

Whither the Euro-Atlantic Partnership? Partnership and NATO's New Strategic Concept

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Whither the Euro-Atlantic Partnership?

Partnership and NATO's New Strategic Concept

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Executive Summary

In July 2009, NATO launched a process which should lead to the adoption of a new Strategic Concept. In defining its future referential framework, the Alliance will no doubt dwell on contemporary trends, such as the ever fastening globalisation of international relations and the widening spectrum of threats. In taking such evolutions into account, it would do well in vying for additional flexibility and pragmatism, instead of trying to define a rigid framework of action that would rapidly become obsolete as unforeseen events will constantly call for redirections. The Alliance should fully develop its comprehensive approach so as to interact coherently with international organisations, partner states and civil society. Only thus will it muster wide support for its operations and set up the preconditions for viable exit strategies. In doing so, NATO could build on the assets developed through the Partnership for Peace and its institutional and political framework, the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council. Indeed, EAPC partner nations can contribute a variety of means to secure peace, security and post conflict reconstruction, whose usefulness, not to be measured in terms of military assets alone, should grow as international security challenges take on ever more varied forms. Hence NATO should not dilute a tried and successful

PfP/EAPC construct in bundling up all other countries associated in one way or the other with NATO's workings and operations into a one tutti-frutti new Partnership Forum. Instead, NATO should differentiate between different types of partners, all the while focusing more closely on the added value and underestimated opportunities of partnership. Indeed, partnerships should be at the core of NATO's ambitions, and not only be seen as a somewhat burdensome and ambiguous sideshow.

Towards a New Strategic Concept

“Twenty years ago, an historic wave of democratic change swept through Central and Eastern Europe. NATO took this opportunity to engage countries across the Euro-Atlantic area in partnership and cooperation with a view to fostering security, stability and democratic transformation. We reiterate our commitment to further develop the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) as the essential framework for substantive political dialogue and practical cooperation, including enhanced military interoperability. (...) We thank our Partners for their significant contributions to our operations. We will continue to develop EAPC policy initiatives”.¹

Echoing one of the Beatles’ more impenetrable songs, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s destiny, it seems, is under the spell of the number nine: 1949, 1989, 1999, 2009... All years when the Alliance’s path took a major turn, as it was conceived, then was left triumphant but apparently senseless, was later given a new strategic direction and is now being reoriented to face a grave new world...

Granted, 2009 does not in itself mark a major shift in the Alliance’s path. But beyond the symbolism of its 60th anniversary Summit, held in

¹ Strasbourg / Kehl Summit Declaration, § 36, 4 April 2009.

April in both France and Germany, that encounter of heads of state did mark the launch of a reappraisal of NATO's strategy and self-definition. Indeed, the Summit cut across a Gordian knot of sorts and decided on the necessity of a new Strategic Concept, to be drafted under the helm of the newly appointed Secretary General. Whereas until then, an overhaul of NATO's referential strategic framework had been called for by many, the search for a new doctrine had been rejected by others, and consequently that search was postponed because of controversies over the possible negative side effects of a lack of common vision of the aims and the purpose of the Alliance.

Shortly after the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit, the launch of the intellectual process – as opposed to the political negotiating – that should lead to a new Strategic Concept for the Alliance was staged in Brussels on 7 July 2009 by a large and open conference chaired by the outgoing Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. It was a fitting end of term legacy by a figurehead who had been calling for such an aggiornamento for over three years. A remarkable show of openness indeed, this launch pad proved from the start that expectations were high, but often contradictory. Outsiders with different agendas, insiders with specific worries, analysts and civil servants tend to view problems and challenges from at best stimulatingly different angles. But whereas some such outsiders may not be familiar enough with the rationale for a politico-military organisation of NATO's standing, the Alliance itself has enough new ground to tread on to not dismiss from the start all views that emanate from different elements of civil society and which in many instances may well bring in constructive propositions.

NATO's show of interest for outside views should not be misinterpreted as a form of puzzlement, conceptual void and lack of intent among Allies. Interested as they may be in novel or unconventional ideas, most insiders agree on the core topics that the new Strategic

Concept must address.² That is the case, above all, of the necessary redefinition of the meaning and the scope of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty which states that:

*“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them (...) will assist the Party or Parties attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”.*³

Indeed, in view of the multiplicity of new threats and new methods of aggression, many of which may not be armed in the traditional gun toting sense, as well as the widening possibilities of major attacks against national interests outside of the territory proper of the nation attacked, new thinking on the trigger effect of Alliance solidarity will be of paramount importance. NATO members will also no doubt devote much attention to such unavoidable and central topics such as the reorganisation of assets and working methods against the backdrop of the ongoing operations in Afghanistan and their reorientation, the quality and direction of NATO-Russia relations, the way to cope with present day nuclear threats, the meaning and practice of a credible deterrence, as well as functional matters such as unsolved questions pertaining to NATO-EU

2 See for instance, for a discussion of the themes the Strategic Concept should focus on: Klaus Wittmann, “Towards a new Strategic Concept for NATO, NATO Defense College, NDC Forum Paper #10, September 2009, as well as Zbigniew Brzezinski, “What next for NATO?”, in Foreign Affairs, September/October 2009, p.3.

3 The words and phrases highlighted point to elements of Article 5 that may need reinterpretation, since the context has changed so radically: as much as they may at first have opened doors for all options, including military action thus secured, they can today be interpreted as being inadequately restrictive or allowing undue opting outs.

relations, to name but a few central topics. All this in a possibly shorter and more focused strategic concept than in 1999.

The bulk of the opening conceptual work has been entrusted to a dozen wise men and women, led by the former American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who will pursue hearings and consultations and report back to the new Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. He in turn will assess the group's report and refer to the heads of State who will adopt the new Strategic Concept. At the end of the day, NATO will have to field inputs, rely on the insights of a number of analysts and experienced cadres, realistically match ambitions with available resources, remain focused, and strengthen its relevance in its specific field of hard security, being that overarching military organisation that cannot be replaced as the backbone of Euro Atlantic collective security.

But this simple proposition, because it purports to keep NATO fully relevant to its member states, is in itself laden with new meaning: it submits that, in today's globalised world, an organisation of NATO's reach and field of action cannot be measured in terms of mere collective defence anymore. The way ahead for the Alliance must be defined by the search for collective security, and not only collective defence, given the wide array of threats that have emerged since the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact, the dawning of hyperterrorism⁴ on September 11, 2001, and more generally, the multiplication and amplification of threats through the workings of globalisation.

True, the traditional geopolitical rivalries that have marred the last centuries still weigh on international relations. Local or regional conflicts over territory and boundaries still threaten to erupt on all continents, from Latin America to Asia, from Eastern Europe to Africa. But given the

4 To use the terms coined by the media after the 9/11 attacks and made perennial by François Heisbourg in *Hyperterrorisme: la nouvelle guerre*, Odile Jacob, 2001.

increasing interpenetration of all economies and societies, enhanced by the intertwining of all aspects of the full range of international relations, the butterfly effect of each crisis is such that security challenges for the few are henceforth of concern to all. Today's security is thus a comprehensive concept: it includes military, but also economic and human dimensions and presupposes responsible behaviour by each actor in each one of these three domains.⁵

It is through an understanding of the interplay of various dimensions of power that the Obama administration has chosen to refocus American foreign policy on the pursuit of smart power, as called for by such proponents as Joseph Nye who states that:

*“Power today is distributed among countries in a pattern that resembles a complex, three-dimensional chess game. On the top board (representing the first context in which power resources may be analysed), military power is largely unipolar. But on the middle board, economic power among states is already multipolar (...). The bottom chessboard is the realm of transnational relations that involve actors crossing borders outside of government control. (...) This adds a new dimension to questions of security and risk, and includes issues for which the military instruments that dominate the top board are clearly insufficient. On the bottom board, power is widely dispersed, and it makes no sense to speak of unipolarity, multipolarity or hegemony. And yet it is from this bottom board that many of the most important security challenges arise”.*⁶

These lower chessboard but widely prevalent challenges and crises, however, are far from being controllable. Indeed, they are all but predict-

5 EastWest Institute, “Euro-Atlantic Security: One vision, Three Paths”, Brussels, Moscow, New York, June 2009, p.3.

6 Joseph S. Nye, Jr, “Recovering American Leadership”, in *Survival*, February-March 2008, p. 58.

able, as they tend to have a life of their own, dependant on local, aye sometimes personal circumstances. This is not to say that such local hearths of tension are commonly overseen and that no crisis can ever be predicted. But in practice, decision making processes cannot take into account all unrelated individual, partial or conflicting predictions, and experience shows that once a crisis does fully erupt, it tends to take most actors and onlookers by surprise, at one level or another.

Against this backdrop, it may seem fair to ask: in its bid to maintain and further security for its members, is NATO capable of predicting the future better than others? If the answer is no, or at least less than yes: why bother with a new strategic concept to be crafted over a year and a half⁷, knowing that its relevance might last at the most a few years, and that it will most probably be challenged by unexpected events? Wouldn't it be more useful to concentrate on trying to fix problems already identified instead of starting a process that could reveal itself more complex and time consuming than ever? In other words, how can we avoid that NATO, as ensconced as it often is in the necessities of political arbitration between national contingencies, prepares itself yet again for set challenges that would eventually be seen as yesterday's war once unpredicted urgencies kick in, even if it tries to adjust to the perceptible future? Wouldn't it be better for the Alliance to more modestly concentrate on developing flexible capacities and adjustable working methods in order to be able to respond to all types of crises?

7 It is understood that the new Strategic Concept is supposed to be presented and adopted at the next NATO summit in Lisbon, slated to take place at the end of 2010.

Yesterday's War

When turning to the future to prepare for contingencies, one is always well advised to look back and take stock of recent evolutions. But what do we see if we take a critical stance in assessing NATO's past?

A somewhat disrespectful description of the North Atlantic Alliance's history would underscore that NATO basically never ended up doing what it had been preparing to do, but had to act in ways it had not expected to. Indeed, it long prepared for the Third World War, but never fired a shot at the avowed enemy it kept in check. When it did first fire its guns in the Balkans, it did so in a state of relative legal unpreparedness, against a foe it had until then not considered an enemy. Every time it acted, it did so outside the territorial scope it had first assigned itself. When the Alliance grew in its later stages, it did so mostly by ingesting former enemies it had never dreamt of welcoming in its midst. And whereas it always prepared for battle against a mighty enemy, it is now toiling against elusive Taliban with some side help of its former main foe and sending warships against ragtag pirates assailing tankers with ladders as was done against castles in the Middle Ages.

