating strategies. While the U.S. military tends to recognize the imperative of retooling through staff colleges and simulation exercises, the broader U.S. bureaucracy often neglects continuing education due to budgetary and time constraints. Singapore’s Civil Service College is a useful, albeit expensive, model for civilian continuous education programmes in government. The employment of scenario planning and horizon scanning programmes as tools to help challenge antiquated assumptions and encourage the instinct to share information is a particularly innovative approach. U.S. agencies can build on programmes like Intellipedia, a wiki platform for national security analysts and incorporate scenario tools, data maps and “serious games” like those featured in the RAHS suite of tools for the purpose of enhancing both issue awareness and inter-agency coordination.

Similarly important (though perhaps less feasible to replicate, given the state of affairs in the United States) is Singapore’s practice of generously compensating civil servants. This is not simply a matter of attracting talent. In achieving some parity between public and private sector salaries, Singapore promotes longer-term careers in

²⁶ Fuerth, Leon. “Strategic Myopia: The Case for Forward Engagement.” *The National Interest*, Spring 2006, p. 22.

government and thus encourages a longer-range orientation in the bureaucracy. Singapore also enhances the civil service mindset through rotating assignments: elite personnel typically move through appointments at various agencies in order to build lateral awareness of governing processes. While the U.S. Senior Executive Service and various government fellowships currently allow such rotations, they are comparatively rare and seldom linked to promotions. More thoroughly integrating this practice could be an important step towards inculcating a networked governance mindset.

WHAT SINGAPORE CAN LEARN FROM THE UNITED STATES

Leaders in Singapore, a quintessentially multi-ethnic nation, seem to deeply appreciate the power of diversity in decision making. It is rare to chat for long with a Singaporean official involved in strategic planning without hearing a reference to James Surowiecki's 2004 book, *The Wisdom of Crowds*, which extols the virtues of information aggregated by large and varied groups. Yet it is the United States that most deeply embodies this thinking. The country's vast array of independent think tanks, advocacy groups, NGOs and media outlets bring a maximum number of perspectives to bear on strategic questions. Indeed, diversity, dissent and debate have often been the foundation of formal decision-making. Consider President Eisenhower's Project Solarium. On 8 May 1953, the President instructed his staff to assemble "teams of bright young individuals" to debate various positions on the question of whether or not to continue the strategy of Soviet containment. Each person was tasked with "tackling an alternative with a real belief in it just the way a good advocate tackles a law case".²⁷ Although the President eventually decided to continue his predecessor's policy, the U.S. grand strategy had been subjected to intense scrutiny by sharp thinkers with fresh eyes, and the chief executive had a chance to thoroughly weigh the prospects and pitfalls of every option. Unaided by technology, it was strategic planning at its best.

The structure of secondary and tertiary education in the United States can also be a model for countries seeking to enhance government foresight. While ideal personnel for programmes like RAHS are talented generalists able to make sense of

²⁷ Greenstein and Immerman. "Effective National Security Advising: Recovering the Eisenhower Legacy." *Political Science Quarterly*. 115:3. 2000.

trends in a variety of disciplines, the British legacy system of education carried on in Singapore forces students to choose between concentrations in sciences and humanities during secondary school and to specialize in a specific discipline such as biology or law upon entering university.²⁸ The U.S. system, in contrast, pushes students to gain diverse academic interests and skills by taking up to two years of liberal arts coursework at university level.

CONCLUSION

A truly anticipatory approach to governance requires more than advanced tools for policy analysis, a forward-thinking bureaucracy or even a grand strategy. Ultimately, it requires an informed populace aware of long-range opportunities and risks, and willingness to reward leaders for investments in the future. While neither the United States nor Singapore has developed the kind of societal early warning system necessary to make this happen, recent innovations are steps in the right direction. Singapore, through RAHS and scenario planning programmes, has become a global leader in analysing broad interdisciplinary trends. The United States has overcome many of its historical aversions and undertaken sophisticated planning programmes within individual federal agencies. These governments should learn from one another how to adapt policymaking to an age of accelerating global change.

²⁸ University preparatory courses like the International Baccalaureate programme popular at many Singaporean schools adopt a model more similar to the U.S. system.

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