The current crisis over North Korea once again brought world attention on the Korean Peninsula. The emergence of the North Korean nuclear issue escalating to international tension is truly tragic, given the enormous progress toward reconciliation between North and South Korea that had been achieved.

Since the late 1980s, the “Nordpolitik” or “Northern policy” of South Korea opened a new chapter in Korean history. While maintaining its previous goals of enhancing political legitimacy, military security, and economic development by maintaining close ties with the West, South Korea greatly expanded its relations with socialist countries. Without a doubt, one of the main objectives of this policy was to open contacts and dialogue with North Korea.

In dealing with North Korea, President Roh Tae-woo first applied an engagement policy in his determination to build an era of reconciliation and cooperation with the North, while reducing military tensions in the Korean Peninsula. This engagement policy toward the North has been continued through President Kim Young-sam and became even a more consistent part of President Kim Dae-jung’s policy toward North Korea. President Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine policy” has differed in kind from the Northern Policies of his predecessors, who energetically sought improved relations with the North.

Although ups and downs occurred in Northern Policies in the 1990’s administrations, the inter-Korean relations had much improved. The historic Korean Summit, held in June 2000 in Pyongyang, produced the June 15 Joint Declaration, which serves as the basic document guiding peaceful co-existence and national unification on the Korean peninsula. It was a major turning point in dealing with the Korean issue worldwide. The 3-days Summit between the Chairman of North Korea, Kim Jong-il, and the President of South Korea, Kim Dae-jung, signalled that the first step had been taken on the long road toward dismantling the confrontational structure on the Korean Peninsula. The groundwork was laid for the peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas.

The Summit has greatly contributed to confidence building between the two Koreas and to tension reduction on the Korean Peninsula. The inter-Korean economic cooperation has

---

1 Las opiniones expresadas en estos artículos son propias de sus autores. Estos artículos no reflejan necesariamente la opinión de UNISCI. The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors. These articles do not necessarily reflect the views of UNISCI.

increased (U$221,943 in 1998 to U$402,957 in 2001) and the issue of separated families is in the process of being resolved steadily. Ministerial-level inter-Korean talks already have been held to discuss several current agendas and to formalize inter-governmental talks.

No doubt, the Kim Dae-jung administration’s “Sunshine policy” has significantly changed the dynamics of diplomacy on the peninsula. This policy based on five principles—gradualism, change in the North, the separation of economic and political relations, reciprocity, and solidarity with allied and friendly nations—has played a substantial role in pushing the U.S to consider normalizing political and economic relations with Pyongyang.

Some U.S. government policy makers supported limited engagement and steps towards normalization of relations of the inter-Korean policies, while many specialists in the CIA and the Pentagon, along with conservatives in Congress, bureaucratic agencies in Washington and the media, were deeply skeptical of engagement. This tension rendered U.S. foreign policy towards North Korea inconsistent and deeply flawed.

Nevertheless, during the last years of Clinton administration, the U.S and North Korea entered into a phase of improved relations. In July 1999, the U.S. Council of Foreign Relations issued various recommendations on North Korea. Among them was the “selective engagement” policy, which advocated first, lifting the U.S. embargo on North Korea. The Clinton administration also adopted a tolerance policy toward North Korea to avert instability on the Korean Peninsula. These steps opened bilateral relations between the U.S. and North Korea.

On the basis of this normalization of relations with the North, the Clinton administration wanted to move beyond the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea to a more stable relationship that would resolve outstanding issues related to (Weapons of Mass Destruction) WMD, including especially nuclear and long-range missile issues, and thus contribute to the Korean unification.

In return North Korea offered to discontinue all testing, production, and deployment of missiles with a range over 500Km (300 miles) as part of the broad normalization agreement.

The two countries exchanged high-level visits: second-in-command Jo Myong-rok to Washington, Madeleine Albright to Pyongyang. Clinton was prepared to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. A meeting was prevented by the controversies of President Clinton’s last

---

days in office. The media indirectly advised against a presidential visit to Pyongyang on the grounds that no satisfactory agreement was ready for the president to sign.\(^8\)

These efforts toward Korean Peninsula stability could not work out independently but only with close consultation between the U.S. and the South Korean government and with Japan, China and Russia as well. Policy coordination among these countries is an essential element, since the crisis in the Korean Peninsula is not just a Korean problem; it is closely related to Northeast Asian security as well. It is also an outright rejection of the plan for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, a plan supported apart from the U.S. and Japan by China and Russia as well.

Without a doubt, the U.S policy toward the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia inevitably has an impact on R.O.K.-U.S. relations, inter-Korean relations, and South Korea’s domestic political situation. Subsequent changes in inter-Korean relations, in return, have a positive or negative effect on Washington’s North Korean policy and Northeast Asian issues.\(^9\) Former President Kim Dae-jung said that the development of U.S-DPRK relations is closely correlated with that of inter-Korean relations and therefore, it is desirable for the U.S. to continue its engagement policy and seek dialogue with North Korea, allowing the North to save face.\(^10\)

However, on taking office, the Bush administration immediately announced a full review of U.S. policy toward North Korea. The conservative Bush administration unveiled a hard-line policy toward North Korea, saying that it would proceed based on the principles of transparency, verification, and reciprocity. This was the Reagan administration’s policy toward the former Soviet Union, “Trust but verify.” Somehow this has been modified to “Do not trust before you verify” in dealing with the North Korea issue.\(^11\)

Unlike the Clinton administration’s approach, which first offered some carrots to encourage North Korea to come forward, the Bush administration’s approach requires North Korea to act first before the U.S. “expands its efforts to help the North Korean people, ease sanctions and take other political steps.”\(^12\) In other words, if North Korea’s stance remains consistent, no serious discussions can be expected.

When the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were attacked by a terrorist group, American policy makers rearranged the country’s national security position. Terrorism became the new threat and brought a new downturn in Bush administration attitude toward North Korea.

In the wake of the disaster, Bush divided the world into two groups, friends and enemies, forces of light and darkness, good and evil. As one of the few nations still on the U.S. list of those practicing international terrorism and a Communist nation threatening a U.S. ally, North Korea was on the dark side of Bush’s world divide. Consequently, in January 2002

---

\(^8\) Oh Kong-dan, cited, p.5.
in the State of the Union address, President Bush labeled North Korea as one of the “axis of evil,” intent on developing weapons of mass destruction.\(^\text{13}\) In response to this new hard-line approach, North Korea not only pulled away from negotiations with the U.S. but derailed ongoing efforts to reconcile with South Korea. In October 2002, North Korea’s uranium enrichment program was revealed, resulting in North Korea’s declaration to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty on January 10, 2003.\(^\text{14}\)

The U.S. issued a series of warnings and has insisted that the North comply before material compensation would be considered. The U.S. asserts its power to take any means necessary, including diplomatic pressure, strong economic sanctions, and search and seizure of North Korean vessels in international waters, to prevent the sale of mass destruction weapons.\(^\text{15}\)

In this critical moment, a presidential election in South Korea elected human rights lawyer and liberal democrat Roh Moo-hyun as the sixteenth President of the R.O.K. To many people’s surprise, Roh Moo-hyun was chosen by the Korean people. Roh, one time cabinet minister of the Kim Dae-jung administration, is widely expected to maintain the general framework of the Sunshine policy.

It was an open secret that Roh was not the favorite candidate of the U.S. The Bush administration would have felt more comfortable with the conservative candidate, Lee Hoe-chang, whose policies would be less proactive and more skeptical toward North Korea and, thus, more in tune with the current reality in Washington.

Upon his inauguration on February 25, 2003, Roh pledged to keep peace with North Korea and said he remains skeptical about the “tailored containment” policy of the U.S. toward the North. This signaled some discrepancies in dealing with the North Korean nuclear crisis.

Basically, Seoul and Washington agree that the North Korea’s nuclear crisis should be resolved peacefully. However, Washington said it is keeping all options on the table, including the possibility of economic sanctions and even the use of military force. Newly elected President Roh has made it clear that U.S. sanctions against the North only increase the

\(^{13}\) Effer John, “Bush Policy Undermines Progress on Korean Peninsula,” Foreign Policy in Focus, Vol.7, No.2, March 2002, p.2-5. According to the U.S. State Department, North Korea hasn’t engaged in terrorism since the 1980s. See also, International Herald Tribune, Feb.1, 2002, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization.9047.pdf. Issues for Congress. and EAR, Vol14, No.1, SP 2002, p.32. In this article, upon the North Korea’s request, Pyongyang had been offered the chance to get off the list near the end of the Clinton Administration but failed to take the few steps necessary. In addition, in response to the terrorist attack of September 11, North Korea issued statements opposing terrorism and signed two U.N. conventions against terrorism.


risk of a war on the Korean Peninsula. Roh and his administration perceive the nuclear issue as the biggest challenge they have to face now and have called for direct talks between the North and the United States. Washington has refused to talk only to Pyongyang, seeking to deal with the issue through an international framework.

In truth, discrepancy exists and debates are raging among the security policy communities in the U.S. and R.O.K over North Korean motives and intentions and how best to deal with Pyongyang. While the two sides may not be as far apart as many believe, significant policy and perception gaps clearly remain between the two allies.

These are mainly due to different national interests, strategic considerations, and policy concerns and priorities of each nation. First, there are somewhat different perceptions toward the North Korean regime itself. President Bush and his advisors harbor mistrust of the North Korean leader. Bush sees the North Korea regime as a suspicious and terrorist-supporting state. He did not deny his intense dislike of North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il. From this point on, U.S policymaking toward North Korea became much more complicated. Some officials in the National Security Council, many in the Defense Department, and some at the State Department raised fierce objections to dealing with North Korea. In contrast, South Korea believes that the North has been trying to adopt a more practical policy for its system’s stability and economic recovery. North Korea wanted to improve relations with the U.S. desperately. According to John Feffer, East Asian policy analyst, they sell weapons not as part of a global anti-American conspiracy but because they need the hard currency so badly. In the 1990s, Pyongyang prioritized dealings with Washington in order to solve its dire economic problems.

Given the inflexible characteristics of the Pyongyang regime itself, South Korea believes that the efforts by North Korea during the Clinton administration could be understood as meaningful changes, even though they fall short of fundamental reforms, such as system change or the introduction of a market economy. In fact, South Korean authorities see the North Korean regime as a partner, necessary to improve inter-Korean relations. For them, Pyongyang’s recent insistence on a North Korea-U.S. non-aggression pact originated from its real worries about its stability, mainly caused by the recent U.S-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Roh Moo-hyun has seen how his predecessor Kim Dae-jung succeeded brilliantly with his diplomacy vis-à-vis North Korea but failed poorly in gaining Washington’s support for engagement because it had other priorities. Roh does not want to let this happen to his administration. Learning from past administrations’ errors, the new government initiated a three-stage institutional measure, Peace and Prosperity Policy, to resolve the impending North Korean problem. As a first step, the Roh administration intends to continue to engage in regular inter-Korean talks between high level officials and defense chiefs. The second step is to expand inter-Korean cooperation and exchange programs in every field, with special efforts

---

18 Dong-A Ilbo South Korean daily, Nov.27, 2002.
in building military confidence to ease the tensions. Ultimately they hope to replace the armistice agreement with a peace treaty.19

The best strategy for handling the North is not obvious, but it is not surprising that policymakers in Seoul, within easy reach of North Korean artillery and missiles, have a different perspective than those in Washington. The most momentous issue involving the Korean Peninsula today is Pyongyang’s continuing pursuit of nuclear weapons.20

Reviewing all the factors mentioned above, the final analysis is that both South Korea and the U.S will undergo an uneasy task to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. Korean unification analyst Park Young-ho characterized the current atmosphere between the U.S. and the South Korea: “although they are in the same bed but with different dreams.” 21

The Roh government is sure not only to continue the Kim Dae-jung’s policy of brisk and comprehensive engagement with the North but also is likely to act to save Kim Jong-il’s regime from the threat of a U.S military action and block any use of force at the final hour. In this perspective, the Bush administration will have a very hard time in persuading the R.O.K government to join it in its all-out campaign to isolate and compel the DPRK to disarm and change.

The summit between the President Roh and Bush on May 14, 2003 enabled both leaders to build a mutual personal trust and to agree on future cooperation about the North Korea issue.22 Compared to the summit of the then South Korean President Kim Dae-jung with Bush two years ago, considered a “diplomatic disaster” due to his failure to convince the Bush administration with his “Sunshine policy,” it appears that President Roh has achieved his goal.23

Nevertheless, although the two leaders agreed to closely cooperate to have nuclear weapons free Korean Peninsula through peaceful means, based on international cooperation, the differing approaches of the two allies are still evident.24

---


Some critics said that the summit talks failed to narrow the gap on the North’s nuclear issue. At the summit, South Korea accepted the U.S. hard line policy by agreeing on “further steps” on the North Korea’s possible provocative actions, but President Roh has so far refused to include the military option in dealing with the North.

On the U.S side, following day of the summit, President Bush’s national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, and White House spokesman, Ari Fleischer showed the differences in strategy with Seoul saying “it would be unwise to rule out the use of military force, even while pursuing a peaceful resolution of the problem.”

On the other hand, it is a matter of concern that the Bush administration is divided on dealing with North Korea issue: Secretary of State Colin L. Powell takes the option opening negotiations with the North Korean regime while Secretary of Defense H. Rumsfeld and members of Vice President Dick Cheney’s staff stand to push a hard line policy. Nonetheless, neither the parties reject the idea of working together with other countries to increase pressure on North Korea as one of the first further steps.

To sum up with these important factors, a better strategy toward the North will require a coordinated response from all of its neighbours, particularly China, Japan and Russia. It will be wise to seek cooperation from these neighbouring countries, as none of these states want war on the Peninsula, none want a nuclear North Korea, and all possess some degree of leverage over Pyongyang.

As for Washington and South Korea, their 50 years as strong allies should narrow the gap on their North Korean policies to bring a peaceful solution. The South Koreans have to do their best to convince the North with a basic message: significant diplomatic and economic rewards are possible, but only for positive, verifiable disarmament. The Americans, on the other hand, should realize the hard time in which South Korea now finds itself and its efforts to protect peace on the Korean Peninsula. When the two countries reach a common understanding, sufficient for a breakthrough with North Korea, and receive strong support from the neighbouring countries, there will be no other option for North Korea but to abandon the WMD and to incorporate in the international community for the good of its people.

---


1. Los incumplimientos norcoreanos y la crisis actual

La complicada situación actual de la Península Coreana tiene como origen el último de la larga lista de incumplimientos de sus obligaciones internacionales por parte del régimen de Kim Jong-II. Unos incumplimientos que se inician cuando Corea del Norte firma el Tratado de No Proliferación en 1985. Así junto al incumplimiento de este Tratado casi desde el mismo momento de su firma, Corea del Norte tampoco va a respetar la “Declaración para la desnuclearización de la Península Coreana” o, “Declaración Conjunta”, firmada en 1991 con Corea del Sur, ni el acuerdo de salvaguardias celebrado con el Organismo Internacional de la Energía en 1992, acuerdo que, por otra parte, se había negado a firmar, como habría sido preceptivo, en el momento de acceder al TNP.

Por lo que respecta a este segundo acuerdo, con la IAEA, si bien lo cumple en un primer momento al permitir la realización de un total de seis inspecciones entre junio de 1992 y febrero de 1993, dejará de hacerlo cuando, a principios de 1993, el Organismo Internacional de la Energía invoque el acuerdo de salvaguardias y solicite una “inspección especial” de dos instalaciones nucleares norcoreanas al sospechar, desde finales de 1992, que Corea del Norte podría haber reprocesado más plutonio de los 80 gramos declarados a la IAEA, además de haber continuado con su programa nuclear con fines militares. Las sospechas del Organismo Internacional de la energía parecían fundadas ya que en una de sus visitas había encontrado un reactor experimental de 5 MW, dos reactores de potencia bajo construcción y una gran planta de procesamiento que no podían tener únicamente una finalidad civil. La agencia deseaba saber con certeza la cantidad de plutonio que el régimen norcoreano había reprocesado desde 1989. Sin embargo, el 12 de marzo de 1993, Corea del Norte, en una situación que en algunos de sus rasgos recuerda de manera bastante interesante a la actual, rechaza tal inspección al tiempo que anuncia su intención de retirarse del Tratado de No Proliferación.

---

1 Las opiniones expresadas en estos artículos son propias de sus autores. Estos artículos no reflejan necesariamente la opinión de UNISCI. The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors. These articles do not necessarily reflect the views of UNISCI
2 La declaración establecía que “ninguna de las dos partes probaría, manufacturaría, produciría, recibiría, poseería, almacenaría, desplegaría o utilizaría armas nucleares” y que “no poseerían instalaciones destinadas al enriquecimiento de uranio y el reprocesamiento de material nuclear”. Asimismo, se establecía un procedimiento de inspecciones intercoreanas y la organización de una Comisión Conjunta de Control Nuclear Norte-Sur que tenía el mandato de verificar el cumplimiento de la declaración. Ver Nuclear Weapons Program-North Korea, Federation of American Scientists, 17 de octubre de 2002, disponible en www.fas.org
3 Ver Garrido Rebolledo, Vicente “La situación nuclear en Asia: ¿Cuál es el atractivo del arma nuclear?, en Asia: escenario de los desequilibrios mundiales, Seminario de Investigación para la paz, Centro Pignatelli, Zaragoza, 2000, pp 247
En esa situación\textsuperscript{5}, sólo las conversaciones entre la administración Clinton y el régimen de Pyongyang permitieron que este último abandonara la idea de dejar el TNP e hicieron posible que, tras la visita del antiguo presidente norteamericano Carter a la capital norcoreana en 1994, se llegara en ese mismo año a la conclusión del Acuerdo Marco\textsuperscript{6} que sería completado en 1995 por dos protocolos modificadores\textsuperscript{7}.

Según el acuerdo, Pyongyang estaba obligado a congelar y desmantelar su programa nuclear, incluyendo los reactores de grafito de 50 y 200 MW aún en construcción y el reactor ya existente de 5 MW y la instalación de reprocesamiento, al tiempo que EEUU proporcionaría a Corea del Norte energía alternativa, inicialmente petrolero\textsuperscript{8} y, con posterioridad, dos reactores de agua ligera de un millón de kilowatios que sustituyeran a los de grafito y que, con una producción de plutonio no apto para uso militar, permitirían sin embargo la generación de energía eléctrica. Al propio tiempo, Estados Unidos, relajó las sanciones económicas existentes contra Corea del Norte.

Por otra parte y con el objeto de hacer posible la financiación de los dos reactores de agua ligera se constituyó en 1995 la KEDO u Organización para el Desarrollo Energético Coreano\textsuperscript{9}. De ella formarían parte EEUU, Japón, Corea del Sur y la Unión Europea.

Ahora bien, más allá de la congelación o no del programa nuclear norcoreano, otros dos elementos de la crisis quedaban sin resolver: por una parte nada se sabía de la cantidad de plutonio de la que realmente disponía el régimen norcoreano y, por otra, éste había logrado, una vez más, obtener un incremento en la ayuda internacional y un mayor reconocimiento del régimen gracias a su amenaza nuclear\textsuperscript{10}. Curiosamente unos objetivos que, los consiga o no, también parecen guiar en la crisis actual a Corea del Norte.

En cualquier caso y después de diversos desacuerdos y dificultades para la aplicación del acuerdo, éste se consideraba en marcha. Sin embargo, no pasaría demasiado tiempo antes de que aparecieran nuevos indicios de que Corea del Norte podía estar incumpliendo una vez más sus compromisos.

De hecho, desde una fecha tan temprana como 1995 se sospechaba que Corea del Norte contaba con una nueva instalación subterránea de producción de plutonio, en Kumchangri, algo de lo que los servicios secretos norteamericanos dicen tener total seguridad desde mediados de 1996. La instalación se localiza a unos cuarenta kilómetros al norte de Yongbyon, donde, como es ampliamente conocido cuenta Corea del Norte no sólo con un reactor nuclear sino con una planta de reprocesamiento de plutonio. El problema es que se consideraba, ya entonces, que las instalaciones nucleares de Kumchangri podrían llegar a

\textsuperscript{5} El ex-secretario de defensa norteamericano William Perry llegaría a decir que se trató de “the only time that I believed that the United States was in serious danger of a major war”, Ver Bucley, Roger The United States and the Asia-Pacific since 1945, Cambridge University Press, Singapur, 2002, pp 194


\textsuperscript{7} Ver Niksch, Larry A. North Korea's Nuclear Weapons, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{8} Cierto tipo de combustible obtenido después de haber extraído del petróleo gasolina, keroseno y fuel para motores diesel.

\textsuperscript{9} Ver http://www.kedo.org

\textsuperscript{10} Garrido Rebolledo, op. cit., Vicente pp 245

En 1999, tras las presiones de Clinton para la celebración de una nueva ronda de negociaciones, se alcanzaría un acuerdo según el que, a cambio de ayuda alimenticia, el régimen norcoreano iba a permitir inspecciones múltiples que, realizadas durante ese mismo año y el siguiente, no hallarían prueba alguna de actividad nuclear lo que motivaría la sospecha de que el gobierno de Pyongyang se hubiera llevado el material, algo que, además, se veía avalado por informes previos. Junto a ello, el acuerdo de Berlín de septiembre de ese año suponía la moratoria norcoreana para la realización de nuevas pruebas y la promesa norteamericana del levantamiento de sanciones económicas.

Por si eso fuera poco, Corea del Norte tampoco ha cesado de reavivar los otros dos temores de la Comunidad Internacional: la transferencia de componentes y tecnología de misiles balísticos a países como Libia, Irán, Siria, Irak, Pakistán o Egipto\textsuperscript{12} (algo que Corea del Norte reconoció en el año 2000 ante los medios de comunicación de Corea del Sur)\textsuperscript{13} y el programa de misiles balísticos del que fueron buenas muestras el lanzamiento de un misil Taepodong-1 en agosto de 1998, que sobrevoló el archipiélago japonés (en concreto la isla de Honshu)\textsuperscript{14} sin previo aviso y cuenta con un alcance de 2000 km\textsuperscript{15} o los misiles Nodong –1, con un alcance de 900 km, que instaló en plataformas móviles frente a la costa de Japón\textsuperscript{16} y cuyo exitoso desarrollo por Corea del Norte había confirmado con anterioridad ese mismo año el ex Secretario de Defensa norteamericano Cohen\textsuperscript{17}.

Asimismo, está desarrollando una nueva versión del Taepodong, el Taepodong-2 con alcance incluso hasta los territorios de EEUU en el océano Pacífico y quizás Alaska y Hawai aunque esto último parece bastante más improbable.

A ellos hay que añadir los misiles Scud-B, con un alcance de 300 km y con capacidad para llevar una carga de 450 kilos y el Scud-C, que posee un alcance de 500 km\textsuperscript{18}.

Pero va a ser finalmente la cuestión no resuelta desde el Acuerdo Marco de 1994 la clave del progresivo deterioro de la situación y la que motivará los acontecimientos a que hemos asistido en los últimos meses. Como vimos, la causa de la crisis del 93 fue la sospecha de la IAEA de que Corea del Norte había logrado reprocesar más plutonio del que declaraba, pese a lo cual ésta es una cuestión que quedó ausente tanto del Acuerdo Marco como de los posteriores protocolos, pero lo cierto, es que sólo el reactor de 5MW le permite producir siete kilos de plutonio al año, cantidad suficiente para la fabricación de una bomba al año, quizás

\textsuperscript{11} Ver Niksch, Larry A. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program op. cit.


\textsuperscript{13} En concreto, ha vendido 450 misiles a Irak, Irán, Siria y Pakistán. Ver Despite Progress North Korea possess major threat, disponible en www.fas.org

\textsuperscript{14} A pesar de que, dada la altitud a la que voló no se trató propiamente de una violación del espacio aéreo japonés.

\textsuperscript{15} Todo Japón, incluida la península de Okinawa.

\textsuperscript{16} Garrido Rebolledo, op. cit., Vicente pp 243

\textsuperscript{17} Ver Niksch, Larry A. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{18} Ver Pyongyang’s missile program en CNN.com, 11 de diciembre de 2002, disponible en http://cnn.worldnews.printthis.clickability.com En la actualidad cuenta con unos 500 SCUD ver Despite Progress North Korea possess major threat, disponible en www.fas.org
más, en caso de que cuente con una tecnología suficientemente avanzada, algo que afirma la mayoría de los expertos.

Por otra parte, se piensa con bastante fundamento que en 1993, en el momento de las sospechas del Organismo Internacional de la Energía, el régimen norcoreano ya había logrado completar una línea de reprocesamiento y que, en 1994, estaba siendo construido un segundo sistema de este tipo en la propia planta de reprocesamiento.

En esas circunstancias, a pocos sorprendieron las declaraciones realizadas por científicos rusos pocos días antes del estallido de la crisis actual en el sentido de que Corea del Norte poseía plutonio en el complejo de Yongbyon que le permitiría la fabricación de armas nucleares en el curso de pocas semanas. Además esos temores se unían a los que generaba la retirada por parte del régimen norcoreano de los precintos de la ONU de instalaciones que se sabía que contenían 8000 barras de uranio cuyo reprocesamiento para obtener plutonio apto para la fabricación de una bomba nuclear habría ordenado Kim Jong-II. De hecho, ese plutonio sería suficiente para la fabricación de cinco o seis bombas que vendrían a sumarse a las dos que se supone que ya tiene Corea del Norte.

Así las cosas, a principios de octubre de 2002, tiene lugar una visita del secretario de Estado norteamericano adjunto para asuntos de Asia Oriental y Pacífico, James A. Kelly, al frente de una delegación, a Corea del Norte. En la reunión se expusieron las sospechas acerca de la existencia no sólo de un programa nuclear secreto norcoreano para enriquecer uranio que, además, supondría una violación del Acuerdo Marco de 1994 y de muchos otros compromisos norcoreanos en la materia, sino de un programa secreto de armas nucleares que también suponía una violación de dichos acuerdos. Es más que probable que ello no fuera una sorpresa para el régimen de Pyongyang ya que Washington ya le había acusado en mayo de 2002 de estar desarrollando un programa nuclear secreto.

En cualquier caso, Corea del Norte que optará en un primer momento por negar tales acusaciones, acabará por reconocer la veracidad de las mismas aunque intentando culpar a Estados Unidos de haber sido los primeros en violar el Acuerdo Marco y señalando que, en consecuencia, ellos lo consideraban nulo.

Ese reconocimiento lo haría público la República Popular Democrática de Corea en noviembre cuando en la radio nacional afirmó que el país tenía “armas nucleares que habían sido desarrolladas para defenderse de un ataque de los imperialistas americanos”. Una sensación de ser objeto de amenaza que, dentro de esta misma lógica perversa, estaría detrás de la demanda dirigida a Estados Unidos de que firmara un pacto de no agresión con Corea del Norte antes de que ésta pasara a eliminar su programa nuclear.

---

19 Ver Tensión nuclear... 26 de diciembre de 2002, disponible en www.labolsa.com
20 Ver “North Korea: not yet ready for diplomacy” en The Economist, 8 de febrero de 2003 pp 57-58
A partir de ahí hemos asistido a un deterioro progresivo de la situación en el que Pyongyang, bajo esa supuesta justificación del temor a sufrir un ataque preventivo, habría reactivado también sus instalaciones nucleares en Yongbyon el pasado diciembre\(^{25}\) y accedido al plutonio ya reprocesado, tras eliminar los equipos instalados por los inspectores del Organismo Internacional de la Energía hace ya ocho años\(^{26}\).

Junto a ello, se ha producido una progresiva movilización de fuerzas tanto norteamericanas como norcoreanas en la Península Coreana\(^{27}\).

2. Las relaciones de Japón con Corea del Norte

Más allá de la relevancia del papel jugado por los Estados Unidos en la actual crisis, entre otras cosas porque, como veremos, Corea del Norte insiste en que es ese el único Estado con el que quiere dialogar, es evidente que otra serie de actores se ven implicados en ella, para empezar, por razones de proximidad geográfica. No en vano, la Península Coreana es el punto de contacto de los principales poderes de la región y el punto donde convergen los intereses vitales de China, Rusia, Corea del Sur y el Estado que aquí nos ocupa: Japón\(^{28}\).

Sin embargo, el papel desempeñado por Japón así como el comportamiento y los planteamientos japoneses ante los actuales acontecimientos no pueden entenderse si prescindimos del marco más amplio de la relación de este país con Corea del Norte. En este sentido, hay que empezar por recordar que son fundamentalmente dos los hechos que van a marcar las relaciones entre estos dos países del nordeste asiático: la ocupación japonesa de la península coreana y la Segunda Guerra Mundial.

En primer lugar, la ocupación por parte del imperio japonés de la Península de Corea desde 1910 hasta su liberación por los aliados en 1945 en el contexto de la derrota japonesa en la Segunda Guerra Mundial, dejó en Corea del Norte, como también ocurriría en el sur, un legado de rencores hacia Japón y una aspiración a una compensación por el daño infligido.

Por otra parte, la liberación de la Península Coreana en el marco de la Segunda Guerra Mundial significó, en consonancia con los acuerdos propios del momento, su liberación por dos de las potencias aliadas: Estados Unidos, en el caso de Corea del Sur y la Unión Soviética en el caso del norte. El proceso se complicó todavía más porque en el contexto del fin de la contienda y de la emergencia de los rasgos básicos de lo que sería la Guerra Fría, en la Península Coreana como en otras áreas del planeta, las que serían las dos superpotencias se esfuerzan por afianzar su influencia.

Así, en 1951, acabada la Guerra Mundial, en los comienzos de la Guerra Fría y con la Guerra de Corea en marcha y Estados Unidos, bajo la bandera de las Naciones Unidas, apoyando intensamente en ella a Corea del Sur, Japón, que se disponía a firmar el tratado de paz en San Francisco, no tuvo opción alguna que no fuera la de encaminar sus esfuerzos al establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas únicamente con la República de Corea\(^{29}\).

\(^{25}\) “North Korea admits it has nuclear weapons” en Asia Today, 24 de abril de 2003, disponible en www.asiasource.org
\(^{27}\) Reinoso, José, “EEUU despliega 24 bombarderos cerca de Corea del Norte” en El País 4 de febrero de 2003.
\(^{28}\) Ver Bueley, Roger, op. Cit pp 189
\(^{29}\) Matake, Kamiya “Japanese Foreign Policy toward Northeast Asia” en Takashi, Inoguchi y Jain, Pumendra Japanese Foreign Policy Today, Palgrave, Nueva York, 2000, pp 240
Japón continuaba siendo deudor de la situación en que había quedado tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial y, en concreto de sus más o menos autoimpuestas limitaciones militares. De ese modo, de la mano de la vinculación de su defensa a la alianza con Estados Unidos, su política hacia la Península Coreana en general y hacia Corea del Norte en particular, iba a estar en cierta medida ligada a la de aquellos.30

Eso no significó, sin embargo, que Japón no intentara, en particular a partir de los años setenta mantener y fomentar intercambios de carácter no gubernamental con Corea del Norte ya que, a pesar de que desde ésta no cesaban las críticas a Japón por imperialista y agresor, en el país nipón las fuerzas de izquierda, en particular en los círculos periodísticos e intelectuales, adquirieron y conservaron cierta fuerza en las décadas que siguieron a la Guerra Mundial, por lo que es posible que no vieran con total antipatía al régimen norcoreano. De hecho, buena parte de la clase política sugirió en más de una ocasión la conveniencia del mantenimiento de relaciones amistosas con Corea del Norte y expresaron su preocupación por que una política desigual hacia las dos Coreas pudiera acabar por ser peligrosa para Japón. Así, es comprensible que buena parte de la población japonesa viera con agrado la política de no confrontación con Pyongyang que, en lo posible, defendía el gobierno japonés.31

En este marco, no es extraño que, nada más acabar la Guerra Fría, Japón intente iniciar un proceso de normalización que le condujera al establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas con Corea del Norte. De hecho, en una fecha tan temprana como 1989, hará una declaración en que expresaba su ‘deep regret and repetance’ por el periodo colonial y, ya en 1990 envió una misión de alto nivel a Pyongyang que permitiría que se procediera a la firma de la Declaración que lleva el nombre de dicha ciudad y que abrirá el camino a unas conversaciones de normalización que, no obstante, no van a ir muy lejos por muchas razones, incluido el rechazo de Corea del Norte a permitir la inspección internacional de sus instalaciones nucleares y el desacuerdo acerca de la escala y la naturaleza de la compensación de Japón a Corea del Norte por el periodo colonial.34

Sin embargo, será la evolución del comportamiento del propio régimen norcoreano en materia nuclear la que determine que Japón opte finalmente por adoptar una postura mucho más dura con respecto a Corea del Norte lo que conllevará que se perfilé cada vez más, si es que alguna vez no lo hizo, como adversario de Corea del Norte. Así, Tokio va a considerar el descubrimiento del programa secreto en 1994 primero, y el lanzamiento del Taepodong –I en 1998 después, como amenazas directas a su seguridad. La propia sociedad japonesa toma conciencia de esta circunstancia y, buena prueba de ello, son las informaciones que a partir de ese momento se van a poder leer en los diarios de ese país, mucho más objetivas que en periodos anteriores y en las que cobra cada vez más importancia el secuestro de ciudadanos japoneses por Corea del Norte durante los años setenta y ochenta, del que también comienza a existir plena constancia y mayor información desde 1997.

30 Idem. pp 244
32 Matake, Kamiya , op. Cit. pp 242
33 Idem pp 299
34 Kim, Hong Nack, “Japan in North Korean Foreign Policy” en Kim, Samuel S. North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, Oxford University Press, Hong Kong, 1998, pp 116
Junto con la determinación a adoptar una política de mayor firmeza hacia Corea del Norte, Japón considerará de gran importancia el mantenimiento de estrechas relaciones de seguridad no sólo con Estados Unidos, sino con Corea del Sur, en especial a través del Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG).

Será precisamente la presión de esos dos Estados y, fundamentalmente la de EEUU, la que haga que, en el contexto de la crisis de 1994 Japón respalde el acuerdo marco y también la que, cuatro años más tarde, fuerce a Tokio a reanudar su contribución financiera a la KEDO, sólo unas semanas después de que fuera congelada por el Estado archipiélago en represalia por el lanzamiento del Taepodong-1 en agosto de 1998, como ya vimos. Igualmente, será la insistencia de Estados Unidos la que haga que se siga el calendario inicialmente establecido para la KEDO, frente al deseo japonés de un aplazamiento. Dicho de otro modo, Japón se ve obligado a respaldar la opción de la administración Clinton de seguir una política de persuasión hacia Corea del Norte con el fin de que limite sus actividades militares y nucleares a cambio de asistencia humanitaria y alimenticia que aliviara la peor de la crisis de subsistencia por la que ha atravesado el país norcoreano, justo en el momento en que deseaba adoptar una postura mucho más dura. Y es que, más allá del incremento de las capacidades defensivas y militares japonesas, del que hablaremos más adelante, Estados Unidos sigue siendo el principal aliado japonés en materia de seguridad y un actor con gran influencia en su política exterior en general, y hacia Corea del Norte en particular.

Pero más allá de esa influencia, se había llegado a un punto de no retorno en la política japonesa hacia Corea del Norte que no hizo sino contribuir a un periodo de unos diez años en que, aunque con ligeras avances y retrocesos, se puede decir que las relaciones entre ambos Estados han estado en punto muerto encerradas en la insistencia norcoreana en la necesidad de disculpas y compensaciones niponas por el periodo colonial, de una parte, y el énfasis en el esclarecimiento de la cuestión de los ciudadanos japoneses secuestrados por otra.

