

Oxford Journal on Good Governance

Volume 1 ~ Number 1

July 2004

A Security Strategy for Europe

The Solana Strategy in the Wake of Madrid

Chris Patten

on the EU's enhanced role in world affairs

Javier Solana

on capabilities for preventive engagement

Doug Bereuter

on NATO's primacy in transatlantic security

Barry Posen

on breathing life into a grand strategy

Steven Everts

on the governance of security policy

and others

Asle Toje
Editor

This Issue Sponsored By
**The
Economist**



Contents

A Bridge Across the Atlantic <i>By Andre Nilsen</i>	5
Introduction by the Editor <i>By Asle Toje</i>	7
A Security Strategy for Europe <i>By Chris Patten</i>	13
Thoughts on the reception of the European Security Strategy <i>By Javier Solana</i>	17
NATO and the EU Security Strategy <i>By Doug Bereuter</i>	21
Forward Again in US-European Relations <i>By Peter Schmidt and Gary Geipel</i>	29
The European Security Strategy: Practical Implications <i>By Barry Posen</i>	33
Two cheers for the EU's new security strategy <i>By Steven Everts</i>	39
US Reactions to the EU Security Strategy <i>By John van Oudenaren</i>	43
US and EU Security Strategies <i>By Jean-Marc Rickli</i>	49
Weapons of Mass Destruction and the EU Security Strategy <i>By Jez Littlewood</i>	55
Forging a Strategic Culture: Putting Policy into the ESDP <i>By Per Martin Martinsen</i>	61

The Oxford Journal on Good Governance

Asle Toje
Editor

Andre Nilsen
Managing Editor

Malte Nuhn
Production Editor

Barbara Mollin
Associate Editor

Sarah McCosker
Printing Manager

Jenny Krutzinna
Distribution Manager

Edward Mollin
Technical Assistant

Published by the Oxford Council on Good Governance

Board of Directors

Andre Nilsen
Chairman
Managing Director

Will Marshall
Vice Chairman
Director, Science Section

Malte Nuhn
Business Director

Sarah McCosker
Academic Director

Barbara Mollin
Director, Law Section

Holger Osterrieder
Director, Government Section

Asle Toje
Director, Security Section

Alex Cobham
Director, Economy Section

Fabien Curto Millet
Non-Executive Director

Abid Raja
Non-Executive Director

Board of Advisors

Chris Patten
Chairman

Joseph Nye
Jose Ramos-Horta

The Oxford Council on Good Governance is an independent, non-partisan, and non-profit think tank registered in England as a private company limited by guarantee. Company number: 04964367 Registered Address: 51 Cardigan Street, Oxford OX2 6BS, United Kingdom

Copyright

All rights reserved. Apart from fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study or criticism or review, as permitted under the UK Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the Publisher. Authorisation to photocopy items for the purpose of policy-making and governance is granted by the Publisher.

Disclaimer

The Oxford Council on Good Governance cannot be held responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this journal. The views and opinion expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Oxford Council on Good Governance, neither does the publication of advertisements constitute any endorsement by the OCGG of the products or services advertised.

A Bridge Across the Atlantic

This first issue of the Oxford Journal on Good Governance focuses on the increasing independence and capability of the European Union as a strategic actor, one of the most important developments in global governance.

The Oxford Journal on Good Governance presents incisive analyses by prominent academics and sharp arguments by high-level policy-makers on public policy and current affairs. It is also a forum where young researchers at the world's leading universities offer cutting edge research and actionable advice. The purpose of the Journal and its publisher, the Oxford Council on Good Governance, is to equip those at the commanding heights of global, regional, and national policy-making with ideas, knowledge, frameworks, and solutions that enable good governance.

The first issue of the Oxford Journal on Good Governance compares and contrasts the new security strategy of the European Union with the national security strategy of the United States. The aim is to encourage real dialogue and understanding as a way to greater trust and cooperation in dealing with common challenges. While the United States should heed European advice not to securitize human rights and international law out of the equation in the war on terror, the European Union should take American lessons in statecraft, placing power and action behind their ideas and words.

The European Union and the United States are the pillars of global governance and need to work together. Just as Oxford for centuries has been a bridge across the Atlantic, so the Council and the Journal will seek to build common ground between Europe and America.

Finally, I would like to thank the Economist on behalf of the Oxford Council on Good Governance for making possible the publication of this issue of the Journal. Their sponsorship is warmly welcomed.

Andre Nilsen, Chairman and Managing Director.

Oxford Journal on Good Governance Vol 1 No 1
Copyright 2004 Oxford Council on Good Governance

About our Sponsor

Established in 1843, The Economist remains true to the principles of its founder. James Wilson who believed in free trade, internationalism and minimum interference by government, especially in the affairs of the market.

The Economist is a weekly international news and business publication, offering clear reporting, commentary and analysis on world politics, business, finance, science, technology, culture, society, media and the arts. Printed in six countries and published on the Internet, worldwide circulation is now in excess of 900,000.



The
Economist

Introduction by the Editor

By Asle Toje

I am pleased to introduce this discussion panel on the European Security Strategy (ESS). The European Union's engagement with the wider world is going through a time of great consequence. The Madrid bombings signify a departure from the voluntary security policies of the post-cold war era and reassert security imperatives under which opting out is not an option. In times of strife, our opinions and advice can have the greatest impact. This is why now is the time for these to be defined and distilled. The Oxford Council on Good Governance has put together a panel, comprising high profile security experts from both sides of the Atlantic. The

views expressed in the contributions are those of the authors, as the policy recommendations are to be attributed to the OCGG alone.

Although the contributors discuss various aspects of the security strategy, some key questions can be discerned. Perhaps the most fundamental issue addressed is simply: why does the EU need a common security and defence policy? This question has a number of answers. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has come about in the tension produced by new threats arising, the internal agendas of the European powers, the logic of integration and - to some degree - US pressures for Europe to shoulder their part of the

Summary

The OCGG presents "A Security Strategy for Europe", a discussion panel addressing the critical questions regarding the new EU Security Strategy in ten opinion papers written by leading academics and decision makers from both sides of the Atlantic.

About the Author

Asle Toje is the Director of the Security Section of the Oxford Council on Good Governance.

international security burden. Most agree that if the foreign policy tools of the Union and its member States were more effectively coordinated, the EU could become a major force on the world stage. This is where the need for a common security strategy comes into play.

The strategy understandably does not dwell on the chequered history of attempts at European foreign policy co-operation, in which the Iraq dust-up is but the latest example. The EU has to date failed to shape international events in a way that could be expected of an actor this size. As one author points out, to date the must talked EU foreign policy 'tool box' has consisted of handing out cash while asking for very little in return. The notion of the EU as a 'different kind of super power' is largely a scholarly construct. This is no doubt a result of the relative powerlessness of most of the EU member states have made them forget that foreign policy can be used to induce change, not only uphold the status quo. Commissioning of a security strategy is in itself an important testimony to a newfound consensus that the EU through an effective foreign and security policy can help shape events.

This leads us to consider what sort of security actor the EU is to be. As the integration process appears to be entering a period of stagnation the Union is in search of a new vision to capture the collective imagination of Europeans. The answer may well lie in perusing European foreign policy. The positive response to the security strategy in most quarters was largely a result of its managing to toe the line between being jargon-free and to the point, while remaining ambiguous about what the ESDP is really about. Rhetorics aside, the strategy makes three main points. It acknowledges that the EU has an obligation to contribute to stability and good governance in its regional neighbourhood. In an implicit criticism of the current US policy mode, the strategy states the view that international peace and stability is best upheld by effective multilateral measures. And it goes some way towards building a shared transatlantic platform from which to address specific security concerns where terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation and regional conflict are singled out alongside state failure and organised crime.

The strategy's catch-all listings of security "threats and challenges" has dismayed some commentators. Considering the varying security

concerns of the member states, the wide approach of the strategy is unsurprising. That being said, terrorism is listed first among the "key threats". The terrorist atrocity in Madrid in March illustrated the relevance of the strategy and the need for the European states to pull together. The EU is doing their part of this work, amongst other elements, by applying the strategy into policy documents such as the new EU strategic objectives to combat terrorism and the strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It will now depend on the member states to translate these efforts into actual security policy.

The EU security policy so far has resembled the English cuisine: The result is often less tasty than the sum of its ingredients. A primary reason for the EU under-performance is the persistent avoidance of tough questions. Many of the authors of the discussion panel express concern about a menacing turn in global security and its impact on the transatlantic security partnership. Elegantly the ESS mentions - but does not address - contentious issues such as the future role of NATO and the United States in Europe. It offers no pointers with regard to how to overcome the inherent dead-lock of collective decision making with 25 vetoing parties. It also steps back from spelling out what is to be done in those cases where "effective multilateralism" fails to deliver.

Arguably, its greatest weakness is that the ESS can hardly be called a strategy - at least insofar as it studiously avoids the using of military means to achieve political ends. Having said this, it would have been very difficult to write a traditional strategy at this stage of European security co-operation. The ESS is holistic, reasonably intellectually coherent and above all sufficiently flexible to allow the EU to meet new challenges in a time of rapid change. As several of the contributors point out, the existence of a EU security strategy is in itself an important first step towards a European strategic culture. The ESS is also a signal that the EU is exiting the creative-conceptual phase and entering international politics. One must not forget that EU foreign policy is not decided by the EU mandarins or academic pundits but by the leaders of the European states. Solana and his cabinet have done their part of the job - from here on it will be up to the European leaders, especially those of France and the UK, to chose whether the EU will be the vehicle for their aspirations. From here on

the EU Foreign and Security Policy will be judged by the results of their labours. With an eye on the current debates, the OCGG offers six suggestions on how to help put Policy into the European Security and Defence Policy.

1 **EU Security Council of 5.** The Iraq war showed yet again that in times of crisis, EU unity crumbles under the conflicting short-term interests of its member states. The mode where dissent translates into paralysis must be discontinued. The EU states need to develop workable decision-making procedures. This cannot be done without acknowledging power relations. As other commentators have suggested, the time has come to establish a 'EU Security Council'. The council should be kept small in order to facilitate decision-making; only the three largest powers should hold permanent seats, with a fourth seat rotating among the three secondary powers and a fifth among the rest. This will clearly be a more effective policy-maker than a 'General Assembly' of 25. Such a move should be accompanied by abolishing the role of the rotating presidency in Foreign Policy matters. The day-to-day running of the CFSP should be left to the Foreign Policy Commissioner whose job looks set to be merged with that of the High Representative.

2 **Increase budgets.** First of all, the EU states should resist the temptation to revert to declaration-making and institution-building when the tough questions force themselves onto the agenda. There are enough declarations to last for a while and structures in place that work admirably - what is needed is funding. The €60 million EU security budget will have to be substantially increased. Ideally, this increase should come directly as a percentage from the €160 billion defence budgets of the member states. However, this is unlikely, at least in the short to medium term. The EU institutions should themselves therefore show that foreign policy will be vital to the *raison d'être* of the EU in the future. Instead of waiting for the council to act the commission should channel funding already in place to the CFSP structures. The EU security staff needs fiscal independence in order to show initiative and to deliver on the security strategy.

