The Potential Role of Non-Traditional Donors’ Aid in Africa

By Peter Kragelund
Assistant Professor, Department of Society and Globalisation, Roskilde University
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# CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ........................................ iv
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES .................................................... v
FOREWORD ..................................................................................... vi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................. vii
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 1
2. SOUTH–SOUTH COOPERATION IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE .... 2
3. THE RE–EMERGENCE OF NON–TRADITIONAL DONORS ............... 4
   3.1 Encapsulating the Fear: China’s Development Cooperation with Africa 5
   3.2 In the Shadow of China? India’s Development Assistance to Africa 9
   3.3 Using One’s Own Experiences to Help Others: Brazil’s Development Assistance to Africa 13
   3.4 Promoting African Renaissance: South Africa’s Development Assistance to Africa 15
4. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENHANCED DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES 18
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................ 23
   5.1 Recommendations .................................................................. 24
ENDNOTES ...................................................................................... 25
REFERENCES .................................................................................. 28
## LIST OF ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Agência Brasileria de Cooperação</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGOA</td>
<td>Africa Growth and Opportunity Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASA</td>
<td>Africa - South America Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRIC</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India and China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISA</td>
<td>China, India and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum for China-Africa Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G77</td>
<td>Group of 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBSA</td>
<td>India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICCR</td>
<td>Indian Council for Cultural Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEC</td>
<td>Indian Technical and Economic Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Multi-fibre Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoC</td>
<td>Ministry of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAAP</td>
<td>Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEAM-9</td>
<td>Techno Economic Approach for Africa India Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>UN Conference on Trade and Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**LIST OF TABLES ANDFigURES**

**Table 1:** Current Status of China’s Eight Development Pledges Made at FOCAC 3  
**Table 2:** India’s Development Cooperation Programmes in Africa  
**Table 3:** Africa-India Framework for Cooperation  
**Table 4:** Ongoing Brazilian Development Projects in Sub-Saharan African Countries (June 2009)  
**Table 5:** Key Characteristics of Four Non-traditional Donors (2007)  
**Figure 1:** Sectoral distribution of the African Renaissance Fund, 2004-2008
FOREWORD

South-South cooperation is by no means a new phenomenon. Indeed, after a decline in the 1980s and 1990s South-South cooperation has regained momentum. China and India are the largest southern donors, but other developing countries like Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and South Africa have an important and increasing role in development assistance in Africa, as well as in other developing countries.

Although the total size of the development assistance from these donors is still small in comparison to the traditional donors’ aid, its role is growing rapidly. Geographical proximity is a major determinant of the direction of most aid flows from the emerging economies. This pattern is mainly motivated by language and cultural similarities and opportunities for increasing trade and strengthening political relations. However, geographical proximity is not the only determinant, and southern donors, particularly China and India, are strengthening their ties with Africa as well as other developing countries. Development assistance is by no means the principal ingredient in South-South cooperation. Indeed, the latter is also largely made of trade and investment, tourism, and peace-keeping operations. Nonetheless, it is the most important element as it is used to facilitate the other flows.

The present Issue Paper (No. 11) on “The Potential Role of Non-Traditional Donors’ Aid in Africa” by Peter Kragelund, Assistant Professor at the Department of Society and Globalisation of Roskilde University in Denmark, challenges the perception that non-traditional aid lacks transparency and contains little or any conditionality thereby undermining the development efforts of ‘traditional’ donors. Moreover, this paper examines the implications of the re-emergence of China, India, Brazil and South Africa as important ‘non-traditional’ donors to Africa on sustainable development and aid flows and governance.

As Kragelund argues, increasing South-South cooperation will result in more development assistance for African countries. Given their need for additional external financial resources to meet the millennium development goals and foster sustainable development objectives in an effective manner, this constitutes a significant opportunity for Africa. However, increased financial flows could also create problems of absorption capacity for some African countries and tempt highly indebted countries to increase their debt to potentially unsustainable levels. Therefore, to maximise the development potential of South-South cooperation and ensure policy coherence and effectiveness coordination between both traditional and non-traditional donors will be crucial. Moreover, African ownership of development assistance (traditional or non-traditional) is an imperative.

The purpose of this paper is thus to contribute to a knowledge-based discussion in this area and to debate on how traditional and non-traditional development assistance can be harnessed in order to foster inclusive and sustainable development in Africa.

Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz
Chief Executive, ICTSD
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The fast growth of big economies like China and India has resulted in a new-found interest in the economic and political consequences for the developed economies. However, the global rise of emerging economies also affects the potentials of South-South collaboration. Emerging economies invest and trade with partners in the South, and they use development assistance to facilitate these economic flows.

This paper examines the consequences for Africa as well as for the traditional donors of the re-emergence of the following four important non-traditional donors to Africa: China, India, Brazil and South Africa. Although the total size of the development assistance from these donors is still small in comparison to the traditional donors’ aid, its role is growing rapidly.

So far, the ‘Western’, in particular the American, perception of these donors has been that of rogue donors supporting African dictators, providing aid with ‘no strings attached’ thereby undermining the development efforts of the traditional donors. This paper questions this dichotomous view and instead argues that the re-emergence of non-traditional donors may affect African development efforts positively as well as negatively. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that for most African countries, Chinese, Indian, Brazilian and South African development assistance is not an alternative to traditional aid but rather complements it.

It is therefore of utmost importance that traditional donors continue their efforts to build capacity in African countries in order to increase the positive developmental effects of the additional flows of development assistance. Moreover, there are some opportunities for collaboration among the two groups of donors provided that ownership of the interventions is on African hands. This could enhance mutual understanding among the developing partners and potentially pave the way for a dialogue based on positive development experiences rather than uninformed critique.
1. INTRODUCTION

In March 2006, from his position as Chair of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Richard Manning addressed the traditional donors’ concern that non-traditional bilateral donors were re-emerging on the development scene.1 His speech, later published in Development Policy Review (Manning, 2006), first established that non-traditional donors’ presence has been insignificant for the past two decades, and therefore, the ‘traditional’ donor community had not worried about them. Second, the speech singled out the two most important non-traditional donors: China and India, and found that there was a risk that the no-conditionality approach of these donors could potentially postpone necessary reforms and waste resources on unproductive investments.

Manning’s speech kicked off a quest among donor agencies, think tanks and researchers alike to identify and establish the doings of non-traditional donors especially, but not exclusively, in Africa. Like Manning’s paper, most studies paid particular attention to China and India. This also applies to some of the more elaborate studies such as ECOSOC’s background study on recent trends in international development assistance (ECOSOC, 2008), the research projects supported by the International Development Research Centre that reviewed development cooperation from four non-traditional donors (Rowlands, 2008), Kragelund’s (2008) mapping of non-DAC donors in Africa, Gabas’ (2009) analysis of these emerging powers’ dual status as both donors and recipients of development aid, and Grimm, Humphrey, Lundsgaarde, & de Souza’s (2009) paper on the challenges that Europe faces in terms of competition from new state donors.

Moreover, some studies have paid attention only to China and India. These include, among others, Naidu & Herman (2009) who seek to single out how China and India provide development assistance and conceptualise their engagement with African countries, McCormick (2008) who proposes a new framework to analyse aid flows from these two economies to Africa, and Six (2009) who questions the long-term consequences of the rise of China and India as donors in terms of our understanding of development.

This paper builds on these studies and seeks to further our understanding of the implications of the rise of South-South development cooperation both for African partners and traditional donors. In order to reach this aim, section two of this paper first explores the limits of South-South cooperation in a historical context and singles out how the current South-South collaboration differs from previous attempts to establish a challenge to the traditional North-South relationship. Section three then takes a closer look at the following four Southern donors’ aid relationship with Africa: China, India, Brazil and South Africa. These donors are chosen because they share a number of similarities and hence are of particular interest to the study of South-South development cooperation: they are emerging economies, they are regional powers, and they have a specific ‘dual’ position among developing countries as both donors and recipients (Grimm et al., 2009; Rowlands, 2008; Six, 2009). Their engagement in Africa is of particular importance as Africa has been economically and politically marginalised for two decades but for its aid relationship with traditional donors. The ambition is to determine to what extent they, given these common characteristics, show internal similarities or differences, and how and to what extent they differ from traditional donors. However, no attempt is made to give a comprehensive account of the history of these aid programmes as this has been done excellently elsewhere (cf. (Bräutigam, 1998; Singh, 2007; Vaz & Inoue, 2007; Vohra, 1981). Following this, section four discusses the challenges and opportunities in terms of enhanced development outcomes that may follow the re-emergence of these donors to Africa. Section five then concludes the paper and points to ways forward.
2. SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

South-South cooperation “...is closely related to the liquidation of colonialism in the 1950s and 1960s” (Folke, Fold, & Enevoldsen, 1993: 22). More specifically, it originated with the 1955 Bandung conference, where twenty-nine leaders from Africa and Asia met to speak the voice of the South, which in turn paved the way for the Group of 77 (G77) which was established in 1964 as an intergovernmental organisation within the UN in order to promote developing countries’ common interests in the UN and to promote South-South cooperation. The G77, originally made up of 77 developing countries, now comprises some 130 membership states (some of which are now members of the EU and therefore do not (solely) represent the South). Hence, it is the largest grouping of Southern countries. The G77 made it possible for the South to voice their common concerns both in the UN General Assembly (a special session was convened in 1974) and in the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which serves as the central UN entity to debate economic and social issues and also coordinates the work of UN’s specialised agencies and funds. Of importance in those early years of South-South cooperation was also the establishment of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, which was closely linked to the G77.

The result of these efforts was the Declaration of a New International Economic Order which was basically the proposition of a new economic and political framework for international relations between equal countries. Even though this proposition received much attention after it was launched at the UN General Assembly in 1974, it never came to make any real difference on the ground.

