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## International Statebuilding

Dilemmas, Strategies and  
Challenges for German Foreign Policy

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**International Statebuilding:  
Dilemmas, Strategies and  
Challenges for German Foreign Policy**

Statebuilding is one of the central tasks facing the international community at the start of the 21st century. Unlike in past times, statebuilding no longer means the founding of new states from either the inside or the outside. Rather, it means designing and configuring new states and fostering their transitions to statehood: in short, strengthening state structures and institutions for long-term sustainability. The international community has been carrying out the most extensive conceivable statebuilding operations of this kind for a number of years in Kosovo as well as in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor and Haiti. In Iraq as well, but this constitutes a special case due to the US invasion and occupation of the country. The current operations in Southern Lebanon are also an attempt to foster statehood—or concretely, to foster the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Further cases of this kind will follow. In the examples mentioned, external actors interfere deeply with state sovereignty, they (temporarily) take over a number of state functions. They fill the gaps left by the lack of state structures in these countries with their own military, police and civilian personnel and take on important functions in local institutions. These protectorate-style arrangements not only entail risks for the external parties but also require that extensive personnel and financial resources be made available for quick deployment. Such an approach is therefore possible only in exceptional cases, and the “Kosovo model” cannot be applied universally.

The real strategic challenge lies in acting preventatively—that is, in identifying and stopping impending processes of disintegration in fragile states. In recent years, however, international policy has been characterized more by ad hoc decision-making and zigzag approaches with alternating phases of passivity, rhetorical exercises, half-hearted involvement and military intervention. Often a phase of dramatic action is followed by a complete about-face. One extreme example of this was the international involvement in Somalia in the early nineties. But in other cases as well, such as Haiti, Burundi, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo, external powers

have followed an erratic course in their involvement: first ignoring the problem, then strategizing, intervening, and finally ignoring it again. A more broadly conceived policy debate is therefore urgently needed, addressing the opportunities and dilemmas, strategies, instruments and resources available for international statebuilding.

The present study intends to push the debate in precisely this direction. We start by posing the following questions: What distinguishes statebuilding from other, similar concepts? What are the typical dilemmas and difficulties facing international statebuilders? What strategies and approaches are currently being discussed and pursued internationally? And finally, what do the answers to these questions imply for German foreign policy, and in particular, for how the government apparatus can improve its own capacities for action and formulate a coherent policy for dealing with fragile states?

This study argues for an integrated “whole of government” approach spanning all ministries and therefore recommends:

- ▶ Developing an overarching statebuilding conception spanning all government departments on the basis of currently existing concepts that deal with specific aspects of the issue. Such a conception will be needed in order to develop a common terminology, to compare different statebuilding approaches, to agree on key areas and priorities, to identify the instruments and resources needed, and not least, to situate statebuilding activities in the broader context of foreign, development and security policy.
- ▶ Creating structures and procedures spanning the different government departments to improve decision-making processes and the planning, implementation and critical evaluation of statebuilding measures. Integrated structures would lend themselves to this purpose, particularly structures of the kind that have been created in Canada and Great Britain. One method would be to establish a permanent Statebuilding Task Force staffed with representatives of all the relevant departments and endowed with its own budget. Another, less ambitious option would be to improve networking among special steering committees in each of the individual departments. Both of these options would require that either the task force or the steering committees be linked to the Interministerial Steering Committee “Civil Crisis Prevention” and that the political status of the steering group be raised significantly within the government

apparatus. Overarching leadership and governance bodies—such as a cabinet committee or a more developed Federal Security Council (*Bundessicherheitsrat*)—would also be needed.

- ▶ Establishing financing instruments that expedite and facilitate the cooperation between the different ministries. Possibilities here would include focalizing existing budgets, creating a rapid response fund and setting up a variety of jointly administered funds for sectoral policies or regional focal points as well as a commonly administered global fund.
- ▶ Increasing the number of civilian personnel in statebuilding activities by creating rapid deployment civilian response teams or setting up full-time stand-by forces. This could also entail closer networking among the existing institutions and donor organizations, further expanding the Center for International Peace Operations (*Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze, ZIF*), or founding a special agency after the Canadian model.
- ▶ Improving the communication between Berlin and the personnel deployed in the field, particularly in the area of civil-military cooperation. The integrated structures in Berlin should, if possible, be reflected in integrated organizational structures in the field. Furthermore, central contact partners are needed for operations in troubled regions and fragile states.

The approach recommended here cannot resolve all the problems of international statebuilding. It can, however, at least facilitate the political and administrative management of statebuilding operations and simplify the coordination among external statebuilders. This kind of restructuring would offer the following advantages:

- ▶ Improved political governance and enhanced planning and decision-making processes;
- ▶ Increased attention to developments in fragile states and troubled regions;
- ▶ Enhanced efficiency in the coordination among ministries (and subordinate institutions) and thus avoidance of unsatisfactory ad hoc solutions;
- ▶ More effective management and utilization of personnel and resources;
- ▶ Greater compatibility between German measures and those of international partners;
- ▶ Enhanced “visibility” of German contributions and thus potentially also increased legitimization of more far-reaching statebuilding operations to the German population.

## What Is the Problem? Configurations of Fragile Statehood

Fragile statehood can be defined in terms of state structures and institutions which have severe deficits in performing key tasks and functions vis-à-vis their citizens. Fragile states are characterised by deficits in governance, control and legitimacy. This concept, however, covers a broad spectrum of states and is not limited to failed or collapsed states or to conflict-torn societies. The term statehood is used in order to avoid restricting the analysis to the government and its bureaucratic apparatus only. Instead, statehood addresses a wide range of institutions including the legislative and the judiciary, other public facilities (schools, media, hospitals, etc.) and institutions at the local or regional level. Statehood, therefore, is a functional term which focuses on core state functions, on the political decision-making process and on the implementation of decisions as well as on the political order in general.

In order to operationalize the concept, it is helpful to distinguish at least three basic state functions: *security*, *welfare* and *legitimacy/rule of law*.<sup>1</sup> First, ideally, the state has to provide physical security for its citizens—internally as well as externally. The state should be able to control its territory and borders, safeguard the security of its citizens vis-à-vis each other and defend against external security threats, ensure public access to natural resources and enforce tax administration. In short, the state has to ensure the monopoly on the legitimate use of force as well as the monopoly on raising taxes and revenues. Plausible indicators of state failure in this respect are: a lack of effective control of the state's territory as a whole; weak control of international borders; non-existent or limited control over tax and tariff revenues as well as of natural resources; an increasing number of relevant armed non-state actors; disintegration, fragmentation or commercialisation of the state's security forces; a massive incidence of crime; and, the use of state security forces against the population of the state.

<sup>1</sup> For the following, see in particular Ulrich Schneckener: "States at Risk. Zur Analyse fragiler Staatlichkeit," in: Ulrich Schneckener (ed.): *Fragile Staatlichkeit* (Baden-Baden: Nomos), 2006, pp. 9–40.

Second, the state should provide basic goods and services as well as distributive mechanisms—both financed by a regular state budget. This welfare function includes, inter alia, macro-economic governance, social policies, management of resources, education and healthcare, environmental protection policy as well as the establishment of physical infrastructure. Typical indicators of deficits in this regard are: the systematic exclusion of particular groups from access to economic resources; severe financial and economic crises; the unequal distribution of wealth; decreasing state revenues; low state expenditures; high rates of unemployment; a significant decline in human development; poor public infrastructure; degradation of the educational and/or the health system; and environmental degradation (e.g. shortage of water).

Third, the state should enjoy legitimation by being organised in a way that ensures modes of political participation, legitimacy of decision-making processes, stability of political institutions, rule of law and effective and accountable public administration. Indicators of state failure in this area include: limited political freedom; increasing repression against opposition groups; election fraud; systematic exclusion of certain groups from decision-making and political participation; increasing human rights violations; no independent court and legal system; ineffective public administration; and an increasing level of corruption and clientelism.

Based on the capabilities of states to fulfil their core functions, various types or configurations of statehood can be differentiated.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> For similar typologies, see Gero Erdmann: "Apokalyptische Trias: Staatsversagen, Staatsverfall und Staatszerfall. Strukturelle Probleme der Demokratie in Afrika," in: Petra Bendel, Aurel Croissant, and Friedbert W. Rüb (eds.): *Demokratie und Staatlichkeit. Systemwechsel zwischen Staatsreform und Staatskollaps*, (Opladen 2003), pp. 267–292; Robert Rotberg (ed.): *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), pp. 2–10; Tobias Deibel and Dieter Reinhardt: "Staatsverfall und Weltordnungspolitik: Analytische Zugänge und politische Strategien zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts," in: *Nord-Süd Aktuell*, vol. 18, no. 3, 2004, pp. 525–538.

*Weak statehood:* The state's institutions are still able to fulfil by and large the security function, but display grave deficiencies in fulfilling at least one of the two other functions. In other words, the government and its apparatus are not willing and/or able to deliver sufficient public services and/or they suffer from severe legitimacy problems. This configuration can be studied in examples covering virtually all regions—see for example Macedonia and Albania in South Eastern Europe, most countries of Northern Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia as well as some states in Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Zimbabwe, Kenya, Zambia) and in Latin America (e.g. Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru). As these examples show, authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes often fall into that category. Despite appearing strong with regard to the monopoly on the use of force, they are in fact rather weak when it comes to provision of public services and their political and administrative systems, including the rule of law. Under these circumstances, armed non-state actors are usually not able to control a particular territory, or at least not for long periods. These states are thus not primarily threatened by clan chiefs, rebels or warlords, but rather by smaller groups such as home-grown criminal and terrorist organisations. Moreover, in some cases militias or para-military groups set up by state authorities may play a role in oppressing regime critics or minority groups. On the whole, governance is still very much shaped, dominated and financed by state institutions (*governance through government*), however, frequently conducted in an ineffective way (e.g. because of widespread corruption) and characterised, for example, by human rights violations.

*Failing statehood:* The state is no longer or has never been able to safeguard the security of its population. The monopoly on the use of force and the exclusive control over resources is either severely restricted or entirely absent, while the state is nevertheless able to function in at least one of the other two areas. Examples include Algeria, Colombia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Indonesia, Nepal, Yemen, Pakistan or Georgia. These states do not completely control their territory, and they are mainly characterised by armed regional conflicts where violent non-state actors occupy and control certain regions. However, these states still deliver public services to the majority of the population and/or still have some degree of political legitimacy. Sri Lanka serves as an example; despite the long-standing conflict in the northern region, the state as such performs comparatively well, providing

public services and running the political system. The examples show that many states in the process of democratisation which are challenged by separatist forces fit in this category. Depending on the individual case, governance clearly involves a range of non-state actors, sometimes including armed actors; the government and its bureaucratic apparatus is just one player among others (*governance beyond government*). In particular, non-state actors with territorial claims will figure rather prominently at the sub-national level, rebels, clan chiefs or *big men* may even be able to establish para-state structures.

*Failed statehood* (or collapsed statehood): None of the three state functions is effectively performed. Statehood as such has collapsed. There may still be a central government, but in lacking resources, capabilities and power, it has hardly any impact. Recent examples include war-torn countries such as Somalia, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Liberia. In the past, Angola, Tajikistan and Lebanon also belonged in this category. In comparison to the other two types, this situation can be described as *governance without government*. Instead, the country in question is by and large dominated by relatively powerful armed non-state actors who rule not only regions and townships, but may also control the access to natural resources, trade and businesses as well as international humanitarian aid. They act as de facto key 'security providers' based mainly on violence, suppression and intimidation, but sometimes also on popular support (e.g. in the cases of clan chiefs or rebels). In any case, the category failed states does not necessarily imply chaos or anarchy, but fragile and contested forms of political order established by a number of different local non-state actors, often with cross-border relationships. In addition, external, intervening actors such as NGOs, development agencies or even international peacekeeping troops may substitute the lack of statehood by delivering basic services.

The analysis of failures and their possible causes, however, does not give the full picture. Despite their critical performance with regard to a number of established indicators and indices (like Human Development Index, World Bank Governance, Failed States Index or Transparency International's Corruption Perception Indicators), many fragile states prove to be surprisingly stable, even on a relative low level. In some cases, deficits in statehood and governance exist over decades without leading to a complete break-



down of state structures. These states are obviously able to “manage” the governance problems for quite some time without collapsing, more typically is a process of slow decline or a stagnation on a rather low level. In other words, in order to understand fragile statehood, it is not just the question why things do not or do no longer work, but also why some aspects of statehood are still in place that should be addressed. Fragility always implies a certain degree of stability. These ‘stabilising factors’ involve a range of local social practices and political mechanisms, often developed by the ruling political and economic elites who have become experts in “fragility management.” These practices and mechanisms include, for example, patronage and clientelism, neo-patrimonial structures, cooptation of certain groups, forms of power-sharing and semi-authoritarianism, the mobilisation of traditional structures and informal practices of self-organisation (i.e. ethnic networks, kinship). Most of these mechanisms, however, do not lead to a sustainable statehood, but are part of the problem. The question is how can they be transformed in a way that does not increase tensions and instability. Moreover, in most cases, the elites and particular groups would have to give up some of their power and privileges in order to reform and transform statehood which makes it for outsiders promoting such an agenda extremely difficult and costly.

## What Does Statebuilding Mean?

Statebuilding aims at sustainably strengthening state structures and institutions, improving state actors' governance capabilities and expanding their capacities for action. This applies in particular to the basic aspects of statehood: guaranteeing public security, providing basic welfare state services, establishing legitimacy and adhering to human rights standards and the rule of law. Sovereign statehood comprises the existence of a broad spectrum of institutions extending beyond the narrower state apparatus and executive branch (including police and army), to the legislative (parliament, political parties) and legal (judiciary) branches, as well as the whole of government administration. At the same time, government-administrated educational institutions, hospitals and public media organizations can also be understood as elements of the state. A state structure can in some cases also include local and regional institutions and actors (municipal and district administrations, local parliaments, provincial governors, etc.). Furthermore, state institutions delegate some specific functions to civilian and private organizations that take on responsibility for the common good. It is thus important to differentiate between the state as a political agent—embodied in a government and a bureaucratic apparatus—and sovereign statehood as a functional concept. The latter entails performing tasks promoting the common good, negotiating and implementing decisions, providing resources, and establishing a political and legal framework to maintain law and order. According to this understanding, statehood is achieved not only through government organizations themselves but through the contributions of other actors as well.

