The Atlantic Council promotes constructive U.S. leadership and engagement in international affairs based on the central role of the Atlantic community in meeting the international challenges of the 21st century.

The Council embodies a nonpartisan network of leaders who aim to bring ideas to power and to give power to ideas by:

- stimulating dialogue and discussion about critical international issues with a view to enriching public debate and promoting consensus on appropriate responses in the Administration, the Congress, the corporate and nonprofit sectors, and the media in the United States and among leaders in Europe, Asia and the Americas;

- conducting educational and exchange programs for successor generations of U.S. leaders so that they will come to value U.S. international engagement and have the knowledge and understanding necessary to develop effective policies.
NATO’s Role in Confronting International Terrorism

Richard A. Clarke & Barry R. McCaffrey • Co-Chairs
C. Richard Nelson • Author-Rapporteur

Policy Paper
June 2004
For further information about the Atlantic Council of the United States and/or its Program on International Security, please call (202) 778-4968.

Information on Atlantic Council programs and publications is available on the world wide web at http://www.acus.org

Requests or comments may be sent to the Atlantic Council via Internet at info@acus.org

THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL
OF THE UNITED STATES

10th Floor, 910 17th Street, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
Table of Contents

Foreword ........................................................................................................................................... v

Key Findings ...................................................................................................................................... vii

I. Analytical Approach ................................................................................................................... 1

II. The Problem of Terrorism ........................................................................................................ 2

   Transatlantic Consensus on the Nature of the Threat .............................................................. 2

   Persistent Differences in Political Evaluations and Priorities ............................................... 7

III. International Responses to Terrorism ..................................................................................... 9

   The Roles of International Organizations ............................................................................... 9

   NATO and the European Union ............................................................................................... 12

IV. NATO’s Comparative Advantages ......................................................................................... 14

   Generating Political Will .......................................................................................................... 16

   Providing Intelligence .............................................................................................................. 16

   Managing Coordination and Integration Efforts ..................................................................... 17

   Interdicting Terrorist Recruitment, Financing, Supply and Operations ............................... 18

   Preventing Terrorist Operations ............................................................................................ 18

   Managing the Consequences of Terrorist Attacks ................................................................. 19

   Security Assistance ................................................................................................................... 20

   Educating the Population, Especially Potential Sources of Recruitment .............................. 21

   Organizing Research and Development ................................................................................ 21

V. Realizing NATO’s Full Potential ............................................................................................... 22

   Decision-Making ....................................................................................................................... 22

   Focusing Responsibility .......................................................................................................... 22

   Intelligence ................................................................................................................................ 23

   Planning and Procedures ......................................................................................................... 24

Annex A: The French Approach to Terrorism ........................................................................... 29

   The French Approach to International Cooperation and NATO ........................................... 30

   Achieving U.S.-French Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism .................................................. 31

Annex B: The Evolution of International Responses ................................................................. 33

   The United Nations’ Response to Terrorism .......................................................................... 33

   NATO’s Response to Terrorism ............................................................................................... 35

   The European Union’s Response to Terrorism ...................................................................... 37

   The United States’ Response to Terrorism ............................................................................ 40

Annex C: Acronyms ....................................................................................................................... 43

Annex D: Working Group on NATO’s Role in Confronting International Terrorism .......... 45

Annex E: Comments by Working Group Members ..................................................................... 47
Foreword

Governments on both sides of the Atlantic recognize that successfully confronting international terrorism requires a multi-faceted approach. Despite persistent stereotypes and misconceptions about each other’s attitudes, responsible officials in the United States and Europe agree that an effective Western response to terrorism will need to combine in appropriate ways law enforcement, judicial, educational/cultural, economic and military measures, among others.

Combining such a broad range of policy instruments into a successful strategy requires governments to identify and take account of the comparative advantages of the many intergovernmental organizations that bring together representatives of European, North American and other friendly countries. The primary purpose of this Atlantic Council study is to identify specifically those areas in which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) might best contribute to the overall Western response, without supplanting or unnecessarily duplicating what is being done well in other contexts, such as the European Union (EU), the G-8 and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In particular, the European Union has, and ought to have, the lead in coordinating many aspects of its members’ counter-terrorism efforts, and in these areas the United States has appropriately sought the greatest possible degree of cooperation with the EU institutions. But in some other areas the Alliance, with its broad base of members and partners, extensive experience in coordinating among member military establishments, possession of useful strategic resources and, not least, the strong presence and commitment of the United States in all its institutions, has a distinctive role to play. This report describes what that role could be and how it would enhance the security of the West in the face of the persistent and evolving challenges of international terrorism.

This report is based upon the insights of an expert working group convened by the Atlantic Council. A central element of the project design was for members of the working group to make visits to different European capitals in order to gain as thorough an understanding as possible of the variety of views in European countries on the nature of the terrorist threat, on its likely future evolution and on the possible roles for NATO in the Western response. Council delegations visited ten European capitals, as well as NATO Headquarters, SHAPE and the EU institutions, between July 2003 and May 2004.

On behalf of the Atlantic Council, I would like to express appreciation for the dedication of the working group members and especially for the able and thoughtful leadership provided by the group’s co-chairs, Richard Clarke and Barry McCaffrey. I also want to acknowledge the capable management of the project by Dick Nelson and the invaluable assistance in all aspects of the project provided by Jason Purcell.

Christopher J. Makins
President
Atlantic Council of the United States
Key Findings

NATO’s Role in a Global Effort

Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic agree that a successful global effort to confront terrorism will require a multi-faceted approach that draws on the strengths and unique assets of many international organizations. One such, the European Union (EU), has already taken a leading role in coordinating national efforts in areas closely tied to many of that organization’s key functions (i.e. judicial and law-enforcement cooperation, financial controls and border security). Similarly, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has and ought to have an important role coordinating other aspects of Western national responses, notably – though not exclusively – those in which military forces are likely to play a primary or a supporting part.

Unnecessary duplication of effort in the Western response to terrorism is to be avoided because it wastes scarce resources and presents the possibility of confusion of strategies and even of goals. But there are additional, useful ways in which the distinctive capabilities and resources of many intergovernmental organizations – including, but not limited to NATO – might be employed. The Atlantic Council’s Working Group on NATO’s Role in Confronting International Terrorism studied European views of the current and likely future terrorist threat and considered several initiatives to make better use of NATO capabilities in confronting it. The following key conclusions and recommendations merit priority attention:

• NATO should appoint a new Assistant Secretary General (ASG) responsible for coordinating NATO efforts to confront terrorism. The individual chosen would work full-time on this problem – not take it on as an additional duty. The ASG would manage the entire spectrum of NATO counter-terrorist efforts. He or she would also serve as the principal NATO representative coordinating counter-terrorist efforts with member and partner countries as well as with the United Nations (UN), the EU and other international organizations.

• NATO peacekeeping and stabilization forces will most likely be operating in environments where terrorism is a factor. NATO forces deployed to the Balkans and to Afghanistan (the Alliance’s first major “out-of-area” military operation) have confronted and will continue to face numerous terrorist threats. The lessons of these two complex operations need to be applied in future NATO operations, since stabilization missions have become a core NATO competency. The creation of a NATO Stabilization Force designed to complement the NATO Response Force (NRF) should be seriously considered in view of the challenges of the transition from combat operations to peacekeeping operations.

• NATO should take full advantage of the relationships developed through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Mediterranean Dialogue in order to work with interested nations
on security assistance and other security measures related to the struggle against international terrorism.

The Problem

Global terrorism will continue to threaten peace and security for at least the next five to ten years in the view of most European and U.S. experts. Although ongoing anti-terrorism efforts may have significantly weakened al-Qa’ida, and the general increase in public awareness and security measures may have mitigated the terrorist threat, international terrorism will continue to pose a very severe challenge to all members of the Alliance.

Government officials anticipating threats and planning responses to international terrorism in the coming five to ten years will likely be operating in an environment characterized by the following trends and possible developments:

- New terrorist threats that are less structured, more diverse, more global and highly lethal are likely to emerge. Terrorists are not only “out there,” they are also inside virtually every NATO country, with potential operatives no longer limited to Arab men. Individual terrorists and terrorist organizations have demonstrated that they are highly adaptive by coping with countermeasures employed by governments.

- The use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons by terrorists is less likely than conventional attacks, though there is little doubt that terrorists would employ a CBRN weapon if available. Nevertheless, because the potential effects of the use of such weapons are so disastrous, there must be serious and comprehensive efforts to prepare for and deal with CBRN attacks, particularly by enhancing security in states that have or had nuclear weapons or advanced nuclear weapons-related capabilities. Use of a radiological weapon (“dirty bomb”) poses a particularly salient danger due to possible terrorist access to radioactive material from many sources.

- While the prevailing view in the United States considers terrorism as a priority threat that requires a war to defeat the enemy, the majority of NATO members still do not view terrorism as a threat calling for a “war”, but rather as a dangerous and inescapable risk to be managed like other international challenges. The debate is not about terrorism itself, but rather the severity of the threat and whether and how it can be defeated. This helps to explain why many European leaders and the majority of the European public attach high importance to UN and/or NATO mandates. Such mandates are essential to mobilize public support for the difficult decisions needed for effective international counter-terrorism operations, including military intervention.

- The Iraq war has complicated gaining and maintaining broad European and international support for counter-terrorism actions. The absence of a UN or NATO mandate combined with the widely-held view in Europe that the Iraq war was not directly linked to the struggle against international terrorism strongly colors security thinking among Europeans.
Responses

International terrorism presents the Euro-Atlantic nations with a complex and persistent threat that calls for a multilateral strategic response involving many dimensions of policy and many international actors. No simple approach and no single institution or channel of international cooperation can be expected to suffice. This report addresses potential future NATO roles and how NATO might best fit into the hierarchy of institutions and means for confronting terrorism.

- Fighting international terrorism is not first and foremost a military problem, whereas NATO is fundamentally a military organization. Nevertheless, the terrorist threat has evolved to the point at which it can, in some circumstances, be considered an opposing armed force that presents a significant international security challenge requiring the deployment of military forces.

- NATO, as a regional organization, fits in between the broadest-scope efforts orchestrated by the UN and more specific national efforts to confront terrorism. A combination of all three levels of effort is required.

- A comprehensive strategy to cope with the terrorist threat is required. Table 1 on page 15 elucidates the Working Group’s concept of the core competencies of, and relationship among, each of the major organizations engaged in counter-terrorism, and illustrates how national efforts can be integrated with those of NATO, the EU and the UN.

- NATO’s vision for confronting terrorism acknowledges that primary responsibility rests with the member nations. NATO’s goal is to assist member states in deterring, defending, disrupting and protecting against terrorist threats from abroad, “as and where needed.” Its basic approach includes four components:
  1. Anti-terrorism defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property;
  2. Consequence management, including reactive measures to mitigate effects;
  3. Counter-terrorism offensive measures with NATO either in the lead or in supporting roles, including psychological and information operations; and
  4. Military cooperation with member, partner, dialogue and other countries, as well as international organizations such as the UN, the EU and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

- NATO is best suited for promoting strategic consensus among its members and for roles that involve coordinated action over a sustained period of time, such as coordination and integration of preventive measures, consequence management, stability operations, surveillance of airspace and sea lanes and enhancing national capabilities, particularly among weaker states.
Challenges

**Seeing the Enemy**
Sharing sensitive intelligence information will normally be done bilaterally, rather than multilaterally through NATO. Yet, accurate and timely intelligence information is critical to confronting terrorism. “Seeing the enemy”, in the case of terrorism, poses a fundamentally different challenge for NATO than does the more traditional task of seeking to determine the composition and disposition of enemy forces.

- Each NATO member and partner faces unique circumstances that result in varying perceptions of the terrorist threat. Systematic analytic exchanges are critical in building consensus on the changing nature of the threat as well as understanding important differences in national perspectives.

- The highly adaptive nature of the terrorist threat requires frequent adjustments in ways of thinking and responding. NATO can provide unique added value by focusing on improving understanding of terrorist modes of operation and intelligence problem-solving, rather than on the exchange of actionable intelligence that involves highly sensitive sources and methods. Such intelligence is better handled and shared through bilateral arrangements.

- NATO can bring together analysts from a wide range of countries, experiences and disciplines whose collective wisdom can lead to a better understanding of how terrorists think – something that no single member would likely be able to accomplish alone. NATO can be a forum for intelligence analysts and scholars to build understanding and solve specific problems.

**NATO-EU Cooperation**
Close NATO-EU cooperation offers substantial benefits in fighting terrorism. These have not yet been realized, even though the two institutions share compatible visions of the problem as elaborated in the EU Action Plan and NATO’s MC 472.

There should be a division of labor between the two organizations in which the EU exploits its primarily legal and economic competencies and NATO exploits its primarily military competencies. Both the EU’s Barcelona Process and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue should have a counter-terrorism component, with the Barcelona effort focused more on legal issues and law enforcement and the Mediterranean Dialogue on military cooperation and assistance. The Mediterranean Dialogue should be suitably broadened or adapted to include other interested nations in the region.

**The War of Ideas**
A decisive arena in confronting terrorism is the realm of ideas. The populations in target areas must come to believe that terrorism is neither justified for any political or religious reason, nor likely to achieve political or social goals. Terrorism must be discredited as a means of political expression. NATO’s role to date on this front has been indirect – consisting primarily of exporting security so that local governments have the possibility of
providing good governance and more tolerant, attractive alternatives to tacitly accepting, effectively harboring or even actively encouraging terrorist movements. However, NATO has the potential, as it did during the Cold War, to offer an attractive, positive vision of diversity, tolerance and progress beneath its security umbrella that could make a valuable contribution to the overall confrontation with international terrorists.
NATO’s Role in Confronting International Terrorism

I. Analytical Approach

International terrorism presents the Euro-Atlantic nations with a complex, persistent threat that calls for a multilateral strategic response involving many dimensions of policy and many international actors. No simple approach and no single institution or channel of international cooperation can be expected to suffice. It follows that there is a need to define appropriate roles for all the institutions involved and to formulate a strategy by which the countries engaged in the struggle can most effectively coordinate and combine their responses in what will at best be a long and difficult task.

