Security in the Black Sea Region
Policy Report II

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About this report

The Black Sea region is increasingly becoming a priority on the international agenda. In fact, a regional approach is emerging as actors understand that common problems need to be addressed jointly. Nevertheless, cooperation efforts are hampered by a number of factors, such as uneven economic and political development within and among countries, nationalist forces, and longstanding animosities between regional players. In this context, it is imperative to foster sound policies aimed at strengthening dialogue and cooperation so as to contain and ultimately resolve conflicts with peaceful means. However, there is little policy-oriented research on the challenges and opportunities for cooperation in the Black Sea region. The Commission on the Black Sea aims to redress this imbalance by presenting a series of four policy-oriented reports which reassess the economic, social, regional political and military developments in the region. This report is the second one, providing a better understanding of the parameters of the security related questions in the Black Sea. The Commission on the Black Sea does not take a collective position with this paper. This text represents only the views of its author.

About the author

Mitat Çelikpala is Associate Professor of International Relations at TOBB Economy and Technology University in Ankara. He has been working on the Caucasus, Caucasian Diaspora, people and security in the Caucasus and the Black Sea regions and Turkish-Russian relations. Before joining the academia, he served for the Turkish National Security Council. Currently he is lecturing in TOBB ETU, War College and Turkish National Security Academy on Turkish foreign policy, politics and history of the Caucasus and Central Asia, and Turkish political structure and political life. He is academic adviser to National Security Academy, Turkish MFA’s Strategic Research Center and TAF’s Strategic Research Center (SAREM), Ankara. Mitat Çelikpala is the author of various publications in academic journals as well as the daily press in Turkey.

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Abbreviations

BLACKSEAFOR
BSEC
CSCP
EaP
EDSP
ENP
ESS
EU
NATO
OBSH
OSCE
US

Black Sea Naval Task Force
Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform
Eastern Partnership
European Security and Defence Policy
European Neighbourhood Policy
European Security Strategy
European Union
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Operation Black Sea Harmony
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
United States
Executive Summary

Regional tensions, natural resources and geopolitical rivalries make the Black Sea region a strategic but sensitive area. In the absence of cooperative structures able to contain conflict, security threats ranging from interstate conflicts to illegal trafficking have emerged.

The region is politically, historically and geographically divided. Today, three principal actors influence security policy options. Russia fears encirclement by the West, and thus works to counteract EU and US influence in the region. It seeks to maintain its own role as the key regional actor, and to block externally driven energy projects or military alliances. It wants to prevent NATO enlargement, as well as to suppress fundamentalist movements.

The US and the EU have varying but complementary goals. US policymakers have focused on promoting democracy and the market economy, and have prioritised energy issues and free trade expansion. Local states’ bilateral US ties and the prospect of NATO expansion have aggravated tensions with Russia. However, the Russia-Georgia war severely damaged US credibility in the region. Eastern enlargement has increased EU interest and activity in the region. The EU has sought various policy and economic reforms, and has served a conflict mediation role, but its regional security impact is limited.

Black Sea countries themselves have diverse approaches to security. The tension driven by non-regional actors is a serious concern, and produces a variety of responses. For instance, Turkey has pushed for a region-wide security initiative, possibly setting the stage for normalisation of Russia’s role.

Threats to regional security are diverse, including ongoing and potential military conflicts between states, frozen conflicts, displaced populations and terrorism. Some weaker states are at risk of failing. Military expenditures are rising, and issues of energy dependency and supply diversity are vital. The lack of cooperation has created a “security vacuum” exacerbating global and regional rivalries. Despite EU and US promotion of democracy and the rule of law, authoritarian governing styles are common across the region.

This environment demands a dramatically more cooperative approach. Policies and institutions emphasizing competition should be discarded, while international organisations should promote regional trust. Conflict resolution processes must include all involved parties, and monitoring of military expenditures and conflict zones should be intensified.

Energy should be treated as a cooperative rather than competitive venture. EU programs should be more inclusive, and Russia in particular should be drawn into a broader network of security cooperation.
A Introduction

The Black Sea Region is one of the main factors in the make-up of security and stability in Europe and Asia. In addition to the numerous other issues in the region, ethnic conflicts, ongoing state-building processes, the presence of vast natural resources, and strategic transport and energy corridors mean that the region is an extremely important and sensitive area.

