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**Peace With Power-Sharing:  
Under Which Conditions?**

**Lukas Krienbuehl**

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## List of Abbreviations

ABSU	All Bodo Student Union
AU	African Union
BAC	Bodoland Autonomous Council
BTC	Bodoland Territorial Council
CHT	Chittagong Hill Tracts
CIA	United States Central Intelligence Agency
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan (2005)
EU	European Union
EZLN	Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional/ Zapatista Army of National Liberation
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
JSS	Parbottya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti/ Chittagong Hill Tracts People Solidarity Association
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NCP	National Congress Party of Sudan
OAU	Organisation of African Unity (since 2002 called AU)
OHR	Office for the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PRI	Partido Revolucionario Institucional/Institutional Revolutionary Party of Mexico
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SSDF	South Sudan Defence Forces
SSIG	South Sudan Independence Group
SSIM	South Sudan Independence Movement
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Programme/ University of Uppsala
UDSF	United Democratic Salvation Front
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

## Glossary

AWAMI-League	political party in Bangladesh
Dinka	Dinkas represent the main ethnic group in southern Sudan
Equatorian	Equatorians are a minority ethnic group in southern Sudan
Indios	the indigenous Amerindian population in Mexico
Jumma	tribal people in the Chittagong Hill Tracts
Mestizos	the population of mixed Amerindian and Spanish descent in Mexico
Nuer	Nuers constitute the second largest ethnic group in southern Sudan
Shanti Bahini	the armed wing of the JSS
Shikomoro	official language in the Comoros



## Abstract/Zusammenfassung/Résumé

Power-sharing mechanisms play an increasingly important role in peace agreements. However, there is profound divergence over the positive effects of the inclusion of political power-sharing provisions in peace accords. Proposing power-sharing solutions may be useful for mediators to get conflict parties to the negotiating table. At the same time those mechanisms imply a number of challenges for academics and practitioners. Many critics argue that power-sharing as specific political model has only worked in particular circumstances, such as in Switzerland. Before formulating general guidelines and recommendations on power-sharing in peace agreements, one has to address this critique. To this end the working paper analyses four contested favourable conditions in the power-sharing model: a small population size, a balance of population size between divided groups, territorial isolation of population groups and a common perceived security threat. Eight case studies are carried out in order to test these four favourable conditions that might influence the durability of power-sharing peace agreements. As a result, this working paper provides evidence that the durability of power-sharing peace agreements does probably not depend on these favourable conditions. It is therefore argued that power-sharing solutions in peace agreements do not seem to require particular favourable conditions to be successful and are not doomed to fail from the outset in a range of different contexts.

Machtteilungsmechanismen spielen in Friedensverträgen eine zunehmend wichtige Rolle. Doch das Einbinden von politischen Machtteilungsinstitutionen in Friedensverhandlungen ist umstritten, da Uneinigkeit über deren positive Auswirkungen herrscht. Für Mediatoren kann das Zurückgreifen auf Machtteilungslösungen nützlich sein, um Konfliktparteien an den Verhandlungstisch zu bringen. Gleichzeitig stellt Machtteilung grosse Herausforderungen sowohl an Wissenschaft als auch Praxis. Viele Kritiker sehen darin lediglich ein politisches Modell, das nur unter ganz bestimmten Bedingungen funktioniert, so zum Beispiel in der Schweiz. Bevor generelle Leitsätze und Empfehlungen zur Berücksichtigung von Machtteilungsmechanismen in Friedensverträgen formuliert werden können, gilt es deshalb, zu klären, ob Machtteilung nur unter bestimmten Bedingungen funktionieren kann. Dieses Working Paper untersucht Bedingungen für funktionierende Machtteilungsmechanismen in Friedensverträgen und berücksichtigt dabei vier begünstigende Kontextfaktoren: kleine Bevölkerungszahl, Bevölkerungsgleichgewicht zwischen den verfeindeten Bevölkerungsgruppen, deren territoriale Abgrenzung sowie eine gemeinsam wahrgenommene Sicherheitsbedrohung. Anhand von acht Fallstudien wird der begünstigende Einfluss dieser vier Bedingungen auf die Dauerhaftigkeit von Friedensverträgen untersucht. Die Ergebnisse dieses Working Papers weisen darauf hin, dass die Dauerhaftigkeit von Friedensverträgen mit einer Machtteilungskomponente nicht von den vier untersuchten Bedingungen abhängig ist. Dies lässt den Schluss zu, dass Machtteilungslösungen in Friedensverträgen nicht auf besondere begünstigende Faktoren angewiesen sind, um erfolgreich zu sein, und sie deshalb in unterschiedlichen Kontexten nicht von vornherein zum Scheitern verurteilt sind.

Les mécanismes de partage du pouvoir jouent un rôle de plus en plus important dans les accords de paix. Pourtant, les divergences sont profondes quant aux effets positifs de ces institutions de partage du pouvoir politique dans les accords de paix. Pour les médiateurs, esquisser une solution de partage du pouvoir peut être utile afin d'amener les parties au conflit à la table des négociations. En même temps, le recours à de tels mécanismes implique des défis importants pour le monde académique et pratique. De nombreuses voix critiques affirment que comme modèle politique il n'a que fonctionné dans des conditions particulières comme en Suisse par exemple. Avant de pouvoir formuler des recommandations et des principes directeurs sur le partage du pouvoir dans les accords de paix, il s'agit donc de se demander si cette critique est pertinente. Tel est le but de ce working paper qui considère quatre conditions favorables dans le modèle du partage du pouvoir: une population de taille limitée, l'équilibre entre la taille des groupes de population antagonistes, l'isolation territoriale de ceux-ci ainsi que la perception commune d'une menace de sécurité. Huit études de cas sont menées afin de tester ces quatre conditions favorables qui pourraient influencer la durabilité d'accords de paix comprenant des mécanismes de partage du pouvoir. Ce working paper fournit des indices que la durabilité de ce type d'accords de paix ne dépend probablement pas de ces conditions favorables. Pour cette raison, la conclusion est avancée que les solutions de partage du pouvoir ne semblent pas requérir des conditions favorables particulières pour être durables et ne sont donc pas condamnées a priori à l'échec dans différents contextes.

