

Baltic Defence Review

No. 11

Volume 1/2004

ISSN 1736-1257

Published by the Baltic Security Society, Riia 12, EE 51013 Tartu, Estonia.

Articles of the Baltic Defence Review are also available to the subscribers of the EBSCO Host database at <http://search.global.epnet.com>.

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Photo on a front cover: An official ceremony of raising a NATO flag in front of the Baltic Defence College, 2 April 2004

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Editor's note

The main purpose of the Baltic Defence Review, the BDR, is to be a place for publication of articles on Baltic defence and security issues, a venue where debate can be started and nourished and where relevant research by Baltic and other scholars can be presented.

This volume is embracing the wider *security* issues. It also takes into account that with the double enlargement of NATO and the EU, the term 'Baltic' may again simply mean countries around the Baltic Sea and stop being a poor paraphrase of the Russian term '*Pribaltika*'.

The list of contributors to this volume includes names from far beyond the three Baltic States. This is our constant ambition, and this time we have succeeded. Even if the issue marks the celebration of the 5-th graduation of the Baltic Defence College courses, it also reflects new initiatives and trends at the College.

One such new initiative is the Open Seminars organized monthly for staff, students, and guests, such as defence attaches, staff from the Ministry of Defence and General Staff and others coming in from Tallinn, Helsinki and Riga, and regularly from the Estonian Defence College and Tartu University. The speakers at these seminars - Pauli Järvenpää, Stanley Sloan, Jørgen Dragsdahl, and Janusz Onyszkiewicz, along with Konstantin Khudoley and Dimitri Lanko - have agreed to contribute with pieces not published before. The purpose of Open Seminars is in a thought provoking way to stir up debate on issues relevant to Baltic security debate.

On the same line, the College has undertaken cooperation with other institutions in the world of learning, both its civilian and military part. The articles by Jennifer Moll, supported by the Fulbright

Foundation, whose scholars are frequent participants at the Open Seminars, as well as the piece by Captain (Navy) Jean-François Morel, former student at the NATO Defence College in which College staff members from the Baltic Defence College have participated in seminars, thanks to the hospitality of the Dean and the Commandant. The speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kristiina Ojuland delivered at St. Antony's College, Oxford, is reproduced in this volume with specific permission from the Oxford College thanks to yet other set of recent international cooperation.

Another article, by Steffen Rasmussen, who worked in the College as a research assistant, is the result of the constant endeavour to create a framework for internal research in the institution. As in earlier volumes, College students are also contributing here.

All in all, this volume expresses continuity and reflects new initiatives, in particular the Higher Command Studies Course described by the College Commandant, and also a MA programme in War Studies under preparation. The end state is of the Baltic Defence College; that is Baltic States' leadership and Baltic States' control of the College. The initiatives described above are focused to support this target.

The issues discussed in this volume are ranging from the new –post enlargement-NATO with focus on the Baltic and Northern members' role within it; the structure of Baltic defence policies and further development of international defence cooperation, along with the cooperation within the Alliance and with its external partners. The Trans-Atlantic Rift, and the European –new and old- vision on the EU-NATO relations is analysed in the perspective of questions like 'Does the USA have a defence strategy at all?', 'Will the EU finally pull itself out of its numerous crises?', and, 'Will it be a stronger or weaker European union?' Finally, 'What

will be the implications for the Baltic region?'

In his article *Security Dimensions of Northern Europe after the Double Enlargement* Kestutis Paulauskas is provoking us to consider the future security agenda of the Baltic Northern region by questioning the very function of Northern Europe – with its specific characteristics such as *northerness of mentality, regionality, and its aloofness towards continental Europe* – within the changing global security order. 'Does the double enlargement actually mean that the world has become a safer place for the Baltic States and the Nordic countries?', asks Paulauskas. The specifics of one of the Baltic nations and its effect on the defence considerations are studied within the framework of the constructivist theoretical approach and the Copenhagen school by Steffen Rasmussen in *Estonian Security Perceptions in the Context of EU Enlargement: A Critical Discussion*, while the argument of the Northern and Baltic states aloofness towards continental Europe is reinforced in Pauli Järvenpää's presentation on *Finland's Defence Policy: Sui Generis*.

Finland, a member of the European Union and active partner to NATO maintains that the very survival of (its) nation state is best ensured by a credible national defence ever ready for territorial defence, though also trained to become good peace-keepers. The logic behind the Finnish 2004 Defence White Paper –soon to be disclosed- is presented by the author for the readers to draw their own conclusions.

Russia is not mentioned explicitly but ever-present, in particular in the Finnish, the Estonian, and the Latvian territorial defence arguments. Russia itself does neither have a common single discourse on the Alliance nor on the Baltic states joining NATO, we are told by Konstantin Khudoley and Dimitri Lanko, invited to present the view from 'the other side' of the no longer disputed, yet not officially approved boarder. Three discourses; a)'Baltic states accepted to NATO to maintain the Alliance', b)'Baltic states accepted to NATO to counter-balance misunderstanding between America and the 'old' Europe; and c)'Baltic states accepted to

NATO to bring Russia closer to the Alliance'; are introduced within the framework of constructivist theory and securitization concept concluding with the potential implications for the Baltic States military transformations.

The same theoretical approach –the Copenhagen school - is favoured in the second part of Jennifer Moll's article on the *Transatlantic Security Rift and Its Implication for Baltic Security*; the *Ramification for Baltic Security* where Moll is conducting a discussion on Baltic unity and on the United States as the primary security guarantor.

The Transatlantic Rift and its consequences for the new Baltic members of NATO is examined in a number of other contributions to this volume: Jørgen Dragsdahl (Denmark) and Stan Sloan (USA) are presenting the US and European perspectives, respectively. Without mediation by the editors these two contributors are highlighting the same aspects: are the Europeans ready for US leadership and substantial burden sharing; how will global US leadership be defined by a

democratic administration –both assume an 'after Bush' era soon-to-be. Dragsdahl is providing us with a thorough discussion of a new type empire and the Baltic dilemma within this prospective, Sloan is drawing our attention to a particular aspect working against the tendencies for a 'rift'. Not only do Europeans and the US Americans share political values, we also share market economic systems in which markets are driven by competition, yet they are governed by democratically approved rules and regulations. So how much does it really matter, all this talk about a Trans-Atlantic Rift? Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Poland's minister of defence during the PIP years is asking in *The Central Issues for NATO* from the perspective of an 'old' new member to NATO: Is the Alliance to remain a common defence structure, an alliance cantered around mutually binding security guarantees, or will it drift towards a much looser common security structure? Playing the 'devil's advocate's role Onyszkiewicz is pointing out that NATO's enlargement has negative effect on the

Alliance's cohesion, and that reasons for Transatlantic Rift are not constrained to the division between Europe and the US, but also divisions within Europe.

This line of argumentation is taken up by Knut Kirste in *NATO's Security Agenda after Enlargement*. NATO's main function in the past was to ensure collective defence and guarantee the security interests of its members, states Kirste. While it may be difficult to decide how long ago this 'past' applies, it is even more challenging to bid for NATO's future. Is it to be the driving force of an international security system and the central defence related link between the USA, Europe, Russia, and a variety of partners?

The discussion items above reflect the new situation of the Baltic States and their neighbours just as they are crucial to members of the next round of NATO enlargement. That is what LtCol Neven Kranjcec is considering on behalf of his country.

Elizabeth Tromer

At the 5th Staff Course Graduation of the Baltic Defence College: The College Now and in the Future

By Michael H. Clemmesen, Brigadier General, Commandant

Seven years ago, in June 1997, the Nordic and Baltic Defence Ministers decided to develop a common school for the education of staff officers. At that time the idea of creating a common staff college was less than a year old.

One year later, many more supporting states joined the original group in signing the formal agreement and the support Memorandum of Understanding in the NATO Headquarters, hosted by the delegation from Sweden, the lead state. Immediately thereafter, the preparation work started in Tartu, and in June 2000 the first “Senior Staff Course” students

graduated. During this first year the faculty had to form as a team, learn, prepare - at the same time as educate the student officers. With the 5th graduation this summer, close to 130 officers from the three Baltic states have been educated to serve as general staff officers. Most have graduated from the staff course, now transformed into a “Joint Command and General Staff Course”, others in the much smaller, parallel “Colonel Course”. They have been educated together with close to 50 officers from 16 different other states. During the latest three school years, a total of close to 40 civil servants have graduated from the “Civil Servants Course”.

Next year, the “Joint Command and General Staff Course” will remain the main activity of the College, supplemented with the “Civil Servants Course”, now increasingly integrated into the staff course modules. The last “Colonels Course” has graduated this summer.

During the five years that the school has existed the education has undergone a constant development, inspired by the students and new staff members, by the improving level of Baltic student preparation, as well as by the need to adjust with vision and ambition to the emerging security framework of the Baltic states armed forces.

From 1999 till 2004, the focus of the tactics-operational teaching changed significantly. From initially spanning the field from battalion to military region, the teaching is now starting with infantry brigade tactics and covers the joint operational level in the final months of the course. This refocusing was necessary. However, it was only made possible by the junior staff courses created and conducted by graduates of the BALTDEFCOL staff course in all three Baltic states.

During the first years, the operational framework was territorial defence, using NATO standards and procedures. Now all teaching in the field of tactics and operations is either of a general character or it deals with the issues and planning procedures of combined expeditionary operations.

The “New NATO” character of the education has made it possible to consider opening the NATO Operational Planning module of the staff course to additional students. This possibility may initially be used to “update” graduates

from the earlier staff course to prepare them better for work in NATO staffs and in mission areas. However, some places have also been offered to NATO School (Oberammergau) as an extra capacity and a possibility to give a somewhat more thorough training than that school can offer in its shorter courses. The details of this potential co-operation will be clarified in the agreed negotiations during the coming months.

The new Alliance mission framework has underlined the need to broaden all military education, making it more “mind-opening”, more academic. This, of course, is of special importance in the advanced education of the selected best, the students in general staff level courses. Therefore the College is preparing to offer supplementary elements linked to the present Joint Command and General Staff Course modules, making these – with the supplement – suitable within an academic “war studies” framework. Those who qualify by having the necessary bachelor degree background, who have a very high level in written English, and who pass the exams

at the end of each module plus supplement will have collected academic credits that can be used in the second half of a complete master programme. In addition, they will have gained part of the deeper and broader understanding of the world and their profession that will be crucial for military success – and Alliance relevance – in the future. As a benefit, officers with the combination of advanced professional education and a master degree with a relevant focus will be highly suited for participating in the further development of the College and the other military education institutions of the three states.

The three Baltic states are deeply committed to do their bit to support the effort of Alliance leaders to transform the organisation by making a much larger part of the available European NATO manpower – currently 2,5 million – ready and deployable. The direct contribution is limited by the small size of own resources and armed forces, however, this limitation makes transformation easier to accomplish. The Baltic states have no large

structural, attitudinal and equipment bal-
last to shed.

The leaders of the three states understand that successful transformation towards relevance depends on the attitude, focus and professional effectiveness of the emerging group of leaders of the European armed forces. To present an example of what needs to be done, the College has been encouraged by the three Ministers to develop a war college level “Higher Command Studies Course” dedicated to “Leadership of Transformation”. After running this course as a small “pilot project” in 2004, the follow-on 2005 course will be open to selected potential high level officers and civilian defence officials from other NATO and PfP-states as a proposed Allied Command Transformation “Centre of Excellence” project. Due to the importance of its clear NATO education requirement focus, the non-Baltic course members will have their course fees covered by the Baltic sponsored project budget. The course and its background are presented later in the Review.

The future of the College will – as in the first 5 years – be dominated by a constant and dynamic adaptation to the requirements of the armed forces of the three new NATO members as well as by a wish to be seen at the front line of Alliance developments.

Section I

Military Education

The Background and Development of the Baltic Defence College Higher Command Studies Course “Leadership of Transformation”

By Michael H. Clemmesen, Brigadier General, Commandant

Background

The course in its final 2004 form has two sets of roots:

Firstly, the gradual realisation of the need to create a War College level course tailored to the time and CEE requirements, a course that could also make it more realistic to develop qualified professional and academic senior staff members for the Baltic Defence College

Secondly, the College endeavours to approach the ideal of the three Baltic

Defence Ministers as closely as possible: to transform all the common Baltic states’ projects, including the College into true NATO structures

The original BALTDEFCOL Higher Command Studies Course

Originally the College agreed with the traditional Continental West-European attitude to fourth - war college - level officer courses: it is the responsibility of a graduate of the third and final level education, the general staff officer course,

to stay updated during the remaining service through the interaction of service experience, discussions with colleagues, and continuous general and professional studies. The needs for further education would be covered by the NATO Defence College Senior Course and short, management oriented courses.

However, the following considerations have led the College to change its mind:

- The defined, formal Baltic states’ officer education systems: All three states included a fourth level officer education

in their plans, especially Estonia; the Commandant of the National Defence College pressed continuously for an in-region course.

- The realisation that the assumption of professional self-development was unrealistic: The best staff officers, potential generals and admirals, are spending an increasing part of their careers being extremely busy in mainly administrative-management oriented jobs. With the reduction of the force structures, the number of positions with a clear, practical or theoretical professional content has been significantly reduced. This combines with the effects of the modern Western family pattern, where the spouse is likely to be less tolerant of purely self-development activities. The result is one where the staff course graduate is more likely just to use rather than develop what he/she once learned. One may safely assume that this has been one factor in the transformation inertia of many Continental West-European armed forces.

- The increasing requirement in the new mission environment: Previously the task

of most West-European general staff officers was to refine the structural and doctrinal responses to a very well defined threat from the Soviet Union. This applied to both national and NATO staff positions. Therefore a rather narrow operational, professional focus was possible. Both now and in the future, however, a much wider both general and joint professional understanding is required from all “flag rank” officers, an understanding they as young command and staff course students of major/lieutenant commander rank were too immature and inexperienced to absorb fully and thereafter develop.

- The inspiration from the UK and U.S.: When the UK created their Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC), the new college adopted the British Army Higher Command and Staff Course, now as a joint three months course concentrating on operational level command issues. The British College underlined the very significant benefits of the course to both the UK armed forces and the College itself. The course acted as a bridge between the College and the

Forces, ensuring interest in higher professional education in the leadership of the Services and preparing future key and leading professional College staff members. In the USMC, the motive behind creating the small (approximately 18 student) Corps War College Course was the then USMC Commandant General Gray’s wish to ensure qualified leading instructors for the Command and Staff College. Thus a similar small course in the Baltic Defence College could develop a better environment and a prepared recruiting field of qualified interested persons for the College.

- Finally, the need, availability, cost and focus of war college courses: The Baltic states are unlikely to field large forces and the immediate focus and contributions are on the purely tactical level. In spite of this, their key officers and civilian defence officials should still have an, in-depth, developed professional understanding so that they advise their political leaders, play a constructive role in the alliance and develop their own military education structures on the basis of an updated understanding of the requirements and

the conditions of their societies. After all, the total sum of their populations is half-way between those of Sweden and Israel. NATO is not a supranational organisation where the truth is only present with its leading members - NATO is not the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Even the small member officials need a general understanding to serve their nations as well as the whole Alliance. Even the small members should maintain the ability to contribute with positions and ideas. Until now, several officers from the Baltic states' armed forces have attended the American armed services war college courses, with the cost sponsored by the U.S., the most prominent being Lieutenant general Johannes Kert from Estonia and Vice Admiral Gaidis Zeibots, the present Latvian Armed Forces Commander. The future BALTDEFCOL Commandant, Col Algis Vaiceliunas is presently studying in the compatible National Security Studies Course in Canada, sponsored by that country. The UK Higher Command Studies Course is not open to Baltic or other CEE students and is likely to remain

closed. The main two specific benefits any non-American officer can gain from attending a U.S. war college course - besides the general widening and deepening professional understanding that you should get from any such course - are the networking to key colleagues and a thorough inside knowledge of current and developing U.S. policy issues and strategies. However, the U.S. courses are costly, something likely to create a dilemma, when sponsorship runs out.

***The original project – the sequence of events and decisions
January 2003-January 2004:***

- The BALTDEFCOL Board Meeting 29th January in Vilnius: The meeting was conducted as a normal meeting linked to the BALTSEA framework. The possibility of conducting a UK-inspired, short Higher Command Studies Course (HCSC) was discussed in the meeting, and was warmly endorsed by Dr Peter Foot of Kings College London and the JSCSC. The result of the meeting was that *“the*

*Board decided that the HCSC will be arranged during 2004 on a preliminary basis. The course will be evaluated before it will be arranged permanently”*¹. The money necessary to conduct the course was granted by the approval of the proposed 2004 budget, part of that money transferred from the cancelled 2003-04 “Colonels Course“. It was a clear premise from the discussion that the course could be conducted without any additional workload for the existing directing staff – the central BALTDEFCOL project was still the Joint Command and General Staff Course.

- The proposed rotation of the course within the circle of Nordic-Baltic Staff Schools: At the Nordic Staff School Commandants' Conference 16-18 September in Denmark, the BALTDEFCOL presentation led to a discussion of the HCSC. This discussion led to a proposal of 9th October to the Nordic staff colleges to consider conducting such a course, rotating among them. This would ensure a constant and relevant number of students (18-24), a development promoting competition with the previous course(s) and

be a very cost-effective solution. It would also address the problem of finding a director for the 2005 and follow-on courses. The 2004 small “pilot” course would be developed and run by the College Commandant, parallel to his handing over to the successor. During the following month it became clear that the proposal conflicted with the development of the course away from the operational level command and general force development focus towards a clear NATO “Leadership of Transformation” emphasis.

Towards an Allied Command Transformation Centre of Excellence (COE) Project January-May 2004:

• The BALTDEFCOL adjustment to become a NATO-focused institution prior to February 2004: Following-up the 2002 Prague NATO Summit invitations to the Baltic states, the three Defence Ministers agreed that the Baltic military co-operations projects should be transformed into NATO-projects.² In the College this meant an in-

tensification of the endeavours to adjust the curriculum to the “New NATO” expeditionary focus, an increased instruction in NATO operational planning procedures and other relevant alliance publications and the creation of a formal co-operation with the U.S-German sponsored “NATO-School” in Oberammergau, Germany.

• 9 February 2004: The first meeting of the new steering body, the “BALTDEFCOL Co-ordination Group” took place in Oslo on 9th February linked to the BALTSEA sequence of meetings³. The meeting was briefed about the planned HCSC and had no critical remarks. However, the College realised from the remarks of the Baltic MoD representatives that something additional had to be done “*to put the BALTDEFCOL under the umbrella of NATO*” to “*...see BALTDEFCOL in the future as an open NATO College*”⁵.

• February-March 2004: As there is no common NATO education system, the only available option was to develop the HCSC into a both unique and open “institution” that supported the NATO member armed forces transformation to become far more interoperable, combat ready

and deployable. If the College succeeded in this and became accepted as an Allied Command Transformation Centre of Excellence, it would live up to the political intentions of the 9th February meeting. The first steps were to ensure that the 2004 HCSC was given a focused “Leadership of Transformation” curriculum, had the right quality of core (Baltic) course members and had access to high quality guest lecturers and commentators at the course theme seminars. The two first of these steps were completed in February, and with generous support and other assistance offered by individuals and partners in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Netherlands, NATO authorities, Israel, Germany and Denmark. They ensured that we had a significant number of the right quality guest lecturers and could proceed. On 25th February the College sent a letter to the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) via the Estonian Military Representative to NATO HQ, LtGen Johannes Kert to introduce the course and propose that a (U.S.) ACT officer participates. The first

contact to ACT had taken place 21st November 2003, when Adm Fernandez, SACT Representative in Europe visited the College together with Gen Kert. The letter was followed by my visit to the U.S. 30 March-02 April to ACT in Norfolk that also came to include conversations in Pentagon (OSD and Joint Staff J5) arranged by the Estonian Defence Attaché to the U.S.

- April-May 2004: The results of the work to refocus and develop the HCSC were reported to the BALTDEFCOL Co-ordination Group meeting in Vilnius on 19th April 2004. The College also presented an adjusted 2005 budget proposal with a Baltic states sponsored HCSC open to all NATO and PfP states⁶. All three states supported the adjusted budget and the way ahead to attain ACT Centre of Excellence status for the course project proposed by Estonia⁷. The 2005 course would maintain its clear “Leadership of Transformation” focus, be adjusted on the basis on the 2004 “pilot” course experience, and it would be open to all NATO and PfP states. The three Baltic states armed forces commanders (the “Baltic Military Committee”) meeting in

Cesis, Latvia on 21st-22nd April followed the recommendations of the Co-ordination Group in relations to the 2005 budget and the way ahead towards attaining CEO status. However, the commanders also underlined “*that the implementation of the Higher Command Studies Course shall influence neither the quality of education nor the budget of the current courses in BALTDEFCOL*”⁸. During April it had become clear that the course member slots offered to the Nordic states would not be used. This gave a possibility to start giving the 2004 pilot course some of the “out-reach transformation” focus that would make the CEO project especially relevant for the Alliance. It will now have a – Danish sponsored – Croatian, an – Estonian sponsored – Serbian-Montenegrin course member and a – Lithuanian sponsored – Georgian course member. The course started with the introduction week 10th – 13th May that included a presentation by MGen Nick Parker, the UK JSCSC Commandant, who earlier in his career directed the British HCSC. In that way we connected to one of the main inspirations of the BALTDEFCOL HCSC.

Final remarks

It is important to underline that the HCSC has not been designed to compete with U.S. War College Courses or the NATO Defense College Senior Course. As with these other courses, it is at 4th officer education level with a significant presence of civilian defence officials. Even if there is some overlap in the substance of the courses, this course was designed to have a different focus, especially relevant for the most senior officers and defence officials responsible for adapting and innovating the doctrines and structures better to support the current and emerging Alliance requirements. It could be used both to prepare for positions in the national central structures and within the common Alliance transformation organisation. Thus it is meant to supplement existing Alliance member institutions and capabilities. It can not be ruled out that a combination of this course with an American War College Course or the NATO Defense College Senior Course can be seen as necessary for some officials.

It will take a major effort to have the 2005 and follow-on Higher Command Studies Courses used properly as a Centre of Excellence, even after it has been granted that status. The three states have to convince other NATO and PFP states that even if – or rather because – their armed forces are small and young, they have been free and able to set up something new and unique that could benefit all. The three states had already done that when they established the first combined English language staff college in continental Europe. The Centre of Excellence is probably only going to become a success, if the NATO states with the most transformed forces, the UK and U.S., “adopt” the course for their own use, benefiting from the Baltic sponsorship to save own money, having their local representatives in CEE capitals (the U.S. ODCs and the UK advisors or DAs) co-operating with the local authorities to identify the right candidates.

The HCSC is run as a nearly completely independent activity in the Baltic Defence College, however, using the same support staff to save resources. It will have a sepa-

rate directing staff including the new Deputy Course Director of the College and a civilian academic of the Institute for Defence Studies, both will be graduates of the 2004 HCSC. Such a limited manning and the resulting independence of the staff supporting the other College courses is only possible due to the limited size of the HCSC and the role of external lecturers in the Course. The HCSC Course Director for the 2005 and immediately following courses will probably have to be seconded from outside the Baltic states on temporary assignment.

End-bullets

- If NATO is to remain relevant in the eyes of the U.S., the continental European alliance members must accelerate the transformation of their armed forces, and especially their armies, to become far more ready, deployable and interoperable.

- If nothing effective is done to develop the attitude of the coming leadership group in these states in favour of innovation and enhance its tools of imple-

mentation, the transformation will – in the best case – become unfocused and protracted.

- As our future security may still depend on the maintenance of an effective NATO, the Baltic states have decided to do their small bit to catalyse transformation.

¹ Minutes from the Baltic Defence College Board meeting in Vilnius, 2003 Jan 29.

² Also clearly mirrored in the Joint Communication of the Ministerial Committee on 10th December 2002 in Riga..

³ Minutes from the Baltic Defence College Co-ordination Group Meeting in Oslo, February 9, 2004.

⁴ Final comment of Grazvydas Jasutis, the representative of the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence.

⁵ Final comment of Edgars Scarenieks, the representative of the Latvian Ministry of Defence.

⁶ With a dedicated budget of 120.000 EUR, the course could be conducted with 20 course members, and with all costs of bringing external lecturers to the College – including a significant lecturing fee – covered by the budget. Thus the course could free itself of the external sponsorship necessary to conduct the 2004 course.

⁷ Draft Minutes – BALTDEFECOL Co-ordination Group meeting 19 April 2004, Vilnius.

⁸ Baltic Military Committee Joint Statement of 22 April 2004.

Section II

Transatlantic Relations

U.S. Hegemony and the Transatlantic Alliance

By Stanley R. Sloan*

A Valuable Relationship under Stress

In recent months, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania along with Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia became NATO members, fulfilling the promises made at the NATO Prague summit of November 2002. Ironically, at a time when the alliance is being enlarged both in membership and mission, a crisis of confidence has developed between the United States and many of its European allies.

To some extent, the current crisis is the product of structural factors in international relations with which the United

States and its allies must deal but which are not easily subject to manipulation. The most important of these is the emergence of the United States as the only global power whose policies and actions inevitably intrude on the sovereign interests of other states, including those of friends and allies.

A related structural factor is that the major West European allies no longer rely on the United States to defend them against Russia, even though some of the new allies still see NATO as an important hedge against Russian power. All European members of NATO, new and old, now are partners with the United States in the war against terror and some of them

joined in the U.S.-led coalition that removed Saddam Hussein from power and occupied Iraq.

Beyond structural sources of difference, U.S.-European disagreements are the product of choices made in democratic decisionmaking processes on both sides of the Atlantic, for example concerning resources allocated for military systems and operations versus resources made available for other sources of national power and influence.

Since the advent of the Bush Administration, European observers and governments have been concerned that U.S. respect for alliances, international law, cooperation and organisations was being

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displaced by reliance on overwhelming U.S. military force. The United States was seen by many Europeans as abandoning what had been a shared Euro-Atlantic commitment to the rule of law, applied internationally as well as within states.

The U.S.-European relationship has from the early post-World War II period been founded on declarations of common values and interests.¹ Throughout the Cold War the United States and its allies had differences concerning how best to respond to the Soviet threat. However, the nature of the threat facilitated resolution of differences and development of common approaches. The new challenges of non-state terrorist threats and the shadowy relationships between such groups and national governments have yielded a variety of interpretations of the nature of the threat and how best to respond. The September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States produced a sense of joint purpose between the United States and its European allies. But the nature of the U.S. response, particularly with regard to Iraq, has produced serious divisions across

the Atlantic and among European states.

Now, as the United States struggles to help establish a democratic regime in Iraq, the question addressed here is whether the behaviour of the United States as a hegemonic power has enhanced or diminished its power and influence in Europe and more generally throughout the world.

Why Does it Matter?

For over 50 years, the United States, Canada and their European allies have taken the Euro-Atlantic alliance for granted: maintenance of a strong, vital “transatlantic link” has been at the core of European and American foreign and defence policies. Early in the 21st century, however, a new period of questioning has begun. Some Americans ask: if the United States is the world’s only superpower, what do weak, disputatious, legalistic Europeans have to offer to U.S. interests? Some Europeans ask: if Europe is on its way to unity, with most European countries on board, why should Europe defer to rude, reckless, impetuous Americans?

The American side of this debate tends to focus on European weakness. A prominent neo-conservative commentator, Robert Kagan, has argued that the success of the European integration process, creating a zone of peace and cooperation among countries that had warred for centuries, has also given birth to a “non-use of force ideology.” According to Kagan, “This is what many Europeans believe they have to offer the world: not power, but the transcendence of power.”²

One European commentator says that Kagan is “absolutely right” in judging that “Americans and Europeans no longer share a common ‘strategic culture.’” Peter van Ham points out that “...for non-Americans, this is gradually becoming a world where the U.S. acts as legislator, policeman, judge and executioner. America sets the rules by its own behaviour, judges others without sticking to these rules itself...”³

Such broad caricatures have recently dominated discussion of U.S.-European relations. They lead all-too-easily to the conclusion that the United States and

Europe are drifting apart. There is a factual foundation for such analyses. States tend to use the instruments of statecraft available to them. What instruments they develop and fund is at least somewhat dependent on what their history has taught them. The history of the Second World War led many Europeans to conclude that military conflict is to be avoided at all cost. Meanwhile, many Americans look at World War II as demonstrating that appeasement of dictators only whets their appetite for conquest. During the Cold War, West European nations learned that putting aside old antagonisms allowed them to build a prosperous, stable community – today's European Union (E.U.). Meanwhile, deterring and finally defeating the Soviet Union in the Cold War reinforced the American conviction that the demonstrated willingness to use force is necessary in dealing with potentially aggressive dictatorial regimes.

However, there is more to be said about the relevance of U.S.-European relations than such critiques reveal.

First, there is the fact that the United States, Canada and the members of the European Union share political systems built on the values of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. Granted, this does not mean that these broad values are practiced similarly in all Euro-Atlantic nations. And the fact that they are interpreted differently may help explain the divergent paths chosen for dealing with the Iraq problem. However, the belief in and practice of democracy remains an important part of the foundation for the Euro-Atlantic community, a factor perhaps best appreciated by the Baltic states and the others who have just joined NATO and the European Union.

In addition to shared political values, the United States and E.U. member states support market based economic systems in which competition drives the market but is governed by democratically approved rules and regulations. Former Soviet satellites in Central and Eastern Europe and three former Soviet Republics (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) have worked hard to adopt "western" political

and economic systems. The desire to align with the United States while protecting themselves against excessive Russian influence provided much of the incentive for these unequivocal commitments. They all have sought to become E.U and NATO members, to ensure that they are part of Europe and of the Euro-Atlantic community.

Moreover, European and American market economies are the essential core of the global economic system. Along with Japan, the United States and the European Union are the main engines of international trade and investment, and it is therefore in their mutual interest to cooperate to make the system work. The economic relationship between the United States and the European Union is vitally important to both. The E.U. is the largest U.S. trade partner when goods and services are added up.⁴ The members of the E.U. have over \$860 billion of direct investment in the United States. The United States has some \$700 billion invested in E.U. states. The E.U. and the United States together account for more than 40 per-

cent of world trade and represent almost 60 percent of the industrialised world's gross domestic product. These numbers and ratios will continue to grow.⁵

At the end of the Cold War, some observers judged that the Soviet threat had imposed a discipline on transatlantic trade and financial relations that would disappear in the post-Cold War era. According to this view, trade differences that had been controlled because of the confrontation with Moscow would break out into the open with a devastating impact on transatlantic relations. Even though the United States and Europe have continued to struggle with a variety of trade issues – most recently including U.S.-imposed tariffs on steel imports and increased subsidies for U.S. farmers – such differences have not shaken the foundations of the relationship. This is so because even though the system stimulates and encourages competition it also ceases to function effectively unless conflicting interests are eventually reconciled. In spite of continuing differences and the absence of a Cold War threat, the United States

and Europe remain committed to resolving their differences in ways that balance costs and benefits over time.

At the heart of the projection of doom and gloom for transatlantic relations by some analysts on both sides of the Atlantic is the view that the U.S.-European security relationship is becoming irrelevant, NATO is dead, and the European Union will never muster enough political will and resources to become a significant military player alongside the United States. There is a growing gap between U.S. and European deployed military capabilities. The Europeans have simply not spent enough since the end of the Cold War to keep up with the U.S. Revolution in Military Affairs in which digital technology is being used to revolutionise the modern battlefield. What they have spent has not always been spent well, maintaining military structures and equipment more appropriate for the Cold War strategic environment than for likely 21st century conflicts.

During the Cold War, the gap between U.S. and European military capabilities

produced different preferences for international problem solving. Now, the even bigger gap yields even more dramatic differences – between the so-called non-use-of-force ideology Robert Kagan ascribes to the Europeans and the unilateral militarism many Europeans see in the Bush administration.

Bush administration Department of Defense political appointees have tended to be sceptical about the willingness of European allies to make serious defence improvements. Granted, the European military modernisation picture is certainly bad, but it is not hopeless. Europe clearly needs to invest much more in defence, but the major European military establishments are trying to develop the capacity to conduct future operations on the kind of high tech battlefield that U.S. capabilities have created. Scheduled improvements in communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, all weather precision weaponry, strategic mobility, and force projection over the next 15 years, if carried out, should produce European forces that are more ca-

pable of conducting operations in a great variety of battlefield conditions in coalition with the United States and, to a lesser extent, on their own if necessary.⁶ The question, of course, is whether political leaders will back up such plans with the required resources.

The debate over Iraq highlighted U.S. differences with some of its key European allies. This did not change the fact that Europe remains the prime source of allies that are willing and able to deploy substantial military forces in zones of conflict far from their borders.⁷ Moreover, the main framework for coordinating U.S.-European military cooperation, NATO, has become an important instrument for international, not just European, peace and security. This process took dramatic steps forward, even in the heat of the debate over Iraq, as the NATO allies – including opponents of U.S. Iraq policy France and Germany – agreed to give NATO a command role in Afghanistan and to support the Polish command in Iraq. Moreover, also during this period of stress, the allies agreed to create a NATO

Response Force (NRF), composed mainly of European troops and equipment, designed to deploy quickly with modern, effective forces to deal with future military crises – in or beyond Europe.

The European Union and its member states can bring together a rich package of assets required for crisis management and avoidance, including diplomatic mediation, peacekeeping forces, police forces, humanitarian assistance and development aid. As one U.S.-European expert study group concluded, “Although the U.S. may be able to win wars without significant allied contributions, it is unlikely in many situations to be able to win the peace without military (and non-military) assistance from European allies, whether those situations develop within or outside Europe.”⁸

Productive functioning of the international economic system depends on U.S.-European collaboration. International security problems are most easily and effectively handled when the United States and its European allies work together. NATO is a unique instrument for coor-

dination of U.S. and European military forces that could be even more important in a continuing struggle against terrorism. To the extent that the U.N. Security Council remains an important instrument for international stability and, in Washington, for the pursuit of U.S. policy objectives, the roles of Britain, France and Russia as permanent, veto-holding members of the Council remain critical. The question is how well the United States has been managing this fundamental building block for the U.S. role in the world.

***Post-Cold War U.S. Foreign Policy
Seen From Europe***

Since the end of the Cold War, European perceptions of the United States have swung from concern about the United States drawing inward and abandoning international activism, to fear of a higher U.S. priority on Asian than European relationships, to more recent worries about U.S. unilateralism and hegemonic behaviour. The debate in the United States on its post-Cold War role in the world

and U.S. actions suggesting one or another outcome have stimulated these varied European perceptions. Perhaps because of the closeness of the ties across the Atlantic, even ripples in U.S. foreign policy sometimes produce tidal waves on European shores.

Since the Cold War ended, there has been an ongoing elite debate about the role the United States should play in an international system that is no longer dominated by the bi-polar confrontation of two alliance systems led by the United States and the Soviet Union.

President George Bush (41) clearly believed that the United States was required to play a strong international leadership role. Some of his advisers, including some who are senior officials in the George W. Bush (43) administration, apparently thought the United States should use its position as the sole superpower to discourage challenges to that position, even among current allies. George Bush (41) nonetheless accepted the importance of building consensus in the United Nations and constructing coalitions to deal with

international challenges (both illustrated by his orchestration of the response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait). Europeans largely appreciated the respect for international cooperation and organisations deployed by the Bush (41) administration and its efforts to build a substantial international coalition with U.N. backing to push Saddam Hussein's forces out of Kuwait.

In the first year of his presidency, Bill Clinton and his foreign policy advisers experimented with a number of different approaches to U.S. foreign policy. President Clinton sought to convert his successful campaign slogan, "It's the economy, stupid," into a pillar of U.S. foreign policy. In part as a consequence of this philosophy, some Clinton Administration officials argued that Asia (rather than Europe) should be the central focus of U.S. foreign policy because of the opportunities presented by growing Asian markets. Europeans were worried by the suggestion that the Clinton administration would try to play Asia off against Europe to promote U.S. trade and economic interests.

By the end of 1993, however, the Administration had moved to a posture emphasizing continuing U.S. political, economic, and strategic interests in Asia *and* Europe.

For most of President Clinton's first term, the Administration seemed to shift between active internationalism and foreign policy reticence. The mood in the country toward foreign entanglements was soured by the peacekeeping disaster in Somalia in 1993. The administration was reluctant to get U.S. troops involved in Yugoslavia and there was a tendency more broadly toward self-deterrence – conscious avoidance of international involvements that might cost U.S. lives and money.⁹ This gave rise to European concerns that the United States might move in isolationist directions. But, in 1996, as he campaigned for a second term in office, President Clinton argued that the United States was the world's "indispensable power," suggesting that the international system required the active involvement of the United States to function effectively. Clinton maintained that such activism was

in the U.S. interest and the United States took the lead in attempting to bring peace to the Balkans. This sign of U.S. interest in stabilising international crisis zones, particularly in Europe, was greatly appreciated by the European allies, even if they were not always comfortable with the U.S. lead.

The more assertive U.S. approach also generated European concerns about growing “unilateralist” tendencies in U.S. policy. Even though overall foreign policy was seen as supporting multilateral approaches, Europeans identified several early signs of U.S. unilateralism and hegemonic tendencies, including:

- The “Helms-Burton Act” that sought to impose sanctions on non-U.S. firms doing business with Cuba;
- Congressional insistence on reform of the United Nations as a pre-condition for payment of U.S. arrears;
- Hard-line sanctions toward Iran, Iraq, Libya;
- Refusal in the mid-1990s to give up NATO’s Southern Command to a European officer;

- The Clinton administration’s approach to the June 1997 Denver economic summit was seen by some participants as “in your face” bragging about the success of the U.S. economic model (at which leaders were asked to put on cowboy hats and boots for the group picture);

- Clinton insistence on limiting the first group of candidates for NATO membership to three countries when several European countries favoured a larger group;

- U.S. refusal to sign the treaty banning anti-personnel land mines; and,

- U.S. proposals in 1998 that NATO should be able to use force even when it is not possible to obtain a mandate from the UN Security Council.

Critics in Europe and elsewhere suggested the United States was beginning to act like a classic, overbearing hegemonic power, using its position of supremacy in the international system to have its way at the expense of the interests and preferences of other powers. Russia complained about NATO enlargement and China advocated a “multi-polar” world as an alternative to U.S. hegemony. In April 1997,

Boris Yeltsin and Chinese leader Jiang Zemin agreed on a “strategic partnership” against those who would “push the world toward a uni-polar order.” European allies occasionally joined the critique overtly. In December 1998, Chairman of the Defense Committee in the French National Assembly, Socialist Paul Quilès, warned that NATO’s 50th anniversary summit in Washington in April 1999 should not “set the seal on the United States’ hegemony over the alliance.”

In this same time period, at least one European observer argued that U.S. hegemonic tendencies were different and less dangerous than those of previous hegemons. This circumstance, Josef Joffe argued, could not be seen simply in classic balance of power terms. He argued the United States was different from previous dominant powers: “It irks and dominates, but it does not conquer. It tries to call the shots and bend the rules, but it does not go to war for land and glory.”¹⁰ Further, he suggested, the dominating U.S. position is based on “soft” as well as “hard” power: “This type of power – a

culture that radiates outward and a market that draws inward – rests on pull, not on push; on acceptance, not on conquest.”¹¹

The George W. Bush (43) administration therefore came to office in 2001 facing a mix of European fears and expectations. Candidate Bush had made statements suggesting the U.S. should begin to pull back from some of its overseas commitments, but the overall thrust of administration policy was in unilateralist directions, at least as seen by most Europeans.

The first foreign policy actions of the Bush Administration tended to raise warning flags for European governments. Unilateral U.S. decisions not to join in the International Criminal Court, to remain outside the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions and to terminate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia were all seen as signs that the United States was heading in new directions based almost exclusively on short-term U.S. policy choices and with no regard for their impact on the views or interests of its closest allies.

The 9/11 Shock

When terrorists mounted the September 11, 2001 attacks against U.S. targets, the European allies responded with unqualified sympathy and support in spite of their ongoing concerns about U.S. foreign policy directions. This included understanding and offers of support for U.S. operations in Afghanistan to remove the Taliban government from power and destroy the Al Qaeda terrorist network that had established itself under Taliban protection. However, the Bush administration was slow to respond to many of the offers of assistance and, from a European point of view, appeared to be sending the message that the United States did not appreciate or need the assistance offered. The administration’s assertion that “the mission should determine the coalition” raised questions about whether the administration was downgrading NATO as an instrument for U.S.-European military cooperation.

