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Modern Developments in Defense Education

Jim Barrett *

Motivation

The first version of this paper was written for the members of a NATO-sponsored Expert Team, prior to one of the in-country visits described below. A description of defense education would seem to be unnecessary for a group of experts, who were all very familiar with the enterprise of military training and education. Perhaps. Nonetheless, there have been significant developments over the last decade or so, and there may well be some differences of opinion among us on the importance or the future impact of some of these changes. Moreover, our understanding of defense education is so strongly influenced by our very different national experiences that we may not have an accurate sense of the larger picture. It was with these caveats in mind that the earlier version of this essay was written, in order to test our assumptions about how these new developments will affect defense education structures and systems, to provoke reaction, and thereby to serve as a basis for the team’s deliberations. This paper is offered in that same spirit; comments, criticisms, and corrections will be welcome.

Modern Currents

The last fifteen years have seen remarkable growth and expansion in the area of defense education. The training apparatus that prepares armed forces for conflict is now seen as something more – an important educational system for the nation, and an important forum for multi-national cooperation on peace and security. Of course, the training of forces for armed conflict remains the core mission of any military training and education system; that fact alone distinguishes defense education from all other educational systems.

But warfare has changed, and modern armies are responsible for much more than the management of violence. Those of us who are in the business of military training and education have seen remarkable changes in the education of officers (and also of NCOs) in response to the modern perception of war as a broader spectrum of more complex conflicts. Words like stabilization and reconstruction have become standard parts of the vocabulary of defense education. Soldiers are expected to be knowledgeable about underlying political and cultural issues and to be interoperable, not just with the forces of allies, but also with civilian governmental and even non-governmental organizations. For the West, the current deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan daily bring important lessons for the form and content of defense education in the new security en-

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vironment. For newly independent and small states, on the other hand, a variety of difficult and complex unresolved conflicts closer to home can be expected to dominate thinking about defense and security for years to come. Defense education is a long-term investment, and its impact will only become clear over several years. Much of that future will depend on how we design our educational systems today.

The preeminent new developments in defense education include:

- Substantially enhanced academic standards
- The growth in continuing professional military education
- International collaboration.

All of these are enabled and frequently stimulated by developments in distance learning, distributed learning, and e-learning, which I will refer to simply by the collective acronym DL. The transformative power of DL should not be underestimated, but neither should it be taken for granted. The use and application of these forms of learning is highly dependent on national culture and the state of local development.

**Enhanced Academic Standards**

Since the end of the Cold War there has been an almost universal enthusiasm for increased academic standards in our defense institutions. The impact is evident at all three institutional levels: the military academy, the staff college, and the national defense college. The growing importance of academic standards has led to a vision of the staff college in particular as a post-graduate institution, and to the development of new masters’ degrees in military science. This has in turn given the military academy increased importance. As staff colleges and national defense colleges seek to meet the demands of higher academic standards, they find many of the scholars needed to implement these more rigorous measures in the faculty of the military academy. These professors and defense scholars, who are typically engaged in the military education of cadets, are an important engine of defense education. This may be the strongest argument for the coordinated oversight and management of the three institutional levels as a coherent system. Perhaps equally important, there are now increased linkages between military academies and colleges and civilian universities and colleges. In part, this growth in civilian-military educational cooperation reflects a growing interest in the civilian academic realm in matters of national defense and security. That is good news, for universities are among the most stable and influential of a nation’s institutions.

For European staff colleges, the Bologna Process sets a reasonable and achievable common standard for what might be termed a “professional” masters’ degree, and this has pushed some staff colleges to acquire university status. There are indications of a parallel *Erasmus militaire* initiative more directly rooted in the defense academies, which seeks to foster the exchange of officers, instructors, and curricula as a means to increase interoperability and to foster a common defense and security culture in Europe. One suspects that, in time, a *de facto* global academic standard will develop for staff colleges, and even national defense colleges. The challenge will be to preserve
the essential military character of staff college instruction while accommodating academic processes and standards. This will demand thoughtful compromise by both academic and military authorities, and can be expected to take some time.

**Continuing Professional Military Education**

The need for continuing professional military education arises in part from the transition from the Cold War, and in part from the emergence of new, broader models of warfare. All of these changes place a formidable learning burden on the modern officer. There is simply not enough time to include all the required curricula in existing residential courses, nor is it efficient to learn all that new material out of context or in situations that are too far removed from operational experience. As a result, we see the emergence of hybrid programs, where part of a required course is provided in residence, and the remainder is offered by DL. Well-designed hybrid programs draw strongly from the experience of the students. In some cases, the entire command and staff qualification can be acquired by DL. These new modalities of program delivery are proving to be useful for regular forces, and particularly so for the reserves. They work best when introduced as part of a coherent defense education structure and accompanied by appropriate policies supported by senior authority.

One particularly challenging new element is the increased need for inter-agency professional development. The so-called comprehensive approach—drawing on the capacities of defense, diplomacy, and development—has attracted a fair bit of attention and stimulated much debate that should in time produce some well-designed inter-agency education programs. We now find more civilian students at the staff and national defense colleges, as well as some entirely new courses designed for public servants and other civilians. Perhaps not surprisingly, this is more prevalent in the emerging democracies of the East than in the established ones of the West. More effort is needed in this regard, although it may not be simple. The challenge arises not only from the profound cultural divide between the military and civilian worlds, but also from the asymmetry of resources and organizational talent available to military and civilian organizations. To be truly effective, we will need multi-national, inter-agency education, which will by definition confront us with more and greater cultural and capability gaps that will need to be spanned.

**International Collaboration**

Long-term defense reform starts with defense education, and defense education reform is a fully shared enterprise, where the newly independent states are the key players. They, after all, have the greatest investment in regional security, and they have the best understanding of their regions’ politics and culture. The challenge is to ensure that these individual national and regional views are not overwhelmed by Western perspectives and priorities. It is true that the dominant models of modern defense education are Western, but some of the best thinking in defense education reform can be found in the newly independent states. It may be that those states are more focused on preparing their armies for the defense of the motherland, but defense education is fully compatible with this mission, offers better prospects for long-term stability, and is not very ex-
pensive. Defense education addresses the key strategic questions of how the defense and security of states can be achieved cooperatively, using the timeless tools of the academy: study, debate, and teaching. It can only succeed with the active participation of the regional players, with the cooperation of the West. How best might we promote a balanced dialogue?

The answer may lie in the Defense Institution Building initiative articulated at the 2004 Istanbul Summit. Encouraged by NATO and the Partnership for Peace ( PfP), and by the United States and other sponsoring nations, the military and civilian academics, educators, and administrators of our military academies and defense academies have engaged in a collaborative PAP-DIB (Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building) activity, known within the PfP Consortium as the Defense Education Enhancement Project, or DEEP. This project has three major components. The first is the development of a Reference Curriculum, and the second is an Educators’ Forum. Both these activities are relatively well underway. The third component is a series of in-country visits designed to assist partner nations with the development of their defense education systems in support of an Individual Partner Action Plan (IPAP) or a Membership Action Plan (MAP). There have already been a number of in-country visits, but this activity is less well defined than the other two, and we are still very much in a learning mode. It will be important to assess and report on the visit process itself so that, over time, an agreed approach and shared expectations will emerge.

The main efforts of international cooperation in defense education are aimed at providing support to the defense colleges of new and emerging democracies through the PAP-DIB/DEEP activities. While the academic products of these institutions are important, the great prize is the interconnected, supportive human network that will sustain not only defense education but also broader contact and dialogue between nations. That support network is, by its design, balanced to ensure that the voices of the reforming states will govern the process and pace of change. The new Reference Curriculum is the result of this kind of collaboration. The best examples of its early application are not simple reflections of the printed document, but new and independent work done in-country and informed by the intellectual discourse that lies at the heart of PAP-DIB.

The PAP-DIB Reference Curriculum is a construct familiar to any academic. It is neither a template nor a doctrine, but rather an assembly of ideas designed to stimulate thought and debate. There are three main themes within the curriculum: Public Administration and Governance; Defense Management and Economics; and Ethics and Leadership. The contributing scholars are drawn from three geopolitical areas: NATO/PfP sponsoring nations, nations who have lived the transformation from the Soviet bloc to national independence, and new Partner nations. The support network can therefore be roughly described as a 3 x 3 x 3 matrix, with one axis representing content, the second representing experience or national context, and the third axis representing the three activities of content development, educators’ workshops, and in-country visits. It is possible for any nation, regardless of its geopolitical power or stage of development, to participate profitably within this general framework.
Conclusion

It is not possible to predict with any certainty what kinds of warfare today’s young lieutenants will face when they become colonels and generals. Climate change and environmental decay will bring new conflicts, which will require new means of resolution. But over our lifetimes and in our many nations we have accumulated a rich body of experience and have gained many insights. Drawing on our collected knowledge, we have much to teach each other. Some of the most interesting and innovative developments in defense education can be found in the newer democracies, which are often less constrained by old habits and old assumptions. The PAP-DIB/DEEP project gives us the framework and the tools to learn together, to debate our ideas, and to share our wisdom. We have an opportunity now to build on that framework, to extend it and, most of all, to exploit it for our national and at the same time our mutual benefit.
A Gaming Approach to Enhancing Defense Resource Allocation

Todor Tagarev and Gueorgui Stankov *

Summary

This article describes the approach and the experience of the Defense and Force Management Department at the “G. S. Rakovski” Defense and Staff College in Sofia, Bulgaria in conducting interactive simulations that support decision making on force structure, force development programs, and the respective allocation of resources. The primary purpose of the simulation is to educate students (mostly senior military and civilian MOD personnel) in the intricacies of defense planning and programming in a changing environment, and to provide hands-on experience in defense programming and budgeting. In addition, it allows participants to explore the space of potential policy alternatives, force structuring, and programming decisions, thus serving as a powerful decision-support tool.

Introduction

In transparent defense management systems, decisions about the allocation of resources—personnel, weapon systems and equipment, infrastructure, and money—are clearly related to policy objectives and priorities. However, the link between policy objectives and resource allocation is not straightforward. Intricate methods and models are used to define requirements, match a given solution to a requirement, aggregate individual solutions, analyze the costs of force structures, and manage the development of the armed forces.

Experienced defense policy makers and planners are aware that even in mature defense planning systems, where the assumption is that rationality in decision making prevails, the provision of transparency is a daunting task. The armed forces are commonly expected to conduct diverse operations and perform a variety of other tasks under conditions that often do not lend to advance clarification. Perceptions and expectations change, on the part of both political leaders and the societies that empower them. It is particularly difficult to predict the amount of money that these actors will be willing to invest in defense, especially in the medium and long term. People and organizations within the defense establishment aggressively compete for their share of the defense budget. And these are only a few among the factors that render the environment

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in which force development and resource allocation decisions are made one of significant uncertainty.¹

Yet in a democratic societies decision makers are accountable to the citizens for the way they use limited societal resources to raise and sustain armed forces. Therefore, a student of security and defense matters is expected to understand the principles of defense planning and resource allocation, including the principle of transparency, and to be aware of the need and the methods for preserving transparency under the impact of unforeseen events.

It was with this belief in mind that in 2004 the leadership of the National Security and Defense faculty of the “G.S. Rakovski” Defense and Staff College in Sofia decided to include a game simulating defense planning and resource allocation decision making in the curricula of all of its master’s programs and a number of other courses.² A similar game was specially developed for training senior defense civilians and military staff in Ukraine. The game was conducted at the National Defense Academy of Ukraine in Kiev in May 2008, and is judged to be very successful.

This essay presents the game as conducted at the “G.S. Rakovski” Defense and Staff College and briefly describes the supporting computer tool. It then builds on the rich educational experience that the game offered, and provides ideas for how such interactive simulations can be used as a decision-support tool. The concluding portion of the essay emphasizes the usefulness of such decision-making simulations for the development of military and civilian expertise and the advancement of democratic civil-military relations.

**Goals and Objectives**

The primary goal of the simulation is to educate military and civilian students in the principles of defense planning and program-based defense resource management. It enhances students’ understanding of important linkages in defense policy making, force development, and budget planning; provides first-hand experience in the process of linking security and defense policy objectives to program decisions to budget pro-

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² This decision was made after the presentation of a very successful one-week game in the “G.S. Rakovski” Defense and Staff College at the end of 2003 by the U.S. Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA, www.ida.org). The authors gratefully acknowledge the impetus provided by IDA in 2003 and the permission to use the supporting tools. Since 2004, both the concept for the game and the supporting tools underwent considerable evolution, in which the authors played key roles. Therefore, we bear full responsibility for the text presented herein.
posals; and allows the students to appreciate the role of key defense policy and planning documents. Furthermore, the simulation increases understanding of the ways uncertainty is accounted for, and trains the students in the application of key mechanisms for the incorporation of changes in the planning environment while preserving the integrity of a defense policy.

The second goal of the game is to provide an exercise in role playing. As a result of the simulation, a participating student is expected to better understand the difference between expert and decision-making roles in designing defense policy, and the particular interactions among variety of stakeholders: civilians and military, political leadership and experts, as well as among staff with different functional responsibilities.

The third goal in the design of the simulation was to provide decision support to defense policy and resource allocation deliberations. The fourth (and final goal) of the game is relevant both to students and decision makers. Based on “best practice” models, the simulation allows students to compare existing and potential future processes of defense resource decision making to current best practices in the field, and to identify important process gaps. It is further useful in identifying data and information requirements, as well as highlighting the necessary methodological, analytical, and training support required for the efficient implementation of advanced defense planning and resource management.

**Approach**

To meet the stated goals (and building on the IDA approach and tools), the team at the Defense and Force Management Department, led by Todor Tagarev, designed an interactive simulation, or game, under the title “Decision making in managing force development.” The simulation is conducted with students in the master’s programs under the faculty of National Security and Defense, as well as with students drawn from a number of additional post-graduate courses. The game usually runs for four days, with six periods in class each day. In addition, students are expected to work on game assignments in their time out of class.

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4 The first two of the goals are educational. The latter two were addressed within project SfP 981149 “Operations Research Support to Force and Operations Planning in the New Security Environment,” financed partially by the NATO Science for Peace program.

5 Alternatively, the game may be conducted over three days, with eight periods in class per day. One class period equals forty-five minutes. Thus, the game includes eighteen hours of total class time.
**Structure**

The game is based on the security, economic, and social environment and policies of an imaginary country, with a notional organization of decision-making bodies and a typical armed forces structure. It is organized in nine blocks: an introductory block, seven interactive sessions, and a concluding block with a discussion on practical challenges. In the interactive sessions, in working groups of six to ten students, game participants are asked to:

- Analyze the security and social environment and reach an agreement on defense policy objectives and priorities
- Analyze planning scenarios and derive capability requirements
- Agree on a draft defense programming guidance
- Design force development programs
- Make program decisions and propose a “Program Decision Memorandum”
- Discuss and propose a defense budget
- Propose changes in force development during budget execution and assess the impact on the level of defense capabilities.

This structuring of the game in sessions (or process phases, as presented in Figure 1) roughly emulates current best practices in defense policy making, programming, and budgeting. One major difference is that the design of force development programs and the program decisions are included in the process of deciding on future force structures. One of the reasons for this—one that is commonly acknowledged in the defense planning community—is that whether or not a future force structure is affordable and achievable depends to a great extent on the force’s current situation (force size, operational engagements, legacy systems and their remaining life time). Another reason that is particularly salient for Bulgaria and other countries with immature defense institutions and defense planning and financial management mechanisms is that standing long-term defense plans—although sanctioned at the highest governmental level—are often unaffordable. What makes such cases even more complicated is that defense ministries sign procurement contracts not according to programs, constrained by official budget forecasts, but in response to requirements in long-term plans, while additional procurement cases and other resource-intensive proposals are pushed through the decision pipeline. A third reason is simple practicality—such simplification permits in-

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7 See, for example, Bulgaria’s “Plan for Organizational Development and Modernization of the Armed Forces till 2015,” approved by the Council of Ministers with Ordnance # 301 of 2004, *State Gazette* 103 (November 2004).
At the end of each session, the working groups report to a plenary group. Thus, game participants are aware of and can compare alternative views. They are also tasked to identify the advantages and disadvantages of selected alternatives.

**Roles**

During the interactive sessions, game participants play roles. Depending on the session, each working group acts as:

- Defense Council in interactive session 1
- Defense Requirements Council in interactive session 2
- Programming Council in interactive sessions 3, 5, 6 and 7
- Program Teams in interactive session 4.

Such advisory bodies and program teams really exist in the defense establishment of Bulgaria, which makes it easier for an experienced defense practitioner to associate himself or herself with a given role—such as Deputy Minister of Defense for policy, personnel, or acquisition; Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Operations; Chief of Staff of the Land Forces, the Air Force, or the Navy, etc. During the game each participant plays two types of roles: one that is close to his or her background (e.g., a military officer plays the role of a flag officer) and one that is atypical (e.g., an officer playing the role of a civilian deputy minister). This approach enables the leaders of the simulation to make the game rather realistic. Approximately half the members of a simulated advisory body have relevant expertise and contribute to informed decision
making, while often bringing with them the views typical of and the loyalties implicit to a particular defense organization. At the same time, each participant has the opportunity to get within the skin of someone on the “other side,” to understand what drives them and better appreciate their respective rationales.

In the simulation, just like in real life, participants are tasked to act within a rational framework, but the decisions they make collectively reflect the mixture of perceptions, individual experiences and preferences, priorities, and loyalties of the particular students in that group. Since each group has a different combination of participants, with a different set of experiences, the decisions they make are thus inherently subjective.

**Coping with Uncertainty**

During the game the participants are forced to adapt previous decisions, plans, and programs to unforeseen events or other changes in the environment, just like leaders of the defense establishment in real life. In each realization of the simulation we prefer to use events that are clearly related to current hot-button issues. The following are among the events most often used in simulations:

- The international community decides to intervene in a conflict region and the country decides to contribute, perhaps deploying a battalion-size unit to an allied force or a coalition. The approved defense budget did not foresee such an operation, and the decision of the parliament to send troops abroad does not provide for additional financing. Therefore, the cost of the unforeseen participation has to be covered within the defense budget.

- A natural disaster occurs, such as a flood, massive forest fire, or earthquake. In response, the government decides to finance certain activities in order to alleviate the negative consequences to the population. Part of that financing is from the previously forecasted (or, depending on the game phase, approved) defense budget.

- The Minister of Defense decides to make an expensive procurement—e.g., to buy a ship—within the budget-planning phase or within budget execution, while such procurement is not included in the respective defense program.

- An accident in a depot where surplus ammunition is stored leads to casualties among the civilian population, and the government decides to speed up the process of utilization (without providing any addition to the defense budget).

- The economic and financial environment during budget implementation differs considerably from the one anticipated during planning and programming, for example:
  - The real rate of inflation is twice the forecasted one
  - The dollar value of the national currency increases (or drops), while payments on signed contracts are to be made in dollars
  - The price of fuel increases dramatically, thus raising the cost of training programs
Figure 2: Relating Objectives, Force Structure, and Program and Budget Decisions in a Changing Force Development Environment.

- The labor market becomes more competitive, and military salaries need to be increased in order to meet recruitment targets.

Such events may be introduced in any of the interactive sessions, and are always introduced in sessions six and seven.

Game participants are then tasked to find affordable solutions while still preserving the transparency of the linkages from security objectives to missions and defense ambitions to capability requirements and force structure to defense activities and capability levels. In practice, the players are able to search for only a limited number of solutions, using the feedback loops presented in Figure 2.

**Supporting Computer Tool**

The conduct of the game is supported by a computer tool, which is a spreadsheet in Microsoft Excel. The tool automates all calculations, including costing, as well as the transition from program costs to budget. Relevant to the concept of the simulations, the tool is simple and realistic, allowing participants to keep their focus on the main issues and leverages in force structuring and programming, namely:

- Personnel levels
- Percentage of conscripts among the enlisted personnel
- Level of training
- Major procurement projects
- Disposal of excess equipment and infrastructure
The tool automatically sums up data from all programs, immediately visualizing the main defense planning parameters. For example, it aggregates (potential) budget requests, highlighting the difference between the cost of all programs and the fiscal guidance. In addition, the tool allows a straightforward merging of programmatic information from different sources—for example, of programs developed by two or more working groups. The computer tool provides for reasonable protection of the model structure and the built-in data from unauthorized interference by students. Thus, only instructors can make changes in the program structure, costing factors, elements with an impact on the fiscal guidance, and other essential features. Finally, the use of commercial-off-the-shelf software such as Excel spreadsheets is considered an efficient approach to the simulation, as there are no special requirements for software licenses, installation and maintenance competencies, etc.

Using the Simulation as a Decision Support Tool

Over the last five years the simulation has proved to be one of the most effective ways to educate students in the complexities of defense policy making, planning, and resource management. For mid-career officers and civilians, as well as for new political appointees in Bulgaria’s Ministry of Defense, it is particularly useful in revisiting major factors and clarifying relationships in setting defense policy and plans, translating policy objectives into budget decisions, and reiterating the need for a rational and transparent decision making process. In addition, it is a promising tool to support the process of defense policy making and planning, and has already been used in this capacity (albeit with limited objectives).

Such interactive simulations with decision makers, people playing particular roles, or a mix of participants can be used to discuss and rationalize the major “dimensions” of defense policy—ambitions, operations, manpower policy, technological level and defense industrial ambitions, budget levels, etc.—and rationalize the process of prioritization. It can be further used to generate rough approximations of qualitatively different force structure alternatives, and thus quickly explore the space of viable force structures. With such alternatives in place, game participants may define and discuss the pros and cons of force structures that are considered acceptable and can be sustained within anticipated defense budget levels. Given a change in the force development environment—the necessity to meet urgent and unforeseen requirements, macroeconomic parameters that differ significantly from the ones used during programming and budget planning, etc.—the simulation can support the generation, analysis, and selection of new program alternatives, reflecting the consequent changes in budget, readiness levels, procurement plans, etc. (We would add a note of caution: it should not be expected that such an approach will result in detailed, meticulously costed force structures and programs that can be turned directly into force development, budgeting, or procurement decisions. While the simulation can be helpful as a decision support tool, it is not intended to produce defense policy fully-formed).
On two occasions in 2007, senior Bulgarian defense officials (including a deputy minister of defense, and directors and department heads from the defense ministry) participated in simulations conducted by the Defense and Force Management Department with mixed groups of senior officers and civilian students. Decision makers listened to and analyzed working group reports during plenary sessions. The main focus in these cases was on:

- Structuring and defining defense ambitions
- Establishing alternative approaches to partitioning defense capabilities, in particular the way in which alternative representations of capabilities are perceived
- Deriving capability requirements from the analysis of planning scenarios.

**Conclusion**

Interactive simulations such as the one described in this article can help make complex theories clearer, and present students with the opportunity to apply theoretical principles and approaches, develop critical thinking skills, and provide “a welcome relief from the everyday tasks of reading and preparing for classes.” In fields with few absolutes—like that of defense policy making, planning, and resource allocation—participants in a simulation can explore the main issues through experimentation, interacting with and learning from fellow students.

We found the creation of incentives through competition to be of particular value. Game participants are divided into teams that are permanent throughout the game. All teams report on the same assignment at the end of each interactive session. Although the faculty always claim that there is no “textbook” solution to the assignment, the motivation of students increases throughout the stages of the game, and teams almost without exception try to outperform the others. An additional benefit of this competitive approach is the opportunity it provides to check and compare the validity of the results against the solutions of other teams.

Finally, our experience confirms and reinforces the finding that human gaming is essential in exploratory analysis supporting defense planning amidst massive uncertainty. Hence, interactive simulations hold the potential to be a powerful tool in support of decision making on defense policy, planning, and resource allocation.