Así, en los años que siguen a 1994, mientras EEUU se esforzaba por continuar con su política de compromiso o engagement hacia Corea del Norte, Japón ha endurecido en buena medida los términos de sus potenciales conversaciones de normalización. Hay que decir, sin embargo, que Japón se ha opuesto reiteradamente a una potencial implicación del archipiélago en una acción militar contra Corea del Norte, siendo contrario incluso, como demostró también en 1994, a una utilización de medios militares como medio de hacer efectivo un bloqueo económico.

En resumen, se puede decir que la política norcoreana de Japón iba estando basada progresivamente en tres elementos clave:

---

36 Matake, Kamiya op. cit. pp 244
38 Ver Bueley, Roger, op. Cit. Pp 192
39 Matake, Kamiya, op. Cit. Pp 300
• La política exterior global de Tokio y en particular la importancia que concede al mantenimiento de una alianza estrecha con Washington y la mejora progresiva de las relaciones con Corea del Sur
• Su preocupación por la paz y estabilidad en el nordeste de Asia y, en concreto, en la Península Coreana
• La situación política interna de Japón, complicada en ocasiones por el legado de su relación histórica con Corea

Ahora bien, en esa política exterior japonesa de conjunto se van a ir produciendo cambios que también introducen matices en su posición actual hacia Pyongyang y en su visión de la crisis actual. La principal transformación en ese sentido vendrá de la mano de la voluntad japonesa, tanto más acusada si cabe desde la llegada del actual primer ministro, Junichiro Koizumi, de adquirir un papel más activo en la escena internacional y ampliar su papel en el marco de la seguridad regional, una demanda, por otra parte, expresada ya desde hace bastante tiempo por Estados Unidos.

En este punto, resulta interesante tomar conciencia de cómo el comportamiento de Corea del Norte, sentido crecientemente desde Japón como una amenaza directa a su seguridad, puede muy bien haber contribuido a la decisión de Tokio de asumir un mayor protagonismo en las garantías de su propia seguridad. Ello, indudablemente, contribuye a que su papel en la crisis actual sea algo más nítido y diferenciado, como veremos. En concreto, y más allá de los actos puntuales de Corea del Norte que han exacerbado los temores japoneses, Japón ve con preocupación tres cuestiones principales:

• El desarrollo norcoreano de capacidad nuclear
• El programa norcoreano de misiles balísticos
• La posibilidad de un ataque suicida a Corea del Sur que pudiera provocar un flujo masivo de refugiados y una recesión económica

A ello hay que añadir y no es menos importante, el temor japonés a que un error de cálculo norcoreano pudiera precipitar una crisis en la que, habida cuenta de las alianzas existentes en la región y, en el supuesto de un potencial ataque norteamericano a Corea del Norte, Japón pudiera ser el objeto de las represalias de esta última.

De la mano de estas percepciones, no es extraño que Japón por una parte reafirme su cooperación en materia de seguridad con EEUU, llegando incluso a la posibilidad de un desarrollo conjunto de un sistema de defensa antimisiles de teatro, pese a las dudas que inicialmente pudiera manifestar el gobierno de Tokio al respecto y, por otra, haya emprendido un proceso de reforzamiento de sus capacidades defensivas y militares de gran importancia.

Sin embargo, en este punto, se complican aún más las cosas por la polarización que ello conlleva en el seno de la propia clase política japonesa donde, al tiempo que unos abogan incluso por el desarrollo, también por parte de Japón de su propio programa de armas nucleares, otros mantienen planteamientos de claro signo pacifista y, desde luego, contrarios por completo a la opción nuclear.

---

41 Idem. Pp 242
42 Idem Pp 243
Desde luego, tal desarrollo es, desde un punto de vista técnico, absolutamente posible a la vista tanto del programa nuclear civil japonés como de su programa espacial. De hecho, existen importantes temores en este sentido entre los vecinos del país nipón a pesar de la insistencia japonesa en que su programa nuclear es exclusivamente civil y de su invocación a los recuerdos de Hiroshima y Nagasaki como episodios que convierten la posibilidad de desarrollo de armas nucleares en absolutamente inaceptable para la mayoría de los japoneses. Junto a ello, en términos estratégicos, enfatizan la vulnerabilidad de un Estado archipelágico a un ataque nuclear preventivo. Asimismo, también hay que apuntar cómo importantes teóricos de las Relaciones Internacionales, particularmente desde la escuela neorrealista, como Kenneth Waltz, señalan que el contexto de seguridad de la Posguerra Fría impulsaría claramente a Japón al desarrollo de armas nucleares, cualesquiera que sean los sentimientos mayoritarios entre su población.

Ahora bien, más allá del rechazo interno y externo al potencial desarrollo por Japón de tales armas y del hecho de que sea signatario desde 1970 del Tratado de no Proliferación, está el hecho de las limitaciones en el terreno militar derivadas de la propia Constitución japonesa, (elaborada en un contexto histórico muy concreto al término de la Segunda Guerra Mundial) que podrían afectar también a desarrollos militares de otro tipo, incluidos los sistemas de armas convencionales.

Sin embargo, una lectura de algunos de los documentos legales claves del Japón de posguerra nos demuestra que tal vez no sea misión imposible una potencial voluntad japonesa de ensanchar mucho más allá de lo imaginable los límites de lo que se viene denominando autodefensa. Así, la “Basic Policy for National Defense”, aprobada en 1957 establece como objetivo “to prevent direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel such aggression, thereby preserving the sovereignty and peace of Japan based upon democracy.” Hasta aquí no parece haber inconveniente alguno para el desarrollo de sistemas de armas por parte de Japón en tanto en cuanto su finalidad sea defensiva. En el mismo sentido, entre los principios para lograr el objetivo arriba mencionado, se recogía el desarrollo de una capacidad de defensa eficaz y, si bien es cierto que otro de los puntos habla de construcción de una capacidad de defensa modesta, no lo es menos que no son lo mismo las amenazas que Japón percibe en 1957 y en el momento actual, ni tampoco la relación con EEUU y Corea del Sur entonces y ahora.

Precisamente el actual Programa Nacional de Defensa japonés atiende a la conveniencia de una adaptación a los cambios, al entender que sería apropiado que, en la situación actual, se revisaran la escala y las funciones de las capacidades de defensa japonesas, con vistas a modernizarlas y hacerlas más eficaces y compactas para garantizar que puedan responder a una amplia variedad de situaciones e incrementar su grado de flexibilidad para que puedan adaptarse a las transformaciones.

En esta línea y, junto con el posible programa de defensa antimisiles de teatro de desarrollo conjunto, Japón puede buscar fortalecer su capacidad defensiva mediante satélites de reconocimiento que sean no sólo fabricados sino operados en solitario por el país nipón.

45 Ver Overview of Japan’s Defence Policy 2002, disponible en www.jda.jp
Lo más llamativo de esta crisis ha sido precisamente que personalidades japonesas como el jefe de la Agencia de Defensa Japonesa se haya atrevido a propugnar el uso de la fuerza militar como medida de autodefensa.

3. La posición japonesa en la crisis actual

Cuando el pasado mes de octubre sale a la luz la posesión por parte de Corea del Norte, no ya de un programa nuclear secreto, sino de un programa secreto de armas nucleares, hacía sólo un mes que, con la declaración de Pyongyang de septiembre de 2002, que recuerda la ya firmada diez años antes, se había vuelto a decidir el lanzamiento de conversaciones de normalización entre Japón y Corea del Norte.

Ese hecho, junto con la actitud de firmeza hacia Corea del Norte adoptada por Japón a mediados de los noventa, su voluntad de desempeñar un papel de mayor relevancia en la escena internacional, (algo a lo que no es ni mucho menos ajeno el actual primer ministro), el mantenimiento de una cooperación estrecha con EEUU y Corea del Sur y su decisión de asumir una creciente responsabilidad en su propia defensa van a determinar los planteamientos japoneses en la crisis abierta actualmente en Corea del Norte.

Así, el Primer Ministro japonés Koizumi se reuniría con Kim Jong-II el 17 de septiembre de 2002 en Pyongyang, no sin antes haber intercambiado puntos de vista tanto con el presidente norteamericano George Bush, en el contexto de una visita previa a Estados Unidos, como con Corea del Sur. En la declaración resultante del encuentro de los dos líderes asiáticos hay una serie de puntos que conviene destacar tanto por el potencial que encerraban para la buena relación futura de los dos Estados, como por el significado que adquieren en el contexto de la actual crisis nuclear norcoreana. Son los siguientes:

- Reconocimiento japonés de los abusos cometidos durante el periodo colonial
- Compromiso japonés de proporcionar ayuda económica a la República Popular Democrática de Corea una vez que el proceso de normalización estuviera en marcha
- Compromiso de ambas partes de cumplimiento del derecho internacional y abstención de acciones que amenazaran la seguridad de la otra parte
- Cooperación en el mantenimiento y fortalecimiento de la paz y estabilidad en el Nordeste de Asia
- Compromiso de cumplimiento de todos los acuerdos internacionales relativos a la cuestión nuclear
- Acuerdo en la necesidad de promover un diálogo que permita resolver los problemas de seguridad, incluyendo los programas nuclear y de misiles balísticos, entre todas las partes implicadas
- Expresión por la República Popular Democrática de Corea de su voluntad de prolongar la moratoria de lanzamiento de misiles más allá de 2003

Habida cuenta de que en poco más de dos semanas quedaría probado el incumplimiento del documento por parte de Corea del Norte, es interesante recordar la insistencia del Primer Ministro Japonés Koizumi, en la rueda de prensa celebrada en el

transcurso de su visita a Pyongyang, en la importancia de que cesaran las violaciones de las aguas jurisdiccionales japonesas por parte de barcos norcoreanos no identificados adecuadamente, en la sospecha compartida por la comunidad internacional de la existencia de un programa nuclear secreto norcoreano y en la grave amenaza que suponía para la seguridad de Japón el desarrollo por parte de Corea del Norte de misiles, cuestión ésta que esperaban resolver por medio del diálogo bilateral. Asimismo, esperaban que Kim Jong-Il cumpliera finalmente sus compromisos. Más aún, se esperaba poder lanzar conversaciones de seguridad entre los dos países.

Sólo unas semanas más tarde, conocida ya la existencia del programa secreto norcoreano, Japón, en la duodécima Ronda de las Conversaciones de Normalización con Corea del Norte, expresó su profunda preocupación por la situación y urgió a Corea del Norte al cumplimiento de todos los acuerdos internacionales en materia nuclear y de la recientemente firmada declaración de Pyongyang.

Sin embargo, para este momento, la retórica norcoreana ya había cambiado y Kim Jong-II, más allá de señalar como culpables de la situación a los EEUU por su supuesta política hostil, “se olvido” de su acuerdo (recogido en la declaración de Pyongyang) de tratar las cuestiones nucleares entre todas las partes afectadas y señaló que la solución sólo sería posible a través de consultas directas con los Estados Unidos, algo que, por otra parte, no es sino una técnica empleada reiteradamente por Corea del Norte a lo largo del tiempo.

Más allá de eso, Corea del Norte no aceptó la petición japonesa de renuncia al programa de armas nucleares en marcha, rechazándola expresamente en las palabras de apertura pronunciadas por la República Popular Democrática de Corea al inicio de las conversaciones.

Por su parte, las autoridades japonesas insistían en que el propio Consejo de Gobernadores de la IAEA había llegado a un consenso en el sentido de que el programa de enriquecimiento de uranio de Pyongyang así como sus otras actividades nucleares encubiertas, de confirmarse, constituirían una violación de los compromisos internacionales de Corea del Norte, incluido el acuerdo de salvaguardias firmado con la IAEA. Asimismo, la IAEA había hecho un llamamiento al abandono inmediato del programa por parte de Pyongyang, algo que Japón respaldaba pidiendo una respuesta positiva norcoreana.

A pesar de todo, Japón reiteró la posibilidad de que Corea del Norte utilizara las conversaciones de normalización y sus conversaciones bilaterales en materia de seguridad como canales para aliviar la situación, al tiempo que insistía en su voluntad de actuar en

---

49 Opening Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the press Conference on the Outcome of his Visit to North Korea, Pyongyang, 17 de septiembre de 2002, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, disponible en www.mofa.go.jp
50 12th round of the Japan-North Korea Normalization Talks (Evaluation and Outline), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 29 y 30 de octubre de 2002, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, disponible en www.mofa.go.jp
52 “Corea del Norte rechaza desmantelar su programa nuclear” en ABC, 29 de octubre de 2002, disponible en www.abc.es
54 Suryanarayana, P. S. “Japan, IAEA mount pressure on North Korea” en The Hindu, 30 de noviembre de 2002. Disponible en www.hinduonnet.com
estrecha cooperación con Estados Unidos y Corea del Sur. De hecho, sólo la voluntad de Corea del Norte de destruir esta cooperación indica mucho acerca de su conveniencia, más allá de ser una muestra más de la voluntad manifiesta norcoreana de negociar exclusivamente con Estados Unidos.

Esta actitud norcoreana unida a la rápida escalada a que procede a lo largo del pasado otoño, las últimas informaciones relativas a los ciudadanos japoneses secuestrados por la República Popular Democrática de Corea y el envío por este mismo país de barcos espía, facilitaron el compromiso japonés de mantener su línea de dureza actual respecto a Corea del Norte cerrando la puerta a cualquier tipo de ayuda económica o financiera hasta tanto el régimen de Pyongyang no se deshaga de forma verificable, definitiva e irreversible de sus programas nucleares.

Así, a finales de octubre, Japón, por medio de Katsunari Suzuki, que encabezaba su delegación en las conversaciones con Pyongyang, comunicaba su decisión de abandonar la financiación de los dos reactores nucleares en construcción en Corea del Norte e, incluso, abandonar las conversaciones de normalización, si Corea del Norte no hacía progresos para acabar con su programa clandestino de armas nucleares.

En todo caso, eso no es obstáculo para que a la altura de enero de 2003, Japón siguiera insistiendo en una solución dialogada a la crisis y creyendo en la contribución que a ese objetivo podía hacer, no sólo la Declaración de Pyongyang sino la cooperación con EEUU y la República de Corea, razón por la que acudiría a la reunión tripartita celebrada en Washington en esas fechas, en la que los responsables de los tres países estudiaron las principales vías para desactivar la crisis y en la que señalaron que la evolución de las relaciones de Corea del Norte con la comunidad internacional dependería, en buena medida, de que se decidiera o no a emprender medidas inmediatas y verificables para el desmantelamiento de su programa de armas nucleares y el cumplimiento de sus compromisos en materia de salvaguardas. Así, aún cuando en aquel momento el recurso a las sanciones económicas parecía la opción más probable a pesar de las reiteradas advertencias norcoreanas de que lo considerarían como una declaración de guerra, lo cierto es que ya entonces, altos funcionarios de la administración norteamericana se planteaban la probabilidad de llevar adelante conversaciones con Pyongyang. En ese sentido, EEUU deseaba entablar conversaciones con el régimen de

56 Funabashi, Yoichi “Japan’s Diplomacy in Critical Test” en Asahi Shimbum, 7 de enero de 2003. Disponible en http://worldpress.org
60 “El Primer Ministro japonés pide a Corea del Norte que respete los compromisos en materia nuclear” en Diario de Noticias, 6 de enero de 2003, disponible en www.noticiasdenavarra.labolsa.com
61 “U.S., South Korea, Japan Say North Korea Nuclear Actions Unacceptable,” International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, 7 de enero de 2003, disponible en http://usinfo.state.gov
62 Funabashi, Yoichi, op. cit
Pyongyang sobre las vías que posibilitarían el cumplimiento por parte de este último de sus obligaciones en materia nuclear, pero rechazaba plenamente la posibilidad de contrapartidas.\(^{63}\)

Poco cambiarían las cosas tras el anuncio norcoreano de su decisión de retirarse del TNP. Japón se limitaría a expresar su grave preocupación por la situación y a reiterar la necesidad de estrecha cooperación entre los miembros del Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group\(^{64}\).

En este punto, hay que señalar que las amenazas de incumplimiento, posteriormente suavizadas, como probablemente ocurrirá también en el caso actual, son otra de las tácticas empleadas una y otra vez por Corea del Norte\(^{65}\) para lograr sus objetivos en materia económica. Mientras sus interlocutores tienen la sensación de que Pyongyang está haciendo concesiones, lo único que está haciendo es retractarse de su manifestación de voluntad de incumplir obligaciones que, por lo general, ni siquiera a empezado a respetar.

Sin embargo, esta voluntad japonesa de que sea una solución negociada la que finalmente se imponga, no debe hacer dudar ni de la firmeza de Tokio respecto al régimen de Kim Jong - II, ni tampoco con relación al sentimiento acuciante entre los japoneses de que Corea del Norte supone una amenaza a su seguridad de la que deben protegerse, incluso, dotándose de los medios militares necesarios para ello. Así, ya en diciembre de 1999, Mikio Aoki, Secretario del Jefe del Gabinete, señalaba respecto de la posibilidad de diseñar un sistema de defensa de misiles que, si tal sistema tenía un carácter exclusivamente defensivo y era la única alternativa con que contaba Japón, entonces deberían dotarse de un sistema de ese tipo. A tal efecto, se iban a poner en marcha los procesos legales y operativos necesarios y la búsqueda del sistema que consideraban óptimo que, en aquel momento, eran los Patriot\(^{66}\).

En esta misma línea hablaba hace apenas dos meses el portavoz de la Agencia de Defensa Japonesa, Ichiro Imaizumi, al declarar que el gobierno estaba investigando y considerando las “cuestiones tanto legales como presupuestarias relativas a la defensa de misiles”. Y, en efecto, a mediados de mayo, la diota japonesa ha aprobado tres leyes en materia de defensa que servirán como marco para la actuación japonesa en caso de guerra\(^{67}\) y permitirán a Japón un reforzamiento de sus fuerzas de Autodefensa de forma que puedan repeler eficazmente un potencial ataque militar\(^{68}\).

Asimismo, según el diario japonés Yomiuri Shimbun Tokio estaría planeando la compra a EEUU de misiles Patriot PAC2 con capacidad para interceptar misiles balísticos con un alcance de 1000 km, con la intención de poder desplegarlos a partir del próximo mes de julio. Estos misiles interceptarían un Nodong de medio alcance que Corea del Norte pudiera lanzar en un hipotético caso con dirección a Japón.

---

\(^{63}\) “U.S., South Korea, Japan Say North Korea Nuclear Actions Unacceptable, International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, 7 de enero de 2003, disponible en http://usinfo.state.gov

\(^{64}\) Comment by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi concerning North Korea’s Withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 10 de enero de 2003 y Statement by Ms. Yoriko Kawaguchi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the Declaration by North Korea to Withdraw from the TNP, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 10 de enero de 2003, disponibles en www.mofa.go.jp


\(^{66}\) Funabashi, Yoichi, op. cit.

\(^{67}\) “Japanese lawmakers reach deal on defence” en The Straits Times, 15 de mayo de 2003, disponible en http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg

No obstante, hay que recordar que Japón cuenta ya con misiles Patriot, pero de un alcance menor.

A nivel legal, Tokio se plantea la posibilidad de revisar su legislación de manera que dichos Patriot pudieran ser lanzados sin una orden directa previa del Primer Ministro. Del mismo modo, podría permitirse al ejército una movilización inmediata en el supuesto de que un misil alcanzara territorio japonés. Por otra parte, Japón no descarta una posible ampliación de su marco de defensa que le permita incluir en él la posibilidad de realizar ataques preventivos a bases de misiles de Estados hostiles, tal y como señaló el jefe de la Agencia de Defensa, Sigeru Ishiba, en la sesión de la dieta japonesa del 28 de marzo. Sin embargo, también hay que recordar cómo otros líderes japoneses como el secretario general del Gabinete, Yasuo Fukuda, han apuntado que ésa es sólo una posibilidad en estudio y que no significa que tales acciones vayan a tener lugar necesariamente, aunque esta clarificación muy bien puede tener su origen más en el deseo de evitar alarma a otros Estados, que en la realidad.

Junto a todo ello, hay que constatar el despliegue por parte de Japón de un destructor equipado con sistemas Aegis en el Mar del Japón. Despliegue éste que, con toda claridad, no ha sentado bien en Pyongyang, algo que se desprende no sólo de las declaraciones norcoreanas sino de los misiles de corto alcance disparados por este país al Mar Amarillo o Mar del Japón. En concreto, han sido al menos tres los lanzamientos efectuados, dos en febrero y uno en abril. Altos funcionarios de defensa norteamericanos confirmaron en el caso de éste último que, efectivamente, se trataba de un misil antibarco aunque, desde fuentes japonesas, se indicaba también que no había supuesto amenaza alguna para Japón.

Por si fuera poco, semejantes acontecimientos dan argumentos a las sospechas japonesas de que Corea del Norte se esté preparando para el lanzamiento de un misil Rodong de medio alcance que podría llegar a la mayor parte del territorio japonés en tan sólo diez minutos y del que el gobierno de Pyongyang tendría unas cien unidades. Tal situación propició que, una vez más, Shigeru Ishiba, Ministro Japonés de Defensa, abogara el pasado mes de abril por la expansión de las defensas antimisiles de su país.

De igual modo, pero también por hechos así, el 28 de marzo, Japón optó por el lanzamiento de dos satélites espía por medio de un cohete de fabricación japonesa H-2A con capacidad de observar objetos de sólo un metro de largo y una tecnología que se considera similar a la empleada por los propios Estados Unidos. A pesar de las manifestaciones de Shigeru Ishiba en el sentido de que los satélites no constituirían una amenaza para otras naciones, Corea del Norte sí consideró el lanzamiento como amenazador y, por ello, como una violación de la Declaración de Pyongyang. Sin embargo, aunque efectivamente el lanzamiento supusiera tal violación, probablemente Japón tendría razón en considerar

70 Japan mulls missile defense plans en CNN.com, 14 de marzo de 2003, disponible en http://cnn.worldnews.printhis.clickability.com
71 Ueno, Teruaki, N. Korea Fires Short-Range Missile Into Yellow Sea, Reuters, 1 de abril de 2003, disponible en http://story.news.yahoo.com
73 N Korea says Japanese spy satellite launch violates Pyongyang Declaration, AFP, 7 de abril de 2003, disponible en http://story.news.yahoo.com
violaciones previas y más graves las norcoreanas, de la mano no sólo del programa nuclear de Pyongyang, sino del también comentado lanzamiento de misiles por parte del régimen tiránico al Mar del Japón o el envío a esas mismas aguas de un posible barco espía el pasado mes de diciembre que sería hundido por los servicios de guardacostas y la marina japonesa.

Sin embargo, estos no son sino nuevos elementos en una escalada que deteriora notablemente el contexto de seguridad en el nordeste de Asia y pone una piedra más en la carrera de armamentos que parece estar lanzada en esa región.

Junto a ello, a nivel de la crisis actual, no contribuyen sino a reafirmar a Japón en su postura de dureza actual hacia Corea del Norte y a reeditar, algo en lo que Corea del Norte parece ser maestra, situaciones pasadas como las de 1993 y 1998, en las que Japón se manifestaría contrario a todo pacto o a toda ayuda económica a Corea del Norte precisamente como consecuencia de demostraciones de fuerza de ésta última tendentes a favorecer el sentimiento de Japón de estar amenazado por el régimen de Pyongyang. La diferencia es que, en esta ocasión, la administración norteamericana tiene probablemente unos planteamientos más próximos a los del gobierno japonés y no es probable que opte, y obligue a Japón a optar, por nuevas ayudas sin contrapartida.

Ese es precisamente el marco en el que Corea del Norte reiteraba el 18 de febrero su voluntad de retirarse del armisticio de 1953 si EEUU se decidía por la imposición de sanciones económicas, al tiempo que acusaba a este Estado de estar planeando un ataque preventivo contra ella. De hecho, esta posibilidad y el consiguiente sentimiento de amenaza que podría derivarse de ella, son, como ya vimos, las justificaciones que alega Pyongyang para su política de incumplimientos de los últimos meses.

Sin embargo, las amenazas norcoreanas de considerar potenciales sanciones económicas como una declaración de guerra, abandonar el armisticio o declarar que se estaba en riesgo de una guerra nuclear no son sino elementos de la clásica táctica psicológica de intimidación del régimen de Pyongyang.

En cualquier caso y, aún cuando como hemos visto, no sea quizás conveniente tomar completamente en serio las amenazas de Corea del Norte, es evidente que era necesario tratar de dar una salida a la crisis y que se debía intentar por todos los medios que fuera una salida pacífica. Es en ese marco en el que se van a organizar para el mes de abril y en Pekín unas conversaciones marcadas por la voluntad norcoreana de hablar únicamente y exclusivamente con EEUU. La única concesión será, finalmente, la presencia de la República Popular China, prácticamente único aliado de Corea del Norte y que, sin embargo, tampoco ve con buenos ojos la posesión por parte del régimen de Pyongyang de armas nucleares ya que, por una parte, puede contribuir a impulsar el crecimiento militar japonés, lo que obligaría a China a

74 Warren, Marcus “Japan sinks North Korea Spying ship” en Telegraph.co.uk, disponible en www.telegraph.co.uk
75 “DPKR Warns It Will Abandon Armistice Agreement in case U.S. Imposes Sanction” en The People’s Korea, 1 de marzo de 2003, disponible en www.korea-np.co.jp
78 Niksh, Larry A., op. Cit., pp 63
79 Ortega, Ignacio, “La Corea comunista acepta conversaciones directas con EEUU para frenar la crisis nuclear” en La Razón, 17 de abril de 2003
incrementar sus ya considerables esfuerzos en este terreno y alentaría a otros Estados claves de la región a hacer lo propio y, por otra, hace más plausible el estallido de un conflicto, con los consiguientes efectos negativos para la economía asiática, en particular del nordeste. Esto último es visto con preocupación por Pekín por sus consecuencias para un país como la RPC centrado desde hace década y media en el crecimiento económico y en la solución de sus problemas internos.

La ausencia de Japón, como otros Estados, de estas conversaciones viola la Declaración de Pyongyang del pasado mes de septiembre, al no estar presentes en las conversaciones todas las partes afectadas por la cuestión nuclear.

En este sentido, desde Tokio se va a reiterar repetidamente el deseo de unirse a esas conversaciones al tiempo que, sin embargo y en el contexto de la suspensión de las mismas tras tres días de negociaciones sin resultado alguno, se señala la importancia de que continúen. Asimismo, ha alertado a la comunidad internacional de que podríamos estar ante un nuevo episodio de la táctica norcoreana de hacer crecientes amenazas que no tienen por qué corresponderse con lo que realmente piensa hacer y que, finalmente, quedan en nada, por lo que es conveniente mantener la calma y no caer en las provocaciones, analizando con cuidado las declaraciones norcoreanas y evitando adoptar una actitud contra Pyongyang excesivamente decidida. Igualmente, Japón va a manifestar su voluntad de volver a proporcionar ayuda económica a Corea del Norte si desmantela su programa nuclear. A pesar de todo ello Japón ha llegado a sopesar la introducción de sanciones económicas si Pyongyang continúa con su actitud actual, cuestión que ocupó un lugar de primer orden en la reunión mantenida por el Primer Ministro Koizumi con el Presidente norteamericano George Bush en Texas el 22 de mayo, reunión cuyos preparativos han sido considerados como una provocación por el régimen norcoreano. De hecho, Corea del Norte, ha llegado a decir que Japón apoya la aplicación a corea del Norte de la doctrina del ataque preventivo y que lo hace como medio para convertirse de nuevo en un poder militar y a amenazado al país nipón con graves consecuencias si sigue en esa línea.

Por su parte, Japón ha señalado por medio del jefe de la Agencia de Autodefensa Defensa, Shigeharu Ishiba, el error cometido por Corea del Norte al insistir en el transcurso de las negociaciones en su posesión de armas nucleares. El Ministro se muestra convencido de que eso no ayudará a Pyongyang a asegurar la supervivencia del régimen ni a ser tomado más

81 “Japan’s Koizumi urges calm over N. Korea in talks with Britain’s Blair”, AFP, 27 de abril de 2003, disponible en http://story.news.yahoo.com
82 “North Korea ready to scrap nuclear weapons program”, AFP, 28 de abril de 2003, disponible en http://story.news.yahoo.com
84 Kin, Kwan Weng, “North Korea is top of Koizumi’s agenda” en The Strait Times, 22 de mayo de 2003, disponible en http://straittimes.asia1.com.sg
85 “North Korea admits it has nuclear weapons”, Asia Today, 24 de abril de 2003, disponible en www.asiasource.org
86 Kin, Kwan Weng, “North Korea is top of Koizumi’s agenda” en The Strait Times, 22 de mayo de 2003, disponible en http://straittimes.asia1.com.sg
en serio por EEUU. No obstante, no es extraño que el régimen norcoreano haya seguido esa lógica pues, hasta el momento, le había dado muy buenos resultados, como demuestra, mejor que ningún otro ejemplo, la crisis de 1994. La cuestión es, por tanto, que nunca debieron la comunidad internacional en general y EEUU en concreto, entrar en ese juego y, eso es lo que tanto el Presidente Bush como el Primer Ministro Koizumi parecen decididos a no repetir, como demuestra su insistencia en no ceder al chantaje de Corea del Norte.

Por otra parte, EEUU, tras las conversaciones de Pekín, ha informado a Tokio de las cuestiones abordadas y, junto con otros aliados como Corea del Sur, Rusia y Australia, están estudiando el plan propuesto por Corea del Norte para eliminar sus armas nucleares y han acordado de nuevo buscar una solución pacífica a la crisis levantada por el programa norcoreano.

Además Tokio ha insistido en que tanto Japón como Corea del Sur tomen parte en futuras conversaciones, convencido de que ello ademas ayudaría a alcanzar mejor una solución. De hecho, Junichiro Koizumi ha señalado que, desde el punto de vista japonés, el formato ideal de las conversaciones sería el formado por el siguiente sexteto: EEUU, Corea del Norte, China, Rusia, Japón y Corea del Sur, aunque Rusia, como también la Unión Europea, podrían unirse más tarde. Desde luego, esto no sólo no es descabellado sino que sería consistente con lo recogido en la Declaración de Pyongyang. EEUU ha mostrado su disposición a incluir tanto a Japón como a la República de Corea en futuras conversaciones. Veremos lo que dice su interlocutor, Corea del Norte y si, finalmente, se reanudan las conversaciones, pero no cabe duda de que es cada vez más improbable que esto ocurra sin la presencia de Tokio en ellas ya que el presidente norteamericano George Bush indicó, al término de la ya mencionada reunión con Junichiro Koizumi, celebrada en el rancho de Texas, la imposibilidad de entrar en negociaciones reales sin la presencia de Japón y Corea del Sur.

Junto a ello hay que resaltar cómo, pese a los reiterados llamamientos a la calma efectuados desde el gobierno japonés éste habría endurecido su postura desde que acabaron las conversaciones celebradas en Pekín y, más allá de amenazar a Corea del Norte con la adopción de medidas más duras si continúa con su actual escalada, está promoviendo la

88 “Japan says Nuclear threat no help to North Korea”, Reuters, 27 de abril de 2003, disponible en http://story.news.yahoo.com
89 “US, Japan will not tolerate a nuclear North Korea” en The Straits Times, 24 de mayo de 2003, disponible en http://straittimes.asia1.com.sg
90 Martínez, Carlos, “Solución a la vista en la crisis entre EEUU y Corea del Norte” en El Mundo, 29 de abril de 2003
91 “North Korea Offers plan to eliminate nuclear weapons: Powell”, AFP, 28 de abril de 2003, disponible en http://story.news.yahoo.com
92 U.S., Japan to Seek Peaceful N. Korea Solution, Reuters, 26 de abril de 2003, disponible en http://story.news.yahoo.com
93 “Japan says it must be part of North Korea talks”, AFP, 29 de abril de 2003, disponible en http://story.news.yahoo.com
94 Caro, Patricia, “Aznar y Koizumi apoyan una solución pacífica en Corea” Cinco Días, 29 de abril de 2003
95 Slavin, Barbara “U.S. rejects N.Korean offer to end nuclear arms plan for concessions” en USA Today, 29 de abril de 2003, disponible en http://story.news.yahoo.com
96 “US, Japan will not tolerate a nuclear North Korea” en The Straits Times, 24 de mayo de 2003, disponible en http://straittimes.asia1.com.sg
97 “Japan, US warn North Korea “tougher measures” are an option” en The Japan Times, 25 de mayo de 2003, disponible en www.japantimes.co.jp
prohibición de la exportación a ese país de materiales susceptibles de ser empleados en la fabricación de armas de destrucción masiva\(^98\).

### 3. Conclusiones

De lo dicho hasta aquí se desprenden necesariamente dos cosas: en primer lugar, Japón ha sido el último engañado por Corea del Norte, toda vez que la Declaración de Pyongyang ha quedado totalmente carente de sentido y con toda probabilidad, cuando Kim Jong-II la firma, ya tenía en mente una evolución futura muy diferente de la que allí se recogía y, en segundo lugar, Japón ha sido marginado en una crisis en cuya solución debía estar implicado en virtud de la citada declaración, pero en la que, además, tiene intereses vitales. La actitud de Corea del Norte, como ya hemos dicho, no ha ayudado a que Japón pudiera jugar un papel más activo pero cabe pensar que el bajo perfil actual de su relación con EEUU y los recelos que pese a todo parecen seguir existiendo en Corea del Sur también podrían haber contribuido a que el país nipón quedara relegado a un segundo plano. Por otra parte, Japón no potenció posibles palancas de actuación con Corea del Norte en los últimos años y el resultado ha sido un aislamiento relativo.

Sin embargo, la actitud norcoreana en la crisis actual en general y hacia el país nipón en particular no ha hecho sino reafirmar a Japón en una postura de dureza hacia Corea del Norte que ya dura casi una década y que ya encuentra tanto apoyo en la opinión pública, mucho mejor informada que en el pasado de los secuestros de ciudadanos japoneses a manos de Pyongyang, como en el gobierno, cada vez menos dispuesto a continuar otorgando ayuda económica y financiera a cambio de nada o, lo que es peor, de lanzamientos de misiles que plantean una seria amenaza al territorio japonés. Por si fuera poco, tampoco es probable que se repitan las presiones norteamericanas del pasado para que Japón continúe con ese apoyo económico incondicional al régimen norcoreano, pero es que, en caso de que se produjeran, tampoco es probable que Tokio se dejara influir.

Esta postura japonesa hacia Corea del Norte, unida a su búsqueda actual de una mayor autonomía en materia de seguridad y defensa, promovida también por Washington desde hace más de una década, y la voluntad japonesa de adquirir un papel de mayor relevancia en la escena internacional, muy bien pueden estar conduciendo al archipiélago a un crecimiento a pasos agigantados en el terreno de las capacidades militares, ensanchando de forma considerable los límites que, en principio, parecía imponer la “autodefensa”.

Es lógico que Japón trate de defenderse, tanto más cuando tiene motivos sobrados para sentirse amenazado y cuando sería casi con toda certeza objetivo norcoreano si en la actual o en una futura crisis se llegara a un conflicto armado, pero también hay que tener presente que un Japón crecientemente armado puede convertirse en un acelerador, como pocos, de la carrera de armamentos existente en Asia.

Junto a ello y, aunque se trataría siempre de una consecuencia involuntaria y no de un efecto buscado conscientemente, no hay que descartar que tales desarrollos pudieran aportar un dinamismo económico que contribuyera a solventar las dificultades por que atraviesa la economía japonesa desde hace ya algún tiempo y que muy bien podrían evidenciar una crisis de demanda que no fuera sino la manifestación económica de una crisis de sistema en que estaría inmerso Japón. Dicho de otro modo, Japón parece experimentar una situación de

\(^{98}\) “Japan to propose N.Korean weapons technology ban” en Mainichi Daily News Interactive, 26 de mayo de 2003, disponible en http://mdn.mainichi.co.jp
cansancio, de agotamiento del sistema y la introducción de factores dinamizadores podrían ayudar a paliarla.