For a number of reasons, but most notably the two oil crises in the 1970s, the South was split. Oil-exporting countries obviously gained from the increase in prices while oil-importing developing countries lost out due to the higher prices as well as due to the recycling of petrodollars that led to the easy availability of cheap private loans at floating interest rates. These loans later became the cornerstone of the 1980s’ debt crisis, which further undermined the idea of a collective South. Moreover, the debt crisis initiated a process of de-industrialisation that created serious setbacks especially in Africa and Latin America, which again negatively influenced South-South economic cooperation. Likewise, the relatively broad (trade) agenda of the GATT Uruguay Round (1986-1993) made political disagreements of the developing countries come to fore, thereby effectively leading to a division among developing countries and thus, a crisis of the G77 (Folke et al., 1993; Lima & Hirst, 2006).

Thus, by the end of the 1980s, the G77 existed in name but not in fact. Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War changed the entire global context. While the former Eastern Block had played only a minor role in both the North-South and the South-South dialogues, it became important in the 1990s as the countries of the former Eastern Block became important destinations for trade, investments and development assistance for the North. Thus, political and economic attention was shifted away from the South towards the East. South-South collaboration, thus, came to a temporary standstill in the beginning of the 1990s.

The fast growth of big economies like China and India in the past two decades has resulted in a new-found interest (internally as well as externally) in the economic and political potentials of South-South collaboration. India and Brazil now see southern votes as essential in gaining a seat in an enlarged UN Security Council (if their quest to reform the UN system is successful), China perceives political and economic connections to the South as a way to fight the US hegemony, and all the big countries of the South “share a belief in their entitlement to a more influential role in world affairs” (Hurrell, 2006: 2).

This rejuvenation of South-South cooperation has led to the establishment of several new
organisations and forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), and the New Africa Asia Strategic Partnership, a trilateral cooperation between South Africa, Vietnam and Guinea Conakry (DFA, 2008b). Likewise, academics have been busy getting a grip on the consequences of the rise of emerging powers for global governance and global political economy (cf. (Palat, 2008; Shaw, Cooper, & Antkiewicz, 2007; Subacchi, 2008).

Among the most interesting new forums for Africa is IBSA. It was formed in 2003 with the overall aim of promoting shared interests such as democratisation, economic and social development and dedication to multilateralism. IBSA is also seen as a way to boost technological cooperation and tourism among the three nations, and the three IBSA countries have been working closely with the UN country team in Guinea-Bissau to develop a pilot project of South-South cooperation. Likewise, they have established an IBSA Fund which is aimed to pave the way for new models of partnership and cooperation based on South-South cooperation (Doelling, 2008; HLC, 2007; Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007).

Even if South-South cooperation is being rejuvenated traditional North-South cooperation still carries more weight politically as well as economically. Two reasons account for this. First, it is problematic to classify all of these tendencies as South-South cooperations. Instead, they point towards a new world economic order characterised a) by triangular relations made up of the traditional North, a group of emerging ‘middle’ economies, and a traditional but very heterogeneous South (Shaw et al., 2007); b) by a quest from ‘second-tier’ states to get more political influence; and c) by a multi-polar world with new and old players engaging politically as well as economically in a variety of ways (Subacchi, 2008). Second, it is increasingly problematic to claim that the Southern donors (in particular China and India) speak the voice of the South (Six, 2009).
3. THE RE-EMERGENCE OF NON-TRADITIONAL DONORS

As depicted above, South-South cooperation is nothing new. However, due to the fact that Brazil, South Africa, India and China (now called emerging powers) above all focused on domestic development issues during the 1980s and 1990s, the North had a large room for manoeuvre to determine the rules of the game for the South in this period. This is not only true in terms of development assistance, which was almost exclusively a concern of the traditional donors of the North from the end of the Cold War until the beginning of this millennium (Manning, 2006), but also in terms of investments and trade.

This picture, however, is about to change. Numerous non-traditional donors are (re-)emerging on the development arena (Kragelund, 2008). ECOSOC (2008: 10) calculates their total development assistance as having made up between 7.8 and 9.8 percent of total development assistance flows in 2006. Southern multinationals are investing massively not only in developed economies but also in developing economies, and South-South trade is intensifying (Goldstein, 2007; UNCTAD, 2006).3

A clear indicator that the South is again becoming an important player for the South is the explosion in popularity of regional meetings. China initiated this wave of high-level meetings with the first Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in October 2000 in Beijing. This Ministerial Conference was then succeeded three years later in Addis Ababa and again in 2006 in Beijing. In November 2009, the fourth FOCAC was held in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt. All of these forums have been completed with specific action plans signed by the attendees. This was followed by Brazil. Led by President Lula da Silva, the Africa-South America Summit (ASA) was held in Abuja in 2006. This meeting also led to declarations, namely the Abuja Resolution and the Abuja plan of Action. These declarations have been followed by the Marrakesh Plan of Action drafted by Trade Ministers of the two regions after their June 2008 meeting in Morocco, whereupon the second ASA meeting was held on 26-27 September 2009, in Caracas, Venezuela. The Indians would not hold back either: In April 2008, they invited African heads of state for an India-Africa summit in New Delhi. Predictably, the most noticeable outcome of this meeting was the Delhi Declaration and the Africa-India Framework for Cooperation.4

Not only was China the first country to rejuvenate these regional meetings, it is by far the most influential non-traditional partner for African economies. Its trade and investments are growing rapidly and development cooperation is used to facilitate these flows.5 It is also getting by far the biggest media and scholarly attention of the non-traditional donors mainly due to its size, its fast growth and its frank offer to its developing partners of an alternative route to development. Nonetheless, it is not the only one and not the only important one. Of importance - not so much for the actual flows of development assistance, but rather for their potential in influencing future developments - are also India, Brazil and South Africa. India for its sheer size and historical relations to (parts of) Africa, Brazil for its shared colonial history with (parts of) Africa and its determination to do things differently, and South Africa for its geographical proximity to the rest of the continent.6

This section provides an overview of the form, modality, geographical and sectoral focuses of these donors’ development assistance to African countries. Furthermore, it also makes an educated guess about the size of the funds that are transferred even if all of these non-traditional donors are characterised by the very fact that they do not disclose the full amount of development assistance provided and what they do disclose is not readily comparable with DAC standards (cf. endnote ii).
None of these donors are new to development aid. In fact, they all have as long a history of aid as the main traditional donors, but this is not the focus here. Rather, this section pays attention to the why, the how, and the what of their current development assistance.

3.1 Encapsulating the Fear: China’s Development Cooperation with Africa

China’s doings in Africa trigger dichotomous reactions from observers both inside and outside Africa (cf. Manji & Marks, 2007; Tull, 2006). Although the hysteria is slowly evaporating, China’s engagement in Africa is still largely seen as either malign or benign to Africa’s development, and outside the scholarly debate, China’s development assistance still triggers panic among some observers (cf. Naim, 2007).7 It seems that China’s development assistance encapsulates the fear brought to light by Richard Manning regarding non-traditional donors in general. It is seen as postponing necessary reforms basically arguing that China’s support of authoritarian regimes in Africa ‘with no strings attached’ endangers the West’s efforts to promote political reforms in Africa. Likewise, it is perceived to counter the efforts to respond to acts of international terrorism as, it is argued, groups in Africa hostile to the West can turn towards the East and thereby impede counter-terrorism activities in Africa (Brookes & Shin, 2006).

The problem is that very little is in fact known about Chinese development assistance: the Chinese government does not disclose much information, several Chinese entities take part in the delivery of development assistance, and development assistance is seen as an integral part of other financial flows, thereby blurring the overall picture. This subsection sets out to open the lid of the black box of contemporary Chinese development assistance to Africa by mapping the most recent development projects, discussing the size of the assistance, and highlighting its sectoral and geographical focus.

China’s recent engagement with Africa became consolidated with the third Ministerial Conference of FOCAC in late 2006. While the first FOCAC in 2000 gave African countries a larger political room for manoeuvre by offering them an alternative route to development (to the (post-)Washington Consensus) via the Beijing Declaration that laid out the foundations for an ‘equitable and just new international political and economic order’, the second FOCAC underlined the growing economic relations between the two sides, concentrating on pragmatic cooperation, and in relatively vague terms pledged development assistance from China to its African partners. The third FOCAC followed the publication of China’s Africa Policy (Government of China, 2006), which for the first time brought together all (or most) of China’s policies dealing with Africa in one document.8 Unlike the two previous ministerial conferences, FOCAC 3 was used to publicise the Sino-African relationship to the world and for three full days the Beijing city centre was wrapped in posters symbolising the close relationship between the partners. Centred on the Great Hall of People, the Chinese-African relations reached their official zenith in November 2006. Since then economic and political relations have indeed increased but it is no longer publicised to the same extent by the partners.

