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CONTENTS

Hizbollah's Force Buildup of 2006-2009: Foundations and Future Trends

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On August 12, 2006, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1701, paving the way for the end of 34 days of warfare between Israel and Hizbollah, a campaign later named the Second Lebanon War. Apart from the immediate need to establish a ceasefire, the Security Council hoped to change the security reality in southern Lebanon while neutralizing the elements that were responsible for the escalation, and prevent the repetition of another round of fighting between the sides. Accordingly, certain security arrangements were put in place, among them the deployment of the Lebanese army in southern Lebanon as well as an increase in the UNIFIL force from about 2,500 soldiers to a maximum of 15,000 to serve as a buffer between Israel and Hizbollah in the space between the international border and the Litani River. Likewise, the resolution forbade anyone other than the Lebanese army or UNIFIL forces to carry weapons or lay the foundations for a military infrastructure in the region, and the government in Beirut was called on to secure the borders and act effectively in order to foil arms smuggling in the area.[1]

Resolution 1701 ostensibly gave an adequate response to Israel's security needs on the Lebanese front and significantly limited Hizbollah's ability to rearm in southern Lebanon. For the first time in three decades the Lebanese army would deploy all the way to the international border with Israel, and together with UNIFIL would prevent Hizbollah's attempts to reconstruct the line of fortifications along the border and build positions for intelligence gathering and planning terrorist attacks. Similarly, UNIFIL and the Lebanese army started to conduct hundreds

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of reconnaissance missions daily, on foot and by vehicle, to check Hizbollah's "nature reserves."[2] This type of a massive, ongoing presence was supposed to prevent the organization from maintaining existing fortifications and building new hiding places, and make it difficult for Hizbollah to smuggle weapons south of the Litani and deploy a dense array of thousands of rockets, as before the war. If there were effective enforcement by the Lebanese army along the eastern and northern border with Syria with regard to unauthorized imports into the country, then Hizbollah's ability to threaten Israel at the same scope as before and during the war would be neutralized, and the reconstruction of its force would be a slow, lengthy process. However, in this case the vision was one thing while reality was quite another. At the end of the fighting, Hizbollah did not miss a beat while adapting to the new reality and made the required adjustments in order to sow the seeds of a new confrontation.

The purpose of this essay is to examine Hizbollah's renewed force buildup since the end of the war in August 2006 despite the constraints of Resolution 1701, to understand the foundations underlying the rearmament of the last three years, and on the basis of this analysis to infer future trends in the organization's operational doctrine and the operative logic behind the trends. The essay analyzes a number of aspects of Hizbollah's force buildup, such as manpower, armaments, training, and deployment in the arena, in context of the lessons the organization learned from its various successes and failures in the war. The essay also examines the extent to which these conclusions match the organization's plan for confrontation against the IDF in the next round.

Divine Victory, Limited Edition

The Second Lebanon War was presented by Hizbollah as a miraculous intervention by Allah and dubbed "the divine victory" by the organization's leadership. At a rally on September 22, 2006 on the ruins of the Dahiya neighborhood in Beirut, Hizbollah's secretary general Hassan Nasrallah lauded the organization's firm stand with only a few thousand fighters of the resistance movement over 34 days against the strongest army in the Middle East, despite the IDF's superior quality of weapons and number of forces.[3]

However, alongside Hizbollah's success in paralyzing northern Israel for over a month by launching some 4,000 rockets of various types, foiling the IDF's attempts at maneuvering, and inflicting injuries on IDF forces,

the view of the organization's ostensible military victory was far from rosy. On the basis of IDF estimations, at least 600 organization operatives were killed, many of whom were veteran soldiers, commanders on the ground, and members of Hizbollah's special forces. Likewise, hundreds of operatives were injured with various degrees of seriousness, taking them out of the circle of fighting.[4] In addition, a year and a half after the war the organization lost the commander of its military branch and its strategic brain, Imad Mughniyeh. The assassination of Mughniyeh in Damascus on February 12, 2008 in a tightly sewn attack was another crack in the compartmentalized wall that was one of the organization's hallmarks.[5] This protective wall was prominently punctured already on the first night of the war with Operation Specific Gravity (*Mishkal Seguli*) taking out the Fadjr-3 and Fadjr-5 mid-range rockets. Israeli intelligence's penetration into Hizbollah's inner sanctum with its destruction from the air of some 40 launchers hidden in the homes of organization operatives in the framework of a covert, classified Hizbollah project shocked the organization's leadership.[6]

However, the Fadjr infrastructure was not the only asset Hizbollah lost in the war. Hizbollah's headquarters in Dahiya, the organization's nerve center, was destroyed; its front line of fortifications along the border was totally shattered; hundreds of targets identified with the organization's logistical and civilian systems were wrecked; and the homes of thousands of Shiite supporters were decimated. True, Hizbollah's senior leadership was not harmed and instead presented an image of a command totally in charge of events, while skillfully using the al-Manar television network, which demonstrated impressive survival skills.[7] Nonetheless, at the end of the war, the heads of the organization were left in the dark, Nasrallah's Iranian patrons stripped him of much of his authority, and aspersions were cast on his decisions within Lebanon.[8]

In the war zone, Hizbollah managed to sustain launch capabilities against Israel; surprise Israel tactically both in terms of the successful attack on the Israeli naval vessel *Hanit* with a C-802 surface-to-sea missile and in terms of the network of underground tunnels and bunkers; and kill 119 IDF soldiers and damage 45 tanks using advanced anti-tank rockets.[9] However more than Hizbollah succeeded, it was the IDF that failed itself. Generally, in every face-to-face confrontation between Hizbollah fighters and IDF soldiers, the latter had the upper hand, and Hizbollah's command and control systems throughout southern Lebanon were destroyed. In

light of this, Nasrallah admitted not long after the war that had he known how Israel would react, he would not have ordered his men to kidnap the soldiers.[10] This revealing admission indicates that the final result of the war was not as unequivocal as Hizbollah would have it appear. On the contrary, it contained more than just a hint that the organization was badly battered by the war and would need a long time for its wounds to heal while it adjusted to the new reality in southern Lebanon.

Hizbollah's Learning Process

In September 2006 Hizbollah's leaders were boasting that the damage the organization sustained in the war was minor. Nasrallah declared that Hizbollah's military capabilities had been fully restored within a few days and that therefore the organization, with an arsenal of 20,000 rockets at its disposal, was stronger than it had been at the outset of the campaign.[11] His deputy, Naim Qasim, went even further and claimed that Hizbollah did not need any military reconstruction since it had launched merely one tenth of its rockets.[12]

However, the reality behind the scenes was totally different. A short time after the ceasefire went into effect, Hizbollah embarked on an in-depth examination process regarding its conduct in the war, studied the manner in which its systems operated against the IDF, and took stock of the damage. The organization launched a series of internal investigations and established an internal commission of inquiry to examine a long list of actions.[13]

First of all, one may assume that the heads of the organization were especially disturbed by the question of how intelligence had been breached so as to allow the elimination of the Fadjrs on the first night of the war. It is certainly possible that consequently there were investigations of organization operatives, and their level of reliability and relationships with suspect elements were scrutinized.

Second, Hizbollah likely studied the performance of its weapon systems and examined their effectiveness during the fighting, including: rockets of various ranges, their level of survivability, and the scope of damages caused to Israel's home front; the anti-tank system as a means of disrupting IDF moves, both against the armored corps in the open areas and against the infantry taking cover in buildings; the engineering branch, including booby traps and landmine pits, intended to delay IDF

ground forces but found to be fairly ineffective during the war; and the aerial defense system that made it hard for Israeli helicopters to operate and even managed to down one of them, but which failed utterly against Israel's warplanes, which flew through Lebanon's skies as their own.

Third, it is entirely plausible that Hizbollah examined the effectiveness of its military doctrine in light of the pressure exerted by the IDF on its strongholds in southern Lebanon. While the use of the underground network proved effective in preventing unnecessary losses and also helped maintain the continuity of the fighting, the organization's fighters did not overpower the Israeli soldiers in face-to-face combat. Moreover, the ability to insert reinforcements and move them from village to village according to operational needs was negligible, and the attempts to move troops from north of the Litani into the war zone in the south failed because the Israeli air force was in control of all the approaches.

The findings of Hizbollah's internal commission of inquiry remain classified, but from statements made by the organization's leadership as well as various UN reports and data leaked to the media over the last three years it is possible to glean that these findings have not been allowed to remain on paper alone. Furthermore, Hizbollah did not suffice itself with investigations. It also drew personal conclusions about which commanders failed to live up to the organization's fighting standards. The most prominent ouster was that of Hussein Jamil Yunis, the commander of the Baalbeck sector, who was one of the people responsible for Hizbollah's logistical support in the Beqaa Valley, as part of the Haider Brigade.[14] Apparently the IDF raid on the Shiite town of Baalbeck as part of Operation Sharp and Smooth (*Had ve-Halak*) and the return of the force without any injuries was seen by the organization as a resounding security lapse. The IDF's capability of inserting some 200 fighters deep into the region under the organization's control without resistance or even anyone noticing their arrival, killing some twenty operatives and returning home safely, proved to Hizbollah that its early warning system in the rear had failed.[15] Replacing Yunis was likely a message to other sector commanders not to let their guard down because of their physical distance from the Israeli border. They were charged with maintaining a high level of alert, reinforcing their measures of detection and surveillance, and preparing for the possibility of an Israeli operation,

despite the fact that such an operation was previously considered impossible.[16]

Apart from analyzing the organization's strengths and weaknesses while attempting to fix the problems, Hizbollah's leadership was also highly attentive to developments on the Israeli side. From the large amount of information leaked to the media about the IDF's operational plans and the atmosphere in the defense establishment after the war, namely the feeling of a missed opportunity and the need to have performed differently, Hizbollah learned about Israel's future methods of operation.

On the eve of the war, the IDF had an off-the-shelf plan for a ground maneuver in Lebanon, dubbed Marom Waters (*Mei Marom*). It had been developed by commander of the northern front in the Second Lebanon War, General Eyal Ben-Reuven, and called for a preparatory stage that would include a concentrated aerial strike and a limited ground move along the border. Afterwards, the army was supposed to have landed large forces north of the Litani, moved south, taken control of the region, and tackled the loci of terrorist concentrations and rocket launchers.[17] The plan was not put into practice, but Hizbollah could have learned from it that it had to reinforce its deployment north of the Litani in order to prevent its operational core in southern Lebanon being outflanked and to deepen the entire aerial defense in order to disrupt a possible helicopter operation in the region.

In addition, Hizbollah can assume that in the future the IDF will not go on raids limited in force and time, but will rather undertake a ground maneuver using a number of divisions in order to aim for a quick decision. The brigade-level sorties in the Second Lebanon War did not reflect the power of the IDF, preserved the operational capabilities of Hizbollah, and resulted in the pointless continuation of the battle. The public disclosure on Marom Waters as well as statements made by senior IDF personnel in this vein from the end of the war onwards simply supported Hizbollah's working assumption.[18] The design of Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip provided further backing to this premise. Israel started its campaign against Hamas with a concerted aerial attack on a series of targets and artillery barrages. Afterwards the IDF started its ground move, did not hesitate to fight in urban areas, and proved itself superior to the enemy at every given moment. True, the cases of Gaza and Lebanon with their respective fronts are highly different, but the

operation in Gaza demonstrated that the IDF was prepared to take more risks on condition that they demonstrate its advantages and lead to as quick a decision as possible.

In light of Hizbollah's awareness that the Second Lebanon War revealed weaknesses in some of its systems and that in a future round of fighting with Israel the IDF would be used differently than in the summer of 2006, the organization has not been resting on its laurels. Despite the calm on the Israeli-Lebanese border, Hizbollah has been hard at work rebuilding its forces and enhancing its military strength, both in the spirit of the lessons it learned and on the basis of its understanding of IDF operational plans, and is now laying a new threat right at Israel's doorstep.

Force Buildup and Adjustment to a Changing Reality

The results of the Second Lebanon War thus brought Hizbollah face-to-face with a complex military challenge. The combination of Resolution 1701, which created a buffer between the organization and the IDF and curbed Hizbollah's moves in the open area, and the need to rehabilitate damaged capabilities quickly, especially in terms of manpower, demanded that Hizbollah adopt new patterns of action adjusted to the newly created reality. Moreover, under these circumstances the organization was required to develop a new operational doctrine that acted on its basic working assumption that in the next round of fighting its fighters would face an extensive ground maneuver by the IDF.

However, despite the difficulties it faced, Hizbollah revealed creative flexibility in terms of its ability to analyze a given situation, identify the cracks, and take advantage of them, and in terms of its ability to translate the lessons it learned into practice, showing impressive zeal in their full implementation. Accordingly, the three years that have passed since the war have been characterized by an intensive process of force buildup, with Hizbollah overcoming the limitations of the moment and working undercover. Below is a breakdown of the primary foundations of Hizbollah's new force buildup:

Manpower: In the Second Lebanon War, Hizbollah's fighting force sustained the most severe blow. The organization, which by various estimates had numbered 6,000-8,000 military operatives, lost 10-15 percent of its manpower strength, so that its most urgent need was

to refill its ranks.[19] The organization, therefore, began with extensive recruitment operations, and it was reported that villages in southern Lebanon were emptied of men, who were sent to training camps in the Beqaa Valley, Syria, and Iran. However, while in the past Hizbollah was careful to enlist only Shiites, in the last three years the organization has also opened its doors to Sunnis, Druze, and Christians.[20] Aside from the immediate need to expand the fighting force, this move was intended to gain both a political and a military goal. Hizbollah, planted deep in the heart of Lebanese politics, viewed recruitment as a tool allowing penetration into segments of the population that were not among its traditional supporters and a potential means for expanding its political strength. Moreover, blurring its Shiite identity and creating a different population mix bolsters its image as a defender of Lebanon rather than a sectarian militia. In addition, turning to new populations and training them in its own warfare methods expands the organization's mass and heightens its chances of more effectively disrupting an IDF ground maneuver in the depth of Lebanon. In other words, the divisions that the Israeli army will insert in the front will face reserves of manpower that were previously not at Hizbollah's disposal. On the other hand, puncturing the organization's homogeneity with an eye to increased electoral strength and more military power invites intelligence breaches and information leaks that could serve both competitors within Lebanon and external players. Moreover, the level of loyalty of the fighters who are not Shiites and their dedication to the cause at the moment of truth remain to be proven.

Armaments: Hizbollah's array of armaments is varied, though in the last war the organization focused its use primarily on various Russian-, Syrian-, and Iranian-made rockets of ranges of 20 to 250 km and on a number of advanced anti-tank missile models, chiefly the Kornet and the Concourse.[21] These proved their effectiveness in attacking Israel's rear and in stopping IDF advances on the battlefield. Because the organization does not manufacture its own armaments, Hizbollah is entirely dependent on supplies from the outside to increase its power. Resolution 1701 strove to stop the arms smuggling across the Syrian-Lebanese border and cut off Hizbollah's oxygen supply, but failed to impose an enforcement apparatus; the responsibility fell to the Lebanese army.[22] Given the fact that armaments, with emphasis on quantity,

represented a central element in force buildup, it was important for Hizbollah to maintain open lines of supply.

The Syrian-Lebanese border stretches some 360 km, with 100 km to the north and the rest to the east of the Beqaa Valley. Despite its length, there are only five official border crossings, of which two are in the east – the Ka'a crossing southeast of al-Hermel and the Masna'a crossing located northeast of Rashaiya. While a supervisory force of 800 soldiers under a Lebanese general and German guidance started operating on the northern border in early 2008, the eastern border is highly porous. Dozens of pirate crossings allow unhindered smuggling of arms to all parts of Lebanon. Furthermore, supervision at the two official crossings has been far from satisfactory. The Ka'a and Masna'a crossings are 12 and 8 km away from the border, respectively. This margin allows free entry of every sort of goods into Lebanon without fear of border inspections. Moreover, the Masna'a crossing on the Beirut-Damascus road is the primary truck crossing. Even though some 200 trucks pass through daily, only 30 are randomly spot-checked, easily allowing the smuggling of heavy armaments in commercial quantities, including long range rockets, directly into Hizbollah warehouses in Beirut.[23]

The reality on the border has played into Hizbollah's hands. At the end of the war, the organization started an intensive arms race; Syria renewed the stockpiles that were depleted in the war and even increased the numbers significantly. In the summer of 2006, the number of rockets in Hizbollah hands was estimated at some 12,000. In August 2007 Defense Minister Ehud Barak announced that the number had climbed to more than 20,000,[24] and a year later intelligence sources put the number at 42,000.[25] The Lebanese army's interception of an ammunitions truck in southern Beirut on February 8, 2007 carrying 300 rockets hidden among bales of hay,[26] and the interception of another truck on June 5, 2007 near Baalbeck carrying Grad missiles[27] uncovered only a small fraction of Hizbollah's smuggling and rearming efforts.

However, Hizbollah has not placed its faith in quantities alone. As a lesson of the war, it has worked to increase the range of its rockets in order to put the majority of Israel's civilian front under threat, and it apparently has attained weapons it did not have in the past.[28] Two years after the war, Defense Minister Barak admitted that most of Israel's citizens are within range of Hizbollah rockets,[29] and that it was possible that the

organization was equipped with an advanced Zelzal missile model and Fateh-110 rockets with ranges of 250-300 km and capable of carrying half-ton payloads.[30]

Other than concentrating on rockets, the organization has also worked to enlarge its stockpiles of anti-tank missiles, with emphasis on the Kornet, capable of hitting its target from a 5.5 km distance; it seems that the latter was the most effective means of stopping the IDF's ground maneuver and disrupting its ground offensive. In light of Hizbollah's working assumption about Israel's plans for the future, the organization has equipped itself with large quantities of missiles received directly from Syria, which according to IDF intelligence has become Hizbollah's arms cache.[31] For its part, the IDF has also learned from the war and has formulated an anti-tank response. Since the war the development of an active defensive system for Israel's armored corps was completed; it is capable of identifying anti-tank fire peripherally and intercepting it in the air before it hits the tank. Installing the system, known as the ASPRO-A (Trophy), on Israeli Merkava tanks is thus likely to neutralize an important Hizbollah tool and allow the IDF to maneuver deep in enemy territory and wrest a decision from it in battle.[32]

Hizbollah has also invested special efforts in aerial defenses, which were revealed to be its chief weakness. The knowledge that the Israel is capable of gathering intelligence and creating targets unhindered, inserting special forces into the depth of Lebanon, and striking at the organization's centers of gravity, has worried Hizbollah. Therefore, the organization came to the realization that shoulder-mounted missiles, whose effectiveness in battle is negligible, are not enough, and that there is a need for more sophisticated systems capable of intercepting fighter planes and drones flying at high altitudes. The declaration made by the head of Israeli military intelligence that Syria has put almost all of its strategic capabilities at Hizbollah's disposal,[33] and the concern voiced by Defense Minister Barak in June 2009 to the secretary general of the UN about the disruption of the arms balance in Lebanon[34] hint that Hizbollah has acquired new capabilities in this field. It is not inconceivable that Syria and Iran have smuggled advanced anti-aircraft systems such as the SA-8 and SA-15 across the border. These systems are installed on armored personnel carriers equipped with powerful radar systems capable of keeping track of several targets simultaneously and intercepting aircraft

at high altitudes using guided missiles. These systems are ideal from Hizbollah's perspective because they are mobile, easily concealed, and require only a three-man team to operate them.[35]

Training: The recruitment of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of new men into the organization, their integration into the ranks of fighters, and their training as guerillas created the need for a developed training network. Furthermore, the introduction of new weapon systems into Hizbollah's arsenal required a lengthy absorption process in order to reach a satisfactory level of operation. Therefore, Hizbollah has sent hundreds of its operatives to courses and specialized training in Iran to acquire specialized skills in anti-tank fire, launching mid and long range rockets, intelligence gathering, and sabotage. The inculcation of these skills is designed to fill the holes created in the organization's ranks by the war and prepare an extensive cadre of operatives with battle training in preparation for the next round.[36]

However, Hizbollah has not satisfied itself with a few localized courses for its personnel. In the last three years, the organization has reportedly held at least two large scale maneuvers in southern Lebanon that are more reflective of a conventional army than a guerilla organization. In early November 2007, it was reported that Hizbollah carried out a three-day maneuver not far from the border with Israel, involving thousands of operatives and testing the organization's military capabilities on the basis of lessons learned from the war while strictly maintaining low visibility and without carrying arms, as required by Resolution 1701.[37] A year later, on November 22, 2008, Hizbollah held a similar maneuver on both sides of the Litani River, in part to test the speed of deployment of its forces with little advance warning.[38] Performing these two maneuvers shows that the organization is preparing to place the mass of its forces against an IDF multi-division maneuver in a large sector and test its capabilities of disrupting an IDF ground offensive as a coordinated fighting system.