4. Bibliografía

Libros y capítulos de libros

Buckley, Roger The United States and the Asia-Pacific since 1945, Cambridge University Press, Singapore, 2002
Garrido Rebolledo, Vicente “La situación nuclear en Asia: ¿Cuál es el atractivo del arma nuclear?, en Asia: escenario de los desequilibrios mundiales, Seminario de Investigación para la paz, Centro Pignatelli, Zaragoza, 2000
Kim, Hong Nack, “Japan in North Korean Foreign Policy” en Kim, Samuel S. North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, Oxford University Press, Hong Kong, 1998
Matake, Kamiya “Japanese Foreign Policy toward Northeast Asia” en Takashi, Inoguchi y Jain, Pumendra Japanese Foreign Policy Today, Palgrave, Nueva York, 2000
Miyashita, Akitoshi, Japanese Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific, Palgrave, Nueva York, 2001

Documentos

Comment by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi concerning North Korea’s Withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 10 de enero de 2003
Despite Progress North Korea posses major threat, disponible en www.fas.org
“DPKR Warns It Will Abandon Armistice Agreement in case U.S. Imposes Sanction” en The People’s Korea, 1 de marzo de 2003, disponible en www.korea-np.co.jp
Opening Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the Press Conference on the Outcome of his Visit to North Korea, Pyongyang, 17 de septiembre de 2002, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, disponible en www.mofa.go.jp
Overview of Japan’s Defence Policy 2002, disponible en www.jda.jp
Statement by Ms. Yoriko Kawaguchi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the Declaration by North Korea to Withdraw from the TNP, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 10 de enero de 2003, disponibles en www.mofa.go.jp
“U.S., South Korea, Japan Say North Korea Nuclear Actions Unacceptable, International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, 7 de enero de 2003, disponible en http://usinfo.state.gov

Prensa

Caro, Patricia, “Aznar y Koizumi apoyan una solución pacífica en Corea” Cinco Días, 29 de abril de 2003
Funabashi, Yoichi “Japan’s Diplomacy in Critical Test” en Asahi Shimbum, 7 de enero de 2003. Disponible en http://worldpress.org
Kin, Kwan Weng, “North Korea is top of Koizumi’s agenda” en The Strait Times, 22 de mayo de 2003, disponible en http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg
Lausin, Francesc “El inventario del eje del mal” en El Periódico, 24 de febrero de 2002
Martinez, Carlos, “Solución a la vista en la crisis entre EEUU y Corea del Norte” en El Mundo, 29 de abril de 2003
Ortega, Ignacio, “La Corea comunista acepta conversaciones directas con EEUU para frenar la crisis nuclear” en La Razón, 17 de abril de 2003
Reinoso, José, “EEUU despliega 24 bombarderos cerca de Corea del Norte” en El País 4 de febrero de 2003
------------- “Shock from North Korea” en International Herald Tribune, 18 de octubre de 2002, disponible en www.iht.com
Slavin, Barbara “U.S. rejects N.Korean offer to end nuclear arms plan for concessions” en USA Today, 29 de abril de 2003, disponible en http://story.news.yahoo.com
Ueno, Teruaki, N. Korea Fires Short-Range Missile Into Yellow Sea, Reuters, 1 de abril de 2003, disponible en http://story.news.yahoo.com
Warren, Marcus “Japan sinks North Korea Spying ship“ en Telegraph.co.uk, disponible en www.telegraph.co.uk
“Corea del Norte rechaza desmantelar su programa nuclear” en ABC, 29 de octubre de 2002, disponible en www.abc.es
“El Primer Ministro japonés pide a Corea del Norte que respete los compromisos en materia nuclear” en Diario de Noticias, 6 de enero de 2003, disponible en www.noticiasdenavarra.labolsa.com
Japan mulls missile defense plans en CNN.com, 14 de marzo de 2003, disponible en http://cnn.worldnews.printrthis.clickability.com
“Japan’s Koizumi urges calm over N. Korea in talks with Britain’s Blair”, AFP, 27 de abril de 2003, disponible en http://story.news.yahoo.com
“Japan says it must be part of North Korea talks”, AFP, 29 de abril de 2003, disponible en http://story.news.yahoo.com
“Japan says Nuclear threat no help to North Korea”, Reuters, 27 de abril de 2003, disponible en http://story.news.yahoo.com
“Japan to propose N.Korean weapons technology ban” en Mainichi Daily News Interactive, 26 de mayo de 2003, disponible en http://mdn.mainichi.co.jp
“Japan, US warn North Korea “tougher measures” are an option” en The Japan Times, 25 de mayo de 2003, disponible en www.japantimes.co.jp
“North Korea: not yet ready for diplomacy” en The Economist, 8 de febrero de 2003
“North Korea admits it has nuclear weapons” en Asia Today, 24 de abril de 2003, disponible en www.asiasource.org

“North Korea Offers plan to eliminate nuclear weapons: Powell”, AFP, 28 de abril de 2003, disponible en http://story.news.yahoo.com

“North Korea ready to scrap nuclear weapons program”, AFP, 28 de abril de 2003, disponible en http://story.news.yahoo.com

N Korea says Japanese spy satellite launch violates Pyongyang Declaration, AFP, 7 de abril de 2003, disponible en http://story.news.yahoo.com

Pyongyang’s missile program en CNN.com, 11 de diciembre de 2002, disponible en http://cnn.worldnews.printhis.clickability.com

Tensión nuclear... 26 de diciembre de 2002, disponible en www.labolsa.com

U.S., Japan to Seek Peaceful N.Korea Solution, Reuters, 26 de abril de 2003, disponible en http://story.news.yahoo.com

“US, Japan will not tolerate a nuclear North Korea” en The Straits Times, 24 de mayo de 2003, disponible en http://straittimes.asia1.com.sg
1. Introducción

En estos últimos tiempos, el supuesto aumento del grado de producción de armamento nuclear por parte de Corea del Norte, ha enraizado las ya de por sí complicadas relaciones entre este país y los Estados Unidos.

Anthony Cordesman expone la existencia de dos tipos de “crisis” entre los dos Estados. Una primera, cuyo motivo es la existencia de armas de destrucción masiva en la península de Corea. Y la segunda, de carácter global, que se centra en la proliferación de armas no convencionales que ciertos Estados, los considerados por el gobierno estadounidense como los componentes del “Eje del Mal”, están llevando a cabo, propiciando un aumento de la proliferación, con la consiguiente carrera armamentística en ciertas regiones de gran importancia geoestratégica.

La segunda razón que argumenta Cordesman, podemos considerarla como complemento a la primera, es decir, la propia capacidad norcoreana de producir armas de destrucción masiva, abre un mercado que resulta muy atractivo tanto para la propia Corea del Norte como para Estados que quieren aumentar sus capacidades no convencionales, pero que carecen de medios tecnológicos y humanos para lograr sus pretensiones.

Pero, ¿es solamente la capacidad nuclear de la que está haciendo gala el gobierno norcoreano, el único motivo de preocupación para las administraciones occidentales, concretamente la estadounidense? Desde mi punto de vista no debería ser el único. Como a continuación expondré, la importancia táctica de las armas químicas ante una ofensiva en la península es conocida por el gobierno norcoreano.

Las dudas surgen a la hora de establecer las razones para el desarrollo de un programa biológico o químico a gran escala.

El conocimiento de la doctrina militar de Pyongyang, nos da un perfil de las razones de un desarrollo de programas químicos y biológicos que el gobierno norcoreano está realizando.

---

1 Las opiniones expresadas en estos artículos son propias de sus autores. Estos artículos no reflejan necesariamente la opinión de UNISCI. The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors. These articles do not necessarily reflect the views of UNISCI
2 Véase, Cordesman, A. Is there a crisis in US and North Korea Relations? Yes, There are two. www.fas.org
La estrategia nuclear, la doctrina y los planes ante un eventual conflicto, no son conocidos de una manera exacta, salvo la colaboración de Corea del Norte con los programas militares nucleares chinos y soviéticos que, durante la Guerra Fría, ayudaron a Pyongyang en el desarrollo de armas nucleares. El reflejo de la doctrina militar soviética ha alcanzado tanto al ámbito nuclear como al químico, pudiendo formar parte, este último, de cualquier acción militar norcoreana.

Por lo tanto, debemos considerar un riesgo para la comunidad internacional que un Estado como Corea del Norte desarrolle capacidades nucleares, pero también es necesario advertir de los posibles usos que este gobierno puede dar a agentes químicos y biológicos, que, por su naturaleza, son difícilmente controlables, siendo conscientes de lo imprevisible que puede resultar un ataque con este tipo de armas de destrucción masiva.

De esta forma, dentro del paraguas al que se engloba a las armas no convencionales, el armamento químico y biológico no se debe pasar por alto, teniendo importancia tanto a nivel táctico (agentes químicos) como estratégico (patógenos).

La utilización de agentes químicos y biológicos por parte de Corea del Norte, no se entendería sin el estudio de su doctrina militar, ya que, como hemos visto, el poder de disuasión nuclear bastaría para anular cualquier ataque.

Por ello, creo necesario dar importancia a este tipo de armamento no convencional, porque, Corea del Norte considera sus programas químicos y biológicos como instrumentos de disuasión o, en caso extremo, como factores ofensivos, siendo importante dar la importancia que se merece a estos agentes que pueden resultar equiparables en poder disuasorio al nuclear, sobre todo el biológico.

2. Doctrina militar de Corea del Norte

La doctrina de política militar norcoreana ha basado sus líneas de actuación en mantener y sostener sus fuerzas militares para hacer cumplir los objetivos básicos o intereses nacionales con respecto a la unificación de la península, bajo control norcoreano. El segundo objetivo es la defensa del territorio. Para ello, la doctrina militar establece dos frentes de actuación. El primero, consistente en fuerzas convencionales, las cuales se establecerían para romper las defensas enemigas, tras la zona desmilitarizada, destruyendo las fuerzas combinadas de ROK y de los Estados Unidos, para avanzar rápidamente por todo el territorio peninsular. Esta operación estaría coordinada con la apertura de un segundo frente, consistente en fuerzas de apoyo que se encargarían de establecer las operaciones ofensivas en la retaguardia del frente enemigo.

La ofensiva del ejército norcoreano se dividiría en tres fases. La primera consistiría en romper las defensas a través de la zona desmilitarizada destruyendo las fuerzas situadas tras ella. La segunda fase se centraría en aislar Seúl, para, finalmente destruir las fuerzas restantes ocupando el resto de la península.

5 Republic of Korea
En lo que se refiere a armas de destrucción masiva, éstas complementarían a las armas convencionales. Ante un ataque sorpresa, las fuerzas norcoreanas, podrían hacer uso de agentes químicos a nivel táctico para eliminar las primeras líneas defensivas enemigas, reduciendo los efectivos y anulando los centros móviles, las zonas de almacenamiento y las bases militares sin destruir físicamente equipos y material logístico.

Los agentes químicos no persistentes podrían ser utilizados para romper líneas defensivas y evitar un contraataque con medios convencionales. Los agentes químicos persistentes, serían utilizados contra objetivos en zonas clave, incluyendo los elementos de mando y control, puertos, zonas de apoyo logístico y bases aéreas.

Los agentes químicos, se utilizarían en la fase temprana de un conflicto, ya que tienen un carácter táctico y no estratégico, pudiendo ser utilizados agentes biológicos para ofensivas estratégicas. La importancia, por tanto, de los agentes químicos en la doctrina militar norcoreana, se puede encuadrar en el contexto de una operación ofensiva como primer recurso, utilizando, tras ello, armamento convencional para proseguir el ataque una vez que la vanguardia está debilitada.

Ésta sería la estrategia militar que el gobierno norcoreano utilizaría ante una posible ofensiva en la península. Pero, según esto ¿qué repercusiones políticas y físicas tanto para los efectivos militares contrarios y propios, como para la población civil implicaría un ataque de agentes químicos como primer recurso?.

A lo largo de la crisis producida por la reactivación de las capacidades nucleares norcoreanas, se ha estado tratando el “asunto” nuclear casi como la única posible amenaza para Occidente, pero se ha olvidado de las capacidades tanto químicas como biológicas que Corea del Norte ha desarrollado. No olvidemos, que su doctrina militar tiene influencias tácticas tanto chinas como soviéticas, quedando éstas últimas reflejadas en la incorporación de armas químicas como parte integrante de cualquier ofensiva militar, como al comienzo de este artículo he apuntado.

¿Se pueden equiparar la percepción que pueda tener un Estado ante un uso de agentes químicos, biológicos y armas nucleares? Indudablemente no. Dentro de la doctrina de la disuasión, no es comparable disuadir con armas nucleares que con agentes químicos. Primero por la capacidad de destrucción. Los agentes químicos se utilizan para aspectos tácticos, localizados y con unos efectos que no suelen permanecer largo tiempo (si se utilizan agentes no persistentes, en cambio, hay agentes neurotóxicos y asfixiantes que pueden causar la muerte). Las armas nucleares son de utilización estratégica, y sus efectos son, en cierta forma, previsibles.

En segundo lugar por la propia disuasión. Como he dicho, no es comparable la percepción de daño que un arma química puede realizar a la de una nuclear. Si establecemos una jerarquía de menor a mayor poder destructivo y basándonos en el carácter disuasorio dentro de las armas no convencionales, podemos situar a los agentes químicos en el escalón inferior, seguidos por las armas biológicas, situando en la cumbre de la pirámide a las nucleares.
Aún así, los efectos de las armas nucleares son conocidos: la explosión causa un aumento extremo de la temperatura, acompañado de fuertes vientos para, tras ello, dejar una ola de radiación cuyos efectos se pueden apreciar durante décadas.

Los efectos de los agentes biológicos, no. La evolución de la biogenética y la tecnología que le acompaña, han propiciado una evolución en la creación de agentes biológicos con cada vez mayor poder destructivo. Las alteraciones genéticas en una cepa, para producir el desarrollo de una enfermedad en individuos con unas características genéticas concretas, es uno de los ejemplos que ha dado paso a una carrera desenfrenada de superación en poder letal.

Este riesgo que no es nuevo, dado que durante la Guerra Fría se realizaron experimentos biológicos, debe ser tenido en cuenta, aunque es poco probable que el gobierno norcoreano vaya a realizar un ataque con agentes biológicos por la situación geográfica y territorial que presenta el Estado, ya que al ser imprevisibles los efectos, sería un suicidio político el utilizar patógenos que, fácilmente, pueden volverse contra su propia población por efectos climáticos.

Volviendo a las consecuencias que puede tener la utilización de armas químicas en una ofensiva por parte de Corea del Norte, la respuesta estadounidense no podría ser proporcional, llegando a utilizar armas nucleares. Las armas nucleares estadounidenses pueden ser utilizadas dentro de un papel limitado como disuasión ante un ataque con armas químicas contra objetivos militares surcoreanos. Así, mientras una respuesta nuclear puede ser vista como una represalia creíble ante un uso de armas químicas y biológicas contra población civil, esta respuesta podría ser menos creíble ante un uso de agentes químicos en el campo de batalla, percibiéndose como totalmente desproporcionada.

Hay que resaltar además que el poder no convencional norcoreano está íntimamente ligado a su capacidad de desarrollo de misiles tanto balísticos como de crucero.

De esta forma, no podríamos realizar un análisis en profundidad si no tenemos en cuenta este factor.

3. Sistemas de misiles de Corea del Norte
Desde comienzos de los ochenta, el gobierno norcoreano ha mantenido un desarrollo de misiles balísticos. La producción de misiles Scud –C con un alcance de quinientos kilómetros, suponía una ventaja con respecto al alcance de los Scud- B soviéticos. En 1993, se iniciaron las pruebas de los misiles Nodong- 1, con alcance superior a mil trescientos kilómetros. Este tipo de misil está operativo desde 1997.

En agosto de 1998, el gobierno norcoreano intentó poner en órbita un pequeño satélite usando los sistemas de lanzamientos de los misiles Taepodong-1. Aunque el intento fracasó, el mecanismo de combustión del misil, la separación del mismo y los sistemas de guiado funcionaron sin ningún problema. Desde esta prueba, se puede decir que Corea del Norte posee capacidad para desarrollar misiles de medio y largo alcance.

El alcance máximo de los misiles Taepodong-1 y Taepodong-2, está estimado en dos mil o dos mil quinientos y seis mil setecientos kilómetros, respectivamente.
Con esto podemos ver que no solamente supone una amenaza para Corea del Sur, sino que puede alcanzar a cualquier país del noreste de Asia.

Informes alarmistas estadounidenses afirman que Corea del Norte, podría desarrollar un ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) que podría alcanzar los objetivos de Alaska, Hawai y la costa oeste de los Estados Unidos5.

La razón que argumenta Pyongyang para producir y poseer misiles de este alcance con capacidad para ser cargados con cabezas químicas y biológicas, es la de poder responder a la expansión de la influencia militar estadounidense y japonesa, usando esta capacidad como forma de negociación que mantenga la supervivencia del régimen6.

En lo que se refiere a la exportación de misiles, Corea del Norte, ha desarrollado un plan para el desarrollo de misiles conjuntamente con Egipto7. A petición del Presidente Mubarak, Kim Il- Sung envió a un grupo de expertos norcoreanos a este Estado, además de transferir tecnología sobre misiles a comienzos de los ochenta.

Asimismo, el gobierno norcoreano ha exportado misiles a Irán con anterioridad a la guerra entre Irak e Irán, exportando una importante cantidad de misiles tierra-tierra y tierra-aire.

4. Capacidad en armas químicas
En 1954 la Unión Soviética y China, transfirieron cierta tecnología, como agentes químicos junto con los medios de protección para los mismos, al gobierno norcoreano.

A pesar de que el país poseía importantes fuentes naturales de materiales para la producción de agentes químicos, tenía dificultades para iniciar una fabricación propia de los mismos.

En 1964, el gobierno norcoreano, negoció un contrato con Japón para que éste le proporcionase sustancias químicas agrícolas. De esta manera se inició un proceso de síntesis de tabún y gas mostaza, además de importar componentes orgánicos compuestos por cloro y fósforo.

El programa químico norcoreano se consideró avanzado a partir de 1989, ya que comenzó una producción importante de gases nerviosos, vesicantes, neurotóxicos. etc, además de una gran variedad de sistemas de proyección.

Corea del Norte cree poseer un importante arsenal de agentes químicos, que podían ser empleados en una eventual ofensiva contra Corea del Sur. Asimismo, ha desarrollado medios de protección para la población civil para evitar los efectos de estos agentes.

---

5 Véase Niksch, L. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program. Issue Brief for Congress IB91141 Oct, 2002
7 Véase Ju- Hwal Choi, North Korea Missile Proliferation Hearing before the subcommittee on international security, proliferation and Federal Services of the Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate, oct, 1997
En 1999, el gobierno de Corea del Sur informaba de la existencia de ocho fábricas químicas, cuatro instalaciones para la investigación y seis instalaciones para el almacenamiento de agentes químicos\(^8\) que el gobierno norcoreano había creado. La producción que se realiza en estas instalaciones es, según informes estadounidenses, de gas sarín, tabúin, fosgeno, ácido prúsico, gas mostaza...etc.

El medio de proyección de estos agentes se basa principalmente en los sistemas de misiles antes mencionados, sobre todo los que se utilizan en un teatro de operaciones, por su carácter táctico. Asimismo, no debemos olvidar la importancia de las piezas de artillería y morteros. Algunas bombas gravitacionales pueden ser empleadas para diseminar agentes químicos\(^9\).

Un dato a tener en cuenta es la negativa a firmar la Convención sobre Armas Químicas, lo que le exime de cualquier inspección y verificación que obligaría a cualquier Estado que haya ratificado dicha convención.

**5.Capacidad en armas biológicas**

Además de los agentes químicos, los patógenos también pueden ser utilizados de forma efectiva en una guerra, pero esto no es usual, por los motivos antes mencionados de desconocimiento de los efectos que puede producir. Por lo tanto su utilización se reserva para un posible uso estratégico.

Corea del Norte continua el programa de armas biológicas manteniendo expertos e instalaciones para su fabricación.

Desde 1960, el gobierno norcoreano ha seguido con el programa de investigación y desarrollo de patógenos para una posible guerra biológica. Partiendo de unas infraestructuras limitadas, se establecieron sistemas para la producción de patógenos y toxinas, destinados a servir como armas ante una posible ofensiva.

De acuerdo con las órdenes de Kim Il-Sung, en noviembre de 1980, Corea del Norte, aceleró el proceso de desarrollo de armas biológicas, organización de centros para la investigación y plantas con expertos de otros países.

La capacidad de producción de patógenos para guerra biológica no se considera con la misma importancia que el desarrollo de agentes químicos o armas nucleares. Un motivo de ello puede ser la carencia por parte de Corea del Norte de tecnología y expertos y por la dificultad que presenta el controlar los patógenos.

La desventaja para el uso de este tipo de armamento es la posibilidad de que se vuelva contra el propio ejército norcoreano. Por lo tanto, el utilizar agentes biológicos no es la mejor opción.

Dentro de los patógenos producidos por Corea del Norte, se cree que ha producido cantidades de ántrax y viruela. Asimismo, científicos han afirmado utilizar esporas de ántrax


\(^9\) idem
con un blindaje de microencapsulación, para proteger a los microorganismos de las radiaciones UVA.

En los últimos años, se ha producido la amenaza del virus de la viruela. De esta forma, el ejército norcoreano ha sido recientemente vacunado contra esta enfermedad\textsuperscript{10}.

Corea del Norte se adhirió al Tratado sobre Armas Biológicas en 1987.

6. Conclusiones

Ante la oposición entre armas biológicas y químicas versus armas nucleares, hemos podido comprobar que dentro de la doctrina militar de Corea del Norte, los agentes químicos y los patógenos, juegan un papel de cierta importancia para un posible teatro de operaciones. ¿Podemos considerar a Corea del Norte, según lo argumentado, un riesgo para la seguridad regional?

Si establecemos un análisis teniendo en cuenta la situación política de la zona y la capacidad no convencional que posee este Estado, desde mi punto de vista, creo que sí se puede considerar como tal. Partiendo de los objetivos que definen sus intereses nacionales, reunificación de las dos Coreas bajo mando norcoreano y la defensa de su territorio, la posesión de armas no convencionales se pueden considerar como factor de riesgo e incluso como amenaza para Corea del Sur. Por lo tanto, la posesión de este tipo de armamento, tiene una finalidad tanto defensiva como ofensiva.

Esta posibilidad ofensiva aumenta la percepción de riesgo o amenaza en la región aumentando la inestabilidad y, de alguna manera, contribuye a una carrera armamentística.

Si a esto unimos la inexistencia de una medidas de confianza e iniciativas de diálogo entre Corea del Norte y sus Estados vecinos, la situación de tensión ante un hipotético movimiento de tropas y colocación de sistemas de misiles en posición ofensiva, podría dar lugar al desencadenamiento de un conflicto, en el que no sólo las dos Coreas estarían implicadas, sino que la participación de Estados Unidos en el mismo sería inevitable, dado no sólo su tratado de defensa con la República de Corea del Sur, sino, de forma especial, la presencia cerca de la frontera de parte de los 37.000 soldados estadounidenses desplegados en la península coreana.

Ante este hecho, ¿cuál sería la postura estadounidense?. La colocación de las baterías de misiles en el teatro de operaciones peninsular, obligaría a realizar por parte del gobierno estadounidense un ataque de anticipación (pre-emptive attack), considerado ya en su política estratégica. Este ataque anularía los medios materiales que dispone el ejército norcoreano, destruyendo los sistemas de misiles colocados en posición de ofensiva.

La cuestión en este caso, es preguntarse si con ello se daría por finalizado el conflicto o se recrudecería, obligando a Corea del Norte a iniciar una respuesta contra Estados Unidos. En este punto, la posibilidad de que permaneciesen sin destruir misiles con cargas no convencionales en posesión norcoreana, provocaría una contraofensiva contra objetivos estadounidenses.

\textsuperscript{10} Véase NTI: Country Overviews: North Korea. www.nti.org
Por lo tanto, creo que iniciativas de diálogo contra la proliferación en la región son de vital importancia para frenar la posibilidad de un conflicto en el que la utilización de armas de destrucción masiva.

Las políticas estratégicas Occidentales, sin embargo, ponen en duda una posible utilización de medios químicos y biológicos, quizás por el poder disuasorio que las armas nucleares poseen y que bastaría para ejercer esta disuasión ante un eventual conflicto. Pero considero que, una vez que un posible conflicto se iniciase, es probable, según la doctrina militar, la utilización de armas químicas como primer recurso para debilitar a la vanguardia de las fuerzas ofensivas.

Por ello, los agentes químicos y patógenos pueden resultar una opción que complemente el poder nuclear de disuasión norcoreano, o que en un futuro lo supla, siendo estos tipos de armas no convencionales difícilmente controlables por la tecnología de doble uso que se le pueda dar.

De esta forma, no se descarta la continuación de los programas químicos y biológicos ya que al ser unos tipos de armas con gran poder destructivo, se pueden producir fácilmente por ser baratas en lo que respecta a los elementos necesarios para su producción, además de no necesitar grandes conocimientos científicos, lo que resulta más atractivo para un Estado que pueda equiparar lo más posible su poder de disuasión con la disuasión nuclear.

Bien es cierto que un país como Corea del Norte, que tiene divergencias importantes con sus Estados vecinos, no quiera desprenderse de la capacidad nuclear que tantos años le ha costado obtener. Por lo tanto, en estos momentos, la capacidad química y biológica, como ya hemos dicho, estaría relegada a un segundo plano, estableciendo un poder disuasorio una vez que el conflicto ha comenzado, o, en caso extremo, pudiendo ser utilizado, pero no supliendo, en ningún caso, a la capacidad nuclear.
THE ASEAN RESPONSE TO TERRORISM∗

AUTOR: LEONARD C. SEBASTIÁN
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
FECHA: Mayo de 2003

1. Introduction
The ASEAN response to the threat of terrorism will to a certain extent mirror the comprehensive security approach adopted in the 1960s and 1970s to deal with the peril of communism. Explicitly, an understanding that collective ASEAN will is necessary to deal with terrorism is evident in the plethora of statements issued at various ASEAN ministerial meetings about the terrorist threat and the need to combat it. Yet, implicitly, due to differences in threat perceptions, the varied domestic contexts, and the strength of national will to resolve the problem, the capacities of the various countries to deal with terrorism will vary considerably.

This paper analyses how the issue of terrorism has been addressed within Southeast Asia by assessing the responses of individual countries as well as cooperation at the ASEAN and ARF levels. My argument is that in this initial stage in the war against terror, states in the region must concentrate on three issues. First, to fine tune multilateral and bilateral responses to terrorism. Second, to look beyond the war on terrorism, by dealing once and for all with the inequities within their countries spurring it. Third, to move from reactive to proactive approaches to dealing with terrorism by stressing the importance of practical measures like the creation of a Common Threat Assessment Centre that would not be inhibited by inter-state political conditions thereby allowing for better coordination and implementation of anti-terrorist strategies.

2. Domestic front
Domestic efforts are significantly the most important because in the end it is the capabilities and will of individual countries to act against terrorists within their own borders that matters most.

Until the Bali bombing of 12 October 2002, Indonesia was in denial mode over the presence of a terrorist network within its borders. For most Indonesians, September 11 was

∗ The initial paper was presented at the 5th Japan-Singapore Symposium (JSS) organised by the Association for the Promotion of International Cooperation (Japan) and the Institute of Policy Studies (Singapore), held in Tokyo, 18-19 February 2003.
1 Las opiniones expresadas en estos artículos son propias de sus autores. Estos artículos no reflejan necesariamente la opinión de UNISCI. The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors. These articles do not necessarily reflect the views of UNISCI.
2 I would like to record my thanks to my colleagues Rohan Gunaratna and Elena Pavlova for stressing to me the need for the creation of a Common Threat Assessment Centre in the region.
largely an American issue. The Indonesian media generally reinforced this stance of denial. (Even a few weeks after the Bali bombing, the media was rife with stories that the CIA was responsible for the bombing). Furthermore, Islamic revivalism and the critical importance of Muslim voters in elections due in 2004 made it difficult for President Megawati Sukarnoputri to take firm action, though a few key foreign terrorist operatives were quietly despatched to the Americans.3

The terrorist outrage in Bali coupled with well publicised investigations by the Indonesian police have altered the country’s perception of the terrorist threat. Aided by foreign forensic expertise, the Indonesian police made a number of significant arrests particularly Muchlas, also known as Ali Ghuffon, a key operational leader of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network.

Within the context of a comprehensive strategy to deal with terrorism, the government has done well to resolve longstanding local conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi. The Malino peace agreement apart from improving the prospects of peace and stability within Indonesia also contribute to the fight against terrorism because local conflict, if allowed to fester can easily be exploited by radical groups wishing to pursue their own agenda. While Indonesia should be lauded for such positive developments, it is an understatement to say that more needs to be done. It is likely that the JI network maybe quite extensive. Over the past five years, while the security agencies have been riven by inter-service rivalries due to Indonesia’s complex political transition, JI has been allowed to develop unhindered within the country and for much longer period among radical Muslim exiles from the Suharto regime. The current spate of arrests may be only scratching the surface.

Islam being an important force in Indonesian politics could be an inhibiting factor in Indonesia’s anti-terrorist struggle. In this regard, political factors may hinder sustained efforts at combating terrorism particularly if terrorists decide to lie low and not mount more attacks so as to risk further disruption of their infrastructure and alienating the population to their cause. With, parliamentary and presidential elections due in 2004, it is likely that the major political contenders may not want to be seen as being tough on radical groups in order not to alienate conservative Muslims.

Radicals are trying to increase their political space. No moderate political party or socio-political grouping will be immune to infiltration as radicals aim to influence the agenda of such organizations. The disbanding of militias by radical groups like the Lasykar Jihad and the Front Pembela Islam should be viewed as a public relations exercise until proven otherwise. The presence of large numbers of battle-hardened mujahidin troops remains a source of concern. Indonesia’s fundamental problems cannot be resolved quickly. The economic distress brought about by the economic crisis since 1997 and the presence of rampant corruption provide the ideal conditions for exploitation for radicals to advance their cause. Indonesia’s institutions of government and governance, and more specifically, its legal

3 On 5 June 2002, Omar al-Farouq, the alleged leading Al Qaeda operative in Southeast Asia was arrested in the west Java city of Bogor and promptly dispatched to Afghanistan under American custody. Likewise, on 16 September 2002 a German citizen of Arab descent, Seyam Reda was apprehended by the Police and charged with visa violations and subsequently handed over to the Americans. Through covert means, a further six foreign nationals were nabbed by Indonesian intelligence as Al Qaeda suspects and handed and placed under American safekeeping. See Tatik S. Hafitz, The War on Terror and the Future of Indonesian Democracy IDSS Working Paper No. 46, March 2003, pp. 13.
and judicial systems remain weak. Such flaws coupled with the country’s geography – a vast archipelago whose borders are difficult to police even in the best of circumstances – make it a potential haven for JI and JI-linked groups.

With an on-going Muslim separatist struggle in the South against perceived Christian domination, the Philippines was the first country in Southeast Asia targeted by Al Qaeda as a base for terrorist operations. The Al Qaeda’s early links with the Abu Sayaf leaders coupled with the poor law and order and governance situation in the South made the region an ideal location for terrorist training camps. A large number of terrorists and radicals have been trained in camps usually under the control of the MNLF. In this regard, effective counter-terrorist operations in the Philippines have a bearing on the overall counter-terrorism effort in region.

Given the evidence over the years of Al Qaeda infiltration, including cases involving Ramzi Youssoff and Operation Bojinka in 1994-95 and the bombings in Manila, Philippine authorities are convinced that there is a nexus between international terrorism and the Muslim separatist struggles in the south. To their credit, the Philippines moved aggressively to deal with the ASG and did not hesitate to seek external assistance for this purpose. U.S. assistance has been sought to upgrade the skills of the Philippine armed forces and equip them with better military equipment. On-going programmes include the attachment of US military advisors to Philippine units, including during operations, and the provision of tactical intelligence and even air support. These efforts are reported to have significantly weakened the ASG on Basilan Islands, one of its strongholds.

Unfortunately, security operations against the ASG have revealed major shortcomings in the security services. The military remains poorly equipped. It operations handicapped by corruption in the police and military forces with reports of collusion between the ASG and the security forces at the local level. To compound matters, the security agencies face a multitude of problems in the south. While aggressive action has been taken against the ASG, the MILF with its various factions remain a formidable guerrilla force of 10,000 to 15,000 fighters that the AFP has never been able to defeat decisively. Under the Arroyo Administration, the authorities have sought a negotiated political settlement with the MILF and a ceasefire is in place. However, there indications that the MILF’s linkages with JI and Al Qaeda have continued and some training of Southeast Asians militants still continue under MILF auspices.

Southern Philippines also has porous maritime borders with East Malaysia and with Indonesia and there have been known movements of terrorist elements between these three countries across this border. Attempts to control transnational crime, including terrorism, in this area through a trilateral Philippines-Malaysia-Indonesia agreement have reportedly met with little demonstrable success so far.

The Philippine counter-terrorism effort remains hampered due to inadequate training and equipment of security forces and above all by the complexity of the situation in the south where Manila is attempting to nullify the ASG threat militarily (with partial success) while seeking a political solution to a bigger problem related to the MILF. Though the Philippines’ inability to deal with the MILF remains a source of considerable concern, it is encouraging to note that strides have been made in dealing with local grievances in Mindanao by treating the MNLF as a rational adversary with practical demands. This is a wise course of action. Unlike
Bin Laden’s apocalyptic goals, such local grievances are indeed amenable to negotiations and political solutions.

Thailand is still in denial mode as to whether it has a terrorist problem. At best, it has acknowledged that JI and other terrorists could be using Thailand for transit to other locations, but not as a base. However, evidence abounds that South Thailand has been used as sanctuary by terrorists due to the presence of a large Muslim population, Muslim separatist groups, and the weak law and order situation there.

According to the Singapore government, JI elements that had escaped the first wave of arrests in December 2001 were thought to have fled to South Thailand. The White Paper published by the Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs in January 2003 made mention of an unnamed jihad group based in south Thailand which was a member of the regional alliance formed by the JI in 1999 called the Rabitatul Mujahidin. According to various reports, Bangkok has been a haven for money-laundering and document forgery, with a significant Middle Eastern and African Muslim community. Last year, with the help of the FBI, one fake travel document ring in the Bangkok area serving the Al Qaeda was broken up by Thai authorities and suspected terrorists have been known to stay in Bangkok’s Middle Eastern district.

Though Thailand has stepped up security to ensure that its holiday attractions are better protected from terrorist attack, it does not seem to have taken significant disruptive action against the terrorist network operating within its borders. All this combined with its porous borders and liberal immigration rules, makes Thailand a weak link in the region’s anti-terrorism drive. The arrest of two Thai Muslims on 10 June 2003 who confessed to planning bomb attacks at embassies and tourist spots in Thailand and admitted belonging to JI was a huge wake-up call to the Thai government. These revelations come in the wake of Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra admission a month earlier that that JI members were present in the kingdom, but insisted they were not active. His admission came after Cambodian authorities smashed a radical Islamic network and charged three men with JI membership, including two Thais and an Egyptian.

The record is better with Malaysia and Singapore. Both countries have efficient and professional security services and the political will to deal firmly with the terrorist threat. Since December 2001, Singapore has detained over 30 terrorist suspects under the Internal Security Act, while Malaysia has detained approximately 70 people. Both countries have benefited from good intelligence cooperation with each other on the terrorist threat, with other ASEAN countries and with friendly powers like the U.S. and Australia.

