

## Europe's Security Policy – A long-term, comprehensive Perspective<sup>1</sup>

by Colonel i.G. Ralph Thiele

*“... key issues that we need to consider in taking ESDP forward into its second decade – policy, analysis of challenges, strategy, partnerships, structures and capabilities.”*

Javier Solana, Brussels 28 July 2009

### 1. Connecting Policies

As Europe's Security Policy needs to develop a long-term, comprehensive perspective in order to align efforts to advance domestic safety and security with those to promote international security and crisis response, a broad continuum of operations needs to be addressed. This continuum is ranging from societal protection, crisis prevention and crisis management to actual combat, humanitarian action and post-crisis recovery and stabilisation, that provides a general framework for contingencies at home and abroad and can be interpreted as a value chain along which each instrument of power can make specific contributions based on specific core competencies, thus providing an intertwined delivery of military and non-military capabilities. The logic of the value chain gives rise to a process-based and network-enabled organisation of interagency and international interaction that helps realign tasks, capabilities, processes and structures of the security apparatus. This paper takes a conceptual look at the Comprehensive Approach, focuses on the issue of prevention and highlights the requirement for a dedicated process of change management in order to strengthen Europe's Security Policy, analysis of challenges, strategy, partnerships, structures and capabilities.

The ratification of Europe's Lisbon treaty has been completed. European leaders have chosen their representatives for the top jobs being created by Lisbon: Herman Van Rompuy has become the President of the European Council. Catherine Ashton is the new high representative for foreign policy with enhanced responsibilities. Ashton, Barroso and Van

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<sup>1</sup> This paper reflects only the opinions of the author, and does not represent in any way the positions of the Luftwaffe or of the German Government.

Rompu have become the new European Union (EU) “*Dream Team*”. It is now predominantly in their hands,

- making it – after a period of introspective, institutional manoeuvres – work comprehensive and effects based,
- bringing together all the dimensions of its external action and making it more coherent,
- striking the right balance between security and other global governance issues.

Until today, the EU external policies have been largely disconnected from each other. Trade, Development Aid, the international dimension of policies such as Energy, Internal Market, Justice and Internal Affairs, have followed their own logic, with minimal attempts to ensure real coherence and to place them in a single integrated international strategy. This situation will now be challenged by the institutional modifications brought about by the Lisbon Treaty. Yet, institutional reform will not solve the problem by itself.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was established under the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union, which entered into force in 1993, and was strengthened under the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force in 1999. The objectives of the CFSP under the Treaty on European Union are to

- safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union;
- strengthen the security of the Union;
- promote peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
- promote international cooperation, and
- promote better governance through the development and consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and the upholding of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The Amsterdam Treaty created the operational arm for the CFSP, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), with the potential for later creating a common defence structure. The first phase of ESDP development dates back to the period between 1999 and 2003, when institutional requirements were established and ESDP was set up by voluntary national contributions of traditional armed forces composed of up to 60.000 troops. The adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003 and especially its realisation gave start to a second phase in ESDP development that can be seen as an attempt to develop “transformed” rapid reaction elements and respective strategic assets, and to boost its willingness and capabilities to act cohesively and effectively in security and defence matters. (Solana 2003, 2)

The ESS defines three strategic objectives

- to take preventive action at an early stage using all the instruments at its disposal.
- to focus on establishing security in its direct neighborhood with the aim of creating a ring of well-governed countries extending from the EU’s eastern border to the Mediterranean region.
- to commit itself to a global order based on effective multilateralism, founded on international law.

From the very outset the ESS has been conceptually aimed at building relevance through capable structures, instruments, analysis, situational awareness, decision support and processes in a holistic approach. These objectives have not really been incorporated by all parts of the EU machinery. There has not been sufficient coordination between the different strands of foreign policy. Obviously the EU machinery requires changes. With the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon ESDP has been renamed to Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).<sup>2</sup> Defense and security will become available to enhanced co-operation. The personal union of the High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations as well as the European External Action Service provided in the Lisbon Treaty will allow for the integration of the security, political, social and economic dimensions in all foreign policies, from the creation to the implementation and evaluation of policy.