Viewed against this backdrop, external efforts to promote international statebuilding can have three different goals: first, to stabilize existing structures and institutions; second, to reform and transform these structures; and third, to (re)construct institutions and structures that either did not exist previously, or not in this form. The latter applies mainly to post-war societies where conflicts have led to the collapse of virtually all state structures. But it also applies to countries where fundamental elements of statehood no longer exist—or never existed in the first

place. In most of the aforementioned cases of fragile statehood, the issue is primarily one of stabilization or of reform and transformation. Often these two goals must be pursued simultaneously, which can lead to a very difficult balancing act. The tension between them is in fact often very difficult to resolve: on the one hand, structural stabilization must not be carried out in such a way that those governmental and social actors are strengthened who have no or only a very limited interest in thoroughgoing structural reform. On the other hand, the necessary reforms—which may encroach on the vested interests of ruling elites—must be prevented from destabilizing the country through a further degeneration of living conditions or an accelerated erosion of statehood. Thus, statebuilding should not only aim at improving capacities in target countries through measures to strengthen statehood, but should also foster the willingness of local actors to contribute constructively to public political life.

Here, the concept of statebuilding offers a framework for a multitude of measures supported, initiated, and carried out to some extent independently by external actors. These can be subdivided according to the central dimensions of statehood (see Table 1, p. 12).

### Statebuilding and the Rest of the “Building” Family

Looking at statebuilding in these terms, one sees clearly how it differs from other semantically related concepts belonging to the now rather extensive “building” family, which also includes nation-, peace-, institution- and capacity-building. Nationbuilding is usually conceived of as promoting the development of the entire society, and particularly, fostering national identity as a basis for the nation-state in the classic sense. Here, the concepts of state and nation ultimately coincide.<sup>3</sup> Although processes of statebuilding

<sup>3</sup> On the debate surrounding nation-building, see Jochen Hippler (ed.): *Nation-Building. Ein Schlüsselkonzept für friedliche Konfliktbearbeitung?* (Bonn: Dietz, 2004); Francis Fukuyama (ed.): *Nation-Building. Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq* (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). In Anglo-Ameri-

and nationbuilding take different perspectives, they can function complementarily. On the one hand, public political life suffers when a segment of society is unable to identify with it—when they perceive the distribution of power, resources or opportunities as unjust, and possibly even demand an autonomous state (separatism). On the other, contemporary historical developments make social progress outside the national framework virtually inconceivable.

Conceptual overlaps exist in the approach to peacebuilding as well.<sup>4</sup> While the concept of peacebuilding is mainly used—at least by the UN—for situations emerging after the end of an armed conflict (“post-conflict peacebuilding”), statebuilding is used not only for troubled regions and post-war societies but also for the problem of fragile statehood in general. Peacebuilding is aimed mainly at fostering peaceful relations between (former) parties to a conflict, and thus ideally at finding comprehensive solutions for the political, economic, social and psychological consequences of wars, and eliminating the structural root causes of conflicts (e.g., socio-economic inequality, ethno-national tension, scarce resources).<sup>5</sup> Rebuilding statehood is thus a central aspect of this understanding.

Institution-building refers to the forging of political and administrative institutions and thus forms an integral component of both statebuilding and peacebuilding. The approach usually does not, however, deal systematically with economic, social or security policy issues. Capacity-building, on the other hand, is more of a technical concept used in international

development policy with the intention of building or strengthening the capacities of local groups to overcome concrete problems. Measures for achieving these ends (e.g., training and educational programs, technical aid, dispatching advisors, financial transfers) can ultimately be conceived for all policy fields. Thus, statebuilding essentially requires a series of capacity-building initiatives, which acquire their conceptual and strategic framework through the statebuilding approach.

## Statebuilding as Multi-level Governance

International statebuilding deals with the provision of governance services in the framework of a complex multi-level policy, within which least four levels of interaction can be distinguished. These are not mutually independent but rather influence and interact with one another:

- ▶ The interactions among local actors, especially between (former) parties to a conflict
- ▶ The relationships between local actors and external, intervening actors
- ▶ The interactions among external actors
- ▶ The internal structure of each external actor—in other words, the level of the national capitals or central offices of international organizations, where a considerable need exists for coordination between ministries, agencies, or member states.

In order to carry out statebuilding in a comprehensive manner, activities on all levels must be coordinated in a sufficiently rational manner to complement one another. This is even more important the larger and more extensive the international engagement.

Reality, however, usually looks different. The political process on each of the levels mentioned follows its own criteria: diverging priorities and interests are pursued, following different plans with different time horizons. The practical constraints and rationales governing the activities of external actors in the field are not the same as those governing their activities at headquarters or in the nation’s capital. There often exists a wide gulf between those individuals dealing with the difficulties of statebuilding operations on site and those working in the central government offices and international bureaucracies who have to organize the necessary political, personnel and financial support for these operations.

can usage, nation-building and statebuilding are often used synonymously: see, for example, James Dobbins et al.: *America’s Role in Nation-Building. From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand, 2003).

<sup>4</sup> For a more detailed discussion, see Christian Schaller: *Peacebuilding und “ius post bellum.” Völkerrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen der Friedenskonsolidierung nach militärischen Interventionen*, SWP-Studie 11/06 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2006); Ulrich Schneekener: “Frieden machen: Peace-Building und Peace-Builder,” *Die Friedenswarte*, vol. 80, no. 1–2, 2005, pp. 17–40; Roland Paris: *At War’s End. Building Peace after Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 13–39; Mir A. Ferdowsi and Volker Matthies (eds.): *Den Frieden gewinnen. Zur Konsolidierung von Friedensprozessen in Nachkriegsgesellschaften* (Bonn: Dietz, 2003), pp. 27–36.

<sup>5</sup> Peace-building also emphasizes—more strongly than statebuilding—psychosocial aspects such as the counseling and reintegration of war victims, child soldiers and refugees, projects for reconciliation and for coming to terms with past conflicts, as well as moral and penal aspects (e.g., truth commissions).

**Table 1**  
**Statebuilding Measures**

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<b>Security function</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Reforming the security sector</li> <li>▶ Programs for demilitarizing, demobilizing and reintegrating combatants</li> <li>▶ Building and/or reforming the police and military</li> <li>▶ Fighting organized crime and violence by non-state armed groups</li> <li>▶ Securing the external borders</li> <li>▶ Monitoring small arms and light weapons</li> <li>▶ Supporting peace processes</li> <li>▶ Deploying international police forces and possibly also stationing international peacekeeping troops</li> </ul>
<hr/>	
<b>Welfare function</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Financial aid and credits</li> <li>▶ Building and implementing a tax, household and customs administration</li> <li>▶ Increasing public investments in education and health</li> <li>▶ Building or rebuilding infrastructure, planning a more efficient use of resources</li> <li>▶ Fostering small and medium-sized enterprises, strengthening local and regional markets</li> <li>▶ Improving the provision of basic supplies to the population</li> <li>▶ Building social security systems</li> </ul>
<hr/>	
<b>Function of guaranteeing legitimacy and the rule of law</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Constitutional reform, voting reform (promoting the right to vote)</li> <li>▶ Democratization aid, support of multi-party systems, election organization and observation</li> <li>▶ Fighting corruption</li> <li>▶ Building and reforming the judicial system and reforming the civil administration</li> <li>▶ Promoting human rights, protection of minorities and freedom of the press</li> <li>▶ Implementing measures for decentralization/federalization, strengthening municipal structures</li> <li>▶ Strengthening and integrating civilian groups and organizations</li> </ul>

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## The Dilemmas of Statebuilding

This situation is aggravated by the different dilemmas confronting external actors both abroad—at the “field level”—and at home in central government offices or organizational headquarters—at the “headquarters level.”<sup>6</sup> In the first case, these dilemmas arise through the interactions among local actors. They include shifts in the balance of power caused by the interventions of external actors, the possible promotion of rent-seeking behavior, the ambivalent effects of conditionality, and the treatment of severe or potential “troublemakers,” especially perpetrators of violence.<sup>7</sup> Dealing with para-state or quasi-state structures poses particular difficulties. Frequently, these structures have replaced, or exist parallel to, state organizations or institutions of governance and political order. Although they often guarantee a modicum of stability, they prevent sustainable state structures from emerging. They are usually entities that have separated themselves off from the central government and possess a local monopoly on violence—partly territorial, partly functional—that stands in competition to the overall state monopoly on violence (e.g., Afghanistan). It is an open question to what extent these para-state entities can be used as interim solutions or building blocks to create or restore statehood, or whether the danger exists that external support will actually solidify these structures, reducing the chances of establishing the state’s monopoly on violence and thus of sustainable development.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar (eds.): *Peacebuilding as Politics. Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001); Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (eds.): *Ending Civil Wars. The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Simon Chesterman: *You, the People. The United Nations, Transitional Administration and Statebuilding* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis: *Making War and Building Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

<sup>7</sup> For a more detailed discussion, see Ulrich Schneckener: “Internationales Statebuilding. Dilemmata, Herausforderungen und Strategien für externe Akteure,” in: Ulrich Schneckener (ed.): *Fragile Staatlichkeit* [see fn. 1], pp. 369–372.

<sup>8</sup> On this debate, see especially Andreas Mehler: *Legitime Gewaltoligopole—eine Antwort auf strukturelle Instabilität in Westafrika?*, Focus Afrika, no. 22 (Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, 2003).

The problems discussed above are further aggravated by the fact that external involvement is by nature temporally limited. This fact is well known to local actors and probably influences their own calculations. Particularly those who have little interest in change or in giving up their vested rights try to simply “sit out” the initiatives and demands of external actors, for example by sealing themselves off, participating only noncommittally in “reform discussions,” creating bureaucratic hurdles, or behaving in a demonstratively indifferent manner. They know that time usually works in their favor. But for those who want to promote change in their societies, the situation is precarious. They often receive encouragement from outside to become politically active, but they also have to fear being abandoned by the international community. In the extreme case—such as an autocracy—this can lead reform-oriented forces to initially avoid the public eye because they cannot be sure of receiving long-term outside support.

The difficulties facing international statebuilders multiply exponentially when the headquarters level is taken into account. Experience shows that what has been neglected at home can usually no longer be compensated for in the field. It is therefore decisive for the success or failure of statebuilding operations that external actors deal with the following problems:

**Political attention:** To what extent is the international community able to maintain long-term political interest in statebuilding operations in a specific country? Attention is usually the greatest in situations where violence has escalated and/or where humanitarian catastrophes are impending that carry potential consequences for regional or international security. As soon as the crisis has been overcome—at least superficially—the topic vanishes from the international agenda (for example, in the UN Security Council). This also happens when other hotbeds of conflict steal the global political spotlight. The same effect can be observed in nearly all major statebuilding operations, not to mention in smaller, less dramatic activities. The lack or decline in political interest is accompanied by a decline in public interest as well, which has negative consequences for the

mobilization of the financial and personnel resources required for international operations.

**Strategy development, operational planning and resource allocation:** A further fundamental problem is that most outside organizations fail to develop systematic statebuilding strategies, and also have problems planning concrete measures and allocating the necessary resources. Instead, international organizations use mainly ad hoc planning processes and structures, and make appeals to their members for contributions of money and/or personnel. The difficulty of maintaining sufficient ongoing support for international statebuilding has been proven repeatedly in the past. It is therefore nearly impossible to predict how much money will actually be available for a particular mission, which further hampers the strategic and operational planning of interventions. Large discrepancies can also emerge between resources promised and resources actually provided. Furthermore, governments and international organizations lack both the necessary planning capacities and the corresponding interagency and interministerial structures and conceptions that would not only support the political decision-making process but also help to systematically build expertise in the field of statebuilding. German foreign, security and development policy is no exception in this regard.

**Coordination and coherence:** Due to the large number of external actors, coordination and coherence problems are nothing less than notorious. As a rule, each of the actors have their own ideas—in some cases based on their own individual mandates—about how statebuilding should be carried out, which projects should be given which priority, and which short-term or medium-term goals should be set and how they can be achieved. In this respect, international NGOs and national development aid organizations compete for scarce resources, influence and authority. At the same time, most are interested not least in maintaining a certain level of autonomy and self-determination for their own activities.

**Legitimacy:** External actors—especially democratically elected governments—have to work to legitimate their actions. In so doing, they often encounter dilemmas: on the one hand, they have to meet a range of different expectations and demands imposed by the population, specific groups, or ruling elites in the area of operations. On the other hand, their activities

must be deemed legitimate by the population at home, for only under this condition can the necessary resources—tax funds—be mobilized. At the same time, input and output dimensions of legitimacy play important roles, and depending on the case at hand, external actors may be measured along one or both dimensions. Here too, we see differences depending on whether the organization has to legitimate its activities to the society where operations are taking place or to the public at home (see Table 2). In addition, tensions arise between the input and output dimension as well. Organizations may succeed at integrating local actors into the process of formulating political content (input), but this may make it more difficult to establish effective decision-making and implementation processes, and in turn lead to sub-optimal results (output). It is not unusual that mandates formulated with the aim of gaining parliamentary support for a country's participation in an international peace mission prove ineffective in practice and thus incapable of meeting the output criteria—neither in the field nor at home. Another example are ostentatious shows of support for NGOs, specific values, or state models, which may increase the support among the population at home but generate major legitimacy problems in the troubled regions.