Both countries can adopt comprehensive strategies better owing to healthier economic conditions and relatively sound institutions of state and governance. Malaysia arguably faces a greater range of challenges in nullifying its terrorist threat as opposed to Singapore. Malaysia is a Muslim majority country and since 1998 has seen an upsurge in support for the opposition Islamic party PAS. To curtail the influence of PAS and make the country more economically competitive, the government wants to revamp its education system by placing more emphasis on English. Significant is its aim to reform the Islamic education curriculum as well as placing greater restrictions on the Islamic party. These are major challenges that are bound to elicit opposition in one form or another. Whether they can be carried out with the necessary
sophistication to minimize adverse repercussions will be a major test for Mahathir government coming at a time where economic conditions are not so favourable.

3. Multilateral frameworks
The exchange of information between countries is critically important because terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and JI operate and cooperate across state borders. Cooperation within ASEAN has two aspects to it. One is political and this is expressed through various ASEAN declarations on terrorism. Two, the declarations are important in reinforcing the political will of countries to keep up the fight against terrorism.

The declarations have included the Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism issued in November 2001 which stressed the need to strengthen cooperation at all levels – bilateral, regional and international to combat terrorism in a “comprehensive manner”. This ASEAN position was reiterated at the 9th ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) meeting in Brunei in July 2002 and at the 8th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh in November 2002 after the Bali bombing. Similarly, the Philippines initiated an anti-terrorist pact with Indonesia and Malaysia as soon as the United States began organising its global anti-terrorist coalition. A three-power agreement, signed on 7 May 2002 in Kuala Lumpur, binds the three states to carrying out joint exercises to fight terrorism and other crimes; sharing airline passenger lists; setting up telephone hotlines; and tightening control of their borders. The above measures could be interpreted as state-level responses to threats of a transnational character linked to militants wanting to set up a single Islamic state comprising these three nations. Cambodia and Thailand have since acceded to the agreement. The partners cooperate informally with Singapore and the United States.

At the multilateral level, the most significant mechanism is the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC). AMMTC is headed by the ministers of Home Affairs and forms the core of ASEAN counter-terrorism cooperation. Terrorism has been on its agenda long before the September 11 attacks. Since that event, the AMMTC decided to hold a Special Meeting on Terrorism in May 2002 where it updated its terrorist work plan, emphasizing capacity building. Malaysia has offered training on intelligence procurement in relation to terrorism and a workshop on psychological operations and psychological warfare in relation to terrorism. Singapore has offered logistical support for training on bomb/explosives detection, post-blast investigation, airport security and passport/document security and inspection in relation to terrorism.

There are also ASEAN agreements with dialogue partners. An ASEAN-U.S. Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism was signed in July 2002. In this regard, ASEAN’s joint declaration with China on non-traditional security goes beyond terrorism and remains largely symbolic, more a quid pro quo that China wanted after ASEAN signed the agreement with the U.S.

A lot of activity has taken place under the auspices of the ARF. Enjoying a new lease of life, a lot of good work is being accomplished in the Inter-Sessional Group on Confidence Building Measures. After the September 11 attacks, two ISG meetings were scheduled, one in New Delhi, 19-21 December 2001, and another in Hanoi from 22-24 April 2002. Two workshops were held under the framework of ISGs – a Malaysia-U.S. Workshop on Financial Measures against Terrorism in Honolulu (24-26 March 2002) whose Statement was adopted
by the 9th ARF meeting in July 2002; and a Thailand-Australia Workshop on Prevention of Terrorism held in Bangkok 17-19 April 2002 whose recommendations were also adopted by the 9th ARF Meeting. Such meetings allow the best practices in the area to be showcased and expertise tapped as well as providing a useful platform for valuable networking.

In Brunei last August, the ARF agreed to freeze the financial assets of terrorist groups. At the ARF meetings, the 10 ASEAN states and the United States also agreed to share information on terrorist activities, develop together more effective counter-terrorism policies, and enhance liaison among their law enforcement agencies. For Washington, an early dividend from its informal cooperation came in the form of Kuwaiti Al Qaeda operative Omar al-Faruq, whom the Indonesians turned over to the CIA.

Other initiatives exist outside the ARF and ASEAN frameworks. For instance, there is a proposal to set up a regional counter-terrorism centre in Malaysia on which the U.S. and Malaysia have been in liaison. On a practical level, Malaysia is able to engage in intelligence cooperation with the U.S. through a bilateral U.S.-Malaysia Anti-Terrorism Pact signed in May 2002.

4. Regional responses to terrorism: Concluding observations
Southeast Asian governments continue to treat homegrown Islamists cautiously – being concerned primarily with the threat of separatism, political instability and social upheaval, as well as their own political fortunes. The common fear is that too-aggressive prosecution of the anti-terrorist campaign would progressively radicalise more and more of the disparate groupings that make up Southeast Asian Islam.

Yet, historical experience suggests that religious violence is best suppressed quickly and justly. Any lack of official resolve at the outset is liable to worsen the situation. For government’s failure to damp down religious violence before it spreads too widely could encourage agitators and terrorists to even greater effort and could lead a country down the slippery slope of communal violence. Ultimately there has to be recognition that an ideology or an idea cannot be destroyed by military, intelligence or police action. It has to be politically contested and defeated. Hence, the importance of effective political action has to be reiterated. In the case of the terrorist threat, this has to be done primarily within the Muslim communities and by Muslims themselves. While governments, can facilitate the process, they must be careful not to unwittingly undercut or marginalise moderate elements within the Islamic polity. A useful example of this can be seen manner in which the leaders of Indonesia’s mainstream Islamic organizations, the Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah consistently issued statements clarifying that the war in Iraq was not a conflict between Islam and the West. Such statements greatly undercut radical Islamists interpretations of the conflict in Iraq thereby minimising the influence of such perspectives in shaping Indonesian mainstream Muslim perceptions.4

This early, the anti-terrorist campaign is sharpening the contrast between the strong states of Singapore and Malaysia and their relatively weaker counterparts in Indonesia and the Philippines. Singapore and Malaysia have come down hard on the networks in their territories.

---

4 See, Leonard C. Sebastian, “Indonesian State Responses to September 11, the Bali bombings and the War in Iraq: Sowing the seeds for an Accommodationist Islamic Framework?” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* Vol. 16, no. 3 (October 2003), forthcoming.
Tough Internal Security Acts held over from the colonial era have allowed them to round up close to a hundred terrorist suspects. Singapore has also foiled plots to bomb western embassies and to attack American warships in the Malacca Straits.

Both Indonesia and the Philippines, with its long and porous coastline; its weak government and law-enforcement agencies; its economic distress; poor law enforcement record; its communal strife; and a political climate that inhibits the repression of extremists make it a good locality for terrorists to burrow in. In these two countries, it will take time to fine tune anti-terrorism strategies. Like the Philippines, one area that Indonesia can benefit is for more consideration to be given to improving the capacity of the security agencies to play a coherent role in the struggle against terrorism, specifically, the national police forces and intelligence agencies. In this regard, the onus may be on Developed countries to provide short-term assistance in the form of equipment and training for security protection systems in order to “harden” potential targets. Efforts also need to be made to reinforce expertise in forensics, investigation, post-disaster management, community relations and anti-money laundering techniques. Over the longer term, development programmes should be crafted to promote good governance with an emphasis placed judicial reform and community policing. Another area of critical concern is the need to enhance “human security” specifically assistance through basic human needs projects that would be directed at areas, which have produced the most radical groups.

At the multilateral level, ASEAN was rhetorically engaged and has produced frameworks of action promising cooperation in intelligence sharing and joint action. While the habits of consultation among regional police forces and intelligence agencies have existed at an informal level for a long period of time, it remains unclear exactly how much information is actually shared.

In conclusion, at least four factors that characterise Southeast Asia’s regional security environment will act as a major constraint on states capability to respond swiftly to acts of terrorism. (1) Porous borders and generally weak immigration controls, with administrative requirements being surmounted through corruption; (2) long-standing economic and trade links between Southeast Asia and Middle Eastern and South Asian countries, many of which operate outside normal financial channels not readily monitored by governments, and which in turn have facilitated funds transfers from the Middle east and South Asia to radical groups in the region; (3) widespread criminal activity including drug trafficking in the region which in turn can facilitate the movement of resources by terrorists; and (4) the availability of large supplies of indigenously produced and imported weapons in Southeast Asia.\(^5\)

Such conditions will dilute the effectiveness of multilateral security cooperation against terror so that regional security institutions such as the ARF would function only at a moderate level, namely, characterised by security dialogues and discussions that remain purely at the first stage: confidence building. Indeed the strong assertion of the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs in a transformed era could well be the stumbling block for effective anti-terror cooperation. To be effectively addressed, the agenda of

problems may require ASEAN to adopt a more pro-active role – a role quite different from the basis upon which the regional grouping has proceeded using the “ASEAN Way”.

In an attempt to embark on new security cooperation strategies to deal with non-traditional threats to regional security, more mechanisms for collaboration and coordination have to be established – strategies that can work immediately - before the JI is able to mount new operations. Of import is the need for (1) the facilitation of more exchanges - person to person/agency to agency; (2) the establishment of common databases; and (3) the need to develop a multinational taskforce. These activities should be coordinated under the auspices of a Common Threat Assessment Centre that could serve as the nucleus for fostering closer regional cooperation in areas such intelligence, extradition, law enforcement, airport security, bomb detection, formation of national anti-terrorism units, and curbing arms smuggling and drug cartels. These were significant areas of concern identified by the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism held in Kuala Lumpur on 20-21 May 2002.
Against the current uncertainties in the international security environment and the kinds of conflicts we are witnessing today at various parts of the world, there has been renewed interest in regional efforts to secure peace. This short article looks at the regional approaches to peace operation within the context of the Asian experience.

At the outset, it must be stressed that Asia’s experience and approaches to peace have to be seen against the broader perspective of what we understand to be “peace operations”. If the definition of peace operations were to be confined essentially to the conventional notions of deployment of peacekeeping forces (either UN-led or NATO initiated operations) in times of crisis, then Asia’s experience may be deemed irrelevant. However, if we were to expand peace operations to include various mechanisms and strategies by regional actors and institutions to work for peace within the broader framework of peace operations involving conflict prevention and peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building, then the Asian experience may be worth telling. This caveat is significant if we are to have any meaningful discussion on differences in regional approaches as it allows us to locate the Asian experience within the multi-dimensional task of peace operations.

This article is divided into two parts. The first part provides a brief narrative of Asia’s experience with peace operations by looking at the experience of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in their efforts at working toward peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region and to the extent possible, contrasts these against the European experience. The second part attempts to identify ways of enhancing cooperation between both the ASEAN and ARF and the UN, as well as between the European regional organizations and both ASEAN and the ARF.

1.Asia’s experience: A Story of Regional Reconciliation, Norm-Building and Inclusive Regionalism

---

1 This short article is based on the author’s presentation at the Conference on The UN, the EU, NATO and Other Regional Actors, Centre de Conférences Internationales, Paris, France, 11-12 October 2002.

2 Las opiniones expresadas en estos artículos son propias de sus autores. Estos artículos no reflejan necesariamente la opinión de UNISCI. The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors. These articles do not necessarily reflect the views of UNISCI
Describing the Asian experience requires one to have a clear understanding of the nature of the regional security arrangements/approaches found in Asia. Many scholars and observers have had their own versions of the Asian approaches to security but they essentially agree on the three major points:

- In the case of ASEAN, its general approach to peace was one of finding appropriate and acceptable mechanisms for regional reconciliation in a milieu, which was once characterised by intra-mural disputes. By creating ASEAN, the sub-regional states in Southeast Asia provided themselves with a stable structure of relations for managing and containing tensions between neighbouring states like Malaysia and Indonesia (that were embroiled in the Confrontation in 1963 over the formation of Malaya) and Malaysia and the Philippines (that disputed over the territory of Sabah). As reflected in the 35-year history of ASEAN, this process of regional reconciliation was extended beyond the boundaries of the original, non-communist states to include other states in the region regardless of their political orientation. Thus, ASEAN had, for all intents and purposes, become a diplomatic devise for regional reconciliation, which in turn underpins regional peace and security. Unwittingly, the ultimate objective was to build a security community founded on the assumption that no member states would ever go to war with each other.

- The types mechanisms for regional reconciliation found in ASEAN had been geared for conflict prevention. These mechanisms referred to as the “ASEAN Way” of diplomacy and accommodation have been reinforced by the careful cultivation, socialisation and adherence to regional norms. These norms include: non-interference in internal affairs of states; respect for national sovereignty, non-use of force in the settlement of intra-regional disputes; and effective cooperation. These norms have been codified in ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which is the only indigenous regional diplomatic instrument providing a mechanism and processes for peace settlement of disputes.

- These mechanisms can therefore be categorised as low-key security approaches that promote trust and confidence-building through established habits of dialogue, observance of regional norms and building loose/informal institutions to support these process-oriented approaches to preventing regional conflicts.

The above characteristics essentially define ASEAN’s approach(es) to peace and security in the region. As a result, Asia’s brand of regionalism when compared with that of Europe is mostly founded on “soft” institutionalisation which has been aptly defined by a noted Asian scholar, Amitav Acharya, as “bureaucratic minimalism, preference for consensus over majority voting, and avoidance of legalistic and binding commitments”.

These were the same approaches that ASEAN embodied when it helped to establish the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. The creation of the ARF may be seen as ASEAN’s attempt to extend its processes of conflict avoidance writ large to the Asia Pacific region. Hence, the processes of regional reconciliation that was earlier confined to ASEAN was

---

3 Among the works of Amitav Acharya that looks at the nature of institutionalisation in ASEAN, see “Realism, Institutionalism and the Asian Economic Crisis”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 21, no.1, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), 1999.
expanded to become “inclusive regionalism” with the formation of the ARF. Currently, we have in the ARF a 23-member grouping comprising like-minded and non-like minded states across the vast expanse of the Asia Pacific. The ARF has also as its members all the major powers in the international system—the US, China, Russia, Japan, India and the European Union.

Since the regional approaches to conflict prevention are process-oriented, there are no alliance arrangements among the Asian states, unlike in Europe. In fact, the Asian security lexicon does not include collective and common security. Instead, comprehensive and cooperative security dominates the discourse both in ASEAN and the ARF. ASEAN has emphasised the comprehensive nature of security in promoting political and economic cooperation in the region. Within the context of the ARF, the objective of cooperative security was seen “as replacing the Cold War security structure (characterised by bilateral military) with a multilateral process and framework…geared towards reassurance rather than deterrence”. More importantly, cooperation security has been translated to be all about the principle of inclusiveness, promotion of habits of dialogue and multilateral cooperation among state and non-state actors.

It may be useful to add at this point that these informal approaches also characterised the other types of regional institutions that emerged before and after the ARF such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1995 and the ASEAN + 3 (APT) in 1997.

1.1. The scorecard

The real question is the extent that ASEAN and the ARF have been effective in maintaining peace and security in the region? The scorecard of these institutions presents a mixed picture and largely depends on the kinds of benchmark used to assess their effectiveness.

As far as ASEAN is concerned, most analysts would agree that it has played a critical role in decreasing the probability of war between its members. The ASEAN Way has helped build confidence, increased trust and has even created a nascent sense of identity or ASEAN solidarity among its members. But while ASEAN has been relatively successful in managing inter-state conflicts, its experience in intra-state conflict has been chequered. The difficulties that ASEAN faced at the height of the East Timor conflict exposed the shortcomings of an organization whose mandate was limited to managing inter-state disputes. These difficulties were compounded with the fact that the East Timor crisis happened when most ASEAN states were still reeling from the devastating impact of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98.

The results are even more inconclusive with regard to the ARF. Since its establishment eight years ago, the work of the ARF has been set to evolve in three broad stages, namely the promotion of confidence building, development of preventive diplomacy and elaboration of approaches to conflicts. So far, even its fiercest critics would agree that as a multilateral forum for discussion of security, the ARF has had moderate success in confidence building in the region. Member states have recognised the importance of the ARF as a vehicle for airing their own security perceptions. Some analysts in fact credit the socialisation through the ARF

---

of engendering a more positive attitude of states that were initially suspicious towards multilateralism.

On the other hand, other critics dismiss the ARF as nothing more than a talk-shop. Its inability to respond to the crisis in East Timor has been seen as a litmus test of its inadequacy as a regional institution to act in times of crisis or prevent crisis from happening.

One could go on challenging facts to either defend both the ASEAN and the ARF or point to several issues that could have been done to make both organizations better equipped to handle crises. However, what this discussion has brought out is the very fact that both organisations do not have the capacity nor the institutional wherewithal—not to mention the political will—to respond to crisis needing concerted action, particularly if this requires some form of military intervention. The East Timor experience presents the extent that ASEAN can go to “intervene” in what is considered as an intra-state conflict involving its member state. And if compared to European organizations like NATO, neither ASEAN nor the ARF has the peacekeeping forces that can be rapidly deployed.

This does not mean however that nothing can be done to enhance cooperation between and among the regional actors in the partnership for peace. I shall now turn to explore the possibilities for task-sharing arrangements between the UN and the regional actors in Asia.

2. Exploring Opportunities for Meaningful Partnership
Many analysts and scholars have argued for a more pro-active ASEAN and ARF in order to have meaningful partnership with the UN. Thus, the issues I have chosen to highlight below are not necessarily new. Nonetheless, it merits reiterating some of what I consider to be practical issues for the purpose of our discussion today.

I shall divide these into two themes. One is on enhancing cooperation between the UN and ASEAN and the ARF by building on their institutional strengths. The other is on enhancing cooperation by improving the institutional capabilities of the ASEAN and ARF, as well as by learning from the experiences of other organisations.

2.1. Enhancing Cooperation by Building on Institutional Strengths

It must be recognised that in spite of limited institutional resources, ASEAN and the ARF have, over the years, built up a solid capital of goodwill and peaceful inter-state relations in the region both at the bilateral and multilateral levels. On the institutional level, both ASEAN and the ARF have also generated a number of other institutions—albeit loose and informally structured. These reservoirs of extensive networks extend from the Track I to Track II and even Track III levels. These networks are reinforced by regularised habits of dialogue which are found in the huge number of meetings that take place in and out of the region. These do not even include the extensive political, economic and security cooperation that are taking place within the framework ASEAN and ARF. These are the institutional strengths of ASEAN and ARF and can be valuable assets that a universal institution like the UN can tap in the efforts toward world peace. How and what are the ways to do this?
• **Strengthening intra-ASEAN and intra-ARF cooperation**

It is important to highlight the need to strengthen interstate cooperation within ASEAN and the ARF before any inter-agency cooperation can take place. Within ASEAN, the inter-governmental cooperation on security issues such as transnational crime and terrorism has been improving. In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attack, there is an ASEAN accord/agreement among the ASEAN states of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Cambodia to step up cooperation in fighting transnational problems (which include, among others, illegal trafficking of drugs, trafficking of small arms and illegal migration) and sharing of intelligence operations in fighting terrorism. ASEAN has also signed an anti-terrorism accord with the United States. Within the ARF framework, cooperation has also been stepped- up in this regard. An inter-sessional group to study terrorism has been established.

• **Building formal linkages with the United Nations**

With the numerous dialogue mechanisms that are already in place, it is ironic that ASEAN is the only major regional organization without observer status at the UN. In fact, Secretary General Kofi Annan at the ASEAN-UN Summit in Bangkok in February 2000 lamented the fact that both ASEAN-UN “have found little to say to each other on peace and security at the time when new forms of security challenges are presenting themselves”.\(^5\) As far as the ARF is concerned, it has already initiated contacts with the United Nations. But more can be done by both ASEAN and the ARF. ASEAN and the ARF could, for example, institutionalise regular meetings or courtesy calls on the Secretary-General. In turn, the Secretary-General and members of his staff may be invited to participate in annual ASEAN/ARF Ministerial Meeting and to the extent practicable, to the important series of Inter-sessional meetings (ISM) on peacekeeping operations, CBMs, disaster relief and search and rescue meetings.

There is much to be gained by exchanging information and sharing of experiences between the UN and ASEAN and ARF in the areas of conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding. More specifically, both ASEAN and the ARF could benefit from the training that the UN offers in early warning and preventive measures.

With regard to peacekeeping and peacebuilding, experience has shown that ASEAN and ARF countries have the potential to contribute more to UN operations, regardless of some obvious limitations. Although ASEAN and the ARF have a long way to go before adopting something similar to NATO-type mechanisms, individual member countries have been volunteering troops to UN peacekeeping operations and this should be encouraged.

ASEAN and the ARF could also offer to undertake some preventive action tasks such as conducting fact-finding missions and some kind of early warning indicators. This task suits the ARF, which has just established the ARF Register of Experts/Eminent Persons (EEP)s and is currently discussing the enhanced role of the ARF Chairman. The EEPs for example could provide “rapid reaction advice” and conduct in-depth studies on regional security issues. The

---

\(^5\) Strengthening ASEAN-United Nations Partnership”, Remarks by Secretary-General of the United Nations at the ASEAN-UN Summit (Bangkok, 12 February 2000).
Brahimi Report on UN Peace Operations\(^6\) has emphasized the contribution of regional expertise, thus ARF's Register of EEPs persons and even those from Track II and non-governmental organizations should be made available to the UN. Since ASEAN and the ARF already have a pool of experts who can offer valuable contribution to the work on confidence-building and preventive diplomacy, this can strengthen the UN’s early warning and conflict prevention capacities.

- **Forging working relationships between regional organizations and other regional organizations**

  ASEAN has links with UN agencies and related bodies such as the ESCAP and the UNDP, while the ASEAN Regional Forum has already made formal contacts with the Organizations of American States (OAS) and the Organisation of Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). However, the aim must go beyond building contacts. Opportunities must also be sought in finding common areas to work together, particularly in conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy. ASEAN and the ARF could look at the best practices found in the experience of OSCE and vice-versa. While cognizant of the differences in regional context, certain experiences and practices found in the OSCE and other regional organizations could be very useful guides in the region’s efforts at preventing, managing and resolving conflicts. Moreover, experience sharing in best practices can provide important indicators in tracking stages of conflict and on what tools to use and when. (This will discussed in more detail below). Thus, a specific recommendation could be that within the ASEAN and the ARF, there should be “units” or “desks” created to liaise and develop joint training and practices with partner organizations like the OSCE.

2.2.**Enhancing Cooperation by Improving the Institutional Capabilities of ASEAN and the ARF**

In crafting strategies to improve the institutional capabilities of ASEAN and ARF, it is tempting to aim high and yet difficult to seek a balance between what is desirable and possible, between the desired ends and available means. Within this context, both ASEAN and the ARF could act on the suggestions that have been offered. I shall highlight some of the most important ones:

- **Building linkages with Track II institutions**

  Within ASEAN, the ASEAN-Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) have been one of the pioneering track-II bodies that have made its mark in Southeast Asia by the kind of work it has done in supporting political and security cooperation in the region. Through their workshops/conferences, academic researches and policy outputs, and their own networking activities, ASEAN-ISIS has built up valuable expertise, and had in fact been responsible in pushing for a more enhanced Post Ministerial Meeting within ASEAN which germinated into the idea of establishing a multilateral security forum, now known as the ARF.

---

On the broader region, the Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region (CSCAP), in which ASEAN-ISIS is a core group member, has made some significant contribution in providing an informal mechanism by which political and security dialogue can be discussed by scholars, officials and others in their private capacities. CSCAP has produced important policy inputs. One of its latest policy outputs is a review of the progress and prospects of the ARF. Under the initiative of CSCAP’s Singapore National Committee, a working paper on “The ARF into the 21st Century” examined ways to move the ARF forward, particularly towards pushing the preventive diplomacy agenda.

As Track 2 institutions, they are known to push the envelope forward by examining issues, which governments may perceive as sensitive. The collaboration and linkages between Track 2 institutions and by ASEAN and the ARF is therefore important in conflict prevention in the region.

- **Engaging civil society (Track III)**

If track-II bodies are the epistemic communities that we can count on, the participation of track III or members of the civil society in any peace operations is crucial. Civil society groups can complement the efforts of the UN and regional organizations through their own work in peace-building activities such as civic education programmes, training, research and human rights advocacy. More importantly, they are well placed to serve as conduits between local actors and the UN and ASEAN and ARF in conflict prevention. There should therefore be a need for a vertical dialogue between the UN and ASEAN/ARF with people’s organizations and NGOs as track III.

In the region, there has not been much contact between local actors and ASEAN nor the ARF. Unlike in EU which provides for a structured representation of civil society in its various activities, and even in Southern Africa’s SADC which provides for an NGO division in its Secretariat, there is none in ASEAN nor in the ARF. However, there is some progress between Track II engaging with Track III in ASEAN. Through the initiative of ASEAN-ISIS, the ASEAN People’s Assembly was started in 2000, the first time ever when representatives from a wide array of civil society groups in the region were brought together to dialogue with Track II. The second APA was held in September 2002.

- **Pushing the preventive diplomacy agenda**

It is in this area where progress should now take place if ASEAN and the ARF want to remain relevant in a rapidly changing regional environment. It is also in this area where the experience of the OSCE can be most instructive for ASEAN and particularly the ARF. Both organizations could learn from the OSCE’s experience in the following areas:

1. Providing for appropriate institutional resources to coordinate activities, gather information and possess analytical capabilities to process information and data. ASEAN has the minimum of institutional structures while the ARF virtually has none.

2. Developing fact-finding and good offices mission to promote conflict prevention and crisis management. ASEAN has introduced the ASEAN Troika to enable ASEAN to
address emerging regional political and security issues that could lead to crisis situations. But, the Troika is only constituted as an ad hoc body and is impeded by the stipulation that it should refrain from addressing issues that constitute the internal affairs of ASEAN member countries. The ARF has yet to make progress on even the role of the ARF Chair.

3. Establishing an OSCE-type Conflict Prevention Centre to deal with conflict prevention and reduction. The ARF could consider establishing a similar institution that can institutionalise activities such as fact-finding and early warning.

4. Formulating a set of norms beyond the established regional set of norms to ensure the security of minority populations while discouraging secessionist aspirations.

These issues are now being studied extensively in the region. The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) of the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, for example, has just published monograph on, “A New Agenda for the ASEAN Regional Forum”. The monograph examined comprehensive options to push the ARF agenda forward, particularly on the work on preventive diplomacy. In fact, some of the recommendations by IDSS included adopting certain preventive diplomacy mechanisms, which are found in the OSCE. These included, among others: the establishment of an ARF Secretariat; setting up of a Risk Reduction Centre (RRC), and promoting enhance defence participation at ARF meetings (so far ARF meetings have been attended mostly by the Foreign Ministers of ARF member states). These recommendations have already been officially forwarded to ARF for their consideration.

Work on preventive diplomacy in the region has been bogged down by controversy and suspicion by some countries that this could lead to interference in internal affairs. Nonetheless, there has been an appreciation that progress must take place and a change in political mindset should also happen, otherwise there will only be heightened uncertainty in the region and both ASEAN and the ARF risk losing their relevance.

In conclusion, while one could not discount the contributions that ASEAN and the ARF have made in working for peace and stability in the region, the impetus to do more cannot be understated. The current practice of adopting informal, “soft” approaches at the expense of early conflict prevention can be counter-productive. Since there seems to a disjunct between regional preferences and the emerging changes in global norms, ASEAN and the ARF’s approaches of regional reconciliation, norm-building and inclusive regionalism must now give way to some form on intrusive regionalism for meaningful peace processes to take place.

---

While the threat of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) continues to spread across the globe, many countries have been bracing themselves to cope with one of the worst health epidemics that have hit several parts of the world. To date, SARS has spread to 28 countries with 7,864 infected cases and 642 deaths. With no known cure in sight, medical teams have been working feverishly to contain the problem as the clock ticks away with more reported casualties, while government authorities have been deploying various strategies to cope with the silent killer.

In the Asian region, hard-hit Asian governments have quickly set in place mechanisms to prevent further the spread of the disease. These mechanisms ranged from quarantine of infected patients including their families and friends who may have had close contacts with them, issuing travel advisories to SARS-affected countries, strict immigration checks and border controls, massive public information programme and even closure of schools. Singapore, one of the badly hit countries in Southeast Asia, has been commended for its hands-on, pro-active approach in containing the disease—even to point of adopting stringent quarantine measures labelled by some media as “draconian”. Within a month after the outbreak of the disease in the Southeast Asian region, Singapore also prompted its neighbours in ASEAN to convene a special meeting of ASEAN + 3 Health Ministers (which would also include Health Ministers of Korea, Japan and China) and ASEAN Heads of Government to discuss regional mechanisms to deal with the crisis. The meetings were held in the ASEAN capitals of Kuala Lumpur and Thailand, respectively at the end of April 2003.

But while Singapore and the other affected countries were prompt to act, some were not. China, for example, had been severely criticised for initially playing down the seriousness of the problem and its delayed response. In particular, in what seemed to be the height of the outbreak, China was censured for its slowness to respond to the request by the World Health Organisation (WHO) to allow its medical team to go to Guangdong where the infectious pathogen was said to have started. In a press statement in mid-March, WHO’s Director-General, Gro Harlem Brundtland, confirmed opinions that had the Chinese authorities acted earlier and with more openness, the outbreak of the disease would have taken a different course.

---

* This a revised version of a commentary prepared for the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Singapore which appeared in the IDSS website in April 2003.

1 Las opiniones expresadas en estos artículos son propias de sus autores. Estos artículos no reflejan necesariamente la opinión de UNISCI. The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors. These articles do not necessarily reflect the views of UNISCI.
China’s belated response has been perceived as due to the authorities’ concern about economic fall-out if the information about SARS is leaked. But the slow process of silence-denial to acknowledgement and cooperation is not really surprising given the prevailing attitude towards infectious diseases. Most, if not all countries—China included—treat infectious diseases as medical problems, thus receiving/meriting a medical response. The fact that it apparently took four-and-a-half months after the first known case of SARS before the Chinese authorities alerted the WHO is reflective of this kind of conventional approach. The delay was reportedly due to bureaucratic procedures to first classify SARS as a Category B disease and only then would local health authorities be required to report this to the central government. Yet, there still remained the problem of how to handle this type of disease, i.e. whether this would fall under the framework of the International Health Regulations (IHR) wherein reporting of infectious diseases becomes imperative.

The IHR, which was introduced by the WHO in 1969 and later revised in 1981, is a global disease surveillance system which require member states to notify WHO within 24 hours of outbreaks of infectious diseases. The WHO, however, does not have any enforcement power and instead relies mostly on persuasion and recommendation to encourage countries to comply. Moreover, the present IHR covers only 3 diseases—cholera, yellow fever and plague and does not cover all other emerging or re-emerging infectious diseases that may have potential for international spread. Given the shortcomings of this system and the lacunae of multilateral arrangements to deal with global health emergencies, the lack of coordination at both local and national level in alerting the international community comes as no surprise. Yet the consequences can be severe if these are not addressed. There are several factors that account for these shortcomings, two of which are highlighted below.

- **Attitudes and Approaches**

  As noted earlier, infectious diseases have been conventionally regarded as medical problems. But in a rapidly changing global environment, the threats brought on by infectious diseases are no longer confined to medical/health risks alone. With the outbreak of SARS, the disruption of business activities, its impact on travel and tourism industries and more importantly—on economic growth are among the serious repercussions that necessitates defining the SARS problem in strategic terms.

  The SARS outbreak has already hit many economies hard across the region. Three months after the reported outbreak, national and regional growths are now under threat as tourism and other travel related industries have taken a nosedive. Estimates of the financial cost of SARS have varied, from a conservative figure of US$30 billion according to the WHO to US$50 billion and to a high of US$150 billion globally. As one Asian analyst, Gurinder Shahi of the BioEnterprise Asia, has noted in the 24 April 2003 edition of the Far Eastern Economic Review, the figures of US$150 billion are only “back-of-the envelopes” figures and are likely to be gross underestimates. Thus, the SARS that has hit the Asian region is now regarded as the region’s own “September 11” and the aftershocks of such episode are still unfolding.

  It has been noted that with globalisation, the scale, speed and reach of movement of people and goods have been unprecedented. These movements in turn have shaped the appearance, spread and distribution of infectious diseases not just in humans but also in
animals and other species. The SARS case is instructive. There are speculations that the infectious pathogen may have come from an animal (e.g. chicken) and has managed to get into humans. In a densely populated Chinese province of Guangdong where human and animal contact is extremely close, transmission and spread of infection is much more rapid while containment of the disease becomes more difficult. Compounded by the massive movement of people in and out of China and the ease of international air travel, the reach of the SARS disease to cover more than 28 countries is not unexpected. Meanwhile, other countries are bracing themselves for the possibility that the virus could reach their community. Indeed, in a globalised world, no community can be entirely immune from these contagious diseases.

SARS is certainly not the first case that illustrates the nexus between movement of people and goods with the nature and spread of infectious diseases. Much has already been said and written about the HIV/AIDS pandemic and threats associated with it. But it bears reiterating that there is still a wide gap between the extent of the HIV/AIDS threat and an adequate and cohesive international action. Within a few years after its discovery, HIV/AIDS had spread to every continent and to every country. So far, 25 million people have died of AIDS and the about 3 million people a year continue to succumb to the disease. In Asia, the current statistics paints an alarming picture: UN estimates for example have noted that China has about 1 million AIDS cases, while in India about 4 million people are reported to have been infected with the HIV virus; by 2010 China could have more than 10 million HIV/AIDS patients while in Cambodia more than half a million of the country’s 11.5 million population will suffer or either die from AIDS. These grim scenarios do not include the death toll from other infectious diseases like tuberculosis (TB) and malaria which kills about 3,000 people daily.

In 2000, the United Nations Security Council declared AIDS as a national security threat, followed by similar political endorsements at the G-8 meetings in Okinawa and Genoa. But despite these initiatives, AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and now SARS are still seen by many countries as health diseases/problems, not as human security threats. It is interesting to recall that when the United States first pushed for HIV/AIDS to be discussed in the Security Council, many nations protested for procedural reasons—many felt that the Security Council was not the appropriate forum for what are perceived as “social and economic issues”. However, unless the linkage between infectious diseases and human security is recognised, most countries will still “medicalise” infectious diseases like SARS rather than “securitise” them until the outbreak of the disease(s) reaches alarming proportions. The experience of Sub-Saharan Africa with AIDS reveals that the socio-economic and political effects are more devastating than the effects of war.

Thus, going beyond the medical approach to securitising infectious diseases must become more of a norm rather than an exception. In the case of SARS, this requires more than official pronouncements that SARS is a national security issue. An integrated approach with the participation of various ministries, government agencies and the medical sector in coping with SARS is an important step. Singapore has adopted such an approach while others like Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand have followed suit.
Iceberg of Poverty

While the linkage between infectious diseases and human security has been forcefully validated by the SARS outbreak, understanding the risks and vulnerabilities posed by infectious diseases is just the tip of the iceberg. There are underlying challenges that also need to be addressed to cope with the threats of infectious diseases. These are the absence and/or lack of basic health care and the poor health infrastructure. These types of health environment are prevalent in many developing countries.

Yet, the most vulnerable to infectious diseases are the poor who are clearly at a disadvantage in protecting themselves. The burden of HIV/AIDS for example, is overwhelmingly concentrated among the people in the poorest regions of the world. One just has to look at the typical health-seeking behaviour among the poor to see why this is so. They resort either to non-treatment or self-treatment in case of illness. Such patterns are not surprising considering that the financing of health care for the poor comes mostly from their own meagre resources, thus a traditional method of cure frequently is sought first, and more often than not, referrals to tertiary health facilities are made at very late stages.