One of the major results of the third FOCAC was a list of eight development pledges to China’s African partners (also reproduced in the Beijing Action Plan 2007-2009). As can be seen from Table 1, these pledges by no means only comprise aid, but combine aid, trade and investment measures and most are best described in terms of the DAC concept “other official flows”, comprising funds from governments that do not meet the criteria for “official development aid.”9 They are mentioned in all official Chinese statements on Sino-African relations (see e.g. Xinhua, 2008) and the list of pledges is reproduced in almost all documents relating to Chinese aid (or other activities) to Africa (see e.g. Bräutigam, 2008b; le Pere & Shelton, 2007; Naidu & Herman, 2009; Pehnelt, 2007; Taylor, 2009)). Moreover, each individual pledge and its (partial) fulfilment gets covered by Chinese and African media. China, thus, gets maximum media coverage of its development cooperation.10
Table 1. Current Status of China’s Eight Development Pledges Made at FOCAC 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLEDGE</th>
<th>STATUS MID-2</th>
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<tr>
<td>Double 2006 aid commitment by 2009</td>
<td>NA (see below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide US$3 billion of preferential loans and US$2 billion preferential export buyer's credit</td>
<td>Preferential loan of USD 8.3bn to Nigeria for railways contract and a loan of USD 2.5 bn from the Ex-Im Bank of China for an electricity project (China Africa News, 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set up a Development Fund to support well-established and reputable Chinese companies in investing in Africa</td>
<td>The China-Africa Development Fund was launched in June 2007. By the end of 2008, the fund had approved projects worth USD 2 bn (Bräutigam 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build a conference centre for the African Union</td>
<td>The foundation stone for the centre was laid in 2007 and the construction is expected to last three years (NPC, 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt forgiveness</td>
<td>As of March 2008, China had forgiven bilateral debt to 32 African countries (Anshan, 2008: 33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase from 190 to over 440 the number of export items to China eligible for zero-tariff treatment from LDCs in Africa</td>
<td>As of July 2007, 454 goods have been relieved of tariffs from 26 African least developed countries (Anshan, 2008: 35; Bräutigam, 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set up 3-5 overseas economic and trade cooperation zones</td>
<td>The first one (plus a sub-zone) is already up and running in Zambia (Kragelund, 2009), a contract was signed in March 2007 to build another one in Mauritius (Ancharaz, 2009), and according to Davies (2008), China will also build a zone in Tanzania, and is likely to build one in Nigeria. According to ETNC (2010), two more are taking shape in Egypt and Ethiopia, respectively. According to Bräutigam (2009: 100, 250), all of the above, plus a zone in Algeria were signed off at the end of 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train 15,000 African professionals</td>
<td>By mid-2007, 2,241 had been trained (Anshan, 2008: 34) and by August 2008, 8,627 had been trained (Xinhua, 2008). Area not specified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send 100 agricultural experts to Africa and set up 10 demonstration centres of agricultural technology</td>
<td>By August 2008, 100 agricultural experts and 113 young volunteers had been sent to various African countries to work (Xinhua, 2008). One demonstration centre in Madagascar in operation, construction commenced for two (Rwanda and Togo) and contracts signed for eight centres (Sandrey &amp; Edinger, 2009: 36). In total, China expects to build 14 centres - all run by Chinese enterprises (Bräutigam 2009: 247f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist in building 30 hospitals</td>
<td>USD 10 mn earmarked for a hospital in Liberia (Dennis, 2008), one in Sierra Leone (Concord Times, 2008), Rwanda (Kagire, 2009), and several pledges e.g. in Ghana (GNA, 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide US$ 40 million for anti-malaria drugs</td>
<td>USD 730,000 (CNY 5 mn) for drugs to Ghana (GNA, 2008).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build 30 demonstration centres for prevention and treatment of malaria</td>
<td>The first such centre was opened in the spring of 2009 in Cameroon (Chinnock, 2009)</td>
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</table>
Table 1 is by no means complete: several announcements for hospitals, schools etc. have been made in various African countries (for Tanzania and Zambia see e.g. Huse & Muyakwa (2008)), but these pledges have either not been verified or the projects have not yet taken off, and are therefore not included in the table. Nonetheless, it seems that most of the major pledges that the Chinese government made during FOCAC 3 have, if not been totally completed before the fourth FOCAC commenced in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt in November 2009, then at least set in motion and seemingly on the right track. Thus, most pledges are still in the implementation phase and a good number of projects are still to see the light of day. It is therefore too early to examine the developmental outcomes of these projects. Moreover, hardly any hard facts about the pledges have been disclosed. For instance, which African professionals have been trained, for how long and in what field? Who has been given scholarships and which goods are covered by zero-tariff treatment by China (and more importantly, which are not?), how do the ‘rules-of origin’ compare to, for instance, those of US’s Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) or EU’s ‘Everything but Arms’?

The only big issue that really remains to be solved is whether or not China has in fact doubled its aid to Africa since 2006. This, however, is really difficult to verify.

As pointed out by Kragelund (2008), estimates on the size of (total) Chinese aid vary considerably. In 2005, some estimates were eleven times higher than the official figure released in China Statistical Yearbook. Even though much attention has since been paid to this particular issue, not least because the Chinese government pledged to double the size of aid in three years based on the 2006 level, the figure is still disputed. Using a very broad definition of development assistance comprising *pledges* of aid, loans and particular government sponsored investments, Lum, Fisher, Gomez-Granger, & Leland (2009) reckon that China transferred some USD twenty-five billion to developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America in 2007 (of which USD eighteen billion targeted African countries). This figure sharply contrasts the estimates of one of the authorities in the field, Deborah Bräutigam, who states that the annual budget for Chinese Development assistance reached USD 1.4 billion in 2007 - a figure, which is almost eighteen times lower than the estimates referred to above (Bräutigam, 2008b: 210).

Roughly forty-four percent of the annual budget for Chinese Development assistance (USD 1.4 billion) is estimated to target African countries making the official Chinese development assistance to Africa in 2007 USD 616 million (rising from USD 462 million in 2006). If the concessional part of Ex-Im bank loans are included, Bräutigam (2008b: 210) calculates that the magnitude of Chinese aid to Africa in 2007 was in the region of USD 1.6 billion. Still, the difference between the two recent estimates is enormous.

Not until central entities in China choose to disclose the real amount of aid (in a disaggregated form that would allow us to compare China’s aid flows with other countries’ aid flows) will we be able to make out whether or not China has, in fact, been able to fulfil the most cited pledge of the FOCAC 3 - that...
of doubling aid to Africa. This, however, is not likely to happen in the near future as Chinese assistance is highly politicised internally as well as externally: it is closely related to other activities, and it is used to facilitate Chinese investments and trade abroad; the government fears that greater transparency may lead simultaneously to greater demands for aid by recipient countries and domestic criticism because of the widespread poverty in China. Moreover, Chinese assistance is decentralised. Although the Ministry of Commerce (MoC) is a central actor, it is not the only actor. Numerous line ministries and de-central agencies also provide aid.18 Lastly, it is perceived as impolite for China to disclose the exact figures (Anshan, 2008; M. Davies et al., 2008; Kragelund, 2008), and according to Chin & Frolic (2007: 11) information on Chinese aid is considered a state secret.

Nonetheless, there is hardly any doubt that Chinese development assistance is indeed increasing rapidly, and if Xu Shanda, an economist presenting at the most recent meeting of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (July 13th 2009), gets his way, China will launch a USD 500 billion ‘Marshall Plan’ in the near future. Of course, not all of these funds will qualify as aid. Even so, China’s Marshall Fund will radically change the importance of China as a development player in Africa. The idea is that the plan, on the one hand, will pave the way for large-scale infrastructure projects in African countries (as well as in Latin America and Asia) and on the other hand, it will boost the Chinese economy by absorbing surplus capacity in the Chinese construction and manufacturing sectors, and by establishing the local currency as an international trading currency (Africa-Asia Confidential, 2009a).

These plans, however, were not (yet) implemented by the time the fourth FOCAC took place in Egypt. The results of this forum (and the Sharm El-Sheik Action Plan 2009-2012) were not surprisingly eight pledges that mirror the challenges that the partners are currently facing. They include: (1) climate change cooperation; (2) technology transfer; (3) Further USD ten billion in concessional loans and cancelling of debts; (4) Zero-tariff treatment for 95 percent of products from ‘poorer’ countries; (5) further development of agricultural cooperation; (6) increased focus on anti-malaria prevention and treatment; (7) enhance education by, amongst others, building 50 schools and training teachers; and (8) increase collaborative research (Africa-Asia Confidential, 2009b).

In principle, Chinese development assistance, which primarily comes as development projects, does not exclude any African country and, according to official Chinese sources, development assistance is allocated according to needs (M. Davies et al., 2008: 6). Nonetheless, some observers point to two factors affecting the size of the allocation. The first relates to the only stated conditionality of Chinese development assistance, namely its ‘one-China’ policy, meaning that countries that change diplomatic status from Taiwan to China are met with promises of large increases in development assistance (ECOSOC, 2008). The second relates to the economic importance of the African countries for China either in terms of resource richness of economic or in terms of political influence. Hence, the more important the country is for China, the more assistance it receives (M. Davies et al., 2008).19 In that sense, Chinese aid allocations seem to resemble traditional donors’ priorities (Alesina & Dollar, 2000).

Likewise, Chinese development assistance targets both productive and social sectors, but according to Chin & Frolic (2007), the majority of the assistance goes to infrastructure projects including roads, power plants and telecommunications. Moreover, China has a history of supporting prestige projects. Hereby, China places a specific focus on assisting African countries overcoming supply-side constraints to increase trade volumes.

To sum up, Chinese development assistance is linked to political objectives and it is rising rapidly, but still at a relatively low level compared to the big traditional donors. It is increasingly complex, guided by a variety of
different interests and directed by various entities. Nonetheless, it is possible to single out a few tendencies: it focuses predominantly on the productive sectors and to a lesser extent on primary health care; it is mainly in the form of (tied) grants and credit lines; it uses the project modality and it covers all African counties (albeit some more than others).

3.2 In the Shadow of China? India’s Development Assistance to Africa

“Beyond the gold, copper, oil, or coltan, India also intends to “mine” African votes in various multilateral bodies” (Malghan & Swaminathan, 2008: 21f)

Like China, India’s aid programme is by no means new. It began in the 1950s, first targeting neighbouring countries with economic as well as military aid, and from the beginning of the 1960s, as a direct consequence of the competition with China, India also began to target countries in Africa. In fact, the development of India’s aid relationship with African countries to a large extent resembles that of China – just on a much smaller scale, a bit tardier and not spurring the same dichotomous reactions.