In addition, most Americans saw the 9/11 attacks as producing a fundamental

change in the international environment. Led by the Bush administration, a war mentality became the core of America’s world-view. Many Europeans, on the other hand, saw the attacks as part of a continuing struggle with terrorism rather than a new phase of international relations. They tended to focus on the need to deal with the causes of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism as aggressively as the United States was dealing with its consequences. These post-9/11 disconnects between Europe and the United States were signs of a bigger problem to come as the Bush administration focused its attention on Iraq as the next target.

The Iraq Factor

The Bush administration’s approach to Iraq produced serious divisions between the United States and some of its key European allies as well as within Europe itself. No European government saw Saddam Hussein and his regime as benign, and all agreed that something more serious needed to be done to replace sanc-

tions that had hurt the Iraqi people more than the Hussein regime. But there were differences about whether Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, the links between Hussein's regime and al Qaeda, and the imminence of the threat posed by Iraq.

Early in 2002, it was clear to many European observers that the Bush administration was planning on removing Saddam Hussein from office, with force if necessary, and with or without the support of the international community.¹² This enhanced the sense among many Europeans that the United States had taken on an "arrogance of power" that was inconsistent with both traditional U.S. foreign policy and the basis of U.S.-European alliance and cooperation.

By the time the Bush administration, at the urging of his close ally British Prime Minister Tony Blair, finally decided to take its case to the United Nations in September 2002, few Europeans believed that the approach was intended to find a peaceful resolution of the Iraq problem. Vice President Cheney in a major speech in

August had made it quite clear that the administration believed Hussein would have to be removed by force.¹³

Many Europeans suspected that the approach to the U.N. Security Council was primarily designed to serve domestic political purposes, secondarily to firm up Tony Blair's support and only incidentally to get U.N. Security Council approval. Public opinion polls late in the summer of 2002 had shown that the American people favoured going to war against Iraq only if the United States were supported by the international community. With the mid-term election campaigns underway, and control of the Congress potentially in the balance, some Europeans thought the administration was simply protecting its electoral flanks. This suspicion was reinforced by comments made by the President's political advisor, Karl Rove, suggesting that the approach to the U.N. was in fact desirable for domestic political purposes.¹⁴

In the end, Blair's insistence that the U.N. string be run out prolonged the attempt to get U.N. approval for an at-

tack on Iraq. However, very few Europeans were convinced that the Bush administration had any intention of suspending its plans to attack, particularly given the massive military build-up around Iraq that had begun late in 2002. Some European governments sympathised with the need to remove Hussein from power, but many thought all other options should be tested before resorting to the use of force.

Early in 2003, the issue of whether to begin planning defensive assistance to Turkey should it be attacked by Iraq during a presumptive U.S.-led coalition attack on Saddam Hussein's regime exploded, threatening the very underpinnings of the alliance. On January 15, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz formally asked NATO to consider what supporting roles it might play in a U.S.-led war on Iraq. Six areas of assistance were discussed, including sending Patriot missiles and AWACS surveillance planes to defend Turkey, the only NATO member that borders Iraq.

After considerable discussion within the North Atlantic Council, Belgium,

France, and Germany publicly announced their opposition to allowing NATO to begin planning to provide military assistance to Turkey. The three recalcitrant allies said they were not opposed to aiding Istanbul but believed that planning for such action was premature while U.N. arms inspectors were still seeking to disarm Iraq peacefully. The initiative was seen as an attempt by the United States to get pre-emptive NATO support for a military action that was not sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council. Once before, in the case of Kosovo, NATO had acted without a Security Council mandate. In that case, however, all the allies agreed that Russia and China should not be allowed to block a military action in Europe deemed necessary by the NATO allies. In this case, the three allies wanted to make it clear that a NATO mandate would not be sufficient to justify military action against Iraq. The choices of the United States to put the issue before the alliance and of the three allies to block the requested planning brought existing political differences over Iraq into NATO in a

form that put NATO's mutual defence commitment on the line.

To break the stalemate, NATO Secretary General Robertson and some member-states suggested taking the issue to the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), in which France still chooses not to participate. Agreement was finally reached in the French-less DPC when Belgium and Germany dropped their opposition to beginning planning possible military aid to Turkey.

The scenario illustrated to what extent the Iraq issue had frayed political bonds among the allies. It also demonstrated that NATO remains an alliance of sovereign states, and that it works only when serious efforts have been made to build a political consensus behind a course of action, particularly when that action requires the use of military force.

The Bush administration worked hard to get as many European governments as possible on board in support of the war. In addition to the Blair government, the most responsive European governments were those that had been liberated from

Soviet control by the successful end of the Cold War. For many of these countries, the goal of eliminating one of the world's most despotic dictators undoubtedly seemed more compelling than for those countries which for decades had experienced peace, democracy and financial well-being.¹⁵ The list of European countries that supported the war effort in principle was substantial.¹⁶ The U.K. contributed combat troops and played a significant role in the attack on Iraq and in the post-war occupation. Poland took charge of a post-war military region in Iraq and Spain and Italy contributed paramilitary and intelligence units. However, even in countries whose governments supported the war, public opinion remained strongly critical.

The initial war against Hussein's regime in Iraq was militarily successful, resulting in the overthrow of Hussein and the eventual capture of the former leader and elimination or capture of most of his top lieutenants. But Europeans remained unconvinced. In the summer of 2003, when asked "was the war in Iraq worth

the loss of life and other costs,” 70% of all Europeans polled answered “no,” while only 25% said “yes.” Even in the states whose governments supported the war, the results were negative. In states whose government supported the war effort, majorities answered in the negative including: U.K. (55%); Poland (67%); Italy (73%); Portugal (75%); and the Netherlands (59%). In the two leading European opponents of the war, the results were even more emphatic: France (87%) and Germany (85%).¹⁷

An in-depth analysis of European public following the Iraq war came to the conclusion that opposition to the war was at least partly rooted in the perception that the United States was acting unilaterally, and without reference to international opinion. According to this analysis, “...it makes a significant difference whether a potential military action involved a unilateral U.S. move or one supported by NATO or the U.N. In Europe support increases from 36% for the U.S. acting alone to 48% for an action under a U.N. mandate.”¹⁸

Following the Iraq war, one influential European commentator who had earlier defended the U.S. role as a benign hegemon, cautioned the Bush administration and other Americans not to sacrifice the good will and cooperation that had for decades constituted part of the foundation for American power. Pro-American commentator Josef Joffe responded to the growing U.S. unilateralist tendencies by observing that the United States would remain the dominant force in international affairs for some time to come, and that no traditional power balance would be provided by other power or combination of powers. However, in Joffe’s view, U.S. self interests would not be well served by a strategy based on a “with us or against us” philosophy like that deployed by President Bush following the 9/11 attacks. Rather, according to Joffe, the United States should assume the inevitable costs that are associated with international leadership.

Primacy does not come cheap, and the price is measured not just in dollars and cents, but above all in the currency of

obligation. Conductors manage to mold 80 solo players into a sympathy orchestra because they have fine sense for everybody else’s quirks and qualities – because they act in the interest of all; their labour is the source of their authority..... Power exacts responsibility, and responsibility requires the transcendence of narrow self-interest. As long as the United States continues to provide such public goods, envy and resentment will not escalate into fear and loathing that spawn hostile coalitions.¹⁹

Late in 2003, when it had appeared the Bush administration was attempting to broaden the base of international support for Iraqi stabilisation and reconstruction, and just before George Bush was scheduled to call the leaders of Germany, France and Russia to ask them to forgive old Iraqi debt, the administration took another unilateral step that surprised and angered the European governments that had opposed the war. A directive from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz – cleared by the White House – was posted on the Pentagon web site making it clear

that only Iraq coalition members would be eligible to serve as prime contractors for U.S.-financed reconstruction projects in Iraq. This eliminated three key countries Bush was about to ask for Iraqi debt relief and others, including Canada. The predictable reaction was immediate. German foreign minister Joschka Fischer said that the move would “not be acceptable” to Germany “And it wouldn’t be in line with the spirit of looking to the future together and not into the past.”²⁰ The move undermined the diplomatic efforts of Secretary of State Powell to build international support for Iraqi debt relief. Russian defence minister Sergei Ivanov, spoke out in opposition to forgiveness of Iraq’s \$120 billion debt, \$8 billion of which is owed to Russia. Ivanov noted, “Iraq is not a poor country.”²¹

Just prior to release of the contracting decision, former Secretary of State James Baker had been asked to travel to Europe to convince key allied states to forgive Iraqi debt as a contribution to Iraqi recovery from the war. Baker received a cool reception in Paris, Berlin and Moscow,

but the three key governments all agreed to negotiate some package of debt reductions. Irritated by the U.S. contracting decision, French President Chirac, German Chancellor Schroeder and Russian President Putin all decided to handle the debt reduction issue via normal diplomatic channels, which in this case would be through the “Paris Club, a group of 19 industrialised nations that have collaborated since 1956 on easing financial burdens of heavily indebted nations.”²²

Consequences: how do perceptions affect policies, actions, attitudes and interests?

U.S. hegemony after 1945 was viewed in Europe as benevolent in the sense that Washington decided to cooperate with its allies rather than dominating them, that it agreed to tame its power by being locked into multilateral organisations, and that its political system was open to access by its allies thus offering them the opportunity to influence U.S. decision-making.²³ As a result, Washington’s leadership

had to do with (hard and soft) power but did not solely rest on it. Leadership is an interactive process where the leader is followed because he is able to convince the followers. By taking into account the needs and goals of its allies and by listening to and caring about their opinion, the United States managed to base followership on persuasion and normative consensus, or soft power²⁴. However, when the leader neglects to bring its soft power into play in support of military actions, would-be followers find the first occasion to deviate. This is exactly what has happened in recent years and what led to the transatlantic crisis over Iraq.

Unilateralism – whether in the hard-nosed form deployed by the current Bush administration or in the more occasional, cushioned and velvet form of the former Clinton administration – is seen from Europe a clear sign of a shifting balance between reliance on hard and soft power in U.S. foreign policy. It provokes criticism because it puts at risk the international normative consensus and undermines the institutional framework²⁵. Be-

fore September 11 and certainly afterwards the new Bush administration interpreted U.S. sovereignty as non-negotiable thus refuting international commitments that might limit the administration's leeway or force it to seek the consensus of others where independent actions would be preferred. In the long run, however, this tendency undermines the attractiveness of the U.S. political, cultural and societal model thereby threatening the core of U.S. soft power.

International public opinion polls conducted in the aftermath of the war on Iraq clearly underlined this danger. According to a study conducted by the Pew Research Center, the rate of those people that somewhat or very much disapprove the U.S. increased markedly in Italy, whose government supported the war, (38% in May 2003 vs. 23% in summer 2002), in France (57% vs. 34%), and Germany (54% vs. 35%). The same study also highlighted a growing preparedness of these countries' population to loosen the NATO ties to the U.S. The most extreme shift was seen in U.S.-ally Turkey where more than 80%

(vs. 55% in summer 2002) have an unfavourable opinion of the United States.²⁶ Extensive public opinion polling in early months of 2004 revealed even stronger European public scepticism about the war against Iraq and questioning of American leadership.²⁷

The foundation for and history of U.S.-European relations since World War II may help explain the intensity of European feeling concerning U.S. unilateral behaviour. The transatlantic alliance has always been based on common interests, to be sure. But behind any cold, hard assessment of national interests this relationship has always been fortified and defended by a sense of common values. Europeans, not possessing the same degree of military power and superpower status as the United States, still believe that they are as responsible as is the United States for defining and defending the common values that countries on both sides of the Atlantic say they share. From a European point of view, the United States has recently strayed from a shared appreciation of international coopera-

tion, institutions and the rule of law. In some respects, the Bush administration appeared to be declaring a new global corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, essentially claiming the U.S. right to intervene anywhere in the world to correct wrongdoing as perceived by the United States.²⁸ From this perspective, Europeans see themselves as defending the foundations of the transatlantic relations, which U.S. actions have undermined.

The widespread European perception of U.S. unilateralist and hegemonic behaviour has not resulted in any formal alliance or conspiracy to balance U.S. influence. However, it has increased tendencies toward cooperation among European countries in cases where U.S. policy choices run contrary to perceived interests of two or more European states.

The most dramatic case of this to date was the collaboration between France and Germany (with a few other European countries, Belgium, for example, on the margins) to complicate implementation of U.S. policy of attacking Iraq and removing Saddam Hussein from power.

Prior to this case, U.S. rejection of the Kyoto Protocol on international environmental standards resulted in all members of the European Union joining together to criticise the U.S. position.

Perhaps the most important impact on European policies and actions has been more subtle. U.S. policy preferences and initiatives are not judged simply on their merits, but also on whether the U.S. approach is a unilateral one or one designed to attract broad European and international support. Such questioning clearly contributed to the widespread reticence in the international community to provide active assistance to the United States in overthrowing Saddam Hussein's regime with military force and then stabilising and reconstructing post-Saddam Iraq. Even though the Bush administration can claim success in convincing many European states to join in both the war and the reconstruction effort, the absence of three important states (France, Germany and Russia) from the coalition can be seen as at least partly attributable to U.S. unilateralism. It is difficult to separate out the role of

perceived U.S. unilateralism from disagreement with the U.S. policy in the behaviour of these states. However, it is somewhat clearer that the approach taken by the United States to the question of whether/when to go to war against Iraq influenced the willingness of these governments to participate actively in the stabilisation and reconstruction process.

It can also be argued that U.S. unilateralism played a role in the attempt to convince France, Germany and Russia to make substantial contributions to the process of forgiving Iraqi debt. Although all three eventually decided to help out, their participation has not been as generous as the United States would have liked. The reticence of these important players in the Iraqi debt forgiveness process can arguably be linked to their displeasure with the way in which the United States went to war and the pre-emptive exclusion of companies from non-coalition partners from the bidding process for prime contracts for Iraqi reconstruction.

The March 2004 defeat of the conservative government in Spain was widely

interpreted in Europe as a vote against the government's close ties to the Bush administration and its policies. Very few Europeans shared the view of some Americans that the March 11 terrorist bombing of commuter trains in Madrid just prior to the elections had revealed the cowardice of Spaniards and Europeans more generally. In any case, the ouster of the Spanish government constituted the first clear "cost" to the United States of its perceived unilateralism. With the new Socialist government's promise to pull Spanish troops out of Iraq as soon as possible, the U.S. goals of broadening international involvement in the long-term process of stabilising and reconstructing the country have been seriously damaged.

The Outlook

Looking ahead, a continued pattern of perceived or actual U.S. unilateralism could produce significant costs for U.S. foreign policy. The long-established democratic governments in Western Eu-

rope all carry forward a strong commitment to the values on which international cooperation, law and organisation have been based since the Second World War. Many of these governments and peoples instinctively feel that the system is not owned just by the United States. They believe their democracies played a role in creating and sustaining the system. When the United States attempts to change underlying aspects of that system, and particularly when the U.S. government attempts to do so unilaterally based on overwhelming U.S. power, they are inclined to question and perhaps even oppose such U.S. efforts. This factor will remain an important influence on the way in which European democracies respond to U.S. policy priorities and goals.

European governments do not wish to see the United States “fail” in Iraq, as they too would suffer consequences of a U.S. defeat²⁹ there. However, many governments would undoubtedly like the United States to come away from the Iraq experience humbled by the difficulties of accomplishing security objectives without

a broad, supportive international coalition. They would like the United States to pay more attention to European policy preferences in the Middle Eastern region (for example by adopting a more balanced stance regarding the Israeli/Palestinian conflict) and to pursue multi-lateral versus unilateral approaches to both Middle Eastern issues and the war on terror.

No U.S. allies in Europe are likely to turn actively against the United States. France, traditionally the most severe European critic of U.S. policy, supports continued U.S.-European and U.S.-French cooperation even if Paris would prefer to shift the balance between overwhelming-U.S. and more limited-French influence over international developments. All European governments still feel strong bonds to the United States ranging from shared fundamental values and basic interests to pragmatic considerations.

However, all the important states in Europe are democracies (with an appropriate footnote reflecting the qualified

nature of Russian democracy). The pattern of public opinion established by the Iraq affair can be reversed with changed U.S. behaviour. But if it should continue, even the governments most friendly to the United States will find it increasingly difficult to support U.S. policy objectives. If the United States cannot convince more countries to join in the process of stabilising and reconstructing Iraq – or even convince current members of the coalition to remain engaged – the United States will pay a significant long term price in lives and national treasure trying to accomplish the task with limited international assistance.

The widespread public disapproval of U.S. policies did not keep several European governments from supporting U.S. policies toward Iraq and joining the U.S.-led coalition. But if the United States continues to be seen by majorities in most European countries as an overbearing, hegemonic power, it will be increasingly difficult for European political parties to take positions that are openly warm and friendly toward the United States. Euro-

pean governments may go along with U.S. initiatives because they serve European interests or because U.S. power is so overwhelming that they have no choice. However, there will likely be a marked reticence to be too closely identified with the United States and its policies if such identification is likely to diminish popular support at the next election. Over time, the United States could find it increasingly difficult to line up support behind its policies.

In particular, the United States could pay a large price in its relationship with the United Kingdom for Prime Minister Tony Blair's strong support for U.S. policy on Iraq. The widespread opinion in the U.K. is that Blair's alignment with Bush accomplished nothing for the United Kingdom and, in fact, undermined British interests in the Middle East, in the struggle against terrorism, and in Europe. This perception could lead Blair and future British leaders to be more reluctant than in the past to support controversial U.S. positions and could produce more British coalitions with its E.U.

partners to shape alternatives to such U.S. approaches.

Such a long-term shift in public and governmental attitudes could seriously undermine U.S. "soft power" foreign policy resources. At a time when the military power of the United States remained superior to that of any other country or group of countries, U.S. influence could decline, particularly in circumstances where it had to rely on the trust and cooperation of other governments. On the other hand, a return to more traditional U.S. foreign policy behaviour that includes a mix of multilateral cooperation and unilateral actions when necessary as well as a balanced blend of hard and soft power would undoubtedly begin to mitigate current European concerns about the U.S. role in the world.

At a time when the American people feel under imminent threat from terrorist attacks, the President can say, as President Bush did in his January 2004 State of the Union address, that the United States does not need a "permission slip" from anybody to defend itself. This re-

mains true, even in "normal" times. However, the American people do not want their government to be the world's only policeman. U.S. public opinion surveys for over a decade have demonstrated that the vast majority of Americans believe the United States should help maintain international peace, but should share such burdens and responsibilities with friends and allies. Meeting this public opinion demand over the long term will require U.S. policies and actions that attract support and involvement from key U.S. allies in Europe and around the globe.

The European NATO allies, including the seven newest members of the club, can help their American ally contain its unilateralist instincts by demonstrating their readiness and ability to share international security burdens in return for a seat at the decision-making table. On the other hand, European allies who are ready to critique American behaviour but not contribute to the solution of international security challenges will only feed the fires of American unilateralism.

Notes

¹Including, most notably, the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty establishing NATO.

²Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," *Policy Review*, June-July 2002.

³Peter van Ham in Stanley Sloan and Peter van Ham, *What future for NATO?*, Centre for European Reform, London, October 2002.

⁴Canada is the largest single merchandise trading partner for the United States (excluding services from the calculation).

⁵For updated figures see "EU/US Facts and Figures," Delegation of the European Commission to the United States, Washington, D.C. (Available at [last accessed January 6, 2004](#)).

⁶See *Future Military Coalitions: The Transatlantic Challenge*, U.S.-CREST, Arlington, Va, September 2002. (This non-governmental four nation (France, Great Britain, Germany and the U.S.) project examined how the development of a common European Security and Defense Policy might affect the conduct of transatlantic coalition operations over the next 15 years. The author was a core participant in the project and contributor to the final report.) See also Robert P. Grant and Stanley R. Sloan, "Don't Write Off the Allies," *Defense News*, March 25-31, 2002.

⁷Some Asian allies, Australia, South Korea and Japan most notably, are capable of contributing forces to international operations, and have done so, most recently in Iraq. But potential European

contributions are magnified by the willingness and ability of British and French forces to engage in operations far from their borders and the integrating military framework provided by NATO that enhances the value of contributions by other European countries.

⁸U.S.-CREST, *Future Military Coalitions*.

⁹Stanley R. Sloan, "The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War World: Away from Self-Deterrence?" Congressional Research Service Report 97-78 F (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service), January 6, 1997.

¹⁰Josef Joffe, "How America Does It," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1997, p. 16.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹²The discussion of European perceptions that follows is based on extensive conversations with European diplomats, scholars and citizens during the course of 2002 as well as surveys of the popular press and public opinion poll data.

¹³Vice President Richard Cheney, Remarks by the Vice President to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention, August 26, 2002. (See the speech text at [last accessed January 7, 2004](#).) This speech, making a strong call for removing Saddam Hussein for power, is frequently cited by German observers as having been the final straw forcing German Chancellor Schroeder to take a strong position against attacking Iraq in the final stages of his reelection campaign.

¹⁴For an example of this perception, see Dan Plesch, "Why war is now on the back burner," *The Guardian*, London (Available at [last accessed January 7, 2004](#)).

¹⁵The White House even noted in April 2003 "...it is no accident that many member nations of the Coalition recently escaped from the boot of a tyrant or have felt the scourge of terrorism. All Coalition member nations understand the threat Saddam Hussein's weapons pose to the world and the devastation his regime has wreaked on the Iraqi people."

(Source: last accessed on January 6, 2004.)

¹⁶On April 3, 2003, almost two weeks after the opening of hostilities in Iraq, the White House listed some 49 Iraq Coalition members, including the following 23 European (including former Soviet republics) states: Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and Uzbekistan.

¹⁷Date quoted is from Ronald Asmus, Philip P. Everts, and Pierangelo Isernia, "Power, War and Public Opinion: Thoughts on the Nature and Structure of the Trans-Atlantic Divide," *Transatlantic Trends 2003*, a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo. (Available at [last accessed January 6, 2004](#).)

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹⁹Josef Joffe, "Gulliver Unbound: Can America Rule the World?," the Twentieth Annual John Bonython Lecture, The Centre for Independent Studies, Sydney, Australia, 5 August 2003. (Available at [last accessed January 6, 2004](#).)

²⁰Erin E. Arvedlund, "Allied Angered at Exclu-

sion From Bidding," *nytimes.com*, December 11, 2003.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Craig S. Smith, "France Gives Baker Luke-warm Commitment on Iraqi Debt," *nytimes.com*, December 16, 2003.

²³ John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," in John Gerard Ruggie (ed.), *Multilateralism Matters. The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 3-47; Peter F. Cowhey, "Elect Locally-Order Globally. Domestic Politics and Multilateral Cooperation," in Ruggie, *Multilateralism Matters*, pp. 157-200; G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies. The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

²⁴ James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership* (New York: Harper & Row, 1997).

²⁵ John Gerard Ruggie, "Embedded liberalism and the postwar economic regimes," in John Gerard Ruggie (ed.) *Constructing the World Polity. Essays on International Institutionalization* (London, New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 62-84.

²⁶ Meg Bortin, "In war's wake, hostility and mistrust," *International Herald Tribune*, 4 June 2003, 1, 6. The report "Views of a Changing World 2003" is available at <<http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=185>> (accessed 12 December 2003).

²⁷ Susan Sacs, "Poll Finds Hostility Hardening Toward U.S. Policies" (*The New York Times*, March 17, 2004).

²⁸ The original Monroe Doctrine (1823) was aimed at keeping European powers out of Latin America. President Theodore Roosevelt's "corollary" to the doctrine, articulated in his annual message to Congress in December 1904, declared that "...in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing [terrorism in today's context] or impotence [failed states in today's context], to the exercise of an international police power."

²⁹ "Defeat" meaning a U.S. withdrawal prior to establishing a relatively stable and peaceful Iraq or establishing some international framework to continue working toward that end.

An Empire Unveiled

By Jørgen Dragsdahl*

In the US election the Democrats promise to undo the Bush revolution in foreign affairs, but will they go far enough to satisfy the conflicting needs of the Baltic states as both EU and NATO members?

Can you think of a worse year for transatlantic relations than 2003? This question was put to a senior EU commission official last December, and, without hesitation, he answered: 2004. But, alas, 2005 is already in the competition. After three years of George W. Bush in the White House many US allies looked forward to the presidential election for a change in leadership. But the joy of expectancy might this time be the greatest pleasure. As the year progressed, US opinion polls, despite tremendous

political set backs for Bush, did not exclude the possibility of four more years.

And even if Bush is defeated, John Kerry might pose the greatest challenge to the Europeans. As a key theme in his campaign, Kerry has promised to revitalise NATO and “lead a broad coalition against our adversaries.”¹ A likely contender for Secretary of State in a Kerry administration, former Clinton national security adviser Samuel Berger gave “the good news”, in a manifesto article – “that the world is eager for the

United States to return to its tradition of leadership.”²

It is, however, far from obvious that Europeans are ready for US leadership and substantial burden-sharing. The Bush administration did find close allies in Europe but, with the exception of the United Kingdom, none of them ventured much beyond the symbolic in support of US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some limits were set by domestic opposition but anti-Bush sentiments also were a convenient cover hiding European inability, caused by lack of both will and military resources, to play a larger role. Many observers claim a more fundamental clash

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of interests is the cause of transatlantic discord. On what these interests are and what the clash is about no consensus exists. During the last couple of years a new debate on grand strategy in the US focused on "American Empire". Fear of domination by an empire can explain why some European countries have resisted accepting US leadership. But analysts disagree on the nature of this empire. Definitions stretch from a "Liberal Empire,"³ offering all members freedom and the pursuit of happiness, to "a new American militarism."⁴

With a Kerry administration we could get the ultimate test of the differing claims. A Democrat in the White House will benefit from a honeymoon in the transatlantic relationship. A sigh of relief will go through European capitals. Nobody really desires confrontation with the US, and a change of American policy could also remove an obstacle to European unity. As Nicole Gnesotto, director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies, noted, "it is now much easier for the Europeans to agree a view on external

crisis than on American policy."⁵ The divisive issue in the EU security and defence policy is America because the Union's role in managing world crisis is closely related to the type of relationship each member country wants to build with America. But even a honeymoon can lead to a new transatlantic conflict. Greater European unity will establish the EU as a stronger global actor and, according to some analysts, also a stronger competitor for the US.

Thus, key questions are: Has the gap in the Euro-Atlantic relationship widened to such an extent that even a Democrat in the White House is unable to bridge it? Are we really at "the end of Atlanticism" as another national security official from the Clinton era, Ivo Daalder, and several other scholars and policy makers fear?⁶ Will we see "the return of rivalry among the world's main centers" of power?⁷ Kerry can make a clean break with his predecessors policies and remove anti-Bush sentiments as an obstacle, but will that be enough? Or, to put it more briefly, what is enough?

The Baltic dilemma

Such questions hang as a dark cloud over the simultaneous enlargement of both the EU and NATO. Countries in "the new Europe" face a growing tension in their role as both the American allies and Europeans. As an American observer with Latvian roots, professor George Viksnins, has stressed the three Baltic states "in particular" are beginning to face what only a few years ago would have seemed an "unthinkable dilemma": having to choose between the United States and Europe.⁸

They have already faced that choice. In June 2003, the EU presidency stated that prospective members are expected to follow the official EU position on the International Criminal Court. A few days later the US suspended military aid to all countries refusing to sign an agreement on immunity for US personnel from prosecution by the Court. But, like some countries in "the old Europe", the Baltic states and other new EU and NATO members prefer not to be presented with such

choices. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, director of Poland's Centre for International Affairs and a former defence minister, predicts that countries along the eastern borders of NATO and the EU "will be very pro-NATO, pro-American, for historical and practical reasons."⁹ Criticism directed against the Bush-administration often is characterised as incomprehensible, silly, anti-American.

Seen from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, a US-related security guarantee is indispensable. In the Baltic Sea area also Denmark, having put itself outside the EU defence co-operation, places a great emphasis on US relations. The US is more-over seen in the area as a counter-balance to a regional Franco-German hegemony and as a stabilising influence to counter European great power rivalry. Whether the EU can survive as a unified institution with a prospect of providing a security guarantee is not certain. Atis Lejins, director of the Latvian Institute of International affairs, even claims that "a split EU and a rump NATO, and the possibility thereby of regaining the Baltic states,

is a scenario that is being studied by several Russian strategic studies institutes."¹⁰ The security agenda for the Baltic states is changing now when membership in both the EU and NATO has been obtained, but after extensive research the American scholar Stephen Larrabee concluded that the first regional priority is to maintain American engagement.

But it takes two to tango. The US could now regard the Baltic problem as "fixed" and decrease its engagement - "indeed, there are already signs of this happening", Larrabee warns.¹¹ The Bush administration "simply does not care about Europe", says Philip Gordon, an expert on European affairs at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC.¹² A former official in the Rumsfeld Pentagon, Thomas Barnett, attacks a "transatlantic partnership overtaken by events" and favours "developing an entirely new alliance" with China, India and Russia because "messy wars requires allies who don't mind getting dirty."¹³ Baltic concerns might then not compete very well with Russian concerns in Washington.

The Baltic states can naturally, as ordained by Larrabee, make an effort to keep American attention, but the future relationship is also a matter of how a US administration views the strategic utility of alliances. The Baltic states want security and influence, but what if the US has overriding priorities and what if membership of NATO gives influence on very little? Some studies suggest that the Bush administration has an "ad hoc and temporary" view of allies.¹⁴ Such signals are noticed around the Baltic Sea. The easy division of Europe into "old" and "new", in "pro-American" and "anti-American", sometimes is dismissed. Atis Lejins has attacked the notion, popular in the Rumsfeld Pentagon, that NATO should be a toolbox for the US. "We all know", the Latvian director writes, "that tools have nothing to say about how they are used. That would be the end of the Alliance."¹⁵

Sweet music from the Democrats

For anybody concerned about the transatlantic relationship listening to the

Democratic presidential candidates must have been sweet music. All leading contenders expressed a strong consensus on the need for alliances, rejected a future for NATO as merely a toolbox to enable coalitions of the willing, stressed the necessity of compromise in working alliances and highlighted addressing common problems.

The Bush administration “has often acted as if our alliances are no longer important”, said former governor Howard Dean in a key presentation of his foreign policy views, a speech co-authored by a group of former Democratic top-officials. It can, he acknowledged, at times be frustrating to obtain the cooperation of allies, but “America is most successful in achieving our national aims when our allies are by our side.”¹⁶

In a similar vein, former SACEUR Wesley Clark promised to “rebuild our alliances” and “strengthen them, so that when America has to act we can call on the military, financial and moral resources of others”. He proposed “a new Atlantic Charter” to reinvigorate the security part-

nership with Europe. The Charter should “define the threat we face in common, create the basis for concerted action from our allies to meet them, and offer the promise to act together as a first choice – not a last.”¹⁷

And John Kerry will “replace the Bush years of isolation with a new era of alliances”, because “our need for allies” is “as great or greater than at any time in the past”. As president he would not cede US security to any institution and adversaries should not have doubts about his resolve to use force if necessary but “even the only superpower on earth cannot succeed without cooperation and compromise with our friends and allies.”¹⁸

Candidates explicitly rejected unilateralism and the associated policy of *ad hoc* coalitions of the willing.

Dean would be “far more interested in allies that stand ready to act with us rather than just willing to be rounded up as part of a coalition”. Alliances “train together so they can function effectively with common equipment, communications, logistics, and planning.”¹⁹ Clark

launched a slogan that reappeared again in the Kerry campaign: “We will act with others if we possibly can and alone only if we absolutely must”. Repeatedly he stressed that in an alliance you have a two way relationship. “Nations are more likely to share burdens if they are also sharing decisions.”²⁰ He blamed the Bush administration for not having worked with the allies on issues of concern to them. It has shown friends and partners “contempt” and in many ways sent the message: “Your security is your own concern, and your concerns are of no concern to us.”²¹

Kerry started out the year 2003 with a most noteworthy attack on unilateralism as “the right’s old isolationist impulse in modern guise”. At core, he explained, is a familiar and beguiling illusion: “That America can escape an entangling world, that we can wield our enormous power without incurring obligations to others and that we can pursue our national interests in arrogant ways that make a mockery of our nation’s ideals.”²² During the year he consistently argued for full in-

volvement of both NATO and the UN in Iraq. While President Bush also says that involvement of allies is crucial, it nevertheless “runs roughshod over the interests of those nations on a broad range of issues – from climate change, climate control to the International Court of Justice, to the role of the United Nations, to trade, and, of course, to the rebuilding of Iraq itself”. The overriding imperative in a Kerry administration will, he added, be to “replace unilateral action with collective security of a genuine nature.”²³

Throughout the Democratic primaries candidates did not just find fault with particular Bush policies. They rejected his general approach in harsh terms rarely heard. Dick Gephardt, a prominent member of the House of Representatives, blasted the “cold warriors” brought out of semi-retirement and their “overwhelming arrogance and lack of appreciation for the subtleties of democracy building or alliance strengthening – all those niceties that intrude on their Hobbesian world.”²⁴ Wesley Clark saw “pride, arrogance, weak leadership, pure domestic

politics and poor decision-making” combined with “the terrible idea that we must selfishly pursue national interests with a kind of 19th century *Realpolitik*”²⁵. Kerry delivered the toughest blow: “Simply put, the Bush administration has pursued the most arrogant, inept, reckless and ideological foreign policy in modern history.”²⁶

Carnivores fighting herbivores

Rhetoric in an election campaign is not always to be taken as an expression of sincerity, and Democrats did compete on who could provide a tough challenge against Bush. But several speeches, only a few are referred to here, were thoughtful and with more substance than normally found in campaign “stump” oratory, and no attack on an administration has reached such heights in recent memory. In 1964 the Republican challenger Barry Goldwater did have quite a battle with the incumbent, Lyndon B. Johnson. In 1972 the election contest between the Republican President Richard Nixon and his opponent George McGovern did re-

fect the animosities caused by the war in Vietnam. But in both cases much of the foreign policy establishment either rallied against the “outsiders” – Goldwater was a right wing extremist and McGovern was a candidate of the peace movement – or kept a facade of neutrality.

In this election the foreign policy elite is split or, depending on how this elite is defined, even massively against the president and his team. Since the early nineties the US national security community has been involved in a debate on a grand strategy. By the end of the decade a split had grown to proportions that led some observers, inspired by the dinosaur fad after the Jurassic Park, to characterise the fight as one among carnivores relying on raw power and herbivores with a “live and let live” attitude. After 9-11 many herbivores did see a need for long teeth but disagreement on fundamental elements in strategy persists and has been documented in numerous policy papers and studies by scholars.

In a recent book a most prominent Democratic strategist, former Carter na-

tional security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, established a stark choice for the United States: Global domination or global leadership? A quest for domination can bring “self-isolation, growing national paranoia and increasing vulnerability to a globally spreading anti-American virus”. The land of the free can be transformed “into a garrison state imbued with a siege mentality.”²⁷ Brzezinski advocate “a co-optive hegemony” – one in which “leadership is exercised more through shared conviction with enduring allies than by assertive domination.”²⁸ Samuel Berger, President Clinton’s national security adviser, sees the real “clash of civilisations” taking place within Washington. It is a clash “between diametrically opposed conceptions of America’s role in the world.”²⁹ Many positions taken by Democratic candidates were incorporated in a lengthy policy paper signed by 15 former Democratic officials, likely candidates for positions in a Kerry administration. They accused the Bush administration of not only “bad manners” but also of “bad strategy”. The

surest way to isolate America, these experts wrote, is to succumb to “the imperial temptation and attempt to impose our will on others”. Too many of our friends, they continued, now question “whether America is a reliable partner in tackling common problems.”³⁰

***Republicans rehabilitate
imperialism***

A Democratic president “will want to undo the ‘Bush Revolution’ in foreign policy and be much less assertive”, says Michael Peters, vice-president of the Council on Foreign Relations.

What is this “Bush revolution”? An obvious place to look for an answer is in a phenomenon most peculiar for Europeans: The rehabilitation of “empire” and even “imperialism”. This is no longer just an insult socialists throw at the US. It is the term now embraced by the far right. “The fact of American empire is hardly debated these days”, according to Thomas Donnelly of Project for the New American Century, a foreign policy

organisation set up in 1997 with support from, among others, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz.³¹ Also, many independent scholars use the term – a rapidly growing list of recent books has “empire” as the topic. While President Bush himself repeatedly has stressed that the US is not an empire and it is not striving for one, even some centrist Republicans accept the term. Dimitri Simes, president of the Nixon Center (a think tank) finds it understandable why some balk at any mentioning of the “e” word. Many past empires gave the term a bad reputation. But Simes nevertheless finds it “an important analytical tool” to see the US as an evolving modern empire with profound consequences. In fact, he says, any realistic discussion of US foreign policy “must begin with the recognition” that most of the world sees the United States as a “nascent imperial power.”³²

Rehabilitation was conducted by conservative intellectuals through books, magazines and institutes. Many articles were published by *The National Review*,

The Weekly Standard and *The Wall Street Journal*. Institutionally writers often were situated in The American Enterprise Institute, The Hoover Institution and Project for the New American Century. For conservatives the end of communism and the triumph of capitalism was a mixed blessing. They were left with an ideological belief in a free market, quite a boring commitment. American conservatives are not status quo oriented but revolutionary in their zeal to change the world. Now they were faced with a *Zeitgeist* of promoting self-interest over the national interest. They felt deeply ambivalent about the culture of capitalism and its elevation of buying and selling above political virtues such as heroism and struggle.³³ In raging against the alleged timidity of President Clinton in asserting US power they, for a while, found a new mission. Some started focusing on a more grand mission. Ralph Peters, a prolific writer with military background, presented a choice to his audience in 1999: "Shall we dominate the Earth for the good of mankind? Or will we risk the enslavement

of our country and our civilisation?"³⁴ Peters saw a new warrior class of erratic primitives with no stake in civil order arising, and this class is to be confronted by America, in the service of mankind, to create a new golden age.

A decisive impetus in the rehabilitation campaign came with the new millennium when Irving Kristol, godfather of neo-conservatism, declared the US an empire – a reality, he predicted, soon to be recognised.³⁵ What's the point, he argued in an interview, of being "the greatest, most powerful nation in the world and not having an imperial role?" The United States "should play a far more dominant role in world affairs - not what we're doing now but to command and to give orders as to what is to be done."³⁶ After the terror of 9-11 conservatives found new receptivity for a mission to defend civilisation and freedom against barbarism and terror. Max Boot, at the time op-ed editor at *The Wall Street Journal*, called acceptance of an imperial role the most realistic response to terrorism.³⁷ A journalist, Robert Kaplan, made him-

self a name in the 1990's through travels in the world's disaster zones chronicling growing anarchy and could thus declare with considerable weight in 2002 re-establishment of order the paramount question for world politics in the early twenty-first century. "A century of disastrous utopian hopes has brought us back to imperialism, that most ordinary and dependable form of protection for ethnic minorities and others under violent assault (...)", he declared. "Despite our anti-imperial traditions, and despite the fact that imperialism is delegitimised in public discourse, an imperial reality already dominates our foreign policy."³⁸ Writing just before the invasion of Iraq, a neo-conservative writer, Stanley Kurtz, abstained from calling the United States an empire because "we have not yet used our military to secure direct and continuous control over the domestic affairs of foreign lands". But in Afghanistan he did see "the germ of a new American imperium", and extended occupation of Iraq to encourage democratisation would be a "just policy."³⁹

An empire of a new type

The Bush administration is inhabited by conservatives of differing ideologies but its policies have clearly been influenced by the new imperialists. Out of the so-called war against terrorism a “neoimperial vision” is emerging in which the United States arrogates to itself the global role of setting standards, determining threats and using force, professor John Ikenberry from Georgetown University concluded in 2002. Washington will use coalitions of the willing but ultimately the US will be “unconstrained by the rules and norms of the international community.”⁴⁰

But what kind of empire is the Bush administration striving for? And, by the way, is empire only a recent US goal? Such questions have been thrashed through by numerous contributors in the debate but little agreement is in sight.