The manner of deployment: The loss of the front line of fortifications along the border with Israel and the activity of the Lebanese army and UNIFIL in the open areas of southern Lebanon have forced Hizbollah to adopt different means of preparation than in the past, adjusted to the organization's current basic working assumption.

First, Hizbollah has turned the villages abutting the border into alternative surveillance and intelligence gathering centers. While its

operatives are not armed, they are equipped with cameras and long range binoculars, and from time to time are sent out disguised as shepherds and hunters to gather information close to the Blue Line. In addition, there have been reports of massive construction of structures near the fence, and it is not inconceivable that these are meant to serve the organization for carrying out terrorist attacks and as a first line of defense in fighting against Israel.[39]

Second, Hizbollah has abandoned its nature reserve strongholds and settled in the villages in southern Lebanon. One reason is that UNIFIL forces have focused their activities on the open areas and have avoided searching the villages, since this could easily be perceived by the local population as a confrontational act that generates much friction and is rife with explosive religious and sexual sensitivities. By contrast, the sympathy of the local population lends the organization much freedom of action.[40] A second reason is that the secret of the nature reserves has been exposed. In light of the organization's assessment that in a future war it will not be able to stand up to the IDF in fighting in the open, the chances of maintaining continuous activity and launchings from urban areas and surprising the enemy with underground fighting are much better. Accordingly, each of the 160 villages south of the Litani has become a fortified military base and been given a role to play in the organization's regional defensive plans. Underground networks of tunnels for fighting and storing weapons have been built in the villages; command and intelligence centers have been erected there along with well-trained engineering and anti-tank cells. It is even possible that there is a secret communications network to increase coordination between sub-sectors, both at the level of rate of fire and launching times and as part of providing better assistance to points under attack. In addition, every village has turned into an independent launching zone, with a fairly large store of rockets smuggled into the south under the cover of civilian supplies or agricultural produce at the disposal of the dozens of operatives providing ongoing maintenance.[41]

At the same time, the move into the villages is not completely free of drawbacks and may in fact limit Hizbollah's sphere of activity to some extent. In the view of the IDF, the villages are no longer civilian entities but military bases and as such are fair game for attack. Hizbollah, in need of support from the local population and with its self-image as a social

movement, must therefore take into consideration the level of damage that its constituents are likely to sustain, and ramifications for its status in Lebanese society. In addition, using the villages for military needs harbors the seeds of potential for a confrontation between local residents and organization operatives because of the extent of the destruction one may expect. It is not inconceivable that the concern about another armed conflict in southern Lebanon may lead to a wave of protest against the organization, as occurred in the village of Marwahain in August 2009, resulting in Hizbollah losing a number of its positions. Hizbollah has started to prepare the zone north of the Litani as a battle zone parallel to the area south of the river. Based on various reports, the organization has gone on a shopping spree of land and homes from Druze and Christian villagers and has started turning them into military installations. In addition, a line of fortification has been built along the northern bank of the Litani, and it seems that mid and long range rockets have been deployed in the region between the heights of Nabatiyeh to the foothills of Jebel Baruch. The rationale behind this change in planning stems from the organization's intention of gaining immunity against an IDF ground maneuver or vertical outflanking, from its desire to maintain a strategy of multi-level launchings not deployed mainly south of the Litani as was the case in the war but that may be well enough protected against infantry sorties and aerial attacks, and from its desire to allow a large enough margin of activity for its anti-tank cells to block lines of armored vehicles moving through the difficult winding hills and lowlands.[43]

The operations concept: From Hizbollah's basic assumption that in the future it will face an extensive ground attack, and from the trends that have characterized its force construction in the last three years, it is possible to derive the main points of the organization's fighting concept. Generally, it seems that Hizbollah realizes that it will find it difficult to defend southern Lebanon against an IDF maneuver and therefore has worked to change the configuration of the battlefield. Instead of fighting in the open, Hizbollah has moved its centers of gravity into the villages. In other words, should the IDF attempt to eliminate the launching sites and concentrations of fighters it will have to conduct simultaneous fighting in urban areas in dozens of different locations. Taking control of the urban sphere against an enemy amidst a civilian population perforce requires significant forces liable to be exposed to fighting in tunnels,

attempted kidnappings, booby traps, and anti-tank fire, while trying at the same time to avoid harming uninvolved bystanders. Thus Hizbollah generates targets in the form of Israeli soldiers, and from familiarity with the Israeli sensitivity to loss of life it can anticipate that exacting a high human toll would undermine Israel's political and military leadership and disrupt continuation of the ground maneuver. Even the expansion of the ranks of its fighters and arming them with advanced anti-tank missiles and deploying them north of the Litani serves this purpose. On the one hand, the IDF would have to expand the lines, move in enemy occupied territory, and be exposed to precision weapons fired from afar. On the other hand, Hizbollah fighters would be able to block the advance of armored vehicle lines with a heavy fire screen of missiles, ambush forces from the rear, and maintain their own survivability or alternately, pull the Israeli army deeper into Lebanon and conduct fighting far from the border. In addition, dense deployment north of the Litani is likely to prevent an outflanking of southern Lebanon and a pincer move by the IDF to take control of this sphere. In other words, the chances of survival for the fighters on Hizbollah's front lines increase while a similar outflanking against the rear line north of the Litani is seen as rife with danger for the IDF and can only play into the hand of the organization.

Parallel to the ground fighting, a central part of Hizbollah's concept is its capability of posing a threat to Israel's civilian front. The significant increase in the number and variety of rockets and their manner of deployment are meant to serve a number of goals: first, to prevent the Israeli air force from carrying out an opening move similar to Operation Specific Gravity, which cost the organization one of its principal strategic cards. The dispersal of long range rockets throughout Lebanon and the hundreds of launching sites are designed to neutralize the air force's ability to attain a similar result in the future and thereby leave Israel's depth exposed to the threat. Second, it aims to preserve continuous fire capability, even if an IDF maneuver in southern Lebanon is successful, thereby strengthening the organization's victory in the public eye. In Hizbollah's view, the IDF is capable of conquering southern Lebanon as it has done on several occasions in the past and damaging the organization's array of short range missiles. However, the extended ranges of the rockets and their deployment in the depth of Lebanon are meant to cancel out the achievement of an Israeli ground maneuver and

defy IDF control of the area while undermining Israeli public confidence in the campaign. In other words, being able to continue launching heavy barrages at Israel's population centers from the depth of Lebanese territory would question the IDF's capability of removing the thread and enhance Hizbollah's image as a surviving organization and an invincible opponent. Third, it aims to sow death and destruction while making life in Israel unbearable, such that it would seem that the fighting had moved onto Israeli territory, i.e., the fate of Israel's citizens would be no different than that of Lebanon's. Beirut and Tel Aviv would share the same fortune; air force bombings would be answered with daily barrages of numerous rockets. Fourth, severe damage to Israel's civilian front is likely to lower the morale of the reservists and their fighting efforts on Lebanese soil. In other words, heavy fire on the coastal strip and greater Tel Aviv area is liable to place most reservists in a dilemma: whether to remain in their fighting units while thinking about their families under attack or to abandon the front in favor of the home. Fifth, placing the military rear on continuous defense is likely to disrupt the orderly activity of the IDF on the fighting front. Rockets hitting staff headquarters or centers of forces would cause delays, keeping the enemy busy with search and rescue operations while also having to take cover. This is liable to damage logistical efforts to stream reinforcements and supplies to the battlefield.

Hizbollah's operational concept also encompasses aspects of fighting in the air and at sea. Damaging the Israeli ship *Hanit* at the beginning of the war and especially the downing of a Yasur helicopter were valuable beyond their own particular successes. Apart from the shockwaves they generated, these events caused a change in IDF moves. The navy adopted much greater caution and moved its vessels away from the coastline, while the downing of the helicopter put an end to an operation that was meant to tilt the balance of the war; instead of continuing, the IDF froze the situation and concentrated on a rescue mission. Therefore, damaging naval vessels or aircraft is seen by Hizbollah as an optimal pivotal event to unsettle the enemy and disrupt its ability to think judiciously. Moreover, Hizbollah has sought to limit the activity of Israel's air force and navy in Lebanon. The understanding that these represent a platform for inserting special forces deep into the territory, as happened in Tyre and Baalbeck during the war, and threatening the organization's assets required a response. The acquisition of C-802 shore-to-sea missiles and advanced anti-aircraft systems is designed to make it difficult to carry out

similar operations in the future and signal to the IDF that the price tag for special operations may be especially steep.

Conclusion

In the three years since the Second Lebanon War Hizbollah has experienced a major transformation. The organization has gone through a comprehensive learning process and its leadership has devoted much thought to the scenario of a future war against Israel, given the new reality in the area and the mood in the IDF. The application of the lessons in light of the current challenge is reflected in Hizbollah's accelerated buildup and the preparation of an adjusted operational concept through the current matrix of force components. Adopting new patterns of activity and changing current trends have proven that Hizbollah is a learning organization gifted in understanding the environment in which it operates, in its adaptability to changing conditions, and in its ability to understand the enemy's point of view and analyze its guiding rationale. These characteristics underscore that Hizbollah is not afflicted with the well known syndrome of other armies that tend to prepare for the last war, but is in fact preparing appropriately for the next. Therefore, it may be assumed that the IDF will face a stronger and radically changed organization from the one it fought in the summer of 2006. Only the construction of an appropriate defense response by the IDF will make it possible to render a serious blow to Hizbollah in its current, updated format.

Notes

1   See the wording of UN Security Council Resolution 1701: http://daccessdds. un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/465/03/PDF/N0646503.pdf?OpenElement.

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Intelligence and the Challenges of High Trajectory Fire

Amir Kulick

Introduction

Every state defines its basic self interests and what in its mind constitutes existential threats. On the basis of these definitions, the state formulates the relevant responses, whether military, diplomatic, economic, or other, to events and developments. For years, the Israeli military response relied on three basic principles: deterrence, warning, and decision. The three principles implied that Israel must deter the Arab states from starting wars. Should deterrence fail, then Israel's intelligence must supply a timely warning of an impending war in order to allow the army time to prepare. Once the war has erupted, Israel must have the capability of moving the fighting onto enemy territory and wrest a quick decision in the campaign, given Israel's lack of strategic depth and limited capacity for endurance.[1]

These three principles – deterrence, warning, and decision – were intended to address the threat of conventional war. However, recent decades have seen the waning of this threat. Egypt's exit from the circle of confrontations with Israel, Syria's decision once the USSR collapsed to quit the race toward "strategic balance" with Israel, and the elimination of Saddam Hussein's Iraq as a military power all contributed to this process. At the same time, two other types of threats have increased: suicide terrorism and high trajectory weapons. Both threats, formulated to avoid frontal confrontations with the Israeli army, became the weapons of the weak that exhaust the Israeli home front. The different natures of these two threats invite a reexamination and expansion of the concepts underlying Israel's military response. During the al-Aqsa intifada, for

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example, the question of how one deters a suicide terrorist setting out on his mission fully intending to die became extremely urgent. In terms of warning, the challenge was no less complex. In the past, intelligence warning about the enemy's plans for a war was achieved by analyzing the routine activity of the enemy military and signs indicating it was preparing for battle. Because intelligence usually dealt with the context of large scale battles, the challenge of detecting warning signals lay in the interpretation of the enemy's intentions and less in finding indicators for war. In contrast to warning about an impending war, suicide bombings are carried out by small compartmentalized cells and within fairly short periods. Similarly, the question of decision became problematic in the context of coping with the threat of suicide attacks, especially since terms of time (an extended confrontation), space (the front and the civilian rear), and the enemy (sub-state organizations) were entirely different.

Nevertheless, it would seem that in recent years Israel found a relatively successful formula for coping with suicide terrorism, combining precise intelligence, preventive efforts on enemy ground, and physical barriers. By contrast, it still has a long way to go in terms of coping with the threat of high trajectory fire on the civilian front. This essay considers the formulation of a response to this threat by expanding the principle of early warning within the country's national security philosophy, and examining the intelligence aspects beyond warning in the context of countering the threat of high trajectory fire.[2]

Development of the Threat of High Trajectory Fire

The use of high trajectory fire against Israel's civilian front is not a new phenomenon. Already in the 1960s, artillery fire was directed from the Golan Heights towards the settlements in and surrounding the Hula Valley. In the 1970s and in the early 1980s, PLO operatives adopted this tactic of warfare and fired barrages of rockets from southern Lebanon at northern Israel. After the PLO was ejected from its Lebanese strongholds by the IDF in 1982, Hizbollah took its place. This organization too gradually adopted rocket fire as a central component in its war against Israel. During the two extensive rounds of fighting between the IDF and Hizbollah in the 1990s (Operation Accountability in 1993 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996), Hizbollah made massive use of rocket fire against northern Israel. From these events, the organization concluded that the IDF does not in fact have an effective operational response to this

type of threat, and that the fire has a significant effect on the Israeli home front. Accordingly, high trajectory fire became the dominant component of Hizbollah's military doctrine.

Hizbollah apparently constructed the core of its high trajectory force after the Israeli withdrawal from the security zone, when it was relieved of ongoing skirmishes with the IDF and had the opportunity to turn its attention to systematic preparations for a comprehensive war. And indeed, during the years preceding the Second Lebanon War, the organization significantly expanded its arsenal of high trajectory weapons. Israeli defense sources assessed that on the eve of the war Hizbollah was in possession of some 13,000 Grad rockets with a range of about 20 km, and thousands more longer range rockets.[3] For Hizbollah, the Second Lebanon War confirmed the effectiveness of this weapon and the fact that the IDF finds it difficult to respond to the high trajectory threat. Its arsenal of rockets has grown significantly since the war, and according to Defense Minister Ehud Barak now can threaten most of Israel's sovereign territory.[4]

Given the lack of an effective Israeli response to high trajectory weapons, Hamas too sought to construct similar rocket batteries. From June 2007, after its takeover of the Gaza Strip, Hamas embarked on a program of accelerated buildup and manufactured hundreds of rockets, improved their ranges, and smuggled Grad rockets with a 40 km range into the Gaza Strip. After Operation Cast Lead (December 2008 – January 2009) Hamas began attempting to acquire rockets with even longer ranges.[5]

Similar conclusions about the effectiveness of high trajectory weapons in the struggle against Israel have been drawn by Syria. For years the Syrian army has had a varied arsenal of high trajectory weapons, which includes rockets of different ranges and surface-to-surface missiles of ranges of hundreds of kilometers. Syria apparently thinks highly of the way Hizbollah deployed its rockets against Israel in the Second Lebanon War, and is looking to duplicate both the objectives of that war (massive damage to Israel's civilian front) and the way the launchers were operated at the tactical level.[6]

The Enemy's Use of High Trajectory Weapons

In order to understand the role played by intelligence against the threat of high trajectory fire, it is necessary to examine the principles underlying the use of this weaponry. In general, as one may conclude from the Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead, at the heart of high trajectory weaponry is the idea of creating a significant threat of fire against Israel's home front while at the same time blocking or delaying IDF ground maneuvers. This is attained by means of several principles:

a. Defining the civilian rear as a central target. The raison d'être of high trajectory weapons is to damage Israel's civilian front. This general definition has many practical ramifications, including a choice of quantity over quality, i.e., equipping the force with as many rockets as possible, despite the fact that they are a weapon that statistically lacks accuracy, instead of constructing heavier precision systems such as surface-to-surface missiles. Other ramifications relate to the choice of targets (civilian targets and urban centers) and warheads with which to equip the rockets.[7]

b. Widespread deployment. Both Hizbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip have sought to increase the launchers' survival odds by deploying them over large areas. So, for example, during Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip, rockets were fired from the northern part of the Strip, from Gaza City, and from the southern part of the Strip. During the Second Lebanon War Hizbollah deployed its rockets over much larger geographical expanses in Lebanon, primarily south of the Litani River but also north of it. Moreover, as may be seen from the attack on the Zelzal launchers by the Israeli air force, long range rockets were also deployed in the Beirut region.[8] This wide deployment forces the IDF to spread out its means of intelligence gathering and target identification, thereby decreasing the odds of locating launchers, which in turns increases their odds of survival.

c. Low physical signature. Another dominant principle is lowering the physical signature of the launchers. The goal is to make it difficult to discover them and is achieved by camouflaging the launchers and the launching activities by two primary methods: one, carrying out most of the activity connected to firing the launchers inside or near civilian surroundings. A prominent example of this is the use

of mosques made by Hamas to store rockets and other armaments.[9] The second way to lower the high trajectory array's signature is by camouflaging the launch barrels inside naturally wooded areas, in small bunkers in open areas, or on the outskirts of urban areas, and in the case of mobile launchers, i.e., those mounted on vehicles, by storing them in the homes of the operatives.[10] One of the main results is the short time frame of target vulnerability, i.e., the window of opportunity for attacking the launcher is brief and sometimes lasts just a few moments. This window of opportunity begins when the launcher is revealed (removing the camouflage or moving it out of hiding), continues during the time it is fired – a number of seconds during which the rocket is on fire, which allows its identification by electro-optical means, and ends with its being camouflaged again or its rapid transportation to another hiding place.[11]

d. A large number of launchers (decreasing the value of any single launcher). As the result of a general understanding of the capabilities of the Israeli air force, both Hizbollah and Hamas concluded that in order to create high trajectory fire over time it is necessary to be equipped with a large number of launch barrels. The large number of launchers makes the specific weight of the single launcher negligible relative to the activity of the entire network. This way the destruction of a few launch barrels has no effect on the rate of fire produced. In the Second Lebanon War, for example, the Israeli air force destroyed 93 rocket launchers – 50 of them in planned sorties on the first day of the war. Thirty-three simple launchers were destroyed by airplanes hovering in the air to hunt launchers.[12] Even so, throughout the war, Hizbollah maintained an average firing rate of some 130 rockets daily, and on the last day managed to fire 253 rockets.[13]

e. A supportive ground defense. High trajectory fire does not stand alone, but is accompanied by ground defense that complements the high trajectory weapons. In practice, ground defense is to a large extent critical, creating a significant threat of fire against the Israeli civilian front, with its objective to curb or delay IDF forces and buy time for the high trajectory fire. Indeed, both Hizbollah and Hamas built a standing ground defense alongside the high trajectory batteries based on anti-tank positions, bunkers, and booby traps

prepared in advance, with the purpose of inflicting casualties and delaying the ground maneuver.[14]

The Intelligence Challenges
Warning
Israel's national security doctrine assigned intelligence a central role – giving early warning that the enemy is about to embark on a war. The fact that in routine times a significant portion of Israel's military force is not mobilized or battle-ready and the fact that Israel does not have any strategic depth turn the intelligence branch and its capacity to give early warning into a first line of defense.[15] Indeed, supplying early warning about an impending war has become the classical function of military intelligence. When large, institutionalized fighting frameworks such as regular armies are involved, giving early warning about an impending war is not a sudden procedure. Usually, it is constructed in stages and may begin with periodic assessments, continue by supplying initial warning about the accumulation of forces, high alerts, preparations, and other indicative signs, and end with a summarizing assessment in which military intelligence determines that a state or a group of states is about to attack in a clearly defined location, at a clearly defined time, and with a clearly defined approach.[16] In other words, the war preparations by a state were an extended process producing many revealing signs throughout the process.