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8 At the time these were novel and methodologically challenging issues for policy makers and planners in the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense.


The Defense Policy of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic Since 1989: Stages, Milestones, Challenges, Priorities, and Lessons Learned

Josef Prochazka *

The end of the Cold War dramatically changed the perception of international security and the subsequent formulation of security and defense policies in both Western and Eastern bloc countries. The newly established political leadership in the formerly communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe had to struggle to adapt their defense policies to a new politico-strategic environment while dealing with the many challenges of democratic governance. Furthermore, the transformation of these states also required a transition from a centrally-planned economy to free market structures.

The Czechoslovak Federal Republic (CSFR)—known since 1 January 1993 (after its peaceful dissolution) as the Czech Republic (CR)—was no exception to this process. The CSFR’s primary goal after the Velvet Revolution 1 was to establish a liberal democracy and a free market economy in the light of Western political and economic values. 2 Ensuring external and internal security has been always seen as an integral part of those overall objectives; thus, the key steps of the transition from communism in the Czech Republic were profoundly connected with security and defense policy formulation and its execution.

This essay examines the main drivers shaping the defense policy of the CSFR and CR since 1989. It also charts its evolution in the form of defense sector reforms. This project also identifies the most important lessons learned, which may be useful for future defense policy formulation and execution in small and medium-size countries that are undergoing the process of military transformation as an integral part of their overall democratization.

For the purpose of this project, “defense policy” is understood as a program for defending a country against its enemies and as a set of all necessary precautions taken by one state in order to safeguard and strengthen its external security. Defense policy is a process, with objectives and priorities. The political leadership of the CSFR and CR has always strived to adopt a liberal defense policy that reflects developments in the national and international security environment, national values and interests, and that

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1 The so-called Velvet Revolution, by which Czechoslovakia shook off Communist rule, began on 17 November 1989 with student demonstrations in Prague.

takes account of the resources available to small, rapidly developing countries. The central questions addressed in this essay are how successful was this process and what could have been accomplished more effectively?

The formulation and execution of defense policy in the CSFR and CR were more or less successful. One could consider the Czech Republic as a very successful country in this context.\(^3\) On the other hand, not all of the visions, strategies, and plans that were contemplated by the new Czech state became a reality, and there exists an excellent opportunity to analyze the causes behind these setbacks in order to share valuable experience and lessons learned.

This paper charts the development and execution of the defense policy of the CSFR and the CR, and identifies four distinct periods in this almost twenty-year-long process:

- Democratization
- Integration
- Reforms
- Transformation.

Each of these periods was driven by different objectives, trends, and events. Furthermore, each period was reflected as the official defense policy of the Czech Republic in strategic and conceptual documents approved by the Czech Parliament.

**The Military in Czech Society**

*Starting Position*

No independent formulation and execution of defense policy existed during the Communist era in Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak People’s Armed Forces (CPAF) were shaped—in their structure, equipment, doctrine, and support—according to Soviet offensive strategy. In comparison to the country’s population, economy, and resources, the CPAF were relatively robust, heavily equipped, and supported by a substantial defense industry. The Czech military during this era was entirely controlled by the governing Communist Party; most generals and high-ranking officers were members of the Communist Party, and all officers were loyal to and active supporters of the totalitarian regime. The CSFR was a member of the Warsaw Pact and, since the 1968 invasion, Soviet armed forces operated on its territory.\(^4\) Forces under high operational readiness

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\(^3\) The U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry said in September 1995 on a visit to the Czech Republic that the country was leading Central Europe’s race to join NATO, and that it had made more progress toward democracy than any other nation in the region. (Associated Press Worldstream, 19 September 1995.)

\(^4\) One of the new government’s first acts was to suggest talks with Moscow on the future of the 80,000 Soviet soldiers that had been stationed in Czechoslovakia since the Warsaw Pact invasion that crushed the reforms of 1968. See “Czech Party Names New Government,” *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 4 December 1989.
were stationed along the nation’s western border, while low-readiness forces, military schools, and supporting elements were located in the eastern part of the country.5

Czech society’s opinion of the CPAF was very low, because these forces had been ineffective in repelling either the 1938 German invasion or the 1968 Soviet takeover. Furthermore, the CPAF were misused by the Communist regime to stop public demonstrations against the Warsaw Pact invasion in 1968 and the so-called “Normalization Process,” which was initiated in August 1969.


The period of democratization in Czech society began on 17 November 1989. In this era, the nation’s defense policy focused primarily on depoliticizing the CPAF by applying democratic control principles based on the Western democratic model. This objective was seen as a matter of urgency because the new political leadership saw the CPAF as a potential threat to the democratization process in society as a whole.6

This approach to defense policy was driven by the assumption that the danger of nuclear holocaust had disappeared. As a result of this assumption (and the anticipated peace dividend), the defense budget in the CSFR and other countries was reduced, along with their defense capability. Nevertheless, the new world proved to be a dangerous place, filled with new challenges. The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union demonstrated this fact and threatened the security and defense interests of the Czech Republic.

In November 1990, the Czech government approved *The Concept for the Development of the Czechoslovak Army by the End of 1993*, which outlined the relocation of units and called for massive reductions in personnel, weapon systems, and infrastructure. Additional restructuring included changes in the command and force structure. At the same time, a more defensive military strategy and doctrine for the CSFR had been adopted in March 1991. Czech defense policy during this period stressed the importance of independent territorial defense of the entire country against a non-specified opponent instead of its former anti-NATO orientation.

Concurrently, domestic defense industry research, development, and production potential and capabilities had been reduced through conservation of military production, restructuring, and privatization of state-owned factories. This process did not have a significant negative impact on the economic and social stability of the country (the Slovak part of the country was affected more seriously, due to its greater reliance

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5 As of 31 December 1989, the CSPA’s main combat force comprised fifteen ground divisions, two air force divisions, two air defense divisions, an artillery division, and a number of surface-to-air missile units. Some 210,000 personnel were on active duty, of whom 148,595 were conscripts and 61,405 were military professionals—41,715 generals and other officers and 19,690 non-commissioned officers (NCOs). The CSPA also employed about 80,000 civilian staff.

on defense production). The critical issue of this period became the withdrawal of Soviet military forces to the Russian Federation. This objective was successfully completed—almost exactly in parallel to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact Treaty—on 30 June 1991.7

Unfortunately, due to historical resentments and the arrogance of both the Czech and Slovak political leadership, the unity of the CSFR became fragile after the revolution. The union of the two in the form of Czechoslovakia was peacefully dissolved on 31 December 1992. The military assets of the former state were divided between the Czech and Slovak Republics in a fair and pragmatic way, in proportion to their respective population (the ratio was approximately 2:1).

By the end of 1992, the democratization stage had been successfully completed. The armed forces were controlled by the civilian minister of defense, and had been completely depoliticized. The Communist political architecture in the ministry of defense was abolished. This ministry’s structure was changed in the spring of 1991, and clear lines were drawn between civilian and military responsibilities. The discredited generals, officers, and members of the counter-intelligence service left the armed forces after several screening processes were conducted. More importantly, decisions about further development of the armed forces and their eventual operational use were to be made in accordance with the newly adopted constitution and respective laws by a democratically elected government. The position of an Inspector General, who was intended to oversee the armed forces, was created in December 1990. His duties included performing inspections and preparing parliamentary reports concerning defense policy and strategy implementation, defense spending, and the level of military preparedness. Most importantly, the armed forces remained politically neutral during the first years following the Velvet Revolution. This neutrality and loyalty to the new political leadership had a positive impact on the democratic development of the country and the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia into its two successor republics.

The defense policy that was in place during this period reflected the need to display support for international peace and stability. This resulted in the deployment of a chemical unit as a part of a coalition force during Operation Desert Storm during the first Gulf War (1990–91) and in participation by one infantry battalion in UN peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a part of UNPROFOR in 1992. Both operations were successfully accomplished and contributed to gains in valuable operational experience within the Czech military. As a direct result of these deployments, the image of the armed forces in Czech society improved significantly.

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7 Officials in Czechoslovakia wanted to replace both Cold War blocs (NATO and Warsaw Pact) with a pan-European collective security system based on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. They believed that this arrangement would overcome the East-West dichotomy. They called for the withdrawal of U.S troops from Europe as well. They also considered Czechoslovak neutrality as an option (as reflected in Henry Kissinger’s proposal in July 1990). See Szayna and Steinberg, *Civil-Military Relations and National Security Thinking in Czechoslovakia*, 26.
The formulation of defense policy during this period was negatively influenced by the new political leadership’s lack of expertise in security matters in general, and in defense in particular. It resulted in unrealistic assessments of future needs and the role of the armed forces. Due to these errors, questionable modernization programs were adopted during this era.

Obviously, after the massive defense budgets of the Communist era, the Czech military budget saw dramatic cutbacks. As a result of these reductions, research, development, and new procurement projects had to be more or less frozen. Furthermore, the armed forces were required to reduce their manpower and operational costs significantly. It accomplished this by decreasing staff, reducing training activities, and shortening the time for compulsory service from twenty-four to eighteen months.

Integration (1993–1999)
The process of integrating the Czech Republic into Western political and military structures started before the formal offer of NATO membership was extended in 1997. In September 1990 and in the spring of 1991, the NATO Secretary-General visited the CSFR, and Czech officials expressed their hope of one day joining NATO, which was neither politically nor militarily prepared for enlargement at this time.

The execution of defense policy in the Czech Republic was still influenced by the reductions in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and by the ongoing tensions in the Balkans (the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which started in 1995, and in Kosovo, which began in 1999). These conflicts seriously threatened security and stability not only in the general European region, but in the Czech Republic as well. These conflicts proved that future challenges would require a strong military. Furthermore, international solutions were required that were far superior to the capabilities of the UN-led peacekeeping force. The spectrum of threats and risks to the security of the Czech Republic were widening during this period, leading to an increased emphasis on the need for security cooperation and collective action instead of independent defense arrangements. A large, conventional attack against the Czech Republic was considered unlikely, but various smaller threats were proliferating.

Based on this development, the strategic objectives of Czech defense policy in this integration stage were clearly defined. After initial political discussions concerning future territorial defense requirements, the country’s geostrategic position in Europe, its economic possibilities, resource limitations, and possible future security and defense interests, the Czech Republic determined to pursue NATO membership and support the broad-ranging effort to strengthen relations with the West. These efforts were not restricted to the armed forces, but also included the realms of politics and economics. As a matter of fact, this objective enjoyed both public and political support across the entire political spectrum and resulted in enhanced interest on the part of the

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political leadership in the country’s future security and defense needs. Persistent and vocal opposition from Russia was viewed as the most serious obstacle to this integration process.

During this seven-year integration stage, there were several important strategic and conceptual documents that were elaborated by the ministry of defense and adopted by the Czech government, which will be discussed below. The first important step taken was that the position of the minister of defense was significantly altered. Unfortunately, there had been four ministers of defense between 1993 and 1999, each with different ideas concerning how the defense sector should be reformed.

Another challenge that had to be confronted was the fact that there was still a very limited ability within the ministry of defense and the armed forces to think strategically and conceptually, despite efforts by Western countries to educate defense sector personnel and to provide some kind of expertise. The first tangible result in the process of Western integration was achieved when the Czech Republic was admitted to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council on 1 January 1993. In the wake of this step, the Czech Republic joined the NATO Partnership for Peace on 10 March 1994, and then signed an associated partnership agreement with the Western European Union on 9 May 1994.

Between 1993 and 1997, the Czech defense budget did not allow for a qualitative change in the armed forces in terms of modernization of equipment, conduct of needed training, and improvement of working conditions. As a result, two separate and distinct forces were being created. The Rapid Reaction Forces were high-priority forces, designed to be deployable and interoperable with troops from other NATO allies. The Territorial Forces were lower priority forces responsible mainly for territorial defense. Furthermore, in an effort to cut operational costs, the Air Force retired 20 percent of its equipment. Other steps that were taken included reducing the command

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9 When the Czech Republic became a member of NATO, 66.9 percent of the population supported accession to membership, while 22.6 percent opposed it, and 10.5 percent held no opinion. Even more interesting fact was that 80 percent of the armed forces’ professional soldiers supported entry into NATO. See Jeffrey Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republic, A Comparative Study in Civil-Military Relations (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 79.

10 The Security Policy of the Czech Republic (Prague: Institute of International Relations, 1997), 17.


12 As the Czech Republic’s first minister of defense, Antonym Bauds, noted in 1993, the Communist-inspired symbols that decorated the main meeting room of the ministry of defense could be easily removed, but it was much more difficult to transform the Czech armed forces into a modern military of the Western type. See Czech National News Wire (26 January 1993).

structure from six to three levels, cutting the length of compulsory service from eighteen to twelve months, and adopting the concept of semi-professional armed forces. Mobilization measures, reserves, and defense industry capability were still seen as essential components of defense policy, but they drained significant resources from the military budget.

Defense concepts adopted in 1997 and 1999 reflected NATO requirements, and were oriented toward the long term. However, successful implementation of these concepts was compromised by inadequate and poorly managed resources. This unsystematic approach resulted in a loss of prospective personnel, who were not motivated enough to stay in this unstable environment—characterized by low salaries, limited career opportunities, mismanagement, an eroding organizational culture, and ineffective military budgeting, acquisition, and procurement processes.

Before the Czech Republic joined NATO on 12 March 1999, the Czech armed forces had fulfilled the military requirements for membership. Through this process, secure and interoperable communication and exchange of information were ensured, airfield infrastructures were modernized, and necessary logistical arrangements for possible NATO reinforcement on Czech territory were established.

Security and defense issues had never played a substantial role in Czech domestic policy up to this point. However, the decision to strive for NATO membership represented a turning point in this situation during the second half of the 1990s. The NATO accession process quickened all of the defense sector reform processes. Military legislation was drafted and approved by Parliament in 1998 and 1999, and the government approved basic security documents in 1999.

We can argue, however, that Czech defense policy in this integration period neither succeeded in focusing on the qualitative characteristics of the defense sector, nor did it properly address the need for stable and sustainable development that would realistically reflect potential risks and take advantage of upcoming opportunities (such as those offered by NATO membership). Despite many problems with reform implementation—e.g., inappropriate decision making, irresponsible management of financial and human resources, a lack of long-term planning, ineffective acquisition, excessive logistic support structures, poorly maintained and unwieldy infrastructure, and useless stocks of old materiel and ammunition—the use of military capabilities actually be-

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14 Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republic, 29.
came one of the Czech Republic’s success stories. First, during a period of severe floods in Moravia 1997, the Czech armed forces proved to be the only effective organization able to protect life and property. Second, successful deployments of Czech units in NATO-led operations in the Balkans proved the growing interoperability with the Allies of some Czech military assets on the operational and tactical level. For example, the NATO Integrated Air Defense System ensured protection of Czech airspace, with contributions from the Czech Republic of appropriate command and weapon systems and sensors.

Nevertheless, political decision making concerning deployments abroad was highly controversial, because of the lack of any common interest and consensus among political parties. Despite the economic recession and political instability in 1997, the Czech government pursued a strict fiscal policy. The ministry of defense therefore experienced (contrary to the case in the first half of the 1990s) a positive budgetary development between 1999 and 2002. Military expenditures became one of the government’s priorities. The government decided to incrementally increase the share of military expenditures as a percentage of GDP by 0.1 percent annually, with a goal of reaching 2 percent of GDP by the year 2000.18

This decision demonstrated the willingness of the Czech political leadership to share the defense burden with Allies, and showed its determination to continue with the reforms necessary to achieve full interoperability. This approach also enabled an ambitious modernization program designed to improve military operational capability and support an ailing domestic defense industry.


After two years in NATO, the Czech Republic had successfully implemented only 26 of its 132 force goals.19 This resulted in sharp criticism from NATO which, coupled with the disappointing results from the military campaign in Kosovo, pushed both Czech politicians and military representatives to reevaluate the achievements of the past decade and to examine the country’s options for choosing the reform process that could best produce a more effective and relevant military.20 It was determined that the reform process that would be most likely to succeed was one that would take advantage of NATO membership. Unfortunately for the defense sector, however, the government’s top priority became EU membership.

Defense policy formulation was influenced by a growing number of intra-state conflicts (failing states) and unprecedented terrorist activities by radical Islamic groups (such as the attacks of September 11). The probability of a conventional attack against the Czech Republic was assessed as very low. Furthermore, the potential to predict a conventional attack in advance and to take the appropriate measures to enhance the nation’s defense capabilities was considered to be relatively feasible. In response to these

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19 Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republic, 104.
emerging threats, Czech defense policy was adapted again, and addressed the new requirements for enhancing the military posture and capabilities of the nation’s armed forces.

The objective of this stage was to reform a still inflated military into a small force with 35,000 active soldiers and 10,000 civilian employees. Furthermore, an ambitious modernization program was developed, spanning the entire Czech military, including infantry, air defense, combat service and combat service support, and the infrastructure of large military bases. Stress was put on deployability, mobility, and interoperability with NATO forces. Human resources received the highest priority, with an emphasis on career opportunities, fair evaluation and promotion procedures, improved benefits, and better working conditions. Discussions involved the creation of an all-volunteer professional force, and the termination of conscription. As necessary preconditions for this reform, several key steps were deemed necessary: the rationalization of all business processes, the reduction of garrisons, changes in the command and force structure, and the reduction of reserve forces. It was believed that by implementing the outlined measures, the ministry of defense could free up resources desperately needed for the further modernization of obsolete weaponry, materiel, and infrastructure and for improving the working and social conditions of military and civilian personal. Emphasis was placed on “soft” values, such as pride, the military’s standing in society, and the overall cultural and professional improvement of the military organization.21

During this reform period, existing strategic documents were updated—namely the Security Strategies of 2001 and 2003, and the Military Strategies developed in 2002 and 2004. These amended documents reflected the rapidly changing security environment, the requirement for a complex approach to security and defense, an evolution in NATO’s political and military thinking, and the Czech Republic’s international obligations and economic realities. Based on the basic principles of these strategic documents, two conceptual documents for further development of the armed forces were adopted by the government.22 The original Concept 2002 was deemed too ambitious and expensive. This became even more obvious after adjustments were made to account for new financial realities in 2003. Significant reductions were needed to bring this concept in balance with the resources available—specifically, a force reduction from three to two mechanized brigades, a reduction of operational commands from five to two, garrison realignment, and a reduction in personnel (target numbers cut by 9,000 military staff, to 26,200 and by 1,200 civilian staff, to 8,800). The government was


also forced to lower its sights in terms of deployable capability (a deployable brigade was downsized from 5,000 to 3,000 troops).

During this period, the Czech Republic successfully accomplished its strategic objective of integration into Western structures, and became a full member of the EU on 1 May 2004. The Czech military became an all-volunteer force on 1 January 2005, faster than had been foreseen in the conceptual documents. Furthermore, the armed forces reached its initial operational capability at the end of 2006 as planned in the first step of its reform process (thirty-seven units fulfilled NATO standards to create a brigade task force of up to 3,000 troops prepared for NATO deployment). The Czech command and force structure was modified according to the revised concept document. Personnel resources were stabilized, with salaries being increased, along with improvements to the career management process and changes to the personnel structure. The number of garrisons, infrastructure, and stockpiles of materiel were reduced and rationalized. Specialization of the armed forces into units focusing on CBRN defense, Passive Surveillance Systems (PSS), and medical service became an investment priority. The military education system was adjusted to account for the declining demand for officers by the smaller military. Outsourcing of services was implemented to ensure that the functions previously conducted by conscripts continued to be accomplished. The most important (and the most controversial) modernization projects were accomplished—e.g., battle tanks, supersonic and subsonic aircraft systems, transport aircraft, and infrastructure. The armed forces successfully participated in foreign operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Success in defense reform was ineluctably connected to the Czech Republic’s assuming greater responsibility and a more important role in multinational operations. In 2005, the Czech Republic became a lead nation in the Multinational Brigade in Kosovo and assumed its command. In 2006, the Czech Republic took responsibility for air traffic control at the Kabul International Airfield in Afghanistan. In addition, classical infantry units with broad-spectrum niche ca-

23 The Defense Concept from 1999 prescribed a gradual reduction in the number of conscripts as the Czech armed forces moved further towards professionalization. By 2009, the rapid reaction units should all be fully professional and there should be only around 22,000 conscripts on active duty. The Defense Concept from 2002 aimed to achieve an all-volunteer force by 2006.

24 The main structure of the Czech military that was implemented in line with the revised Concept is as follows: an integrated MoD with directly subordinated elements (intelligence service, military police, special forces, military schools and hospitals) and two operational HQs. Joint Command consists of two mechanized brigades; an artillery brigade; a surveillance battalion; fixed-wing, rotary, and transport air bases; an air defense brigade; an air command and control brigade; a CBRN brigade; a logistic brigade; a rescue and engineer brigade; a communication battalion; a passive surveillance battalion; and a PSY OPS/CIMIC Centre. Supporting and training command is created by directorates for personal, logistic and medical support and training and doctrine.

25 Including the introduction of accommodation allowances, which were equal to approximately one-third of an officer’s average pre-tax salary.
Capabilities were being used (medical, EOD, CBRN, military police, special forces, and helicopters).

During this stage of the defense reform process, the military budget again declined significantly as a result of changing government priorities after the short period of stability experienced in 1999. The first budget cut was connected with the floods during the summer of 2002. These cuts were necessary in order to pay for the reconstruction of destroyed national infrastructure. Later reductions in 2005 and 2006 were influenced by a strict government fiscal policy as the country pursued EU membership and worked to fulfill Stability Pact criteria to achieve admission into the EU Monetary Zone (the priority was the reduction of state debt and the budget deficit).  

_Transformation (2007–2025)_

During the transformation period, which is presently under way, Czech defense policy primarily addresses itself to the new strategic thinking in NATO, which is the product of a new perception of the security environment, taking into account such factors as the stability and reconstruction of failing states, the proliferation of WMD, ballistic missile defense, cyber defense, and energy security. Czech defense policy is also being driven by the demand to develop a more expeditionary military capability. Furthermore, during this period the newly elected government (a coalition government led by the Liberal Party) changed its attitude toward public spending, placing greater emphasis on saving and budget cuts.

As a result of these influences, in the first half of 2007 the MoD assessed its reform achievements concerning Concept 2002 and the revised Concept (2003). In addition, the MoD asked NATO for out-of-cycle consultation in order to deal with the growing gap between the financial resources required for further defense transformation and the resources allocated by the new Czech government. Based on this feedback, the government tasked the minister of defense to come up with feasible and realistic proposals in order to reestablish the equilibrium between the main objectives of the nation’s defense policy and the available resources without compromising the Czech Republic’s security or international obligations.

During this process it was recognized that the nation’s military capabilities still did not completely meet rapidly changing military requirements. Defense planning disciplines were not adequately interconnected. There was still no effective command and control system within the ministry of defense or the armed forces, despite its reduced

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26 Those cuts created a gap greater than the amount of an entire year’s military budget in the middle-term perspective in comparison with the money required for successful Concept implementation.

size and improved efficiency.\textsuperscript{28} There were significant delays in some modernization projects (e.g., communications and information systems, armored personnel carriers, air and land transport), as well as in eliminating useless materiel and infrastructure. An effective corps of non-commissioned officers was also notably absent. The military’s rank structure was still not properly balanced, featuring too many high-ranking officers. Furthermore, there were many civilian employees who lacked clear rules and procedures career progression.