On the other hand, a less ironic stance would underline that NATO, "the most successful military alliance in history" as its advocates like

to recall, came out stronger from its 60th Anniversary Summit with a reenergized transatlantic link, better perspectives of complementarities between NATO and the European Union as well as a common analysis of the situation and the basic strategy to be applied in Afghanistan – pending President Obama’s further decisions on the reorientation of the conflict and the means to terminate its open military phase. Furthermore, as NATO’s departing Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer was keen to say: many aspects of the 1999 Strategic Concept still seem to remain viable and useful today, which points to the fact that within a given framework and all throughout the changes of the strategic environment, some basic and experienced thinking does lead to solid results.

So, given the contrasted lessons from the past, what are the prospects for a renovated NATO making the best use of the new Strategic Concept exercise? In trying to answer that question, it may be useful to first identify a few of the security challenges lying ahead.

Possible Challenges

Geographically, any observer can point to already well known trouble spots and volatile situations directly affecting NATO. The ongoing surge in Afghanistan, both military and civil, may well enable a future withdrawal of foreign forces from the country. But the situation there could still derail in ways that are sure to impact on NATO and the security system as a whole. Right next to Afghanistan and inextricably linked to it, Pakistan is today one of the most volatile countries, a most complex and worrisome pole of attention whose tribal areas, at least, mesh with the environment the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has to contend with. Georgia may be past its war with Russia. But given its unabated intent to join NATO and the assurances it has received to this effect, a substantial lowering of tensions will not be accomplished easily anytime soon. In more general terms, the Caucasus, North and South, as any ethnic and historical map of this most ancient cradle of civilisation will tell, will long retain its potential for bellicose undertakings, possibly dragging in the Alliance in the one or the other way.

Given the dangers of nuclear proliferation and its current relative instability, Teheran will be considered an unpredictable factor for some

time to come. Its current impact on missile defence schemes, mainly the planned and recently relinquished Ballistic Missile Defence deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as nuclear deterrence weighs heavily on the Alliance's nuclear posture and defensive thinking. Further down, fragile and failed states on the African continent, such as Somalia and Sudan will long continue to be sources of instability, with wide ranging effects as massive migration and refugee flows have already shown over time, there and elsewhere. And since those territories control some of the major world shipping routes, the Alliance will not be able to avoid keeping its attention focused on such areas. Other parts of Africa of main concern to a number of NATO allies⁸, as well as the Middle East, specifically Israel and some of its immediate neighbours, will also remain hotbeds of unpredictable flare ups with possible extended consequences.⁹

More causally, no modern security equation can discount the possible tugs of war over energy and dwindling resources. Recent attention directed to the Far North¹⁰ serves as a reminder that the race for resources and supply routes is such that dangerous tensions may well arise from the pernicious effects of climate change, as the map of acces-

8 If some regions are of concern to certain NATO member countries because of historical ties, a new layer of problems should be of concern to all: "For instance, coltan (the ore for the rare metal tantalum, which is essential for cellular phones and laptop computers) is mined illegally in northern Congo and smuggled out by militias. In Nigeria and Sierra Leone, rare natural resources are controlled by gangs and rebels; this, of course, means that these groups have a potentially global impact". Klaus Naumann, John Shalikhvili, Lord Inge, Jaques Lanxade, Henk van den Breemen, "Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World. Renewing Transatlantic Partnership", Noaber Foundation, Lunteren, p. 49.

9 We are only listing those tension areas that lie in the Euro-Atlantic zone and the outer reaches of NATO's main partnerships. But crisis areas also abound elsewhere, as exemplified by border tensions in the Andes, the Amazon and Central America, South East Asia, or around specific regions such as Kashmir or North Korea, not to mention Burma, Xingjian, Tibet or Taiwan and other such less than international trouble spots which have the potential of affecting international relations.

10 See, for instance, Margaret Blunden, "The New Problem of Arctic Stability", in *Survival*, October-November 2009, pp. 121-141.

sibility is redrawn by the global warming in addition to technological advances.¹¹ Fundamentalisms and terrorism as we know it, as well as possible new forms of terror attacks, are unfortunately here to stay, be it only because of the modern means of communication at the disposal of demagoguery, combined with demographic expansion and mounting resource and wealth imbalances. Although terrorism is by far not a modern phenomenon, it has evolved and internationalised in such a way that its scope of action is relevant to the whole, even when it aims at impacting on a local situation. At another level, pandemic scourges amplified by extensive travelling and their disruptive potential, to say nothing of the deleterious effects of economic crises, overlap with hard core security concerns and cannot anymore be considered matters to be dealt with solely by the medical or financial and business literati.

Functionally, finally, we can point to the security challenges inevitably posed by cyber attacks, piracy, especially on the high seas of course, but possibly on land also, by hostage taking by criminals and states prone to brinkmanship, international crime and trafficking, as well as the infectious turmoil of failed states which may comprise all of the above.

But whereas many possible crises and causes for concern may be known, their unravelling and full scale effects will always partly outwit even the most foresighted. Moreover, new trouble spots are almost sure to emerge in the coming years, as they consistently did in the past. The energy crisis which struck repeatedly in Eastern Europe could have deteriorated even more and may well yet flare up. The one cyber attack unleashed on Estonia in 2007, however limited to one small country, was a serious alert: more of the same could come from anywhere by surprise, as shown by a series of more limited attacks on large compa-

11 The recently announced launching of a colossal solar energy grid project in the deserts of North Africa by a consortium of private companies will surely have security implications for all countries concerned.

nies and government institutions around the world. In the summer of 2008, the Georgian war caused actions and reactions in the field and at political and military headquarters that had not been predicted – and this had a big impact on the course of international relations. And, obviously, the financial and economic crisis we are now facing is of far greater proportions than any former contingency planning had ever suspected – and will surely not be the last, as economic cycles have a life of their own.

What does remain certain, on the other hand, is that while geographical rivalries still play an important role, security challenges are amplified and in some cases accelerated by the phenomenon of globalisation. In other words, the only thing that is predictable is that NATO – like other organisations and governments – will have to face rapidly changing contradictory forces and events for which it will not have fully prepared. This trend has already been well recognised by the Organization, whose Multiple Futures Project, in envisaging possible evolutions until 2030, states: “The security environment will continue to evolve and be influenced by a variety of unforeseeable and dynamic political, social, technological and military developments. Conflict will become increasingly complex, unpredictable and more difficult to control”.¹² To quote another group of high level NATO insiders:

“The nature of these dangerous and complex challenges cannot be dealt with by military means alone. The Western world and its allies need to agree a new concerted strategy that would include the use of all available instruments, and to prepare its capabilities for those global and regional challenges that we can predict, as well as those we cannot”.¹³

12 Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, “Findings and Recommendations”, NATO Multiple Futures Project, Norfolk, Virginia, April 2009, p.3.

13 Klaus Naumann et al. Op cit, pp 44-45.

Therefore, it may be argued that NATO's best interests in preparing for the future lie in an approach that should be as pragmatic as possible. Taking into account that structures should follow substance and not the reverse, what is called for above all is a new adaptability of the Alliances' institutions and operative structures. NATO should make sure that it can be flexible enough to deploy appropriate capacities of all kinds on the theatre of the next crises, be that theatre geographical or functional. In doing so, the Organization should find it advantageous to develop instruments to cooperate in optimal conditions with its partners, so as to make sure that the right mix of capacities can be drawn on as wide a pool of military and civil resources as possible.



This truth also stems from operational realities. As the probabilities and the dangers of major block to block conflicts have faded away and as the process of European integration extends its stabilising effects on widening portions of the European continent, it seems obvious that the Alliance's operations are bound to keep on taking the form of expedi-

tionary activities, rather more than simple repositioning of forces and strengthening of defences. Indeed, even where local territorial defence seems to be rendered necessary by the perceived dangers of possible local crises in the henceforth widened area of the Alliance, a propping up of defences does presuppose a flexible response and expeditionary activities within the Alliance's boundaries – a conclusion already drawn by NATO in defining its NATO Response Force (NRF) missions.

But all expeditionary actions must rely from the start on a coherent overall strategy, including the transition to a stabilised peace and a realistic exit strategy, if they are to avoid mounding into inextricable quagmires. Exit strategies, in turn, call for additional assets, non-military support and other factors, different skills and different approaches. They must also rely on state and institution building that must aim at fully reconnecting the pacified crisis area to the wider world. In this sense, no exit strategy from a conflict zone possibly stabilised through NATO action can do without involvement from a wide number of countries and organisations lying beyond the set boundaries of the Alliance. Thus, interaction and commonality of purpose with other international organisations and resolute partner countries' involvement are of the essence if overall lasting security, and not only circumstantial troubleshooting, is to be sought for.

With partner organisations like the UN or the EU, an important question that will have to be resolved in this context is that of the juncture between military means and civilian efforts, security and human security, peace enforcing and nation building. That should lead to the development of a doctrine of cooperation and separation of responsibilities among different regional and world organisations, in NATO lingo the development of the "comprehensive approach". In other words, if Afghanistan requires today a multifaceted approach and flexible mechanisms, so will inevitably the next crises, especially since we cannot know in advance what their exact twists and turns will be.

On the Use of Partners

Finding the best ways to work with partner organisations and countries should be seen neither as a lesser sideshow nor as a daunting task. The structures developed around the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace since the 1990s are a very valuable established asset in this context. It is therefore rather astonishing that the EAPC and PfP have been neglected for a certain time, as the Alliance was preparing for its 60th anniversary summit meeting. Indeed, over a certain period and even though many partner countries remained committed to a lively partnership, those institutions did not seem to be used to their full potential by NATO member states, who admittedly left this outer forum aside. This turn of events strayed away from a number of proposals agreed to at the previous Riga and Bucharest summits, when it was still deemed unquestionably useful to strengthen the Euro-Atlantic Partnership.¹⁴ But whereas those earlier meetings reasserted the value of the Partnership, partner countries were not even invited to the Strasbourg-Kehl summit, under the pretext of a lack of space in the conference facilities...

¹⁴ See Annex 1 p.65. "Riga Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga", 29 November 2006.

Understandably, it can be argued, the Alliance was focused on its difficult relationship with Russia in the aftermath of the Georgian crisis, just as it felt it needed to deal behind closed doors with the difficulties of its policy of enlargement, its inner equivocations over its ties to the European Union, as well as with the mounting difficulties in its main operation in Afghanistan. Moreover, it can be noted that the Georgian events have sparked up a revival of the old “East-West” divide in strategic thinking. Those multilateral institutions that should have prevented and helped resolve such a crisis, namely the UN Security Council, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the NATO-Russia Council¹⁵, failed to function. And as the stalemate has not yet been overcome a year and a half after the war and is not about to be for anytime soon, it has contributed to discredit the notion of cooperation across the revived East-West divide.¹⁶ Against this background a few months after the conflict, a widening of palavers to the outer circle of partner countries, including some that are an opposing party in a contentious issue, may well have seemed unnecessary and overly time consuming, if not outright counterproductive.