3 **Invite Solana.** The ESS rightly states that the EU should enhance its support for the United Nations to uphold international peace and security. A first step to show that the European countries

are serious about "effective multilateralism" would be to merge France and Britain's seats at the UN Security Council into a shared EU seat. This is, for reasons of national prestige, regrettably unlikely. There are signs that the three great powers are in the process of forming a directorate based on their military might. Only these three states can function as "framework nations" for EU military operations as long as the EU does not have such capabilities. This is a positive trend that promises to deliver the ESDP from eurosclerosis. But the three must keep in mind that their interests do not necessarily translate into those of the EU as a whole. A change for the better would be for the three great powers to start inviting the HR-CFSP to their security deliberations as they have generally failed to do in the past.

4 **A EU security doctrine.** In order to meet the critique that EU security is more concerned with process than output, the EU needs to be more specific about how, when and where it will resort to force. The EU should move away from the principle of 'common assessment' of threats, which invites too many hands on the steering wheel. The EU should help formalise the ongoing process of role specialisation of the member States' armed forces, i.a. by bringing forward the framework nation principle and accelerating developments in establishing a toolbox of niche capabilities. More attention should be paid to the EU Situation Centre's country assessments, while resources under the Commission and the Council need to be better coordinated. Shared threat assessments will make it easier to prioritise and take up sanctions or act militarily against persistent offenders. Or more importantly: it would make the EU look less of a paper tiger.

5 **Learn strategic culture elsewhere.** In order for the EU to build a "strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention", its military credentials need to be strengthened. The EU has already a planning cell housed at NATO's continental headquarters in Mons, Belgium. This approach should be discontinued. NATO's strategic culture is centred on article 5 on military territorial defence. The EU should avoid NATO thinking rubbing off on its own strategic culture. One of the greatest strengths of the ESDP is that it is a post-Cold War initiative centred on post-Cold War threats. Although a collective defence article should be adopted in the future

to correspond with the goals of integration, it is not urgent in the short run. Leaving territorial defence to NATO for the time being will also help avoid the ESDP becoming overburdened at this early phase of the initiative.

6 The US and the EU need to talk. Today the EU is the right address if one wants to speak to Europe. It is time that Washington realise that bilateral relationships and NATO are no longer sufficient to manage the West. Only when the EU is acknowledged as a player can the Europeans become what the US needs, namely strong and able partners. It would also help prevent the EU seeking legitimation by playing up to the current anti-American sentiments in Europe. The EU is finding it difficult to move from fervour and visions to common policy. In order to become effective the EU security policy needs tough love from the indispensable ally. Unless the US helps the Europeans pull together -and make them deliver - they are destined to fall short of what the West needs to uphold the global order -which is clearly in the interest of both parties.

A Security Strategy for Europe

By Chris Patten

In the forty years after the Second World War, Europe lived with a rather simple security architecture. The Iron Curtain drew a tangible, easy-to-identify limit between our space and our potential enemy's. A strategy of containment was widely accepted by most European countries and underpinned by NATO. Even if debates on transatlantic partnership were sometimes fractious, as in the 1950s on the European Defence Community, few fundamental questions were asked about the necessity for cooperation.

This vision belongs to the past. Europe was profoundly shaken by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the break up of the former Yugoslavian Federation. More recently, the USA discovered that its own homeland was no longer the untouched, invulnerable sanctuary it had been throughout the twentieth Century. The events of September were a shockingly vivid demonstration of the new security threats that face us all.

Our response has been, necessarily, the product of complex and sensitive debate. It has coincided with difficult decisions on other

Summary

The ESS is the response to a more complex security reality. The ESDP is in its infancy. Challenges remain with regards to terrorism, the development rift and enlargement. This must be solved relying on the full policy tool kit, without alienating NATO and in accordance with our principles.

About the Author

Chris Patten is the Chairman of the Board of Advisors of the Oxford Council on Good Governance. He is the European Commissioner for External Relations and the Chancellor of the University of Oxford.

issues as well, with the European Union searching for new Constitutional arrangements, and facing a considerable challenge in the field of economic reform. Nonetheless, we have to ensure that arguments over qualified majority voting within the Council, the composition of the next Commission, or how best to boost growth in the euro-zone don't dissipate all of our energy.

In today's world, a comprehensive, widely-supported Security Strategy is all the more necessary as we operate in a complex and fast-moving environment. It is essential both to define the strategy, on which we have made significant progress, and to focus on the specific political and operational decisions it implies.

There have been significant practical breakthroughs, such as the decision of the Council in November 2003, to create an Agency in the field of Defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments. Yet, considerable challenges remain. To focus on a few:

- **Terrorism:** which has evolved from fairly easily identifiable groups fighting for specific political goals to amorphous organisations like Al-Qaeda, embracing a confused multitude of causes and drawing on disparate resources. As well as more conventional militias, it uses scientists, technicians and specialists, potentially bringing to bear the very same cutting-edge technologies which make our economies so successful. Hence the vital importance of counter-proliferation. Its geographical dispersion has virtually no limits, from Bosnia to Chechnya, from the Gulf to Indonesia.

- **The development rift:** of course, there can be no justification for acts of such reckless terrorism and hate. But it would be foolish not to recognise that we can undermine support for extremism by addressing frustration and anger that come with poverty, and particularly with the recognition of relative poverty. Unsurprisingly, European citizens quote Poor/Rich countries imbalances as one of the threats they fear the most¹ (49%), after Terrorism (71%) and Proliferation of WMD (64%).

- **Enlargement** means that our external borders have been reshaped on an unprecedented scale, bringing security challenges closer to our doorstep. We have to step up the fight against drug

smuggling, and help our neighbours to develop as stable and prosperous partners.

In adopting the European Security Strategy last December, the European Council acknowledged we were at cross-roads and had to work pro-actively in order to transform an emerging vision into a set of concrete, operational proposals. No one would deny that the European Union's 'Security and Defence Policy' is developing, but is nonetheless still in its infancy. It will be some time before the EU can claim to have raised the effectiveness of its "second pillar" to the level it has so painstakingly and patiently achieved in the economic areas of the first one.

But it is essential that it should do so. For centuries, governments' authority has derived from their ability to provide a secure environment to their people. We have fortunately moved beyond quite such a basic model of legitimacy, but the EU's credibility will be greatly enhanced if it can demonstrate its contribution to the safety and security of its citizens.

Of course, there are potential pitfalls. Firstly, we shouldn't be lured into a nonsensical debate as to whether the EU's Security and Defence Policy is pro- or anti-NATO. The existing facilities built within the existing Alliance remain pivotal. We must bear in mind that cooperation is not only possible, like in Afghanistan: it is to be sought, whenever possible. Conversely, we have to be prepared to take action where and when our transatlantic partners do not feel the same urgency to act, for legitimate and understandable reasons. The European Union's ability to operate on its own will contribute to the World's stability.

Secondly, we shouldn't lose sight of the fact that a European Security Strategy cannot exclusively be based on a military approach to security issues. Military capabilities are certainly important, and the work underway to address Europe's manifest shortfalls is welcome. But, we should rather try to concentrate on building operational capabilities. After all, USA's leadership has its roots in the lessons learned in 1949 with the Berlin Blockade and the Korean War in the 1950s. Their unmatched ability to operate tens of thousands of miles from their country remains a model. In that respect, the deci-

sion made last year by European governments to launch the Airbus A400M Carrier project goes in the right direction. Beyond that, we also must rely on our demonstrated ability to address related issues such as assistance to states that need help to stabilise their internal situations. Afghanistan has given evidence that stopping military action requires a careful and smooth phase-out process. It implies a combination of police, judicial, intelligence means. We have developed a widely-recognised know-how which we can be proud of. Other situations will stress the need for economic instruments. Again, our track-of-record must give ourselves a moderate, but fair sense of pride.

Thirdly, we should keep in our minds that security cannot be set apart and above all our principles, such as freedom or the protection of individual rights. The balance is difficult to maintain and public opinion very sensitive. The uproar which occurred when we decided to cooperate with US Government on securing airline transportation by allowing access to passengers' data illustrates how difficult it will be to match efficiency with privacy protection, to take this only example.

We are but at the beginning of a difficult and challenging but nonetheless exciting task. It will take time, energy and dedication but I am confident this debate will be one of the most appealing to European citizens, one which will make them feel more and more "euro-activists".

I am therefore extremely happy to see that NGOs like the Oxford Council on Good Governance are eager to make their contribution to this essential debate. It shows that this question no longer remains concealed inside the inner circles of governments and International Agencies. It is an encouraging step towards a more democratic, therefore stronger Europe.

1 Published by French Poll Institute IPSOS in November 2003.

Thoughts on the reception of the European Security Strategy

By Javier Solana

When I was asked last to bring forward work on a European Security Strategy for adoption by the European Council in December, I expected that this would stimulate an important - and overdue - debate on the shape and direction of our security policy. But few could have anticipated just how thorough, widespread and productive that debate would be.

As work began on the preparation of a European Security Strategy, Europe was just emerged from deep divisions over Iraq. We were facing an expansion, which will soon bring some 100 million new citizens into the Union. We were entering a crucial point in the debate over our future constitutional structure. Although we had made considerable progress in the development of new civilian and military instruments for crisis management, we had as yet no strategic framework for the deployment of these instruments. We had no common perception of the threats to our security or of how best to address these threats. In many respects we were at a point of transition. In many respects, this is precisely the right moment to launch a debate on our security policy.

Summary

Common threat perception is only a first step. The EU needs credible capabilities and must be ready to act preventively to meet its global responsibilities.

About the Author

Javier Solana is the High Representative of the European Union for the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The draft report, which I presented in June, was discussed widely, including in several parliaments. The ensuing consultations extended across several months and several cities. In Rome, diplomats, academics and journalists came together to discuss new threats to security. In Paris and in Stockholm there were consultations on how Europe should respond to those threats and on how we should adapt in order to do so effectively. And of course, EU member states and applicants reflected and contributed. What emerged from these consultations was a remarkable convergence of views, an authentic European voice on security issues.

That voice has a number of distinct themes. Foremost among these is "responsibility". A political union of 450 million people in 25 countries producing a quarter of the world's GDP has both regional and global security responsibilities.

Preventive engagement is at the heart of the EU approach. The threats we face are dynamic and if left alone, they will grow. If we wait for them to materialise, we may have waited too long. We need to be able to act at the first signs of trouble. Our responsibility is global. Terrorist and criminal networks do not acknowledge borders. Non-state actors can play a role in the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. In an interdependent world, the first line of defence will often be far from home. Therefore we need to think globally and act locally - defuse crisis as early as possible by using the full range of capabilities at our disposal - including our military capabilities.

Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future. This requires a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention. It also demands a preparedness to tackle the environment of conflict, poverty, and religious extremism in which threats are generated and sustained.

Credible capabilities is a theme running through the strategy. Today's security threats demand more mobile, flexible military forces. To achieve this, we must find more resources for defence. Military efficiency has often been followed by civilian chaos. We need police and other civilian capabilities in crisis and post-crisis situations. And we need to use these in a co-ordinated way with humanitarian, trade and development policies. There is no alternative, no easy option. Collectively,

Europeans already spend E 160 billion a year on defence. We need to use these resources wisely, reducing duplication, filling gaps and adapting our capabilities to meet new challenges such as terrorism.

The strategy stresses that a more effective multilateral system is essential for our security. We will depend more - not less - on a rule-based international order and well-functioning international institutions. The United Nations is at the centre of this system, but can only play its role if we have imagination and collective will to strengthen it, equip it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, and if we have the courage and determination to act when its rules are broken. Our partnership with the United States has underpinned European integration and our security remains irreplaceable.