In geographical terms it is difficult to specify the boundaries of the Black Sea Region, since there are numerous regional and sub-regional structures. In the post-Cold War period there has been a large measure of openness to several neighbouring areas, such as the Mediterranean, the Balkans, and the Caspian region. This kind of openness makes it difficult to define both the nature of the region and its borders. It is reflected in terms such as “Black-Caspian Seas Region” and “Black-Mediterranean Seas Region”. Some analysts have even argued that the Black Sea Region is simply an intellectual invention. In order to avoid confusion, this policy report is based on the definition adopted by the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC).

This policy report is primarily devoted to exploring and understanding the security environment and the main threats to security and stability in the Black Sea Region. Which actors have an influence on regional security or are affected by specific threats? Which factors create these threats, and for what reason? Might it be possible to create stability and security in the region? Might it be possible to establish a permanent security regime that takes into account the interests of all the actors in the region?

The study is also concerned to propose solutions for the region’s security problems. For this reason it will focus on regional security problems in a comprehensive manner, and take into account both soft and hard security issues.
At the end of the Cold War, the states around the Black Sea regained their freedom and escaped from a bipolar conceptual straitjacket. This historical event not only marked the start of a move towards independence, democracy and market economy, but also unleashed hitherto suppressed ethnic, national and territorial conflicts, and even terrorism.

From the early 1990s onwards the region witnessed armed conflicts and an increase in political tension. Political and territorial disagreements such as border disputes and clashes between both peoples and states are the main reason why the prospects for regional security cooperation are rather bleak. The Black Sea basin was of secondary importance for the Euro-Atlantic community during the 1990s as it focused on stabilizing and integrating central and eastern European countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea. However, in the 21st century the changing global and regional balances created new political and security dilemmas for the Black Sea Region. The global and regional powers increasingly supported competing political and security agendas which, although they occasionally contradicted each other, were clearly interlinked.

After 11 September 2001 the US increased its involvement in the region, for example with new programmes in Georgia and Ukraine. This went hand in hand with the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement processes and global political developments. The differing approaches to the creation of security and stability in the region led to tension and rivalry between the regional actors.

In the post-Cold War period, the Black Sea Region failed to develop a cooperative security vision or structure in which the regional actors would have been the principal stakeholders. The Russian-Georgian War in August 2008 showed quite clearly that the initiatives designed to pacify the region had not produced a security system capable of preventing or containing internal and interstate conflicts. One lesson that can be learned from the August 2008 crisis is that the interplay of regional and global forces will continue to dominate future political and military issues in the region. It remains to be seen whether the war in August 2008 will lead to a new cooperative security environment in the Black Sea Region.

Finally, all kinds of security issues ranging from energy security to environmental degradation and from terrorism to illegal trafficking in arms, human beings and drugs continue to be unresolved as a result of international rivalry.
C Challenges

The clashing interests of the principal actors

The most important and critical challenge is the fact that there are a large number of actors and clashing interests within the Black Sea Region. In security terms the region suffers from several historical legacies. The Black Sea Region used to be treated as a ‘passive area’ and analyzed as the periphery of more significant geographical units. Thus the Black Sea basin has been variously described as the backyard of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, as an extension of Soviet zone of influence, as the frontier of Europe, and, finally, as the extension of the Mediterranean world. Moreover, the existence of several distinct sub-regions within the Black Sea Region, i.e. the Caucasus, the Balkans and to a certain extent the Mediterranean, Eastern Europe and the Middle East, is another factor that destabilizes the area. Time and again sub-regional identities have prevented the emergence of a Black Sea identity, created instability, and impeded the establishment of a comprehensive regional security framework.

There are both regional and non-regional actors in the Black Sea Region, and three principal actors exert varying degrees of influence on the available security policy options.

Russia’s interests

There can be no doubt about the fact that Russia is one of the principal actors when it comes to defining regional stability and security. Russia’s main concern in the “near abroad” is to maintain and consolidate its power and to restrict the presence of other powers. Historically Russia has considered the Black Sea Region to be a crucial component of its national security and for this reason the protection of the Russian sphere of influence is deemed to be in the national interest. Thus Russia seeks to keep other balancing actors, i.e. the United States (US), NATO or other Western security organizations out of the region. While some countries such as Ukraine and Georgia feel that Russia is a threat, the Russian Federation in turn feels that it is being encircled and contained by the West.