The Atlantic Council project that gave rise to this report was designed to address potential future NATO roles and how NATO might fit into the hierarchy of means and institutions for confronting terrorism. The Council’s working group recognized that fighting international terrorism is not first and foremost a military problem, whereas NATO is fundamentally a military organization. Nevertheless, the terrorist threat has evolved to the point at which it can, in some circumstances, be considered an opposing armed force that presents a significant international security challenge requiring the deployment of military forces. NATO has accepted this challenge in Afghanistan and in other regions and its special skills and capabilities are likely to prove relevant to other aspects of the problem in the future.

Against this background, the Atlantic Council project sought to identify areas in which NATO has a comparative advantage in the struggle against international terrorism. Much of the working group’s effort was devoted to discussing the many issues associated with the terrorist challenge with both governmental and nongovernmental leaders and experts in European countries.¹ These discussions focused on understanding the probable evolution of the terrorist threat in the coming five to ten years in all its manifestations, on identifying

¹ The countries visited were, in alphabetical order, Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Romania, Russia and Spain. Discussions were typically held with officials of the foreign and defense ministries and intelligence agencies, as well as with nongovernmental experts knowledgeable about terrorism and/or transatlantic cooperation. In addition, visits were made to NATO headquarters, SHAPE and the European Union Council Secretariat and Commission.
the functions critical to the implementation of an effective campaign against the evolving threat and on determining which national or international institutions, including bilateral relationships, were well suited to undertake each of these functions.

One critical aspect of understanding the terrorist problem is that both the threat and our understanding of it are in a state of continuous evolution. While a definitive analysis of the threat was not a primary purpose of the project, an understanding of how the threat is perceived in different countries is fundamental to any consideration of how the threat can best be countered. Accordingly, this report begins with a summary of the evolution of the threat as perceived by the Council’s working group during its visits to Europe, as a basis for the discussion of the potential division of labor between NATO and other institutions.2

II. The Problem of Terrorism

Transatlantic Consensus on the Nature of the Threat

European and U.S. experts agree that international terrorism will continue to pose a serious problem for many years. While various national perspectives reflect somewhat different concerns and priorities, there is now a consensus regarding the nature and extent of the threat that provides a basis for coordinated planning and action. Definitions of terrorism or debates about which organizations should or should not be included on certain lists of terrorists have not inhibited the evolution of this general consensus. Rather, it is now widely accepted that international terrorism is a single problem with many manifestations, whereas in the past terrorism was viewed more as a series of discrete national phenomena with the result that the differences among terrorist groups were highlighted. The older approach missed important linkages among terrorist groups and consequently underestimated the need and the opportunities for broad cooperation among governments in dealing with the problem.3

Radical Islamic Terrorism vs. Political and Nationalist Terrorism

The ideology of 21st century terrorism will be even more difficult to defeat than that of the political and nationalist terrorism of the 1960s through the 1980s. Moreover, the lethality, geographic reach and appeal of radical Islamic terrorism have surpassed that of earlier movements. Al-Qa’ida has excelled at adapting and co-opting others’ causes to expand its reach and base of support, though other movements have morphed as well, constituting a dangerous trend.

---

2 It should be noted that the majority of the dialogues took place before the terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004. Not surprisingly, the dialogues held after this event reflected a heightened awareness of the threat to European countries and targets from radical Islamist groups.
3 The principal qualification to this general conclusion relates to the question of whether Palestinian attacks on Israeli targets are properly considered as terrorism. While an increasing number of Europeans have come to the view that they are properly so considered, there remains a strong sentiment in some European countries that Palestinians have no recourse against Israeli occupation and repression other than violence and that it is unhelpful to accuse them of terrorism in their attempts to use that recourse. The practical significance of this difference of view will be noted below.
Earlier groups that were once primarily secular or nationalist, like Fatah and anti-Iraqi Kurdish nationalists, have spawned religiously oriented offshoots such as the al-Aqsa Brigades and Ansar al-Islam.

Some international terrorist groups have endured 20 years or more. Many groups, like the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Basque Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), can still conduct lethal attacks even though their popularity and ability to recruit have fallen below earlier levels. Others, like Italy's Red Brigades and Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo, have reconstituted themselves, at least in part, after former leaders and members were released from prison.

The Key Concern: al-Qa’ida’s Abiding Strength

At the moment, the United States and European governments are appropriately focused principally on al-Qa’ida and radical Islamist terrorism that is dedicated to attacking, disrupting and destroying a broad range of Western government and civilian targets. Despite the substantial blows to al-Qa’ida over the last two years, the extremist anti-Western Islamist message it and other radical organizations purvey resonates widely among Muslims, making it unlikely that terrorist threats will soon decrease.

The sources of the global radical Islamist phenomenon are generally seen as complex and varied, drawing on movements, ideas and resources from the Gulf, North Africa, South Asia and Muslim communities in Europe. Many in the movement were trained in the camps of Afghanistan during and after the Soviet-Afghan war. They are led by veterans like Usama bin Ladin and the “Afghan Arabs”, who first fought against the Soviet Union in support of the Afghan Mujaheddin in the 1980s. Thousands of trained fighters, including Islamist extremists who have fought in places such as Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, the Philippines and now Iraq, are believed to be ready to execute a wide range of attacks on Western interests. Assessing the current strength of al-Qa’ida is no simple task, though the following points help elucidate the reasoning behind the assertion of many in Europe that it is indeed still the most worrisome terrorist threat.

- Al-Qa’ida’s top level leadership cadre – many of whom have been captured or killed since September 2001 – may not be so easily replaced, but with an estimated 70,000 to 100,000 individuals trained in camps in Afghanistan, the Philippines and elsewhere over the past decades, there are thousands of potential replacements for al-Qa’ida’s leaders and rank and file. Recruits for like-minded groups are also readily available.

- Bin Ladin’s message continues to resonate among Islamic extremists worldwide. Disaffected Muslim youth provide ample and accessible recruitment targets in religious schools, mosques and prisons.

- Many Europeans, both in and out of government, believe that the war in Iraq has significantly augmented the recruitment of the extremist organizations, both in the Middle East and in European countries.

4 For a fuller account of the origins of al-Qa’ida and related groups see The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s War Against America, by Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, as well as other recent analyses.
The Changing and Adaptive Nature of the Threat

The ultimate goals of al-Qa'ida and related groups are increasingly understood to relate both to the establishment of a new order in the Middle East and the Gulf based on strict Islamic principles – eventually amounting to the reestablishment of a Caliphate in the region – and to the elimination of the Western presence in the region along with Western support for what the extremists see as the infidel and corrupt regimes that currently exist there. Accordingly, the terrorists are seen as seeking to attack a broad range of targets both in the region and outside that can help achieve these far-reaching ambitions. As the number of attacks has increased, most analysts in Europe have come to see that, while there may be a preference on the part of the terrorists for high-value, high-symbolism targets such as those attacked on September 11, 2001, the amount of attention and impact that terrorists have been able to garner by attacking lower value, less difficult targets (such as those selected in Madrid or in Saudi Arabia in recent months) suggests that this latter type of attack is likely to proliferate because, and as long as, it continues to serve the underlying goals of the terrorist groups. This is one example among many that supports the widespread Western view of terrorists as highly adaptive to changing circumstances.

Consistent with this analysis, European experts note that the Islamic extremists have specifically targeted U.S. allies over the last year, especially those who have contributed troops to operations in Iraq and/or Afghanistan. Attacks in Great Britain, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan, the Philippines, Spain, Tunisia and Yemen targeted tourists, diplomats and soldiers, as well as local nationals. The view that the countries that have supported U.S. policy in Iraq – in many cases against the grain of their public opinion – have as a result exposed themselves to a higher risk of attack was several times expressed in the dialogues the Council’s working group members had in Europe. The Madrid attacks of March 11, 2004 thus seem as an object lesson along these lines and may unfortunately have led the terrorists to conclude that they should continue to attempt carefully timed attacks, which have had and could therefore continue to have significant political payoff from their point of view, both in the region (for example in Iraq) and in Europe and the United States.

Likely Future Modalities of Action

It is clear that, in whatever form, terrorists will continue to look for ways to attack Western interests. Most of the European experts consulted for this report believe that terrorist groups are most likely to continue to rely primarily on technically simple and tested methods of attack such as the use of pipe, car and truck bombs and, increasingly, suicide bombers. Statistics indicate an overwhelming reliance on conventional means of attack. But there is also general agreement that – if only because the consequences would be disproportionately severe – it would be foolhardy to ignore stepped-up terrorist interest in unconventional weaponry over the last decade. Several senior European experts thus share the widely held view in U.S. circles that a terrorist attack using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear devices is only a matter of time. The evidence of experimentation with CBRN weapons and the dramatic impact such a weapon would have make it hard to escape the conclusion that CBRN weapons would be used if available. Moreover, bin Ladin has declared the procurement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to be a “religious duty”.

The Changing and Adaptive Nature of the Threat

The ultimate goals of al-Qa'ida and related groups are increasingly understood to relate both to the establishment of a new order in the Middle East and the Gulf based on strict Islamic principles – eventually amounting to the reestablishment of a Caliphate in the region – and to the elimination of the Western presence in the region along with Western support for what the extremists see as the infidel and corrupt regimes that currently exist there. Accordingly, the terrorists are seen as seeking to attack a broad range of targets both in the region and outside that can help achieve these far-reaching ambitions. As the number of attacks has increased, most analysts in Europe have come to see that, while there may be a preference on the part of the terrorists for high-value, high-symbolism targets such as those attacked on September 11, 2001, the amount of attention and impact that terrorists have been able to garner by attacking lower value, less difficult targets (such as those selected in Madrid or in Saudi Arabia in recent months) suggests that this latter type of attack is likely to proliferate because, and as long as, it continues to serve the underlying goals of the terrorist groups. This is one example among many that supports the widespread Western view of terrorists as highly adaptive to changing circumstances.

Consistent with this analysis, European experts note that the Islamic extremists have specifically targeted U.S. allies over the last year, especially those who have contributed troops to operations in Iraq and/or Afghanistan. Attacks in Great Britain, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan, the Philippines, Spain, Tunisia and Yemen targeted tourists, diplomats and soldiers, as well as local nationals. The view that the countries that have supported U.S. policy in Iraq – in many cases against the grain of their public opinion – have as a result exposed themselves to a higher risk of attack was several times expressed in the dialogues the Council’s working group members had in Europe. The Madrid attacks of March 11, 2004 thus seem as an object lesson along these lines and may unfortunately have led the terrorists to conclude that they should continue to attempt carefully timed attacks, which have had and could therefore continue to have significant political payoff from their point of view, both in the region (for example in Iraq) and in Europe and the United States.

Likely Future Modalities of Action

It is clear that, in whatever form, terrorists will continue to look for ways to attack Western interests. Most of the European experts consulted for this report believe that terrorist groups are most likely to continue to rely primarily on technically simple and tested methods of attack such as the use of pipe, car and truck bombs and, increasingly, suicide bombers. Statistics indicate an overwhelming reliance on conventional means of attack. But there is also general agreement that – if only because the consequences would be disproportionately severe – it would be foolhardy to ignore stepped-up terrorist interest in unconventional weaponry over the last decade. Several senior European experts thus share the widely held view in U.S. circles that a terrorist attack using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear devices is only a matter of time. The evidence of experimentation with CBRN weapons and the dramatic impact such a weapon would have make it hard to escape the conclusion that CBRN weapons would be used if available. Moreover, bin Ladin has declared the procurement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to be a “religious duty”.
Fortunately, the mere possession of instructions, equipment and ingredients for chemical and biological weapons – all of which al-Qa’ida is known to have – does not automatically translate into a bona fide unconventional weapons capability.\(^5\) For instance, terrorist cookbooks and many government documents on weapons manufacture omit essential information, such as how to scale-up chemical agent production from beaker quantities to the larger amounts needed to inflict mass casualties. For catastrophic attacks, terrorists must not only master the technical intricacies involved in the manufacture of chemical and biological agents, but also acquire the mechanical and operational expertise to disperse the agent effectively. Likely future advances in equipment and techniques that are widely shared for scientific and/or commercial purposes could facilitate terrorist efforts in this regard.

More than one terrorist group (e.g., Chechen separatists and al-Qa’ida) has shown an interest in radiological dispersal devices, known as “dirty bombs”. Of the millions of radiation sources used commercially, only a few are of high-risk concern (e.g., Strontium-90, Californium-252) for their potential to cause considerable harm were they to be used in a dirty bomb. Otherwise, the principal risks from radiation dispersal devices are of injury from the explosive blast, ensuing panic and economic damage to the area of attack.

Projections of catastrophic terrorist events involving unconventional weapons have particularly abounded since mid-March 1995, when the religious cult Aum Shinrikyo released a weakened grade of the nerve agent sarin in Tokyo’s subway system. The incident killed a dozen, far fewer than some of the more prominent conventional attacks of the past decade (e.g., the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing or the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Africa). The outcome of the sarin attack – when contrasted with Aum Shinrikyo’s significant financial and scientific investment in the acquisition of the gas and of other germ weapons – underscores some of the technical difficulties surrounding weaponry that is often portrayed as “easy” to obtain and further supports the view that terrorists are likely to continue to use primarily conventional means of attack, which can be locally produced and are relatively dependable.\(^6\)

**Where Terrorists Will Likely Reside, Carry Out Operations and Plan and Prepare Attacks**

Remote safe-havens like Afghanistan were essential to the original development of extremist groups. They are widely seen as less important now because terrorist cells are well established in Western societies, where they can rely on local recruitment. Recent al-Qa’ida operations indicate as much. Moreover, progress in cyber-communications and “virtual” organization make a given group’s operations harder to detect.