# 1 Introduction

The power-sharing model is influential in the field of conflict management. Some scholars have argued that power-sharing has the potential to manage internal conflicts in deeply divided societies (Lijphart, 1975b; 2002; Sisk, 2003). Power-sharing peace agreements have recently emerged 'as the West's preferred instrument of peacemaking' (Tull & Mehler, 2005: 375) and are recommended by leading mediation organisations as a mediation outcome at least for a transitional period (Papagianni, 2007; 2008). Yet, those arrangements are contested. It is argued that power-sharing can only function in Western countries where this political system has been established over a long period of time such as in Switzerland. Therefore, it is important from a practical and academic point of view to answer the question: Do power-sharing peace agreements need particular favourable conditions to be successful? Only if empirical evidence rejects such favourable conditions can one then formulate practical guidelines about the best sequencing, implementation and type of power-sharing mechanisms in mediation processes and peace agreements to be used in different contexts.

For that purpose, this working paper considers conditions that may affect the durability of power-sharing peace agreements. Hence, it contributes to the debate about whether power-sharing institutions depend on particular favourable conditions. It will be based on the most prominent consociational or power-sharing model (Lijphart, 1969; 1975a; 1977). In his model, Lijphart has established favourable conditions affecting the durability of power-sharing. Even if heavily criticised (Bogaards, 2000; Pappalardo, 1981; Van Schendelen, 1984), four recurrent conditions can be identified in Lijphart's work (Bogaards, 1998). They are a small population size, a balance of population size between segmented groups, territorial isolation of segmented population groups and a common perceived security threat. There is no other empirical study that considers Lijphart's four conditions and their effects on the durability of power-sharing peace agreements. This is a gap in the understanding of power-sharing and its practical application. The main question is therefore to what extent do Lijphart's four favourable conditions affect the durability of power-sharing peace agreements and what do the findings imply for the applicability of power-sharing provisions in peace agreements in different contexts.

After this introduction, chapter two briefly reviews the academic literature and practical guidelines on power-sharing in peace agreements, outlines the critiques of power-sharing institutions and presents Lijphart's model including favourable conditions. Chapter three explains the case selection and the operationalisation, and analyses the conditions potentially influencing the durability of power-sharing peace agreements through eight case studies. Finally, chapter four discusses results and chapter five concludes with a summary of empirical findings and outlines practical implications.

## 2 Power-Sharing Institutions and Peace Agreements

The purpose of this chapter is to briefly review the literature and practical guidelines on power-sharing peace agreements in the context of internal armed conflicts as well as major critiques. Then, it considers Lijphart's power-sharing model, giving a precise definition and considering conditions that may favour the durability of power-sharing peace agreements.

### 2.1 Mediating Power-Sharing Peace Agreements

Power-sharing has become particularly prominent both in academia and practice since the end of the Cold War. The increasing number of negotiated settlements to end internal armed conflicts has brought about a great interest in the power-sharing model. In particular sharing executive power between former belligerents potentially offers strong conflict resolution incentives. From Bosnia and Herzegovina to Sudan mediators have relied on power-sharing clauses in order to convince conflict parties to negotiate, reach an agreement and increase the acceptance of a peace settlement by warring parties (Sisk, 2003; Papagianni, 2007). Western states in particular are more and more promoting power-sharing solutions in peacemaking processes in the wake of increased international involvement to bring internal armed conflicts to a negotiated end (Sisk, 2003; Tull & Mehler, 2005). For this reason increasing attention has been paid to power-sharing in the academic world but also in regard to practical implications and recommendations as outlined below.

As political arrangement in peace agreements, power-sharing institutions are particularly prominent in the academic literature. A peace negotiation process provides a context, which facilitates changes to political institutions in a deeply divided society. Power-sharing potentially makes peace settlements more stable and durable. Academic studies have shown the positive effect of political, territorial, economic and military power-sharing clauses in peace agreements on the durability of peace (Binningsbø, 2005; Bose, 2005; Byrne, 2001; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Hoddie & Hartzell, 2003), although political power-sharing as most common institution in peace agreements might not be sufficient (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008). Yet, there is still profound disagreement on which political arrangements are the best conflict management mechanisms (Horowitz, 2001; Mehler, 2009; Oberschall, 2007; Reilly, 2006; Sisk, 2003). Despite this fact, a number of experts and specialised organisations developed practical recommendations regarding the use of power-sharing in peace mediation and negotiations as one potential solution. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (Papagianni, 2007; 2008) published for its Africa Mediators Retreat 2007 and for the Oslo Forum 2008 brief policy and background papers dealing with the use of power-sharing in peace negotiations. They recommend that mediators consider power-sharing agreements as an option, but only when the agreement 'defines the expiration day of power-sharing arrangements (...) and guarantees during the transitional period the gradual expansion of political participation beyond the signatories of agreements' (Papagianni, 2007: 33). Other experts advise as well to negotiate power-sharing agreements for a limited interim phase so that they enable a broader, more inclusive constitution-making process (Töpperwien, 2010). International actors should at the same time stay engaged throughout this power-sharing transitional phase (Papagianni, 2008).

Democracy represents a central pillar for peace in Western and international approaches to peacebuilding (Paris, 1997). Democratic systems however, especially during electoral periods which often come at the end of a peacemaking process, can also increase conflictual competition and sharpen divisions (Crocker & Hampson, 1996; Lijphart, 2004; Paris & Sisk, 2009).<sup>1</sup> A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) guide on conflict prevention proposes pre-election power-sharing pacts as solution to mitigate conflict-exacerbating elections (UNDP, 2009). In such post-conflict contexts, power-sharing solutions have indeed a major strength according to the academic

<sup>1</sup> Although there is a debate about whether power-sharing institutions imply that democracy has to be sacrificed for peace (Mehler, 2009), this debate is not addressed in this paper because it would lead to far.

literature: it does not allow for the political isolation of a former warring party even in the context of democratic competition. Power-sharing aims to increase 'the sense of security by maximising its [the segmented group's] control of its own destiny' (Lijphart, 1995: 856). This represents the conflict management potential of power-sharing politics in post-conflict settings. Experts have therefore developed specific mediation guidelines on wealth-sharing (Hayson & Kane, 2009) and federalism (Töpperwien, 2009), two very specific forms of power-sharing. Another major problem for stable peace is the security dilemma faced by combatants: demobilisation and giving territory back to the government is necessary in order to stabilise peace. Yet, such a move increases the rebels' vulnerability to military defeat if conflict resumes. This fact hinders them to be credibly committed to peace (Sisk, 2001; 2003; Walter, 1999). For this reason the sequencing of mediation in general (Zartmann, 1995; Zartmann & de Soto, 2010) and of power-sharing institutions in particular are practically of central importance (Töpperwien, 2010). The mentioned security dilemma can be overcome through extensive political, territorial and military power-sharing (Hoddie & Hartzell, 2005; Walter, 1999), because decisions are then consensus-based and can be blocked through mutual veto power (Papagianni, 2008). Rebels therefore often ask for a guaranteed institutional share of power because of the security dilemma (Rothchild, 2002; Walter, 1999).