On the other hand, it can also be said that all too often, partner countries tend to be assessed mainly according to their purely military contribution to operations. On its face value, that is a legitimate and perfectly understandable approach, especially given the fact that those operations serve the common security of all nations linked in one way or the other to the Alliance. But then again, an assessment of partner contributions limited to purely military components ends up being rather short

15 *“The irony evident was that (...) [the Nato-Russia Council] was deemed more useful by both NATO and Russia as a symbolic marker and vehicle for strategic signalling than for its primary and ostensible purpose : a forum for discussing issues of strategic importance between partners”.* Graeme P. Herd and Daniel A. Flesch, “The Georgia Crisis: Implications for the Partnership for Peace”, in *Connections, The Quarterly Journal*, Winter 2008, p.4.

16 EastWest Institute: “Euro-Atlantic Security: One vision, Three Paths”, p.1.

sighted. Indeed, partner assets should rather more be viewed through the widening lens – the fish eye, as it were – of global security needs, of that incontrovertibly necessary comprehensive approach we touched on, as well as of a viable exit strategy. And in witnessing the aforementioned revival of the old “East-West” divide, it may be useful to caution against the trappings of overly NATO-centric thinking and subliminal logic falling back to pre-Partnership times...

It may be argued in this context that whereas NATO has made a turn for the better by calling for a “comprehensive approach”, it should avoid doing so for reasons that may not be entirely satisfactory. Initially, a perceived need for additional military assets in the ongoing operations in Afghanistan has surely played a major part in bringing about this new openness. Indeed, in the face of mounting difficulties on the ground, that openness was surely sparked by a new interest for the possibility of drawing in military contributions from outside the established pool of Alliance resources. Then, as the overall focus on the intricacies of the Afghan situation widened, non-military assets were increasingly seen as being highly relevant. But well beyond the situation in Afghanistan, such an approach should aim at a more comprehensive role distribution among different players, not principally for the sake of obtaining more military resources, but rather for a long term better overall shared management of all crisis situations, conducive to a smoother transition from the stabilisation to the reconstruction and state building phases.

In turn, such a comprehensive strategy including an appropriate exit strategy must rely on diplomatic means, economic and financial support, industrial inputs and business commitments, development aid and cooperation on the ground, sustainable nation building efforts of various sorts, logistics, and expertise in many fields... As well as, very importantly, human resources, training and support in the field of police and law enforcement, which become all the more essential as the outright fighting subsides and the country reorganises. All matters where partner

countries have assets, knowledge and in some instances, special relationships to a given crisis area that may prove to be invaluable, especially when the prerequisites for a lasting solution come to be better understood.¹⁷

In this context, it must be stressed that the Partnership for Peace and the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council are, as such, instruments to promote the values and principles shared by partner and NATO members alike, as well as confidence between all countries of this wider community. The EAPC validates at the political and diplomatic level the activities and the work done under PfP. It is the forum best suited to conduct political dialogue on hard security issues.¹⁸ Let us remember in this context that any new security architecture for Europe in its wider sense, as it is being called for by Russia, will have to involve not only states but also international organisations such as the OSCE, the EU and to a certain extent the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), in addition to NATO. Come the time, it will surely be better for NATO to have strengthened and made denser and wider its working ties with its institutional partners, rather than to have loosened those ties more or less inadvertently.

Furthermore, the EAPC involves political leaders of partner countries, and thus usefully impacts on national decision making processes: that national process which is just as important in partner countries as it is

17 The different shifts of focus on policies related to opium crop and drug control, the build up of the National Afghan Army as well as local police forces, interactions with the local population and the types of control of territory, etc. all point to evolving understandings of the necessities of the Afghan conflict. The realisation that any permanent solution for the country needs to rely on much wider inputs than purely military means is taking a much stronger foothold, as the focus is being shifted towards the interactions between military and civil assets.

18 Even though it seems fashionable in some circles to deride the EAPC as being dysfunctional or unsubstantial, let there be no mistake about the scope of the political dialogue enabled by the EAPC: well beyond the sole monthly Ambassadorial meetings and the henceforth lone yearly gatherings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs as well as Ministers of Defence, dialogue is pursued on a weekly and sometimes daily basis as all mission members interact according to the calendar of numerous committee meetings and informal contacts.

in longstanding or newer NATO members, as public opinions everywhere are usually wary of calls for further involvement in crisis areas. Indeed, NATO circles perceive better and better the pressing needs of public diplomacy, as the act of reaching out to home public opinions is called. But that reaching out should just as well be directed towards those hesitant public opinions in partner countries that do influence NATO's strategic environment – be they considered friendly and reliable like-minded ones or nations that remain more aloof and difficult to convince and interact with. And this, of course, calls for closer – not looser and more casual – ties with partner governments, parliaments and institutions.



But the Euro-Atlantic Partnership is more than a means to promote commonality of values and outlooks at the governmental policymaking level. It was the cradle for the enlargement process and for the contribution of partners in NATO-led operations. It has brought interoperability to levels hitherto unknown and is impacting on both training and procurement policies. It serves as a home for many initiatives like

the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Reduction Centre and the Building Integrity Initiative, numerous trust funds, the political military framework (PMF) or policy discussions like the implementation of UNSCR 1325. It has linked parliamentarians and opinion shapers of all countries and political affiliations through the expanded NATO Parliamentary Assembly. It has brought together thousands of officials, experts, academics and senior military through the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes.¹⁹

It also provides a clearing-house mechanism for South-Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. And, best of all from the perspective of partner nations not vying for membership, it allows for institutionalised relations with NATO and for self-differentiation of each and every country. Self differentiation, a principle enshrined in the Partnership's founding document (Annex 1, p.42), was aptly designed to respond and correspond to the substantial differences among new partners. As such it proved to be a most foresighted and pragmatic set up, since it is on this basis that NATO is seen as acceptant of differences and idiosyncrasies of partner states, as opposed to being overly demanding and prone to pressuring.

Granted, partner countries are a motley crew, ranging within the EAPC from Russia to Malta, from Central Asia and CSTO member states to Western European countries and EU members. But that diversity is no adversity: in fact, the gene pool of resources of such a contrasted lot should be considered all the more interesting and useful to NATO and to all common endeavours to secure peace and stability. And with the practice of hundreds of Pfp activities each year, EAPC partner countries do come closer to NATO and to each other, at varying paces but in a similar fashion.

¹⁹ For an insight into the riches of the Consortium see: Connections, Summer Supplement 2008, published on the 10th Anniversary of the Consortium.

With all these qualities, EAPC/PfP is clearly a tried and tested model for other types of partnership, such as the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)²⁰, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)²¹ and for NATO links with the so-called Partners around the globe like Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan. In some cases, for example in martial operations, such partners bring more support to the Alliance than many Allies themselves. It is but normal that NATO and its members would increasingly focus on these further and farther partners, and it has become almost commonplace, when thinking about how to revamp NATO's partnership scheme, to linger on the possibility of drawing them in by bundling all different associates, present and future, into a wider body such as a new Global Partnership Initiative. Indeed, it seems satisfying, at a theoretical level, to do away with what may appear as excessive compartmentalisation and multiplication of various groupings and bodies. However, the needs, interests and ambitions of these different categories of partners are far from being similar and creative solutions to accommodate different contingencies are required.

The Mediterranean Dialogue was established the same year the PfP was created. It would thus have had the same length of time – close to half a generation! – to flourish. Yet that Dialogue has proven to be somewhat less effective than hoped for,²² as both publics and elites across the Mediterranean seem deeply suspicious of NATO, and as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot but loom large over perceptions and

20 The Mediterranean Dialogue countries comprise Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

21 The ICI encompasses four countries of the Arabian Peninsula members of the Gulf Cooperation Council: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Oman and Saudi Arabia were invited but chose not to join.

22 For a discussion of the inefficacies and shortcomings of all other partnership schemes than the EAPC/PfP, see: Graeme P. Herd and Daniel Kight, "Future Visions of NATO Partnerships and Cooperation Programs", in *Connections*, Fall 2007, pp 1-9.

intents. The MD has thus not been able to enhance partnership among the Mediterranean countries themselves, as is consistently the case among PfP countries. It is doubtful that such an a priori would simply fade away if those countries were to permanently join the EAPC or its successor organisation. As far as the ICI is concerned, it was created ten years later, in 2004, and may not have had the time to develop its full potential yet. But “while the central aim of the Initiative was to engage hard security challenges in the region, thus far the body has operated only at political level. This hindrance is due in large part to the poor conditions for peace and dialogue in the Middle East at present”.²³

This is not to say that no deepening of relations with these two and other groups of countries is possible. In fact it is desirable on different counts, and the bottom-up approach based on needs and interests identified by MD and ICI countries merits encouraging. Based on the better experiences of the PfP process, a revamping of these two Mediterranean and Arabian partnership models would certainly be in the cards, provided it is not done at the expense of the quality and intensity of the existing PfP/EAPC construct.

This is one field where the Strategic Concept could and should bring concrete answers as to the role that NATO will attribute to its institutional partners, to that first circle belonging to the PfP and EAPC structures, and then to the outer circle of less-than or non-institutional partner countries, which may yet expand to much greater numbers than is the case today. That would mean computing in from the start the overall and case by case added value of both non member countries and sub-regional clusters of countries. A change of the mental predispositions of NATO might be required to progress on this issue: it would imply embarking on a vivified focus on the wide variety of partners and

23 Graeme P. Herd and Daniel Kight, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

their many qualities, instead of ceding to the temptation of simplifying the task by granting them all the same status, however incoherent that welding together may be. Such a levelling would unavoidably bring the whole of the Partnership to its lowest common denominator instead of building on its various strengths.

But in the long run, this change of attitude is important given the fact that NATO will increasingly need consultations with partners in all regions of the world and might eventually even want to rely partly on Partner involvement in flexible structures such as the NATO Reaction Forces (NRF). Given the mounting difficulty of NATO to reach consensus at 28, some Allies might also increasingly want to resort to coalitions of the willing involving partners – with the political blessing but no burden-sharing of some other Allies,²⁴ as is already the case in KFOR for instance, which comprises a good number of Partners but only 24 of the 28 Allies. Furthermore, it seems equally important for NATO to reach out to some selected partners when it comes to mustering political support needed in specific issues, especially in its relations with the European Union, the United Nations and countries lying in the vicinity of crisis areas.