Poverty and infectious diseases are fellow travellers—each feeding on the other. The risks of poverty-related diseases are compounded by malnutrition and environmental threats, especially the lack of clean water and sanitation. Add in crowded conditions and poor hygiene, these become perfect breeding grounds of infectious diseases.

Strategies for Protection and Empowerment

Coping with infectious diseases therefore requires multi-dimensional responses. Among the imperatives is the importance of building a good mechanism for global disease surveillance and control. The Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network was initiated by the WHO in 1997 and maintained by Health Canada. It has a network of 100 existing laboratory and disease reporting systems. However, for this to be successful, cooperation at both local and national level is crucial. For new infectious diseases like SARS that has several unknowns in epidemiology and treatment—the race to discover these things requires multilateral coordination at many levels. But as discussed earlier, the problem is not simply one of getting countries to cooperate. Unless certain mindsets and attitudes are changed to regard infectious diseases as more than a health problem, it would be difficult to get certain governments to act promptly and decisively. As we have seen in the case of SARS in China and more recently in Taiwan, mismanagement of health crisis can destroy the credibility of governments.

It can therefore be argued that health issues are too important to be left solely in the hands of medical professionals and bureaucrats. Hence, health must be a security priority at all levels. But health matters, as noted by an ASEAN bureaucrat, have always been regarded as belonging to national domains. However as illustrated in the SARS unfolding episode, governments must be made accountable to both the local and international community in ensuring health and security. The globalisation of health risks also means that leadership must be exercised by the United Nations with the support of the global public. Reducing health threats to security will therefore require comprehensive cooperation among diverse actors and nations.
The other equally important issue is the need to develop the public health system, especially among the poorer communities who are the most vulnerable. The greatest paradox of our times is that given the world’s existing knowledge, technologies and resources, more than 40% of 56 million deaths annually are avoidable. The WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health has reported that of the 17.7 million people who die every year from infectious diseases, about half could actually be saved had basic health care been provided. The study goes on to highlight the fact that the way to save lives in the future is not dependent on discoveries today but more about “getting the basics right, e.g. getting tetanus shots for children…and providing safe drinking water for more villages.” Perhaps this situation is best encapsulated in the remark of a Cambodian physician who said that the “in our country, the real killers are poverty, ignorance, fear and corruption…disease just administers the coup de grace.”
El día 21 de mayo se ha cumplido el quinto aniversario de la caída de Suharto que tuvo lugar en medio de la crisis económica provocada, a su vez, por la crisis financiera de julio de 1997. De esta manera, a la crisis económica se le superpuso una crisis política que, en principio, se cerró con la convocatoria de las primeras elecciones democráticas libres en Indonesia en junio de 1999. Desde 1998 Indonesia ha iniciado una nueva y accidentada etapa política, que se denomina Reformasi Order en contraposición con el New Order de la época Suharto: ha conocido cuatro presidentes; el país sigue sacudido por conflictos separatistas (Aceh, Papua) cuyo final no acaba de vislumbrarse; los conflictos étnicos y religiosos (Molukas, Sulawesi) siguen presentes y el extremismo musulmán tiene puesto un pie firme en el país a pesar de la negativa a aceptarlo hasta el atentado de Bali del 12 de octubre del 2002.

La accidentada presidencia de Abderrahmán Wahid (octubre 1999 a julio 2001) vino a poner de manifiesto la fragilidad del nuevo sistema político instaurado. Intentó circunscribir la actuación del ejército a las tareas puramente de defensa exterior y someterlo al poder político democráticamente elegido, pero, al final, el cazador resultó cazado. La crisis económica, el fuerte endeudamiento interno y externo del país, la falta de estabilidad macroeconómica hizo fracasar, entre otras causas, el plan del expresidente; no contaba ni con los medios económicos ni con una sociedad civil lo suficientemente fuerte para llevar a cabo su proyecto. Al final, se quedó sólo, sin el apoyo político de los partidos políticos islámicos que le llevaron al poder y de los poderes fácticos del país que se lo llevaron por delante. El día 23 de julio del 2001 Abderrahmán Wahid, tras un turbulento proceso de destitución, era reemplazado por la vicepresidenta, Megawati Sukarnoputri, hija del legendario primer presidente del país, Sukarno.

Este trabajo trata únicamente de dibujar de una manera simplificada lo que podríamos denominar coyuntura política y económica del país en estos momentos, sin más pretensión que la de proporcionar al lector algunos elementos de reflexión. No se trata de hacer un balance de estos cinco años de ausencia de Pak Suharto, sino de esbozar los rasgos que nos parecen los más relevantes en la actual coyuntura económica y política de Indonesia, el cuarto país más poblado del mundo con 216 millones de habitantes, con una gran diversidad étnica, ligüística y cultural, que se extiende a lo largo de 6.400 Km. desde la parte más oriental (Aceh) hasta Papua.

1 Las opiniones expresadas en estos artículos son propias de sus autores. Estos artículos no reflejan necesariamente la opinión de UNISCI. The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors. These articles do not necessarily reflect the views of UNISCI
1. Democracia tutelada

La subida al poder de Megawati despertó mucha simpatía y esperanzas en un país atribulado por la crisis económica y la inestabilidad política. El primer éxito a contabilizar en el haber de la presidencia estriba en haber dotado al país de una estabilidad política tras el breve período del errático y provocador Abderrahman Wahid. Ahora bien, no se trata una estabilidad fundamentada en una sociedad civil fuerte y en el buen funcionamiento de las instituciones democráticas, sino en el apoyo político del partido Golkar (partido del Gobierno de Suharto) y del ejército (TNI). En las elecciones generales de 1999 el partido liderado por Megawati, PDI-P (Partido Democrático de Indonesia en Lucha), ganó las elecciones, pero no consiguió la mayoría absoluta, necesitando el apoyo de otros partidos para su labor de Gobierno que, definitivamente, se ha concretado en el apoyo del Golkar. A cambio, por ejemplo, el presidente del Golkar y del Parlamento (DPR), Akbar Tanjun, sigue en sus funciones a pesar de haber sido sentenciado formalmente a tres años de cárcel.

Por su parte, el ejército ha dado todo el soporte necesario en la calle para que la Presidenta no esté sujeta a las incertidumbres políticas que podrían derivarse de su precaria mayoría parlamentaria y de problemas colaterales que podrían enturbiar su presidencia hasta las próximas elecciones generales previstas para verano del 2004. Cuando en enero del 2003 el Gobierno indonesio estuvo sometido a la presión de un fuerte movimiento de protesta popular durante dos semanas que se extendió a todo el país reprochando al Gobierno su sometimiento a las “órdenes” del FMI y del Banco Mundial como consecuencia de las fuertes subidas de precios propiciadas por la reducción de los subsidios a los productos energéticos, el general jefe del ejército (TNI), Endriartono Sutarto, declaró que si bien los ciudadanos tenían el derecho a protestar por las subidas de precios, no se toleraría que el objetivo de éstas fuera el derrocamiento del Gobierno, que sería considerado como un acto anticonstitucional. A cambio de este apoyo, el ejército, aunque ha disminuido su papel político durante este período, cuenta con la tolerancia gubernamental respecto a actividades de dudosa legalidad con las que financia sus gastos que el presupuesto sólo cubre en un 30%. Es un secreto a voces que el ejército obtiene pingües ingresos de la tala ilegal de bosques y de la minería ilegal; contrabando; drogas; juego; prostitución y extorsión.

Megawati también ha contado con el apoyo de los prohombres del régimen anterior, representados por el partido Golkar. Con la aprobación de la ley de partidos 31/2002 se ha tratado de apuntalar las organizaciones políticas tal como existen hoy día impidiendo la creación de partidos que podrían perjudicar a los existentes, teniendo en cuenta que en el 2004 tendrán lugar las elecciones generales. Por otro lado, la Presidenta ha decidido eximir de responsabilidades penales a los exbanqueros que no han devuelto los importantes préstamos recibidos para salvar el sistema financiero de su bancarrota, invocando como argumento la necesidad de tal medida para resolver el problema de su deuda al estado que, a su vez, podría dar lugar a dificultades en “otras áreas”. La consecuencia más grave derivada de esta situación es la falta de voluntad política para combatir con seriedad y coherencia la corrupción que afecta a todas las instancias del país, especialmente en el ámbito legal y judicial, que constituye el entorno en el que el "establishment" se mueve con toda impunidad. El mantenimiento en su puesto del Fiscal General del Estado, a pesar de su probada corrupción, es un caso paradigmático de lo que sucede a todas las escalas.

En definitiva, estamos ante una democracia formal cuya estabilidad no tiene un fundamento sano y sólido, sino que se mantiene tutelada por el ejército y el antiguo establishment.
La comunidad internacional así lo ha percibido y se está traduciendo en el mantenimiento de la salida neta de capitales y en la falta de interés inversor, tanto interior como extranjero. Como consecuencia de ello, el PIB del país es incapaz de sobrepasar un crecimiento del 4% basado en el tirón del consumo privado. De hecho, el FMI ha previsto entre los posibles escenarios para Indonesia uno denominado "muddled through", según el cual, el país mantiene a grandes rasgos la disciplina macroeconómica, pero con bajo nivel de reformas, incluyendo privatizaciones y reformas legales. En este escenario, el peso de la deuda se reduciría, pero mucho más gradualmente, y la recuperación económica seguiría siendo frágil y vulnerable a situaciones negativas y a nuevas pérdidas de confianza por parte de los inversores. Se estima que la economía indonesa debería crecer entre un 6% y un 7% para ir absorbiendo el fuerte desempleo existente en el país, así como la nueva mano de obra que accede al mercado laboral.

2. Estabilidad macroeconómica

En el ámbito económico, hay que anotar en el haber de Megawati el logro de la estabilidad macroeconómica con un crecimiento positivo durante los prácticamente dos años que lleva gobernando, que ha tenido como consecuencias muy favorables la apreciación de la moneda (la rupia), el descenso de los tipos de interés y la reducción de su deuda externa. Ahora bien, esta estabilidad macroeconómica no se ha trasladado al sector real de la economía ya que la inversión sigue muy estancada. Una idea de lo que está ocurriendo nos la proporciona el dato de las aprobaciones de inversiones, tanto internas como extranjeras. En el 2002 las aprobaciones de inversiones interiores se redujeron a la mitad y las extranjeras un 37%; en ambos casos con niveles cuantitativos muy bajos.

Según datos provisionales del Instituto Estadístico Indoneiso, en 2002 el PIB indonesio creció un 3,66% en términos reales, por debajo de las previsiones del Gobierno (4%). En precios constantes, éste alcanzó 426 billones Rp (alrededor de $45.747 millones al tipo de cambio medio 9.312 Rp/US$ en 2002) contra 411 billones Rp en 2001. El crecimiento del PIB ha tenido como impulso básicos la demanda del sector público y la demanda privada que crecieron un 12,79% y un 4,72% respectivamente. La contribución del consumo al PIB se estima en un 5,2% (4,6% el consumo privado). La formación bruta de capital fijo tuvo un crecimiento negativo del 0,2% y las exportaciones e importaciones crecieron un 1,21% y 0,90%, respectivamente.

Este menor crecimiento del PIB se ha debido en parte al empeoramiento del clima de inversión en el país como consecuencia de los fallos en la implementación de la autonomía regional, problemas laborales, problemas de seguridad y una corrupción generalizada. Además, hay que destacar el impacto negativo del atentado de Bali del 12 de octubre del 2002 como otro de los factores que han contribuido a la caída del PIB por la reducción del número de turistas y de ingresos del sector. La Inversión Extranjera Directa (IED) ha jugado un papel muy importante en el proceso de desarrollo, diversificación y exportación de la economía indonesa. El gobierno indonesio fomentó durante décadas esta política a través de un régimen relativamente liberal para la implantación y sin reservas a la repatriación de beneficios y la desinversión. Si es cierto que algunos sectores, sobre todo los servicios, quedaban fuera del alcance del inversor extranjero, el hecho es que el sistema establecido unido a una oferta abundante de mano de obra barata, a la existencia de unos grandes recursos naturales, al desarrollo de las infraestructuras, a la estabilidad política que suponía el régimen de Suharto, logró atraer unas cantidades de IED importantes. Mientras que se podría considerar que la crisis financiera y la inestabilidad política fueron los responsables de la fuerte caída en las
aprobaciones de inversión directa que se registraron durante los años 1998 y 1999, la fuerte caída de las solicitudes a partir del 2000 ha sido básicamente debida a la inseguridad jurídica y judicial del país. La inversión en Indonesia sólo ha conseguido situarse al 60% de los niveles precrisis. El ratio inversión/PIB se estima que está por debajo del 20%. En estas condiciones es difícil pensar que el PIB crezca a ritmos del 6-7%. En cuanto a la corrupción, es importante señalar que diversas encuestas realizadas muestran que durante la época de la Reformasi ésta se ha incrementado respecto a la época del New Order de Suharto. No es de extrañar que el entorno legal y judicial sea un obstáculo importante que explique en gran parte el bajo nivel de inversiones.

Para el 2003 el Gobierno indonesio espera un crecimiento real de PIB del 4% y con este supuesto ha confeccionado el presupuesto para el 2003. A finales de febrero del 2003, antes del desencadenamiento de la guerra de Irak y de la enfermedad SARS, el Banco Asiático de Desarrollo rebajaba al 3,7% el crecimiento del PIB para este año sobre la base del mantenimiento de la tasa de consumo. El Fondo Monetario Internacional estima que el PIB indonesio crecerá un 3,5% al incluir el factor guerra de Irak y el impacto negativo del SARS. El turismo, que contribuye con un 5% al PIB, se está resintiendo. Las exportaciones correspondientes al mes de febrero del 2003 cayeron un 0,85% respecto a la de enero y, dentro de éstas, las distintas de gas y petróleo lo hicieron un 2,79%. El índice de confianza de los consumidores referente a febrero, antes de la guerra de Irak, que elabora el Danareska Research Institute, ha bajado un 10,2% respecto a enero. Este dato es muy significativo puesto que el factor principal del crecimiento en Indonesia, hoy por hoy, es el consumo privado.

Los primeros datos oficiales referentes al comportamiento de la economía indonesia en el 2003 reflejan una tasa de crecimiento del PIB del 3,43% en el primer trimestre del 2003 respecto al primer trimestre del 2002, lo que supone una desaceleración de la tasa de crecimiento con relación a los dos trimestres anteriores, debido al debilitamiento del consumo doméstico que bajó 1,23% respecto al último trimestre del 2002. Es interesante recordar que en el último trimestre del año el consumo creció un 2,9%, por debajo de los ritmos de crecimiento del segundo (6,23%) y tercer trimestre del año (5,97%). Parece que esta tendencia negativa se ha ido consolidando sin tener en cuenta el factor guerra Irak y el SARS. Por otro lado, no parece que se pueda suponer que el consumo pueda seguir teniendo un impacto importante indefinido en la evolución del PIB ya que el incremento del consumo ha ido paralelo con una disminución de la tasa de ahorro del 28% antes de la crisis hasta llegar al 22% actual. Ello hará más complicado la obtención de recursos financieros del sector privado.

Otros datos macroeconómicos a destacar positivamente son la inflación, la evolución de los tipos de interés y la apreciación de la rupia. Así, la tasa interanual de inflación para el 2002 ha sido del 10,03%, por debajo de la inflación registrada en el 2001 (12,55%); en abril del 2003 la tasa de inflación interanual había bajado al 7,4%. Los tipos de interés de referencia a un mes del Banco de Indonesia han ido bajando paulatinamente a lo largo del 2002 desde el 17,39% hasta el 15,63% a finales del 2002, llegando actualmente al nivel del 11%. La rupia ha experimentado una apreciación constante a lo largo del 2002 y en los primeros meses de 2003. El tipo de cambio medio ha pasado de 10.393 rupias/US$ en enero del 2002 a 8.811 rupias/US$ en abril del 2003. Esta evolución positiva de la rupia ha contribuido a disminuir el monto de la deuda en dólares americanos de forma notable, pasando de constituir más del 100% del PIB en 2000 al 72% en el 2002.
La otra gran nota negativa, consecuencia del bajo nivel de inversión, la pone el número de desempleados que oficialmente asciende a 8,1 millones de personas (8,3% de la población activa), sin contar con el paro encubierto. En la coyuntura actual no se perciben indicios de que a corto plazo vaya a cambiar la tendencia, sino más bien todo lo contrario, ya que se estima que el crecimiento actual es incapaz de absorber a los nuevos llegados al mercado de trabajo.

Según datos provisionales facilitados por el Ministerio de Finanzas, el déficit presupuestario para el 2002 ha quedado situado en 27,3 billones Rupias (Rp) en vez de los 42,1 billones Rp presupuestados como consecuencia de la reducción de los gastos previstos. Este déficit se ha solventado mediante una financiación interior neta de 24,6 billones Rp y una financiación exterior neta de 2,7 billones Rp. Resalta el hecho de que los 16,1 billones Rp de financiación exterior neta previstos han quedado en 2,7 billones Rp. A su vez, la principal fuente de recursos interiores para financiar el déficit ha sido la venta de activos en manos de IBRA (43,3 billones Rp) y las privatizaciones (7,6 billones Rp) que han permitido la recompra de bonos (-11,4 billones Rp) emitidos en su día por el Gobierno de Indonesia para financiar la crisis bancaria del país y la reducción de los depósitos bancarios del Gobierno de Indonesia (-21,3 billones Rp). Por lo que se refiere a la financiación neta exterior, las aportaciones de los países donantes entre ayudas a proyectos y a programas alcanzó la cifra de 20 billones Rp (se habían previsto 33,6 billones Rp) y la amortización neta fue de –17,2 billones Rp, gracias a la renegociación de 30,4 billones Rp de deuda externa correspondiente al 2002 dentro del marco del Club de París, el día 12 de abril del 2002.

Por lo que se refiere al presupuesto para el 2003, se ha previsto un déficit de 34 billones Rp, equivalente al 1,8% del PIB. En cuanto a su financiación, la aportación neta del estado indonesio se cifra en 22,4 billones Rp y la exterior en 11,9 billones Rp. La financiación interior descansa en los ingresos previstos por la Agencia Indonesia de Reestructuración Bancaria (IBRA) y privatizaciones (34 billones Rp), 16,9 billones Rp menos que en el 2002 ya que en 2003 finaliza la actividad de IBRA; en los depósitos bancarios del Gobierno de Indonesia (8,5 billones RP) y en la emisión de bonos del tesoro (7,7 billones Rp). En cuanto a la aportación del exterior, el Gobierno de Indonesia cuenta con el reescalonamiento de sus pagos de principal e intereses durante 2003, lo que supondría un diferimiento del pago de 27 billones Rp (unos $3.000 millones) y una aportación de 29,2 billones Rp en concepto de aportaciones brutas de ayuda para proyectos y programas de desarrollo (los donantes del Comité Consultivo del Banco Mundial para Indonesia (CGI) han comprometido $2.700 millones para el año fiscal 2003). Están previstos 44,2 billones Rp en concepto de pagos por principal e intereses al exterior en 2003.

Desde 1997 Indonesia ha firmado una serie de acuerdos con el FMI. El 4 de febrero del 2000, a petición indonesa, el FMI aprobó un nuevo préstamo (“Extended Arrangement”, a 10 años, 4 años y medio de período de gracia y tipo de interés 5,18%) hasta diciembre del 2002 por 3.638 millones de Derechos Especiales de Giro (DEG) (unos $5.000 millones cambio de febrero del 2000). Hasta el momento se han efectuado ocho desembolsos por un importe de $3.394 millones, lo que está suponiendo un gran respaldo para la estabilidad de la rupia y la sostenibilidad fiscal del país. El acuerdo tenía previsto su finalización en diciembre del 2002, pero fue acordada su prórroga hasta diciembre del 2003. En principio, no parece que por parte del Gobierno indonesio haya mucho interés en renovarlo, si bien habrá que esperar al proyecto de presupuesto del 2004 para conocer la auténtica opinión del Gobierno al respecto. En el contexto de las próximas elecciones generales para el 2004 la renovación del acuerdo con el FMI podría ser

---

2 El tipo de cambio medio $US respecto a la rupia en el 2002 ha sido 9.319 Rp/$US.
motivo de fuertes críticas de corte nacionalista hacia la presidenta y al partido que representa, el PDI-P.

Según datos provisionales del Instituto de Estadística Indonesio, las exportaciones en el 2002 alcanzaron la cifra de $57.002 millones y las importaciones $31.239 millones, lo que supone un aumento del 1,21% y 0,90%, respectivamente, respecto al 2001, con un superávit comercial de $25.763 millones. Por lo que se refiere a las exportaciones, las correspondientes a petróleo y gas han alcanzado $12.106 millones (-4,19% respecto al 2001) y el resto, $44.895 millones (+2,77% respecto al 2001). En cuanto a las importaciones, las correspondientes a petróleo y gas supusieron $6.462 millones (+18,10% respecto al 2001) y el resto, $24.777 millones (-2,8% respecto al 2001). Teniendo en cuenta que el saldo de la balanza por cuenta corriente se ha estimado en $1.283 millones ($4.900 millones en 2001), ello quiere decir que el saldo neto de la balanza de servicios es -$24.480 millones, que incluirían los pagos derivados del servicio de su deuda exterior, estimados en $21.040 millones.

En cuanto a la balanza de capital, según datos provisionales de Bappenas, el saldo de la balanza de capital mostraría un saldo negativo del $6.800 millones, inferior al registrado en 2001 ($10.500 millones). Este resultado menos negativo que el año anterior se debería a una menor salida neta de capitales privados ($5.300 millones) y a unas menores salidas de capital oficial ($1.500 millones) respecto al 2001. El país ha necesitado de la cooperación del Club de París para aminorar el servicio de la deuda por un importe de $3.000 millones. Las reservas brutas se habrían situado en $30.200 millones en diciembre del 2002, equivalente a 7,1 meses de importación.

Según datos del Banco Mundial, la deuda exterior a finales del 2002 se habría situado en $131.331 millones, equivalente al 75% del PIB. En el 2001 la deuda exterior representaba el 91,5% del PIB. El servicio de la deuda ha supuesto $21.040 millones, lo que supone el 38,3% del total de las exportaciones de bienes y servicios. Según proyecciones del Banco Mundial, a finales del 2003 el total de la deuda (desembolsada y no desembolsada) ascendería a $106.526 millones, siendo los pagos correspondientes al servicio de la deuda $17.435 millones.

3. A modo de conclusión
Desde el punto de vista político, si bien es necesario reconocer las importantes mejoras institucionales habidas durante el período Reformasi y la estabilidad política que ha traído consigo la presidenta Megawati, la política belicista del Gobierno respecto a Aceh y Papua contribuyen a dar un protagonismo especial y desproporcionado al ejército, convirtiéndolo en árbitro principal de la situación política, al margen del debido respeto a los derechos humanos que quedan sacrificados en el altar de la integridad del país.

En el ámbito económico, hay un cierto consenso en afirmar que hoy por hoy Indonesia goza de una estabilidad macroeconómica, pero con un crecimiento insuficiente para absorber el paro generado por la crisis económica del 97 y los nuevos llegados al mercado de trabajo. El propio crecimiento económico, basado en el consumo privado, está mostrando sus límites cuando se han desencadenado factores exógenos (guerra de Irak, SARS) que el Gobierno de Indonesia no puede controlar.

La ausencia de una justicia imparcial y no politizada y de una política de reformas económicas especialmente en los ámbitos legal y judicial, la corrupción que no cesa, deja a los...
representantes de los intereses económicos de la época de Suharto con un alto nivel de impunidad, lo cual viene a constituir un elemento más de incertidumbre en la creación de un clima favorable a la inversión, auténtica asignatura pendiente del actual Gobierno en el ámbito económico.

La institución singapurense Centennial Asia Advisory ha pronosticado una tasa de crecimiento del PIB indonesio en un 3% este año. Según este instituto, la reducción de la tasa de crecimiento del consumo y la creciente incertidumbre internacional a medida que se aproximan las elecciones generales del 2004 contribuirán a reducir la tasa de crecimiento del PIB. Quizá el crecimiento podría ser mayor si hubiera una indicación clara de las intenciones reformadoras del Gobierno al que se le reconoce que cinco años no deja de ser un período excesivamente corto para juzgar sus difíciles decisiones sobre problemas que tienen raíces profundas en la compleja sociedad indonesia.
1. Introduction
The activities of many criminal groups cross national boundaries and escape the control of
governments and law enforcement agencies. As a result, they are as much part of domestic as
of international politics. The problem of transnational crime in Southeast Asia is severe and
consists primarily of drug trafficking, illegal migration, terrorism, money laundering,
transnational prostitution, piracy, arms smuggling, credit card fraud, and corruption. Drug
trafficking is perhaps the most serious transnational criminal problem faced by the Southeast
Asian states. Some of the largest and most dangerous criminal organizations operating in the
region are the Chinese triads, the Japanese yakuza, and Vietnamese gangs. Smaller networks
have also flourished in most regional states and set up transnational criminal activities. All
these groups take advantage of corrupt officials and politicians as well as weak governmental
institutions and law enforcement agencies to broaden their actions and increase their profits.
By doing so, they undermine new democracies and developing countries in Southeast Asia.

This article consists of three sections. The first introduces the notion of transnational
crime and positions it both within a discourse of crime and security. The second section
examines the problem of transnational crime in Southeast Asia with a special focus on drug
trafficking, human smuggling and trafficking, and sea piracy. It also discusses the kind of
regional inter-state cooperation that has been established to address this growing problem.
The final section considers some judiciary, domestic and regional factors that have limited the fight
against transnational crime in Southeast Asia.

2. Transnational Crime: A non-Traditional Security Threat
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye first discussed the notion of transnationalism in the early
1970s as well as its importance to the study of international politics.\(^2\) Transnational relations
refer to “those networks, associations or interactions which cut across national societies,
creating linkages between individuals, groups, organizations and communities with different

---

1 Las opiniones expresadas en estos artículos son propias de sus autores. Estos artículos no reflejan
necesariamente la opinión de UNISCI. The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors. These
articles do not necessarily reflect the views of UNISCI

nation-states.”

Transnational crime can be addressed both in a discourse of crime and security. Let us start with the former. The United Nations (UN) has defined transnational crimes “as offences whose inception, prevention and/or direct or indirect effects involved more than one country.” Such crimes must be differentiated from international crimes, which are recognized by and can therefore be prosecuted under international law, and domestic crimes that fall under one national jurisdiction. In order to be considered as transnational, a crime must involve the crossing of borders or jurisdictions. The UN has identified 18 different categories of transnational crime. These are: money laundering, terrorist activities, theft of art and cultural objects, theft of intellectual property, illicit traffic in arms, sea piracy, hijacking on land, insurance fraud, computer crime, environmental crime, trafficking in persons, trade human body parts, illicit drug trafficking, fraudulent bankruptcy, infiltration of legal business, corruption and bribery of public officials, and finally other offences committed by organized criminal groups.

Transnational crime has also been discussed as an international security issue in the academic literature. McFarlane and McLellan claimed in 1996: “Transnational crime is now emerging as a serious threat in its own right to national and international security and stability.” It is important to highlight the threats posed by transnational crime to states, national economies and civil societies. In the case of international terrorism, non-state actors can use this method of terror as a means of promoting their political causes. Such groupings gain strength from their ability to forge linkages across national boundaries. Their activities represent a challenge to the national sovereignty and integrity of independent states and can threaten the survival of governments. Other forms of transnational crime can dangerously affect states and their societies. Criminal activities, such as drug trafficking and money laundering, can reduce a government’s capacity to govern, weaken the credibility of financial institutions and undermine social order by questioning the rule of law and increasing the level of violence. Weak states as well as open societies are particularly vulnerable to transnational criminal activities.

Drug trafficking, money laundering or terrorism require international cooperation and cannot be effectively addressed by individual governments. Indeed, the problem of transnational crime requires a transnational response. Still, cooperation tends to be limited, as governments prefer to react to these problems at a national level. Inter-state cooperation against transnational crime is complicated by the fact that its touches on sensitive questions such as national sovereignty and jurisdiction, the sharing of information, extradition laws and problems of corruption. As will be discussed in the next two sections, these different issues have restricted the response to transnational crime in Southeast Asia.

The fight against transnational crime has already led to some examples of international cooperation, resulting primarily in the criminalization of the issue. Founded in 1923, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) has currently 176 member states and

---

provides a vehicle for the exchange of information and assistance between police forces. The European Union (EU) formed Europol in July 1999 in an attempt to combat transnational crime at a European level. The Group of Seven (G7) nations created in 1989 the Financial Action Task Force (FAFTF) to tackle money laundering and it set up the Lyon Group in 1995 to improve international cooperation against transnational crime. The UN has also established different bodies, which include the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and the Commission on narcotic Drugs, and introduced conventions such as the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Moreover, it organized the Naples Ministerial Conference on Organized Crime in November 1994 that led to the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan Against Organized Transnational Crime.

3. Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia

3.1. Trafficking of Illicit Drugs

Several Southeast Asian countries are major producers of narcotics and/or serve as transit for illicit drugs exported to North America, Europe and other parts of Asia. The Golden Triangle, which incorporates Northern Thailand, Eastern Myanmar and Western Laos, is one of the leading producing regions of narcotics in the world. Myanmar and Laos are respectively the first and third largest cultivators of opium poppies, which are later transformed into heroin. As a result, it is estimated that two-thirds of the world’s opium is cultivated in Southeast Asia. In supplement to the heroin trade, the manufacturing of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), commonly known as “shabu” or “ice” in Southeast Asia, has dramatically increased in the Golden Triangle since the early 1990s and specifically in Myanmar where relatively inexpensive forms of the drug are being produced in massive quantities.

The United States and most other ASEAN members are concerned with the scale of heroin and ATS production in Myanmar and with the low level of Yangon’s anti-narcotics efforts. The central importance of Myanmar in the Golden Triangle heroin trade partly results from the activities of the former Burmese Communist Party (BCP) and its breaking-up into separate factions in 1989. The BCP started to traffic drugs in the 1970s to fund its fight against the military regime of General Ne Win and gradually became a central player in the production and distribution of heroin. In September 1988, the military government in Rangoon transformed itself into the State and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) after having violently suppressed a popular rebellion. This was followed a year later by the splitting up of the BCP into four groups; namely, the United Wa State Army, the Shan State Army, the National Democratic Alliance Army, and the New Democratic Army. SLORC reached agreements with some of these separatist militias that permitted them to trade heroin in exchange for not attacking government troops or entering areas under its control.

The production of narcotics in the Golden Triangle rapidly increased in the 1990s due to the drug trafficking activities of these groups and the rampant level of corruption among Burmese government officials. Olson explains that it is not clear whether these ethnic rebel armies are “drug trafficking organizations that use a cover of nationalism to give their

---

8For an excellent discussion on Myanmar and the drug trade, see Dupont, “Transnational Crime, Drugs, and Security in East Asia,” Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 3 (May/June 1999), pp. 433-455. This paragraph is based on that discussion.
activities a patina of legitimacy or whether they are national liberation movements that turned to drug trafficking as a means to raise money.”

9 Untroubled by Yangon with which a ceasefire agreement has been signed, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) disposes over ten thousand soldiers and exercises almost full control over the Shan State in Northeast Myanmar. The UWSA is estimated to control 80 per cent of the opium-heroin trade as well as most ATS-producing laboratories in the country.10 Due to the growing evidence of complicity between the military government and the drug traffickers, Dupont writes that Myanmar is “the most egregious example of a drug-tainted regime in East Asia.”11 To improve its international image and indicate its determination to fight the drug trade, the military regime has organised bonfires of opium, heroin and amphetamines. For instance, the authorities burnt some US$1 billion of illicit drugs during a ceremony in June 2002. Yet, as mentioned above, most of the opium poppies are cultivated in areas that are not controlled by Yangon.

An effective distribution network enables the drug traffickers to transport the refined heroin and amphetamines from the Golden Triangle into Thailand, which is still one of the major routes of the illicit drug trade. Narcotics are also smuggled from the Golden Triangle into China’s Yunnan Province and then overland to Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao. Moreover, Ho Chi Minh City, Manila and Phnom Penh have become important hubs in the global drug distribution. All these different destinations are used as transit points to supply domestic and international markets. The Chinese triads trade most of Asia’s narcotics and collaborate with other transnational criminal organizations, such as the Japanese yakuza, Vietnamese gangs, Nigerian groups and Colombian cartels, to distribute illicit drugs worldwide. The drug trade, but also to an increasing extent human trafficking, has provided these mafias with exceptional financial resources. These funds enable the criminal syndicates to dispose over modern military equipment and to corrupt politicians, judges and police authorities. Consequently, to refer to these mafias, especially in the case of the Chinese triads, as mere criminal groups tends to minimize the threat that they pose to the political, economic and societal stability of regional states. Instead, it may be more appropriate to speak of transnational criminal powers. These are the kind of non-state actors that the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)12 will have to combat jointly in the coming years.

Narcotics produced in the Golden Triangle used to be primarily exported to non-Asian countries. This has changed since the late 1980s due to a dramatic increase in drugs consumption in East Asia. The consumption of ATS, which are smuggled from Northeast Myanmar and to a lesser extent Laos and Cambodia, has become the prime drug problem in the region, larger than opium or heroin addiction. Its consistent abuse leads to violent behaviour, deep forms of paranoia and hallucinations, and suicidal depression during withdrawal. This problem has reached epidemic proportions in Thailand. The average age of users continues to decline rapidly. Thailand regards the drug activities of the UWSA as an immediate threat to its society and national security. Yet, the Thai authorities are poorly equipped to deal with the narcotics problem and their activities are severely restrained by the

---

10 “Thaksin will persuade Yangon to Talk to Rebels,” Straits Times Interactive, 28 January 2003.
12 ASEAN was established in Bangkok in August 1967. The original members were: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.
fact that they have no influence on the production of ATS in the Shan State of Myanmar. The problem in Southeast Asia is not confined, however, to Thailand. ATS tablets are channelled to the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia in ever-increasing amounts. The consumption of narcotics in Southeast Asia, especially amphetamines, is unlikely to decline in the future.

In October 2000, ASEAN organized in Bangkok the International Congress in Pursuit of a Drug Free ASEAN 2015 in association with the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNDCP). It led to the formulation of the Bangkok Political Declaration in Pursuit of a Drug-Free ASEAN 2015 and to the adoption of a plan of action, the ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD). The latter seeks to eradicate or at least seriously reduce the production, trafficking and consumption of narcotics in Southeast Asia by 2015. It created a Plan of Action that relies on four central pillars:

1. Proactively advocating civic awareness on dangers of drugs and social response
2. Building consensus and sharing best practices on demand reduction
3. Strengthening the rule of law by an enhanced network of control measures and improved law enforcement co-operation and legislative review
4. Eliminating the supply of illicit drugs by boosting alternative development programmes and community participation in the eradication of illicit crops.13

While the ACCORD is only a declaration of intent, it seeks to address some key issues. First, it regionalizes cooperation against narcotics by including China. The regional production, trafficking and consumption of narcotics should be viewed as an East Asian problem rather than just a Southeast Asian one. It needs therefore to be addressed through broader cooperative structures. Second, the ACCORD aims to tackle the issue of supervision by establishing a monitoring mechanism and introducing target dates. If implemented, this could be an important step in a cooperative process where the adoption of binding measures will most likely remain unattainable in the short to medium term.

### 3.2. Human Smuggling and Trafficking

Over the last ten years, the issue of illegal migration has been increasingly linked to organised criminal groups that now largely control the smuggling and trafficking of people. People-traffickers and smugglers make high profits while risking relatively short prison sentences in comparison with drug dealers. They are connected to other transnational criminal networks involved in narcotics, arms trafficking, money laundering and counterfeit documentation and dispose over the necessary funds to purchase modern equipment and corrupt police and other government officials. Their activities rely on complex infrastructures and are taken more and more seriously by states.