**Table 2**  
**Legitimacy Demands Placed on External Statebuilders**

	<i>Field Level</i>	<i>Headquarters Level</i>
Input Legitimacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Integrating local actors into the formulation and implementation of political goals</li> <li>▶ Support from the local population</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Participation of international bureaucracies, donor organizations and other countries</li> <li>▶ Participation of national parliaments</li> <li>▶ Public support, both at home and internationally</li> </ul>
Output Legitimacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Creating a secure environment</li> <li>▶ Improving the social and economic situation</li> <li>▶ Establishing sustainable structures in the government and society</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Cost-efficient project implementation</li> <li>▶ Successful implementation</li> <li>▶ Support to specific actors (e.g., NGOs), values and political models (e.g., “Western” democracy)</li> </ul>

## Strategies of International Statebuilders

As mentioned, the dilemmas and problems are largely due to the diverging strategies which—implicitly or explicitly—inform the approaches to statebuilding pursued by external actors. The assumptions underlying these strategies about the role of the state, the behavior of local actors, the root causes of fragile statehood, the priorities for statebuilding, the required resources, the time-frame allotted to statebuilding projects and programs as well as the ways of external involvement in local structures differ considerably. In brief, these strategies result from diverging worldviews and conceptions of political order. They can roughly be attributed to the main theories of International Relations (IR) (see table 3, p. 20). Conceptually speaking, they are not mutually exclusive but are rather complementary; sometimes they are interdependent. In practice these approaches are usually pursued simultaneously, albeit with different foci, depending on the case at hand. At the same time, however, proponents of these strategies compete for scarce resources of bilateral and multilateral donors and political attention. In general, four ideal-type strategic orientations or paradigms can be distinguished:

### Liberalization First

This strategy still constitutes the dominant paradigm in development policy, even though individual actors such as the United States, the World Bank, the IMF, regional development banks, the European Union or bilateral donors prefer different aspects when it comes to practical implementation. First and foremost, *Liberalization First* is about the promotion of political and economic liberties, the strategy aims at democratization and the establishment of market economies (the so-called *Washington Consensus*). In IR-theoretical terms, this approach comes closest to the liberal assumption, which sees democratic market economies as guarantors of peace and stability—in their internal affairs as well as their external relations. This hypothesis is derived from the democratic peace theory, according to which democracies are less war-prone than non-democracies, and above all do not wage war

against each other. This approach is moreover informed by assumptions about the pacifying effects of free trade and economic interdependence (peace by trade).<sup>9</sup> In IR-literature one also finds the label “Neo-Wilsonianism,” following President Wilson’s idea of a liberal international order guaranteeing peace and security.<sup>10</sup>

Advocates of this strategy believe that weak states suffer from a lack of transparent, democratic governance structures and from a lack of economic freedom, which is reflected in pervasive rent-seeking, limited access to international markets, technological backwardness and a low investment rate. Post-conflict cases are therefore regarded and treated as special cases of transformation societies which are transitioning from authoritarian rule to democracy. Consequently, the focus of this statebuilding strategy is on holding free and fair elections, guaranteeing political liberties and protecting private property, promoting good governance in terms of effective public administration and comprehensive economic reforms. The latter includes privatization and market liberalization in order to facilitate economic integration into global markets. The state is seen as a guarantor of basic liberties. According to pure theory, it shall confine itself to providing a reliable legal framework within which the market economy can thrive freely. By the adoption of the *Millennium Development Goals* in 2000, the *Liberalization First* approach has been broadened and put more emphasis on the welfare aspect of liberalization (*Post-Washington Consensus*). Particular attention was devoted to poverty reduction and the establishment of effective educational and public health systems. This volte-face was triggered by the realization on the part of large donors that meeting basic human needs is a

<sup>9</sup> See John R. Oneil and Bruce Russett: “Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict,” *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 36, no. 4, 1999, pp. 423–442; Charles P. David: “Does Trade Promote Peace? Liberal (Mis)steps in the Peace Process,” *Security Dialogue*, vol. 30, no. 1, 1999, pp. 25–41.

<sup>10</sup> See Roland Paris: *At Wars End. Building Peace after Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 40–54.



crucial precondition for realizing civil and economic liberties.

A prominent example for *Liberalization First*—at least on a conceptual level—is the Bush Administration’s foreign policy doctrine developed after 9/11, whose centerpiece is the promotion of freedom and democracy around the world.<sup>11</sup> In the same vein, the *National Security Strategy* of March 2006 considers the creation and promotion of “effective democracies” to be key to countering a number of security challenges.<sup>12</sup> Hence, Secretary of State Rice emphasized the need for “transformational diplomacy” aimed at the establishment and consolidation of democratic, well-governed states which are responsive to the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.<sup>13</sup> Although Washington’s new strategic focus does not consistently translate into operative policies, it did leave a mark on U.S. foreign policy: The *Millennium Challenge Account*, for instance, which was established in 2002, consciously distinguishes between “good performers” and “bad performers” in order to create incentives for democratization, good governance and economic reform.

## Security First

Advocates of this strategy, which maps on realist thinking in IR, propagate a less ambitious approach: In their view, external actors should focus on guaranteeing physical security, in particular on the (re-) establishment and strengthening of the state’s mon-

opoly on the use of force.<sup>14</sup> According to Amitai Etzioni, external actors should in particular avoid any kind of social engineering, be it democratization or nationbuilding efforts, for both normative and empirical reasons.<sup>15</sup> Instead, the Security First agenda is premised on the assumption that if the state is unable to perform the essential task of providing physical security, sustainable development in other areas of governance is impossible (“no development without security”). Moreover, the introduction of civil liberties and individual rights are meaningless without guaranteeing a secure environment.

The primary focus is thus on the internal and external protective as well as coercive dimension of state sovereignty. Therefore, the demobilization (or at least containment) of armed non-state actors, security sector reform, training of the armed forces, of border troops, the police and the judiciary (in particular with a view to improving the ability of prosecution agencies to effectively combat violence), the transformation of war economies into economies of peace, the fight against crime and the strengthening of the state’s ability to control its territory and its borders are considered critical to any statebuilding effort. Moreover, in the case of post-conflict societies, separating the warring parties and eliminating the intra-state security dilemma are considered as essential first steps in order to prevent the state from relapsing into conflict. In the case of ethno-national conflicts which have already escalated, some authors therefore support partitioning territories and redrawing borders which may even include territorial secession, in order to permanently separate the warring factions.<sup>16</sup>

Traditional United Nations peacekeeping missions epitomized the *Security First* approach, because they aimed primarily at stabilizing the situation by separating the belligerent parties (“trip-wire” function) and by monitoring a cease-fire or a peace agreement. Yet this approach is not compatible anymore with the needs of today’s multidimensional UN-missions.

<sup>11</sup> In this context, President Bush spoke of a “global campaign of freedom” which he sees as a strategic response to the twin challenge posed by “terrorists and tyrants.” See President Bush’s speech, National Endowment for Democracy, Washington D.C., October 6, 2005.

<sup>12</sup> See National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington D.C.: The White House, March 2006, pp. 4–7, [www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf).

<sup>13</sup> See Secretary of State Rice’s speech on “Transformational Diplomacy,” Georgetown University, Washington D.C., January 18, 2006. This position is endorsed in the final report of the *Princeton Project on National Security*, in which the authors state: “We must develop a much more sophisticated strategy of creating the deeper preconditions for successful liberal democracy—preconditions that extend far beyond the simple holding of elections. The United States should assist and encourage Popular, Accountable, and Rights-regarding (PAR) governments worldwide.” See G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter: *Forging A World of Liberty Under Law. U.S. National Security in the 21st Century* (Princeton University, September 27, 2006), p. 6.

<sup>14</sup> See Marina Ottaway and Stefan Mair: *States at Risk and Failed States. Putting Security First*, Policy Outlook (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2004); Kimberly Zisk Marten: *Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

<sup>15</sup> See Amitai Etzioni: *Security First. For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).

<sup>16</sup> See for instance Chaim D. Kaufmann: “When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century,” *International Security*, vol. 23, no. 2, 1998, pp. 120–156.

Hence, the *Security First* strategy is primarily about concepts for security sector reform, programs for the containment of small arms and light weapons proliferation as well as for the disarmament, demobilization and re-integration of combatants (DDR programs), which have for instance been developed by the OECD/DAC, UNDP or the British government.<sup>17</sup> Great Britain's statebuilding policy in particular is significantly (albeit not exclusively) informed by *Security First* thinking. Proof of this orientation can be found in various strategy documents which assign priority to the protection of civilians, the reform of security institutions as well as the delivery of basic services.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, the *Global Conflict Prevention Pool*, which is jointly administered by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defense, and the Department for International Development (DFID), focuses inter alia on developing initiatives for security sector reform and for combating trade in small arms and light weapons. These programs received a considerable share of the Pool's funding.<sup>19</sup> Finally, the Pool—when compared to other donors—clearly focuses on the security sector when it comes to funding specific projects in target countries.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>17</sup> See: UNDP: *Security Sector Reform and Transitional Justice. A Crisis Post-Conflict Programmatic Approach*, March 2003, [http://www.undp.org/bcpr/documents/jssr/ssr/UNDP\\_2003\\_JSSR\\_Approach.doc](http://www.undp.org/bcpr/documents/jssr/ssr/UNDP_2003_JSSR_Approach.doc); OECD/DAC: *Security System Reform and Governance*, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (Paris: OECD, 2005).

<sup>18</sup> See Department for International Development [DFID]: *Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States* (January 2005), pp. 20–23.

<sup>19</sup> See DFID, FCO, and MoD: *The Global Conflict Prevention Pool. A Joint UK Government approach to reducing conflict* (London: August 2003). See moreover: DFID: *Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools. The Security Sector Reform Strategy*, Evaluation Report EV 647 (London: March 2004).

<sup>20</sup> This conclusion emerged from the *Joint Utstein* study, which evaluated more than 300 peace-building projects funded between 1997 and 2001 by four donors (Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, and Germany). According to this study, Great Britain displays the strongest commitment to security sector reform, whereas Germany and Norway predominantly funded projects with a socio-economic focus. See Dan Smith: *Getting Their Act Together. Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding. Synthesis Report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding* (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, November 2003), pp. 41–43.

## Institutionalization First

The primary focus of this strategy is on strengthening legitimate and effective institutions on the national as well as local level in order to enable these to deliver essential services. This approach is partly a reaction to the various failures of the *Liberalization First* strategy. Despite their common dedication to the ideal of a democratic market economy, the two approaches differ with regard to the means of implementation. In particular with regard to post-conflict societies, the formula *institutionalization before liberalization* is deemed appropriate (Roland Paris).<sup>21</sup> The basic assumption adherents of this strategy such as Francis Fukuyama make is that knowledge about organizational structures, about public administration and the creation of institutions is transferable, whilst other aspects—socio-cultural factors (such as social norms) in particular—can hardly be influenced by external actors.<sup>22</sup> Proponents of the *Institutionalization First* approach share a belief in the socializing effects of political institutions, which—in the medium and long-term—contribute to altering the behavior of local actors and furthering processes of collective learning, which in turn promote respect for public institutions, thereby strengthening their capacity to govern effectively. Their activities are therefore primarily directed at establishing and consolidating political institutions (parliaments, councils), promoting the rule of law (establishing constitutional courts, for instance), strengthening and reforming public administration (in particular tax-, customs- and fiscal authorities) and fighting corruption. Another core task is the creation of institutions and procedures for conflict management and dispute settlement, such as ombudsman offices, committees, arbitration panels, “councils of elders” or traditional courts.

The legitimacy of such measures depends crucially on the involvement of all relevant societal groups in these institutions. *Institutionalization First* is thus compatible with informal or formalized power-sharing models which place a premium on the inclusion of all relevant actors, not least to prevent cleavages between minorities and the rest of the population. All-party governments, proportional representation, quotas which ensure a fair distribution of offices, as well as veto rights are common measures to ensure equal

<sup>21</sup> See Paris: *At War's End* [see fn. 4], pp. 179–211.

<sup>22</sup> See Francis Fukuyama: *State Building* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).

representation.<sup>23</sup> Other methods for political decision-making that do not necessarily correspond to democratic standards but are nevertheless accepted as legitimate by the local population are traditional forms of rule, neo-patrimonial structures (patron-client relations) or procedures aimed at co-opting and consulting societal groups.<sup>24</sup> This approach in line with the promotion or revitalization of existing institutions influenced by local traditions inasmuch as these contribute to the consolidation of statehood. Hence, proponents of this concept are not only skeptic regarding rapid economic liberalization, but also regarding the imposition of the classical model of a majority democracy (Westminster style), in particular in the context of multiethnic societies.

In practice, bi- and multilateral donors pursue this approach especially with a view to reforming public administration and promoting the rule of law. Dutch development policy is exemplary in this regard, because its *Stability Assessment Framework* focuses primarily on institutional capacity building in the military and police forces, the judiciary, parliament and public service.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>23</sup> On power-sharing in multiethnic societies see Benjamin Reilly: *Democracy in Divided Societies. Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Ulrich Schneekener: *Auswege aus dem Bürgerkrieg. Modelle zur Regulierung ethno-nationalistischer Konflikte* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2002), pp. 237–333; Ian O’Flynn and David Russell (eds.): *Power Sharing. New Challenges for Divided Societies* (London: Pluto Press, 2005).

<sup>24</sup> The councils of elders (Barza Intercommunautaire) formed in North Kivu (DR Congo) in 1998 provide an illustrative example. The councils consist of 24 members (each of the eight local ethnic groups is allotted three representatives) and are in charge of dispute settlement and consultation. See Denis M. Tull: *The Reconfiguration of Political Order in Africa: A Case Study of North Kivu (DR Congo)* (Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, 2005), pp. 215–216.

<sup>25</sup> The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and The Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’: *The Stability Assessment Framework: Designing Integrated Responses for Security, Governance and Development* (The Hague: January 2005), pp. 36–45. This focus is also reflected in Dutch-funded projects which were evaluated in the context of the Joint Utstein survey. See Dan Smith: *Getting Their Act Together* [see fn. 20], pp. 32–35.