Early warning may be divided into two main categories: one is warning about the strategic intention to use weapons to obtain political or other objectives, and the other is warning about concrete preparations for war. With regard to the army's preparation for war, the fire array does not stand on its own. Therefore, the primary challenge for military intelligence in this context is to identify the changes in the routine activity of the high trajectory fire array and integrate this data into the general picture of the enemy's preparations for war. Among the state players using large and established high trajectory systems, the mission is fairly simple and is apparently carried out in the context of ongoing surveillance of army activity as part of efforts to identify war indicators.

Among the sub-state players such as Hamas and Hizbollah, however, the issue of indicators is problematic. At the strategic level, decisions are usually made at the level of a very small, closed group of operatives. At the

operational level, no armies are involved and therefore their intelligence signature is low. It is precisely in these instances that surveillance of the high trajectory weapons is likely to make a significant contribution to understanding the intentions of the enemy at the strategic and especially operational levels, because the number of indicators created by this system is relatively high. The logistical infrastructure and manpower required to operate the high trajectory weapons, alongside the technical preparations necessary to raise combat readiness, ensure that indicators will in fact be emitted and identified. In this sense, surveillance of the sub-state organizations' high trajectory arrays is important not just for the sake of understanding the threat but also because it is likely to contribute to understanding the comprehensive picture regarding enemy intentions.

Alongside the classical dimension of early warning for war, the high trajectory threat presents a new dimension for intelligence: providing warning during the fighting. Here, warning focuses on pointing to the enemy's intentions to start using types of weapons it has not yet used, e.g., an intention to fire rockets equipped with chemical warheads or an intention to target areas in Israel that have so far not come under fire. This type of warning relies on the assumption that the enemy will make graduated use of its firepower; therefore, the intelligence gathering must supply warning in time in order to allow the Home Front Command and the civilians themselves to prepare for the anticipated threat. The ramifications for constructing the intelligence force are many; central to these is the need to sharpen the degree to which intelligence reaches the decision making echelon on the political level and in the relevant organizations and ensure that this information flows continuously, even during the war. This presumes, of course, that critical decisions about the use of high trajectory weapons will be made at these echelons rather than by unsupervised field level operatives.

Decision
In everything having to do with warning, intelligence about high trajectory weapons does not stand on its own but is rather a part of a broader matrix. At the end of the day, intelligence in this regard is supposed to produce warning. By contrast, when it comes to decision and the high trajectory threat, the work of intelligence plays a more significant, central role.

Decision, a complex issue that goes beyond the narrow topic of dealing with an enemy that uses high trajectory fire, lies outside the scope of this essay and is worthy of a separate discussion. Nonetheless, one may say that in Israel's defense doctrine, decision is generally a synonym for "causing the Arabs stinging defeats," as defined by Israel Tal.[17] According to Tal, the ways to achieve such "stinging defeats" include destroying the enemy's military force as a cohesive fighting force and to a lesser extent, conquering its territory and occupying its areas of deployment and maneuver, damaging the enemy's allies, destroying its economic infrastructure, and threatening its capital city.[18] These principles were formulated in the 1950s and were meant to provide a response to the confrontation with state enemies holding territorial assets and defending them with regular armies.

The implementation of these principles in order to achieve decision against sub-state organizations such as Hizbollah and Hamas needs greater clarification than the present discussion.[19] Nonetheless, it is clear that in any future confrontation with sub-state organizations using high trajectory fire as their principal combat strategy against Israel, the issue of coping with fire at the civilian front is critical. Accordingly, attaining a decision against the enemy will to a large extent be measured by three basic parameters: one, a halt to or reduction of the fire at the home front; two, damage to the enemy's strategic assets; and three, the stamina of Israel's civilian front. The resilience of the Israeli public depends on a number of factors where intelligence seemingly plays an important role, though secondary to other components. Here the task of intelligence lies primarily in identifying the set of possible threats before a war (in order to build the Home Front Command force and reduce public uncertainty), identifying developing threats during a war (such as the enemy's intention of using non-conventional weapons), and participating in situation assessments about the civilian routine. Intelligence plays a more central role with regard to the first two parameters – stopping or reducing the fire and damaging the enemy's strategic assets.

Stopping/Reducing High Trajectory Fire at the Home Front

The ability to significantly reduce the fire directed at Israel's civilian front depends on understanding the principles guiding Hamas, Hizbollah, and Syria in the operation of these arrays. Finding solutions to operational

problems posed by each of these principles can in the end lead to a successful tackling of the high trajectory threat. These solutions lie fully or partly within intelligence's purview.

The problem: dispersed deployment and low physical signature.
The response: prioritizing regions and focusing the intelligence gathering.
Two of the important principles guiding Hamas, Hizbollah, and apparently Syria in their use of high trajectory systems are the deployment of launchers over large geographical areas and the reduction of their physical signature, which make it more difficult to locate them and increases their odds of survival. In this, intelligence plays an important role; central to it is defining the priorities for response and, in conjunction with the operational side, determining the type of operational response for each of the areas. Widespread deployment, especially when extensive regions are involved such as those in Lebanon and Syria, does not allow one to allocate the same operational and intelligence gathering resources to each site (either an open or populated area) where a rocket launcher may be found. Still, the rocket launcher's low signature requires a quick response coming immediately on the heels of its identification.

At the same time, by their nature launching barrels cannot be distributed equally throughout the entire campaign arena, and the fire produced by each geographical area is not identical in amount or in its type of target. An analysis by Uzi Rubin shows that in the Second Lebanon War Hizbollah fired rockets from a number of primary regions. For example, fire was directed at population centers in western Israel – the northern coastal strip and particularly Haifa – from the outskirts of Tyre, whereas fire was directed at the Golan Heights from the southern part of the Beqaa Valley.[20] Similarly, in Operation Cast Lead rockets were fired at Ashdod primarily from the northern part of the Gaza Strip. It is necessary to take advantage of this situation in order to determine geographical priorities for response and prepare specialized intelligence and operational solutions for every area. In the first stage, intelligence must identify the geographical spheres most likely to produce most of the fire aimed at Israel's civilian front or, alternately, produce fire (even if sporadic) aimed at the major population centers, such as the greater Tel Aviv region, and at strategic infrastructures. Such prioritization may occur by weighing a number of factors, such as terrain, population,

enemy deployment, and type of rocket deployed in the region, as well as the ability of intelligence to identify targets in the same sphere. In the second stage, it is necessary to prepare an intelligence and operational response tailored to each geographical area. As such, a broad operational program is constructed out of sub-programs – a kind of intelligence-operational mosaic providing the optimal response to the specific threat in every geographical region. This would replace any large scale program seeking to impose a uniform response for the entire sphere of fighting.

Adopting this method in previous confrontations would have resulted in channeling intelligence gathering resources and larger aerial or ground forces to the region of Tyre or the northern part of the Gaza Strip at the very beginning of the respective campaigns, eliminating the need to wait for the accumulation of data on the fire (after a few days or a week of sustained fire). Alternately, in the absence of intelligence and the ability to identify targets in these spheres, the operational plan could have formulated an appropriate ground response to these disparate ground cells before the outbreak of the fighting, and have allowed for the channeling of intelligence gathering efforts to other regions in which the ability to identify targets was higher. In this respect, intelligence and analysis of rocket launcher deployment is likely to assist in synchronizing the aerial efforts and intelligence gathering with ground moves, and prevent the concentration of intelligence gathering efforts in locations where the ability to identify targets is low, or alternately, direct ground forces to these areas ahead of time, already at the planning stage. This becomes even more critical if we take into consideration Hizbollah and Syria's arms buildup and the possibility that in coming wars massive fire of long range rockets will be produced from deep within Syria and Lebanon.

From an intelligence and operational perspective, regional prioritization must not stop with the outbreak of the war, but must be dynamic and base itself on an analysis of the data concerning the incoming fire, the condition of IDF troops, and perhaps even the state of the civilian population in specific areas in Israel. So, for example, it is possible that repeated and severe damage to a certain urban center will force the IDF, as part of its effort to assist in bolstering civilian resilience, to formulate a quick, ad hoc operational response against the region that

was the source of the fire, even if this region did not previously figure among the army's top priorities.

The problem: a large number of launchers. The response: operational planning with a strong damage capability

The third principle discussed in operating high trajectory weapons batteries is the large number of launchers dispersed in order to reduce the specific weight of each launcher and avoid a situation in which damage to a few launchers affects the potential rate of fire at Israel. In tackling the quantity challenge, intelligence work plays a double role, one at the planning stage and the other at the execution stage. In light of the understanding that the large number of launching barrels does not allow the physical destruction of every one of them, intelligence must, when the operational program is formulated, point to the enemy's weaknesses that if damaged, would neutralize the largest possible number of fire sources. For example, assuming that operating a large number of launchers in an organized fashion over time requires some kind of central command and control apparatus – local headquarters, communications infrastructures, and so on – intelligence must at the planning stage identify these components (both from analysis standpoints and from target standpoints).

In the Second Lebanon War, Hizbollah lowered and raised the rate of fire at Israel's home front at will.[21] This requires some kind of organized structure of command and control. Moreover, as Ben-Israel explains, Hizbollah is on the one hand an organization with guerilla elements (in particular in terms of clandestine operation, compartmentalization, and survivability), but on the other hand is also "a classical military organization with command and control strongholds, advanced communications systems, weapons warehouses...a fixed infrastructure, and regional units of well-trained fighters."[22] Biddle and Friedman, who analyzed Hizbollah's fighting in the summer of 2006, also came to a similar conclusion, and demonstrated that during the confrontation with the IDF, the organization conducted itself more as an organized military force than a decentralized guerilla organization.[23] This principle is certainly applicable also to Syria, where firepower would likely occur according to a coherent hierarchical command system, stemming from the very fact that these rocket batteries are part of the regular army. In light of processes of

establishment that Hamas' military force is undergoing, presumably in the future the fire batteries of this organization will also acquire coherent command and control at some level or another. Accordingly, the task of intelligence must amount to more than indicating the nature of the threat and the enemy's intent and deployment. Already at the planning stage intelligence personnel must point to the organizational components whose damage would help neutralize the largest possible number of high trajectory batteries.

An additional dimension concerning response to the large number of launching barrels is connected to the capability of intelligence to produce targets for attack. In modern armies, where firepower is a dominant element, the job of the intelligence branch to identify targets plays a leading role. In essence, without intelligence about high quality targets, no effective operation of fire is possible. From this aspect, intelligence transmits detailed information about the location of targets in real time, and no less importantly assists in determining the priorities for destroying them, according to the measure of risk represented by each target and the availability of the means of attack.[24] This task of intelligence becomes critical in a confrontation with high trajectory weapon batteries based on a large number of launchers. The high number of targets requires intelligence not just to undertake better early preparation and construction of objectives for attack before the campaign, but also – and especially – to develop the ability to provide information about targets in real time. Fulfilling this task successfully is presumably dependent on developing a response based on a combination of intelligence data (the type of armaments in enemy hands and the enemy's manner of operating them at the tactical and techno-tactical levels) and advanced technological capabilities (location and attack). Focusing on one side of the equation alone, be it intelligence data or technological capabilities, will supply only a partial operational solution.

Damaging the Enemy's Strategic Assets: The Deterrence-Decision Connection

Beyond damaging the enemy's military force – in our case, the destruction of a large number of launchers and other organizational components affecting the production of fire – decision or handing the enemy a "stinging defeat" can be achieved also through damaging its strategic

assets. When discussing a state enemy, the term "strategic asset" is fairly clear and includes essential areas (from a security perspective), governing institutions, essential national infrastructures, central economic installations, and so on.

What is a strategic asset for sub-state organizations such as Hamas and Hizbollah? These organizations are not states, and therefore do not have national infrastructures or governing institutions. Seemingly, the discussion is about organizations for which territory does not play a central role. Nonetheless, a closer look at Hamas and Hizbollah reveals that they too have assets that may be defined as strategic. Territorially speaking, the center of gravity of these organizations may be found in the areas that are home to their ardent supporters and out of which the organizations operate. In the case of Hamas, one may assume that it would be possible to define certain neighborhoods and refugee camps in the Gaza Strip as its territorial strongholds. In the case of Hizbollah, southern Lebanon, the central and northern parts of the Beqaa Valley (the region from Baalbeck to al-Hermel), and the southern neighborhoods of Beirut have traditionally served as its natural territorial strongholds. Damage to and conquest of these areas, either fully or in part, would probably be deemed by the organizations as strategic damage.

The organizational-institutional dimension joins the territorial aspect. Both Hamas and Hizbollah are organizations that emerge from within the population and maintain close mutual links through a network of institutions providing state-like services (*daw'a*). In this, Hizbollah surpassed the other movements by establishing a quasi-government (the Executive Council), which is responsible for providing various services such as education, health care, construction, social support, culture, religion, and more to the Shiite community. This system relies both on a human infrastructure in the form of a bureaucracy, and on a physical infrastructure such as offices, warehouses, and buildings. These infrastructures are an example of the organization's strategic assets. To the same extent, a strategic asset may be a certain activist who is defined as a potential future leader, or a string of economic assets providing a living for the organization's senior members. While damage to this type of asset would not directly affect the fire directed at Israel during the war itself, it would likely contribute to the sense of a stinging defeat within these organizations and their leaderships.

In terms of Israel's defense doctrine, obtaining a decision or stinging defeat is meant to build up Israel's deterrence over time. Therefore, a war against an organization using high trajectory weapons cannot end by merely tackling the enemy's firepower; it must look ahead and view the confrontation as a part of an ongoing process, at whose end Hamas, Hizbollah, and every other party will understand that firing at Israel's civilian front can only result in a Pyrrhic victory. In these respects, intelligence has a decisive role to play, primarily to identify the assets whose damage would contribute to the process, to create a critical mass of these assets, to gather data about them, and to prepare them as targets for attack.

Conclusion

The high trajectory threat presents Israel's security concept with many challenges and should prompt those in charge to engage in a new type of thinking about the principles forming the underlying principles of deterrence, warning, and decision. Similar to the fundamental level of the security concept, adjustments − or even more far reaching changes − are also necessary in the field of intelligence in order to tackle the challenges presented by high trajectory weapons to Israel's home front. In contrast to the function assigned to intelligence by the national defense doctrine − providing early warning about an impending war − the intelligence branch never restricted itself to dealing with this field alone. Intelligence personnel were always involved not only in intelligence gathering and assessment but also in providing intelligence for a wide range of military needs, including force buildup, planning, special operations, and achievement assessments. At the same time, it seems that the complexity of the challenge presented by high trajectory fire in a future war must prompt the intelligence community to show greater involvement in the operational planning stage that precedes a battle, in providing vast and higher quality target intelligence, and in conducting the campaign in general. Nevertheless, tackling the high trajectory threat successfully depends not only on the intelligence branch and its people but also on the understanding of other military branches that it is necessary to integrate intelligence and its research and assessment deeply and extensively into planning and execution. This sort of understanding is likely to ensure

that in the next confrontation with the high trajectory threat, the result will be much better than it has been in the past.

Notes

1   Israel Tal, *National Security: The Few vs. the Many* (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1996), pp. 61-63, 80-81, 85-86.
2   For a discussion of the general ramifications of the threat of high trajectory fire for Israel's national security concept, see Gabriel Siboni, "High Trajectory Weapons and Guerilla Warfare: Adjusting Fundamental Security Concepts," *Strategic Assessment* 10, no. 4 (2008): 12-18.
3   Amos Harel and Aluf Benn, "Head of Military Intelligence: Hizbollah Has Rockets Capable of Reaching the Sharon Region," *Haaretz*, July 27, 2004.
4   Barak's statement at the end of a tour of the south, August 7, 2008, http://euro.walla.co.il/?w=/21/1326281. For more on Hizbollah's network of rockets after the Second Lebanon War, see Amir Kulick, "The Next War with Hizbollah," *Strategic Assessment* 10, no. 3 (2007): 41-50.
5   Amos Harel, "Gaza After Operation Cast Lead: Hamas Arming with Long Range Rockets and Anti-Aircraft Missiles," *Haaretz*, April 22, 2009. For more on the process of Hamas' force buildup and the attempt to duplicate Hizbollah's doctrine of warfare, see Amir Kulick, "'Lebanon Lite': Lessons from the Operation in Gaza and the Next Battle with Hizbollah," *Military and Strategic Affairs* 1, no. 1 (2009).
6   Yiftah Shapir, "The Syrian Army Buildup," *Strategic Assessment* 10, no. 2 (2007): 16-22.
7   For a discussion on the warheads attached to the rockets, see Uzi Rubin, *The Rocket Campaign against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War*, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Middle East Security and Policy Studies No. 71, June 2007, p. 10. For a discussion of the targets, see p. 12.
8   For a discussion of rocket deployment regions, see Isaac Ben-Israel, *The First Missile War: Israel vs. Hizbollah (Summer 2006)*, Program for Security Studies: A Position Paper, Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2007, p. 9.
9   The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, "The Use of Mosques for Military and Political Purposes by Hamas and Other Terrorist Organization," March 1, 2009, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/Hebrew/heb_n/html/hamas_065.htm .
10 Rubin, *The Rocket Campaign against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War*, pp. 8-9.
11 Rubin, *The Rocket Campaign against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War*, p. 20; Ben-Israel, *The First Missile War*, p. 45; Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, "The Qassam Is Promoted to the Next Grade (Hope That It's Not in Your School)," *Haaretz*, September 2, 2007; Amos Harel, "Hamas Improved Rockets and Use of Timers," *Haaretz*, January 18, 2008.

12   The data is taken from a speech given by former air force commander Eitan Ben Eliyahu, as cited by Yossi Melman, "This Is What the Next War Will Look Like," *Haaretz*, July 6, 2008; different data is cited by Ben-Israel *The First Missile War*, p. 46, whereby the air force destroyed 126 launchers by hunting them.

13   Alon Ben David and Yoav Limor, "Saddam and the Qassam," Ynet, April 17, 2008; Rubin, *The Rocket Campaign against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War*, pp. 13, 38.

14   Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, "How Hamas' Army Is Preparing for War With Israel," *Haaretz*, December 26, 2008; The General Security Services, "Hamas and the Construction of Force," November 30, 2008, http://www.shabak.gov.il/publications/study/Pages/gaza-hamas-terror-report.aspx.

15   Tal, *National Security*, pp. 86-87.

16   Aviezer Yaari, "Intelligence Assessment in the Unique Circumstance of the State of Israel," in Zvi Offer and Avi Kober (eds.), *Intelligence and National Security* (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1987, Hebrew), p. 216.

17   Tal, *National Security*, p. 56.

18   Tal, *National Security*, pp.56-60.

19   For a discussion of this issue, see Gabriel Siboni, "Disproportionate Force: Israel's Concept of Response in Light of the Second Lebanon War," INSS Insight No. 74, October 2008.