From a practical point of view, there are still quite few guidelines for mediators on how and when to use political power-sharing mechanisms, although power-sharing has widely been used in peace agreements. After addressing the academic arguments and guidelines supportive of power-sharing as conflict management model in peace processes, one has to address the critiques as well. The next section outlines the main critiques dealing with the unintentional message of power-sharing for other armed groups, the effects of power-sharing on the political space and on the divides in society, as well as the impracticability of a model supposedly doomed to fail.

## 2.2 Contested Power-Sharing

Power-sharing in conflict contexts is contested. A number of critiques have been formulated and are outlined below, including some solutions to address problems. Getting armed groups to the negotiating table is often only possible when rebel groups consider it feasible to obtain some shares of power through negotiations. At the same time, buying rebel groups in a mediation process through a potential share of power is problematic. Following a predictable logic due to the increasing number of examples of engaged armed groups in power-sharing peace negotiations, 'would-be leaders are induced to conquer power' through armed insurgency (Tull & Mehler, 2005: 375). The multiplication of armed insurgency and militarised politics in order to get the 'rents of violence' (Tull & Mehler, 2005: 391) can be the adverse consequences. One solution might be to raise the threshold for inclusion in negotiation processes based on the respect of international humanitarian law (Tull & Mehler, 2005).

Once an agreement is reached, a power-sharing peace agreement will freeze the war-time balance of power between the armed parties, not allowing for the inclusion of political actors, which did not participate in the armed conflict and the negotiations (Sisk, 2003; Tull & Mehler, 2005). Therefore, mediators have to make sure that power-sharing is only transitional and will allow for the gradual inclusion of excluded groups (Papagianni, 2007; 2008; Rothchild, 2002; Sisk, 2003). Another contested alternative in order to avoid this risk would be the promotion of enlarged and inclusive representation at the negotiation table (Töpperwien, 2010). Moreover, 'by freezing cleavages, a consociational regime may actually reinforce (...) the kind of conflict it is designed to solve' (Dryzek, 2005: 223). Indeed, the integration of the societal divides into the political system may lead to centrifugal ethno-nationalist political competition, which can sharpen identities and increase tensions (Horowitz, 2002a; Spears, 2002) without solving the underlying conflict (Mehler, 2009). Power-sharing restrains for example multi-ethnic or non-ethnic parties and is vulnerable to extremist political spoilers who exert pressure on more moderate group representatives (Horowitz, 2002b).

A potential solution would be to gradually open up the political space and institutions during a transitional phase, in particular to civil opposition groups and possibly to excluded armed groups, although elites in power will strongly resist such developments (Papagianni, 2008).

Another critique is that power-sharing institutions will often end in deadlock, because they are vulnerable to competition within the government and to radical elites tempted to misuse their veto power to block decisions. This point is linked to the argument that power-sharing has been established as political model based on European examples (Lijphart, 2002a) and that it can only work in very few particular European countries where cleavages in society are less severe (Horowitz, 2001; Spears, 2002). Some authors therefore have argued that it is a vague and normative theory of superior democracy (Bogaards, 2000; Lustick, 1997; Sartori, 1994, Van Schendelen, 1984). This working paper deals with this fundamental critique, because it directly relates to favourable conditions as will be shown later. In a post-conflict context, decisions by power-sharing governments will only reflect the minimal common denominator and may hinder effective post-war reconstruction and reconciliation processes (Papagianni, 2007). In particular, many contested issues will not be settled in the peace agreement and therefore have to be addressed within the power-sharing institutions. Yet, continued commitment by international actors may help resolve some of the issues, such as disarmament and demobilisation, electoral laws or security sector reforms, even though elites may resist further external involvement (Papagianni, 2008). Power-sharing institutions can then act as 'vehicle through which the parties continue talking and negotiating' (Papagianni, 2008: 3) and create consensus-oriented elite behaviour (Lijphart, 2002a). Power-sharing institutions can be promoted by external actors to some extent, but in order to work they need to be pragmatically supported and not for tactical reasons by conflict parties (Sisk, 1996).

In practical terms, the identification of the most suitable power-sharing mechanisms to avoid the pitfalls mentioned is important. But first following the aim of this working paper, it is essential to deal with the more fundamental critique and ask if power-sharing solutions in peace agreements may only work in the context of particular favourable conditions. If so, power-sharing peace agreements in conflict-affected countries are probably doomed to fail in most contexts. This relates to the critique as outlined above: as a specific European model power-sharing allegedly cannot work and is doomed to fail elsewhere. This question is of practical importance, because power-sharing is increasingly used in peace agreements in a wide range of contexts.

### 2.3 Defining the Power-Sharing Model

A number of authors (Lehmbruch, 1974; McRae, 1974), but in particular Arend Lijphart (1969; 1975a; 1977; 1995; 1996; 1999; 2002b), have observed that some divided societies have established a stable democratic system through cooperative elite accommodation. This is called the consociational or power-sharing model. This working paper is based on Lijphart's model, because his model is the most prominent one. Academic work (Binningsbø, 2005; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Sisk, 1996) and practical publications (Papagianni, 2007) all refer to Lijphart's work. Lijphart is so overwhelmingly prominent in the power-sharing debate that he has been called 'Mr Power-sharing' (Lijphart, 2002a). Critiques in particular are directly addressed to Lijphart's model (Bogaards, 2000; Horowitz, 2001). Conceptually it therefore makes most sense to rely on Lijphart's model in this working paper as well, despite the fact that models should never be applied one-to-one in practice.

The model is based on empirical evidence from the Netherlands until 1967 (Lijphart, 1975a), Switzerland, Belgium (Lehmbruch, 1974; Lijphart, 1975a; McRae, 1997) or South Tirol (Markusse, 1997). Power-sharing institutions can be described as 'government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy (...) into a stable democracy' (Lijphart, 1969: 216) in the context of religious, linguistic, ideological, political, cultural or ethnic cleavages which underlie perceived group distinctiveness (Lijphart, 1977). These identities are particularly salient during and after armed conflicts. Lijphart (1969; 1975a; 1977; 1996) proposes a number of defining characteristics in order to qualify for a power-sharing political system. In his most recent publications Lijphart has defined power-sharing in

terms of two primary characteristics:<sup>2</sup> executive power-sharing and segmental group autonomy (Lijphart, 2002a; 2004).<sup>3</sup> These two characteristics are rather broad and can practically take a number of different forms.