---

\(^5\) Al-Qa’ida and Jemaah Islamiya are known to have been working on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capabilities, particularly chemical and biological agents. The arrests of poison plotters in Europe – associated with research into crude poisons and toxins – underscore terrorist interest in unconventional weapons. Over time, terrorists might well be able to acquire more sophisticated chemical or biological agents and delivery devices.

\(^6\) As al-Qa’ida has done in the past, terrorists could well use the infrastructure of Western society to inflict stupendous casualty tolls. For example, conventional attacks on, or insider sabotage of chemical plants, many of which are situated in and around metropolitan areas, could prove just as harmful to humans, animals and the environment as the classic warfare agents. Although not the result of a terrorist action, the 1984 chemical accident at Bhopal, India, which killed approximately 3,800 people, illustrates the potential severity of an attack on a chemical plant.
State sponsorship, so crucial to terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s, has declined in importance and been replaced by “lawless zones” in failed or weak states where terrorists operate with impunity. South and Southeast Asia, Africa and South America are the places in which such zones will most likely proliferate, while remote regions of Russia and especially Central Asia are likewise areas of growing concern.

Nevertheless, the problem of the on-going development and growth of extremist groups would be exacerbated if regimes sympathetic to extremists were to take power in countries such as Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco or Pakistan. North African instability, in particular, would increase the threat to NATO’s Mediterranean members.

Terrorism at sea is another area of concern, particularly in sensitive narrows and choke points where shipping is congested. The Suez and Panama Canals, the Strait of Hormuz and perhaps even the Strait of Malacca (just to name a few), could be closed if ships were sunk or critical facilities contaminated as the result of a terrorist attack. The potential damage resulting from large fuel spills also remains a serious concern. Multinational cooperation is essential in dealing with these kinds of problems.

The “Nexus”: Terrorism, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime

Although terrorist groups and narcotics, human trafficking and organized crime networks cooperate at times, integration is viewed as unlikely because today’s terrorists do not see themselves as criminals and, for ideological or religious reasons, generally reject such integration. Some groups such as the Red Army Faction (RAF) and Red Brigades have partially supported themselves through kidnapping, extortion, contraband smuggling and bank robbery, while other groups, such as the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines and some Latin American groups, still raise funds this way.

Nevertheless, the scarcity of legal resources and the demands of a fugitive life make it likely that terrorists will continue to cooperate with criminals and share resources such as travel agencies, document and credit card forgers, drug smugglers and human smugglers.

This nexus between drugs and terror is important and has particular implications for organizing and managing efforts to deal with these problems. A substantial number of international terrorist groups are linked to drug trafficking. For example, almost half of the foreign terrorist groups on the U.S. State Department list are involved with drug trafficking, including Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the United Self-Defense Forces of Columbia (AUC), the National Liberation Army (ELN) of Columbia and Sendero Luminoso.

Terrorists and drug traffickers are often drawn together because of geography, strategy and politics. Terrorism and drug trafficking thrive in areas where central government authority is weak or even non-existent, including parts of Afghanistan, the Northwest Frontier Province

---

7 The U.S. State Department website still lists seven nations – Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria as state sponsors of terrorism although it also notes that Libya and Sudan have made very significant progress toward easing international concerns regarding their support of terrorism. The State Department also notes that while Iraq remains a base of terrorist activities primarily directed against the Coalition Provisional Authority, all terrorism-related sanctions against Iraq have been suspended.
of Pakistan, frontier areas in Myanmar and northern Thailand and other similar regions, e.g., in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. In rural areas where farmers engage in illegal drug cultivation, outlawed terrorist groups can provide protection and thereby enrich themselves with hundreds of millions of dollars from this criminal activity. If not checked, such tactical cooperation can even destabilize governments.

These relationships indicate that many of the same resources are needed in confronting both problems. Reducing drug trafficking weakens terrorism and defeating terrorism enhances drug control. This then argues for close cooperation between counter-terrorism and drug intelligence centers, rather than shifting resources from drug enforcement to anti-terrorism as has happened in the United States.

Persistent Differences in Political Evaluations and Priorities

Threat or Risk?
Even though official assessments of terrorism are quite similar throughout NATO, important differences remain over political evaluations and priorities. The September 11, 2001 attack on the United States prompted NATO to invoke Article 5’s provisions for the first time in its history in common recognition of the terrorist threat. However, while the prevailing view in the United States considers terrorism as a priority threat that requires a war to defeat the enemy, the majority of NATO members still do not view terrorism as a threat calling for a “war”, but rather as a dangerous and inescapable risk to be managed like other international challenges. The debate is not about terrorism itself, but rather the severity of the threat and whether and how it can be defeated.

While this distinction can be over-stated and the two views are not mutually exclusive, preferences for one approach over the other nevertheless dictate priorities, strategies and trade-offs for collective action. For example, the U.S. view tends to dictate a strategy that emphasizes offensive and preventive or preemptive measures, while the view more widely held in Europe tends to call for a strategy emphasizing defensive measures. Having said that, both sides would accept that components of both approaches are needed for an effective counter-terrorism strategy. The issue is how the balance should be struck.

Some see these differences as resulting from a fundamental divergence between the U.S. and European strategic approaches. Robert Kagan’s now famous phrase “Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from Venus” captures this divergence, as does the tendency by Americans to see Europeans as favoring appeasement and the European inclination to see Americans as partial to military solutions. Whatever the truth of this analysis, there are many more concrete factors that influence the transatlantic divergences on how to deal with terrorism. These include the large and often ill-assimilated domestic Muslim communities in many European countries, historic connections to the Middle East and North Africa, varying degrees of anti-U.S. sentiment that complicate coordinated responses and different views on the centrality of making progress on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to reducing the terrorist threat.

8 For example, the persistent anti-Americanism in Greece, which pre-dates problems over the Iraq war, also colors Greek views of the terrorist issue.
But the most immediate, and probably the most important, factor is the war in Iraq. European governments supported, and still support, the war in Afghanistan as a vital element in the campaign against international terrorism. Whereas for the most part they do not believe that military means are central to the struggle against terrorism, they readily agreed that the destruction by military force of al-Qa’ida’s operating base in Afghanistan was an indispensable element of that struggle. The same is not true of the war in Iraq, which few Europeans see as directly related to the campaign against terrorism and many see as likely to make the campaign harder and longer.

All European countries, to a greater or lesser extent, see themselves as being in the line of fire of the terrorists and accept the necessity of confronting terrorist groups. Indeed, as has been mentioned, many experts and officials in countries such as Italy and Spain believe that they have exposed themselves to greater risk as a consequence of their support for U.S. policy in Iraq. Some in the United States may interpret this as implying that some in Europe believe that they can shelter themselves from terrorist threats by dissociating themselves from the United States. This view is especially current concerning France, which in the past has adopted such an approach. By and large this is a serious misrepresentation of the current thinking of European governments. And it is especially inaccurate in relation to current French policy, which is in many ways tougher on terrorists and terrorism than that of any other European country. The importance of the French position in any consideration of transatlantic cooperation on terrorism is such that a fuller assessment of it is presented in Annex A of this report.

Public Threat Perceptions in Europe
Another important transatlantic difference that complicates coordinated responses derives from public attitudes. Prior to the March 11, 2004 terrorist attacks in Spain, many Europeans did not feel particularly threatened by terrorism, in marked contrast to the official views within the same countries. Although the attacks in Madrid may have somewhat shifted public perceptions, unlike the U.S. public since September 11, 2001, most Europeans still do not see terrorism as posing the kind of fundamental threat to their national survival and way of life that they experienced during the Cold War. As a consequence, European publics are not inclined to support increases in national defense efforts or expenditures on operations such as the U.S. attack on Iraq on the grounds that there is a terrorist threat to themselves. Similarly, in those countries where new legislation is required to deal more effectively with terrorism, governments have, as a result, greater difficulty in obtaining support for new initiatives. These attitudes also underpin the perceived importance in the public mind of a sound legal basis, by means of UN and/or NATO mandates, for participation in international counter-terrorist operations.

The Iraq war was not directly linked to the terrorist problem in the minds of most European citizens and their widespread opposition to the war strongly colors thinking about international security, today’s terrorist threat and the United States more generally. While most NATO members have joined the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq, they have done so in the face

---

9 There may, of course, be other reasons for which even those Europeans who do see terrorism as a direct threat would not support increased defense expenditures or current U.S. policies as the preferred means of dealing with it.
of strong domestic opposition to the war. U.S. pressure for European/NATO involvement has reinforced concerns that the United States is mainly interested in using NATO as a tool to project U.S. power, rather than as an alliance to promote collective defense.

The Madrid bombings of March 2004 and the bombings in Istanbul in December 2003 may lead to a change in public attitudes in Europe, although it is too early to determine how this will affect public support for different approaches to dealing with terrorism. For the moment, European governments’ strong negative reaction to Usama bin Ladin’s “offer” in early April 2004 (of a ceasefire with European countries if they withdraw from Afghanistan and Iraq) has been well accepted in public opinion.

III. International Responses to Terrorism

There is widespread acceptance in Europe that a comprehensive multi-layered response to international terrorism is essential. The notion that coping with terrorism is primarily a “local” problem is losing credibility with each new terrorist act. Most of today’s terrorists are not “home-grown.” There is ample evidence that many terrorist acts either are organized by an international terrorist network or at least receive from one some international funding guidance, funding, material support or intelligence support. To be sure, the first response capabilities that include responsibility for emergency/rescue services are mobilized at the local or national level. However, individual states are not capable of combating modern international terrorism on their own.

The Roles of International Organizations

While most cooperation between governments will necessarily be bilateral and primarily among law enforcement and intelligence agencies, international organizations – including the UN, the G-8, NATO and the EU – can and must play important coordinating and integrating roles in supporting national efforts. Logically, NATO’s role, like that of the EU or the G-8, fits in between the broadest-scope efforts orchestrated by the UN and more specific national efforts to confront terrorism.\textsuperscript{10}

All the key institutions discussed in this report have compiled an extensive track record of responses to the terrorist threat, notably since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Annex B contains a summary of these responses by the United Nations, NATO and the EU, as well as a summary of the evolution of the U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which was published in March 2003. Much of the effort of the Atlantic Council working group and its dialogues in European capitals was focused on understanding how these different responses related to one another in the eyes of European and U.S. experts and how these interrelationships affect the potential role that NATO could play in the future.

\textsuperscript{10} There are several relevant international organizations in addition to NATO and the European Union at the intermediate level between national efforts and the United Nations, but they are outside the scope of this paper. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, for example, reaffirmed its involvement in the broad struggle against terrorism in the March 2004 Vienna Declaration, which called for cooperation in building the capacity of member states to fight terrorism.
The United Nations

The United Nations is an indispensable part of a well-coordinated, successful global campaign against terrorism. It alone can provide a strong political and legal basis for such a campaign, create a global network of states and organizations to take part in it and pursue a framework within which their efforts can be coordinated. The United Nations Security Council can formulate and endorse norms and establish priorities to motivate and guide national responses to terrorism. Without the overriding moral and legal framework provided by the United Nations, it is difficult for individual nations to separate counter-terrorism from the continual flow of tactical foreign policy issues. Moreover, United Nations leadership makes it possible for nations to offer support to the international struggle against terrorism without appearing to support other aspects of U.S. policy that they may oppose.

However, the United Nations cannot by its very nature be a source of policy leadership. Strategic, practical and programmatic leadership will inevitably come from countries or groups of countries that feel themselves to be most at risk.

Filling an Institutional Void

Many Europeans are acutely aware that there has been a lack of real strategic dialogue on this subject in recent years. On the one hand, it is apparent that many European leaders are not willing simply to follow a “Made in the USA” strategy. Equally, however, a combination of transatlantic differences of the kind discussed earlier and intra-European differences that have inhibited the emergence of a robust consensus in Europe have by default created a situation in which U.S. leadership has been the principal source of strategic initiative on the subject. If, however, as many increasingly believe, A) the struggle is likely to last a decade or more; B) the threat is comparable in scale to that of Soviet power during the Cold War; and C) the response of the Euro-Atlantic countries which are on the front line in confronting the terrorists is likely to be more effective if it is a cooperative response, then there is a need for an institution in which a shared strategy for the mobilization of the full range of appropriate policy instruments can be developed.

The United States and its allies need a consultative venue for the development and regular updating of their strategy toward international terrorism.

- First, there is a need to bridge more effectively the gulf between those countries, like the United States, that see the counter-terrorism effort in terms of a war designed to suppress terrorist groups – requiring, among other means, the use of military power in selected situations – and those, like many countries in Western Europe, that think more in terms of managing a danger, primarily through law enforcement and intelligence cooperation.

- Second, there is a need to accommodate to the fact that the threat itself is continually evolving in ways that are of great importance to the choice of policy remedies to be adopted.

In short, the Western countries need to think and act in terms of a long-term strategy combining the whole range of policy instruments that are relevant to the counter-terrorism
effort. The analogy is to the way in which, during the Cold War, they continually developed strategies – not without considerable disagreements – toward meeting the Soviet threat.

**Evaluating the Advantages and Disadvantages of the Institutional Options**

Where a strategy for the struggle against international terrorism based on close transatlantic cooperation can best be forged was a question on which the Atlantic Council’s working group focused many of its discussions in Europe. There are a number of institutions through which this process could be conducted. Among them are the G-8, the U.S.-EU summit process, the OSCE and NATO. Each presents advantages and disadvantages for this purpose.

- The G-8 has a restricted membership, which is both an asset (because it may allow for less inhibited discussion) and a liability (because it is arguably not sufficiently broadly-based). Its inclusion of Russia and Japan also presents both advantages and potential disadvantages. Furthermore, the G-8 lacks a strong and permanent institutional infrastructure, which makes it harder to implement its decisions (though this fact has not prevented its successful launch of initiatives such as the Global Partnership relating to nuclear proliferation). However, by virtue of the range of the issues that it addresses, including security, economic and other issues, it has a distinct advantage over NATO in the eyes of those who believe that the U.S. approach to terrorism is too greatly concentrated on the use of military means, which are the principal strengths of NATO as an institution. The G-8 could establish a commission on terrorism similar to the way in which they have addressed the weapons of mass destruction issue, although this would not necessarily constitute the most effective approach to remedying these two problems.