A common theme is that the United States is not like empires of the past, built on colonies, conquest and the white man’s

burden. A left liberal writer, Michael Ignatieff, sees “a new invention in the annals of political science, an empire lite, a global hegemony whose grace notes are free markets, human rights and democracy, enforced by the most awesome military power the world has ever known”. Behind the new imperialism stands a people “who remember that their country secured its independence by revolt against an empire, and who like to think of themselves as the friend of freedom everywhere”. It is “an empire without consciousness of itself as such, constantly shocked that its good intentions arouse resentment abroad”. But, like Ikenberry, Michael Ignatieff also acknowledges that an empire dictates the rules while exempting itself from other rules that go against its interest.⁴¹

William Odom, head of the National Security Agency in 1985-1988, has co-authored the most original contribution. He warns against the use of terms like “imperial” and “empire”. Those words convey notions of a hierarchy or power, subordination and dominance that are “ei-

ther missing from the American empire or only loosely institutionalized”. The US is head of a “Liberal empire”, a “voluntary community of sovereign states”, most of which have mature, Liberal constitutional regimes.⁴² By definition countries like Afghanistan and Iraq are thus not a part of the empire. A requirement for full membership is a constitutional breakthrough in establishing Liberal institutions and values – thus around the Baltic Sea countries like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, all though members of the empire through membership in NATO, are not really full members because the constitutional breakthrough is deemed “uncertain”.

The study is most useful by describing requirements for stability in this empire and can thus indirectly explain recent transatlantic discord. Liberalism, the classical kind, led to a separation of powers in the US constitutional order, and the US elite developed an ideological approach towards public service. This is vitally important for stability in the US as barriers against abuse of power. But the Liberal

empire is not a replica of the US federal government. It lacks 'checks and balances'. The "most serious danger to the American empire", identified by Odom, is that the "power of its leaders is limited primarily by their ideology – that is, by the Liberal norms that guide their use of that power". Thus, "to insist that the United States conduct its foreign policy mainly on the basis of unilateralism is to promote the destruction of the American empire."⁴³

A conservative professor from Boston University, Andrew Bacevich, also sees the empire as more than an invention of Bush administration. The vision of empire was set out by President Truman in a speech at Monticello on July 4, 1947. Truman declared that "nations are interdependent and that recognition of our dependence upon another is essential for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness of all mankind."⁴⁴ The collapse of communism offered an opportunity to fulfil that vision. While until then the orientation of the US policy had been primarily defensive it now became largely offensive. Since the end of the Cold War the United States

have adhered to "a well-defined grand strategy" the purpose of which is to "expand an American imperium". Bacevich describes the imperial project as "as an open and integrated international order based on the principles of democratic capitalism, with the United States as the ultimate guarantor of order and enforcer of norms."⁴⁵

A rich variety of views is offered by other contributors in numerous books and articles. The historian James Banner dates the start of an American empire to 1803 when President Jefferson bought Louisiana from France – an enormous land mass from the Mississippi to the Rocky Mountains – and founded what Jefferson himself called "an Empire of Liberty". This initiative also caused genocidal warfare against natives and slavery a considerable boost. According to James Banner, an American imperial mission took roots at that time and a dichotomy between rhetorical justification and actual deeds accompanied the enterprise ever since.⁴⁶ At the start of a bloody colonial war for control of the Philippines President McKinley allegedly prayed to God for light and

guidance. It came to him, as he later explained, "that there was nothing left for us to do but take them all, and to educate the Filipinos and uplift them and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the best we could by them, as our fellowmen for whom Christ also died."⁴⁷ The Spaniards had, of course, Christianised the islands a while back but the argument carried the day. When listening to more recent justifications of empire, the traditional dichotomy should not be forgotten. As Dimitri Simes of the Nixon Center mentions also today "double standards and deception, or at least considerable self-deception, have become all too common."⁴⁸

Many writers do not see any or few redeeming elements in American imperialism. Professor Benjamin Barker from the University of Maryland, a prominent anti-globalisation ideologue, believes that his country's present leaders "pursue a reckless militancy aimed at establishing an American empire of fear more awesome than any the terrorists can conceive."⁴⁹ A huge biography on the geographer Isaiah Bowman (1878-1950) in the introduction

reveals that today's push for empire springs from two earlier attempts in 1919 and 1945. The war on terrorism actually is "a war devoted to the completion of the geo-economic globalism of the American Empire", the writer, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography Neil Smith, states.⁵⁰ Another professor, Chalmers Johnson, decries that most Americans "do not realize that a vast network of American military bases on every continent except Antarctica actually constitutes a new form of empire."⁵¹ And veteran journalist John Newhouse documents "the Bush assault on the world order."⁵² A more classical view of imperialism is expressed by Michael Klare, author of numerous books on the changing nature of warfare. American strategy now, he states, "focuses on oil-field protection, the defense of maritime trade routes, and other aspects of resource security."⁵³

Dominion is an imperial strategy

International relations theory is supposed to assist in cutting through the fog

of arguments, set up some definitions for what constitutes an empire and even help in understanding their likely development. Confusion reigns, though, because "empire" is used with so many different definitions, and, historically, empires appeared in different forms. Much American rhetoric today is just an echo of the allegedly altruistic motives behind British empire-building in the 19th century. All empires are not just known for their cruel subjugation of foreign people in far away lands. Some European powers did promote development in their colonies. Total loss of sovereignty did not take place in parts of the empires that Athens or the Soviet Union built – in the latter case the, say, Estonian and Polish experience differed. Also, a master plan for conquest often did not exist. Empires developed step by step, sometimes as a search for security. Calling the United States an empire thus can be fitted into the historical pattern without necessarily invoking all the worst excesses of previous empires.

Often the superior power of the United States – military, political, eco-

nomic and ideological (cultural) - is highlighted as a proof of American empire. But some scholars see that as insufficient evidence. Empire also is a matter of what power is used for.

"Hegemony" at times is used as synonymous with empire. The word indicates that an imperial power establish the rules by which others routinely play. Others may come to approve of the rules as mutually beneficiary, so that hegemony is partly legitimate. That was the case in much of the world after World War II. But the catch is, as professor Michael Mann from the University of California writes, "to be hegemonic, the US has to play by the rules it has established."⁵⁴ If it abandons the rules, it risks losing hegemony, and, in order to continue ruling, the US must enter a more directly repressive phase. That this is happening seems to be a widespread fear among left-liberals in the US and in much of the rest of world.

In an examination of eight possible grand strategies, Robert Art, Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University, explores "dominion" and distin-

guishes it from “superiority” or “primacy”, as he prefers. Dominion and primacy differ in two important respects. First, dominion is a grand strategy; primacy is not. “Dominion prescribes a goal – the triumph of American values – and the means to achieve it: imperial rule”, he says. Primacy does not prescribe the ends of policy, only a means to achieve them. Second, dominion and primacy differ in the margin of strength they call for. “Dominion is absolute rule; primacy is superior influence”. Dominion implies invariably prevailing; primacy means winning more often than others do.⁵⁵

Stephen Peter Rosen, Professor of National Security and Military Art at Harvard University, agrees that hegemony, or primacy, is not the same as empire. The issues facing an empire differ qualitatively from those facing merely a powerful state. And he provides a theoretical framework for an analysis of whether contemporary American power is imperial in nature:

“Empire is the rule exercised by one nation over others both to regulate their

external behaviour and to ensure minimally acceptable forms of internal behaviour within the subordinate states. Merely powerful states do the former but not the latter. The central – one may say the necessary but not sufficient – imperial task is the creation and management of a hierarchical interstate order (...). But an empire must also ensure the security and internal stability of its constituent parts, extract revenue to pay the costs of empire, and assimilate the elites of non-imperial societies to the metropolitan core, tasks that presuppose influence over the internal affairs of other societies.”⁵⁶

In an empire rules for the behaviour of states differ from those stressed by the scholars of the realist tradition. The organising principle of interstate relations is, according to them, anarchy. States help themselves by balancing against centres of power that could hurt them – by building up their own military power or by joining with others. Rosen continues:

“The organizing principle of empire rests, in contrast, on the existence of an overarching power that creates and en-

forces the principle of hierarchy, but is not itself bound by such rules. In turn, subordinate states do not build up their own capabilities or join with others when threatened; they call instead on their imperial power for assistance. In so doing, they give up a key component of state sovereignty, which is direct control of their own security”.

The Bush revolution in foreign affairs

Dominion is a powerful temptation for a superpower like the United States. Why should a state accept threats against its security and see its interests challenged, if an alternative is possible through application of overwhelming military might? In fact, since World War II dominion has been on the US agenda several times.

In the early 1950s voices, on the extreme right demanded a roll back of communism. Former Communists and Trotskyites brought a radical fervour to a movement otherwise best known for the

isolationism represented by senator Robert Taft and his warnings against a permanent global engagement which could create “an American Empire, doing what the British have done for the past 200 years”⁵⁷. In the pages of *National Review* James Burnham and other conservative intellectuals called for political warfare, paramilitary actions and ultimately general war to liberate the peoples enslaved by the Soviet system. Rollback never became an official US policy; General Eisenhower could, as a president from 1953, deflect the right wing pressure. But secretly a version of rollback was adopted in a policy of psychological warfare. Throughout the entire Cold War era the United States also blocked and overthrew governments in the Third World deemed to be influenced by the communists or in other ways acting against US interests. The second coming for rollback came during the 1980s in the Reagan administration. Many neo-conservative intellectuals got their first taste of power during these years, seeing in the ultimate dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union

a confirmation of the utility of military power in an offensive mode.

At the end of the Cold War President George Bush, Sr. advocated publicly a new world order to be built on cooperation with the Soviet Union and a strengthened UN. But his administration included officials favouring a strategy of dominion. Among them were the then Secretary of Defence, Richard Cheney, and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz. With the demise of the Soviet Union not only a possible strategic partner disappeared, but also a possible check on US power was gone. Adherents to a strategy of dominion presented their views in a DoD planning document, drafted by an office led by Paul Wolfowitz.⁵⁸ The scent of imperial strategy, as outlined by professor Rosen, is unmistakable.

“Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival”, the document says. It outlines three additional associated objectives: “First, the U.S must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competi-

tors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role”. The US should aim to “encourage the spread of democratic forms of government and open economic systems”. Outlined are several scenarios in which US interests could be threatened: “Access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, threats to U.S. citizens from terrorism or regional or local conflict, and threats to U.S. society from narcotics trafficking”. There is no mentioning of taking collective action through the United Nations. Instead it states that the U.S. “should expect future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies” formed

to deal with a particular crisis and which may not outlive the resolution of the crisis. But if coalitions cannot be assembled, the US should be ready to act independently.

The draft was leaked to *The New York Times* and caused an uproar. A final version was toned down, but with George W. Bush, Jnr, as president the adherents of dominion got a new chance. They came to the task having spent the years attacking the policies of President Clinton. America had, they argued, become a Gulliver tied down by the midgets of the international community. The fourth appearance of dominion strategy was in part a reaction to the Clinton foreign policy, and in part a reaction to fears caused by the possible spread of weapons of mass destruction. But it was also, Robert Art states, “due to an arrogance born of the knowledge that American power, especially its military power, bought the United States a lot of freedom of political maneuver.”⁵⁹

As a presidential candidate Bush did not shine as a foreign policy expert, and

thus many observers saw him as a puppet, directed by more experienced advisers and groups – Dick Cheney and neo-conservatives as the foremost. But this view is rejected by two skilled observers, former Clinton National Security Council staffers Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay.⁶⁰ They portray George W. Bush as coming into office with a set of simple views and then leading a revolution in US foreign policy. 9-11 did not inspire this revolution; it was already on its way. First, Bush believed that the only way to ensure US security in a dangerous world was to “shed the constraints imposed by friends, allies, and international institutions”. Second, “an America unbound should use its strength to change the status quo in the world”. In claiming that “Bush led his own revolution” they may be overdoing an interesting argument, but Ronald Reagan did not impress intellectually either and still was able, through stating simple principles, to lead his government. As stressed by William Odom and Robert Dujarric in their study, the ideology of American leaders is most significant for the nature

of the empire they lead. Bush abandoned the Liberal ethics, guiding and limiting many of his predecessors, and thus passed from just seeking primacy to seeking dominion. How far he had strayed was best illustrated when he invoked a Leninist axiom, either you are with us or against us, in his so-called war against terrorism. As Robert Art stresses, “dominion would create a global American imperium; it would be an aggressive, interventionist, unilateralist, and transformational strategy.”⁶¹ Seen in this light, the realist use of “unilateralism” to describe US foreign policy is not exactly measuring up.

Might is right in Bush world

After World War II the US was the driving force in the creation of a new international legal order built on treaties, agreements, multilateral institutions and alliances. As tools they made exercise of US power easier but they also inhibited American empire and thus made the new world order acceptable to countries on their way to give up empire themselves.

An international legal order is founded on the principle of equality under the law. The most powerful must subject themselves to it, even when difficult, costly or unnecessary, because superior military, diplomatic or economic power would, in the absence of law, secure the desired objectives. Although praising this ideal, the US often broke international law, but development of an international legal order continued, often with American leadership. This order was seen as an alternative to conflicts and war. It could not eradicate war and breaches of law, but it could limit the associated risks – and during the Cold War military confrontation that was quite an advantage.

As this confrontation disappeared also the benefits of an international legal order grew smaller in the eyes of some US national security experts. The price paid by the world's only superpower seemed unnecessarily high. The Clinton-administration focused on economics and globalisation, and in this context interdependence of nations became a strong argument in favour of legal order. But

pressure from right wing radicals in Congress blocked enactment of the Clinton vision – several planned treaties and reforms could not be passed. The attack on the whole concept of international law was escalated by the Bush administration before and after 9-11. Among the victims were the Chemical Weapons Convention (limited US compliance), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (not ratified), the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (promises and obligations broken), the Biological Weapons Convention (draft protocol rejected), the UN Framework Convention on Climate Control and the Kyoto Protocol (treaty obligations in UNFCCC not being met and protocol rejected), the International Criminal Court (signature called back and attempts to sabotage implementation), the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (unilateral withdrawal), and Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war and the populations in occupied territories (deemed irrelevant).

Without an international legal order the powerful becomes “police, prosecu-

tor, judge, jury and executioner all rolled into one”, one group of American legal experts claimed. And if the rule of power rather than the rule of law becomes the norm, then security is likely to be a casualty. When an influential state like the US treats legal obligations as a matter of convenience, “other states will see this as a justification to relax or withdraw from their own commitments”, these critics charged.⁶² But seen with the eyes of the Bush administration this is an acceptable risk, because nobody can combine the mentioned functions of police, judge, executioner etc. better and with greater power, and the US itself is an honourable country without a need for treaties to do the right thing. If the US is to play a leading role, Paul Wolfowitz prescribed before his appointment as a Deputy Secretary of Defence, it means “demonstrating that your friends will be protected and taken care of, that your enemies will be punished, and that those who refuse to support you will live to regret having done so.”⁶³ Hierarchy, in other words, becomes a substitute for a legal order.

Logically, the Bush administration also picked a confrontation with the UN Security Council. This institution gives other powers an influence not matched by the real power relations in an American empire. Before the war against Iraq Bush challenged the world organisation and gave it a choice: Accept my will or become an ineffective, irrelevant forum for debate! But the problem was not really the challenge from Saddam Hussein, Professor of International Law Michael Glennon showed, but “rather an earlier shift in world power toward a configuration that was simply incompatible with the way the UN was meant to function”. It was, he continues, “the rise in American unipolarity” along with “cultural clashes and different attitudes toward the use of force,” that gradually eroded the Council.⁶⁴

Also, the formal alliances created in an earlier era are not compatible with the desired hierarchy. The Washington-Treaty, for example, is closely tied to a world order with the United Nations in a key role, and through the North Atlantic Council

a single member can block consensus and any collective action. But the Bush administration goal is “to prevent America’s security from being undermined by constraints imposed by other powers, including— and perhaps most especially— those of America’s traditional allies”, professor James Chace said.⁶⁵ Use of ad hoc coalitions helps to evade control by allies through NATO. And President Bush himself has dismissed the need for consultation and agreement with allies before action with this philosophy: “Confident action, that will yield positive results, provides kind of a slipstream into which reluctant nations and leaders can get behind (...).”⁶⁶

***Military hierarchy with nukes
as trump***

American military power becomes an indispensable guarantee of security and interests of smaller powers in the absence of an effective international legal order. Being providers of “tools” for the exercise of US power might give them a

favoured position in a world order characterized by hierarchy and US dominance. And the equation works both ways: An absence of legal order can secure the dominant access to compliant tools for policing an empire.

Since the end of the Cold War US security managers have focused on the spread of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Both threats have been dismissed by scholars of the realist school in international relations. Professor Kenneth Waltz, virtually the dean of this school, has argued that the likelihood of war “decreases” as nuclear weapons spread because deterrent and defensive capabilities will increase. Thus, “the gradual spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared.”⁶⁷ Scholars also have attacked the focus on terrorism. The term should not, they argue, be detached from particular context. Use of terrorism can, as Jeffrey Record of the US Army War College, claims, “reflect rational political choice.”⁶⁸ Terrorism is tactics, not an enemy, William Odom and Robert Dujarric stress and for good measure add:

“The United States, by any legal definition of terrorism, has been the largest sponsors of terrorist operations since World War II.”⁶⁹

But in an empire different forces are at work. Weapons of mass destruction can be used by smaller powers as a deterrent against the US, and terrorism can be an effective tool in asymmetric conflicts. And for the US, using the terms of “weapons of mass destruction” (an impossibly broad term) and terrorism (detached from context) in an ideological campaign, provide glue for an empire. Successful imperial governance must focus on justifying and maintaining an advantage in the ability to generate military power. For American citizens and Europeans, an effort against proliferation and terrorism can make good sense as self-defence and a programme to ensure global stability – a view not shared by many others as opinion polls in several Muslim countries have shown. But, as professor Rosen says, viewed through the lenses of imperial practice “US non-proliferation policies compose a classic case of an imperial ef-

fort to keep a monopoly on the forms of military power that help provide its dominance.”⁷⁰

Change in the US military strategy to fit an imperial policy was signalled very clearly by Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld during his confirmation hearing in the Senate. He repeatedly ruminated on the concept of deterrence in novel ways. Credible deterrence, he said, can no longer be based solely on the prospect of punishment. “We don’t want to win wars, we want to prevent them”, he said. “We want to be so powerful and so forward looking that it is clear to others that they ought not to be damaging their neighbors when it affects our interests, and they ought not to be doing things that are imposing threats and dangers to us.”⁷¹ The ambitious goal is no less than dominate the thinking of any possible adversary, but Rumsfeld also admitted: “I don’t know that I really understand what deters people today (...)”. Thus the most important – and probably only possible – goal is to influence the thinking of American leadership itself. They are to

believe that no adversary can believe that the United States can be challenged. Secondly, everybody under the shield of empire must believe that the US cannot be challenged.

This is more than a prescription for an arms race with the US itself: If challenges are perceived, logic dictates that the US is not strong enough, and thus a continuous arms build-up is necessary. What is sufficient cannot be measured in traditional terms of military balance, like just spending on defence as much as the rest of the world combined. The imperial will-power also must be demonstrated in doctrines and projection of military assets.

Elevating preventive warfare to a prominently positioned doctrine in the national strategy was for this reason a necessary step. Pre-emption and even preventive war has always been an option, sometimes also exercised. Critics might, as they have, claim that preventive warfare is contrary to international law. But such arguments overlook the important point. The doctrine is to keep everybody who could come

under suspicion for harbouring aggressive plans against US interests in perpetual fear – and force them unto a track of constantly sending accommodating signals. To publicly claiming a right to preventive war, in spite of international law, also demonstrates who is in charge.

In the early 1990s US leaders saw nuclear weapons as obsolete. As a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell told Third World leaders that nuclear weapons is a wasted investment of limited political and military value.⁷² But in the Bush strategy nuclear weapons again play a key role. They emphasize the distribution of power in the global military hierarchy. As stated in a report from the National Institute for Public Policy, an important think-tank for development of the new nuclear posture, “strategic nuclear weapons continue to play vital roles in foreseeable US defense planning.”⁷³ Besides deterring Russia and China the roles described in this report and official documents from the Bush administration include: 1) Dissuasion of rogue states and other adversaries from acquiring or us-

ing weapons of mass destruction (WMD); 2) Deter aspiring peer competitors; 3) Provide a “hedge” while exploring defences and conventional alternatives; 4) Provide options for striking some WMD facilities and deeply buried targets; 5) Provide “a secure guarantee of American power in the face of asymmetric attacks from small, despotic countries, failed states, non-state actors – all with access to an increasingly lethal toolbox of means”.

Development of Ballistic Missile Defences in similar ways highlights the special status of US power. As spears and shields earlier in the history of war complemented each other to enable offensive action, the nuclear arsenal and the missile shield will, it is claimed, secure freedom of action. It is not very likely that any state armed with long range missiles will attack the US. Retaliation will be swift and devastating. The only exception is if the US wants to depose a regime – then threats and use of long range missiles can be a last and desperate defence. An anti-missile system could provide answers to such threats and give a policy of

regime change credibility. It could also give other countries protection and make a security guarantee to them more credible because the American homeland will seem less vulnerable and US leaders can be perceived to have more freedom of action.

Ensure minimally acceptable forms of internal behaviour

In assessing American empire and its future potential, the greatest uncertainty arises on what constitutes “minimally acceptable forms of internal behaviour within the subordinate states”. At the strategic level, the Bush administration has advocated “a new principle” of limiting sovereignty if states support terrorism or massacre their own people. But an empire would be more demanding.

During the election campaign in 2000, both Bush and his soon-to-be national security adviser Condoleezza Rice refuted that the US should play a significant role in the internal affairs of foreign countries. Prominent neo-conservatives had

long argued for promoting democracy abroad, and after 9-11 and during mobilisation for war against Iraq “democratic imperialism” came on the agenda. With a series of speeches in 2003 President Bush joined this, in the opinion of many experts, utopian vision of democratic transformation in the Middle East with Iraq as a showcase.⁷⁴ In more general terms, the Bush administration had published the previous year a national security strategy stating that the goal not only is a more secure world, it should also become a better world.⁷⁵ Administration spokesmen went to great length in stressing the voluntary nature of the project. President Bush said in a cover letter: “We seek (...) to create a balance of power that favours freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty”. And Condoleezza Rice said the US would not “impose democracy on others”. Our vision of the future, she explained, “is not one where every person eats Big Mac and drinks Coke (...).”⁷⁶

But many observers read the strategy differently. To former Clinton officials Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay it embodied “a hegemonist worldview” and “the essence” of the strategy is to “remake the world in America’s image.”⁷⁷ In Iraq, the imported American staff for the Coalition Provisional Authority tried to implement with great zeal many social reforms favoured by conservatives in the US. But a distinction should be made separating democracy-building in newly “liberated” dictatorships and failed states from the control imposed by empire-builders in all subordinated states. Andrew Bacevich is probably close in describing the minimalist demands to members of the empire when he writes about “the imperative of openness and integration, given impetus by globalisation but guided by the United States”. In this global order American enterprises will enjoy free reign and American values enjoy pride of place and thus “benefit the US most of all”. US global leadership means perpetuating American political, economic and cultural hegemony.⁷⁸ According to former Reagan

trade negotiator Clyde Prestowitz, strategists in the Bush administration see globalisation as a kind of soft power “that will induce integration within the empire by dint of others wanting voluntarily to do what we want them to do”. Prestowitz finds this view naïve.⁷⁹ But such minimalist demands are not dramatically at odds with the practice of some former empires. A British historian, Niall Ferguson, even claims that all empires were based on cooperation and not primarily the use of force.⁸⁰

Cooperation is also what the US benefit from in financing the empire. In a study of the US financial policy the American economist Michael Hudson claims that the US has “achieved what no earlier imperial system had put to place”. Americans can live beyond their means with large deficits in the trade balance and the fiscal budgets through “forced loans” from abroad – sale of US Treasury bonds.⁸¹ In January 2004, The International Monetary Fund estimated US foreign debt at 40 percent of the gross national product – “an unprecedented level”, the IMF said.⁸²

A clash of two world order projects

If a single truth can be distilled from the US debate on empire it must be: It makes a difference whether an empire is formal or informal – these forms of empire are then the outer, opposite, points on a sliding scale with the degree of domination being the decisive factor.

The subordinated states and their peoples certainly experience the difference. Before Bush and the new imperialists got into the driver's seat the Europeans knew, if they thought about it, very well where real power was situated in the transatlantic community. And the Americans knew it, too. Even years after the Cold War had ended and the EU had set its sights on a more independent course, Zbigniew Brzezinski could write: "The brutal fact is that Western Europe, and increasingly also Central Europe, remains largely an American protectorate, with its allied states reminiscent of ancient vassals and tributaries."⁸³ It was rare, though, to see the power relations described in such

direct terms, and Brzezinski himself added that the roles are unhealthy, for both the US and European nations. He, of course, portrayed an American empire, but it is markedly different from the empire which the US apparently has been striving for under the reign of President Bush. Brzezinski could claim that in contrast to previous empires the US is not heading a "hierarchical pyramid". No, in this empire power is exercised through "continuous bargaining, dialogue, diffusion, and quest for formal consensus (...)."⁸⁴ And he, like many American foreign policy pundits in the early 1990s, viewed empire as a passing stage to a truly cooperative global community.

This empire based on co-optation was rocked when the Bush administration passed the divide separating superiority and dominion. The subordinate Europeans were challenged when the empire took a still more formal character, raising fears of the extent to which the US would seek dominance in not only their external behaviour but also their internal behaviour.

Naturally, Brzezinski, when the new aims of the Bush administration became clear in 2003, had to call its foreign policy "narrow and extremist". We need, he said, the Europeans, "we need the European Union", and not seek to divide it up into "a fictitious new and a fictitious old."⁸⁵ Splitting Europe is exactly what the Bush administration had attempted. Colin Powell, almost valiantly, as Secretary of State tried to deny the obvious by talking about misunderstandings obscuring the real US "strategy of partnerships" and, on the relations with the EU, highlighting that "never has our common agenda been so large and mutually significant."⁸⁶ But ideologues like John Hulsman from the conservative Heritage Foundation, closer in mind than Powell to the White House and the Pentagon, saw an EU "that matters only peripherally in the international system". He advocated a general American transatlantic foreign policy based on "cherry-picking" – engaging coalitions of the willing European states on a case-by-case basis. The US has a "unique opportunity" when faced with Europe

which is more about diversity than uniformity.⁸⁷ Richard Perle, the grey eminence of Bush administration hawks, together with David Frum, former speechwriter for the president, suggested that Americans, first of all, “must acknowledge that a more closely integrated Europe is no longer an unqualified American interest”. Every European government should be forced “to choose between Paris and Washington.”⁸⁸ Gunther Burghardt, the EU ambassador in Washington, commented in May 2004: “The situation has never been so bad in 50 years. It is a fact of life that America is a hegemonic power, but the question is how that power is used. We need to know that America is open to a confident relationship, not just with certain member states but with the EU as such.”⁸⁹

On both sides of the Atlantic experts are eyeing a nascent conflict between the antagonistic interests of states. This conflict, they claim, is obvious when France, Germany and Russia ganged up against the US before the war against Iraq and it will become more obvious the more the

EU acquires state-like properties. The wisdom in these predictions are based on theories from the realist school in international relations predicting that a unipolar system is short lived because weaker states will get together against the hegemon and that in an empire subordinate units prefer greater autonomy and thus will seek to get it whenever opportunity arises. A more advanced, related theory is presented by Philip Bobbitt, an American academic with a considerable experience as a national security manager. Both the United States and Europe are moving into a new world order where old rules of behaviour are abandoned because they do not adequately answer the challenges of today. As often before in history, he argues, the state is changing, this time into what he calls “The Market-State”. The state is moving beyond the national looking for tools to effectively handle security and economics on the regional and global marketplace. The EU and the US typify two out of three kinds of Market-States he describes. Their ability to cooperate, relative power and differing views of an

acceptable world order will determine events in the next few decades.⁹⁰

Europeans do, as the French prime minister Raffarin has said, want a “dialogue among equals” in the transatlantic relationship, and they also want “common goals for the world” to constitute the basis for cooperation.⁹¹ This will not be easy. The EU is about a new world order comparable to a spider’s web. A network of mutual obligations to block unilateralism of the strong is the goal. The European peace project is governed by a few fundamental principles: 1) The political is above the military; 2) Negotiation and compromise are the very foundation of international relations; 3) No state should be above or apart from international law. When the new American imperialists prefer a hierarchical pyramid instead of a spider’s web characterised by interdependence they not only strangle dialogue. They also promote a world order in fundamental conflict with European historical experience, present goals and the very identity of the European Union. Peaceful coexistence is to be hoped for but not very likely.

A viable transatlantic community

The eminent British military historian Michael Howard warns in a foreword to the Bobbitt study that mankind could be facing a tragedy without precedent in its history if the new Market States fail to cooperate and slide into confrontation. But realist theory, although in common use by politicians and strategists alike, is not necessarily a sound reflection of today's realities. Conventional wisdom might be wrong if we live in a qualitatively new era of world politics. Few could have predicted that the ideological bent of a few top officials would steer the United States off the course followed for decades, against the better advice of its traditional foreign policy elite. And just projecting theories based on historical patterns of inter-state rivalry on to the relationship between Europe and the United States is a bit lazy. Europe is, for beginners, not a state, hardly even a well defined geographic entity, but much more, as Raffarin wrote, "a state of mind".

It is possible that Condoleezza Rice is right when she claims that old arguments from academic disciplines "obscure reality" because the world's great centres of power are united by common interests, common dangers and – increasingly – common values.⁹² And it is very possible the Bush administration itself has obscured that reality. Neither the US nor Europe can afford a divorce. Economic integration is so far advanced that the price of confrontation will be prohibitive. Cooperation and respect for international law do benefit all. And the Americans and Europeans do have important values in common.

Transatlantic economic intercourse is much deeper and broader than at the times when divorce among interconnected states gave rise to realist theories. The end of the Cold War allegedly has weakened transatlantic ties but the 1990s actually strengthened economic integration. By far the greatest part of American investments abroad went to Europe, and European corporations have invested greatly in the US. Business for American enterprises in

Europe has been estimated at 333 billion dollars in 2000, and European firms in the US had a turnover of 301 billion – far more than the national product of most nations. In total, these businesses provided jobs for 13 million people.⁹³

The main argument against the dreams of new American imperialists is that the price of empire will be too high. The Bush administration has in fact tried a discount version of imperialism in sending too few soldiers and too little economic support to Iraq and Afghanistan. In both cases hybris – America can do everything on its own – has been succeeded by going begging at the doors of allies and the UN. And in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal a very high price was paid for having created an atmosphere of lawlessness by putting the US above international law. But even a *de facto* admission of defeat in Iraq, although sobering for empire-builders, will not make today's challenges go away. Together, the EU and the US can move the world but the Bush administration strategy, its empire building, and its ideological blindness, block this possibility.

The claim about common American and European values is more fragile. It is a fact, but tinged with banality that a belief in freedom, democracy and market economy unites the Euro-Atlantic community and that we have common cultural roots. But right wing radicalism in the US has highlighted differences in attitudes, towards property, equality, social solidarity, public services and power politics.⁹⁴ An American commentator, Robert Kagan, had great success when he proclaimed: Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus. His portrayal was even greeted with, unintended, applause by the left wing Europeans. But a more correct version of this War of the Worlds is that the Bush administration and its ideological backers are invaders from Mars. They have swept themselves in the American flag, but they are a crowd apart – both on Earth and in America.

Opinion polls often are used to prove a great, and rapidly growing, gap between the US and Europe. Overwhelming majorities in Europe are against the Iraq war, reject US leadership and disapprove of

policies of President Bush. But from this perspective surprising results also appear. The gap represents more a dislike of current US policies than a gap between two communities. A poll from September 2002 leads to this conclusion: “European publics look at the world in a similar way to ordinary Americans, while harbouring deep reservations about the conduct of certain aspects of US foreign policy”.⁹⁵ They, for example, agreed on the relative importance of economic versus military strength – economic strength was rated higher by 84 percent of Europeans and 66 percent of Americans. Either a plurality or a majority of the public on both sides of the Atlantic believes the World Bank, IMF, WTO, NATO and UN should be strengthened. And Europeans, contrary to Kagan’s claim, were in principle as willing as Americans to use force. Almost a year later another poll found: “Americans and Europeans do not live on different planets when it comes to viewing the threats around them”.⁹⁶ This poll found that not only Europeans, but also Americans, share apprehension of the way in

which the US is exercising its power. When asked whether US unilateralism is a possible threat in the next ten years, 78 percent of Europeans and 67 percent of Americans listed it as an extremely important or important threat.

The polls raise a question of key significance for the transatlantic relationship: If Europeans and Americans have so many views in common, how come policies on the two sides of the Atlantic are so different? In an analysis of the latter poll, three scholars gave an interesting answer. Based on fundamental attitudes to power they created four distinct groups: Hawks, Pragmatists, Doves and Isolationists. This division revealed a dramatic difference. Pragmatists constitute the great middle group on both side of the Atlantic – 65 percent in the US and 43 percent in Europe. But Hawks are so numerous in the US (25 percent), that if a leader from this group can win support from Pragmatists, a majority is possible. But in Europe Doves are 42 percent – a centrist Pragmatist cannot as a leader ignore them – but Hawks are extremely few, 7 percent, foreclosing

their appeal or possibilities for coalition. The difference between America and Europe thus is not so much a matter of different attitudes in the general public as very different possibilities for national leaders when coalitions are made for elections and sustainable government. "If Washington is interested in restoring a viable consensus across the Atlantic", this analysis concluded, "when it comes to the use of force, it must recognize the need to develop a rationale for such action that takes the structures and requirements of European public opinion into account (...)."97

American pragmatists will, while looking at Europe, see a spectrum of attitudes not far from their own, more hawkish politicians will see a dramatically different scene. It is common for Democrats to stress that Europe both can and must cooperate. They see differences as quite natural disagreement to be overcome through dialogue and compromise because they do not constitute an unbridgeable gap. As Daniel Hamilton, head of the State Department office for political strategy in the Clinton administration, has said:

"Many transatlantic tensions result less from the fashionable notion that our societies are drifting apart, and more from the growing evidence that they are in fact drawing closer together".98 Robert Hunter, ambassador to NATO during the Clinton years, claims: "The destinies of the United States and Europe are now intertwined in such critical ways as to be inseparable."99

From this perspective conflicts in the transatlantic relationship are not so much an issue of international relations as an issue of "transatlantic domestic politics", as Hamilton and others have suggested. It is becoming quite common to look at inter-European relations as an issue of domestic politics but we have yet to approach the transatlantic relationship in similar ways. The so-called laws used by the realist school for analysing interaction between states are not very useful any longer. In domestic politics we have more than a few "rational actors" and ideology plays a significant role. Popular participation adds new complexity and we have a myriad of issues on the agenda. In the

case of Iraq, for example, we had European states, based on *raison d'état*, giving the Bush administration support while their own publics were overwhelmingly against the war. That is why members of this ad hoc coalition could only provide symbolic support – their publics would not allow greater national sacrifice at the level of what was claimed to be at stake.

We are thus faced with an issue of transatlantic governance. The social reality is fundamentally at odds with the system of government. Empire is as unnatural as dictatorship would be in the individual democracies comprising the empire. In the EU concentration of power in Bruxelles is perceived by many as a threat – leaders are considered to be distant and outside the influence of democratic processes. But the EU still provides ways of democratic control and leaders must work hard for their legitimacy. American leaders cannot be held accountable by European voters and democratic institutions.

This study started out posing a question: How far should a new US president

go in reversing the Bush revolution to restore transatlantic cooperation? The answer is that he must distance himself from everything that makes the empire more formal than informal. The subordinate publics will not accept dominion. If an American president wants to be "the leader of the free world" he must work hard for his legitimacy also in Europe. He cannot gain legitimacy through a vote, and exactly that fact makes a permanent campaign, listening and explaining, necessary because he can be rejected at any time. He will not get legitimacy just through approval from European leaders. And he can choose a strategy not very different from the one EU leaders adopted in December 2003 by listening to people like Zbigniew Brzezinski who sets the goal as "a global community of shared interests", develop "a web of interdependent relations" through "the natural evolution of interstate relations into an informal governance structure."¹⁰⁰

Indications are that president Kerry has understood this. He has attacked the basic premises of dominion: "Intoxicated

with the pre-eminence of American power, the administration has abandoned the fundamental tenets that have guided our foreign policy for more than half a century: belief in collective security and alliances, respect for international institutions and international law, multilateral engagement, and the use of force not as a first option but truly as a last resort."¹⁰¹

Rejection of this alternative in favour of four more years of empire-building will force the Baltic dilemma to the top of the political agenda, but in this they will not be alone. If Kerry wins, we can, as the veteran journalist Elizabeth Pond, as a minimum hope for enough trust to be rebuilt "between the natural allies of the United States and Europe to prevent the next clash too from being fatal."¹⁰² And we might even see a new and strengthened progressive alliance among equals.

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The Transatlantic Security Rift and Its Implications for Baltic Security

Jennifer Ann Moll*

For 13 years, the Baltic states¹ pursued a policy of re-integration with the West; foreign policy goals were few in number and clear, which allowed the three Baltics to conduct one of the most successful foreign policy campaigns of the last decade. Indeed, 'the fundamental strategic concept' of the Baltic states which was 'to consolidate the accomplishments and the positive changes of the last decade and make them irreversible'² was actualised in April and May 2004 in a historic moment that changed the importance of geopolitics for all three. Membership in the European Union (EU)

and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), however, is only the beginning and there is an understandable and widespread feeling of uncertainty for what the future holds. Both the EU and NATO have changed during the enlargement process and will continue to change. A clear understanding of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian needs will allow each state to use its memberships to influence these organisations and advance its own interests.

This essay will be delivered in two parts. In the first half, I will give a brief history of the Transatlantic Alliance and the ten-

sions that have existed from the outset. While highlighting the major changes in NATO, I will also delve into current facets of the transatlantic security rift by analysing the differences between security goals of the major parties as well as differences in such areas as threat assessment, military forces, and the use of force. Arguing from the viewpoint that a more balanced and multilateral, not multipolar, approach to international security would be best for both sides of the Atlantic, I will assess Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian foreign policy documents in order to ascertain each state's foreign

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policy goals. Then, I will give recommendations on how each may enhance their security within the EU and NATO frameworks.

Part One - The Transatlantic Security Rift

I. 'Forging the Alliance'

In the wake of the Second World War and its attendant destruction, two superpowers emerged: the USSR united a vast amount of land, manpower and resources with a fierce command economy, and the United States emerged coveting its vast amount of military hardware in addition to moral and economic power. As democracies assembled against the Soviet Union, the Western European powers quickly realised that, 'only the Americans could really assure any forward defense for Western Europe.'³ With security at the forefront of their priorities, leaders of the United Kingdom began pressuring their American allies to link their own security with that of Western Europe. For many

Western Europeans, the lessons of World War II and the necessities dictated by the Cold War era demanded an organisation that could, as NATO's former Secretary General Lord Ismay remarked of NATO, 'keep the Soviets out, the Americans in and the Germans down.'

As with the First World War, however, many Americans were keen to forget about Europe and return to a 'splendid isolationism.' Indeed, the Marshall Plan revealed the United States' desire to get Europe back on its feet without direct involvement. It was not until the Cold War heated up with the Soviet blockade of Berlin that the United States Senate and populace became ready to face the challenges of a belligerent bipolar system. President Truman's re-election ensured that the United States would not abandon its Western European friends and allies.

Although Don Cook argues, 'it is certainly the case that the birth of the NATO Treaty was one of the most collegiately successful diplomatic negotiations in the history of free nations,'⁴ tensions were evident at the outset.

Through their involvement in the Working Group and the Ambassadors Committee, Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, and at the end of the process, Norway, are responsible for the substance of the NATO Treaty. From the beginning, Europeans were frustrated by the American representatives' 'deliberate tactics of caution, evasion, and circumlocution'⁵ that were necessitated by the domestic political context. And while it seems that most representatives were annoyed by French tactics, the government of the United States was particularly incensed that France tried to 'lay down conditions'⁶ for joining a transatlantic security pact, because 'everyone knew perfectly well that the French were practically on their knees praying for a treaty to sign.'⁷ From the outset, the French government linked the successful completion of any collective defence treaty to: immediate US assistance in equipping French forces, a promise that the US would send ground forces to help

defend France if a war with the Soviet Union would erupt, and French membership in the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff organisation that had been created in World War II.