Executive power-sharing is the guaranteed inclusion of representatives from the different divided groups in society in the executive decision-making process (Lijphart, 2004). This can for example take the form of quotas within the government or the repartition of functions such as president and prime minister between various groups (Lijphart, 1995). Segmental group autonomy, the second characteristic, is the 'rule by the minority over itself in the area of the minority's exclusive concern' (Lijphart, 1977: 41). Group autonomy is widely recognised as an essential part of accommodative arrangements (Ghai, 2002; Hartzell et al, 2001; Horowitz, 2001; Sisk, 1998). It can take the form of territorial federalism, territorial autonomy or even non-territorial autonomy such as legislative power regarding religion, culture and education for a segmented group (Lijphart, 1995).

The presented power-sharing model has been established in the context of political parties sharing power in a European context. Using this model in conflict and peacebuilding contexts to share power between armed groups and governments therefore implies difficulties. This could be an explanation for the contested nature of power-sharing in peace settlements. On the other hand, power-sharing in conflict contexts is a trend and reality that has to be acknowledged. In order to better understand how it may work, making the link from the academic model to practice is necessary. Due to the conceptual centrality of Lijphart's political model, it is important to apply and test Lijphart's model in the particular context of peace agreements and thus to link the political model to international practice in conflict situations. This does not mean that an academic model, which is mainly an analytical tool, should be applied as such in practice without adaptation to the local reality.

## 2.4 Favourable Conditions

Following the aforementioned critique that power-sharing can only emerge and function in particular circumstances such as in the Netherlands until 1967 or Switzerland, Lijphart tried to identify favourable structural conditions for the power-sharing model. Those conditions may lead to 'overarching elite cooperation and stable non-elite support' (Lijphart, 1977: 54), although they are probably not sufficient to establish and maintain power-sharing institutions according to Lijphart (1977). Therefore, other scholars (Pappalardo, 1981; Van Schendelen, 1984) have rejected Lijphart's favourable conditions. The tension between the voluntaristic approach of power-sharing based on the free will of elites and the deterministic favourable conditions has been criticised (Bogaards, 1998). This heuristic debate between determinism and voluntarism cannot be resolved here. Yet, this working paper is able to make a contribution to the debate about conditions by empirically testing favourable conditions in the context of power-sharing peace agreements. In the context of an armed conflict, a peace agreement is not just a decision to change political institutions and adopt new ones, but to abandon armed struggle for power-sharing. This dramatic shift can hardly be explained by context factors alone and implies a voluntaristic approach to institutions. However, once a power-sharing peace agreement is signed, favourable conditions might be increasingly important to maintain and ensure the durability of those institutions over time (Schneckener, 2002). Therefore, favourable conditions are used as analytical tool to try to understand where power-sharing agreements may potentially work.

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<sup>2</sup> These two defining characteristics correspond to horizontal and vertical power-sharing as developed in management theory (Drake & Mitchell, 1977).

<sup>3</sup> Lijphart only mentions proportional representation as secondary characteristic (Lijphart, 2002b). Proportionality which is sometimes part of the definition (Papagianni, 2007) will therefore not be taken into account, especially because this specific electoral feature is almost never explicitly mentioned in peace agreements and may already pre-exist in a country affected by armed conflict.

A large number of favourable conditions have been proposed in the literature including systemic, country, divided group and elite characteristics (Lehmbruch, 1975; Pappalardo, 1981; Bogaards, 1998; Sisk, 2001; Schneckener, 2002). Theoretical coherence is often lacking in the selection of conditions. Lijphart's (1969; 1975a; 1977) own conditions have been changing over time. This is a problematic theoretical background. However, Bogaards (1998) has identified four recurrent mainly structural favourable conditions in Lijphart's work: a small population size, the balance of population size between segmented groups, territorial isolation of segmented groups and a common perceived security threat.

A **small population size** is the first condition. The most important argument about the favourable character of a small population size is that it implies less policy issues and political burden faced by a country. Hence, accommodation is easier (Lehmbruch, 1975; Lijphart, 1975a; 1969). It is also stated in the literature that small countries face less conflicts (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002).

The **balance of population size between segmented groups** is the second condition. A multiple balance between more than two segmented population groups is favourable, because if only two segmented groups exist, the majority group might prefer to dominate the minority group through majority rule, whereas a multiple balance forces groups to cooperate (Lijphart, 1969; Lehmbruch, 1975). Hence, it is important not to have a clear majority group in the population and a rough equilibrium between groups regarding size (Lijphart, 1977; Schneckener, 2002). Too many segmented population groups are unfavourable as well, since cooperation would be extremely difficult between more than four groups (Lijphart, 1977).

**Territorial isolation of segmented population groups** is the third condition. Power-sharing is favoured in divided societies with clear geographical segmental lines. The intermingling of segmented groups is more conducive to conflict, since isolation limits the potential for hostility to transform into actual conflict (Lijphart, 1969; 1975a). It also has a favourable character because it facilitates executive power-sharing and group autonomy on a geographical basis (Schneckener, 2002).

A **common security threat** is the fourth condition. The political willingness to cooperate is facilitated by a common security threat. Yet, it should be perceived as a threat by all segmented groups (Lijphart, 1977; McRae, 1997). If segmented groups are supported by different external rival powers for example, an external threat will certainly not favour the durability of power-sharing (Lehmbruch, 1975).

This paper will only test the influence of those four favourable conditions on the durability of power-sharing peace agreements, since there has been no coherent attempt in the literature to test the four mentioned favourable conditions in the particular context of peace agreements. The context differences in terms of economic development or political environment is certainly huge between stable European societies and those emerging from conflict. Yet, the aim of the working paper is to deal in particular with the critique arguing that power-sharing can only work in a favourable European context. Thus, one has to apply the four favourable conditions identified in the model based on European examples to peace agreement contexts as analytical starting point. If such favourable conditions are confirmed by empirical evidence from power-sharing peace agreement case studies, power-sharing provisions should probably not be used in peace agreements in a variety of contexts, since power-sharing would in that case only be successful in a very particular favourable context as claimed by critics. These four conditions therefore directly relate to the research aim of this working paper. Yet, I do not claim that those four conditions are the only one relevant in conflict situations as will be shown.

One has to bear in mind that many variables influence the durability of peace agreements in general (Stedman, 2002). These variables include context factors such as the international system (Hartzell et al, 2001) or the level of development (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000), as well as conflict characteristics such as the type of conflict, duration and intensity (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Gleditsch et al, 2002).