Hence, just as China, it came as no surprise that India lost its interest in development aid as a foreign policy tool in the 1980s and 1990s and changed its perception of aid again in this millennium, now seeing it as an instrument to gain political and economic influence. Therefore, development aid, or rather, a shift from mostly being an aid recipient to also being an aid donor, was perceived by the then Minister of Finance Jaswant Singh as a means to get more international political leverage and ultimately obtain a seat in (an enlarged) UN Security Council. Essentially, development aid and in particular the ‘India Development Initiative’ launched in 2003\textsuperscript{20} was perceived as a means to brand India anew: the world’s attention had to be diverted away from India’s internal problems of poverty and inequality towards its role as an emerging economy (Agrawal, 2007; Six, 2009).

Table 2. India’s Development Cooperation Programmes in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Aim</th>
<th>Total size (USD)</th>
<th>Annual budget (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indian council for cultural relations (ICCR)</td>
<td>1950-1964</td>
<td>Scholarships</td>
<td>Strengthen cultural relations</td>
<td>1-2 bn</td>
<td>Approx. 1800 scholarships (274 for African countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian technical &amp; economic co-operation (ITEC)</td>
<td>1964 ➔</td>
<td>Tied grants &amp; technical assistance</td>
<td>Enhance trade and investment relations</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>10 mn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa programme (SCAAP)</td>
<td>1982-2004 ➔</td>
<td>Tied credit lines and TA</td>
<td>Enhance trade relations with Africa</td>
<td>&gt; 550 mn</td>
<td>ND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus Africa Programme</td>
<td>2002-2007</td>
<td>Credit lines</td>
<td>Promote trade and investments</td>
<td>1.9 bn (Africa)</td>
<td>ND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exim Bank</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Tied credit lines</td>
<td></td>
<td>500 mn</td>
<td>ND</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{20} India Development Initiative launched in 2003.
Although India’s aid has been, and still is, minuscule compared to the big traditional donors, it comprises several different programmes (see Table 2). Historically, the most important programme has been the Indian Technical and Economic Co-operation (ITEC), which was initiated in 1964 and is still running. According to the Ministry of External Affairs, India currently transfers Rs 500 million (USD 10.3 million) a year via this programme. Even though it also targets African countries, the main beneficiaries of this programme are countries located in India’s immediate periphery. Basically, ITEC uses a slots system to allocate aid. Slots may then be exchanged into five different aid modalities, namely: training of personnel in India, project aid, technical assistance, study trips and humanitarian assistance. These modalities comprise a variety of different sectors including numerous courses to enhance production and trade competitiveness in African small- and medium-sized companies as well as courses focusing on intellectual property rights and infrastructure project preparation. The Ministry of External Affairs allocates slots to India’s collaborating partners reflecting the economic and/or political importance India gives this country. These slots are adjusted on a yearly basis and recently a number of African countries (to a large degree coinciding with the TEAM-9 countries, see below) have got their ITEC slots increased. During its life-span of close to 50 years a total of USD one billion has been transferred from India to other developing countries via this programme (MEA, 2009a, 2009b).

ITEC has a sister programme called the Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme (SCAAP). Basically, it makes use of the same aid modalities as ITEC but unlike ITEC, SCAAP only targets African countries in the Commonwealth (nineteen in total). However, not all African Commonwealth countries are targeted with the same degree of eagerness and offered the same conditions. Rather, SCAAP units, which may be exchanged with any of the five aid modalities, are allocated according to the perceived importance of the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Continued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Responsible entity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country focus</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sectoral focus</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modality</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (Agrawal, 2007; Chanana, 2009; ICCR, 2009; Katti, Chahoud, & Kaushik, 2009; MEA, 2009a; Naidu, 2008; Naidu & Herman, 2009).
recipient country for India (just like the ITEC slots). Hence, countries like Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda (large Indian diasporas and/or economic importance) receive a relatively large number of slots, while countries with hardly any Indian diasporas, no natural resources and no economic influence receive only a tiny amount of slots.  

India also offers scholarships to overseas students (university courses at various levels, professional courses, and courses linked to Indian music, dance, and art) via the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) scholarship scheme. By far the majority of the slots offered via this scheme go to neighbouring countries, but during the academic year 2009-2010 some fifteen percent of the slots will go to African countries. Like the ITEC and the SCAAP, India uses this scheme geopolitically. Hence, countries like Mauritius (forty), South Africa (twenty-five), and Kenya (twenty) are allocated far more scholarships than say Cameroon (one), Guinea (one), and Togo (one).

No doubt the transfers from India to its African partners were small in the first three or four decades of these programmes’ existence, and although India’s development assistance to Africa is still insignificant in financial terms, it has been boosted massively over the last few years. The new importance given to development cooperation was sparked by the 2003 budget speech, which set the unsuccessful ‘India Development Initiative’ in motion (Kragelund, 2008; Price, 2004). Since then, numerous schemes (with a particular focus on Africa) have been launched, totalling Rs 26.7 billion (or USD 547 million) in 2008. Hardly any of these would be categorised as aid in a strict DAC sense of the term. Rather, they are amalgamations of grants, contributions to international organisations and international financial institutions, direct loans, and subsidies for preferential bilateral loans (Chanana, 2009).

“Ancient feature of India’s new policy towards West Africa is the recognition that the region is an attractive source of energy” (Singh, 2007: 7).

Among the most important new initiatives is the Focus Africa Programme (2002-2007) totalling USD 550 million, administered by the Export Import Bank of India. Essentially, it seeks to enhance commercial links between India and African countries by offering export subsidies to Indian companies trading with African nations and tied lines of Credit to African governments and regional entities. Likewise, the Techno Economic Approach for Africa India Movement (TEAM-9) is important. It provides eight West African countries with credit lines worth USD 500 million. Just as the other Indian aid programmes, the focus of TEAM-9 also reflects the politico-economic interests of India. Hence, the TEAM-9 countries overlap with countries courted by Indian oil companies (Kragelund, 2008), and much of the assistance provided by India is tied to purchases of products and services from India. In addition, India has offered NEPAD a USD 200 million credit line and is funding the Pan-African E-Network with USD 100 million. Moreover, India offers bilateral debt relief (by 2008, India had written off debt totalling USD twenty-four million (Naidu, 2008: 126), UN peace-keeping operations, and humanitarian assistance to several African countries.

The April 2008 India-Africa summit in New Delhi, attended by heads of state of fourteen African countries and leaders of the main regional groupings, marked the culmination of India’s renewed focus on Africa. As mentioned above, it was spurred largely by India’s aim to change the world’s perception of India - away from being a recipient to being a donor - in order to boost its global political position. Moreover, it was a realisation that political ties have lagged behind the growing economic ties between India and certain African countries. However, there were more reasons: India’s competition with China played a major role in setting up the summit (Chanana, 2009), and it was also seen as a way to reinvent and rejuvenate an old relationship between India and Africa and thereby influence the
global political and economic agenda. Just as important, however, was India’s aim to diversify its energy resources (India currently imports twenty percent of its oil imports from Africa (eleven percent from Nigeria)), create market access for Indian products and pave ways for Indian investments in Africa (Africa-Asia Confidential, 2008; Cherian, 2008).

Table 3. Africa-India Framework for Cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas</th>
<th>Sub-Areas</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Concrete Initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic cooperation</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Food security, market access, exports to world markets, and joint ventures</td>
<td>Cooperation, capacity building, experience sharing, and TA</td>
<td>Financial support to AU to mutually agreed programmes of continental importance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade, industry and FDI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SMEs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Integration</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political cooperation</td>
<td>Peace and security</td>
<td>Governance structures, civil society, peacekeeping operations</td>
<td>TA, capacity building, and cross-fertilisation of ideas</td>
<td>Joint platform for discussion of global issues (South-south basis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Society and Governance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science, technology, and research</td>
<td>Science and technology ICT</td>
<td>Technology transfer, quality standards, and ICT regulation</td>
<td>Experience sharing, cooperation</td>
<td>Roll out the Pan-African E-network project (funded by India)</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social development</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>MDGs, Human resource development, access to health care</td>
<td>Experience-sharing, cooperation</td>
<td>Increase ITEC scholarships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Water and Sanitation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Culture and sports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poverty eradication</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Regulation and governance</td>
<td>Partnerships with PS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure, energy and environment</td>
<td>PPP and creation of enabling environment</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media and communication</td>
<td></td>
<td>South-south communication</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The India-Africa summit resulted in the adoption of two documents: the India-Africa Framework for Cooperation Forum and the Delhi Declaration. Like China’s Africa Policy and the Beijing Action Plan 2007-2009 (see above), the Framework for Cooperation lists several areas (and sub-areas) for cooperation (see schematic representation in Table 3) and a number of focus areas therein. In that sense, the Cooperation Framework is nothing new. What is really interesting, though, is the vague wording of the form (cooperation, sharing of experiences, and capacity building) and the extremely few concrete initiatives, which have lacked reference to costs, agency of implementation, and time frame. On the other hand, one thing is clear: the focus is on South-South cooperation (especially towards establishing a new World order), and particular attention was given to interaction among equal partners.
In addition to the Framework, the partners agreed to develop a plan of action and follow-up mechanisms to implement it. Since the summit, India has announced several financial development pledges including a USD 5.4 billion credit line over the next five years (increasing from USD 2.15 billion in the past five years), grants worth USD 500 million over the next five years (including a 60 percent increase in the 2009 financial year to USD twenty million), and a unilateral opening of India’s economy for exports from all LDCs (thirty-four African) (cf. Naidu & Herman (2009: Box 3).

To sum up, India has again acknowledged the importance of African countries in global governance. Hence, collaborations with African countries have recently been scaled-up and publicised massively. India’s development assistance, however, is still small in terms of funds transferred, but it is not insignificant as it may create a new platform for South-South dialogue and it is framed as a partnership between equal partners, which may enhance the developmental aspect of it. Moreover, it tends to focus on trade-related issues. India’s development assistance is totally linked to India’s own capabilities and its interests in Africa. It is a combination of tied project aid and scholarships and it mainly targets African countries rich in resource or rich in Indian diasporas.

