Staggered Wages, Sticky Prices, and Labor Market Dynamics in Matching Models

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March 26, 2010

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† We would like to thank Christian Merkl for highly valuable comments and suggestions.
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1 Motivation

In recent years, macroeconomic research is characterized by an increased importance of labor market imperfections. The standard model to introduce such imperfections is the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) (MP, henceforth) search and matching model. In this prototyp model, separations are driven by job-specific productivity shocks affecting new and old jobs, drawn from a time-invariant distribution. These shocks generate a flow of workers into unemployment, while the transition process from unemployment to employment is subject to search frictions, characterized by a matching function. A widely used assumption is, that the economic rent of a match is splitted in individual Nash bargaining. This partial equilibrium core is often expanded to a general equilibrium model with sticky prices. In addition, since Erceg et al. (2000) staggered wages are a widely recognized feature of New Keynesian models when it comes to explaining inflation dynamics. In contrast, our contribution is to shed light on the importance of sticky prices and staggered wages for the performance of the MP model with respect to labor market dynamics. We show that the partial equilibrium core creates too much volatility of key variables. The general equilibrium sticky price model outperforms the staggered wage model in terms of explaining standard deviations. Both rigidities perform reasonably well in replicating cyclical patterns. We conclude that the introduction of sticky prices or staggered wages alone does not help the model in explaining the stylized facts. The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we develop our model and in section 3 we discuss the role of price and wages stickiness. Section 4 concludes.

2 Model Derivation

2.1 Preferences

We assume that our economy is populated by a continuum of infinitively-living identical households. Furthermore, and in line with Merz (1995), households equally share income and risk among all family members. Utility of a representative household is defined by

\[ E_t \sum_{l=0}^{\infty} \beta^l \left[ \frac{C_t^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1 - \sigma} - \kappa n_t \right], \tag{1} \]

where \( C \) is aggregate consumption and \( n \in [0, 1] \) is the fraction of employed household members. \( \beta \in (0, 1) \) is the standard discount factor, while \( \kappa \) gives the disutility of labor. Household members either search for a job on the labor market or supply labor services. However, employment is determined by the search process and hence is not subject to the households control. Then, the budget constraint is

\[ C_t + T_t = w_t n_t + (1 - n_t)b + \Pi_t, \tag{2} \]

1 See Faia and Rossi (2009) for a paper that features unionized wage setting.
2 See e.g. Huang and Liu (2002).
benefits are financed by a lump-sum tax, $T$. $\Pi_t$ are dividends, while $w_t$ is the wage. The household solves its maximization problem by choosing the path of consumption. There is no explicit labor supply decision because the employment status determined by the search process. Optimization yields the Euler equation

$$C_t^{-\sigma} = \lambda_t,$$

where $\lambda_t$ is the Lagrange multiplier in the budget constraint.

### 2.2 Search Process

The firm searches for workers on a discrete and closed market. Trade in the labor market is uncoordinated, costly and time-consuming. Therefore, labor market frictions are modelled via a Cobb-Douglas type matching function with constant returns to scale, viz. $m(u_t, v_t) = \mu u_t^{\xi} v_t^{1-\xi}$. Job seekers, vacancies respectively are given by $u_t$, $v_t$ respectively. $0 < \xi < 1$ is the match elasticity with respect to unemployment and $\mu$ reflects match efficiency. The vacancy filling probability is $q(\theta_t) = m(v_t, u_t)/v_t$, where $\theta_t = v_t/u_t$ is labor market tightness. We assume that separations, $0 < \rho < 1$, are determined exogenously such that the evolution of employment, defined as $n_t = 1 - u_t$, is given by

$$n_t = (1 - \rho) [n_{t-1} + v_{t-1}q(\theta_{t-1})].$$

### 2.3 Production

#### 2.3.1 Flexible Price Equilibrium

Firms, acting on a monopolistically competitive market, produce differentiated products subject to labor adjustment costs. In addition, the vacancy posting process is modelled along the lines of Rotemberg (2006), such that total recruiting costs are given by $\frac{\psi}{\psi} v_t^\psi$. Output $y_t$ is produced with labor being the only input, i.e.

$$y_t = A_t n_t^\alpha,$$

where $A_t$ is an aggregate technology shock and $0 < \alpha \leq 1$. The firm chooses $\{n_t, v_t, p_t\}$ by maximizing the stream of profits given by

$$E_t \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \lambda_t \left[ p_t \left( \frac{p_t}{P_t} \right)^{-\alpha} Y_t - w_t n_t - \frac{\psi}{\psi} v_t^\psi \right],$$

where $p_t$ is the price choosen by the firm and $P_t$ is the aggregate price index. The demand elasticity is given by $\epsilon$. Finally, the first-order conditions read as

$$\frac{\partial n_t}{\partial \tau_t} = \alpha \frac{y_t}{n_t} \phi_t - w_t + (1 - \rho)E_t^\beta \phi_{t+1} \tau_{t+1},$$

$$\frac{\partial v_t}{\partial \phi_t} = (1 - \rho)q(\theta_t)E_t^\beta \phi_{t+1} \tau_{t+1},$$