20   Rubin, *The Rocket Campaign against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War*, pp. 11-12.

21   Rubin, *The Rocket Campaign against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War*, pp. 13-14.

22   Ben-Israel, *The First Missile War*, p. 10.

23   Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman, *The 2006 Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, September 2008, pp. 35-73.

24   Yaakov Amidror, *Intelligence: From Theory to Practice* (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 2006), p. 76.

War and Victory

Gabriel Siboni

Introduction

Before embarking on Operation Cast Lead, the IDF and the defense establishment held many discussions about the need for military action in the Gaza Strip and the strategic objective of such an action in the event it would in fact occur. These discussions were held in light of the sharply worded recommendations of the Winograd Commission, which wrote the following in its report:[1]

> We were surprised to discover a significant weakness in terms of the in-depth thinking and multi-dimensional, deep, sophisticated strategic planning required in complex arenas and in conditions of rapid change and uncertainty. The planning and prosecution of a war or the use of military force in some other informed manner must also include attention to such principles of strategic thinking.
>
> Attention to how to end a war or to an exit strategy is not a sign of weakness but rather a critical component of planning. True, things do not always develop as planned, but a plan based on information and reasonable scenarios must be present.
>
> **In a war, an army must strive for victory. If it is known ahead of time that there is no preparedness or possibility of arriving at such a victory, it is proper to avoid going to war in the first place, or even to avoid any move liable to deteriorate into war.**
>
> As noted, we found none of the above in the military's thinking in the Second Lebanon War, not even in the material the military presented to the political echelon. (As noted, the fact that the political echelon did not demand such materials represents a severe failure on its part.)

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The desire to implement the Winograd Commission's recommendations – even if this was not explicitly stated by the decision makers – dragged out the discussions and the strategic situation assessments, even though at the end of 2008 it was already clear to everyone that in light of the scope of rocket and mortar fire from the Gaza Strip a military operation was inevitable. However, notwithstanding the extent and intensity of the strategic thinking processes and situation assessments by the IDF and the political echelon before the operation, Operation Cast Lead was launched without a clear strategic framework or without an exit strategy formula. The following statement by Major General (ret.) Giora Eiland expresses that gap well:

> When [Operation Cast Lead] began and when the first strike by the air force was carried out – a strike that was very successful in and of itself – it was still unclear what it was we wanted to achieve. The definition given by the political echelon was a definition along the lines of "creating better security conditions." This is a vague formulation, which may be rephrased more simply as "we want things to be better." This is not a definition of goals that lends itself to translation into concrete military terms. It was only three days after the beginning of Operation Cast Lead that a real discussion began at the political echelon and between the political echelon and the senior military echelon about what we wanted to achieve.[2]

This essay contends that against the threat that has developed in recent years, Israel's war objectives are fixed goals attainable by means of fixed principles of action. The essay thus argues the irrelevance of the terms "victory" or "decision" in the State of Israel's strategic discourse, and then shows why the Winograd Commission recommendation is not only unclear and impossible to implement but is also a recommendation whose potential for damage far exceeds any possible benefit.

The Military Goals of War

The change in the nature of the threat faced by the State of Israel has been discussed extensively.[3] Today the threat of high trajectory fire, based on the use of conventional weapons (missiles, rockets, mortar bombs) in massive quantities, tops the list of threats Israel confronts. It is joins the classical, conventional threat that was based on the use of large military systems engaging in battles of ground maneuvers. Both may be called

conventional threats, and both may be contrasted with threats of an essentially different nature: the non-conventional threat and the threat of terrorism (inside Israel and abroad). This essay focuses on the objectives of a war against conventional threats.[4]

Israel's geo-strategic situation has not changed since the establishment of the state. Israel cannot end the conflict with its neighbors by force. Therefore it operates on the basis of strategic defensive principles, which can be summed up as the attempt to preserve and fortify Israel's national existence. Almost all of Israel's wars[5] occurred within the context of this strategic philosophy. Ben-Gurion clarified Israel's unique situation in this context when addressing IDF officers:[6]

> There is a deep-seated difference...between our situation in the conflict and that of the Arabs who are a party to it. The Arabs attacked us; we won; they plot the next round. Let us assume that the next round takes place in the year X and we win again. They will then plot the third round. We have no option of a final resolution between the sides as long as the Arabs reject it...We do not have the option of ending the conflict, but they do, whereupon the conflict will be eliminated.

Clausewitz's formative historic claim about the supremacy of political objectives of war over military objectives[7] still holds true. However, in light of Israel's unique situation as described by Ben-Gurion, the political goal of operating military force by the State of Israel is a fixed defensive one, focusing on preserving the national existence of the state. From here one may derive the objectives of the application of military force by the state: the goal of the Israeli military is to foil Arab enemy plots to damage Israel's existence and sovereignty.

Based on the understanding that after every round of confrontation another one will follow, it is worth examining the achievement required of the IDF in these rounds of confrontation. Should it be impossible to create a lasting political achievement as the direct objective of the fighting, the supreme requirement of the military must be to extend the period of time between the rounds of confrontation and, to the extent possible, minimize the duration and damage of every such round. The intervals of calm can be achieved through deterring the enemy from acting against Israel. Thus, one may determine two fundamental types of action that allow the IDF to meet this requirement:

1. *A severe blow and significant damage to the enemy*: The IDF must use the two major components of its capabilities, firepower and ground maneuver, in order to damage both the enemy's military capabilities and its political or organizational infrastructure. The purpose is to impress the severity of the blow on the enemy for as long as possible so that it postpones its next operation against Israel for years and, additionally, will be bogged down in an extended, resource-intensive process of reconstruction. An enemy seeking to avoid severe blows operates purposefully and cynically within civilian population centers in order to attain two goals: first, limit Israel's ability to operate freely, and second, allow the enemy to present Israel as an entity attacking civilians.[8] In order to prevent harm from befalling bystanders, the IDF acts to evacuate civilians from the war zones and separate civilians from soldiers. Further refinement of this approach will make it possible to deepen the impact of the blow against the enemy while at the same time minimizing harm to uninvolved civilian populations.

2. *Activity to reduce the duration and damage of any given round of confrontation*: The IDF must act to minimize the damage caused to Israel as a result of fighting. This goal may be attained through a number of steps:[9]

   a. Isolating the confrontation arena**:** The IDF must isolate the arena of fighting away from the other arenas of confrontation, both by means of stationing battle-ready forces in these arenas and by means of using force in the proper doses – based on necessity – in order to deter the enemy from opening additional fighting fronts.[10]

   b. Reducing the scope of fire directed against Israel: The army is required to take action to reduce the scope of fire directed against Israel both by means of precision fire at the sources and resources of the fire (weapons caches, command and control installations, launchers, and so on) and by means of ground maneuvers towards the sites that can directly affect the reduction of the scope of the fire.

   c. Reducing the damage: The army must employ defensive means to reduce the damage caused to the fabric of civilian life in the round of confrontation.

    d. Reducing the duration of the fighting: The IDF must act to ensure a blow of such scope and intensity that the enemy will understand that continuing to fight belies its own best interests. On the other hand, the fighting must cease only after a critical blow has been rendered against the enemy, as defined above.

These are fixed types of action, adjusted to the relatively fixed threat, and do not require reexamination before every confrontation. The IDF has to construct its force and operate it in times of crisis in order to conform to these principles. Experience from the recent past, the Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead, demonstrates that even a partial implementation of these principles allows the attainment of lasting strategic results. The combination of defensive principles of action and the transition to offense (moving the fight onto enemy soil) complete the picture of the principles of response.

Israel's geo-strategic situation requires it to take maximum advantage of the periods of calm between the rounds of confrontation to gain three primary objectives. The first lies in the field of security:[11] constructing the military force and the political conditions (e.g., constructing international legitimacy) in advance of the next confrontation. The second objective is developing the country in various fields such as immigration, the economy, education, social issues, and more. The third objective is the attempt by the political echelon to identify ways of arriving at a political settlement with the enemy. The efforts by the political echelon to provide the army with a context for its activity are critical. Despite the constancy of the objectives of Israel's wars, the political echelon must provide the constraints of force operation alongside a description of how it intends to leverage the military action into political achievement.[12] In many cases and as a result of not understanding the principles described above, the political echelon creates fuzzy political directives so that it will be possible to create the appearance of a "victory" in the public eye.

Victory and Decision

On the basis of these principles of operation guiding the IDF, it is important to clarify the terms "victory" and "decision" in Israel's strategic discourse. It is hard to understand what the Winograd Commission intended when it determined that "in a war, an army must strive for victory. If it is known ahead of time that there is no preparedness or possibility of arriving at

such a victory, it is proper to avoid going to war in the first place."[13] What did the Winograd Commission have in mind when it used the phrase "such a victory"? It seems that this statement relates more to the field of tactical concepts than to the field of strategic ideas.

Clausewitz viewed victory as limited to the tactical level in battle. He claimed that "in strategy, there is no such thing as victory."[14] In his book, Yehoshafat Harkaby writes that "the strategic-political success of a war is measured by yardsticks that lie outside the purview of the military."[15] A tactical unit can determine with certainty that the enemy facing it has been defeated and that the unit has won the battle if the enemy is no longer relevant in the given encounter. This holds true in one of three situations: the physical destruction of the enemy; the enemy's collapse as a fighting entity and its flight from the battlefield; and its surrender to our forces. These criteria are not relevant at the level of strategic discourse because in practice it is physically impossible to destroy the adversarial entity that Israel faces. Alternately, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which the white flag is raised over the presidential palace in Syria. As Harkaby says,

> The verdict over "victory" in a battle is therefore autonomous, self-referential. It is an immediate judgment at the end of the battle. By contrast, the verdict over the war is not autonomous: it is dependent on outcomes that are not immediate, rather delayed.[16]

It is possible that the members of the Winograd Commission fell victim to popular opinion and its notion of how to calibrate the results of the war, to the popular and prevalent index guiding the public's concept of victory. Indeed, for years the public was trained to use the concept of victory even when it was completely irrelevant. The transformation of the threat resulted in a situation in which after the Second Lebanon War, the public found it difficult to determine the "winner" at the end of that particular round of fighting. The difficulty was intensified when on the one hand Israel experienced media frenzy and hysterics, while on the other side of the hill the celebrations of "the divine victory" grew more lively. While relating to public opinion both inside Israel and abroad is important and carries significant weight, it must not stand in the way of reaching a lasting strategic achievement in the form of deterring the enemy from attacking Israel for many years to come.

One cannot underestimate the importance of this aspect. Before embarking on Operation Cast Lead, the army and the political echelon, still under the influence of the Winograd report, dealt extensively with the issue. There were innumerable discussions in an attempt to understand what would constitute a "victory and decision" in the south, despite the fact that the intensity of fire at the Israeli settlements in the vicinity of the Gaza Strip, which inflicted severe harm on the fabric of civilian life there, demanded quick action to end the fire and deter the enemy from pursuing the same path in the future, regardless of the desperately desired appearance of "victory."

The achievement that the IDF must provide the State of Israel on the one hand, and the concept of "victory" on the other, are entirely unrelated. The IDF is required to postpone the next confrontation as much as is possible. That is the supreme goal. The index for examining this achievement is clear: the achievement is measured by the intensity of the blow dealt to the enemy and by the number of years of calm between rounds of confrontation. The environment in which we live does not always make it possible to see the outcome clearly at the end of the war; one must not be swayed by enemy bravado. In the future, it would be highly advisable to leave the concepts of victory and decision to the dimension of concepts dealing with tactical fighting rather than misusing them in the context of Israel's strategic discourse.

Going to War

The purpose of applying military force is to gain political objectives. In Israel's unique situation, the long term political objectives are constant – i.e., preserving and fortifying the national existence of the state. The principles of applying force as described above were derived from them. A more in-depth discussion requires examination of the scenarios requiring the State of Israel to go to war or engage in high intensity violence. Israel has no choice but to go to war given one of the three following situations:

1. Stopping enemy violence: The enemy, both on the northern and southern borders, is equipping itself with high trajectory weapons, intended to harm civilian and military targets within the State of Israel. As long as the enemy is careful not to use these weapons and the fabric of civilian life is not harmed, the purpose of applying force on Israel's part would be to preserve deterrence and to damage, as

much as possible, the processes of the enemy constructing its force. However, once the threat is realized, the State of Israel must act quickly in order to end it and create renewed deterrence. In such a scenario, Israel is *reacting* to a threat that has been realized in practice.

2. Foiling a concrete threat: There are times when a threat develops whose existence and potential are viewed by Israel as highly dangerous. In the process of risk management with regard to such a threat, and after non-aggressive tools of foiling (e.g., economic, political) have been exhausted, the application of force remains the last alternative. In such a case force will be applied in order to create a preventive blow whose supreme goal is to foil the potential of the threat. In this scenario, Israel *initiates* its use of force against the *potential* of the enemy's threat.

3. Strategic retaliation as a reaction to an enemy action**:** There are times when the potential of the threat is realized and action to stop it is irrelevant, e.g., a one time attack on Israel by long range missiles or a significant terrorist attack.[17] In such an event, the State of Israel must apply force whose purpose is to inflict a strategic retaliatory blow on selected enemy targets. In this scenario, too, Israel *is reacting* to a real threat posed by the enemy.

All of these scenarios have the following in common: they are defensive strategies based on the understanding that the use of force by Israel does not serve long term political goals other than removing the threat from the agenda and giving the country some years of calm that would allow the political echelon to do what it is supposed to do so that the Arabs will accept the existence of the State of Israel in the region. In all three scenarios, the principles of application of force on the part of the IDF remain constant. The variable components touch primarily on the nature of the agreement that comes after the military action. As Ben-Gurion said, what is at stake is not a political peace settlement, rather a local arrangement intended to create the conditions for a ceasefire. While the concrete political context affects the nature of the application of force, this influence is limited because the setting of the action remains unchanged.

Holding innumerable discussions before embarking on the operation in the Gaza Strip while hundreds of rockets were fired at the State of Israel was meaningless and made virtually no contribution to the overall

effectiveness of the operation. The statement made by Ehud Barak is particularly enlightening in this context:

> Another discussion, another meeting, another assessment will not solve the problems we are facing…Would another staff discussion of the war have changed anything? In the end there are leaders and there is leadership.[18]

Therefore, it behooves us to reread the Winograd Commission's recommendation, "If it is known ahead of time that there is no willingness or possibility of arriving at such a victory, it is proper to avoid going to war in the first place," and to conclude that this statement contains no insight applicable to the geo-strategic reality of the State of Israel.

Conclusion

As far as one can see, it is unlikely that the Six Day War and its confluence of conditions will ever recur. A new conceptual framework is required to coordinate expectations among the IDF and the political and the civilian echelons. Such a framework must be based on relevant strategic discourse in which the supreme objective of the Israeli military is to attain consistent, unchanging achievements. The strategic discourse in Israel must rid itself of concepts such as quick and absolute victory and decision, or at least redefine them in the context of the present threat. The use made of these concepts by the Winograd Commission not only fails to serve any useful purpose but also damages the possibility of conducting relevant strategic discourse.

In addition, Israel's decision makers must adopt decision making processes that rely less on discussions of situation assessments in real time (just before the threat is realized) and more on the routine study of reality between wars. At the end of the day, situation assessments in real time tap precious resources of time, are ineffective, and have little effect on the characteristics of the application of force. These must be derived from the fixed principles of action. By contrast, discussions focusing on the study of reality are imperative in order to create and expand a common language and understanding of the security challenges and the analysis of events and reactions. Israel must take care not to chain itself to the recommendations of the Winograd Commission, which mandate the advance identification and definition of "victory" and the formulation of an exit strategy before the war has begun. The characteristics of Israel's

strategic environment prove that these processes are liable to paralyze the military and the defense establishment.

Notes

1   The Winograd Commission Report, Chapter 12, "Recommendations for the Military," p. 416, par 7. The emphasis in the third paragraph is the author's.

2   Giora Eiland, "The Second Lebanon War: Lessons on the Strategic Level," *Military and Strategic Affairs* 1, no. 2 (2009): 13.

3   Zaki Shalom, "Is the IDF Prepared to Face a Regular War against Arab Nations?" *Military and Strategic Affairs* 1, no. 1 (2009); Gabriel Siboni, "High Trajectory Weapons and Guerilla Warfare: Adjusting Fundamental Security Concepts," *Strategic Assessment* 10, no. 4 (2008): 12-18.

4   An analysis of the objectives of a nuclear war involving the State of Israel lies outside the scope of this essay. The purpose of the war against terrorism is based on ongoing action (ongoing security in Israel and abroad) to foil attempts to form organizations and plan attacks. In order to focus the discussion, this type of activity is also not analyzed in this essay.

5   Operation Peace for the Galilee is an exception. It attempted to implement a grand offensive strategy motivated by the desire to change Lebanon's political situation from the ground up. However, this is an exception and not indicative of the overall strategy.

6   David Ben-Gurion, "Distinction and Destiny: An Address to IDF Officers, July 5, 1955," Ministry of Defense Publications, September 1971, p. 207.

7   Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Penguin Classics, 1982), pp. 109, 401-10.

8   The Arabs and their supporters around the world have labored to delegitimize Israel's military operations during the Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead, because they identify the high degree of effectiveness of this response. In this context one may also refer to the Goldstone report published in September 2009.

9   The IDF's activity with regard to the civilian front comes under the rubric of the need to reduce the damage by means of preserving the civilian fabric of life and defending critical civilian and military infrastructures through both active and passive means of defense.

10 This of course is in addition to the messages of calm or the threats to be transmitted by the political echelon to the appropriate elements.

11 Ben-Gurion already determined that Israel's primary consideration must be security: "I count security first, because if we fail to exist, there will be nothing." Ben-Gurion, "Distinction and Destiny," p. 209.

12 The desire to define a long range political objective for every military action is laudable. However, it is necessary to remember that in Israel's geo-strategic environment it is not always possible to act on that desire. At times, the entire purpose of applying force is to manage the violence on the battlefield

and to provide the required years of calm. In these cases, the function of the political echelon is to characterize what it wants the situation to look like at the end of the fighting, e.g., the stationing of multinational forces, the introduction of some other kind of force, capturing and running the arena until such an element is identified, and so on. It should be remembered that these are secondary questions when compared to the central objective, which is the removal of the threat and the construction of deterrence for years to come.

13 See note 1.
14 Quoted in: Yehoshafat Harkaby, *War and Strategy* (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1990), p. 593.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Or an attack on Israel with non-conventional weapons. Even though this topic lies outside the scope of this essay, the example appears here to demonstrate the concept of strategic retaliation.
18 Ehud Barak in the cabinet meeting of September 13, 2009, during a discussion of the law on the National Security Staff.

The IDF and the Road to a More Professional Military

Yuval Bazak

Introduction

The Second Lebanon War revealed a string of failures in the way that the Israeli military operated against Hizbollah, with the result that the IDF was unable to achieve its objectives fully. The results of the war obligated the IDF to undertake a deep, thorough examination and draw conclusions for practical assimilation and implementation in a long, ongoing process. The Winograd Commission established by the government to investigate the failures of the war found "fundamental flaws in the preparation and execution of the war" and determined that "the army in its entirety, especially through its senior command posts and ground forces, failed in providing an adequate military response to the challenge it faced in executing the war in Lebanon and did not supply the political echelon with a proper military basis for political action."[1]

The "missed opportunity" of the Second Lebanon War did not occur out of the blue. To a large extent it was a continuation of the sense of the IDF's inability to achieve any decisive victory in the confrontations of recent years. Often this feeling has led to public criticism and even a sense of disappointment; these reached new heights after the Second Lebanon War.