3.3 Using One’s Own Experiences to Help Others: Brazil’s Development Assistance to Africa

“Brazil’s desire to cultivate close relations with African states constitutes one of the top priorities of the country’s current foreign policy agenda” (Doelling, 2008: 5).

Lula da Silva’s foreign policy builds on a long tradition in Brazil of seeking international recognition as a ‘big country’ in world affairs (Lima & Hirst, 2006). In fact, Lula’s major aim is to reform global governance and thereby secure a permanent seat for Brazil in an enlarged UN security council (just like India). According to Vigevani & Cepaluni (2007), Brazil’s engagement outside the continent is strongly linked to this aim, and the development agenda is a central part of this (Schläger, 2007).

This also applies to Brazil’s interest in Africa. Although Brazil pays particular interest to South Africa in this context as it represents the faith that Brazil: “...places in Africa’s contribution to achieving certain political ambitions” (Doelling, 2008: 7), it is not the only African country of interest to Brazil. In fact, Brazil has opened sixteen new embassies in Africa since 2003 (ABC, 2009). While Brazil primarily engages with South Africa via IBSA (see section 2, above), it engages with other African countries chiefly via its various development interventions - or ‘international cooperation’ as Brazil’s government prefers to call it (Vaz & Inoue, 2007). Even though Brazilian international cooperation is clearly linked to foreign policy objectives, it is not confined to ‘buying’ votes from African countries in order to obtain a seat in the (enlarged) Security Council. It also aims to build a platform to augment trade and increase international security.

Like many other non-traditional donors, Brazil makes use of high-level political summits to open up its political and economic Agenda. In the Brazilian case, the summit is called ASA. It aims to harmonise and coordinate positions (especially in terms of trade negotiations), to ease trade between the two regions (and worldwide), to ease investments, and to enhance development cooperation and technical assistance. While the first ASA summit in 2006 identified the energy sector as a priority sector for further collaboration and investments (Sikuka, 2009), the second meeting on Isla Margarita, Venezuela, 26-27 September 2009, was held under the heading: Closing gaps, opening up opportunities. One of the main points on the agenda was the need for reforming the UN Security Council, but the summit also confirmed the need for a Bank for the South and the partners agreed to set up a Radio for the South.
Brazil’s history as a donor country began in the beginning of the late 1960s (two projects), but Brazil did not really take off as a donor until 1978 when the country officially introduced the technical cooperation scheme. Since then, Brazil also adopted a special relationship to the lusophone African countries, i.e. the five Portuguese-speaking African Countries that were once Portuguese colonies, which were soon to become among the priority countries for Brazilian international cooperation (Vaz & Inoue, 2007).

Roughly a decade later, the Agência Brasileria de Cooperação (ABC) was set up in order to coordinate Brazilian technical cooperation. Nonetheless, Brazilian international cooperation is still largely dispersed and several public and private entities take part in it (cf. Vaz & Inoue (2007: 8).

Even so, the ABC fills a unifying function for Brazilian international cooperation and its recent annual report on cooperation with Africa thus lists numerous projects implemented by public and private Brazilian entities such as the local ILO office, various Ministries, the fire brigade, tertiary training centres, research institutions, banks, and human rights institutions. In fact, ABC only implements very few of these projects (and most often in collaboration with other institutions) listed in the annual report (ABC, 2009).

Most assistance targets the agricultural sector (including the Cotton-4 project in four west-African countries), education (technical skills as well as basic literacy projects), and health, but as depicted in Table 4, Brazil’s international cooperation also targets governance, culture, infrastructure, and post-conflict resolution. Three quarters of these projects are channelled to the Lusophone African countries (in terms of both resources and projects). The lion’s share of these projects comes as technical assistance, which in the eyes of the Brazilian donors is perceived as “specifically geared toward helping encourage structural change in productive systems as a means to overcome obstacles to growth” (Vaz & Inoue, 2007: 9).

### Table 4. Ongoing Brazilian Development Projects in Sub-Saharan African Countries (June 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Benin</th>
<th>Burkina Faso</th>
<th>Cape Verde</th>
<th>Cameroon</th>
<th>Côte d’Ivoire</th>
<th>Guinea-Bissau</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
<th>Mali</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>São Tomé and Príncipe</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th>Togo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation based on information from ABC (2009).

Moreover, Brazil feeds its experiences from dealing with poverty and inequality at home into its international cooperation programmes. Recently, therefore, Brazil adapted and transferred two national programmes: the ‘school grant programme’ and the ‘programme for fighting illiteracy’ to some of its Southern partners in Africa and Latin America (HLC, 2007). Likewise, Brazil makes use of trilateral co operations, for instance in health projects, where Brazil has initiated collaboration with non traditional donors such as Cuba in the
fight against HIV/AIDS in, for instance, African countries, and with traditional donors such as Japan in Bolivia (Altenburg & Welkert, 2006). However, Brazilian international cooperation is not confined to the bi- and trilateral levels. Brazil also supports multilateral agencies, most notably the UN, and according to ECOSOC (2008: 13), Brazil also provides debt relief and emergency assistance to a smaller extent.

Bilateral projects are most often co-funded with local institutions. Unfortunately, the ABC does not disclose the costs of the projects (and thereby the overall disbursements), but forecasts that in the financial year 2009-2010 Brazil will allocate USD thirty-eight million for Brazilian South-South Cooperation (ABC, 2009: 6). Even though this figure is indeed small compared to the development aid from traditional donors, it is indeed a large increase from the 2000-2004 level when Brazil according to Schläger (2007: 5) made USD twelve million available for international co operations. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that these figures may grossly underestimate the real value of the international cooperation as an official source puts it: “Another significant characteristic of the Brazilian TCDC [Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries] program is that it is estimated that each US$ 1.00 spent should be multiplied by ten, since its execution partners are institutions that do not charge for their participation nor for the know-how they contribute” (HLC, 2005). Thus, the figure of USD 356 million (0.03 percent of GNI) for 2006 excluding humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping reported by ECOSOC (2008: 11) is probably not widely off the mark. Roughly, one-tenth of this was directed towards aid-related issues.

To sum up, Brazil is placing more and more political emphasis on Africa. South Africa is the centre of this attention after which come the lusophone African countries that have been courted by Brazilian development assistance for the past thirty years. Brazilian development assistance is no longer confined to the African countries sharing the same colonial history but now covers fifteen sub-Saharan African countries (cf. Table 4). Brazil’s minuscule international cooperation (in economic terms) is largely uncoordinated and involves several different actors in Brazil as well as elsewhere. The majority of the projects target agriculture, education and health, but Brazil also engages in infrastructure projects in Angola and Cap Verde.

### 3.4 Promoting African Renaissance: South Africa’s Development Assistance to Africa

South Africa has a long history of development assistance, which to a large extent mirrors that of other non-traditional donors. South Africa, thus, used development assistance during the apartheid era to buy friends and thereby curb the external critique of the regime (Braude, Thandrayan, & Sidiropoulos, 2008). Even though it is still possible to identify a certain level of scepticism among South Africa’s neighbours in terms of accepting South Africa’s role as a regional power, the situation today radically differs from the pre-1994 era. Nonetheless, development assistance (in its multiple forms) is still used as a foreign policy tool in South Africa.

The real change in South Africa’s role in the rest of Africa, however, did not take place until after Thabo Mbeki came to power in 1999. His ambition was to make South Africa the leading power in Africa. In order to reach this goal, he, amongst other things, chaired the AU in 2002/2003, architected the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001, and spoke out for Africa in the global arena (Alden & Vieira, 2005; Sidiropoulos, 2008). Moreover, he framed all these activities under the notion of ‘African Renaissance’, which encompasses three South African foreign policy aims, namely keeping peace in Africa, promoting democratisation, and championing Africa’s interests worldwide. Not surprisingly, therefore, South Africa’s most well known development assistance programme is entitled the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF) established in February 2000. As pointed out by Braude et al. (2008), however, the ARF only comprises a very small part of South Africa’s development assistance. By far
the majority comes from other governmental entities, especially the Department of Defence and the Department of Education. Nonetheless, the ARF sets the agenda of all South African development assistance.

The ARF comprises grants and loans to collaborating African partners (predominantly Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Conakry, Sudan and Uganda) and takes the form of co-financed projects and technical assistance. Figure 1 depicts the sectoral distribution of the ARF over four financial years (2004-2008). It shows a sharp increase in disbursements from 2005/2006 to 2006/2007 (60 million ZAR (eight million USD) to 392 million ZAR (53 million USD)) and points to the three most important areas of the ARF, namely capacity building, democratisation, and post-conflict reconstruction.

South African development assistance is by no means confined to the ARF. In fact, Braude et al. (2008: 5) establish that only 3.3 percent of South African development Assistance in 2004 came from the ARF. With the sizeable increase in ARF disbursement since then, this figure may have changed but the overall picture remains the same: numerous public entities in South Africa are involved in the development cooperation including the South African National Defence Force and the South African Police Services. Like other non-traditional donors, South Africa also makes use of high-level meetings to strengthen bilateral relations. In 2007, South Africa had high level meetings with Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger, Ghana, Nigeria, Lesotho, and Guinea-Bissau.

Moreover, the most recent annual report from the Department of Foreign Affairs informs us that South Africa provides humanitarian assistance via multilateral agencies especially, but not solely, to the rest of the continent. Furthermore, it signed bilateral agreements with the Democratic Republic of Congo to support infrastructure, health and the military, and with Madagascar to assist with humanitarian assistance in 2007-2008. Likewise, South Africa embarked upon capacity building, support to education, health, and water projects bilaterally in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Comoros, and Sudan and supported the African Union Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Fund (DFA, 2008b). Lastly, South Africa is involved in triangular cooperation in African countries funded by Japan (ECOSOC, 2008).