Based on these deficiencies, the government recognized the need to build a more useful military with expeditionary capabilities that could serve worldwide, under diverse conditions, together with Allies and Partners, to accomplish peacekeeping missions in accordance with international law or to defend the Czech Republic and the security interests of its Allies and Partners. The conceptual framework outlined necessary changes in the ministry of defense and the armed forces up to 2018, when the Final Operational Capability (FOC) is to be achieved. Furthermore, the government asked the minister of defense to elaborate upon a more visionary outlook extending as far as 2025,\textsuperscript{29} to update the Military Strategy of the Czech Republic, to rewrite the Concept for Armed Forces Mobilization, and to elaborate upon the Concept for the Protection of Czech airspace after 2015.

In the autumn of 2007, a transformation document was adopted by the government and discussed in parliament. In order to simultaneously meet new military requirements and comply with rapidly declining financial resources, political-military ambitions were adjusted in favor of supporting the most likely operational deployments.\textsuperscript{30} In line with this document, the command and force structure will be changed in order to deal successfully with the most likely operational scenarios.\textsuperscript{31} Business processes will be streamlined based on external audit results; spending for operation and maintenance will be more strictly monitored; investments in new materiel will be reprioritized; multinational cooperation in capability development will be enhanced; and strategic capabilities will be shared within NATO and the EU. It has become clear that most of the planned programs will be postponed and reduced (the armored personnel carrier program will be reduced by half), and that plans for large-scale infrastructure projects to concentrate units in garrisons will be disregarded. New programs aimed at supporting

\textsuperscript{28} One of the reasons why command and control systems were not delivering desired output was the failure in the implementation of the process management model that has been seen as the most effective tool for overall business rationalization within the ministry of defense.


\textsuperscript{30} The Czech Republic is able to deploy 40 percent and sustain in operations 8 percent of its army, as is set forth in the Istanbul criteria, and plans to increase these figures up to 60 percent and 12 percent respectively by 2014. Furthermore, all deployable units should meet NATO standards in line with the Capability Statements by 2018.

\textsuperscript{31} Preparations for worst-case scenarios—including mobilization, the maintenance of duplicate administrative structures and supporting databases of personnel and materiel, and training of reserves—will be reduced to a minimum.
ongoing operations will be implemented or will receive higher priority, such as the modernization of the military’s helicopters and the development of a new generation of UAVs, small personnel carriers, transport airplanes, communications and information systems and network-enabled capabilities).

During the summer of 2008, the government approved updating the Military Strategy to take into account the long-term vision for the transformation of the Czech armed forces. The Military Strategy set forth the nation’s political-military ambitions and provided the basic principles for the construction and deployment of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{32} This document stressed the importance of collective defense and multinational cooperation for defending the Czech Republic. The military will most likely be deployed in full-spectrum joint, combined, and multinational operations. The nation will build one set of forces to operate with all international organizations, which will rely on sharing some strategic capabilities with Allies.\textsuperscript{33} The Czech armed forces will be modular, interoperable, and capable of cooperating with a wide spectrum of actors. Furthermore, the armed forces will provide niche capabilities in the field of CBRN protection and will be structured and equipped for the most likely operational scenarios. The ability to react to the most dangerous threats as the situation dictates will also not be ignored.

The Long-Term Vision is the first attempt since 1989 to look beyond the current security horizon and orient the MoD’s administration and military planners toward long-term developments for both the ministry and the armed forces. One of the most important and remarkable successes during this period is indisputably the change in the way the Czech Republic’s political leadership and military representatives have approached defense policy formulation and its implementation. After a long period of short-term and middle-term approaches, the nation has recognized the critical need for long-term strategic thinking. Long-term political guidance makes it easier for military planners to think about future military operations and required capabilities. Furthermore, armament and acquisition policy and human resource development policy benefit from this approach.

The MoD accelerated the implementation of transformation objectives in 2008. Ministerial guidance consisting of six strategic objectives and tasks has been adopted, and the Middle-Term Plan (2009–2014) outlines programs and activities in order to meet those objectives and tasks in accordance with new priorities. The Czech Republic’s obligations with respect to the NATO defense planning cycle for 2008–2018 were discussed and agreed to as challenging but fair. NATO’s response to the Czech Defense Planning Questionnaire was the most positive since the Czech Republic entered NATO.


\textsuperscript{33} Strategic lift, strategic intelligence, air-ground surveillance, missile defense, protection of its air space within the NATO Integrated Air Defense System.
Concerning the deployment of military capabilities, the Czech Republic will continue contributing in line with its updated political-military ambitions. During the second half of 2009, the nation will provide forces to the stand-by EU Battle Group. Furthermore, Czech supersonic aircraft will conduct air-policing missions in the Baltic countries in order to protect their airspace. The activities of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan will support NATO stabilization and reconstruction efforts there, and helicopter deployments will enhance weak NATO intra-theater lift capabilities.

After analyzing the military budget, one can see that Czech defense spending is well below the agreed upon NATO benchmark in terms of percentage of overall GDP (the budget forecast for 2009 is for military spending of 1.4 percent of GDP). On the other hand, a reasonable balance between personnel (50 percent), operations (25 percent), and investment (25 percent) spending has been achieved. Additionally, the government pledged to cover costs of unplanned military deployments in case of crisis management.

Lessons Learned

Caution is always needed when identifying lessons learned and making recommendations for the future, or when highlighting mistakes for other countries to avoid. However, several aspects of the process of defense policy formulation and execution in the CSFR and the Czech Republic are worth considering for countries currently in a state of transition, whether they are NATO applicants or countries that are newly independent, newly democratic, or turning their attention to new military and non-military threats.

1. **Strive for clear role delineation between political leadership and military representation.** The principle of civil control over the military must be legally established and implemented by an educated, well-prepared, and responsible political leadership. *(Successfully achieved)*

2. **The formulation of defense policy is easier than its implementation.** The elaboration of realistic and feasible strategic and conceptual documents is difficult, but their implementation is even more complicated. People responsible for the design of defense reforms should be accountable for their implementation. *(Still a desired goal)*

3. **Take a complex approach to security matters and promote a wide articulation of defense policy objectives.** The main objectives of defense policy should be well balanced with policies of other areas of government, in order to gain needed political support for their implementation and to avoid significant budgetary constraints during the process. Plans and programs should convince the political leadership that they provide value for the money they will cost. Furthermore, defense policy execution should be reinforced by effective diplomacy; in the Czech case this included the withdrawal of Soviet Union military units, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the dismemberment
of the CSFR, and the Czech Republic’s integration into Western structures. The reduction of the size of the military should be coupled with social programs and effective economic reforms including conversion, privatization, and restructuring of the defense industry. (Partially implemented)

4. Set acquisition policy objectives and modernization priorities. An acquisition policy must reflect overarching political goals, actual military needs, and the nation’s level of technological development. Furthermore, it must strive for the most effective life-cycle cost solution. Acquisition of costly modernization programs should be the least-preferred solution for capability enhancement. Nonmaterial solutions involving business processes and improved tactics, techniques, and procedures should be given top priority. Project management should be performed in a timely manner, within both budget and delivery capabilities. (Partially applied)

5. Personnel management is critical. Investment in people should be given a high priority. Steps that should be taken include recruitment from competing markets using a set of incentives in line with demographic trends, selection of the best suited personnel, proper training reflecting the likely deployment realities, appropriate education, protection during operations, fair career opportunities, transparent promotion procedures, benefits based on fulfillment of standardized performance criteria and in balance with responsibilities, motivational working conditions, and social appreciation. (Striving for, but failed to achieve fully)

6. Allocations of financial resources reflect defense priorities. Limited resources require allocation based on transparently established priorities, defense policy objectives, and constantly updated financial standards. Furthermore, personnel expenditures, operational expenditures, and investment expenditures must be well-balanced, support the long-term objectives of defense policy, ensure adequate training, sustain demand for operational deployments abroad, and continue necessary modernization. Limited resources should be balanced with rational business processes within the entire MoD (new procedures, integration of information systems, outsourcing, and flexible organization). (Partially implemented)

7. Engage in strategic management and long-term defense planning. Decision-making processes at the strategic level must be supported by adequate analytical tools to enhance transparency and to avoid non-systematic solutions, misallocation of funds, and risks to the country’s defense capability. Defense planning must be driven by rigorous analytical processes in order to determine long-term military operational requirements and must be adequately responsive to lessons learned during current operations (urgent operational requirements should not supersede the standard planning process). Internationally, the military should contribute its fair share to collective defense, shared capabilities, and cooperation. (Partially applied)
Conclusions

The Czech Republic’s process of defense policy formulation has always been seen as an integral part of security policy articulation within the nation, and is balanced with foreign, internal security, and economic policies. Economic interests have in many instances superseded defense interests (including procurement decisions, offset policies, and garrison and military infrastructure closures). To some extent, Czech defense policy has reflected changes in the internal and external security environment and public sentiment (democratization, integration, and professionalization). The objective of Czech defense policy has been mostly influenced by liberal values and beliefs. Processes such as the democratization of military structures, participation in international institutions, weapons nonproliferation and reduction, military diplomacy and cooperation, and conflict prevention have become the major drivers of defense policy in the Czech Republic, rather than an emphasis on strong military capabilities. The use of military power has always been seen as the option of last resort in solving security problems and crises, and this use of power has required an international mandate.

As reflected in this essay, the four periods of defense policy formulation and execution (democratization, integration, reform, and transformation) in the Czech Republic have resulted in an overall transformation of the country’s defense sector. It has been an enormous task with many setbacks; however, almost two decades after the end of the Cold War, the defense interests of the Czech Republic are now safeguarded by membership in Western political, military, and economic structures (collective defense and a strong North Atlantic link) and by existing credible military capabilities which create a basis for fair and valuable contributions to both these structures and to international peace and stability operations.

Since 1989, the Czech military has been incrementally changed in many aspects to become an effective tool for defense policy execution. First, the Czech armed forces democratized in line with the Western model of democratic control of the military. Furthermore, the military was never used to resist or obstruct the broader transformation efforts underway in Czech society.

Third, the relics of the Cold War’s robust forces—in terms of personnel, weaponry, and a military infrastructure with an immense mobilization capability and enormous industrial potential—have been replaced through painful, nonsystematic reforms which fortunately did not lead to social or economic disruption. To the contrary, these reforms have led to a flattened command structure and a deployable, sustainable, and fully professional force structure. Modernization of the Czech Republic’s military has resulted from a combination of high-tech updates to outdated equipment and infrastructure. The speed of replacement and reconstruction depends on available resources. This process will continue in line with newly adopted strategic and conceptual documents and with the resources available.

Fourth, the Czech military has accelerated a process of successful integration into Western security structures, and has contributed significantly to enhancing the country’s strong international recognition through successful operational engagements. Finally, the military’s learning processes have been positively influenced by cooperation
with Allies and Partners. Future long-term transformation has been contemplated to ensure continuous adaptation to the changing environment and new challenges.

A lot has been achieved in the last twenty years, and even more will be necessary to continue with the successful adaptations of the country’s defense policy for the twenty-first century. This will remain one of the most significant challenges confronting the Czech Republic. How it addresses this challenge will have profound and far-reaching implications for the nation’s ability to protect and advance its vital strategic, security, and defense interests.
Missile Defense and NATO Security

Peppino A. DeBiaso *

For our readers who noted the article on missile defense policy in the Fall 2008 edition, which provided a Russian point of view, this article, reprinted from the Joint Force Quarterly, provides a U.S. point of view on the subject.

Henri Bigo, Executive Director, PfP Consortium

Armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the global proliferation of ballistic missiles is introducing more widely the means of modern strategic warfare that were once the purview of only a small number of countries. This transformation in the security environment raises new questions for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the strategic implications of defending its territory against ballistic missile attack. During the recent NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania, the Alliance acknowledged for the first time that missile defense can make a contribution to protecting NATO territory and populations from attack. Consequently, NATO is undertaking an intensive examination of the issues associated with a comprehensive continental defense against ballistic missiles to enable it to counter future military risks.

Emerging Security Environment

The threats to the security of the United States and its NATO allies have changed significantly since the early 1990s and the demise of the Soviet Union. A broader and more complex range of challenges confronts the Alliance today. Prominent among these are the proliferation of destructive technologies, such as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the ballistic missiles to deliver them at great distances. Ballistic missiles capable of carrying WMD have become the weapon of choice for an increasing number of states that view them as low-cost, high-impact arms capable of offsetting Western military advantages. And the danger they pose is expanding in Northeast and South Asia, as well as the Middle East.

In the 1970s, at the height of the Cold War, nine nations possessed ballistic missiles. Today, more than twenty states have these weapons. Furthermore, these missiles are undergoing improvements in range, accuracy, mobility, and ability to carry a variety of conventional and unconventional warheads. Over the past decade, in addition to the roughly two-dozen states operating short-range ballistic missiles (up to 1,000 kilometers), the number of countries with medium-range (1,000–2,500 km), intermediate-range (2,500–5,500 km), or intercontinental-range (greater than 5,500 km) ballistic missiles has increased from five to nine. Not only has the number of nations possessing

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ballistic missiles been growing, but this group also includes some of the most dangerous regimes in the world, such as North Korea and Iran.

North Korea has an ambitious ballistic missile development program and is a major exporter of missiles and missile technology to other countries, including Iran, Syria, and Pakistan. North Korea has long possessed a large arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles (Mobs). Through the 1990s, it was also able to develop or acquire the technologies for ballistic missiles capable of striking other continents. In August 1998, it tested the three-stage Taepo Dong 1 missile in an attempt to orbit a satellite. The missile’s third stage failed, but not before it flew long enough to prove that North Korea had the basic technologies necessary for longer-range ballistic missiles. Pyongyang is now developing several such longer-range weapons, including a new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with a range estimated at 2,500 km. In July 2006, North Korea conducted seven widely publicized launches. It successfully fired six theater-class SRBMs and Mobs, demonstrating the capability to conduct salvo strikes against U.S. forces in the region, as well as South Korea and Japan. The seventh missile, the Taepo Dong 2 space launch vehicle/intercontinental ballistic missile, was flown for the first time. The Taepo Dong 2, capable of carrying a nuclear payload, could reach much of the Asia-Pacific region and parts of the United States when operational. Although the Taepo Dong 2 failed shortly after launch, the test made clear the significant program North Korea has under way to build ever more sophisticated missiles with global reach.

In the Middle East, while several states are fielding new and improved SRBMs and Mobs, Iran represents the most serious concern because it unites a vigorous ballistic missile program, the development of key capabilities needed to produce nuclear weapons, the demonstrated use of missile-delivered chemical weapons (against Iraq in the 1980s), and the stated desire to destroy nearby countries (namely Israel). Iran also has a history of support for international terrorism, especially in terms of weapons transfers. Most recently, Iran reportedly supplied the Lebanese Shiite militia Hezbollah with both long-range rockets and short-range ballistic missiles, with the former used against civilian population centers in Israel during the conflict in 2006. Iran already has the largest inventory of SRBMs and Mobs in the region to underpin its growing freedom of action throughout the wider Middle East.

Iran’s plans to deploy longer-range ballistic missiles go beyond the capacity needed to strike U.S. forces and allies in the Middle East. It is developing technology for missiles of increasing range and sophistication, which will allow it to threaten Europe. Iran is modifying its 1,300-km Shahab-3 MRBM in order to give it greater range. In 2004, it claimed that it had successfully extended this missile’s range to 2,000 km. If true, Iran can now target large portions of the Near East and Southeastern Europe, along with U.S. and NATO bases and deployed forces in Turkey and Central Asia. Tehran recently announced that a new solid propellant MRBM—the Ashoura—is in development and could begin flight testing soon. It also continues to work closely with North Korea on ballistic missiles of longer range. As a result of ongoing foreign assistance, Iran’s Mobs and IRBMs could develop more rapidly than would be possible on the basis of its indigenous capabilities. According to multiple open source reports, Tehran
Figure 1: Current and Projected Ranges of Iran’s Missiles.

has acquired from North Korea 2,500-km-range missile systems. As with most ballistic missiles, the possibility to extend this range exists through improving the design of the airframe or using lighter payloads. A range increase to 3,500–3,800 km would allow Iran to reach European targets as far west as the United Kingdom (as shown below in Figure 1). Additionally, it continues to develop the key technologies for an intercontinental-range ballistic missile and a space launch vehicle, giving it multiple paths to achieving weapons capable of striking the United States by the middle of the next decade.

The spread of ballistic missiles and missile technology has been accompanied by corresponding trends in the area of WMD. This is the case for two major reasons. First, there are more than twenty nations today that possess or are seeking to acquire nuclear, biological, or chemical capabilities that can be carried by ballistic missiles. Second, in the past decade, the proliferation of WMD technologies and the expertise required to “weaponize” them have been accelerated by the willingness of both state and non-state organizations to collaborate to advance these programs. This became evident with the revelation in 2003 that A.Q. Khan, known as the “father” of Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons program, had built an international network of suppliers and expertise over several decades to sell nuclear bomb-making design information and technology to several countries, including Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Syria.

The consequences of these activities are beginning to emerge. In October 2006, North Korea carried out a nuclear weapons test. Its progress in developing a nuclear device (along with any foreign assistance it may have received) went largely undetected. Moreover, North Korea continues to provide assistance to other states’ nuclear programs, as suggested by recent events regarding its cooperation with Syria on a nuclear reactor. The disclosure in 2007 that Iran had a covert nuclear weapons program for many years further highlights the difficulty of accurately predicting the emergence of new nuclear weapons states. A 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concludes that, although Iran appears to have suspended some aspects of this program, it is keeping its options open on nuclear weapons. Indeed, Iran’s ongoing pursuit of enriched uranium is the crucial element it its capacity to bring a nuclear capability to fruition. Its activities in this area, combined with its program to build longer-range missiles, reflect its commitment to acquiring strategic arms.

All of these troubling indicators are characteristic of today’s security environment. The spread of WMD technologies along with missile delivery vehicles is increasing the strategic warfare potential of regional powers and will influence the shape of future crises and conflicts. Indeed, states have already demonstrated a willingness to use ballistic missiles to serve a variety of political and military goals. As illustrated in Figure 2, there have been at least ten conflicts since the early 1980s in which states have conducted missile launches against civilian as well as military targets. This also has included the employment of ballistic missiles armed with WMD that occurred when Iraq and Iran used chemical weapons in the 1980–88 “War of the Cities,” killing and injuring tens of thousands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type</th>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq against Iranian cities</td>
<td>Scuds</td>
<td>1980–1988</td>
<td>Political: Incite fear in civilian population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran against Iraqi cities</td>
<td>Scuds</td>
<td>1985–1988</td>
<td>Political: Incite fear in civilian population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya against U.S. naval facilities in Italy</td>
<td>Scuds</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Military: Response to U.S. airstrikes on Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soviet Union against mujahideen forces in Afghanistan</td>
<td>Scuds</td>
<td>1988–1991</td>
<td>Military: Destroy rebel forces in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
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<td>Iraq against Israel, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Scuds</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Political: Attempt to split coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran against Iranian dissident camps in Iraq</td>
<td>Scuds</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Military: Destroy Iranian dissidents</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Yemen against North Yemen during civil war</td>
<td>Scuds</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Military: Destroy rebel forces in North Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China launches near Taiwan</td>
<td>CSS–6s</td>
<td>1995–1996</td>
<td>Political: Attempt to influence elections on Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia against targets in Chechnya</td>
<td>SRBMs</td>
<td>1999–2000</td>
<td>Military: Destroy rebel forces in Chechnya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq against U.S.-led coalition forces</td>
<td>SRBMs</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Military: Destroy coalition forces</td>
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Figure 2: Ballistic Missile Use since 1980.
Responding to New Threats

The United States and its allies are considering how best to counter these new threats—namely, the prospect of catastrophic weapons falling into the hands of a rising number of countries with the ability to deliver them trans-regionally and with little warning. The United States, for its part, has taken steps to field missile defenses against these arms in order to underwrite four key global security goals.

First, missile defense can serve as a valuable instrument—along with diplomatic and political measures—to combat WMD proliferation and support nonproliferation efforts. Defenses may dissuade adversaries from choosing to acquire or expand ballistic missile arsenals by negating any advantage that they might hope to achieve by building them in the first place. In the presence of defenses, ballistic missiles launched by hostile states would no longer have a “free ride” against the population centers or deployed forces of the United States and its allies. Defenses would make ballistic missiles an unwise military investment with diminishing utility. Missile defense can further strengthen the goal of nonproliferation by providing allies the means to protect themselves against a nuclear-armed adversary without having to acquire their own nuclear deterrent. This is the path Japan has taken, developing a layered missile defense system in cooperation with the United States to protect its population centers and military forces against the threat of a North Korean missile attack.

Second, missile defense provides the leadership of the United States and its allies with a wider range of responses to manage crises and conflicts beyond the immediate use of offensive weapons. This was demonstrated during the North Korean launch preparations of the Taepo Dong 2, when the United States placed its missile defense system on operational alert for the first time. Although still limited in its capabilities, the system was prepared to defend the United States against any North Korean long-range ballistic missile. While some national security experts called for preemptive strikes against the North Korean missile and its launch facility, missile defenses gave American decision makers an option beyond preemptive strikes that, in turn, contributed to stability during the crisis.

Third, by diminishing the likelihood of a successful attack, missile defense can enhance traditional offense-based deterrence by introducing doubt and uncertainty into a potential adversary’s plans to attack. By denying the achievement of the political or military goals of any contemplated threat or actual strike, defenses would reinforce the deterrence of aggression. Finally, and most importantly, missile defense provides protection to threatened population centers and deployed forces against actual attack should deterrence and diplomacy not succeed in preventing a conflict.

The missile defense approach the United States is taking to address threats to its national territory as well as to its forces abroad involves a number of elements. To protect its troops and those of its coalition partners against shorter-range missiles, the Pentagon is fielding ground- and sea-based interceptors and tracking radars along with sensors on land, at sea, and in space. These include the land-based Patriot Advanced Capability–3 (PAC–3) and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems for defense against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles for forward operating troops,
military bases, and combat staging areas. Also being deployed are sea-based missile defense systems on Aegis-class ships, which will provide a mobile capability against missile attack. These are being fitted to carry the Standard Missile–3 (SM–3) interceptors to counter short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.

To defeat longer-range ballistic missiles, the United States is establishing a ground-based defense system in Alaska and California. The Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) will engage intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase of flight, hundreds of kilometers above the Earth. This ground-based defense—which is supported by space-based sensors and land- and sea-based radars—will allow the United States to defend itself against missiles launched from Northeast Asia or the Middle East. The U.S. missile defense system, with approximately fifty GIBs planned for deployment by 2013, is designed to provide a modest defense against a few tens of long-range ballistic missiles.

As ballistic missile and WMD threats change over time, so will the composition of missile defense forces. Adjustments to the number and locations of defenses will be based on new or emerging dangers. Some threats (like Libya) may recede, while others (like Iran) may grow. Given the uncertainty in forecasting the timing and location of adversaries possessing such weapons, and the many years required to build and field defenses, the United States and its allies must consider how to have systems in place before a threat fully emerges.

**Missile Defenses in Europe**

Against the backdrop of the global proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMD technologies, the United States is advancing a range of initiatives to extend the benefits of missile defense to its allies. As NATO territory comes under increased risk of ballistic missile attack, the ability of the Alliance to preserve its freedom to act across the full spectrum of military conflict—from humanitarian and peace enforcement interventions to conventional operations—will require some measure of Alliance protection. Over time, defenses that only protect the United States may lead to the decoupling of U.S. security from that of its allies. This would undermine the indivisibility of Alliance security, which has been the bedrock of NATO since its founding. However, by extending the protection afforded by missile defenses to Europe, it is possible to offer a set of capabilities to blunt ballistic missile/WMD coercion of NATO, thereby allowing the Alliance to more effectively deter aggression and carry out its military and security obligations.