- NATO has the advantage of a membership that is almost ideal for the purpose, especially if the NATO-Russia Council is considered a part of it. It also has the tradition from the Cold War period of the kind of common assessment and discussion of major security issues that is required and the habits and scale of staff conducive to the management of this process. However, it suffers from a number of corresponding drawbacks. These include, notably, concern on the part of many Europeans that the United States has become accustomed to using NATO as an instrument for the implementation of U.S. policy and, increasingly, as a tool-box from which to draw on European military capabilities that are of value to it for this purpose. The United States, in the view of several other NATO members, made a major mistake in not making better use of the Alliance when it launched operations against *al-Qa’ida* and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Put bluntly, the Allies played little or no role and felt that they were not wanted as the United States prepared to go it alone. While this perception has been partially reversed since then, notably at the time of the Prague summit agreements, it has

---

11 It may seem paradoxical that Europeans hold this view so strongly when they have broadly accepted the necessity of high intensity military operations to root out *al-Qa’ida* and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The explanation of the paradox is that few Europeans see a future situation developing that would be comparable to the one in Afghanistan and they therefore do not foresee a requirement to prepare to deal with such a contingency.
by no means disappeared and was regularly raised during the consultations in Europe on which this report is extensively based.

- The U.S.-EU process is at present a less apt institution for this purpose. The agendas for the U.S.-EU summits have expanded considerably in recent years to include security matters and the U.S.-EU process would be more acceptable to some European countries than would NATO as an institutional home for such a dialogue. But there is little prospect that it would be seen on the U.S. side as suitable, if only because the range of subjects on which the EU participants are empowered to act independently of the member states does not include many of the most important subjects involved in dealing with the terrorist threat. The U.S.-EU summit process also excludes Russia and, as currently constituted, only indirectly involves all the governments that need to be part of the deliberation.

- The OSCE has an appropriately broad membership, but has little experience with the sharing of classified information and a staff infrastructure that is not ideally suited for an expanded role in confronting terrorism.

**NATO and the European Union**

_The Potential for Closer NATO-EU Cooperation_

Closer NATO-EU cooperation potentially opens a way toward the resolution of this institutional challenge. NATO-EU relations in the area of terrorism have developed slowly and with considerable difficulty. Thus, the substantial potential benefits of NATO-EU cooperation in dealing with terrorism have not yet been realized, even though the two institutions share quite compatible visions of the problem as elaborated in the EU action plan and NATO’s MC 472.\(^{12}\) Part of the problem stems from a widely held view in Europe that the European Union is better suited than NATO to deal with terrorism. This argument contends that terrorism is a problem best handled by police and that placing more emphasis on the military dimension will draw attention and resources away from important political, economic and social instruments. Furthermore, a concern shared by many Europeans is that NATO has become primarily a tool of U.S. foreign policy, so they are reluctant to support efforts to empower NATO further in dealing with terrorism. Finally, at least part of the concern of European skeptics in regard to using NATO for the purpose of strategic dialogue about terrorism flows from the difficulty that the members of the EU have experienced in implementing the proposed European Security and Defense Policy and its associated Rapid Reaction Force – and in establishing its proper relationship with corresponding NATO capabilities.

Such views present a false choice between NATO and the EU: this is not an either/or proposition. Both institutions can make useful contributions and their closer coordination would be helpful. A lack of close coordination will probably lead either to inefficiency or unnecessary duplication of effort. One area of concern in this regard is the air space over Europe. The EU wants to assume responsibility for air space management, while NATO has a comparative advantage in terms of early warning, air defense and missile defense.

\(^{12}\) See Annex B.
Any comprehensive, long-term, multifaceted response to the terrorism problem must involve both organizations. An implicit division of labor is possible and desirable in which the EU focuses on legislative, judicial and law enforcement responses while NATO addresses the security spectrum that involves employing military assets and security assistance. Still, these efforts will often overlap. For example, both the EU’s Barcelona Process and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue have a counter-terrorism component, with the Barcelona effort more focused on legal issues and law enforcement and the Mediterranean Dialogue on military-security cooperation. To date, both have fallen short of expectations. The Mediterranean Dialogue has disappointed primarily because, as a multilateral approach, it has fallen afoul of political divisions among the Middle East countries involved.

**Building on Current Efforts**

For the time being, NATO-EU cooperation is limited to crisis management. The recent focus has been mainly on the handover of peacekeeping operations in Macedonia from NATO to the EU. Thinking more broadly, the NATO staff prepared a “Food for Thought” paper that identified potential areas of cooperation. These ideas were discussed at the second of three levels of NATO-EU coordination. This led to enhanced cooperation on civil emergencies and an agreement to hold a seminar on terrorism at the ministerial level before the June 2004 Istanbul Summit.

There have been other positive developments. One obstacle in NATO-EU relations was overcome when the EU decided at the Brussels Council in December 2003 not to proceed with building a separate EU military headquarters and to work within the “Berlin Plus” framework. Another positive development was the first NATO-EU joint crisis management exercise, which was conducted in November 2003. This exercise focused on NATO-EU interaction at the strategic political-military level based on arrangements for consultation and cooperation between the two organizations. The exercise scenario involved a crisis in which NATO as a whole decided not to act, but made its assets and capabilities available to the EU. Troops were not deployed for this exercise.

To facilitate closer cooperation, an EU staff group has been established at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) as part of the strategic operations center. This provides the EU access to the NATO planning and resources called for under the Berlin Plus arrangements. NATO also has a representative at the EU which, combined with the EU group at SHAPE, brings the two force planning processes closer together. This is necessary because there is for the most part only one set of forces, even though NATO focuses on its NATO Response Force and the EU on its Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). But these liaison arrangements have yet to overcome completely considerable doubt and frustration about the coordination process.

---

13 The three levels, beginning at the lowest level, are: staff-to-staff, NATO’s Policy Coordination Group dealing with the EU’s Political-Military Group and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) dealing with the EU’s Political-Security Committee.

14 Berlin Plus is a set of agreements that calls for NATO to have the right of first refusal in dealing with an international security problem and provides for the EU to have access to NATO capabilities, including command by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Deputy SACEUR), should NATO decide not to take action.
Whether and when the evolution of closer NATO-EU cooperation and a changed perception in Europe of U.S. policy toward the Alliance will enable NATO to be used as a principal venue for strategic dialogue about terrorism remains to be seen. It goes without saying that if NATO were to be used for this purpose, it would not be with an eye to its becoming the primary implementer of the strategy. It would take on only those tasks for which it has a comparative advantage. Its use as the venue for strategic discussion would aptly fit its primary purpose as the premier security organization of the Western world and fill a serious gap in the way in which the Western countries have hitherto addressed the terrorism problem.

However, the obstacles to NATO being accepted as the venue for strategic dialogue among the Allies in the immediate future are probably insuperable and such dialogue, to the extent that it takes place at all, seems likely to continue to be conducted in multiple parallel settings, including the G-8, NATO and the U.S.-EU process. Only if and when the terrorist threat is seen more widely within the Euro-Atlantic world as immediate enough to override some of the factors that have inhibited the struggle against it being focused in a single institutional framework will such a focus develop in one or other of the appropriate institutions.

**IV. NATO’s Comparative Advantages**

Against the background of the discussion in the previous section, this section will determine the key components of a counter-terrorism strategy for which NATO has a discernable advantage. For analytic purposes, the functions that are essential to a comprehensive international campaign against terrorism can be separated into eleven categories. Table 1 on the next page summarizes these functions and indicates the roles for which individual states, NATO, the EU and the UN are best suited. The analysis that follows explains how the judgment was made that NATO is indeed relevant to the comparatively wide range of important functions suggested in the table. The final section of this report will then offer some specific conclusions and recommendations for NATO’s roles in performing these functions.

The major counter-terrorism functions in which NATO can play an important role are:

- Generating Political Will
- Providing Intelligence
- Managing Coordination and Integration Efforts
- Interdicting Terrorist Recruitment, Financing, Supply and Operations
- Preventing Terrorist Operations
- Managing the Consequences of Terrorist Attacks
- Arranging Security Assistance
- Educating the Population, Especially Potential Sources of Recruitment
- Organizing Research and Development
Table 1: Key Functions in Fighting Terrorism – Where NATO Fits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Functions</th>
<th>States Leading</th>
<th>NATO Supporting</th>
<th>EU Managing</th>
<th>UN Coordinating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Will.</strong> Develop common vision; build international consensus on nature of problem, appropriate responses and need for sustained, collective effort. Enhance legitimacy of measures against terrorism.</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intelligence.</strong> Provide actionable intelligence, develop threat assessments, commission studies and analyses, stimulate study and debate.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal Architecture.</strong> Provide legal framework for countering terrorism; make international legal system more hostile to terrorism; enforce laws (arrest, try, punish terrorists); provide for extradition of terrorists; protect citizens against abuse by authorities under counter-terrorism laws.</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coordination/Integration.</strong> Develop strategies, plans and networks for cooperation and coordination; establish priorities; share costs; develop doctrine; conduct training and exercises; enhance interoperability (especially communications and logistics support).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interdiction.</strong> Arrest, capture, kill terrorists; prevent and suppress terrorist financing; provide access to ports, airfields and facilities for counter-terrorism operations; over-flight.</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prevention.</strong> Develop defensive measures; reduce vulnerabilities; protect critical infrastructure; provide transportation and border security; prevent movement of terrorists and weapons across borders; prevent supply of weapons, especially nuclear, biological and chemical.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consequence Management.</strong> Organize and coordinate disaster relief resources, conduct training and exercises, provide lessons learned.</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Assistance.</strong> Strengthen weak, vulnerable areas; conduct stability operations; deny safe havens; demobilize armed, illegal groups.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>War of Ideas and Education.</strong> Diminish recruitment pool, engage in a “War of Ideas” to discredit popular appeal of terrorists, prevent widespread disaffection of Muslim youth, gain the moral high ground, provide public information, education.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Research and Development.</strong> Develop new technologies for counter-terrorism.</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Potential)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dissuasion.</strong> Determine motivations for terrorism, address root causes, provide good governance.</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Generating Political Will

Individually and collectively, national leaders must be able to make a compelling case about why substantial resources and sacrifices are necessary to deal with terrorism. The discussions and arguments will vary in each country, but these will all benefit from the extent to which they reflect a common understanding of the problem with other countries and leaders. There are several fora that have the ability to help build such a common understanding and NATO is certainly one of them.

The process of consensus-building is important because international cooperation is critical: the costs of fighting terrorism will be enormous and only the highest political levels can make the difficult choices and national trade-offs that are necessary to commit substantial resources to this purpose. Furthermore, given that confronting terrorism is likely to be a long-term, indefinite struggle, there is a danger of mission fatigue that can be mitigated if individual responses are part of a larger, credible international effort.

NATO has a unique way of mobilizing a wide range of important countries. It plays a leading role in defining threats to international security and, in the case of terrorism, has ensured that this problem receives regular attention at the highest political levels in Europe and beyond. By addressing terrorism in the systematic, comprehensive manner that characterizes NATO’s approach to security issues, consensus has been built on the nature of the problem and, in general, on appropriate responses. As a result of this and similar efforts by other institutions, it is no longer acceptable for any nation to provide a permissive environment for terrorists, sometimes justified as “freedom fighters”, in return for terrorists not causing trouble within its territory.

Providing Intelligence

Intelligence is critical to fighting terrorism. “Seeing the enemy”, in the case of international terrorism, requires looking beyond one’s borders and exchanging information with other countries in order to understand the international networks through which modern terrorists operate.

Discussions with European governments, as well as longstanding U.S. preferences, make it quite clear that specific, “actionable” intelligence will continue to be exchanged almost exclusively on a bilateral basis so that it may be acted upon quickly and without jeopardizing sources and methods. Additionally, NATO typically deals with “finished” intelligence that has already been analyzed by national intelligence agencies, as opposed to “raw” intelligence that involves original source reporting and may be incomplete, or, in some cases, intentionally misleading (if it is derived from double-agents who are not known to the reporting intelligence service). If NATO were to rely on raw intelligence or to try to generate original intelligence, it would be more vulnerable to deception.

But there is widespread interest in the possibility that, at a more general level and drawing on a broad set of information from national sources, NATO could act effectively as a clearinghouse for exchanging assessments of the terrorism problem. This is a necessary part
of the consensus-building process through which members reach general agreement on the nature of the problem before making decisions on responses. Given the wide range of experiences with terrorism of member and partner countries, NATO can provide a useful forum for comparing views and developing a deeper overall understanding of the phenomenon. These efforts might usefully be expanded to include the sharing of academic perspectives on terrorism and better sharing of information on international criminal activities that potentially offer support to international terrorism.

Managing Coordination and Integration Efforts

The United Nations is responsible for global coordination of efforts to deal with terrorism working through the Counter-Terrorism Committee.\textsuperscript{15} For most of Europe, the European Union manages coordination of law enforcement, judicial and other efforts. For security issues, however, NATO has some distinct comparative advantages.

NATO plays a leading role in developing strategies, doctrine and training for fighting terrorism for those contingencies in which military force may be needed. Of particular note is NATO’s program of exercises that provides opportunities for developing and practicing integrated civil-military operations to deal with a wide range of potential terrorist attacks. A broad network to facilitate cooperation has been established. NATO’s Partnership Coordination Cell in Mons has military representatives from 43 countries, giving it the broadest geographic reach of any international military organization in the world. The NATO-Russia Council and NATO’s partnership with Ukraine are also important venues for cooperation on terrorism-related issues. For example, these venues have been important in developing the capacities of Russian and Ukrainian troops to operate with NATO members in stability operations in the Balkans and in other places where, although terrorism may not be the primary threat, peace operations must be conducted in an environment in which terrorists are active.