In addition, another shift in attitudes must be completed to lift a lingering ambiguity about partnerships. Even though one of the main rationales of the Partnership for Peace at its inception was to ease the way for aspirant new members, it must be recognised that as it evolved, the Partnership has acquired a life of its own. Indeed, there needs to be acknowledgement of the fact that partnership is not necessarily to be

24 In fact, NATO and its most active members might find it useful to rely on the Partnership and the commitments of partner states as a sting and as a benchmark for some more reluctant members of the Alliance, since “it would be difficult to uphold a situation where some partners of NATO contribute more to Alliance operations than some full members”. Karl-Heinz Kamp, “The Way to NATO’s New Strategic Concept”, NATO Defense College Research Paper No 46, June 2009.

understood as a pre-stage to membership in NATO. Just as the Alliance itself developed well beyond its first purpose,²⁵ so has PfP/EAPC developed a purpose of its own, as it has had a rallying effect on partners and the enhancement of their cooperative attitude. NATO would hence do well in dwelling on the intrinsic merits of partnership, and not consider it solely as a transitional state.

25 "Although NATO was created primarily to provide such assurance against the looming Soviet threat, its political effect in Western Europe was to promote reconciliation with the former Axis powers Germany and Italy, while fostering an enduring acceptance of transatlantic interdependence". Zbigniew Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, p.5.

Institutional Solutions

In trying to associate partner countries more closely to its decision-making process and its operations, NATO is confronted with a dilemma. Being open and transparent with all its partners increases NATO's standing and acceptance in the international community, but at the same time bears the risk of slower decision-making or even blockage. The crisis in Georgia, for instance, has simultaneously shown the importance of the EAPC as a forum for political dialogue – it was, after all, the last political arena where NATO went on meeting and talking with Russia – but has hindered NATO's good intentions to share more internal debates with partners. True, when it comes to operations, the troop contributing partners have been increasingly associated in the decision-shaping of the Alliance thanks to the Political-Military Framework process. However, those partners are often consulted late and without a real possibility to influence the processes.

One simple past example of this discrepancy is to be found in relation with the recent decision on the downsizing of the Kosovo Force (KFOR). As new thinking on the matter was shaping up, it became clear to the ones in the know that the question of the transition to a reduced Deterrent Presence would be a main topic of the Defence Ministers'

Meeting on 11-12 June 2009. Yet no ministerial meeting in KFOR format was organised on that occasion, even though it would have seemed only natural to associate troop contributors to such an important decision. A group of Western European Partners (WEP), namely Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland shared their concern about this and NATO finally did decide to organise an information-sharing NAC meeting with KFOR partners, one week after the decision had been taken by the ministerial meeting. Furthermore, even though the relevant documents were circulated just before the said Ministerial to the relevant partners, there was very little time given to those partners to react.



Oftentimes partners have been confronted with the situation of a “fait accompli”, even in matters of direct concern to them. This is certainly not the best way to engage them and give them a sense of ownership. Several other examples can be referred to in this context, ranging from

the debate on the comprehensive approach to energy security matters as well as civil emergency planning.

What is at stake when it comes to a greater involvement of partners? Apparently there are two main points blocking more information-sharing with non members of the Organization: the first one is that when Allies do not agree on one issue, they are reluctant to share the debate with others, as they fear that their differences might be taken advantage of by non-Allies. The second one is that for political and/or security reasons, Allies would probably agree to share their information with some, but not all partners. While both explanations are very legitimate, there remains scope for improvement on this delicate matter to the end benefit of NATO. Because at the end of the day, Partners do bring in an added value to NATO and it is in the Alliance's own best interest to draw in as much as possible those useful and committed Partners.²⁶ What could NATO propose to this avail in its new Strategic Concept? The simple answer would be to include the possibility of sharing information with partners even if there is no agreement among Allies, or to start a discussion on a specific topic in an EAPC or even wider context in order to have all views at the beginning. This is by the way what happened very opportunely at the launch of the new Strategic Concept process with the big tent conference that took place on 7 July 2009 in Brussels.

Another possibility mentioned on several occasions by Allies would be the "compartmentalisation" of the EAPC in different groups (Western European Partners, Caucasus, Central Asia, etc...) according to the needs of each one of these groups – as foreseen in fact by the 1997 basic docu-

26 "...in the new security environment, our Partners make a critical contribution to our shared objectives. That is why the links with our partner countries (...) are a true strategic asset. We need to ensure that we have the closest possible partnership with those countries that can, and are willing to, help defend our shared values". Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Speech at the 42nd Munich Conference on Security Policy, 4 February 2006, (Annex 2 p.86).

ment of the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (Annex 1, p.47), which made allowance for meetings in limited format between the Alliance and groups of partners. This approach is in some ways already in force for Russia, Ukraine and Georgia in the NAC+1 format, or at another level for the Mediterranean Dialogue. It is also already operational through the Partnership Review Process (PARP) which draws in a selected number of Partners, in addition to the 28 NATO members and the one partner country under review.

NATO also already had occasionally a separate meeting with countries from Central Asia or the Caucasus. This NATO+N model has the advantage of efficiency and coherence, and could well be put to more frequent use. However, the big disadvantage of an intensification of this type of links compared with meetings in EAPC format is the loss of the feeling of belonging to a security community sharing the same values and principles and the loss of the confidence building effect that such a setting has. And that sense of a commonality of ethos and of purpose is not to be merely discounted as a time consuming luxury. In other words, any move towards compartmentalisation should make sure that the backbone of the EAPC as it stands presently remains intact: specific gatherings of like-minded or similarly positioned groups of countries should come as an addition, and not replace altogether the EAPC framework.

A third possibility would be to adapt the present structures of the EAPC on an ad hoc basis to host partners from all around the globe intermittently, according to the topics on the agenda, perhaps even by calling additional Ambassadorial meetings, beyond the ordinary monthly EAPC session. All three options are possible, non-mutually exclusive instruments at the disposal of NATO.

The Way Forward

Will it ever be possible for NATO to meet all different expectations of partner nations, some wishing to join, some contemplating the move and some set on remaining outsiders? Besides, there already is an intrinsic difficulty in simply putting everyone in agreement among the 28 Allies, including, as mentioned at the outset, when it comes to the path leading to the Strategic Concept itself.²⁷ The fact remains, however: in our view, consulting with partners, be they countries or international organisations, will be a defining element of NATO's future. As such, the question cannot be whether or not to consult, but rather how to define the ways to best consult and fully interact with a wide range of partners.

The lead up to the final Strategic Concept will be a telling indication about the importance given to consultations and outside views. The first signs are encouraging in this respect. The group of wise persons who is to work alongside Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen will no doubt pursue consultations with other experts and try to take into

27 A fact candidly laid out in the open from within NATO itself: "There was concern that a publicly held strategic discussion could reveal how disunited NATO was on key questions like the future role of the Alliance. According to this view, a revision of the Strategic Concept could further erode NATO's already strained cohesion and would be a counterproductive effort". Karl-Heinz Kamp, *op.cit.*, p.1.

consideration a variety of views. Some general meetings along the way have already been slated as open to partners and certain international organisations, which are requested to pitch in their views. And in the end effect, a series of recommendations and more or less novel ideas are most probably going to be laid out, just as a number of former summit concluding documents have called for a strengthening of ties between Allies and Partners.

It is highly unlikely that partners and partnerships be openly discarded as being obsolete, cumbersome or merely “nice to have” gadgets to be postponed until more urgent and important matters are dealt with. As well, NATO’s Multiple Futures Project does underline (nota bene in its military implications recommendations) that “Cooperation and collaboration with non-NATO nations and other international actors are necessary to create opportunities for the Alliance to enhance security and stability”. Hence the recommendation: “Re-evaluate the Alliance’s various partnership mechanisms to ensure that partners are more closely involved in NATO’s defence policy initiatives, especially with regard to the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as well as in partnerships across the globe”.²⁸ In the meantime, partner countries will no doubt be keen to give their views, by submitting food for thought papers to be discussed at the EAPC level, and perhaps also by convening the one or the other workshop focused on specific questions of importance to a selected group or to the whole. But whatever the process and the inputs that may possibly be taken in, what will be most important is what lies ahead: is NATO truly going to abide by a revamped spirit of outer cooperation, or is it going to surreptitiously subside in inner controversies limiting its openness and availability for external consultations?

28 Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, Multiple Futures Project, “Findings and Recommendations”, p. 10-11.

That is where the basic aim of the new Strategic Concept is of importance: if it limits itself to trying to foresee the next crisis or coming tensions and prepare for them, it may run the risk of quickly falling into a relative irrelevance. But if it aims at giving NATO all the necessary flexibility to adapt as quickly as possible to shifting circumstances, then it will surely rely on the added virtues of including the Partnerships at the core of NATO's future, embedding NATO, as it were, in its strategic environment.²⁹ Granted, thinking on crisis areas, lethal operations and evolving threats must focus on the bone and the meat of security requirements. Yet, just as the bacteria which can spoil the whole of a meal - and the days that follow - may well lurk in one of the side dishes rather than in the roast, the full flavour of the plate does owe a lot to its association with the sauce and the spices.

29 "NATO will indeed need partners in the future for success, and it will continue to need different partnerships to achieve different objectives, as will the partners themselves. The prudent path for the Alliance to take is to build in flexibility and achievable and practical goals into these partnerships, to treat each case on an individual basis, and to carefully select partners in the first place". Graeme P. Herd and Daniel Kight, op. cit, p.9.

Annexes

Annex 1: A Selection of Official Texts

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Partnership for Peace: Invitation Document issued by
the Heads of State and Government participating in the
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council
10 -11 January 1994

We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, building on the close and longstanding partnership among the North American and European Allies, are committed to enhancing security and stability in the whole of Europe. We therefore wish to strengthen ties with the democratic states to our East. We reaffirm that the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to the membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.

We have today launched an immediate and practical programme that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. This new programme goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership - a Partnership for Peace. We therefore invite the other states participating in the NACC and other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to this programme, to join with us in this part-

nership. Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.

The Partnership for Peace, which will operate under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, will forge new security relationships between the North Atlantic Alliance and its Partners for Peace. Partner states will be invited by the North Atlantic Council to participate in political and military bodies at NATO Headquarters with respect to Partnership activities. The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance.

NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.

To promote closer military cooperation and interoperability, we will propose, within the Partnership framework, peacekeeping field exercises beginning in 1994. To coordinate joint military activities within the Partnership, we will invite states participating in the Partnership to send permanent liaison officers to NATO Headquarters and a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes. (...)