## **2. Comprehensive Approach**

The EU today faces security challenges entirely different from those at the time of its inception. The European Union and its Member States are part of a highly interdependent, dynamic and complex world. Europe is vulnerable. It has global interests. Europe's economic and financial interests, energy security, environmental protection, etc., require a global approach. The EU itself and various member countries are at the centre of the system of global governance and wish to maintain such a role.

Conflict is often linked to state fragility. Countries such as Somalia are caught in a vicious cycle of weak governance and recurring conflict. To break this, both development assistance and measures to ensure better security need to be employed. Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration are a key part of post conflict stabilisation and reconstruction. Failed states, border disputes, environmentally induced migration, and resource conflicts: all have increasingly intercontinental, if not global, repercussions. The related security challenges range from money laundering and corruption to organised crime and violent terrorist acts to weapons of mass disruption, natural disasters and pandemics. The EU is obliged to cope with these external risks and threats – or their potential impact – on its domestic security. This is reflected in the growing involvement of its Member States and their militaries, police forces and civil protection institutions in peacekeeping and nation building across the world.

There are two interrelated dimensions to this challenge. The first is security at home. During the Cold War, “territorial security” was linked to a potential Soviet assault across the plains of Central Europe, and was thus primarily an issue for the military, whereas fighting terror was considered primarily within a domestic context as an issue of emergency response and law enforcement. Today societies face asymmetric threats that blur the distinction between internal and external security. When facing the potential for catastrophic terrorism, the concept of “territorial integrity” becomes inadequate, since the aim of such terrorism is not to acquire territory but to destroy or disrupt societies. As a result, we are witnessing a paradigmatic shift from Cold War total defence systems, which focused on the security of the

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<sup>2</sup> Article 42 (ex Article 17 TEU) “1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.” CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, 9.5.2008 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 115/13, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF>

territory, to post-Cold War societal security systems, which focus on the security of critical functions of society within and beyond the confines of a single state.

Antagonists wishing to inflict harm upon a society are interested in finding the key nodes where critical arteries of our societies connect. Terrorists equipped with weapons of mass destruction or mass disruption are not interested on seizing and holding our territory. They seek to destroy or disrupt the ability of our societies to function. Al-Qaeda and related terrorist groupings are acting as flexible and agile lethal networks, constantly able to reconfigure themselves, to address new challenges and seize new opportunities. They are networks that target other networks – i.e. vulnerabilities of our societies that accompany the free flow of people, ideas, goods and services. These range from global electronic financial networks, networked information systems, “*just-in-time*” supply chains and air, sea and land transportation to flows of fossil fuels or nuclear energy.

A security system focused on protecting the functioning of society needs to protect critical nodes of activity while attacking the critical nodes of those networks that would do us harm. A societal security approach would identify potential vulnerabilities linked to the technological complexity of the modern world and seek to transform them into high reliability systems. It would seek to anticipate and prevent possible “*cascading effects*” of a breakdown or collapse of any particular node of activity. It would develop processes to ensure that new vulnerabilities are not built into future systems.

Military forces may or may not be involved in this approach. Many of these challenges are not susceptible to military tactics. Instead, the key is to link the military as one key element of an all-societal mobilization. Moreover, it would be essential to integrate government response together with active participation of the private sector, which actually owns and controls most of these networks. The interdependent nature of complex modern societies makes civil-military and public-private collaboration essential to prepare a nation for peacetime crises in ways that may also benefit preparedness for catastrophic attack by a thinking enemy. As – given rapid changes in technology and the growth of even more complex interdependent networks – societal vulnerabilities will change over time, revolutionary developments in science and technology could affect critical functions of society and consequently need to be permanently monitored and assessed. An integrated, networked system needs to align efforts to advance domestic security with those to promote international security and crisis response in ways that better enable Europe and its partners to relate the security and defence of nations to the safety of citizens.

This leads to another dimension of the challenge, and that is how to project stability beyond the borders. Tackling the vast majority of today's global problems requires a careful mix of hard and soft security instruments. Military response can be important, but it will often be but part of a wider campaign that includes diplomacy, law enforcement, international intelligence cooperation, and efforts to support civil society. Of course, military forces still have a particular role in interventions and defence. They are also important in complex emergencies when escalation dominance – the ability to revert to combat if other parties escalate violence – is essential.