The European Security Strategy signals the arrival of strategy in our security thinking. Since it was adopted, the strategy has given new momentum to our work in building capabilities, in addressing the threat of terrorism, in developing more effective multilateral approaches to security and building security in our neighbourhood. Of course, the true test for any strategy lies not only in implementation but also in the test of time and of events.

The Strategy is a short document. It is free of jargon, clear and - I hope - accessible to all. I hope that it is widely disseminated and read. I hope that it is discussed and debated, not only by public representatives and policy makers but also more widely. This is how it should be. Security is everybody's business. If this strategy has helped to initiate and sustain a truly European discourse on security, then I think we will have taken a valuable step forward towards the creation of a European strategic culture.

Our ambition is a Europe more active; capable - a more articulate and more persuasive champion of effective multilateralism. The European Security Strategy is an important contribution to that objective.

I welcome the Oxford Council on Good Governance's initiative to launch this debate on the Security Strategy, and the important questions it opened in terms of strategic culture, strategic partnerships, and capabilities.

Great minds
like a think.

The Economist

NATO and the EU Security Strategy

By Doug Bereuter

The European Council and its High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, are to be commended for their work on a security strategy for the European Union. The document adopted by the Council in December 2003 is a serious analysis of the threats that face the EU member countries, one that grounds the Common Foreign and Security Policy firmly in reality. The strategy's sober assessment of the security environment will help the Council develop a CFSP that can enhance international security.

At the same time, the document does not answer the fundamental question of how the EU member states should ensure their own security. Much of this is probably due to the differing views in the various EU countries about the respective roles of the EU, NATO, and the states themselves. In all likelihood, the strategy is as detailed as a consensus document could be at this stage. However, while the strategy is specific when it defines threats and responses, it is vague (perhaps necessarily) in prescribing the EU's own role in international security.

Summary

The Madrid bombings reinforce the transatlantic community. The EU cannot opt out on the fight against terror. Competing with NATO will only make Europe less secure. The ESS overstates the role of the UN and understates that of NATO. Undermining NATO may lead to US disengagement.

About the Author

Doug Bereuter is a Member of the US Congress and the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO.

TOWARD A COMMON THREAT ASSESSMENT

The greatest achievement of the EU strategy is the recognition that the gravest threats confronting Europe are the same threats that confront the United States. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it became evident to Americans that global terrorism posed the greatest threat to the people and territory of the United States. In Europe, while there was tremendous sympathy and solidarity toward the American people, there was not the same immediate appreciation of the dangers that global terrorism posed nor of the urgency of responding to them. Of course, this is somewhat understandable, as terrorism is not a new phenomenon for many Europeans. However, it is important to recognise, as the EU strategy does, that global terrorism “poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe.”

The EU strategy is a step toward a common transatlantic threat assessment. The document explicitly rejects the ideas that Europe is not a target of global terrorists and that Europeans need not defend themselves against such threats. Sadly, the March 11 bombings in Spain demonstrated the accuracy of this assessment. If there was still any thought among Europeans that they were somehow immune from al Qaeda attacks, these bombings proved them mistaken. Europe was a target of al Qaeda even before 9/11 and the Iraq war, and it remains a terrorist target today.

Likewise, if anyone in Europe believes that standing on the sidelines will somehow keep them safe from terror, they are wrong. The response to terrorism cannot be a quest for neutrality. It cannot be the pursuit of a non-aggression pact or a *modus vivendi*. The only viable response is the reaffirmation of a commitment to strenuously work together, within Europe and within the Atlantic Alliance, to root out the terrorists in our midst and to destroy their ability to operate throughout the world. Therefore, allies on both sides of the Atlantic have fervently condemned the terrorist bombings in Madrid and expressed strong and unwavering support for the fight against terrorism.

The EU strategy goes on to address the need to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to ensure that those weapons do not fall into the hands of terrorists. “The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction,” the strategy states, a view that is widely shared on both sides of the Atlantic. And the EU strategy recognises that failed states can provide haven and support for the terrorists who seek WMD to kill Europeans and North Americans indiscriminately. It also recognises the threat that regional conflicts can pose to our own security.

The adoption of the EU security strategy clearly brings the threat perceptions of Europe and North America closer together, an immensely valuable contribution to the transatlantic security relationship. But the document is less clear about how to go about countering these threats.

RESPONDING TOGETHER TO TODAY’S THREATS

During the 1990s, one of the most important issues in transatlantic defence was the out-of-area debate about whether NATO would act outside of its traditional theatre of operations. The decision to undertake a peace operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrated that NATO would act outside the territory of its member states in order to ensure that a civil war on its periphery would not threaten the security of its European members. The welcome decision to send AWACS aircraft to patrol the skies above the United States demonstrated that NATO would act not only in Europe, but in North America as well.

Finally, the decision to take over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in August 2003 demonstrated the need for Europeans and North Americans to act outside of Europe and North America in order to confront today’s threats wherever they might be found. Lord Robertson, the former NATO secretary general, stressed the importance of NATO’s role in Afghanistan. “If we fail,” he said, “we will find Afghanistan on all of our doorsteps.”

The EU Security Strategy reflects this concern. It declares, “With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad.” The out-of-area debate is truly over. And the strategy also accepts that “preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future,” signalling a common understanding of the need to be proactive in dealing with these threats.

Unfortunately, the EU strategy declares, “The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” This greatly overstates the case. The UN Security Council has shown itself ineffective in responding to many of the gravest security challenges that we face. While the UN performs an invaluable role in humanitarian assistance, civil society and traditional blue-helmet peacekeeping, it is incapable of undertaking high-end military action, such as peace enforcement in the Balkans. The Security Council can contribute to international peace and security when its members are in agreement, but we cannot delegate the security of our nations to a body that is often unwilling or unable to act responsibly and quickly.

COOPERATION AND COMPLEMENTARITIES

As long as threats remain to the security of Europe and North America, NATO will be the primary institution through which its members provide for their common defence. So all of us who value the Alliance should worry when we read comments by leading European officials who advocate having European defence become increasingly independent from NATO.

In January 2004, Finnish General Gustav Hägglund, chairman of the EU Military Committee, proposed a European security arrangement in which, “The American and European pillars would be responsible for their respective territorial defences ...”. Actually, General Hägglund’s proposal was not inconsistent with a provision in the proposed EU Constitution to have the European Union take on a mutual defence role that duplicates the fundamental reason for NATO’s creation and its primary mission.

Turning to other organisations for collective defence would leave Europeans more vulnerable.

If Europe creates a competitor to NATO for Europe, it will risk undermining the rationale for NATO, and it will risk undermining the support for participating in NATO from the governments, legislatures and people of the United States and Canada. Both long-time NATO members and its newest members surely must be concerned about the possibility that an untested EU defence guarantee might jeopardize the continued existence of the Atlantic Alliance.

Unfortunately, there are too many folks in the corridors of the EU institutions who view defence as just another area for greater European integration. For those true believers, defence policy is no different than agricultural policy or trade policy. Their concern is, as they would say, “building Europe” – not the fundamental responsibility to protect their citizens. They need to understand that defence policy is fundamentally different from any other political issue. As we saw a decade ago in Bosnia, when mistakes are made or when there is a failure to act, people die. When mistakes are made in defending a country’s territory, it is its own citizens who die.

In order to best defend our people, Europeans and North Americans should redouble their commitment to NATO so that the alliance has the capabilities and structures it needs to act wherever security threats to our nations arise, be that in Europe, North America, or elsewhere in the world. NATO and the EU should not compete with each other; rather, in the words of NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the two organisations should work “to complement and reinforce each other’s efforts.”

A UNIQUE EU ROLE

The Solana document stays above the constitutional debate of whether the EU should assume responsibility for the collective defence of its members. Rather, the strategy draws attention to the genius of European Security and Defence Policy: The ability to help unstable countries move from conflict to peaceful integration. This

can and should be the primary EU contribution to European security. Speaking of the EU itself, the strategy states, "We could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities."

Instead of debating whether to build new ESDP headquarters in Belgium or trying to create an additional mutual defence agreement for Europe, the EU would do better to focus its efforts on creating its Rapid Reaction Force. As agreed in the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal, that force of up to 60,000 troops with complementary air and naval assets could be rapidly deployed and sustained for one year for crisis management, peacekeeping, rescue, or humanitarian operations. By acting under the Berlin Plus arrangements with NATO, this EU force can take advantage of capacities that the European members of NATO have already developed, maximising efficiency and capabilities.

The EU should strive to assume primary responsibility for what could be characterised as intra-European crisis management; that is, for undertaking military operations within Europe when the security of the continent is threatened by domestic instability or civil war. The Balkans conflicts, of course, are the best example of such crises. Ideally, NATO should not have to intervene in such conflicts in the future.


An effective peacekeeping capability will complement other EU competencies, such as the EU's work to build civil institutions, its economic and infrastructure assistance, and its deployable pool of civilian police officers. In that fashion, the ESDP can be an important part of a comprehensive spectrum of capabilities for crisis management in Europe.

Furthermore, a great stride toward a peaceful Europe came in June 2003 when the European Council declared that the EU is open to membership by the countries of the western Balkans. Ultimately, the incorporation of this region into the EU will assist its people in building peaceful, prosperous lives.

CONCLUSION

The EU Security Strategy does an excellent job of identifying the security threats that Europe faces today, but it shies away from specifying how its member states should defend themselves and their citizens. While the EU has an important role to play in European security, it should not seek to usurp NATO's responsibility to defend its members' territories against outside threats. In the event of an external attack against a member country, NATO must remain the primary vehicle for the allies to provide for their common defence. It goes without saying that all of the EU countries that desire such a collective defence commitment are already members of NATO.

Maintaining NATO's primacy in transatlantic security is not a barrier to European integration; rather, it is essential for the security of not only Europe, but also North America. No one nation alone can defend against today's primary security threats: global terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the states that support them. We all need allies in this effort, and NATO must remain the cornerstone of our common defence.



w i n d o w o f o p p o r t u n i t y

Advertising in the Oxford Journal on Good Governance lets you exclusively target those that shape the public agenda. Our select list of readers is carefully maintained and amended for each issue, and this focus ensures their interest. Why not benefit from their guaranteed attention?

If you are interested in communicating your message to those that matter, visit our website at www.oxfordgovernance.org/journal for more information. Or write to us at advertising@oxfordgovernance.org.

Forward Again in US-European Relations

By Peter Schmidt and Gary Geipel

In one of the perennial loops that keep us diehard Atlanticists optimistic, transatlantic relations are at a mend. The lessons of two years of US-European bickering contributed to a modest breakthrough late last year with the European Union's new security strategy. In December 2003, Javier Solana – the foreign policy coordinator of the European Union – released Europe's first attempt at a (supra)national security strategy. The document earned widespread support from European governments in spite of – or perhaps because of – an assessment of global security that reconfirms that of America. Much for the same reasons it was scarcely noticed in the US.

Former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl once compared the progress of European integration to a well-known annual parade in Luxembourg, in which the participants make three steps forward before jumping back two steps. Last year's developments in Europe made even that assessment seem generous. The EU's two-month-long Intergovernmental Conference, intended to finalise agreement

Summary

The tone and format of the ESS fails to strike fear in the eyes of potential adversaries. But despite reading like an obituary to NATO, it brings Europe and the US closer. The ESS shows that the US will remain Europe's indispensable ally.