There is no doubt that since the Yom Kippur War fundamental transformations have taken place in the nature of the confrontations involving Israel, and hence the IDF. At the core lies the shift from classical (force-on-force) wars where one army confronts another army, to confrontations with non-state organizations using terrorism and

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guerilla warfare that involve intensive psychological warfare alongside the fighting on the ground among civilian populations. This was true for suicide terrorism in Judea and Samaria; Qassam terrorism from the Gaza Strip; Hizbollah operations in the Second Lebanon War; and it is true of Syria's preparations for the next war. These changes have forced the IDF to adapt to the developing reality and be better prepared for the security challenges facing the State of Israel.

As a result, recent years have seen the evolution of a debate on the right way to implement these changes. Many have called for the end of the IDF as a people's army and its replacement with a professional volunteer army specifically geared to the IDF's current theaters and challenges. Others have suggested a comprehensive organizational reform in the IDF in order to improve its function and therefore its effectiveness, i.e., an internal reorganization of the existing model. Still others have argued that "the nature of war has changed" and that the IDF is in the midst of a conceptual crisis; as such, a paradigm shift is needed in terms of an innovative doctrine of operations, one that is not necessarily based on the longstanding principles of traditional IDF doctrine.

The discussion in recent years has thus focused on the question of the change the IDF has to make, on the assumption by almost everyone that such a change is necessary. The gamut of opinions has run from those who have called for a revolution, i.e., declared the end of the IDF as a people's army and urged its reconstruction as a volunteer army, to those who have retained the concept of a people's army (whether for reasons linked to shared values, functionality, or others) amended with changes and updates, especially on the organizational and technological levels (the "small and smart" approach, for example) or conceptual changes.

Presenting a different point of view, this essay contends that it is possible to turn the IDF into a more professional army adapted to the challenges it must face within the model of a people's army, which remains crucial in light of the threats against Israel and its geo-strategic situation. It is possible and necessary to do so not only on the basis of organizational changes or technological improvements, but also – and principally – on the basis of a full adaptation of all the components, chiefly the professionalism of the command core, to the reality in which the IDF operates and the challenges it will face.

Professional, Quality Command: The Key to the Challenges of Tomorrow

The Winograd Commission recommended:

> The military profession is extremely demanding: it involves command and management, knowledge of technical issues and the operation of technological systems, and at the end of the day, the ultimate test of commanding soldiers who are risking their lives under stressful situation by the commanders whose lives are also at stake. Investment in quality training of commanders and soldiers is sometimes more important than investment in the quality of the equipment at their disposal, and is critical in order to make optimal use of the sophisticated equipment.[2]

It seems that no one doubts that the quality of the command core determines the outcome of IDF missions. This quality is determined essentially by four major variables: the selection of commanders; the training of officers in both the regular and reserve armies; the number of officers and the numerical ratio between officers and soldiers; and finally, the career development of the officers both in terms of mandatory retirement age and in terms of their various positions during their years of service. The comprehensive quality of the command structure is thus a product of the multiple variables, i.e., all the variables are indispensable and one significant weakness in any of the four is capable of damaging the quality as a whole. The question of how to improve the chain of command given the constraints on the IDF, including constraints of resources, the society, the government, and the legislative body, and how to adapt commanders to the complex challenges facing them is thus one of the key questions capable of affecting the comprehensive power of the IDF.

Selecting Potential Officers

Selecting a pool of potential commanders and choosing the most suitable candidates is the first necessary stage in defining the officer cadre. Belonging to this group is a precondition, though not the sole criterion, to the development of an officer. In the IDF, this selection takes place in two primary stages: the first occurs before enlistment when the potential serviceperson's quality rating and officer suitability are determined. This

process establishes whether the soldier is part of the potential officer cadre or not.

The second stage takes place during service. Here, unlike most armed forces, the IDF selects its officer from among the ranks,[3] i.e., from the units in which the potential cadre of officers are serving as soldiers. The advantage of this method lies in its ability to identify those who were already identified by previous testing as the most suitable ones on the basis of their performance in practice. In other words, unlike most armies in which the officers are chosen primarily on the basis of theoretical testing, the IDF has the advantage of seeing them function as soldiers and even as junior commanders before it decides to turn them into officers, and this lends the selection more weight. Assuming that the potential officer cadre, as defined in the initial stage of selection, is uniformly and equally distributed in all units, this approach has enormous advantages in creating the possibility for identifying the most suitable commanders from this potential group. In practice, this is not so.

The IDF runs a meticulous and very effective pre-recruitment selection system whose purpose is to cull those suited to special and elite volunteer units from among the potential conscripts.[4] These units are given the opportunity to test and choose the most suitable recruits from among the identified potential.[5] In practice, most of those included as potential for the officer cadre are also identified as potential for the elite volunteer units, and therefore a situation is created in which almost all potential candidates for the officer cadre in operational units go through the "sieve" of physical selection processes (called "retreats" or *gibushim* in Hebrew) before their placement, and the top[6] among them will find their way to the elite volunteer units.[7] Those who do not earn high marks in the selection process are placed in operational units (the operational brigades and battalions) representing the mass of the IDF combat force. On the other hand, of those selected for the volunteer units, only a relatively small number of potential commanders will actually advance to the command cadre.

In short, the current selection method, which gives preference to placement in the volunteer elite units, creates a situation in which on the one hand the most capable personnel, i.e., those placed in these units, will not be tapped for officer purposes, not necessarily even as junior officers, while on the other hand, the quality of the potential pool remaining for

the officer cadre of the operational units, from which the future core of commanders develops, is of necessity made up of less qualified recruits. The paradox is that the more sophisticated and efficient the selection system becomes, the fewer outstanding candidates in practice it will miss. In other words, the IDF, on the basis of its own free will, perpetuates a situation in which the most qualified candidates are not the ones who become potential officers in the operational units.

The present system is ill conceived not only because it prefers the very last soldier in a volunteer unit to the first officer in the Golani and Givati Brigades, but also because it is wasteful with the most highly qualified human resource available to the IDF. Moreover, it reinforces the ethos that gives clear preference to service in a commando unit rather than to volunteering to lead.

The Good – to Elite Units; the Best – to Officer Training

The only yardstick the army is required to use when testing operational or administrative subjects is the contribution (direct or indirect) to overall IDF operational effectiveness. In this sense there is no doubt that a highly qualified command core, at all echelons of command, makes an immeasurably greater contribution to the comprehensive effectiveness of the IDF than that made by the elite units, no matter how great, bold, or heroic. It is true that in the past the volunteer and special units were a platform used by the IDF to set high standards for the military as a whole, and as such were also the primary greenhouse for the highly qualified officer cadre of the entire IDF.[8] However, for years this is no longer the case, as the current practice is that every unit develops the core of future commanders from within its own ranks (and rightly so).

The conclusion is twofold: first, the IDF must ensure that its selection process is geared towards identifying potential future officers, and, second, it has to ensure that this potential is steered towards units in a way that provides a sound basis for the development of future officers from within the ranks in the units.[9] At the first stage, the IDF must reduce to a minimum the number of units allowed to engage in a pre-recruitment selection process in order to prevent the current situation whereby the "obvious choice" of the most qualified recruits determines their placement in the IDF rather than the army's real manpower requirements.

At a later stage, the IDF must find the right equilibrium between steering potential officers to field units and steering them to the volunteer units. One of the ways to ensure a balance between the need for excellent officers and the need for excellent soldiers for the volunteer units is to stand the current selection system on its head, i.e., to select the potential for officer training in a preliminary selection process, and to select the soldiers for the special units from within the ranks. The recruitment of soldiers (and not potential conscripts) to special units was done in the past. It was only because of the long period of training compared to the short time in service that the IDF preferred to make the selection at the beginning of the service period. In most armies in the world, special forces soldiers are selected from within the ranks and serve in these units as standing servicemen. Both in terms of mentality and maturity and in terms of effectiveness between training time and service time, it would be right to adopt the universal model. A good example of this model is implemented in the Special Police Unit ("Yamam"), which recruits its service personnel after their release and trains them for combat roles they will fulfill as fighters in the standing force. To a large extent, Yamam succeeds in preserving a very high level of qualified personnel compared with parallel IDF units, which have relatively less qualified manpower, since the forces' maturity, training, and experience outweigh the basic manpower qualifications.

Number of Officers

In their book *Crisis in Command*,[10] Gabriel and Savage analyze the reasons for the failure of the American command in Vietnam, which they identify as the primary reason for the American failure in that war. One of the main factors they identify is the overly large number of officers, which relates to two central negative phenomena: the lower quality of the officers and the lower requirements and standards as the number of officers rises. Both phenomena lead to no less than damage to unit cohesion – one of the most significant foundations for the quality of an operational unit.

The quality of the officers declines as their quantity increases. This almost axiomatic statement in developing an officer cadre in modern militaries stems from two major reasons. One is that the selection pool narrows as the system feeding the officer cadre is required to fill more positions, a situation in which compromises will necessarily be made

with regard to standards and quality, if only to fill the ranks. The second reason stems from the quality of the training given to the officers: when it is necessary to train more officers, the level and quality of training inevitably drops. Every year the IDF trains thousands of officers[11] in courses lasting five to six months, after which the officers are placed in their positions in the units, including operational positions. The vast majority of officers will fill only one or two positions before leaving the service.[12] This situation stems from a model that became fixed over the years whereby the duration of compulsory standing army service for junior officers was just one year, which put the entire military into a state of "hyperventilation,"[13] with a continuous race to train officers and fill positions.

One senior IDF commander once noted correctly that the rank of second lieutenant is not an officer rank[14] but a rank bestowed in the first year of the officer's service, a year that is actually a hands-on year-in-training. In practice, from day one these officers are in the thick of operational activity, a direct product of the short period of time they will fill officer functions before completing their army service.[15] It is clear that in this reality, the IDF finds itself consistently compromising on the quality of those designated for officer training as well as on the standards one could possibly insist on given such mass training. This reality necessarily generates two ancillary problems: the inability to tap this vast number in the reserves,[16] and the destructive effect on the possibility of developing the remaining potential of a junior command core of squad commanders and sergeants,[17] which is, as in any professional army, supposed to be the basic layer on which the entire command structure is constructed and anchored. An essential weakness at this level causes the entire chain of command to be sucked downwards in an attempt to cover the gap with directives, procedures, and mentoring to control this inherent weakness.

Less is More

The recommendation on this point is almost trivial: the IDF must drastically reduce the number of officers serving in its ranks, both in the regular and the standing army. Here too the military leaders must strive for a change in the ethos that took root in the IDF, whereby anyone who can and wants to must become an officer.[18] The IDF must strive to establish an ethos that endorses high quality and high standards for the

officer cadre as dominant values, and establish the officer cadre as the "club" that admits only the very few who can demonstrate their ability to meet high professional standards over the long term (as in the pilot training course and in elite units).

In order to effect such a situation, the IDF must reduce the number of officers. This reduction is possible through the following three steps:

a. *Civilian systems.* In recent years the IDF has undergone a major outsourcing process and in doing so has privatized entire systems that were in the past manned by IDF soldiers and officers, such as the catering system, the motor vehicle pool, and others. The IDF must continue in this direction, guaranteeing three primary criteria: one, the system is not part of the routine or emergency operational system; two, there is long term economic benefit; and three, the level of service given to the IDF is at the very least not adversely affected.[19]

b. *A solid, revitalized system of NCOs and civilians employed by the army.* This is a basis that provides the skeleton for the professional system and in some cases even for the operational system as well in armies around the world. The advantage of this approach lies in the relative permanence of these systems, i.e., the systems' ability to remain in the same function for a long period of time, allowing for greater professionalization without considerations of promotions and periodic lateral moves so characteristic of the officer cadre.

c. *Extending the reenlistment period* for officers completing the IDF Haim Laskov Officers School to three to four years. In recent years, the air force and navy have combined the academic contents for the officers and naval commanders courses so that anyone graduating from these courses earns a Bachelor's degree. This change has necessitated extending the training period and consequently also the extension of the reenlistment period. By contrast, the ground forces still operate with a model of a short five month course followed by a single year's reenlistment period. One of the assumptions is that extending the reenlistment period would lower motivation and reduce the number of soldiers attending the Officers' School, thereby making it difficult for the army to fill its ranks. Yet this assumption prefers the current view to the visionary one, which necessarily invites false conclusions and leaves the current system in place. Although it is difficult to say with certainty what the implications of such a change would be on

the motivation to become an officer, it is certainly possible to point to two processes that would assuredly change today's statistics. The first is that the IDF will train far fewer officers every year, and therefore will need much less of a potential pool of candidates than at present. The second stems from the expected shift in ethos likely to result from so significant a change that would necessarily lead to a different view of the officer's role in the IDF.[20]

Training the Officer Cadre

One of the central questions in this discussion thus becomes, what is the military profession? Whether the IDF is a profession or a mission has been debated for years. The view of officer training presented by Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Gabi Ashkenazi to the General Staff in 2007 stated that there is no contradiction between the two: service is a mission that must be executed professionally. Over the last two years the Doctrine and Training Division of the IDF has undertaken a comprehensive study in order to define the manner of training for the IDF officer cadre that ensures ongoing training to develop the officer's capabilities with regard to the level at which s/he operates and in accordance with her/his position. This is the first time that there is an outline of a development track for the IDF's officer cadre in accordance with universal professional standards. The concept, now in its implementation stages, has established academic contents for the entire officer cadre in order to create a necessary common professional basis, and requires that every officer undergo a command and staff course before being awarded the rank of lieutenant colonel in order to prevent a situation (prevalent in recent years) where officers studied law or business administration instead of the military profession.

If we focus on officers' courses (at the Haim Laskov Officers School, pilot training course, and naval commander course), the question that immediately arises concerns the profile of the graduates: are we giving them the technical tools to be a platoon commander, for example, or are we giving them the fundamentals and a broad base for all the components of the military profession that are supposed to be the professional foundation necessary for their continued professional development? Clearly, the five month period most officers spend (and for most of them this will be the only professional military training they undergo during their entire military service, whether in the regular army or in the

reserves!) is not enough to give them both. The system naturally tends towards the practical field and results in a technocratic officer class,[21] one that is highly capable of dealing with practical problems at familiar levels but is hard pressed to cope with complex problems requiring broad based theoretical knowledge and a high level of understanding of the military profession.

Here too the IDF differs from foreign armies where officer training occurs in a long, institutionalized training process in military academies that allow officers to acquire the professional foundations that will serve them over the course of a military career. The basic assumption in these armies is that being an officer is a profession and that from the moment someone has chosen this profession s/he must undergo in-depth training just like other academic professions. The IDF still takes the approach that being an officer is more a posting than a profession; the direct result is that the vast majority of officers trained by the Israeli army will remain in their positions for a very short period before turning to their "real" careers in life after their term of service ends. The problem focuses primarily on those who stay in the system and continue to develop in it as officers. The vast majority of these personnel will remain with the training they received in their officer's course – the last training they ever receive in the military profession.[22] Those who continue to develop into roles played by lieutenant colonels will have to wait 10-15 years before encountering the institutions of military training in the command and staff training course.

Officers Academy: Bestowing the Foundations for the Military Profession

Selecting officers from among the ranks has allowed the IDF an advantage in the way that officers are selected and in the practical experience they accrue before they join the officers' training course. Nevertheless, given the assumption based on earlier recommendations about selecting officers and reducing their numbers, the IDF is required to improve significantly the professional foundations given to its officers in their basic officer training in the form of a military academy for training the officer class. Such an approach reflects the universal recognition that the military is a profession like any other, requiring a broad base of theoretical knowledge, and requires the adoption of an academic model instead

of the current one, which emphasizes practical knowledge serving the officer in junior positions.

Considering that designated officers have undergone very basic training and even junior command courses before coming to the officers course, and given the assumption that it is possible to bestow an academic degree on those remaining within the system at a point in their future development, it should be possible within one year to give a firm professional foundation to the future IDF officer cadre. Such a foundation is of course required also of the officers being trained in the pilot and naval commander courses, which have already embraced an academic model, but requires significant adjustment of the academic contents for implementation of this approach. If all IDF officers acquire a firm professional basis in the officers course it will be possible to build the designated training programs in the regular service and the reserves on these foundations and thereby considerably improve the professionalism of the entire IDF officers core.

The Short Military Career: A Mixed Blessing

Questions about retirement age of standing army service personnel and early retirement are often central issues in the public discourse in Israel, especially when it comes to the argument between a Treasury that rejects the notion of the special conditions enjoyed by standing army personnel, versus the IDF and the Defense Ministry which insist on them.[23] This discussion quickly degenerates into pure economics: rights, rewards, the attractiveness of the service, compensation for the irregular way of life, and so on. In the midst of this, people – especially army personnel – often forget the professional aspects affected by this argument. There is no doubt that army service, especially that of the operational officer class, cannot be considered a profession just like any other and that it must not be thought of as such, if only for the simple reason that the purpose of the operational officer cadre of all ranks requires the members of this cadre to risk their lives routinely in order to fulfill the tasks assigned to them. In this the military profession is different from any other profession and is therefore worthy of different standards in terms of the service model and its rewards. However, the discussion of officers' careers must not end with that statement. It is only proper that the question of "what is the right way to develop officers over their term of service in order to

train them in the best way possible for their positions" also be asked, assuming that filling different positions, both operational and staff and training positions, are an integral part of the training system of an officer advancing through the ranks.

The basic assumption of a short career has unintentionally created a number of byproducts that affect the development of a military career. The first is the phenomenon known as "the second career," which implies the significant advantage of the second career that officers, according to this model, can pursue after leaving the army while still in their prime. One of the major problems created by this phenomenon is that many officers are busy preparing for their next career during their military service. An expression of this problem is the fact that many prefer general studies capable of promoting a second career to military studies, and do so on the army's dime and the army's time.

In practice, one can easily imagine a paradoxical situation of an educated discussion in a commanders meeting about economic or legal issues while those seated around the table lack the necessary professional tools to discuss and solve military-professional problems. While this scenario is extreme, it is not far from the reality that has come into being, as both the Command and Staff College and the National Security College have been educating the officer class not designated for central command or staff positions, while the "hard core" operations officers have been attending academic institutions and studying in departments of law, economics, and business administration. In recent years this issue has been redressed to a certain extent: the operational officers and potential future commanders are now required to go through the Command and Staff College or the National Security College. Thus the IDF has found itself – not in its best interest – training senior manpower for the Israeli economy, while it parts from its officers when in most cases they have not yet realized their potential.

A second issue is the duration of postings and officer development between posts. In recent years there has been a dramatic change that has significantly raised the age of commanders. If 15-20 years ago the average battalion commander was appointed at the age of 28 and the average brigade commander started his posting at 32-33, today battalion commanders are appointed at 32-34 while brigade commanders start at 36-37. The primary reason for this situation lies in the creation at the end

of the 1980s of service tracks that led to many officers reenlisting for long service periods, together with the creation of a norm of holding posts for relatively long periods (two years) in command positions.[24]

In practice, especially with regard to ground forces, the concept of developing a career in a professional manner has not yet taken hold, leading to two secondary phenomena with severe ramifications: one, there is almost no transition between command and staff positions, because the understanding is that command positions are much more influential with regard to promotions (the old IDF ethos that venerates operational command over paper-pushing at the staff also contributes to this), and therefore many officers avoid significant staff postings before being promoted to the rank of brigadier general,[25] a fact that without a doubt represents a significant professional lacuna according to professional criteria. The second phenomenon is that high quality officers in the ground forces are not represented in the general staff – neither as a professional cadre whose voice is heard in fundamental discussions shaping the nature of the IDF for years to come,[26] nor as an element representing the interests of the branch in various discussions.