Since the US has simultaneously exerted military and political influence on the Black Sea Region through NATO enlargement, bilateral defence agreements, and support for pro-Western elites which have opposed pro-Russian governments, the Russian Federation thinks that it is being hemmed in. The intensity of the Russian fear of encirclement was clearly discernible during the crisis in August 2008.
For this reason Russia’s interests in the Black Sea Region may be defined as follows: 1) In view of the increasing influence of both regional and global actors in the Black Sea Region, retaining its position as one of the key actors in the region; 2) preventing the emergence of energy-related actors or projects which are not under Russian control; 3) preventing the emergence of divisive anti-Russian military coalitions; 4) preventing countries in the region from moving towards NATO membership; and 5) fighting and suppressing separatism, fundamentalism and terrorism.

The Russian-Georgian war changed security perceptions in the Black Sea Region. It is now very clear that its security is closely linked with the protracted regional conflicts. After the end of the war certain developments enhanced Russia’s role as a regional actor. It now has new military bases in the Caucasus; Western credibility is rapidly disappearing; and the regional threat perception is at its peak.

Figure 1: Conflicts in the Black Sea Region
The interests of the Transatlantic Community

The second actor in the Black Sea Region is the transatlantic community and the slightly different approaches of the US (“Wider Black Sea Region”) and the EU (European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Black Sea Synergy, and Eastern Partnership (EaP)).

The end of the Cold War enabled the Euro-Atlantic community to interact with the region, thus triggering a gradual shift towards the emerging pan-European political and economic area. The US and NATO initially adhered to the delicate balance of the Cold War and did not play an active role in the Black Sea Region. In fact, in the first decade of the post-Cold War era, the US maintained a rather low profile when it came to Black Sea issues. The main priority in those days was how to deal with post-Soviet Russia. This approach gradually changed in the late 1990s when Caspian energy issues drew US attention to the region. Another factor as far as the US and NATO were concerned was to prevent newly independent states from succumbing to Russian influence or pressure.

After 11 September 2001 the transatlantic security focus shifted from central and Eastern Europe to what has been dubbed the “Greater Middle East” and “Wider Black Sea” regions. The US reassessed its geostrategic interest in the area and added a military dimension to its strategy by enhancing the role of NATO. This led to a predictable response from Russia.

The US sought to develop a more coherent and comprehensive strategy towards the Black Sea Region. This had three main points. Firstly, the US administrations paid special attention to the promotion of democracy and the market economy. This approach focused on greater political freedom as a result of free and fair elections, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and transparent market economies. Secondly, priority has been given to the energy issue and the expansion of free trade. This includes an increase in the number of gas and oil pipelines; an increase in trade and economic development on account of improvements in the transportation and communications infrastructure; and promoting tourism, customs cooperation, environmental protection, etc.

Security is the third main pillar of the US approach to the region. Here the main emphasis has been on fighting terrorism, organized crime, and the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction by means of an enhanced border security regime and a civil-military response. Of particular importance in this regard has been US support for the Black Sea Border Security Initiative and the Black Sea Civil Emergency Response Planning funded by the US Defense Department, which is designed to improve trans-border coordination.

In order to improve its profile in the area the US has developed close bilateral security ties with regional actors such as Georgia, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Romania. Furthermore, successive US administrations have supported the role of the transatlantic alliance in the region. Indeed, the US attempt to develop a broader strategy towards the “wider Black Sea” region imparted a specific
importance to NATO enlargement. The US also supported NATO membership for both Ukraine and Georgia. However, this policy made it impossible for NATO to provide security in the Black Sea Region as a whole. Moreover, the Russian view that the US is pursuing a policy of deterrence designed to contain Russia has merely aggravated the tensions between Russia and other regional actors. The war between Russia and Georgia was very damaging to US credibility and had a negative effect on the security environment in the area. The US failed to respond to Russia in an appropriate manner and thus its position as security guarantor for Georgia has been called into question. The Obama administration’s policy of “pressing the reset button” with regard to Russia in order to ensure the latter’s support for a number of key security issues makes it unlikely that the US will seek to openly challenge Russian interests in the region. Plans for further NATO enlargement have been shelved, and this has had a negative impact on some of the regional actors.