Conflict resolution requires the application of all relevant security instruments. These need to contribute to addressing a continuum of operations ranging from societal protection, crisis prevention and crisis management to actual combat, humanitarian action and post-crisis recovery and stabilization, and which provides a general framework for contingencies at home and abroad. The continuum itself can be interpreted as a value chain along which each

instrument of power can make specific contributions based on specific core competencies, thus providing an intertwined delivery of civilian and military capabilities. The logic of the value chain gives rise to a process-based and network-enabled organization of interagency and international interaction that helps realign tasks, capabilities, processes and structures of the security apparatus.

Experience not only from EU, but also from NATO operations, has demonstrated that coordination with a wide spectrum of actors from the international community, both military and civilian, is essential to achieving key objectives of lasting stability and security. This calls for structured, regular, network enabled coordination, consultation and interaction among all actors involved. A Comprehensive Approach is required to deal with most of 21st century security challenges.

The Comprehensive Approach is aimed at preventing crises, combating them once they have escalated, mitigating their impacts, and providing stabilisation in their aftermath. The relevant security instruments include. diplomacy, information, military, law enforcement, and economic measures. The range of security tasks to be accomplished in this context includes conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict stabilisation. A systematic networking of all relevant security actors and levels of decision-making and implementation – from the international level within NATO, the EU and the United Nations to local levels of interaction – drastically improves situational awareness and understanding. It increases transparency, shortens decision-making cycles, and enhances the ability to employ instruments rapidly. It ensures a deliberate and superior exploitation of one's own possibilities and optimises – also in an interagency context – the cost-benefit equation through speed, precision, selectivity and parallel, integrated action.

*The Comprehensive Approach requires developing a sense of common purpose and resolve, the clear definition of strategies and objectives before launching an operation, as well as enhanced planning to support nations' contributions to operations. Civilian and military capabilities need to be embedded into a grand strategy, an "overall package" of governmental and/or international measures. The civilian and military actors involved in such operations need to agree on the political end-state and engage in the joint planning, execution and evaluation of their operational activities in order to achieve it. A strategic framework provides a clear structure for operations conducted by all actors. The elements to be considered include common and updated documentation, multinational training, closing interoperability gaps, awareness in cultural sensitivities, and standard terminology.*

*A Comprehensive Approach would enable the collaborative engagement of all requisite civil and military elements of international power to end hostilities, restore order, commence reconstruction, and begin to address a conflict's root causes. Early engagement of non-military instruments of power is essential. Often civilian agencies have presence in crises regions prior to military engagement. They provide continuity during transitions and are rather focused on long-term solutions. Much expertise is resident within NGOs. These are particular valuable resources when it comes to design action and effects, methods for assessments and interpreting results. Consequently, a policy needs to be developed that facilitates participation of NGOs but honours their autonomy and neutrality.*

*Addressing the root causes and the consequences of new types of conflicts requires new types of operations. Thus, there is a need for operational concepts that help blending civil and military capabilities on the one hand and the integration of non-state actors on the other.*

*Capabilities for interagency and joint planning are required as well as command and coordination capabilities, which ensure that the most appropriate means are employed. The Comprehensive Approach requires new knowledge, which is to be based on a holistic analysis of the challenges to be addressed. Institutions, decision-making processes and command structures must be flexible and adaptable. In this context it is quite obvious that better information is needed, as better processes and tools to design and conduct network enabled operations in an interagency context, including international and non-governmental partners.*

*The core capability within the Comprehensive Approach is a superior, integrated command and control process which - based on a network of governmental and non-governmental expert knowledge and instruments of power - makes it possible to project all available instruments of power at an early stage and in an integrated fashion in order to achieve a maximum outcome. In order to get there, a systems approach is necessary. The key actors need to be analyzed from various perspectives, with particular attention paid to political, military, economic and social, information and infrastructure aspects. Providing relevant insights requires intensified cooperation with academic disciplines in terms of social, cultural, and regional studies. In this context, it is essential to take account of the knowledge requirements of all stakeholders in the broadened spectrum.*