The third issue touches on budgetary concerns. In practice, the Israeli army finances the pensions of its officers until the age of 67 out of the defense budget. This component of the IDF's budget is expected to continue to rise in the coming few years and will continue to offset the army's budgetary flexibility and, as such, the army's ability to respond to operational needs and force buildup. Understanding this point has led the IDF for the first time in years to examine the issue of the pensions and duration of service. In 2004, the IDF moved to a model of a cumulative pension. The effects of this move on pension expenses are expected to reduce the spending on pensions out of the general defense budget in the long term and to increase the defense system's budgetary flexibility. However, while the results of this move will economically speaking be visible in the long term, its implications in terms of the career army officers model are liable to find dramatic expression much sooner. The pervasive reluctance to leave the service, due to the monetary pension that left many standing army personnel in the system until retirement age, is expected to crumble and with it, the assumptions about the career model.

One Central, Balanced Career

In terms of regulating the military career, the IDF must make some immediate adjustments. First needed is a fair relationship between the serviceman and the system so that the challenge of the job itself will be the central component in an officer's considerations when thinking about staying on. One of the central tensions and a real challenge to the military is finding a balance between the highly demanding nature of the organization represented in its culture and conduct, on the one hand, and family life, on the other. This issue arises as a central point for officers making a choice about continuing their military career, which is a challenge to family life. The issue has become even more complex in recent years as women have been developing their own careers and the demand for a different type of division of the family burden has become increasingly legitimate. There is no doubt that in this sense the IDF is required to make a profound change, not just in the material or organizational settings, but also – and especially – in its conception of manpower management and organizational culture. Raising the age of retirement can be an opportunity for the IDF, instead of its being the threat it is viewed as today. A long career ending at the age of 55-57 allows a more moderate promotion policy necessary for the inclusion of staff positions, training, and education for officers at every rank, instead of the intensity embodied by the current model. Such an alternate model would ensure a more professional group of officers as well as less intensive periods at every stage of their careers that could also allow the officer and his family some breathing room. In short, it would be possible to develop the officer more professionally and in a more balanced manner, and to save significantly on pension spending while improving the conditions given the officer and his family. Over the years, this model would produce a professional officer corps, where military service is a calling and a source of pride. Such an officer cadre would be capable of creating a new ethos for the military profession that would raise its status and thus attract more highly qualified manpower into its ranks.

Conclusion

The complex sphere in which the IDF operates, which includes international law pressures, questions of legitimacy, the motivation of Israeli society, and budgetary limitations confront the army with an

unprecedented challenge. The need to supply uncompromising security on the one hand and the enormous complexity of the combat sphere on the other require IDF commanders more than ever before to have professional skills (theoretical-analytical) no less than operational skills in leading forces into battle. It would seem that here the IDF is finding it difficult to generate an essential change, as it is caught between current needs and its own ethos.

This vicious cycle can be broken in only one long but crucial way, namely, professionalization of the army's chain of command. This change is intimately linked to a change in the ethos that has accompanied the IDF since its inception: not just experience but also in-depth, professional training in the military profession ("academization"), not just a calling but also a career, not "the best to elite units" but also the best to command, not a first career on the road to the real career but rather one major career.

The IDF is already required to construct a whole coherent model to develop a high quality command core based on four components: selecting the most highly qualified candidates for command; drastically reducing the number of officers trained and raising the standards of training; institutionalized professional training for all command echelons; and adjusting the career aspect in terms of length of service and the pattern of postings, because of the needs of officers and their families, the needs of their professional training, and the needs of the system. Without constructing a whole new model it seems that the crisis in which the IDF has found itself in recent years will only become more acute.

It is not necessary to change the people's army model, nor is it necessary to overwhelm the budget. The IDF itself has the capacity to improve the quality of its command cadre fundamentally at every level through making decisions that are within its own purview, and to base its doctrine of operations on this highly qualified command core in the face of the developing challenges. When David Ben-Gurion established the IDF he demanded that Israeli quality counter the quantity enjoyed of Arab armies. The truth of this founding principle has not only not eroded, but appears more right than ever for the IDF and the State of Israel in the contemporary environment. High quality command is a fundamental principle for a professional Israeli army and a cornerstone of IDF strategy, which requires comprehensive reforms so that the IDF

may continue to safeguard the integrity of the State of Israel and the security of its residents from any future threat.

Notes

1   The Winograd Commission Report, Chapter 17, Section 40, p. 550.
2   Winograd Report, Chapter 12, Section 31, p. 425.
3   Exceptions are the pilot training course and the naval commander course, which identify the future officer cadre in a selection process taking place before enlistment.
4   This includes elite commando units, pilot and naval officer courses, elite units such as Shaldag, search and rescue units, Egoz, and so on, and the paratrooper division, which is a volunteer unit. The general rule is that anyone who is basically fit and wants to try out for one of these units is given the opportunity to do so.
5   The IDF selects soldiers for elite units differently from the way this is done in most of the world's militaries, where the pool of potential officers comprises the soldiers that have served in regular units.
6   "Top" expresses the combination of cognitive capabilities confirmed in the early selection process at the recruitment centers with physical, social, leadership, and other capabilities demonstrated during the physical selections.
7   The selection method prior to enlistment gives preference to the hopes of future conscripts to serve in volunteer units. Most of the high quality recruits strive to get into the most elite units. There are recruits who will attend three or even four retreats before placement in order to fulfill their dream. Those who do not succeed are placed in companies designated for operational battalions.
8   So, for example, Moshe Dayan designated a central role for Unit 101 in establishing high norms of command and combat. The assimilation of these norms throughout the IDF was made possible by the appointment of the graduates of 101 and its successor, the Paratrooper Brigade, to central command positions.
9   At stake here is primarily a change needed in the selection for the field units, because the air force and the navy already select their officer cadres for pilot and naval commander courses in their pre-enlistment selection process, and thereby ensure the high quality of the command structure in these branches.
10 Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, *Crisis in Command*: *Mismanagement in the Army* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1979) uses universal experience and professional parameters to analyze the primary reasons that caused the failure of the command in this war.
11 This means that in the course of 25 years of service by an officer in the regular army and the reserves, the IDF trains tens of thousands of officers! Obviously, in the best case scenario, most of this potential is not fully tapped; in the worst case scenario, they make a negative contribution by inflating the

command centers suffering from a surfeit of officers or by certifying officers in many reserve units above the quotas. In some cases, they serve functions as squad commanders; in other cases, two to three officers serve in the same platoon, and this is liable to be very damaging to cohesion.

12 Exceptions to this are the pilot and naval commander courses, which train a relatively small number of officers over a relatively long period of time (three to four years), before assigning them operational positions.

13 Similar to the medical phenomenon in which the patient breathes very shallow rapid breaths in order to supply the necessary oxygen to the body, which under normal conditions needs fewer but deeper breaths.

14 In fact, in the IDF's list of available positions there is no such rank as second lieutenant. Second lieutenants serve in positions that according to the IDF's manpower requirements are described as lieutenant positions.

15 For purposes of comparison, whereas an air force pilot is trained for almost five years before becoming an operational pilot and a naval commander is trained for almost four years before commanding a junior operational task, the young officer in the ground forces, will, after a two and a half to three year service period (of which five to six months are spent on officer training), find himself commanding a system in operational activity in the different combat zones.

16 While in the regular army there is a constant race to fill the ranks, in the reserves there is an overwhelming glut that cannot be utilized and certainly not developed or trained. In certain places, this results in the social division of the burden among several officers (a destructive trend, capable of damaging the cohesion of the troops) or in situations in which officers fill the function of NCOs – a problematic situation in and of itself.

17 In a General Command Faculty conference held in 1956 after the Sinai Campaign, when it became clear that the layer of squad commanders was the weak link in the chain of command, the head of the training division at the time, Col. Iska Shadmi, claimed that the reason for the failure was "not the result of inadequate training – this was not the problem – but rather the level of manpower remaining for the task after the large scale entreating of people to serve in all other conceivable positions." Sagi Turgan, *Training Combat Leadership in the IDF 1949-1956* (Doctoral dissertation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2008), p. 87.

18 Recently the commander of Training Base 4, Col. Aharon Haliwa, said that anyone who can embark on an officer's training course and fails to do so is "a criminal," a statement that is deeply rooted in the existing ethos.

19 One example, cited by the Brodet report, is transferring the medical services given in military clinics, currently employing many officers in the regular and standing army and in the reserves, into civilian hands.

20 A representative example in this context lies in the changes that took place in the age of service personnel in command and staff positions, as well as the

extension of the terms of the positions, two changes that were seen as impossible merely a decade ago.

21 A fairly superficial examination will show that the vast majority of majors in the principal command headquarters who serve as the foundation for the system in executing most of the work of the staff underwent their first and only training in the form of the officers course (at the Haim Laskov Officers School or the now defunct BAHAD 12 Officers' School in Tzrifin), which gave them the "professional foundations" serving them to this day.

22 This gap in the perception of officer training has been identified especially among personnel with the rank of major serving on the staffs of the principal command headquarters. Therefore, a course designed to close the training gap, if only a little, has already been developed especially for them.

23 For many years the IDF assumed that the main draw for serving in the IDF was the early age of retirement and that any impinging on it would lead to its inability to keep officers in the system. However, at the same time the IDF avoided asking what damages from a professional perspective resulted from this service model.

24 Until the early 1990s the average service time of a battalion or brigade commander was one to one and a half years.

25 A familiar phenomenon is that ground force officers reaching the rank of general first encounter "the staff world" as heads of divisions at the General Staff.

26 This is especially serious because the IDF is a ground army and the General Headquarters (MATKAL) is the headquarters of the ground forces in addition to being the supreme headquarters encompassing all the military service branches.

The US Military in Iraq and the IDF in Judea and Samaria

Giora Segal

Introduction

In recent years the phenomenon of war has been commonly divided into symmetrical warfare and asymmetrical warfare. Notwithstanding new semantics, however, there is nothing new about this division,[1] which represents the two principal interrelated components of war[2] and therefore demands ongoing professional study.[3] Confrontations between countries are liable to develop into symmetrical conventional wars, and at the same time or in their wake, a confrontation with asymmetrical properties can ensue. The transition from fighting a conventional enemy to fighting terror and guerilla tactics is a direct and natural transition.

For some years there has been an understanding in the Middle East that a limited confrontation takes place alongside and pursuant to the conventional war.[4] Armed forces must prepare to cope with the new aspects of this phenomenon, both in terms of force buildup and deployment. What is especially new in this phenomenon is that force deployment of this nature by non-state organizations and the challenge they pose to democratic countries is growing. The term "a terrorilla army"[5] describes both the operational ability of a terror organization to be a quasi-military organization, and the difficulty democratic countries face in coping with it in military terms, as these organizations operate from within civilian populations and use them as human shields.

Against this background, this essay examines some selected issues to compare the deployment of the United States armed forces in Iraq since 2003 and IDF deployment in Judea and Samaria.

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The Background to the United States Fighting in Iraq

After occupying Iraq in 2003, the US instituted military rule. The US strategy in Iraq, which was devised after the occupation, determined that control must be built, strengthened, and transferred to a local Iraqi administration under the right conditions:[6] a degree of governmental stability, a low level of violence, and the basis for a reasonable civilian life. Achieving these conditions is necessary throughout Iraq, down to the level of the local authority. Three operational components were derived from this strategy:

a. Economics: international humanitarian aid, aid to develop regional economic infrastructures, resource management, and establishment of an economic growth capability.

b. Government: restructuring the Iraqi administration, institutionalizing and strengthening self-government, and developing a functional capability in civilian areas and social rehabilitation.

c. Defense: reducing the level of violence by means of a comprehensive and direct campaign by the United States against terror, building up the Iraqi military, forging local and regional police forces, improving the personal security of civilians, enhancing public security, and safeguarding civilian life.

The tensions between the national political system in Iraq, especially the Shiite dominance balanced by the Sunnis and Kurds in the representative central government in Baghdad, and the local community politics based on religious, party, and tribal allegiance are a springboard for violence. Thus violence in Iraq, which comprises the overall threat, is inter- and intra-community violence and violence based on "resistance." After General Petraeus was appointed commander of the American forces in Iraq in the spring of 2007, the US adopted the "surge" strategy, significantly boosted their forces in Iraq, and started concerted military operations designed to inflict heavy damage on terror elements and neutralize their treat.[7] The essence of this strategy was to infuse the field with military force and conduct an intensive operation against the armed uprising as well as an extensive action within the civilian population in cooperation with all the available security organizations.[8] From June 2007, four months after the start of this campaign, there was a marked decline in inter-community violence.

From the United States' point of view the initial results of the surge strategy[9] were successful, both as there were very few fighting incidents in the operational areas of responsibility, and because the security stability in the areas under US responsibility improved appreciably. In addition, the civilian rehabilitation of these areas greatly boosted cooperation between the Iraqi civilians and the Americans. These developments created a sense that the situation was proceeding in the right direction and that the surge strategy and all that it entails (improvement in the local infrastructures following work by American rehabilitation teams, local economic improvement, and other civilian improvement components at local town, village, or municipal levels where the military activity has been successful) will ultimately further the possibility of withdrawal of American forces from Iraq.

Nevertheless, the tensions still exist,[10] as control of the area by large US and Iraqi forces under the aegis of the Americans has remained a crucial condition of maintaining the achievements of the surge. Transferring US forces to Afghanistan, which was initially at the expense of the forces in Iraq, necessitated significantly increasing and boosting the Iraqi forces in cooperation with the United States, to make the surge achievements possible.

In January 2010, the Americans decided to attempt a similar strategy in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, reflected in President Obama's decision in December 2009 to add 30,000 troops to the force in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, violent incidents continue in Iraq, and although the intensity has decreased, the potential for their extensive renewal exists.

The way to attain sustainable achievements requires the ability to transfer the authority resulting from occupation of the territory to local forces that can impose the necessary order. As of now, this has yet to be achieved in Iraq, and it is not clear if withdrawal will generate regional stability. Large scale terror is liable to develop in a place where there is no regional stability or a reasonable means of administration.

Iraq and the West Bank: Mapping the Threat

For some years the Judea and Samaria area has been the IDF's main arena for combating threats of terror and urban guerilla warfare (as opposed to threats of high trajectory mortar and rocket fire from the Gaza arena).

In the Judea and Samaria arena the IDF has faced the threat of terror warfare in a long and ongoing campaign of attrition. In the past this was reflected in direct attacks on military forces and administrative civilian operational elements, and in indirect systemic damage to governmental and administration systems, civilian life, the security of the Israeli and Palestinian populations, and the pursuit of normal life in the region. The level of this threat has lessened significantly since Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 and the subsequent years of the anti-terror campaign in Judea and Samaria, though the potential exists and is kept at a low level through continuous operational activity by Central Command and the IDF's security organizations.

In Iraq the threat is actualized by terrorist elements and by criminal organizations that damage the fabric of governmental life. This threat is no different from that described in the principles that T. E. Lawrence formulated in the 1920s not far from Iraq while combating guerilla fighters in the Middle East.[11] The difference between the challenge that Lawrence talked about and the challenge the Americans now face in Iraq lies in the operational and military technological capabilities acquired by irregular forces.

An initial observation suggests that the tactical threats in the West Bank and in Iraq are similar and incorporate the following common elements:

a. Direct guerilla and terror attacks on military forces and civilian systems
b. Use of snipers in urban areas and open areas
c. Fire from ambush in urban areas and on traffic routes
d. High trajectory mortar and rocket fire
e. Suicide bombers, attacks on guerilla units, outposts, and roadblocks
f. Car bombs in combined attacks
g. Attempts to kidnap soldiers, civilians, and employees of government and civilian support organizations

There is also much similarity between the urban domains where some of the warfare occurs. In-depth knowledge of the urban domain – i.e., knowledge of the older parts of typical Middle East cities, e.g., the "kasbah," understanding of the population, familiarity with the use of underground areas as a significant operational domain in the urban space

– enables terror and guerilla activists to establish an effective operational capability.

Fighting in Judea and Samaria vs. Fighting in al-Anbar

Examination of the fighting against terror and guerilla activities in Judea and Samaria and in western Iraq in 2003-2009 is intriguing and generates important conclusions.[12] In September 2007, as part of the surge strategy operations, General Allen's division, which was stationed in western Iraq,[13] was given the following mission: carry out combat operations against the guerilla and terror activities to achieve security and civilian stability; overcome el-Qaeda in the region; neutralize the popular uprising in the district; formulate internal security capabilities; establish a local administrative capability; and enable economic development, in collaboration with the leadership in al-Anbar and together with the US provincial reconstruction rehabilitation (PRT) team, in order to allow the transfer of governmental and security authority to the local administration and to the renewed Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The mission will be completed when regional stability is achieved; a time frame was not stipulated.

The district of al-Anbar is bordered on the west by Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, and on the east by central Iraq and the Tigris-Euphrates basin. The size of the area is the equivalent of Britain. The main cities there are Rahava, Hith, al-Asad, Rithba, Fluja, and Ramadi, all with over 200,000 residents and surrounded by many other towns in Iraq's western desert. The total population of the area is around 1.5 million inhabitants. Responsibility for this enormous area rested with a divisional command with aerial and special forces capabilities, and two BCT American structured regiments.[14] The principal enemy named by the Americans was al-Qaeda.

The assault operations focused mainly on the cities. The operations in the area were principally arrest and interrogation operations, targeted killings, raids, and obstruction and screening operations. The use of military intelligence, HUMINT, VISINT, and SIGINT, and the use of trained dogs were essential and hence widespread. The urban area brigades operated in a number of ways, first, in offensive and defensive operations. The main effort was in offensive operations, with the defensive operations designed to protect the forces and permanent

bases. The second element was the use of an established Iraqi force and the building of an Iraqi force to collaborate with the Americans on control and enforcement of regional security. In the future this force can assume responsibility for the entire region. Meanwhile the American forces aimed to achieve stability by addressing the needs of the population on all physical infrastructure levels. The US premise was that addressing the needs of the Iraqi population at the regime level and the level of the local authority will allow a reasonable degree of normal life and will divert support away from terror. The idea was based on regional rehabilitation.

With regard to offensive activity, the IDF's activity in Judea and Samaria has similar attributes to those employed in the al-Anbar district. These include an offensive effort against terror, a defensive effort centered on operational military bases and Israeli centers of population, and a focused civilian effort to maintain the civilian infrastructure and fabric of life of the Palestinian civilians in the West Bank.

The principal differences are in the tactical modes of operation, and in the intelligence context and inter-organizational cooperation. Here one can identify a significant difference in the ability to enjoy in-depth cooperation between non-military organizations, which in the American context include intelligence organizations and the civilian support system, and in the IDF context include the GSS, the Civil Administration, and so on. In contrast with events in Iraq, where US intelligence activity does not involve the Iraqis with regard to the use of unique intelligence resources such as SIGINT and HUMINT, inter-organizational cooperation enables the IDF to continue to thwart terror activity. In addition, in Judea and Samaria an attempt has been made to build up local capabilities (police, PA security forces) to handle law and order on a local level. A Palestinian force trained by the Americans is operational in the Jenin, Nablus, and Ramallah districts, and its operational area and capabilities are slated for expansion. The removal of most of the roadblocks in Judea and Samaria, the withdrawal of most of the IDF force from the cities, and the open borders with Jordan allow impressive economic development.[15]

Management of criminal activity in Judea and Samaria is different from its counterpart in al-Anbar. Concurrent with the tactical operational activity in the Anbar district, the Americans engaged in building a strong Iraqi police force based on the understanding that the criminal organizations are strongly connected to terror activity and that the local

forces should handle the criminal organizations. The aim of building a police force was to transfer control of criminal issues to it after the withdrawal of the American forces. Keeping law and order was also a fundamental goal. Thus, the principles were:

a. Establishing Iraqi units against insurgents outside the cities
b. Establishing strong police forces in the towns
c. Deploying Iraqi units along the borders with Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia
d. Setting up a regional division comprising two or three American regional regiments, which carry out offensive and defensive activities and civil rehabilitation

Herein, therefore, lies a fundamental difference. In Iraq the general intent is to build up an army and security forces with skills and a range of abilities, while activity in Judea and Samaria is oriented towards developing forces for maintaining law and order that will be able to prevent terror (with Israel's support). Israel does not have any intention of developing state military abilities in the Palestinian Autonomy.