Debates to hammer out Article V, the key element of collective defence in NATO, were also frustrating as the United States Senate demanded a re-wording after the representatives had already agreed on the article's wording. Finally, consensus was reached and, in a revolutionary change in commitment strategy from its time-honoured practice of isolationism, the US acquiesced to the treaty's Article V:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it

deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area.⁸

At the end of negotiations, twelve states signed the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949. For many Western Europeans, the belief that their security would increase with an US security guarantee was confirmed when Stalin's Soviet Union announced its desire to end the Berlin blockade one week after the Treaty was unveiled.

Until the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, the North Atlantic Treaty was seen as little more than a mutual defence commitment. After the invasion, however, the Allies were persuaded to organise an integrated peacetime military command structure and to establish the readiness of a long-term US presence in Europe, finally adding the 'O' in NATO.⁹ As the Alliance took shape, the British and US positions increasingly aligned, leaving France on its own. Cook argues that Kenneth Younger, a minister of state in the British Foreign Office during the formative NATO years best

understood what Cook calls 'the Great Dichotomy of the North Atlantic Alliance.' Younger wrote, 'We [the British] and the Americans want to start building up an Atlantic Community which includes but transcends Western Europe, but the French still hanker after a European solution in which the only American function is to provide military and other aid.'¹⁰

Similarly, the British and French responded differently to the US nuclear supremacy as the Soviets approached parity earlier than the Allies had anticipated. The Suez Crisis further distanced France as Britain under Harold Macmillan became determined never to be isolated from the United States again, while France focussed on establishing 'Europe.' A growing rift was accelerated by France's rejection of a European Defence Community and General DeGaulle's 1966 decision to withdraw France from the integrated NATO military command; the US-French relations have never recovered.

Despite ongoing tensions, the passage of time has proven and enhanced NATO's

importance. Although the basis for NATO's continued success lay in the US equation of security with its demonstrated nuclear power and its strong stance against further Soviet encroachments to the West, the urgency of maintaining the US engagement in European security affairs produced spill-over effects that few of NATO's architects could have foreseen. In addition to providing a military structure and presence in Europe, NATO also provided Europe with a framework of security and stability that has allowed it to prosper. In fact, the security that NATO has provided since 1949 cannot be underestimated, for without it the members of the Alliance would not have been able to advance in other ways. Yost propels the argument further, 'The Alliance has provided a setting of safety for the European economic integration movement, from the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 to today's European Union.'¹¹ Additionally, NATO has provided a forum to address Europe's power problems, limit the scope of nuclear proliferation, denatio-

nalise defence-planning and legitimise democracy as a form of government.

II. NATO and the End of the Cold War

NATO's contributions to the North Atlantic and European communities have made it a successful organisation central to the 'Western' world, this centrality was furthered by NATO's role in ending the Cold War. Although of secondary importance compared to domestic problems plaguing the Soviet Union, NATO *did* have a role in the downfall of the USSR. The Alliance closed an opportunity for a military solution in a bipolar world and shifted the confrontation to economic and social fields. NATO's show of strength within the states bordering the USSR showed the Allies' unity and desire to limit communist ideological expansion.

After all the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact had agreed in 1990 that 'security is indivisible' and that the security of each state is inextricably linked to the security of Europe as a whole, the

USSR cast doubt on the idea of relying on an all-European security structure, such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE). The Soviet refusal to accept the CSCE's wishes with regards to the Baltic republics in 1991 guaranteed a minimal role for Russia in European security relations and led to the Baltic equation of hard security needs with NATO membership, which remains today. The consensual decision-making in the CSCE made it unable to provide protection; in comparison, NATO possessed well-functioning and credible decision-making mechanisms built on the unity of purpose and a good track record for resisting Soviet threats. Yost argues, 'It was thus during 1991 that attention turned to NATO as a much more reliable security guarantor than the CSCE was likely to become.'¹²

As the importance of NATO in the post-Cold War era was being reaffirmed for the Baltics, many members of the Alliance expressed their doubts and concerns for NATO's future. These doubts pleased a Russian government which desired

NATO's decline so that Russia could assume more power and influence in European security. The Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation from 7-8 November 1991 by allied heads of state expresses the confusion generated by the new era. 'The challenges we will face in this new Europe cannot be comprehensively addressed by one institution alone... Consequently, we are working towards a new European security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other.'¹³ The elimination of the Soviet threat required a new role for NATO, if it were to survive at all.

After the Luxembourg Foreign Minister and Chairman of the EC Council of Ministers Jacques Poos proclaimed 'the hour of Europe'¹⁴ had arrived and that Europe could solve the Yugoslav problem without NATO, it became increasingly evident that Europe was not capable of handling the problem. Indeed, the post-Cold War environment necessitated an adaptation in NATO, and the crisis

that erupted in the former Republic of Yugoslavia highlighted the ability of the Alliance to add crisis management and peace support operations to its mission. It was not until June 1992, however, that NATO ministers agreed to engage in peace support operations. This decision had two important consequences: 'first, it blurred the distinction between traditional Article V collective defence and non-Article V missions; and second, it required a widening in the mission spectrum for many allied forces.'¹⁵

The Bosnian conflict had negative repercussions for a 'security-Europe' because it shattered the illusion of political cohesion created in the wake of the Maastricht and Petersberg meetings. Emil J. Kirchner argues that one of the lessons of the Bosnian conflict was that, 'there could be tension between the formal tasking and the relative capabilities of both organisations.'¹⁶ While NATO suffered from a restricted mission, its military capabilities were, and remain, great; the Western European Union (WEU) worked under fewer restrictions and with less capabili-

ties. The Bosnian crisis had not only discredited the United Nations (UN) and European Community, it had also reaffirmed the importance of NATO to have an out-of-area military crisis response, which was solved by the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) initiative.

The CJTF initiative made it apparent that the Europeans and Americans were frustrated with their roles in NATO. With different conceptions of NATO, it is no surprise that many NATO members had different perspectives and policies on enlargement as well. Although the dual enlargements have made these past disagreements seem inconsequential, it is telling that many states, including Germany, wanted to exclude Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from both organisations at first because they feared a mutual defence pact with 'former Soviet republics.' The Europeans' ambition for a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) was related to their aspiration to have more influence and power in 'Europe' and thus in areas of European security. The Americans were also calling on Europeans to

share more of the economic burden for NATO and desired enlargement to maintain the primacy of NATO. Although the CJTF was first discussed in 1993, the decision taken at the January 1994 summit to enact the CJTF and 'make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy'¹⁷ also unofficially launched a troubled ESDI.

NATO's new Strategic Concept was first tested in Kosovo. Many factors, including NATO's success in the preceding Bosnian conflict, a strategy relying on air strikes because of a political culture against land strategies, and a probable Russian veto in the UN Security Council, led NATO to resort to force without a UN mandate. Instead of reaffirming the new Strategic Concept, however, both sides became highly critical of the operation. Frédéric Bozo argues, 'The conduct of the operation demonstrated the limits of NATO's functioning in a major crisis and

highlighted the relative unsuitability, political and military, of the Alliance to perform its "new missions" outside Article V.'¹⁸

III. A Deepening Transatlantic Rift

While Europeans have long protested against the US stance towards the Middle East, Russia and China, hormone-treated foods, and the death penalty, it seems that the number of complaints has risen under the Bush administration. Europeans have repeatedly attacked the Bush administration's plans for missile defence, its policy on rogue states, and its refusal to sign and/or retain international commitments, including the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). While some look at the catalogue of Transatlantic differences and claim that there is an increasing value-rift, others argue that for the remarkably high level of cooperation that has endured for more than 50 years, these differences are relatively small. Differences in security and

defence goals and policies, however, are more threatening to the future of transatlantic cooperation.

Immediately after the Cold War, French leaders began asserting that Europe did not need American leadership to set its own security policy. As soon as ESDI, and thus the European desire for 'autonomy' in security and defense, was launched, confusion on both sides led to suspicion and mistrust. While France, Germany, and the US initially supported an ESDI, the UK's reluctance to loosen, or even appear to loosen, its special relationship with the US, has only just begun to subside. This, of course, occurred as the US became increasingly suspicious of European autonomy as a result of the movement against the ESDI (seen by Europeans as being limited to strengthening the European component of NATO) towards a Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP or ESDP) outside of NATO. US mistrust of ESDP, which encompasses all questions of EU security and is thus seen as much more 'European' in nature, was evident in

former Secretary of State Albright's conditional support for it as long as it avoided the 3 Ds of 'decoupling, duplication, and discrimination.'

While many in Washington were worried by this broadening of European security and defence policies, tensions were re-aggravated when 'some Europeans, particularly in France,' used the WEU's definition of the 'Petersberg Tasks,' to 'argue for a clear differentiation of responsibilities, one in which NATO's role would be limited to collective defense (Article V) while the ESDI would be responsible for the more probable contingencies of crisis management and peace operations (non-Article V).'¹⁹ This, of course, clashed with NATO's Strategic Concept, which was largely based on crisis response.

Indeed, European and the US complaints regarding the Kosovo operation show an increasingly divided Alliance. As Europe's economic power has risen, it has demanded an equal footing with the US, while the US demands Europe assume more responsibility for its own security and defence before it gains that equal foot-

ing. In the Kosovo operation, the US military and policymakers were angered, arguing that for the amount of power Europeans had in determining a strategy, they should have contributed more to its operations militarily. Europeans, however, were angered by their small role in the operation, with many believing that a more balanced Alliance would have resulted in a better strategy. Thus, while Americans call for increased burden-sharing in the wake of Kosovo, Europeans call for better decision-sharing.

Many on both sides of the divide, however, question the sincerity of these calls. Clearly, the US enjoys its military and decision-making supremacy and does not want to give up either, while many Europeans do not want to increase their defence burden within a structure they believe will never permit a balance in decision-sharing. Perhaps inevitably, European cooperation with the US in security and defence led some European states to question a continued reliance on the US and to further posit that Europe could only be truly independent through in-

creased integration. The list, for example, of French foreign policy principles provided by the French government highlights this point. 'France values its independence highly, a principle which guided General de Gaulle's foreign policy during the 1960s and underpinned his decision that France should develop a credible independent defence capability based on nuclear deterrence.'²⁰ Of course, France does not mean independent in the conventional sense, but in the sense that a European defence would be independent of US influence.

Emboldened by the success of its pet project ('Europe') and its permanent seat on the UN Security Council, France has been the most identifiable European power pushing for Europe to act as a counterweight to the United States. Germany, however, is still largely torn between the two. Although Germany wants 'the European Union to become a full-fledged partner in all areas of global policy,' it also claims the United States to be its 'closest ally and partner outside the European Union.'²¹ Between France's clear desire to

minimise NATO's importance and Germany's unclear stance, it is no wonder the US would prefer the UK to be the voice of 'Europe.'

September 11th 2001, and each side's response to it, further entrenched divisions. Although the European states all expressed their solidarity with the United States in the following days, President Bush's response to the attacks exposed his unilateralist tendencies. While still pressing for a multilateral campaign in Afghanistan, the European Council on 21 September 2001 highlighted Europe's different security preoccupations by calling for 'the broadest possible coalition against terrorism under the United Nations aegis,' 'political emphasis on reactivating the Middle East Peace Process on the basis of the Mitchell and Tenet reports,' and 'humanitarian relief for Afghanistan.'

In the wake of September 11th, the Bush administration has chosen to spearhead its own missions, with a 'coalition of the willing' who accept American military and operational dominance. The coercive di-

plomacy leading to the most recent war with Iraq has reinforced competing conceptions of international security and the vision of Bush's US as a unilateral superpower that is all too eager to dangerously rebuke the international legal system. The authors of a recent report argue that Iraq was so explosive because it was 'the first major crisis within the alliance to take place in the absence of an agreed-upon danger.'²²

As stated previously, the defeat of the Soviet threat has paved the way for various interpretations and policies responding to the post-Cold War era. As the sole superpower, the US has perceived more international threats, and more danger in these threats, than Europeans. While many Europeans call for multilateralism to address these problems, the Bush administration has been increasingly unilateral to pre-emptively remove threats; Europeans fear this will weaken the UN system built on the renunciation of the use of force, except for extreme conditions that are approved by the Security Council. Although some, such as Robert Kagan claim

that, 'On the all-important question of power – the utility of power, the morality of power – they [Americans and Europeans] have parted ways,'²³ I am inclined to say that thinkers like Kagan represent current problems and not the means to resolve the current rift. Furthermore, just as anti-Americanism has risen all over the world under the Bush administration,²⁴ so might the transatlantic rift subside under a new US administration that does not rely so heavily on neoconservative foreign policymakers.

Indeed, many current tensions in the transatlantic alliance currently arise from issues of global governance. As Brian Murphy argues, the disagreement over strategic visions 'has less to do with judgments about how to preserve global hegemony than about interpretations of self-interests.'²⁵ While France, Germany, and Belgium have recently claimed an interest in acting as a counterweight to US hegemony, the United States has increasingly used its hegemonic position to fight the war on terror. Furthermore, because the experiment of European integration has

relied on diplomacy, cooperation and compromise, the Europeans are more willing to engage the rest of the world in the same way. Americans have been less willing to rely, as the Europeans advocate, on international law to right the world.

Then there is the issue of capabilities. In trying to meet the needs of asymmetric warfare, the US military has concentrated on technology to decrease the risk to its forces. Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler illustrate this capabilities rift with the statistic that, 'the U.S. defence budget is larger than the combined defence budgets of the next nine states on the top ten list.'²⁶ With a large portion of the defence budget going to research and development, the US military has made interoperability with NATO Allies more difficult because its Allies simply cannot compete. Recent missions have also exposed the expanding capabilities gap. Former US Secretary of Defence William Cohen argued in 1999 that, 'NATO [European] countries spend roughly 60 percent of what the United States does and

they get roughly 10 percent of the capability.'²⁷ Indeed, Alexander Moens argues that EU members continue to depend on NATO command and control and US assistance for, 'sophisticated intelligence, air transport, logistic and power projection capability.'²⁸

Europe's main security risk has been defined by security challenges in its periphery, while the US has become preoccupied with global security. Europeans have been happy to preoccupy themselves with the issues of crisis management and have built militaries centred on manpower. In fact, the only area that Europeans claim military supremacy is in manpower. When genuinely operational, the European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) hopes to draw from 100,000 troops, 4,000 combat aircraft, 100 ships, and 100 buildings to create a 60,000 strong force which can be assembled and supplied. As one British expert remarked, the capability gap is 'irrelevant if the Europeans can deal on a reasonable basis with the threats at hand and conduct any necessary interventions.'²⁹ Indeed, Europe's security goals

under the Petersberg tasks of 'humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking,'³⁰ seem much more manageable than America's decision to fight 'a war against terrorists of global reach.'³¹

While most European states still say that European security is still wedded to the US security, it seems that we are currently on the cusp of a new arrangement. As most of 'old Europe' turns away from NATO to focus on European defence, it appears that a pro-American bloc consisting of Poland and the Baltic states, and led by the UK, will propel NATO for the immediate future. Despite varying capabilities and different beliefs on the use of force, the transatlantic link remains. Just as the US security documents argue that Europe, as a natural partner, plays the leading role in its grand strategy, one Lithuanian author observed that for Europe, 'NATO is and shall remain the anchor of the US engagement in Europe and the cornerstone of European collective defence.'³²

Part Two - Ramifications for Baltic Security

Having given a brief overview of the transatlantic security rift, I will now highlight its ramifications for Baltic security. I will begin by examining the Security Concepts of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to find common foreign policy goals, and thus will speak of Baltic security. Having defined Baltic security goals, I will recommend various options to maximise gains.

I. Baltic Security Concepts

Having recently witnessed the successful completion of their two greatest foreign policy desires, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are now official members of 'the West.' Long-time fears of being geopolitically suspended between two political giants have become irrelevant, but by joining the West, the Baltic states have inherited many concerns and responsibilities. Although I had originally intended to analyse the security concepts of each of

the three separately, my analyses have confirmed many more similarities than differences. I shall thus proceed by speaking of 'Baltic Security,' and illustrate with specific examples drawn from each state's security concept.

A Note on Baltic Unity

Attempts by Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, and especially by those in power, to emphasise a distinctive state identity that could be recognised by Western counterparts have received much press both in the three states and abroad. While the Soviet occupation of all three was their first link of commonality, the post-Soviet transformation that they all have undergone, and the related challenges that they continue to face, unite them as well.

As a collective defence organisation, NATO correctly based its enlargement programme on the belief that Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian security was indivisible. Because of the softer nature of the EU, however, the three Baltic states were able to advance their own distinct interests during negotiations. Although

some claim that Baltic unity disintegrated when Estonia and Lithuania sought to be treated on an individual basis for EU accession, their fates are very much still linked. Just as Estonia has advanced its Nordic identity and Lithuania has claimed its own Central European identity, so Latvia and Lithuania emphasise the importance of relations with Belarus while Kaliningrad is a distinct issue area for Lithuania.

Despite these differences, it is very much possible to speak of 'Baltic' security. Andres Kasekamp and Martin Sæter have observed, 'At the general European level, all three [Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania] are facing much the same challenges and sharing much the same opportunities. Neither the EU itself, nor Russia, nor the USA has been distinguishing among the roles these countries are expected to play in the wider context of European security.'³³ With that in mind, I hold, as the Latvian Security Concept argues, 'that the threat endangerment to one of the Baltic States countries is the endangerment threat to all Baltic countries.'³⁴

Threat Perception

Having cast aside foreign domination, the re-newly independent Baltic states immediately recognised the EU and NATO as the key to joining the Western world of stability and democracy. In order to strengthen the legitimacy of the new governments at home, each state looked abroad to garner international support. While it was clear that NATO was the only organisation capable of providing hard security, few recognised the EU's worth as a security mechanism until much later. Indeed in 2000, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, then the Foreign Minister of Estonia, argued, 'The EU is not a security organization and Estonia does not regard membership in the EU as a security guarantee.' But he also added, 'Yet for over 50 years, the Union has created the non-military basis for security and stability in Europe. The EU has done the most to add to stability in the post-communist world in the past decade.'³⁵ Joint memberships in the EU and NATO show that stability and security are intertwined.

Although tensions with Russia were intense in the first few years of independence, all three states currently claim, as Lithuania does, that 'at present, the Republic of Lithuania does not observe any immediate military threat to national security and as a result does not regard any state as its enemy.'³⁶ With this declaration, it would appear that the post-Soviet era is a much safer one for the Baltic states, but their memberships in such high-profile international organisations as the EU and NATO have brought responsibilities in addition to security guarantees. All three currently acknowledge that, 'the majority of traditional and new challenges to security are transnational in nature.'³⁷

While Latvia acknowledges that, 'the probability of a global war has decreased,' the government cites the increase in probability of 'regional and local crises,' 'illegal uncontrolled migration,' and 'the spread of weapons of mass destruction' as some of its fundamental threats.³⁸ Lithuania adds terrorism to the list of serious security threats.³⁹ Because of the rising importance of these unconven-

tional threats, all three also place importance on the 'active participation in maintaining peace and international stability.' By giving priority to:

conflict prevention, diplomacy, and international legal measures. Of particular importance is the priority given to participating in international crisis management, preventing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, participating in international arms control regimes, and establishing policies and legislation to address new security challenges, dangers, and threats.⁴⁰

The Use of Force and International Law

Historical precedents have left the Baltic states with the conflicting desire to uphold the international legal order and to aid others in totalitarian regimes. With no mention of the latter in any of the security concepts, it appears as if the Baltics remain conflicted on this issue and prefer *ad hoc* policies. The Latvian National Security Concept States that, 'Upon implementing the security policy, Latvia com-

plies with the principles of international law, which are incorporated in the Statutes of the United Nations, documents of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as the international agreements binding for Latvia.⁴¹

While Latvia 'complies with the principles of international law,' Lithuania relies less on international law by giving 'priority to participation in operations led by organisations that acquire the mandate of the United Nations Security Council.'⁴² Estonia also, 'participates in the establishment of broad norms and the implementation and development of principles.'⁴³ While the difference is slight, it is an important one. It appears as if Latvia has taken a more European approach to international law while Lithuania and Estonia have sided with the United States by acknowledging that they may act without a UN mandate, but prefer to act with a UN mandate. With that said, however, it is important to note that Latvia signed the Vilnius 10 letter on Iraq that supported the US recent intervention in Iraq because all ten, 'understand the dangers posed by tyranny and the special respon-

sibility of democracies to defend our shared values.'⁴⁴

The EU and NATO

As full-fledged members of the EU and NATO, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania now have three spheres of immediate foreign policy operations. All three have direct relations with Russia and other Eastern neighbours, while they also have access to the rest of Europe as well as the United States. These three vectors provide 'flexibility' for each 'to balance different influences and interests.'⁴⁵ Each of the three, however, clearly identifies the United States as their primary security guarantor, through NATO. Kasekamp and Sæter argue that 'the Baltic states are strong Atlanticists. They have always viewed the USA as the only credible counterbalance to Russia and as the only country that could guarantee their security.'⁴⁶ The Latvian Security Concept, for example, states, 'In the sphere of common defence, NATO and the USA still retain the leading role.'⁴⁷

Indeed, the Estonian government's position on the CFSP and ESDP reflects

caution in expanding EU defence policy, 'because that might duplicate the existing cooperation within the NATO framework and because the EU Member States currently lack the military capacity due to chronic under-investment. The EU's contribution at present should be conflict prevention, civil crisis management and resolution of low-intensity military conflicts.'⁴⁸ Latvia agrees that as European states assume greater responsibility for their own security and defence, they should use this 'to play a more important role in the international crisis management.'⁴⁹

Furthermore, the three Baltics have clearly pronounced that 'solidarity with the EU's Common Foreign Policy and participation together with the EU in the process of developing a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)' should be done in such a way 'that complements and strengthens the transatlantic partnership between Europe and the United States.'⁵⁰ As a Baltic security identity is being created, Baltic security cooperation has been achieved in several fields in or-

der to satisfy NATO (read: US) requirements. The Baltic Battalion, or BALTBAT, is the oldest project of Baltic defence cooperation.⁵¹ In addition to BALTBAT, the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), the Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET) and the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL) have all been designed to increase the interoperability of the Baltic forces for NATO missions.⁵²

II. On Russia

While Russian-Baltic relations have been very tense, as one Estonian civil servant has observed, 'we have never in our history had such good relations as now, and this is true.'⁵³ Although the Baltic states cannot change their geographical position, while 'respecting the parameter of non-mobility,' they can, through 'alliance policy, . . . modify its significance.'⁵⁴ This is *the* central ramification of Baltic memberships in the EU and NATO and this point cannot be overstated.

All three acknowledge that the ongoing instability in Russia is a source of

concern, but 'the Republic of Lithuania does not observe any immediate military threat to national security and as a result does not regard any state as its enemy.'⁵⁵ While this may be true, the transnational problems, including the proliferation of WMD, ethnic conflicts, and illegal migration, discussed in each of the security concepts are directly related to problems in Russia. For this reason, it is in each state's best interests to use their new positions in the international arena to help 'Russia and Belarus' develop 'into fully democratic countries with functioning market economies which would support democratic values generally recognized in the societies of European and transatlantic countries.'⁵⁶

Baltic membership in the EU and NATO should finally end Russia's patronising belief that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania remain in Russia's sphere of influence. By being forced to treat the Baltics as it would treat any other European state, Russia will seem even less threatening to Baltic security and this may provide the platform for increased dialogue

and cooperation. All three states should place themselves at the forefront of organisational relations with Russia to offer advice and expertise as dialogue increases between Russia and both the EU and NATO. By exploiting their positions as the gateway between the West and Eurasia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania can work to improve conditions on both sides. Closer economic and trade ties should be sought to help normalise relations and boost mutual trust and confidence.

Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has advocated a multipolar world in order to check the hegemonic power of the US. For that reason, Russia has been eager to support some European states' desires for an EU that will rival or counter-balance the US power. To gain concessions and aggravate tensions, Russia has been trying to play the EU against NATO for the past ten years, and the Baltics must work to limit this as much as possible because it directly counters their interests as listed in their Security Concepts. As Renatas Norkus stated of Lithuania,

'It is going to be our primary national interest, as a member of both organizations, to work with other members to make sure that the partnership remains strong and relevant.'⁵⁷

As long as the US remains *the* superpower, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania should work to keep NATO strong, through close the US involvement in the Alliance. 'A more European NATO would be welcomed in Moscow precisely because it would be a much weaker, indeed a terminally sick, NATO. In short, there is no security-Europe.'⁵⁸ Headlines such as, 'Russia may be offered bigger say in European security'⁵⁹ ensure the impression that, for now, only NATO can guarantee European security.

III. Policy Recommendations

For the immediate future, and as long as the US involvement in Europe is the only real security guarantor, the Baltics should: work with the EU to develop its CFSP, strengthen their ties with the US, and stay militarily competitive with US standards to

ensure NATO interoperability. With EU and NATO memberships, each state should create its own grand strategy that will set out clear goals for relations with the US, EU, and its Eastern neighbours. While Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania must be ready to deal with problems on an *ad hoc* basis should it be necessary, careful planning will ensure their security both domestically and in the international arena.

In order to stay abreast of developments in a rapidly changing world, each state must be ready to have regular meetings in order to talk about the international security environment and question, 'What do the EU and NATO do for *our* security?' With a panel of civil servants, military officers, politicians and academics, these meetings should form the basis of each state's security policies. I would recommend that the committees use Barry Buzan's work on security, which holds that security should be each state's master concept, as its basis. This would allow military, political, economic, environmental and societal factors to be considered within the security rubric.

What Kind of the EU and NATO Have the Baltics Joined?

The dual enlargements have greatly altered both the EU and NATO and these organisations will continue to transform as the needs and capabilities of the new members are incorporated. It is very possible, as Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler suggest, that enlargement will accelerate NATO's transformation from a collective defence to a collective security agency.⁶⁰ Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania must work to ensure that NATO does not devolve into a more muscular OSCE. 'They want to join the Alliance because of what it *was*. Unfortunately, their very membership changes NATO, making it less attractive as a military security "product."⁶¹

It seems that the Baltic states have sought to join the NATO of the 1950s more than the contemporary NATO. Vaidotas Urbelis, for example, argues that many of the new member states, including the Baltics, 'loathe the Russians, are suspicious of other Europeans and are attracted to the Americans. For them, it is true today what was true for many West

Europeans fifty years ago: to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down.’⁶² Enlargement, however, has altered NATO. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO security was primarily tied to the US nuclear security umbrella. As of late, talk of the nuclear link has all but disappeared. Similarly, the role of Germany is key to the very success of European integration, while the increase in NATO-Russian dialogues shows that Russia is as much ‘in’ as ‘out’ of NATO.

Likewise, it seems that the Baltics were hoping to ‘join the EU of the 1970s and 1980s – the body which helped Spain, Portugal, and Ireland to develop at a phenomenal pace but which in security and foreign policy followed the U.S. lead.’⁶³ The EU has undergone significant changes in the last decade, however, and despite reforms, it is apparent that new members will not receive the same amount of support and aid as the ‘Poor Four’ received. Indeed, it is no longer possible to speak of the EU as merely a political and economic actor, but it was not until very

late in the accession process that the Baltics realised they were inheriting European security architecture as well.

The British Approach for NATO?

For the time being, Baltic leaders should act from the British policymakers’ belief that ‘any diminution of the US role in European security is a loss for European security as a whole.’⁶⁴ Baltic governments must take care to avoid repeating Tony Blair’s mistake of alienating a substantial portion of his electorate in order to support the US policies. This problem associated with the British approach raises an important point which has great security ramifications, because a people’s feeling of insecurity will rise when they distrust their democratically-elected government or when that government ignores their wishes on such matters of high-politics.

Another problem that will continue to plague the Baltic governments is how to balance Europe and the US. Jacques Chirac’s statement in February 2003 that by taking a pro-American stance, ‘Eastern Europeans missed an opportunity to shut up’

shows that finding an equilibrium will not be an easy task for the Baltic states. ‘A separate issue is that voices in France in particular have expressed concern that the new members (especially Poland, and in the future the Baltic states) are too prone to agree with the U.S. positions.’⁶⁵ Unlike these policymakers, however, I believe that varying levels and voices of pro-American and pro-European security strategies are best for the Alliance. It is very possible that the UK, Poland and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will form a pro-American bloc within NATO. Pro-American voices are especially important today and can act as the British have, to keep the Alliance united while pushing the US foreign policy to be more multilateral.

On European Defence

The Baltic states’ caution with regards to European desires for assuming more defence responsibility is natural when taken in the context that ‘Baltic states retain considerably more faith in the United States and NATO in this regard.’⁶⁶ Indeed, if there is ever going to be a ‘security-

Europe,' Europe must be willing to spend more on defence in order to gain capabilities. 'A European Armaments Agency is essential for the promotion of European armaments projects and the long-term survival of a European armaments industry,'⁶⁷ argues Emil Kirchner. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania should encourage developments towards such an agency, with the provision that monies for research and development ensure top-quality European armaments that utilise the latest technology.

To increase its own capabilities and to ensure compatibility with the US war machinery, the Baltic states should use their youth to create niche forces that are technologically superior. Vaidotas Urbelis has argued, 'Due to the capability gap, the US will less and less rely on European contribution in future operations.' Because of this, he worries that the 'diminishing importance of Europe means a decreasing US interest and lower level of involvement in the US into CE and Northern European affairs.'⁶⁸ The development of niche forces that rely on US-compatible

technology would assure a continued US interest in Baltic security. As the British example illustrates, those who are able to work with the US military garner the respect of Washington and frequently gain more importance and influence in US foreign policy.

Conclusions

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have entered a new era of international politics. For the

Baltic states, it is equally important that the US maintains its security presence in Europe and that the experiment in European integration continues to succeed. Together, these organisations help protect all aspects of Baltic independence and security. Through joint efforts, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have already succeeded in creating a substantially more secure environment than the one they inhabited ten years ago. Furthermore, their efforts have already 'strengthened the Transatlantic link by engaging the USA not only in the promotion of specific Baltic interests but by also engaging the

USA in a wider framework of Baltic sea regional cooperation.'⁶⁹

Because of the transnational nature of many of today's threats, NATO's recent push to involve itself in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism is beneficial to all three Baltic states. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania should also encourage NATO and the EU to 'develop a common policy toward states that possess or seek to possess weapons of mass destruction or that support terrorism in any way.'⁷⁰ Furthermore, as Schengen borders come into effect, the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian governments should work to increase NATO-EU cooperation on these matters.

Clearly the Transatlantic Alliance needs to be more balanced, not just for the sake of NATO or Europe, but to increase the member states' security across North America and Europe. As the Baltic states continue to work for a strong NATO and EU, it is important to keep in mind Bozo's argument that, 'Today it is the prospect of a more assertive EU that constitutes

the true guarantee in such a strategic re-balancing, and hence its best hope of conserving a strong transatlantic relationship.⁷¹ With the security benefits that hail from NATO and EU membership, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will be able to pursue better relations with their Eastern neighbours. Having normalised relations in the international security context, it will be important for each state to use the EU and NATO machinery to improve domestic factors, such as the regional disparity of wealth, the lack of trust in government and the lack of civil society networks, to further strengthen each state's security.

¹ I will use the terms 'Baltic States' and 'Baltics' to refer to the Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

² The Republic of Lithuania, Ministry of National Defence, National Security Strategy (Vilnius, 2002), Article 5.2.1.

³ Don Cook, *Forging the Alliance: NATO, 1945-1950* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1989), 179.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 176.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 179.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 183.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 218.

⁸ NATO, *The North Atlantic Treaty* (Washington,

D.C. 4 April 1949) www.nato.int.

⁹ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1998), 29.

¹⁰ Kenneth Younger in his private diary, qtd. in Cook, 235.

¹¹ Yost 1998, 62.

¹² Yost 1998, 49.

¹³ Quoted in John Barrett, 'NATO Reform: Alliance Policy and Cooperative Security,' in Ingo Peters, Ed., *New Security Challenges: The Adaptation of International Institutions - Reforming the UN, NATO, EU, and CSCE since 1989* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 129.

¹⁴ Jacques Poos on ITN News, 28 June 1991. Yost, 193. Cited in Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, 48, 50.

¹⁵ Thomas-Durell Young, 'NATO's Double Expansion and the Challenge of Reforming NATO's Military Structures,' in John Boyd and Leo Drepair, Eds., *EU Common Foreign and Security Policy: New Europe, New Century, Old Imperialism* (Merseyside: Campaign against Euro-federalism, 2000), 105.

¹⁶ Emil J. Kirchner, 'Second Pillar and Eastern Enlargement: The Prospects for a European Security and Defence Identity,' in John Boyd and Leo Drepair, Eds., *EU Common Foreign and Security Policy: New Europe, New Century, Old Imperialism* (Merseyside: Campaign against Euro-federalism, 2000), 50.

¹⁷ January 1994 Summit Decision, Yost 1998, 201.

¹⁸ Frédéric Bozo 'The Effects of Kosovo and the Danger of Decoupling,' in Jolyon Howorth and

John T.S. Keeler, Eds., *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy* (New York: Macmillan 2003), 64.

¹⁹ Yost, 1998, 209-10.

²⁰ The Government of France, 'French Foreign Policy Principles.'

²¹ The Germany Embassy in the United Kingdom, 'German Foreign Policy: an introduction.'

²² Henry A. Kissinger and Laurence H. Summers, Co-Chairs, Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director, *Renewing the Atlantic Partnership: Report of An Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations 2004), 9.

²³ Robert Kagan, 'The Healer,' *The Guardian*, 3 March 2003.

²⁴ See the Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2003.

²⁵ Brian Murphy, 'Finding Balance in the Transatlantic Security Equation,' 16 September 2003,

²⁶ Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, 'The EU, NATO, and the Quest for European Autonomy,' in Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, Eds., *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy* (New York: Macmillan 2003), 3.

²⁷ William Cohen quoted in Elizabeth Becker, 'European Allies to Spend More on Weapons,' *New York Times*, 22 September 1999, pA13. In David S. Yost, 'The U.S.-European Capabilities Gap and the Prospects for ESDP' in Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, Eds., *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy* (New York: Macmillan 2003), 83.

²⁸ Alexander Moens, 'ESDP, the United States and the Atlantic Alliance,' in Jolyon Howorth

and John T.S. Keeler, Eds., *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy* (New York: Macmillan 2003), 27.

²⁹ Yost's interview in London, 28 June 2000, in Howorth and Keeler, 92.

³⁰ Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June 1992, *Petersberg Declaration*, Paragraph 4 of Part II, 'On Strengthening WEU's Operational Role.'

³¹ President George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002.

³² Eitvydas Bajarunas, 'The Interests and Efforts of Lithuania,' in Georg Klöcker, Ed., *Ten Years after the Baltic States Re-Entered the International Stage* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2001), 220.

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³⁴ Republic of Latvia, Ministry of Defence, *The National Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia* (Vilnius, 2002), Article 3.1.

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EU-NATO Relations: A European vision

By Captain (Navy) Jean-François Morel*

An analysis of relations between the European Union and NATO is far from being a comparison of like organisations. On the one hand, NATO is a political-military Atlantic Alliance which has been in existence for 54 years and which has embarked in the past few months on a process of “transformation” aimed at adapting its existing structures to the new and rapidly evolving threats of our century. On the other hand, the European Union is a unique organisation, its Member States having created common institutions to which they delegate part of their sovereignty, particularly in the economic, financial, environmental and even legal spheres. The Military Staff of the European Union was not set up until June 2001, after the fifteen

Member States decided in December 2000 in Nice to establish politico-military structures. The first uniformed officers thus began working with their civilian colleagues in Brussels at the General Secretariat of the European Union.

In 2003 the Military Staff carried out the strategic planning for the first two military peace-keeping operations in the history of the EU, one in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the other in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, both of which have been successfully completed. The experience of these operations, enlargement (which will increase the population of the EU to nearly half a billion inhabitants producing about a quarter of world GNP), the recent *European Security Strategy* (which has provided the EU with a shared

vision in the field of security and defence) and the work on the future European Constitution have all paved the way for new European defence projects.

In the light of the evolving – and at times extremely complicated – circumstances on both sides, it is not surprising that there should be transatlantic tensions, against a background of disagreements on the Middle East, leading to “crises of maturity” between the EU and NATO¹, mutual suspicion, accusations of competition², and even the view that one organisation is a threat to the future of the other.

Closer relations

In the course of 2003, however, relations between the military staffs became

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closer and more regular, particularly as a result of the so-called Berlin Plus agreements, which strengthen the EU's operational capability and provide a framework for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in the area of military crisis management.

In practice, the officers concerned are often the same: many of those recently assigned to the EU Military Staff have acquired considerable experience of NATO in the course of their careers and regularly receive training from NATO. Like the operational forces, the military staffs of the two organisations are taken from the same pool of officers, share the same working methods and social codes, and the same networks of contacts. Moreover, movement in the opposite direction is beginning to take place: officers finishing their assignments with the EU Military Staff are sometimes seconded again to NATO, particularly to the International Military Staff in Brussels or the SHAPE Military Staff in Mons³.

This naturally facilitated the planning and implementation of the EU's Opera-

tion Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which had access to NATO military assets and capabilities. Operation Concordia concluded in mid-December 2003 and is considered to have been a success on the ground. The Proxima police mission, launched by the EU towards the end of 2003, opens a new phase with civil objectives, made possible by the successful conclusion of the military phase.

There are also other regular official contacts at all levels: between the Secretaries-General of NATO and the Council of the EU, between the Ambassadors of the respective Member States at meetings of the EU's Political and Security Committee and the North Atlantic Council, and between senior military representatives at meetings of the military committees of the two organisations. These ongoing contacts enable information to be exchanged, particularly in relation to operations and capability.

A EU-NATO working group on military capabilities has been meeting regularly for the last few months for mutual

briefings on the steps being taken to improve military capabilities and adapt them to new needs. Despite differences in methods between the EU and NATO, countries which are members of both organisations do not have forces assigned exclusively to one or the other organisation: thus, since the forces come from the same pool, improvements made by one will necessarily benefit the other as long as there is some basic coordination.

In short, contacts between the two organisations take place in an atmosphere of cooperation. Both sides seem to be working to minimise the repercussions of the differences on Iraq. With the preparation of a new EU operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, involving a military component with access to NATO assets and capabilities, 2004 may see movement towards a new equilibrium.

Fundamental issues not yet resolved

Nevertheless, such an equilibrium in relations between the two organisations

is far from having been achieved, with differences on fundamental issues remaining between proponents of greater autonomy for European security and defence policy and those who insist on closely linking the control of European military action to NATO. This is reflected, in practice, in friction in relation to a number of vital issues.

First, although the Berlin Plus arrangements have been implemented by an EU operation with access to NATO resources assets and capabilities, there are differing interpretations as to the scope and field of application of Berlin Plus. Must the EU systematically consult NATO prior to all military operations even if it does not intend to use Atlantic Alliance resources? In this regard, there was surprise in some quarters that NATO was not consulted when the fifteen Member States decided to launch the Artemis military operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in conjunction with the UN but without recourse to NATO.

The arrangements cover assured access to NATO planning capabilities, the use

of NATO's European command options (including the role of the European Deputy to the SACEUR⁴) and the use of Alliance assets and capabilities identified in advance by the Alliance. Giving credence to the idea that the Berlin Plus arrangements might actually reflect the whole EU-NATO relationship can be viewed as an attempt to wield influence over fields which – legally – fall outside the scope of Berlin Plus: in particular, work on improving military capabilities, arrangements for associating non-EU NATO members with European operations and the use of an alliance member's resources for an EU military operation.

Some ambiguity surrounds the role of the European Deputy SACEUR, who is regarded by the Alliance as the strategic coordinator and as being well-placed to resolve conflicting demands. The broad interpretation of this role is of concern to proponents of greater autonomy for European defence: does it refer to strategic coordination within the Alliance itself or does it represent a desire to go beyond the strictly NATO framework in

an attempt to take on wider responsibilities on the European continent?