## Civil Society First

This strategy, which figures prominently in the literature on peace research and development policy, puts civil society at the center of statebuilding efforts. In contrast to the three other strategies outlined above, this approach thus emphasizes the need for *bottom-up* processes.<sup>26</sup> It proceeds from the assumption that the state and its institutions must develop at the grassroots level and must be sustained by society as a whole. This approach is thus primarily about the development of a political culture and political norms that are supported by a broad majority. Yet this is exactly what is often lacking in weak states. Usually the gap between the ruling elites, the state apparatus and fragmented societal actors looms large. Adherents of the *Civil Society First* concept therefore believe it to be of prime importance to strengthen social cohesion, to improve opportunities for political participation, to support disadvantaged and marginalized groups as well as to promote the development of a (critical) public. They admonish governments to respect basic civil liberties and human rights such as freedom of the press and free speech rights, freedom of assembly and freedom of association. Moreover, they implement projects in the field of women’s and children’s rights, education, culture, and social work. Their objective is the mobilization of civil society forces (*empowerment*). In comparison to the other strategies, this approach places a stronger emphasis on enhancing the state’s input legitimacy; viewing the state primarily as a forum for participatory bargaining processes and discourses shaped by different segments of the society.

In the case of post-conflict countries the promotion of civil society by external actors typically includes the delivery of basic humanitarian services, psychological support (such as providing trauma therapy to victims of the war), the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, the reintegration of child soldiers, methods of non-violent conflict management as well as national reconciliation (victim-offender mediation, for instance). In practice, this usually entails supporting

<sup>26</sup> See Norbert Ropers: “Prävention und Friedenskonsolidierung als Aufgabe für gesellschaftliche Akteure,” in: Dieter Senghaas (ed.): *Frieden Machen* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1997), pp. 219–242; Tobias Debiel and Monika Sticht: *Towards a New Profile? Development, Humanitarian and Conflict-Resolution NGOs in the Age of Globalization*, INEF Report 79/2005 (Duisburg 2005); Paul van Tongeren, Malin Brenk, Marte Hellema, and Juliette Verhoeven (eds.): *People Building Peace II. Successful Stories of Civil Society* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005).

**Table 3**  
**Statebuilding Strategies**

<i>Strategy</i>	<i>Priorities (e.g.)</i>	<i>Time-horizon</i>	<i>Level of interference</i>	<i>IR-theory</i>
Liberalization First	Democratization, economic reform, privatization, integration into the world economy	Short- to medium-term (5 to 10 years)	High	Liberal approaches, in particular democratic peace theory
Security First	Strengthening the state's monopoly on force, strengthening the security apparatus, security sector reform	Short- to medium-term (5 to 10 years)	Low to moderate	Realist approaches
Institutionalization First	Strengthening political and administrative institutions, promoting the rule of law	Medium- to long-term (10 to 20 years)	Moderate	Institutionalist approaches
Civil Society First	Strengthening social cohesion, enhancing political participation, supporting NGOs, associations, parties	Medium- to long-term (10 to 20 years)	High	Social-constructivist approaches

human rights groups, women's associations and peace activists, churches, journalists, political parties, unions or local communities.<sup>27</sup> More often than not the creation of such NGOs is induced by external actors; some NGOs are local spin-offs of international NGOs or activist networks which have specialized in particular issue-areas. Hence, in contrast to the other strategies presented in this article, advocates of the *Civil Society First* approach give more importance to the promotion of complementary or alternative structures sustained by non-state actors, if only as temporary solutions until effective state structures are (back) in place to deliver services to large parts of the population.

Concrete examples of this approach are the Civilian Peace Service (*Ziviler Friedensdienst*, ZFD), created by the German government in 1999, funded by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), but also numerous projects initiated in the context of the program Civilian Conflict Management (*Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung*, Zivik), which was started in

2001 and which is funded by the Federal Foreign Office. In the context of ZFD, by the end of 2005 more than 200 persons had been trained in conducting peace work in conflict- and crisis regions in cooperation with partner organizations. Zivik primarily aims at supporting NGOs and other non-state organizations in order to help a culture of peace take root in war-torn regions. In both cases activities include establishing forums for dialogue and reconciliation, youth- and social work, education, and advising local or international NGOs, respectively. The German *Aktionsplan "Zivile Krisenprävention"* (Action Plan "Civilian Crisis Prevention") therefore considers ZFD the single most important instrument to promote peace potential in civil society.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> See, e.g., Martina Fischer (ed.): *Peacebuilding and Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ten Years after Dayton* (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006).

<sup>28</sup> See: Federal Government of Germany: *Action Plan "Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding"* (Berlin, May 2004).

## Unintended Consequences and Adverse Effects

Each strategy entails certain unintended consequences and has potential adverse effects: The *Liberalization First* program underestimates the destabilizing effects often associated with rapid democratization and the liberalization of markets (“shock therapy”). On the one hand, it is in the very nature of elections and electoral campaigns to reinforce polarization and tensions between segments of the society; this applies in particular to post-conflict situations, but also to latent conflicts. Considering the almost inevitable unequal distribution of resources, the ruling elite usually enjoys exclusive access to the state media and has manifold opportunities of manipulation; hence, it is usually the power-holders who benefit from such processes, because they can clothe their actions in the cloak of democratic legitimacy. In post-conflict societies often this reinforces the political cleavages and configurations of power which emerged from the conflict, thus empowering those policy-makers who were responsible for the escalation of violence in the first place. The 1996 elections in Bosnia, from which the ethno-nationalistic parties emerged as the dominant forces, provide a virtually paradigmatic example. Under such circumstances moderate forces or new groupings do not really have a chance to influence the contours of the post-conflict order. Moreover, the economic aspects of *Liberalization First*, i.e. economic reform aimed at privatization and deregulation, usually serve the interests of the economic elite such as clans or oligarchs, thus deepening the socio-economic divide. Privatization processes in particular are usually associated with corruption and forms of economic crime. This significantly hampers the establishment of tax-funded public institutions devoted to the common good. These effects are reinforced by liberalization efforts’ tendency toward de-institutionalization. Existing institutions and structures are deemed ineffective, they are called into question or even eliminated by donors—witness the Structural Adjustment Programs adopted by the international financial institutions in the 1980s and early 1990s. The US-led *Coalition Provisional Administration* (2003–04) in Iraq provides a textbook-example of the destabilizing effects of *Liberalization First*. The CPA prioritizes

clearly rapid democratization and market liberalization over security.<sup>29</sup>

The *Security First* approach, which is rather stability- than reform-oriented, entails the risk of degrading into a *Security Only* approach and ultimately strengthening status quo forces. Although it can hardly be disputed that the provision of physical security is vital to the success of all other statebuilding activities, focusing on the state security apparatus may lead to the establishment and strengthening of authoritarian or semi-authoritarian structures, which in turn would prove counterproductive in other areas of statebuilding. In extreme cases, the ruling elites obtain internationally funded, more effective instruments of political power which allow them to block or reverse reforms, repress oppositional forces or even marginalize certain parts of the population, which in the medium term should prove destabilizing. In some cases state security forces could moreover feel encouraged to escalate festering or acute conflicts with armed non-state actors—as happened after 9/11 in the context of US-funded and -trained anti-terror units in Yemen or the Philippines.

Advocates of the *Institutionalization First* approach adopt a broader focus, emphasizing the need to create or enhance institutional capacity. Nonetheless, their strategy also tends to de facto privilege actors whose main objective is to secure their power and pursue their particularistic interests, rather than to consolidate statehood in the long run. The elite-oriented, top-down perspective of this approach favors such tendencies. In particular the necessity inherent in this strategy to (temporarily) draw on pre- or non-demo-

<sup>29</sup> On the one hand, it has become clear from the CPA’s decisions regarding the De-Baathification of the state apparatus (Order 1 and 5) and regarding the dissolution of remainders of the Iraqi army (Order 2) that the CPA consciously pursues de-institutionalization (including the layoff of half a million civil servants), in order to pave the way for (alleged) democratization. On the other hand the CPA ordered a shock treatment for the Iraqi economy, which had been centrally planned to date. This included tax cuts (Order 37) and the creation of favorable conditions for foreign investors (Order 39). As early as May 2003, shortly after the official cessation of hostilities, the head of the CPA Bremer had declared Iraq “open for business.”

cratic procedures or institutions, respectively, may undermine or entirely frustrate the long-term goal of democratization. The unintended consequence of this strategy could thus ultimately be the consolidation of authoritarian or clientelistic structures, whose representatives reject any type of reform-oriented policy by making reference to tradition and/or religion and who ultimately continue to pursue their policies irrespective of institutional “facades.” Correspondingly, the gap between legally formalized procedures and factual politics would widen. In the long run, this would challenge the legitimacy of externally induced institutionalization and would exacerbate the population’s alienation from the state’s institutions.

The *Civil Society First* strategy is diametrically opposed to this approach. Proponents of *Civil Society First* assume that statebuilding is often doomed to failure because of insufficient civil society mobilization. However, this perspective ignores that most fragile states grapple with the weakness of public institutions vis-à-vis private and societal actors. The state is sometimes constrained by powerful non-state actors who increasingly assume its tasks and functions. Supporting NGOs and other civil society actors in such a situation of obvious state weakness risks strengthening just those parallel structures and thereby impeding the development of legitimate statehood. In addition, there are several fundamental difficulties with the implicit normative premises associated with the term civil society. One problem is to identify which actors exactly constitute “civil society” in any given case. Is the “West” trying to impose its own standards on non-Western societies? This approach has thus an inherent tendency to go beyond a transformation of statehood and aims at a comprehensive restructuring of society. This will inevitably increase external interference into local structures and will require a greater resource investment as well as raise serious legitimacy questions. Moreover, evidence abounds that NGOs—in particular those that are externally funded—can only to a very limited extent be regarded as authentic civil society actors. More often than not NGOs are perceived as “foreign elements” by the local population whose services are consumed but who are not accepted as legitimate representatives. Equally problematic is the orientation of most NGOs toward particularistic interests instead of the common good; their subordination to the objectives of external donors. Other issues are the imperative of fundraising which dominates many activities and the financial attractiveness of the salaries NGOs offer. They are usually higher than salaries

offered by the state, which leads to a corresponding “brain drain” of local employees out of the public sector. Finally, there exists often a barrier to civil society engagement due to bureaucratic and intransparent structures within NGOs. These effects are particularly striking in the case of post-conflict societies in which NGOs virtually mushroom—witness Bosnia after 1996.<sup>30</sup>

A comparison of the approaches brings out another aspect: *Liberalization First* and *Civil Society First* adopt a holistic perspective, which dictates a comprehensive (maximalist) agenda. Both approaches hence intrude deeply into state and societal structures. The other strategies, by contrast, can be reduced to a rather modest agenda (minimalist) and are hence more focused and less intrusive. *Security First* and *Institutionalization First* can thus be assumed to be more susceptible to “second-best solutions” or suboptimal results, respectively, whilst the other two strategies, due to their normative maximalist agendas, will be less amenable to compromise solutions. On the contrary, experience has shown that *Liberalization First* and *Civil Society First* tend to successively broaden their agenda in the face of emerging problems, thereby step by step adjusting to the actual complexity of political and socio-economic processes. As a result, despite their explicitly stated objective, namely achieving market liberalization/democratization or strengthening civil society, respectively, priorities in the statebuilding process shift or become blurred.

The more modest variants of *Security First* or *Institutionalization First*, on the other hand, may reduce the likelihood of a clash of rival goals. Moreover, the sequencing of measures these approaches propose seems less complicated and more apt to be realized, not least because of the relatively narrow confines of these measures. On the flipside, however, these approaches risk to fall short of what may be necessary to consolidate statehood by focusing exclusively on the state’s core functions. These rest on rather shaky foundations if the economic and social environment continues to be highly unstable. Indeed, the danger of

<sup>30</sup> As early as 1998 more than 400 NGOs were active in Bosnia, the overwhelming majority of which was dependent on international funding. See Roberto Belloni: “Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 38, no. 2, 2001, pp. 163–180; David Chandler: “Democratization in Bosnia: The Limits of Civil Society Building Strategies,” in: Peter Burnell and Peter Calvert (eds.): *Civil Society in Democratization* (Portland: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 225–249.

“mission creep” inheres in these two strategies as well: the more demanding approaches to security sector reform or to strengthening the rule of law are pursued, the greater the likelihood that issues of democratization and civil society control will become salient. Hence, in practice missions with a rather modest mandate (see the so-called light footprint approach for Afghanistan 2002) were quickly extended in scope, due to the realization that the security situation, the stability of political institutions, the quality of public administration and the rule of law as well as economic development all depended on each other.

Against this background it is hardly surprising that the strategies cannot neatly be attributed to external actors or specific statebuilding operations. As a rule, most international organizations, multilateral donors and governments draw on various strategies simultaneously or use a mix of strategies, because internally each strategy has its advocates in different administrative units such as ministries, departments, or—as in the case of the UN—specialized agencies. More often than not different actors within an international bureaucracy or a government with diverging strategic preferences and policy backgrounds (security policy, development policy, humanitarian aid, diplomacy) compete for limited resources. Typically, Western ministries or departments for development tend to advocate *Liberalization First* or *Civil Society First*, respectively, whilst defense and interior ministries are primarily interested in *Security First* issues.

This functional differentiation also gives rise to inter- and intra-institutional competition over resources and policy approaches and explains the frequently lamented lack of actor coherence. It is hence decisive whether and to what extent external actors are capable of combining the respective advantages of the various strategies, and to what extent they are able to capitalize on the interdependencies that exist between the different measures. In reality, pragmatic compromises must be struck and strategies must be tailored to the circumstances of the particular case at hand, because none of the strategies outlined above constitutes a viable approach in itself.

For these reasons, international statebuilders are faced with the challenge to develop an internally concerted policy rooted in their respective capitals or headquarters, combing the relevant strategies or strategic elements into operative structures and programmes. In recent years some OECD-countries—especially Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway,

Sweden, Canada and Australia—have made efforts to build joined-up- or Whole-of-Government approaches and capacities. In so doing, they hope to improve the coherence and coordination of their policies, reducing the necessity of ad hoc decisions and enhancing their strategic and operative response to the challenges of fragile statehood.<sup>31</sup> In Germany, however, in spite of some first attempts that are primarily related to the aforementioned Action Plan “Civilian Crisis Prevention” such efforts are still in the early stages.