With the expansion of NACC activities and the establishment of the Partnership for Peace, we have decided to offer permanent facilities at NATO Headquarters for personnel from NACC countries and other Partnership for Peace participants in order to improve our working relationships and facilitate closer cooperation.

Partnership for Peace: Framework Document issued by
the Heads of State and Government participating in the
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council
10 -11 January 1994

(...)

2. This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action. Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership. In joining the Partnership, the member States of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other States subscribing to this Document recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law. They reaffirm their commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights ; specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means. They also reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents and to the fulfilment of the commitments and obligations they have undertaken in the field of disarmament and arms control.

The other states subscribing to this document will cooperate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in pursuing the following objectives:

- a. facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
- b. ensuring democratic control of defence forces;
- c. maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;
- d. the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peace-keeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed;
- e. the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

(...)

8. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.

Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 30 May 1997

1. The member countries of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and participating countries of the Partnership for Peace, determined to raise to a qualitatively new level their political and military cooperation, building upon the success of NACC and PfP, have decided to establish a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. In doing so, they reaffirm their joint commitment to strengthen and extend peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, on the basis of the shared values and principles which underlie their cooperation, notably those set out in the Framework Document of the Partnership for Peace.

2. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will be a new cooperative mechanism which will form a framework for enhanced efforts in both an expanded political dimension of partnership and practical cooperation under PfP. It will take full account of and complement the respective activities of the OSCE and other relevant institutions such as the European Union, the Western European Union and the Council of Europe.

3. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, as the successor to NACC, will provide the overarching framework for consultations among its members on a broad range of political and security-related issues, as part of a process that will develop through practice. PfP in its enhanced form will be a clearly identifiable element within this flexible framework. Its

basic elements will remain valid. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will build upon the existing framework of NATO's outreach activities preserving their advantages to promote cooperation in a transparent way. The expanded political dimension of consultation and cooperation which the Council will offer will allow Partners, if they wish, to develop a direct political relationship individually or in smaller groups with the Alliance. In addition, the Council will provide the framework to afford Partner countries, to the maximum extent possible, increased decision-making opportunities relating to activities in which they participate.

4. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will retain two important principles which have underpinned the success of cooperation between Allies and Partners so far. It will be inclusive, in that opportunities for political consultation and practical cooperation will be open to all Allies and Partners equally. It will also maintain self-differentiation, in that Partners will be able to decide for themselves the level and areas of cooperation with NATO. Arrangements under the Council will not affect commitments already undertaken bilaterally between Partners and NATO, or commitments in the PFP Framework Document including the consultation provisions of its article 8.

5. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will meet, as required, in different formats:

§ In plenary session to address political and security-related issues of common concern and to provide information as appropriate on activities with limited participation.

§ In a limited format between the Alliance and open-ended groups of Partners to focus on functional matters or, on an ad hoc basis, on appropriate regional matters. In such cases, the other EAPC members will be kept informed about the results.

§ In a limited format between the Alliance and groups of Partners who participate with NATO in a peace support operation or in the Planning

and Review Process, or in other cases for which this format has been agreed. The other members of the EAPC will be informed as appropriate.

§ In an individual format between the Alliance and one Partner.

Structure

6. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will meet, as a general rule, at Ambassadorial level in Brussels and on a monthly basis.

7. The Council will meet twice a year at both Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers level; additional meetings can be envisaged as required. It may also meet at the level of Heads of State or Government, when appropriate.

8. The Council will be chaired by the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Alliance or his Deputy. The representative of a member country will be named President d'Honneur for six months according to modalities to be determined.

9. The work of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will be supported regularly by the Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC) and the Political Committee (PC) in their configurations at Alliance with all Partners. On an ad hoc basis an EAPC Senior Political Committee would address issues referred to it, as required. The EAPC will consider, based on evolving practical experience, whether this support could be improved by an EAPC Steering Committee (EAPC-SC) which would integrate the functions of the former enlarged Political Committee and the PMSC in NACC/PfP format. The PMSC will meet, as appropriate, in an Alliance with individual Partners or Alliance with groups of Partners (e.g PARP) configuration. The PMSC and PC with Partners will meet at least once a month, or more frequently if required. Other NATO Committees will expand opportunities for work with Partners on cooperation issues and will inform the EAPC on their work in this regard. Their activities will become part of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council framework. An important part of this framework will be new opportunities for Partner

consultations with the Military Committee. The Military Committee will also play a major role in the expanded range of opportunities for consultation and cooperation provided by the future support structure for the EAPC.

Substance

10. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will adopt at the time of its establishment the NACC Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation and will replace it with an EAPC Work Plan as part of its future work. The activities included in the Partnership Work Programme (PWP) will also come under the general purview of the EAPC.

11. Specific subject areas on which Allies and Partners would consult, in the framework of the EAPC, might include but not be limited to: political and security related matters; crisis management; regional matters; arms control issues; nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) proliferation and defence issues; international terrorism; defence planning and budgets and defence policy and strategy; security impacts of economic developments. There will also be scope for consultations and cooperation on issues such as: civil emergency and disaster preparedness; armaments cooperation under the aegis of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD); nuclear safety; defence related environmental issues; civil-military coordination of air traffic management and control; scientific cooperation; and issues related to peace support operations.

Eligibility

12. Present NACC members and PfP participating countries automatically become members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council if they so desire. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council is open to the accession of other OSCE participating states able and willing to accept its basic principles and to contribute to its goals. New members may join the EAPC by joining the Partnership for Peace through signing the PfP Framework Document and by stating their acceptance of the concept of

the EAPC as laid out in this document. The EAPC would be invited to endorse the accession of its new members.

'An Alliance for the 21st Century'

Washington Summit Communiqué issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C.

24 April 1999

(...)

22. We reaffirm our commitment to consultation, partnership and practical co-operation through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace. We commit ourselves today to build an enhanced and more operational relationship with Partners for the 21st century that strengthens stability, mutual confidence, and security throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. The EAPC and the PfP have transformed political-military relations across the continent and have become the instruments of choice when the Alliance and its Partners consult and act together in the pursuit of peace and security. We look forward to consulting with our Partners at tomorrow's EAPC Summit meeting.

23. The EAPC, founded in 1997, contributes substantially to stronger political consultation and practical co-operation between the Alliance and its Partners, for solutions to security issues. We applaud this expanded dimension of political consultations, which has enhanced transparency and confidence among all EAPC members. The Alliance and its Partners have consulted regularly on regional security issues, such as on Bosnia and Herzegovina and on Kosovo. We have also developed new areas of co-operation such as peacekeeping, humanitarian de-mining, control over transfer of small arms, and the co-ordination of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.

24. We welcome the successful fulfilment by the Alliance and its Partners of five years of Partnership for Peace and the full implementation of PfP enhancements launched in 1997. Enhanced PfP has ensured that NATO-Partner co-operation contributes concretely to Euro-Atlantic stability and security. The participation of 15 PfP Partners in IFOR/SFOR demonstrates the real-life benefits of PfP's focus on interoperability and provides valuable lessons for future Alliance-Partner co-operation. The presence of Partner officers in an international capacity in NATO military headquarters enables Partners to participate in planning for NATO-PfP exercises and NATO-led PfP operations. Enhanced PfP has also permitted NATO to take action to assist Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with their unique security concerns.

25. We welcome and take special note of the initiatives designed to make the Partnership more operational and ensure greater Partner involvement in appropriate decision-making and planning, as we had envisioned in our Madrid Declaration. These steps will ensure that the Partnership will be better able to address its objectives, and will provide a solid foundation for its continuing evolution as the core of a co-operative security network between NATO and its Partners for the 21st century. To further this goal, we have today approved the following comprehensive package. We have:

§ approved a Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP operations, which will enhance Partners' roles in political guidance and oversight, planning, and command arrangements for such operations;

§ endorsed the expanded and adapted Planning and Review Process, which will further enhance interoperability of Partner forces declared available for PfP activities, and will allow for more focused and increased Partner contributions of valuable forces and capabilities for future NATO-led PfP operations;

§ endorsed the outline Operational Capabilities Concept for NATO-led PfP operations, which will provide for deeper military co-operation

between the Alliance and Partners with the goal of improving the ability of Partner forces and capabilities to operate with the Alliance in NATO-led PfP operations and directed the Council in Permanent Session to pursue its further development;

§ endorsed the outline programme on enhancing PfP training and education to optimise and harmonise NATO and national PfP activities in order to meet the current and future demands of an enhanced and more operational PfP. The outline programme includes the role of three new PfP tools - a PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, a PfP Exercise Simulation Network and PfP Training Centres. We directed the Council in Permanent Session to develop a PfP Training and Education Enhancement Programme. (...)

29. The Mediterranean Dialogue is an integral part of the Alliance's co-operative approach to security since security in the whole of Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. We are pleased with the development of our Mediterranean Dialogue. The Dialogue is progressive in nature and we welcome the progress towards developing broader and deeper co-operation and dialogue with the countries in the Mediterranean region (...).

Prague Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State
and Government participating in the Meeting of the North
Atlantic Council in Prague, Czech Republic
21 November 2002

(...)

7. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) have greatly enhanced security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. We have today decided to upgrade our cooperation with the EAPC/PfP countries. Our political dialogue will be strengthened, and Allies, in consultation with Partners, will, to the maximum extent possible, increase involvement of Partners, as appropriate, in the planning, conduct, and oversight of those activities and projects in which they participate and to which they contribute. We have introduced new practical mechanisms, such as Individual Partnership Action Plans, which will ensure a comprehensive, tailored and differentiated approach to the Partnership, and which allow for support to the reform efforts of Partners. We encourage Partners, including the countries of the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia, to take advantage of these mechanisms. We welcome the resolve of Partners to undertake all efforts to combat terrorism, including through the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism. We will also continue to further enhance interoperability and defence-related activities, which constitute the core of our partnership. Participation in the PfP and the EAPC could be broadened in the future to include the Federal Republic

of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina once necessary progress is achieved, including full cooperation with the ICTY. (...)

10. We reaffirm that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. We therefore decide to upgrade substantially the political and practical dimensions of our Mediterranean Dialogue as an integral part of the Alliance's cooperative approach to security. In this respect, we encourage intensified practical cooperation and effective interaction on security matters of common concern, including terrorism-related issues, as appropriate, where NATO can provide added value. We reiterate that the Mediterranean Dialogue and other international efforts, including the EU Barcelona process, are complementary and mutually reinforcing.