Secondly, the success of Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was not achieved without some ill feeling. An analysis of the lessons to be drawn from the operation reveals a number of stumbling blocks, particularly in relation to the command structure used by NATO, the sharing of information, and the establishment of the EU's operational headquarters within SHAPE. These difficulties need to be resolved as far as possible before the launch (following NATO's SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina) of a new more global EU operation which will also make use of NATO military assets and capabilities.

Finally, the creation of rapid reaction forces is one of the big challenges facing the two organisations. The *NATO Response Force* (NRF) was set up last year, and a British-French-German proposal this year seeks to create within the EU tactical battle groups of 1,500 men, which would be able to participate in European operations without recourse to NATO. This initia-

tive is of particular interest to the United Nations, which shares the EU's multilateralist vision and concern for Africa.

Although the missions of the NRF and the EU's Rapid Reaction Force are potentially different, they will both be calling on the same pool of rapidly deployable national forces. How are the implications of this to be managed? While it is true that future crises in different parts of the world will not necessarily require large military forces, this issue will remain a concern until the mobility and interoperability of the various military tools has developed sufficiently to limit potential friction.

The decision on which organisation is to participate in an operation will depend largely on political considerations, particularly the degree of involvement of the United States. However, factors such as the nature of the specific operation in question and the simultaneous conduct of other operations will influence the choice of organisation to intervene in specific cases.

European Union initiative

In the light of the evolving conditions on both sides, how are we to identify those factors which are already playing a part in the basic trend and will impinge in the future on the EU-NATO relationship?

From a European standpoint, there appears to be potential for the Union to enjoy a certain degree of initiative. In particular, the aspiration (which, in truth, is recent) to build a genuine Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), given new impetus by enlargement, could help clarify this debate. It is against this backdrop that the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is taking place.

The *European Security Strategy* was approved by the fifteen Member States in December 2003 on the basis of a proposal from the High Representative for the CFSP. Inconceivable before 2003, it provides a common strategic vision for the Union's external action, founded on pre-

vention, civil and military capabilities, and partnership. It recognises in particular that none of the new threats identified are purely military: terrorism; proliferation of arms of mass destruction; regional insecurity, which often directly or indirectly affects European interests; and organised crime, of which Europe is a prime target.

In combating these threats, which would be accentuated if they were to materialise concurrently, the EU plans to use a combination of the civil and military instruments available to it. In particular, it will reinforce and broaden the range of military tasks that can be carried out by European defence to prevent conflicts or restore peace.

Finding an appropriate combination of military and civil instruments is one of the major challenges facing the EU, firstly in relation to the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the EU is preparing to launch a global mission following NATO's SFOR military mission. The Union has been engaged in a police mission there for over a year – a follow-up to

the one conducted by the United Nations⁵ - which aims to assist in the development of the local police force and is scheduled to conclude at the end of 2005. A combined strategy is therefore being put in place in order to create, more generally, a true European perspective for the Western Balkan countries.

Achieving this aim will require, in practice, greater civilian-military cooperation, firstly within the European Union itself, where very significant improvements are necessary. While the documents produced in the field of security and defence are already often common to the different EU bodies, the experts who prepare them have probably gone as far as they can in cooperating under the current institutional framework. It needs to be asked how a Community structure such as the European Commission, which has its own decision-making process for implementing powerful civilian instruments, is to be made to fit in with the politico-military structures of the EU Council, which are controlled on an intergovernmental basis, i.e. any of the

Member States can oppose progress if they so wish.

Many of the Member States' Ministries of Defence have bodies in which officers from the three armed services, diplomats and civilian analysts, frequently from university backgrounds, work together. Such bodies enable different visions and areas of expertise to contribute to tackling current politico-military problems. No such structures exist formally at EU level, although civilian-military cooperation is one of the EU's main objectives. Approved in 2000 in Nice, the EU's politico-military structures are based on those of NATO, which no doubt facilitated the negotiations when they were being defined; however, they do not provide an optimum response to the wish to combine civil and military instruments in dealing with the threats facing us today.

Institutional advances

The necessary institutional advances should take place with the future Constitution for Europe, the draft version of

which envisages a "*Union Minister for Foreign Affairs*", under whose authority a "*European External Action Service*" would be set up, composed of personnel from the General Secretariat of the Council (i.e. potentially both civilian and military), from the Commission and personnel seconded from the national diplomatic services. The *Union Minister for Foreign Affairs* would also have authority over "*Union delegations in third countries*", which would also be made up of staff with a broad range of experience. This would undoubtedly improve the EU's capacity to evaluate world developments, and to analyse, plan and coordinate European actions.

Other provisions in the draft Constitution will probably help to get the European Security and Defence Policy properly off the ground. Whereas at present the EU cannot legally launch operations in the territory of one of its Member States, the solidarity clause would authorise assistance to any Member State which fell victim to a terrorist attack or a natural disaster, through the mobilisation of all possible EU instruments, including

military assets (e.g. helicopters, mobile medical installations, decontamination equipment). This opens a significant field for international civilian-military cooperation. The dramatic events since 11 September 2001 have heightened awareness of the threats to populations and highlighted the scope of the action that needs to be taken at international level.

Closer cooperation could even cover mutual defence in the event of one of the participating States being the subject of armed aggression on its territory. Discussions on this issue seek to reassure those concerned about the possible weakening of NATO's collective defence. For the Union, however, the challenge takes on another meaning in the context of its own logical development: is it really possible to pursue European construction and expect to share a community of destiny without solidarity capable of defending major interests?

Finally, the possibility of structured cooperation in the field of defence, which is also excluded under the current Treaty, is intended to enable Member States to take

on more binding commitments while remaining within the framework of the Union. The potential resulting improvements in military capabilities in terms of the interoperability of materials, training and operations, etc. would contribute to increasing the credibility of European aspirations. The new structures and crisis management procedures are meaningless if they fail to produce a range of credible capabilities to cope with the challenges facing the enlarged Europe. Furthermore, such efforts cannot but benefit the Atlantic Alliance.

Need for patience

The development of the European Union is governed essentially by its own internal logic and takes place at its own – sometimes irregular – rhythm. An area of prosperity, security and structured diversity is gradually being put in place, not in opposition to any other entity but because it responds to an internal need which has reasserted itself in one way or another. More specifically, the integration achieved to date in many spheres now

requires progress in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy if inconsistencies and imbalances are to be avoided. Moreover, the importance of the entity resulting from the accession of ten new countries in 2004 will be such that it will no longer be able to ignore its responsibilities in Europe and in the wider world. And the process is not yet over: in the near future other countries will be fulfilling their European vocation. Strategies are thus being put in place vis-à-vis the EU's partners and neighbours such as the United Nations, the United States, Russia, the countries of the Near and Middle East, and all those countries on the borders of the enlarged Europe.

This acceleration in development is really very recent, and the major effort that has begun will require time to sustain the necessary political will, stabilise institutional aspects, optimise procedures and acquire operational capabilities that meet European aspirations and are effective on the ground.

The development of a new strategic environment will inevitably have an im-

pact on existing arrangements. It appears that three conditions will need to be fulfilled if harmonious relations are to exist between the European Security and Defence Policy and NATO in the future.

First, the EU must successfully build on its unique position as a global organisation and combine in a credible way the civil and military instruments available to it: this implies that it must equip itself with the necessary resources and adapt them regularly to evolving security needs.

Secondly, NATO itself needs to bring about its own transformation, find its new role in the world and preserve the ways in which a significant and confident link with the US partner can be maintained.

Finally, the EU needs to convince the United States, on the basis of experience of the ground, that it is capable of making a contribution in the field of security and defence. Thus, while it has become ever more natural for Europeans to share sovereignty in broad areas, the US strategic vision views its allies essentially in terms of their potential contributions

to its policies: Washington has for some time past encouraged the development and adaptation of European military capabilities. It shares strategic objectives, particularly the fight against terrorism and against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, with the Europeans. Making a practical input to these objectives in their own way, and thereby demonstrating the significant contribution which Europeans can make to achieving the long-term objectives they share with the Americans, would boost mutual confidence and respect.

Against this background, the very development of the European Security and Defence Policy would seem to make for the clarification of transatlantic relations.

⁵ On 1 January 2003 the *European Union Police Mission* succeeded the UN's *International Police Task Force*, which had been in place for seven years.

¹ Laurent Zecchini - Le Monde, 27 October 2003.

² Nicholas Burns, U.S. Ambassador to NATO (Press conference on 30 September 2003).

³ Specifically, the first Director-General of the EU Military Staff, Lieutenant-General Rainer Schuwirth, is now Chief of Staff of SHAPE.

⁴ The *Supreme Allied Commander Europe* is an American General; his deputy, the Deputy SACEUR - or DSACEUR - is a British General.

Section III

Challenges to New NATO and New Regional Security Agenda

The Central Issues For Nato

By Dr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz*

“As an alliance we have never been stronger. We have never been more united. We have never been more resolved to move forward together”.

Paul. D Wolfowitz, Munich, Feb. 2nd, 2002.

Nobody would say, that this statement reflects the present day reality. One can argue, was this statement true even at the time of the year 2002? Right after 9/11 the question “Is NATO still relevant?” was asked by many prominent politicians on both sides of the Atlantic. Iraq has not dispersed the clouds over the future of the Alliance. The general feeling is that NATO is on a cross-road. De Gaulle once said that all alliances are like roses – they wither and decay. If NATO does not want to share that fate some serious issues have to be addressed.

1. Reaffirm basic principles

First is the question – what does NATO want to be? Everybody knows what NATO used to be for the whole Cold War period and even afterwards. The goals of the alliance were repeated in the Strategic Concept adopted in Washington in 1999. According to this document, “NATO’s essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its’ members by political and military means”. NATO developed an aura of

reliability, efficiency, and solidarity epitomized in famous Article 5 security guarantees. Everybody believed that in case of an aggression, once Article 5 was invoked, it was NATO which would take care of confronting the aggressor and organising a collective response involving every member country.

Unfortunately it did not happen after September 11th, and the debates over addressing Turkey’s security concerns during the Iraq crisis cast a shadow of doubt not only on Article 5 but even on Article 4. Declaration of one of the member states that combat troops sent to Afghanistan would be withdrawn in case fighting broke out contributed further to the destruction of the faith in the Article 5.

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So, the question arises, will NATO remain, first of all, a common defense structure, an alliance centered around mutually binding security guarantees, or will it drift towards much looser common security structure?

True, the classical type aggression, under present political circumstances, is rather remote. However, it would be important to remind what was said in Washington in 1999, namely, that “notwithstanding positive developments in the strategic environment and the fact that large scale conventional aggression against Alliance is very unlikely, the possibility of such a threat emerging over longer term exists”. The crisis of credibility of security guarantees already prompted some debates in NATO border countries about the need to pursue more national approach to basis security requirements. If this issue is not promptly addressed, we may see a destruction of one of the greatest NATO achievements that is an internationalisation of the defence policy in Europe.

Naturally, NATO cannot be something else then what the member countries want

it to be. It applies first of all to the US. “Tool box” concept reduces NATO from an important forum of transatlantic political debate to a minor technical instrument of American policy. However, if the US loses an interest in NATO, the Alliance will be doomed. Without US leadership, it is very likely NATO will not be a dynamic, innovative structure and soon will become another WEU. On the other hand, strong and attractive NATO should not be seen as detrimental to justified and legitimate ambitions to make CFSP and ESDP important factors.

2. Strengthen NATO military capabilities

The best way to make NATO not only relevant but indispensable for the security of Europe against old and new threats, it is necessary to improve NATO capabilities. NATO’s shortcomings were among the reasons for the US to go it alone in Afghanistan. It is worth noticing that various European countries embarked on programmes of modernisation

of their armed forces. Procurement of large transport planes; British and French plans to build new aircraft carriers are good examples of these efforts. NATO Response Force could be a visible sign of change from ground defence posture of the Alliance to new missions.

Equally important are radical changes in the command structure. Swift implementation of these changes will be essential for the reliability of the Alliance. In response to potential threats, it is the SACEUR who will play the central role. However, as far as “out of area” actions are concerned, the most likely regions that NATO as a whole might be engaged are the wider Middle East, and Central and East Asia (Africa, as Congo recent operation shows, could be easily handled by Europeans alone, either under NATO or EU flag). This is why SACEUR would be rather SAC World.

Only after the completion of this task, NATO will be able to address new challenges. To perform these duties, the second hat SACEUR wears (the commander of the US and EUROCOM) would not

help that much. Taking into account the above-mentioned areas NATO could be engaged, there is no single US command which could be given to SACEUR as a replacement of the EU Command. On the other hand, in Kosovo, General Clark was in two chains of commands, one US and one NATO which created a lot of bad feelings among Europeans who felt being bypassed by the US line. That is why it might be better to separate NATO command posts (including SACEUR) from the national ones.

3. Strengthen NATO as a political transatlantic forum

One of the reasons why NATO is in crises is the rift between the US and Europe, and to a lesser extent, divisions within Europe. Although the threat perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic are very much the same, there are serious differences about how to deal with them. Therefore, NATO should become a central forum to discuss such issues like the sufficient conditions for wag-

ing a preemptive action, more comprehensive definitions of aggression and terrorism, as well as under what conditions a non-Article 5 missions could be carried out without the UNSC mandate (but only with unanimous support of all NATO countries), etc.. Other, perhaps more important, political issues for a common debate are Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, or Caucasus.

It is worth mentioning that NATO is not only a defence alliance. NATO is also a hard core of a very extensive system of concentric circles of cooperation in security issues. Going from the centre outwards we have: NATO, candidates to NATO, EAPC, PpP countries and countries from outside the PpP but cooperating with NATO on various peacekeeping missions. On top of that we have NATO-Russia Council, NATO-Ukraine Commission, Mediterranean Dialogue, North Atlantic Assembly with observer countries, etc.. It is clear that the political potential of this system is far from being exhausted. In particular, the EAPC meetings which

are quite routine and rather dull events could be transformed into a vibrant forum debating important issues.

4. Integrate new member states and maintain the cohesion of the Alliance

The process which may have a negative effect on the cohesion of the Alliance is the process of expansion. The common defence in a situation when there is no obvious well-defined enemy can be permanently, structurally organised in reliable fashion is only when there is a strong bond of common values, perceptions, interests, and shared political culture between member countries. Hopefully, the forthcoming round of expansion will not affect this foundation of NATO, especially when the effort will be made to integrate fully all new member states. Further enlargement, however distant, involving countries like Croatia or Ukraine, may not adversely affect the Alliance either. On the other hand, potential membership of - for

example - Russia may create an insurmountable problem in foreseeable future. A group of prominent political figures such as Bronislaw Geremek, Jacques Lanxade, or Klaus Nauman rightly said: "an expanded NATO with Russia linked to it could well be so political that its defence guarantee would look hollow. NATO would no longer be used in crisis. It would be the end of NATO a disaster for Europe and a severe blow to American national interests".

To preserve the cohesion of the Alliance of 26 or more member states, it seems necessary to introduce some disciplinary measures. As things are at this moment, NATO membership is a one-way street. There is no way of getting rid of a country which challenges basic principles of the Alliance or can paralyse functioning of its structures. Therefore, there must a legal possibility to limit the participation of such a country in some NATO institutions or fora or, in more drastic cases, suspend or exclude a country which may put the very existence of the Alliance at risk.

5. Restore the attachment to the indivisibility of the US and European Security

One of the greatest dangers of the post 9/11 and post Iraq period is a feeling that the US does not need Europe and vice a versa. However, there are very good reasons to believe that decoupling the US and European security would have disastrous consequences. This is why we all need more evidence that we are still together. The US should therefore become a self-limiting super power. It means that even if the US can carry out an operation like in Afghanistan alone, it would be worthwhile to sacrifice some efficiency for the sake of taking at least some European partners. Symmetrically, if Europeans saw the need to launch another operation in Africa, it would be important to have at least a symbolic American contingent.

On the 40th anniversary of the D Day, President Reagan said, "we are bound today by what bound us then - the same

loyalties, traditions, beliefs. We were with you then, we are with you now. Your hopes are our hopes and your destiny is our destiny".

Let us hope that on the 50th anniversary of that day, we shall be able to say that again.

NATO's Security Agenda after Enlargement

Dr. Knut Kirste*

With the accession of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania in late March 2004, NATO has completed its biggest enlargement round ever. Since then, more than 45 million additional citizens have joined the Euro-Atlantic Alliance. Today, roughly 40% of NATO's nations are former socialist or communist states. This is historically significant because with this second round of enlargement since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance has come closer to realising a vision of Europe whole and free. At the same time, this enlargement has been remarkably non-dramatic: first, because NATO will continue its open

door policy as documented by inviting the heads of government of Albania, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to attend the accession ceremony in Washington on 29 March. Second, because the Alliance is unlikely to grant itself and its new members much time for celebration and will soon return to address the major security challenges facing NATO in the 21st century.

Contribution to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond

As in the past, one of NATO's main functions is to ensure collective defence

and to guarantee the security interests of its members. With the latest round of enlargement, this includes new responsibilities, in particular regarding air defence arrangements for the three Baltic states and Slovenia. Before the new members joined the Alliance, an interim solution was found to ensure collective support for those countries currently not able to provide for their own air defence. Within their capabilities, however, the new members themselves will soon and indeed already have become active providers of security, if only in certain niche areas, initially.

Protecting Allies' security interests and its populations against new risks, includ-

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ing the complex challenge of international terrorism, has become a major task for NATO. This can only be done by working closely with other international organisations and institutions which can bring their specific strengths to bear. The Alliance for its part has responded with a military concept for the defence against terrorism, including elements of anti-terrorism, counter-terrorism, consequence management and increased cooperation with Partners, other states and international organisations. In future, NATO's role in combating international terrorism will have to be further refined, addressing issues such as the renegade concept, cyber terrorism, better intelligence sharing and increased cooperation with the EU.

Over the last few years, NATO's role has also evolved beyond its classical defence function and also includes providing security and stability on a more global scale involving both Allies and Partners. The U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns, in a Senate hearing, has eloquently formulated NATO's new secu-

rity concept: Today, the issue was not so much how many states NATO would have to defend. Rather, the issue was how many states would act as potential allies in times of crisis.¹

Afghanistan

Afghanistan, where NATO took over the command function of the ISAF in August 2003, is the first example for such a more global perspective of the Alliance. This serious and long term commitment is also a test case for how well the 26 Allies and their Partners can muster the military capabilities needed to expand the so far limited mission beyond Kabul in order to help the Karzai government project its power and influence throughout the country and to help secure the elections scheduled for September. It is worth mentioning that NATO's mandate in Afghanistan differs from the role it played in the Balkans: in the former, the roughly 6.500 Alliance troops from 34 contributing nations have a peace *supporting* mandate, while in the latter NATO had the full re-

sponsibility for *guaranteeing* the peace. In the medium term, until the NATO Summit in Istanbul, the Alliance is expected to install five additional Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan's Northern and Western provinces. It is obvious that NATO has a high level of ambition in Afghanistan but the expectations from the international community and indeed from the Afghan people themselves may far exceed what NATO's nations are ultimately prepared to do. Nevertheless, NATO is committed to its ISAF operation, and the new Secretary General has made clear that the Alliance must not fail in Afghanistan. In this context, the Alliance's new members already contribute significantly - within their means and capabilities - to NATO's new operations.²

Balkans

Afghanistan will prove once again what has already been demonstrated in the Balkans: today's peace keeping and peace support operations require a long term

political and military commitment. The recent wave of unrest in Kosovo has prompted NATO to review its planned troop reductions in the province.³ NATO's Kosovo commitment will be a lasting one for years to come. Now, other institutions must address the political, economic and social dimension of the unfinished Kosovo business, including the pending status question.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, by contrast, things look more promising and NATO will turn over a successful military peace support operation to the EU later in the year but will retain some residual functions in Bosnia. Both organisations are currently working on a sensible distribution of roles for NATO and the EU after the hand-over. This is an important test for the new strategic Partnership between NATO and the European Union under the 2003 Berlin-Plus agreement. In the longer term, NATO and the EU must extend their co-operation beyond the purely military-technical aspects and start working together on a political-strategic level, based on prag-

matism and trust, including by developing joint approaches to the fight against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and civil emergency planning. The new members with their own rather pragmatic perspective on NATO-EU relations may accelerate and add a positive momentum to this sensitive institutional process.

New Operations?

It is widely believed that by the time of the Istanbul Summit, the Alliance will engage in a debate about what - if any - role it should play in Iraq. NATO's Secretary General has repeatedly made clear that the Alliance stands ready to assist if it is being called upon by a legitimate interim Iraqi government and if the proper conditions, including a United Nations Security Council mandate, exist. Given NATO's ongoing challenge in Afghanistan and continuing operations in the Balkans, any potential role for the Alliance in Iraq in the medium term will necessarily have to be a limited one.

Regardless of what happens next in Iraq, there seems to be an emerging pattern of cooperation between NATO and the UN for many conceivable conflict scenarios. While the UN will provide political legitimacy and take the lead in coordinating reconstruction and nation-building efforts, NATO can provide the security relevant aspects of crisis management. The Alliance is better suited than the UN in combining both multilateral security policy and military effectiveness. On the one hand, today NATO offers a cooperation framework for 26 Allies, 20 diverse Partners and a number of countries linked to the Alliance by a more or less structured security dialogue. The old notion of NATO representing exclusively the 'West', i.e. the United States and its European Allies, today is as anachronistic as the Cold War. This can help NATO's credibility and acceptability. On the other hand, if nations muster the political will and if the ongoing military transformation of the Alliance is successfully completed, NATO's military structures and mechanisms can provide very effective

military solutions to global security problems.

Political and military transformation

Efficient political decision making and effective military capabilities are therefore key elements on which NATO's future depends. The new Alliance has significantly increased its political and operational ambitions, and those ambitions will have to be matched by appropriate military capabilities.

That is why NATO needs to carry through with its ongoing military and political reform process. One part of the equation are obviously better military capabilities. In this context, the NATO Response Force (NRF) is designed to provide the Alliance with an effective and rapid military tool capable of mastering today's military challenges in a new threat environment and on a high end level. The progress achieved in building up the NRF so far is impressive and final operational capabil-

ity should be ensured as scheduled by October 2006. The NRF is clearly designed for and capable to perform future high-end military operations but NATO is also increasingly more active in peace support operations beyond its traditional area of operation. Afghanistan may just be a first example of further operations to come. In that context, the Alliance still needs to generate substantial force contingents for extended peace keeping and peace support operations in far away places. Efforts are being made to significantly increase nation's output and usability targets, i.e. increasing the number of troops that can be actually deployed in theatre. In addition, making NATO's force generation process, i.e. the way in which nations agree to commit troops to a NATO operation, more responsive to operational requirements, will be one of the greatest challenges for the Alliance. Political decision making, force generation for individual operations and the Alliance's overall defence planning process must be better coordinated in future if NATO and

nations are to deliver on their ambitions. New members can and should make an important contribution to this process by creating forces that can be of net value to the Alliance.

Reform and Extension of Partnerships

NATO's Partnership concept has been an essential tool for the Alliance ever since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. By accepting seven new members from Central and Eastern Europe in March 2004, NATO has come markedly closer to transforming itself from a largely inward looking traditional defence alliance of the Cold War to an outward looking, Partnership oriented security organisation. Today, NATO offers a range of diversified cooperation opportunities for members, Partners, third countries and other international organisations, in particular the UN, the EU and the OSCE. The further strengthening of these Partnerships continues to remain a top priority on NATO's agenda.

Individual Partnerships

The recent enlargement process will further accelerate a process already started at the NATO Summit in Prague, allowing Partners to individualise their cooperation with NATO. Partners as diverse as Sweden and Kazakhstan with considerably different security requirements rightly expect a diversified approach when dealing with the Alliance. As NATO's first partner country, Georgia in April submitted an Individual Partnership Action Plan, signalling the beginning of a truly tailor made approach. NATO's successful Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) must also become more operational, for instance by including Partners even more in efforts to combat international terrorism. With seven new members joining the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Russia Partnership will enter into a new era but despite the new composition of the Council, the Alliance will continue a remarkable process started in 1997 of turning Russia from a long term enemy into a

trusted partner. This emerging Partnership will have to become more operational and will also have to take a close look at some of the more controversial issues such as the fulfilment of Russia's 1999 Istanbul commitments with respect to the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia and Moldova and the related ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty.

Mediterranean Dialogue and Cooperation with the Middle East?

It is also likely that the NATO will further reach out to enhance and intensify its existing dialogue with seven Mediterranean nations as these countries can offer the Alliance a different perspective and historical experiences. This is particularly true in the field of international terrorism, and it is to be hoped that the present dialogue can be transformed into more operational cooperation, including, eventually, some form of practical cooperation similar to the PfP type activities such as training, or the reform of the security sector. There is no reason why the Alli-

ance, when contemplating the future of its Mediterranean Dialogue, should not think in much more ambitious terms. After all, countries such as Jordan and the United Arab Emirates have already been included in NATO's peace keeping operations in the Balkans.

In light of a cooperation initiative with the Greater Middle East, an idea initially launched in spring by the United States, Germany and others, NATO has started to consider what useful role it could play in engaging the region. Any such NATO role would have to be in close concert with other - initially more relevant - organisations for such cooperation, such as the G-8, the World Bank or the EU. However, the Alliance is prepared to play an important support function in the area of security dialogue with those countries and some form of a cooperation initiative is expected to be issued at NATO's Istanbul Summit in June. In addition, NATO is expanding its dialogue and Partnership concept to nations far beyond its traditional sphere of influence, including nations such as Japan, Aus-

tralia, New Zealand and most recently China.

A Web of Institutional Partnerships

Close cooperation and coordination with other international organisations and security related institutions has become a precondition for successfully addressing ever more complex international security challenges. Today, no single one organisation can effectively deal with all aspects of international security, from conflict prevention to crisis management and post-conflict nation building. In addition, most countries have adopted a rather pragmatic position on the operational roles of international organisations. Which institution nations will choose and support in a given conflict scenario depends on individual organisations' problem solving capacity, i.e. its ability to deliver effective solutions. This in turn depends more and more on an organisation's ability and willingness to deal effectively with other relevant play-

ers. In such a world of institutional pragmatism, there is no place for artificial rivalry or dogmatism. Since March 2003, NATO has established a structured cooperation in crisis management with the European Union, called Berlin Plus. This series of agreements regulates how NATO can support the EU with operational planning, assets and capabilities as well as with a command structure for EU-led operations. The hand-over to the EU of NATO's SFOR Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be a test case for the two organisation's ability to work together smoothly. NATO has also started earlier this year an internal review process of its relations with the UN and the OSCE aiming at further strengthening effective structures and mechanisms for cooperation. In addition, international organisations and institutions, including the Alliance, must learn to work more closely with NGOs which are already an important factor in all present peace support operations. The concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, combining military and civilian assets,

may be a promising step in that direction.

The Future

NATO as a traditional defence alliance with a limited regional focus on territorial defence has become irrelevant, overtaken by events and new challenges emerging over the last few years. NATO as a mere toolbox for coalitions of the willing using its military infrastructure would be problematic. More flexibility, however, including opting outs and varying coalitions of NATO Allies with different partner nations for different scenarios may be a promising although unpopular scenario to address some of the more difficult security challenges for the future. After all, the ISAF is such an example of a successful coalition of the willing under a NATO framework.

What appears to be emerging is an Alliance which is becoming the driving force of an international security system and which is the central defence related link between the United States, Europe, Rus-

sia and a variety of Partners. This group of countries will jointly – but not necessarily always together – address today’s security challenges: International terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and failed states. Such an Alliance also manages to draw in the periphery of the Euro-Atlantic area, for example, by extending the Mediterranean Dialogue or by offering a cooperation initiative with the countries of the wider Middle East. Together with other international organisations and institutions, in particular the UN and the EU, this alliance actively supports the international community by providing security and by stabilising crisis areas.

Most of this scenario is already a reality today. It can be fully implemented if NATO as an organisation successfully masters the challenges of transformation initiated at the Prague Summit in 2002. Ultimately, it requires that nations understand their responsibilities as Allies and positively respond to NATO’s new level of ambition.

¹ See Nicholas Burns, Expanding the Alliance of Democracies, *The Wall Street Journal*, 29 March 2004.

² All new NATO members contribute troops to NATO’s Balkan operations as well as either to the ISAF or Operation Enduring Freedom. By April, six of the seven new countries also participated with their own troops in the Polish-led multinational division in Iraq.

³ Indeed, the Alliance, within hours after the events on 19 March, has deployed additional troop contingents to Kosovo and is re-engaging itself in the province.

Security Dimension of Northern Europe after the Double Enlargement

By Kestutis Paulauskas*

The contemporary society faces two kinds of threats: mentally constructed ones and real ones. Living in an unpredictable world many people including decision makers are inclined to see threats everywhere: in the neighbourhood, in a bad weather forecast, in the eyes of a passer-by. Luckily, most of these threats are the fruits of imagination and stereotypes – and a food for thought for the academic community. However there are also real dangers – if somebody points a gun at you and shoots, you will not reflect on the flying bullet – you will act trying to escape it. The real challenge for both

the decision makers and the academics is to recognize the real threats among the constructed ones. This is a particularly outstanding challenge in the case of Northern Europe where stereotypes and old thinking clichés are abundant.

There are scores of articles and studies produced on the subject of the Northern European security and implications of the double enlargement. One can hardly come up with strikingly new insights that were overlooked by other analysts. The goal of this paper is not overly ambitious, yet it does raise a few provocative suggestions about the future security agenda of this

region. It does not seek to grasp the full range of issues related to the security dimension of Northern Europe in the wake of ongoing political integration. Instead the paper focuses on one yet very important aspect – what is the function of Northern Europe in the changing global security order?

To answer this question, the paper discusses a possible construction of security identity of Northern Europe, building on theoretical constructivist assumption that the number of military troops is not the only thing that counts in international politics – national and collective identity,

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values, culture and mentality are of no lesser importance. The paper also discusses the nature of security challenges that the Northern European countries face in the wake of the 21st century and argues that certain misperceptions of actual threats persist among these countries causing certain inadequacy of their security policies. Northern Europe seems to be a quiet corner of the world far away from hotspots of violence and unaffected by the virus of terrorism. Yet this appearance is deceptive and it is only a matter of time when the ripples of conflicts and instability in various regions will reach Northern Europe. The paper finally tackles security-related institutional framework of Northern Europe, outlining its shortfalls and opportunities. The paper rounds off with a prophecy about the future of the region.

***Constructing identity for the
Northern Europe***

The legitimate question about the limits of Europe is equally applicable to

Northern Europe as well. In the broadest geographical sense one could draw the border of Northern Europe around the North Atlantic, Greenland, the Spitzbergen, the Barents Sea area, the five Nordic countries, North-Western Russia, the three Baltic states and the northern shores of Poland and Germany. For the purposes of this particular paper I will focus on the so-called Nordic-Baltic Eight, assuming that they form the core of what could be identified as Northern Europe.

What is so special about security of Northern Europe? In what ways is it different from, say, security of the Balkans or the Caucasus? Does the term “Northern” only specify the geographical location of the region, or does it have additional cultural, psychological or social meaning? What does the “Europe” part of Northern Europe refer to: Europe as a community of nation-states, Europe as a community of values, a Christian Europe or Europe of liberal democracy? There is one obvious commonality inherent to both the Nordic and the Baltic states –

their geographic location in the Northern part of Europe. Most of these countries share some very common history from early interaction among the Vikings and the Baltic tribes to the wars of the 17th century between Sweden, Lithuania and Russia. In addition, Finland and the three Baltic states shared a common destiny as a part of Russian Empire in the 19th century and the interwar independence.

Yet the history of statehood of all 8 nations is rather different. Denmark, Sweden and Lithuania were among the great powers of Europe throughout the middle ages while Norway, Finland, Latvia and Estonia have been struggling hard to preserve their national identities. In the modern times, only Sweden and Denmark lived through an extensive period of statehood, Norway, Finland and Iceland established their complete independence in the first half of the 20th century, the Baltic states escaped from the Soviet rule only in 1991.

Apart from history there are also differences in culture, language and religion.

Most importantly, the eight countries have different ideational relationship to Europe and the Western civilisation as a whole. If the Nordic countries have a strongly established Western and European identity (including non-EU countries), the Baltic states are still undergoing a difficult mental transition from perceiving Europe as something exogenous and therefore dangerous towards perceiving Europe as indispensable intrinsic value of national identity. The double enlargement did provide institutional framework for this transition but the true mental and cultural breakthrough may take another generation.

The existence of a strong common regional identity shared by the Nordic and the Baltic countries is arguable at best. At least sub-regional identities among the Nordic countries and the Baltic states for obvious reasons seem to be much stronger than a common Northern European identity. However certain constituent elements of what could be defined as an emerging security identity of Northern Europe can be traced.

- *“Northernness” of mentality.* All eight countries share the same cautious and sometimes suspicious approach towards international politics. Non-interference, self-restraint, self-exclusion, a sense of remoteness from the hotspots of the world are among the predominant elements of this mentality. It is by no means to say that the Nordic and the Baltic states do not participate in the world politics – it is more about how they proceed on the world arena. It is a mentality of small rationally minded countries that are fully aware of the minor role they can play and modest level of ambitions they can pursue in world politics.

- *Regionality.* Some analysts refer to Northern Europe as the vanguard of a future Europe characterised by dense levels of regionalisation. Indeed regionalism is at the heart of the Northern European identity. The network of national, sub-national and international, governmental and non-governmental, private and public organizations, agencies and institutions is so dense that national borders are almost completely disregarded.

- *Peace culture.* Peaceful settlement of disputes and arms control are other characteristic features shared by most of the Nordic and Baltic states. Tradition of neutrality has strong roots in most of these countries. Presumably peacekeeping efforts also enjoy wide public support in the whole region, especially if these efforts are undertaken under the auspices of the UN and fall strictly within the realm of international law.

- *Humanity and tolerance* may be considered as yet another constituent element of the Northern European identity. Human rights, the rights of ethnic, religious, sexual minorities, social justice rank very high in the value system of the Northern Europeans. These values are reflected in their security policies as well.

- *Aloofness towards continental Europe.* Political and security self-identification with continental Europe is not very strong in the minds of Northern European public and elite. There are two non-EU countries, Denmark has opted out of the ESDP, Sweden said no to euro, Finland is against collective defence role of the EU, the Bal-

tic states historically and mentally are more attached to the United States than Europe when it comes to “hard” security guarantees.

Any analysis of security dimension of Northern Europe must take into account the identity features discussed above.

Security agenda prior to the double enlargement

During the Cold War Northern Europe was never a top issue on the security agenda of the two superpowers and their respective alliances. Instead, leaders of both blocs used to meet in Helsinki and Reikjavik to discuss disarmament, arms control and confidence building issues. Northern Europe was a buffer zone with a delicate balance of power: NATO members Iceland, Norway and Denmark in the West, the Soviet Union in the East, and neutral Finland and Sweden in between. One should not be mistaken however that the region was free of conventional or nuclear threats. Substantial Soviet forces, including strategic units equipped with

nuclear missiles were deployed in the Baltic republics and Kaliningrad; the Kola peninsula was another major Soviet military base area. For NATO, securing airspace and sea communication lines above and around Northern Europe was of primary strategic importance in order to deny the Soviet Union access to the Atlantic. The US kept large air base in Iceland while NATO had developed an extensive contingency plan for the defence of Norway. Even the two neutral countries Finland and Sweden throughout the Cold War were arming heavily and preparing their societies for a total decisive war.

The end of the Cold War brought significant changes to this configuration. The delicate balance of power was broken. The Baltic states shortly after regaining independence chose integration with the Western structures, NATO and the EU, as their strategic goal. Finland and Sweden became EU members in 1995. In 2004, the Baltic states became members of both NATO and the EU. Meanwhile Russia has clearly lost its standing of a world superpower and

turned into a regional state with very limited political, economic and even military (except nuclear force) leverages to affect international politics.

Until the double enlargement there was a clear security agenda for Northern Europe, that consisted of two main objectives: 1) assist the efforts of the Baltic states to reintegrate with Europe politically and mentally, 2) facilitate transition of Russia from an expansionist authoritarian empire into a Western-style democracy that would be in cooperation but not confrontation vis-à-vis the rest of Europe. The Baltic states and Russia were seen as having human security concerns that needed to be resolved, while the Nordic states were seen as having the necessary resources to help resolve these concerns. As long as the Baltic states and Russia were insecure and hostages to the security dilemma, the Nordic states could never be secure also.

The role of the Nordic countries was instrumental in bringing the Baltic states back to European structures. Contrary to the prevalent scepticism among the major Western European countries about the pos-

sibility of integration of the former Soviet Republics, political and economic transformation of the Baltic states was rapid and successful. It is rather symbolic, that Iceland was first to recognize the independence of the Baltic states back in 1991. Denmark and Sweden put a lot of effort into economic recovery of Latvia and Lithuania and assisted the build-up of their armed forces from scratch. Finland was the main advocate of Estonia. Meanwhile initial optimism towards Russia soon turned into disillusionment about the true intentions and policies of Russia that underlie democratic and reconciliatory rhetoric.

Northern European Initiative and Northern Dimension Initiative were focused on the agenda “before the double enlargement”. Both initiatives were related to the two objectives stated above: integration of the Baltic states and alleviating Russian concerns about Western goals in this region and preventing Kaliningrad from turning into a black hole right in the heart of Europe. Except for NATO and the BALTSEA forum specifically designed to assist defence reforms and preparation

for NATO membership in the Baltic states, military security aspects were, to a large extent absent from all other narratives of Northern European security: ND and NEI focused on “soft” security matters, quality of life, economic prosperity, cross-border transactions. The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) explicitly excluded defence matters from its agenda. There were a lot of efforts on behalf of the US and the EU put into desecuritisation of the regional cooperation agenda, to use terminology of the Copenhagen school of thought. The logic of desecuritisation was rather experimental. To solve the traditional security dilemma in Northern Europe, the US and the EU chose a post-modern approach: building ties of economic interdependence, developing cross-border cooperation, strengthening NGOs had to create a win/win situation in which military defence issues no longer mattered. Despite clear merits of these efforts, there were certain counter-productive effects that resulted in the current inadequacy of threat assessment characteristic to most countries in the region, including Russia.

***Inadequacies of threat
assessment, inadequacies
of security policies***

There is more certainty and less political diversity in Northern Europe after the double enlargement, but does it mean more security? On the one hand, there are no major military threats in the region. Moreover, this region did not see a single violent spark involving any kind of use or threat to use force from any country for at least the past decade. Recently resolved transit issue to Kaliningrad is a recent example of how even the most difficult disputes can be settled peacefully in this region. From a traditional military viewpoint the region is as predictable as it can be in this turbulent era. Good neighbourly relations and the success of the initiatives towards regionalisation will remain the key to regional security after enlargement. The fact that the eastern borders of the Baltic states became the eastern borders of NATO and the EU should only add a new quality of

credibility and reassurance to the neighbouring states. On the other hand, other modern threats that cannot be foreseen or predicted proliferate throughout the globe. In this sense, Northeast Europe is no less and no more secure than any other region. The double enlargement is not the end of history – the world did not become a safer place neither for the Baltic states nor for the Nordic countries. Various security challenges, mostly of non-military nature will persist indefinitely.

Curiously enough, the actual security policies pursued by most countries in the region seem to be contrary to the logic of the threat assessment outlined above. Security policies seem to fit more the challenges of the past rather than the contemporary security environment. Both Nordic and Baltic states still hold on to the total defence concept, which is to a large extent the legacy of the Cold War. Total defence concept in terms of defence planning implies preparation for a full-scale all-out war, encompassing total mobilisation of national resources, large armies of conscripts, large reserves, large

national guard organisations, territorial defence and ultimately guerrilla warfare. Meanwhile the likelihood of such a war is very low. Moreover, both NATO and the EU are focusing on the creation of rapid reaction forces, capable of intervention wherever needed to counter rogue regimes, terrorist organisations, or to prevent ethnic and religious conflicts.