<sup>31</sup> For comparative analyses see OECD/DAC: *Whole of Government Approaches in Fragile States* (Paris, December 2006); Center for Security Studies: *Zivile Friedensförderung als Tätigkeitsfeld der Außenpolitik* (Zürich: ETH, November 2006); Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown: *Greater than the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing ‘Whole of Government’ Approaches to Fragile States* (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007).

## “Whole of Government”: Challenges for German Policy

Since the middle of the nineties, the Federal Republic of Germany has been involved to an increasing degree in international statebuilding activities. Currently, the country is engaged in four large-scale missions with a long-term orientation: Bosnia (since 1995), Kosovo (since 1999), Afghanistan (since 2002) and Lebanon (since 2006). Furthermore, Germany has deployed and is deploying civilian, police and military personnel in the context of UN, EU and OSCE missions in other troubled regions and fragile states including Macedonia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Indonesia/Aceh and Georgia. The increased number and complexity of international peace missions aimed not least at stabilizing and strengthening state structures has direct consequences for German policy: an increasing number of ministries are providing manpower and funding for international activities and carry out measures in the areas of security, welfare and the rule of law to promote statebuilding. This extends far beyond those ministries of the federal government chiefly responsible for foreign policy issues—the Federal Foreign Office (AA), the Federal Ministry of Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Federal Defense Ministry (BMVg)—but in some areas also includes the Ministries of the Interior, Justice, Environment, Economics, Finance and Education, as well as the corresponding subordinate administrative agencies (e.g., the German Federal Agency for Technical Relief, federal police, federal courts). This heightens conflicts among ministries as the traditional boundaries and distributions of competencies—particularly within the foreign, defense and development policy triangle—are called ever more into question and as increasingly cross-sectional tasks thrust themselves onto the agenda. On the other hand, this necessarily increases the need for coordination and governance within the federal government.

For all these reasons, there is unanimous agreement among those working in this field that an interministerial approach is needed. The Framework Document on “Civil Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peace Consolidation” (2000) already contains a broadly formulated appeal for an “overarching political strategy” that “interlinks the instruments of foreign, security, development, fiscal, economic, en-

vironmental, cultural and legal policy.” The Action Plan of 2004 puts it in somewhat more concrete terms, identifying the “creation of reliable state structures” as one of the main objectives of an interministerial policy. According to this plan, fostering the rule of law and the reform of the security sector should be given priority.<sup>32</sup> In the coalition agreement of November 2005, the area of crisis prevention was declared a “priority cross-sectional task” that requires the consolidation of existing financial and personnel resources and the allocation of additional resources. Furthermore the White Book on “Security Policy and Federal Armed Forces Reform” (October 2006) calls for the development of a “networked security” approach and foresees an interaction among military, police, diplomatic and development policy instruments—particularly on international peace missions. Despite the repeatedly professed commitment to interagency cooperation within the German federal government, this has not yet come far in practice—at least not in comparison to other Western governments. The most severe deficits and needs for reform exist in the following five areas: conception and strategy, structures and procedures, financing instruments, personnel resources, and the relationship between the headquarters level and the field level.

### Concept and Strategy

The Federal Republic of Germany does not yet possess an overarching conception or strategy for statebuilding encompassing all ministries. The aforementioned Action Plan cannot and should not fulfill this task: for one, it is much too broadly conceived; for another, it is mainly a catalogue of more or less specific measures or statements of intention that provide few details on how these goals are to be realized. No such attempt

<sup>32</sup> See the Federal Government of Germany: *Action Plan “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding”* [see fn. 28], pp. 36–39. For a comprehensive analysis of the Action Plan, see Tobias Deibel: “Wie weiter mit effektiver Krisenprävention? Der Aktionsplan der Bundesregierung im Vergleich zu den britischen Conflict Prevention Pools,” *Die Friedenswarte*, vol. 79, no. 3–4, 2004, pp. 253–298.



has been made at the ministerial level either—nor at agreeing on the use of comparable terminology. The only significant exception are conceptual papers of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development on peacebuilding within the context of development policy and on transformation policy in cases of fragile statehood.<sup>33</sup> Also in overarching papers on security and development policy—the Action Program 2015 on Fighting Poverty (2002), the Defense Policy Guidelines (2003), the Development Policy Action Plan for Human Rights (2004), and the White Book on Security Policy (2006)—neither these nor other substantively related concepts are found, nor any guidelines as to what approaches might be used in dealing with fragile states.<sup>34</sup>

In other industrialized countries, however, there do exist papers of this kind, that were jointly elaborated either under the authority of individual development agencies or ministries or through the collaboration of several government departments (see Table 4, p. 26). Depending on their authorship, the papers use varying formulations for their subject matter ranging from “fragile states” (USAID, DFID, AusAID), to “un-governed areas” (US Defense Ministry), to “poorly performing, unstable and conflict-ridden countries” (Canada’s International Policy Statement) to “countries at risk of instability” (UK Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit). Despite this fact, the documents fulfill an array of functions: some are basic theoretical papers examining the relationship between development and security policy in the framework of an overall strategy; others directly address strategies for dealing with regions in crisis and fragile states; others are more operational in character, drawing conclusions for statebuilding measures and discussing the consequences thereof for inter-ministerial cooperation.

To develop a interministerial statebuilding strategy in Germany, it is possible to draw on a number of already existing documents that deal with the issue or touch on individual aspects thereof. These include an array of contributions on civil conflict resolution,

good governance, international police aid, civilian military cooperation, human rights, fighting poverty, etc. However, the majority of these are based on concepts developed in a single institution (most in the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development), and do not attempt to formulate broader targets or goals for the federal government’s policy as a whole.

But precisely this kind of exercise is needed. Currently, every ministry has its own approaches or philosophies that it confirms with each new internal position paper. Often the medium or long-term political goals described in these papers even conflict with one another. A statebuilding strategy could thus accomplish the following:

- ▶ Develop a common terminology, so that all those involved can attain a common understanding of the problem;
- ▶ Balance and weigh different perspectives and goals for statebuilding;
- ▶ Achieve agreement on the main areas of statebuilding that Germany would like to be involved in, whether working together with other donors or independently of other donors in distinct areas;
- ▶ Define the necessary instruments and resources and identify potential “gaps”;
- ▶ Provide a context for statebuilding relating this aspect to other goals of foreign, development and security policy and thus embedding it in an overarching perspective.

It will also be crucial to rethink the traditional division of labor among agencies and make the necessary changes to reduce the need for cooperation and coordination. In other words, a statebuilding strategy should not only contain common guidelines and focal points and promote cooperation; it should also clarify the profiles and competencies of the different ministries (to answer the question “Who is doing what?”). Yet here as well, reality looks rather different. In some areas, no clear leadership is identifiable. One result of this is that a variety of ministries—the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Federal Foreign Office, and others—are financing projects in third countries with similar aims and orientations such as strengthening civil society, gender-specific aspects of conflict resolution, reconciliation policy, or supporting human rights. This situation is due in part to the still-prevalent “watering-can” principle, distributing resources in a indiscriminate way, which governs not only development policy but also measures for promoting democracy and bilateral

<sup>33</sup> See BMZ: *Übersektorales Konzept zur Krisenprävention, Konfliktbearbeitung und Friedensförderung in der deutschen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Eine Strategie zur Friedensentwicklung (Strategy for Peacebuilding)* (Bonn 2005). See BMZ: *Entwicklungsorientierte Transformation bei fragiler Staatlichkeit und schlechter Regierungsführung*, BMZ Konzepte 147 (Bonn, March 2007).

<sup>34</sup> The Joint Utstein Study criticized the lack of comprehensive conceptual guidelines for carrying out peace-building projects; see Smith: *Getting Their Act Together* [see fn. 20], pp. 61–67.

**Table 4**  
**Concepts and Strategies for Dealing with Fragile Statehood**

USA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ The White House, <i>National Security Strategy of the United States</i>, 2002, 2006.</li> <li>▶ Department of Defense (DoD), <i>National Defense Strategy of the United States</i>, March 2005.</li> <li>▶ DoD, <i>Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations</i>, November 2005.</li> <li>▶ The White House, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-44), <i>Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization</i>, December 2005.</li> <li>▶ United States Agency for International Development (USAID), <i>Fragile States Strategy</i>, January 2005.</li> <li>▶ USAID, <i>US Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenge of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century</i>, 2004.</li> </ul>
Great Britain	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, <i>Investing in Prevention: An International Strategy to Manage Risks of Instability and Improve Crisis Response</i>, 2005.</li> <li>▶ Department for International Development (DFID), <i>Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States</i>, January 2005.</li> <li>▶ DFID/Ministry of Defense (MoD)/Federal Coordination Officer (FCO), <i>The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool: An Information Document</i>, September 2004.</li> <li>▶ DFID/MoD/FCO, <i>The Global Conflict Prevention Pool: A Joint UK Government Approach to Reducing Conflict</i>, August 2003.</li> <li>▶ DFID/FCO, <i>Closer Working Action Plan</i>, 2003.</li> </ul>
Netherlands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <i>The Stability Assessment Framework: Designing Integrated Responses for Security, Governance and Development</i>, January 2005.</li> </ul>
Norway	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <i>Strategic Framework: Peacebuilding – A Development Perspective</i>, August 2004.</li> </ul>
Sweden	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Policy Analysis Office, <i>Project on Fragile States: Final Report</i>, 2005.</li> <li>▶ Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), <i>Promoting Peace and Security through Development Cooperation</i>, October 2005.</li> <li>▶ <i>Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s Policy for Global Development</i>, Government Bill 2002/03:122, 2003.</li> <li>▶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <i>Preventing Violent Conflict – Swedish Policy for the 21st Century</i>, 2000.</li> <li>▶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <i>Preventing Violent Conflict – A Swedish Action Plan</i>, 1999.</li> </ul>
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Government of Canada, <i>Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World</i>, April 2005.</li> <li>▶ Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), <i>On the Road to Recovery: Breaking the Cycle of Poverty and Fragility: Guidelines for Effective Development Cooperation in Fragile States</i>, November 2005.</li> <li>▶ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)/CIDA, <i>Peacebuilding Initiative Strategic Framework</i>, 1997.</li> </ul>
Australia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), <i>White Paper on the Australian Government’s Overseas Program, Australian Aid: Promoting Growth and Stability</i>, 2006.</li> <li>▶ AusAID, <i>Fragile States: What Is International Experience Telling Us?</i>, June 2005.</li> <li>▶ Management Advisory Committee, <i>Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia’s Priority Challenges</i>, 2004.</li> <li>▶ AusAID, <i>Approaches to Peace, Conflict and Development Policy</i>, 2002.</li> </ul>

military and police cooperation. The criteria used to identify target groups for these activities differ from one case to the next, resulting in different lists of countries. This area requires harmonization with the help of a statebuilding concept in order to focus activities and instruments and undertake more specifically targeted work. Efforts are underway in countries such as Great Britain,<sup>35</sup> Canada<sup>36</sup> and Switzerland<sup>37</sup> to develop approaches drastically limiting the number of focus countries and regions.

At a lower level, beneath the overarching strategy, it would also be helpful to have individual concepts for specific focal points. The federal government's Action Plan contains several recommendations on this, identifying security sector reform and promotion of the rule of law as key focal points for German policy. In fact, Germany is active in both areas, most prominently in Afghanistan and the Kosovo. But here too, current activities need to be consolidated, focused and integrated into a conceptual framework. This can be illustrated on the example of the security sector, where Germany lacks any comprehensive strategy.<sup>38</sup> In the individual ministries, however, programs are being carried out—relatively unsystematically—that would fall under this area of statebuilding even if they differ to some extent in their underlying logic. They include all aspects of cooperation on military policy (AA/BMVg),<sup>39</sup> individual measures undertaken in the framework of civilian-military cooperation (BMVg),

arms export policy (AA/BMVg/BMWi), bilateral police aid, border police support and participation in international police missions (AA/BMI), cooperation in the judicial field (BMI/BMJ/BMZ), GTZ projects supporting democratic control in the security sector, and programs for the reintegration of ex-combatants financed by the KfW Bank for Reconstruction. Conceptually coordinating these and other measures as well as the instruments connected to them (including budget items) would be necessary precondition for an effectively targeted policy.

## Structures and Procedures

At the core of the whole-of-government approach are structures and procedures that deal with the planning, decision-making, implementation, follow-up and evaluation of statebuilding measures. Here one must differentiate among the levels of political leadership (ministers/state secretaries), interagency coordination and practical operations. The experience so far has shown, first, that these three levels do not share a common planning phase but that planning processes often take place in several different ministries simultaneously. Furthermore, the “planning cultures” differ, particularly between the military and the civilian side. Second, decision-making processes within the government have repeatedly proven to be extremely protracted, particularly on larger statebuilding operations, where the lack of coordination or agreement among agencies causes specific questions to simply be passed on to the next-higher level of the hierarchy. This happens especially when there are no clear political guidelines which in fact constitutes the rule rather the exception. Third, there is often disagreement between ministries on the question of how policies that have been approved should be implemented (and financed)—not at least due to typical conflicts within and between ministries and their different priorities. Compromises or ad hoc solutions are often reached on a case-by-case basis due to the lack or ineffectiveness of established procedures. Even if these solutions satisfy ministerial interests at the federal government level in Berlin, they can lead to new problems in the field (see, for example, the German concept for Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan). Fourth, the agencies involved do not work together to evaluate operations. If conducted at all, evaluations are usually prepared by each

<sup>35</sup> The definition of geographic priorities takes place mainly in the framework of the British GCCP. See DFID, FCO, and MoD: *The Global Conflict Prevention Pool* [see fn. 19], p. 9.

<sup>36</sup> The Canadian development agency CIDA concentrates on 25 countries: Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, Cambodia, Cameroon, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Rwanda, Zambia, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Ukraine and Vietnam.

<sup>37</sup> On the debate in Switzerland, see Center for Security Studies: *Zivile Friedensförderung als Tätigkeitsfeld der Außenpolitik* [see fn. 31].