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership - Refocusing and Renewal

23 June 2004

I. Adapting Objectives and Priorities of Partnership

1. The New International Environment

1.1. NATO's policy of Partnership and Cooperation and the PfP have lasted for more than 10 years, and during that period the international environment has changed. Democratic transformation in Central and most of South-Eastern Europe has succeeded. NATO and the EU are enlarging. The grounds have been laid for further efforts to secure and stabilise the Balkans and to pursue integration of countries in this region into the Euro-Atlantic structures, including the participation of Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina in EAPC/PfP when all the conditions are met. Partners have joined, and contributed greatly to, NATO-led efforts to ensure security in Europe and beyond. NATO's relations with Russia have been put on new and solid foundations. Ukraine is making a growing contribution to stability and security in Europe.

1.2. At the same time, the challenges to Euro-Atlantic security are changing. The evolving threats, including terrorism, have domestic and external sources and a transnational nature. While threats to stability remain in the strategically important region of the Balkans and particularly in Kosovo, events in Afghanistan, where NATO leads the ISAF operation, have demonstrated that threats to our common security

increasingly come from the periphery of the Euro-Atlantic area. In this environment, international stability and security will increasingly depend on domestic reform on the one hand, and wide international co-operation on the other. These two imperatives are inseparable, for effective security co-operation is impossible absent basic doctrines and institutions of a fundamentally democratic nature.

1.3. The Allies are determined that the Euro-Atlantic Partnership play an enhanced role in both respects, taking into account the role of international organisations and regional organisations and cooperation in these areas. They will develop it accordingly, in close co-operation with Partners, building upon the founding documents of PfP and EAPC and the decisions of the Washington and Prague Summits. In doing so, Allies will take account of NATO's continued commitment to Eastern and South East Europe, of the need to bring more stability and security to the Caucasus and Central Asia, and of the valuable contribution that the Western European Partners make to NATO-led operations and Partnership programmes.

2. The Objectives of NATO's Partnership Policy

2.1. Dialogue and Co-operation: NATO will conduct political dialogue and practical co-operation with its Partners on a broad range of international and appropriate domestic issues of common concern, in particular those related to terrorism and other evolving threats to security. NATO will be prepared to develop such dialogue and co-operation in different formats, on a geographical or functional basis, and in agreement with EAPC and PfP principles. The Alliance will encourage and support regional initiatives to address such issues.

2.2. Reform: NATO will enhance its efforts to promote democratic values and foster democratic transformation across the Euro-Atlantic area. To this end, the Alliance will provide interested Partners with political and practical advice on, and assistance in, the defence and security-related

aspects of the domestic reform, including armed forces under civilian and democratic control. NATO will also encourage larger policy and institutional reform and support it within its competence and resources, complementing efforts by other international organisations.

2.3. Operations: NATO will continue to prepare interested Partners for participation in NATO-led operations. For this purpose, it will cooperate with all Partners, giving greater attention to their individual abilities and interests, in order to support their efforts to develop military interoperability and transform their defence in keeping with NATO's own evolving operational role and capabilities.

2.4. Enlargement: NATO will continue through Partnership for Peace to support Partners who wish to join the Alliance, consistent with the Open Door policy enshrined in the Washington Treaty and the PfP Invitation Document.

3. Current Priorities

3.1. Geographic Priority – Special Focus on the regions of Caucasus and Central Asia

3.1.1. NATO will continue to engage, and promote democratic transformation in, and regional co-operation between, Partner countries in Eastern and South-East Europe, including the Republic of Moldova. However, in response to the changing international environment, the Alliance will put special focus on engaging with Partners in the strategically important regions of Caucasus and Central Asia (...).

II. Matching the Ends and Means - New Co-operation Initiatives

4. To ensure substantive progress towards Partnership objectives and priorities, NATO will continue pursuing vigorously the Partnership initiatives undertaken at the Washington and Prague Summits and will encourage Partners to make the full use of all instruments offered in the Comprehensive Review of EAPC and PfP. NATO will also take further

steps to develop and complement these initiatives. While taking these steps, NATO expects all Partners to fulfil their commitments to the protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms, human rights and other fundamental values embedded in the basic documents of PfP and EAPC. For its part, NATO will enhance its efforts to encourage and assist Partners to implement these values through the new co-operation initiatives.

(...)

III. Enhancing supporting tools

5. NATO will further develop and adapt tools designed to support political dialogue and practical co-operation:

5.1. A targeted Public Diplomacy effort will be essential in informing Partner public opinion about objectives and priorities of Partnership, in particular those related to domestic reform. Effective communication means will be employed, including high-visibility Flagship Events, involving high-level representatives of NATO and Allied nations as well as key personalities and broad audiences in Partner countries. Seminars and conferences in Partner countries will reflect NATO's agreed objectives and priorities for the Euro-Atlantic Partnership. The use of the Contact Point Embassy mechanism in pursuit of Partnership objectives and priorities will also be optimised (...).

Istanbul Summit Communiqué issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council
28 June 2004

(...)

27. Building on the progress made since our Prague Summit, we have today taken a number of steps to further strengthen the Euro-Atlantic Partnership. While taking these steps, we expect all Partners to fulfil their commitments to the protection and promotion of human rights and the other fundamental freedoms and values they have adhered to under the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace. We support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in the Euro-Atlantic area.

28. We have launched today a Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building. We encourage and support Partners to make full use of this new instrument to build democratically responsible defence institutions.

29. Military interoperability and transformation are central to the effectiveness of our Partnerships in helping us to meet evolving security challenges and to enable Allied and Partner forces to operate effectively in NATO-led operations. The value of this cooperation to the Alliance, in particular by the Western European Partners, is continuously being demonstrated in the Balkans as well as in Afghanistan. We intend, therefore, to provide our Partners with increased opportunities to enhance their contributions to NATO-led operations, and to help

transform their defences in keeping with NATO's own evolving operational roles and capabilities, including through enhancement of the Operational Capabilities Concept. We will seek the earliest possible involvement by troop-contributing nations in the decision-shaping process, including the possibility of political consultation. NATO's new command structure offers opportunities to increase the participation by Partners, including by offering them appropriate representation in the Allied Command Transformation.

30. NATO has adopted a comprehensive policy to contribute to international efforts to combat the trafficking in human beings, which constitutes a flagrant abuse of human rights and fuels corruption and organised crime. We are also determined to work together with our Partners to support international efforts, where NATO can add value, to combat this and other forms of illegal trafficking.

31. In enhancing the Euro-Atlantic Partnership, we will put special focus on engaging with our Partners in the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Towards that end, NATO has agreed on improved liaison arrangements, including the assignment of two liaison officers, as well as a special representative for the two regions from within the International Staff. We welcome the decision by Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan to develop Individual Partnership Action Plans with NATO. This constitutes a significant step in these countries' efforts to develop closer Partnership relations with the Alliance. We welcome the commitment of the new government of Georgia to reform.

(...)

36. From its inception in 1994, NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue has greatly contributed to building confidence and cooperation between the Alliance and its Mediterranean partners. In the current security environment there are greater opportunities for effective cooperation with Mediterranean Dialogue partners. Following our decision at Prague to upgrade the Mediterranean Dialogue, we are today inviting our

Mediterranean partners to establish a more ambitious and expanded partnership, guided by the principle of joint ownership and taking into consideration their particular interests and needs. The overall aim of this partnership will be to contribute towards regional security and stability through stronger practical cooperation, including by enhancing the existing political dialogue, achieving interoperability, developing defence reform and contributing to the fight against terrorism. Our efforts will complement and mutually reinforce other Mediterranean initiatives, including those of the EU and the OSCE.

37. We have today also decided to offer cooperation to the broader Middle East region by launching our “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative”. This initiative is offered by NATO to interested countries in the region, starting with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, to foster mutually beneficial bilateral relationships and thus enhance security and stability (...).

38. While respecting the specificity of the Mediterranean Dialogue, the enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue and the “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative” are complementary, progressive and individualised processes. They will be developed in a spirit of joint ownership with the countries involved. Continued consultation and active engagement will be essential to their success.

The Istanbul Declaration - Our Security in a New Era
issued by the Heads of State and Government participating
in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Istanbul
28 June 2004

(...)

Collective defence remains the core purpose of the Alliance. But the threats that NATO faces have changed substantially. We remain committed to address vigorously the threats facing our Alliance, taking into account that they emanate from a far wider area than in the past. They include terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. North America and Europe face these threats together. NATO is engaged in fighting terrorism, strengthening security and building stability in many regions in the world. Now as ever, unity within the Alliance is essential, and the principle of the indivisibility of Allied security is fundamental. We are determined to address effectively the threats to our territory, forces and populations from wherever they may come. (...)

NATO continues to build closer cooperation on common security concerns with the European Union and with states in Europe, including Russia, Ukraine and the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as with states of the Mediterranean and the Broader Middle East. Today, we have taken decisions aimed at strengthening these relationships further in order to cooperate effectively in addressing the challenges of the 21st century.

Riga Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga
29 November 2006

(...)

11. NATO's policy of partnerships, dialogue, and cooperation is essential to the Alliance's purpose and its tasks. It has fostered strong relationships with countries of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), as well as with Contact Countries. NATO's partnerships have an enduring value, contributing to stability and security across the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. NATO's missions and operations have also demonstrated the political and operational value of these relationships: eighteen nations outside the Alliance contribute forces and provide support to our operations and missions, and others have expressed interest in working more closely with NATO.

(...)

12. With this in mind, we task the Council in Permanent Session to further develop this policy, in particular to:

§ fully develop the political and practical potential of NATO's existing cooperation programmes: EAPC/Partnership for Peace (PfP), MD and ICI, and its relations with Contact Countries, in accordance with the decisions of our Istanbul Summit;

§ increase the operational relevance of relations with non-NATO countries, including interested Contact Countries; and in particular to strengthen NATO's ability to work with those current and potential contributors to NATO operations and mission, who share our interests and values;

§ increase NATO's ability to provide practical advice on, and assistance in, the defence and security-related aspects of reform in countries and regions where NATO is engaged.

13. Together, we will pursue these objectives, subject to North Atlantic Council (NAC) decisions, by:

§ making consultations with PFP Partners more focused and reflective of priorities, including by adapting the EAPC process and by making full use of the different formats of NATO's interaction with Partners, as provided for in the EAPC Basic Document and agreed at our Prague and Istanbul Summits;

§ enabling the Alliance to call ad-hoc meetings as events arise with those countries who contribute to or support our operations and missions politically, militarily and in other ways and those who are potential contributors, considering their interest in specific regions where NATO is engaged. This will be done using flexible formats for consultation meetings of Allies with one or more interested partners (members the EAPC, MD or the ICI) and/or interested Contact Countries, based on the principles of inclusiveness, transparency and self-differentiation;

§ strengthening NATO's ability to work effectively with individual countries by opening up for consideration those partnership tools currently available to EAPC countries to our partners in the MD and the ICI, as well as interested Contact Countries, on a case-by-case basis.