The Americans' main success in this region is combating al-Qaeda, though stabilization of the situation depends on continuous activity. This is likewise true for the Judea and Samaria arena. The recovery ability of terror in al-Anabar is similar to its potential to reemerge in Nablus, Ramallah, and Jenin. In both cases it appears that the preventive factor with the greatest impact is the presence and activity in the field and the urban areas where the civilian population is the main focus.

Accordingly, retaining a force's ongoing presence, maintaining initiative and an offensive approach, identifying operational opportunities, and conducting military operational activity supported by the police and civilian security elements are critical elements of success. The situation of Judea and Samaria is similar to al-Anbar in qualitative terms. In other words, while the IDF and the local police forces in the Palestinian areas, including the security systems there, do not work together, they coordinate their work in the complex West Bank reality. The result in terms of civilian life in the field is similar: a degree of stability and of law and order makes it possible to maintain the fabric of civilian life.

Urban Fighting in Baghdad

In addition to examining these principles of warfare, it is worthwhile looking at the elements of warfare in the urban domains. The typical mission of a division responsible for AO in Baghdad in the surge[16] days was to conduct a combined arm battle and carry out various kinds of military operations; and to provide security to the population, by overcoming the guerilla and terror elements and the criminal organizations in the division's area of responsibility and by reducing the activity of local cult or religious uprising units while enhancing the operational abilities of the Iraqi army and the local government capabilities. The divisional commander claims that this is not just a matter of combating terror and guerilla warfare but also a matter of complete municipal authority operations. As such, the divisional commander is responsible for many divergent elements, from various divisions, including Iraqi forces with a complex civil administration, to various kinds of intelligence units.

The Americans conducted campaigns with tactical properties similar to those used by the IDF in Judea and Samaria, though of longer duration. For example, operations involving entry into the northwestern part of Baghdad and beyond, from one target to another in the city's neighborhoods, continued over a period of several weeks. This is how an operational capability is formed, familiarization is achieved, and a large amount of knowledge of the area is accumulated. However, a significant difficulty results from the fact that a large part of the fighters and the chain of command are replaced every six months. This turnover impedes preservation of the operational knowledge over time.

The operational method in northwest Baghdad was based on operations in the field, as far as possible maintaining operational freedom of activity, and offensive campaigns with direct contact against terror elements, i.e., actual warfare. At the same time an operational effort was conducted with cooperation with local sheikhs. Cracks between organizations were exploited to procure collaborators, and by means of continuous payment, they were included as "salary recipients" of the US army. Activity of the ISF in close coordination with the Americans continued.

It is interesting to review the special campaigns in the divisional domain. They were conducted separately from the divisional command and control, and in many cases these operations were difficult to integrate

in the division's activity. Frequently there is a conflict of interest between the method of operation of the divisional commander and the nature of activity of the special operations. This is a consequence of the difference between the missions. The effort of the special operations must derive from insight into the operational environment of the division; if not, campaigns that go wrong can destroy long months of success of combat cooperation with locals. This resulted, for example, from extreme use of force in special operations by the Americans without the need, from their point of view, for coordinating with the divisional parties.

The use of force by the special forces in their operational arena is liable to be aggressive, utilizing all the abundant operational ability they have at their disposal. An operation can cause the deaths of collaborators or their families, due to the special force's lack of knowledge of the environment in which they are fighting, and local connection and cooperation efforts built up over several months may be wasted. Even though the inter-organizational cooperation and principles of command and control of the IDF were devised in order to avoid similar occurrences, this danger exists in Judea and Samaria too, and care should be taken to ensure that this lesson has been learned and applied.

Another important lesson learned by the Americans relates to dividing the region into regimental areas of activity. In their eyes this is one of the main keys to success, and therefore constant activity is maintained in the regimental fighting arena, including searches for hostile terrorist activity infrastructures, targeted killings, arrests, and interrogations, based on unified command and regimental coordination. Theses include combat operations − various types of ambushes, arrests and interrogations, specific attacks, targeted attacks, damaging the chain of command of the organizations in the urban area, psychological warfare campaigns with rumors and practical campaigns that support the rumors, use of SIGINT and HUMINT, and use of local collaborators that are suitable for a specific area. In this way the regiments also became a type of spatial regiment.

This analysis generates a number of insights in the context of the IDF:

a. Presence in the urban arena and ongoing familiarization with it generate an operational freedom of activity that allows greater potency against terror elements over time. The IDF has to find the best way to preserve this operational freedom of activity in the West

Bank cities, in order to preserve the ability to harm terror elements and undermine threats to regional stability.

b. The centers of operational knowledge that specialize in the area should be preserved as much as possible in the IDF, and as far as possible severing the knowledge chain by the frequent mobility of commanders should be avoided. The need to scale forces in other operational arenas (in Gaza and on the northern border, in particular following the Second Lebanon War) which leads to forces being moved around necessitates examining how it will be possible to continue to preserve the know how in the best possible way.

c. Special campaigns must be coordinated and linked on two levels: the first is on the level of operational coordination, meaning that the regional division commander has to be involved in the special operations in order to ensure that they are synchronized with the other divisional activity; and the second relates to the need to ensure that the objectives of the special campaign are compatible with the long term operational insights formed in the regional division.

d. The independence granted to the spatial American regiment is not suitable for application in Judea and Samaria. In Judea and Samaria the area is divided into regiments, which for the purpose of carrying out their missions mainly depend on the spatial division, and enjoy limited overall operational independence. Thus in many cases, an operational activity takes place in an area that does not come under the authority of the "spatial" divisional commander.

Conclusion

In the last few years of fighting and in particular since Operation Defensive Shield, the Americans have learned a lot from Israel and vice versa. Baghdad is a model for operational learning about warfare in a city, and the conclusions from the fighting in Baghdad can be applied to cities in Judea and Samaria. The reverse is also true.

An analysis of the situation in Iraq of 2009 concluded: "The semblance of stability in Iraq throughout the spring of 2009 and anticipation of the pending withdrawal of US combat forces have created a tendency among Americans to label the Iraq War a 'victory.' Such thinking overlooks the sectarian chaos of 2006 and 2007 and downplays the fact that Iraq's explosive internal disputes are largely held in check by the immediate

presence of US combat power."[17] Indeed, the overall connection between fighting and stabilization activities is worthy of examination. The American view and the British view of the need for civilian security stabilization operations result from their understanding of the population as the focus in the fighting arena against terror and guerilla activities. Stabilization operations should be researched for operational use by the IDF.

The stability achieved in Judea and Samaria since Operation Defensive Shield and the campaign against terror, which has been conducted continuously with varying degrees of intensity, persist only because the IDF is present there and undertakes extensive operational activity. The operational similarity is clear and therefore affords an important insight. A significant reduction in the IDF forces in Judea and Samaria is liable to return the region to the difficult security reality that existed before Operation Defensive Shield. The State of Israel must consider that in any future political agreement.

Notes

1   Yehoshafat Harakbi, *War and Strategy* (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1992), pp. 436-37. On symmetry and asymmetry in attrition see the example of the Boer War, 1899-1902.

2   Werner Hahlweg, *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy*, ed. Michael I Handel (London: Frank Cass, 1986), pp. 127-33. This article indicates that Clausewitz also related to guerilla warfare in his language as a small war, although the context of his reference was initially the fall of Prussia in 1806-7 and later the fighting in Russia in 1812. In a lecture series at a German war college in 1810-11, Clausewitz addressed this topic and defines the phenomenon and the connection between all the components of the phenomenon of war. In other words there is nothing new in "small" wars and in their juxtaposition to "big" wars, and the connection should be studied with regard to both force buildup and force operation in this kind of hybrid confrontation.

3   Giora Segal, "The Threat to Ground Maneuver as a Deciding Element," *Strategic Assessment* 10, no. 4 (2008): 27-35. In addition, the principle of equilibrium, which involves finding a balance between these two types of confrontation that always exist in war, demands attention when planning force buildup and operation in order to be ready for any type of confrontation. See also Harkabi, pp. 193-214. The analysis offered with regard to guerilla warfare and terror indicates the need for regular professional examination, with consideration to dealing with the unique situation while recognizing the historical background of this generic phenomenon. As Harakbi puts it, guerilla warfare is the oldest known form of war.

4   According to IDF thinking the asymmetrical confrontation is defined as "a limited confrontation."

5   Yoram Schweitzer, "The Limitations of War against a Terrorilla Army," *Military and Strategic Affairs* 1, no. 1 (2009).

6   David Kilcullen was one of the close advisors of General Petraeus. See David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerilla, Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (London: Hurst & Company, 2009).

7   Bing West, *The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics and the Endgame in Iraq* (New York: Random House, 2008), pp. 247-79. This campaign was led by General Petraeus and his staff, and was inspired by his ideas on combating guerilla warfare and terror. It was highly intensive and was based on his understanding of the way to deal with uprisings, guerilla warfare, and terror. Petraeus's view of the civilians as a strategic and operative focus in combating uprising largely enabled him to act in a determined fashion, using a large force against the terror and guerilla warfare activists.

8   Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerilla*. The chapter in the book devoted to the surge describes the formulation of this strategy. The idea is based on a well formed approach to combating uprisings, which believes in integration and cohesion of all the levels involved in this warfare context – the operational, civilian, and political levels. This holistic vision served as the basis of Petraeus's operational concept. It is interesting to note the interface between prior knowledge, history, learning from events in the field, and from the unique conditions in the fighting arena itself.

9   Ephraim Kam, "Entanglement in Iraq: Light at the End of the Tunnel?" *Strategic Assessment* 10, no 3 (2007): 6-13. The potential for tensions presented in this 2007 article still exists. The American presence in the region is the element that enables progress towards implementing a withdrawal strategy. The argument is paradoxical, but accurate.

10 Ibid.

11 T. E. Lawrence, *War & Peace*, ed. Malcolm Brown (London: Greenhill Books, 2005), pp. 275-84.

12 The difference between the al-Anbar district in Iraq and Judea and Samaria is clear, in terms of the size of the geographical area and the size and nature of the population. On the other hand, a qualitative comparison can be made in activity and the elements of the operational and strategic perception without any attempt to compare the general problem faced by the commander of the al-Anbar district and the commander of Judea and Samaria.

13 West, *The Strongest Tribe*, pp. 281-92. The Americans defined the operational results of the campaign against the uprising in Anbar as a victory and a successful implementation of the concept of combating the uprising introduced by General Petraeus and his team. Following the operations and the campaign as a whole, the Americans relate to their success in al-Anbar as a point for comparison and emulation. This is also the case with regard to their parallel campaign in Afghanistan.

14 BCT – Brigade Combat Team.

15 One should not overestimate the potential for cooperation. In this context one can learn a lot from the killing of the three people involved in the murder of Rabbi Meir Hai on December 26, 2009, whereby the IDF and GSS preferred to operate independently, even though the Palestinians could apparently have arrested those involved.

16 Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerilla*, pp. 115-85.

17 Clint ZumBrunnen, "Guardians of a Tense Peace: US Combat Forces in Iraq," *Strategic Assessment*, 12, no. 2 (2009): 79-90.

Warfare against Insurgencies:
The Theory behind the Practice

Tal Tovy

For most of its sixty years, the State of Israel has faced an ongoing confrontation generated by guerilla/terrorist movements.[1] After World War II, it became customary to call this phenomenon a war of revolution or insurgency, connoting confrontation launched by political-revolutionary movements whose goal is to attain governance through violent means and the politicization of the local population. This is not guerilla or terrorist warfare in the classical sense, rather a war that in the beginning uses guerilla tactics (rural or urban) and even terrorism, at the same time that it attempts to persuade the local population of the justness of the cause.[2]

The classical example of a war of revolution was the Chinese civil war between the forces of the Communist Party and the Kuomintang (the Chinese Nationalist Party). At first Mao Zedong's soldiers fought with guerilla tactics against the superior forces of the government army, but as the Communists gained strength they built a larger army, with units at the brigade and division levels that brought about a comprehensive defeat of the government forces. An insurgency can also thus be a civil war, but is not a war between two states. After World War II, European nations, the United States, and the Soviet Union often found themselves intervening on behalf of one side or another in various places around the world. Research suggests that insurgencies then were an expression of the Cold War: the two superpowers were incapable of fighting one another because of their huge nuclear arsenals, and therefore fought wars by proxy.[3] The current military confrontations in Afghanistan and

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Iraq are contemporary insurgencies. The forces of the United States and its allies are facing semi-military revolutionary forces using principles similar to those formulated by Mao in the 1930s during the Chinese civil war.

The purpose of this essay is to examine the development of military theory in the context of a war against a revolutionary army, or counterinsurgency (COIN), with an emphasis on British and American thinking, and to contend that it is possible to find military theory for confronting insurgency, similar to other modes of warfare that are well grounded in military theory. Israel has developed military theories and doctrines for conventional wars, but has not formulated any military theory regarding confrontations based on guerilla activity and terrorism.[4] Shlomo Gazit claims that after the Six Day War, the Israeli army looked to the experience of foreign armies in its attempt to confront Palestinian terrorism in the territories,[5] but he does not elaborate.

In order to understand COIN theories it is first necessary to understand Mao Zedong's military theory in the late 1930s. This theory greatly affected guerilla movements all over the Third World, including Fatah. In simplified terms, Mao stressed the importance of the civilian population in the struggle and the use of guerilla warfare as a tool. The way to attain victory, according to Mao, is to expand the human and territorial support base, while the guerilla forces simultaneously convert into a regular army. The struggle is political rather than military. In other words, the military force is only one means in an array of ways to attain the political meta-goal. The purpose of the military force is to defend political achievements and to serve as political agents within the civilian population.

One may say that Mao's military thinking rests on one central basic principle: the long lasting war. This principle includes three political and military sub-principles that interact and affect one another. The first is attaining the support of the peasantry. The second is the establishment of base areas. The third is the construction of regular military forces that will achieve the final victory, but only on condition that the first two sub-principles are attained.

In other words, already at this stage a war against an organization that operates on the basis of Mao's principles cannot focus only on the organization's overt military force but must also attend to its political and

social aspects. Therefore, those who say that damaging the organization's military force will bring about its political eradication are simply wrong.

British School of Thought

After World War II, Britain faced a broad-based Communist uprising in Malaya. It began in 1948 and continued until it was finally quelled in 1960.[6] Six years after the end of the war, Sir Robert Thompson, one of the most important figures in the suppression of the Communist uprising, published his experience and the lessons he learned in a book called *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam*.[7] In this book, which can be read in context of Mao's military thinking, Thompson formulated five basic principles for the successful management of a counterinsurgency. In fact, this book makes it clear that Thompson was one of the most important military thinkers in the second half of the twentieth century, because his military theory was based on practical experience and affected the management of COIN in the years to come. In this, he differs from thinkers in the field of nuclear warfare, whose ideas have remained purely theoretical. Moreover, as we shall see, Thompson's principles are relevant today too.

Thompson's first principle is the construction of a political, economic, and social system that will oppose Communist ideology. Communism in East Asia developed in states that experienced political and economic crises, offering an ideological alternative that would effect economic and social improvements, as well as liberation from the yoke of Western imperialism.[8] Therefore, it is necessary to present a political system that at the end of the process would construct a politically and economically stable democracy.[9] The second principle is an operational mechanism for attaining the first principle. The state must undertake the process of democratization in the context of the state's legal framework and avoid taking brutal action toward the civilian population. Moreover, says Thompson, even the warfare against the guerilla fighters must occur within the setting of the laws of the state in which the confrontation is taking place.[10]

The third principle is action for all the relevant military and civilian elements on the basis of a previously defined modus operandi. This principle determines that it is necessary to balance between military and civilian efforts and coordinate all the systems working to contain the

insurgency.[11] By means of this principle, Thompson stresses the natural tension between military actions whose effect can be seen and assessed immediately (e.g., the number of guerrilla fighters killed or the weapons captured by the army) and civilian actions whose effect can be assessed only with the passage of time.[12] In essence, Thompson is warning against exclusive focus on military actions and determines that both efforts – military and civilian – must be given equal weight. Thompson adds that the balance must be achieved on the basis of the prevailing reality in the given arena: sometimes more weight must be given to the military effort and sometimes to the civilian. In any case, both forms of action must complement one another and the military effort must support the civilian one, and vice versa.[13]

According to Mao, an insurgency bears a political character, with the military efforts derived from it. Thompson too stresses this fact, and in his fourth principle he claims that the government must give precedence to defeating political subversion and not to defeating the guerilla fighters.[14] This activity must be undertaken together with isolating the guerilla fighters from the population. In essence, this principle stresses most prominently that Mao's teachings were properly understood. Mao claimed that the guerilla could not operate without the support of the civilian population. Therefore Thompson determines that the road to victory against the guerilla is through severing the connection between the guerilla and the civilian population. According to Nagl, this is the indirect approach to fighting against an insurgency, whereas the direct approach is military action directed against the guerilla fighters.[15] It is possible to eradicate the guerilla fighters only after cutting them off from the civilian population and isolating them.

The fifth principle too presents an understanding of one of Mao's most important principles: the base regions. Thompson claims that the government fighting subversion must safeguard its base region from the gradual wresting of control by the revolutionary guerilla. At the same time that the defensive process is taking place, the government must expand its base of support within the indigenous population and expand it bases of control until it controls the entire state.[16] Thus in this process civilian action is important and the task of the army is to defend the base regions, again similar to the function of the army according to Mao's doctrine. The offensive actions of the government military forces should take

place in the regions where the government has yet to establish control. Paraphrasing Mao, one may say that the army units that should operate in regions where control has yet to be established should be units that operate on the basis of the principles of guerilla. In other words, these are special forces. However, just as Mao's guerilla fighters had political-civilian tasks, the special forces must also operate in the civilian realm.[17] This is how the Green Berets, the American special forces, were used early in America's involvement in Vietnam.