<sup>38</sup> Initial conceptual considerations can be found only in a GTZ paper. They are oriented, however, primarily towards German development cooperation. See GTZ: *Reform des Sicherheitssektors in Entwicklungsländern* (Eschborn 2000). At the same time, within the Interministerial Steering Group “Civilian Crisis Prevention,” a working group has been formed on the issue of security sector reform that is to develop guidelines.

<sup>39</sup> These include military training assistance provided mainly in Africa, Central Asia and Eastern Europe, bilateral cooperation programs, dispatching of military advisors as well as Federal Armed Forces advisory groups as part of programs providing equipment and supplies.

unit separately with no attempt at making them transparent to third parties.

These points are further aggravated by the following aspects: the differing logics under which different units and departments are working; the framing of competences within the administration which are largely determined by personnel policy aspects than by practical reasons; the duplication of structures, for example within the AA and the BMZ, both of which consider themselves responsible for UN policy, human rights, humanitarian aid and conflict resolution; the inseparable linkage of career trajectories and personnel planning to particular ministries; and finally, the examples set by political leaders, who are interested mainly in polishing the image of their own individual ministries. The latter problem is particularly acute in a coalition government setting.

This policy has led to a lack of interministerial structures and routine procedures for statebuilding. The creation of special task forces (*Sonderstäbe*) within the AA (e.g., on Bosnia/Western Balkans, Afghanistan) has not succeeded in changing this situation significantly: first, most of these were composed almost exclusively of AA personnel and can not be described as an example of pooling personnel resources from different government bodies. Second, such task forces have only a limited ability to coordinate or steer German activities in the field, since the responsibility (and financial resources) are often distributed among several units within the AA as well as among the different ministries. The Interministerial Steering Committee (*Ressortkreis*) “Civilian Crisis Prevention” created in 2004 (headed by the AA), in which special coordinators of all ministries are represented, should not and cannot fulfill this task. Its mandate is above all to guarantee that the Action Plan is carried out. In the best case, it could also identify priorities and guidelines for German contributions to international statebuilding, provide advice and input to decision-making processes at the leadership level, and evaluate common experiences. But in practice, these expectations have proven impossible to meet. First of all, the Committee offers an inadequate framework since the aforementioned tasks must be carried out by the core ministries involved. Second, it has been progressively pushed to the margins within the government system and disconnected from the political leadership level—despite the fact that the Action Plan stipulates that it can, when necessary, convene the Federal Security

Council (*Bundessicherheitsrat*).<sup>40</sup> Third, the Interministerial Steering Committee has an understandable tendency to discuss only those activities where agreements are possible, even if they are not the heart of the problem. To sum up, the Committee will only develop the necessary focus if it receives clear guidelines from the political leadership.

There are a variety of conceivable models for institutionalizing interagency cooperation. They can be seen in other Western countries where some initial experience has already been gathered with these kinds of innovative structures. The focus here is on integrated structures, that is, permanent organizations comprising personnel from different departments that can fulfill both coordinating and operational functions. Examples can be found in the USA, Great Britain, Australia and Canada (see Table 5).

In reaction to US Senate recommendations on this topic<sup>41</sup> calling for civilian tasks to be furnished with better resources, infrastructure and coordination, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was set up in the US State Department (DoS).<sup>42</sup> Up to now, the S/CRS has dealt on an operational level with cases like Nepal, Chad, Haiti, Lebanon and above all Sudan, and has additionally undertaken planning for a potential political upheaval in Cuba.<sup>43</sup> At the same time, experiences up to now are not particularly encouraging: the S/CRS has not yet succeeded in developing any strong position—neither within the government system nor within the State Department. In addition, the office is considered underfinanced given the low support in Congress for the approval of funds. Instead, the office was financed out of existing budget lines. Thus its work depends essentially on the willingness of other government departments and divisions to cooperate, particularly the Pentagon (DoD). For every case, the corresponding

<sup>40</sup> See Federal Government of Germany: *Action Plan “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding”* [see fn. 28], p. 67.

<sup>41</sup> The initiatives of Senators Richard G. Lugar and Joseph R. Biden are the most noteworthy of these. See *Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act (S 2127)*, February 2004.

<sup>42</sup> The *National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD 44) “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization”* passed on December 7, 2005, forms the foundation for the S/CRS and its mandate.

<sup>43</sup> Interviews with S/CRS staff members in Washington (October 3, 2006). See also U.S. Department of State: *Fact Sheet*, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, [www.crs.state.gov](http://www.crs.state.gov).

**Table 5**  
**Integrated Structures**

Country	Unit	Administrative Structure	Resources
USA	<i>Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)</i> , established 2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Integrated into Department of State (DoS),</li> <li>▶ Headed by a <i>Coordinator</i> with the rank of an ambassador</li> <li>▶ Four administrative units: planning, best practices/sectorial coordination, early warning/prevention, response strategy/resource management</li> <li>▶ Interdepartmental Coordination via the <i>Policy Coordinating Committee on Stabilization and Reconstruction</i> (PCC), headed by the Coordinator and NSC, which meets at least twice a year. Several Sub-PCCs with thematic specializations meet usually once a month at the working level (e.g. regarding issues of constitutional legality, reconstruction, humanitarian aspects)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Up to 80 officials from various departments and agencies (i.a. DoS, DoD, DoJ, DoF, USAID, CIA and Joint Chiefs of Staff),</li> <li>▶ An <i>Active Response Corps</i> and a <i>Standby Response Force</i>, are being built up, enabling rapid dispatchment of experts to areas of operation</li> <li>▶ <i>Conflict Response Fund</i> (74 million USD), with own budgetary funds for financing projects in the early stages of statebuilding operations.</li> </ul>
Great Britain	<i>Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit</i> (PCRU), established September 2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Not affiliated to any department</li> <li>▶ Political leadership and inter-departmental coordination by a committee consisting of representatives of FCO, MoD, DFID and Cabinet Office.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ About 30 officials, dispatched by FCO, MoD and DFID,</li> <li>▶ No access to interdepartmental financing instruments (Pools),</li> <li>▶ Database with about 400 Experts</li> </ul>
Australia	<i>Fragile States Unit</i> , established 2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Affiliated to AusAID</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Primarily staffed by AusAID personnel as well as officials dispatched from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Department of Defense and the Federal Police</li> </ul>
Canada	<i>Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START)</i> , established September 2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Affiliated to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)</li> <li>▶ Divided into four units: Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Response Group, Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Group, Mine Action and Small Arms, Peacekeeping and Peace Operations Group</li> <li>▶ The <i>START Advisory Board</i> is responsible for interdepartmental coordination</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ About 70 officials, mainly from DFAIT, alongside personnel from the development agency CIDA, the Department of Defense and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP),</li> <li>▶ <i>Global Peace and Security Fund</i> (142 million CAD in 2006/07) for own projects</li> </ul>

funds must be raised individually.<sup>44</sup> The S/CRS is also not involved in either Iraq or Afghanistan policy although 50 per cent of US foreign aid goes towards these operations.<sup>45</sup> Furthermore, the S/CRS now faces new competition from within its own ranks, so to speak, due to a reorganization placing US foreign aid within the State Department. In the framework of her “transformational diplomacy” agenda, US Secretary of State Rice created a new position in 2006 with the Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) and a corresponding department that is to comprise a total of 80 to 100 staff members from the DoS and USAID.<sup>46</sup> The DFA stands, as Deputy Secretary of State, above the S/CRS in the hierarchy. It has access to around 55 per cent of the total budget for US foreign aid and simultaneously heads USAID.<sup>47</sup> The DFA should therefore take on a central position in the area of statebuilding as well. Even in the case of acute crisis management, activities tend to run through its offices more than through the S/CRS (e.g., in the case of Lebanon).<sup>48</sup> Observers doubt, however, if this attempt at centralization will indeed lead to greater coherence and intensified engagement with fragile states in practice. Not only has the long-standing institutional conflict between the DoS and DoD continued despite these reforms; furthermore, foreign aid is still—despite all the rhetoric—aimed primarily at geo-strategic goals as can be seen in the list of the main recipients. There, along with Iraq and Afghanistan, we still find Egypt, Israel, Pakistan,

44 An indication of the growing frustration within the office is the fact that the first Coordinator, Ambassador Carlos Pascual, resigned after a relatively short time in office and in 2006 took the position of Vice President of the Brookings Institution.

45 Lead management lies mainly in the hands of the DoD which in the year 2006 spent over 4.6 billion USD for civilian reconstruction and stabilization measures. Added to this are around 7 billion USD for the training of local security forces. See Stewart Patrick: *U.S. Foreign Aid Reform: Will It Fix What Is Broken?* (Washington D.C.: Center for Global Development, September 2006), p. 8.

46 With the appointment of Randall Tobias as head of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, a close confidante of President Bush was given the position. At the end of April 2007, however, he stepped down due to a “call-girl scandal.”

47 The exception here are the Millennium Challenge Account, the HIV/AIDS initiative as well as an array of different budget lines that are located in different departments. See Patrick: *U.S. Foreign Aid Reform* [see fn. 45], pp. 6–8.

48 The focal points of the DFA’s work listed in its *Strategic Framework for Foreign Assistance* (May 2006) include—along with “developing countries,” “transforming countries,” “sustaining partnership countries”—“restrictive countries” as well. *Ibid.*, pp. 3–4.

Columbia and Jordan at the very top, while relatively little aid is provided to the large majority of fragile states.<sup>49</sup>

In Great Britain, Australia and Canada, different administrative solutions are being pursued: with the *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit* (PCRU) in Great Britain, a unit was created that is not directly subordinated to any ministry but acts autonomously under the political leadership of a committee encompassing representatives of the different government departments. The PCRU was set up mainly to improve the planning process within the administration. In practice, this constellation has proven to be not without its own inherent problems. Within the government, the PCRU is considered largely isolated and marginalized since it is situated outside departmental structures and vested with almost no operational competencies and no financial resources.<sup>50</sup> Its activities up to now range from providing personnel support to the British Embassy in Kabul (Strategic Delivery Unit) to improving the coherence of British aid in Afghanistan. The PCRU has also carried out evaluations and provided advice in the context of British involvement in the Afghan province of Helmand, in Basra (Iraq) and in Yemen.<sup>51</sup>

A much more modest approach has been taken in Australia. The *Fragile States Unit* within AusAID concentrates mainly on improving the coordination and coherence of Australian policy toward fragile states in the Asia-Pacific region—for example, in Indonesia, Timor-Leste, Papua/New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.<sup>52</sup>

The administrative reorganization in Canada, on the other hand, is more ambitious. There, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) established the *Stabilization and Reconstruction*

49 See Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown: *Fragile States and US Foreign Assistance: Show Me the Money* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, September 2006).

50 See Patrick and Brown: *Greater than the Sum* [see fn. 31].

51 See [www.postconflict.gov.uk/](http://www.postconflict.gov.uk/).

52 The AusAID 2004/05 annual report states on this point: “With the security, governance and economic challenges facing the region becoming more demanding and requiring more complex development responses, the newly created Fragile States Unit allows AusAID to take a more integrated and cross-government approach to addressing weak or fragile states in our region. The role of the unit is to improve the Australian Government’s understanding, analysis and responses to existing and possible future fragile states in the Asia-Pacific region.” (AusAID: *Annual Report 2004/05* [Canberra 2005], p. 6.)

*Task Force (START)*, granting it a broad mandate for measures in crisis and conflict regions including humanitarian aid, disaster relief and mine clearing operations.<sup>53</sup> START was founded based on existing government divisions (e.g., Disaster Assistance Response Team), which is why there were apparently fewer institutional obstacles to this undertaking as compared to the US S/CRS or the British PCRU. START concentrates primarily on the planning and coordination of measures being financed and undertaken by Canada in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Haiti, Sudan, Iraq and Palestine. A further focal point is earthquake aid to Pakistan and Indonesia (Java). START has its own financing and thus enjoys a certain degree of autonomy within the government apparatus. Yet, it does not have any formal authority with respect to other departments but requires the support of the cabinet.

Along with the integrated structures, divisions or focal points have also been created to take on the leadership role within a ministry (coordination units) and to act as contact points for other ministries. Examples include the *Conflict Issues Group* in the British Foreign Ministry, the *Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department* in the DFID, the *Justice Reconstruction Group* in the Canadian Department of Justice, die *International Peacekeeping Branch* within the Canadian Police, the *Conflict Management and Mitigation Office* in USAID and the *Defense Reconstruction Support Office* of the US Defense Ministry. The latter was explicitly founded as a liaison office for the S/CRS, endowed with significantly more personnel and financial resources and, in contrast to S/CRS, directly involved in Iraq policy. This example illustrates the general problem of parallel structures, which arises again and again despite the existence of integrated units such as the PCRU, S/CRS and START. An imbalance occurs particularly when individual divisions are given greater political influence and more resources than the units that are actually responsible for the overall coordination. In such cases, the latter are threatened by marginalization, thus calling into question their authority and leadership capacities within the government system.

For whole-of-government approaches, it is also crucial whether and to what extent common evalua-

<sup>53</sup> The foundation for START is the Canadian government's *International Policy Document* (April 2005). For further information, see *START: Year in Review. Mobilizing Canada's Capacity for International Crisis Response* (Ottawa, November 2006), [www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/peacepostconflict/pdfs/MobilizingCanadasCapacityforInternationalCrisisResponse-Englishversion.pdf](http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/peacepostconflict/pdfs/MobilizingCanadasCapacityforInternationalCrisisResponse-Englishversion.pdf).

tion procedures exist, and whether the corresponding instruments are being utilized consistently. In Sweden, for example, the Foreign Ministry, the development agency SIDA, the Defense and Justice Ministries as well as the Parliament are all obliged to participate in the joint preparation process for strategic orientation of development policy, which the State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of directing.<sup>54</sup> Other cases, however, show that especially on the operational level, very different instruments come into play depending on the particular priorities of the department in question. In Great Britain, for example, the interdepartmental country analyses of the Countries at Risk of Instability Initiative promoted by former Prime Minister Tony Blair<sup>55</sup> exist alongside the Joint Stability Assessments undertaken by the PCRU and the Drivers of Change analysis by DFID. In the USA, there are also separate early warning and monitoring procedures: while the S/CRS and the National Security Council together compile a list of "countries at risk of instability" on a semi-annual basis, USAID uses the Conflict Assessment Framework for its analyses. The Pentagon, however, follows different criteria to identify potential cases requiring intervention.