South Africa's development assistance thus to a large extent resembles that of the other
non-traditional donors in Africa: It lacks a coordinating body and exact figures are unavailable. (Braude et al. (2008: 15) however, estimate that South Africa’s development assistance in 2006 was in the region of 3211 million ZAR (433 million USD) corresponding to 0.18 percent of the GDP).\(^2\)\(^8\) It is closely linked to other foreign policy objectives and this link is directly reflected in geographical as well as sectoral choices.

To sum up, South Africa’s current development assistance programmes only date a decade back but prior to this, South Africa used development assistance as an important foreign policy tool. Now, development assistance underlines South Africa’s quest to become a regional power. Via its various small programmes, South Africa seeks to engage in capacity-building, humanitarian assistance and post-conflict reconstruction in several African countries.
4. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENHANCED OUTCOMES

Whether or not the re-emergence of non-traditional donors on the African continent will actually lead to long-term economic and social development in Africa depends to a large extent on whether it assists the process of structural transformation involving economic, political and social changes. Part of this structural transformation has to do with increasing the share of manufacturing in the economy (and the twin process of raising agricultural productivity) and enhancing the ability to trade.\(^{29}\) In the short term, however, other factors are more important. They relate to, amongst others, access to clean water, better health facilities, and the improvement of primary education.

Hence, an assessment of the role of non-traditional donors in either spurring or blocking development in Africa requires that we have reasonable accurate information about the scale, content, form, mode and sectoral distribution of the non-traditional donors’ development assistance. Unfortunately, this is not the case. As spelled out in most studies on non-traditional donors data reliability is a big problem as the donors themselves do not disclose (all) development assistance, definitions vary, coordination is lacking, and they all make widespread use of pledges of assistance rather than document actual disbursements (cf. ECOSOC, 2008; Grimm et al., 2009).

Nonetheless, Table 5 tries to summarise the key characteristics of the four non-traditional donors discussed in this paper. The table highlights several interesting points. First and foremost, development assistance (somewhat comparable to ODA) is still minuscule compared to most traditional donors (ODA from DAC donors represented 0.28 Percent of GNI in 2007 on average - ranging from 0.16 (Greece and United States) to 0.95 (Norway)). Thus, what matters most is not the size of development assistance per se but the principles that underlie the assistance and how it is related to other forms of financial flows. Secondly, these non-traditional donors show a number of similarities and differences. As appears from Table 5, non-traditional donors all make widespread use of project aid, they officially use development assistance to further South-South cooperation, and much of their assistance is provided through loans or credits. However, they also differ in certain key respects. Both China and India make use of debt cancellation in their development assistance portfolio while the two other donors do not. China, India and Brazil focus on productive sectors while South Africa is more preoccupied with democracy and conflict resolution, and while South Africa only provides development assistance to countries in its immediate neighbourhood, the three other countries provide aid to countries geographically very distant from themselves.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>China</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aid (USD mn)</td>
<td>1,400-25,000</td>
<td>1,420</td>
<td>356(^a)</td>
<td>433(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%/GNI(^b)</td>
<td>0.04 - 0.79</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsible entities</td>
<td>Ministry of Commerce (but performed by numerous entities)</td>
<td>Ministry of External Affairs, Indian Council for Cultural Relations, and Ministry of Commerce and Industry</td>
<td>Agência Brasileira do Cooperação</td>
<td>The African Renaissance and Development Fund (but performed by numerous entities)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notwithstanding the fact that it has been impossible thus far to assess the development assistance flows (as well as other financial flows) from these donors accurately (cf. OECD (2009)), journalists, politicians and academics alike do not refrain from drawing strong conclusions based on these rather poor data. During the past couple of years we have thus witnessed a growing concern about the consequences of the growing importance of non-traditional donors for Africa’s development. The lion’s share of these concerns refers directly to China’s political and economic engagement in Africa as China most eagerly publishes its activities. Nonetheless, they may just as well be applied to other non-traditional donors as the concerns relate directly to certain shared characteristics of the non-traditional donors’ development assistance (cf. Table 5). Thus, the following claims (as well as the analysis thereof) regarding Chinese engagement in Africa to a certain extent also apply to India, Brazil and South Africa.

The most widely circulated claim is that these donors support African dictators and thereby undermine development efforts (of the traditional donors). This is indeed true for China and India as they provide aid to all African states, including the ones that may be classified as rogue states. Likewise, Brazil and South Africa’s collaborating partners in Africa include states that to some extent overlap with these regimes. Nonetheless, this does not warrant the claim by Naím (2007: 95) that these donors’ “goal is not to help other countries develop. Rather, they are motivated by a desire to further their own national interests, advance an ideological agenda, or sometimes line their own pockets. Rogue aid providers couldn’t care less about the long-term well-being of the population of the countries they ‘aid’.”

According to Woods (2008), this claim is exaggerated. In the case of Sudan, for instance, the story is way more complex than merely Chinese support for Chinese oil companies. It

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Table 5. Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>China</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Form</strong></td>
<td>Grants, credit lines, interest free loans and concessional loans</td>
<td>Credits, concessional loans and grants</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Grants and loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modality</strong></td>
<td>Projects, debt cancellation and stipends</td>
<td>Projects, scholar-ships, debt can-cellation, and humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>Co-financed projects and technical assistance</td>
<td>Co-financed projects and technical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official aim</strong></td>
<td>South-south cooperation, altruism, regional stability and access to markets and resources</td>
<td>South-south cooperation, enhance trade relations, strengthen cultural relations and promote investments</td>
<td>South-south cooperation</td>
<td>South-south cooperation, democracy, conflict resolution and economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country focus</strong></td>
<td>Latin America, Asia and Africa (44 percent)</td>
<td>Immediate neighbourhood and Africa</td>
<td>Latin America and 15 African countries (Lusophone in particular)</td>
<td>Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sectors</strong></td>
<td>Infrastructure, productive sectors, health, and prestige projects</td>
<td>Agriculture, infrastructure and transport</td>
<td>Agriculture, education and health</td>
<td>Democratisation, post-conflict resolution and humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (Agrawal, 2007; Bräutigam, 2008; ECOSOC, 2008; Lum, Fisher, Gomez-Granger, & Leland, 2009)
a 2006 figures. bAll aid/GNI figures are author’s own calculations based on GNI data from the World Development Indicators database.
is also a story of China urging the Sudanese President Bashir to work with the UN to end the Darfur conflict as well as a story of Chinese efforts to maintain a peacekeeping operation in the area. Likewise, she states that the Chinese support for Mugabe’s regime in Zimbabwe has not “been immune to the views of other states” (Woods, 2008: 1207). Thus, we have to put aside the one-dimensional view of non-traditional donors as rogue donors and instead examine the positive as well as negative consequences of their engagement.

Related to Naim’s (2007) claim about rogue donors, several observers have argued that aid with ‘no strings attached’ - a characteristic of all the non-traditional donors - jeopardises hard fought-for gains in terms of economic and political reforms. Following Taylor (2004), Tull (2006: 476) in a much cited paper about the consequences of China’s engagement in Africa states that: “...there is virtually no way around the conclusion that China’s massive return to Africa presents a negative political development that ‘almost certainly does not contribute to the promotion of peace, prosperity and democracy on the continent’.”

There are basically two parts to this argument. First, that the economic and political reforms that have been implemented (and have turned out beneficial for the population in African countries) in fact are causally related to the conditionalities of aid and second, that the politics of ‘no conditionalities’ halt future (necessary)reforms. Regarding the first argument there is hardly any doubt that conditionalities have played a major role in changing policies in many African countries (cf. Kragelund, 2009; Rakner, 2003) for Zambia). In spite of this, it is somewhat questionable whether, or to what extent, the traditional donors’ conditionalities have furthered improvements in health, safety and environmental standards (Woods, 2008): these improvements are most often related to a number of other internal and external factors. The second argument is also weak. To begin with, non-traditional donors’ development assistance is still tiny compared to the overall flows of aid to Africa (cf. Table 5).

Thus, for most African countries, Chinese, Indian, Brazilian and South African development assistance is not an alternative to traditional aid but rather complements it (cf. ECOSOC (2008)). African state agencies still spend the majority of their time negotiating with their ‘Western’ counterparts. Thus, although African heads of state in certain cases are able to turn to the non-traditional donors (cf. the much cited case of Angola turning down an IMF loan in favour of a Chinese credit), in most cases the availability of additional funds may be used to increase sovereignty. Thus, rather than presenting a negative political development on the continent, the return of non-traditional donors will enlarge the room for manoeuvre for African heads of state and thereby (maybe) increase their power of negotiation vis-à-vis traditional donors (cf. Whitfield (2008)). This is probably also the reason why, according to OECD (2009), the development partners in, for instance, Africa, welcome the non-traditional donors and see their engagement as an opportunity for the future.

However, most what has been said about the potential negative effects of non-traditional aid is general and hypothetical (cf. McCormick (2008). We still lacked detailed studies of the effects of the re-emergence of non-traditional aid to Africa in terms of developmental effects in Africa as well as in terms of responses of the traditional donors. Nonetheless, the small numbers of more extensive studies that do exist offer us some insights into the effects of the re-emergence.