3
\( \beta_{t+1} = \beta^{\lambda_{t+1}} \) is the stochastic discount factor and \( \varphi_t \) is the Lagrangian parameter w.r.t. eq. (5) and represents real marginal cost. Melting these two equations yields the job creation condition

\[
\frac{\kappa \psi_{t+1}^{-1}}{q(\theta_t)} = (1 - \rho) E_t \beta_{t+1} \left[ \alpha \frac{y_{t+1}}{n_{t+1}} \varphi_{t+1} - w_{t+1} + \frac{\kappa \psi_{t+1}^{-1}}{q(\theta_t+1)} \right].
\]

(9)

The left-hand side of this equation gives the hiring costs which equal the benefits of creating a new job (right-hand side). The latter depends on the marginal product of labor depleted by the wage and increased by saved hiring costs in the next period in case of non-separation.

### 2.3.2 General Equilibrium

In addition, to the previous section we now introduce nominal rigidities following Rotemberg (1982). This assumption allows us to consider a representative firm. Therefore, the firm problem reads as

\[
E_t \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \lambda_t \left[ p_t \left( \frac{p_t}{T_t} \right)^{-1+\epsilon} Y_t - w_t n_t - \kappa \psi_{t+1} - \frac{\theta}{2} \left( \frac{p_t}{p_{t-1}} - \pi \right)^2 Y_t \right],
\]

and the additional derivative is given by

\[
\partial p_t : 1 - \vartheta(\pi_t - \pi_t) + E_t \beta_{t+1} \left[ \vartheta(\pi_{t+1} - \pi) n_{t+1} \frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_t} \right] = \epsilon(1 - \varphi_t),
\]

(11)

where \( \pi_t \) is the inflation rate and \( \pi \) is steady state inflation. Log-linearizing this FOC gives us the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC, for short)

\[
\bar{\pi}_t = \beta E_t \bar{\pi}_{t+1} + \zeta \dot{\varphi}_t,
\]

(12)

where \( \zeta = (\epsilon - 1)/\vartheta \) depends on the degree of price adjustment costs and the elasticity of substitution, while the real marginal costs are given by \( \varphi_t \).

### 2.4 Wage Setting

#### 2.4.1 The Benchmark Case: Nash Bargaining

We use the Nash bargaining regime as the baseline model in order to be able to compare the effects of staggered wages with the standard case used in the literature. Therefore, we assume that the economic rent is splitted by maximizing the bargaining function

\[
\mathcal{S}_t = \left( \frac{1}{\lambda_t} \frac{\partial W_t(n_t)}{\partial n_t} \right)^\eta \left( \frac{\partial J_t(n_t)}{\partial n_t} \right)^{1-\eta},
\]

(13)

\footnote{See Lubik (2009).}
where $\eta$ is the worker’s bargaining power. The first parenthesis contains the marginal value of a worker of being employed and the latter contains the marginal value of a worker to the firm. The marginal value of a worker is given by

$$\frac{\partial W_t(n_t)}{\partial n_t} = \lambda_t w_t - \lambda_t b - \chi + \beta E_t \frac{\partial W_{t+1}(n_{t+1})}{\partial n_{t+1}} \frac{\partial n_{t+1}}{\partial n_t}.$$  

(14)

The optimality rule can be written as

$$\frac{\partial S_t}{\partial w_t} : (1 - \eta) \frac{1}{\lambda_t} \frac{\partial W_t(n_t)}{\partial n_t} = \eta \frac{\partial J_t(n_t)}{\partial n_t}.$$  

(15)

Finally, by substituting the marginal values in, the individual wage follows

$$w_t = \eta \left[ \frac{y_t}{n_t} \varphi_t + \kappa \psi_t^{-1} \theta_t \right] + (1 - \eta) [b + \chi C_t^\alpha].$$  

(16)

We can infer that the wage is a linear combination of the firm’s surplus and the worker’s payments in case of being unemployed. In contrast to other models, the latter also contains the consumption utility of leisure as in Lubik (2009).

### 2.4.2 Staggered Wages

As in Erceg et al. (2000), each household supplies specialized labor $L_t(j)$ which is combined according to

$$L_t(j) = \left[ \int_0^1 L_t(j)^{\frac{1}{1+\gamma}} dj \right]^{\frac{1}{\gamma}},$$  

(17)

by a representative labor aggregator, where $\epsilon^w_t$ is a time varying measure of substitutability across labor services. Profit maximization by the aggregator implies that demand is given by

$$L_t(j) = \left[ \frac{w_t(j)}{W_t} \right]^{\frac{\epsilon^w_t}{\gamma - 1}} L_t,$$  

(18)

where the aggregate wage index is given by

$$W_t = \left[ \int_0^1 w_t(j)^{\frac{1}{\gamma - 1}} dj \right]^{\gamma - 1}.$$  

(19)

Following Sala et al. (2010) we assume that in any given period a fraction $1 - \theta_w$ of households is able to re-set its wage. In addition, households who are not able to re-set index their wages to past inflation and steady state inflation, i.e.

$$w_t(j) = w_{t-1}(j) \pi_t^{\gamma_w} \pi_{t-1}^{1-\gamma_w}.$$  

(20)
Then, the aggregate wage index in the presence of staggered wages evolves as

\[ W_t = \left[ (1 - \theta_w)(W_t^*)^{1/(\eta^*-1)} + \theta_w(\pi_{t-1}^{\gamma_w} \pi_{t-1}^{1-\gamma_w} W_{t-1})^{1/(\eta^*-1)} \right]^{\eta^*-1}. \]  

(21)

Here, we assume that the household solves the same maximization problem as in the absence of search frictions, since she has market power by the assumption of specialized labor. Either the search process is successful, such that the household supplies labor and sets wages or the search process is not successful and the worker stays unemployed. While there is no chance to influence labor supply - due to search frictions - wages are set in the standard staggered way.