About the Authors

Peter Schmidt is Senior Researcher at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin and Professor at the University of Mannheim. Gary Geipel is Senior Associate of the National Institute for Public Policy in Washington.

on the Union's first constitution, ended in failure on December 13 with curt statements and off-the-record finger pointing. The Solana strategy does not offset the constitution debacle but it does send an encouraging message to Washington: a recognition of shared transatlantic challenges and a commitment to partnership with the US may be among the few factors holding the European security initiative together.

The EU strategy paper carries an appropriately modest title, "A Secure Europe in a Better World," and its laundry-list format and politically correct tone clearly were not designed to strike fear into the hearts of potential adversaries. The document manages to narrow rather than widen transatlantic differences. Terrorism is described as a "strategic threat" without international boundaries. Vital national interests – for example in the energy sector – are acknowledged. And global progress towards democratic governments – a clear echo of US strategy – earns recognition as "the best protection for our security."

American Atlanticists, however, should find plenty in the EU document that disappoints. Its occasional references to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) read more like a retirement tribute than a consensus on future utility. And when the precise structure of EU-NATO relations finally comes up, Solana (a former Secretary General of NATO) gives in to the "NATO-as-EU toolbox" mindset that so rattles US policymakers. The European aim is described as "an effective and balanced partnership with the U.S.A.". We know that "balanced" serves as a codeword for "limited" in at least one major European capital. The document also diminishes the significance of the term by calling for "strategic partnerships" not only with the US but also with the likes of "Canada and India."

The preceding observations are quibbles, however, in comparison with what might have been. The run-up to the US invasion of Iraq represented a 60-year low point in US-European relations, and if ever the moment had arrived for the EU to declare its strategic independence from Washington, that was it. Yet almost nothing that happened in the US or Europe during the second half of 2003 should have provided encouragement to those who continually predict (or favour) the emergence of a European counterpoint to American strategy.

While they were lining up behind the Solana document in December, for example, European leaders also quietly jettisoned the idea of an EU military-planning and command cell independent of NATO – a bad idea hatched by France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg at the height of the Iraq dust-up of April 2003. They agreed instead to strengthen primarily an EU planning cell housed at NATO's continental headquarters in Mons, Belgium.

Washington shares responsibility for the deterioration of US-European relations after 2001, but it is the leaders of France and Germany who have made the most mortifying trek back to the status quo ante. The EU's new strategy paper, without intending it, lays out the three stark conditions under which all European governments will operate for the foreseeable future: The world is more dangerous than ever. European nations are drawn together by a common need for security in this dangerous world, but they have no prospect of achieving the structures and systems of a credible defence in its true sense. Therefore, the US will remain Europe's indispensable ally.

The German poet Gottfried Benn once wrote that the opposite of good is not bad, but well meant. And indeed, Solana's plea for a more muscular Union not only has a good side but also raises the dangers of "well meant." That is because the desire to stand tall in the world might not be supported by the decision-making realities of an enlarged Union with 25 member states or by adequate resources for security and defence.

The future size and shape of the Union demands a degree of priority setting in foreign policy, which the paper does not deliver. Energy dependence is listed as a "special concern," terrorism as a "strategic threat," and the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a "strategic priority" – along with the need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to the EU's neighbours in the East while tackling political problems in the Mediterranean region. Quite a list – one that might well overburden an already dysfunctional decision making process. A Union that not only takes on the burden of expansion but also tries to "shoulder the world" faces the danger of being overwhelmed, which in turn will lead to indecision.

In its subtitle, Solana's paper is called a "European Security Strategy". This is, however, a misleading characterisation. In a traditional sense a strategy paper is expected to define concrete aims and establish priorities to achieve those goals. It should also describe which means can be used under what conditions in order to fulfil that specific purpose. If one accepts this definition, one is sure to notice that the paper does not meet these criteria. The best use of the Solana paper would be as the starting point of an important debate about the EU's strategic orientation and priorities. It would be in the Union's interest to avoid describing the Solana Paper as a "strategy," both in naming the paper and in its statements about the document. Furthermore, the Union should not celebrate this draft as a breakthrough towards a new policy. It is a start – not more and not less. The fissures resulting from the failure to agree upon a constitutional treaty may well determine the future structure and capacity of the EU more than Solana's paper.

There will continue to be peaks and valleys in the transatlantic relationship, as there always have been. But there is reason to hope that the depth of the valleys will not reach the low points seen in 2002 and 2003. Even the aftermath of the horrible Madrid bombings – apparently the work of Al Qaeda – did not throw the relationship back off track. The election of the socialist government in Spain, and the rash comments of Prime Minister-elect José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero regarding the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq, were not followed by a new round of overheated rhetoric but by a continuation of sober deliberations in Brussels and Washington about the proper response to terrorism.

Much now depends on the success of U.S. attempts to re-engage the UN in Iraq, on the ability of the U.S. to maintain its military role in Iraq in the face of public concerns in an election year, and on Europe's steadfastness in fighting the War on Terror as a common transatlantic strategic effort rather than as a divisible set of police actions.

The European Security Strategy: Practical Implications

By Barry Posen

Modern states publish and promulgate grand strategies for practical reasons. Indeed perhaps too much is expected of them. "A Secure Europe in A better World," is a grand strategy, albeit a somewhat unusual one, insofar as the EU is less than a state but more than an alliance. The latter quality makes it potentially an important actor on the international scene; the former guarantees that when it acts, it will be slow and unwieldy. It is difficult for the EU to develop a grand strategy, but it may need one even more than would a unitary state.

A grand strategy can be best conceived as a theory about how to achieve security. Security as a concept encompasses the safety, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and power position of states. A grand strategy identifies and prioritises threats to a state's security, and similarly identifies appropriate political and military remedies. These remedies consist of chains of interconnected political and military means and ends-including military forces, intelligence capabilities, alliances, defence industry, for-

Summary

The ESS has all the elements of a traditional grand strategy. It embodies a distinct conception of EU collective strategic interests. It serves both external and internal functions. It gives a more or less clear perception of member States' collective security interests, in addition to providing a basis for capabilities planning but prioritising is needed.

About the Author

Barry Posen is the Ford International Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a member of its Security Studies Program.

oreign aid programs, etc. Grand strategies are not recipes. They should include explanations for why certain means are expected to achieve certain ends.

A grand strategy serves external and internal functions-though only if it becomes a living document. It must be published, discussed, and cited as a source of legitimacy. It must spawn ancillary documents. Its principles must find their way into political speeches and diplomatic communiqués. Externally, a grand strategy dissuades and coerces by warning potential challengers of what matters. It reassures by conveying the limits of its ambitions. And it makes friends and wins allies, by taking up the causes of other states, small and large.

Internally, a grand strategy coordinates the actions of the disparate branches of state-foreign office, intelligence services, the military, and foreign assistance programs. For the EU, grand strategy bears an even heavier burden, as it must coordinate the actions of these same institutions in 25 states, as well as the actions of the states themselves. A grand strategy aims to mobilise domestic political support-especially for the financial and human resources necessary to achieve difficult objectives. Finally, a grand strategy guides the work of the Military. It should direct operational planning, organisation, doctrine, and procurement.

Grand strategies thus have grand ambitions. And many other powerful factors can be expected to intervene between their abstract pronouncements, and the array of practical activities and problems they aim to influence. Grand strategies are expected to produce beneficial effects not because they provide precise guidance and point solutions, but because they provide a general orientation that helps the state avoid disasters, and achieve efficiencies in the use of its political and material resources.

A practical assessment of the effectiveness of the EU's new grand strategy must await events. We can, however, assess the text against our general expectations for a grand strategy to see how it measures up.

EXTERNAL FUNCTIONS

The document is admirably clear on the threats that no longer exist—threats to Europe's territorial integrity. Moreover the authors are on the whole optimistic about Europe's power position, which they seem to expect to improve. Instead the document is largely concerned about threats to safety—from terrorists, weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists, and weapons of mass destruction in the hands of (undemocratic?) states. It is also concerned about threats to safety in the form of cross border crime. Finally, uncontrolled flows of refugees seem to be viewed as a potential threat—though the nature of this threat is not entirely clear. Much of the language throughout the document is global, but it is not difficult to infer that peace and order on Europe's periphery is the number one security priority for the EU. It is there that Europeans find terrorism and weapons of mass destruction most disturbing. And it is there that civil wars can produce refugee flows and criminal activity that Europeans will experience.

This identification of priorities serves the goals of deterrence and coercion reasonably well—but largely in Eastern Europe, the Middle East/Persian Gulf and North Africa. Both non-state and state actors in these regions should infer from the document that their security business is the EU's business. The document does not go quite so far as to threaten explicit actions that would deter or coerce. Unlike the Bush grand strategy document of Fall 2002, it does not threaten preemptive military action but instead recommends "preventive engagement". European diplomacy, economic assistance, and even military activity have been and are likely to remain concentrated in these areas. Thus, the message of the strategy will be repeated, amplified, and supported by facts on the ground. If NATO, led by the US, became the sheriff of the European periphery during the mid-1990s, it has a new deputy sheriff. And if the sheriff has to go into the badlands to apprehend other miscreants, there is a deputy to preside over the town and its environs.

The bows in the direction of global security aspirations do serve a second purpose. They please the US. The strategy document is realistic about the current distribution of power in the world. The US is

explicitly viewed as number one, and cooperation with the US is identified as a key means to EU security. NATO is portrayed as an essential partner. Though it seems unlikely that Europeans actually care much about terrorists and weapons of mass destruction in the Far East, the document implies otherwise. There can be little doubt that for now, the EU does not want to go it alone. Nevertheless, Europe probably will not provide much real help to the US in its global pursuits. Even in Afghanistan, Europe seems to have trouble providing the resources necessary to pursue, much less achieve, success in the reconstruction of that country.

INTERNAL FUNCTIONS

The EU strategy declares that Europe needs new resources for defence and needs to reallocate resources within the current national defence budgets. In the bad old days of the NATO-Warsaw Pact competition, there were simple ways to make this case to Europeans. The Soviets were great producers of military materiel; invariably charts were displayed showing big gaps between NATO and Pact inventories of tanks and fighter aircraft. Even this appeal worked only so well, but without a threat, the argument for additional resources is more complicated. NATO has taken to talking about the European-US capabilities gap, which must be closed so that Europeans and Americans can fight together. Though right in principle, it is asking a lot of European publics that they rise to the challenge and arms race with their principal ally and strategic benefactor.

This strategy is not likely to mobilise many additional resources from voting publics and their representatives to support European military or intelligence efforts because it does not explain why Europe needs to spend more on defence. The document asserts but does not demonstrate that enhanced European military power is needed to fight terrorism and proliferation, and to end regional conflicts. If the strategy's commitment to the pacification of Europe's periphery were more explicit and distinctive it might catch on with European publics. But if it were more explicit, it would also provide guidance for how new money would be spent, and how to reorder

current defence spending. The document's surprisingly muted discussion of military requirements arises from a dilemma. Amicable NATO-EU relations are premised in part on an unstated bargain. NATO grudgingly tolerates the ESDP, because the EU lends its political legitimacy to the pursuit of NATO's force goals. Though the EU cares mainly about its periphery, NATO promises the US global assistance in the war on terror. Regional specialisation of European forces for peace enforcement does not give the US ally what it wants. The EU strategy document thus bows in the direction of global missions, but the writers surely know that most Europeans are not enthusiastic. The document falls between two stools-globalism and regionalism. Without a clearer direction, the strategy lacks the sizzle to carry sceptical publics.