Kragelund (2008), for instance, found that the developmental consequences of the re-emergence of non-traditional donors to Africa depend principally on the current donor-recipient relationship in the African countries: it implies that more sectors in more countries were reached. Thus, while traditional donors until very recently targeted (only) social sectors, non-traditional donors targeted the productive sectors. Moreover, the studies found that not only were ‘donor darlings’ targeted but so were conflict and post-conflict countries (formerly mostly targeted by multilateral agencies and
The political elite in these non-donor darling countries will consequently have a marked enlarged room for manoeuvre while the re-appearance of non-traditional donors will put (further) pressure on the absorptive capacity for donor darlings - already faced with several bilateral donors, international financial institutions, vertical funds, and non-governmental organisations eager to engage in development collaborations. Similarly, the widespread use of project aid among non-traditional donors is not necessarily decreasing the effectiveness of aid even though project aid is known to have high transaction costs compared to for instance sector-wide approaches or budget support (cf. Morss (1984). The turn towards sector-wide approaches and budget support has meant increasing administrative pressure on key line ministries in developing countries. Thus, new aid modalities from non-traditional donors targeting other institutions in fact spreads transaction costs rather than increase them per se (Andersen & Therkildsen 2007).

The ECOSOC study concludes that non-traditional donors’ development assistance is growing rapidly (although currently still small compared to that of traditional donors’). It is complementary to traditional aid, linked directly to other flows, especially trade, and therefore concentrated in countries reflecting cultural and language links. Moreover, it is less burdened by administrative and procedural delays and it is tied (ECOSOC, 2008).

The International Development Research Centre also requested a study of the emergence of non-traditional donors. It concludes that these donors present opportunities for Southern partners as they are perceived as credible intermediaries between the traditional donors and the recipients. Moreover, they are seen to provide valuable services. On the other hand, their re-emergence challenges traditional donors’ authority to set the standards and norms of development aid in the future. This is perceived as potentially destructive (Rowlands, 2008).

This latter conclusion is somewhat followed up by Grimm et al (2009) who conclude that the re-emergence of the non-traditional donors challenges the perception of traditional donors regarding the link between democracy and development as well as regarding the importance of human rights. This, however, only becomes a real problem if it causes individual DAC members to align to the non-traditional donors and thereby challenge the consensus among DAC donors. However, this consensus has, to the knowledge of this author, not yet been challenged.

Gabas (2009) follows this line of thinking. He reckons that the dual stance of non-traditional donors as both donors and recipients of aid will challenge the very aid system established by the traditional donors since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, allocation criteria are at odds which certainly will lead to an improvement of recipient states’ bargaining power that will inevitably test the status quo.

Other factors, however, are also at play. Most importantly, the perception of Africa differs between traditional and non-traditional donors. While non-traditional donors tend to perceive Africa as a potential business partner and source of natural resources, traditional donors have (at least until very recently) perceived Africa as a lost continent in need of targeted assistance. Consequently, Brazilian, Chinese, Indian and South African companies are making big inroads into the continent - often competing for the same resources but in some cases also collaborating. Development assistance (for better or for worse) is openly used to facilitate this (cf. Biggeri & Sanfilippo (2009). This could provide valuable input for Africa’s development and structural transformation, but the flip side is that the unclear boundaries between development assistance and other external financial flows make the transfers less transparent (Grimm et al., 2009). Similarly, the non-traditional donors’ perception of Africa may spark ‘a race for access to Africa’s resources’ as Chinese as well as Indian development assistance is to some extent linked to the availability of natural resources.

These contrasting perceptions affect the way development assistance is provided as well as
how it is perceived. As a result, non-traditional donors pay more attention to supporting productive sectors while traditional donors pay attention to the social sectors directly linked to the achievement of the millennium development goals. Linked directly hereto, both China and India provide wide-scale tariff exemptions to African countries. These exemptions are unilateral and cover close to 90 percent of African exports to these markets. This form of aid, which differs from the tendency of the traditional donors to insist on mutual tariff reductions (which still exclude some major export commodities of the South), may play a significant role in the development of Africa’s productive sectors and may facilitate structural transformations. As pointed out above, however, we still lack basic information about the specific coverage and design of these measures. Hence, we are a long way away from being able to determine their effects in terms of increase in African exports.

The two groups also differ with regards to the speed with which they respond to the demands of their African counterparts. While the processes set up by DAC to enhance the quality of aid tend to prolong the response rate of traditional donors, non-traditional donors are not affected by these procedures and are therefore able to respond much quicker to the needs of African governments (Hilsum, 2005). According to ECOSOC (2008), this difference has given rise to partner governments perceiving non-traditional development assistance as more predictable than traditional aid. In the same vein, there is a tendency for the non-traditional donors’ development assistance to be ‘tailor-made’ while traditional aid since the beginning of the 1980s’ structural adjustment programmes have been characterised by a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach.

Non-traditional development assistance is often (negatively) portrayed as tied aid and as the analysis of four of the major non-traditional donors has depicted it is indeed true: China and India, and to a lesser extent also Brazil and South Africa do tie their development assistance to the purchase of goods and services. This, however, is neither necessarily distinct nor bad. Even though over the years DAC has been trying to persuade its members to untie aid in order to increase the effectiveness of aid (the argument being that competition lowers prices and increases choices), DAC aid is not yet untied: regular reviews of members’ development aid show that the majority of members still make use of aid tying. Similarly, the fact that non-traditional donors’ development assistance is tied does not automatically result in decreased effectiveness. Firstly, to this author’s knowledge, no studies of the effectiveness of, say, Chinese aid has been conducted. Secondly, Chinese (and Indian) companies currently win a good share of public tenders in many African countries indicating either great competitiveness of these companies, partly due to their already extensive presence on the continent (that reduces costs) (or widespread use of corrupt practices) (cf. CCS (2006)).
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

South-South cooperation is by no means a new thing, but China’s, and to a lesser extent Brazil and South Africa’s, renewed interest in South-South relations has fuelled a heated debate about the motives, strategies and effects thereof. Development assistance is in no way the principal ingredient in South-South cooperation, which is largely made of trade and investments, but also includes migration, tourism, and peace-keeping operations. Nonetheless, it is the most important one as it is used to facilitate the other (interwoven) flows. Thus, an analysis of the current trends in development assistance may also provide us with answers regarding the other flows (albeit they of course affect different groups in society differently).

The motives and strategies of course differ among the non-traditional donors, but they all centre on politics (restructuring global governance to obtain international political power corresponding to their increasing economic power) and securing access to valuable resources) and economics (access to markets and investment opportunities). The big question is how it affects development outcomes for African (and other developing countries) as well as how it alters the current aid architecture.

As spelled out in section 4 above, the dichotomous view of non-traditional donors being either benign or malign to Africa’s development is not consistent with the (albeit poor) information that we do have. Instead, the re-emergence of these donors to Africa will result in more development assistance to more sectors in more countries. Given the need for external financial flows to meet the millennium development goals, this is indeed good news (cf. Asiedu (2004)). Moreover, non-traditional donors pay particular attention to trade-related aid including duty- and quota-free access to the Chinese and Indian markets, training and technical assistance to build private sector capacity, and support to large-scale infrastructural projects. This could pave the way for increased trade flows. Recent studies, however, point out that not all trade facilitation is equally important in terms of increasing trade flows. Helble, Mann, & Wilson (2009), for instance, conclude that even though these factors matter, changes in trade policy and trade regulation matter more.

The current financial crisis will most likely affect both foreign direct investments and credits to developing countries negatively (Cali, Massa, & te Velde, 2008), and based on experiences from a previous economical depressions, development aid from traditional donors will also be affected negatively (Roodman, 2008). However, the situation is somewhat different for the big non-traditional donors and in particular for China. In the words of Cook & Gu (2009: 43), “There is little reason to believe that [the] financial crisis will significantly alter China’s economic and strategic interests in Africa….China may in fact play a role in cushioning the impact of global recession for some low income economies as its heavily infrastructure-biased domestic stimulus package may shore up demand and thus the price for some resources.” In other words, non-traditional donors’ presence in Africa is more important than ever right now.

Of course, the re-emergence of non-traditional donors should not only be seen through rose-tinted glasses; increased financial flows may create problems of absorption capacity for some African countries courted by both traditional and non-traditional donors, it is provided in the forms of projects which increase the proliferation and fragmentation of aid, putting pressure on African bureaucracies. It is seldom on the budget (which to a large extent is also true for traditional donors’ aid) thereby risking to undermine transparency, it targets the political elite, and it is tied.

Moreover, the re-emergence of these donors will enlarge policy space for African governments. On a positive note, this may help bring
sovereignty and ownership back to Africa - something that the Paris Declaration has not yet been able to do (Whitfield, 2008), but on a negative note, it may further bad governance as non-traditional donors do not make use of economic and political conditionalities.

The effects of South-South cooperation are not only confined to the African counterparts; they also shape traditional donors’ aid. Thus they need to attune their policies and adapt to new roles as South-South cooperation grows stronger (P. Davies, 2007: 30). As pointed out by Cook & Gu (2009), traditional donors have already responded by engaging in infrastructure projects in Africa again. Likewise, they engage in trilateral cooperation with some (but not all) non-traditional donors in Africa.

5.1 Recommendations

- Traditional donors should engage non-traditional donors in areas of mutual interest. These areas include, amongst others, peace and security, infrastructure, and food security as they are targeted by both groups on a project-by-project basis (thereby excluding areas primarily targeted by budget support such as health).

- Of importance in this respect is African ownership. Devoid of African ownership, non-traditional donors will have no interest in taking part in trilateral cooperation. Hence, it is imperative that traditional donors continue their commitment to build institutional capacity in African countries.

- This is particularly important in relation to trade-related assistance. Non-traditional donors pay much attention to trade-related aid, but mostly in terms of project-to-project facilitation. In order to enhance the developmental effects of these projects, traditional donors could scale up support to regulatory reforms.

- Related to this, traditional donors should engage non-traditional donors at the local level thereby ensuring that the process is African-driven. Such engagement could enhance mutual understanding among the development partners via positive development experiences.

- African countries have to bear in mind that when dealing with non-traditional donors they are dealing with a multitude of players comprising public and private entities, with different and sometimes opposing interests. In order to deal constructively with this situation, traditional donors should help African countries to seize the new opportunities by building capacities in central and line ministries.