NATO has been examining the requirements for missile defense for several years. Its past focus has been on the protection of military forces operating outside of Europe against short-range missile threats. The United States, Germany, and the Netherlands, for example, are deploying new shorter-range missile defenses composed of the PAC–3 system. Italy, Germany, and the United States are jointly developing the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) to provide mobile defense for expeditionary forces against short-range missile threats. As ballistic missile threats have evolved in terms of range, technical sophistication, and payload, allies have started to examine
longer-range missile defenses. Toward this end, in 2001 NATO initiated a major technical feasibility study to define an architecture for protecting Alliance deployed forces operating outside of NATO territory against ballistic missile threats of up to 3,000 km. Known as the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program, this effort was completed in 2003. The following year, the supporting technical blueprint and required funding were approved by NATO defense ministers to begin building a command and control “operational backbone” to which nations could contribute missile defense interceptors and sensors in the future.

As important as this work was, it remained limited in scope because it did not examine options for protecting Alliance territory and population centers from longer-range threats. In recognition of the growing risk from missiles, the November 2002 Prague Summit Declaration by NATO heads of state and government stated, “Today we initiated a new NATO Missile Defense Feasibility Study to examine options for protecting Alliance territory, forces, and population centers against the full range of missile threats, which we will continue to assess.” This follow-on feasibility study of the architectural options to defend NATO forces, populations, and territory from ballistic missiles of all ranges was completed in July 2005. At the November 2006 Riga Summit, NATO heads of state and government acknowledged the study’s findings that missile defense for Alliance territory and populations is technically feasible.

In parallel with these efforts at NATO, the United States carried out a series of detailed technical and architectural assessments examining options to provide protection for Europe and the United States from longer-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East. The analysis concluded that the optimal location for defending Europe against limited intermediate- and long-range missile strikes, and for providing additional capability to the current missile defense system located in Alaska and California to defend the United States, is Central Europe. After consultations with interested NATO allies, the United States began formal discussions in January 2007 on basing defenses in Europe.

The current U.S. proposal calls for an interceptor site of up to ten Gibes in Poland similar to those deployed in Alaska and California. The Gibes would be housed in underground silos in an area about the size of a soccer field. These interceptors, like those based in the United States, employ small non-explosive hit-to-kill vehicles to destroy incoming warheads. The interceptors would be supported by a fixed X-band radar in the Czech Republic. They would track and discriminate ballistic missiles in the midcourse portion of their flight. The radar’s location would be optimized to point its narrow beam toward the Middle East to detect missiles in flight from that region. The data collected would be used to guide the Gibes to the projected trajectory of the missile warhead. These new missile defense assets would be integrated with existing radars in Fylingdales in the United Kingdom and Thule in Greenland, as well as with the missile defense interceptors located in California and Alaska. Construction of the missile defense sites could begin as early as 2009, with the first interceptors in place in 2011–12.

The proposed plan offers a way that the United States and its NATO allies can not only cooperate on missile defense, but also maintain the collective security of the Alli-
ance by creating a defense that would protect all NATO countries facing a long-range ballistic missile threat from the Middle East. Some Alliance members in south eastern Europe would not face these long-range threats given their proximity to the region. Rather, they are more likely to be threatened by shorter-range ballistic missiles. For these countries, short- and medium-range missile defense systems would provide the desired protection. To this end, individual NATO nations are already pursuing shorter-range missile defense systems, and the Alliance, as described above, is developing the ALTBMD program to link them into an integrated command and control network.

Figure 3: Areas Protected by U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System.

At the April 2008 NATO summit, heads of government took a major step in moving the Alliance toward a policy on continental defense. They cited a growing threat to Alliance territory and populations arising from proliferation and the “substantial contribution to the protection of allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defense assets” in Central Europe. NATO leaders also stated the importance of exploring ways to link the U.S. long-range missile defense capability with current NATO short-range missile defense efforts through the development of options that NATO would consider at its 2009 summit.

In the framework NATO agreed to, the long-range missile defense assets proposed by the United States could provide a capability to the Alliance that would complement existing and planned NATO missile defense efforts. A long-range defense system in Europe would be interoperable with current Alliance short-range defenses as well as NATO’s ALTBMD program. The command and control architecture for the U.S. long-range missile defense system is being designed to be compatible with ALTBMD and the NATO Air Command and Control System, which, when operational, will serve as a unified air command and control network enabling NATO members to seamlessly manage air operations and air defense over Alliance territory. Information on missile defense operations, including data from the U.S. ballistic missile defense system, would be a part of this shared situational awareness. As missile defense systems, operators, and commanders from NATO nations are able to effectively coordinate efforts,
they should be better positioned to deploy assets efficiently, ensure vital areas are defended, and avoid redundant resource expenditures.

Cooperation on missile defense along this path could lead to significant efficiencies and cost savings, with the United States focusing on long-range defense while NATO systems address shorter-range threats to allies in south eastern Europe. This approach combines Allied national missile defense contributions with possible NATO assets similar to the way the Alliance has fielded capabilities in the past. Such an arrangement would also provide another avenue for burden sharing in Europe, with hosting nations providing a significant contribution to the collective defense of the Alliance. U.S. and European combined efforts in short- and long-range defense would keep U.S. and NATO security indivisible by providing all members with a defense against the full range of ballistic missile threats. With the protection provided by U.S. and allied capabilities in Europe, NATO member states would have an answer should a future hostile state attempt to use WMD-armed ballistic missiles to intimidate or coerce the Alliance regarding actions in defense of its interests.

Consultations with Russia

Since the January 2007 announcement of U.S. plans to field defenses in Europe to counter limited attacks from potentially hostile states such as Iran, Russia has expressed strong objections. Officials claim the system could nullify Moscow’s strategic nuclear arsenal. The United States has been transparent with Russia regarding its plans and capabilities for the long-range missile defense system in Europe, and has encouraged the Kremlin’s cooperation against common dangers arising from missiles and WMD in the Middle East and elsewhere. Senior U.S. officials have conducted frequent consultations with their Russian counterparts, as well as Russian experts, on the proposed U.S. defense system.

U.S. officials have explained in detail that the proposed missile defense system for Europe would pose no threat to Moscow’s ICBM assets that might be launched from Russia at the United States. Nor would it have any capability against the Russian sea-based strategic force of submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Given their proposed location, U.S. long-range interceptors based in Europe could not catch up to Russian missiles in flight—the defensive interceptors would be in a “tail chase.” Although a moot point because of the preceding fact, it is evident that ten interceptors would not be able to threaten Russia’s strategic force of hundreds of missiles and thousands of warheads. Nor can these systems be used as offensive ballistic missiles or converted to carry warheads. To do so would require significant modifications and testing, all of which would be impossible to undertake clandestinely.

To address Russian concerns, the United States has offered an array of measures to increase transparency in its missile defense activities, including those proposed for Europe. These range from visits to missile defense sites and opportunities to observe related tests to the sharing of information on U.S. missile defense plans and programs. The United States has also been willing to explore cooperation with Russia across the full spectrum of missile defense activities. In 2007, it provided Russia with a compre-
hensive list of possible cooperative missile defense measures. For example, the United States proposed to develop a joint regional missile defense architecture that could incorporate both U.S. and Russian missile defense assets. This concept could involve any number of linked missile defense assets or systems, all working toward the goal of defending the United States, Europe, and Russia from the shared threat of ballistic missile attack. To date, Moscow has not directly engaged on these cooperative proposals. Instead, it insists that Washington and its allies must suspend plans to deploy long-range missile defenses in Europe. In exchange, Russia has stated that it would be willing to jointly monitor Iranian missile activity and share any relevant data from its early warning radar systems. Despite these differences, the United States is continuing to explore opportunities for cooperation with Russia, both bilaterally and within NATO.

The long lead time involved in building and deploying missile defenses, combined with the growing dangers of nuclear and missile threats, suggests the need for the United States and its NATO allies to address, in a timely and comprehensive manner, how best to move forward with the proposals before them. As they do, several areas merit further attention. The Alliance should:

- Sharpen its focus on the strategic implications of a shift to defending its populations and territory against ballistic missile attacks
- Broaden its understanding of the ways in which missile defense can complement other measures to combat and roll back WMD and missile proliferation
- Expand intelligence-sharing on the extent and timing of WMD and ballistic missile threats to European allies so they may better assess the implications of such threats for stability and the protection of European interests
- Develop a roadmap for the incremental fielding of defenses that integrates shorter- and longer-range systems from those nations with the capacity to make contributions; this should include identifying arrangements for the command and control of such defenses in a way that optimizes the effectiveness of the system and is transparent to all allies.

Together, these efforts would lead to a better understanding of the contribution missile defense can make to strengthening the Atlantic Alliance as it adapts to the security environment of the twenty-first century.
Strategic Arms Control After START: Issues and Options

Amy F. Woolf *

Summary

The United States and Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in 1991; it entered into force in December 1994, and is due to expire in December 2009. The United States and Russia have held several meetings to discuss options for continuing their arms control relationship, but have not agreed on whether to extend START or how to replace it. START counts each deployed ICBM, SLBM, and bomber as a single delivery vehicle under the treaty limit of 1,600 delivery vehicles and attributes an agreed number of warheads to each deployed delivery vehicle. This attribution rule provides the total number of warheads that count under the 6,000-warhead limit in the treaty. To verify compliance with START, each side monitors the numbers and locations of ballistic missiles, launchers, and heavy bombers deployed by the other country. The parties use a wide variety of means to collect information—or monitor—these forces and activities. Some of these monitoring systems, such as overhead satellites, operate outside the territories of the treaty parties. They have also been required to exchange copious amounts of data on locations, operations, and technical characteristics of the treaty-limited items. This verification regime has allowed the parties to remain confident in each other’s compliance with the treaty.

The United States and Russia began to discuss their options for arms control after START expired as early as mid-2006. They have, however, been unable to agree on a path forward. Neither side wants to extend START in its current form, as some of the treaty’s provisions have begun to interfere with some military programs on both sides. Russia wants to replace START with a new treaty that would further reduce deployed forces while using many of the same definitions and counting rules that are in place in START. The United States initially did not want to negotiate a new treaty, but would have been willing to informally extend some of START’s monitoring provisions. It has recently agreed to conclude a new treaty, with monitoring provisions attached, but this treaty would resemble the far less formal Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty that the two sides signed in 2002. In December 2008, the two sides agreed that they wanted to replace START before it expired, but acknowledged that this task would have to be left to negotiations between Russia and the incoming Obama Administration.

The United States and Russia could choose from a number of options for the future of their arms control relationship. They could allow START to lapse, or they could extend START for five years. They could extend START, and then amend it to ease some of the outdated provisions. They could negotiate a new treaty, or they could pur-

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sue less formal arrangements to manage their nuclear forces. Moreover, if a new treaty included further reductions in nuclear weapons, it could use some START definitions and counting rules, or the less formal Moscow Treaty declarations.

**Introduction**

The United States and Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) on 31 July 1991. After the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the parties signed a protocol that named the four former Soviet Republics with nuclear weapons on their territory—Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia—parties to the Treaty.\(^1\) START entered into force on 4 December 1994. The treaty was to remain in force for fifteen years, unless replaced by a subsequent agreement, and, therefore, will expire on 5 December 2009.\(^2\) According to Article XVII of the treaty, the parties must meet “no later than one year” before this date to consider whether the treaty should be extended or allowed to lapse.\(^3\) If the parties agree to extend the treaty, the extension would last for five years, unless START were replaced by a subsequent agreement during that time. The United States and Russia have held several meetings to discuss the options for continuing their bilateral arms control relationship after START, but have not yet reached an agreement on whether to extend START or on how to replace it. The discussions between the two parties, along with statements from members of the U.S. Congress and others following the process, reflect not only on the specific issues that may be addressed in a possible follow-on treaty, but also on the broader question of what role (if any) arms control should play in future U.S.-Russian relations.

The Treaty contains many detailed definitions and restrictions that not only limit the number of nuclear warheads each nation is permitted to deploy but also restrain the locations and movement of delivery vehicles carrying nuclear warheads and require extensive exchanges of data about them. Many of these provisions reflect the more competitive relationship between the United States and Soviet Union that prevailed during the Cold War, and the concerns that drove their inclusion in the treaty may no longer seem as important to the U.S.-Russian relationship.

Specifically, some in the second Bush Administration and the broader foreign policy community have argued that, because the United States no longer structures its nu-

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\(^1\) The leaders in Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan agreed to eliminate all of the nuclear weapons on their territories and to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states. These three states have been nuclear-free since the late 1990s; all remaining Soviet-era nuclear warheads are deployed in Russia.

\(^2\) The United States and Russia signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (also known as the Moscow Treaty) on 24 May 2002. They do not, however, consider this treaty to be a successor to START. Article II of the Moscow Treaty specifically states that START remains in force. See Amy F. Woolf, *Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty*, CRS Report RL31448 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 18 January 2008).

\(^3\) The parties did not need to make a decision about the future of START in December 2008; they just needed to meet to consider the question.
clear forces in response to a Russian threat, it no longer needs a treaty that restrains and reduces the weapons that make up that threat. They, therefore, question whether START, or U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control in general, remain important as tools in the political relationship between the United States and Russia.

Some U.S. critics of arms control argue that the bilateral arms control process should fade away after START expires. They note that START may have served its purpose by helping to reduce the size of the Russian arsenal after the demise of the Soviet Union and by restraining the permitted operations of the remaining forces, but its reductions have been overtaken by deeper cuts mandated by the Moscow Treaty. They also point out that the restrictions on Russian forces serve to restrict the flexibility of U.S. forces. In the current environment, the United States may be better served by maintaining its own freedom of action in deploying and operating its nuclear forces than by retaining START’s or similar restraints on U.S. and Russian forces.

Others, however, argue that START remains relevant to the U.S.-Russian relationship and deserves to be either extended or replaced with a similar treaty. In this view, the predictability created by START’s well-defined restrictions on Russian and U.S. nuclear forces can benefit both countries. Moreover, continuing this cooperation can help to restore some trust in the relationship between the two nations. In addition, some in Russia still feel threatened by U.S. nuclear weapons and continue to value the restraints provided by arms control treaties such as START.

Some members of the U.S. Congress have joined this debate, with several endorsing the view that extending START (and its monitoring and verification provisions) will help improve the relationship between the United States and Russia. For example, Senator Richard Lugar has stated that “the current U.S.-Russian relationship is complicated enough without introducing more elements of uncertainty. Failure to preserve the START Treaty would increase the potential for distrust between the two sides.”[^4] Some also believe, as Senator Lugar has noted, that the “failure to renew START will be seen worldwide as weakening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and [will be] a further sign to many foreign leaders and experts that U.S. nonproliferation policy is adrift.”[^5]

The United States Congress has limited influence on the process of seeking a replacement for START. If the United States and Russia amend START, or negotiate a new treaty to replace it, the U.S. Senate will have to provide its advice and consent before the parties ratify the treaty. However, if the two parties do not reach any agreement and START lapses, or if they choose simply to extend START for five years, according to the provision in Article XVII, the Senate would not have to approve or reject the outcome. Nevertheless, Congress can, through resolutions, hearings, and consultations, offer the administration its views on the future of START and the U.S.-Russian arms control regime.

This article provides background information about START and reviews the discussions about a possible successor to the treaty. It also presents a range of alternatives that the United States and Russia might consider if they choose to follow START with a new framework for the arms control process.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Key Limits

START limits long-range nuclear-capable delivery systems—land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers—in the United States and the four states of the former Soviet Union. The treaty limits both the number of delivery systems and the number of warheads that can be carried on these systems. As Table 1 below indicates, each side can deploy 6,000 “attributed” warheads on no more than 1,600 ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, with no more than 4,900 attributed warheads on land-based and submarine-based ballistic missiles.

Table 1: Central Limits in START

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deployed Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles</th>
<th>1,600</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heavy ICBMs</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountable Warheads on Deployed Delivery Vehicles</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic Missile Warheads</td>
<td>4,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warheads on Heavy ICBMs</td>
<td>1,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warheads on Mobile ICBMs</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ballistic Missile Throwweight</td>
<td>3,600 metric tons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within the aggregate limits on ballistic missile warheads, START also limits each side to no more than 1,540 warheads on heavy ICBMs, which are defined as those with a throwweight greater than 4,350 kg, and 1,100 warheads on mobile ICBMs. These two limits are an added effort to restrain forces that the United States feared would provide the Soviet Union with an avenue to exceed the warhead limit. The United States had long sought to use the arms control process to limit (or eliminate) the Soviet monopoly on heavy ICBMs, because it believed that the Soviet Union could expand the capabilities of these missiles by deploying them with more warheads or higher yield. The United States did not have any ballistic missiles of this size, and had no plans to develop or deploy them. The Soviet Union initially resisted U.S. pressures to

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6 From the full text of the treaty and its many annexes, which is available at the U.S. State Department website: www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/18535.htm.

7 This is around 54 percent of the throwweight deployed on Soviet missiles when the treaty was signed.
limit these missiles, but eventually agreed under START to halve their force of 304 SS-18 ICBMs, each of which was deployed with ten warheads.

As the START negotiations proceeded through the 1980s, the United States also grew concerned about the Soviet deployment of ballistic missiles on mobile launchers. The Soviet Union had begun to deploy single-warhead SS-25 missiles on road-mobile launchers and ten-warhead SS-24 missiles on rail-mobile launchers. The United States considered these missiles both a military and an arms control problem. Because the United States did not think it could locate and track these missiles all the time, it believed it would be difficult to target them during a conflict. Moreover, because the Soviet Union had large land areas where it could operate and conceal these missiles, U.S. negotiators argued that the United States would not be able to monitor mobile ICBM deployments well enough to count the missiles and verify Soviet compliance with the limits in START.

The United States initially proposed that START ban mobile ICBMs, even though it was considering the possible use of mobile launchers for its new ten-warhead Peacekeeper (MX) ICBM and for a prospective small, single-warhead ICBM. But after the United States and Soviet Union began to consider options for a monitoring and verification regime that might track the numbers of mobile ICBMs, they agreed to limit, rather than ban, these systems. The limited numbers—when combined with location restrictions, notifications prior to movement, data exchanges that identified the numbers of missiles and warheads based at approved locations, and a continuous monitoring regime outside the final assembly facility for one type of mobile ICBM—would help each side count the number of acknowledged mobile ICBMs and complicate efforts to conceal extra missiles or warheads. Even though the United States eventually dropped its plans to deploy mobile ICBMs, it agreed to apply these limits and restrictions to the Peacekeeper (MX) missiles that were deployed in silos.

START also limits the total amount of throwweight on each side’s ballistic missiles, to an amount equal to around 54 percent of the amount of throwweight deployed on Soviet missiles before the treaty entered into force. Throwweight is the combined weight of the post-boost vehicle, warheads, guidance system, penetration aids, and other equipment found on the front end of a missile. It is considered to be a measure of a missile’s destructive capacity because larger missiles with greater throwweight can carry larger or greater numbers of warheads. Hence, this limit was a further effort by the United States to limit the potential for the Soviet Union to add warheads to its missiles in violation of the treaty’s limits. Because the Soviet forces that were deployed when START was signed carried more than three times as much throwweight as U.S. missiles, the United States did not have to reduce its forces to comply with this limit. However, the United States could have exceeded the limit on throwweight if it had deployed new, larger missiles while START remained in force.

Counting Rules

START counts each deployed ICBM and its associated launcher, each deployed SLBM and its associated launcher, and each deployed heavy bomber as a single delivery vehicle under the treaty limit of 1,600 delivery vehicles. They count regardless of
whether they are equipped with nuclear or conventional warheads. They also continue to count under the treaty limits until the launchers or bombers are eliminated according to the treaty’s detailed elimination procedures.

For example, a bomber (such as the U.S. B-1 bomber) that has been converted to carry conventional weapons continues to count under the treaty limits. Moreover, an empty missile launcher, either on land or on a ballistic missile submarine, continues to count as if it still held a missile and the missile still carried the attributed number of warheads, even if the missile system is deactivated or the launcher has been converted to another purpose.

The number of warheads attributed to each type of missile or bomber is listed in an agreed database. For the most part, the number of warheads attributed to each type of missile equals the maximum number of warheads that the missile had been tested with and could be equipped to carry when the treaty entered into force. In some cases, however—such as for the U.S. Trident II (D-5) missile—the number of warheads attributed to the missile (eight) fell below the maximum number the missile could carry (twelve). The Soviet SS-18 missile had also been tested with twelve or fourteen warheads, but the database counted it as carrying only ten. The parties adopted this formula of counting delivery vehicles and attributing warheads to each type of delivery vehicle because, although they sought to reduce warheads, they could not monitor the actual numbers of warheads deployed on the delivery vehicles. They could, however, identify and count the large delivery vehicles with their monitoring systems.

The number of warheads attributed to heavy bombers falls far below the maximum number that could be carried on those aircraft. Heavy bombers that are not equipped to carry long-range nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs)—such as the U.S. B-1 and B-2 bombers—count as only one warhead under the START limits. This number applies even though these bombers can carry at least sixteen bombs and short-range missiles. Further, heavy bombers that are equipped to carry ALCMs count as half of the maximum number of weapons they are permitted to carry. START states that U.S. bombers can be equipped to carry up to twenty ALCMs, but they only count as ten warheads under the treaty limit of 6,000 warheads. Russian bombers can be equipped to carry up to sixteen ALCMs, and count as only eight warheads under the treaty limit.

START allows the United States and Soviet Union to reduce the number of warheads attributed to a particular type of ballistic missile through a process known as “downloading.” According to the treaty, each party can reduce the “attributed number” listed in the database for up to three types of missiles. If they do this, they must then reduce the number of warheads carried on each missile, and if the number declines by

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8 The most recent data base exchanged among the parties to the treaty can be found at U.S. State Department, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, “START Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms;” available at www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/prsrl/2008/110337.htm.

9 Long-range nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles are those with a range of more than 600 kilometers.
more than two warheads, they must replace the platform on the missile that holds the warheads, so that it does not have space for the larger number of missiles.

This “downloading” process would allow each country to spread its 4,900 ballistic missile warheads among a greater number of missiles. The countries use short-notice onsite inspections to confirm that the number of warheads actually deployed on a particular missile does not exceed the number of warheads attributed to that type of missile in the database. The United States has taken advantage of this provision with its Minuteman III and Trident II missiles.

Existing types of missiles cannot be deployed with more warheads than the number attributed to that type of missile in the database. The number in the database could only increase if the missile were altered to meet the definition of a “new type” of missile. START bans new types of heavy ICBMs. For smaller missiles, it contains an elaborate definition that is designed to allow the parties to distinguish between modified versions of existing ballistic missiles, which would be subject to the warhead attribution numbers already in the database, and new types, which would receive a new warhead attribution number. During the negotiations, the parties agreed that the definition would reflect changes in missile characteristics—such as the propellant used, the number of stages, its length and diameter, and its throwweight—but they differed on the magnitude of the changes that would define a “new type” of missile. The United States feared that, with smaller changes, the Soviet Union would be able to have a missile that was virtually identical to an existing missile declared a new type with a greater number of warheads, and then might secretly retrofit the older version with more warheads as well. This was one of the last issues resolved in the START negotiations.10

Collateral Constraints

START contains detailed definitions of the specific items and activities limited by the treaty. The parties have also been required to exchange copious amounts of detailed data on the technical characteristics of the treaty-limited items. The treaty mandates that the parties locate all strategic forces limited by the agreement at “declared facilities,” which include production, assembly, testing, storage, maintenance, deployment, and elimination facilities. It outlines detailed notifications that must be provided and procedures that must be followed when items move from one location to another. It further defines detailed procedures that the countries must follow when they eliminates weapons limited by the treaty, or close down facilities that had once housed these items. Designed to reduce ambiguities and minimize the opportunities for dispute,

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10 The Soviet Union suggested that a 15 percent change in throwweight would be enough to distinguish a new type of missile, while the United States wanted a throwweight change of 30 percent and a change in one other missile characteristic. They eventually agreed to essentially split their differences and defined a new type of missile as one with a 21 percent change in throwweight and at least a 5 percent change in the length of the first stage. This would mean that new types of missiles would have to be significantly different from existing types.
these details provide the foundation for the treaty’s verification regime by drawing sharp distinctions between permitted and prohibited forces and activities.