What guidance does the document provide to Europe's military planners? How should they spend their "160 billion Euros?" At least one priority is clear. The EU needs more and better intelligence capabilities-both in terms of collection and analysis. The authors hope that the EU can "prevent" civil wars, terrorism, and proliferation-and do so through a combination of political, military, and economic assistance. If this is to work, then a good deal of reliable information is necessary. Though their reasoning is unstated, the authors are undoubtedly sceptical that they can rely on the massive collection capabilities of its US ally, which is not known to share its information freely. The flattering references to the US and to NATO thus cannot hide the fact that the EU hopes at least to possess sufficient intelligence of its own to come to its own conclusions.

Finally, what kind of military do the EU's strategists want? As noted above, the opportunity was missed to set some priorities. Should Europe's militaries aim to close the capabilities gap with the US? Should they organise, train, and equip to stand shoulder to shoulder with the American forces in offensive operations anywhere in the world, at short notice? This would be an expensive standard, but it seems to be what NATO wants, and is embodied in the NATO reaction force. Or, should European militaries take their regional peace enforcement mission as their true priority? Should they aim for numbers and staying power, and for military capabilities tailored to cooperate with political, legal, and economic assistance organisations? In the US, when the problem turns to nation-building, we sud-

denly find ourselves in desperate need of so called "high demand, low density" units-military intelligence, military police, and civil affairs. Of course, the density of these units is low in the US military as a consequence of policy choices. Maybe European militaries should make different choices.

The EU strategy document is an important achievement. Europeans are starting to develop a distinct conception of their collective strategic interests, and some sense of what they need to pursue those interests. But this is a transitional document. All the pieces are there-identification of threats, a discussion of political and military means and ends, and a hint of prioritisation. The document nevertheless reflects a basic fact of life in Europe. Most European states still seek their security in a NATO or a national context, and do not want the EU to do anything that seriously irritates the US. That said, the outlines of an independent vision, and an autonomous capability to achieve it, are discernible.

Two cheers for the EU's new security strategy: Soft power and hard power

By Steven Everts¹

Although failing to agree on a constitution in December 2003, leaders of the European Union's member countries can take heart in the success in adopting a formal security strategy. Javier Solana, the EU's foreign policy chief, has drafted a tightly argued text that sets out how Europeans see the international security environment, what Europe's main interests and objectives are, and how the EU will achieve them. Many seasoned analysts and diplomats are bound to dismiss the EU security strategy as yet another ineffectual document. While understandable, this attitude is mistaken.

The point of drafting a formal security strategy was to do so from an explicit European rather than a narrow national viewpoint. During the Iraq crisis, EU leaders learned the hard way that without a common analysis of the threats, a consensus on how to tackle them would prove unattainable.

The security strategy proves that the EU can learn from its failures. It has forced European leaders to debate strategies and policies, rather than seek refuge in more familiar discussions on institutions

Summary

The ESS shows new EU assertiveness, but decision-making procedures need to be streamlined for the strategy to be successful. Cooperation among the EU Member States, as well as with the US, has to improve. Priorities must be set and followed up on, while keeping focus on the near abroad.

About the Author

Steven Everts is a senior research fellow at the Center for European Reform in London.

and processes. It has already produced a "new realism" that pervades current debates on EU foreign policy. A year ago it would have been impossible to get all countries to sign up for a European strategic culture "that fosters early, rapid and, when necessary robust intervention."

Solana's security strategy has four particular strengths. Unlike all other EU documents, it is mercifully short, sharp and devoid of waffling. While it rightly mentions global warming and AIDS, there is a helpful focus on five key threats: strategic terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime.

Moreover, it is good news that the EU now explicitly recognises that it should use its policies on trade, aid and migration in a politically targeted and conditional way. This realisation is long overdue but very welcome. Europeans like to think of themselves as being good at "soft power." But because of a lack of focus, coherence and self-discipline, the EU has underperformed for years in foreign policy.

Third, it is right that the latest version of the document recognises, along with the emergence of new threats that old regional and ethnic-style conflicts still remain. Such frozen conflicts - in Kashmir, in Africa's Great Lakes region, in the Palestinian territories - often fuel the new threats. Europeans are right to emphasise the regional security dimension to proliferation problems, often missing in US thinking.

Finally, the tone of the whole document heralds a new assertiveness and suggests that the EU is losing its innocence in handling international affairs. The concept of effective multilateralism, which runs like a scarlet thread through the paper, is critical as it acknowledges the need to act tough when countries break international rules.

Inevitably, the security strategy has its weaknesses. There is much emphasis on governance, the rule of law and human rights, but hardly any mention of democracy and none of freedom as important objectives for the EU - confirming the suspicions of the many who think that Europeans are too focused on stability and managing the status quo. Democracy and freedom deserve a more prominent place; they are too important to be left to the neo-conservatives. The United

Two cheers for the EU's new security strategy:
Soft power and hard power

States talks a lot about promoting democracy in the Middle East but is ill equipped to bring it about; the Europeans are better-placed to do so but do not seem to want it badly enough.

The strategy has also gone backward in one important respect. The notion of "pre-emptive" engagement has been substituted in the final version by the less threatening term "preventive" engagement. When asked, EU officials said many European languages lack a direct translation for pre-emption. But the political connotations of the term, and its prominent place in US thinking, must have been a greater problem. The EU must grapple with the contentious issue of the conditions for the use of force, which cannot be eliminated by a semantic fudge. EU leaders need to demonstrate that the strategy is not just well-meaning verbiage but real in its consequences, and that a different approach to international affairs can deliver better, more lasting results. If this is to be the case the EU needs to adhere to five general, but important rules of engagement:²

Decision making procedures need to be streamlined and the High representative for Foreign Policy, Javier Solana should be given more resources. All reform efforts should focus on improving the EU's ability to act. For a start, the EU should abolish the rotating presidency's role in the CFSP. The High Representative should take over the crucial task of representing the EU externally. For this to happen budgets need to be increased and more national diplomats should be transferred to Solana's policy unit. In order to avoid total policy paralysis when new members enter the Union decision-making should be made smoother by more decisions being taken by qualified majority voting.

Ensure better co-ordination within EU institutions, and between the EU and member states. The EU needs to apply its policies on security, trade, financial assistance, and immigration to support pre-defined political goals. For this to happen the EU will have to reform the overburdened General Affairs Council into a Foreign Policy Council. The split between supranational and intergovernmental sides of EU external policy need to be overcome. The jobs of the High Representative and Commissioner for External Relations should be merged into a single foreign policy office to work for EU interest around the world.

Continue to play to the strengths of the Union -alongside the US. The EU should continue to champion international organisations and an international system based on clear rules. Promoting robust international regimes is not a sign of weakness. Wherever possible the EU should try to pull alongside the US, because this is nearly always a pre-condition for effective multilateral action. But wherever necessary the EU should have the confidence to develop its own, distinctive approach.

Define meaningful priorities, and stick to them. EU foreign policy is a new and incomplete project that badly needs clear priorities. Politicians should resist their current inclination to dream up a policy on all issues, regions and conflicts in the world. Instead the amalgamated foreign policy chief and the EU foreign ministers should set out, once a year, the EU's foreign policy priorities. The list should cover three or four issues at most. This more focused approach will increase the chance of producing one or two much-needed successes.

Think strategically and globally, but start with the 'near abroad'. The EU should be an active, outward looking global player, and deepen its political relations with Asia, Latin-America, and Africa. But EU foreign policy should in its infancy start with its own back yard: the Balkans, North-Africa, Russia, the Ukraine and the Middle East.

Many of these reforms may sound ambitious. Some proposals, such as those regarding the rotating presidency or merging the jobs of Patten and Solana, will require changes in the EU treaties. Other measures, such as linking aid with foreign policy priorities, can be implemented immediately. Conventional wisdom says that governments will never agree to such a radical overhaul as the five points suggest. But the new and real threats now facing the citizens of Europe may prove conventional wisdom wrong.

1 A version of this article appeared in the International Herald Tribune Tuesday, December 9, 2003.

2 The 'five rules' for a more credible EU foreign policy was introduced and examined in greater detail in the pamphlet 'Shaping a credible EU foreign policy' (CER, London, 2002).

US Reactions to the EU Security Strategy

By John van Oudenaren

Reactions in the U.S. policy community to the OEU security strategy paper that was issued in June 2003 by CFSP High Representative Javier Solana and formally adopted by the European Council in December 2003 generally have been positive. Timing in part accounts for the favourable reception. Solana issued his A Secure Europe in a Better World shortly before the June 2003 U.S.-EU summit in Washington, which both sides approached with a clear determination to patch up relations after the splits engendered by the Iraq war. The Solana document made clear that while the EU did not necessarily agree with aspects of the U.S. approach to terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it was not ignoring these problems and was beginning to think seriously about how it could best contribute to their resolution.

Solana's personal reputation also helped. As a former NATO Secretary-General who in his EU role has worked closely with his U.S. counterparts on problems relating to the Balkans, the Middle East, and elsewhere, Solana is widely respected in Washington. The

Summary

The ESS is a welcome addition to the transatlantic debate. While edging towards US threat assessments, it resists a tedious repetition of Europe's multilateralist claims. The ESS provides a basis for improved transatlantic co-operation - and for effective multilateralism.

About the Author

John van Oudenaren is Head of Division at the Library of Congress in Washington.

fact that the strategy paper was issued by his office and identified with him personally rather than with, for example, the European Commission helped to ensure a positive reception in Washington.

Above all, however, many U.S. analysts and policy-makers were pleased with the content of the paper and by extension the new security strategy. The thread that runs through the strategy document is "effective multilateralism," a sentiment that subsequently was echoed by President George W. Bush in his November 2003 speech at Whitehall Palace in London. In this regard, the Solana paper was important as much for what it did not say as what it did say about multilateralism. Privately, many U.S. officials (including career civil servants and diplomats not politically aligned with the Bush administration) have long been irritated with what they see as the tendency of the EU, assisted by some allies outside Europe, to define, unilaterally as it were, what constitutes true multilateralism and to label all dissenting views as unilateralist.¹ The result has been something of a European campaign, heavily associated in the U.S. view, with some member state governments and the European Commission, to de-legitimize U.S. policy through reckless and indiscriminate wielding of the "unilateralism" charge.

In the 1990s, for example, the United States played a very positive role with regard to de-mining activities around the world, and would have signed the Ottawa treaty banning land-mines had it been allowed a temporary exception for the dangerous Demilitarised Zone between North and South Korea, where the United States maintains 37,000 troops facing a much larger North Korean army. The European backers of the treaty steadfastly refused any compromise on this issue. As a consequence, the land-mine treaty is a tribute to the moral purity of European countries (most of which border upon each other and are not exposed to any external threats), but it was not accepted by the United States and many other countries faced with actual or potential security problems at their borders.²

Similarly, the EU-led "like-minded group" rammed through the creation of the International Criminal Court at the 1998 Rome conference, steadfastly refusing to continue negotiations with the Clinton administration on issues of concern to the United States about the court. As a consequence, the ICC has come into being, but it is not

supported by the three largest countries in the world (China, India, and the United States), and it does not include among its members three of the five members of the UN Security Council (China, Russia, and the United States).