### **3. Priority for Prevention**

EU Member States have accepted that they have a 'responsibility to protect' the innocent. The ESS refers to the need to develop a strategic culture that "*fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention*" (Solana 2003, p. 11). This relates not just to humanitarian considerations, but also because instability, conflict and state failure have a detrimental impact on our own security in this interdependent world. Particular attention is needed with regard to the phenomenon of "*small war*". Its protagonists observe neither international standards nor arms control agreements. They make use of territories where they do not have to expect any sanctions because there is no functioning state to assume charge of such sanctions or because the state in question is too weak to impose such sanctions. This type of war does not provide for any warning time. It challenges not only the external security of the nation states and international community, but also their internal safety (ZASBw 2002).

The fundamental idea of conflict prevention and preventive action corresponds to the general understanding that prevention is better than cure. In view of the expense of carrying out large-scale interventions and post-crisis rehabilitation, this understanding applies equally well to the prevention of conflicts, quite apart from the fact that great human tragedies such as famine, expulsion, war, and genocide could perhaps be prevented. Instability, conflict and deprivation lead people to flee their own countries. Integrating refugees and accepting economic migrants are difficult issues and pose huge challenges.

The challenge is to establish a dynamic stable international order within the framework of a cooperative, effective multilateralism based on the steadily increasing mutual dependence of national economic systems within the scope of globalization. It must ensure the advancement of good governance, which permits the satisfaction of the economic, social and cultural, needs of an ever-increasing number of people. The goal of the international order must be to prevent governmental and non-governmental protagonists from trying to influence this process by war. For this purpose, a comprehensive set of foreign and security policy instruments needs to be

developed into a comprehensive strategy. It particularly needs to take account of crisis prevention and the post-crisis period rather than focusing only on ending a conflict.

The essential elements of a 21<sup>st</sup> century security policy will be:

- further development of collective security,
- reinforcement of the states' exclusive right to use force,
- strengthening of good governance and
- containment of the phenomenon of "small wars".

Within the new security environment, prevention has priority in every respect. Because of the potential damage that may be caused in future conflicts and possible consequences for people, including economic and social development, the time dimension – there will be no sufficient warning time and no long-time implications – will only allow the authorities in minor cases to wait and see what damage is caused before reacting to a threat. In those cases with far-reaching consequences – e.g. in which there is a threat to the very survival of nations and to their economic and social development – priority must be given to preventive action.

Moreover, a policy aimed at prevention will encourage economic development and reduce the overall costs. The advancement of the international order towards a world in which there is less force as well as the encouragement of civilization development and the containment of the phenomena of the small war are the fundamentals of such a prevention policy and instrumental in reducing the causes of violence and in establishing non-violent mechanisms for conflict management.

To achieve and secure a non-violent international order, the two most important strategic objectives of future security policy will be the establishment of a cooperative, effective multilateral world order and the prevention and containment of interstate and "*small wars*". Consequently, the development of the military instruments of the international community will head in the direction of enabling successful intervention. This approach requires military capabilities, which support deterrence by denial – i.e. the real capacity to deprive one or several states or non-governmental actors of the capability to wage war.

What are needed to influence developments on the ground and enforce the political purpose are both defensive and offensive military capabilities, which allow both military control of and the exertion of influence on the protagonists. Of course, the required capabilities are not only of a purely material nature. Legitimacy, for example, is of particular importance. Considering all the experience available, there will be two essential tasks for the armed forces in the future: One is to win a conflict militarily in a rapid and decisive manner – predominantly from a distance. The other is to consolidate the military success on the ground. Both tasks support the political purpose. There is no imperative sequence for them, so the focus of action between decision and consolidation can always shift in the course of an operation. It is determined largely also by the protagonists.

The military superiority of the intervention forces will probably prevent a conflict from escalating, especially when the political goals of all the parties involved are limited. If there are any doubts concerning the willingness or capability to intervene, the probability of the military decision phase being entered will increase distinctly. Priority should always be given to the goal of influencing the opponent's will not to make use of his warfare capability: either by stressing one's own convincing military superiority or by providing the enemy positive incentives to forgo force. If used cleverly, both elements can complement each other.