In addition, the political context including the involvement of a third party (Walter, 1997; 1999), the United Nations (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000) or the existence of spoilers (Stedman, 1997) are seen as important. Finally, variables also include the terms of settlement regarding disarmament and demobilisation (Spears, 2002; Walter, 1999) and the extent of actual implementation of the agreement (Hoddie & Hartzell, 2005). Those factors are likely to affect all peace settlements, not only the one providing for power-sharing institutions (Papagianni, 2007). The broad range of variables implies that a systematic evaluation is very difficult and beyond the scope of this working paper. At the same time, some of these context factors may be particularly important for power-sharing peace agreements. Therefore, beyond testing Lijphart's four favourable conditions, the case studies will also be used in this paper to identify potential context factors among those identified in the literature which may be of particular relevance in regard to the durability of power-sharing peace agreements and which practitioners should pay attention to.

In the next chapter, the case selection is outlined. Variables are then operationalised and the four conditions potentially favouring the durability of power-sharing peace agreements tested on the sample of peace agreement cases.



## 3 Eight Case Studies

This chapter outlines the adopted case selection strategy and the operationalisation of variables for testing the four favourable conditions. In the second part the eight case studies are carried out.

### 3.1 Case Selection

The unit of analysis for this paper is the peace agreement. The population of all agreements included in the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP)<sup>4</sup> at Uppsala University will be used. The UCDP recently compiled a specific dataset (version 1.0) on peace agreements,<sup>5</sup> covering the period from 1989 to 2005 (Harbom et al, 2006). The dataset has recorded 146 peace agreements between 1989 and 2005 in 44 different internal armed conflicts. Peace agreements of this dataset signed between at least two conflict parties are selected if they contain the two defining characteristics of Lijphart's power-sharing model. For the two defining characteristics UCDP database variables<sup>6</sup> are used which match closely the definition adopted in this paper. First, the UCDP variable *power-sharing in the government* or the variable *local power-sharing* for peace agreements affecting institutions at the local level are used to operationalise executive power-sharing as first characteristic. Secondly, the UCDP variables *autonomy* or *federalism* are used to operationalise group autonomy as the second characteristic of Lijphart's definition. Only the following eight agreements provide for the two defining power-sharing features:

Table of power-sharing peace agreement cases

Peace agreement	Date	Country/Region
Bodoland Autonomous Council agreement	1993	Bodoland (India)
Washington agreement	1994	Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina
Dayton peace agreement	1995	Bosnia-Herzegovina
San Andrés agreement	1996	Chiapas (Mexico)
Chittagong Hill Tracts agreement	1997	Chittagong Hill Tracts (Bangladesh)

<sup>4</sup> The UCDP database is widely used mostly in European academia. The academic database on civil wars mostly used in the United States is the Correlate of War Project. It records all civil wars reaching a threshold of a 1,000 battle-related deaths a year or in total. This threshold excludes well-known conflicts such as the one in the Basque Country. The UCDP database used here uses a lower threshold for the definition of an armed conflict: 'a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year' (Gleditsch et al, 2002: 3). Although this low threshold may be criticised, it is more interesting to include cases of low intensity conflict to allow for a greater variation of cases.

<sup>5</sup> A peace agreement is defined as an arrangement concerning, managing or regulating 'the problem of the incompatibility [cause of conflict], either by settling all or part of it, or by clearly outlining a process for how the warring parties plan to regulate the incompatibility' (Högbladh, 2006: 3). Such a definition is largely accepted (Downs & Stedman, 2002).

<sup>6</sup> For the exact codification rules for those variables see Högbladh (2006) and Harbom et al (2006).

Khartoum agreement	1997	Sudan
Framework agreement	2003	Comoros
Comprehensive peace agreement	2005	Sudan <sup>7</sup>

As a result, this paper will take into consideration all eight<sup>8</sup> power-sharing peace agreements even though some have been signed in the same country. The diversity of the cases in terms of geographical variation allows gathering empirical evidence in regard to the research question and practical implications. This sample of cases has mostly not been considered by Lijphart himself or other authors.

### 3.2 Operationalisation of Variables

The different variables and in particular the four favourable conditions are operationalised in order to analyse cases consistently. They are based on Lijphart's ideas even though some adaptations are necessary to fit the armed conflict context.

First, one has to define the durability of a peace agreement as the outcome variable. In the literature, some define a one-year period for durability (Binningsbø, 2005) or a five-year period (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Hartzell et al, 2001) during which no armed violence occurs between the signatories and during which the agreement is not ended by one side. Given the difficult short-term implementation of a peace agreement and because very few conflicts have re-emerged after five peaceful years (Hartzell et al, 2001; Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008), I opt for the longer five-year period as a measure for durability. It is measured through the UCDP variable *violence with the same parties restarted within 5 years* and the UCDP variable *agreement ended by parties*.

Regarding the following four operationalised favourable conditions, data and information used are as close as possible to the date of signature of the case agreement, although the scarcity of data is a limitation to this endeavour. The outlined operationalisations apply to a country or a region depending on the geographical scope of the power-sharing peace agreement. Favourable conditions are operationalised as follows.

For population size, the categories used in the case studies are *small* or *big*. Even though this factor is often used in the literature for statistical analyses, small or big population categories are not defined (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; 2004; Hegre & Raleigh, 2007) and other measures such as population density are also considered. In this paper I follow Lijphart's approach (1975b; 1977), who used thresholds to qualify countries based on European examples. Since the case studies are

<sup>7</sup> In fact two more agreements provide for the two defining characteristics: the Protocol on power-sharing in Sudan in 2004 and the Protocol on Kordofan and Blue Nile States in Sudan in 2004. Both protocols were part of the official negotiation process that led to the Comprehensive peace agreement in 2005. As such they cannot be considered as separate case studies.

<sup>8</sup> One may wonder why the 1998 Good Friday peace agreement in Northern Ireland is not a case study. It is commonly acknowledged as a power-sharing accord (Byrne, 2001; Horowitz, 2002b; Lijphart, 2002a). The reason is a definitional problem. The UCDP adopted a narrow definition of executive power-sharing privileging reliability over validity: an agreement should establish percentages or numbers of representation for divided groups. The Belfast agreement has no such *formalised* executive power-sharing provision, even though in reality the Belfast agreement led to power-sharing governments in Northern Ireland. The Good Friday case is not included in the case study research, since the paper relies on the UCDP database.

scattered around the world, I opt for the threshold of the median population size of all countries in the world, which is 5.4 million in 2009 (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2009). The median is a reasonable measure for central tendency (Geddes, 2003) and is therefore appropriate for a threshold value. Moreover, due to the clear repartition of cases some problems linked with thresholds can be avoided in this working paper. Out of the six countries or regions for which the eight power-sharing peace agreements have been signed, only Sudan has a population of about 39 million clearly to be considered as big. Bosnia-Herzegovina as the second largest country studied has only a population of about four million which is clearly below the median population size for all countries in the world. Therefore, one can reasonably classify all case studies as big or small countries or regions. Sources for population figures include the World Factbook (CIA, 2010), governmental websites and academic work. Yet, one has to keep in mind that census figures in a conflict context are highly politicised and often contested.