Inadequacy of threat assessment is also evident in the case of Russia. Reaction of Russian officials and analysts to the recent NATO enlargement and especially the deployment of 4 NATO fighters in Lithuania was loaded heavily with old-fashioned Cold War-type rhetoric. Although the Kaliningrad oblast remains the most militarised zone in Europe today, Moscow blamed NATO and the Baltic states for heightening the tension in the region. Russia considered the action to be counterproductive in the context of rapprochement between NATO and Russia. In its own right, NATO justified the move as a routine implementation of NATO air defence policy: the security of the airspace of all NATO members (including those

that do not have their own aircraft) is ensured collectively. Finally, the public of the Baltic states perceived the deployment as a symbol of “hard” security guarantee acquired with NATO membership.

One can draw an interesting conclusion from this narrative. Russia still seems to perceive the relations with NATO as a zero sum game. Protection of the airspace above the Baltic states is considered to be a major political and military blow to national security of the Russian Federation and countermeasures are sought now. Russian rhetoric, in turn, revitalised the suspicions in the capitals of the Baltic states about the dormant revisionism of Russia. Realist school of thought would be happy to conclude that security dilemma was not removed from Northern Europe by NATO enlargement to the Baltic states and one can now observe a classic “chicken game” between NATO and Russia.

However, from a constructivist perspective one can see an entirely different picture. The NATO enlargement (and even the deployment of aircraft in Lithuania)

has been driven not by military goals, but by common Euroatlantic values, ideas of cooperative security and moral restitution of injustice committed after the Second World War. Harsh reaction of Russia was not a rationally calculated play in the spirit of *Realpolitik*. It was rather highly emotional rejection of reality stemming from psychological stereotypes engrained among the Russian elite and the public towards the Baltic states as former Soviet republics that broke apart the Soviet Union for no apparent reason. Recent polls in Russia indicated that up to 60 % of Russian citizens considers NATO an aggressive military bloc. The Baltic states celebrated NATO enlargement as a solution to their long-sought guarantee of security from the ever-aggressive neighbour. By the same token, NATO has reasserted its standing of a reliable collective defence alliance capable of providing appropriate security measures to all its members.

Meanwhile the true importance of NATO enlargement to the Northern European security was lost in translation. In

fact, all sides benefited from this enlargement of NATO but not in a traditional “hard” security sense. Russia will now have a safe and predictive Western border that does not pose any real threat to its security and at the same time does not raise any empty temptations to review the results of the end of the Cold War – endeavour that Russia had devoted too much energy to during the past decade. NATO aircraft capable of stopping any potential terrorist activity similar to 9/11 will now constantly police the airspace of the Baltic states. It lowers the likelihood that terrorists could choose the Ignalina nuclear plant or any other sensitive object in the Baltic states as a potential target for a renegade air strike that could cause disastrous consequences to the whole region.

Such inadequacies of threat assessment are reflected in the overall security policies of the Northern European countries. Some actors in the region and outside the region still seem to be searching for traditional security challenges, which do not exist anymore. Meanwhile desecuri-

tisation of other threats traditionally attributed to the realm of “soft” security in the new international environment now seems to be counterproductive. Such an approach to security produced “inside the box” way of thinking about international affairs among the Northern European countries, while the contemporary security environment calls for thinking outside the box. In other words, the “regionality” feature of the Northern European identity turns into an impediment to developing a truly trans-regional approach to security challenges.

On the one hand, the Nordic countries are among the most active participants in the UN peacekeeping operations, which is very much in line with the peace culture inherent in these nations. On the other hand, these countries take somewhat ambivalent approach to the global war on terrorism and even more cautious approach to further expansion of the Euroatlantic area of stability towards the Eastern borderlands, the South Caucasus, and the Middle East. The fact that Northern European countries, apart from Russia,

did not suffer any major terrorist attack should not be a reason to abstain from the global war on terrorism. Inaction towards the Eastern borderlands, which are a potential source of all kinds of new challenges, also does not increase the security of the entire region. This problem can be partly attributed to the current institutional framework in the Northern Europe, which does not provide strong tools to developing a more cohesive Nordic-Baltic strategy on global politics in general and trans-regional activities in particular.

Current security architecture of the Northern Europe

The picture of the current security architecture of Northern Europe is somewhat blurred. On the one hand, after the double enlargement, there is less political diversity “outside” the region. 4 countries (3B’s and Denmark) are members of both NATO and the EU, Sweden and Finland are members of the EU, Norway and Iceland are members of NATO and Russia has a special relationship with both orga-

nisations, albeit very remote from a true membership. On the other hand, there are a number of initiatives and formats in one way or another dealing with security issues of Northern Europe: Northern Dimension, Northern European Initiative, the CBSS, the BALTSEA, the Nordic-Baltic Eight, the Nordic-Baltic Six, the brand new E-PINE initiative (Enhance Partnership in Northern Europe). Most of these formats were designed to assist the Baltic states to prepare for integration. What is their value after the double enlargement? Regardless of the past merits, their future utility should be reviewed.

The main regional framework that Nordic countries and the Baltic states share as equal partners is the CBSS, but “hard” security and defence matters are explicitly excluded from its agenda. The BALTSEA assistance forum to a large extent exacerbated its tasks and is pending closure or transformation into a more viable framework with a possible focus on other regions. Although all eight countries have different relationships with NATO and the EU, the outside players – the US and the EU – see Northern

Europe as one regional entity, as expressed by their respective initiatives – the Northern Europe Initiative (replaced by the E-PINE) and the Northern Dimension Initiative. E-PINE initiative shows a certain shift in American approach towards the region from reliance on local regional institutions to a more assertive 8+1 cooperation framework that would work in three directions – cooperative security, economic and social affairs. It is interesting to note, there are no references made to Russia in the wording of the E-PINE. The eight countries developed the Nordic-Baltic cooperation into a rather extensive network that works in various directions, including defence, which makes it a particularly attractive format for the US to keep engaged in the formation of the Northern European security agenda.

Nordic-Baltic security and defence cooperation: building an agenda for the future

The membership of the Baltic countries in the Euroatlantic institutions by no means undermines the need for an ever-

closer Nordic-Baltic security cooperation. To use the existing opportunities and implement the shared interests, the NB 8 needs a new and active agenda, which should be built upon the following imperatives if it is to succeed:

- *Build upon existing political will.*

There is a strong mutual interest to bring forward the Nordic-Baltic security defence co-operation, which has been expressed on several occasions during Nordic-Baltic Ministerial meetings.

- *Consolidate the transatlantic link.*

The NB 8 framework is a regional bridge between the EU and NATO. Northern Europe is a test bed for the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU as it consists of non-NATO EU countries, non-EU NATO countries and members of both;

- *Involve the non-aligned countries.*

Sweden and Finland can take part in the defence-related endeavours with 6 Nordic and Baltic NATO members on a regular basis. NB8 would also be of use, once Sweden and Finland decide to apply for NATO membership;

- *No new frameworks – use existing tools.* There are more than enough frameworks for the Nordic – Baltic cooperation. There is no need to invent any new formats and duplicate the existing ones. Nordic – Baltic ministerials provide excellent political framework to build upon.

- *Involve the U.S.* All 8 countries see the US as an indispensable participant in the European defence and a major ally/partner in security affairs. Since 9/11 the US strategic focus has shifted from Europe (including its north-eastern part) to elsewhere in the world. NB8 shares a common goal in keeping the US involved in the region. The US is willing and able to take part in security and defence-related cooperation activities in Northern Europe. Combining Nordic-Baltic Eight with the E-PINE initiative could prove to be a promising endeavour. Common agenda of cooperative security includes counter-terrorism, non-proliferation of the WMD, border security, regional challenges and new threats.

- *Get pragmatic and pool resources.* NB8 should focus and work on practical

initiatives that would enhance security of the Nordic and the Baltic countries and add value to the overall security of Euroatlantic community. Today the Nordic and the Baltic countries face similar challenges of military transformation – downsizing the armed forces, moving away from territorial defence posture, acquiring modern military capabilities and developing deployable and sustainable forces able to counter contemporary threats. Given financial and resource constraints, where possible, NB8 should pool resources in developing common capabilities.

- *Stay open and flexible.* In certain areas cooperation of all eight countries may not be possible or desirable. NB8 may provide the political framework for coordination of practical initiatives or exchange of information. NB8 should not in any way undermine the cooperation in any other format (bi-lateral or multi-lateral, including non-NB8 states). It could accommodate transparency, dialogue and coherence of various regional activities.

- *Outreach to other regions.* Together with the US NB8 could develop and imple-

ment a common Nordic-Baltic strategy towards the regions beyond Northeastern Europe. NB8 countries could explore opportunities to contribute with resources and advice to the expansion of security and stability area to the Ukraine, Caucasus and Central Asia. This area of cooperation may prove to be all the more viable due to the US persistent interest in anchoring these regions to the Euroatlantic community.

- ***Share burden and responsibility.*** There could be certain arrangements set up to divide labour, tasks and burden, depending on priorities and resources. For example, Nordic countries focus their attention to the Balkans while the Baltic states have more experience in working with the South Caucasus, yet the two processes could and should be coordinated within the NB8 framework with benefits to both.

- ***Go out of area, go out together.*** Nordic and Baltic countries already have extensive experience acquired in common international exercises, international operations, implementation of BATLDREAM

projects, well-developed network of military-to-military contacts. As a result, Nordics and Baltics share essentially the same military culture. These advantages should be exploited to the full in the future international involvements of the Nordic and Baltic states. NB8 framework provides excellent ground to prepare for common participation in either NATO, EU or UN-led operations.

- ***Talk to Russia.*** The role of Russia in the region should not be neglected and positive agenda must be worked out. NB8 countries share a common interest to bring Russia closer to the Euroatlantic community and involve into an open dialogue on security and defence affairs. Experience of the NEI and ND would be of great value in this process.

- ***Speak in one voice on the world arena.*** A cohesive regional group of countries has more chances to succeed in advancing their interests inside and outside the EU. Active NB 8 agenda would strengthen visibility and weight of Northern Europe in international politics. All 8 countries are interested in development

of an attractive identity of Northern Europe as an open, developed, democratic and safe region, willing and able to support the spread of the same values worldwide.

Predicting the Future

The era after the double enlargement coincides with a period of global turmoil. Although countries in Northern Europe may feel more secure than ever before, in fact they face a whole new era of unforeseen challenges and unexpected crises.

The countries of Northern Europe as well as many other European countries face a huge challenge, which is not a military, political or economic but first and foremost a mental challenge. The scope and nature of the contemporary threats requires from the decision-makers to erase the notion of national borders and national security from their thinking. Security is not a national endeavour anymore. In today's world homeland security starts way beyond the national borders. If the

Balkans, the South Caucasus, the Middle East are not stable and at peace, any region, even as remote and calm as Northern Europe, will feel the ripple effects of insecurity via illegal migration, organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism. The main question is whether the countries in Northern Europe that currently enjoy a period of relative peace and security are ready to change their cautious approach towards global security matters and start to think and act globally.

In a best-case scenario, in the next 10 years there will be no non-aligned countries left while Russia will be closely engaged into the activities of both NATO and the EU. The Nordic-Baltic Eight will become a club of like-minded states cooperating as equal partners, coordinating their policies inside NATO and the EU, coordinating participation in the international operations and drafting common strategies and activities towards other regions. The worst-case scenario is an escalation of the global instability, breakdown of international order and another Afghanistan close to the Northern European

borders. The most likely scenario as usually is somewhere in between.

To sum up, "political integration" in Northern Europe does not mean the end of history - Northern Europe faces a challenging agenda of the future, which is global in scope and therefore requires a global approach.

Section IV

Perceptions and Policies of Non-Member States After Enlargement of NATO

Russia, NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States

By Dr. Konstantin Khudoley and Dr. Dmitri Lanko*

NATO has been an important part of the domestic and foreign political context of Russia during the past ten years, and in this NATO context various discourses have been created.

It is important to stress that Russia does not have a common or single discourse on the Alliance, but a variety of discourses of both temporal and spatial dimension (mainstream discourses and secondary discourses). When mentioning the temporal dimension of discourse being a dimension not transforming but only maintaining, one cannot help mentioning the change in the Russian mainstream dis-

course in 1999, when the Alliance attacked Yugoslavia, through 2002, when the NATO-Russia Council was founded. Mentioning the spatial dimension, which is apart from the mainstream discourse, two other discourses are worth noting as the Alliance has both a political and a military dimension and as different agents in Russia perceive NATO as either strengthening its political or its military dimension. This paper will focus on these three discourses.

The three Baltic states¹ have been another important part of the contexts for Russia. Three key issues should be mentioned in relation to the Baltic states: the

EU enlargement, NATO enlargement, and the human rights of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia and Latvia which is tightly interrelated with the status of the Russian Orthodox Church in Estonia. Here again one may distinguish the mainstream and the secondary discourses. The mainstream discourse used to, and still does securitise the Baltic states, which “intend to place NATO bases on their territories after the enlargement”, and “intend to tell the EU about Russian threat when they join the Union”, and “wish to banish the Russian-speaking population”. At the same time, one must distinguish several secondary discourses as well, which

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are not that pessimistic. The outline of these discourses and their correlations with the Russian discourses on NATO is another objective of this paper. A special focus will be made on the third discourse due to the fact that it is least heard and least studied abroad.²

It is important to stress that this paper will not draw a line between the political elite and the academic community, in other words, between “practitioners” and “theorists”, as officials of the Russian Foreign Ministry tend sometimes to put it. Both “practitioners” and “theorists” contribute to the Russian discussion on NATO with almost similar arguments. To clarify the above mentioned spatial division of Russian discourse on NATO, one should mention that discursive space in Russia, especially concerning foreign political argumentation, does not to any extent correlate to institutional space. Moreover, writings of some of the “theorists” may be considered both as data for the analysis and as indicators for discourse changes among the “practitioners”. A good example is the Russian Council for

Foreign and Defence Policy. Neither will this paper draw a line between proponents of various international relations theories, for example, between power realists and constructivists. The words “power”, “geopolitics”, “ordering systems”, “international structure”, “securitisation”³ and many others which are crucial to different international relations theories are to be found in the context of NATO.

Another important thing to be stressed in this introductory part of the paper concerns the terms used in Russia for NATO enlargement. “Enlargement” is a rather neutral term, it does not have any negative context in the country, since it is used for both NATO and the EU enlargement. It is worth mentioning that Arkadiy Moshes uses the term “enlargement”, when describing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “pragmatic” perception of this phenomenon.⁴ At the same time, two other terms are commonly used as well, being that of “Baltic states joining NATO” and that of “acceptation of the Baltic states into NATO”. The first term underlines the role of the three Baltic

states in the enlargement, meaning that the enlargement took place mostly due to promises made by the West in the early 1990s when the character of international relations was completely different. Today NATO has new tasks and new challenges, and enlargement does not have any crucial importance in fulfilling or meeting these. On the contrary, the term “acceptation”, which will be used hereafter in this paper, stresses the role of the West while the Baltic states are still in search for their role and niche in the Alliance. It is worth mentioning that the use of the term “joining” refers to NATO more as an international regime in transition, than those preferring “acceptation” viewing the Alliance as a solid, though not unitary, international actor.

***Discourse 1:
“Baltic States are Accepted into
NATO to Maintain the Alliance”***

Such an opinion is to be found in the first discussion paper out of many, on Russian relations with the Baltic states,

prepared by the Russian Council for Foreign and Defence Policy.⁵ During the last ten years some Russian foreign policy-makers have frequently expressed their concerns about the American military power, including the presence of U.S. troops in Europe and Eurasia, as posing a “real” threat to Russia. For this discourse (it may be classified as mainstream of the 1990s) “it became a common sense to equate NATO with the U.S.”⁶ Simultaneously, some authorities have frequently claimed Russia not posing any threat to either America or Western Europe or to Central and Eastern Europe or to the Baltic states, and therefore NATO is becoming an international organisation, which is irrelevant to the security policies of its members, as the membership becomes politically meaningless and the Alliance militarily ineffective. Consequently, these Russian authorities have invented separate explanations for why NATO is no longer relevant for the U.S., Western Europe and the Baltic states.

For the U.S., they claim, NATO has become too political and no longer able

to counteract challenges rapidly. The NATO war on Yugoslavia in 1999 was an unpleasant surprise for them,⁷ however controversies within the NATO member states on the issues of Afghanistan and Iraq made them optimistic again.

On the contrary, for Western Europe, they claim, NATO has become a too military organisation. The armies of Western European countries are not capable to counteract the new security challenges, such as terrorism. Therefore, Western Europeans, in the view of this part of the Russian elite, perceive NATO as a meaningful forum for shaping political consensus, especially on delicate issues such as the acceptance of Turkey into the European Union and the re-unification of Cyprus. Though the two arguments contradict, they do, in combination, create a discourse of NATO as an out-of-time international institution.

And concerning the Baltic states, the Russian elite has frequently noted that NATO would not be able to guarantee the independence and security of the Baltic states. Despite Article 5 of the Wash-

ington Treaty, NATO would hardly start a “war on Russia”, even if Russia swallows Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania, or all of them. Consequently, they proposed that instead of joining NATO the Baltic states should become neutral, accept the Russian security guarantees, contribute to forming a new security regime in Europe within the OSCE, or pay more attention to the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. Within this discourse, the only reason for NATO to accept the Baltic states has been to maintain itself. NATO enlargement was perceived as NATO becoming politically meaningless to its members and as a search for a new political meaning which could have saved the old Alliance. This discourse was especially popular among Russian foreign policy-makers prior to and during the first wave of the enlargement, when the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary joined NATO. This is the reason why the first wave of the enlargement did not provoke any serious response from the Russian side. Russian authorities were graciously watching NATO on

its way towards military ineffectiveness; they did not consider NATO becoming more effective militarily after the three Central European States joined. It is important for the understanding of this discourse to take into account that the military capability of neither Central European nor the Baltic states was perceived as important in Russia.

The Russian foreign policy strategy was created on the basis of this discourse and focused on strengthening alternative security institutions in Europe and Eurasia, and globally to replace NATO after its expected complete loss of relevance to the security policies of its members. Russian attempts to create an effective defence organisation on the post-Soviet period are among the examples of such policies. As a result, the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty, an organisation created in the early 1990s “to preserve limited influence of Moscow over military sphere and defence policies of the CIS countries” (Tkachenko & Petermann, 2002: 15), has become a counter-terrorist organisation by today. Another example of such poli-

cies is the Russian policy on the UN, especially the efforts to preserve the role of its Security Council as it was during the Cold War. And further, within the same discourse, Russian attempts to maintain the OSCE as an important part of the European security architecture, are to be placed. This was especially important in the context of the Baltic states, as the OSCE Human Rights Commissioner most actively worked in the field of the human rights of the Russians-speaking minority in Estonia and Latvia in mid-1990s.

Discourse 2:

“Baltic States are Accepted into NATO to Counter-Balance Misunderstandings between America and the “Old” Europe”

Another part of Russian foreign policy-makers could not help noticing the strengthening of the military dimension of NATO in the past ten years. They watched very carefully the extending of NATO military staff inter-operability to new members and candidate countries

and the adaptation of this extended inter-operability to the new, mobile and flexible military forces prepared to accomplish new military missions. However, this part of the Russian elite did not have certainty about the nature of those new missions. And as NATO was preparing to act outside Europe, the discourse of NATO as a “world sheriff” was created in Russia. It became especially popular among this part of the Russian elite after the attack on Yugoslavia; some of the Russian authorities and scholars even expressed concerns like “Yugoslavia today, Byelorussia tomorrow?” In 1999 the Russian Council for Foreign and Defence Policy wrote that after Yugoslavia “NATO enlargement should be considered not just as an unfriendly step, but they should be considered as preparations to aggression” (SVOP, 1999). The same people in Russia even wished to warn the Baltic states from participating in wars far away from their national spheres of interest, which nevertheless would hurt the Baltic states.

At the same time, they could not help

noticing a gap appearing between America and the “old” Europe, thus admitting the transformation of the Alliance from what it used to be during the Cold War. In Russia, this may be considered the first step towards de-securitisation of NATO. For the part of the Russian elite being analysed, the Northern Dimension of the EU policies and the Northern European Initiative of the U.S. Department of State were two competing strategies to gain power in the Baltic Sea Region (Tkachev & Churov, 2000). Again, they were trying to underline the U.S. efforts to strengthen NAFTA, which became especially evident after George W. Bush was elected the U.S. President: he made his first visit to Mexico. As a result, like in the first discourse, this part of Russian political elite perceived the emerging Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU as an alternative to NATO. Throughout the 1990s there was a myth within the mainstream foreign political discourse, which claimed that “the EU is good, while NATO is bad” (Yagya, 2001: 175). As a result, Russian society and elite

started discussing whether the country should build strategic cooperation with America or “old” Europe.

This gap became especially evident to this group of the Russian elite after the U.S. failed to implement Article 5 of the Washington Treaty after 9/11, and after France and Germany refused to participate in the war on Iraq in 2003. Consequently, the enlargement was seen as an attempt to counter-balance this gap. Central European and especially the Baltic states seemed loyal to the U.S. Another important feature of the Baltic states was their mainstream discourse not to perceive NATO and the European Union as organisations in mutual competition in the field of providing security to Europe, unlike the discourse of this part of the Russian elite. Of course, some people in the Baltic states, too, perceived NATO and the EU as competitors, for example, Jaan Kaplinski in Estonia, but this was definitely not the mainstream (see, for example, Soosaar, 2003). Another example here is former Estonian Foreign Minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves (Ilves, 1999), who

suggested Estonia to choose the Nordic way of development, which did not mean necessarily rejection of NATO membership (Denmark and Norway are members of NATO), but opt-outs and social democracy.

This part of the Russian elite was most active in opposing NATO enlargement. For some time it was a popular opinion among them that no country should enter the Alliance, if the country did have border disputes with other countries. To imitate border disputes between Russia and the Baltic states, this part of the elite lobbied the delay in demarcation and delimitation of borders, and later did its best to prevent border treaties with the Baltic states getting signed. As a result, the border treaty with Lithuania was ratified only in 2003, as the status of Kaliningrad became one of the top priorities of Russian foreign policy. Border treaties with Estonia and Latvia have not been even signed yet. Another instrument used by Russia to prevent the NATO enlargement was its attempt to link enlargement with the ratification of the CFE

Treaty, which is a treaty still not open to the new members.

***Discourse 3:
“Baltic States are Accepted to
NATO to bring Russia Closer
to the Alliance”***

Last, but not least, there is a group inside the Russian political and academic elite, who view the acceptance of the Baltic states into NATO positively, despite small internal disagreements. They perceive the development of NATO as mostly a development along its political dimension. This group contributed most of all to de-securitisation of the Alliance, or, in Russian mainstream terms, to a “pragmatic approach” towards NATO and to the enlargement. For them NATO represents, first of all, a group of countries with high standards of democracy, liberal values and civil control of the armed forces. Thus, they perceive the Alliance itself as a meaningful forum for shaping political consensus and as an anchor for the new democracies in Europe as they prepare for

membership; they also stress the NATO’s ability to conduct peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, and to share knowledge and experience in the military field. As a result, they rejected the first discourse, which spoke of “NATO coming closer to Russian borders”, and introduced a new discourse of “Russia coming closer to the Alliance” in terms of democratic values and techniques of civilian control over the military.

It is worth noting that the Russian President Boris Yeltsin opposed to the acceptance of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO, as he considered the first wave of the enlargement as a part of Russian bargain with the West (Yeltsin, 2000: 151). For example, Yeltsin hoped to achieve full membership in G8 this way. During the Kosovo crisis of 1999, his opposition against NATO strikes on Yugoslavia had a clear domestic political background: the State Duma was at the same time discussing the possibilities to impeach Yeltsin. The situation of the Baltic states was completely different. According to a former U.S.

Secretary of State Madeline Albright, Yeltsin has always been principally against the acceptance of the Baltic states into NATO (Albright, 2003: 255). He frequently discussed this issue with then the U.S. President Bill Clinton, including after the results of the U.S. presidential elections in 1996 were announced.

A vast part of the ruling elite in Russia in the late 1990s believed that the whole territory, which used to be the Soviet Union, would remain within the sphere of political, economic and military influence of Russia, one of the poles of the “multi-polar” world. This hope created the myth about the so-called “red line” which lies along the borders of the Soviet Union, as outlined in 1975, when the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed. A part of the Russian elite expected the country to oppose principally, if NATO intended to cross it. Thus, they were hoping that the Yalta – Potsdam system of international relations in Europe would be restored, though not in full. Consequently, it was the time, when the deci-

sions of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences started being viewed positively in numerous statements by researchers, close to the Russian Foreign Ministry.

For this part of the Russian elite the acceptance of the Baltic states into NATO and into the European Union (related statements appeared in 1999) has become an “issue of prestige”; it occupied a larger part of the Russian domestic discourse than it was worth. This discourse was not solid; its different implications have been evaluated in the previous parts of this essay. However, this part of the Russian elite (though mostly heard both in Russia and abroad) was not the only one. There was another (though smaller) group which was not sharing such views. Their point of departure was that NATO in the 1990s had transformed into the most important security organisation in Europe, and furthermore, that the political dimension of NATO had become more important for the Alliance than its military dimension. Consequently, they believed that the enlargement of the Alliance, including the Baltic states, would

give a shift to the transformation of NATO in such a direction which they would consider favourable for Russia (SIR, 2002).

9/11 produced a sensitive shift not only for various international political processes, it did not only led to regrouping of powers on the international arena influencing the whole international system; it also gave impetus to the transformation of domestic contexts in Russia. As a result of the terrorist attacks on the U.S., Russia joined the U.S.-led anti-terrorist coalition and agreed on the deployment of coalition military bases in Central Asia, i.e. in the post-communist space. Thus, NATO member states have crossed the “red line”, but in different places than the Baltic states, and in a different situation: Russia welcomed it and did not oppose to it. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin called leaders of the Central Asian states personally, urging them to accept NATO member states military bases on their territories. For this third group within the Russian elite, this meant a significant shift to a very important pro-

cess, namely, to the beginning of integration of Russia into Western security space.

This was the first step, but other steps followed. Russia and NATO signed the 2002 Rome Agreements, and Russia and Germany signed the agreement on transit of German military goods across Russian territory. The number of joint military exercises, involving Russia and NATO member states grew from less than ten in 2003 to over fifty planned for 2005. The agreement on the status of NATO forces on Russian territory, and visa versa, will be signed soon. It is remarkable that neither the controversies over the U.S. war on Iraq, nor the YUKOS case etc. have become important obstacles to the development of the relations between Russia and NATO. Despite the fact that vast part of this group in the Russian elite condemned the arrest of YUKOS President Mikhail Khodorkovskiy, they could not help but mention that it did not affect Russian-NATO relations to any great extent. Thus, though integration of Russia into Western security sphere has not be-

come an irreversible process yet, it has gone far ahead during past several years.

It is evident to them that the longer border between Russia and NATO, which will appear after the Baltic states join the Alliance, will create some problems in the short run. The adjustment of two ordering systems along this new longer border will be more complicated than in case of the short borders of Murmansk/Norway and Kaliningrad/Poland. The Cold War-type way of thinking as part of domestic discourses on both sides of the border should also be taken into consideration, when speaking about the relations between Russia and NATO member states in general and about international relations in the Baltic Sea Region in particular. However, in the long run, many problems will be solved and many will disappear themselves, as new models of cooperation are introduced. Despite the fact that even this part of the Russian elite predicts numerous problems to appear in the short run, they consider it as a mistake to delay the development of the existing positive tendencies in the relations between Russia and the Alliance.

Moreover, they think that Russia will benefit from the acceptance of the Baltic states into NATO and the European Union even in the short run. Once the double enlargement has happened, this will give all parts of the Russian political and academic elite a sense of stability on its north-western borders. This becomes especially important today, when stability in the south of Russia is in question. For the Russian elite, one of the possible scenarios is the “balkanisation” of Afghanistan and Central Asia, and a merge of the conflicts in Iraq and Israel/Palestine; terrorism, infectious diseases and illegal drugs will spread over both the Central Asia and Middle East. So far, the Russian elite has not worked out a clear solution to these challenges; in such a situation of an exaggeration of the “threat” of Baltic membership in NATO there is a possibility for the part of the Russian elite to “hide away” from the necessity to recognise these new threats.

To our mind, Russia should sign border treaties with Estonia and Latvia as first steps of action in order to benefit more from NATO enlargement. The absence of

the treaties does not affect the quality of cross-border cooperation between Russia and the two countries, but it contributes to a sense of watchfulness evident on both sides of the border. In the past, such a situation seemed reasonable to at least a part of Russian political elite; they hoped that absence of border treaties would become obstacles for the Baltic states in joining NATO and the European Union. Today, as the enlargement has already happened, it will be very difficult even for this part of the Russian elite to explain why the treaties with Estonia and Latvia are delayed again. Moreover, the border treaty with Lithuania, which is already signed and ratified due to the fears within the Russian elite considering how Kaliningrad otherwise could “flow away” after enlargement, which has proved to be an important tool to make the relations between the two countries better.

However, this may be considered as only the first step; other steps are also to be undertaken. In the early 1990s, Russia signed treaties with Poland, Hungary and several other Central European states.

Those treaties put an end to reflections on the history of the relations between Russia and those countries in their official rhetoric and established the basis for cooperation for the future. However, no other similar treaties have been signed in the following ten years. The main reason was Russia's opposition against NATO enlargement. Political relations between Russia and Central European countries were almost frozen. Doing so, the Russian diplomacy of the 1990s did the same mistake as the Soviet diplomacy of the 1930s, when Soviet diplomats used to discuss issues of Polish security in London, Paris and Berlin, but not in Warsaw. In the 1990s, again, Russian diplomats raised the issue of NATO enlargement in Washington D.C., Brussels and Berlin, but not in Prague, Warsaw or Budapest.

As a result, anti-Russian attitudes came to dominate foreign policy discourses not only in the Baltic states, but also in Central Europe. Russia's participation in the anti-terrorist coalition has changed the policy of Russia. It is indicative that Russia and Romania signed the Treaty

on Friendly Relations and Cooperation in July 2003, when Romanian membership in NATO was pending. In our mind, it would be logical for Russia to sign similar treaties with the Baltic states as well. Of course, it will take more time to work out such a treaty with Estonia than with Romania. At the same time, the very negotiations on such a treaty, once started, will contribute greatly to the creation of a sense of trust and partnership between our countries. Today such a sense is lacking, which is the main obstacle for developments in the relations between Russia and the Baltic states not only on a political, but also on an economic level.

A further step should introduce a milder position regarding the CFE Treaty. Unfortunately, the adapted treaty, signed at the Istanbul summit in 1999, will hardly be ratified by a majority of the parties. In particular, the Baltic states are not ready to sign the treaty, neither politically, nor technically. For the part of the Russian elite analysed here, it seems valid, if all parties follow the guidelines of the treaty

without any ratification. This concerns, first of all, Russia. Russia should not increase its military capabilities in the Northwest Russia, including Kaliningrad, neither in Belarus. It would hurt the investment rating of the Northwest Russia and produce a threat of getting involved in a conflict with or inside Belarus, where its President Alexander Lukashenko remains unpredictable and the possibility of an internal conflict remains far from negligible.

A segment within this part of the Russian elite perceives cooperation between Russia and NATO as a factor influencing military reform in the country. Such a reform is becoming more and more urgent, since Russian military forces were only reduced, however not reformed throughout the 1990s. At the same time, the unreformed military used to create and is now creating obstacles to modernisation of the country as a whole. Another segment within this group, including the writers of this paper, question whether cooperation with NATO and even NATO membership is an impor-

tant factor for a democratic transition in the army. For example, in 1949–1974 the Portuguese army used to be one of the pillars of the authoritarian regime, despite NATO membership. In the 1970s it was not the cooperation with the U.S. army which made the army step out against the regime; rather it was the failure in the colonial wars. And moreover, in 1974–1976 a vast part of the Portuguese officers were not planning transition to democracy; instead, there was a plan to replace the existing right-wing regime with a left-wing one. NATO and Western European countries, especially the Social Democratic Government of Germany, got involved in domestic issues in Portugal only at that stage.

This part of the Russian elite perceives resistance of its other parts as insuperable at the current stage of defence policies. Their opponents, especially those wearing military uniform, would like to limit this cooperation down to only exchange of visits. Another part of the elite would prefer to see tensions between Russia and NATO (but not confrontation), which

could justify high military expenditures for public opinion. Cooperation between Russian and NATO forces in the framework of SFOR and KFOR has not made a shift in either the public opinion, or discourses among the elite. The Cold War type of discourses still exists. Though terrorism as a threat is perceived among all part of the Russian elite, other types of threats are perceived as more important. The anti-terrorist coalition resembles the anti-Hitler coalition of WWII, when all states were trying to reduce their role in military actions, though planning to occupy leading positions in the post-war world order. To conclude, even this part of the Russian elite is sceptical regarding military reform in Russia. At the same time, they agree that cooperation with NATO may create a friendly background for the reform. Successful military reform can only take place in peaceful times, not in the times of tensions and confrontation. Thus, the important constructs for the discourse on NATO, common for this part of the Russian elite are: a friendly environment for Russia's military reform,

better relations with Central European and Baltic states, and, last but not least, stability in Europe in the situation of instability in the South.

Conclusion

Russian mainstream discourse on NATO keeps viewing the Alliance as unable to transform and therefore as a threat. At the same time the NATO enlargement in 2004 is to become one of many important steps towards de-securitisation of NATO and the Baltic states for Russia and visa-versa. Today the Alliance is mentioned in none of the contexts concerning the top priorities of Russian foreign policy in any of the above-described groups of the Russian elite. Furthermore the de-securitisation on the Russian side of the border is depending on how the developments of the NATO-Baltic states relationship will be perceived in Russia.

Above we did only outline three possible scenarios stemming from the transformation of NATO (conservative, military and political), but there are more sce-

narios undergoing current discussion within the Alliance. Again, the military transformation of the Baltic states has not been completed yet. And obtaining U.S. weapons does not necessarily mean a creation of an army in compliance with NATO standards. Finally, the de-securitisation will depend on to what extent the NATO-Russian Council, which was created only two years ago and which is perceived as a very effective tool by all parts of the Russian elite, will remain effective. The effectiveness of the Council still has to be tested; and one of the tests will be the Baltic states.

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³ “*politization*”, if translated directly from Russian – Voronov, 2003: 79

⁴ Moshes, 2003: 37

⁵ SVOP, 1997

⁶ Zaslavskaya, 2002: 62

⁷ probably, this was the main factor, why some Russian authorities became so mad with NATO in March 1999

Finland's Defence Policy: Sui Generis?

By Dr. Pauli Järvenpää*

At this particular juncture of history, most of the armed forces in Europe are undergoing a process of profound, long-term transformation. Most countries are abandoning the concept of territorial defence and emphasizing capabilities to conduct international crisis management operations at distances far away from their own borders. Not Finland. Most countries in Europe are also discarding the great Napoleonic idea of raising mass armies by conscription and, instead, they are creating small all-professional armed forces. Not Finland. Furthermore, for most Western and Central European countries NATO is the answer to their defence prayers. Once again, not for Finland.

How can all of this be explained? Why is Finland a sui generis case? Why is it

still holding on to the concepts of military non-alignment, general conscription and territorial defence, all the while these concepts are to become abandoned remnants of yesterday for practically all other countries in Europe?

Three circles of national security interest

In order to understand Finnish defence thinking it might be helpful to think of Finnish national security interests as three concentric circles. The outer circle can be thought of as comprising of common values. Finland is of course interested in defending such values, which is demonstrated by its steadfast support of, and participation in, the United Nation's

peace-keeping and humanitarian operations. Clearly and demonstrably Finland shares international responsibility and solidarity and is willing to use its resources to promote and defend common values.

The second circle brings us closer to home, to Europe and its security environment. By actively participating, as a member of the European Union and as a Partner to NATO, in the efforts to make Europe and its immediate neighbourhood stable and safe, Finland is also looking after its own self-interest. The more stable our continent remains, the safer Finland will be. As a consequence, Finnish forces are heavily involved in the NATO-led operations in the Balkans.

And finally, in the third circle national interest is at its highest by such core is-

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sues as national independence, security and well-being of the nation and its citizens, and ultimately, in the gravest possible situation, where the very survival of the nation is at stake. To defend Finland the Finns need a credible national defence, and since the country has chosen, at least for the time being, to stay outside of NATO, the national defence will have to be built independently to cover all possible circumstances. These circumstances are now in a flux. The future challenge will be to shape Finland's military capabilities to respond to the new security environment.

In sum, the Finnish forces are actively participating in the peace-keeping and crisis response operations abroad, at the same time Finland is making sure that its territory will be successfully defended, should an adversary threaten the territorial integrity of the country or threaten the very existence of the nation. And this Finland continues to do as a non-allied country.

The Defence White Paper of 2001

What is Finland's defence planning based on today? How is the country's

military defence organized? Are the three concentric circles, briefly outlined above, visible in Finnish defence and security planning?

The image of three concentric circles is obviously a metaphor explaining the different dimensions of Finnish national defence. Yet, the basic notion holds that we have to have a national defence and a force planning system in place which will produce troops all readily available, solidly trained, and well enough equipped for the three tasks depicted by the metaphor. There is a strong conviction within Finland that the only way is to produce good soldiers first. Only good soldiers are to be trained to become good peace-keepers.

One dimension of Finnish defence policy bears a first highlighting. And that is the exceptionally high popular support of and for the military throughout the country. According to national opinion polls conducted over the last few years the most trusted institutions in the country are the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Forces. The polls also show very

high figures of support for actually defending the country. The Advisory Board for Defence Information, located in the Ministry of Defence, has conducted opinion polls for many decades, and answers have been very much the same from one year to another: The answers have, year after year, indicated the fact that more than three-quarters of the people answer affirmative when asked if they would take up arms in defence if Finland was attacked, even in circumstances of an uncertain outcome. For example, in 2003 the figure was 78%. Furthermore an even larger percent of the Finns would be willing to participate in national defence, bringing their specific skills and abilities to bear, if the country was attacked.

Finnish national defence has, since the mid-1990's, been developed in accordance with the recommendations authorized in a series of Defence White Papers. In 1995, the Government produced the first issue, and hereafter it has become customary for each Government to produce a Paper in the early phase of its term in office. The Defence White Paper published in 2001,

entitled "The Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2001", forms the basis of Finland's current defence policy and development plans.

The Paper recognizes the significant change of Finland's international position which has past in the post-Cold War period: "Finland's membership in the European Union raises the threshold to exert pressure against Finland." Also, the active participation in the NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme did improve Finland's interoperability with the Alliance. Furthermore, preparations for host nation support (HNS) were already started on the basis of the 1997 Defence White Paper. The same point was reiterated in the 2001 White Paper: "Creation of capabilities for receiving assistance in a crisis situation is taken into consideration when developing Finland's national defence."

According to the 2001 White Paper, the following threat scenarios constitute the basis for defence planning: 1. a regional crisis with repercussions for Finland, 2. political, economic and military pressure,

which may include threat or limited use of military force, 3. a strategic strike intended to force the state leadership into taking desired decisions by paralyzing central institutions and functions of society and the defence system, and 4. a large-scale attack, with the aim of capturing strategically important areas or using Finnish territory against a third party.

For the first time ever the strategic strike as a surprise attack severing the society from its leadership and vital assets, civilian as well as military, became the main yardstick with which to measure and develop the Finnish military capabilities. The White Paper concludes, "resources are primarily allocated to achieving a capability to prevent and repel a strategic strike." As a result, improvements in wartime equipment in the planning period 2001-2008 focus particularly on command, control and surveillance capability, electronic warfare, land force mobility and the capacity to deliver and protect against long-range weapons effects.

The waning of a large-scale attack as a likely military threat by the waxing of the

strategic strike meant significant changes in the Finnish military structures. The major change was to reduce the wartime strength of the mobilised Defence Forces from 540 000 to 350 000 soldiers by the year 2008. The forces would be divided into operational and territorial forces. Roughly about 100 000 soldiers would form the backbone of the operational forces, while 250 000 reservists would be assigned local defence tasks.

The striking power of the land forces was to be concentrated in three readiness brigades, the Pori, Karjala and Kainuu Brigades, which were modernised to high military standards. The number of brigades was reduced from 27 to 22, while 11 of them were to be armoured, readiness or jaeger brigades. The Pori Brigade was also assigned the task of training conscripts, who volunteered to be trained for international crisis response operations. The firepower and mobility of the land forces were enhanced by the acquisition of 124 Leopard 2A4 tanks, armoured fighting vehicles (CV 90), more armoured personnel carriers, and transport helicopters.