People-smugglers demand large sums of money to individuals in exchange for their illegal entry into a new country. They normally provide transport, fake passports, transit accommodation and the crossing of borders. The strengthening of immigration procedures in host countries has often forced those that wish to escape domestic poverty or conflict to rely on these dangerous and expensive services. The undocumented immigrants usually reimburse

---

13ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD), Bangkok, Thailand, 13 October 2000.
the price of the passage after their arrival. Unable to pay off their debt, many start working for organized gangs in low skilled jobs, the sex industry and crime. Gangs can therefore be involved in the smuggling as well as in the exploitation of illegal labourers. People traffickers trap mostly young women and children into work or prostitution through the use of force or deceit. They end up after having been promised good jobs as sex slaves, domestic labourers, and cheap labour. Their passports are generally confiscated and their illegal status makes it much harder for them to approach the local police authorities. When they do, they risk fines, prison terms and deportation.

Many undocumented workers in Asia have relied on people-smugglers to illegally enter their final destinations. A majority of these illegal immigrants are now women who often fall into the hands of people-traffickers. The UN estimates that 200,000 women are trafficked annually in Southeast Asia. Thousands of women from China, Laos, and Myanmar work as prostitutes in Thailand. Vietnamese girls are also trafficked to Cambodia to supply the sex trade and to China and Taiwan for marriage. The illegal trade in women has become a great source of income for people-traffickers and remains difficult to apprehend as it is predominantly hidden within the broader phenomenon of undocumented migration. The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 and the ongoing economic difficulties faced by Indonesia and other regional nations have increased the trafficking of women in Southeast Asia. Poverty as well as a lack of education and job opportunities for women are the root causes of this problem.

Some Southeast Asian states have sought to promote regional cooperation against undocumented migration by organizing ministerial conferences. In February 2002, Hassan Wirayuda and Alexander Downer, the foreign ministers of Indonesia and Australia, co-chaired the Regional Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime. The event was held in Bali and gathered ministers from thirty-four countries, including Iran and Afghanistan from where a lot of illegal migrants depart, as well as representatives from the International Organization for Migration, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and INTERPOL. Indonesia’s President Megawati Sukarnoputri stressed in her opening speech that undocumented migration is a problem that needs to be addressed collectively and warned states against taking unilateral actions to solve the matter. She declared: “We have witnessed some impatient governments taking unilateral steps to protect their national interests.” Australia later denied that Megawati was referring to its controversial policy on illegal immigrants first implemented in the summer of 2001. It consisted of intercepting ships carrying Iraqi and Afghan asylum-seekers and diverting them to Pacific Islands for processing or sending them back to Indonesia, from where they set sail.

Despite some attempts to promote inter-state cooperation against human smuggling and trafficking, the issue has continued to cause political problems among the Southeast Asian states, especially since the financial crisis of 1997. This has limited bilateral and multilateral collaboration against human smuggling and trafficking. The lack of political unity among the Southeast Asian countries on this issue results from the sensitivity of the illegal migration question and the bilateral tensions that it creates. Several examples are indicative of how illegal migration can negatively affect bilateral ties. Malaysian relations with Thailand have been strained due to the entry through their common land border of undocumented labourers from Bangladesh, Myanmar and Thailand itself. Besides strengthening border control and extending military patrols, Malaysia built a fence along their joint frontier. Illegal migration

---

has also been a recurrent cause of political strain between Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta. For instance, Malaysia announced a general amnesty period in early 2002 for illegal immigrants to leave the country without punishment. More than 300,000 illegal workers, mostly from Indonesia, left Malaysia under the voluntary repatriation programme. Finally, the severe poverty and economic disparities that persist in Southeast Asia severely undermine regional efforts to address the problems of human smuggling and trafficking.

3.3. Sea Piracy

Sea piracy is an historical and cultural phenomenon that has continued in this modern age to affect maritime traffic in some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. It is estimated by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) to cost as much as US$ 16 billion a year in commercial losses.\(^\text{15}\) Founded in 1981, the IMB defines piracy as “an act of boarding any ship with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act.”\(^\text{16}\) This definition can be distinguished from the narrower approach adopted in international law. According to the latter, sea piracy is a crime committed inside international waters, which includes the high seas, exclusive economic zones and the contiguous zone, and therefore beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any country.\(^\text{17}\) The Third United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) declares: “All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside of the jurisdiction of any State.”\(^\text{18}\) The notion of sea robbery refers in international law to attacks on commercial ships located in territorial waters where no foreign state has jurisdiction. The IMB’s definition will here be used as most acts of piracy in Southeast Asia take place in territorial waters.

The number of reported piracy attacks in the world has been rising quickly over the last few years. Many of these incidents occur along the coasts of South Africa, Bangladesh, India, Ecuador, and in the Red Sea. Yet, a majority of them take place in Southeast Asia, primarily in Indonesian waters and in the Malacca Straits. The IMB reported 72 cases of piracy attacks in Indonesian waters during the first nine months of 2002. This represents more than a quarter of the 271 attacks recorded by the IMB in that period. A total of 103 piracy attacks were finally reported in Indonesian waters in 2002. Significantly, it is believed that at least a third of the attacks are never reported. Ship-owners and captains are afraid of increased insurance premiums and to be regarded in the industry as unreliable freight carriers.

The problem of piracy in Southeast Asia is a threat to regional and international economic security. The free and safe navigation of commercial vessels in Southeast Asia is essential for international trade. The risk of piracy in the region has already led to a high economic cost reflected by the loss of merchandise and ships and the increased insurance premiums added to a number of cargoes that pass through the Strait of Malacca. Moreover, it


\(^{18}\)1982 Convention
is feared that a piracy attack on an oil super-tanker crossing the Strait could lead to an environmental disaster of massive proportions. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore are the ASEAN countries mostly affected by piracy.

Sea piracy in Southeast Asia is typically perpetrated at night by fishermen, small criminals, ex-members of the armed forces but also by well-organised criminal gangs. The latter are often better equipped than most naval authorities. They dispose over speedboats and modern weaponry to take control of merchant ships. A majority of piracy incidents occur in ports or when the boat is at anchor. The crew can be violently assaulted by armed groups that target cash, expensive equipment, and parts of the cargo. Attacks also take place when boats are navigating in territorial waters and to a much lesser extent on the high seas. Crime syndicates are increasingly involved in piracy and generally target relatively small vessels carrying products that can be sold with high profits on the black market. They also use hijacked ships for human smuggling and the transport of illicit drugs and weapons. These groups take advantage of weak governments that lack the financial resources, political will and efficient enforcement agencies to tackle their criminal activities.

The dramatic rise of piracy attacks in Southeast Asia chiefly results from the acute economic difficulties and political instability faced by Indonesia since 1997. The number of attacks in Indonesian waters doubled from 1998 to 1999. Even greater poverty and increased unemployment have transformed piracy into an attractive source of income. Rampant corruption among maritime officials and port workers enable the pirates to be well informed about the movement of ships and the composition of their cargoes. Rivalry between the Indonesian police and navy also undermines efforts to prevent piracy attacks. All these factors explain why piracy is currently out of control in the Indonesian waters and in the Strait of Malacca. Nevertheless, the problem is still viewed as secondary in Indonesia despite the fact that it is damaging its weak economy. Little has been done by the central government, which lacks the funds and political will to address the issue. Navy and coast guard budgets have been reduced since 1997. The maritime forces remain poorly equipped, lacking fast patrol boats and sophisticated weaponry. Only thirty percent of the navy’s one hundred and thirteen ships are said to be fully operational.¹⁹ This questions the navy’s ability to address the sea piracy problem within Indonesia’s territorial waters. Pirates can act within these waters without having to fear an external naval intervention.

In addition to corruption and ineffective naval authorities, sea pirates take advantage of jurisdictional limitations and often commit their crimes in the territorial waters of one state before seeking sanctuary under another country’s jurisdiction. Most ASEAN members refuse to prosecute pirates who found sanctuary in their territory for crimes committed outside of their own jurisdiction. These criminals are also rarely extradited. A solution to this problem is offered by the 1988 Rome Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, which provides a legal structure for inter-state cooperation against piracy. It empowers signatory states to extradite or prosecute pirates arrested in their territorial waters for crimes committed under the jurisdiction of other countries. Except for Vietnam and Singapore, none of the ASEAN members have ratified the convention.

Regional collaboration against sea piracy has been based on a so-called “spider web approach,” outside of an ASEAN framework. The member states have developed a bilateral

¹⁹Derwin Pereira, “Indonesian Navy Ships not fit to fight, says Chief,” The Straits Times Interactive, 3 July 2002.
system of confidence building and military linkages. Such defence ties have included the exchange of information, cross-border agreements, and training exercises. The spider web strategy has been applied to the piracy problem since the early 1990s. Indonesia and Singapore agreed in 1992 to set up direct communication links between their navies and to organize naval patrols in the Singapore Strait. Both states have continued to work together to improve and coordinate their efforts against piracy. Indonesia and Malaysia decided in 1992 to establish a Maritime Operation Planning Team to coordinate patrols in the Strait of Malacca. The Philippine and Malaysian navies reached an agreement in August 2001 to cooperate and exchange information to prevent piracy attacks. Thailand has also conducted joint patrols with Malaysia and Vietnam.

Japan has played an active role in trying to increase regional cooperation against sea piracy and has encouraged the Southeast Asian states to intensify their efforts. This is not surprising in light of the economic interests at stake. Japan is one of the largest trading nations in the world and it imports most of its oil from the Persian Gulf. Many of its super tankers and other commercial ships cross the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea on a daily basis. Japan has provided expertise and training to regional states. Most ASEAN countries can gain from Japan’s support due to their need for sophisticated equipment and a better training of their naval officials. Tokyo has also pushed for additional collaboration within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)20 and has used the ASEAN+3 (Japan, South Korea and China) to introduce new ideas. At the ASEAN+3 summit of heads of state and government held in the Philippines in November 1999, Japan’s Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi suggested the creation of a regional coast guard as an anti-piracy measure. It was proposed that these patrols be based on a multilateral approach and involve Japan, South Korea, China, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. While the ASEAN members were not overly enthusiastic about the idea, China openly opposed Obuchi’s proposal. As a legacy of the Pacific War, most regional states fear the prospect of Japan extending its security role in East Asia. China also perceived the Japanese initiative as an effort to constrain its rising power and reduce its regional maritime influence.

Japan took again the initiative during the following ASEAN+3 summit in Singapore in November 2000. Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori suggested the organization of an Asian Cooperation Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery. Held in Tokyo in October 2001, the conference consisted of three sessions dealing with the exchange of information, anti-piracy measures already implemented by regional states, and future cooperation. The participants agreed that “multilateral regional cooperation was indispensable in order to effectively combat piracy and armed robbery against ships and that Asian nations should take the initiative in taking the anti-piratical measures in Asia.”21 Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore in January 2002 and addressed once more the sea piracy issue. In Singapore, he declared:

---

20 The founding dinner of the ARF was held in Singapore in July 1993. Its initial participants were: Australia, Brunei, Canada, China, the European Union, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. Cambodia was admitted in 1995, India and Myanmar in 1996, Mongolia in 1998, and North Korea in 2000.

21 Chairman’s Concluding Statement for Asian Cooperation Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, Tokyo, Japan, 4-5 October 2001.
I believe we need an agreement for regional cooperation on piracy, and I will promote consultation to achieve that end. We must band together to eradicate the plague of piracy. In addition, I would like to strengthen cooperation between the Coast Guard of Japan and ASEAN counterparts.  

Nevertheless, Japan’s attempts to increase maritime security in Southeast Asia have been restrained by the question of national sovereignty. Indonesia and Malaysia have for instance accepted the holding of common anti-piracy exercises but rejected the presence of armed patrol boats from other countries in their territorial waters.

Besides Japan, the United States could play an active part in the fight against sea piracy in Southeast Asia. It has provided counter-piracy training to different Southeast Asian navies since 1999. In light of its naval presence and strong links with different regional states, the US is in a favourable position to help address the issue. Its military deployment in Southeast Asia has not been overly affected by its departure from Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base in the Philippines in November 1992. The Philippine Senate ratified in May 1999 a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the United States that enabled the resumption of joint military exercises. The VFA could play a role in fighting sea piracy. Moreover, the US navy has been conducting joint exercises with the Thai and Malaysian navy respectively since 1982 and 1984 and it has access to the Changi Naval Base in Singapore. Washington has suggested that these agreements be used as a common platform to organize multilateral anti-piracy exercises.

4. Domestic, Judiciary and Regional Factors Limiting the Fight Against Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia

The difficulty to cope with transnational crime in Southeast Asia partly results from a series of domestic factors, including the role of corruption, vested interests, and a lack of resources. The links between domestic instability, poverty and transnational crime need to be stressed. A majority of Southeast Asian countries have remained weak states that suffer from fragile domestic institutions and socio-economic problems. Corruption as well as poorly financed law enforcement agencies have undermined domestic attempts to combat organized gangs. For instance, corruption and a lack of resources have undermined efforts to address the growing problem of drug trafficking and consumption in Southeast Asia. The poverty and economic disparities that persist in the region also diminish ASEAN’s ability to tackle other forms of transnational crime, particularly the issues of human smuggling and trafficking.

Some Southeast Asian countries have been slow to criminalize aspects of transnational crime due to some of the domestic factors mentioned above. This is translated in the fact they do not dispose over the necessary legislation to prosecute specific categories of crime. Indonesia, for example, does not have laws against people smuggling and trafficking and its judiciary system often prosecutes these crimes merely for visa offences. This is in sharp contrast to Thailand that has adopted tougher laws over the last few years, including the 1997 Trafficking in Women and Children Act. The rule of law is only partially applied in Myanmar and Cambodia; two failed states where corruption and domestic struggles for control undermine administrative and judiciary systems. They therefore provide ideal environments for organized crime. Vietnam’s legal system is also incomplete, particularly vis-à-vis criminal

Speech by Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi, Japan and ASEAN in East Asia: A Sincere and Open Partnership, Given at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore, 14 February 2002.
activities. In short, one sees in the case of some Southeast Asian countries a failure to criminalize transnational crime at a national level, which complicates any attempt to respond regionally to such activity. To address this fundamental shortcoming, all ASEAN members should be encouraged to ratify the 2000 UN Convention Against Transnational Crime, and its Protocols on Human Smuggling, Sex Trafficking and the Illicit Trafficking in Firearms. Cyber crime, corruption and additional forms of transnational crime have either been addressed or are in the process of being addressed by the Convention. Once it gains international legal standing, the ASEAN nations that have adhered to the protocols will be forced to translate these instruments into national law.

The Southeast Asian countries have also failed so far to establish effective law enforcement cooperation at the regional level through the signing of extradition treaties and mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATS). The latter aim to increase judicial assistance and to regularize and ease its procedures. Such treaties involve, among others, the right to summon witnesses, to compel production of evidence, and issue search warrants. An extradition treaty, either at a bilateral or multilateral level, leads to the delivery of suspected or convicted criminals by the state where they have taken refuge to the state that asserts jurisdiction over them. Extradition treaties are therefore essential instruments to combat transnational crime. Most Southeast Asian countries have signed bilateral extradition treaties with the United States and other countries but very few with each other.

Finally, the issue of transnational crime is closely linked to the question of national sovereignty. On the one hand, transnational criminal activities represent a threat to the national sovereignty and integrity of independent states and endanger the survival of their governments. On the other, effective cooperation in combating transnational crime requires some surrendering of state sovereignty. Indeed, a section of national sovereignty needs to be abandoned for it to be protected more effectively. This is in direct contradiction with a Westphalian understanding of national sovereignty, which is still prevalent among the ASEAN members. The Southeast Asian countries have traditionally been strong defenders of the sanctity of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. This derives from a history of colonization and Japanese occupation and as a result of a process of independence and state building that only started, with the exception of Thailand, after the Second World War.

A paradigm shift vis-à-vis the questions of national sovereignty and non-intervention has therefore not yet occurred in Southeast Asia. Thailand’s Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan suggested in June 1998 the need to amend the basic principle of non-intervention, which caused disagreement between the members at the AMM of July 1998. Only supported by Thailand and the Philippines, the notion of ‘flexible engagement’ was rejected by the other members that feared interference in their domestic affairs. The foreign ministers eventually agreed on the euphemistic compromise of ‘enhanced interaction’. This has led to a clash between the necessity to achieve deeper multilateral cooperation against transnational crime and domestic priorities to oppose any kind of restrictions on these principles.
1. Al Qaeda’s trajectory in 2003

Despite being the most hunted movement in history, Al Qaeda and its associated organizations will pose a significant threat in 2003. Al Qaeda will fragment, decentralize, regroup in five zones of the world, work with like-minded groups, select a wider range of targets, focus on economic targets and population centres, and conduct most attacks in the global south. Although the group will be constrained from conducting coordinated simultaneous attacks against high profile symbolic or strategic targets in the West, together with its regional counterparts Al Qaeda will conduct similar attacks in Asia, Africa, Middle East, and even in Latin America. Despite heavy losses, including the likely capture or death of its core and penultimate leaders, Al Qaeda’s anti-Western universal jihad ideology inculcated among the politicized and radicalized Muslims will sustain support for Islamism, Islamist political parties and Islamist terrorist groups. With the detection, disruption, and degradation of its human and material infrastructure, Al Qaeda may evolve and survive as a state-of-mind among Islamist territorial and migrant pockets. With a skewed US Middle Eastern policy, Islamist support for political violence will grow prompting terrorist groups to conduct mass casualty attacks, especially suicide bombings of economic targets and population centres.

Since October 7, 2001 when US-led coalition forces began to dismantle Al Qaeda’s state-of-the-art operational and training infrastructure, its intention to attack has not diminished but its capability to attack has gravely suffered. With US working with several Middle Eastern and Asian governments, Al Qaeda’s strength has depleted to a third of its rank and file especially the loss or capture of its key leaders and experienced operatives. For instance, in Afghanistan, its military commander Mohammad Atef was killed in a predator attack in Pakistan, its director external operations Abu Zubaidah and in UAE its maritime commander Al Nishri were captured. Al Qaeda as an organisation has gravely suffered severe disruption to its command and control. Therefore, the group is increasingly probing targets that can be attacked with least effort and least cost. In keeping with its doctrine of repeating its successes, Al Qaeda and its associate groups are increasingly adopting the tactic of suicide terrorism against soft targets.

While Al Qaeda’s priority will be to attack US targets, it only has the resources and opportunity to attack US allies and friends. With diminished Al Qaeda assets and hardened US and Israeli diplomatic targets, the group will mount and attempt to mount attacks against
British, French, German, Italian, Canadian, Australian targets and possibly other European and Japanese targets. Throughout 2002, Al Qaeda or its associate groups killed German tourists in Djerba, Tunisia, French naval technicians in Karachi, Pakistan, Australians and Westerners in Bali, Indonesia, and Israeli’s Mombassa, Kenya. Osama bin Laden’s pronouncements in October and November 2002 will be the best guide to unfolding Al Qaeda events in 2003. As such more effort is needed to track and target Al Qaeda experts moving worldwide and disrupt them from coordinating attacks together with Al Qaeda associate groups with which it had shared ideology, finance and training during the last decade in Afghanistan and in other conflict zones.

Countermeasures, especially target hardening, by law enforcement and protective services of vulnerable government personnel and infrastructure have forced Al Qaeda to focus on economic targets and population centres. Hardening of government targets will displace the threat to softer targets making civilians prone to terrorist attack. Economic targets especially the tourist and the hotel industry will suffer from terrorism. Churches, synagogues, and other non-Islamic institutions as well as trade and investment will remain particularly vulnerable. Similarly, hardening of land and aviation targets will shift the threat to sea targets particularly to commercial maritime targets. Due to the difficulty of hijacking aircraft to ram them against targets difficult to acquire from surface attacks, Al Qaeda will acquire and employ hand held Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs). If appropriate and immediate countermeasures are not taken to target the Al Qaeda shipping network, SAMs under Al Qaeda control held in the Pakistan-Kashmir-Afghanistan theatre, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Horn of Africa will find its way to the Far Asia and to Europe, and possibly even to North America. Other groups operationally and ideologically unconnected to Al Qaeda will learn from Al Qaeda technologies, tactics, and techniques.

With US security forces and the intelligence community targeting Al Qaeda’s nerve centre in Afghanistan-Pakistan, Al Qaeda will decentralize even further. While its organizers of attacks will remain in Pakistan and its immediate neighborhood, its operatives will travel back and forth coordinating with Al Qaeda nodes in the south. To make its presence felt, Al Qaeda will increasingly rely on its global terrorist network of like-minded groups in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Horn of Africa, Middle East, and the Caucasus to strike its enemies. Already attacks in Kenya, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Kuwait and Yemen seek to compensate for the loss and lack of space and opportunity to operate in Afghanistan. Its operatives will work together with Jemmah Islamiyah (JI: Southeast Asia), Al Ithihad al Islami (Horn of Africa), Chechen Mujahidin (Khattab faction: Caucasus), Tunisian Combatants Group (Middle East), Jayash-e-Mohommad (South Asia) and other groups it trained and financed in the past decade. In addition to its own members, Al Qaeda will operate through the Salafi Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) and Takfir Wal Hijra – two groups it had infiltrated in Europe and North America. With the transfer of terrorist technology and expertise from the centre to the periphery, the attacks by the associated groups of Al Qaeda will pose a threat as great as Al Qaeda.

Although attacking inside North America, Europe, Australasia and Israel remains a priority, the measures and countermeasures taken by these governments will make it difficult for Al Qaeda to mount an operation in the West. Al Qaeda finds it less costly to operate in parts of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East where there is lack of security controls. Therefore, most attacks will be against Western targets located in the global south. While focusing on
Western targets will remain a priority, Al Qaeda will continue to conduct operations against Muslim rulers and regimes supporting the US led “war or terror.” The physical security Pakistani and Afghan leaders Musharraf and Karzai will remain particularly vulnerable and their regimes will come under sustained political challenges. While a number of Pakistani groups fighting in Kashmir will come under greater control of Al Qaeda, the group working together with the surviving elements of the Taliban will develop a clandestine network inside Afghanistan to conduct guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and political assassination.

For greater impact, Al Qaeda conduct coordinated simultaneous attacks against symbolic, high prestige or strategic targets with the intention of inflicting maximum damage to human and physical infrastructure. With Al Qaeda resources under strain and its operatives coming under increasing scrutiny in the global north, Al Qaeda will be constrained from mounting multiple attacks in the global north. However, Al Qaeda and its associate groups are still able to mount multiple operations in the global south where they have greater leverage, space, and time to operate. For instance, JI attacked the Sari and Kuta clubs and the US consulate in Bali, Indonesia on October 12, 2002; and Al Qaeda attacked an Israeli owned hotel and aircraft in Mombassa, Kenya on November 29, 2002.

2. Resilience
Al Qaeda has suffered with the arrest of nearly 3000 organisers, operatives and supporters in 98 countries from October 2001. With the increase in pressure, Al Qaeda is increasingly depending on its associate groups to conduct attacks. Traditionally, Qaeda with better trained, more experienced and highly committed operatives wanted to attack more difficult targets especially strategic targets and leave the easier and tactical targets to its associated groups. Today, with Al Qaeda operatives working closely together, the lethality of the attacks conducted by the associate groups of Al Qaeda is increasing. As Bali demonstrated, the attacks conducted by the associate groups of Al Qaeda can be as lethal as the attacks conducted by Al Qaeda itself. With attacks conducted by Al Qaeda’s associated groups posing a threat as great as Al Qaeda, the theatre of war will widen. US assistance, presence and influence will grow in the Muslim World generating wide ranging reactions.

With the loss of Afghanistan as a “liberated theatre of jihad,” Islamists will seek to create new theatres. Dr Ayman Zawahiri, Osama’s deputy, designated successor and principal strategist of Al Qaeda considers Afghanistan and Chechnya as the only two liberated theatres of jihad. Already due to the difficulty of movement of recruits and flow of support from Islamist migrant pockets in the West and in the Middle East to Afghanistan, there has been a partially diversion of support to Chechnya. Although there is a significant reserve of Afghan trained active and sleeper terrorists in the West, terrorists entering the West to attack Western targets may be trained in a number of theatres especially Chechnya. With Al Qaeda fragmenting several other groups will take over the role of waging a universal jihad. More territorial Islamist groups will espouse universal agendas and more Muslim separatist groups will become vulnerable to penetration by Islamist groups.

Al Qaeda will be operating across the technological spectrum but is likely to use low-tech high impact attacks, especially civilian infrastructure to attack civilian society and critical infrastructure. With greater border controls, members and associate members of Al Qaeda will use what can be readily purchased off the shelf especially from pharmacies, chemist shops, and hardware stores. Al Qaeda members will live off the environment and turn commercially
available material into weapons. Al Qaeda’s Tunisian member conducted a suicide attack against the oldest Jewish synagogue in Djerba, Tunisia, using a LPG truck; JI used a consignment of chlorate purchased from the port city of Surabaya in Indonesia against targets in Bali; and 9-11 hijackers used passenger aircraft against America’s icons. The latter attack, an Al Qaeda detainee said was “like using your own finger to prick your eye.” Using multiple identities, Al Qaeda members will travel to target countries, receive instructions, plan and prepare attacks through the Internet, and attack targets. They will generate support from low level crime, organized crime, infiltrated charities, and from politicized and radicalized segments of their migrant and diaspora communities.

With the capture of the 9-11 mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed alias Mohammad the Pakistani alias MP, the head of the military committee of Al Qaeda on March 1, 2003, Al Qaeda has lost tactical control of its cells (See Annex). He was central in the planning and preparation of attacks. His persona highly influenced the nature of almost all Al Qaeda attacks. First, mass casualty attacks, second, the abundant use of suicide terrorism, third, bombings, and fourth, assassination. As mass casualty attacks need a large number of operatives, greater resources, and planning over a long period of time, Al Qaeda today will be able to conduct a fewer attacks but still they are likely to become spectaculars or theatrical attacks. Assassination will be used more frequently although suicide bombings will be the most predominant form of attack. As suicide attacks are very difficult to disrupt in the execution phase, 2003 will see the tactic of suicide terrorism being used more widely. As Al Qaeda maximizes its successes and partial successes of attacks and minimizes its failures, suicide attacks will become increasingly common. Although Al Qaeda’s long term and sustained interest to use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents has not diminished, conventional terrorism will remain the preferred mode of attack.

3. Conclusion

US policies towards the Middle East especially the unilateral US threat to invade Iraq and Israeli-Palestinian issue will strengthen support for Islamism, Islamist political parties and terrorist groups. US’s skewed foreign policy will continue to pose a significant terrorist threat to Western interests both at home and overseas. In many countries, Islamism will move from the periphery to the centre, making it difficult for many governments to openly support US led “War against terrorism.” With support for Islamism rising, Islamists will campaign either politically or violently or both in Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, and other emerging democracies. In addition to well-organized groups, individual terrorists will mount operations, similar to the shooting at the El Al counter at the Los Angeles Airport on America’s Independence Day 2002. With more new in the media about Islam, the Muslim public will become more aware of Islam. The number of Muslims directly supporting violence will remain very small but there will be more support for a Muslim way of life, especially the implementation of Sharia laws. Furthermore, the need to wage jihad in support of their suffering brethren will rise among politicized and radicalized segments of the Muslims.

If the threat posed by Islamism is to be countered and the life span of Islamist terrorist groups is to be shortened in the long term (10 years), the current Western especially the US approach of 95% military and 5% ideological will have to be reversed. To reduce the space for the Al Qaeda to survive and grow, the international community must develop a multi-pronged, multi-dimensional, multi-agency, and multi-jurisdictional approach against terrorism. Failure
to develop a comprehensive long term strategic response will mean, Al Qaeda changing shape, surviving and continuing the fight.

As much as 2002 was, 2003 will be a year of experience and learning both for government law enforcement and intelligence agencies. With the wider acknowledgement that there is no standard textbook for fighting Al Qaeda, it will be a learning process where new structures and institutions will have to be built and shaped to fight a rapidly evolving cunning and a ruthless foe, willing to kill and die. To win, governments will have to repeat their successes and build upon their successes.

In its founding charter, Al Qaeda Al Sulbah (The Soild Base) is defined as the “spearhead of Islam” and the “pioneering vanguard of the Islamic movements.” The existing and emerging Islamist groups burdened with the Al Qaeda ideology will pose a continuous terrorist threat. Although Al Qaeda as a physical entity will be relegated to history, it has at least partially accomplished its primary role of “showing the way” to other groups especially the need to go beyond a limited territorial agenda and wage a universal jihad. The momentum Al Qaeda has so successfully unleashed will spawn and sustain a dozen existing and emerging Islamist groups at least in the immediate (1-2 years) and in the mid term (5 years).


4. Bibliografía

ANNEX

Khalid Shaikh Mohommad: The 9-11 Mastermind
Khalid Shaikh Mohammad is the most feared terrorist in the world. The Kuwait-born US-educated Khalid organized Holy Tuesday, the operation to strike America's most outstanding landmarks on September 11, 2001, the single biggest terrorist attack the world has ever witnessed. As the mastermind of Holy Tuesday, the Al Qaeda code for 9-11, Khalid is today the most hunted terrorist. Khalid is not an operative but an organizer of terrorist attacks. As he does not directly conduct terrorist attacks, his identity remained illusive and his personality largely unknown to the intelligence community until mid-2002.

Khalid belongs to the rare category of highly experienced organizers of terrorist attacks across international borders. In the profession, his predecessors includes Imad Mugneyev, the coordinator of the bombing of the US marine barrack and French paratrooper HQs in Lebanon (1983) and Israeli targets in Argentina (1992, 1994) and Illich Ramirez Sanchez alias Carols the Jackal, the organizer of the hostage taking of 11 oil ministers in Austria (1975), bombing of three pro-Israeli newspapers in France (1974), and the Air France hijacking in Greece (1976) culminating in the Entebbe raid. As an important functionary and thereafter the head
of Al Qaeda's military committee, Khalid was the key planner of several Al Qaeda landmark operations: the first World Trade Center bombing in New York (1993), assassination attempt on Benazir Bhutto (1993), Oplan Bojinka (plan to destroy a dozen US airliners over the Pacific, assassination attempt of Clinton and Pope John Paul II, and ram commercial airliners on to the CIA HQ and the Pentagon in 1994-5) and Operation Holy Tuesday.

There are several other operations where his hand has not been exposed such as the slaying of two American officials killed in Karachi in March 1995, and four American oil workers in Karachi in November 1997, both in retaliation for Pakistan's extradition and US sentencing of Mir Aimal Kansi, a Pakistani responsible for the murder of two and injury to three CIA employees outside the CIA HQs in Langley in January 1993. Although Kansi did not belong to Al Qaeda, like Khalid he was a Baluchi from Quetta, the capital of Balochistan Province of Pakistan, which borders Afghanistan. Although Ahmad Saeed Omar Sheikh of Jayash-e-Mohomad, an associate group of Al Qaeda, committed the murder of Pearl, it was an Al Qaeda operation. With the depletion of Al Qaeda strength since October 7, 2001, Khalid is known to have enlisted the services of Jayash-e-Mohomad and other Pakistani groups that shared training and operational infrastructure with Al Qaeda and Taliban throughout the 1990s. Pearl's research of Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, led him to Karachi, also the forward headquarters of Khalid. Sensing the threat, the Pakistani intelligence community believes that Khalid ordered Pearl's death. As Yosri Fouda of Al Jazeera who interviewed Khalid in Karachi in June 2002 was leaving, Khalid gave him a copy of the Daniel Pearl slaying video and a 112-paged manifesto justifying 9-11 operation.

Among the fraternity of terrorists, he remains one of the few surviving leaders still able to conceptualise grand designs, prepare a blue print, and carry them out effectively and efficiently. To quote an Al Qaeda member: "Khalid thinks big...he engages in systematic and meticulous planning spectacular or theatrical terrorist operations. He is a creative genius..." To quote a former Intelligence Chief of the Philippines National Police Colonel Rodolfo Mendoza: "He behaves like he's an intelligence officer. He appears and disappears. He has safe houses. He is very, very clever." In his capacity as the head of the military committee, Khalid dealt with a wide range of personnel both within and outside his committee. In addition to consulting with bin Laden and Al Zawahiri, the Al Qaeda leadership, he regularly interacted with Al Qaeda experts who were young and impressionable. At the time of their capture, Abu Zubeidah, head of external operations was 31, Mohammad Mansour Jabara, coordinator of the suicide attacks in Southeast Asia, was 22, Ramzi Bin Al Shibh, Chief Logistics Officer of 9-11 was 30, and Hambali, head of operations for Southeast Asia, was 36.

Khalid fills a void in the operational community of taking an idea and operational sing it with the vast global network he had built over the years. As much as he had access to youth willing to kill and die, Khalid had sufficient funds. Whenever he needed funds, Khalid discretely approached businessman, politicians and charity workers he had cultivated over the years. Rarely did anyone decline or refuse a request for assistance from Khalid. What Al Qaeda lacked were trusted individuals located in the west with sufficient knowledge of the west to receive, protect and guide the suicide terrorists to their enemy targets. Recruiting and positioning Al Qaeda members and supporters strategically in forward and rear bases for immediate and subsequent exploitation was Khalid's specialty. It was Khalid who always communicated with these assets and not the other way around. Although he knew the weaknesses and limitations of technologies in conducting terrorist operations, he intelligently
exploited the technologies available to him. In July 2002, the four-bedroom apartment he was living in Karachi, Pakistan, had three laptops and five mobile phones.

As far back as 1992, he developed a plan together with his nephew and protégé Ramzi Ahmed Yousef to bomb the World Trade Center in New York, topple one tower on the other and kill several tens of thousands of people. The operation killed six injured over 1000 and caused extensive damage to the structure. In July 1993, Khalid funded an operation to assassinate Benazir Bhutto, the woman Prime Minister of Pakistan. In 1995, Khalid planned an operation across the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and other countries to destroy a dozen US airliners. Since the mid-1990s, he was an important functionary and later the head of Al Qaeda's military committee that conducted multiple attacks in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Yemen, and planned another two-dozen attacks worldwide. His roles vary dependent on the operation and circumstance - directly participating in the bombing of a Philippines Airline flight from Cebu to Tokyo that killed a Japanese executive and injured others in December 1994; chairing the planning meetings of Holy Tuesday in Asia and in Europe, and wiring money to Yousef for Oplan Bojinka and to 9-11 hijackers. With experience, his operations have become complex often involving assets and operatives across many countries. For instance, Holy Tuesday involved operational planning in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Malaysia, Germany, Spain, UAE, UK and US. With his unrivalled and unmatched career, he presents a clear and a present danger to the international system.