- Traditional donors should make sure to keep promises of aid disbursement as well as aid reforms implementation in order to maintain credibility vis-à-vis African partners and thereby be able to further institution building.

- Likewise, traditional donors should seek to demonstrate and explain the link between economic and political conditionalities and social and economic development better. Thereby, development partners would not perceive assistance from the two types of donors as contrasting but complementary.
ENDNOTES

1 Richard Manning denoted this group of donors: ‘emerging donors’. However, most of the donors covered in his speech were not new to development assistance and therefore not really emerging (new) donors but rather re-emerging donors (Manning, 2006). This led Kragelund (2008) to suggest the term ‘non-DAC donors’ (grouped according to membership of either EU and/or OECD) instead to capture the fact that what really distinguished them from other donors was their lack of membership of DAC. Grimm, Humphrey, Lundsgaarde, & de Souza (2009) also question the accuracy of the term ‘emerging’ and instead suggest the term ‘new state actors’ (distinguishing between donors (re)emerging into the international consensus, ‘traditional donors’ beyond the OECD, emerging global powers, regional powers with strong foreign aid activities in their respective region, and other donors not aspiring to OECD-DAC standards). For the sake of simplicity, this paper uses the term ‘non-traditional donors’ to point to the difference in terms of definitions and standards between the established bilateral donor community (organized in the DAC) and the others.

2 Even though form, modality and focus of South-South development cooperation will be discussed at length in this paper, one aspect has to be stressed from the very outset, namely that the definition of non-traditional donors’ development assistance differs from that of the traditional donors. No doubt, definitions overlap, especially in terms of the overall goal of fostering social and economic development (Naidu & Herman, 2009), but direct comparisons are very hard to make, not least because non-traditional donors’ development assistance includes monetary as well and non-monetary forms and because assistance is openly used to catalyse other, larger, flows of external finance. This paper uses the terms development cooperation and development assistance rather than development aid in order to point to the differences in definitions between the non-traditional donors’ use of the word and the traditional ones’.

3 According to Das (2009), South-South trade reached USD two trillion in 2006, thereby accounting for thirty-seven percent of developing countries’ total trade in 2006 and comprising some seventeen percent of world merchandise trade.

4 Later, the Turkish President Abdullah Gul followed up and arranged a Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit in Istanbul, Turkey.

5 See Biggeri & Sanfilippo (2009) for an attempt to quantify the relationship between Chinese aid, trade and investments. Amongst others, they find that aid has a strong positive impact on investments and trade is positively related to (previous) investments.

6 Other countries broadly sharing the same similarities have also entered the development scene. Egypt provides aid to African countries via its Fund for Technical Cooperation with Africa. Of late, Egypt has given electric generators to the Central African Republic, provided equipment to a vocational training centre in Southern Sudan, food aid to Ethiopia, Mali, Sudan, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, and technical agricultural assistance (with the Islamic Bank of Development) to cotton producing nations in Africa (MFA, 2009), amongst others. Likewise, Libya has embarked on a route to become an international donor. In 1998, the Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation was established. So far, its main activities have targeted Libyan citizens, but of late it also provides development assistance to Asian and African countries including the donation of a field hospital and an immunization campaign in Chad, vocational training and the construction of a mosque in Burkina Faso, and construction of a primary school and drilling of wells in Niger (GDF, 2008).

7 This media attention contrasts with the attention that derives from its engagement in neighboring countries even though China’s aid, trade and investment activities in its geographical backyard historically is far greater than its engagement in Africa.

8 FOCAC was originally perceived as a way to strengthen and further develop existing Sino-African relations, which to a large degree centred on development projects (of which the Tazara railway from Kapiri Mposhi to Dar es Salaam is the most famous). The aim was thus
to build an extra layer on the relationship - a layer of trade and investments. Hence, the
delegates paid much attention to expanding trade between China and Africa.

9 Hence, depending on the exact terms of the concessional loans, the USD three billion
over three years could qualify as aid, while it is highly unlikely that the USD two billion
preferential buyers’ credit qualifies as aid (Pledge 2). Likewise, the USD five billion
Development Fund (Pledge 3) is undoubtedly not aid (Bräutigam, 2008b).

10 See Pehnelt (2007) for a similar argument regarding China’s use of loans rather than
grants, viz. loans provide positive reactions twice: when the loans are provided and again
when the debts are forgiven.

11 In light of the growing uncertainties following the global financial crisis, Chinese
President, Hu Jintao, during his 2009 tour of African countries committed to “fully and
punctually implement measures agreed at the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-
Africa Cooperation” (cited from Cook & Gu (2009: 43)). This comes as no surprise as China
also fulfilled its (somehow fluffy) pledges made during FOCAC 1 (le Pere & Shelton, 2007:
145). This commitment is echoed by Chinese officials speaking to Africa-Asia Confidential
in October 2009. Nonetheless, Africa-Asia Confidential has reservations about the actual
fulfillment (Africa-Asia Confidential, 2009b).

12 It should be noted though, that Minson (2008: 3), based on an ‘unofficial’ Chinese version
of the list of products covered by the agreement, calculates that 88 percent of the
products cover items already exported from Africa to China and that the average margin
of preference on these products is 10.4 percent (certain important products such as
raw cotton are excluded from the list). Based on these figures, Minson reckons that the
value of the Chinese preferences is in the region of USD ten million/year. This figure
is contrasted by an official Chinese spokesperson, who states that USD 680 million was
transferred via this programme from 2006 to 2008 (Bräutigam, 2009: 96).

13 See Mattoo, Roy, & Subramanian (2003) for a discussion of the impact of rules of origin on
the overall effectiveness of AGOA.

14 Bräutigam (2008b: 208) rightly points out that the high estimates confuse loans with aid:
this was also the case with the USD 8.1 billion 'aid' disbursement announced by a couple
of journalists.

15 This figure comprises grants, the face value of zero-interest loans administered by Ministry
of Commerce, and the interest rate subsidy given to the concessional loans administered
by China Ex-Im Bank, as well as expenses for health teams and training programs, but not
scholarships (Bräutigam, 2008a: 22).

16 This figure differs slightly from the figure that Bräutigam presents in a working paper on
the same issue (Bräutigam, 2008a).

17 Two main factors account for this enormous difference. First, Bräutigam (2008a, 2008b)
disaggregates the various Chinese loans and grants while Lum, Fisher, Gomez-Granger, &
Leland (2009) add them all together. Secondly, Bräutigam uses official figures while Lum,
Fisher, Gomez-Granger, & Leland base their estimate on media stories of transfers. There
are problems related to both approaches, though. While Bräutigam risks missing out all
the aid that is not recorded for political and/or administrative reasons (see below), Lum,
Fisher, Gomez-Granger, & Leland mistakenly confuse pledges for actual transfers and mix
up multi-year commitments with annual flows as most credit-lines run for more than one
year. Moreover, the press reports that they rely on for information often do not distinguish
between development assistance and commercial activities (cf. (Chin & Frolic, 2007)).

18 For a schematic overview of the most important entities in Chinese development assistance,
see for instance (Chin & Frolic, 2007; M. Davies, Edinger, Tay, & Naidu, 2008).

19 This view is supported by Chaponnière (2009: table 3.1), who estimates that 68 percent of
Chinese aid to Africa in 2004/2005 targeted only five countries (Sudan, Algeria, Nigeria,
Angola and Egypt).
This initiative concurred with India’s efforts to downsize its relationship with (small) external donors resulting in a situation where India now only accepts bilateral aid from eight bilateral donors and the EU (Agrawal, 2007).

Other ministries, such as Ministry of Human Resource Development and Ministry of Science and Technology are involved in the technical training related to ITEC and SCCAP.

As of 1 April 2003, the programme was extended from the original seven beneficiaries to all countries with an Indian diplomatic mission. In essence, the missions cover all African countries.

India provides budget support to Bhutan, Nepal and Afghanistan.

Slots for ITEC and SCCAP as well as scholarships via the ICCR are adjusted on a yearly basis. The updated levels are publicised in Ministry of External Affairs annual reports (cf. (MEA, 2009a)).

In ABC’s own report, technical cooperation is now referred to as horizontal cooperation (ABC, 2009).

In 2007 Equatorial Guinea included Portuguese as an official language (alongside Spanish and French) and thus became the sixth Portuguese-speaking country in Africa.

The corresponding figure for the 1998-2004 period was USD fifteen million (Altenburg & Weikert, 2006: 34).

It must be noted though, that Braude et al. (2008) put this figure 1000 times higher: clearly a typing error. Thanks to Jan Corfee Morlot for calling my attention to this.

See McCormick (2008) for a discussion of the differences between China and India in terms of supporting Africa’s manufacturing sector.

See also Large (2008) for a description of the increasingly complex relationship between China and Sudan.


During the last quarter of the twentieth century, global trade and production of clothes and textiles was governed by the MFA, which allowed countries to impose tariff and quotas on imports of these products. The MFA was terminated on the last day of 2004 essentially allowing big producers like China unlimited access to world markets (Morris, 2006).

Even though non-traditional donors are characterised by their lack of standards in terms of, for instance, definitions of aid and monitoring and evaluations systems, they do evaluate their development assistance projects in order to enhance its effectiveness. For this reason, China regularly sends scholars to Africa to assess progress (or lack thereof) of particular projects.

According to estimates made by Jean-Raphaël Chaponnière: “25 percent of African Development Bank’s (in 2005/2006) and 15 percent of World Bank’s projects in Africa were carried out by Chinese firms” (Chaponnière, 2009: 66).

With the outbreak of the global financial crisis, China has overtaken Germany to become the third largest economy in the world (Cook & Gu, 2009).
REFERENCES


29


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