One particularly interesting aspect of the 2001 Defence White Paper was its emphasis on the preparation for international crisis response operations. Peace-keeping has a long and honourable tradition in Finland. The Finns participated in UN peace-keeping operations already in 1956 at Suez, a year after Finland had become a member of the UN. Since then, more than 45 000 Finnish soldiers have served in such operations, and at the moment, nearly 1000 Finns are participating in eight different operations around the world, from Afghanistan and Kashmir to Eritrea and Kosovo.

Finland has greatly benefited from its cooperation with NATO in its effort to develop already existing crisis response capabilities. The Planning and Review Process (PARP) with its Partnership Goals (PG) has been particularly useful. Finland did as the first non-NATO nation take over the command of a brigade in a NATO-led operation (brigade MNB(C) in Kosovo from 1 May 2003, half year rotation). This earns as a clear testimony of the high professional standards the

Finnish forces maintain in crisis response operations. From 1 May 2004 the same brigade is once again being commanded by a Finnish general.

It is also worth noting the fact that all expenses for peace-keeping operations are shared equally between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. The total cost for 2004 is in the area of 105-110 million euros. Furthermore, it is equally worth mentioning that the part maintained and paid by the Ministry of Defence for peace-keeping operations are money separate from the regular defence budget.

The Defence White Paper of 2004

Finland's national defence, as the defence arrangements in most nations of Europe, is currently undergoing an important period of transformation. In May 2003, the Government appointed a four-person working group of experienced civil servants to prepare the Defence White Paper of 2004. All relevant ministries are represented in the process; however the main portions of the report are prepared

by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence.

The group was tasked to report on its progress to the Government's special Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy, and it is expected to complete its work in September this year. The White Paper will provide the necessary focus and direction for national defence development and plans for the next four years and beyond, all the way to the year 2012.

It is of course too early to tell what the main focus in the Defence White Paper will be, but certain cornerstones of policy have already been laid out by the Government. An interim report outlining the main policy directions was made public on 15 April this year. The report states that the Finnish Government will continue to base the security policy of Finland on maintaining a credible national defence, remaining militarily non-allied and continuing active participation in international crisis management efforts and in other security co-operations. Due to the fact that Finland is not seeking NATO membership, one especially important and

highlighted aspect of the policy will be to maintain and further develop the excellent working relationship with NATO.

A clear indication of the future defence policy of Finland was given on 15 April, as the President of the Republic and the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy discussed the basic guidelines for the 2004 Defence White Paper. First of all, it was argued that Finland continues to develop its cooperation with NATO and continues to participate actively in the PfP programme. At the same time, it was stated that Finland will continue to follow the transformation of NATO, therefore pursuit of NATO membership remains an option in Finland's security and defence policy also in the future. In other words, the door to NATO will be kept ajar, however the Government for the moment does not wish to enter through it.

Furthermore, as a member of the European Union, Finland underlines its cohesion, solidarity and common commitments with the Union enhancing the security of Finland. The Government

notes full participation of Finland in the development and implementation of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. More specifically, Finland is prepared for participation in the EU's rapid reaction force which is being developed through the concept of battle groups.

The Cabinet Committee states that Finland will maintain and develop its defence capability as a militarily non-aligned country. The defence planning will remain firmly focused on enhancing the ability to defend national territory, if necessary, and rather than enhancing the ability to reconstitute defence forces should military threats materialize (of which the current Swedish policy is an example).

Compulsory military service is maintained and national defence will continue to be based on the territorial defence concept. At the same time, resources are being developed for participation in military cooperation in various crisis situations. Specifically this means that Finland has to be able to cooperate and contribute to operations abroad, and at the same time improve its facilities to draw on the

assistance of other countries, in case such situations arise.

Apart from the interim report of the Government outlining the main directions of the Finnish security policy, several discussions in Finland on various aspects of national security have been handled. Three separate studies merit attention. Firstly in February 2004, a parliamentary working group published a study of various changes in the Finnish security environment. The main aim of the study was to examine and raise questions on which the Parliament expects answers in the Defence White Paper later this year. The parliamentary group concluded that parallel to maintaining the need of a credible national defence, increased solidarity and multilateral cooperation are essential to counter today's threats.

Secondly, the Ministry of Defence published a report on the military requirements for NATO membership in March 2004. On the 4 of February 2003, Mr. Jan-Erik Enestam, then Minister of Defence, appointed an expert group to pre-

pare a report on the consequences for Finland's defence system and defence administration of a possible membership of such a military alliance. If one wants to crystallise the key conclusions of the report, it would be that Finland would be able to fulfil all criteria for NATO membership with the exception of popular support and that our current defence budget levels, refocused, could readily sustain the membership costs.

And thirdly, the Defence Staff, also in March 2004, published a study concerning the army's strike capabilities in the future years. The capabilities to be developed were selected from a wide repertoire of weapons systems, ranging from multi-launch rocket systems to attack helicopters. One of the most interesting findings was the recommendation to develop a stand-off air-to-ground capability for the F-18 Hornet fleet.

A big question in the course of preparing the 2004 White Paper will be the question how many resources will be allotted to national defence in Finland. Even though there are no grounds to assume that defence budgets will rise dramatically

over the coming years, there are reasons to remain confident that the budget levels will remain stable. The 2001 White Paper provides a defence budget of about 2,1 billion euros in 2004, with about 2% real increase each year until 2008, which is the end of the 2001 White Paper planning period. Approximately one third, or about 650 million euros, of the defence budget continues to be spent annually on procuring major defence materiel. If the same level of defence spending is maintained, the Finnish defence experts are confident that Finland's national defence capabilities can be steadily and prudently developed to answer the challenges in the early 2010's.

Conclusion

For those who might wish to see radical changes in Finland's defence orientation, the 2004 Defence White Paper will most likely be a disappointment. As the early indications attest, no major policy changes will be in the offing.

As perhaps the most important continuity in the defence orientation of Fin-

land it will maintain its ability to defend national territory rather than the ability to reconstitute defence forces. The feature of a system of general conscription will remain as well, which will guarantee the quality and quantity of national reserves. It is also important to note that neither of these concepts will be seriously contested by the citizens of Finland. On the contrary the public mind sets these concepts as the cornerstones of Finnish national defence, and as such they are fully supported by the vast majority of the population.

The robust commitment to international operations is also there to stay. As the Government's interim report states, "international military cooperation is an essential part of Finland's defence and security policy, and it supports Finland's own defence." If future brings economic constraints, role specialisation and cooperation with like-minded nations will be a requirement. This will be especially important due to the fact that cooperation grows within the European Union, and crisis response capabilities within the Union are to be developed further.

Reforms of the Croatian Armed Forces toward NATO

By Neven Kranjcec¹

The principal strategic objectives for the Republic of Croatia are all linked to joining NATO and the EU as two mutually supporting goals. The primary activities supporting these goals are focused on enhancing efficiency of the Croatian Armed Forces (CAF) and their interoperability with the forces of NATO countries, enabling and enhancing stability and security nationally, regionally and internationally. In support of these national objectives, the Republic of Croatia entered the PFP programme in May 2000, the Intensified Dialogue in July 2001, and the Membership Action Plan (MAP) in May 2002.

Since its establishment in 1991, the Croatian Armed Forces have passed through numerous reform efforts, which could be outlined in the following phases:

- 1991-1995, the defence reforms during this period were conducted under considerations of the then present war situation.
- 1996-1999, the post-war defence reforms were mainly focusing on the maintenance of sufficient independent military capabilities ensuring national security.
- 2000-; partly as a result of the PFP Initiative, comprehensive reforms of the military sector were launched for the first time. Political and legal redefinition of the defence-related framework in 2002¹

and 2003² opened the door for a more intensified defence reform programme.

Since joining the Partnership for Peace, Croatia has progressively intensified its dialogue with NATO and sought to make the most of Alliance's expertise, structures and programmes, including the PARP, to assist and guide the military reform process³.

This article will focus on the latest reforms (2002 and onwards) that started with the legal and constitutional changes, intended to clarify uncertainties in the political relationship between the President, the Parliament, the Ministry of Defence, and the Chief of Staff. The constitutional changes and the Defence Law

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and Law on Service in the Armed Forces regulated issues concerning defence and established responsibility over the defence system in a much more balanced and detailed manner among the highest institutions of the Government. These laws emphasise the democratic control of the Armed Forces through a more viable division of authorities and responsibilities with regard to key players in the defence system management and command⁴.

Reform of the CAF is an ongoing process seeking required capabilities, based on the Alliance's Defence Capabilities Initiative⁵. In this process of developing affordable, modern and capable armed forces that are well organised, trained and equipped, the Planning and Reviewing Process (PARP) plays a significant role. And Croatia has, furthermore, realised a need to approach reforms from a rational, holistic and long-term perspective. Therefore, already in the early beginning of the defence reform, a requirement for a Defence Review (DR)—as a comprehensive study and a clear directive—was determined.

This article will try to describe these reform achievements in reorganisation, planning, personnel management, modernisation, cooperation and contribution with the inputs from the DR as a corrective tool for future processes.

Reorganisation

To redirect resources for modernisation and the advancement of capabilities, the CAF implemented a new organisational structure and downsized the professional and reserve components. Most of the reorganisation and downsizing was completed by the end of 2003. Continuation of this effort in 2004 and 2005 will allow a gradual shift, emphasising the CAF modernisation and mobility and deployment capabilities. These adjustments, especially with regard to management, development and deployment of professional forces, will also demand refinements in the present laws and subsequent procedures.

Reform concerning reorganisation began with organisational restructuring

in the Defence Ministry, General Staff and Armed Forces. The size of the CAF is defined by the Croatian President's 'Decision on the Size, Composition and Mobilisation of the CAF', passed in May 2002. The Armed Forces are limited to the authorised wartime strength of about 140,000 troops. The peacetime authorised ceilings do not exceed 29,000 personnel, including up to 21,000 active duty military and 8,000 serving conscripts. The reserve component is to be reduced to 108,000 personnel. The Armed Forces should have up to 4,000 civilian personnel. These numbers have been under serious revision since 2003, as it was realised that the new armed forces structure was not adapted to the new security situation properly and was, beyond question, unaffordable. It is to believe that the DR will come with adequate recommendations on this issue.

The land component represents the largest part of the CAF. During 2002-2003 it was reduced from 6 area commands to 4 corps⁶. This is based on a geographic-territorial principle. Each corps consists of

8-14 brigades, centred around one professional 'guardian' brigade. A corps is designed to be operationally independent, based on a modular system, which allows the easier transfer of smaller units between the corps.⁷

At the beginning of 2004, it was concluded that the existing structure was too reliant on mobilisation, and not efficient and effective in its focus. Recently, it has been found that this territorial system resembles too much the previous 'Concept of Territorial Defence' and, therefore, not applicable to the future NATO collective defence requirements. This kind of organisation cannot support developing of deployable, modernised forces, and it was recommended to adopt a new organisation and composition, with a smaller number of headquarters, less guardian—full time—brigades and less, but better trained reserve forces. It is quite possible that the unnecessary commands such as Navy and Air Forces Command will be abolished. Today the Navy is organised into the Navy Command, the Fleet and two naval sectors. The Air Force

consists of command, four air bases, one brigade, and several supporting units.

The main intent of the future force structure is to base it on operational capabilities reducing a multiplication of authorities/competence and unnecessary administration. This is also to optimise and integrate physically dispersed, but identical activities, and the squandering of already insufficient resources should be avoided.

Planning

The reform process is influenced by the PARP, the Individual Partnership Programme and the Partnership Goals (the number of which increased from 21 in 2001 to 48 this year, followed by an increased number of activities - 69 in 2001 to more than 360 in 2004). PARP has had an extremely important role in the preparation of Croatian units for NATO-led operations. It also exposes Croatian defence system, as a whole, to the interoperability requirements, having great effect on the most significant aspects

of the Croatian defence policy related to training and education, procurement and acquisition as well as resource management. Some of the key findings were immediately adopted⁸ and some are planned to be. Consequently, a Defence Review will serve as a basic guidance for the Long Term Development Plan (out to 2015) and will provide revised priorities for the modernisation of the Armed Forces.

Further, to foster improved planning and budgeting to meet requirements, the Minister of Defence signed into effect the new regulation formally implementing the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) in February 2003. In turn, the "PPBS Methodology" was adopted in July 2003, and the "Methodology of Planning in the CAF" was developed. Additionally, the "Annual Military Priorities" document was adopted in 2003. It defines priorities for planning and budgeting for the fiscal year 2004. Having gained experience in the development and implementation of the PPBS through co-operation with NATO members, the MoD is pioneering the introduction of this form of

planning and budgeting in Croatia. Success in the implementation of the PPBS will provide an extended long-term planning horizon and ensure a more realistic connection between the operational needs and the resources available.

Personnel Management

Currently, the programme of downsizing the number of personnel in the Croatian Armed Forces is the main project. This programme was initiated in October 2002, and proceeded throughout 2003. The intention of downsizing to the appropriate size of the military to the national security requirements are to be based on strategic assessments and a new organisational structure, and on savings of personnel costs— all directed toward modernisation of military capabilities and equipment. In addition to and in parallel with the restructuring, the personnel management system is internally re-evaluating its role and function to re-vamp the personnel management function, as it adjusts to the future demands. To

that end, personnel management is also evaluating and developing new proposals for enhancement of the officer and NCO professional education and development programme, the pay and benefits system, the officer evaluation and promotion system, the recruitment programme and quality of life enhancements, to attract and retain quality personnel. The end result is intended to be a more professional, capable and affordable military that is well trained and equipped to contribute to national security and, through the UN and NATO operations, to international security.

The personnel management system within the CAF and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia has focused in part on the role of improving interoperability with NATO forces, as well as various other Pfp goals. Criteria have been established to select, train and educate personnel to be involved in NATO/Pfp activities, as well as staff officers associated with the planning and co-ordination of such activities.

Significant improvements and changes in this regard have been achieved in the

officer, NCO and enlisted soldiers training systems, as well as the training of battalion and brigade staffs. Thus far, full level of compatibility with NATO standards has been achieved in the NCO support chain, thanks to continuous efforts in the development of the Armed Forces, and this system will continue to evolve even further.

The professional development system for active officers and NCOs is based on a 20-30 year service career. All officers and NCOs are given the opportunity, based on performance, to retire from military service as a captain, major, lieutenant colonel or colonel, or as an NCO, after 20 years of service. Active duty soldiers may be promoted to NCO if they meet criteria and are younger than 25, and/or to officer if they are younger than 30 – given that they meet civilian and military education requirements. Soldiers that are not promoted to NCO must retire at the age of 40. This system allows the maintenance of a satisfactory age structure in the armed forces.

In the period from December 2002 to the end of February 2003 all officers,

NCOs and soldiers were screened to determine who met the standards for retention. In February 2003, the MoD adopted the "Regulation on Selection and Posting of Active Military Personnel during the CAF Reorganisation". Posting priority was given to active military personnel meeting standards, then to those who had the potential and opportunity to meet standards. Some of those who did not and could not meet the standards were retained temporarily to fulfil the needs of the CAF. It is planned that until 2010 approximately 2000 of active duty personnel per year will be released from duty and replaced by 1000 newcomers.

The quality of personnel is essential in reaching the level of readiness needed by the CAF in order to carry out tasks for and contribute to the Alliance. Therefore, the personnel management system will remain in focus for the next several years, until the entire career path for the military, as well as for the civilian personnel employed in defence sector, is well established.

Modernisation

Croatian Armed Forces desperately need modernisation. Obsolete and non-standardised equipment, mostly captured during the war, has to be replaced with new, modern one. During previous years, this was not possible because of high personnel costs. The personnel expenses in 2002 amounted to almost 70% of the defence budget, which impeded effective development and modernisation of the CAF. The planned programme of downsizing will hopefully reduce personnel expenses to some 50% of the defence budget by 2010, releasing more funds for the desperately needed modernisation.

Today the key issues of modernisation and equipping are focussed on:

- Overhaul and upgrade of Mi-8 transport helicopters and PC-9 training aircraft.
- Integration of new FPS-117 air-surveillance and Peregrine coastal radars, acquisition of communications and fire control systems for artillery;

- Initiation of the armoured personnel carrier (APC) programme and possible continued slow-rate production of the M-84A4 tank;

- Continued re-equipping (interoperability) for units destined for overseas deployment, primarily at tactical level.⁹

The important issue is whether all the plans and proposals for modernising of the armed forces match the resources and whether the resources are, subsequently, spent for the purpose for which they were actually provided. Combining the introduction of the PPBS with the modernisation of the CAF is the main issue in the near future, after which personnel costs will also be balanced properly.

Cooperation

In terms of limited resources, emphasis is placed on areas where national requirements do overlap with international commitments. Currently, the CAF units are deployed on a number of the UN and other peace operations, including the

ISAF, in Afghanistan.¹⁰ Croatia has been especially active within the framework of initiatives and processes concerning Middle and South Eastern Europe (the Stability Pact, SEDM, CENCOOP, Quadrilateral (Italy, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia) and the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative), and has intensified activities related to full membership in the military element of the Quadrilateral MLF brigade.

Bilateral co-operation activities are conducted with the goal of supporting: interoperability with NATO; developing the defence system and CAF capabilities; facilitating defence transition; developing good neighbourly relations and regional co-operation; and enhancing international security through participation in international activities. Considering limited budget resources, bilateral activities that support more than one Partnership Goal receive priority. The most intensive bilateral defence co-operation is conducted with the US, the UK, Germany, France, Austria, Hungary and Slovenia. The number of activities has remained approximately the same, but emphasis has shifted

to activities directly contributing to defined international defence co-operation goals. Due to budget restrictions, a process has been introduced to define areas in which certain bilateral partners (especially NATO partners) can serve as “mentors”. The objective of this process is to avoid duplication of efforts, so that multiple partners do not provide assistance in the same areas of co-operation.

Unfortunately, the existing cooperation on the unit level cannot be considered satisfactory, especially in the light of cooperation agreed by the “Adriatic Charter”.¹¹ With the exception of the participation in PFP or similar exercises and MP platoon deployed in Afghanistan, the rest of the cooperation activities are conducted on an expert’s level.

Contribution

Croatia is currently working on the implementation of 48 Partnership Goals. From 2003, the Croatian Army is able to provide for participation in NATO/PFP exercises and operations: a light infantry

company (with the proper relief forces for rotation), a military police platoon (currently engaged in Afghanistan), an engineering platoon for de-mining, an NBC platoon for decontamination, as well as two medical support teams. Simultaneously, the equipping and preparations for logistics support of the PSO-declared units were completed. Maintaining the readiness of these units is ongoing, as well as the improvement of language skills for the selected personnel. New personnel, mostly NCOs, are selected and are in the preparation process for serving at the international military staffs.

The adoption of NATO documents, procedures and standards in the area of NBC defence started in 2003. It will continue in 2004, through unit training and mission preparation instruction provided by the International Military Operations Centre (IMOC). The objective of the CAF is to have all designated units engaged in NATO-led peace operations capable of meeting the basic standards of individual and collective NBC defence by the end of 2004.

Defence Review

A key approach for Croatia is to contribute to NATO and benefit from NATO membership. NATO interoperability is viewed as the basic principle to lead development of the CAF and capabilities for both national defence and international contributions. Thus, advancements in national defence capabilities and NATO membership requirements are mutually reinforcing goals. Simultaneously, these advancements contribute to regional and international security and stability.

Taking into consideration the balance of national requirements and requirements ensuing from future membership in NATO and the EU, the DR will determine options for achieving defence capabilities and the affordability of each option. It will redefine the present strategic defence concept, redirect its focus from individual to collective defence, and provide the basis for further changes in the defence system, including the CAF struc-

ture, command and management structures of the MoD and the Joint Staff. A key factor is the ability of the proposed CAF structure to fulfil responsibilities derived from membership in the Alliance. The Review will also address issues such as the size, training, equipping and infrastructure related to reserve forces, and the type of forces (contracted, conscripted, or some combination of both).

The Defence Review is to be conducted by the MoD, with expert assistance and co-operation from the international community, and, domestically, by academic experts and other ministries, and they will complete the final recommendations in 2004. The expected outcomes of the DR, as an excellent vehicle to overcome diagnosed shortfalls of the Croatian Defence System, are:

- Clear definition of missions, capabilities and priorities
- Easier and faster adjustment to the new strategic circumstances
- Better rationale behind decision making in terms of missions, priorities and resources

- End of “crisis management” practice
- Affordability, transparency and reliability¹²

Hopefully, similar process will become a regular practice in the future as a tool intended for a more realistic linkage between tasks and resources.

Conclusion

A continued defence reform is a necessity for Croatia to meet the demand for modern armed forces without the creation of any overwhelming burden onto the state economy. Furthermore, there is an urgent need to invest in modernisation and acquisition of new military equipment, facilitating execution of the armed forces mission. Downsizing the personnel will provide for smaller personnel costs, and release more resources needed for modernisation. These reforms are necessitated by the future NATO membership. With the progress of implementation of the Partnership Goals and supported by the results of ongoing reorganisation, increasing cooperation on

unit level is expected. The development of a modern approach to the planned tasks of the unit, and to equipping and manning will have direct impacts on capabilities of the CAF to contribute to the international operations.

The process of reforms itself is to be emphasised; comprehensive reforms encompassing a rational, holistic and long-term perspective are a must. The reform is a process of permanent analysis of the shortfalls of the previous reforms, with the purpose of improvement in the light of the development of more efficient armed forces, and should be considered as consistently driven by long-term plans and visions. The dynamics of changes in the environment and an accession to NATO require that part of the existing strategic documents and legal regulations are taken into consideration and revised, as well as new supporting documents are produced. The ongoing reforms of today within the CAF are very much in line with this comprehensive perspective, however are to be followed up by appropriate reviewing tools.

The Republic of Croatia has reached a point where it has to thoroughly review its defence system in order to define the role and capabilities the armed forces shall maintain and can afford. Until now, no such review of the CAF has been conducted. In order to get the maximum benefit from the reforms the DR must consider the structure and type of forces, their capability and the reserve component usage. This is also required when defining the size and force capability to deploy for a full spectrum of NATO missions.

The latest reform is not the last one the CAF will pass through. It is positive to see development of the forces as a permanent process of reform to ensure the adequate legal base, efficient planning system, appropriate management of personnel and budget, technical modernisation and proper assessment of possible shortfalls as a tool for future improvements, all in order to contribute to collective security within the EU and NATO. And once such cycle planning - funding - implementation - assessment - improvement is

reached, it must be maintained as a process in which the whole society will be informed about and integrated in. A comprehensive reform like this, interacting actively with society, is a vital interest of the defence forces, and without the support from society it will not succeed its mission.

¹ The adoption of a package of strategic documents and laws in the area of national security and defence should be regarded a major development in 2002. These are: National Security Strategy, Defence Strategy, Defence Law, Law on the Service in the Armed Forces, Law on the Production, Repairment and Trafficking of Weapons and Military Equipment and the Law on the Participation of Members of Croatian Armed Forces in Peace Support Operations Abroad.

² The President of the Republic of Croatia signed 'Military Strategy' in 2003 (based on the Chief of the Joint Staff recommendation and Minister of Defence approval). Based on it, the MoD developed "Defence Policy 2003/04" and "CAF Vision 2014" as leading short and long term planning documents.

³ Mahecic, Zvonimir; "Aspiring to NATO membership", NATO Review, Winter 2003, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue4/english/special.html>

⁴ The President, as the supreme commander,

signs principal decisions regulating the Armed Forces. Under the Defence Law of 2002, the Prime Minister, through the Defence Minister in peacetime, is responsible for the day-to-day management of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence. In peacetime, the Chief of the Joint Staff reports – through the Defence Minister – to the President. In wartime or crisis, the President can exercise command of the Armed Forces directly through the Chief of the Joint Staff, keeping the Defence Minister and government informed.

⁵ http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0211-prague/in_focus/capabilities/index.htm

⁶ 1st around Zagreb, 3rd around Osijek to the East, 4th around Split to the south and 5th north of Zadar - around Rijeka on the coast

⁷ See: *Novi list*, Rijeka, 14 January 2003. (<http://www.novolist.hr/>)

⁸ Alike in the area of modernisation of MiG-21 and M-84A4 tank production it was found that could not be considered as priority because they are rapidly becoming outdated in the sense of the modern battle-space and its operational requirements.

⁹ Watkins, Dr Amadeo, *PfP Integration: Croatia, Serbia & Montenegro*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, April 2004, p 9

¹⁰ Currently Croatia has just over 60 troops deployed abroad on 7 peace operations, including some 35 military police and NSE personnel with ISAF IV in Afghanistan. See: *Jutarnji list*, 2 January 2004. Some new missions are recently offered for military observers' participation

(Burundi, Haiti, and Cyprus) and some are under consideration (Sudan, Ivory Coast).

¹¹ On May 2, 2003 in Tirana was signed "Adriatic Charter" among foreign ministers of Albania, Croatia, Macedonia and USA, a document in spirit of 1998 signed "Baltic Charter" among Baltic states and USA, with similar purpose. Charter emphasised what has been told briefly to this states during the Prague summit - that cooperation among them same as with neighbouring countries Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Serbia and Montenegro will be one of the crucial measurement of contribution.

¹² Source: Briefing to the members of NATO Parliamentary Assembly during their visit to Croatia on March 2004, given by Dr Jelena Grèiæ Poliaæ, Head of MoD Defence Policy Division

Section V

EU Enlargement and New Members

EU25 > 15+10

By Kristiina Ojuland*

I want to discuss the imminent enlargement, as well as the future, of the European Union from the Estonian perspective. I would like to stress in advance, however, that although Estonia's and Britain's place in the enlarged European Union differs significantly, our vision about the future of the Union coincides in many important respects. An eloquent proof of this was the article on taxation in the European Union, co-authored by the British and Estonian prime ministers, Tony Blair and Juhan Parts, which was published last November in *The Financial Times*.

I also have a personal example of our common perceptions. It is well known, that at one of the European Council sum-

mits, Mr Jacques Chirac, President of France, represented Germany. It is less well known, however, that during one of the sessions of the Intergovernmental Conference last year, the foreign minister of Estonia represented the United Kingdom. Similarly I had the honour of representing my Latvian colleague at the EU meeting with US Secretary of State Colin Powell. Representing each other at meetings is symbolic of the reality of today's Europe. European integration is not confined to institutions, it also includes shared visions. Although, there have recently been concerns about the possibility, that different interests of Member States might have a negative effect on the future and unity of the enlarged Euro-

pean Union, the overriding common national interest of all of us – old and new, big and small countries alike – is the same: we want ourselves and others to enjoy peace, stability, and prosperity. We believe that the best way to achieve this is through the enlarged European Union. We want European integration to succeed.

The political and economic implications of the enlargement are obvious – twenty-five European countries acting as one, in the international arena, is a force with considerably more weight than the sum total of twenty-five individual countries. Europe must be strong, in order to achieve its goals in many areas.

An enlarged Europe will also benefit European culture as a whole. Pluralism

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and cultural diversity has made Europe so successful in the past, and will provide a great potential also for the future.

It goes without saying, however, that the upcoming enlargement also poses several obvious challenges for both current members and Acceding Countries, as well as the European Union as a whole. The founding members have half a century of experience in European integration, and have seen how the three previous enlargements in the history of the European Union have changed the Union, in more or less, dramatic ways. The first enlargement, three decades ago, added three countries – Britain, Denmark, and Ireland. While the founding members intended to create a political community, of which the economic communities were the first step, the three new members placed a greater emphasis on the economic aspect of the community. The tension between these two visions has been present ever since, and is still important to the debates concerning the future of the European Union today. The accession of Greece, Spain, and Portugal, two decades ago, also

shifted priorities significantly, and led to the development of a cohesion policy, but also to the increased budgetary tensions between richer and poorer members of the European Union. The accession of relatively wealthier Austria, Finland, and Sweden, a decade ago, added the northern dimension to the Union, and brought along a greater focus on social and environmental issues.

The enlargement, which takes place in May, however, is particularly dramatic. And not only because of its “big bang” nature. Above all, it has a powerful symbolic meaning. The membership of ten new countries, to the east and the south, touches the “collective psyche” of Europe. This enlargement erases the dividing line that was drawn during the Cold War between Eastern and Western Europe.

The continuation of the Cold War division, into the 21st century, is unthinkable and morally unjustifiable. For the countries that are involved in enlargement, it concludes the process of European reunification, which was launched, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the

collapse of Communist regimes in Europe. It can be said, that for at least eight countries, the Cold War will truly come to an end on 1 May 2004, when they rejoin the rest of Europe after more than six decades of forced and artificial separation.

What could be the most immediate challenges that the enlarged Union might have to face? An obvious one is a change in the borders of the Union. This means new neighbours, and hence, a need for new policies, for dealing with them. This is where the experience and the know-how of new members can be particularly useful. It is also clear, that the ongoing enlargement will be accompanied with changes in the decision-making process of the European Union, as well as, within its institutional structure, a matter currently debated at the Intergovernmental Conference.

The functioning of the Union after enlargement means, that the priorities of, not fifteen, but twenty-five Member States, have to be reconciled. It also entails the coordinating of the external priorities of an increased number of countries. This

has posed a challenge already for the fifteen current members, as was evident last year in the case of Iraq. Obviously, the Union must make its institutions more efficient, so as to be able to cope with the arising situations. The balance between small and big states, as well as, between the net contributors and net recipients from the EU budget, will also change considerably.

These challenges, however, are not essentially new in the history of the European Union, and are clearly outweighed by the long-term benefits of the reunification of Europe, the word that I would particularly want to emphasise. The enlargement in May makes Europe – or at least most of it – a whole again, after so many decades of artificial division. Europe would not be the same without Budapest and Prague, which have been the heart of Europe for centuries, or without the Hanseatic towns of Tallinn and Riga. The Baltic Sea was Europe's true mare nostrum during the times of the Hanseatic League – a unifying, not dividing sea – and is becoming one again.

European integration worked for Western Europe both in terms of economic reconstruction as well as the creation of post-war peace and stability after various decades dominated by nationalism, totalitarian ideologies, and tensions between countries. It led to prosperity, completely different political agenda and changed system of inter-state relations.

The genius of Jean Monnet and the Schuman plan will work for the new members as well. The preparation for accession has been a motor of transformation and has undoubtedly contributed to stability and prosperity in Europe as a whole. In Estonia, we started our transformation in the early 1990s at a time when we did not expect to join the European Economic Community in the near future. In retrospect, we did many things right but it was only in the accession negotiations that we realized how much work we still had ahead of us. Without the prospect of European integration, we would not have achieved as much as we have today. And without integration, today's Europe would be a worse place than it is today.

Security in Europe is indivisible and the enlargement of the European Union extends the model of stability and prosperity that has worked so well in the West.

The economic dimension of the enlargement is most evident and discernible. European integration is a long-term process where we must, mutually, discuss all possible options, and ultimately implement everything that all members have agreed upon. The agreement to pursue economic integration has worked very well; – the reunification of Europe extends the single market. This contributes to the goal of transforming the European Union into the most competitive economy in the world. Enlargement adds almost eighty million new citizens to the European Union, which is a significant contribution to the Union's labour force. This is particularly important, considering that the population of Europe, as a whole, has been decreasing and aging constantly, which has an adverse effect upon the region's competitiveness.

And now, a few words about the future of the European Union from the Es-

tonian perspective. Membership in the European Union, as well as in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, has been the main priority of Estonian foreign policy since the country regained its independence in 1991. Pan-European ideas in Estonia are, however, much older than that. Noor Eesti (Young Estonia), a significant literary movement, which influenced 20th century Estonian thinking, called for "becoming European, but remaining Estonian", already a hundred years ago. One of the major proponents of the Pan-European movement in Estonia, during the 1920s, Kaarel Robert Pusta, the one time Estonian foreign minister and ambassador to France, argued in 1929, echoing the ideas of count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, that "everything that strengthens the unity of Europe, also provides security for our [...] independence."

In November 1995, Estonia submitted its European Union membership application, and in 1997 received invitation, along with several other states with the same aspirations, to start accession negotiations. This process began, in March

1998, in Brussels, and was concluded in Copenhagen, in December 2002. The Accession Treaty was signed, last year, in Athens, on April 16. A correspondingly successful referendum on EU accession was held in Estonia on September 14, 2003.

It must be emphasised, however, that - like in Britain's case - Estonian support for European integration has not been unconditional. The average Estonian has been cautious, as was indicated by the accession referendum. The referendum ultimately resulted in a "yes" vote, with 67 percent of the voters being for the accession. But this support was relatively low, compared with most other Acceding Countries.

Due to our recent history, the question of true Estonian sovereignty has played a central role in the debates concerning our European integration. This, I think, is a core question for Europe as a whole. Does European integration mean a transfer, or delegation, or pooling of sovereignty? Some of the answers, to these questions, may lie in the familiar social contract theory, the main philosophical

justification for the existence of the "state".

The concept of a social contract entails the giving away of some of our freedoms, so that, everybody can equally benefit from the rewards of cooperation. It might be said, that the European Union is the social contract, which binds the peoples of Europe. We pool some of our sovereignty, and that is precisely, what makes coexistence, not just possible, but also beneficial. This is, yet, one more argument for the advantages that the European Union, of twenty-five members, has, over twenty-five individual countries.

It is rarely mentioned, that the European Union can also delegate some of its sovereignty to international organizations. One of the initial reasons for drafting the Constitutional Agreement was, to enable the Union to accede to the Council of the Europe Human Rights Convention. It is the essence of modern international relations to work together to solve common problems.

The European Union, which Estonia is about to join, is a constantly developing organisation. After signing the Acces-

sion Treaty, Estonia was granted observer status. This gave us the right to participate in the work of the Council of the European Union at all decision-making levels. Estonia has made definite use of these opportunities. Within the framework of the consultation process, we have participated in the ongoing general procedures, so that, our interests would be taken into consideration, as the new European Union legislation is being drafted. Especially, when it comes to taxation, environmental, domestic, judicial, and energy matters Estonia has also actively participated in formulating the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The enlargement of the European Union, and the more thorough integration, which accompanies this process, makes it essential, that institutional and procedural changes are made. A noteworthy achievement is, no doubt, the fact that both the Member States as well as the Acceding Countries are unanimous concerning the need to make the European Union legislative process, as a whole, public and

more comprehensible for the citizens of Europe.

Estonia supports the development of the European Union, as a union of states, in which the equal treatment of all members is assured. This has always been one of the European Union's basic principles, and must also be maintained in the future.

After the European Council held on 12-13 December and the failure to conclude the Intergovernmental Conference, some founding members of the European Union, have resuscitated the old idea of "two-speed Europe," distinguishing between the "core Europe" characterised by increased integration, and the rest. There have even been suggestions that the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union could be adopted only by a selected number of Member States. Other terms like "pioneer" and "avant-garde group" have also been used.

Such distinctions are, to my mind, counter-productive and politically dangerous. "Core Europe" can, in essence, be interpreted as protectionist, encapsulating, and exclusivist. A distinction of this kind

does not contribute to the dynamic development of Europe. Quite the contrary - it even threatens to slow it down. Steady progress of reforms is, however, of vital importance in the situation where the population of Europe is aging and thereby, the competitiveness of Europe is decreasing. The concept of an enlarged Europe, which entails unity, rather than division, is, to unite us, rather than to create new divisions. Possibilities for closer co-operation already exist in the current treaties. There are successful examples, such as the Economic and Monetary Union and Schengen. But closer co-operation has to be flexible and adjustable to the needs of Member States in different policy areas.

In spite of the considerable progress achieved during the Italian Presidency at the Intergovernmental Conference, there are a few big issues - the matter of qualified majority voting in particular - and several smaller ones, that still need to be agreed upon. Recent developments give hope that reaching consensus is possible, and that the IGC probably can be completed during the Irish Presidency.

I would also like to add a few words about the Estonian perspective on the European Union's common foreign and security policy. As far as the Union's external relations are concerned, Estonia totally shares the majority of the other Member States' conviction, that the European Union's international role needs to be increased. There exists a significant potential for this, considering that the collective opinion, and the joint actions of twenty-five states, carry much more weight than the simple sum of the actions of individual states.

We support the new European Neighbourhood Policy and in particular the "New Neighbours" initiative, and are ready to actively develop relations with the European Union's Eastern next-door neighbours, as well as to participate – both financially and with intellectual capital – in the cooperation projects aimed at the Western Balkan states. We already have experience with carrying out bilateral development cooperation with several of the Western Balkan states. After accession to the European Union we can even bet-

ter contribute to the international efforts to help these states. This is significant for all of Europe. Just as stability in Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova augments security in the whole Europe. Various policies aimed at both the South Caucasus states and the "New Neighbours" are still being formulated in the European Union, thus giving Estonia and other new members a chance to contribute with their particular historical experience and know-how to this effort.

Estonia is also committed to the development of the Barcelona process and close partnership of the EU with its Mediterranean neighbours. It is important to look for ways to establish in foreseeable future a free trade area of the countries of the Southern Mediterranean.

The European Union's partnership with Russia is of great importance. We will contribute to the development of this partnership and also continue bilateral cross-border cooperation with neighbouring regions of Russia. In less than a month's time presidential elections will be held in Russia. We are following the

developments in Russia closely. Like all the Member States and Acceding Countries Estonia underlines the importance of the extension by Russia of the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation agreement from May 1.

In our view the European Union should be careful, however, in extending cooperation in the area of defence policy, as this could unnecessarily duplicate the cooperation in the NATO framework and have negative implications for the existing transatlantic security structure. In this respect our position is very similar to that of the United Kingdom. Regarding the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), Estonia supports in principle the strengthening of the Union's capabilities. We appreciate the EU and NATO agreement – Berlin Plus – that enables the European Union, within the framework of the so-called Petersberg tasks, to also carry out military operations. The further development of the ESDP, however, should not cause a weakening of the transatlantic link or duplicate NATO. Strong transatlantic cooperation between Europe and

the United States is of utmost importance for global security. We see NATO as the only credible guarantee of collective security in Europe, and the ESDP thus as an addition to NATO.

Among the most important endeavours of European integration are the increased efficiency and competitiveness of the European economy with a strong internal market. In order to revitalize the European economy, it is important that all Member States follow the conditions imposed on their fiscal policy by the Stability and Growth Pact. Even further liberalization of markets and maximization of the potential of all Member States rather than suffocating it with red tape is also of particular importance. Estonia has been in the forefront among Acceding Countries in this respect. According to the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report, in 2003 Estonia ranked 22nd with its growth competitiveness index, ahead of seven EU Member States. Of the Acceding Countries, only Malta did better.

Efficiency and increased competitiveness are the core of the so-called Lisbon

strategy and Estonian priorities coincide to a large extent with the measures that the Irish Presidency is undertaking to implement the strategy. Among these are creating more employment in Europe, investment in human resources, life-long learning, and the promotion of environmentally safe technologies.

In addition, to secure economic growth in Europe and increase its competitiveness, research and development and scientific innovations should be prioritised even more. Increased attention has to be paid to the development of information and communication as well the so-called frontier technologies, biotechnology in particular. Estonia is among the most successful Acceding Countries also in this respect. The information technology report by Harvard University from 2002, for example, gave the ICT development in Estonia the 23rd ranking among 75 countries surveyed. Estonia was the only CEE country among the top 25 and will take this innovative and cutting-edge approach along to the European Union.

The basis for the success of the European Union has been the capability of uniting very different states into a functioning mechanism, and thereby generating development and growth. It has been characterized as the “most successful union of countries in the history of mankind” that has set an example for other communities in different parts of the world.

The enlargement on 1 May will add ten new members to the European Union. This is not integration for the sake of integration but a process that will bring very real benefits for everyone. It creates the surplus value of prosperity and security that the divided Europe would not be able to provide.

Estonian Security Perceptions in the Context of EU Enlargement: A Critical Discussion

By Steffen B. Rasmussen*

Since the end of the atrocities of World War II the process of European integration has been motivated primarily by security concerns. The means dictated by the bipolar structure of the International system were economic integration, but the ends were to avoid another war in Western Europe. Viewed in this perspective, the European integration project has been an enormous success, since it has not only prevented war in Europe, but led to the emergence of a security community where the threat or use of armed force has become utterly

unthinkable. Contrary to what might seem logical, the EC has influenced the security in Europe by dealing with more or less everything but security and military issues. In other words, the relations between the Member States of the EU were de-securitized by the creation of economic interdependence and effectively excluding security concerns from the discourse of the cooperation.