Khalid is a professional terrorist. He has spent most of his adult life planning, preparing and executing terrorist attacks. He is unrelenting in continuously talent spotting, recruiting, motivating, training, identifying targets, reviewing plans, and positioning operatives in key countries to execute attacks both against military and civilian targets. Khalid functions by operating a state-of-the-art agent handling system where operatives recruited, trained and assigned to the military committee are dispatched worldwide with missions. For instance, Khalid missioned the Al Qaeda dirty bomber, Jose Padilla, a US national of Latin American origin and a convert to Islam. On a tip off from the Inter-Services-Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, Padilla was arrested by the FBI at Chicago's O Hare Airport on May 8, 2002. Similarly, another member of the military committee Abu Muhammad Al Masri, one of Khalid's protégé's asked the American Taliban John Walker Lindh at the end of his training in Camp Al Farook in Afghanistan in mid 2001: "Would you do a martyrdom operation?" meaning a suicide attack against US, European or an Israeli target. To manage such a vast network efficiently he must accept the risks, travel frequently, and be as close as possible to the theatre of operations. As head of the military committee, with the specific responsibility for targeting US, its allies and friends, KMS has always accepted the challenge and lived outside the "base area" and operate in the "field" whether it is in Europe, the Middle East or in Asia. In preparation for 9-11, he applied for a US visa but was turned down. Similarly, after 9-11 Khalid could have remained on the Afghan-Pakistan border with other leaders but instead he moved to a four-storey building in 15th Commercial Street, Defense Housing district in residential Karachi on June 14, 2002 to facilitate the movement of Al Qaeda operatives back and forth from Pakistan and Afghanistan to the rest of the world. He is likely to remain in Pakistan. To mitigate the risks, Khalid has developed the skills and the techniques over the years, both by example and by trial and error. He is both a master at disguise and at blending into the local culture and population.
Khalid earned the trust and respect of the Al Qaeda leadership by serving as one of Osama bin Laden's earliest bodyguards. Thereafter, bin Laden dispatched Khalid to the Philippines where he trained ASG and MILF members in his specializations - bomb making and close quarter assassination - in 1991. As an outstanding organizer, bin Laden gave Khalid substantial operational authority. Unlike most other Al Qaeda terrorists and leaders, Khalid's motivation is not religion but retribution, retaliation and revenge. He is driven by pure vengeance - a single mission to punish the United States of America and its friends. Unlike most other Islamist terrorists, his lifestyle demonstrates a duality. Although Khalid portrays that he is a believer, he is not strict Muslim. Khalid is jolly, sharp, hardworking and liked acting. Although he is authoritative and serious when it comes to work, he is known to joke and play with colleagues to ease the pressure on him and on them. Khalid's past record in the Philippines reveals that he is a playboy, a frequent visitor to Manila's red light district - its Karaoke bars and mirrored go-go clubs - and a womaniser. To impress Rose Mosquero, a dentist Khalid once courted in the Philippines, he phoned on her mobile and said: "look out of the window and look up." There was Khalid and his nephew Yousef waving from a helicopter flying over her clinic holding a banner "I love you." Khalid also met Yousef's girlfriend Carol Santiago, who has since then disappeared from the Philippines. In contrast to bin Laden and his followers, who lived frugally and a spartan life style, Khalid was flamboyant, spent lavishly and enjoyed life. For instance, the 9-11 suicide hijackers lived in econo lodges, but Khalid lived in plush hotels. Khalid entertained several women in five star hotels. Together with their associates, Khalid and Yousef visited both hotel bars and nightclubs in Manila. To women he met in Manila, Khalid portrayed himself as a wealthy businessman from Qatar. For the uncle and nephew, it was not only work but also play. In December 1994, Yousef and Khalid took a scuba diving course in Puerto Galera, a beach resort south of Manila. Despite the entertainment and the fun, they always took their profession seriously - to target the US, its Allies and its friends.

Many of Khalid's operatives hold him both in fear and reverence. Even after his best operative, Yousef, who planned to assassinate Prime Minister Bhutto, President Clinton, Pope John Paul II, and bomb US airliners over the Pacific, was arrested he did not divulge the name of Khalid. Although Yousef refers to bin Laden, he does not refer to his immediate superior Khalid. Even in an off-the-record discussion with the FBI, Yousef refused to answer certain questions. Despite the risk of receiving a 240-year sentence, Yousef stated that he does not wish to compromise others, meaning Khalid. In preparation to assassinate President Clinton who was visiting Manila, Yousef "made contact with a person he described as an 'intermediary' but who he would not further discuss." Furthermore, bin Laden consistently denied Yousef as one of his operatives because of the Al Qaeda leader's fear that his uncle Khalid would be identified.

Khalid was responsible for introducing two principles to the group. First, Al Qaeda's loosing and learning doctrine. If Al Qaeda fails in an operation, suffers human and material losses, still it is not considered a strategic loss, provided the group learns, improves, and vows not to repeat its mistake again. As such Al Qaeda could revisit its failed operations and engage in retargeting the same old targets using improved or better tactics. Although Al Qaeda failed to destroy the World Trade Center in February 1993, it succeeded on September 2001. Similarly, Yousef failed to assassinate Pope John Paul II in 1995 but Khalid returned to the Philippines via the southern backdoor in September 1998 with the intention of assassinating the Pope planning to visit Manila in January 1999 for the canonization of Mother Ignacia. In
early 1999, Khalid was observed "hanging around a nightclub in Malate, Manila." Second, Al Qaeda should be a goal-oriented and not a rule-oriented group. For instance, with the disruption of Al Qaeda plans to attack government, diplomatic and other hard targets were disrupted in Southeast Asia, Khalid approved a proposal by his Southeast Asian representative Hambali to attack population, economic and other soft targets. The bombing of "bars, café's or night clubs frequented by Westerners" in Southeast Asia including the Bali attack on October 12, 2002 received the blessings of the Al Qaeda leadership.

After Khalid was identified as a foreign terrorist working with both the MILF and the ASG in 1991, he has been on the run. However, he has demonstrated his ability to function effectively over long periods of time under extreme pressure. Despite being placed on nearly 100 watch lists and tracked by two-dozen governments even before 9-11, he has managed to both organize and operate across the world. As a master of disguises he alters his appearance frequently. He is portly, light brown in complexion, brown eyes, thinning dark hair, and has a long round face. During the past decade he has gained weight, and has been described as "relatively short" and "slightly overweight" by Al Qaeda detainees in US custody. He is 5 foot 5 inches (1.55 meters) and weights 160 pounds (72 kilograms). He often sports a closely trimmed beard and mustache and wears glasses. He tints his hair, the color ranging from dark brown to black. He wears western cloths, speaks very good English, and travels frequently. Dependent on the circumstance he either portrayed himself as a rich businessman from Doha, Qatar or a trader of holy water from Medina, Saudi Arabia. Even amidst a high threat to his life, Khalid is considered an active and an impatient man, constantly working, organizing, and moving. When the Al Jazeera's Yosri Fouda met with Khalid and his head of logistics for 9-11, Ramzi bin Al Shibh, he observed that Khalid's "hands never stopped moving as he wandered erratically around us. He was the doer while Ramzi was the thinker."

Khalid is not only a military figure but also a man of many other skills. Although Khalid is committed to operating at the cutting edge of terrorism, he was also involved in and supported the non-military activities of Al Qaeda. He was very much a party to Al Qaeda's decision to publicise its landmark operation. It was to demonstrate Al Qaeda's resilience, determination and ability to strike again. However, even when Khalid met with Fouda, the Al Jazeera journalist, in Karachi in June 2002, the arrangements made reflects the meticulous planning adhered to by Khalid. When the journalist was brought to one of his safe houses, an Al Qaeda operative placed and taped cotton wool onto Fouda's eyes, got him to wear dark glasses. After arriving at the safe house, Al Qaeda did not want the neighbors to observe that they were escorting a man who was blind folded. The Al Qaeda operative got Yosri to hold on to one end of a long box, creating the impression that Yosri was helping him to carry it, and the Al Qaeda operative led the way into the safe house guiding Yosri through several steps. Of all the journalists, Al Qaeda only authorized Fouda access to Al Shibh and Khalid. Although Fouda interviewed both of them he was sent only the audiotape of Al Shibh. Nonetheless, Khalid and Al Shibh were both media savvy.

During the past decade, law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies have identified Khalid to use at least 50 aliases. They are Walid Muhammad Salih Ba Attas; Khalid Shaikh; Khalid Al-Shaikh; Mohammad Khaled; Khalid; Salim Ali; Ali Salem; Muhammed Khalid Al-Mana; M Almana; Ashraf Refaat Nabith Henin; Ashraf Refaat Nabih Henin; Nabih Hanin; Fahd Bin Abdallah Bin Khaled; Muhammad Muhannadi; Ashraf Ahmed; Ashraf; Ahmed Refaat; Khalid Abdul Wadood; Khalid the Kuwaiti; Babu Hamza; Mukhtar; Al-Mukh;
Muhammad Ali Al Balushi; Mukhtar Al-Baluchi; Abdul Rahman Abdullah Al-Ghamdi; Khalid Mohammad Mohammad; Khalid Shaikh Mohammad; Khalid Mohammad; Khalid Al-Shiekh; Khalid Abdul Wadood; and Khalid Saeed Muhammad. Although Khalid appears older, Khalid frequently uses two birthdays - April 14, 1965 and March 1, 1964. In addition to using forged and adapted passports, Khalid uses several fraudulently obtained passports - African (Sudanese), Middle Eastern (Saudi) and Asian (Pakistani). For instance, his Saudi Arabian passport is no C174152 with expiration date April 23, 2005 lists his date and place of birth as September 24, 1968 and Saudi Arabia respectively. Similarly, he received Pakistani passport numbers 488555, issued at the Pakistani Embassy in Kuwait and 113107, issued at the Pakistani Embassy in Abu Dhabi on July 21, 1994, the latter with an expiration date of September 18, 1997. In 1995, the FBI retrieved a photograph of Khalid from Yousef's Toshiba laptop, the first indication that he was an important terrorist. Even before the FBI and the CIA knew the link between Khalid and bin Laden or Khalid and Al Qaeda, Khalid has been a wanted terrorist. Nonetheless, by using multiple identities, Khalid has evaded law enforcement authorities worldwide and operated on every continent including in Latin America. For instance, operating under the Egyptian name Ashraf Refaat Nabih Henin, Khalid obtained a Brazilian visa no 194-95 (C0077250) issued in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

From the very inception, Khalid adhered to the strictest principles of security. He operated clandestinely even a far as other Al Qaeda leaders and members were concerned. When the detonator of the bomb meant for assassinating Bhutto accidentally blew up in his face, Yousef was rushed to the Agha Khan Hospital for treatment of his hands and an eye. His accomplice Abdul Shakur, a Baluchi Al Qaeda member met Khalid who visited Yousef at the hospital. Although Shakur had visited Bait-ul-Ansar and trained at Al Farook and other Al Qaeda camps and even participated in sensitive operations, Khalid identified himself as a trader in holy water from Medina. Khalid deceived him by convincing him that he was living in Madeena Munawara and engaged in import-export business. Khalid also convinced him that he "imported containers of Abe Zam from Saudi Arabia for sale to Karachi through a company called Al-Majid Importers and Exporters." Operating strictly on a need-to-know basis, Khalid breaks routine, varies time, changes plans regularly, and trusts no one with his personal, and whenever possible with organizational security. Instead of communicating over the phone or email, Khalid dispatch couriers and operatives with guidelines and instructions. For instance, immediately before 9-11, Khalid dispatched Mohammad Mansour Jabarah alias Sammy, a 21-year old Canadian from St. Catharines, Ontario, and a suicide bomber Ahmed Sahage to join with Hambali and plan attacks in Southeast Asia, beginning with the Philippines. Although he remained in touch with his field organizers and operatives, quite early on in his profession, Khalid mastered the art of protecting himself by positioning "cut-outs" between front-end organizers and operatives. For instance, even the Al Qaeda member Abdul Shakur tasked to assassinate Bhutto knew Khalid as Munir Ibrahim Ahmad operating as Abdul Majid Madni. Khalid had several layers of protection - even if one was breached, there was another, and behind that a third. As an extremely cautious and a security conscious terrorist, Khalid could afford to operate not far away from the center of action but at the same time remain untouched. The security measures taken by Khalid that prevented several governments investigating terrorist attacks throughout the 1990s from identifying bin Laden as the financier and himself as the organizer. Although the Philippine authorities recovered components of a high powered rifle and laser scopes, Khalid respected for his marksmanship was not aggressively hunted. Similarly, the confession of Al Qaeda's first pilot Abdul Hakim Murad first in the Philippines and then in the US was not taken seriously. In addition to working with
Yousef to "plan the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993," co-conspirator Abdul Hakim Murad said that Khalid "supervised the plan to assassinate Pope John Paul II with a pipe bomb during a visit to the Philippines" and was "involved in the 1995 plot to blow up 11 US-bound airliners" over the Pacific.

Despite launching the largest ever investigation following 9-11, the counter measures enacted by Khalid took the US and other governments eight months to identify Khalid as the key planner of Holy Tuesday. The US government identified Khalid as the mastermind of 9-11 only in June 2002 after Abu Zubaydah, Al Qaeda's head of foreign operations was arrested after a gunfight in Pakistan in March 2002. Although Abu Zubaidah identified Khalid as the mastermind of 9-11, the US intelligence community did not believe him. For three months, FBI and CIA operatives corroborated Abu Zubaidah's revelations that it was Khalid who masterminded 9-11 and not himself. Holy Tuesday was so well compartmentalized that the US authorities came to know of the details of 9-11 only after the arrest of Al Shibh, exactly one year after the event. The revelations of Al Shibh after his arrested in Karachi immediately before 9.00 a.m. on September 11, 2002, enabled the US government to conclusively identify Khalid as the mastermind of 9-11. Considering his past, Khalid has been fortunate to evade capture. For conspiring to hijack and bomb several transatlantic flights heading for the US in January 1995, US federal prosecutors in New York indicted Khalid in January 1996. Although the FBI offered US $ 2 million for information leading to his capture, there was little effort to specifically target him until October 2001. In December 2001, FBI placed him on the list of the 22 most-wanted terrorists and offered US$ 25 million, the same reward offered for information leading to the capture of bin Laden.

Khalid's ability to operate in the Asian, Middle Eastern and in the Western worlds accorded him significant protection. Although of Asian origin, he grew up in the Middle East, and studied in the US. As such, unlike most Al Qaeda members, Khalid could organize and operate in a number of environments with equal ease. He communicates in perfect Urdu, Arabic, and English. In appearance, he could pass off as an Asian or as an Arab or even an American Muslim. He operates with non-Arabs such as Hambali (the senior most non Arab in Al Qaeda), but because Al Qaeda was largely Arab he operated primarily through the Arab rank and file. His companions, whether it was in Chechnya, Georgia, UAE, Qatar, Germany, Malaysia, Indonesia or Pakistan, were mostly Arabs. For instance, when police raided two Al Qaeda safe houses used by Khalid in Gulshan-e-Iqbal neighborhood in Karachi on September 11 and 12, 2002. All but ten arrested including the two killed, were Arabs. Although Khalid escaped operations in the Philippines, Qatar, Brazil and Pakistan, the closest a government came to arresting Khalid was in Karachi.

Khalid's origin remains in dispute. US government reports initially stated that Khalid's father was the first imam of al-Ahmadi mosque in Kuwait and was stripped of his citizenship after a dispute with a leading Kuwaiti family. Born as Khalid Al-Shaikh Muhammad Ali Dustin Al-Blushi in Kuwait on April 14, 1965, Khalid spent his early years in Fahaheel, south of the city. Being born in Kuwait does not automatically qualify someone as a citizen. After Khalid was identified as the mastermind of 9-11, the US intelligence community stated that he was a Kuwaiti national. After the European Union issued in December 2001 a terrorist list citing Khalid as a Kuwait, the Kuwaiti information ministry denied that neither Khalid nor his father were Kuwaitis. The Kuwait intelligence service checked all its records and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs through its missions overseas clarified to governments worldwide that the
"said person in question is not a Kuwaiti national and does not hold a Kuwaiti passport."
Although born in Kuwait, he acquired Pakistani citizenship. After obtaining a Pakistani passport from the Pakistani Embassy in Kuwait on December 6, 1982, Khalid left Kuwait for the US. After studying at the Chowan College in northeastern North Carolina for one semester in 1984, he transferred to another US university in North Carolina where he obtained a degree in mechanical engineering. Thereafter, he moved to Pakistan and served as the secretary of Abdul-Rab Rasool Sayyaf, leader, Ittehad-e-Islami, one of seven large groups that fought against the Soviet troops and Najibullah in Afghanistan. Sayyaf was well disposed towards bin Laden and to Abdul Rajak Janjalani, the founder leader of the Abu Sayyaf Group, who may have named the Moro group in his honour. As there were many Arabs in the ranks of Ittehad-e-Islami, Khalid established a wide network during the second half of the 1980s. In 1991, Khalid followed bin Laden's brother-in-law Mohammad Jamal Khalifa to the Philippines, strengthened cooperation with the Moro groups, founded a base of operations, and established a leadership base in Malaysia. On his return to Pakistan, he engaged in anti-Shia operations in Pakistan, including the assassination of prominent Shia leaders and bombing Shia shrines, and trying to liquidate Bhutto, a pro-West woman leader. He also expanded his network also recruiting and enlisting many from Kuwait. From Fahaheel, where a significant percentage of Palestinians lived, many Arabs and Pakistanis joined, supported or sympathized with Al Qaeda. Among them were Yousef; Abdul Shakur, the attempted assassin of Benazir Bhutto; Wadi Al Hage, secretary to bin Laden; and Abdul Hakim Murad, the first Al Qaeda pilot, and his associate Nasir Mubarak, also a pilot who trained at the same US flight school. Once again, this demonstrated that Al Qaeda recruited from familial and social networks.

On his second visit, Khalid lived in the Philippines from August 1994 to September 1996. Until the Yousef's cell was exposed, Khalid lived mostly on the top floor of Manila's Dona Josefa Apartment where Yousef experimented with explosives to destroy US airliners. The apartment was Al Qaeda's operational center until a fire erupted. In fact, Khalid had arrived in Yousef's apartment just as the apartment caught fire, but managed to escape. After the detection of the Yousef cell in Manila, Yousef fled to Pakistan where he was arrested. Khalid who knew Yousef since childhood, was affected by his arrest in Pakistan but Khalid remained in the Philippines. Due to the security measures he adopted, Khalid was confident that he would not be arrested. He was observed visiting the VIP Restaurant in the Harrison Plaza Complex in Manila. Khalid was frequently "seen hanging around the restaurant almost everyday at around 1000-1100 p.m. An Arab national, Anton Hannania, usually accompanied Khalid. After Yousef fled Manila, the FBI mounted and operation together with their Philippine counterparts to arrest Khalid at the Bandido (Bandit), a restaurant in Manila, he frequently visited in early 1996. The operation went wrong due to the increased visibility of FBI and other agents. Khalid immediately left Manila for Doha, Qatar. In Qatar, he lived at the estate of Abdullah bin Khalid and worked at the Public Works Ministry. Abdullah bin Khalid was among the influential Islamists who supported Al Qaeda and received bin Laden twice in the mid 1990s. When the FBI and CIA tracked Khalid to an apartment in Doha, and was about to arrest him, the US government believes that a senior Qatari official tipped him. Although the Qatar government was willing to hand him over to the US, the process of getting permission to arrest him took time. Together with an associate, Khalid fled Qatar using forged passports. In the fall of 1996, Khalid surfaced in Brazil. The CIA arranged through its liaison with Brazil's security service to arrest him but he slipped away. Khalid reappeared in the Middle East and Europe in 1997 and 1998, building a network for the purpose of attacking US targets.
Al Qaeda's watershed operation to destroy America's most outstanding landmarks took two and a half years of thinking, planning and preparation. It began with a visit by Khalid to Hamburg in early 1999. Khalid met with Ramzi bin Al Shibh and Mohammad Atta alias Mohamed El-Emir, the nucleus of the Al Qaeda cell in Hamburg. Atta who studied English at the American University in Cairo had moved to study city planning at the technical university in Hamburg in 1992. Without the prospect of finding a job, Atta became increasingly frustrated and religious when Al Qaeda recruited him and his roommate Al Shibh at the Al Quds mosque in Hamburg. The turning point of the Hamburg cell from an Islamist cell to a terrorist cell was in November 1998 when Atta, Al Shibh and Said Bahaji moved into the Marienstrasse apartment. In mid 1999, Khalid dispatched four reconnaissance units to America in pairs or singles over the space of five to six months to mount surveillance on the intended targets. Due to navigation reasons, White House that was on the list was taken off and replaced with the US Capitol. Al Qaeda 'Holy Tuesday' operation was originally called the Manhattan and Washington Raids. Al Qaeda used the Arabic word, ghazwah, which refers to a raid against enemies of the Prophet. Al Qaeda leader bin Laden's intention was to force the US to withdraw from Saudi Arabia and disengage itself from the Middle East, the intention of the 9-11 operational team was to inflict maximum social and economic damage as well as to humiliate the US. Khalid selected the team cautiously and over a period of time. At least some of the hijackers dreamt of crashing flying objects to targets even before they were recruited.

In the autumn of 1999, Atta - who hated high-rise buildings - traveled to Kandahar and met with Khalid at Al-Ghumad House in Afghanistan. The house, where they planned Holy Tuesday, was named after the Saudi Al Ghamdi clan - four of whose young members would be the musclemen in the hijackings. The Holy Tuesday operational team, chaired by Khalid, configured into a consultative council. In addition to the pilots Mohammad Atta, Marwan al Shehhi, Hani Hanjor, and Ziad Jarrah, the council consisted of Khalid al-Mihdar, Atta's deputy, Nawaf Al-Hazemi, Said Bahaji, and Ramzi bin Al Shibh, all of who left Hamburg in late 1999 or early 2000 and trained in Afghanistan. If Atta was arrested or killed, Al Hazemi was designated to lead the operation. As their passports had Pakistani visas and to prevent them from being subjected to suspicion when they applied for their US visas, immediately after Atta, Al Shehhi and Jarrah returned to Germany they reported that their passports were stolen. As Al Qaeda believed that it would be a risk for the members of the operational team to return to Afghanistan, they decided to hold the first planning meeting in Malaysia in January 2000. Twelve Al Qaeda members arrived in Malaysia in January 2000, the CIA identified Khalid al-Mihdar and Nawaf Al Hazemi. Except Hani Hanjor who was living in the US prior to launching the operation, Al Mihdar and Al Hazemi were the first 9-11 operatives to enter the US from Bangkok on January 15, 2000. Al-Midhar obtained a multiple entry visa to enter the US, yet the CIA failed that he be placed on a State Department Watch List to prevent him from coming to the country. Both Al-Midhar and Al Hamzi were not placed on US Watch Lists until August 23, 2001. Both Al Mihdar and Al Hazemi traveled to Thailand with the assistance of Hambali, who organized the Malaysia meeting. Both Tawfiq Al Attash alias Khallad from Yemen, Chief Planner of the USS Cole bombing and Hambali paid the hijackers. For the 9-11 operation, Khalid too applied for a visa to enter the US but his request was turned down. It demonstrated Khalid's fearlessness to enter the very heartland of his enemy in order to strike and destroy its most outstanding landmarks. When Atta arrived in New York in June 2000, he carried with him a report of potential targets made by Al Qaeda reconnaissance teams in mid 1999. Atta and Al Shehhi chose Huffman Aviation in Venice,
Florida to learn to fly in the summer of 2000 because it was warm and cheap. As it was risky for all the Al Qaeda members to train in one flying school, Jarrah enrolled in the nearby Florida flight Training Center, also in Venice. Hanjour, already living in the US and a trained pilot, underwent further training in Arizona. Despite being hunted by the US intelligence community for his role in the USS Cole bombing, Al-Shibh applied on four occasions for a US visa to enter the US. Al-Shibh the fourth of six brothers from Yemen and brought up by his mother after his father died 14 years ago wanted to be one of the suicide pilots. Al Shibh met his replacement Moussaoui in the UK in December 2000. Moussaoui entered Kuala Lumpur with the intention of learning to fly but was unhappy with the quality of training at the flight school in Malaysia and decided to train in the US.

Atta, his deputy Hazemi and other pilots studied security arrangements at airports and aircraft. The hijackers determined the best time to attack the cockpit was during 15 minutes after takeoff. After the operation Al Shihb told Yosri Fouda, an Al Jazeera journalist: "The group storming the cockpit is formed of two persons. It would be the nearest group to the cockpit. in order to seize the opportunity when the door is opened...and enter into the cockpit swiftly, take it over and slaughter those inside. And then the brother pilot comes very quickly....to guide the aircraft." Five months before 9-11, Khalid chose a dozen Saudis from the martyrs department of Al Qaeda as musclemen. For martyrdom operations, there was an excess of volunteers in Afghanistan. After they were handpicked and trained in the Spring of 2001, Al Qaeda recorded their last will. Although they knew that they were going to die, they did not know how, when and where until the last moment. They entered the US by July 2001 demonstrating Al Qaeda's capability to infiltrate operatives into the US without much difficulty. From an agent in Afghanistan Egyptian intelligence knew in July that 20 Al Qaeda members - four of them Cessna trained - had entered the US. Although the Egyptian service informed the CIA, there was no response.

In mid July 2001, Atta flew to Madrid and drove 500 miles to Cambrils, the Spanish coastal holiday resort near Tarragona. At the second planning meeting, Al Shihb and other Al Qaeda leaders met Atta. In keeping with Khalid's wish of giving operational leverage to Atta, the field operational commander decided on the choice and timing of the operation. Atta brought for Al Shihb relevant books and documents about the US that would strengthen Al Qaeda's knowledge to conduct future airborne suicide operations inside the US. Al Shihb brought with him a thick "how-to-fly" textbook, an air navigation map of the American eastern seaboard, how-to-speak English books, floppy disks, flight simulator CD-Roms, and other paraphernalia given to him by Atta. One of the books had the handwriting of Atta next to "how to perform sudden maneuvers." Atta also brought the annual flight schedules for airlines and other information that enabled Al Qaeda operational leadership that met in Europe to meticulously plan the hijacking of the airliners. This was necessary because Al Qaeda code forbid Atta from discussing the overall plan with any one of the 19 hijackers. In preparation for the assault, the final reconnaissance of targets was conducted from ground and from the air. By air, the Al Qaeda pilots traveled as passengers or rented planes and flew over the intended at close range but without evoking suspicion. The spirit of Al Qaeda's suicide hijackers in the US was high. It is reflected when Al Shihb recalls the last instructions to the 19: "You are going into battle, an unconventional battle against the most powerful force on earth. You are facing them on their land among their forces and soldiers with a small group of 19." The spirit of the hijackers was reinforced by multiple techniques. They were even named and referred to after Islamic heroes: Ziad Jarrah as Abu Tareq alias Tareq bin Ziad, the
conqueror of Andalusia (Spain), Marwan al Shehhi as Abul Qaqa alias Abu Qaqa, the conqueror of the Persians, and Khalid al Mihdar, as Sinan, a reference to the great Islamic architect of Istanbul. Similarly, they received "Instructions and Prayers" manual that kept them on course. Written during the "last hours of his life," Abdul Aziz Al-Omari, a hijacker provided spiritual comfort and guidance to the hijackers as they approached the climax of their mission: "Force yourself to forget that thing which is called world," "the time for amusement is gone and the time of truth is upon us ... If God grants any one of you a slaughter, you should perform it as an offering on behalf of your father and mother, for they are owed by you. Do not disagree among yourselves, but listen and obey."

Throughout the operation, Al Qaeda remained undetected in the US by adhering to the strictest principles of security. When Atta in the US and Al Shibh in Germany communicated by email in German through the Internet chat rooms in July and August 2001, Atta pretended he was a young man in America talking to Jenny, his girlfriend in Germany. "The first semester starts in three weeks...Nothing has changed. Everything is fine. There are good signs and encouraging ideas. Two high schools and two universities. Everything is going according to plan. This summer will surely be hot. I would like to talk to you about a few details. Nineteen certificates [reference to the 19 hijackers] for private study and four exams [reference to the four missions]. Regards to the professor. Goodbye." In keeping with his operating procedure, Khalid, perhaps the professor, communicated with Al Shibh and not with Atta until the last moment. Atef's last phone call to Khalid on September 10, 2001, was monitored by the US National Security Agency but it was translated from Arabic to English only after the attacks. In code, Khalid approved the operation for the four teams to strike. Similarly, three hours before Nizar Naouar, the Al Qaeda suicide bomber who targeted German tourists visiting the Jewish synagogue in Djerba, Tunisia, on April 11, 2002, placed three calls of which one was to Khalid.

Khalid ordered key Al Qaeda operatives to withdraw from Europe and North America immediately prior to 9-11. For instance, Al Shibh dispatched his flat mate Said Bahaji, a German Moroccan, to Karachi, Pakistan. While some operatives have been identified by government intelligence agencies others have not. It is likely that Al Qaeda may task these operatives to return to the West using false, forged and adapted identification to plan, prepare and execute operations. After gathering his belonging, bin Al Shibh cleared the Marienstrasse apartment clean before arriving in Pakistan to inform Bin Laden. Through a messenger, Bin Laden only knew of the date of Al Qaeda's watershed operation on September 6.

Khalid's capacity to conceptualize, plan and operationalise low cost high impact operations has been constantly underestimated by the international security and intelligence community. As Khalid makes things happen, more than bin Laden, increasingly intelligence analysts are of the opinion that targeting Khalid should be a priority. If he survives the current hunt, Al Qaeda will certainly strike again. Each day he is free, the likelihood of another high impact terrorist attack especially a mass casualty attack increases. Unlike his contemporaries, restrained by their political controllers and paymasters, Khalid has always been determined to kill more, inflict maximum damage, and employ creative means and new methods, such as unconventional weapons or passenger airliners. When Khalid met Fouda in June 2002, Khalid said that initially Al Qaeda "considered attacking US nuclear facilities but decided against it" due to the risk of failure. To quote Khalid, "We decided not to consider this for now." Considering Al Qaeda's intention, if Khalid survives, it is likely that the group will go down
this route. Khalid's mindset is reflected when he told Fouda that Al Qaeda "hope to accomplish a thousand more assaults similar to September 11" meaning that Al Qaeda has not given up the fight. As an individual terrorist, Khalid poses the single biggest threat to domestic, regional and international security.

### THE ORDER OF BATTLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FLIGHT 011 (WORLD TRADE CENTER NORTH TOWER)</th>
<th>WORLD TRADE CENTER [FACULTY OF TOWN PLANNING]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Atta</td>
<td>Abu Abdul Rahman al Masri (pilot and operational commander)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sattam al-Suqami</td>
<td>Azmi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walid al Shehri</td>
<td>Abu Mus'ab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wail al Shehri</td>
<td>Abu Salma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Aziz al Omari</td>
<td>Abul Abbas al Janoubi (author of the Raid Manual)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FLIGHT UA 175 (WTC SOUTH TOWER)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marwan al Shehhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayez Rashed Beni Hammad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamza al ghamdi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed al Ghamdi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad al Shehri</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FLIGHT AA77 PENTAGON [FACULTY OF FINE ARTS]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hani Hanjour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nawaf al Hazemi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salem as Hazemi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalid al Mihdar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majed Moqed al Harbi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FLIGHT UA 93 DESIGNATED TARGET: CAPITOL HILL [FACULTY OF LAW] BUT CRASHES IN PENNSYLVANIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ziad Jarrah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Said al Ghamdi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed al Haznawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed al Na'ami</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

2 The names and Al Qaeda names of the 9-11 suicide hijackers, list of targets and their code names.
1. Introduction.
2. Framework Analysis
4. US Policies on Iraq and North Korea. Different approaches?
   - Iraq: Compellance and Blackmail.
   - North Korea: Coercive Diplomacy, Blackmail or Engagement?
5. Possible scenarios: Compellance, escalation and war.
   - Asymmetries, perceptions and images.
   - Compellance scenario: Coercive Diplomacy and Blackmail.
   - Military scenario: Escalation, pre-emptive strikes and war.
6. A Desirable Scenario: Engagement.
   - A nuclear or a non-nuclear North Korea,
   - A conditioned Comprehensive Engagement Policy?

1. Introduction
The behaviour of the Bush Administration on North Korea has been quite moderate up to now. From the current declaratory policy of “zero tolerance” on terror and WMD, it could be thought that its policy would have been different. The 2002 National Security Strategy Document (NSSD), previous declarations and statements from President Bush and his aids, (“Axis of Evil”) and strategies developing aspects of the NSSD (for instance, National Strategy for Combat WMD) indicate an active and aggressive stand on this issue. However, there are some factors that probably inhibited Bush Administration from taking firmer positions up to now.

   - US diplomacy has been giving its full attention to the Iraqi crisis.
   - The Korean Peninsula scenario is quite different from the Middle East.
   - DPRK’s WMD capacity related to South Korea called for a careful handling of diplomacy;
   - DPRK’s posture on bargaining vis-à-vis United States, leaves out China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the postures of all these powers;

---

1 Las opiniones expresadas en estos artículos son propias de sus autores. Estos artículos no reflejan necesariamente la opinión de UNISCI. The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors. These articles do not necessarily reflect the views of UNISCI
- In a military crisis scenario, the rapid deployment of US reinforcement forces in the field would be difficult should the crisis break out during military operations in and the occupation of Iraq.

This article focuses on available strategies and the paths of possible action for the Bush Administration on the North Korea issue and their possible consequences. At the same time, it is intended to find out why the approaches chosen by the US Administration regarding Iraq and North Korea are different. The Bush Administration has a wide range of approaches to tackle the North Korea issue:

2. A Limited Engagement Policy within the Containment Policy established by the Clinton Administration through the 1994 Agreed Framework.
3. A Comprehensive Engagement Policy, addressing DPRK’s security necessities and a long-term plan for a peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.
4. A Coercive Diplomacy strategy or Blackmail posture using isolation, economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure and a deterrence posture, including forces deployment and higher alert postures, in order to stop and/or oblige to abandon DPRK its nuclear program.
5. Military action. With reference to the previous point, due to the Pyongyang regime idiosyncrasy, those measures could trigger an immediate military response: they could be seen by Pyongyang as a first step for a pre-emptive attack. The Military action could be an operation in accordance with the 1994 Pentagon plans, a conventional counterforce attack and/or a limited nuclear strike. This could include the invasion of North Korea or the response to a conventional attack and invasion of South Korea by DPRK forces. This is the response to the previsions established in OPLAN 5027 Mayor Theater War for the US-ROK Combined Forces Command.

2. Framework Analysis
The analysis of both cases this article will use are the concepts of Compellance, Blackmail and Coercive Diplomacy. In this sense, Coercive Diplomacy and Blackmail are branches of Compellance:

- Compellance is defined as: *behaviour established to compel an adversary to carry out an action that do not want or stop doing something*. It implies coercive diplomacy, blackmail and, sometimes, even deterrence.,
- Coercive Diplomacy is defined as: “*efforts to persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action*”.
- Blackmail can be considered as an offensive use of coercive threats: an *effort to persuade an opponent to do something*.

---

3 George, A. and Simons, W. (ed) *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*. Westview, Boulder, 1994. p. 7-8. Others authors use a different classification but here, I will use George’s framework. See, for instance, Jakobsen, P. *Western use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War*. Palgrave, MacMillan. NY. 1997. He starts from a concept of Strategic Coercion where Deterrence and Compellance are the main branches, and Blackmail and Coercive Diplomacy are sub-branches of Compellance. I will not enter i his debate on George’s established
Concepts and strategies such as Deterrence, Reassurance and other non-military strategies will also be considered. After that, we will see what military approaches can be used in the process should a military crisis break out.

- Deterrence is a strategy that threatens punishment or denial to prevent an adversary from taking unwanted action;
- Reassurance seeks to reduce the incentives adversaries have to use force by reducing fear and insecurity, often responsible for escalation to war.

References to Robert Jervis’ and Charles Glaser’s concepts on the Security Dilemma, will would be also useful as a useful tool to explain process and postures.