NATO is noted for enhancing the interoperability of international forces and can bring this expertise to bear on those dimensions of the terrorism challenge to which military force is relevant and on situations, such as that in Afghanistan, in which NATO forces will be operating in an environment in which terrorists are a potential threat. Using English as a common language and using comprehensive NATO Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), more than 50 countries are developing the capacity to work together. Two areas, in particular, that stand out in this regard are communications and logistics. Compatible military communications enable international forces to work well together and, by association, with civil authorities and non-governmental organizations. NATO’s experience in the Balkans has been most helpful in developing such capabilities. In addition, NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT) plays a leading role in introducing friendly force identification technologies to the Alliance, which will help reduce the chances of friendly fire casualties in complex multinational combat operations. Also, as NATO undertakes out-of-area operations, such as Afghanistan, new arrangements for logistics support are being developed.

\textsuperscript{15} See Annex B.
Interdicting Terrorist Recruitment, Financing, Supply and Operations

Given the nature, size and typical weapons cache of terrorist groups, these can normally be defeated by national law enforcement, paramilitary and military forces unless the regular military forces of a host country protect them or they are operating in a failing state or sanctuary area. Similarly, national forces can conduct hostage rescue operations in most cases. Interdiction of terrorist finances also falls for the most part to national authorities with cooperation from elements of the international financial system.

Nevertheless, counter-terrorism is part of NATO’s mandate. Although approval and authority for NATO to undertake specific combat counter-terrorist operations is not likely to be delegated in advance, generic counter-terrorism planning and training are not only useful but essential. The strength of European countries’ views, as discussed earlier, that military means are not likely to play a significant role in the response to terrorism has prevented NATO’s counter-terrorism mission from becoming a driver in the development of its transformation and in the evolution of the NATO Response Force. And it may indeed be difficult to specify circumstances under which the NRF would be called upon to fight terrorists as a primary mission. However, many of the areas in which the NRF is most likely to be called upon to operate are ones in which terrorist groups are active and will therefore be part of the threat environment.

One particular topic that arose in many of the Working Group’s discussions related to the value of the Spanish Guardia Civil, the Italian Carabinieri, the French Gendarmerie and other similar forces in a variety of counter-terrorism roles associated with stabilization and peace operations outside Europe. Cooperation among these forces is already developing within the EU, but the great potential of such forces for these missions – and the fact that they represent a capability that the United States has not yet developed – argues for consideration of the potential of including them in emerging NATO counter-terrorist planning.

Preventing Terrorist Operations

States have primary responsibility for protecting their citizens. They must take steps to reduce vulnerabilities to terrorist acts, including instituting security measures for transportation systems and other components that constitute their critical infrastructure.

In supporting such efforts, NATO plays several useful roles, especially by helping to improve border security in partnership countries. More than 20 partnership countries collaborated to develop the “Partnership Action Plan for Terrorism,” which outlines the steps these states can take individually and collectively to improve their capabilities to confront terrorism. To date, 17 of these states have provided troops to NATO-led stability operations in the Balkans.

NATO can also help prevent terrorists from gaining access to weapons, especially of the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear variety. To assist in these efforts, NATO has established a Weapons of Mass Destruction Center, which is undertaking a series of initiatives to improve Alliance capabilities. These include developing a mobile laboratory that may be deployed with NATO forces; a joint assessment team; a virtual center of
excellence for defense against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons; stockpiles of appropriate chemical and biological defense pharmaceuticals; and a disease surveillance system that will provide NATO commanders with timely information on any outbreak of disease.

**Managing the Consequences of Terrorist Attacks**

States provide the first responders in the case of terrorist attack. The EU also offers an institutional mechanism for consequence management among its member states. But NATO has developed a unique – though poorly resourced – capacity to provide international back-up support in the event that a problem exceeds national capabilities. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) maintains a NATO-wide registry of capabilities that may be called upon. It also has a force generation process including communications, transport and logistics, as well as monitoring and relief units. These capabilities are exercised regularly and have substantial experience with disaster relief.

The EADRCC was established in its present form in 1998 and includes all 46 NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) countries. It draws on the substantial experience of NATO with disaster relief and refugees dating back to 1953. This eight-person coordination center operates around the clock to coordinate timely responses using national assets that are catalogued and deployed regularly, either in training exercises or in response to natural disasters. The EADRCC deals directly with a dedicated organization in each of the 46 countries and it does not need to wait for immediate NAC approval to act. Thus, for example, the Coordination Center was able to respond to Turkey’s request for support in preparing for a possible chemical attack, biological attack or large refugee flow before the Iraq war, even though similar Turkish requests for air defense units were not approved by the NAC.

Cooperation between NATO’s strategic commands and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center has been developed and practiced in exercises. One such exercise involved a hypothetical “dirty bomb” incident in Romania and featured search and rescue, decontamination and medical assistance from 16 neighboring countries. The exercise involved real radioactive sources and included coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World Health Organization (WHO). The on-site coordination concept and procedures used in this and other exercises were developed by the United Nations.

With only an eight-person staff and requirements for round-the-clock operations, the EADRCC is over-stretched. It must rely on volunteers to augment the staff during emergencies. Around 40 to 50 people are needed to staff the organization fully and to provide for emergency responses, as well as to develop standard operating procedures, evaluate exercises and develop lessons learned. Moreover, the EADRCC and the EU disaster response capabilities need to be coordinated in order to avoid undesirable duplication and waste. Both could have a useful role to play. A major challenge is to coordinate the “coordinators”, given the wide scope of international assistance available.
While this would seem to be a natural priority for NATO, there is considerable skepticism within Europe about expanding the current effort. This appears to be based on several different arguments. First, officials in several countries do not believe that the political will exists to increase spending on preparation for “unthinkable” contingencies. The Council’s delegations were repeatedly told that governments were not willing to face up to the problem. A second reason given was that in the event of a large scale terrorist disaster involving CBRN devices, national governments would likely refuse to send their limited resources to help others because of a fear that they, themselves would be targeted next. Finally, in a small number of countries, NATO action in this area is seen as likely to draw resources away from the EU’s efforts to build up its own consequence management capabilities.

**Security Assistance**

Although the United Nations coordinates assistance and the European Union provides important aid, NATO has a major comparative advantage in regard to security assistance in certain areas. Countries that are not members or partners, such as Jordan, can and do ask NATO for security assistance in their efforts to fight terrorism.

In addition to efforts with the partnership countries, NATO is taking on increasing responsibility for stability operations in Afghanistan, both geographically and functionally. The first step of a “progressive process” is to increase the scope of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond its original mandate to provide security around Kabul. A new mission to provide military support to the German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the northern region of Kunduz began on December 31, 2003. NATO will also help with the important task of demobilizing warlords’ forces and local militia. This will likely be followed by NATO taking over support for the other PRTs – teams of 70 to 200 soldiers and civilians in seven provinces who provide security to aid workers and help with reconstruction.

As NATO’s roles expand in Afghanistan, ISAF is likely to be increased from 5,000 to 10,000 (or even 15,000) troops. At some point, it would be logical for NATO to take responsibility for all of the roles in Afghanistan, including combat operations now conducted by a U.S. Task Force. At the same time, however, NATO planners are worried about the political will of members to meet force requirements.

Afghanistan provides a key test for NATO in meeting the challenges of terrorism and the new international security environment. Mission fatigue will likely post an increasing challenge to the political willingness of member nations to fulfill the requirements of fighting terrorism over the long haul. This suggests that NATO must set priorities lest it become over-committed.

---

16 See Annex B.
Educati ng the Population, Especially Potential Sources of Recruitment

One decisive arena in confronting terrorism is the realm of ideas. Although the leadership and structure of al-Qaeda may have been seriously damaged by the war in Afghanistan and other actions, the ideology of global jihad has grown stronger. Indeed, anti-U.S. sentiment has increased substantially as a result of the war in Iraq.

In this war of ideas, radical jihad ideologies must be countered and discredited. The populations in target areas must come to believe that terrorism is neither justified for any political or religious reason, nor likely to achieve political or social goals. But neither NATO nor Western governments are well suited to tackle this task directly. The key debate is within Muslim communities and involves differing interpretations of Islam.

NATO’s role, to the extent that it has one in the ideological component of the struggle against terrorism, will be indirect – consisting primarily of exporting security so that local governments have the possibility of providing good governance and more tolerant, attractive alternatives to tacitly accepting, effectively harboring or even actively encouraging terrorist movements. However, NATO also has the potential, as it did during the Cold War, to offer an attractive, positive vision of diversity, tolerance and progress beneath its security umbrella that could make a valuable contribution to the overall confrontation with the international terrorists.

Even though indirect information and psychological operations are part of NATO’s overall approach to the problem (as outlined in MC 472) it is not clear at this point how NATO plans to engage in the war of ideas. One possibility would be for NATO to sponsor scholarly and other expert studies of the problems of terrorism. Such a systematic exchange could provide a common foundation for understanding the constantly evolving terrorist phenomenon and thus for a more constructive policy dialogue among its members. Additionally, NATO could ensure that a significant share of education, planning, training, doctrine and other efforts reflect a fundamental shift from traditional force-on-force operations to psychological operations with the planned use of communications designed to influence the behavior of key target audiences.

Organizing Research and Development

Another important function in dealing with terrorism is the development of new technologies. For the most part, this is handled at the national level. However, NATO could potentially play a useful role by encouraging the development of new technologies relevant to the military dimension of the struggle against terrorism. ACT, for example, plays an important role in promoting cooperation among defense industries. Through ACT’s efforts, NATO could help ensure that any new anti-terrorism equipment is interoperable by specifying standards.
V. Realizing NATO’s Full Potential

As part of this project – and in the course of discussions in the European countries in which it held dialogues – the Atlantic Council working group developed and discussed several ideas for enhancing NATO’s capabilities to confront terrorism that it believes deserve consideration by NATO officials and national representatives. In particular, we recommend that NATO examine the following areas:

Decision-Making

As the Alliance grows, the difficulty of making timely, tough decisions increases. NATO needs to produce timely responses to specific threats if the 26-member Alliance is not to become paralyzed. The Iraq war has compounded this challenge, notably by raising concerns about the adequacy of intelligence for preemptive or preventive missions, which may be among the most important ways in which military forces would be effective in a counter-terrorist operation. NATO is working on this problem, however, and uses terrorism scenarios in high-level strategic exercises so that leaders are more aware of the problems and choices they may face. Some officials are hoping to improve the decision-making process so that the North Atlantic Council can reach decisions within several hours, although the political difficulties of doing this in a real contingency should not be underestimated.

As the struggle against terrorism requires a multifaceted approach – including, but not limited to the improvement of financial monitoring, the strengthening of border controls and coordination among national law enforcement agencies – NATO should consider inviting Ministers of Finance and Ministers of Interior to periodic meetings for security dialogues. Key debates on various aspects of confronting terrorism often take place within national governments where competing priorities must be addressed and difficult trade-offs made. By enlarging security discussions at NATO to include finance and interior officials, such national debates will be better informed.

The NATO-Russian relationship remains under-developed, even though the global war on terrorism presents a natural framework for closer cooperation between the two. On the Russian side, this gives rise to suspicions that the United States, working through NATO, wants to weaken Russia. On the NATO side, there is a reluctance, for various reasons, to engage Russia fully. A proposal to change NATO’s policy in this area involves considerations that go far beyond the scope of this report. But to the extent that some of the other recommendations made here are adopted – for example in terms of the exchange of information and assessments regarding the changing directions and modalities of international terrorism – it would be advantageous to engage Russian participation to the greatest extent possible.

Focusing Responsibility

NATO’s response to terrorism has suffered from the lack of a focal point of responsibility. Member governments should consider appointing a single official, accountable to the Secretary General, with sole responsibility for coordinating all aspects of the International
Staff’s work on terrorism. The task is sufficiently extensive and involves a wide enough range of activities to require a senior person at the Assistant Secretary General level, working full-time on this problem. It should not be assigned as an additional duty. This person would manage the entire spectrum of NATO efforts related to terrorism and oversee the coordination of NATO efforts with those of member and partner countries individually, the UN, the EU and other international organizations. This official would correspond to the new Counter-Terrorism Coordinator established at the EU Council Secretariat following the March 2004 terrorist attack in Madrid.

Such a consolidation of responsibility for terrorism would also help facilitate better management of NATO resources in fighting terrorism. As things now stand, the costs of programs relating to terrorism are not separate budget items; they fall wherever they occur. A single manager would help focus attention on areas where requirements are not being met by the resources currently allocated. Such a change could also help to allay the concern – expressed to the Council’s working group by several officials – that the Alliance is becoming overly fixated on the problem of terrorism at the expense of maintaining a more robust set of military capabilities, with which to respond to the challenges for which NATO was originally designed. They cautioned against NATO putting “too many eggs in the counter-terrorism basket.”

Furthermore, in developing strategies for fighting terrorism, NATO should ensure that they are competitive strategies in the sense that their costs can be sustained indefinitely. NATO nations are taking on costly new operations, even though budgets are limited and the costs of recent responses to terrorism have been enormous. These trends are probably not sustainable.

**Intelligence**

As was noted in the previous section, NATO is not well equipped to deal with “actionable intelligence”, that is information that is specific, precise and believed to be reliable enough to support immediate law enforcement or paramilitary action. Besides, such action would most likely be undertaken by the authorities of one or two countries without the use of NATO capabilities or assets.

But in considering more broadly the role of information and assessment in facilitating consensus about the best strategy and tactics to employ against terrorism, NATO could play a useful role in shaping and disseminating better understanding about the highly adaptive nature of the threat and facilitating the frequent adjustments needed in ways of thinking and acting to deal more effectively with the problem. The struggle against international terrorism will be prolonged and a cadre of analysts is needed who are able to get inside the heads of the terrorist groups – to understand how the terrorists evaluate the attractiveness of alternative targets, what the terrorists see as their strengths or as societal weaknesses that they can exploit, the criteria by which the terrorist organizations decide whom to trust, how they attract and recruit talent, the role of Muslim communities in Western countries, and so forth.
NATO can provide some unique added value in this area by focusing on problem-solving in the area of assessment and analysis. NATO can bring together analysts from a wide range of countries, experiences and disciplines whose collective wisdom will lead to a better understanding of how terrorists think – something that no single member would likely be able to accomplish alone. NATO could also provide a forum for intelligence analysts and scholars to come together to build understanding and solve specific problems. In the near term, Russia could be asked to update the threat assessment on al-Qa‘ida that it previously prepared for NATO.