In the same way, the 2004 EU enlargement to the east is primarily about security. In Estonia both the EU and NATO membership debates have evolved largely

around security concerns. This makes Estonia an interesting case since in previous enlargements the acceding countries tended to focus on the economic gains of EU membership. Estonia is set to receive net roughly 700 million euro in the period of 2004–2006. This makes the overwhelming focus on security even more interesting. Considering the history of Estonia as a very small country being ruled for most of its history by foreign powers, it cannot surprise that a feeling of vulnerability in Estonia leads to an intense focus on how to maintain

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the security and independence of the country. But considering the status of the concept of security in the academic debate as an essentially contested concept, meaning that there is little agreement about what security is, it seems odd that using the concept in arguments about EU membership is regarded as straightforward and unproblematic in Estonia. Furthermore, when considering the very different historical and political contexts of Estonia and Western Europe one might question whether the security concept of Estonia and the security logics of European integration are compatible to an extent that enlargement of the EU to include, among others, Estonia is also straightforward and unproblematic in terms of security.

In this essay I will seek to discuss the Estonian security concept in the context of EU enlargement. Because of the massive scale of the enlargement, it influences not only the new member states, but fundamentally changes relationships across Europe. I will therefore discuss the Estonian security concept not only in rela-

tion to Estonian membership of the EU, but also in the context of EU enlargement in general.

Since security is an ambiguous term, I shall, in the next section, attempt to reach a definition of security, which will then form the basis of the ensuing discussion. The discussion is structured into three sections. The first investigates the link between state sovereignty, national identity and the Estonian security concept. This section also includes considerations about the role of the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia. The second section considers the role of Russia and how Russia is constructed as being both Estonia's 'other' and fundamentally different from Europe, and how enlargement challenges this construction. In the third section the discussion turns to the expansion of the concept of security and the notion of 'hard' and 'soft' security. The argument is that the reliance on the 'hard/soft' dichotomy has repercussions for the understanding of the EU security logic. The essay will end with some concluding remarks.

The concept of security

This outline of the concept of security serves to clarify, what is meant by the Estonian security concept, which is the object of the study. As the topic of this essay suggests, what is studied is not Estonian security in the sense of objectively identifiable threats and corresponding security policies, but rather the meaning the concept itself is given. The starting point of this study is a subjectivist understanding of security, meaning that what security is cannot be decided objectively by the analyst. Instead, what constitutes security is decided by an inter-subjective understanding among humans. The subjectivist approach to security is widely associated with the Copenhagen School of security studies, which is epitomised by the works of Ole Wæver. His approach to security will be briefly outlined in the following¹ since it constitutes a coherent subjectivist approach to security that will serve as the theoretical foundation of this essay.

Starting from the premise that security, like other social phenomena, is socially constructed, Wæver argues that what should be studied is the ideational phenomenon of security. In other words, it is the construction of security that should be studied rather than its contents, since universal attributes of the form of security will be constant regardless of the contextual substance, which may vary. This makes a debate over which parts material reality should be taken into account of superfluous, i.e. the debate over whether security is only about military and defence or if security is also about economy, the environment etc. When security is not objectively identifiable, it also entails a shift in epistemology from rationalist positivism to interpretative analysis, which will be employed in this essay.

To decide what security is in a particular context, Wæver argues that the meaning of a concept is decided by the way people use it, regardless of what their intentions are with the usage. Security, thus, is a discursive practise; a specific way of framing an issue. This specific way is termed securitisation, where an actor iden-

tifies a referent object that is existentially threatened by a specific threat. That one actor frames an issue as a security issue does, however powerful the actor concerned, not alone make it a security issue. It must be accepted as such by the audience to which the speech-act of securitisation is directed. This makes security a shared understanding. This said, not all actors are equally powerful in this respect. Those speaking or behalf of a large group, or those who are in a position of authority, will find it easier to get acceptance from the audience, thus successfully securitising the given issue. This power-holder bias, which is inherent in the theorising, means that the study should focus mainly on the speech-acts of the elite.² Here, it is beneficial to imagine a continuum on which an issue might be positioned, ranging from non-politicised (the issue is not on the political agenda), through politicised (the issue is being dealt with through normal political procedures) to securitised (the issue assumes primacy over other issues). Securitisation, seen this way, means moving the issue from non-politicised or politicised

to securitised with the securitised issues then constituting security.

To structure the discussion, the heuristic categorisation of issues into different sectors, established on the basis of discursive commonalities, will be applied.³ This means viewing military, political, economic, societal and environmental security issues not as different kinds of security, but as sectors of security into which securitisations can be grouped for reasons of clarity.

Drawing on the above conceptualisation of security, I now move on to analyse the social construction of Estonian security. From an investigation of which threats to which referent objects are successfully securitised in the Estonian security discourse as it is played out in the media and academia, I shall arrive at an overall picture, the Estonian security perception and discuss this in the EU context.

State sovereignty and national identity

This section contains three sub-sections. I shall analyse, first, fundamental

aspects of the Estonian security perception and how these are expressed in the EU membership debate. Next, I will outline the EU context, and thereafter move on to discuss the Estonian security concept in the context of the EU enlargement.

The history of the Estonian people as a coherent group inhabiting the territory of present day Estonia stretches back to the 12th century.⁴ Nevertheless, the territory of present day Estonia has been ruled by foreigners throughout history. Estonian independence followed after a bloody war in the wake of the October Revolution and the (temporary) collapse of imperial Russia. The period of independence lasted only until 1940 when Estonia was incorporated into the Soviet Union. Still, the period of independence has had a profound impact on the Estonia that regained its independence in 1991 from the Soviet Union. Estonia merely restored its statehood after 51 years of Soviet occupation. This meant focusing on re-establishing the legal and territorial features of inter-war Estonia, with the only

foreign policy objective being the independence and sovereignty of Estonia. This geo-political and essentially realist thinking led to border disputes with Russia, since the territory of the Estonian Soviet Republic was not identical to that of inter-war Estonia.⁵ In terms of citizenship, this was awarded to citizens of the inter-war republic and their descendants only, turning the Russian-speaking residents of Estonia (35% of the total population⁶) into aliens, since these had largely come to Estonia during the Soviet era. The historical experience of two Russian occupations and the small size of the state left a feeling of vulnerability and insecurity permeating Estonian society.⁷ The main threat securitised was an outright Russian invasion, evident from the security policy guidelines of 1996: "The main sources of danger threatening state security are aggressive imperial aspirations and political and/or military instability".⁸ This should be seen in the light of the continued presence of Russian troops on Estonian territory until 1994 and the outstanding border dispute which meant that Es-

tonia made demands on territory de facto part of Russia.

Even though the security definition has been expanded since the mid 1990's from only being about military security, a central concept in contemporary Estonian security discourse remains that of sovereignty. In contemporary Estonia, state sovereignty is also constructed to mean security of the Estonian nation.⁹ This is evident in the preamble of the Estonian constitution. It mentions as the primary responsibility of the state to "guarantee the preservation of the Estonian nation and culture through the ages".¹⁰ This means that the central mission of the state is to secure the Estonian nation and that the absolute sovereignty of the state becomes essential for the survival of the nation.¹¹ From a study of the minority legislation and integration policy of Estonia, it is possible to conclude that the state through legislation has effectively assured that citizenship and socio-economic integration can only happen through linguistic and cultural assimilation.¹² To be a subject of the

state thus requires membership of the nation.

But in the Estonian discourse, 'nation' is not an exclusively cultural term, as it is expressed in the constitution, but also refers to the biology of the ethnic Estonians.¹³ The link between state sovereignty and survival of the nation is further strengthened by a close link between the nation and Estonian territory, to which ethnic Estonians have a special right due to their long-term settlement here.

The Estonian nation in terms of cultural identity as well as the state, geopolitically, is in the security discourse constructed as being permanently in danger of assimilation and extinction.¹⁴ Here, the historical and geographical context of being a small people inhabiting a small territory comes into the picture. The sheer size of the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia means that Russian-speakers cannot be easily assimilated into the nation. Thus, no permanent solutions to the Russian threat are articulated.

The Estonian close linkage of state, territory and nation is thus a good example

of the theoretical category of a primal nation-state, where the nation precedes the state, and where the purpose of the state is to protect and express the nation.¹⁵ These close linkages between state sovereignty, territory and national identity are of decisive impact on the concept of security and do not leave much room for Russian-speakers, who are considered alien both to the national identity, the territory and the state.

***The Estonian EU membership
debate***

In the Estonian EU debate 'euroskeptics' securitised membership of the EU as a threat. The strict conditions of accessions to the EU involved a relaxation of citizenship laws and guaranteeing the rights of the Russian-speaking minority. The loss of the right of the state to decide over issues concerning the Estonian nation essentially questions the whole construction of both the Estonian state and the Estonian nation as a primal nation-state. Therefore, EU membership is heavily

securitised, because by questioning the direct link between state and nation, it threatens both, since the two depend on each other. In this line of argument, the fusion of state sovereignty and national identity into one single referent object for security is evident. The extensive securitisation stems also from the feeling of vulnerability and being permanently threatened by extinction. This gives rise to issues of Estonian identity being viewed in terms of either/or: Either the state preserves the biological and cultural continuity of the Estonian nation, or the nation will dissolve in larger flows.

But in the anti-EU discourse it is not primarily integration in general that is constructed as a threat to the nation, but Russia and the Russian-speakers.¹⁶ This is due to three factors. First, their presence on Estonian soil weakens the link between state territoriality and nation, which is the foundation of the primal nation-state. Second, their integration is framed as an existential threat to Estonian culture, if integration means anything short of linguistic, cultural and eventually biological

assimilation. Third, they are seen as an embodiment of the Soviet regime with its russification policies.¹⁷ Some even go as far as arguing that the EU accession demands are part of a Russian plot: "Russia is waiting to ambush not from Ivangorod, like in the Middle Ages, but from Brussels."¹⁸ Consequently, in the debate about the loss of sovereignty as a result of EU membership, by some observers the EU is seen to run Russia's errands and the EU is equated to Russia, working together against Estonia.¹⁹ The EU is seen not as a direct threat to the Estonian nation. It is framed as a threat to state sovereignty, which then leads to a growing Russian threat to the nation.

The official, pro-EU rhetoric also frames the EU membership in terms of sovereignty and security. While the euroskeptics see a loss of sovereignty as a direct threat to the security of both the Estonian state and nation, in this perspective a loss of sovereignty is seen as a necessary evil to achieve enhanced security through modifying the power asymmetry vis-à-vis Russia. Because it is a condition for EU mem-

bership, the required citizenship and minority rights legislation must be adopted, because membership enhances Estonian security more than it threatens it. The further argument is that the internal stability of the state is increased by having the EU as a guarantor of the rights of the minority instead of the Estonian state, which should reassure the Russian-speaking minority. Increased stability of the state then again means increased ability to protect the Estonian nation in the long term. Another version of the argument is that EU membership increases the security of the national identity through guaranteeing the survival of the Estonian language and culture. It thereby also strengthens Estonian independence, meaning sovereignty of the state.²⁰ In terms of sovereignty, EU membership is seen as a bulwark against wider processes of globalisation, and EU membership thus becomes a prerequisite for the existence of the Estonian state.

The state-building taking place from the 1990's onwards was from the very beginning taking place alongside Euro-

pean integration, to an extent that integration into the EU has also become an element in the state-building itself. In 1997 Estonian president Meri expressed the phenomenon: "Estonia integrates with Europe and therefore Estonia is a state".²¹ This same view of EU enlargement as a means for Estonia to consolidate rather than lose its sovereignty is put forth in the National Security Concept.²²

The debate about membership of the EU has brought out in the open various aspects of the Estonian security concept, not least due to the fact that the debate has largely evolved around security concerns, with extensive and contradictory securitisation taking place. The general picture is that the discourse has been dominated by the pro-EU arguments, because the Estonian elite are almost exclusively for EU membership, arguing partly from a geopolitical standpoint.²³ However, the security arguments against EU membership are not only the views of a few radicals, but are put forth both in mainstream media²⁴ and in the parliament, mainly by the nationalist Pro Patria Union.

As seen above, the notion of sovereignty has been central in the arguments for the security implications of EU membership with extensive securitisation taking place. The securitisation of both state sovereignty and national identity has been the basis of both pro-EU and contra-EU arguments. In spite of the different views on EU membership, virtually all actors frame the issue as a security issue drawing on the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty is universally seen as an ideal, with arguments ranging from the securitisation of sovereignty itself to arguments that sovereignty can only be compromised if it increases security (and thereby again independence and thus sovereignty). Another central feature of the security discourse is the universal acceptance of the close link between state sovereignty, national identity and territory. This means that threats to state sovereignty in the political or military sector are also seen as cultural threats to national identity in the societal sector. International cooperation is seen as means to an end, which primarily remains the defence of state sovereignty

and national identity and the link between them.²⁵

The EU context

That EU enlargement has revealed, or even reinforced, a close link between state sovereignty and national identity that has subsequently been securitised is a bit of a paradox, when considering the security logic underlying and legitimising the EU. The analysis by the 'founding fathers' of the EU concluded that the cause of the Second World war was not the evil nature of Germany or the breakdown of the system of a balance of power. Instead, the anarchic inter-state system of sovereign nation-states was seen as the cause itself. The idea of European integration as a large-scale peace project to address the problem is dominating the European security discourse also today.²⁶ Enlargement in this perspective then becomes an enlargement of the zone where a Kantian rather than a Lockean logic dominates inter-state relations.²⁷

The notion of the EU as a peace project is the foundation in the European identity

formation process. Here, common European values and norms are referred to. But more interesting, the 'other' used to define the 'us' is not other actors, be it Russians, Asians, Muslims etc. Instead, the 'other' in the European identity formation process, and the very *raison d'être* of the EU, is Europe's own past of warfare among sovereign states. This view is apparent not only in the core countries of Germany and France, but also dominates the discourse in the United Kingdom²⁸ as well as in other member states.

The implications of the historical context of European integration for the present security discourse is that what is securitised as a threat to Europe is the return to the inter-state security logics of the past. The main threat to the EU is thus constructed as fragmentation of the EU to which continued integration is the proper response.

The Estonian security conception in the EU context

Epitomising the difference between the Estonian security concept and the EU se-

curity concept is the view on the historical period between the two World Wars. In the Estonian concept, this is the Golden Age, where the cultural identity of the Estonian nation for the first time found its natural political expression in an independent and ethnically relatively homogenous sovereign nation-state.²⁹ In the EU security discourse, the inter-war period is constructed as the Dark Age, where the clash of Westphalian states in an international system characterised by the logic of sovereignty led to the atrocities of World War II.

In the Estonian security concept, the construction of the state as a natural expression of the nation means that the sovereignty of the state is closely linked to the security of the national identity. State sovereignty and national identity are thus fused into a single referent object of security whose intrinsic right to survival must be protected, even by extraordinary measures. The EU discourse constructs national and political identities as separate through stressing the diversity of the members of the EU while at the same time pursuing

political unification. National identities thus remain what they are, while a political identity is forged at the European level.³⁰ The logic of the EU is thus to decouple culture and national identity from territoriality and sovereignty and desecuritize the links. The difference is also apparent in the nature of the anti-EU discourse. In Estonia the EU is constructed as a threat to a great extent because its impingement on state sovereignty means that the nation becomes threatened by Russia and the Russian-speaking minority. Thus, Russia is securitized as a threat to the nation, not primarily the EU itself. Anti-EU discourse in the EU-15 also frames the EU as threat to national identity, but without coupling this to the sovereignty of the state.³¹

On the contrary, in the EU discourse the Westphalian order system that the Estonian ideal of unqualified national sovereignty would give rise to, is precisely what is securitized as a threat to Europe as such. However, as Estonia is consolidated as a state and the feeling of vulnerability of the Estonian nation subsides,

as it is supposed to with EU membership in the arguments of the pro-EU elite, the nationalist securitisation of state and nation might gradually decline. In general, periods of transition tends to increase the perception of security risks.³² On the other hand, the continued Russian framing of security in Westphalian terms might reinforce the similar traits of the Estonian security conception.

Russia and the European Union

In the previous section I focused on the Estonian securitisation of state sovereignty and national identity. The aim was to show how the basic notions of state and nation are constructed as prerequisites of one another and how they, via the notion of sovereignty, were closely linked referent objects in the security debate about EU membership. The debate was here whether EU membership would impinge on the sovereignty of Estonia and whether it would thereby constitute a threat or a solution to the Russian threat. I argued that the historical context of

Russian occupation played a vital role for the security conception. In this section I will discuss how Russia is also constructed as an 'other' to Europe, rather than only Estonia in the Estonian security discourse. After considering the security logic of the EU, I discuss how this contradicts with the Estonian construction.

Russia is not only constructed as a political threat to Estonia, but also as an alien culture. The historical context of Russian invasions means that the Estonian security perception tends to equate the cultural difference with threat. This is why Russia threatens not only the state but also the national identity directly. Interestingly, the construction is not only Russian culture in opposition to Estonian culture, but also Russian/Orthodox civilisation in opposition to the European civilisation, to which Estonia belongs. Estonian vulnerability thus partly stems from the fact that "Estonia has emerged as the frontier of Western values and principles in Europe. We are a frontier where the contrasts between two different views of development, history and

security are as striking as the contrast once was between West and East Berlin."³³ This civilisational construction effectively makes the Russian threat to Estonia a threat to Europe. The inspiration from Samuel Huntington's thesis of the inherent differences between civilisations that makes conflicts unavoidable could not be clearer, and it is noteworthy that his 1996 book "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order" is among the most revered and cited scholarly works in Estonia.³⁴ The cultural dimension means that the Russian threat is not constructed as one that will fade as Russia undergoes political development, but is a permanent phenomenon. The binary construction of Russia versus Europe then makes integration into Europe the only possible policy option for Estonia if it is not to fall into the sphere of influence of Russia and the Orthodox civilisation, and because of the imminent threat this should happen as soon as possible. But in terms of civilisation, the Estonian membership is not exclusively constructed as a security measure against the Russian threat, but also

as something natural beyond debate, given the civilisational similarities of Estonia and the EU.

In terms of an inherent civilisational difference, the 'other' is not only to be found on the other side of Estonia's Eastern border. Also the Russian-speaking minority is constructed as belonging to this alien civilisation, both in terms of culture and biology. This means that the Russian-speaking minority is constructed by some as a potentially disloyal segment of the population that could act as a fifth column in a struggle with Russia. This is by no means a consensus view; some argue for granting citizenship to the Russian-speaking part of the population and integrate, not assimilate them, into being subjects of the state without belonging to the Estonian nation. But even though these arguments do not frame the issue in terms of an existential threat, there seems to be a consensus in so far as the inherent civilisational difference is concerned. The notion of two separate societies on the Estonian territory is thus constructed by near consensus.³⁵ This is

important for the security concept. It is undoubtedly easier for an actor to securitise the Russian-speaking minority as a threat, when the notion of two distinct communities is already generally accepted by the Estonian audience.

In a current official articulation of the security concept, the National Security Concept of 2001, security is framed in cooperative terms: “Estonia’s security policy is guided by the principle that security is indivisible and international cooperation is necessary, and is based on a belief in the collective defence of common values”.³⁶ This is a reflection of a general shift in official statements towards a configuration of security as shared. These official statements also try to frame the Estonian-Russian relationship in cooperative terms. It is a logical consequence of globalisation and the corresponding increased interdependence to define security in cooperative terms. But the official rhetoric of shared and cooperative security does not correspond with the drawing of civilisational borders and pervasive construction of Russia as the ‘other’.

This seems like a contradiction within the Estonian security concept.

But one should be careful not to see the cooperative framing of security as shared as a fundamental change in the basic concept of security in Estonia. Primarily, the official statements are directed at the international audience, mainly NATO and the EU to which Estonia has acceded. Thus, it should be viewed more as engaging in Euro-Atlantic rhetoric and should be interpreted in the Estonian context. A member of the working group authoring the National Security Concept thus jokes that when Estonians refer to Russia as “teddy” they really mean “bear”.³⁷ This then means that most Estonians consider Russia a threat, and the softening of the official statements were merely meant to persuade the EU (and NATO) into accepting Estonia as a member. This then gives rise to the two contradictory security discourses of the virtue of cooperation and engagement with Russia, and Russia as being inherently different and the main threat. On the one hand, security is framed for the international audience in cooperative

terms to make Estonia part of the EU community of values, and, on the other, Russia is securitised as a threat, primarily as a reflection of the underlying concept of security, but also in order to mobilise support for integration into the EU and delegitimise domestic political opposition. But, drawing on the constructivist definition of security, I argue that the official statements are shaping the security concept towards a more cooperative understanding, no matter the intentions behind them. This is confirmed by the policy impact; Estonian-Russian relations have become more cooperative.³⁸ Potential membership has meant for Estonia that the need to be with Europe is greater than the need to be against Russia, and this is reflected in the security discourse.

But keeping in mind the construction of Russia as civilisatory different in the security discourse, one should not exaggerate the change in the Estonian security concept caused by the cooperative rhetoric. It still talks about the ‘defence of common values’. One could argue that the ‘shared’ security rhetoric is taken by

the majority of the Estonian audience to mean shared primarily in terms of the Euro-Atlantic area whose common values should be defended, and that Russia is not included. This would then mean that the EU and NATO members together can increase their security on behalf of Russia's security. The framing of the Estonian-Russian relationship in cooperative terms and the improvement of bilateral relations is thus not an expression of a perception of their securities being shared or a policy goal in itself, but merely an expression of the fact that cooperation with Russia is a necessary component of EU and NATO membership. This way, it is not the threat that has been redefined but merely the perception of how it is necessary to deal with it.

The security logic of the EU

The enlargement of the European Union not only has implications for the 25 states concerned, but requires a re-constitution of relationships across the continent, not least with the new

neighbours to the east. Enlargement means that the EU is faced with security dynamics on its borders which it cannot afford to ignore in the long term.³⁹ While for Estonia, integration into the EU is seen as increased independence from Russia, for the EU, enlargement forces it to formulate a new policy towards Eastern neighbours.

The primary reason for this is that the effective de-securitisation of the EU in an increasingly interconnected world depends on a de-securitisation of the international system as such.⁴⁰ This makes the primary security objective of the EU to "promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations."⁴¹ The security strategy also identifies as vital for European security to avoid letting enlargement create new dividing lines. In line with the security policy of "making friends" through de-securitisation and creating networks of interdependence, the instruments employed by the EU are

not designed to impose the will of the EU by force. The ambitious goal of the EU is thus to diffuse its own norms in the international system, so that the global system comes to be based on the same ideas of the EU itself; pacifism, principles, consensual decision-making, network governance and the pooling of sovereignty.⁴² Towards Eastern neighbours the normative diffusion has manifested itself in a multi-level governance approach based on networking, most evident in the Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI) of the EU,⁴³ incorporating both EU members, acceding states (including Estonia) and non-members. A striking feature of the NDI is the attempt to define security in positive rather than in negative terms. Essentially, there is no 'other' in the security discourse, there is only a 'we'.⁴⁴ The further argument is that the cooperative method of the NDI has a socialising effect that will affect the perceptions that the parties involved have of each other. Another aspect, which I shall return to below, is that a new principle of 'subsidiarity' is evident, in that

the formulation and execution of policy on behalf of the EU is largely left to the member states most concerned, seen in the Finnish ownership of the NDI.⁴⁵

***The Estonian security conception
in the EU context***

The case of the NDI exemplifies the security logic of the EU. Through networking it seeks to draw in the neighbouring states and avoid creating a hard dichotomy of insiders and outsiders. The cooperative threat reduction activities in Russia have a similar aim of diffusing norms while also addressing substance.⁴⁶ The official Estonian statements framing security in cooperative terms are very much in line with the networking approach to security policy. But the other branch of the security discourse that relies extensively on the construction of Russia as the 'other' contradicts the logic of the EU security policy, because this relies on influence through norm diffusion and does not involve defining other actors as 'others'. Further-

more, a central component in the EU policy designed to expand the security community (the acceding states already being part of it) is the construction of interdependencies and networks. This is at odds with the Estonian construction of independence from Russia as a security issue. An illustrative case here is the Estonian electricity grid. It is integrated with the Russian grid, and runs on different standards than the grids in Western Europe. In Estonia, the debate has been about the cost of refurbishing it to fit the Western European standards,⁴⁷ thus increasing independence from Russia by severing the links to the Russian grid and thereby enhancing Estonian security. In this way, the link to the Russian grid is constructed as a security problem. Following the EU logic of security, the link should be seen not as a problem but as an opportunity to strengthen interdependence and thereby security. This is just one example of how different security concepts of Estonia and the EU would give rise to different security policies. This is so, because although

the Estonian security concept is also shifting towards acknowledging the need to engage Russia through cooperative means, in the Estonian concept the threat remains Russia itself, while in the EU concept the threat is the independence and isolation of the EU and Russia from each other.

Whether the EU is successful in creating new networks with its new Eastern neighbours is another and questionable issue. Indeed, it has been argued that the NDI exemplifies how the EU cannot implement the post-sovereign rhetoric in practice but remains confined to pursuing conventional sovereignty-based foreign policy.⁴⁸ This would then suggest that the difference between Estonia and the EU is more at a conceptual than practical policy level.

The general reconstitution of relationships means that the EU is in the process of boosting the networking strategy. A window of opportunity for Estonian or Baltic leadership and influence through the 'subsidiarity' principle when the EU reformulates policy towards Eastern

neighbours seems to open. However, this is likely not to be perceived as such because of the remaining centrality of independence in the Estonian security concept, and the centrality of interdependence in the EU security logic.

At another level of abstraction the difference between the Estonian and the EU view towards Russia can be seen in the debate on the extent of Europe, a debate that has been intensified and put to the forefront with enlargement. While the EU is undecided and ambivalent as to whether Russia 'belongs' in Europe, the civilisational construction in the Estonian security discourse leaves no doubt that Russia does not belong in Europe. With Estonian membership of the EU the Estonian influence on the EU discourse and debate whether the new neighbours are 'us' or 'them' could pull the EU in the direction of perceiving them as 'them'. But since defining other countries as the 'other' runs contrary to the fundamental logic of European integration such a shift is not likely to become dominant.

EU security policy contains a contradiction between two objectives. This is between the security need for 'hard' external borders due to the removal of internal borders (essentially the Schengen acquis), and the need to break down borders to create networks of interdependence to expand the security community. This border issue has thrown the EU into what amounts to an organizational dilemma, questioning the very identity of the Union.⁴⁹ The dilemma is brought to the forefront by the Kaliningrad problem, where the EU hitherto has favoured border-drawing to networking.⁵⁰ The Estonian need for the construction of Russia as the 'other' in terms of identity and for political reasons, while also needing to engage Russia cooperatively, is this way paralleled by an EU need to harden its external border, while at the same time reducing its significance. Here, the Estonian security concept would most likely impact the EU further in the direction of transferring the traditional state security thinking about borders to the new EU borders.

***The expansion of the concept
of security***

Above I have focused on sovereignty as a central concept and Russia as a central factor in the Estonian security perception. I will now take in consideration the broadening of the security concept that has taken place since the mid to late 1990's. In the first years after re-independence, the concept of security referred to military security alone. Gradually, the concept was expanded to include non-military security issues. As argued above, a result of this has been influence from Western European discourse, but another factor is the perception of a decrease in the immediacy of the Russian military threat, allowing other issues to become securitised.

In the Estonian National Security Concept from 2001,⁵¹ all the five sectors of military, political, economic, societal and environmental issues are framed as security issues, whereas the Guidelines of the National Defence Policy of Estonia from

1996 focus exclusively on military security. Those environmental and economic issues that are framed as security could also be seen as part of the explanation for the softening of the approach towards Russia, in that these threats to a larger extent than military defence demand cooperation with Russia instead of exclusively with the EU and NATO member states.

While a very wide range of issues are defined as potential security issues in the National Security Concept, this has simultaneously led to a hierarchy among them. In the Estonian case, the close link between nation and state means that societal security is closely linked to political and military security. As such, a societal threat to the national identity automatically also becomes a political threat to state sovereignty, and vice versa. So in the Estonian security concept it is clear that the military, political and societal sectors have primacy over the economic and environmental sectors. The hierarchy of issues finds its linguistic expression in the reliance on the concepts of 'hard' and 'soft' security concerns. Because of the wide-

spread usage of the concepts, it is hard to reach a consensus definition, although 'hard' security usually refers to military security (the 'original' object of security studies) whereas 'soft' security refers to economic, societal and environmental security. The question of whether the political sector falls into the category of 'hard' or 'soft' security is not straightforward to decipher, it seems to hover somewhere in the middle. The Estonian Ministry of Foreign affairs uses the term 'semi-soft' security, to denote security from outside political pressure,⁵² i.e. political security. The distinction is not a heuristic distinction as that of the five sectors of security, but an analytic distinction, based on an objectivist understanding of security. Thus, 'hard' and 'soft' security is seen as two different things, rather than two aspects of the same thing. This is problematic because of the close linkages and spill-over effects among the five sectors of security. For instance, a 'hard' security issue such as a military threat might also have repercussions for the economy and the environment. Furthermore, 'hard' and 'soft' secu-

rity threats are seen as something demanding, respectively, 'hard' security guarantees and 'soft' security guarantees. This results in the construction of EU and NATO membership as complementary, in that NATO provides a 'hard' guarantee, while the EU provides a 'soft' guarantee. This construction of security as something to be guaranteed leads to a very widespread concept of a division of labour between NATO and the EU, where NATO 'does' 'hard' security and the EU 'does' 'soft' security.⁵³ This simplistic thinking, however, fails to capture the security impact of the EU to which Estonia has acceded.

This is so, because the primary security function of the EU is not to deal with threats, illustrated by the fact that countering threats is only mentioned as the third strategic EU security objective.⁵⁴ Applying the Monnet method in its security policy, the approach of the EU is not to deal with the threats, but instead seek to prevent them from arising. This is the essence of the normative power projection, which is the main external impact of the EU.⁵⁵ By conceiving security

in terms of threats to which guarantees must be obtained, the Estonian security concept cannot incorporate an understanding of the main security impact of the EU. Further, because the 'hard' and 'soft' security categories are constructed in terms of threats and guarantees they are also inappropriate for understanding the EU security policy. Thus, the negligible 'hard' security that the EU is perceived to be doing is the military dimension of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The problem is that the Estonian security concept implicitly, through the reliance on the 'hard/soft' dichotomy, fuses the nature of threats with the nature of possible measures to be taken against these threats. But, since the normative power projection is intended to change the logic of the international system into one where relations among states are de-securitized, this is also very much 'doing' 'hard' security, only the tool is not 'hard'. The key argument here is that the EU does both 'hard' and 'soft' security. How successful the EU is, and how large its impact is on 'hard' security

through normative power projection is, is open for discussion, the point is just that the Estonian security concept does not allow for understanding that the EU does both 'hard' and 'soft' security because the 'hard/soft' dichotomy does not allow for an understanding of links between the sectors of security in terms of policies of one sector influencing other sectors.⁵⁶ This is the reason for the fact that the potential for economic cooperation as an opportunity to alleviate military and geopolitical concerns has not been explored to a great extent, as seen in the example of the electricity grid. Still, it was this logic that was the foundation of the Northern Dimension Initiative of which Estonia was part.⁵⁷

A further illustration is that, following the Estonian security concept a strengthening of the evolving military dimension of the CFSP would mean a linearly increased EU impact on 'hard' security. Possessing military capabilities, and the decision-making capacity to utilise them, would undoubtedly increase the ability of the EU to respond military to

threats. There is thus a certain immediate impact. But at the same time, developing the military dimension, in essence increasingly acquiring state-like characteristics, the EU would probably lose capacity for normative power projection, in that it would no longer be an example of a normatively better inter-state dynamics to be followed, but a strategic actor with its own geopolitical agendas.⁵⁸ Thereby, the mechanisms of norm diffusion would lose their effect.⁵⁹ The result would be a decreased long term impact on 'hard' security. Whether an increased military capability would increase the impact on military security would then be doubtful.

On the other hand, there is a tendency to blur the security issues and blend the sectors. For instance, NATO membership is also constructed as a guarantee against the cultural threat that Russia represents. In a conventional definition of 'soft' and 'hard' security this would amount to seeking a 'hard' guarantee against a 'soft' threat, and thus be an indicator of a perception of security incorporating the links between the sectors in terms of

policy initiatives and the threat these are to deal with. Another interpretation is that the sovereignty that NATO guarantees is so closely linked to the societal security of the nation, that in this instance, a referent object spanning the military, political and societal sectors is constructed.

Conclusion

The widespread and uncontested usage of security arguments in relation to Estonian EU membership coupled with a questioning of whether the Estonian security perceptions and the security logic underpinning European integration are compatible to an extent that makes Estonian accession to the EU straightforward and unproblematic in security terms, inspired the discussion of Estonian security perceptions in the context of EU enlargement.

The overall picture of the Estonian security perceptions in the context of EU enlargement is a complex and at times contradictory one. Utilising the speech-act approach to security, the discussion

revealed that EU enlargement brings out in the open contradictions within the Estonian security concept, as well as between this and the security logic underpinning the process of European integration. While the overall picture is one of complexity, three characteristic features of the Estonian security concept were nevertheless singled out in the context of EU enlargement.

Firstly, a prominent characteristic of the Estonian security concept is the close coupling of state sovereignty with national identity. In relation to EU membership the debate has been characterised by pervasive securitisation of these two concepts by both the proponents of EU membership and those who opposed it. This has led to a traditional Westphalian security concept with the territorial state as the central referent object being the natural expression of the nation. The construction of sovereignty to mean independence and to be the central referent object of security fundamentally contradicts the EU security logic of pooled sovereignty and creation of interdependent

relationships, with a securitisation of the logic of sovereign nation-states as the main threat. There is also an internal contradiction in the Estonian security concept between the stressing of independence and the stressing of shared and cooperative security.

Secondly, Russia plays a dominating role in the Estonian security discourse stemming from the frequent construction of Russia as the 'other' in the construction of the Estonian national identity. Estonia instead belongs to the European civilisation, which is why EU membership is entirely natural. The historical context of Russian invasions has led to an equation of difference with threat in the Estonian discourse. This contradicts the EU security ambitions of enlarging the security community, which rests on forging a shared identity through mechanism of norm diffusion and creation of interdependence.

Thirdly, a tendency to rely on the distinction of 'hard' and 'soft' security issues is evident in the Estonian security concept, stemming from the widened

notion of security that has evolved in the recent years. Because the distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' security is made by the nature of the threat and the policies to counter these, the Estonian security concept does not allow for an understanding of the logic of the main EU security policies which are not aimed at countering threats, but seek to prevent them from arising, involving an indirect and essentially de-securitising approach.

While the discussion in this essay has been focused on the understanding of the concept of security as constructed in Estonia, this does not mean that the findings are relevant for conceptual disputes only. The definition of the meanings of words and concepts is essentially an exercise of power, since meanings have a direct impact on political practise substance. The difference between the Estonian security perceptions and the logic of European integration thus gives rise to different political practises, and it is doubtful they can be reconciled without the understandings of security approaching each other. Although inconsistencies in world-

views can exist, there must be a limit to their size.

Only time will tell whether the inconsistencies identified within the Estonian security concept and the contradictions when compared to the EU will remain, with destabilising consequences, or whether the contradictions will even out as a result of the general change in political practices that EU enlargement entails.

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¹ Drawing primarily on Wæver, O. (1997) and Buzan, B. et al (1998).

² Mortensen, J. (1998), p.

³ For detailed explanations of the categories and how precisely issues are grouped into them, see Buzan, B. et al. (1998), where the sectoral framework is developed and explained in great detail.

⁴ Lind, M. (2003), p. 66.

⁵ Alto, P. and Berg, E. (2002)

⁶ Feldman, M. (2000), p. 11.

⁷ Alto, P. and Berg, E. (2002), p. 260.

⁸ Guidelines of the National Defence Policy of Estonia (1996), quoted in Minotaite, G. (2001), p. 18.

⁹ Defined by Buzan, B. (1991), p. 70 as "A large group of people sharing the same cultural, and possible the same ethnic or racial, heritage".

¹⁰ Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, Preamble.

¹¹ Kuus, M. (2002), p. 401.

¹² Lind, M. (2003), p. 47.

¹³ Kuus, M. (2002), p. 403.

¹⁴ Feldman, M. (2000), p. 26.

¹⁵ Buzan, B. (1991), p. 73.

¹⁶ Kuus, M. (2002), p. 403.

¹⁷ Lind, M. (2003), p. 68)

¹⁸ Estonian Member of Parliament quoted in Feldman, M. (2000), p. 21.

¹⁹ Kuus, M. (2003), p. 578.

²⁰ In the Estonian security discourse, the terms sovereignty and independence are often used synonymously. Kuus, M. (2002), p. 399.

²¹ Quoted in Kuus, M. (2002), p. 398.

²² National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia (2001)

²³ Stefanova, B. (2002), p. 158.

²⁴ I have been forced to rely mostly on secondary material. The authors I refer to have focus on the discourse of the elite and the mainstream media, with the quotes taken mainly from the largest newspapers in Estonia, Postimees and Eesti Päevaleht.

²⁵ I shall below discuss the widened security agenda, also securitising economic and environmental issues.

²⁶ Wæver, O. (1998)

²⁷ Terminology taken from Wendt, A. (1999). Wendt opposes the Kantian logic of friendship to the Hobbesian logic of enmity and the Lockean logic of rivalry.

²⁸ Buzan, B. and Wæver, O. (2003), p. 361-363.

²⁹ Ethnic Estonians constituted more than 88% of the population. Feldman, G. (2003), p. 558.

³⁰ Wæver, O. (1998)

³¹ Buzan, B. and Wæver, O. (2003), p. 356.

³² Richmond, O. P. (2000), p. 53.

³³ Minister of Foreign Affairs Siim Kallas in 1996, quoted in Feldman, M. (2000), p. 17.

³⁴ Feldman, M. (2000), p. 15.

³⁵ Lind, M. (2003), pp. 84-85.

³⁶ National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia (2001), p. 5.

³⁷ Aap Neljas, in Kuus, M. (2003), p. 581.

³⁸ Kuus, M. (2003), p. 581.

³⁹ Richmond, O.P. (2000), p. 51.

⁴⁰ Manners, I. (2002a), p. 28.

⁴¹ Solana, J. (2003), p. 7.

⁴² Manners, I. (2002b), pp. 242-244.

⁴³ Archer, C. (2000)

⁴⁴ Filtenborg, M. S. et al. (2002).

⁴⁵ Filtenborg, M. S. et al. (2002).

⁴⁶ Höhl, K. et al. (2003).

⁴⁷ Kuus, M. (2002), pp. 405-406.

⁴⁸ Browning, C. (2001)

⁴⁹ Richmond, O. P. (2000), p. 45.

⁵⁰ Browning, C. (2002)

⁵¹ National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia (2001)

⁵² Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004).

⁵³ Evident in e.g. Männik, E. (2003), Moroff, H. (2002)

⁵⁴ Solana, J. (2003).

⁵⁵ Manners, I. (2002b)

⁵⁶ A more fitting dichotomy, if one is indeed needed for reasons of simplicity, would be one of immediate v. long term impact on security. In this dichotomy Estonian membership of both the EU and NATO would then be constructed as necessary on a basis that NATO deals directly with military security through a guarantee against the enemy, and thus has an immediate impact. The EU has an immediate impact on environ-

mental security through strict legislation and economic security through fostering growth and a long term impact on military security through its efforts to change the nature of the enemy turning it into a friend.

⁵⁷ Archer, C. (2000)

⁵⁸ Manners, I. (2002b)

⁵⁹ Höhl, K. et al. (2003) argue that the legitimacy of the EU, in the eyes of Russia, in engaging in the cooperative threat reduction activities is dependent on the perceived absence of geo-strategic interests on part of the EU.

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The Baltic Defence College would like here to express our warmest gratitude and appreciation to the A.P. Møller and Wife, Chastine McKiney Møller's Fund.

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