Regarding the balance of population size between segmented groups, one has first to define segmented groups. In many countries the very complex, for example, ethnic divisions do not correspond to the fault lines in conflict. Thus, segmented population groups are considered if they are part of the armed conflict. For example a segmented group is not a rebel movement, but the population group it claims to represent. The demographic size of the relevant segmented groups is calculated based on the same sources as for the population size. A balance of population size between segmented groups exists if there is no majority group over 50 percent (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; 2004; Lijphart, 1977) and when three or four segmented groups exist (Lijphart, 1977).<sup>9</sup> This definition corresponds to the one widely used in the literature (Boogards, 1998; Lijphart, 1977; Schneckener, 2002).

Territorial isolation of the segmented population groups implies the geographical concentration of the relevant population groups (Lijphart, 1969). Therefore, it can be operationalised by considering a territorial fragmentation/homogeneity indicator (Lijphart, 1977). Demographic group figures for the administrative subdivisions are compared to national or regional figures depending on the scope of the power-sharing peace agreement. If segmental homogeneity is significantly higher at the regional than at the national level or at the local than at the regional level, one can conclude that the segmented population groups are territorially isolated (Lijphart, 1975; 1977). This is particularly true when the different segmented population groups form clear majorities in different administrative subdivisions. Accurate subnational demographic figures are not easily available for conflict-affected countries. However, estimates based on the academic literature and official figures enable to draw conclusions on how segmented population groups are distributed in different administrative subdivisions for the eight cases under consideration in the six countries/regions.

Finally, regarding a security threat it is clear that a threat can only be a favourable condition if all relevant segmented population groups perceive it as a common threat (McRae, 1997). The operationalisation is based on the speech act security framework proposed by Buzan et al (1997). It states that security is a subjective discursive product. An issue is a security threat when it is presented and perceived as such. Therefore, a common perceived security threat exists when all relevant population groups often represented by a political or military movement present or describe in their discourse or published documents a threat as jeopardising the segmented population group's security. This operationalisation is mostly based on information in the academic literature and allows analysing whether a threat is subjectively perceived as such.

<sup>9</sup> The Ethnic Fractionalisation Country Index (Posner, 2004) cannot be used neither for the balance of population size nor the territorial isolation of segmented groups, since many case agreements only relate to a region and not to a country.

Following the proposed operationalisation of the four favourable conditions, this paper considers the eight selected power-sharing peace agreements. First, the agreement in Bodoland, then the two agreements in Bosnia-Herzegovina, one in Chiapas, one in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, one in the Comoros and finally the two agreements in Sudan are analysed. The case studies briefly analyse the armed conflict and the peace process, determine the outcome variable and whether the favourable conditions are fulfilled or not.

### 3.3 Bodoland Conflict, Assam (India)

Bodo generically designates the Boro-Kachari tribal people inhabiting the plains on the northern shores of the Brahmaputra river in the west of the Indian state of Assam (Dasgupta, 1997).<sup>10</sup> The Bodo tribes have felt discriminated and aggrieved by the Assamese state, as well as threatened by Muslim Bengali and tea-tribe<sup>11</sup> migrants. Large parts of Bodo land was alienated and the Bodo people did not enjoy the same protection and autonomy as granted to other tribes by the Indian constitution (George, 1994; Bhaumik, 2000).

Following the example of other successful tribal insurgencies in Assam, the All Bodo Student Union (ABSU) took up the Bodo cause, asking for autonomy (Chadha, 2005). Violent agitation started in 1987, escalating rapidly into insurgency against the Assamese state, but also targeting migrant communities (George, 1994). In February 1993, the ABSU and the Bodo People's Action Committee signed a memorandum of understanding with the government of Assam (Bodoland Territorial Council, 2007). This accord is the first case. It creates the power-sharing Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) composed of a General Council with 35 elected members and five government-nominated members from groups not otherwise represented and an Executive Council. At the same time, it provides for tribal courts and local autonomy (Bodoland Territorial Council, 2007). According to the UCDP (Harbom et al, 2006), this peace agreement has not been ended even though temporarily delayed and no violence has resurged within five years between the same conflict parties. Thus, the agreement has been durable. Yet, in the years 1996 to 1998, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland, not party to the agreement, as well as the newly created Bodoland Liberation Tiger Forces continued the armed struggle for full independence (Dasgupta, 1997; Bhaumik, 2000). This short overview leads to the analysis of the four favourable conditions in Bodoland.

#### 3.3.1 Favourable Conditions in Bodoland

One of the problems in assessing the conditions in Bodoland is that the peace accord does not clearly define the BAC territory. Bodo movements claimed a large Bodo homeland. Yet, the government unilaterally decided that the BAC area would encompass 2750 villages with a population of 2.14 millions (George, 1994; Chadha, 2005). Even if this figure is problematic, the region clearly has a small population size, as defined in the selected operationalisation.

Regarding the balance of population size between segmented groups, the accord stipulates that all villages with at least 50 percent Bodo population would be included in the BAC. However, eventually the BAC comprises 38 percent of Bodo population, because many non-Bodo villages have been included in the BAC in order to create a contiguous entity (Chadha, 2005). In particular, the inclusion of tea plantations implies that tea-tribes, but also Bengali immigrants and Assamese form a large part of the BAC population (Dasgupta, 1997; Shimray, 2006). Exact figures cannot be provided for the operationalisation. However, Bengali and Assamese are traditionally in conflict in Assam, and the tea-tribes have started to resist collectively creating armed resistance groups

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<sup>10</sup> Refer to the map in appendix 1.

<sup>11</sup> This name refers to tribal groups brought to Assam to work on tea plantations (Bhaumik, 2000).

(Bhaumik, 2000). Thus, one can conclude that there are at least three, probably four segmented groups relevant to the conflict. The largest group, the Bodos, only represents 38 percent of the population. This logically implies that the condition of balance of population size as defined above is fulfilled, even though Bodos are exercising much of the power (Dasgupta, 1997).