Such regular exchanges would also be useful because of each country’s unique circumstances. Thus, systematic analytic exchanges could help build consensus on the changing nature of the problem and improve understanding of important differences in national perspectives. These differences must be understood if multinational programs are to be tailored to fit local conditions.

For this purpose, the working group recommends the creation of a NATO counter-terrorism (CT) research institute that would help stimulate such research and analysis. It could draw on NATO’s long experience in bringing together people from all member nations to work together against a common threat, and it could diminish the risk of bias that might be introduced by national sponsorship of such a process or by the need to solicit corporate financial support. It could also serve as a useful symbol of NATO’s determination to work together against terrorism and to obtain the knowledge needed to deal with terrorism at its roots.

Such an institute could also play useful roles in intelligence problem-solving without requiring full exchanges of sensitive information. NATO could provide a venue where analysts from many countries would work together to solve vexing intelligence problems that are frustrating unilateral, national efforts. In all probability, at least some of the most important CT-related intelligence problems would be easier to solve if the information, expertise, and diverse thought patterns of several NATO countries could be brought to bear.

Also, intelligence related to terrorism often pertains more to law enforcement than to the military functions of NATO. NATO should thus consider taking steps under Article 2 to share pertinent law enforcement information, especially intelligence regarding international criminal enterprises that have the potential to provide financial and logistical support for international terrorism.

**Planning and Procedures**

**Role of the North Atlantic Council**

The NAC should empower the Alliance’s two strategic commanders to undertake a broad range of generic planning and preparations for confronting terrorism, especially in relation to the development of concepts for the NRF. To begin with, the NAC should ensure that obstacles are removed, such as the traditional restrictions that preclude commanders from planning for operations that are not yet specifically approved by the NAC.
Early political reconnaissance would also help NATO planning and preparations. Geographically, the areas with major terrorist concentrations are well known, so NATO officials could visit them and gather information that would help the NAC select decisive strategic objectives to guide possible military operations. Winning on the battlefield is not enough – the desired political end state must also be agreed upon and appropriate military operations designed that will contribute to the achievement of this objective.

**Forces**

As discussed above, there is value in assigning the NRF counter-terrorism roles and missions because that would assist in developing a broader base of national capabilities than would otherwise exist within the Alliance. Such missions would require the NRF, in certain contingencies, to reduce its reaction time to less than five days (particularly for the use of special forces and air strikes) and to assess the balance of capabilities it may need to undertake its missions, notably in the area of special operations forces.

NATO could also play important roles in facilitating national or bi- and multinational counter-terrorist operations by providing a venue to coordinate the granting of overflight rights and the provision of access to airfields, ports and other facilities.

Although preemption or “anticipatory self-defense” remains controversial, once NATO forces are committed to an area that includes terrorists, such as Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, the Balkans, they should be given the necessary authority to engage terrorists. This could be facilitated by a dialogue on a set of “rules of engagement” between the two NATO strategic commands, the International Staff and the NAC.

Of note is that these conclusions may have important implications for NATO’s force structure. Conventional thinking about “tooth to tail” ratios for combat, combat support and combat service support troops will need to be reconsidered, probably in favor of more “tail”. In particular, precision weapons need precision intelligence and the latter is in very short supply.

Finally, the role of Russian forces should be considered as NATO develops plans for fighting terrorism. The experience Russian forces are gaining by working with NATO troops in the Balkans could provide the basis for broader Russian participation in NATO stabilization operations. Also, Russia could be asked to join NATO’s “Active Endeavor” maritime surveillance operations in the Mediterranean.

**Consequence Management**

NATO should consider substantially augmenting the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center and making it the focus of assessment and planning for terrorist contingencies involving unconventional weapons. The Center is under-staffed, particularly if it is to meet its full potential, including evaluation of lessons learned from actual experiences and feedback to participants following exercises.

SHAPE should consider establishing a hot-line connecting institutions responsible for counter-terrorism operations in each member and partner country, plus the EADRCC, the
NATO Military Committee, the EU Terrorism Coordinator, and – should the position be established – the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Counter-Terrorism. Such connectivity could provide for rapid NATO support to member states if it is requested.

**Early Warning**

NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor, which monitors shipping in the Mediterranean, complements the Proliferation Security Initiative. NATO should help develop standard procedures that will facilitate expanded participation in, and an increased scope for, these operations.

Protection against hostile missiles and hijacked aircraft in the hands of terrorists is of clear concern and NATO has comprehensive early warning systems in place, linked to civil air control centers and military intercept capabilities. Using these capabilities, NATO may intercept suspicious aircraft, but cannot shoot the aircraft down in peacetime without specific political authority. But terrorism defies the kind of wartime/peacetime distinction that underlies many NATO operational procedures. And it is unrealistic to assume that such authority will be pre-delegated, especially since the intelligence judgments by NATO members on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction proved unreliable.

As NATO wrestles with these problems, it might look to other examples where similar concerns are being addressed with regard to missile defense. For example, U.S. and Japanese authorities must develop arrangements for both to have their “fingers on the trigger” in order to deal with missile threats from North Korea.

Another problem is the unnecessary duplication of capabilities between NATO and the EU. Some Europeans insists on placing all responsibility for air-space management in Europe in the hands of the EU. While there is some merit to this approach, it could lead to inefficiencies and ineffectiveness if not well coordinated. In the near term, it would probably be helpful if EU representatives were invited to participate in the work at, or observe the operation of, NATO air and missile defense operations centers.

**Afghanistan, the Balkans and Stabilization Operations**

Afghanistan provides both a useful model and a key test for NATO in meeting the challenges of terrorism and the new international security environment. NATO forces were invited by the Afghan government and operate under a UN mandate, thus providing the necessary political context for members to participate. The key test is whether or not members and partners will meet the requirements for future troop rotations.

In Afghanistan, a more unified command and control arrangement is needed. This would involve NATO command over the full range of missions: conducting stability operations of the type now conducted by ISAF, but with expanded geographic scope to cover the entire country; managing provincial reconstruction teams so that limited assets, such as helicopters, may be more efficiently allocated; and undertaking offensive counter-terrorist operations of the type now conducted by U.S. Task Force 103.
NATO, in partnership with the EU, must also persist in efforts to bring security to the Balkans. Kosovo is still a powder keg and violence there could easily spread more widely. The focus should be on planning smooth transitions in stabilization operations from NATO to the EU. The experience gained from the NATO-EU transition in Macedonia should provide useful lessons to guide future efforts.

Stability operations will probably continue to be in high demand and NATO is accumulating vast experience in the Balkans and Afghanistan. The lessons from these operations should be developed and widely disseminated. Furthermore, special attention is needed to the transition between combat operations and stability operations in environments in which terrorism is a component of the threat.

In this regard, the creation of a NATO Stabilization Force to complement the NATO Response Force deserves serious consideration. Such a force could draw on the experiences of unique paramilitary forces that are highly regarded in counter-terrorism. For example, NATO established a Multinational Specialized Unit in 1998, organized around Italian Carabinieri troops, and deployed the unit to Bosnia. Similar units have been deployed to Kosovo and Iraq. The experiences of these units would be relevant in any effort to organize a future NATO Stabilization Force.
Annex A: The French Approach to Terrorism & Its Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation

Differences between the United States and France on issues related to terrorism continue to be reflected at NATO, including on the Military Committee, and in NATO-EU relations. These differences derive from differing approaches to organizing European security in general as well as from policy differences over issues such as the Iraq war. While the resulting tension may in the extreme lead to the inability of NATO to act, it does potentially yield the added legitimacy that comes from the requirement for more compelling, rigorous justification for action than would otherwise be the case.

One mistaken view with no foundation and another with some basis pervade U.S. thinking on the French approach to the war on terrorism. The first is that France is soft on terrorism. In this view, either because France is weak or because it does not feel threatened by terrorism, French authorities feel little compunction in accommodating terrorist groups or in simply ignoring the threat. The second is that French policy is motivated primarily by a desire to undermine the U.S. position in Europe and to establish a French-led European alternative that reduces NATO to a technical military organization.

These two views cause Americans to dismiss any French opposition to U.S. policy initiatives on terrorism as based on parochial concerns that have little to do with the content of the policies. The United States and France do have important differences on the appropriate policies for fighting terrorism, but they stem, for the most part, from substantive disagreements about what are likely to be the most effective approaches. Resolving those differences will be critical to the wider struggle against terrorism as well as to allowing effective use of multilateral instruments such as NATO.

The idea that the French authorities are complacent about the current terrorist threat is offensive to French ears and divorced from reality. The French have a long, bitter and continuing history with terrorism and with its Islamist incarnation. Indeed, from their perspective, the French experience during the 1980s and 1990s led them to early appreciation of the threat posed by an internationalist Islamist movement. Their efforts to engage other Western countries on this problem before September 11, 2001 – particularly the United Kingdom, but also the United States – were strong and prescient.

France has scored some notable successes in disrupting terrorist operations within France and in preventing specific terrorist attacks at home and abroad. Thus, for example, the al-Qaeda cells and individuals involved in the planning of the September 11th attacks settled and operated in Germany and the United States, as well as in Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain, but appear to have avoided France.

French counter-terrorism is based firmly on the principle of repression. Anti-terrorist officials in France have and regularly exercise powers – wiretaps, subpoenas, preventative roundups etc. – that are in many ways far more stringent than any measures the U.S. government has contemplated, even in the wake of September 11th. Indeed, the principal
dispute with the United Kingdom during the late 1990s over terrorism stemmed from a British judge's decision not to allow the extradition of a terrorist suspect to France essentially on the grounds that he would be tortured.

The difference of approach derives mainly from differences in judicial systems between the Civil Code system in France and the Common Law systems in Britain and the United States. Whatever may be the differences between the ways in which the two systems approach the problem of terrorism, they do not justify a conclusion that the French approach is more permissive of terrorist activities or that one system is inherently more effective in dealing with terrorism than the other. More to the point is the conclusion that politics and other factors on both sides have at times inhibited both from cooperating at the UN Security Council and at NATO, while obscuring more practical bilateral cooperation. Indeed, the record suggests that Franco-American cooperation in law enforcement and intelligence related to terrorism has been generally at least as good as that between the United States and any other country in recent years.

U.S.-French problems over Iraq also highlighted a pre-existing difference regarding the most effective tools for fighting terrorism. In the French view, the U.S. strategy relies far too heavily on military means to the detriment of more effective instruments, particularly the trinity of intelligence, law enforcement and judicial tools. Pre-emptive military strategies aimed at snuffing out the terrorist threat at its source are indeed tempting, and sometimes useful. But from a French perspective, the U.S. reliance on such strategies represents a lack of understanding of the true nature of the modern terrorist threat.

The French Approach to International Cooperation and NATO

The transnational character of the modern terrorist threat points to what the French view as the primary flaw in their own counter-terrorist apparatus: international cooperation. French successes during the 1980s and 1990s stemmed in no small part from the development of mechanisms of coordination and information sharing across the myriad organizations within France that had a role in counter-terrorism. Such mechanisms by and large do not exist on the international level, even within Europe. For example, within the EU, most member-states have removed their border controls, but coordination of their intelligence, law enforcement and security services has only slowly followed.

While cooperation has improved vastly since September 11th, coordination, information sharing and the capacity for rapid joint response remain significant worries. Adapting existing multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, NATO and the European Union, to the threat of terrorism represents an important part of the French strategy for counter-terrorism. They have embarked on several such projects in recent years, including sponsoring UN action on combating terrorist financing and supporting the formation of police and judicial organizations (Europol and Eurojust) within the EU.

Nonetheless, that strategy has its limits. Given what they have already accomplished domestically and given the continuing nature of the threat, the French are very reluctant to concede authority to multilateral organizations that have little experience in fighting
terrorism and a reputation for bureaucratic inertia. In their view, multilateral organizations have only a slight relevance to the immediate problem of counter-terrorism. Although their future role may be much greater, the French government is taking a somewhat incremental approach to the problem, trying to complement French capabilities without diminishing the day-to-day efficacy of any of their existing tools.

Second, and more relevant for NATO, the French want multilateral cooperation to establish a firm footing within the EU before it moves into transatlantic fora. The stated reason for this position is that cooperation among the European partners is the first priority and that the EU provides the appropriate forum for the type of intense cooperation on non-military matters that is most critical for the struggle against terrorism. Police, judicial and intelligence issues invoke the type of sovereignty concerns that the EU has dealt with for decades (albeit with difficulty). NATO is predominantly a military organization with even more cumbersome intergovernmental decision processes than the EU. It is thus seen as less relevant to confronting the key issues involved in counter-terrorism.

This argument only partly explains the French position. French opposition to greater cooperation on terrorism within NATO also expresses a traditional distrust of U.S. power in Europe – a sentiment that has dramatically increased over the course of the Bush Administration’s policies. This distrust stems from a Gaullist view that the United States will use transatlantic fora to dominate Europe, and from a newer concern that, absent a unified European position, NATO will serve as a vehicle for the Americanization, and thus the undesirable militarization, of the struggle against terrorism in Europe. Such an outcome would, in this view, weaken French and European counter-terrorism capabilities and disrupt EU counter-terrorism cooperation efforts.

Nonetheless, while France suspects U.S. motives and methods, it recognizes that U.S. power and assets are critical for European and French security, not least in the area of counter-terrorism. The overall French policy is thus aimed not at undermining the U.S. position in Europe, but rather in creating European institutions unified enough to provide as high a degree as possible of autonomous protection and to move U.S. policies in the desired direction. Given the strong Atlanticist orientations within most European countries, and even within important segments of French society, that unity could never be built on an anti-U.S. agenda.