On Kyoto, the EU secured for itself a highly advantageous negotiating position (using 1990 as a base year so as to count emissions reductions attributable to the shut-down of East German industry against its Kyoto targets), and then stubbornly refused to compromise with the United States at the 2000 Hague Conference of Parties on rules that might have allowed the Clinton administration to finalise U.S. adherence to Kyoto. While Kyoto may yet go into effect, the fact that the treaty is seen by many outside Europe as heavily biased in the EU's favour helps to explain why it has faced such difficult ratification battles in Canada and Japan and why it was rejected by Australia and may not be ratified by Russia. And many in Europe made a major issue out of the fact that the U.S. Senate refused to ratify as unworkable and unverifiable the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, ignoring the fact that however unfortunate this circumstance might have been, the United States tested its last nuclear weapon in 1992, in contrast, for example, to France, which was testing in the South Pacific as recently as 1995-1996.³

An important virtue of the Solana paper is that it avoids a tedious repetition of Europe's multilateralist claims and the corresponding check-list of EU-defined tests that the United States has to "pass" in order to re-qualify as a true multilateralist in Europe's eyes. While not denying the clear differences across the Atlantic on some issues and the EU's continued support for, e.g., Kyoto and the ICC, it concentrated on the positive: on a wide range of multilateral institutions and instruments and their effectiveness (or lack thereof) in confronting real problems, mentioning the UN, the World Trade Organisation, the international financial institutions, the transatlantic relationship, and important regional organisations such as ASEAN, Mercosur, and the African Union. Conversely, the paper noted the existence of certain other countries that have "placed themselves outside the bounds of international society" and recommended that these countries be forced to pay a price for their internal and external "rogue" (the term itself is not used) behaviour in their relations with the EU. In sum, without denying Europe's commitment to

multilateralism and international law, the paper was less presumptuous than many other statements in asserting the claim of the EU (generally explained in terms of the Union's "inherently" multilateral character) to define for the rest of the world and above all for the United States what constitutes proper multilateral behavior.⁴

So much for what the Solana paper did not do. With regard to its positive content, American observers also were generally impressed. Here again, the paper stressed the traditional European theme that security problems in the developing world are in part attributable to poverty and alienation and reiterated the EU's commitment to addressing these problems. This is an area in which the United States arguably has been moving toward the "European" position by, for example, increasing its foreign aid budget, launching new initiatives on AIDS, and pledging to "stay the course" in post-war Iraq and Afghanistan and committing the money needed to help these societies re-build. At the same time, however, the European Security Strategy seemed to move Europe somewhat in the "American" direction by acknowledging that threats such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, and state failure can become imminent and that there may be occasions when Europe will have to take action to defend itself before the international community has a chance to solve the underlying economic, social, and political problems that cause these threats. The European document does not go as far as the U.S. national security strategy in endorsing preemptive or indeed preventive military action, but there clearly is common ground between the documents in that both recognise that long-term ameliorative actions do not eliminate the requirement for short-term military readiness or, conversely, that immediate security requirements should not be so all-absorbing that they lead to neglect of long-term programs to combat poverty and other underlying causes of security threats.

Finally, the European strategy document contains a welcome admission that in order to build an effective partnership with the United States in some areas, the EU will have to upgrade its capabilities and that this will require increased effort. "To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary." The United States and selected

European countries already are working closely together in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan, allowing both sides to see the other's strengths and weaknesses in action. U.S. observers will be looking for the upgrading in capabilities that the Solana document called for, but inevitably will do so with somewhat sceptical eyes, given past failures and, for example, the EU's lag in meeting its own 1999 headline goal.⁵

In sum, the European Security Strategy establishes a basis for improved U.S.-European cooperation in the future - both because of what it leaves out and what it includes. In tone and substance it projects an attitude that is serious but not alarmist, hopeful about "a better world" but realistic about the effort that will be required by the EU and other partners to achieve such a world. These virtues have not been missed in Washington and account for the positive reception accorded the new document. Whether these positive sentiments persist into the future will depend very much on how the strategy is implemented, of course, and therein will lie the test for an enlarged EU in 2004 and beyond.


1 For an excellent discussion of this issue by a leading Democratic foreign policy expert critical of both the Bush administration and European stances on multilateralism, see Michael Haltzel, "Europe and the USA: Overcoming Mutual Misperceptions," American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, www.aicgs.org/c/haltzelc.shtml.

2 Non-signatories of the 1997 treaty (as of October 2003) include China, India, Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, the United States and, within the EU, Finland, Estonia, and Latvia.

3 China tested nuclear weapons in 1993 and India and Pakistan in 1998.

4 For a more detailed treatment of the multilateralism issue, see John Van Oudenaren, "What Is Multilateral?" Policy Review, No. 117, February-March 2003 (also available at www.policyreview.org).

5 See, for example, David C. Gompert, "What does America want of Europe?" in Gustav Lindstrom, ed., *Shift or Rift: Assessing US-EU relations after Iraq* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2003), pp. 43-75.



There's more to us than this journal...



Interested in what you are reading? This journal is one of our many products and services, and like all of them it is shaped clearly by our mission: to provide those at the commanding heights of public policy making with actionable, reliable and non-partisan advice.




By drawing on the knowledge, intelligence and creativity of analysts at leading universities like Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard and ENA, we can assist you in creating public value based on cutting-edge research. And whether this takes the form of a personal consultation or a written recommendation, you can be certain that our results always are to-the-point, concise, unbiased, and realistic.



For more information about the Oxford Council on Good Governance, we encourage you to visit our website at www.oxfordgovernance.org.

*The Oxford Council
on Good Governance*



Weapons of Mass Destruction and the EU Security Strategy

By Jez Littlewood

What 'security' actually means in the contemporary period has changed fundamentally since the end of the Cold War. War and conflict between states or war and conflict within a state still remains a central concern, but international terrorism of the kind perpetrated in the US in September 2001, Indonesia in 2002, Turkey in 2003, and Spain in 2004 has changed our current focus and concerns. New threats have been added to a list of old threats and how the EU chooses to deal with this range of security threats will have major implications for Europe itself and the place of the EU in the world. The European Security Strategy (ESS) "A Secure Europe in a Better World" offers some pointers to what we can expect over the next few years.

Summary

The EU cannot yet inspire confidence when a crisis arises. Strategy alone is not enough-the EU needs policy. The member States must agree on whether they want to use the carrot or the stick.

About the Author

Jez Littlewood is Research Fellow at the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies at the University of Southampton.

The ESS recognises that security threats come in many forms and there is a link between national, regional, and international peace and security, with economic development and prosperity of individuals and states. The ESS is a positive development for the EU, but questions remain over how the ESS will work and which direction it will take the EU as a global actor. Will Europe remain the 'good cop'

to the US's 'bad cop'?¹, the soothing peacekeeper and state-builder to the US enforcer of global order?, or will it become an independent actor in its own right, particularly in its own 'near abroad'? Under the ESS, 'soft security' aspects of the strategy do not present a problem and can be rapidly brought to bear and play to the strengths of the Europeans. If the ESS is to have real meaning, detailed thought will need to be given to how it will be used to tackle a range of threats and immediate dangers, including: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction globally; nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programmes, or interest in such weapons, in states such as Iran, North Korea, Russia, Pakistan, India, Israel, Syria, and Libya; and, terrorism involving chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological materials.

To develop an understanding of where the ESS may lead the EU it is important to note what the ESS says, but also what it does not say, and what past practice in the EU implies for the implementation of the strategy. Two issues stand out in this regard. First, that the strategy rightly states that 'Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security'² but understandably stops short of stating that Europe is ready and able to shoulder such a responsibility. Hence, tacit recognition that Europe, or rather the EU, is neither politically nor militarily able to share in the responsibility for global security that population and economic weight would imply. Second, the ESS is not actually calling for anything 'new' but reaffirms the utility of existing EU policies and objectives. In particular, the deliberate avoidance of the critical question related to the WMD regimes, treaties and non-proliferation agreements: compliance enforcement. Quite correctly the ESS notes that European security increasingly depends on an effective multilateral system and identifies the ESS objective as the 'development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order'³ This is a bold objective, but how is such a rule-based order to be managed and ultimately enforced? In place of the original implication that force may be used by the EU the ESS now contains anodyne claims that the EU 'should be ready to act before a crisis occurs' and 'preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future'⁴. This is classic diplomatic fudge; a constructive ambiguity in the text, which permits all partners to reach agreement knowing they

interpret the same words very differently. Differences over enforcement take us to the very heart of the contemporary proliferation problem.

For example, the ESS identified threats facing Europe that include terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime. It is significant that the strategy recognises that these issues are not discrete. The detection of an underground Pakistan-based nuclear proliferation network with links to Libya and Iran underlines critical linkages. Pakistan's as well as others' failure to enforce export and non-proliferation controls on nuclear technologies permitted an underground network akin to organised crime to meet demand for WMD; this demand was fuelled by regional conflicts and security concerns and involved supplying technologies to states known to sponsor certain terrorist groups.⁵ There are necessary caveats to add here, not least that the terrorism connection is not known to be with groups like Al Qaeda, but the uncovering of this network is a bleak warning to all that existing non-proliferation efforts are only as strong as their weakest link -and that they are failing. Export controls may slow down proliferation but there have been co-ordinated export controls in place since the early 1970s under the aegis of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, since the mid-1980s for chemical weapons, and the early 1990s for biological weapons, under the Australia Group as well as the Wassenaar arrangement. These have not stopped nuclear, chemical or biological weapons programmes in states as diverse as Pakistan, North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Iran, India, Syria, or South Korea. Export controls at best buy time for a state or group of states to address the proliferation problem through other means. History suggests that the breathing space provided by existing export control arrangements to tackle underlying political and security causes for WMD has not been used effectively. Furthermore, Europe and the 'West' no longer have a monopoly on WMD technologies. It should not escape the EU's notice that many of the states widely touted in the open literature as taking an interest in WMD are on, or close to, its border. Clearly recycling existing policies is not sufficient: new policies are required.

There is nothing wrong with reaffirming existing policies per se, and under the ESS multilateralism and the importance of the United Nations Charter and the UN Security Council are given prominence.

This is an important statement because it establishes a clear objective: '[w]e want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must, therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken.'⁶ However, it begs the question of what constitutes 'effective' for the EU? Consensus agreement in these fora; a lowest-common-denominator communiqué or final declaration; a decision by an organisation or a regime's states parties to challenge alleged non-compliance; agreement on political measures, sanctions and coercive means to uphold the legal obligations; the use of military force?

In an effective security strategy all such measures have a role and it is always preferable to avoid the use of military force, but international organisations and regimes are notorious for glossing over and avoiding difficult decisions. Rules require enforcement mechanisms, and serious threats and crises cannot be tackled solely by non-military means. Absent the threat of credible enforcement, hard cases of non-compliance and errant or 'rogue' behaviour cannot be resolved. Compliance enforcement may be done through a variety of policies, but in the most difficult circumstances enforcement rests on the ability and a willingness to use force. The fact remains that the EU has neither the ability nor the willingness to use force as an actor in its own right: its member states - or some of them - do.

The recent record of some EU member states, for example France, Germany and the UK, in this area is improving. The case of Iran and the co-ordinated pressure applied by France, Germany and the UK played an important part in forcing Iran into accepting the IAEA Additional Protocol and meeting the IAEA's demands for greater transparency in later 2003. But it is also important to note that the UK and the US brokered the deal with Libya; the UK, Germany, and France co-ordinated their role in the Iranian nuclear crisis with the US and the IAEA; and, the UK got involved in Iraq. The EU had no meaningful role to play in any of these issues as an actor in its own right; it played a supporting role, and a marginal one at that. Put simply, the EU is not sufficiently developed to inspire confidence that it will act as a coherent political body in a security crisis.