In Germany, the situation is similar: here too, ministry-specific country analyses predominate despite the interministerial country discussion groups and pilot projects.<sup>56</sup> Situation reports are produced jointly on a case-by-case basis only in the Interministerial Committee for Early Crisis Identification, in which, under direction of the AA, the Federal Chancellery, the BMZ, the BMVg and the Federal Intelligence Service are represented. The problem here is less the different procedures of the different ministries and more the fact that instead of integrating the different findings into an overall strategy, the ministries draw their own conclusions for their activities based on their own methods.

In order to prevent such developments, overarching political leadership and steering bodies are needed. These could take the form of cabinet committees on

<sup>54</sup> This obligation arises from the document Government Bill 2002/2003:122, *Shared Responsibility—Sweden's Policy for Global Development* (Stockholm 2003).

<sup>55</sup> These country analyses were carried out for Bangladesh, Nigeria, Myanmar and Jamaica among others.

<sup>56</sup> In the context of the Interministerial Steering Committee "Civilian Crisis Prevention," for example, a working group on Nigeria was set up in order to develop an interagency perspective.

foreign and security policy that could be convened on demand or on a regular basis—for example, the *Defense and Overseas Policy Committee* of the British Cabinet or the Australian *Strategic Policy Coordination Group*, which brings the deputy secretaries from the departments together to discuss current international strategic questions. Similar interministerial bodies are found in Canada and the US as well. In Germany, the only existing equivalent is the Federal Security Council, which meets secretly, or the Preparatory Commission of the State Secretaries, in which the AA, BMVg, BMZ, BMWi, BMF and BMJ are represented under chairmanship of the Federal Chancellery. Its role would, however, have to be redefined since it has not yet acted as the coordinating body for foreign operations or more complex statebuilding operations. Notwithstanding the current debates on the situation of security policy—particularly after September 11, 2001—it is still primarily a commission for questions of arms exports policy. Nevertheless it has a much broader mandate according to the standing orders of the federal government and can also establish interministerial commissions on specific issues.<sup>57</sup>

What conclusions can be drawn from these experiences for German policy? The following points can be made: the creation of integrated structures must not be undermined by parallel structures in the same or different ministries. These units need to be endowed with the necessary resources in order to attain a certain level of autonomy from the ministries. They must also possess operational competencies as well as a coordinating function in order to be relevant for daily practical activities. Finally, they should be closely connected to the political leadership level so that they possess the necessary authority within the government apparatus. If these conditions are not ensured, these structures will be restricted from unfolding their potential value—as the US example shows. Under these kinds of conditions it makes more sense to improve the horizontal coordination between the departments—for example through the creation of coordination units—and to forego the establishment of permanent integrated structures. Thus, two options are ultimately conceivable: the first aims at centralization and would thus have far-reaching practical consequences for the government apparatus and also for

<sup>57</sup> On the Federal Security Council and potential reforms, see Cord Meier-Klodt: *Einsatzbereit in der Krise? Entscheidungsstrukturen der deutschen Sicherheitspolitik auf dem Prüfstand*, SWP-Studie 34/2002 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2002), pp. 13–15.

the principle of ministerial autonomy (“Ressortprinzip”), which allows each minister to independently shape his own policies provided that these are in agreement with the overall directives of the federal government. The second aims at networking among departments. It would not fundamentally call into question the existing division of competencies and would thus be easier to align with the status quo.

### Model 1

According to the Canadian model, a permanent Statebuilding Task Force should be created, made up of employees of all the relevant ministries (pooling), if possible based on already existing work structures. This task force should not—as in Great Britain, for example—be set up alongside the government departments but should function as an integral component of one department. Ultimately only the Federal Foreign Office (AA) come into question here. The task force should also have its own budget, particularly to finance short-term measures and to dispatch its own experts. Furthermore, it should be endowed with sufficient authority to strengthen its position in relation to other units inside and outside the AA. It is therefore crucial that an interministerial body be given the political leadership and that this body be connected to the Interministerial Steering Committee “Civilian Crisis Prevention.” The task force could thus also be understood as the administrative substructure of the Steering Committee. It should be responsible for developing concepts and strategies, dealing with sectoral questions and coordinating concrete operations. It would also need to interface with the individual ministries. At the same time, the task force should be a visible point of contact for international organizations, NGOs and third countries. It would thus be sensible to subdivide it into thematic areas (e.g., security sector, constitutionality and human rights issues, political institutions/administration) and functional areas (e.g., early warning/analysis, evaluation, management of personnel resources). Furthermore, larger-scale statebuilding operations should be set up to include state or region-specific task forces (taking the special task forces as a model), which are also staffed with employees from the different departments and tasked with operational steering of concrete operations. At present, this would apply to Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Lebanon. These



temporary work forces would be subordinate to the Statebuilding Task Force, which maintains an overview of all broader activities. At the same time, the individual task forces do not have to be spatially linked to the AA but could also, depending on their focus, be located in other departments and managed by a ministry representative there. If an operation relies primarily on development aid, for example, the subunit and the corresponding country-specific formats could be located within the BMZ. A precondition for such a structure would be to break with the career track principle within the individual ministries. In its place, incentives would have to be created for diplomats or civil servants willing to join integrated units. Work experiences in such initiatives should be taken into account when filling higher positions within the ministries.

## Model 2

A more decentralized alternative would be to set up coordination units (focal points) in the key ministries (at least in the AA, BMZ, BMVg and BMI) that would take on responsibility for central statebuilding tasks, in coordination with one another. Here, too, a (limited) exchange of personnel would make sense since some issues and functions are difficult to assign to one specific ministry. These focal points would have to be granted a strong position and the corresponding resources, at least within their particular ministry. It is crucial that coordination mechanisms be set up to interlink the focal points. The Interministerial Steering Committee could play a role here as well, for example, by making the particular crisis manager simultaneously the head of the focal points. With larger statebuilding operations, it would nevertheless also be sensible—especially in the starting phase—to set up ad hoc integrated task forces (as in Model 1) whose personnel should be recruited largely from the coordination units. In this model, particularly the coordination function of the Federal Chancellery would have to be strengthened—for example, by setting up a unit within the Chancellery that would maintain an overview of all activities of the individual focal points or task forces. It could also take on responsibility for coordination with international organizations, particularly in the case of an acute crisis.

To conclude: whichever option is chosen, both would demand political leadership and a strategic

center for foreign, security and development policy. This would mean either developing the Federal Security Council further or creating another body at the ministerial level (“Statebuilding Commission”). At the same time, the position of the Interministerial Steering Committee would have to be raised politically and connected more closely to the Federal Security Council or an equivalent thereof.

## Financing Mechanisms

In the area of finances resources what is required are, first, special budgets for statebuilding measures, and in particular, resources that can be mobilized rapidly in the case of a crisis. Second, financing mechanisms are required that can encourage interministerial cooperation. Germany urgently needs to catch up in both areas. In the past, financing issues frequently led to conflicts within the administration—especially when quick solutions had to be found. Each ministry is always hard at work to defend its own budget and avoid the additional burden of extraordinary expenses—a point that has been notoriously evident in the discussion regarding foreign deployments of the Federal Armed Forces. But even if agreement is reached on this point, the practical application is often a more complex and thorny matter, and problems are likely to be particularly severe at the outset of an international statebuilding operation. One example can be found in the financing of police assistance and projects on civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan. Most of the resources came from the budget of the BMZ and went to the AA, which drafted the general concepts, and then allotted a certain portion of the resources to the BMI and BMVg for operational implementation of the strategy. Financing, planning and implementation were thus distributed among various departments and were not concentrated in a single hand as would be conceivable in an integrated structure.

To improve this situation, one should consider setting up new instruments and funds, as has been done in other countries like Canada and Great Britain.<sup>58</sup> The following possibilities could be considered, which are not mutually exclusive:

<sup>58</sup> The Action Plan “Civilian Crisis Prevention” (Action No. 145) contains demands of this kind. The working group convened on this subject has not produced any results, however—not least due to the opposition from the BMF.

- ▶ Focusing existing budgets more on statebuilding activities, primarily in the security sector, in setting up political and administrative structures, and in the area of the rule of law. This applies to the BMZ in particular. Furthermore, those ministries that are immediately involved in statebuilding operations should have their own budgets, such as the BMI and the BMJ, in order to avoid waste of money and time through quarrels among the ministries. In Canada, for example, CIDA has had its own *Peacebuilding Fund* since 1996 (10 million CAD per year) and the Foreign Ministry has had a *Human Security Program* since 2000. Both instruments are used, among other things, to finance a range of measures that can be embraced under a statebuilding perspective. The case is similar with the *Stability Fund* established in the Dutch Foreign Ministry in 2004, which serves primarily in financing security sector activities, and the budget for peace and security-building activities in the Swedish Foreign Ministry.
- ▶ Creating a *Rapid Response Fund* and thus the most flexible financing instrument possible to finance activities at an early phase of a crisis or a post-conflict scenario before regular development aid or project funds can be provided. Examples of such measures include the deployment of “Field Teams” and observers for monitoring and fact finding, or start-up financing for mission personnel. These funds should be located in the AA and possibly allocated by a reformed Interministerial Steering Committee to expedite decision-making processes and avoid protracted debate on the question of which budget lines should finance an operation. Possible models could be the Canadian *Crisis Pool* (150 million CAD), which is jointly administrated by CIDA and the Foreign Ministry, or the US *Conflict Response Fund* (74 million USD), which is located in the S/CRS.<sup>59</sup>
- ▶ Setting up several jointly administrated funds organized either into priority regions or typical areas of statebuilding. Overall control could lie with one department, while coordination and decision-making could be carried out by a steering committee. It would be conceivable to create a joint fund for deploying civilian personnel as well as police forces (AA, BMZ, BMI, BMJ) or a fund for

<sup>59</sup> Initially, however the Conflict Response Fund was rejected repeatedly by the US Congress based the fact that other such budget lines already exist. Congress ultimately approved only 74 million USD instead of the 100 million USD originally requested.

measures in the security sector, comprising all the different budgetary funds that are now distributed among the budgets of the AA, BMZ, BMI and BMVg. One example would be the interministerial *Canadian Police Arrangement*, which has its own financing mechanism for deploying personnel to international police missions (19 million CAD for 2003–2006). Another option would be to establish regional funds after the model of the British *Africa Conflict Prevention Pool* (ACPP), which is administrated by an interdepartmental steering group headed up by the DFID.<sup>60</sup>

- ▶ Setting up a jointly administrated *Global Fund* with a relatively open structure and used to finance the key civilian measures in the crisis region. This would mean the de facto pooling of a series of different budgets that are currently distributed among different ministries. However, to induce the ministries to pay money out of their own budgets into this joint fund, the fund itself would have to significantly larger than the sum of funds contributed by the ministries to it (bonus). It would be modeled on the British *Global Conflict Prevention Pool* (GCPP, 74 million GBP for 2006), which came into being in a similar way in 2001. Under the leadership of the Foreign Ministry, together with the DFID, MoD and the Finance Ministry, it serves in the financing of diverse strategies. For each of these focal areas of support, there is a “strategy manager,” supported by a “strategy management team” staffed with representatives of the different departments.<sup>61</sup> Another alternative form is the Canadian *Global Peace and Security Fund* (142 million CAD for the 2006/07 fiscal year), which, as mentioned above, is located directly within START. In Germany too, a general fund of this kind would either have to be headed by a steering group from the AA, BMZ, BMVg, BMI and BMF or by an integrated structure comparable with START.

Jointly managed funds offer, at least in theory, a series of advantages: those who want to spend money jointly also have to decide jointly what to spend it on. To this end, concepts and criteria have to be developed

<sup>60</sup> The ACPP has been increased a number of times since 2001 and has grown from 45 million GBP (2001/02) to around 67 million GBP (2007/08), see Debiel: “Wie weiter mit effektiver Krisenprävention?” [see fn. 32], p. 280.

<sup>61</sup> See DFID, FCO, and MoD: *The Global Conflict Prevention Pool* [see fn. 19], pp. 8–9. On the management of the pools, see Debiel: “Wie weiter mit effektiver Krisenprävention?” [see fn. 32], pp. 278–279.

by the participating ministries. This financing instrument is thus also used to push forward on the conceptual or strategic level and to reach agreement on priorities and strengthen cooperation at the operational level. At the same time, it leads to an array of problems in practice, as the British experience demonstrates.<sup>62</sup> First, there is the danger of being restricted to solutions representing the lowest common denominator: those concepts are used where agreement is possible, and not those that may indeed be more urgent and preferable with regard to situation in a fragile state. Second, a tendency exists to expand programs to encompass all the interests of everyone involved, avoiding discussions about which issues to focus on. In practice, this leads—as in the case of the GCPP—to a wide array of individual strategies each of which ultimately disposes over just a limited amount of financial resources. This calls the effectiveness of such programs into question.<sup>63</sup> Third, in the pool framework, departments try to push through political agendas and projects that they had planned to engage in anyway. If they fail in this effort, they evade coordination by simply paying for the measures out of their own budgets. In other words: the desired discussion and coordination among departments does not necessarily take place. Fourth, the individual funds can get in each other's way. In Great Britain, for example, a number of points of overlap have emerged between the ACPP and the GCPP, which have in turn raised new coordination problems. Fifth, such funds are fairly susceptible to being politicized or instrumentalized by political leaders who use them as a means to exert influence. In the case of the GCPP this has led to the financing of mainly short-term operations that appeared opportune to decision-makers and promised conspicuous evidence of success.