**Achieving U.S.-French Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism**

Despite differences, U.S.-French _bilateral_ cooperation on terrorism remains one of the few bright spots in the relationship. France and the United States have a sense of a common threat, as well as capabilities that the other finds useful. Tensions between the U.S. and French governments are significant at the political level, but on both sides the ministries and agencies responsible for counter-terrorism remain important advocates of continued cooperation.

Recent events such as the Moussaoui trial and the Guantanamo military tribunals could exacerbate an already fragile relationship. In the longer term, there is a danger that France’s
view of the Iraq crisis means that the United States and France no longer see the same Islamist threat.

In the context of the current fragile bilateral cooperation, the process by which the United States engages multilateral fora on these issues will be critical. Effective multilateral cooperation within Europe and between the United States and Europe is a key component of the struggle against terrorism. The most urgent issue in this realm involves increasing coordination and information sharing among EU member-states. At present, terrorists can move freely across internal European borders, but police, intelligence and judicial authorities cannot. This asymmetry presents an unacceptable risk to both Europe and North America. The United States should encourage France to continue to place a high priority on improving EU capabilities for fighting terrorism and support this objective, within the context of close U.S.-EU cooperation. This should not, however, preclude an ongoing dialogue with French authorities on improving NATO counter-terrorism capabilities, especially in areas in which NATO has a distinct comparative advantage by virtue of its capabilities and missions.
Annex B: The Evolution of the Responses of Key International Institutions & the United States to the International Terrorist Threat

The United Nations’ Response to Terrorism

The Counter-Terrorism Committee
Authority and responsibility for the global response to terrorism are outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001, which also established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (known by its acronym, CTC). The CTC is made up of the 15 Security Council members and it coordinates national and multinational activities, assists states in building their capabilities and monitors compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373.

All 191 UN member states have submitted initial reports on their counter-terrorism capabilities and the steps taken to implement UNSCR 1373, although 58 states failed to meet the 31 October 2003 deadline for the submission of outstanding second and third reports. As of April 2004, 41 States were parties to all 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and many more have ratified the majority of the conventions.17

While the CTC has been successful in establishing a global counter-terrorism network, the results have been uneven, reflecting states’ differing interests, priorities and capabilities. The

17 The 12 major multilateral conventions and protocols related to states’ responsibilities for combating terrorism are as follows:
CTC does not have a list of terrorist organizations or individuals, nor does it have the authority to impose sanctions.

In working to increase the capability of states to fight terrorism, the CTC focuses on the following primary tasks:

- Receiving reports from member-states on how they are working to prevent terrorists from using their territories and/or financial systems to further terrorist activities;
- Responding to these reports with further questions;
- Matching requests for technical assistance by member-states with available donors of technical assistance;
- Monitoring member-states’ progress in becoming party to all 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism; and
- Creating a global network of organizations working to combat terrorism.

The CTC receives requests for technical assistance from member-states and reports detailing assistance available from regional organizations, sub-regional organizations and individual countries. The help most often requested falls into three broad categories: drafting legislation to strengthen national CT capabilities, personnel training and putting into place financial intelligence units.

NATO has regular liaison with the CTC, however the relationship has not been developed to the point of providing any particular value-added because NATO has not yet determined the precise roles it is to play in counter-terrorism.

**Challenges for the CTC**

Although all 191 UN member-states submitted initial reports to the CTC on their counter-terrorism capabilities, many states have not followed up as required. Several explanations have been advanced for the apparent slow-down in member-state responsiveness:

- **Report Fatigue.** Some governments have indicated that they simply cannot continue to devote the resources necessary to produce, in some cases, a 3rd or 4th follow-up report requested by the CTC.

- **Lack of Proper Resources.** In many cases, governments lack the structures they need to respond accurately to CTC inquiries. For example, many developing country governments lack units for financial monitoring, making it all but impossible for them to report on suspicious flows of liquid assets into or out of their countries.18

- **Concern over the Externalities of Reports.** CTC officials explain that many governments have stopped reporting entirely (or are making less than complete reports) for fear of a backlash based on the content of their reports. Some worry that admitting to having any terrorist

---

18 Another barrier to financial tracking and reporting is that terrorist groups seem increasingly inclined to use cash, as opposed to bank accounts, in order to avoid, to the greatest extent possible, the detection and seizure of their assets.
activity within their borders will result in falling foreign investment and a downgraded credit rating. They also worry that such admissions will lead to pressure from other countries and possible unwanted interference into affairs they consider entirely domestic.

- **Difficulties Justifying the Resources Devoted to Combating Terrorism.** Some governments, particularly in the developing world, have a hard time justifying their use of human and financial resources to produce reports for the CTC or to cooperate with other governments on fighting terrorism because other problems (i.e. HIV/AIDS, unemployment, civil unrest etc.) seem far more pressing. As such, these governments would welcome political cover – in the form of additional mandates for CT work – from appropriate regional or sub-regional organizations.

Most of the remaining challenges highlighted by CTC officials stem from the perception that many key CT-related definitions are too broad (or simply absent), while others are intentionally misinterpreted by member states in order to legitimate unrelated and often undesirable policies. Examples include:

- **Confusion on the Part of Member-States as to What the Term “Economic Resources” includes.** Countries are indeed working to deny terrorists “economic resources” by freezing bank accounts. But they disagree as to whether other measures, such as property seizures or land repossession, are also necessary, desirable or required. An offshoot of this problem is that governments, notably in the Middle East, will close down charities (or dummy companies) suspected of funneling money to terrorist activities only to see the European branches of these charities remain open because the extent and/or implications of the center-periphery link are poorly understood.

- **Human Rights Abuses.** Groups such as Human Rights Watch have complained that all over the world governments are using the fight against terrorism generally, and compliance with Resolution 1373 specifically, as a pretext to crack down on domestic dissidents, limit migration and deny civil rights.

**NATO’s Response to Terrorism**

**The Invocation of Article 5**

NATO invoked Article 5 within 24 hours of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. By October 4, 2001, in response to requests by the United States, NATO allies agreed to take eight measures to expand their ability to confront terrorism, including: enhanced intelligence sharing, blanket over-flight rights and access to ports and airfields, assistance to states threatened as a result of their support for coalition efforts, the deployment of NATO naval forces to the eastern Mediterranean and the dispatch of Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft to the United States to backfill U.S. AWACS deployed to support operations in Afghanistan.

NATO was the logical international framework within which to institutionalize the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, which has become NATO’s first operation outside Europe. NATO’s comprehensive, systematic approach to the problem is in
part responsible for the fact that terrorism has now become a high priority consideration on the national security agendas of 53 countries directly affiliated with NATO, including those taking part in its Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean Dialogue. The Partnership for Peace helps prepare the least prepared countries to understand the terrorist problem and enhances their capabilities to deal with terrorism, with obvious benefits to the security of Alliance members.

**MC 472**

NATO’s vision for fighting terrorism acknowledges that primary responsibility rests with the individual member-states. NATO’s goals are to help states deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist threats from abroad, “as and where needed”. The basic approach, outlined in MC 472 and approved in November 2002, includes four components: (A) anti-terrorism defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property; (B) consequence management, including reactive measures to mitigate effects; (C) counter-terrorism offensive measures with NATO either in the lead or in supporting roles, including psychological and information operations; and (D) military cooperation with member, partner, dialogue and other countries, as well as international organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Although NATO’s political guidance notes that it is preferable to deter or prevent terrorist acts rather than to deal with the consequences, any direct action by NATO against terrorists or those who harbor them requires approval by all of the member-states. Thus NATO is best suited for roles that involve coordinated action over a substantial period of time, such as building consensus on the scope and direction of the threat and the range of needed responses; consequence management; stability operations; surveillance of airspace and sea lanes; and enhancing national capabilities, particularly among weaker states. In this latter category, enhanced border control provides an important contribution in fighting terrorism by focusing on the illegal movement of people, arms and drugs in dangerous areas.

NATO has focused analyses and contingency planning on the threat posed by *al-Qa’ida* and other terrorist organizations. NATO, appropriately, has not wasted efforts in developing an agreed definition of terrorism or lists of terrorist groups. Such lists are being dealt with elsewhere and would be of marginal value in coordinating NATO’s efforts.

**Partnership for Peace**

NATO’s Partnership for Peace program provides a useful framework in which to initiate and build a range of useful activities. For example, in November 2002, NATO approved the Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism, which commits partners to:

- Intensify political consultations and information sharing on armaments and civil emergency planning;
- Enhance preparedness for combating terrorism by security sector reforms and force planning, air defense and air traffic management and armaments and logistics cooperation;
• Impede support for terrorist groups by enhancing exchange of banking information and improving border controls;

• Enhance capabilities to contribute to consequence management and civil emergency planning; and

• Provide assistance to partners’ efforts against terrorism through the Political-Military Steering Committee and creation of a PfP Trust Fund.

The plan has yet to achieve very much, in part due to the diverse nature of the Partnership countries. Ten of the original Partnership for Peace countries became full members of the Alliance in 2004. This leaves a Partnership of 20 countries with different aspirations – if any – to full membership, while two others seek to join the Partnership:

• Five “advanced” partners – Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland – with no interest in joining the Alliance at this point;

• Three Membership Action Plan (MAP) partners – Albania, Croatia and Macedonia – which do aspire to membership;

• Ukraine, which now claims to be an aspirant with an “Action Plan”, and desirous of joining the MAP process;

• Three Caucasus partners – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (Georgia has stated a desire for full membership);

• Russia, which does not aspire to membership, but maintains a special relationship through the NATO-Russia Council;

• Five Central Asian partners – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan;

• Two relatively inactive partners – Belarus and Moldova; and

• Two Balkan aspirants – Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro.

Given such a diverse set of countries, programs are tailored to individual needs and interests. Several Partnership for Peace initiatives show promise of making useful contributions to the fight against terrorism. One is the “buddy system” originally established by Sweden and Finland to help the Baltic States on their path to membership. This approach can help enhance security with partners in the Balkans and Caucasus.

The European Union’s Response to Terrorism

Like NATO, the EU was quick to respond to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. On September 21 of that year, the European Council declared, “... terrorism is a real challenge to the world and to Europe...” and that “…the fight against terrorism will be a priority objective for the European Union.” It thus adopted a “Plan of Action” that called for the EU to increase its involvement with the international community to prevent and stabilize regional conflicts and to promote good governance and the rule of law. In addition to coordinating measures within the EU, the plan included provisions for dealing with the problem of terrorism in its external relations, including the provision of technical assistance, legal aid and cooperation on extradition. Internally, the focus was on arriving at a common definition of terrorism, coordinating police efforts, developing a common arrest warrant,
adopting measures to interdict terrorist financing and publishing lists of persons, groups and entities implicated in terrorist activities.

Like NATO, the EU role is to aid member states in fighting terrorism. Unlike NATO, the EU focuses mainly on providing links between police efforts and judicial institutions in dealing with terrorism. The EU recognized that the lack of borders within the EU had created a serious vulnerability that enables terrorists to move between European countries to avoid surveillance and arrest. Consequently, a counter-terrorism unit has been established at Europol with a mandate that includes illicit trafficking in arms and nuclear materials. Europol also expanded its efforts to include training and education.

Part of the EU's efforts to deal with terrorism in surrounding countries includes providing aid and in particular, building on the Barcelona Process, which promotes economic and social development in nearby Mediterranean countries in order to achieve a more stable and peaceful region.

Following the terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004, the EU established a new senior position, Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, and appointed Gijs de Vries to the position. The EU also agreed to new measures for combating terrorism, as outlined in Table 2, below.

Table 2: Summary, European Union Strategic Objectives to Combat Terrorism  
(Revised Plan of Action – March 25, 2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective 1: To Deepen the International Consensus and Enhance International Efforts to Combat Terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Support the key role of the United Nations in sustaining the international consensus and mobilizing the international community as a whole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Work to ensure universal adherence to, and full implementation of, the UN Conventions on Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Work with and within regional and international organizations to ensure their effective contribution to combating terrorism in accordance with UN obligations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Include effective counter-terrorism clauses in all agreements with third countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective 2: To Reduce the Access of Terrorists to Financial and Other Economic Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Ensure the effectiveness of EU asset freezing procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish operational links and improve cooperation between relevant bodies to facilitate enhanced exchange of information on terrorist financing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop and implement an EU strategy on the suppression of terrorist financing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cooperate closely with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Pursue political and technical dialogue with Third Countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective 3: To Maximize Capacity within EU Bodies and Member-States to Detect, Investigate and Prosecute Terrorists and Prevent Terrorist Attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Ensure optimum and effective use of existing EU bodies such as Europol, Eurojust and the Police Chiefs Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Improve mechanisms for cooperation for the sharing of expertise on protective, investigative and preventive security policies between police and security services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Promote effective, systematic collaboration in intelligence exchange between Members</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 Continued: Summary, European Union Strategic Objectives to Combat Terrorism (Revised Plan of Action – March 25, 2004)

- Enhance the capacity of appropriate EU bodies in the preparation of intelligence assessments of all aspects of the terrorist threat
- Work to identify, disrupt and dismantle arrangements for supply of weapons to terrorists

**Objective 4: To Protect the Security of International Transport and Ensure Effective Systems of Border Control**
- Ensure the integration of counter-terrorist considerations into the work of relevant EU bodies (transport, border controls, identity documentation etc.)
- Work to develop further EU transport security standards
- Develop and implement a common EU approach to the exchange and analysis of passenger information
- Encourage and support non-EU states to comply fully with ICAO and IMO standards
- Enhance capacities for the identification of terrorists and the detection of terrorist devices, materials or funds at ports, airports and land borders
- Reinforce the protection of European citizens in third countries

**Objective 5: To Enhance the Capability of the European Union and of Member-States to Deal with the Consequences of a Terrorist Attack**
- Identify areas for closer cooperation in consequence management with other international organizations within their respective competences, including NATO
- Ensure full implementation of the EU Health Security and CBRN programs
- Develop strategies to improve the capacity of Member-States to communicate with citizens in the event of a major terrorist attack
- Ensure that support and assistance is provided to the victims of terrorist crimes, and protect minority communities who may be at risk of a backlash in the event of a major attack

**Objective 6: To Address the Factors which Contribute to Support for, and Recruitment into, Terrorism**
- Identify factors which contribute to recruitment to terrorism, both within the EU and internationally, and develop a long-term strategy to address these
- Continue to investigate the links between extreme religious or political beliefs, as well as socio-economic and other factors, and support for terrorism, and identify appropriate responses
- Make more efficient use of external assistance programmes to address factors which can contribute to the support for terrorism, including support for good governance and the rule of law
- Develop and implement a strategy to promote cross-cultural and inter-religious understanding between Europe and the Islamic World

**Objective 7: To Target Actions under EU External Relations towards Priority Third Countries**
- Expand the role of the SitCen in the carrying out of threat assessments to enable working groups to focus on the development of policy
- Develop capacities to analyze and evaluate third country activities in counter-terrorism
- Develop technical assistance strategies to enhance the counter-terrorist capacity of priority countries, in coordination with other international organizations and Donor states
- Ensure that specific counter-terrorism issues are a key element of EU relations at all levels with priority countries
- Mainstream counter-terrorist objectives into the work of the geographical working groups and external assistance programs.
Significantly, in the EU’s Revised Plan of Action, cooperation with NATO is limited to consequence management. NATO is not otherwise mentioned specifically in the plan, including in the section that deals with international cooperation.