14. We will continue to follow closely how all Partners fulfil their commitments to the values and principles they have adhered to under the EAPC and the PFP. We reiterate the right of any Partner to seek consultations with the Alliance. We welcome the progress made by Individual

Partnership Action Plan countries and encourage further reform efforts. We commend the initiatives to strengthen cooperation, security and stability in the Black Sea region and will continue to support the regional efforts to this end.

15. We welcome the progress achieved in implementing the more ambitious and expanded framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) agreed at our Istanbul Summit, and we remain committed to it, including through the decisions we have taken today.

16. We also look forward to using the new pragmatic approach we have adopted today to enhance our relationship with MD and ICI countries as well as interested Contact Countries.

17. Since our Istanbul Summit, NATO's expertise in training has developed further while our partnership with the nations in the broader Middle East region has matured and grown in importance to NATO operations and missions. In this light, we have today launched the NATO Training Cooperation Initiative in the modernisation of defence structures and the training of security forces (...).

Bucharest Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest
3 April 2008

(...)

4. We have welcomed to Bucharest a number of our partner nations; Mr. Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary-General of the United Nations; and prominent representatives of other international organisations. Many of today's security challenges cannot be successfully met by NATO acting alone. Meeting them can best be achieved through a broad partnership with the wider international community, as part of a truly comprehensive approach, based on a shared sense of openness and cooperation as well as determination on all sides. We are resolved to promote peace and stability, and to meet the global challenges that increasingly affect the security of all of us, by working together.

(...)

30. We reaffirm that NATO's policy of outreach through partnerships, dialogue, and cooperation is an essential part of the Alliance's purpose and tasks. The Alliance's partnerships across the globe have an enduring value, contributing to stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. With this in mind, we welcome progress made since our last Summit in Riga in strengthening NATO's policy of partnerships and cooperation, and reaffirm our commitment to undertake further efforts in this regard.

31. We value highly the contributions that our partners are making to NATO's missions and operations. Seventeen nations outside the Alliance are contributing forces to our operations and missions and many others provide different forms of support. We will continue to strive to promote greater interoperability between our forces and those of partner nations; to further enhance information-sharing and consultations with nations contributing to NATO-led operations; and to offer partner countries NATO's advice on, and assistance with, the defence- and security-related aspects of reform.

32. We welcome our Euro-Atlantic Partners at the Bucharest Summit and reiterate the enduring value of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. We remain committed to substantive political discussions and effective cooperation within these frameworks. We welcome Malta's return to the PfP and look forward to its active engagement in the EAPC. We welcome the strengthening of political dialogue through the EAPC Security Forum. We will give priority to several new practical initiatives, which include building integrity in defence institutions and the important role of women in conflict resolution as outlined in UNSCR 1325. We value the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre's successes over the past ten years in coordinating NATO and partner countries' contributions to disaster relief. We will continue to make full use of the NATO/PfP Trust Funds and of their opening to other partner countries. We welcome and will continue to support the engagement of all interested Partners across the Euro-Atlantic area in programmes to support defence and broader reforms, including the Individual Partnership Action Plan. Recalling our Istanbul Summit decision, we are committed to engage our Partners in the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia, including by strengthening liaison arrangements in these regions, and will continue dialogue with our Central Asian Partners on Afghanistan. We appreciate the significant contributions provided by

our EAPC Partners to Alliance operations and look forward to working with them to address the security challenges of the 21st century.

33. We are pleased to note the significant progress achieved in the framework of our Mediterranean Dialogue since the Istanbul and Riga Summits. Political consultations with our Mediterranean Dialogue partners have gained both in frequency and substance, and the meeting held between our Foreign Ministers and their seven Mediterranean Dialogue partners last December contributed to a further deepening of our partnership. We therefore plan to pursue this momentum through deepening our liaison arrangements, on a voluntary basis, with the region. Our practical cooperation has grown in several areas, and new opportunities have been created especially in training and education (...). The conclusion of Individual Cooperation Programmes (ICP) with Egypt and Israel will help in establishing long-term, structured and effective cooperation with those countries. We encourage our other Mediterranean Dialogue partners to develop their own ICP in the near future (...).

34. We welcome the response of four countries in the Gulf region to our offer of cooperation in the framework of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and encourage other countries of the region to take up that offer. To that end, we plan to develop our liaison arrangements, on a voluntary basis, with this region. We are pleased to see their increased interest and participation in NATO training and education activities, and stand ready to enhance our cooperation in this and other fields. We welcome the progress made in the implementation activities of the NATO Training Cooperation Initiative (...).

35. The Alliance places a high value on its expanding and varied relationships with other partners across the globe. Our objectives in these relationships include support for operations, security cooperation, and enhanced common understanding to advance shared security interests and democratic values. We have made substantial progress in building

political dialogue (...). Recognising that each of these countries wishes to pursue a unique degree of relations with NATO, and that other countries may wish to pursue dialogue and cooperation with NATO as well, we reiterate our willingness to further develop existing, and openness to new, individual relationships, subject to the approval of the North Atlantic Council, and at a pace that respects mutual interests in so doing.

36. We reaffirm the continued importance of the Black Sea region for Euro-Atlantic security (...).

Strasbourg / Kehl Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg / Kehl
4 April 2009

(...)

36. Twenty years ago, an historic wave of democratic change swept through Central and Eastern Europe. NATO took this opportunity to engage countries across the Euro-Atlantic area in partnership and cooperation with a view to fostering security, stability and democratic transformation. We reiterate our commitment to further develop the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) as the essential framework for substantive political dialogue and practical cooperation, including enhanced military interoperability. We welcome the offer of Kazakhstan to host the EAPC Security Forum for the first time in Central Asia in June. We thank our Partners for their significant contributions to our operations. We will continue to develop EAPC policy initiatives. In this regard, we welcome the work of the EAPC in education and training activities, and encourage national educational institutions to contribute to these efforts. We also encourage the EAPC to further develop the Building Integrity initiative which promotes transparency and accountability in the defence sector, and to report back to us on this initiative at our next Summit. We remain actively engaged with our Partners in supporting the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on

women, peace and security, with the aim of having a comprehensive set of measures in place by autumn 2010. We are also contributing with our Partners to international efforts to put an end to the trafficking in human beings.

37. Peace and stability in the Mediterranean region are essential for Euro-Atlantic security. For the past fifteen years, NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue has provided a valuable forum, including meetings at Ministerial level, for consultations and cooperation with our Mediterranean partners on a wide range of issues, and we welcome their significant contributions to Alliance-led operations and missions. We are convinced that joint ownership remains essential to the success of our relationship (...). Against a challenging background in the Middle East and much welcomed renewed international commitment to build peace in the region, we stand ready to further enhance our political dialogue and practical cooperation with all our Mediterranean partners (...).

38. The security and stability of the Gulf region is significant to the Alliance. We are pleased with the significant progress achieved in the framework of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) since its establishment in 2004. Political consultations and practical cooperation have intensified, and new opportunities have been created in key areas such as energy security, maritime security and training and education. We encourage our ICI partners to develop ICPs. We value highly the support provided by our ICI partners to NATO's operations and missions.

39. Within the context of our Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, we welcome the substantial progress made in implementing the first phase of the NATO Training Cooperation Initiative, including the establishment of a dedicated faculty at the NATO Defense College and the inauguration of the faculty's NATO Regional Cooperation Course.

40. Since Bucharest, NATO's relationships with other partners across the globe have continued to expand and deepen, reflecting their increasing importance to the Alliance's goals in operations, security cooperation, and efforts, through political dialogue, to build common understanding of emerging issues that affect Euro-Atlantic security, notably Afghanistan. These relationships, which take many forms, offer a flexible means for countries to pursue dialogue and cooperation with NATO, and we reaffirm our intent to enhance them, on a case-by-case basis (...).

41. The Black Sea region continues to be important for Euro-Atlantic security (...).

Annex 2: A Selection of Statements by NATO's Secretary General

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Farewell Speech to the Council by NATO Secretary
General, Lord Robertson
NATO HQ, 17 December 2003

(...)

It is, however, customary for those who retire from the North Atlantic Council to offer some advice to those who will continue to carry the torch. I am no exception. I have a few brief points. (...)

Ninth, protect and promote the Partnership for Peace, one of our gold-dust assets. Use it to bring Ukraine, the Caucasus countries, the 'Stans' of Central Asia and the Mediterranean Dialogue nations closer and closer to our coalition of common values and interest. The Partnership is one of the best investments ever for a future safer world.

Opening Statement by NATO Secretary General de Hoop
Scheffer at the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at
Ambassadorial Level
NATO HQ, 14 January 2004

... almost exactly 10 years ago, NATO leaders launched an “immediate and practical programme” that was to transform the relationship between NATO and its Partners across Europe and Central Asia. Today, we are celebrating 10 years of Partnership for Peace. It was adopted by Heads of State and Government of then 16 NATO countries meeting in Brussels, on 10 January 1994. This practical programme was to complement the political dialogue between NATO and Partners launched already in 1991 and conducted in the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), and then, since 1997, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

As we look forward to the Istanbul Summit to further develop both EAPC and PfP, let me use this occasion to recall briefly why it is worth doing so.

The practical focus of PfP was to be on preparing the military forces of Allies and Partners to work together seamlessly. Today, Allied and Partner soldiers serve shoulder-to-shoulder in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Some Allies and Partners are putting their PfP experience into use in Iraq.

But our Partnership has also forged a common purpose which goes far beyond military interoperability. It has helped develop political and

institutional interoperability between Allies and Partners, building on common values. It has helped build an impressive Euro-Atlantic network of political leaders, diplomats, soldiers and civil servants who can speak the same language, work together, and solve problems together. In short, we have laid the foundations for a common, Euro-Atlantic security culture.

Partnership has stimulated and supported defence reform in aspirant and many other Partner countries. It has helped many nations to build more modern, effective and democratically responsible armed forces and other defence institutions; it has also helped many nations manage the social and material consequences of such effort.

Partnership has helped prepare 10 nations for the responsibilities of NATO membership. But it has also provided a unique instrument for countries who are not seeking membership to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security without compromising the principles of their foreign and security policies.

More recently, and immediately following the shocking events of 11 September, 2001 Partnership provided the framework for the 46 participating nations to respond together to the threat of terrorism.

Therefore, as we greet this ten-year mark, we can look back at a record of success. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership has been a catalyst of domestic transformation and of international security co-operation on a historically unprecedented scale. NATO has always been at the core of this endeavour. Partnership has also been moving towards the core of NATO's business. It has served Allies. It has served Partners. It has served democracy and peace.