2.5 Equilibrium

In any specification of our model, the resource constraint is

\[ Y_t = C_t + \frac{\kappa}{\psi} v_t^\psi. \]  

(22)

In addition, in the general equilibrium case the model is closed with a standard Taylor rule, i.e.

\[ \left( \frac{\pi_t}{\pi} \right) = \phi_{\pi} \left( \frac{Y_t}{\overline{Y}} \right) \phi_{\psi} \]  

(23)

where \( \phi_{\pi} \) is the weight on inflation and \( \phi_{\psi} \) is the weight on output set by the monetary authority. The aggregate productivity shock follows an AR(1) process, \( A_t = \rho_A A_{t-1} + \epsilon_t \).

We calibrate our model to match quarterly data for the United States. Table 1 summarizes our calibration. Missing parameter values are computed from the steady state. Then, the model is log-linearized around its deterministic steady state and simulated using Dynare.

3 Discussion

In the partial equilibrium core of our model (core, henceforth), a positive productivity shock leads the firm to reduce employment (see Figure 1). In addition, wages gain leading to a higher demand and consistently to higher output. Based on the increased wage and lower re-hiring cost, vacancies run low.

In a general equilibrium context with sticky prices, firms are not able to adjust prices instantaneously, such that consumption and output converge much more persistent. The entire firm adjustment process evolves more gradually. As a consequence, unemployment increases less strongly as in the previous case. This result is driven by (i) a more persistent adjustment and (ii) a larger change of wages. In addition, this explains why the response of vacancies is less strongly pronounced. Since less workers are separated, and demand stays higher for a longer period of time, the firm has less incentives to decrease

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5See Erceg et al. (2000) or Sala et al. (2010) for a detailed derivation.
vacancy posting.

Staggered wages in a general equilibrium with flexible prices mainly affect the dynamics of the model through the wage channel. Compared to the core model, we find that since wages are rigid over the cycle, less worker become unemployed and hence demand evolves more persistently. The same reasoning explains the less pronounced decrease in vacancies, since the firm receives a higher share of the profits.

Finally, staggered wages and sticky prices imply a smoother and a less strong adjustment of wages over the cycle. This has an additional effect on lay-offs and employment. Since firms realize higher profits, wages rise less strongly, such that firms keep more employees compared to the previous two cases. As a consequence of higher employment, demand increases and goes along with higher output. Moreover, higher profits create less incentives to post less vacancies.

We now compare the standard deviations of our three models (see Table 2). We can conclude that our core model creates too much volatility compared with the data. The introduction of sticky prices significantly reduces the volatility of the model such that key variables are closer to their empirical counterparts. Compared with the core model, the introduction of either sticky prices or staggered wages, the sticky price model outperforms the staggered wage model in terms of volatility, while the staggered wage model shows a stronger Beveridge curve. However, the sticky price and staggered wages model is able to match the observed volatilities reasonably well. In addition, while all models show a negative correlation between vacancies and unemployment, this model perfectly replicates the Beveridge curve relation.

4 Final Remarks

This paper develops an exogenous separation matching model and considers three different versions of this model. (i) the baseline flexible price core, (ii) the general equilibrium model with sticky prices, (iii) the general equilibrium model with staggered wages and (iv) compares sticky prices with staggered wages. Our contribution is to shed light on the importance of sticky prices and staggered wages within this model context. We show that the core creates too much volatility of key labor market variables. The model with sticky prices performs much better because the interaction of prices with labor market variables cause a more gradual adjustment within the labor market. The staggered wage model performs better in explaining the Beveridge curve but is outperformed by the sticky price model in terms of standard deviations. Finally, staggered wages and sticky prices lead the model to match the empirical evidence for standard deviations and the Beveridge curve. The reason is that the interaction of sticky prices and rigid wages cause more sluggishness in the labor market. Firms profits increase and change incentives in vacancy posting and employment adjustment.
References


Tables and Figures
Table 1: Calibration.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Lubik (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi$</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>Blanchard and Diamond (1989)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
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<td>Lubik (2009)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Krause and Lubik (2007)</td>
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<td>$\theta_w$</td>
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Table 2: Theoretical Moments - Comparison.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>Core</th>
<th>SP</th>
<th>SW</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlations</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>$u, v$</td>
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Notes: Data for the U.S. are taken from Shimer (2005). Core = Partial equilibrium model. SP = General equilibrium model with sticky prices. SW = Sticky wages.