**Monitoring and Verification**

Verification is the process that one country uses to assess whether another country is complying with an arms control agreement. To verify compliance, a country must determine whether the forces and activities of another country are within the bounds established by the limits and obligations set forth in the agreement. Treaty language forms the core of the verification regime: it describes the limits and obligations the countries must observe and allows them to identify the forces and activities that comply with the terms of the treaty. The identification of compliant activities also helps a country focus on what it should look for when it collects information about the other country’s forces and activities. No verification regime can ensure the detection of all violations, but the START regime is designed to ensure that parties would have a high probability of detecting militarily significant violations.

The parties to a treaty use a wide variety of means to collect information on (or monitor) the forces and activities of the other parties. Some of these monitoring systems, such as overhead satellites, operate outside the territories of the treaty parties. But the parties can also cooperate in providing information by exchanging data, displaying treaty-limited items, and allowing onsite inspections. Once they have collected this information, the parties analyze and refine the raw data to help develop a meaningful picture of each other’s forces and activities. They then evaluate the results of the monitoring process, compare the observed forces and activities with the expected forces and activities, and determine whether the other party has complied with its obligations under the terms of the treaty.

To verify compliance with START, each side monitors the numbers and locations of ballistic missiles, launchers, and heavy bombers deployed by the other country. To achieve this goal, the countries have had to:

- Establish the number and location of deployed and stored ballistic missiles and deployed bombers when the treaty entered into force
- Confirm the technical characteristics of existing types of weapons and establish the measurements for new types of weapons
- Add the number of ballistic missiles and heavy bombers deployed after the treaty entered into force
- Subtract the number of ballistic missiles and heavy bombers eliminated, according to treaty rules, during the life of the treaty
- Track treaty-limited items when they move between declared facilities
- Monitor the armaments on permitted systems, to confirm that missiles and bombers are deployed with the numbers and types of warheads permitted by the START database
- Monitor ballistic missile flight tests to determine the characteristics of different types of ballistic missiles.
START contains a complex verification regime that is designed to allow the parties to achieve these objectives. Both sides use their own satellites and remote sensing equipment—their National Technical Means of Verification (NTM)—to gather the vast majority of the information each needs to monitor the other country’s forces and activities and to determine whether the other country has complied with the limits in START. But the treaty also contains a number of specific verification provisions that are designed to help the parties gather and confirm the needed information. For example, it bans measures that would interfere with the parties’ ability to collect information with their NTM, and requires that they use data exchanges, notifications, and onsite inspections to gather information about forces and activities limited by the treaty. These measures do not replace monitoring with NTM, but they can add detail to information collected by NTM, enhance a country’s confidence in the meaning and reliability of the information, and help deter violations. The treaty also established the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), where the parties meet to discuss treaty implementation issues and compliance questions.

**Access Measures.** START contains several verification measures that allow the countries’ NTM to gain access to information about the other country’s treaty-limited forces. These measures include a ban on interference with NTM—for example, the parties cannot interfere with the launch or operation of the other side’s satellites—and a requirement that they broadcast telemetry (the technical data generated during missile flight tests) over open channels. START also bans efforts to conceal forces and activities from NTM and mandates that the parties display treaty-limited items under certain circumstances, so that NTM can confirm their locations and some characteristics.

The ban on data denial during missile flight tests was a particularly important feature of START for the United States. Each nation transmits data, known as telemetry, during its flight tests of ballistic missiles. Even before START came into effect, each nation monitored the other’s missile flight tests to gain information about characteristics such as missile throwweight, launch weight, and the number of reentry vehicle releases tested during the flight. The nations could deny each other access to this data by encrypting it and transmitting it in coded form, recording it during the flight and storing it aboard the missile for recovery after the test, or by jamming and otherwise interfering with the other side’s receiving instruments. Because the United States believed that this information would be critical to its efforts to monitor Soviet compliance with START, it insisted that the treaty contain a complete ban on the denial of data generated during flight tests. Not only must the parties broadcast unencrypted data during the tests, they also agreed to exchange the tapes of data recorded during the flight tests.

**Information Exchanges.** START mandates that the parties exchange detailed information about the numbers, locations, and characteristics of treaty-limited ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. For the most part, this information confirms data that each country collects with its own NTM. It can provide additional details and help the countries interpret ambiguous or incomplete data. The countries have also had to notify each other when they move ballistic missiles or bombers that are limited by the treaty.
fications help each country monitor the locations of the other side’s permitted systems and detect the possible presence of excess or illegal systems.

Onsite Inspections. Under START, the United States and Russia have conducted several different types of onsite inspections. They use these inspections to collect information about permitted systems and activities at declared facilities, but they are not permitted to go “anywhere, anytime” in search of treaty violations. These inspections may not provide much new information that is needed to verify compliance with the treaty, but they can confirm and add detail to information collected by NTM and data exchanges. Further, with the short notice available before many of these inspections, a country would find it difficult to hide evidence of a violation at a declared facility.

START has permitted inspections at all the declared facilities that produce, house, and support ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. The countries use these inspections to confirm information about the number of systems located at each facility. They have also viewed treaty-limited items to confirm information about their characteristics. For example, they can use short-notice inspections to confirm that the number of warheads on a missile does not exceed the number attributed to that type of missile in the database. Each country has also established permanent monitoring systems around a final assembly facility for one of the other country’s mobile ICBMs to help them count mobile ICBMs as they are deployed.

Each of the inspections permitted by START is governed by complex and detailed procedures that address everything about the inspection process. These procedures outline (among other things) the airports the inspectors can use when they arrive in the country, the amount of notice they need to give before the start of an inspection, the amount of time the host country has to transport the inspectors to the selected site, the types of equipment the inspectors can use, the amount of time that can transpire during the inspection, and the procedures the inspectors and hosts would use to resolve questions that came up during the visit. These procedures and rules are designed to outline the rights and responsibilities of both parties, and minimize any potential conflict that might occur during inspections, but they also can create conflicts of their own if questions about procedures come up during the process. Most analysts agree, however, that the START inspection process has had few significant problems over the years.

Synergy in Monitoring and Verification. Each verification provision in START is designed to provide the parties with a distinct source of information about the forces and activities of the other side. They also mesh together in a way that is designed to deter violations and increase confidence in the parties’ compliance with the treaty. For example, much of the data collected during onsite inspections can also be collected by NTM or shared during data exchanges. The inspections essentially confirm expected information. Nevertheless, this redundancy can detect inconsistencies and thereby complicate efforts to conceal information and evade treaty limits. For example, if one party did not notify the other before it moved a treaty-limited item to a different facility, but the other party’s NTM detected the movement, the inconsistency might raise questions about whether the first party was trying to hide or conceal an item limited by
the treaty. Over time, the START regime has also allowed the parties to collect information that may not be central to the goals of the treaty but could still add to their understanding of the forces and operations of the other side. Many of the treaty’s supporters argue that this adds confidence and predictability to assessments of the other side’s strategic forces.

**START Implementation**

In September 1990, before START entered into force, the United States had more than 10,500 accountable warheads deployed on nearly 2,250 delivery vehicles. By mid-2008, this number had declined to 5,941 accountable warheads on 1,214 delivery vehicles. Soviet forces had declined from more than 10,000 accountable warheads on 2,500 delivery vehicles in September 1990 to 4,138 accountable warheads on 839 delivery vehicles in mid-2008. All the nuclear warheads from the SS-18 ICBMs and heavy bombers in Kazakhstan had been returned to Russia by May 1995. All Soviet-era nuclear weapons had been removed from Ukraine’s territory by June 1996, and all eighty-one SS-25 mobile ICBMs had been moved from Belarus to Russia by late November 1996. Ukraine has eliminated all the ICBM silos and heavy bombers that were deployed on its territory. All the parties have also participated in the onsite inspections permitted under the treaty. They continue to meet, twice each year, in the JCIC. While both the United States and Russia have raised some questions about compliance with the treaty, both agree that there have been few significant compliance disputes.

**The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty**

In 2001, during its first year in office, the second Bush Administration conducted a Nuclear Posture Review to evaluate the size, structure, and role of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. As a part of that review, the administration determined that the United States could reduce its strategic forces to between 1,700 and 2,000 “operationally deployed nuclear warheads.” During a summit meeting with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin in November 2001, President George W. Bush announced that the United States would pursue these reductions unilaterally in the next decade, without signing a formal arms control agreement. President Putin indicated that Russia wanted to use the formal arms control process to achieve deeper reductions in nuclear arsenals, and emphasized that the two sides should focus on “reaching a reliable and verifiable agreement.”

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13 The text of this treaty can be found at U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Treaties and Agreements section; available at www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/10527.htm.

Within the Bush Administration, Secretary of State Colin Powell supported the conclusion of a “legally binding” arms control agreement. He apparently prevailed over the objections of officials in the Pentagon, who reportedly wanted the United States to maintain the flexibility to size and structure its nuclear forces in response to its own needs. Consequently, the United States and Russia signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (also known as the Moscow Treaty) on 24 May 2002. It received the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate on 6 March 2003 and the approval of the Russian Parliament on 14 May 2003; it entered into force on 1 June 2003.

The Moscow Treaty states that the United States and Russia will reduce their “strategic nuclear warheads” to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by 31 December 2012. The text does not define “strategic nuclear warheads” and, therefore, does not indicate whether the parties will count only those warheads that are “operationally deployed,” all warheads that would count under the START counting rules, or some other quantity. The text does refer to statements made by Presidents Bush and Putin in November and December 2001, when each outlined their own reduction plans. As a result, the United States and Russia each use their own definition when counting strategic nuclear warheads, and neither uses the START counting rules. The Moscow Treaty does not limit delivery vehicles or impose a sublimit on specific types of weapons systems. Each party shall determine its own “composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms.” In addition, the treaty does not contain any definitions or descriptions of the types of missiles and bombers whose warheads count under the treaty limits. In addition, the treaty does not contain any monitoring or verification provisions.

During the hearings on the resolution of ratification, the Bush Administration noted that the United States and Russia already collect information about strategic nuclear forces under the START limits as well as through the implementation of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. At the time, some in Congress questioned whether this information would be sufficient for the duration of the Moscow Treaty, since START expires three years ahead of the later treaty. This discontinuity is one of the primary reasons why many analysts and members of Congress believe the two sides should at least extend the monitoring and verification provisions in START through the end of the Moscow Treaty.

Preparing for START Expiration

U.S.-Russian Discussions

In September 2006, U.S. Undersecretary of State Robert Joseph and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak met to initiate a new strategic security dialogue. This

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17 For details, see U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, Testimony of Secretary of State Colin Powell, 9 July 2002.
dialogue evolved into a series of meetings that addressed a range of issues; START was included, but was not high on the agenda of the meetings. During the first meeting, and at a second one in December 2006, the two sides outlined their goals for the talks. Russia indicated that it wanted to follow START with a new formal treaty that would be “similar in size and complexity to START” and would use many of the same definitions and counting rules as START. Russia also suggested that the two sides establish a regular working group, with meetings chaired at the Assistant Secretary level, to work out the details of this new treaty. According to a Bush Administration official, the United States had “no appetite for those big, giant documents that try to script every single element of strategic forces.”

The Bush Administration emphasized that the United States and Russia no longer needed arms control agreements to manage their strategic relationship. The United States also did not want to set up a working group or negotiate a new treaty to follow START, and preferred to pursue broader “strategic discussions” within a political framework.

In spite of their differences, the United States and Russia agreed that they should continue to implement some of the monitoring and verification provisions in START after the treaty expired. Russia proposed that they include these verification provisions in a new, legally binding treaty that would also limit the number of warheads permitted on each side. According to one Russian official, these measures would have to be a part of a legally binding agreement to be permitted by domestic Russian law. The United States, however, argued for a less formal arrangement of transparency and confidence-building measures. These could include voluntary notifications and site visits, but would not contain the detailed procedures and provisions included in START.

Although Undersecretary of State Joseph initially rejected the idea, the two sides did hold a series of meetings chaired at the Assistant Secretary level to pursue a possible monitoring and verification agreement. They continued to disagree, however, on whether the verification measures should be voluntary or legally binding, and whether they should be attached to a formal treaty that would also limit the numbers of deployed warheads.

In addition to the periodic meetings at the Undersecretary level (Joseph/Kislyak, then Rood/Kislyak) and the working group meetings at the Assistant Secretary level, the United States and Russia held several high-level meetings that addressed the future of U.S.-Russian arms control. For example, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in July 2007. Their formal statement after the meeting stated that “the United States and Russia reiterate their intention to

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21 Kralev, “Russia, U.S. to Discuss START.”
carry out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible level consistent with their national security requirements and alliance commitments.” It added that the “ministers discussed development of a post-START arrangement to provide continuity and predictability regarding strategic offensive forces.” But the United States still did not accept Russia’s proposal to pursue a formal treaty.

The U.S. position began to shift later in 2007. Secretary Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates held joint meetings in Moscow with their counterparts in October, and concluded that, although the United States was still seeking something “far less formal than a major treaty,” it might accept, according to Secretary Gates, “a binding agreement” preserving some of START, as long as it was “narrowly focused.” Nevertheless, the United States continued to reject a formal treaty that would limit the number of nuclear weapons. When Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice traveled to Moscow to discuss START again in March 2008, Secretary Rice argued that the current U.S.-Russian relationship does not require “the kind of highly articulated, expensive limitations and verification procedures that attended the strategic arms relationship with the Soviet Union.” Russian officials, however, continued to reject the U.S. proposals for an “informal notification” regime.

Presidents Bush and Putin failed to break this stalemate when they met in Sochi, Russia in April 2008. Although they signed a new Strategic Framework that contained a pledge to enact nuclear weapons reductions “to the lowest possible level consistent with our national security requirements and alliance commitments,” they failed to agree on a way forward in their arms control relationship. Russia still wanted to negotiate a treaty based on the START framework, while the United States was only willing to codify some verification measures.

The talks continued through the spring and summer of 2008, although according to some news reports they were “irregular and unproductive.” Some reports suggested that the United States might suspend the talks in response to the Russian incursion into Georgia in August 2008, but both sides agreed the talks were important enough to continue in September and October. Nevertheless, the two sides remained far apart. Russia was unwilling to recede from its call for a formal treaty with detailed definitions and counting rules, while the United States still preferred a less formal agreement that

24 Wade Boese, “U.S., Russia at Odds on Key Arms Issues,” Arms Control Today (April 2008).
26 Wade Boese, “Russia Wants Limits on Prompt Global Strike,” Arms Control Today (June 2008).
called for transparency and confidence-building measures. The United States did, how-
ever, recognize that Russia would not permit onsite visits without a formal treaty, so
Washington proposed in October 2008 that the two sides attach an informal transpar-
ency regime to a legally binding treaty that essentially reiterated the limits and declara-
tions outlined in the Moscow Treaty. Russia rejected this proposal. In a speech deliv-
ered on 10 October 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that Russia at-
taches “exceptional importance to concluding a new, legally binding Russian-American
agreement on nuclear disarmament” to replace START. He further noted that “what we
need is a treaty and not a declaration,” which is a reference to the format used in the
Moscow Treaty.  

The United States and Russia—along with representatives from Ukraine, Belarus,
and Kazakhstan—met in the JCIC from 13–21 November 2008. This forum provided
the venue for the formal meeting, mandated by START, where the parties considered
whether to extend the Treaty. They did not reach any agreements during this meeting,
other than to note that they were leaving the options open for the incoming Obama
Administration. The United States and Russia held one final meeting in their series of
strategic security discussions on 15 December 2008, where bilateral arms control was
one of many issues on the agenda. They held extensive discussions about the U.S.
draft treaty, but they failed to reach agreement on any of the outstanding issues.
Neither the United States nor Russia believes the two parties should extend the
START agreement. Neither wants to continue to implement all the monitoring and
verification provisions included in START; the lengthy and highly detailed lists of
procedures and requirements have proven costly and complicated. In some cases, these
details were designed to address concerns about the potential for cheating and evasion
that no longer exist in the current environment. Moreover, as is noted below, some of
the limits and restrictions have begun to interfere with ongoing weapons programs for
both nations. A simple extension of START would not reduce these pressures and,
unless the parties could agree on a new treaty, could remain in force for five years.

**Russian Proposals for Revision**

In a speech to Russian diplomats in June 2006, then-President Vladimir Putin proposed
that the United States and Russia begin negotiations to replace START with a new
treaty. Since then, Russia has consistently and repeatedly insisted that the two sides
replace START with a treaty that would not only reduce each side’s strategic offensive

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29 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, “Fact
Sheet: Statement by the United States Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection
30 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Media Note: Acting Under Secretary
for Arms Control and International Security John C. Rood to Travel to Moscow for Bilateral
forces to 1,500 warheads, but also would count the warheads on all deployed delivery vehicles, as START has done. Such an agreement would maintain the predictability and the stability afforded by START, an outcome that would not be possible in the absence of a detailed, legally binding treaty. The new treaty would not need to keep all the provisions of START, but should preserve “the main systematic structure of the agreement,” including limitations on delivery vehicles and warhead deployments.

Reports indicate that Russia would like the new treaty to relax START’s requirements for new types of ballistic missiles. As was noted above, START contains a precise definition of the changes needed to have a new missile counted as a “new type.” These provisions were designed to prevent Russia from deploying its SS-25 missile with more than one warhead. But Russia has developed the RS-24 missile, a new variant of its single-warhead SS-27 missile, which is itself a variant of the SS-25, and it plans to deploy this new system with three warheads on each missile. Because the missile does not satisfy the treaty’s “new types” definition, it would be limited to a single warhead under START, and a three-warhead version would violate the treaty. This missile had its third successful test launch in late November 2008, and recent press reports indicate that Russia now plans to deploy this missile in December 2009, as soon as START expires. Russian officials have indicated that this missile is critical to the future of Russia’s strategic forces, not only because it can carry up to three warheads, but also because it will incorporate technologies that would allow it to penetrate U.S. ballistic missile defenses.

According to some reports, Russia would also like the new treaty to ease some of the restrictions that START imposes on mobile ICBMs. Although these restrictions were intended to apply to both parties, the United States has never been affected by them because it never deployed mobile ICBMs. These provisions—including limits on the size of deployment areas, notifications about exercises, and the rights to special on-site inspections after the missiles have dispersed for exercises—were designed to complicate any effort to hide extra missiles within the legal deployments of mobile ICBMs.

36 “Russia to Deploy Missile to Counter U.S. Missile Shield Next Year,” London Daily Telegraph (29 November 2008).
But they also impinge on the operations of the permitted missiles and add to the costs of operating the systems.\textsuperscript{38}

Over the years, Russia has also expressed concerns about the U.S. ability to add warheads to its missiles quickly by restoring warheads that had been removed under START’s downloading provisions. It may insist that a new treaty require the United States to replace the platform on all downloaded missiles, instead of just those that have had more than two warheads removed.\textsuperscript{39}

Russia would like to retain some of START’s monitoring and verification provisions, although it would like to make them less costly and cumbersome. For example, the two sides could reduce the numbers of short-notice inspections permitted each year, and replace these inspections with less formal “visits.” The parties could also reduce the number of mandatory notifications, which were intended to help each side monitor the numbers and locations of treaty-limited items, and replace them with routine, periodic data exchanges.\textsuperscript{40}

\textbf{U.S. Proposals for Revisions}

When U.S. and Russian talks on the future of START began in 2006, the United States expected START to expire and the parties to pursue their own priorities for modernizing and modifying their nuclear forces. However, the participants in the U.S. government were divided on the question of whether to extend START’s monitoring provisions. According to some reports, U.S. officials believed the two sides should evaluate whether they even needed to continue to implement these provisions because, even without START, the amount of military cooperation and transparency between them had increased over the years.\textsuperscript{41} They further argued that the inspections regime had become too costly and cumbersome for the United States and could interfere with military operations, without providing certain knowledge about Russia’s nuclear forces. Moreover, in the new security environment, the United States no longer needs detailed information about Russian forces; it just needs to understand the general trends and pending changes in force size and structure. Therefore, according to this argument, the two sides need at most an informal system with less structured visits and looser inspections.

Others argued that the START regime provides valuable information about Russian forces that is not available elsewhere, while also helping to build confidence and coop-

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
eration between the two sides. Furthermore, reports indicate that officials in the U.S. intelligence community have argued that, without START’s cooperative monitoring provisions, it will not be able to assess with any degree of confidence Russia’s compliance with the limits in the Moscow Treaty.

While the United States has not identified any of the central limits in START that impinge on its current plans and programs, some officials have expressed concerns that an extension of these provisions (or their inclusion in a new treaty) could affect future plans, such as the possible deployment of conventional warheads on ballistic missiles and the potential deployment of these conventional missiles at sites that are not listed in the treaty. This concern has emerged as a major roadblock in the recent U.S.-Russian discussions about what type of treaty should follow START. Russia has insisted that the new treaty count the warheads that could be deployed on all strategic delivery vehicles, as START did, in part to capture the warheads that could be carried on missiles converted to carry conventional weapons. It wants to count these warheads to limit the United States’ ability to break out of the treaty by converting the missiles back to nuclear warheads. The United States, however, does not want the warheads that could be carried on these missiles to count under the treaty because it does not want any limits on conventional warheads or any forced trade-offs between numbers of nuclear and conventional warheads.

U.S. officials have also expressed concerns about some of START’s monitoring and verification provisions. For example, the U.S. Navy has indicated that Russian requests for re-entry vehicle inspections on U.S. ballistic missile submarines can interfere with the scheduled maintenance and operations of the submarines, because the navy must bring the submarine into port and the missile into a handling facility on the base. The treaty’s limits on the number of warheads that can be removed (or downloaded) from Trident submarines might also interfere with the navy’s deployment plans for the future, particularly if the United States chooses to remove more warheads from Trident missiles as it continues to reduce the overall number of strategic warheads in its arsenal.

Some in the U.S. government have also argued that START’s provisions requiring the exchange of telemetry data during flight tests of ballistic missiles will interfere with

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46 “Russia Concerned by U.S. Position on START, Deputy Foreign Minister Says,” Interfax News Agency (19 December 2008).
U.S. military plans and programs.\textsuperscript{47} In particular, the United States uses retired Minuteman II ICBMs as target vehicles during tests of its missile defense capabilities. Because these missiles are still limited by the START provisions, the United States must provide Russia with all the telemetry generated during these flights. Yet the data from these tests may reveal information not only about the Minuteman II ICBMs but also about the goals of the flight test and the characteristics of the missile defense interceptors. This concern has been a key issue in discussions about whether (and how) the United States and Russia should extend some of START’s monitoring provisions.

The Bush Administration eventually proposed that the two sides replace START with a short, legally binding treaty similar to the Moscow Treaty and a longer, non-binding appendix on transparency and cooperation. This transparency regime would be far less detailed and complex than START. It would allow for informal visits, without the detailed plans and notifications required by START, and probably would relax the telemetry provisions, or at least exempt Minuteman II flights during missile defense tests from the requirement to broadcast and exchange telemetry. Moreover, as is noted above, the legally binding portion of the U.S. proposal would not contain any of the detailed definitions and counting rules of START; the parties would declare their numbers of deployed warheads, as they do under the Moscow Treaty.