In Germany, even aside from legal problems, a jointly managed Global Fund thus appears fairly unpromising, unless it were directly situated in an integrated structure—as in the case of Canada—where the staff of different departments work together on a daily basis. At the same time, a number of different, thematically focused funds could be created, each run by a different ministry and all required to coordinate

all activities with one another. Here too, if the Inter-ministerial Steering Committee were reformed and its political position raised correspondingly, it could take on an important role in this area.

## Human Resources

Along with the financial aspects, the question arises as to the human resources needed for international statebuilding activities. This applies not only to the staffing of ministries and the corresponding divisions or work units, but even more importantly to the possibility of delegating personnel to civilian and police tasks—often in the context of UN, OSCE or EU missions. Depending on the particular situation and mandate, these experts act as observers, advisors, trainers or—in the case of transitional administrations—as decision-makers with their own power of authority. Germany has indeed made some progress in this area, not least of all with the foundation of the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) and the Civilian Peace Service (ZFD), even if the ZFD can only be seen as a very limited and indirect instrument of statebuilding. Furthermore proposals have been made to reform the Federal Police in order to make deployments abroad easier and—like in Sweden, Norway and Australia<sup>64</sup>—to grant them a stronger role in general decisions regarding appointments as well as individual career planning.

Despite these developments, still not enough civilian personnel are available. The need for police, customs, border police, judges, and administrative and legal experts is particularly acute since they often have to be withdrawn from positions at home on extremely short notice and for a longer period of time. In Germany, this is compounded by the problem, which lies in the coordination between the federal government and the governments of the *Länder* (states). This can be seen in the allocation of personnel for international police missions, where the federal and state levels have agreed on an allocation formula but quarrels still occur constantly, especially over the costs and deployment of highly qualified personnel.

<sup>62</sup> Discussions with staff members of DFID and the *Prime Minister's Strategy Unit*. See also Debiel, "Wie weiter mit effektiver Krisenprävention?" [see fn. 32], pp. 291–293.

<sup>63</sup> In the year 2006, the GCPP, for example, primarily funded measures in Iraq (12.5 million GBP), in Afghanistan (20 million GBP) and in the Balkans (8 million GBP). This left comparatively small sums for most of the other strategies.

<sup>64</sup> While in Sweden and Norway a certain percentage of the police force is planned for international operations, in Australia, an International Deployment Group was developed specifically for this purpose. It currently includes approximately 400 police (700 are planned), who receive special training for deployment in international missions.

The situation is not much better when examining other Western countries. Nevertheless, a few initiatives are worth mentioning: the most advanced of these is in Canada, where the *Canadian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights* (CANADEM), founded in 1997 with funds from the Foreign Ministry, now has at its disposal a staff of approximately 7,500 experts who can be deployed to fragile states and crisis regions to carry out diverse civilian tasks. This number includes a reserve force of 500 police and security experts as well as other specialists who can be deployed rapidly. In Norway, with the *Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights*, a similar system is in place since 1993, including approximately 350 experts registered for international peace missions. Among them are around 150 members of a stand-by force who can be assigned to short-term operations for a maximum of six months. In addition a *Crisis Response Pool* was established in 2004 in the Norwegian Ministry of Justice comprising up to 40 persons including judges, state prosecutors and prison officials, who are dispatched mainly in the context of security sector reforms.<sup>65</sup> Since 2000, with its *Expert Pool for Civilian Peacebuilding* situated in the Foreign Ministry (comprising about 500 persons) Switzerland also disposes over an instrument for personnel recruitment. In the USA similar ideas have been put forward in recent years, particularly to enable more rapid deployment of personnel in the case of a crisis.<sup>66</sup> Very little progress has been made in this direction so far, however, aside from creating the *Action Response Corps*, which is subordinated to the S/CRS and set to comprise up to 100 diplomats and other experts.

Germany needs to press ahead with developing its personnel resources in the civilian area. A first step in this direction would be to combine existing personnel pools, data banks and on-call lists of police, judicial, and administrative experts, election and human rights observers, peace service workers, etc. at a central point in order to attain an overview over the

whole spectrum of civilian experts and their availability. It would also be helpful to have civilian teams available that could analyze a situation in the first few months (up to one year) on location in a bilateral or multilateral framework and get the first initiatives underway. A crucial point here will be the education and training of civilian personnel, since in their normal professional training, police, lawyers and administrative officers are not prepared to take on international tasks. These experts should receive much more of their training for international operations together and not divided up into separate professional groups. This will be particularly important for the cooperation between civilian and military experts. The following options are possible:

- ▶ Better cooperation among existing organizations such as the GTZ, ZIF, ZFD, InWent (Capacity Building International, Germany) and the Federal Academy for Security Policy or also police academies with regard to the training and allocation of civilian personnel. Their cooperation could be take place through joint modules, the exchange of teaching personnel, and the sharing and synchronization of data.
- ▶ Expanding and developing the ZIF (currently about 1,000 persons in the personnel pool) as a central location for education and training, registration, deployment and debriefing of personnel and for compilation of early warning analyses and evaluations.<sup>67</sup>
- ▶ Founding a specific agency according to the model of CANADEM, managed jointly by the AA and BMZ, which would possibly have its own full-time stand-by forces that could be deployed rapidly for international missions or bilateral operations in the field.

<sup>65</sup> See Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: *Peacebuilding—A Development Perspective* (Oslo, August 2004).

<sup>66</sup> In their initiative, Senators Joseph R. Biden and Richard G. Lugar proposed that a Response Readiness Corps be set up with up to 250 persons as well as a Response Readiness Reserve, consisting of around 500 federal employees or other staff members. See Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act (S 2127) [see fn. 41]. See also Nina M. Serafino and Martin A. Weiss: *Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, April 2005).

<sup>67</sup> This proposal is also found in part in the action plan “Civilian Crisis Prevention,” where the expansion of the ZIF is recommended (Action No. 152).

## Linking Headquarters and Field Level

Even the most comprehensive whole-of-government approach is of little use if it fails to show results on missions in the field. The focus here is, on the one hand, the relationship between the Berlin level and the individual activities in the field. On the other hand, mechanisms are needed for coordination and cooperation, both among the representatives of German organizations and between them and other international organizations. There is a de facto tendency, however, for organizations to engage in bilateral activities side by side with one another—even engaging in directly competing activities. In this way, contradictions between ministry-specific measures and concepts are reflected in the areas of operations. What is not coordinated in Berlin usually also cannot be organized in the field, since each is funded and commissioned from different sources, each works with different partners, adheres to different rules of engagement and follows different priorities. This does not rule out pragmatic solutions on a case-by-case basis, but also does not ultimately lead to a coherent policy.

The most acute problems have arisen in the cooperation between military and civilian components, particularly since the military is generally tied into multilateral structures and only partly governed from the capital.<sup>68</sup> At the same time both sides depend on each other as numerous operations from Bosnia to Afghanistan have shown. While civilian reconstruction requires a safe environment, the military forces are interested in seeing sustaining political and economic successes so that military operations can be reduced or discontinued. Under these circumstances, misunderstandings, conflicts and mutual accusations should come as no surprise. The overlap of tasks and measures naturally leads to tensions which can be observed for example in the controversies around the civil-military cooperation of the Federal Armed Forces in Bosnia, the Kosovo and Afghanistan.<sup>69</sup> Having peace troops take on civilian tasks should improve their “good guy”-image vis-à-vis the local population (“hearts and minds” operations), and at the same time

increase the support for these operations among the German population. Conversely, there are more and more NGOs and civilian experts who carry out tasks in the security sector, whether in mine clearing, demobilizing combatants, or army reform. Especially among NGOs and development experts and particularly in Germany, the view often predominates that maintaining a clear distance from international troops is a precondition for successful work. This has led to repeated problems especially at the outset of missions.

The best example of this was the establishment of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kunduz, Afghanistan, in 2003. The BMZ insisted—despite the integrated concept—on carrying out its work in the province in a separate building and politically independently from the PRT, which was jointly headed by the BMVg and AA. Only in mid-2004 had the differences been overcome for the most part and bridged through coordination meetings.<sup>70</sup> This episode made it clear how important it is to practice the whole-of-government approach on both levels—in the capital and in the crisis region. In other words: it is scarcely possible to rely on integrated structures in the field if these exist only rudimentarily—or not at all—at home. An interministerial steering group set up in an ad hoc manner and coordinated by AA—as in the case with the PRTs—does not appear to be an adequate substitute for this.

A glance at other countries shows that the debate on this issue has only just begun. There are, however, some examples of attempts at developing integrated structures in the field with corresponding structures in the capital. This is true for the Swedish and Canadian PRTs in Afghanistan, which comprise representatives of the foreign ministries, development agencies and police. An even more comprehensive approach has been taken in Australia since 2003 in the context of the *Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands* (RAMSI), which also includes other countries from the Pacific region. Here, an integrated structure for military, police and civilian personnel was created to foster the political and economic stabilization of the country. The Special Coordinator, an Australian diplomat, functions as the central interface between the on-site mission and the Australian government (and other partners) at home.

Ultimately, however, case-by-case solutions will be unavoidable depending on the size of the mission,

<sup>68</sup> See Stefan Klingebiel and Katja Roehder: *Entwicklungspolitisch-militärische Schnittstellen: Neue Herausforderungen in Krisen und Post-Konflikt-Situationen* (Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, January 2004).

<sup>69</sup> See Michael Schmunk: *Die deutschen Provincial Reconstruction Teams*, SWP-Studie 33/2005 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2005), pp. 26ff.

<sup>70</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 28ff.

distribution of tasks and point in time of the deployment, particularly regarding how to weight the different personnel components. Furthermore, these structures have to be compatible with those of other international actors or embedded in multilateral contexts. Here it is crucial that the steering and governance takes place in the capital, and that structures be established that offer points of contacts for those working on the mission in the field, and that these contacts are granted the necessary authority within the government apparatus.

## Summary and Prospects

The whole-of-government approach cannot solve all the problems and dilemmas connected with international statebuilding—especially not those arising from interactions between local and international actors at the field level. At the same time, such an approach would alleviate some of the pressure on the political and administrative leadership: it would improve their ability to react to changing conditions in the field, to achieve agreement with one another, and appear in front of local actors with a unified position. Above all, however, such an approach should also address the problems typical at the headquarters level. The advantages of an interministerial, integrated statebuilding policy would thus include the following:

- ▶ The improvement of political governance as well as planning and decision-making processes;
- ▶ Raised awareness of developments in fragile states and crisis regions;
- ▶ Increased efficiency of coordination between ministries (and subordinate organizations and agencies) and thus avoidance of inadequate, ad hoc solutions;
- ▶ More effective utilization of personnel and financial resources;
- ▶ Improved compatibility between German measures and those of international partners;
- ▶ Increased “visibility” of the German contribution and thus potentially increased legitimacy for more extensive statebuilding operations with a civilian and military component among the German population.

Furthermore, this kind of approach would offer the opportunity to find constructive solutions to the well-known conflicts that inevitably arise within the government apparatus due to different preferences for different statebuilding strategies. By promoting such an approach, one would be enabled to understand more clearly the unintended consequences and adverse effects of different strategies and could prevent the “ideologization” of the particular approaches or worldviews of one side or another.

In Germany, however, the chances of actually realizing the whole-of-government approach described here should nevertheless be assessed with a degree of skepticism. Within the government apparatus, the

topic has been brought up repeatedly in recent years when an acute crisis occurs, although under a range of different, thematically related headings like “conflict prevention” and “networked security.” In the German Bundestag as well, efforts are being made to fundamentally reexamine the whole of security policy and statebuilding operations, which is due not least of all to the expansion of German military operations abroad. At the same time, there is no actor in sight that appears willing and able to deal with these problems and push through the necessary institutional changes—at least in the field of statebuilding. Ultimately, such reforms can only succeed if the political leadership takes on the issue and introduces the necessary steps in the cabinet. In its current form, the Interministerial Steering Committee “Civilian Crisis Prevention” cannot take on this task; it can at most provide an impetus in this direction. Yet even to accomplish this, closer political links to the leadership of the government departments would be required.

This situation is alarming given that international obligations and constraints in this area only stand to increase further in the future. This is due first to the number of countries currently in acute or impending crisis, second to the institutionalization of these questions in international frameworks like the EU, NATO and the recently founded UN Peacebuilding Commission, where Germany is member as one of the largest UN financial contributors. At both the EU and UN level, therefore, Germany will be expected and required to make civilian, military, financial and conceptual contributions that cannot be met—also not in public communication—with a defensive or reactive stance. Instead, a proactive, forward-looking role is required—which will, however, require a corresponding structuring of the government apparatus.

## List of Abbreviations

AA	Auswärtiges Amt (Federal Foreign Office)	PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team (Afghanistan)
ACPP	Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (United Kingdom)	RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development	S/CRS	Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (USA)
BMF	Bundesministerium der Finanzen (Federal Ministry of Finance)	SIDA	Swedish International Development Authority
BMI	Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)	START	Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (Canada)
BMJ	Bundesministerium der Justiz (Federal Ministry of Justice)	UN	United Nations
BMVg	Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Federal Ministry of Defense)	UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
BMWi	Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology)	UNDP	United Nations Development Program
BMZ	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development)	USAID	United States Agency for International Development
BTI	Bertelsmann Transformation Index	USD	US Dollar
CAD	Canadian Dollar	ZFD	Ziviler Friedensdienst (Civilian Peace Service)
CANADEM	Canadian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights	ZIF	Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (Center for International Peace Operations)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (USA)		
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency		
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq)		
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (World Bank)		
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)		
DFA	Director of Foreign Assistance (USA)		
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)		
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)		
DoD	Department of Defense (USA)		
DoS	Department of State (USA)		
EU	European Union		
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom)		
GBP	British pound		
GCPP	Global Conflict Prevention Pool (United Kingdom)		
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation)		
HDI	Human Development Index (UNDP)		
IMF	International Monetary Fund		
InWEnt	Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung gGmbH (Capacity Building International, Germany)		
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Bank for Reconstruction)		
MoD	Ministry of Defense (United Kingdom)		
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization		
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization		
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development		
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe		
PCC	Policy Coordination Committee (USA)		
PCRU	Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (United Kingdom)		