Especially in the case of "*small wars*", when the state has disintegrated or social, economic and government structures have to be rebuilt, new capabilities are required in the area of "*nation-building*", the armed forces notably being needed to support consolidation. Non-governmental and governmental protagonists will develop new areas in the course of asymmetric warfare. These will include: urban areas, the information area, the international media world, the different areas of social, economic and political life and perhaps even outer space. Every form of risk potential in societies and all forms of transition from non-violent to violent action – e.g. guerrilla action, terrorism, intifada, organized crime, migration, piracy, etc. – can be instrumentalized militarily. Especially urban areas, which will probably grow considerably in the decades to come, offer the protagonists a wide range of possibilities to use organized force and thus wage war in the grey area of organized crime with considerable financial backing.

Consequently, the security elements of the future should be designed as follows:

- Command and control:  
Interconnected complex of command and control, communications and information collection and processing as well as intelligence (C4ISR) at the disposal of the political and military leaders as well as an adequate logistics set-up for all civilian and military task elements used.
- Forward-based elements:  
Small modular task groups with a high C2 capability, the necessary situation picture, access to land-, air- and sea-based active options as well as strategic-operational mobility.
- Force multipliers and stand-off elements:  
Land-, air- and sea-based active systems which ensure that decisions can be brought about in a stand-off manner with or without the support of the forward-based task elements.
- Consolidation elements:  
Militarily organized and armed police or similar units with components for nation-building, economic and social intervention as well as for countering international criminality/terrorism. This includes experts from the areas of administration, social affairs, infrastructure, judiciary, civil defence etc. as well as possibly support from and cooperation with non-governmental organizations.

All these elements must be able to participate in multinational coalition operations. Besides a small number of major nations, there will be few states left with war fighting capabilities with any prospect of success in an interstate war. This is in stark contrast to the emergence of more and more new and non-governmental protagonists prepared to wage war. But this is the rationale of warfare: While modern industrial states are interested in preventing war out of self-interest, there are states and non-governmental protagonists which use war as an economic or ideological factor leading to another cost-benefit calculation. Furthermore, information warfare offers the possibility to considerably affect especially those protagonists who depend on command and control systems and employ them hierarchically.

While the military decision is increasingly sought from a distance, the implementation of the political goals calls for forces on the ground. Based on the existing conflict analysis, these must as a rule have capabilities enabling them to win the hearts and minds of the societies concerned. In this type of operation, military power has the purpose of denying the protagonists of such failing states the use force and of helping to promote the stable



development of a region by supporting political, social and economic development. This requires the build-up of a wide range of elements of self-organized units within these societies.

So purely military approaches are just as likely to fail as wholly civilian ones if the exclusive right to use force is left too early to the regional interplay. But the regional exclusive right to use military power is primarily a question of internal safety, i.e. the use of force by the police and police clearing-up methods in the sense of the adequacy of means.

*The prerequisite for successful conflict prevention is a well-functioning early-warning system. As conflicts normally have a prehistory they can theoretically be recognized at an early stage and to a certain extent are also predictable. The crucial problem, however, is the correct assessment of a multitude of information and drawing timely conclusions. The criterion “timely” reveals the dilemma of early warning. Early warnings, which are not followed by direct actions, suggest a lack of credibility. A timely early warning does not necessarily imply that rapid and preventive action will be taken to hinder the outbreak of a conflict or war or to contain them, as the examples of Rwanda or the Balkans show. As direct national interests of states potentially intervening in international conflict prevention are often not at stake, it is often very difficult to justify the efforts which preventive action involves vis-à-vis the own population. Even if crisis prevention is successful, it may become a victim of its own success. Early action is not evidence enough that a war or a conflict did not take place just because of this. But if a warning is issued too late, there is no point in such a warning.*

#### **4. Manage the Change**

Nothing can be achieved without the means to do the job. For the years to come, the primary policy responsibility is to make Europe function better, including its crisis prevention and crisis management structures and to enhance its collective ability to handle global crises. As Europe’s ambitions are growing, there is a gap between the ambitions and the reality of European capabilities. To successfully engage in more complex and risky endeavours, it is essential to own the personnel and capabilities – both civilian and military, to back up the political decisions. To actually achieve this capability requires dedicated change management. Change management is a structured approach to transitioning individuals, teams, and organizations from a current state to a desired future state. Change management is a well-established tool in the business world and is well suited to be applied in the field Common Security and Defence. Change management requires

- a clear vision,
- a plan that synergistically addresses
  - people,
  - organisation (both processes and structures/architectures) and
  - technology.
- It includes the communication of objectives, progress and outcomes.