\textit{Options for the Future}

Many expect the Obama Administration to review the U.S. position on the future of START and the U.S.-Russian arms control process. In response to questions posed by the Arms Control Association, then-candidate Barack Obama stated that he would “seek Russia’s agreement to extend essential monitoring and verification provisions of START before it expires.” He also said that he would seek “real, verifiable reductions in all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons—whether deployed or no deployed, whether strategic or nonstrategic….”\textsuperscript{48} His transition team has since reaffirmed these goals. While this statement does not specify whether the new U.S. president will support an extension of START or its replacement with another agreement, it indicates that he is more open to completing formal agreements with Russia in general, and to negotiating further reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.

The United States and Russia have two distinct issues to consider when they contemplate the future of their arms control relationship. First, what, if anything, should they do within the next year to extend or replace START? And, second, should they seek to negotiate a new treaty to replace the Moscow Treaty before it expires in 2012? Moreover, should the provisions in a new treaty focus on transparency and confidence-building measures, or should the two nations also seek to implement deeper reductions in their strategic offensive forces?

It is unlikely that the United States and Russia will be able to negotiate and ratify a new treaty before the end of 2009, even though both sides have said they want to do so.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.

The Obama Administration has to name the senior State Department and Defense Department officials who will be responsible for crafting U.S. policy on arms control and nuclear weapons, developing its negotiating positions for a future arms control treaty, and negotiating and reaching agreement on a wide range of issues with Russia. Both sides must present any prospective treaty to their legislatures for approval. Moreover, during its first year in office, the Obama Administration must conduct a Nuclear Posture Review, which could recommend changes in both U.S. nuclear weapons policy and the U.S. force structure.\(^49\) These changes could affect U.S. arms control proposals, but the study will not be completed until early 2010.

The United States and Russia could choose from a number of options for the future of their arms control relationship. They could allow START to lapse, or they could extend START for five years. They could negotiate a new treaty, or they could pursue less formal arrangements to manage their nuclear forces. A new treaty could include further reductions in nuclear weapons, or it could simply establish a transparency regime that called for continued cooperation in monitoring without further reductions in deployed weapons. In their discussions thus far, the United States and Russia have agreed they do not want to extend START, but they have been unable to agree on what kind of arrangement will follow START, in part because they do not agree on the goals they seek to achieve in their discussions. Hence, the remainder of this article will review some of the possible goals for the future of the U.S.-Russian arms control relationship before it reviews the range of options.

**Possible Goals**

**Improving the U.S.–Russian Relationship**

Many of the public discussions about the future of the U.S.-Russian arms control process focus on whether arms control can help the United States and Russia improve the tenor of their broader political relationship. As was noted at the beginning of this essay, many observers (including some who served in the Bush Administration) believe that the U.S.-Russian relationship has evolved to the point where the parties no longer need arms control as a symbol of their cooperation on resolving common security issues. Others, however—including some members of the U.S. Congress—believe that START and the arms control process still represent “the foundation of the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship” and a “key basis for trust between the two sides.”\(^50\)

**Supporting Nuclear Nonproliferation Goals.** During the past few years, the public debate over arms control and nuclear weapons has increasingly focused on the role that the U.S.-Russian arms control process can play in furthering broader international nuclear nonproliferation goals. For example, many analysts have argued that a U.S.-Russian agreement to either extend or replace START can demonstrate their commitment

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to their arms reduction obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and can therefore help strengthen the nonproliferation regime in general, and help ensure a successful outcome at the 2010 review conference of the NPT.\textsuperscript{51} Others, however, argue that the nations that are currently seeking nuclear weapons would not be swayed in their decisions by any steps taken by the United States or Russia, as their nuclear programs derive from their own political and security concerns. Moreover, they note that the United States and Russia have already reduced their Cold War-era nuclear arsenals sharply, without reaping any benefits in their efforts to stem nuclear proliferation.

\textit{Restraining Weapons.} Many analysts in the United States and officials in the Bush Administration have argued that, in the current security environment, the United States and Russia no longer need to worry about all the details related to the size or structure of the other side’s nuclear forces. Rather, they just need to understand the general trends.\textsuperscript{52} Both have reduced their forces in recent years, and neither needs to fear that the other would attack it with its remaining forces. Therefore, this view holds that the two nations no longer need to negotiate formal treaties to establish and maintain balance between their force structures. Moreover, these treaties undermine the flexibility that each nation may need to adjust its forces in response to future threats from emerging adversaries.

Although Russia recognizes that the relationship between the two nations is not as tense as it was during the Cold War, it still sees threats to its security from U.S. policies and programs. Therefore Russia continues to value arms control measures that restrain U.S. forces because these measures provide both stability between the two sides’ forces and predictability for Russia when it considers how U.S. forces may evolve.\textsuperscript{53}

Many analysts in the United States also believe that the stability and predictability offered by arms control agreements are sufficiently valuable to offset any limits the treaties may impose on U.S. flexibility. Some argue that the process of implementing an arms control treaty, with its communication and cooperation provisions, is an important exercise in itself, so that the parties can avoid misunderstandings while they work together to reduce nuclear forces and nuclear dangers. Others, however, emphasize that the actual limits and restrictions in the treaty determine the amount of stability and predictability offered by the treaty just as much as does the cooperation required to

\textsuperscript{52} Jonathan S. Landay, “Dispute Delays Arms Control Talks with Moscow,” \textit{McClatchy Newspapers Washington Bureau} (18 June 2007).
\textsuperscript{53} In a recent interview with the Arms Control Association, Russia’s Ambassador to the United States, Sergey Kislyak (who, as Deputy Foreign Minister, participated in talks on the future of START) stated that “the mutual constraints provided for in START should not be lost because they do provide stability and are one of the important things that also should be preserved and should not be discarded.” See Arms Control Association, “Interview with Sergey Kislyak, Russian Ambassador to the United States,” December 2008; available at www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_12/KislyakInterview.
implement them. They note that the United States and Soviet Union included many of the detailed provisions in START because both nations wanted to restrain and reduce the nuclear forces of the other side in order to reduce the threat from those forces, and both agreed to include detailed monitoring and verification provisions so that they could be more confident about achieving the goal of reducing the threat.

Promoting Transparency and Cooperation. Many have argued that—at least in the near term—the United States and Russia should seek to replace START with a regime that will ensure transparency and build confidence, even if it does not mandate deeper reductions in nuclear weapons.\(^{54}\) This type of agreement will ensure that some form of monitoring and verification provisions remains in place in the gap after START expires and while the Moscow Treaty remains in force. A confidence-building regime can foster cooperation between the two sides even if the data it provides is not needed to verify compliance with an arms control treaty. As one observer has noted, START “forces the United States and Russia to communicate,” and to interact in ways that can build trust between them.\(^{55}\) Therefore, an agreement that allowed the parties to continue with data exchanges, notifications, and some inspections could prove valuable, even if it did not mandate specific future reductions.

Some argue that the United States and Russia can promote transparency and continue their cooperation without signing a formal arms control agreement. They note that the two sides will continue to cooperate on reducing nuclear dangers through the nonproliferation and threat reduction programs that the United States funds to improve security and eliminate weapons in Russia. These efforts can be bolstered by informal visits to weapons deployment areas and storage facilities. Moreover, some have argued that the formal monitoring and verification provisions in START can create tensions and undermine cooperation with their rigid requirements and stringent rules, which do not allow the parties to adapt their activities when conditions change.\(^{56}\)

Scope

Reductions vs. Transparency. Some analysts have argued that START provides the United States and Russia with a framework they could use to move quickly to negotiate a comprehensive agreement that would both reduce forces below the Moscow Treaty limits and outline a wide-ranging monitoring and verification regime.\(^{57}\) This approach would not only satisfy Russia’s preference for pursuing deeper reductions in a subsequent agreement to START in the near term, but would also allow the United States and Russia to demonstrate bold leadership to the international community in the months before the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The two sides may not have time to complete this type of agreement before START expires, but this could still advance the

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\(^{55}\) Pavel Podvig, “Why START Is Important.”

\(^{56}\) Gardner, \textit{et al.}, \textit{Extension of the START Treaty}.

\(^{57}\) Daryl G. Kimball, “START Over,” \textit{Arms Control Today} (June 2007).
arms control agenda by highlighting their commitment to pursue a treaty on deep reductions even if START were to lapse in the near term.

On the other hand, some have argued that a shorter, less detailed document—such as the Moscow Treaty—might be sufficient to foster communication and cooperation. Even without specific definitions and restrictions, such a document can still demonstrate the parties’ intent to reduce nuclear arms. Further, with fewer detailed restrictions, both sides would be able to maintain the flexibility they might need to alter their forces to meet unforeseen changes in the international security environment. Moreover, the negotiations could probably proceed more quickly than those that would seek to produce a lengthy, detailed treaty. The United States and Soviet Union took seven years to negotiate START, but the United States and Russia completed the Moscow Treaty in less than a year.

**Linkages.** The START regime limits only strategic offensive delivery vehicles and the warheads carried by those systems. But the history of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations is full of examples where one side or the other has tried to include limits or restrictions on other types of weapons. Over the years, both countries have sought to include some types of limits on their shorter-range nonstrategic nuclear weapons in arms control agreements; analysts continue to suggest that these limits are both necessary and inevitable in a future agreement. The two sides have also often linked progress in discussions on missile defense programs with progress on limits on strategic offensive nuclear weapons. This linkage was explicit in the 1970s, when the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) produced both the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms. This linkage between offense and defense remains important to Russia, as is evident in its concerns about U.S. plans to deploy missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic.

Several analysts have also suggested that future treaties should limit not only deployed warheads, but also the numbers of warheads that each side retains in its stockpile of reserve warheads. While no arms control treaty has ever sought to reduce either nation’s stockpile of reserve warheads, as the number of deployed warheads declines further, the number of warheads in storage could create an imbalance if either side could return them to deployment quickly. Moreover, reductions in the numbers of stored warheads (and their consolidation in a smaller number of storage facilities) might ease concerns about the possibility that some might be stolen from insecure installations and fall into the hands of terrorist groups.

**Participants.** Although the United States and Soviet Union signed START as a bilateral agreement, it evolved into a multilateral treaty when Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, and

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59 As of this writing, President-elect Obama has indicated that he would seek to include limits on weapons in the stockpile in a future arms control treaty. See Arms Control Association, “2008 Presidential Q&A: Democratic Candidate Barack Obama.”
Kazakhstan succeeded the Soviet Union as parties to the treaty. Each of the four former Soviet states is subject to the limits, restrictions, and monitoring provisions in START, even though Russia is the only one with nuclear weapons left on its territory. Each also has a voice and a vote in the deliberations in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission established by the treaty. If the parties agree to extend START, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan will remain as parties to the treaty unless they agree to amend it to include only the United States and Russia. If the United States and Russia sign a new treaty, these three former Soviet states probably would not be included.60

Analysts have long suggested that, as the United States and Russia reduce their forces to ever lower levels, they may eventually open up the arms control process to other nuclear weapons states. This was rarely an issue during the Cold War, because the United States and Soviet Union each deployed thousands of warheads on their strategic offensive nuclear weapons. France, Great Britain, and China have just a few hundred deployed warheads each.61 Most analysts agree that these other nations should not join the process until the United States and Russia reduce to 1,000 or fewer warheads. Hence, as the United States and Russia decide how (or whether) to advance their bilateral arms control agenda, they may also begin to think about when (or whether) to expand the process to include other nuclear nations.

Potential Paths

*Allow START to Lapse*

The United States and Russia could allow START to lapse at the end of 2009. The Bush Administration initially preferred this option because it did not want to continue the formal U.S.-Russian arms control process at all, but also because it believed that START could lapse without signaling the end of U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation or even the end of formal arms control. As the Bush Administration eventually suggested, the two sides could agree to continue to implement some of the monitoring provisions in START without signing a formal treaty, so that they could both gather the information needed to verify compliance with the Moscow Treaty and maintain the cooperative relationship that had developed during START’s verification process. This path could, however, conflict with Russia’s domestic law, as it would need to be a party to a legally binding treaty before it could allow foreigners to have access to sensitive military

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60 According to an official with the U.S. State Department, Russia “prefers working bilaterally with the United States on nuclear weapons issues and wants to ‘exclude’ Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine from future arrangements.” See Wade Boese, “START Decision Put Off to 2009,” *Arms Control Today* (December 2008).

and nuclear sites. To rectify this problem, the parties might seek to negotiate a separate executive agreement or memorandum of understanding to allow the visits. Alternatively, they could attach the monitoring provisions to a simple treaty document that essentially restated the provisions of the Moscow Treaty, as the Bush Administration suggested.

If the parties allowed START to lapse, and did not have the time to agree on a replacement before December 2009, they could still pursue negotiations on a treaty that would eventually replace both START and the Moscow Treaty. Concerns about the absence of any arms control limits might inspire them to press forward on this task and seek compromises in a short amount of time. Conversely, if the absence of arms control limits did not appear to threaten stability or diminish the level of cooperation between the parties, then the pressure to reach a new agreement might decrease. Hence, this path may be attractive to those who believe that the United States and Russia no longer need formal treaties to manage their relationship, but it may appear too risky to those who believe that the arms control process remains an important part of the relationship.

Extend START

Neither the Bush Administration nor the current Russian leadership want to extend START in its present form, particularly for the full five years allowed under the terms of Article XVII of the treaty. Yet this path may be the only one available if the parties want to retain some of the START monitoring and verification provisions in the near term. They could possibly agree to extend START for a shorter period of time—perhaps two years—while they negotiate a new treaty that would replace START. But this option is not mentioned in the current treaty, so it might need to be handled as an amendment to the treaty, and thus require the approval of both nations’ legislatures. The U.S. Senate might not object to a short-term extension of START, particularly since several senators have already called on the parties to extend the treaty’s monitoring and verification regime, but Russia’s parliament may not be as accepting. The current tensions in the U.S.-Russian relationship—along with ongoing concerns about U.S. plans to deploy missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic—could lead some in Russia to question whether any extension of START, with its limits on Russia’s ability to modernize its forces and deploy multiple warhead ballistic missiles, serves Russia’s interests.

Extend and Amend START

Instead of amending START so that they could extend it for less than the mandated five years, the parties might extend START according to the treaty provisions, which they could do without seeking approval from their legislatures, then try to amend the treaty to adjust the provisions that each finds too restrictive in the current environment. For example, Russia might want to alter the “new types” rule in START, or it might

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seek a waiver from the rule for the RM-24 missile. For its part, the United States might want to alter the provision requiring the exchange of telemetry from missile flight tests, or seek a waiver for retired Minuteman II missiles that are used as missile defense targets. Both sides might want to modify the verification protocol to remove some of the more costly and intrusive requirements, particularly if the parties believe the data they provide is no longer critical to understanding the scope of the other side’s nuclear forces. Consequently, they might be able to craft a package of amendments that would incorporate each side’s highest priorities.

Both the United States and Russia would have to submit this package for approval by their legislatures. Some in the U.S. Senate might object to the changes that relieve Russia of some of its obligations, but a package that addressed both nations’ concerns might still win the approval of the necessary two-thirds majority. The Russian parliament might object to any agreement that extended START without addressing Russia’s concerns about U.S. missile defense plans. However, it might accept an amendment package that addressed some of Russia’s concerns with the provisions in START. In addition, if the United States and Russia extended START for five years before negotiating the amendments, the Russian parliament would have to accept either the unmodified extension or the amendment package.

Replace START

Regardless of whether they allow START to lapse or extend it before December 2009, the United States and Russia could continue negotiations on a new treaty. If they completed the treaty before an extended START expired, the new treaty could replace START, or—if it were similar to the Moscow Treaty, with aggregate limits but no detailed definitions, counting rules, or monitoring provisions—it could run concurrently without substituting for START.

As was noted above, Russia would like the new treaty to be a complete package of further limits on nuclear weapons, detailed definitions and counting rules, and monitoring and verification provisions. The Bush Administration, on the other hand, would have liked the new treaty to essentially replace the Moscow Treaty, with some informal monitoring provisions to offer a measure of transparency and cooperation. A future treaty could take either of these forms, or it could focus solely on monitoring measures by establishing a legally binding framework for transparency and cooperation not linked to the need to verify compliance with restrictions on nuclear forces and activities.

Further Reductions with START Rules

A new treaty could contain START-style definitions and counting rules, along with deeper reductions in the permitted numbers of warheads. This combination of provisions would continue to reduce U.S. and Russian deployed forces and would also provide transparency and predictability for the future. Without the START-style definitions and counting rules, neither side would be able to confirm that the other has complied with the treaty’s reductions, because each will not know what the other side considered to be limited by the treaty.
At the same time, a treaty that required the United States to reduce its forces below the Moscow Treaty limits of 1,700–2,200 warheads but that also used the START counting rules to calculate the number of warheads attributed to deployed delivery vehicles could force the United States to make hard choices and significant changes in the structure of its nuclear forces. Under START, all deployed delivery vehicles count under the treaty’s limits (Russia has proposed that the same be true in a new agreement); the parties then calculated the number of deployed warheads by multiplying the number of deployed delivery vehicles by a set number of warheads listed in the database for that type of delivery vehicle.

The Moscow Treaty, on the other hand, does not assume all delivery vehicles carry deployed warheads, and allows the parties to exclude those that do not. As a result, the United States does not count the launchers or warheads on two of its fourteen Trident submarines, because they are in overhaul and not “deployed.” However, these systems would count under the START rules. It also has removed more than two warheads from some Trident missiles, without changing the front end of the missile. Under the START provisions, these missiles would count as six warheads each. In its declaration under the Moscow Treaty, the United States counts only the aggregate number of actual deployed warheads; it does not even have to specify how many warheads are deployed on any given missile or submarine. Moreover, under the Moscow Treaty, the United States counts only the bomber weapons maintained in the active stockpile at U.S. bomber bases. Under START, each bomber equipped to carry cruise missiles would count as twenty warheads, regardless of available weapons or actual deployments.

These differences produce striking variations in the number of warheads that count under each treaty. In May 2008, the United States declared that it had 2,871 operationally deployed strategic warheads that would count against the Moscow Treaty. At the same time, when it exchanged START data with Russia in July 2008, it stated that it had 5,951 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed Slims, and heavy bombers. Many of these attributed warheads could be eliminated with some accounting changes, but it is clear that under START definitions, the United States would have to count hundreds of warheads that it excludes from the Moscow Treaty total because it does not consider them to be operationally deployed.

To bring its warhead totals down to 1,500 or less while using definitions and counting rules similar to those in START, the United States could seek to deploy each

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64 For example, this total includes 400 warheads attributed to Peacekeeper missiles. These missiles have been deactivated, but the United States did not eliminate the silos according to START rules, so the warheads still count. It also excludes up to 768 warheads that could be deployed on four Trident submarines. The U.S. Navy has converted these submarines to carry non-nuclear cruise missiles, but because it did not remove the launch tubes for the Trident missiles, they still count under START as if each launch tube held one missile and each missile carried either six or eight warheads.
of its remaining Trident missiles with a smaller number of warheads. However, if START rules apply, a reduction of more than two warheads would necessitate the costly replacement of the platform on the post-boost vehicle on each missile. The United States could suggest that the new treaty relax this rule, but Russia may object, as it has been concerned about the U.S. ability to upload its missiles and increase its warheads in a crisis. Russia has long suggested that the parties tighten the downloading rules to minimize this possibility.

As an alternative, the United States could reduce its total warheads by eliminating some of its deployed launchers (bombers, ICBMs, or Slings), or even removing one leg of its “strategic triad” from the nuclear force. However, the United States probably would not want to reduce the number of B-52 and B-2 bombers, as these aircraft also fly conventional missions in ongoing conflicts, so it might have to remove them from the nuclear force altogether. It also might be difficult to reduce the Minuteman fleet of ICBMs below the current number of 450 without also reducing the number of bases and cutting into the number of personnel trained to operate the system. Furthermore, as the number of deployed platforms drops, it may be difficult to justify the costs associated with retaining the smaller force.

Most experts agree that the Trident submarines are going to be the mainstay of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the future. But, unless the United States cuts deeply into the other “legs” of its strategic triad, deep reductions in total warheads may require reductions in the number of Trident submarines. If the United States were to reduce its Trident fleet to ten or fewer submarines, it might not be able to operate out of two bases, as it does now, and retain submarines in both oceans on patrol in the areas from where they would fire their missiles. Changes in this deployment pattern might require changes in the missions and targets of the submarine fleet. The president and the U.S. military would probably want to consider the implications of these basing and operational changes before deciding whether to accept arms control limits that produce such changes.

Hence, if the United States agrees to replace START with a new treaty that reduces warheads below the levels in the Moscow Treaty but retains many of the definitions and counting rules of START, it will have to make difficult choices about how to structure and operate its nuclear force. These decisions are not likely to come easily or quickly, and could delay both the start and the finish of negotiations on a new treaty.

**Further Reductions without START Rules**

The complexities detailed above demonstrate why the Bush Administration was unwilling to follow START with a similar, detailed document. Even those in the administration who believe that the U.S.-Russian arms control process should continue argue that the two sides should pursue a treaty that does not contain the same level of detail that existed in START. For example, during a speech before the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in October 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said, “I am not sure that agreements that are the size of a telephone book and take years to negotiate are in the interest of either party.” He went on to say, “I believe we should go for another agreement with Russia. I believe it could involve further cuts in the number of
warheads. I believe we do need the verification provisions. But I think it ought to be an agreement that is shorter, simpler, and easier to adjust to real-world conditions than most of the arms control agreements I’ve seen over the last forty years.”

A shorter, less detailed treaty may not, however, provide the level of transparency or predictability sought by many analysts. Under the Moscow Treaty (which is short and contains few details) neither the United States nor Russia has to offer any transparent view into the structure of its nuclear forces. Each simply has to declare how many warheads it has deployed on its operational forces. Further, because the treaty includes no timelines for the reduction process, and no definitions of the items limited by the treaty, neither side can predict with confidence the process or outcome of the other side’s reductions. As a result, some argue that, while the shorter negotiations may seem preferable, a shorter treaty with fewer details would not necessarily serve the goals of an arms control process that seeks to strengthen the relationship between the United States and Russia or to reduce the perceived threats from their nuclear weapons.

**Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures**

Some members of Congress and analysts outside government have called on the United States and Russia to extend the monitoring regime in START, even if they cannot reach agreement on further reductions in nuclear forces. In a “Dear Colleague” letter circulated in July 2007, Representative Ellen Tauscher, Chair of the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, noted the “transparency required by the START verification regime has bred confidence in both Russia and the U.S. enabling cooperation on a range of nuclear arms issues.”

An agreement that established a transparency regime without imposing any further reductions in nuclear weapons could allow the United States and Russia to sustain their confidence in their knowledge of each other’s nuclear deployments. The START regime’s extensive exchanges of data about the characteristics of each party’s weapons systems provide both nations with significant amounts of information that would not have been available otherwise, or would have been extremely difficult to acquire. The parties can be confident in the accuracy of this data because they have the opportunity to visit the sites and view the weapons themselves. Moreover, START required each party to notify the other when they changed the numbers or locations of strategic systems. Even if the parties have not agreed to limit or reduce their nuclear weapons, they could continue to house their weapons at agreed sites, provide data about their characteristics and capabilities, and provide notifications when they moved them.

Some have also argued that by continuing to cooperate in monitoring the locations and characteristics of deployed nuclear weapons, the United States and Russia would

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66 Representative Ellen Tauscher, “Call on the President to Extend the Most Significant Remaining Arms Control Agreement of Our Time,” July 2007.
be better positioned to monitor compliance with the Moscow Treaty. The notifications and data exchanges would continue to inform them about the numbers and locations of missiles and bombers, while onsite visits would give them an opportunity to count the warheads deployed on at least some missiles. These inspections would not, however, provide the parties with an opportunity to calculate all the warheads that would count under the Moscow Treaty. Because START inspections were designed to confirm that the number of warheads deployed on a particular missile did not exceed the number specified in the database, they do not provide a way to count the total number of warheads deployed within the entire force. However, by confirming that the deployed warhead number did not exceed the number in the database, the inspections could provide the parties with some confidence in the number of warheads they might then use in their calculations of deployed warheads across the force.