The European Union has viewed terrorism as a crime and a challenge to its fundamental objective of establishing a “House of Law and Order”. It has been much less inclined than the United States to view terrorism as an act of war. In the process of developing tough measures to deal with terrorism, considerable tension has resulted because these measures can also be abused in such a way that they threaten civil rights. For example, most EU framework decisions are recommendations to members to be fulfilled through the legislation of national parliaments. In the case of the EU arrest warrant, the EU decision\(^\text{19}\) is directive in nature, specifying that suspected criminals shall (rather than “can”) be extradited to the requesting state. This provision leaves little latitude to the arresting state.

In order to coordinate counter-terrorism efforts among the member states, the EU found it necessary to define acts of terrorism and then establish a list of persons and groups linked to terrorism. This list includes about 25 persons and 25 groups and is updated regularly (the most recent revision was published on April 2, 2004.)\(^\text{20}\) Another interesting aspect of the EU measures to deal with terrorism is the establishment of a mechanism for peer review of national arrangements in the fight against terrorism.\(^\text{21}\)

**The United States’ Response to Terrorism**

In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration formulated a new strategy for combating terrorism in the United States and abroad. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism was published in February 2003 and focuses on identifying and defusing threats before they reach the borders of the United States. It is a strategy of “…direct and continuous action against terrorist groups, the cumulative effect of which will initially disrupt, over time degrade, and ultimately destroy the terrorist organizations.” The document states that the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community in this fight against a common foe. If necessary, however, the United States will not hesitate to act alone, to exercise its right of self-defense, including acting preemptively against terrorists to prevent them from doing harm to the United States or its citizens.

The national strategy envisions simultaneous action on several fronts by attacking terrorist sanctuaries, leadership, command and control, communications, material support and finances. The United States also will seek to deny further sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists by encouraging other states to accept their responsibilities to take action against the international threats within their sovereign territory. In addition, the United States will work to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit by enlisting the international community to focus its efforts and resources on the areas most at risk. Finally, the United States will defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad.

---

\(^\text{19}\) European Arrest Warrant, 2002/584/JHA; June 13, 2002.

\(^\text{20}\) 2004/306/EC.

The strategy further elaborates these goals in terms of more specific objectives, as outlined in Table 3 (below).

### Table 3: U.S. Goals and Objectives in Fighting Terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Defeat Terrorists and Their Organizations**    | • Identify terrorists and their organizations  
• Locate terrorists and their organizations  
• Destroy terrorists and their organizations |
| **Deny Sponsorship, Support and Sanctuary to Terrorists** | • End state sponsorship of terrorism  
• Establish and maintain an international standard of accountability with regard to combating terrorism  
• Strengthen and sustain the international effort to fight terrorism  
• Interdict and disrupt material support for terrorists  
• Eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and havens |
| **Diminish the Underlying Conditions that Terrorists Seek to Exploit** | • Partner with the international community to strengthen weak states and prevent the emergence of terrorism  
• Focus on the “War of Ideas” |
| **Defend U.S. Citizens and Interests at Home and Abroad** | • Implement the National Strategy for Homeland Security  
• Attain domain awareness  
• Enhance measures to ensure the integrity, reliability and availability of critical physical and information-based infrastructures at home and abroad  
• Integrate measures to protect U.S. citizens abroad  
• Ensure an integrated incident management capability |

---

Annex C: Acronyms

ACT – Allied Command Transformation
ASG – Assistant Secretary General
AUC – Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Forces of Columbia)
AWACS – Airborne Warning and Control Systems
CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CT – Counter-Terrorism
CTC – Counter-Terrorism Committee (United Nations)
EADRCC – Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center
EAPC – Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (NATO)
ELN – Ejército de Liberación Nacional (Columbia, National Liberation Army)
ETA – Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (Spain, Basque Fatherland and Liberty)
EU – European Union
FARC – Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia)
FATF – Financial Action Task Force (EU)
G-8 – Group of Eight
IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO – International Civil Aviation Organization
IMO – International Maritime Organization
IRA – Irish Republican Army
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force
MAP – Membership Action Plan (NATO)
MC – Military Committee (NATO)
NAC – North Atlantic Council (NATO)
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRF – NATO Response Force
OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PiP – Partnership for Peace (NATO)
PRT – Provincial Reconstruction Team
RAF – Red Army Faction (Germany)
RRF – Rapid Reaction Force (EU)
SACEUR – Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SHAPE – Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SitCen – Situation Center (EU)
SOPs – Standard Operating Procedures
UN – United Nations
UNSCR – United Nations Security Council Resolution
WHO – World Health Organization
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction
Annex D: Working Group on NATO’s Role in Confronting International Terrorism

The members of the working group believe that the recommendations stated in this paper promote overall U.S. and Western interests. While there may be some parts of the report with which some participants are not in full agreement, each participant believes that the report, as a whole, provides a sound basis for future actions by NATO and the governments of the United States and its allies. The views of the working group members do not represent the official position of any institution.

Co-Chairs
Richard A. Clarke, Good Harbor Consulting, LLC
Barry R. McCaffrey, Bradley Professor of International Security, U.S. Military Academy at West Point

Project Director & Author-Rapporteur
C. Richard Nelson, Atlantic Council

Assistant Project Director
Jason S. Purcell, Atlantic Council

Members
Stanley S. Bedlington, Consultant
Daniel Benjamin, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Nora Bensahel, RAND Corporation
Frances G. Burwell, Atlantic Council
Daniel L. Byman, Georgetown University
Wesley K. Clark, Wesley K. Clark & Associates, LLC
Anthony Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Roger W. Cressey, Good Harbor Consulting, LLC
Robert Hunter, RAND Corporation
Stuart Johnson, National Defense University
Richard Kugler, National Defense University
Ellen Laipson, The Henry L. Stimson Center
Thomas McNamara, The George Washington University
Anne M. Moisan, National Defense University
Aris Pappas, IntelligenceEnterprises, LLC
Michael Pillsbury, Consultant
John H. Sandrock, Atlantic Council
Jeremy Shapiro, The Brookings Institution
Peter J. Sharpman, The MITRE Corporation
Steven Simon, RAND Corporation
Amy E. Smithson, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Victor Utgoff, Institute for Defense Analyses
R. James Woolsey, Booz Allen Hamilton
The Atlantic Council Working Group on NATO’s Role in Confronting International Terrorism also benefited from contributions by representatives of several European countries as well as various branches and departments of the U.S. government.
Annex E: Comments by Working Group Members

Wesley K. Clark

The United States should take the lead in pressing for NATO transformation from a military alliance into a security alliance. That is, with multifunctional responsibilities so that terrorism and proliferation can be dealt with legally. We need NATO to help us harmonize definitions of the crime, standardize elements of proof and evidentiary rules and facilitate multinational information and exchange.

John H. Sandrock

Is terrorism a criminal act to be dealt with by “local” law enforcement or is it a military or quasi-military effort (ranging from guerrilla-like individual acts or small unit actions to more conventional direct conflict) which may require the intervention of organized military forces?

Until recently acts of terrorism were considered problems that could be – and properly ought to be – dealt with primarily by local law enforcement authorities. While terrorism was previously considered to be at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, the severity and impact of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Madrid bombings and the plethora of recent attacks throughout the Middle East make clear that terrorism also operates well up the scale of conflict.

NATO, as the preeminent international organization capable of reacting to and combating international conflict, must play a larger role in preventing and responding to acts of terrorism. NATO has recognized the threat, but has yet to prepare adequately to deal with it. Planning, training and equipping for a combat situation and for terrorism-related consequence management are the essential steps that follow recognition of the threat. Here is where NATO can – and needs to – do much more. Member-states must demonstrate their political will and dedication to minimize the danger and consequences of international terrorism by concrete steps that involve the transformation of NATO’s capabilities.

There is a direct linkage between NATO’s willingness and capability to cope with the threat of terrorism and its willingness and capability to modernize (transform).

NATO transformation is on the threshold of revolutionary change. Just as the U.S. force posture was forced to change from one geared to waging a massive campaign in Europe against the Warsaw Pact to one prepared to fight non-conventional conflicts such as the war on terrorism, the military forces of the NATO allies must also adapt to this new situation. The tactics and tanks prepared to fight on the North European plain are not fully relevant to the type of conflict facing NATO now and likely to face the Alliance in the future.

A successful campaign against terrorism goes hand-in-hand with NATO transformation. The two efforts must be linked as quickly and thoroughly as possible.
THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL’S BOARD OF DIRECTORS

CHAIRMAN
*Henry E. Catto, Jr.

VICE CHAIRS
*Carol C. Adelman
*Chas. W. Freeman, Jr.
*Roger Kirk
*Geraldine S. Kunstadter
*Richard L. Lawson
*John D. Macomber
*Virginia A. Mulberger
*W. DeVier Pierson
*Paula Stern
*Ronald P. Verdicchio

TREASURER
*Jan M. Lodal

SECRETARY
*Walter B. Slocombe

PRESIDENT
*Christopher J. Makins

DIRECTORS
David L. Aaron
Robert J. Abernethy
*David C. Acheson
Donald M. Alstadt
G. Allen Andreas
Nancy Kassebaum Baker
Donald K. Bandler
Lucy Wilson Benson
*Dennis C. Blair
*Julia Chang Bloch
Avis T. Bohlen
Beth A. Brooke
Harold Brown
Kent N. Brown
Dan W. Burns
Richard R. Burt
Daniel J. Callahan, III
Sarah C. Carey
Michael P.C. Carns
Gareth C.C. Chang
Daniel W. Christman
Wesley K. Clark
William Clark, Jr.
Vance D. Coffman
*Curtis M. Coward
Ralph D. Crosby, Jr.
W. Bowman Cutter
W. Kenneth Davis
Edwin Dorn
William H. Draper, III
Stanley Ebner
Stuart E. Eizenstat
*Robert F. Ellsworth
Richard W. Fisher
*William H.G. FitzGerald
Rosemarie Forsythe
Barbara H. Franklin
Leon S. Fueth
*John L. Fugh
Jacques S. Gansler
Sherri W. Goodman
Lincoln Gordon
C. Boyden Gray
Maurice R. Greenberg
*Janet Mullins Grissom
Donald L. Guertin
Kenneth H. Hannan
*Harry Harding
Rita E. Hauser
Marten H.A. van Heuven
James Hogg
*Mary L. Howell
*Benjamin Huberman
*Robert E. Hunter
Mercy Jimenez
*George A. Joulwan
Paul G. Kaminski
Arnold Kanter
Robert M. Kimmitt
*James V. Kimsey
Henry A. Kissinger
Michael V. Kostiw
Franklin D. Kramer
*Charles R. Larson
Roderick K. von Lipsey
Susan M. Livingstone
John R. Lyman
Diana MacArthur
Barry R. McCaffrey
James P. McCarthy
Joan M. McEntee
*David E. McGiffert
*Jack N. Merritt
*Judith A. Miller
George E. Moore
*Steven Muller
William A. Nitze
Robert E. O’Brien
Philip A. Odean
Hilliard W. Paige
Harry A. Pearce
Charles R. Perry
William J. Perry
*Thomas R. Pickering
Joseph W. Prueher
Joseph W. Ralston
Norman W. Ray
Stanley R. Resor
Joseph E. Robert, Jr.
Marjorie M. Scardino
James Schlesinger
William O. Schmieder
John P. Schmitz
Jill A. Schucker
*Brent Scowcroft
Patricia Sherman
Eric K. Shinseki
Matthew R. Simmons
Kiron K. Skinner
Anne-Marie Slaughter
William Y. Smith
*Helmut Sonnenfeldt
George J. Stathakis
Robert D. Stuart, Jr.
Gordon R. Sullivan
Carl E. Vuoio
Roger W. Wallace
John Walter
J. Robinson West
Togo D. West, Jr.
R. James Woolsey

HONORARY DIRECTORS
James A. Baker, III
Frank C. Carlucci, III
Warren Christopher
Harlan Cleveland
Russell E. Dougherty
Gerald R. Ford
Andrew J. Goodpaster
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Christian A. Herter, Jr.
Robert S. McNamara
Paul H. Nitze
Bernard W. Rogers
Edward L. Rowny
George M. Seignious, II
Raymond P. Shafer
George P. Shultz
William H. Webster
John C. Whitehead

*members of the Executive Committee