The EU might also be construed as a regional actor, even though the Black Sea was not a priority in the 1990s and the EU did not have a coherent foreign policy approach to the region. The EU not only lacks a holistic strategic vision. It does not possess the resources that are needed in order to pursue a classical kind of foreign policy. The EU’s priorities revolve around the question of membership, and thus the region as a whole was of only marginal interest. However, it became more interested in the area in the early 2000s. In 2003 the European Security Strategy (ESS) was the first official document to state that the South Caucasus was a part of the region that required further attention. In the wake of the ESS, the region was accorded greater importance in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The enlargement procedure led to an increasing EU involvement in the area. This was based on the ENP, the EU’s basic blueprint for what it does in the region, and the Black Sea Synergy document, which in 2007 became the most concrete indication of the EU’s interest in the area.

The Black Sea Synergy could be regarded as an intermediate step leading to a strategic vision of the EU for the region. It complemented the ENP, the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia, and the negotiation package with Turkey. The significance of the Black Sea Synergy was twofold. On the one hand it pinpointed the key areas where it might be possible to promote regional cooperation. On the other, it has attempted to stimulate reform in various policy areas and economic sectors of the countries in the area, to support stability, foster growth, and to single out feasible projects that would require practical work throughout the region and thus create an atmosphere conducive to the resolution of the ongoing conflicts. In March 2009 the EU launched the EaP, which followed hard on the heels of the war in August 2008. It focuses on deepening bilateral cooperation and a greater degree of alignment with the EU.

Furthermore, the EU’s role in brokering the ceasefire agreement between Georgia and Russia, the deployment of observers in Georgia, and the EU involvement in the Geneva peace process have enhanced its profile in the region.
Despite the existence of all these initiatives, which are designed to increase the presence of the EU in the region, the international community (and this includes Russia) has tended to treat the EU as an actor with no more than a limited ability to reach collective decisions and with a limited impact on the region’s security structure.

Diverging security preferences

The countries in the region and their security priorities constitute the third factor with a potential to influence the regional security arrangements. Many of them have adopted diverging approaches. And one of the main concerns of the regional actors is the antagonistic atmosphere that is the result of rivalry between non-regional actors. There is widespread concern about this kind of antagonism. For example Turkey, a staunch ally of the transatlantic world, has gradually developed a set of diverging policies towards Russia. The changing security environment after 11 September 2001, Turkey’s disagreements with the US about Iraq and growing tensions between Russia and NATO led Turkey to pursue a policy of “caution” with regard to the Black Sea. In order to prevent the existing and operational initiatives (e.g. BSEC, Black Sea Naval Task Force (BLACKSEAFOR) and Operation Black Sea Harmony (OBSH)) from being damaged as a result of the emerging rivalry, Turkey has chosen to defend the status quo.
The Turkish activities in the Black Sea Region in the wake of the Russian-Georgian war are rather striking. This vigorous role is generally perceived as Turkey’s return to active regional diplomacy, especially in the Caucasus. The Turkish proposals for the establishment of a regional security initiative, the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, which would include all the regional actors, have revived the ongoing debate about whether Turkey and Russia ought to establish a new regional security architecture. Despite the fact that these steps led to a discussion about the prospects of Turkey’s membership of the EU and improved strategic relations with Russia, Turkey’s activities may help to provide a platform for a more constructive Russian role in the Black Sea Region. Moreover, Turkey is hoping to normalize relations with Armenia, and this could also help to change the regional security structure.

Other regional actors have developed their own priorities. Romania and Bulgaria are currently NATO and EU members, and are more interested in establishing closer relations with the US. The US position in the region was promoted by Romania in particular, which was supported by Bulgaria, Georgia and to a lesser extent Ukraine. The Romanian government would like Romania to be the main actor in the EU when it comes to issues that have something to do with the Black Sea. Without the support of Greece and Bulgaria it may not be able to change a great deal, though it may be able to obtain significant concessions from the EU in the course of the bargaining processes.