Choosing a Path

Although President-elect Obama has stated that he would like the United States and Russia to negotiate deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals, the two nations still may not be on the same page in their views of their arms control relationship. They still have to decide what (if anything) to do about START before it expires, and what (if any) type of treaty they should negotiate to replace START in the longer term. They may agree that such a treaty should contain more details than were included in the Moscow Treaty, but they will still have to decide which of START’s counting rules and definitions will continue to apply, whether the new treaty would ease or tighten the rules governing the downloading of missiles and the deployment of new types of missiles, and which of the treaty’s monitoring and verification provisions they would continue to implement. Moreover, they would have to decide whether to include only deployed warheads, or all deployed and reserve warheads, and whether to link reductions in strategic weapons to other issues, like nonstrategic nuclear weapons or missile defense.67

Because each side would like some of START to continue and some of it to end, both may find it difficult to reach an agreement on the substance of a new treaty that matches their priorities. On the other hand, if they balance and offset their differing preferences and priorities, they may be able to craft a compromise that provides them with more transparency and predictability than the Moscow Treaty, but less precision than the START agreement.

67 For a detailed proposal that addresses these issues, see Arbatov and Gottemoeller, “New Presidents, New Agreements? Advancing U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Control.”
GAO Report on NATO Enlargement: Albania and Croatia *

Joseph A. Christoff, et al.

Background: NATO Enlargement

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April 1949 by twelve European and North American countries to provide collective defense against the emerging threat that the Soviet Union posed to the democracies of Western Europe. Since its inception, the Alliance’s key objective has been to achieve a lasting peace in the North Atlantic area that is based on the common values of democracy, the rule of law, and individual liberty. Article 10 of the treaty permits the accession of additional European states if they are in a position to further the treaty’s principles and contribute to North Atlantic security. While members must unanimously agree to any new country’s accession, the treaty contains no explicit criteria that a country must meet to join the Alliance. NATO’s invitations to countries to join the Alliance are political decisions based on the unanimous agreement of members.

At the 1999 summit meeting in Washington, D.C., NATO promulgated, among other things, the Membership Action Plan, to provide guidance and counseling to other NATO aspirants to facilitate their preparations for possible membership. The plan sets forth defense, budgetary, information security, legal, political, and economic goals for countries to work toward in order to enhance their readiness for membership. Essentially, NATO wants countries that are seeking to join the Alliance to:

- Be democracies that are based on the rule of law
- Have harmonious relations with neighboring countries and settle international disputes peacefully
- Provide and protect civil liberties, human rights, and minority rights
- Have an open market economy.

In addition, NATO wants countries to modernize and restructure their defense capabilities to be interoperable with NATO and therefore be able to contribute to NATO operations. To reach that goal, NATO would like countries to spend at least the equivalent of 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defense development. Countries also need to implement NATO requirements for handling and securing NATO classified information and to be free from legal barriers that would prevent a country from deploying forces abroad or hosting foreign troops on their territory. Each

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* This report was presented to the relevant committees in the U.S. Congress by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) in September 2008. It was also presented to the Secretaries of State and Defense. Key staff in the GAO’s International Affairs and Trade section who contributed to this report include Joseph A. Christoff, Jeffrey D. Phillips, M. Elizabeth Guran, Gezahagne Bekele, Lynn A. Cothern, Martin H. De Alteriis, Ernie E. Jackson, and Berel Spivack. The full text of the original report is available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081165r.pdf.
country participating in the Membership Action Plan develops an annual plan of actions that it will pursue to achieve those goals. NATO reviews the plans and monitors aspirant member states’ progress in implementing them, providing annual feedback to each country.

Since its inception, NATO has enlarged its membership five times as changing political and strategic circumstances have warranted. The first three occasions were linked to confrontation with the Communist bloc, particularly the Soviet Union, and were the result of pressing strategic and security needs. Turkey and Greece joined NATO in 1952 for strategic reasons, permitting NATO to shore up its southern flank to forestall Communist military action in Europe at the height of the Korean War. West Germany joined the Alliance in 1955 after agreeing to maintain extensive NATO forces on its territory and to place its national army within NATO’s integrated command structure. With Spain’s accession to membership in 1982, NATO gained better access to Spain’s air and naval bases, while the newly democratized nation improved its chances of joining the European Economic Community.

A significantly different strategic environment marked the fourth and fifth rounds of enlargement. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO’s goal was to extend stability eastward. In 1994, NATO committed to enlarging its membership to include the newly democratic states of the former Communist bloc. As a result, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined the Alliance in 1999. At its summit meeting in November 2002 in Prague, NATO invited seven additional countries to join as part of the fifth round of enlargement. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia became members in March 2004. On 2 April 2008, Albania and Croatia were invited to begin accession talks with NATO, marking the start of the sixth round of enlargement. Figure 1 shows the two new invited countries and the current European members of NATO.

Reports to Congress on New NATO Members

The admission of new members to NATO requires ratification by two-thirds of the United States Senate. To ensure that Congress had sufficient information on the countries invited to join NATO, the Senate mandated in a 1999 resolution that the president provide Congress with information on countries seeking to join the Alliance before NATO made any decision on enlarging its membership. In particular, the president was required to assess how countries would further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty, contribute to North Atlantic security, and affect U.S. national security interests. The president also was required to evaluate countries’ eligibility for membership and estimate the military requirements and costs associated with a country’s membership

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Figure 1: Countries Invited to Join NATO and Current European NATO Members.

for both NATO and U.S. budgets.\(^2\) President George W. Bush submitted a classified report on Albania and Croatia to Congress on 28 March 2008 to meet this requirement, in advance of the invitation to begin accession talks that was issued to the two countries on 2 April 2008.

Prior to signing any protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of any country, the Senate mandated that the president provide Congress a classified and an unclassified report that provide updated information on the status of political, economic, defense, and related issues for the countries invited to join NATO in the recent round of enlargement discussions.\(^3\) In addition, these reports are to provide an assessment of the invited countries’ likely impact on NATO’s military effectiveness and an analysis of the ability of each invited country to fulfill the full range of financial bur-


\(^3\) Ibid., Section 3(2)(E)(ii).
dens of NATO membership. President Bush submitted these reports on Albania and Croatia to Congress on 20 June 2008.

The Senate also requires that the U.S. Government Accountability Office—the investigatory arm of Congress charged with examining matters relating to the receipt and payment of public funds—review and assess these reports. To fulfill our mandate, we determined whether the reports met the Senate’s requirements, the information in the reports was complete, and the information in the reports was current.

To address our objectives, we reviewed information from an array of reports and analyses from the U.S. government, NATO, and the countries invited to join NATO, and discussed supporting documentation and methodologies used to prepare the reports with officials of the Departments of Defense and State. To address the first objective, we determined whether major issues in the mandates were addressed in the reports. To address whether information in the reports was complete, we assessed whether information in the president’s reports concerning the aspirant countries was consistent with other U.S. government documents and data we collected from various sources, and whether key evidence that could affect the conclusions in the reports was included. To assess whether information in the reports was current, we assessed the supporting evidence to determine that it was dated within the past year and whether key events that have occurred that might alter the general information provided in the reports were included. This report addresses both the March and the June 2008 President’s reports.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 through September 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Scope and Methodology

We assessed the March and June 2008 classified reports and the June 2008 unclassified report and determined whether they addressed each of the mandated requirements. We assessed the completeness of the information by identifying whether all the major issues in the mandate were addressed, information in the reports and other U.S. government source documents were consistent, and key evidence that could affect the conclusions in the reports was included. However, due to our time frames, we did not compare the information with that contained in non-U.S. government sources. For the financial information, in our 2003 report, we determined whether the methodology and analytical criteria were clearly and fully described and whether the methodology provided a range of information that supported the conclusions.

To assess the currency of the 2008 reports, we determined whether the supporting evidence was current and whether any recent events cast doubt over the findings. For the purpose of this report, we defined current information as being from documents dated within the past twelve months or those most recently available. As part of our assessment, we also determined whether the president’s reports addressed the recommendations that GAO made in its May 2003 report on NATO enlargement, and
whether the unclassified report was generally consistent with the findings and conclusions identified in the classified reports.

We relied primarily on source documents from U.S. government agencies, including:

- The U.S. State Department’s country background reports and annual reports assessing human rights practices, religious freedom, and trafficking in persons
- State Department reports and cable traffic concerning the aspirant countries
- Defense reform assessments prepared by the U.S. Department of Defense
- NATO documents concerning the aspirant countries’ progress in meeting the goals identified in NATO’s Membership Action Plan
- Country background reports from the Congressional Research Service
- Assessments and reports from the U.S. intelligence community.

We also reviewed reports from Amnesty International, Freedom House, and Human Rights Watch, and statistics from the Fraser Institute’s and the Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal’s annual assessments of economic freedom. To assess the reliability of the statistical indexes in the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal and Fraser Institute’s assessments, we reviewed the methodologies used to create them, and compared the indexes against each other. We determined that the indexes are useful tools for describing the relative levels of economic freedom for the nations included in them.

**Results in Brief**

President Bush’s March and June 2008 reports on NATO enlargement respond to the congressionally mandated requirements and address all the key elements contained in the resolution concerning Albania’s and Croatia’s accession to NATO membership. For example, the reports discuss how Albania and Croatia would further the principles of NATO and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. They also discuss country eligibility for membership, including political, economic, defense, budgetary, information security, and legal issues—all goals of NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP).4 Similarly, the president’s reports respond to mandated requirements for estimates of the potential impacts of new members on both NATO and U.S. costs, and on NATO’s shared costs.

The March 2008 report, submitted before the commencement of accession talks with Albania and Croatia, responded to the requirements for information identified in the congressional mandate. The June 2008 report updated the information in the March 2008 report and responded to additional information requirements concerning the aspir-

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4 The MAP is a document intended to aid the preparations of those nations seeking to join the Alliance. Their participation in the MAP and in other NATO programs is intended to enable them to make significant strides in reforming their militaries and in enhancing the interoperability of their armed forces with NATO forces.
rant countries’ ability to meet the full range of the financial burdens of NATO membership and the aspirants’ likely impact upon the military effectiveness of NATO.

The March 2008 report contained responses to the five requirements in the Senate’s mandate, explaining:

- How these countries’ accession would further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and contribute to North Atlantic security
- The countries’ eligibility for membership based on the principles and criteria identified by NATO and the United States
- How these countries’ accession would affect U.S. national security interests
- The common-funded military requirements and costs associated with integrating the countries into NATO and the impact on NATO’s costs and members’ shares of those costs
- The impact on U.S. defense and other budgets of integrating the country into NATO.

The June 2008 report on NATO enlargement responded to a specific Senate request to update the information contained in the March 2008 report and provide an analysis of the countries’ ability to meet the full range of financial burdens of NATO membership and of their likely impact on NATO’s military effectiveness.

The GAO analysis found the reports’ information to be generally complete, and consistent with the data we collected from various sources, including agencies within the U.S. government and NATO. For example, the discussion of country eligibility for membership, including political, economic, defense, budgetary, information security, and legal issues and the status of their implementation is detailed and provides more information than reports submitted to Congress for previous rounds of NATO enlargement. The reports are also current, and address the relevant key events; in addition, there have been no recent developments that would call into question any of the reports’ conclusions.

However, we found that the reports provide an incomplete explanation of why NATO lowered its estimate of certain enlargement costs for the two aspirants. We also found that the information concerning the countries’ ability to fulfill the full range of financial burdens of NATO membership is incomplete. The June 2008 classified and unclassified reports provide little information concerning Albania and Croatia’s ability to meet the full range of financial burdens of NATO membership, and do not identify the methodology used to support the conclusion that Albania and Croatia will be able to meet their financial obligations. We raised similar issues in our May 2003 report on
the previous round of NATO enlargement.\textsuperscript{5} Without a complete understanding of the aspirant countries’ ability to meet their financial obligations, NATO cannot be assured that goals in other areas will be achieved, since many of the goals rely on financial resources for their successful implementation. In addition, a key U.S. intelligence assessment that we reviewed differs from some of the conclusions in the president’s reports concerning Albania and Croatia’s ability to meet NATO financial obligations.

We are recommending that, for future NATO aspirants, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, provide more complete information on the true costs of NATO enlargement. Such information would include the full range of the financial burdens of NATO membership for each country invited to join NATO in the future, each country’s ability to assume those burdens, and the methodology used to reach the conclusions on this issue included the president’s report, with explicit identification of the known and unknown costs involved.

**March 2008 Report**

The information in President Bush’s report of March 2008 is generally complete. In addition to providing detailed information on the status of each aspirant under each required element, the report discusses challenges, progress, and future plans to address the elements. However, in response to the requirement to provide an analysis of the common-funded military requirements and costs associated with integrating the aspirant countries into NATO, we found that the report provides an incomplete explanation for why NATO lowered its estimate of certain enlargement costs for the two aspirants.


To assess how Albania and Croatia would further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and contribute to North Atlantic security, the president’s March 2008 report provides a broad discussion of the countries’ support of NATO principles, such as democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law, and provides some examples of Albania’s and Croatia’s achievements in this area. For example, Albania remains committed to good neighborly relations and regional cooperation with its neighbors and has continued to be a steadfast ally in the global war on terrorism, offering substantial troop contributions to the operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The report states that Croatia respects and promotes the basic principles embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty. It has a stable, multiparty, democratic political system characterized by regular elections and a free and vibrant press. Croatian armed forces are under civilian control.

In discussing the countries’ potential impacts on North Atlantic security, the report describes their contributions to regional peace and stability—in particular, the ways in which Albania and Croatia address issues with neighboring countries and enhance regional cooperation. For example, Albania is a member of a Black Sea economic cooperation organization, which promotes economic liberty, cooperation, and trade development. Croatia enjoys good relations with neighboring countries and was elected to a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council during the 2008-2009 period. To address the implications of these countries’ membership for U.S. security, the report provides a detailed discussion of the contributions that Albania and Croatia have made and continue to make to NATO operations in Europe’s Balkan region and their cooperation and assistance in the war on terrorism.

Requirement 2: Country’s Eligibility for NATO Membership Based on the Principles and Criteria Identified by NATO and the United States

Most of the March 2008 report addresses the second information requirement of the mandate: to evaluate Albania’s and Croatia’s eligibility for NATO membership based on the principles identified by NATO and the criteria identified by the United States. The president’s report presents a detailed discussion of the political, economic, defense, budgetary, information security, and legal goals that are part of each country’s eligibility for membership. These goals emanate from NATO’s Membership Action Plan. The report includes more detail on issues concerning membership eligibility than the reports submitted to Congress in 2002 and 2003, during the previous round of NATO enlargement. In addition to providing an update on the status of each MAP category, the report identifies the challenges faced by Albania and Croatia in meeting these goals and their plans to correct identified challenges. For example, the report notes that corruption in Albania remains a problem, but that the government has made additional arrests of high-level public officials and is making progress on convictions.

The political and economic goals addressed in NATO’s MAP cover a broad spectrum, ranging from the implementation of democratic institutions, free and fair elections, the rule of law, judicial independence, and civil liberties to peaceful relations with bordering countries, peaceful settlement of international disputes, and protection of human rights and minority rights. The report’s discussion of defense issues is extensive and describes Albania and Croatia’s achievements in each of five key capability areas: deployability and mobility; sustainability and logistics; command and control; effective engagement; and survivability of forces and infrastructure. The report’s discussion of budgetary issues focuses on the countries’ commitments to defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product, and defense procurement. Discussion of information security and legal issues focuses on the extent to which each coun-

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6 One of the findings in the GAO’s November 2002 report on NATO enlargement was that the president’s report filed in advance of that enlargement round provided limited discussion of some eligibility issues, particularly concerning challenges facing the countries seeking NATO membership and what the countries were doing to address those challenges. See GAO-03-255.
try has met or achieved NATO requirements. For information security, the report assesses the extent to which Albania and Croatia have implemented NATO requirements for personnel screening and the handling and storage of classified documents. Regarding legal issues, the report assesses whether the countries’ constitution and/or laws provide any barriers to the deployment of their troops abroad in support of NATO operations, and discusses certain other legal issues.

The report also discusses the status of each country’s economy, including economic growth. We also assembled additional information not contained in the president’s reports that Congress may find useful on economic issues as they pertain to the two states—specifically, this information is a comparison of measures of economic freedom for NATO aspirants. These independent assessments of the level of economic development in Albania and Croatia are in line with the MAP commitment to promote stability through economic freedom. These assessments rely on two current studies that produce numerical measures of economic freedom—the Fraser Institute’s 2007 Economic Freedom of the World report, which covers 141 countries for the year 2005, and the Heritage Foundation/ Wall Street Journal’s 2008 report, Index of Economic Freedom, which covers 162 countries generally for the year ending mid-2007.\(^7\) Both indexes are revised annually and are based on numerous measures or indicators that are grouped together into areas of economic freedom.

To measure economic freedom, the Fraser Index studied twenty-three factors—some of which include multiple components—that fall into five categories\(^8\):

- Size of government
- Legal structure and security of property rights
- Access to sound money
- Freedom to trade internationally
- Regulation of credit, labor, and business.

Each country’s overall score for economic freedom is based on the average of its scores in each of these five areas. Scores range from zero to ten, with ten the highest degree of economic freedom.

To measure economic freedom, the Heritage Foundation/ Wall Street Journal index studied numerous economic variables that fall into ten broad categories of economic freedom\(^9\):

\(^7\) The Fraser Institute is an independent Canadian economic, social research, and educational organization that works to raise the level of understanding about economic and social policy; an additional 72 institutions in 72 countries are co-publishers. The Heritage Foundation is a research and educational institute that promotes conservative public policies that are based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense.

\(^8\) For the Fraser Index, the key ingredients of economic freedom are personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to enter and compete, and protection of persons and their property.
Business freedom
• Trade freedom
• Government size
• Monetary freedom
• Investment freedom
• Financial freedom
• Fiscal freedom
• Property rights
• Freedom from corruption
• Labor freedom.

Each country’s overall score for economic freedom is based on the average of its scores in each of these ten areas. The index scores countries from 0 to 100, with 100 indicating an assessment of “most free.”

Figure 2 below presents the ratings of countries by the Fraser Index and the Heritage Foundation/ Wall Street Journal index for the NATO applicants Albania and Croatia, each of the ten newer members, as well as each of the sixteen older members. The farther a country’s location is toward the upper right of the graph, the higher its ratings of economic freedom. For example, considered together, the two indexes rate the United States followed by Canada then the United Kingdom as having the most economic freedom, and they appear farthest toward the upper right. Since all of the countries we are concerned with scored between five and nine on the Fraser Index and fifty and ninety on the Heritage Foundation/ Wall Street Journal index, we limited the graph to this region.

Both Albania and Croatia have low levels of economic freedom compared to most NATO members. Economic freedom in Albania is rated lower than all NATO members by the Fraser Index, but slightly greater than or equal to seven NATO members according to the Heritage Foundation/ Wall Street Journal index. The level of economic freedom in Croatia is rated slightly greater than or equal to that in three NATO members, according to the Fraser Index, but is lower than all NATO members according to the Heritage Foundation/ Wall Street Journal index.

Requirement 3: Potential Effect of Albania’s and Croatia’s NATO Membership on the National Security Interests of the United States

The March 2008 report provides generally complete information on Albania and Croatia’s impact on U.S. national security interests by focusing primarily on the aspirant countries’ participation in NATO-led and coalition operations, both within the region and outside of it. The report speculates on Albania and Croatia’s continued capa-

9 The Heritage Foundation/ Wall Street Journal index defines economic freedom as the absence of government coercion or constraint on the production, distribution, or consumption of goods and services beyond the extent necessary for citizens to protect and maintain liberty.
Figure 2: Indexes of Economic Freedom for NATO Members and Countries Seeking NATO Membership.

bility to provide support to coalition operations. For example, the report stated that Albania is building its niche military capabilities and is on its way to being fully interoperable with NATO forces. It stated that Croatia has demonstrated its willingness to contribute to common defense and security efforts, and that its membership in NATO would strengthen stability and security in the Balkans.
**Requirement 4: An Analysis of the Common-Funded Military Requirements and Costs Associated with Integrating the Countries into NATO**

The president’s report of March 2008 contains an incomplete analysis of the common-funded military requirements and costs associated with integrating the aspirant countries into NATO. NATO estimates the common-funded enlargement costs for Albania and Croatia at USD 60 million each over a period of ten years or more post-accession. This is nearly half the estimate for a small aspirant country used during the previous round of enlargement. The report does not, however, provide an explicit explanation of how NATO reached this significantly reduced number, except to state that the decision to reduce the cost estimate was based on experience from the 2004 round of enlargement. Providing a fuller explanation of how NATO arrived at these cost figures would be useful, particularly in light of the uncertainties associated with the condition and capability of defense facilities in Albania and Croatia, as identified in the report. These uncertainties include the condition and capability of command, control, and communications networks, reception facilities, and air defense systems.

The report offers a generally complete explanation of the impact of enlargement on NATO’s costs and members’ shares of those costs. In its calculations, the report assumes that, given the relatively modest estimated costs of enlargement for Albania and Croatia, these costs would be funded largely within future common-funded budget ceilings. The report does not, however, explain how it determined that Albania and Croatia’s enlargement costs will be “modest,” particularly after identifying uncertainties associated with defense facilities and installations in these two countries. The report projects that any increases to the NATO Security Investment Program or military budget attributable to this round of enlargement would be minimal. On the basis of Albania and Croatia’s projected cost shares, the report states that the U.S. cost share for each of the military common budgets would be reduced by approximately 0.08 percent.

**Requirement 5: Impact on U.S. Defense and Other Budgets of Integrating Albania and Croatia into NATO**

The report contains a generally complete discussion of the impact that the integration of Albania and Croatia into NATO would have on the U.S. defense budget and other U.S. budgets; the information provided generally supports the conclusions presented. According to the report, the costs can be accommodated within the likely future ceilings for the NATO Security Investment Program budget through a reordering of project priorities and extending the schedules for other projects. As a result, the report concludes that there will be minimal impact on DOD budget elements that provide the U.S. contribution to the NATO Security Investment Program and the military budget. For NATO’s civil budget, the report estimates that in light of the smaller number and size of the current aspirants, the addition of Albania and Croatia will result in only a small increase in the civil budget, and possibly a modest addition to the construction costs for the new NATO headquarters building. Any increase would be partially offset by the new members’ contributions to the civil budget and to the construction project.
June 2008 Report

The information contained in President Bush’s June 2008 report on NATO enlargement is generally complete. As required, the report updates the information contained in the March 2008 report on the integration of Albania and Croatia into NATO. The report then provides an analysis of the countries’ ability to meet the full range of financial burdens of NATO membership, and the likely impact upon the military effectiveness of NATO. However, we found that the information and analysis concerning the countries’ ability to fulfill the full range of financial burdens of NATO membership are incomplete. The report does not discuss the methodology used to reach conclusions about the countries’ ability to meet financial obligations and does not include some costs. As mentioned above, without a full understanding of the aspirant countries’ ability to meet their financial obligations, NATO cannot be assured that goals in other areas will be achieved if the countries lack sufficient financial resources. In addition, a key U.S. government information source differs from some of the conclusions in the President’s reports concerning Albania and Croatia’s ability to meet NATO financial obligations.