This article will review the policies carried out in the two cases since the Bush Administration took office in 2001 and when they were inserted in the US Foreign Policy general framework. Secondly, we will explain why the Bush Administration has chosen different approaches for each case, above all, after 9/11. Then, I will stress why the Bush Administration has chosen a policy of coercive diplomacy in the North Korea case up to now. Finally, in spite of the election of this latter approach, we will evaluate if this path can be considered erroneous and if certain steps should be taken, even though at first they could seem correct on a crisis prevention approach. In this event, the development of events could result in a military crisis and war. If the Bush Administration adopts a concrete path of action on the Korean issue, not taking in account the perceptions, approaches and policies of the Pyongyang regime, even though this path response to a preventive approach, US policy could be condemned to carry out a pre-emptive military action, in the face of a North Korean invasion of South Korea, or even worse, in response to a nuclear first strike.

3. Bush Administration Security Policy
From the point of view of the Bush Administration National Security declaratory policy, a set of conceptual approaches can be distinguished that are changing the core assumptions on US differences between offensive and defensive point of views in Coercive Diplomacy. My aim is not to discuss in theory but give a policy analysis, alternatives and possible results. For this purpose, this article will consider “more offensive” Blackmail than Coercive Diplomacy.

5 Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, No. 2 (January 1978). The security dilemma arises as states take measures that other states perceive as being detrimental to theirs. See also Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” in World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997). Glaser posits two new variables—the presence of greedy states, and each state’s perception of other states’ motives, that affect impact the severity of the security dilemma. The importance of uncertainty lies on in knowing the size and nature of its security requirements.
Foreign and Security Policy used during Cold War. This creates a new framework from which any analysis has to be done.

The National Security Strategy, NSSD, issued in 2002, is the evolution in the development of a truly new US Grand Strategy since the Cold War. The NSSD establishes new parameters but maintains certain characteristics from the Bush I and Clinton Administration approaches. In fact, these characteristics were already included in the Containment Policy, although conditioned by the Soviet threat and the global struggle between both superpowers. The Containment Strategy and the Bush and Clinton projects established a posture of Primacy and Selective Primacy respectively, which included the characteristics of Primacy posture:

- An international order favourable to US interests and values. This means international institutions, rule of law, democracy and free markets. The US would be the center of this system.
- To prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under its consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. This means technological and military superiority.

All of these are principles to be maintained after the Cold War. The Containment Grand Strategy also included the coordinated use of every political, economical, military and moral national resource to face the threat posed by the USSR. After the Soviet Union’s collapse, the Primacy Strategy used uncertainty on risks and threats to US National Security, instead of the Soviet threat. It maintained the rest of characteristics. Following the 9/11 events, the Bush Administration substituted uncertainty by war on terror and mobilization of all the resources available to fight this threat, creating a truly new Grand Strategy.

As the first President Bush announced the creation of a New World Order in 1990, drawing up a democratic and stable international system anchored on American values under a peaceful UN security structure, a set of principles were issued to structure a US strategic vision for the Post-Cold War world: a Collective Engagement approach and a Democratic Peace (this means the enlargement of the number of democratic nations). This approach was also followed and improved by the Clinton Administration as the core of its foreign policy:

---


8 Ibidem, p. 11-12.
10 The concept of Enlargement and Democratic Peace responds to the Kant’s concept of “permanent federation in a permanent enlargement”.
"ultimately the best strategy to insure our security and build a durable peace is support the advance of democracy elsewhere"\textsuperscript{11}. This was to be the theoretical framework for developing its Engagement and Enlargement Strategy\textsuperscript{12}. "the successor of a doctrine of Containment must be a strategy of Enlargement, Enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies"\textsuperscript{13}. This approach received harsh criticism due to the use of realism and liberalism alike: an old internationalist approach with bits of Nixon-Kissinger's geopolitical mechanisms using a Wilsonian rhetoric.

However, the neo-conservative influence on the Bush Administration pushed forward an ideological aspect in the new Grand Strategy beyond the Wilsonian concepts. In fact, this envisages a posture \textit{à la} Reagan. The neo-conservatives from the Congress were pushing during the Clinton Administration for a hard-headed foreign policy. There are several examples: the 1995 "Contract with America"; articles in the \textit{Foreign Affairs} journal like “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy”, or the creation of \textit{Project for the New American Century} in 1997. From this last initiative a plan on US Defense policy was created, based on neo-conservative principles, and was supported by people like Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Peter Rodman, Jeb Bush, Dan Quayle, Fred C. Ikle, Francis Fukuyama, Zalmay Khalilzad, Eliot Cohen o Aaron Friedberg. A current example of the position making the case for this approach is Robert Kagan’s, \textit{Power and Weakness}\textsuperscript{14}. Thus, the three pillars that support the NSSD were established by President Bush in his West Point address\textsuperscript{15}. They are directly related to the three principles that conform the US Grand Strategy:

- To “defend the peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants”: War on terror, the first principle of the Grand Strategy.
- To “preserve the peace”: through preventing any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power.
- To “extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent”: an international order according to US values.

According to these premises, this strategy establishes a strategy or approach to rollback terror (WMD, terrorist and tyrants), re-creating the Reagan approach of \textit{Peace through Strength}, restoring the militarization of US Foreign Policy. This approach assumes the geo-strategic strategies of the Nixon-Kissinger era, the expansive conceptions of the Kennedy-Johnson era and the rhetoric of Wilsonianism (a rhetorical speech about Evil, Evil Empire, Axis of Evil) as an ideological aspect; a renovation of the Reagan Doctrine through the Bush Doctrine on rogue organizations, networks and states, and a reassessment of SDI throughout

MD. It is also important to assume the language of the NSSD. Since Reagan, a state of war has not been assumed in the NSSDs, when the objectives of defending and expanding peace were stated. In the NSSD of Clinton, a clear situation of peace, using enlargement and engagement to reinforce this situation can be found. Moreover, the 2002 NSSD introduces a set of concepts that, although they do not appear clearly in the document, can be envisaged as core assumptions in the conduct of US Foreign Policy and Strategy.

To begin with, Deterrence and Containment, which have been the bedrock of US Strategic Policy since 1947, have been substituted by Compellence and Defense. The concept of Defense, related to Strategic Defense began to be reinforced after President Reagan unveiled the project of a Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983. And strategically, Containment was not an adequate response to the problems in the security and defense environment after the Cold War. Deterrence strategies were to be substituted by coercion strategies. This does not mean that Deterrence and Containment disappeared from strategic policy but that they would not be the center of the security realm anymore. But the concept of Reassurance is almost inexistent in the 2002 NSSD. There are only three lines in the NSSD about the concept of Reassurance after explaining pre-emptive action options. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice explains and qualifies this action: “this approach must be treated with great caution. The number of cases in which it might be justified will always be small. It does not give a green light-to the United States or any other nation to act first without exhausting other means, including diplomacy. Pre-emptive action does not come at the beginning of a long chain of effort. The threat must be very grave. And the risks of waiting must far outweigh the risks of action”.

Rice also talked about Deterrence and Containment and she does not completely rule out both concepts because she still considers them useful in certain situations, but establishes that they are not the center of National Security Strategy: “the National Security Strategy does not overturn five decades of doctrine and jettison either containment or deterrence. These strategic concepts can and will continue to be employed where appropriate. But threats are so potentially catastrophic...that they cannot be contained”. Thus, she justified pre-emptive actions before a threat materializes or an attack: “Extremists....are unlikely to ever be deterred. And new technology requires new thinking about when a threat actually becomes imminent”.

In this analysis it is essential to address the Bush Doctrine. The so-called Bush Doctrine is the evolution of the Reagan Doctrine in a Post-Post-Cold War context. This renovation links rogue organizations, networks and states, terrorism and WMD. All of them are valid objectives of the doctrine, which will be used to cover different policies and adequate strategies for every situation: for instance, a limited military operation in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda (terrorist network) and the Taliban (rogue regime and terrorist supporter); law

---

17 For a review on the evolution of US strategic posture see García Cantalapiedra. Una Estrategia de Primacía. pág. 77. For a wider discussion see García Cantalapiedra. op.cit. note 6.
enforcement action in America and Europe against terrorist networks; international intelligence cooperation and sharing; military advisors in Philippines; WMD disarmament by regime change in Iraq though a military operation. But we will see later that, paradoxically, this Neo-Reaganite Doctrine received a major impulse during the first Clinton Administration with the creation of the “rogue states” doctrine in 1994.

President Bush established in West Point: “We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorist and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.” Then, after the 9/11 events, the Bush Administration created the Bush Doctrine The United States started the creation of a pre-emptive action policy against NASTI: NBC-Arming Sponsors of Terrorism and Intervention. “If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will wait too long…Yet the war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action”. The 2002 NSSD explains that US strategic thinking has reached the conclusion that it is impossible to deter or stop these threats in Western democratic societies: “With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, our security environment has undergone a profound transformation”. For the Bush Administration, deterrence and containment are not available strategies for this situation: “we cannot let our enemies strike first….to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.”

A set of documents developing the NSSD as the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction or the National Strategy for Combat Terrorism has completed the process.

4. US Policies on Iraq and North Korea. Different approaches?

Departing from the Clinton Administration policies, the Bush Administration has changed US policy in both cases:

- US Iraq Policy has changed from containment to regime change (rollback) through Compellance and Blackmail;
- In North Korea, from containment, limited engagement to coercive diplomacy (for the time being).

Both approaches had been created or, at least, projected, before 9/11. This event only advanced and speeded up a harder, clearer US position, above all, in the Iraqi case. The Dual Containment policy created during the Clinton Administration, based on the expression, “keep Saddam in his box”, with different approaches during his two tenures (Comprehensive Containment, Dual Containment, Limited Containment, Containment plus), was the basic US policy on Iraq up to 1998. But after the 1998 bombing, Republicans and Democrats prompted a posture of regime change, not progressively as it was thought with a Comprehensive Containment policy (destruction of the regime for its own contradictions, economic sanctions, military coup) as was first established by the Bush I Administration, but through coercive and even military actions (rollback).

Clearly, the most apparent difference between the approaches the United States has used toward Iraq and North Korea is an offensive-defensive stand: in the case of Iraq, the Bush Administration has been always offensive, with a compelling and coercive approach. Despite the positions before the UN Security Council on disarmament, the Bush Administration policy on Iraq, even at the 2000 presidential election and before, has always had an implicit regime change as the final objective. However, on the other hand, the behaviour toward North Korea has been more defensive, in the realm of coercive diplomacy, but neither with Iraq nor with North Korea, has Reassurance been used properly or at all.

4.1. Iraq: Compellance and Blackmail

Iraq has been one of the US Foreign Policy main objectives for decades and now it is one of the main fronts of the Bush Administration. This was the approach followed during the Presidential Campaign and also by the Neo-conservatives, prior to the War on Terror\textsuperscript{23}. It is not surprising, then, the policy to rollback Saddam Hussein’s regime, creating a regime more friendly to the United States. Paradoxically, such an important issue is named only once (page14) in the 2002 NSSD, only related to WMD. However, the NSSD put Rogue states and terrorism at the same level.

The First Bush Administration did not established a clear posture about Rogue States in the early 1990s, even using only the term “outlaw” states. The term rogue only came after the Kuwait invasion by Iraq. In fact, the posture of the Bush I and Clinton Administrations was containment and “wait and see”, hoping that the regime’s own contradictions and sanctions would breakdown its resistance. In this sense, the objective always was to knock down Saddam, but not directly. This position was considered the most suitable because, in the short term, the United States did not want a power vacuum, allowing other powers like Syria or Iran to become the main powers in the area. Besides, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process took off through Madrid Conference and Oslo pacts, putting peace within reach. Any policy had to avoid disturbing the process. Yet, there have been remarkable changes in US policy since 1997. For the first time, the Clinton Administration launched, in March 1997, the possibility of using a rollback strategy in Iraq\textsuperscript{24}. The Secretary of State Madeleine Albright explicitly sought the removal of Sadam from power, although President Clinton articulated, in February 1998, a retreat to the limited containment posture of “Keep Saddam in his box”.

Since the end of the Gulf War, the main approach on Iraq has been Containment. The Clinton Administration policy was essentially a continuation of the comprehensive containment policy that the Bush Administration had pursued toward Iran and Iraq after 1991. This was a policy of “Dual Containment. The enunciation of this posture came in a major address by Martin Indyk, Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs at the NSC. Indyk, however, noted a significant difference of US objectives between the two cases: in the case of Iran, United States focused on the Iran foreign policy as supporter of terrorist groups or its efforts to acquire WMD. In the case of Iraq, the purpose was “ to establish clearly and unequivocally that the current regime in Iraq is a criminal regime”. The speech did not explicitly state that the US objective was regime change; but it repeated an earlier formulation


\textsuperscript{24} Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.” Preserving Principle and Safeguarding Stability”. Remarks at Georgetown University. March 26, 1997.
that Washington sought full Iraqi compliance with US Security Council resolutions, on the assumption that Saddam could not meet those requirements while remaining in power. This constituted an implicit policy of rollback\textsuperscript{25}.

This policy received a clear and important support from the National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, in spring 1994. Foreign Affairs published an article called “Confronting Backlash States” in which Lake elaborated a detailed articulation of rogue states policy: “as the sole superpower, the United States has a special responsibility for developing a strategy to neutralize, contain and, through selective pressure, perhaps eventually transform these backlash states into constructive members of the international community”. After the successful containment of USSR, the United States “now faces a less formidable challenge in containing the band of outlaws”\textsuperscript{26}.

However, the Dual Containment policy was considered insufficient in 1998 and it provoked a debate in two directions within and outside the US Government: a hard-line advocated by a Republican-dominated Congress and Neo-conservative outsiders, toward an explicit rollback posture. Even some legislative measures were taken, among them, the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998\textsuperscript{27}. On the other hand, it was the Clinton Administration, including the Pentagon and the CIA, the UN Security Council and the Arab states, which favoured a limited containment policy, focused on deterring Saddam from regional aggression and denying him any means to threaten the countries in the area: “Keep Sadam in his box”.

Thus, the main argument from Neo-conservatives and some officials within the Bush Administration, was that the problem with Iraq was not the symptoms, WMD, but the regime, i.e., the cause: you cannot terminate an effect that is inherent in the characters and policies of a regime unless you terminate the regime itself. Although UN inspectors would have detected WMD and forbidden arms and missiles, and would have enforced the completion of the UN Security Council Resolutions, Baghdad would have had a free hand again to push forward its programs after the departure of UN inspectors if permanent caution and surveillance in the country were not maintained. Saddam’s regime would have pursued WMD programs, even secretly, as Pyongyang’s regime has done since 1997-98. Besides, there are two examples supporting this posture: the failure both of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process in 2000 and a military solution for the Iraqi case. The problem, in the end, is the dictatorial and closed regimes. Of course, this does not completely explain the policy if strategic, security and energy realms are not introduced into the equation\textsuperscript{28}. But by introducing these parameters, it is clear that the main objective was regime change. It was a consequent conclusion taking into

\textsuperscript{25} Martin Indyk. “Challenges to US Interests in the Middle East: Obstacles and Opportunities”. The Soref Symposium. Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Washington D.C. May 18-19, 1993. In the case of Iran, the focus was on objectionable Iranian external behaviour.

\textsuperscript{26} Lake, Anthony. “Confronting Backlash States”. Foreign Affairs 73, nº 2 March-April 1994.


account the comprehensive policy of Middle East restructuring planned by the Neo-conservative sector of the Bush Administration.

4.2. North Korea: Coercive Diplomacy, Blackmail or Engagement?

The US North Korean policy of Limited Engagement was established mainly because of the North Korea nuclear program and the DPRK’s forces deployment along the De-militarized Zone (DMZ). But other sources must also be taking in account: the US Post-Cold War Grand Strategy, maintaining the US-Japan Alliance and the US-ROK Alliance in Asia, and China’s vital interests in the Korean Peninsula\(^{29}\). This included US interests in avoiding a new war but at the same time, keeping ROK safe from a DPRK invasion.

Coming from the Bush Administration I policy on North Korea, Containment strategy with engagement approach responded to a National Security Review carried out by an interagency committee in spring 1991. The three policy options were: to follow on Containment policy; an engagement approach, withdrawing nuclear forces from South Korea and reducing joint military exercises; and coercive diplomacy to compel Pyongyang to comply with NTP obligations\(^{30}\). The Bush Administration I chose the engagement approach. It produced the Joint Declaration on the de-nuclearization of the Korea peninsula by both Koreas and the signing and ratification by Pyongyang of the IAEA safeguards agreements. However, the only US-DPRK direct meeting produced contention with Seoul and established a dangerous precedent: Pyongyang could consider itself as the valid representative regime for the whole Korea in a foreseeable future, as Kim il Song’s strategy had done so during decades. Moreover, it permitted Pyongyang to think that, in the future, any negotiation should be established bilaterally with the United States. This allowed Pyongyang to force United States to agree a negotiation in 1993-94 on a bilateral basis.

The Limited Engagement policy (through the 1994 Agreed Framework) established by the Clinton Administration was an approach with the intention to reaching a final objective of peaceful unification, covered by the containment framework strategy established under the Bush I and Clinton Administration. Moreover, there were few alternatives, which were not acceptable paths: coercive diplomacy and/or military measures (pre-emptive attack, isolation, economic sanctions). However, the economic reasons that pushed Pyongyang towards this agreement have produced in the long term the contrary effect, because this engagement has created a fear in Pyongyang: the downfall of the regime due to dependency on foreign aid. Taking in account that the main objective of Pyongyang is the survival of the regime, even an engagement policy can create different effects from those wanted because of Pyongyang’s misperceptions of US behaviour and the size and nature of its security requirements.

Still, the 1994 Agreed Framework was a bad agreement but better than nothing. Neither the Clinton Administration nor the Bush Administration liked it but, due to the situation in the Korean Peninsula, it was the only solution available. However, after taking office, the Bush Administration reviewed US policy toward the Korean Peninsula. The Department of Defense and the NSC considered the 1994 agreement as a rewarded blackmail. But after this review, the conclusion was that it could not been abandoned without something


to replace it. Basically, the first policy on North Korea of the Bush Administration came from the 2002 State of Union Address, when President Bush included DPNK in the Axis of Evil, although in June, 6, 2001, he had made the first statement on North Korea with the following objectives:

- improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea's nuclear activities;
- verifiable constraints on North Korea's missile programs and a ban on its missile exports;
- and a less threatening conventional military posture.

This approach, a “carrot and stick” strategy, tried to offer North Korea the opportunity of demonstrating the seriousness of its posture by improving bilateral relations. If North Korea would respond affirmatively and would take appropriate action, the United States would expand “efforts to help the North Korean people, ease sanctions, and take other political steps”. However, this policy was really designed to reducing Pyongyang’s WMD, missiles, and artillery positioned along the DMZ: in fact, Pyongyang maintains 70% of its 1.2 million armed forces within 90 miles of the DMZ. Since July 2001, the Bush Administration has given warnings on the suspension of the construction of the light water reactors if Pyongyang does not fulfill its obligations with IAEA. Partly, the US position was based on the CIA’s suspicion ever since 1998 about a secret Highly Enrichment Uranium program (HEU), and the fears that terrorists (above all Al Qaeda) could gain access to WMD. This means a significative departure from the Engagement policy: the Bush Administration, at first, did not explicitly show a policy designed for a peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula as a final objective, but a policy ready to terminate with Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities. In this sense, the Limited Engagement policy was similar to Clinton’s Iraq policy: keep Kim il Song-Kim Song-il in his box, while waiting for a change in the situation of the regime (in one case, hoping for the failure, in the other, waiting for the unification).

But the Bush Administration has changed the pattern in both cases with different approaches: on the one hand, blackmail and military actions, and, on the other, coercive diplomacy, but without ruling out military action as a possible option: Secretary Powell on his trip to Seoul said to President Roh that “you cannot ever remove an option that is always available to you” though he opposes the idea that military force should be kept on the table. Besides, “the United States has no plans to invade North Korea”.

Pyongyang has been taking a set of initiatives to show a commitment of good intentions, but assymetricaly. The measures taken by Pyongyang did not fulfill the

---

32 Specially, the concentration of artillery and multiple rocket launchers within the range of Seoul. Statement of General Thomas Schwartz, Commander, US Forces in Korea. Senate Armed Services Committee. March 27, 2001.
Washington requirements\textsuperscript{36}. Then, the Bush Administration considered the DPRK were trying to avoid complying with the points established by President Bush in July 2001. Then, after the discovery of the DPRK’s HEU secret program in July 2002 by the CIA, which was not admitted until the Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly’s trip to Pyongyang in October 2002 (probably he carried with him evidence obtained by the CIA to show the North Korean officials that DPRK started to develop the HEU program in 1997-98), the United States stopped funding the light water reactor, and the KEDO Executive Board suspended in November, 15 2002, fuel oil shipments. And even though a military solution was discarded and a clear multilateral approach was adopted after the visit of Assistant Secretary Kelly, “the United States will not dole out any “rewards” to convince North Korea”. According to the Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, the DPRK must change its behaviour abandoning its nuclear weapons program, dismantling the plutonium program, and its HEU program, cooperating fully with the IAEA and complying with NTP and the safeguards agreement\textsuperscript{37}.

The US policy has been introducing new elements since 2001. The US Policy established 3 main elements in mid-January 2003:

- to terminate the Agreed Framework;
- to assemble an international coalition to put pressure on North Korea;
- and to propose a dialogue with North Korea that focuses on actions by North Korea to end its nuclear program.

The propositions about the DPNK did not obtain “any reward” until the freeze of nuclear programs was repeated very clearly by Secretary Colin Powell during his trip around Asia in February: “Unless North Korea ends its program, it cannot expect the benefits of relationships with the outside world….We had provided assurances that no one was thinking of invading or attacking North Korea. The United States and Japan agreed that these concerns and these conversations and discussions must be addressed in a multilateral context for the simple reason that it is not just a U.S.-North Korean problem, it's a problem that affects the entire region”\textsuperscript{38}.

\section*{5. Possible scenarios: Compellance, escalation and war}

\subsection*{5.1. Asymmetries, perceptions and images}

The greatest danger in the crisis is asymmetry of interests and of focus of both parts. Pyongyang has always pushed for a negotiation vis-à-vis Washington to recreate the past 1990 and 1994 scenarios, but the Bush Administration is focusing multilaterally on a resolution of the crisis precisely because it wants to avoid such a scenario.

Another asymmetry is the position of US policy and ROK “Sunshine” policy. Kim Dae-jung and now Roh Moo Hyun believe that the DPRK is changing to ensure the survival of its regime and South Korea’s engagement policy will bear fruit. But the Bush Administration believes that Pyongyang has been cheating international agreements and the Agreed Framework since 1998. This induced a lack of confidence in an Administration with a hard


line already toward WMD, missile proliferation and rogue states. The consideration of the Agreed Framework as a bad agreement, the suspicion of the existence of a secret HEU program, and the Zero Tolerance approach on terrorism were opposed to the Sunshine policy. Even that position could be explained from a US domestic policy point of view: heightening tensions and expanding war on terrorism to justify increases in the US Defense budget and pave the way to win the 2002 November elections. But this posture on the North Korean case made no sense because there was already a crisis in progress in Iraq, and there was a lot of bargaining at the UN Security Council.

Nevertheless, to assure the survival of his regime, Kim Jong-Il could have maintained secret the HEU program not only as a mechanism of security, but also as a real position that would mean that DPRK had never had the intention of changing progressively. The perception of the Bush Administration due to the Bush Doctrine, reinforced by Kim Jong Il’s Military Strategy on Korean Peninsula Reunification, was that the US would surely attack North Korea and, in order to survive, North Korea had to launch a first strike pre-emptively. Since the Bush Doctrine stresses that the Axis of Evil countries will not be tolerated anymore, there was nothing to loose for Pyongyang. A perception of a war in its own soil should push the DPRK to use WMD (not only nuclear forces) pre-emptively against South Korea, Japan and the United States.

5.2. Compellance scenario: Coercive Diplomacy and Blackmail.

By mid-March, the development of the crisis had introduced more elements into the US posture that finally established a Coercive Diplomacy approach, which the Bush Administration had begun to assemble in July 2001. Besides, one of the points behind this policy was to keep this issue under control until the end of the Iraq crisis:

- there will not be negotiations until the DPRK satisfied US concerns over nuclear program;
- warning on the prospect of economic sanctions. There were drafting plans but the position of China, Russia, Japan and the ROK against these plans have contributed to de-escalate these declarations
- proposing multilateral talks involving North Korea and interested countries, possibly under UN auspices; (Reassurance)
- progressive suspension of the 1994 Agreed Framework; heavy oil shipments were suspended in December 2002 in spite of Japanese and ROK’s reluctance. This was also used by Pyongyang to justify the re-opening of Yongbyon nuclear facilities. The next decision will be whether to continue or suspend the two light water reactors. Bush Administration however has funded this project with $3 million in the FY 2003 budget
- assembling an international coalition to pressure Pyongyang (China, South Korea, Japan and Russia); 5+5 framework proposed by Powell during his February 2003 trip to Asia.
- Ambivalence on US military option. Disavowing any intention to attack North Korea militarily but warning against any attempt by North Korea to reprocess weapons-grade plutonium. (Reassurance and/or Deterrence)

Paradoxically, the DPRK refused a multilateral approach, seeking bilateral bargaining vis-à-vis United States, up to 13 April 2003\textsuperscript{40}. This change is probably related to the US diplomacy with China and the quick end to the Iraq crisis and its consequences (regime change). On March 6, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in a step to reassure Pyongyang, stated that the US Administration was considering reducing US Forces level in South Korea, withdrawing all or part of the US 2\textsuperscript{nd} Infantry Division from the DMZ. And there has not been forces deployment and higher alert postures, although the stationing of B-52 in Guam and F-117 in South Korea as part of the annual Joint US-ROK Exercise Foal Eagle could be seen by Pyongyang as an aggressive movement or the beginning of a pre-emptive strike. (Security Dilemma-misperception)

Pyongyang has also played its cards. Despite its ambiguous acceptance of multilateral negotiations on April 13, a deliberately ambiguous statement from a spokesman of the DPRK Foreign Ministry was issued on April 18: the English version said that Pyongyang was “successfully reprocessing more than 8,000 spent fuel rods at the final phase” and had informed the United States of what it was doing in early March. However, the Korean version said: “Nuclear activity had been going on successfully and its final phase to the point of reprocessing fuel rods”. The English version appeared to leave no doubt that Pyongyang planned to build nuclear warheads, especially after the war in Iraq. The statement in English also said that China’s presence in its requested bilateral talks would play “a relevant role as the host state” while issues “related to the settlement of the nuclear issue will be discussed between the DPRK and the US”, downgrading the expectation on “multilateral negotiation” with the participation of China, to show no public concession although Pyongyang privately accepted it. This acceptance did not offer a pretext to the Bush Administration for breaking negotiations. Clearly, Pyongyang is using this ambiguity on reprocessing fuel rods as a bargaining chip. After conceding on multilateral talks, the North Korean regime has used a veiled threat of plutonium reprocessing to strengthen its position after the quick victory of the US-led coalition troops in Iraq. Still, analysts say that the DPRK had not actually begun reprocessing, but that they were prepared to. Despite this fact, the Bush Administration thinks that Pyongyang has crossed the line, elevating the crisis to a new level. But the United States attended the talks scheduled for 23-25 April in Beijing\textsuperscript{41}, leaving the Pyongyang delegation hours earlier after stating that the DPRK indeed had nuclear weapons\textsuperscript{42}. However, the Bush Administration keeps the diplomatic channel open, considering these talks as a first approach.

Meanwhile, different statements from the new ROK government officials, as National Security Adviser Ra Jong Il, and the ROK ambassador to the United States Han Sung Joo, stressed that a flexible attitude toward North Korea was necessary. At the same time, Pyongyang is playing other cards: first, North Korean officials telephoned South Korean officers at the border village of Panmunjom to propose Cabinet-level talks on April 27-29 in Pyongyang. North Korea often has tried to drive a wedge between South Korea and the United States, by dealing with the two nations separately and saying that only Koreans can resolve tensions on the peninsula. In fact, on April 21, South Korea’s Unification Minister, Jeong Se Hyun, accepted the North Korean offer in a telephone message. Secondly, the same day the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission of the Worker's Party of Korea

\textsuperscript{40} North Korea hints it may allow others to join talks. IHT. 14 April 2003.
jointly issued a call to all its citizens, which was carried in Pyongyang newspapers, to increase the country's defence capabilities. Pyongyang is also calling for the speeding up of the Korean peninsula reunification as the nation marks the 55th anniversary of its founding.

This event does not help the consideration of Pyongyang behaviour on a “good faith” basis, supporting opinions within the Bush Administration that the nuclear drive is designed to blackmail the US again into paying to end the programme. There are other opinions that consider that North Korea has decided that its security is only guaranteed by becoming a nuclear power. In this sense, this behaviour responds to the Glaser’s security dilemma posture: the DPRK is more likely to engage in a build-up beyond the means necessary to ensure its survival, and to opt for an offensive build-up. But the importance of uncertainty, then, comes not so much in being sure of the character of the adversary, but in knowing its size and the nature of its security requirements.

If the DPRK does not accept freezing its nuclear program and the other requirements of the US, the Bush Administration will probably begin to assess a blackmail posture, trying first to convince China about the necessity of putting pressure on steadily Pyongyang. Thus, the Bush Administration could carry out economic sanctions, including the ongoing suspension of heavy oil shipments, finally suspending the funding of the two light water reactors, and putting an end to the 1994 Agreed Framework completely, and reducing the ambivalence of the US military option, passing from a deterrence posture to a coercive deployment of US Forces through a reinforcement and augmentation of Air Force bombers and Navy CVBG’s in the area surrounding the Korean Peninsula, as the Pentagon and CENTCOM did during the Iraqi crisis.

Pyongyang already considers economic sanctions as an act of war. Thus, escalation to a military conflict would be likely even before carrying out this blackmail posture. Probably, any attempt by the Bush Administration to change the bargaining scenario will lead to a military scenario. Thus, a previous effort to achieve a common posture with China, Russia, Japan and ROK would be essential. China does not want a nuclear DPRK but neither does it want to impose economic sanctions on Pyongyang.

5.3. Military scenario: escalation, pre-emptive strikes and war

Some analysts believe the United States can strike without causing war on a wider scale, and they predict that the risks of lethal nuclear fallout from such a precision attack on North Korea's known nuclear sites may be minimal. But they are ignoring one critical problem: In 1994, when North Korea's program was restricted to three nuclear reactors plus the reprocessing of plutonium at Yongbyon, the US might have been able to effectively eliminate it through precision strikes. But now, the location of the HEU program is unknown. Thus, eliminating Pyongyang's complete nuclear production capacity through precision bombing is now very difficult, though it will be possible to terminate the short-middle term nuclear capacity posed by this installation.

The first target would be the plutonium reprocessing facility at Yongbyon. The only technological problem would be preventing the spread of radioactive fallout. And the good news for any such plan is that massive radioactive fallout is unlikely. A U.S. strike would almost certainly avoid dispersing more than a small fraction of North Korea's radioactive
materials, and even this fallout would be largely contained within Yongbyon. Technically, it is possible to destroy this capacity without causing major fires and using the collapse of the heavy concrete walls to trap most of the radioactive material in the rubble, thus avoiding serious fallout at distances far beyond the Yongbyon site itself. The other priority target would be North Korea's nuclear reactor, also at Yongbyon. But since North Korea refuelled its reactor with natural uranium before restarting it barely a month ago, the risk is greatly reduced. A direct attack on the reactor now, before it has been operating for very long with its fresh fuel load, might not spread very much high-level radioactive material: there would be no danger beyond North Korea's borders and no immediate radiation sicknesses or fatalities beyond Yongbyon.

The problem is still the potential of North Korean retaliation and the HEU program. The problem is the same as in Iraq, and, since, like a chemical plant, a centrifuge program consumes little electricity and can be physically small, American intelligence is unlikely to locate it. It is thus almost certain that any precision strike on North Korea's nuclear facilities will leave some of its uranium-enrichment program intact. Even could exist other undetected plutonium-reprocessing facilities outside Yongbyon. This was a crucial point of debate among American military planners in 1994. President Bush said on March 3 to reporters that if America's efforts "don't work diplomatically, they'll have to work militarily.", backing Secretary Powell remarks on military option as a negotiating tool. As the Korean crisis has escalated, more and more analysts--including some in the Bush administration--have begun arguing that a U.S. strike on North Korean nuclear targets may be worth the risk. In 1994, a pre-emptive attack on nuclear installations was a genuine alternative for achieving the same objective sought by diplomacy. But, according to this analysis, complete de-nuclearization of North Korea is impossible militarily short of occupying the North. Probably, military operations in Korea would be carried out following OPLAN 5027 Mayor Theater War for the US-ROK Combined Forces Command.

6. A Desirable Scenario: Engagement
6.1. A nuclear or non-nuclear North Korea

The conclusion of the North Korea crisis will be a nuclear or a non-nuclear North Korea, at best, or, at worst, an escalation to war:

- A nuclear North Korea:
  + A still no-military situation but critical scenario in middle-long term:
    This will allow Pyongyang to periodically blackmail the United States, the ROK, and Japan. If Pyongyang maintains its nuclear and long range missile capacity, the NTP will mortally wounded and the balance in North-East Asia as well as security in the whole of Asia will be dangerously affected. This could push Japan, the ROK and/or Taiwan to obtain nuclear capacity, and this will create a nuclear arms race in Asia. At the same time, this will create a sense of vulnerability in China, after losing control of Pyongyang.
  + A military scenario will bring us escalation and, possibly, war:
    - a pre-emptive strike against the nuclear facilities: as we saw above, this solution is not available without taking many risks.
    - An attack/invasion from the DPRK armed forces responding to US-ROK preventive military measures as higher alert status and
reinforcements or new deployments to the area: CVBGs, bombers and anti-missile Patriot batteries.
- US-ROK preventive/pre-emptive operations on North Korea Forces before a DPRK attack.
- Nuclear/conventional scenario.

- A non-nuclear North Korea:
  Should Pyongyang abandon its nuclear program, United States, the ROK, Japan, China and Russia could guarantee North Korea security as the first step that would permit the development of a whole de-nuclearized Korean Peninsula policy in order to achieve a peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.

6.2. A conditioned Comprehensive Engagement Policy?

Correctly, the Bush Administration has mainly chosen, up to now, a multilateral and diplomatic approach in the North Korea crisis. But, probably, the Bush Administration policy ought to focus on developing a whole Korean Peninsula policy instead of focusing only on North Korea and mainly on its nuclear program, strengthening multilateral approaches in a similar-2+4 German reunification framework, reinforcing common positions with the ROK and Japan, pushing Beijing to convince Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear programs, and obtaining legal support from the UN Security Council and the IAEA.

However, a US-whole Korean Peninsula policy now could allow Pyongyang to think that its policy to push United States to other negotiations similar to those of 1990 and 1994 was correct, allowing them to try to blackmail once again to obtain advantages in order to sustain the regime without apparent concessions. From this point of view, the Bush Administration could suffer from the 1938 Munich Pact “appeasement syndrome”, if Pyongyang maintains a challenging position to US steps to de-escalate the crisis and negotiate a solution. Thus, a whole-Korean Peninsula policy could go ahead after, and only after, the DPRK abandons its nuclear program. This position is defended by different institutions and people, for instance, the Perry Report, an article from Henry Kissinger, some hearings at US Congress and articles in journals such as Foreign Affairs.

However, as these analyses also establish, any step toward this solution should be only taken after Pyongyang abandons its nuclear program. The problem would be if Kim Song Il’s regime does not agree to abandon its nuclear program and does not permit the IAEA to monitor once again its nuclear installations. Some analysts such as the “hawkish” Victor Cha say that “the anticipated costs of unification are lower than we think. And the costs of a nuclear North Korea are much higher than we think”, above all for South Korea. But once Pyongyang plutonium production reaches a level beyond an international control capacity, the

---


solution will probably lay in the military realm. However a military attack would be extremely costly to both sides.