The complex network of relationships among and between the regional and non-regional actors and their policies is of decisive importance for the future of the political and security arrangements in the Black Sea Region.

The changing nature of the threats and actors

The Black Sea Region has to contend with numerous threats of a conventional and non-conventional kind. These hard and soft security problems make the region volatile, insecure and unstable.

Ongoing and potential military conflicts among the regional states constitute the basic threats to regional stability and security. The disputed notion of neighbourliness plays a role in the region and needs to be taken into account since it is a source of instability and insecurity. Hard security issues are still the basic problem in the region, no matter whether they are caused by ethnic, religious or any other differences between peoples and states, or by border problems. Thus Russia’s recent recognition of the unilateral declarations of independence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia has changed not only the regional balance and the borders, but also has implications for political developments throughout the world.

The non-state actors, frozen conflicts, unrecognized states and internally displaced peoples are some of the things the region has to contend with. It remains to be seen what will become of
the de facto states and other simmering conflicts. There can be no doubt about the fact that the conflicts which emerged at the end of the Soviet era in Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria have played a very destructive role in the region over the last 20 years. They have hindered the development of certain states, made regional co-operation virtually impossible, and continue to create serious problems for peace and security in the region. Despite the Russian recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the international community still attaches great importance to the principles of respect for independence and the territorial integrity of states.

Some of the states in the region are still weak and disorganized. Some of them could easily become failed states. Their weakness makes the region one of the global hot spots for threats such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and illegal trafficking in drugs, arms and human beings. Thus these fragile states have the potential to affect the security of other regional actors and of nearby EU states. In some of the states in the region there is a tendency to favour authoritarianism and to glorify military power. This exacerbates the threat perceptions already in existence and has an adverse effect on regional security.

Another issue connected with the militarization of the region is the growth in military expenditures. There is a need for more information on this subject, and thus it would be a good idea to develop quantitative methods of identifying and comparing military expenditures in the various countries. There is clearly a need for control mechanisms. Thus it is worth considering whether economic growth in the Black Sea Region actually makes a contributing to normalization, or whether it will encourage the resumption of hostilities. This topic ought to be analyzed in some detail.

Another important issue is energy security. The need to achieve energy supply diversity on the one hand and the risks associated with energy dependency on Russia on the other show the importance of gas and oil from other sources being piped to the European markets through the region. The energy dispute between Russia and Ukraine in late 2008 and early 2009 clearly illustrated the importance of energy security for the region and the EU. In addition to exploration, production and transport-related problems, oil and natural gas have become one of the main security issues in the Black Sea Region, which as the principal energy transit route, is also a testing ground for the interaction between producer, consumer and transit countries. This means that the region is not only a potential hub. There are also numerous rivalries.
Finally, a number of problems associated with soft security issues which range from environmental concerns to the potential for social unrest and economic collapse need to be analyzed, especially if there is a likelihood that they will disrupt political stability and security in the region. Potential destabilizing threats such as the global financial crisis also need to be kept under review, as does the impact of the crisis on the countries in the region or on the redefinition of the roles of the regional powers, and the opportunities arising from a redefinition of the global economic environment.
D Different expectations and possible solutions

There are some basic differences when it comes to describing and finding solutions to the regional security problems among both regional actors and regional and global actors. This controversy, which has been exacerbated by the inability of regional and global actors to develop a common regional security regime, creates a kind of “security vacuum” that triggers global and regional rivalries. On the other hand, the presence of players which include state and non-state actors and numerous international organizations and regional groups has not been able to fill this vacuum. In fact, the plethora of interests simply causes overcrowding, confusion and insecurity.

The EU and the US are trying to promote basic Western values such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights as the best way of finding solutions to problems. However, the region is currently witnessing a rise in authoritarian practices. Instead of finding innovative and peaceful ways of dealing with deadlock in the not-so-frozen disputes or with conflicting national interests, some of the regional actors now have a tendency to use political and military pressure in their international relations, and to favour authoritarian methods in order to deal with the domestic opposition. Proposals for the resolution of existing and potential problems may vary according to the style of government and its problem-solving preferences. In order to devise viable solutions for regional problems it will be necessary to identify areas where views and attitudes coincide, and those where they do not.