Regarding the segmental territorial isolation of population groups, Bodos form a majority in 1100 villages out of 2750 under the BAC authority (Chadha, 2005). There are no precise statistics for the BAC region, because it partially covers the seven districts of Dhubri, Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, Barpeta, Nalbari, Kamrup and Darrang<sup>12</sup> (George, 1994). However, proxy estimates of territorial distribution of the Bodos exist. The four Assamese districts created in the Bodo region in 2003 cover approximately the BAC territory (Chadha, 2005). The Chirang district in the former northern Bongaigaon district has about 49 percent tribal Bodos, the Baksa district in northern Barpeta, Nalbari and Kamrup 47 percent, Udalguri in northern Darrang 47 percent and only northern Kokrajhar has a 58 percent majority of Bodo people (Bodoland Territorial Council, 2006). Even though these are only proxy figures, one can argue that Bodos are not geographically isolated in the BAC, since there is no significant percental difference between the regions within the BAC. Indeed, this is a logical implication of the fact that non-majoritarian Bodo villages have been included in order to create a contiguous region. Hence, one has to conclude that no segmental territorial isolation exists.

Finally, a potential common security threat has to be considered. Bodo and Assamese nationalist movements cooperated in the 1970s and 1980s against the common perceived threat of Bengali immigration (Dasgupta, 1997). However, more recently, the government of Assam and Assamese people have tried to 'arbitrarily cleanse Assam of its genuinely original and authentic inhabitants' according to Bodo insurgents (Dasgupta, 1997: 357). Hence, the Assamese government's policies of 'Assamisation', but also Bengali and tea-tribe migrants are seen as the major threats to the economic and cultural survival of Bodos (Dasgupta, 1997). On the other hand, Bodo groups have cooperated with other insurgent groups in the region and received some support from New Delhi in order to destabilise the government of Assam (Bhaumik, 2000). Since the territory of Assam has already been significantly reduced by the creation of independent tribal states within the Union of India, the Bodo insurgency is considered as another serious tribal threat to the unity of Assam (George, 1994). Hence, at the time the peace agreement was signed, no common perceived threat existed anymore.

This analysis will be used to compile a summarising table in chapter four after the completion of the other case studies. This peace agreement between the two conflict parties has been durable. It fulfils two favourable conditions out of four: a small population size and a balance of population size between segmented groups.

### 3.4 Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina

This case study deals with the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995. In the context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, wars broke out in Slovenia and Croatia (Malcolm, 1996). The Bosnian government only had the choice to remain in a Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia or to declare independence (Rogel, 1998). At the same time, the Serb regions in northern and eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina were arming up with the support of the federal Yugoslav army and demanding secession (Malcolm, 1996). After the acceptance of the independence referendum and despite international mediation, Bosnia faced civil war in spring 1992 (Kumar, 1997). The autonomous

<sup>12</sup> The tribal figures (Shimray, 2006) for those districts would not be useful, because the districts are by far larger than the BAC. See also map in appendix 1.

Republika Srpska supported by Yugoslavia was fighting against Bosnian troops and Croatian paramilitaries (Malcolm, 1996). At an early stage, Serb paramilitary forces conquered up to 60 percent of Bosnia, expelling Bosniak Muslim<sup>13</sup> and Croat populations, setting up camps and starting ethnic cleansing (Rogel, 1998). The war continued throughout 1993 and 1994. The United Nations (UN), the United States and European countries were reluctant to act (Malcolm, 1996). In 1993, the Vance-Owen peace plan was presented, proposing autonomous 'ethnicised' cantons in Bosnia. This peace plan was signed by the warring parties, but later rejected by the Bosnian Serb parliament. As a result, competition for territorial conquest increased, triggering heavy fighting between Bosniaks and Croats as well (Rogel, 1998; Kumar, 1997).

In March 1994, the Washington agreement was signed by Bosniak and Croat representatives. It creates a Bosniak-Croat Federation of autonomous cantons within Bosnia-Herzegovina and a corresponding regional power-sharing government with an alternating presidency, preserving the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina (UCDP, 1994). This accord is one of the case agreements. It allowed a common military effort against the Bosnian Serbs (Kumar, 1997). In 1994, new peace negotiations based on a division of Bosnia into the Federation and a Serb entity took place, but stalled (Malcolm, 1996). Yet, after the military victory of the Croatian army against the Serb autonomous regions in Croatia in 1995 and the beginning of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) bombardments, the Bosnian Serb troops were under increasing military pressure (Rogel, 1998). At this stage, mediator Holbrooke pressured Croatia not to push for a full military victory in Bosnia. Finally, negotiations between Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia, representing the different segmented groups in Bosnia, took place. After a ceasefire in October, negotiations were finalised in Dayton and led to the signing of the General Peace Agreement in Paris in December 1995 (Malcolm, 1996). This is the second case agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This agreement provides for the maintenance of the two autonomous entities of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska in a sovereign Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>14</sup> Extensive regional autonomy encompasses internal security. The central power-sharing government and a tripartite presidency – composed of one Bosnian Croat, one Bosniak and one Bosnian Serb representative – only have competences in regard to foreign policy, trade, immigration and customs. One third of the parliament seats are reserved for each national group, with the possibility to declare an issue destructive of vital interests, requiring a majority vote from each group (OHR, 2010; Chandler, 2000).

Authors have argued that Bosnia was condemned to renewed violence and partition (Malcolm, 1996). Yet, mainly because of massive international presence of the UN, NATO, the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the conflict has not flared up (Bose, 2005; Chandler, 2000). Data from the UCDP (Harbom et al, 2006) confirms that the Washington and the Dayton agreements have not been ended, nor has violence resurged within five years. Both agreements are therefore durable. This brief presentation of the conflict and the peace agreements under consideration leads to the analysis of the four favourable conditions.

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<sup>13</sup> In Yugoslavia, 'Muslim' was a nationality. However, this group is commonly named Bosniak, whereas Bosnian designates all citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Rogel, 1998).

<sup>14</sup> See map appendix 2.

### 3.4.1 Favourable Conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina

It is important to differentiate the two agreements under consideration. The Washington agreement only affects the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina mainly inhabited by Bosniaks and Croats, whereas the Dayton peace agreement deals with the whole country.<sup>15</sup> Hence, conditions are analysed for both accords separately.

Regarding population size, pre-war data shows that Bosnia-Herzegovina had 4.35 million inhabitants, but the impact of war in terms of civilian casualties and refugees has lowered the population size to an estimated 3.5 to 3.7 million (Rogel, 1998; UN Development Programme, 2002). This applies to the Dayton agreement. The region of the Federation had 2.7 million inhabitants before the war (Federal Statistics Office, 2008) and about 2.4 after the war (Kumar, 1997). Hence, for both cases, the population size is small.