An analysis of the British struggle against the Communist uprising in Malaya shows that the British, in conjunction with the Malayan government, understood that the most effective way of containing the insurgency would be to sever the guerilla from the indigenous population at the same time as classical military operations were underway. Thompson's book brings one to the conclusion that the people who formulated British policy and planning in Malaya understood Mao's philosophy of war and created a military theory designed to neutralize Mao's basic principles. So, for example, civilian activity was stressed more than the military effort and severing the fighters from the civilians prevented the Malayan communist guerilla from making progress on the basis of Mao's doctrine. Moreover, the war indeed proved long lasting because the British understood that the political struggle and isolation of the guerilla were long term processes and their impact could be felt only after the passage of time. The doctrine of counterinsurgency warfare was applied immediately at the start of the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya (1952), and Britain's quick response in implementing a counterinsurgency was one of the main reasons for the successful suppression of the revolt in Kenya.[18]

American Thinking

American military thinking in the context of COIN has been greatly influenced by the British experience in Malaya. The following examination of American theories is based on an analysis of documents of the American civilian administration (CORDS)[19] that operated in South Vietnam.[20] This was the meta-framework that organized and concentrated all civilian agency operations in South Vietnam under the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). CORDS was established in May 1967, replacing the Office of Civilian Operations

(OCO). Its first director was Robert Komer, who served as special advisor to President Lyndon Johnson on pacification. In November 1968 William Colby, formerly director of CIA operations in Vietnam, was appointed in Komer's stead. CORDS operated until the evacuation of American forces from Vietnam in late February 1973.[21]

The discourse in America starting in the second half of the 1950s on ways to fight guerilla was part of a much broader academic discussion about the essence of the limited war.[22] In this context, theories regarding COIN were included as a sub-category. The main incentive for the discussion was the Korean War. The most prominent research was that of Robert Osgood, who claimed that in a limited war the civilian echelon plays a decisive role in determining the outcome of the war, because the political echelon has a greater effect than the military on the management of the war and the determination of the strategic goals. If before Korea the political echelon defined the general political objectives of any given war but intervened little in military-strategic considerations, after World War II the political echelon started becoming involved also in military considerations. In the Korean War, President Truman limited the war and refused to allow the American forces to harm targets in China so as not to escalate the war, despite the fact that from a military perspective the operational logic of bombing Chinese targets that were assisting the effort of the Chinese forces in Korea was clear.

Political capability and strength are of greater importance in this type of war than the military resources of the state engaged in the fighting. The objectives of the war too are political-civilian rather than military, and there is no significance to destroying the enemy's force militarily.[23] This is in contrast to World War II where attaining political objectives, i.e., the defeat of Germany, Italy, and Japan, were totally dependent on comprehensive military activity. This claim made by Osgood led him to a far reaching conclusion: if the limited war must be fought with political tools, the army's place is secondary and the war must be fought by the civilian echelon.[24] For this reason, the civilian echelon estimated that its importance had increased in the prosecution of the new type of warfare – the limited war.

Before President Kennedy was sworn in, the Pentagon published two studies about the means necessary to defeat Communist subversion in Southeast Asia. The main line of these studies and others that followed

was that the key to successful COIN is the control of the indigenous population.

The first study, published in May 1960, represented the conclusions of the discussions at the senior levels of the American military and government about COIN methods of warfare in Laos and South Vietnam. According to the study, the indigenous population was minimally if at all interested in political events in the nations under discussion; it did not understand Communist ideology or even the concept of nationalism at all. One cannot claim that the authors of the study failed to understand the political literacy of the Vietnamese peasant. Many studies examined the political inclinations of the rural population and the grounds that caused it to enlist on behalf of one political goal or other. There studies determined unequivocally that the main reason – sometimes the exclusive reason – was the peasant's desire to bring about an improvement in the standard of living of his family and that peasants would support the stronger political side active in their region in order to protect their families and villages from harm.[25] Moreover, the Communists themselves explained to the peasants the essence of the socialist philosophy (called in Vietnamese Xa Hoi Hoa) using the traditional terms of maintaining the people's connection to the land as a sacred value (Xa).[26]

The second study was a report written by the assistant to the secretary of defense for special operations, General Edward Lansdale, who was considered an expert on guerilla warfare, especially in the East Asian arena, and was one of President Kennedy's most important advisors on these matters.[27] The report, compiled in August 1960, raised a number of critical points on why the peasant supported the Vietcong. The two main points were the fury at the government forces for having destroyed the economic infrastructure, which affected the indigenous population, and fear of the terrorism practiced by the Vietcong against the indigenous population. According to Lansdale, most of the indigenous population supported the Vietcong because they had no choice as a result of the terror tactics employed by the Communists.[28]

In early 1962, *Foreign Affairs* published an essay written by Franklin Lindsay, a prominent scholar of the phenomenon of insurgency and a theoretician in the field of developing doctrines of counterinsurgency.[29] Lindsay's thesis is that the key to guerilla warfare is complete control of the guerilla fighters in the indigenous population.[30] As evidence

for his thesis, he cites the factors leading to the defeat of the French in Indochina, an historical example with great relevance to the events of 1962. According to Lindsay, the French were defeated in Vietnam because they lost the support of the indigenous population, while the Viet Minh won because it succeeded in arousing anti-colonialist feelings and assimilating Communist ideology among the peasants.[31]

The necessary conclusion is that the foundation of any policy or strategy against guerilla must be the government's complete control of the villages.[32] Later in the essay Lindsay sketches out the program of action required in South Vietnam. Because the Vietcong imposes its rule on the peasants by means of terrorism, the government must construct secure villages and charge militias composed of the peasants themselves with the task of safeguarding them. Every such secure village would also have advisors, both military and civilian, belonging to the government forces. These advisors would be in charge of everything occurring in the village, be able to identify the Communist cadres, and be able to neutralize them. The government would have to invest great resources in the civilian field, such as constructing schools and clinics, improving the agricultural infrastructure, and at the same time undertake military actions against the Vietcong's strongholds. It would be necessary to ensure the guerillas are always on the move, without the ability to consolidate their control of the rural areas, and to prevent their access to food supplies, shelter, medical treatment, and means of warfare.[33] The American advisors, taken from the special forces, would come to the region to become experts in the customs and culture of the peasants, learn the local dialect, and study the special problems of each village.[34] In other words, the Green Berets, in addition to being experts in guerilla warfare from a military point of view, were also supposed to become experts in guerilla warfare from the civilian point of view.[35] The Green Berets were the spearhead of the array of American advisors during the Kennedy administration. These soldiers underwent intensive training in the practice of COIN, a kind of training not given to any other American army unit.[36]

In March 1962, a conference called "The US Army's Limited War Mission and Social Sciences Research" was held in Washington. The initiative for the conference came from the Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army, while the conference organizer was the Special Operations Research Office (SORO), an

academic-military research group financed by the US military. Including presentations by American academics and by senior army officers, the central topic of the conference was the army's doctrines of COIN warfare and the connection to the military reality in Vietnam, and the most effective programs in providing an appropriate response to Communist guerilla warfare. In his presentation, General Clyde Eddleman, the Vice Chief of Staff of the US Army, claimed that the major front of the Cold War was the underdeveloped portion of the world, i.e., Asia, Africa, and Latin America, areas that are home to almost half of the world's population. In order to prevent these areas from falling to the Communists, it was necessary to establish a stable economic and social system that would study the needs of the indigenous populations and assist them in the long run.[37]

The function of the US army is to assist local armies in their efforts in the civilian realm. The military units sent to areas in danger of being overrun by the Communists should include professionals with civilian skills: medical teams, engineers, and agricultural experts. Their task would be to develop links between the isolated villages and the centers of the urban areas by improving roads and building bridges, constructing medical clinics, educating the indigenous populations about personal health, and improving agricultural practices. In guerilla-stricken areas, such as Vietnam, it would also be necessary to put together local militias to fight the guerillas and to provide them with the required logistical support, training, and weapons. At the same time, all of America's efforts would have to be presented as if the South Vietnamese government and army were executing the programs, while the Americans were there only as advisors.[38] According to General Eddleman, these are the most effective tools for fighting guerilla because conventional forces, especially America's nuclear arsenal, were intended primarily to provide deterrence with regard to the Soviet Union, and not vis-à-vis the Third World.[39]

Another speaker at the conference was Robert Slover, deputy chief of the Plans and Doctrine Division, Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs, Department of the Army. His presentation dealt with civilian activities carried out by the army as anti-guerilla weapons. He too argues that the battlefield in the underdeveloped nations is within the indigenous population. General Slover pointed to three objectives of activities in the

civilian realm: recognition of the legitimacy of the local army on the part of the indigenous population; a strengthened connection between the local army and the peasants; and the acceptance of the central government by the people, with the army as its tool. The purpose of the army is not only to defend the country but also to construct it. The indigenous population must understand that its support of the central government and cooperation with its agents will perforce result in an improvement of their standard of living. In other words, the military dimension must also include civilian activity. If the indigenous population supports the army and the government, the guerilla fighters will be denied the support of the indigenous population, which is critical to the success of guerilla warfare. Withholding that support would eliminate the military infrastructure of the guerilla as well as their political success.[40] However, according to Slover, there is no substitute for military actions but these will be most effective only if there cooperation by the indigenous population.[41] Slover adds that in order to operate civilian programs most effectively it is necessary to study the way of life of the target population, their customs, social structures, and needs.[42]

From a survey of the presentations of two senior US army officers it is clear that the American army started to focus on a new aspect of warfare doctrines in the context of COIN, and even more so on non-military aspects in eradicating guerilla warfare in Southeast Asia in particular. In 1962, American involvement in Vietnam was growing steadily.[43] Military advisors were on the battlefield fighting alongside the South Vietnamese army, and American pilots provided aerial assistance to South Vietnamese army units fighting the Vietcong, which was becoming more and more entrenched within the indigenous population.[44] The people formulating policy at both the civilian and military levels clearly understood that destroying the Vietcong could not be done at the physical level but would have to take place by eliminating its popular infrastructure, in other words to make the Vietnamese peasantry support the government forces. "To win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people" became a popular slogan at that time. The knowledge that most of the population was supporting the Vietcong because of terrorism applied against the peasants made the military and civilian policymakers want to provide physical and economic security to the indigenous population so that it

would stop fearing the Vietcong and perhaps even turn against it, while transferring its support to the Vietnamese government.

Conclusion

This essay sought to understand the theoretical basis required for a regular army fighting a revolutionary organization. COIN theories say that in a war against guerilla there must be elements of civilian activity and it is necessary to find the right balance with military activity. One of the ways to do so is to make the indigenous population, whose support is critical to the guerilla fighters, support civilian and military authorities fighting against the guerilla. It would be wrong to focus only on military action; rather, it is necessary to find the right balance between military and civilian (pacification) activities.

The American pacification programs during the war in Vietnam were constructed and executed in light of COIN theories developed in the United States before and during the American involvement there. Studying the lessons learned by the British in the suppression of the Communist uprising in Malaya also had an effect. The purpose of the military thinking was to find an operational mechanism that would damage the political and military infrastructures of the Communist guerillas organizations. Any guerilla or terrorist organization with a revolutionary orientation seeking the support of the civilian population is exposed to harm if COIN programs combining civilian and military activities are put into effect against it.

Thus, in fighting guerilla it is wrong to focus on military activity alone. Sometimes it serves as only one of a mix of political-social means that together can be effective in eradicating a revolutionary movement. The British case, and to a certain extent also the American one, presents us with an approach to fighting against a well founded theory, which has influenced many revolutionary movements around the world.

This essay has attempted to provide the historical foundation for understanding the way to create a theory of COIN. Just as a regular army must understand the principles upon which the enemy army operates and develop doctrines suitable to constructing a counter-force and putting it to work, so it must understand the doctrines guiding revolutionary organizations. The general COIN principles developed in the early 1960s must be studied and adapted to the political-social

realities of the contemporary era to find the theory most applicable to the relevant Israeli circumstances of time and place.

Notes

1   The two concepts – guerilla and terrorism – are joined here because it is impossible to come up with a definitive definition acceptable to most scholars that would distinguish a terrorist organization from a guerilla movement. Any definition that distinguished between the two would be individualistic and subjective, and depend on cultural, political, and social aspects of one nation or another. Therefore, the concepts of guerilla and terrorism will be used interchangeably in this essay. Alex P. Schmid, in *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature* (Amsterdam, 1987), pp. 152-55, presents numerous definitions from the leading literature on the study of terrorism. See also Robert Kennedy, "Is One Person's Terrorist Another's Freedom Fighter? Western and Islamic Approaches to 'Just War' Compared," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 11, no. 1 (1999): 3-4. Brian M. Jenkins, *New Modes of Conflict* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1983), pp. 7-9, claims there is a chronological distinction, arguing that guerilla warfare became terrorism at the end of the 1960s when guerilla organizations despaired of this form of warfare and understood that they would be unable to attain their goals through conventional warfare.

2   For different types of revolutionary political protest see Ariel Merari, "Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency," in Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin (eds.), *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), pp. 12-48.

3   For a discussion of the essence of insurgency or war of revolution see John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, "Revolutionary War," in Peter Paret (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 817-19.

4   To see the creation of conventional military thinking in Israel, see Haim Nadel, *Between the Two Wars* (Tel Aviv, 2006), pp. 47-67; and Hanoch Bartov, *Dado: 48 Years and 20 Days* (Tel Aviv, 2002), pp. 109-10. These references are examples of theoretical thinking that created a military doctrine, which in turn affected IDF force buildup and application. See also Israel Tal, *National Security: The Few vs. the Many* (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1996), pp. 68-84.

5   Shlomo Gazit, *Trapped Fools: 30 Years of Israeli Policy in the Occupied Territories* (Tel Aviv, 1999), p. 35.

6   For a discussion of the British moves and operations see Tal Tovy, *Like Eating Soup with a Knife: The American Experience in Vietnam 1959-1973* (Tel Aviv, 2006), pp. 54-61.

7   The book has been translated into Hebrew as *Shilton Umardanut: Likhey Malaya Vevietnam* (Tel Aviv, 1967). This essay uses the Hebrew translation.

8   W. M. Bull, *Nationalism and Communism in East Asia* (Tel Aviv, 1954), p. 7.

9   Thompson, *Shilton Umardanut*, pp. 50-51.

10 Ibid., p. 51.

11 Ibid., pp. 53-54.

12 See also John S. Pustay, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp. 150-54.

13 Thompson, *Shilton Umardanut*, p. 54.

14 Ibid.

15 John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 27-28.

16 Thompson, *Shilton Umardanut*, p. 56.

17 To define the tasks that special forces need to carry out in the context of COIN see Richard K. Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises* (Tel Aviv, 1981), p. 156. For information on the Special Air Service (SAS) and programs in the civilian field see Neillands, *In the Combat Zone – Special Forces since 1945*, p. 108.

18 For information about the Mau Mau revolt and its suppression, with emphasis on counterinsurgency, see Tovy, *Like Eating Soup with a Knife*, pp. 63-65.

19 Civilian Operations and Revolutionary (Rural) Development Support.

20 Records of the United States Forces in Southeast Asia, 1950-1975 (RG-472), Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) Office of Civil for Rural Development Support (CORDS), College Park MD.

21 For an overview of CORDS, see James K. McCollum, "The CORDS Pacification Organization in Vietnam: A Civilian Military Effort," in *Armed Forces and Society* 10, no. 1 (1983): 105-22; Richard H. Hunt, *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 82-132.

22 For an overview of the development of theories in the United States during the 1950s see Douglas S. Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: The U.S. Doctrine and Performance* (New York: Free Press, 1977), pp. 22-51; D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1988), pp. 104-32; Michael McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counter-Insurgency, and Counter-Terrorism, 1940-1990* (New York: Pantheon, 1992), pp. 100-36; Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2006), pp. 131-71.

23 Robert Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 7.

24 Ibid., p. 14.

25 The phenomenon of peasants enlisting in revolutionary movements occupied sociological and anthropological research in the 1960s and 1970s because it was from the peasants that the revolutionary movements of East Asia, Africa, and Latin America derived their strength. See Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), pp. 453-83;

Theodor Shanin, "The Peasantry as a Political Factor," *Sociological Review* 14, no. 1 (1966); Eric R. Wolf, *Peasant Wars in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969); Pierre Gourou, *Men and Land in the Far East*, tr. S. H. Beaver (London: Longman, 1972); Eric R. Wolf, "On Peasant Rebellion," in Sam C. Sarkesian (ed.), *Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare* (Chicago: Precedent, 1975); Richard K. Horner, "Agrarian Movements and Their Historical Conditions," *Peasant Studies* 8, no. 1 (1979); Christine P. White, "The Peasant and the Party in the Vietnamese Revolution," in D. B. Miller (ed.), *Peasant and Politics: Grass Roots Reaction to Change in Asia* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979); D. B. Miller, "Introduction: Peasant, Politics and the Study of Social Change in Asia," in *Peasants and Politics: Grass Roots Reaction to Change in Asia*; Scott E. Guggenheim and Robert P. Weller, "Introduction: Moral Economy, Capitalism, and State Power in Rural Protest," in Scott E. Guggenheim and Robert P. Weller (eds.), *Power and Protest in the Countryside: Studies of Rural Unrest in Asia, Europe, and Latin America* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1982).

26 The verb "hoa" indicates divine authority through people on earth. The meaning of the word "hoi" is union. Thus the idea of socialism is as that which unites man and the land, both of which are connected to and sanctified by divine authority. See White, "The Peasant and the Party in the Vietnamese Revolution," p. 26; Wolf, *Peasant Wars in the Twentieth Century*, p. 189.

27 Walt W. Rostow, *The Diffusion of Power* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 118-19; Cecil B. Curry, "Edward G. Lansdale: LIC and the Ugly American," *Military Review* 68, no. 5 (1988): 45-57.

28 For an overview of the two studies see Ron Spector, *Advice and Support: The Early Years of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1941-1960* (New York: Viking Press, 1983), pp. 361-62. See also Francis J. Kelly, *U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971*, Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies (Washington D.C., 1973), p. 19. Here reference is made to a study that deals with the situation in Southeast Asia. The study, conducted in 1961, determined unequivocally that the Vietcong controls the entire hilly region of South Vietnam and that the efforts of the South Vietnamese army are ineffective. The study's conclusion was that effective use of locals could prevent the continuation of the spread of Communism. See also Lawrence Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 287-88. For an additional discussion of Lansdale's military thinking see McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft*, pp. 197-213.

29 Franklin A. Lindsay, "Unconventional Warfare," *Foreign Affairs* 40, no. 2 (1962): 264-74.

30 Ibid., pp. 264-66.

31 Ibid., p. 266.

32 Ibid., pp. 269-71.

33 Ibid., pp. 267-68.

34 As early as 1957, the Green Berets put into practice a program called the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) whose objective was to train the Degar mountain tribes (called the Montagnards by the French) to defend themselves and to go on small scale offensive operations against Vietcong units moving in the region or trying to cross into Vietnam from neighboring countries. For the stages of the CIDG program see Kelly, *U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971*, pp. 32-35.

35 Lindsay, "Unconventional Warfare," p. 274.

36 See Kelly, *U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971*, 6-18; Shalby L. Stanton, *Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia 1956-1971* (Novato: Presidio, 1985), pp. 9-16, 35-41.

37 Clyde D. Eddleman, "Limited War and International Conflict," in: William A. Lybrand (ed.), *The U.S. Army's Limited-War Mission and Social Science Research* (Washington D.C., 1962), pp. 27, 30-31.

38 Eddleman, "Limited War and International Conflict," pp. 35-36.

39 In his presentation, General Eddleman cites the Kennedy administration policy of flexible response as well as President Kennedy's view that the struggle against Communism is actually taking place in the developing nations.

40 Robert H. Slover, "Civic Action in Development Nations," in *The U.S. Army's Limited War Mission and Social Science Research*, pp. 70-72. See also Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms*, pp. 116-18.

41 Slover, "Civic Action in Development Nations," p. 72.

42 Slover, "Civic Action in Development Nations," p. 77.

43 Towards the end of the Eisenhower administration there were 875 American army personnel in Vietnam. By 1962, there were already some 11,000 soldiers there. See Spencer C. Tucker, *Vietnam* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), pp. 97-98; Phillip B. Davidson, *Vietnam at War: The History, 1946-1975* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 300-1.

44 Marilyn B. Young, *The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990* (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), pp. 69-88; Tucker, *Vietnam*, pp. 97-98.