C'est pour moi un privilège de présider un nouveau chapitre de cette histoire, qui est l'histoire d'un succès. Je suis déterminé à contribuer à affiner, tout en lui donnant plus de substance, le cadre du nouveau Partenariat que nous avons construit au Sommet de Prague, en 2002. Ce

cadre repose sur trois piliers : la réforme, le dialogue politique et l'interopérabilité.

Aucune transformation démocratique n'est possible sans une réforme approfondie de la défense. Aussi, je suis persuadé que nous devons faire en sorte que l'OTAN fournisse aux Partenaires des conseils et une assistance plus efficaces pour la mise en place d'institutions de défense solides et répondant à l'exigence de transparence démocratique.

Les Alliés doivent, en particulier, renforcer leur aide aux pays du Caucase et d'Asie centrale, deux régions dont nous avons reconnu l'importance stratégique.

Pour aider ces pays et les autres Partenaires dans leur phase de transition, nous devons également renforcer notre dialogue politique avec eux.

Je suis aussi persuadé qu'à mesure que le concept de sécurité et de défense évolue, il doit en aller de même en ce qui concerne la portée et l'accent des programmes de coopération au titre du Partenariat. Nous devons, en particulier, continuer de rapprocher l'ensemble des Alliés et des Partenaires dans la lutte contre les grands défis de notre temps – le terrorisme et la prolifération des armes de destruction massive.

Alors que nous continuons de faire face conjointement aux risques pesant sur notre sécurité commune, il faut donner aux Partenaires qui ont la volonté et la capacité de contribuer de façon significative aux efforts dirigés par l'OTAN des possibilités accrues d'agir dans ce sens. Nous devons aussi continuer de trouver les moyens de rapprocher ces Partenaires des structures et des processus décisionnels de l'OTAN.

Si nous réussissons à réaliser tout cela, le Partenariat ne va pas seulement se rapprocher du cœur même des activités de l'OTAN ; il en deviendra une partie intégrante. Nous avons de bonnes raisons d'être fiers de ce que nous avons accompli. Mais nous devons continuer d'en faire plus. J'ai bien l'intention d'œuvrer avec le Conseil et avec l'ensemble de la communauté du Partenariat afin d'y parvenir.

Chairman's Statement of the Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at Summit Level, held in Istanbul, Turkey, 29 June 2004

The tenth anniversary year of Partnership for Peace, the Heads of State and Government of the 46 member states of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) met today in Istanbul to discuss current security challenges and how they can best meet them.

The EAPC Heads of State and Government met with President Karzai of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan to discuss progress in that country, and the valuable role played by both Allies and Partners who make up the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). All recognised that much remains to be done for Afghanistan to become a peaceful and stable country, fully integrated into the international community. They welcomed the decisions taken by the Alliance to expand ISAF and provide support to the Afghan authorities for the upcoming elections, and pledged to support the operation and its objectives. Allies and Partners alike recognised that their common security was at stake in the success of Afghanistan, and agreed upon the importance of accepting risks and facing responsibilities together.

EAPC Heads of State and Government reaffirmed the commitment of the Euro-Atlantic community to peace, security and stability in the Balkans. They welcomed the presence of the Heads of State of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro at their meeting as

observers, and urged them to meet the outstanding conditions set for PfP membership by Allies.

In facing up to these new common threats to security, they reaffirmed the resolve of their states to fight the scourge of terrorism. They took stock of initiatives aimed at increasing the EAPC's contribution to the fight against terrorism and broadly endorsed the further implementation of the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism, developed by Allies and Partners.

EAPC Heads of State and Government expressed broad support for a major report on the future development of their Euro-Atlantic Partnership, which outlines the core objectives of Partnership - political dialogue and practical co-operation, efforts to promote democratic values and foster democratic transformation across the Euro-Atlantic area, preparing interested Partners for participation in NATO-led operations and continuing through Partnership for Peace to support Partners who wish to join the Alliance.

They reaffirmed their commitment to building a Partnership which would be tailored to the different needs of individual Partners. In this respect, they welcomed NATO's intention to place a special focus on relations with the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia, including the decision by the Alliance to appoint one liaison officer for each region. They also welcomed the launching of the Individual Partnership Action Plan process by several states of the two regions. This process enables individual Partners to establish together with the Alliance a range of reform objectives, upon which the Alliance will provide advice and assistance. They expressed their endorsement of the Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building, which reaffirms the EAPC's conviction that effective and efficient state defence institutions under civilian and democratic control are fundamental to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, and essential for international security cooperation. This

new mechanism aims to support and sustain further development of such institutions across the Euro-Atlantic area.

EAPC Heads of State and Government welcomed the commitment to ensure that as NATO reforms the way in which it develops future military capabilities, how it marshals them for operations and conducts operational planning, it will closely bear in mind the need to ensure that Partners are able to continue making high-value contributions to NATO-led Operations. They also endorsed the NATO Policy on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings developed in consultation with Partners.

Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
at the 42nd Munich Conference on Security Policy
4 Februar 2006

...Afghanistan illustrates a new reality – in the new security environment, our Partners make a critical contribution to our shared objectives. That is why the links with our partner countries – from Austria to Finland and from Armenia to Kazakhstan -- are a true strategic asset. We need to ensure that we have the closest possible partnership with those countries that can, and are willing to, help defend our shared values.

To my mind, that means also building closer links with other like-minded nations beyond Europe – nations such as Australia, New Zealand, South Korea or Japan. NATO is not a global policeman, but we have increasingly global partnerships.

In Europe, NATO's partnership policy has been a major success. But for some nations, partnership is only a step towards the ultimate goal of NATO membership. The prospect of joining NATO has been a major incentive for many countries to tackle the challenge of reform. It has helped to foster stability and democracy. This logic of integration remains as valid as ever, especially in the Balkans. But it also means that when nations have performed, when they have done what NATO asked

them to do, the Alliance cannot hold out on accession. When aspirant countries are ready, we must let them enter NATO's open door. I expect Riga to bring that message home – loud and clear.

Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
at the 44th Munich Security Conference
9 February 2008

(...)

As NATO looks to its Bucharest Summit in April, I believe there are four key things that we have to get right.

First we have to ensure that the Afghanistan mission is on the right track so there is not just the reality but also the perception of progress in our parliaments and publics.

Second, we have to integrate the Balkans more firmly into Euro-Atlantic structures and keep the door of Euro-Atlantic integration open to the new democracies on this continent.

Third, we must develop our ability to interact and cooperate with other players, such as the UN, the EU, the World Bank, and the NGOs. Security doesn't last without reconstruction, development, good governance and political reconciliation.

So a comprehensive approach is more than just a noble objective; we need to actually apply it in practice.

And fourth, NATO cannot stay on the sidelines as new threats to our populations emerge – including threats close to home. Proliferation of WMD, but also of missile technology, terrorism, cyber attacks and vulnerabilities in our energy supply lines are collective challenges, and we must provide collective responses to them.

Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
at the NATO Defense College, Rome
28 May 2009

(...)

Fifth, a new Strategic Concept must reconfirm the consolidation of Europe as a long-standing, strategic objective of NATO. Over the past twenty years, the Alliance – together with the European Union – has played a major role in the creation of a European continent that is whole, free and at peace. We have come a long way towards that goal, but it is not a reality just yet. And so I believe that a new Strategic Concept should confirm NATO's commitment to continue to engage countries all across Europe in political dialogue and practical cooperation – but also to keep its door open to countries who wish to join the Alliance, and who are able to meet its rigorous standards.

Security Through Partnership, Keynote Speech by the
Secretary General of NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the
2009 EAPC Security Forum, Astana
25 June 2009

(...)

Le Conseil de partenariat euro-atlantique (CPEA) a maintenant douze ans. Il a d'emblée été conçu comme un mécanisme souple destiné à suivre l'évolution de l'environnement de sécurité. Et en effet, le CPEA a évolué considérablement. Aujourd'hui, il n'est pas seulement un cadre de coopération concrète, il offre aussi un forum vital de dialogue politique entre les Alliés et les Partenaires. Mais sommes nous allés assez loin dans notre Partenariat ? Et pouvons nous faire mieux s'agissant d'articuler et de mettre en œuvre la logique du Partenariat dans l'environnement de sécurité instable que nous connaissons actuellement ? Je voudrais, dans mes observations de ce matin, vous donner quelques indications à cet égard.

(...)

Partnership has proved a very precious idea – because we have been willing and able to push limits. The number of common projects has increased dramatically. Political and military cooperation between Allies and Partners has constantly intensified. And in NATO-led operations today, Partner countries make indispensable contributions. Kazakhstan's vital

support for the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan is just one, major example of the enormous strategic value which our Partners can offer.

Over the years, Partnership has also become a two-way street. Partners have taken an active role in its evolution, and they have done so with increasing self-confidence. This active involvement by our Partners has made the Partnership concept a resounding success. Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council have nourished a true “security culture” across the Euro-Atlantic area.

Partnership has been a success because we have had the vision to recognise that the world was changing, and because we had the courage to work together to shape that change. Today, we need vision and courage more than ever. If we want Partnership to continue to play its important role, we must continue to adapt it to the changing environment.

This means, first and foremost, that the Partnership must develop a different working culture. Thus far, our working culture is characterised by a certain caution, even from time to time hesitation, to tackle difficult issues. Sometimes we shy away from having a meaningful, substantial debate, simply to avoid controversy. There were good reasons for doing so in the past, when the Partnership was still fragile. Today, with the experience of one-and-a-half decades, we can afford to go further.

We must realise that Partnership is no longer about eliminating residual mistrust left over from the Cold War. Today, Partnership has turned into something quite different: it has become a unique instrument to tackle common challenges in an increasingly globalised world. And it is up to us to make the best possible use of that instrument.

The agenda of today’s EAPC Security Forum does not shy away from critical questions, but tackles them head-on. The issues that we will discuss today range from Afghanistan to the Caucasus, and from energy security to Central Asian security. Each of these topics affects NATO Allies and Partner countries. And so each of them has a strong Partnership dimension.

The ambitious agenda of this EAPC Security Forum makes clear that the logic of Partnership has not lost any of its relevance as a result of recent rounds of NATO enlargement. Of course, enlargement means that the balance between Allies and Partners in the EAPC has shifted. And it is also true that these Partners are widely spread geographically. But there is plenty of life left in our Partnership. It is up to us, NATO members and Partners, and representatives from across the strategic community, to ensure that Partnership remains vibrant and healthy. And our meeting today will -- I am sure -- help us in doing just that.

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