One of the current problems related to regional rivalry is the changing role of international organizations. Although the importance of the EU continues to grow, the significance of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has diminished primarily as a result of geopolitical rivalry between the major powers. This is a new challenge, for the OSCE is an inclusive organization and the EU a selective club. The consequences of this reversal of roles for regional security and stability will become apparent in the years ahead.
Recommendations

- The Black Sea Region should be transformed from a competitive security environment into one that fosters and strengthens regional cooperation. For this reason all international or regional cooperation initiatives should be supported, as should the transformation of cooperation into structures that can play a role the field of security.

- In order to establish an atmosphere of mutual trust, global and regional policies that emphasize competition and create tension and mistrust should be discarded. There is also a need for substantial discursive change.

- International organizations such as the UN or the OSCE must be given the opportunity to promote trust and cooperation in the region. These organizations will make it possible to overcome the political mistrust that has predominated in the recent past.

- A radically different approach is required in order to resolve the ongoing or potential conflicts that are perceived to be the root causes of the region’s problems. The de facto situation in the Black Sea Region, and particularly in the Caucasus, means that all the parties to these conflicts must be included in the peace-making process. The Geneva talks on Abkhazia could be the model for a new political vision that treats Abkhazians and Karabakh Azerbajjanis and Armenians as parties which ought to participate in the peace-making process. It needs to be emphasized that the mechanisms established in this process do not constitute a de facto recognition of the separatist entities. The ultimate goal must be to reach a solution that is acceptable to all of the parties involved.

- There is a need for policies that can prevent tensions in the region from turning into armed conflicts. For this purpose there needs to be a military armament map of all the states in the region. Furthermore, an attempt should be made to introduce certain political and military restrictions in order to sustain a regional balance. International security structures could be especially useful when it comes to developing preventive mechanisms.

- It might also be useful to establish proactive and effective international monitoring mechanisms in areas which can easily turn into hot conflict zones. In case this mechanism fails, there should also be another international mechanism which will enable other actors to become involved in the conflict as quickly as possible and to arrange a ceasefire between the belligerents.

- Energy should be seen in terms of cooperation and not of competition, and for this there needs to be a cooperation structure that includes all the states in the region. A regional organization that can coordinate cooperation between producer, transit and consumer countries would certainly make a positive contribution to long-term regional stability.
• A collective mechanism designed to provide security for the ever increasing number of pipelines that criss-cross the region like a web could might also trigger regional cooperation.

• Steps should be taken with regard to issues such as the fight against terrorism, human trafficking and arms smuggling, which suggest to the rest of the world that the region consists of nothing but problems. Countries outside the region should provide staunch support to the regional cooperation mechanisms that are established to deal with these issues. Intelligence agency cooperation is a vital factor in this context.

• EU cooperation programmes should stop stratifying or excluding certain actors in the region. They should be redesigned as inclusive programmes that depend on the participation of all the regional actors. In this framework regional structures such as the BSEC should assume a leadership role.

• Policies that are based on the idea of Russia as “the Other” or which perceive it to be a source of trouble should not be adopted. Thus Russia should be drawn into the network of cooperation. On the other hand, the sensibilities of certain countries and peoples in the region who still perceive Russia as a threat also need to be taken into account. There is a need for regional security programmes which are in a position to make everyone feel secure. Black Sea Harmony and Black Sea Force are examples of positive initiatives of this kind.
The Commission on the Black Sea

The Commission on the Black Sea is a civil society initiative, jointly developed and launched in January 2009 by the German Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh; the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation (BST –GMFUS), Bucharest; the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), Ankara; and the International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), Athens.

Among members of the Commission on the Black Sea are a former vice prime minister, former ministers, current and former parliamentarians, public intellectuals and scholars from the whole Black Sea region, the European Union and the United States. The Commission’s work has been supported and complemented by several individuals from different countries, who wish to remain anonymous due to their current official affiliations or for personal reasons. The names of those members who are willing to associate publicly are listed below. They all serve on the Commission in a personal capacity. Neither this report nor other publications of the Commission should be construed as reflecting the views of the states, governments, organizations or institutions with which the members are associated.