As the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty provide for a framework to strengthen the EU’s capacity to address the upcoming challenges through an improved coherence, better institutional co-ordination and enhanced strategic decision-making, this opens a window of opportunity to introduce a change management process in order to building a Common Security and Defence in Europe that supports a Comprehensive Approach to Security.

Taking the road towards a Comprehensive Approach the related vision should aim at a holistic, inter-departmental and multilateral approach that aims at effectively integrating governmental and non-governmental instruments for conflict prevention, crisis management and post-crisis rehabilitation to provide a sustainable overall strategy(Federal Ministry of Defence 2006 4).

To this end the EU's needs improve its ability to combine civilian and military expertise from the conception of a mission, through the planning phase and into implementation must be reinforced. Particular focus is needed to enhance cooperation between civil and military resources in order to make full use of the EU's enormous potential for conflict prevention and crisis management. This requires a concrete, practical approach that includes the exploration of possible synergies in the development of capabilities for use in civilian and military missions. This aspect of CSDP needs to be developed by putting the appropriate administrative structures, financial mechanisms, and systems in place. The EU needs to plan and build appropriate and effective command structures and headquarters. For civilian missions, Europe must be able to assemble trained personnel with a variety of skills and expertise, deploy them at short notice and sustain them in theatre over the long term. National contingents need to have full interoperability between each other.

*Civilian and military leadership needs to be harmonised for interagency actions. There is an obvious need to establish policies, technologies, and procedures to enable multinational information sharing. The utility of the common knowledge base depends upon the ability to practically share data in a timely manner. It is especially in the field of stability operations that leadership and integration, synergy and rapid action are crucial factors. For military missions, EU members have to strengthen significantly their efforts on capabilities, as well as mutual collaboration and burden-sharing arrangements. These efforts must be supported by a competitive and robust defence industry across Europe, with greater investment in research and development.*

The ways in which equipment is made available and procured needs to be made more effective to enable timely deployment of missions. Since 2004, the European Defence Agency (EDA) has been driving this process. There has been some success, but there is the need for much more. To ensure that dual-use technologies respond to military and civilian needs and provide more value for money the European Defence Agency needs to explore ways to connect Defence Research and Technology Investment with Technology Investment in the civil sector in order to increase interoperability.

The Comprehensive Approach builds on technology. Technology matters in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Technological capabilities are key to the successful conduct of missions in conflict and human disaster environments. Of course this also requires a new mindset to enhance the cooperation of civil and military authorities that, in many instances, use similar organisations and equipment. Technology affects particularly the *value creation chain* of network-enabled operations, which is based on a common clear and thorough situational understanding and the networking of all relevant actors. Implementing the value creation chain makes it possible to effectively enter the decision cycle of criminal, terrorist or hostile actors and to prevent them from carrying out their plans or to limit the damage done immediately.

Network-enabling technologies play an ever-important role in the interdepartmental context. The inherent potential of affordable high-performance sensor, information and communications technologies opens up vast possibilities for a successful fulfilment of even complex, time-sensitive tasks. Networked security in interdepartmental, multinational and

joint operations requires the staffs, agencies, forces and actors involved to fully cooperate across all echelons and on the basis of a common operational picture and situational understanding for the planning, command and control of operations. For networked planning and action, all parties involved need to be supplied with extensive information in near real time and without interruptions.

With both affordable and powerful state-of-the-art information and communications technologies – combined with knowledge management, modelling and simulation – and up-to-date sensors, it will be possible to generate an operational picture that reduces complexity in near real time, allows for higher-quality actions with significantly improved response time behaviour and, most importantly, significantly improves the integration of civilian and military coordination partners into operational decision-making processes. In addition to political requirements, profound findings from the work carried out by civilian actors can be included from the first planning stage. Decisions and actions are taken on the basis of a common situational understanding and implemented in a coordinated manner.