Any such confidence is further undermined by "common threat assessments" being identified as 'the best basis for common actions.'⁷

Significant obstacles will have to be overcome if any common threat assessment is to become a useful base for developing policy. To begin with, to whom or what is the threat directed against: the EU or its member states? In the real world we should be looking at the latter and the fact remains that, to give only a few examples, Greece's strategic and foreign policy interests in South Asia are different to those of the UK; Poland's relations and interests in Francophone Africa are different to those of France; Finland's strategic interests in the Mediterranean are different to those of Spain and the latter's is different to those of Finland and the Baltic states in relation to Russia. This is a world of multifaceted, complex, and dynamic threats related to all the factors the ESS outlines. Forming a common threat assessment among the 25 will be a monumental task, if that threat assessment is to have any real use or form the basis of common policies to counter the threats. It is useful to develop a strategy against the proliferation of WMD; but it is quite another thing to implement that strategy and examine proliferation threats in detail and develop policy priorities for action. To offer one example, will continued Iranian stonewalling with the IAEA warrant the EU to wave its 'big stick' or will it attempt to 'talk softly' and offer more carrots, leaving the 'stick' to the US? Or will it waive all interests and leave the issue to the UK, France and Germany? The latter implies the 'big three' will oversee European Security, and objections in principle from second and third tier security powers in the EU will scupper any such chances.

At the multilateral level, within the regimes themselves a lowest-common denominator EU Common Position for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), or the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), or the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) will have little practical impact in strengthening those treaties. Such positions and statements may make the EU feel it is doing something, but in the reality of international negotiations it has minimal practical effect. In technically complex negotiations the EU rotating Presidency has been a hindrance to effective policy; a broad 'strategic' common position on a particular issue is often undermined by national statements or qualifications related to the detail; such divergences exploited by other states to their own advantage. The result is that a EU statement on proliferation, or other security issues for that matter, simply does not carry the weight of a statement from some of its individual members.

The proliferation of WMD is recognised as a threat to international peace and security. As a consequence, the success of the ESS and its implementation will be closely tied to this issue. How the EU copes with divergence in its policies related to WMD is therefore critical to the ESS. The EU must recognise the positions and policies of those particular member states that are, and will, take the lead on global security issues. To give the ESS real meaning will require the EU to accept that security threats will be perceived differently by each of the twenty-five. If 'common' is interpreted to mean collective and unanimity required for any such threat assessment each state will have a de facto veto on what, or more importantly which states, are identified in the common threat assessment. If this occurs then as a strategy it will be moribund because for too many EU states proliferation problems in specific countries are of no direct concern to them and action against such states would be politically unpalatable. Implementation of the strategy must therefore be flexible enough to permit each of the twenty-five to use their individual economic, political, and ultimately military, strengths to best effect within a broader objective of a world with significantly fewer WMD threats than currently exist. That will be a far from easy task for the EU if the modus operandi is to be a common assessment of threats, and such assessments fail to recognise the different views of each member state.

1 Joanna Spear, 'The Emergence of a European 'Strategic Personality'' Arms Control Today, Volume 33 Number 9 (November 2003).

2 EU, 'A Secure Europe for a Better World' European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 1.

3 Ibid., p. 9.

4 Ibid., p. 7 and p. 9.

5 John Burton et al, 'Pakistani ring 'fed Libya nuclear parts'', Financial Times 20 February 2004.

6 A Secure Europe for a Better World, p. 9.

7 Ibid., p. 12.

US and EU Security Strategies: Same Planet, Different Hemispheres

By Jean-Marc Rickli

In a famous article, Robert Kagan depicts the United States as coming from Mars and the Europeans from Venus.¹ Through this metaphor he argues that due to an imbalance in power distribution, a weak Europe has become averse to using military force, while a powerful America is the advocate of hard power. While the bulk of Kagan's argument rests on the issue of capability, namely that the Europeans were reluctant to invest in their own defence during the nineties preferring instead soft power tools such as economics and trade, the publication of a European Security Strategy² (ESS) represents a milestone in European security,

and therefore can potentially shed new light on Kagan's argument. Bearing in mind that the American National Security Strategy³ (NSS) was published before the Iraq war whereas the ESS is to a large extent a consequence of this war, a closer look at the threat assessment, the strategy and the means proposed by both papers can help us clarifying the debate.

The two papers are uneven on the place devoted to threat assessment - with the ESS devoting 5 out of 14 pages while the NSS limits

Summary

The transatlantic gap is not as wide as many would have it. The US and the EU security strategies are remarkably similar. They coincide on threat assessments and counter-measures, but differ on enforcement.

About the Author

Jean-Marc Rickli is President of the Geneva University Strategic Studies Group and a Manager of the Oxford Council on Good Governance.

its analysis to a few sentences - but are relatively similar in their conclusions. The threat assessments of the respective strategies start with two different assumptions. The analysis of the ESS traces back the development of European security to post-War Europe and points out that Europe since then, lives in an unprecedented "period of peace and stability". The NSS, a direct response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, focuses squarely on countering the new threats facing the US homeland. Both papers acknowledge the danger failed states, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction pose to their citizens, their territory and international security in general. In the NSS, failed states are depicted as a primary threat as they not only provide a sanctuary for terrorist organisations but could also breed them. The ESS concurs with this analysis, while emphasising the crucial role of regional conflicts as enabler of extremism, terrorism, state failure and organised crime.⁴ Yet, both strategies reach the same conclusion, namely that the major threat is the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist organisations. While the Bush national strategy reckons that "the gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology", the Solana paper considers that "the most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction".

Building on their threat assessment, both papers highlight the importance of spreading liberal democracy. The focus, however, is different. While the Solana paper mentions the importance of good governance, the Bush paper focuses on political and economic freedom. The objective of the NSS becomes therefore to "create a balance of power that favours human freedom". In order to protect its values and to implement its objectives, each paper defines its own goals. The NSS aims to go about this task by promoting "political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity". The ESS also sets three goals, namely to address the threats, to build security in the EU's neighbourhood and to develop an international order based on "effective multilateralism".

The issue of the implementation is marked by the greatest differences between the European and the American strategies. The EU has adopted a two-pronged strategy comprising both the promotion of security by integration⁵ and "effective multilateralism". The former relies on the idea that the perspective of the European integra-

tion "offers both strategic objectives and an incentive for reforms". For this purpose, the Balkans is considered a key region for the success of the European strategy. The latter entails "multilateral co-operation in international organisations" and "partnerships with key actors" in order to ensure global governance. To this end, the EU strategy identifies the United Nations as the primary international body responsible for the maintenance of peace and security. NATO is offered a less prominent place and is barely considered as a security actor in its own right. Rather, NATO is referred to, on the one hand, as a toolbox for EU missions and, on the other, as a bridge in transatlantic relations. Interestingly, the first draft mentioned the transatlantic relationship before the UN. Yet, the final version not only primarily emphasises the role of the UN, but also elaborates on a EU contribution to it. Thus, the ESS pledges to support "the UN in short-term crisis management". As this was not mentioned in the draft version, we can legitimately assume that this stems from the successful European experience during Operation Artemis in Congo.

Unlike the European approach, the American strategy is based on the instrumentalisation of co-operation. Since the nature of the threat has become unclear and volatile, the NSS argues that coalitions can no longer be fixed, but depend on the mission.⁶ Thus, although the US will "work with others to defuse regional conflicts" it will not inhibit its freedom of action by fixed pattern of co-operation. As the NSS puts it: "forming coalitions of the willing and co-operative security arrangements are key to confronting these emerging transnational threats". Likewise, the role of international organisations is also subordinated to the mission. Thus, NATO must be able "to act wherever American interests are threatened, creating coalitions under NATO's own mandate, as well as contributing to mission-based coalitions". In the same vein, the NSS reaffirms American encouragement to develop a European Security and Defence Policy that is compatible with NATO and therefore with American interests. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the NSS refers to the United Nations somewhat vaguely as a potential ally of the American strategy and exclusively for soft security matters.

The differences in strategy are echoed in the means favoured to implement them. The NSS places great importance on military power. Military force is envisioned as an appropriate tool to "disrupt

and destroy terrorist organisations of global reach", "to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapon of mass destruction", to "strengthen America's homeland security" by protecting against and deterring attacks, to defend America's interests, and to assure its allies. In other words, military strength is considered as the vehicle of American hegemony and must be maintained by building defences beyond challenge. Non-military means are also considered but take the role of a distant second to military might and apply mainly in soft security issues. Thus, foreign aid is used to promote freedom and good governance; financial aid must be granted for promoting education, fighting AIDS and reforming the world's poorest economies so as to expand free market and free trade; and diplomacy and arms control must bolster non-proliferation efforts. Similarly, international and non-governmental organisations are solely considered when they favour American interests.

The European approach on the other hand advocates striking a balance between military and civilian instruments. Military assets are considered useful to restore order in failed states and in post conflict phase.⁷ For this purpose, the ESS calls for the "need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary robust intervention" and to pool EU member defence resources to become more effective. Although the final version of the Solana paper puts more emphasis on the military dimension than the draft version, the European approach nonetheless underlines that these assets must be complemented by civilian instruments. Especially important are international law and existing institutions such as the UN or the World Trade Organisation. The most striking and most commented difference between the two strategies is on the way they deal with emerging threats. While the NSS adopts the strategy of pre-emption, the ESS refrains from talking of pre-emption referring instead to "prevention".⁸ The Bush strategy states that deterrence no longer works against people willing to sacrifice their lives for a cause and concludes that America is compelled to strike before its enemies do so. Furthermore, the concept of pre-emption introduced in the NSS is closely associated with a unilateralist approach: "we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defence by acting pre-emptively". The ESS, on the other hand, operates with a multilateral "preventive approach" that spans the full range of soft-

security tools up to, and including, armed forces. Hence, "conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early" and should be anchored within the UN framework. This difference can be understood as an implicit criticism of the prominence given to the expedient resort to military force in US foreign and security policy.

A comparison of the European and American security strategies leaves little to confirm the Mars and Venus metaphor. Indeed, the European Union and the United States security strategies are remarkably similar regarding their threats analysis and the values promoted. Unlike Kagan, we can conclude that the EU and the US actually are from the same planet. Yet, when it comes to tackle international threats, they live in different hemispheres. The EU adopts a post-modern strategy that relies on multilateralism, international organisations and security through integration. Contrary to Kagan's criticisms, the EU does not shy away from using force but incorporates military power into a broader toolbox comprising notably international law. As for the United States, it maintains a strategy typical of a Westphalian state focusing on military strength to deter and to defend against threats. Yet, this does not mean that other instruments and co-operation with other actors are excluded. On the contrary, the NSS is output-oriented and makes it clear that any useful contribution to enhance American security will be incorporated in the American toolbox. Yet, "American internationalism" is bound by the utility of others' values and interests to US aspirations.

The United States and the European Union might have drifted apart, had they listened to policy analysts on both sides of the Atlantic. The publication of the first European Security Strategy is likely to contribute to draw closer the United States and the European Union in the explicit acknowledgement that they are facing the same threats and accordingly require joint efforts to fight them.

1 Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness", Policy Review, no. 113, June 2002.