Erhard Busek
Former Vice Chancellor of the Republic of Austria; Coordinator, Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), Vienna

Sergiu Celac
Former Foreign Minister of Romania; Senior Adviser, National Centre for Sustainable Development, Bucharest

Daniel Daianu
Former Minister of Finance of Romania; former Member of the European Parliament; Professor of Economics, National School of Political Studies and Public Administration (SNSPA), Bucharest

Gernot Erler
Former Minister of State of the Federal Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany; Member of the German Bundestag; President of the Association for Southeastern Europe, Berlin

Tassos Giannitsis
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic; Chairman, Hellenic Petroleum, Athens

Tedo Japaridze
Former Foreign Minister of Georgia; Alternate Director General, International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), Athens
Suat Kiniklioğlu
Member of Parliament, AK Party Deputy Chairman of External Affairs, Ankara

Irakli Menagarishvili
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Tblisi

Rasim Musabayov
Former Adviser on Interethnic Relations to the President of Azerbaijani Republic; Vice-President, Centre for Economic and Political Research (FAR-centre), Baku

Vartan Oskanian
Former Foreign Minister of Armenia; Chairman of the Board, The Civilitas Foundation, Yerevan

Vlaimder Papava
Former Minister of Economy of Georgia; Senior Fellow, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS), Tbilisi

Volker Rühe
Former Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hamburg

Özdem Sanberk
Former Ambassador and former Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Istanbul

Hannes Swoboda
Member of the European Parliament; Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Brussels

Borys Tarasyuk
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine; Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on European Integration, Kyiv

Yannis Valinakis
Former Deputy Foreign Minister of the Hellenic Republic; Professor of International Relations, University of Athens

Mustafa Aydın
Director, International Policy Research Institute of Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), Ankara
Armando García Schmidt  
Project Manager, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh

Alina Inayeh  
Director, Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, Bucharest

Dimitrios Triantaphyllou  
Director General, International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), Athens

Franz-Lothar Altmann  
Associate Professor for Intercultural Relations, Bucharest State University

Ireneusz Bil  
Director, Amicus Europae Foundation of Aleksander Kwasniewski, Warsaw

Mitat Çelikpala  
Deputy Dean, Graduate School of Social Sciences, University of Economics and Technology TOBB ETU, Ankara

Johanna Deimel  
Senior Expert on Southeastern Europe and Black Sea, Munich

Panayotis Gavras  
Head, Policy & Strategy, Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB), Thessaloniki

Peter Havlik  
Deputy Director, The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW), Vienna

Jörg Himmelreich  
Senior Transatlantic Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington D.C. and Berlin

Alexander Iskandaryan  
Director, Caucasus Institute, Yerevan

Tim Judah  
Correspondent of the Economist, London
Georgi Kamov
Project Coordinator at Bulgarian School of Politics; Member of the Executive Board at Economics and International Relations Institute (EIRI), Sofia

Alan Kasaev
Head of the CIS & Baltic Department, Russian State News Agency RIA NOVOSTI; Co-chairman, Association of the Russian Society Researchers, Moscow

Sergei Konoplyov

Andrei Kortunov
President, New Eurasia Foundation, Moscow

Bruce Lawlor
Director of the Center for Technology, Security, and Policy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Ian Lesser

Andrei Lobatch
Senior Project Manager, Foundation for Effective Governance, Kyiv

Panagiota Manoli
Senior Research Fellow, International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), Athens; Lecturer, University of the Aegean, Rhodes.

Ognyan Minchev
Executive Director of Institute for Regional and International Studies (IRIS), Sofia

Fabrizio Tassinari
Senior Fellow, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Copenhagen

Yannis Tsantoulis
Research Fellow, International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), Athens

Andrei Zagorski
Associated Professor, Institute of European Law, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Moscow
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Bertelsmann Stiftung
Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256
P.O. Box 103
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GERMANY

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Language Editing
Alfred Clayton, Hamburg, and
Barbara Serfozo, Berlin

Design
Nicole Meyerholz, Bielefeld

Photo
Thomas Kunsch, Bielefeld
Address | Contact

Bertelsmann Stiftung
Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256
P.O. Box 103
33311 Gütersloh
GERMANY

Armando Garcia Schmidt
Phone +49 5241 81-81543
armando.garciaschmidt@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de

www.blackseacom.eu