To be effective, the Comprehensive Approach must be complemented by sustained and coherent communication process. Maintaining public support for European global engagement is fundamental. In modern democracies, where media and public opinion are crucial to shaping policy, popular commitment is essential to sustaining the commitments abroad. As the EU deploys police, judicial experts and soldiers in unstable zones around the world, governments, parliaments and EU institutions need to communicate how this contributes to security at home. Information campaigns should be substantiated by systematic and updated information, documenting progress in relevant areas. It is important to ensure that the information strategies of the main actors should complement and not contradict each other.

## **5. Engagement and Partnerships**

Europe's neighbourhood is the world. Threats and risks to be confronted are clearly global. The strategic goals that will guide the political EU actions will also in future be based on three pillars:

- extending the “security belt” around Europe,
- strengthening the world order while observing current international law and promoting good governance by promoting democracy, fighting corruption, and developing co-operation, and
- proactively fighting old and new threats.

The guiding principles for future international EU activities need to build on an effective multilateralism under UN primacy and preventive actions in a comprehensive security sense. While the political will for engagement may rapidly grow as global issues are becoming dynamically more threatening, the EU capabilities have to be built step by step and in close cooperation with partners. The Comprehensive Approach builds on partnership. Partnerships will be decisive factors in meeting tomorrow's security challenges, but to this end they need to provide for a solid foundation in order to successfully cooperate in a complex, dynamic environment. In sum, legitimacy and effectiveness need to be improved, and decision-making, crisis prevention and crisis management in multilateral fora made more efficient. This means sharing decisions more, and creating a greater stake for others. Faced with common problems, there is no substitute for common solutions. This very fact highlights the necessity to spell out the Comprehensive Approach and to getting engaged in a dedicated change management

process that enables the partners with regard to their people, organisations and technology to work closely together for common purpose and common objectives.

The international system, created at the end of the Second World War, faces pressures on several fronts. Representation in the international institutions has come under question. Over the last two decades, the premises on which this security architecture was built have largely vanished, and the roles and relative importance of the security institutions have undergone significant changes. NATO has taken on multiple functions. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) does not play the central role originally envisaged for it. The EU has developed its own security and defence dimension. Both the EU and NATO have enlarged. The altered roles of the EU, NATO and other institutions as they have developed need to be recognised. For example, NATO will have to be an essential element of any future architecture – but not the only one. The role of the OSCE could perhaps be strengthened. And what about Asia?

Without any doubt the geopolitical point of gravity has been shifting to the east. Europe needs to come to grips with that evolution. In terms of security, the first challenge is to define European interests in Asia. How much does Europe need to care about this region for its own stability? Europe has already deepened links with its Central Asia partners through the Strategy adopted in 2007, with strengthened political dialogue, and work on issues such as water, energy, and security. China and India, both nuclear powers, are rising rapidly to meet Japanese economic, industrial and technological strength. All three have – respectively are rapidly acquiring – the capacities to challenge Europe and the United States in many fields. The future of international stability and security will largely depend on their ability and willingness to manage their respective growth without major conflicts and on their decision to share responsibility with regard to the challenges of global governance.

The relations with Japan are particularly promising, since it is a strong and stable democracy, an ally of the United States, and a long-term member of the G-8, clearly supporting international stability and security. Certainly there is potential to strengthen the relationship between the EU and Japan on the security policy level – for example by an enhanced, long-term cooperation in security issues, including peace operations and crisis management. In fact, the development of the European relations with the other Asian powers calls for further advances in the Euro-Japanese relationship. A couple of policy issues may be particularly promising, among those climate, non-proliferation, free trade agreement, and Afghanistan. Twenty years ago the Berlin Wall fell and the world began to change. The time has come to make the Comprehensive Approach work – not only in Europe and for the European Union and NATO, but also beyond. The Comprehensive Approach is added value for everyone involved. The underpinning logic – the distinctive civil-military approach to crisis management – has proven its validity. It provides a sound basis not only for Europe's security policy on which to approach the coming fifteen years.

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### ***Remarks:***

*Opinions expressed in this contribution are those of the author.*

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