Aspirant Countries’ Financial Qualifications

The June 2008 classified and unclassified reports provide incomplete information on Albania and Croatia’s ability to meet the full range of the financial burdens of NATO membership. The discussion in the reports is limited to identifying the countries’ common-funded budget cost share and their 2008 defense budgets. On the basis of this information on the two governments’ commitments to meet these costs, and the current rate of economic growth in both countries, the president’s reports conclude that Albania and Croatia should be able to meet their financial obligations to NATO. The reports do not identify the methodology used to support the conclusions that Albania and Croatia should be able to meet their financial obligations. Without such a discussion of the methodology used, it is difficult to understand how the conclusions were derived.

In addition, the reports do not discuss all the costs associated with NATO membership. For example, becoming a NATO member also entails the cost of supporting country representation at NATO’s facilities, such as its civilian and military headquarters in Belgium and its command posts in Europe, as identified in the GAO’s 2003 report on NATO enlargement. As we reported, officials of the aspirant countries invited to join NATO during the previous round of enlargement stated that the costs of establishing and maintaining country representation at NATO facilities should be in-

10 For example, according to the June 2008 unclassified report, Albania’s common-funded budget cost share, which includes the civil budget, the military budget, and the NATO Security Investment Program, is 0.0685. Croatia’s common-funded budget cost share is 0.2550. Albania’s approved 2008 defense budget is USD 268.9 million, which represents 2.01 percent of GDP. Croatia’s approved 2008 defense budget is USD 1.14 billion, which is 1.8 percent of GDP.

cluded in considerations of the costs of NATO membership. According to these officials, costs could vary between under 1 percent to as much as 2 percent of a country’s annual defense budget. For countries with relatively small GDPs, this commitment of personnel and resources could be significant. By failing to discuss all of the costs associated with NATO membership, the reports do not provide comprehensive support for their conclusions on this issue.

In addition to not reporting the costs of country representation at NATO facilities, the reports also did not identify the costs of NATO membership as a percentage of the countries’ total defense budgets. As discussed in our previous report on enlargement, the president’s reports are not required to include this information, but these data would have provided useful background about the level of demand these costs will place on a country’s total allocation of funds for defense, and hence its ability to fulfill the full range of NATO financial obligations.

**Impact on the Military Effectiveness of NATO**

We found that the information and description of the methodology for assessing the likely impact of Albania and Croatia on NATO’s military effectiveness in the June 2008 reports were generally complete. The methodology laid out in the classified and unclassified reports assessed the soundness and feasibility of each country’s defense reform plan, each country’s support of U.S. and Allied actions through contributions to U.S. and NATO military operations, and the ability of each country to contribute specialized military capabilities to NATO once it becomes a member. The information provided supports the reports’ conclusions about the likely impact of these countries’ membership on NATO’s military effectiveness.

The discussion of defense reform plans provides an understanding of the status of the countries’ defense modernization efforts, their degree of military preparedness, and the extent to which NATO may need to assist the countries in accomplishing certain tasks. For example, the report points out that both Albania and Croatia have transformed their militaries from primarily territorial-based forces to militaries capable of deploying to Alliance and coalition operations, and that the United States and NATO have had numerous opportunities to assist Albania and Croatia in developing and implementing their defense reform plans. Identifying examples of how Albania and Croatia have participated in or contributed to NATO or other multilateral defense operations demonstrates how they can be expected to participate in NATO operations as members of the Alliance. Determining what kinds of specialized military capabilities the aspirants could provide to NATO illustrates how they will enhance NATO’s preparations for future missions.

**Conclusion**

President Bush’s reports to the Congress on the accession of Albania and Croatia to NATO membership responded to the Senate’s requirements, providing information that was generally complete and current on each of the two aspirant states. While the discussion of country eligibility for membership is detailed and provides more infor-
mation than reports submitted to Congress for previous rounds of NATO enlargement, we found that the information and methodology concerning the full range of the financial burdens of NATO membership, and the countries’ ability to assume those burdens, was incomplete. We raised similar issues in our May 2003 report on NATO enlargement, but the President’s 2008 reports do not address these issues. Without a more complete assessment of the financial burdens of NATO membership for Albania and Croatia, and their ability to assume those burdens, Congress would not have a fully accurate picture of the true cost of NATO enlargement.

**Recommendation for Executive Action**

To provide Congress with a complete picture of the cost of NATO enlargement, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, provide more complete information on the financial burdens of NATO enlargement for the president’s reports to Congress. The needed information would include the full range of the financial burdens of NATO membership for each country invited to join in the future, each country’s ability to assume those burdens, and the methodology used to reach conclusions on this issue in the reports, with explicit identification of the known and unknown costs involved. Given the short time frames for congressional action on this round of NATO enlargement, we would not expect such information to be provided for Albania and Croatia, but would expect that the Secretary implement our recommendation for all future NATO aspirant countries.

The GAO provided a copy of this report to the Departments of Defense and State for comment. DOD officials responded orally that the department concurred with the recommendation. They also provided additional information and documents on Albania and Croatia’s ability to meet financial obligations that were not available at the time the reports were drafted. DOD officials said that they would add a more detailed discussion of the financial burdens of NATO membership for each country invited to join in the future. This would include more explicitly identifying both known and unknown costs and the methodology used to reach the report’s conclusions. We modified the recommendation slightly to reflect DOD’s comments. The State Department generally concurred with the report’s findings and conclusions but had no comments on the recommendation.
The Influence of the Neoconservative Movement on U.S. Foreign Policy

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This brief essay is drawn from a larger dissertation project at the University of Vienna dealing with the subject of neoconservatism, written under the supervision of Prof. Heinz Gärtner. In the limited space available here, we will primarily attempt to explain a few small facets of this political-philosophical phenomenon. We will also make an effort to illuminate the pattern of explanations offered for the military deployment in Iraq, which was vigorously promoted by neoconservatives in the United States. Who are the Neocons actually? What are their goals? What beliefs and experiences shape their thinking?

The term neoconservative has never represented a coherent and unified political construct; there was no central link between the various political ideas that characterize the positions held by those thinkers typically identified with neoconservatism. The centrifugal forces within the neoconservative community have typically been predominant, until the movement is mobilized by the awareness of an enemy. This is most notably the case in the original animating impetus behind the emergence of neoconservatism in the U.S.: anti-communism and the pursuit of victory over the Soviets. Most histories of the movement trace its origin to a group of formerly leftist thinkers in the U.S. who in the middle of the twentieth century were driven rightward by the totalitarian excesses of Stalinism in the USSR. Almost all scholars who have studied the issue speak of a loose grouping of liberal intellectuals who share similar ideas and views and who mainly use publications in magazines (The Public Interest, The National Review, Commentary, and The Weekly Standard) to advance their thinking and disseminate their ideas. Martin Lipset summed up this view of the diverse and fragmented nature of the movement, stating that the perception of the neoconservatives as a tightly unified group is based on a phenomenon that most sociologists call “labeling.”

Neo-conservatism, both as an ideological term and as a political grouping, is one of the most misunderstood concepts in the contemporary political lexicon. The reason is simple: the word has never referred to a set of doctrines to which a given group of adherents subscribed. Rather, it was invented as an invidious label to undermine political opponents, most of whom have been unhappy with being described as “neoconservative.” The neoconservatives are perhaps the most prolific group of intellectuals in

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American history; in fact, neoconservative thought on practically every major issue of U.S. politics or policy in the past forty years is extensively developed.

Francis Fukuyama adds that the neoconservatives have an idealistic belief in social progress and the universality of rights, coupled with intense anti-communism. And it is remarkable that main principles of neoconservatism feature no coherent vision in relation to the domestic and foreign affairs in the United States, with only one exception—the fight against the USSR.

One can argue that, without the Cold War, neoconservatism could not exist. Just as the events of 11 September 2001 provided the “window of opportunity” for contemporary neoconservatives to implement their agenda in Iraq, the Cold War played the same role for neoconservatives fifty years ago. Hence, our first hypothesis is that the Cold War assured the existence of the neoconservative movement. The provocative question raised by this hypothesis is its opposite implication: Why didn’t neoconservatism disappear with the end of the Cold War? Instead, the movement lurked for a while behind the liberal internationalism of the Clinton era, particularly given that President Clinton was also willing to approve the use of military resources for humanitarian missions. However, after their years of semi-exile during the Clinton Administration, U.S. Neocons successfully and artfully invented the doctrine of morally-motivated interventionism, which they planned to use to overturn the old order of the international peace architecture.

To discuss neoconservatism as a complex set of ideas is accurate and apt, since the neoconservative legacy is complex and heterogeneous. We can distinguish between a few generations and typologies of neoconservatives: Cold War liberals, democratic internationalists, liberal imperialists, realistic Wilsonians, Straussians, neoconservative realists, liberal realists, etc.

After September 11, and especially after the Iraq War, many commentators explored the intellectual links between the neoconservative movement and Leo Strauss, a European émigré and longtime political philosopher at the University of Chicago who died in 1973. What is remarkable about these writers’ obsession with the Strauss connection is that Leo Strauss never held an opinion on Saddam Hussein or Iraq. In fact, Leo Strauss had been dead for three decades by the time contemporary Neocons became preoccupied with regime change in Iraq. Thus, we cannot find a significant intellectual debt to Strauss in contemporary neoconservatism. Strauss’s writings, in short, are philosophical inquiries and have nothing of the dogma of a political movement. His thought culminates in no political program, no slogans or “cookie cutter” approaches to public policy. His focus is on how to read the so-called “Great Books.” Strauss was characterized by many of his critics as the intellectual mastermind behind the war in Iraq, as an elitist who preached a policy of force and deception, and as the philosopher-king of the neoconservative movement.

1 The creed of Leo Strauss might be reduced to six principles: a deep suspicion of the power of the state; a preference for liberty over equality; patriotism; a belief in established institutions and hierarchies; skepticism about the idea of progress; and elitism.
One of the most widely quoted definitions of the movement identifies neoconservatives as conservative internationalists with idealistic-utopian aspirations (in the vein of Lenin and Trotsky), who endorse high military spending and define the United States’ national interest very broadly. What they feared most was global anarchy, in the terms of the neo-realist school in international relations (similar to that articulated by Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz), in which evil conquers good. In terms of the structure of U.S. government, they desired an “imperial presidency” (in the words of Arthur Schlesinger); thus, neoconservative intellectuals were active under various presidents, based on the so-called “revolving door principle.”

Francis Fukuyama, writing in the period after his detachment from the neoconservative movement, explained that neoconservatism today has become evidently associated with concepts like coercive regime change, unilateralism, and American hegemony and primacy (the set of ideas that has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine). But the attempt to examine neoconservatism only in the context of the policies of the Bush Administration is too simplistic, and does not offer sufficient guidance for interpreting neoconservatives’ political-philosophical concepts. Rather, what is needed is an intensive investigation of U.S. foreign policy since Woodrow Wilson, which even found resonance as recently as the 2008 presidential election in the United States. The contemporary neoconservative agenda is about shaping a new kind of politics, where the instruments of hard power lie in the foreground, while soft power—which actually won the Cold War (as Margaret Thatcher noted, Ronald Reagan won the Cold War without firing a shot)—will be maneuvered onto the sidelines.

The moral and historical error of the neoconservatives lies in their own narrow-mindedness, as most critics point out. Two widely noted works of political science—the first by Francis Fukuyama (The End of History, published in 1992) and the second by Samuel P. Huntington (The Clash of Civilizations, published in 1996)—have had an enormous impact on the philosophical and dialectical thinking of contemporary neoconservatives. These two books have to a certain extent transformed the thinking of the neoconservative movement, and brought the Neocons to the conclusion that democracy is the primary achievement of humanity and now, since the Cold War has ended, it is the task of the modern Western democracies, especially the United States, to spread democracy throughout the world. Such ideas—which were also expressed by political dissidents such as Natan Sharansky—were the basis for a historically congenial version of the global political map after the Cold War.

Along with Francis Fukuyama, another author whose ideas were kidnapped by the neoconservatives was Samuel P. Huntington. First in an article in Foreign Affairs and then in his book-length study The Clash of Civilizations, he explained his thinking about the future of international relations. What Huntington wanted to say was certainly not what most neoconservative intellectuals wanted to hear. Following Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee—whose most influential books were published before

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World War I and after World War II, respectively—he analyzed the relationships between different cultures (an interaction he famously characterized as the “clash of civilizations”). The ideological narrative of the second generation of neoconservatives combined the views of Huntington and Fukuyama. From then on, the leitmotifs in the scholastic world of contemporary neoconservatives were dogmatic activism and historical determinism, which nobody in “Old Europe” wanted to understand. It is this ideological basis that constitutes the now rigid structure of indoctrination for the neoconservative movement, since with the passing of Fukuyama and Huntington they lost two of the most prominent political scientists of the twentieth century.

The dream that democracy is the inevitable fate of humanity and the belief that the “clash of civilizations” is looming over the horizon—with an implacably hostile Islam as the main actor—resulted in a Manichaean doctrine, which neither of the two above-mentioned scholars would have accepted. Democracy as a terminus of human development on the one hand, and the existential struggle with the moral values of Islam on the other, was the foundation of the neoconservative mindset, which suddenly gained a philosophical character.

Even Fukuyama himself stressed that many readers had misunderstood his book *The End of History and the Last Man*. If neoconservatives wanted to know what the yearning for democracy is, they should have read Fareed Zakaria’s *The Future of Freedom*.3 That all people aspire for freedom is self-evident; Immanuel Kant postulated it in his categorical imperative in the eighteenth century. But the notion that Western liberal democracy offers the appropriate recipe for the reconstruction of societies, regardless of culture, is not necessarily true. For Fukuyama, everything was primarily about modernization. What was universal from the beginning was not a dream of a liberal democracy, but the desire to live in a post-modern society, with its technical achievements, high standard of living, and quality health care.4 However, the neoconservative apologists could not know this, since ultimately they never dealt with such issues (e.g., social engineering, nation building) in their programmatic agendas.

It is important to take a step back from the many imprecise conclusions of many journalistic sources and try to conduct an in-depth analysis of the issues. In doing this we will try to retain a scientific approach and remain (reasonably) close to neutral in our views. The risk of failing while verifying or falsifying the hypothesis is always present; nonetheless, we will attempt to tackle the problem scientifically.

Today, neoconservatism is very often associated solely with the U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, which is only partially true. What many critical observers often forget is that *neoconservatism* is not a simple term of definition, and to present neoconservatism only with the help of simple comparisons and conspiracy theories would bring us to a deadlock.

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We ourselves do not purport to be apologists for neoconservatism, but we do think
that it represents one of the possible sets of strategies in the fight against terrorism. It
does not mean that “the Neoconservative Moment” must necessarily transform into a
“unipolar moment.”\(^5\) Furthermore, it is clear that neoconservatism does not represent
the only possible political-philosophical world order. Contemporary neoconservatism
is “a kind of muscular Wilsonianism, minus international institutions.”\(^6\)

So, was the U.S. attack on Iraq legitimate and legal? From the neoconservative
point of view, it definitely was. According to the neoconservative point of view, mili-
tary action was justified because Saddam Hussein had long been considered to be a
disruptive factor in the region. Involved in both Gulf Wars (against Iran and then the
invasion of Kuwait), Saddam was ready to risk a “World War IV” and to assume the
role of a peer (and competitor) to the U.S.\(^7\)

From the neoconservative perspective, Saddam was far more dangerous to the
United States than Al Qaeda. This could be seen in the attempts by three key members
of the administration of the second President Bush—Under Secretary of Defense
Douglas Feith, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld—to convince the president that Iraq represented a crucial issue for
U.S. security. The nightmare scenario that had Saddam secretly developing a func-
tional WMD program caused suspicion that terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda
could gain possession of such deadly weapons, which in turn led to the conviction that
the security of the American people and the territorial integrity of the American nation
were at stake. This was a rational argument, and the Iraqi leadership bore some respon-
sibility for feeding this key tenet of neoconservative belief, because Saddam and his
clique broke several international agreements, and evicted UN weapons inspectors
from the country. Furthermore, the Hussein regime was willing to cooperate only when
placed under pressure from the U.S. and UN; even so, however, it obstructed inspec-
tions and never disclosed the extent of its “nuclear program.” In the end, the neocon-
servatives were suspicious, and could not view the efforts (and perhaps the honest in-
tentions) of the Iraqi dictator as being serious and credible.

Saddam himself also made a miscalculation, and showed that he had not learned
much from the first Gulf War. When he intervened in Kuwait, Saddam was convinced
that he would be able to dictate his conditions to the international community, led by
the United States. It was true that the American position irritated him, since the U.S.
administration \(a \text{ priori} \) had ruled a military invasion of Kuwait by Iraq as being unac-
ceptable. So he calculated that—in spite of its clearly articulated position—the United
States would swallow the strategic defeat represented by his invasion of Kuwait and
negotiate with him. This gross underestimation cost the Iraqi dictator significant do-
mestic and international legitimacy, and negated his reputation in the Middle East as a


\(^6\) Francis Fukuyama, \textit{America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative

\(^7\) See Norman Podhoretz, \textit{World War IV: The Long Struggle Against Islamofascism} (New
promoter of pan-Arab unity. Saddam wanted to be the new Nasser, but ultimately he came to be seen as a villain who attempted to thumb his nose at the world’s sole superpower, and to change the geopolitical order in the world’s most sensitive region.

President George H.W. Bush’s response at this time was deliberate and well thought-out. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft assembled an international military coalition, which was also supported by the UN, and which forced Saddam to retreat. There was, however, no UN mandate to depose Saddam, and he remained in power, although with significantly diminished credibility, even within the Arab world.

Saddam’s original blunder was that in September 1980 he had believed that the entire Arab world would support him after he ordered his troops to attack Iran. Obviously, this war was sparked by a territorial conflict between the two countries, but the idea that the Iraqi despot represented the Arab cause against the Persians carried a double flaw. This war—which Saddam deliberately orchestrated, and was the longest and most intense war fought since 1945—represented a risk factor for the Saudi regime, and did not help either of the adversaries to achieve its political goals.

An additional significant neoconservative argument in favor of U.S. intervention in Iraq was rooted in the belief that the United States had to show the United States’ potential adversaries and enemies in the Middle East that the new Bush Administration was prepared to act swiftly and firmly, with a full mobilization of U.S. political, economic, and social resources (as compared with the Clinton Administration’s indecision). According to this line of argument, it would be a tremendous mistake to give terrorists evidence to support the belief that the United States would pull back from one of the regions of greatest strategic importance for its national interests (the Middle East) simply because it had been hit hard by a terrorist attack on 9/11. Terrorist groups needed to know that the new American leaders would make no distinction between terrorists and their supporters. An American retreat from the Middle East would be equivalent to admitting defeat; thus, the U.S. response to attacks of this sort had to be prompt and supported by overwhelming military strength. Even though the Cold War was long since over (and was in no danger of reheating), the old tried and tested notions of the Cold War era such as the domino theory gained renewed importance. Should the U.S. lose in Iraq, this would have unforeseeable consequences for the entire Middle East—this was the main premise of many neoconservative proponents, like Richard N. Perle and Elliott Abrams.

U.S. neoconservatives also saw the occupation of Iraq as the next step in the larger reconstruction of the entire Middle East. They tried to present their ideas to the world community as a plan for the “Greater Middle East.”

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so-called “Road Map”—and tried to impose it on their Israeli partners (such as Benjamin Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon) as well as the Palestinians. The plan failed miserably, however, as the “Greater Middle East” notion in their presentation received no support from either the Israelis or the Palestinians. Neoconservative attempts to reshape the geopolitical landscape, enhance the level of regional and global security, and make Iraq a model democracy for the entire Arab world were extremely ambitious; however, they lacked any significant awareness of (and accounting for) cultural and historical realities.

Analogies between the wave of democratization after World War II in West Germany, Italy, and Japan with the situation in an ethnically and religiously heterogeneous tribal state showed how deeply flawed the neoconservative argument actually was. Iraq was envisioned as being the first democratic Arab state, and was assigned the task of weakening both pan-Arabism and Islamist radicalism; it will be a long time before this neoconservative project comes to fruition (if it is ever achieved at all). It became increasingly unrealistic to talk about the rise of democratic institutions, economic progress, and social emancipation in Iraq (which is not to say that this neoconservative idea was by definition impossible—exactl...
manuel Todd, and Noam Chomsky—discussed the thesis that U.S. foreign policy had lost its compass in the wake of the Cold War and the proxy wars in the Third World, and could not find a substitute for its lost spheres of influence in Vietnam and Iran. The geopolitical tide in the Persian Gulf had shifted dramatically against the United States, and a new guarantor of stability (and promoter of U.S. interests in the region) was needed.

It is hard to imagine that the neoconservatives wanted to promote Iraq as their primary mechanism of domination and control in the region, and reduce their dependence on the Saudi royal family. But it is indisputably true that the United States relocated their naval formations in the Persian Gulf, in the process providing a tremendous number of new bases from which to launch air operations, so that even Turkey’s refusal to allow U.S. troops to use its territory (and thus open a new front in the Iraq war) did not prevent the U.S. from dislocating Iraqi forces. So the criticism promoted by opponents of the neoconservatives that the U.S. invaded Iraq in order to improve its own strategic and military position is simply not relevant. Even the presumption that the United States was actively searching for war scenarios in the Middle East, and that the attacks of 9/11 provided a so-called “window of opportunity” are devoid of any logical basis.

Perhaps the most widely cited argument in favor of U.S. intervention in Iraq—one that is popular even today among many neoconservative intellectuals—is that the situation in the Middle East bore similarities to that in Europe in the 1930s. The analogy rests on the assumption that Neville Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement toward the Third Reich essentially gave Germany permission to annex the Sudetenland. If Saddam is compared with Hitler (as many neoconservatives stated), George W. Bush could not follow the dangerous path set forth by the conservative British Prime Minister. According to neoconservatives, the United States will never again allow dictators to set the terms of negotiations, thus surrendering power to them and conferring legitimacy on their regimes. Had Chamberlain taken a tougher stance in 1938, this thinking holds, the world would have most likely avoided the Second World War.

The final element of the neoconservative interest in intervening in Iraq (one that is highly controversial) concerns the security of Israel. The political scientists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt argued in their book *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* that the U.S. and the neoconservatives (a certain number of whom are of Jewish descent) had intervened in Iraq in order to guarantee the security and borders of Israel. This absurd thesis simply cannot be true, because Iraq had lost its monopoly on weapons procurement after the first Gulf War, and was not capable of posing a serious threat to the Israeli Defense Forces, which are superbly trained and equipped with the most modern armaments. The international sanctions and arms control measures in the wake of Iraq’s failed annexation of Kuwait in the 1990s nullified Iraq’s military poten-

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tial, so it was extremely difficult for Saddam even to maintain the miserable state of its army, much less to speak about upgrading it.

The argument of this article is that neoconservatism as it applies to U.S. foreign policy has a liberal vision; its roots lie in a bygone landscape, at the dawn of America’s struggle against a totalitarian foe. At home and abroad, the struggle for democracy is also a struggle for equal opportunity. For many neoconservatives, liberty alone is the goal, and government action to promote social justice imperils it. But for modern liberals like Peter Beinhart, championing freedom around the world requires championing development, because (as the architects of the Marshall Plan understood) liberty is unlikely to survive in the midst of economic despair and social engineering.10

The Neocons supported the war because they considered it the only remaining way to prevent Saddam Hussein from obtaining a nuclear bomb. They also believed it could produce a decent, pluralistic Iraqi regime, which might help open a democratic “third way” in the Middle East between secular autocrats and their theocratic opponents—a third way that offered the best long-term hope for protecting the United States’ strategic interests. The blunders in Iraq will haunt U.S foreign policy for years to come, but the war on terror will likely last even longer that that. How the United States fight it will help shape the kind of country it becomes in the new millennium.

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