2 Javier Solana, "A Secure Europe in a Better World", Brussels, 12 December 2003. In this article the first draft of the Solana paper presented at the European Council of Thessaloniki on 20 June 2003 will also be taken into account.

3 White House, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of

America", Washington, September 2002.

4 It is worth noting that the first draft of the Solana paper did not mention regional conflicts but put more emphasis on the terrorism-weapons of mass destruction nexus. Thus, in the June version, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were depicted as "the most important threat to peace and security among nations" while in the December version it reads "is potentially the greatest threat to our security", p. 5 respectively p. 3.

5 Alyson Bailes calls this in her EU and US Strategic Concepts paper the "European style of neutralising enemies by absorbing them" (Paper for the EU/US Seminar at Rome, 17 November 2003, p. 8.).

6 In a recent article, Colin Powell reaffirms the centrality of partnership in the American strategy. "We conduct the war on terrorism with an eye toward great-power co-operation, and we seek enhanced great-power co-operation with an eye towards success in the war on terrorism". ("A Strategy of Partnership", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 83, no. 1, p. 29).

7 One might be struck that the Solana paper completely omits to mention the use of military force for homeland protection. One could therefore assume that either the EU no longer feels territorially threaten or that this task is devolved to the member states' national policies or both of them at the same time.

8 The phrase-"pre-emptive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future"- was omitted in the second draft, although the argument leading up to this core point was left.

Forging a Strategic Culture: Putting Policy into the ESDP

By Per Martin Martinsen

One sometimes gets the feeling that the EU's military dimension is more about clever wording than about substance. The European Security and Defence Policy has celebrated a number of rhetorical victories by covering up deadlocks with 'have your cake and eat it'-logic. For example, the EU military force is to be "separable but not separate" from NATO. Behind the catchphrase is the hidden fact that the Europeans could not and, indeed, still cannot agree on the division of labour between Europe and America in security matters. So, when the new EU Security Strategy (ESS) points to the need to develop an EU "strategic culture", the call was sure to be accused of

being yet another rhetorical exercise. This time, however, Solana and his followers in the Policy Unit finally seem to have hit the nail on its head. Developing a strategic culture could be the way to remedy what has been the greatest weakness of the European Security and Defence Policy so far, namely that it is desperately short on just that-policy.

Summary

The call for an EU strategic culture highlights the problem with the ESDP-the lack of actual policy. Member States must identify common interests and pre-defined responses based on shared intelligence. Make use of existing institutions and procedures rather than forcing convergence through majority voting.

About the Author

Per Martin Martinsen is a graduate student from the University of Cambridge.

Clearly, the EU has sufficient muscle to make itself felt in world affairs if the member States join forces. At the same time, European policy makers profess a keen interest in bringing foreign and security policy into the heart of the Union. Why is it then that thus far the EU has come up with so little in terms of actual policy? Traditionally the EU has overcome the inherent deadlock of all member States' potential 'veto' over common policy by shifting policy matters into the so-called first pillar where majority voting can be applied. There is, however, a qualitative difference between the mainly economically oriented first pillar and matters of security and defence. Most states jealously defend their perceived sovereignty when it comes to the latter. To take a frank view, the EU needs to re-invent itself, such that it creates procedures whereby decisions can be made and implemented without actually having to pool sovereignty.

Solana refers to this problem when he, in the ESS, points to the need to develop a "strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention". But the strategy gives few pointers as to what is understood by the term or how such a strategic culture may come about. What is certain, however, is that Solana sees in strategic culture the key to reassure the doubters and silence the voices of dissent. Strategic culture, in Solana's logic, would be an "Asterix" potion to make the EU pull its weight at the world stage. Revisiting briefly strategic culture as a theoretical concept may shed some light on whether the potion might work.

(RE)INTRODUCING STRATEGIC CULTURE

Strategic culture first appeared back in the 1970s in a research report by Jack Snyder, who applied the term to explain differences in Soviet and American nuclear strategies.¹ Since then, the concept has become a part of the strategic studies vocabulary. Iain Alastair Johnston identifies three generations of strategic culture studies. The first generation is represented by Snyder, who suggested that a range of variables such as historic experience, political culture, and geography act as constraints on strategic choice.² Offering a qualitatively different perspective, the second generation scholars were concerned with how culture is used as a discursive tool to legitimise strategic

doctrines, focusing on the difference between what decision makers say and what they actually do—admittedly a familiar problem also observed in the short history of the ESDP.

After criticising earlier studies for failure to isolate culture as a variable, the third generation, represented by Johnston himself, adopts a rigorous scientific approach to strategic culture. By decoupling behaviour from culture, he aims to make strategic culture falsifiable in a positivist scientific sense. This approach has, in turn, been met with criticism that behaviour itself is a constituent part of culture, which cannot, therefore, be studied separately.³

What most scholars seem to agree on is that culture consists of a number of elements which can be grouped as follows: a behavioural factor and a more elusive factor that includes common and stated expressions of ideas, expectations, values and attitudes.⁴ Incidentally, all of these elements are reflected in most definitions of the term, yet how they are inter-related is usually left vague. One way of seeing it, however, is to picture culture as the product of the dynamic interplay between these two factors, such that they rely on and affect each other in a continuous process. Conceptualising culture thus has three main advantages and may clarify the role of an EU strategic culture in eventually developing a more coherent and potent ESDP:

First, the concept is non-deterministic and dynamic, which means that strategic culture is disengaged from its traditional state-centric focus. Hence, there is no reason why the EU cannot realise this sort of a strategic culture. At the same time, a number of strategic cultures—i.e. centred on the EU, NATO or the nation state—may exist at any given time. The strength of each will be determined by the degree to which ideas and expectations are reflected in patterns of behaviour and vice versa. Secondly, the definition differentiates between words and action. This is a clear advantage since if one was to evaluate the ESDP on the speeches alone, it would—rather undeservedly—look like a spectacular success. This also brings us to the final advantage, namely the provision of two, more or less, material yardsticks, along which progress towards a strategic culture can be measured. For the EU to have a strategic culture, ideas, expectations and patterns of behaviour need to converge. Such a strategic culture

would provide an effective link between military and other means-applied under implicit or explicit threat of force-and a set of pre-defined political ends.

At the moment, the most striking problem of the ESDP is found in the ideas and expectations component of strategic culture. There is a profound lack of agreement on where, how, when and for what reasons the EU should flex its military muscle. The EU lacks a clear formulation of the ends towards which a set of means are applied. This is where the work towards an EU strategic culture must start, although the question remains as to whether strategic culture itself represents the magical potion to forge a convergence of interests and opinions at an overall strategic level.

Currently, at least three schools of thought can be discerned on what the overall strategic objectives of the EU ought to be. One school is led by the UK and France, which sees the EU as undertaking a wide range of missions on a global scale. Another group of countries, led by the EU neutrals such as Sweden and Austria, wishes for the ESDP to remain primarily a regional initiative centred on conducting UN-mandated crisis management operations. A third school, of which Germany has been the proponent, has been less inclined to support the idea of projecting power abroad as a tool to deepen internal integration. In the run-up to the European convention, the "big three" of European politics-France, Germany and Britain-attempted to overcome these differences of opinion by simply leapfrogging over the smaller countries. Accordingly, they prepared the ground for a directorate of EU states set to break out and develop the ESDP further, unhindered by voices of dissent. Such an 'EU Security Council' will clearly be a more effective policy maker than a 'General Assembly' of 25, yet it is questionable whether the aspirations of the three largest states translate into those of the EU as a whole. Disenfranchising all who say 'nay' is clearly not in the spirit of the strategic culture of the ESS. One must turn to Solana's own dispositions, therefore, to see if these offer some clues as to what is meant by a strategic culture on a more practical level.

AN INSTITUTIONALLY BASED STRATEGIC CULTURE?

The recent institutional changes occurring are, in fact, all representative of Solana's strategy to develop an in-house strategic culture. Steps have been made towards coordinating civilian and military resources, including the incorporation of all crisis management elements in the Korthenberg building in Brussels. The new facilities have also provided the physical and attitudinal preconditions for increasing the security measures among the personnel involved. Apart from facilitating the transmission of politically sensitive information, such a security culture is also crucial for the free flow of intelligence from the member States, on which the assessments worked out by the joint Situation Centre (SITCEN) are based. The establishment of the SITCEN itself is a unique project because it brings together a range of competencies, civilian and military, in one unit. This provides a framework for independent analyses that caters for the needs of both branches. The growing access to own sources of information also supports the emergence of such an EU intelligence culture. For example, the WEU satellite centre in Torrejón in Spain allows the Europeans to replicate and validate the basis for US assessments on which the EU has been reliant so far. Last but not least, the establishment of a military planning capability within the Council Secretariat has brought military uniforms into the EU bureaucracy, at least tentatively marking the introduction of a traditional military-based strategic culture centred in Brussels.

Much of the work in the growing institutional apparatus today is also targeted at harmonising the views of the member States before a formal vote is taken. Significantly, in the Policy Unit Solana has surrounded himself with people who are well connected and to be trusted with sensitive information flowing between the European capitals and Brussels. This information provides the basis for the Unit's Policy Option Papers (POPs), which can be seen to represent a harmonisation of the member States' views on a particular issue. If perceptions of what the role of the ESDP ought to be stray too far apart, the room for compromise gets smaller and weakens the consensus mechanism, which until now has allowed the EU to pursue strategies without having strict enforcement structures.

Solana has, in just half a decade, managed to mould a strategic culture according to his own logic. This culture is centred in Brussels and based on the overall principles and objectives set out in the security strategy. The next step is to close the time gap between an institutional apparatus that has been made ready to face the new security challenges and a group of decision makers who are still unable to decide which of these challenges lie within the Union's area of responsibility. The question is whether an EU strategic culture, in fact, can be forged or shaped to fit the broad political objectives set out in the ESS. With the call for a strategic culture, at least it looks like the EU has finally got the sequence right. First, the broad objectives of the security strategy need to be translated into a list of common interests. Next, a set of pre-defined responses to cases when these interests are threatened must be identified. Finally, the EU states will have to apply their resources immediately and unconditionally when a crisis occurs. This is the ultimate yardstick by which the EU strategic culture will be measured.

1 Snyder, J. (1977) *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Options*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, R-2154-AF.

2 Johnston, A. I. (1995) 'Thinking about Strategic Culture', *International Security*, 19/4.

3 See e.g. C. Gray (1999) *Modern Strategy*, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 130.

4 This way of conceptualising culture is presented in greater depth in P.M. Martinsen (2003) *The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) - A European Strategic Culture in the Making*, presented at the ECPR 2nd General Conference, Marburg 18-21 September 2003, <http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/generalconference/papers/17/1/Martinsen.pdf>.

published by the Oxford Council on Good Governance

*I welcome the Oxford
Council on Good
Governance's initiative
to launch this debate on
the Security Strategy*

Javier Solana

About us

The Oxford Council on Good Governance is an independent and non-partisan think tank. We provide actionable advice to high-level policy makers. Our areas of expertise cover law, government, security, economy, and science. Our advice is based on cutting-edge research by our analysts at Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard, ENA and other leading universities.

Vision

The vision of the OCGG is a world order of good governance that guarantees security, justice, welfare, and truth for everybody. This is a multipolar world order under the auspices of the United Nations that upholds human rights and the rule of law, democratic legitimacy and administrative effectiveness, international peace and multilateral cooperation, a vital economy and a fair welfare state, and progress in education, science, and technology at national, regional, and global levels.