The balance of population size between segmented groups is a sensitive issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Even though the interpretation of 'ancient ethnic hatreds as the origin of the conflict' (Malcolm, 1996: 270) has been rejected, propaganda and war have segmented the population (Bose, 2005; Rogel, 1998). For the three relevant groups in the conflict, the 1991 census indicates that the population was composed of 43.7 percent Muslims/Bosniaks, 31.4 percent Serbs and 17.3 percent Croats (Federal Statistics Office, 2008). After the war, the estimated repartition among segmented groups was 48.3 percent Bosniaks, 34 percent Serbs and 15.4 percent Croats (UN Development Programme, 2002). These figures are approximately confirmed in the 2000 census (CIA, 2008). Thus, the figures imply that no group has a majority and that the two smaller minority groups are able to outvote the largest group (Schneckener, 2002; Chandler, 2000). Hence, a balance of population size between the three groups exists in Bosnia. This applies to the Dayton agreement.

In the Federation, pre-war figures show 52.3 percent of Muslim, 21.9 percent of Croat and 17.6 percent of Serb population (Federal Statistics Office, 2008). However, after massive population displacements during the war, the ethnic composition changed. In a very controversial 1996 unofficial census confirming ethnic cleansing, the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) counted 72.5 percent Bosniaks, 22.8 percent Croats and 2.3 percent Serbs in the Federation. Even though recently return of minority population has occurred, these figures have probably not changed significantly (Bose, 2005). One can cautiously conclude that there is one dominant majority group in the Federation (Belloni, 2004). Hence, there is no segmental balance of population size for the Washington agreement.

The territorial isolation of segmented population groups in Bosnia is difficult to assess. Even though during pre-war time, ethnic patterns were complex and no contiguity existed, ethnic cleansing and displacements during the war have created a more homogenous ethnic repartition, especially in the Republika Srpska (Malcolm, 1996; Chandler, 2000). In the unofficial 1996 UNHCR census, the territorial isolation was such that 98 percent of the population in the Republika Srpska was Serb (Kumar, 1997), even though up to 150,000 Bosniaks have returned in recent years (Bose, 2005). In the Federation, cantons have been purposefully drawn to create clear Croat and Bosniak majorities, except in Mostar (Malcolm, 1996).<sup>16</sup> Indeed, most Croat districts have a clear Croat majority population of over 75 percent; the same applies to Bosniak districts (Kumar, 1997). Therefore, dominant group figures are regionally significantly higher than at the national level. Within the Federation, figures also indicate territorial isolation of Croats and Bosniaks. Hence, segmented groups are territorially rather isolated in Bosnia-Herzegovina and within the Federation. Both Dayton and Washington agreements fulfil this condition.

<sup>15</sup> See map appendix 2.

<sup>16</sup> See map appendix 2.

Regarding a common security threat, Bosnia is interesting. At the Federation level, Croats and Bosniaks feared each other to a certain point. Yet, the common perceived threat of Serb nationalism and aggression brought Croats and Bosniaks together against an imminent Serb threat in 1992 at the start of the war and again in 1994 when the Washington agreement was signed even though fighting broke out between these conflict parties in-between (Malcolm, 1996; Kumar, 1997). Hence, one can conclude that a common perceived threat existed when the Washington agreement was signed.

This does not apply to the Dayton agreement. During the civil war, the Serb propaganda depicted the Croats as 'Ustasha hordes' (Malcolm, 1996: 217) in reference to the fascist Croatian regime during World War Two (Rogel, 1998). At the same time, the Muslims were presented as Islamist fundamentalists who would outbreed Bosnian Serbs (Slack & Doyon, 2001). The propaganda proved effective, since Serb population in Bosnia has been convinced of the Croat and Muslim threats (Malcolm, 1996). For the Croat population, Serb nationalism and expansionism was considered as the major threat. On the other hand, Bosniaks feared both Serb and Croat nationalism, but mostly Serb expansionism (Rogel, 1998; Bose, 2005). Thus, for the Dayton agreement, it is certainly not possible to speak of a common threat perceived by all three relevant groups.

The Washington and Dayton agreements have been durable. The Washington agreement fulfils the favourable conditions of a small population size, territorial isolation and a common threat, whereas the Dayton agreement fulfils the conditions of a small population size, a balance of population size and territorial isolation.

### 3.5 Conflict in Chiapas (Mexico)

Chiapas as the poorest state in Mexico has an important indigenous community, while the white and *mestizo* elite controls land, politics and business (Womack, 1999). With few arable lands in the highlands where *Indios* live, with economic exploitation, attempts at acculturation and high birth rates, the situation for the indigenous population deteriorated. It led to important migration to remote jungle lowlands (Womack, 1999). With no development in those newly settled areas of the Lacandón,<sup>17</sup> the *Indio* community set up its own structure, including armed militias (Weinberg, 2000). In 1992 a land reform allowing landless communities to be granted land by the state was suppressed. The decrease of agricultural prices and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations also threatened the poorest *Indio* farmers in Chiapas. In that context, the insurgency broke out (Womack, 1999). In early January 1994, 3'000 armed men and women of the *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional*<sup>18</sup> (EZLN) surprisingly took several towns and villages in the highlands. The Mexican army used military force to defeat the insurgents. Yet, after massive popular pressures the government declared a ceasefire shortly after the insurgency started (Holloway & Peláez, 1998).

Increasing popular support for the Zapatistas forced the Mexican government to start dialogue in the cathedral of San Cristóbal with the EZLN. However, after consulting civil society the EZLN rejected the settlement terms proposed by the government (Holloway & Peláez, 1998). Low intensity violence continued and the EZLN declared an autonomous region in Chiapas (Weinberg, 2000). After another military attempt to crush the rebellion in late 1994 (Stahler-Sholk, 2007), a new dialogue with the participation of civil society was started in San Andrés in March 1995 (Womack, 1999). The San Andrés agreement was signed in February 1996. This is the power-sharing peace agreement under consideration. It acknowledges the right to autonomy and self-government for *Indio* people,

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<sup>17</sup> See map appendix 3.

<sup>18</sup> Zapatista Army of National Liberation.



recognising indigenous rights and culture. It also provides for a new form of federalism in the Republic of Mexico. At the same time, it stipulates the participation of indigenous people in Chiapas' political institutions, local councils and the administration (UCDP, 1996).

This agreement has not been implemented and the EZLN boycotted the municipal elections in 1996 (Stahler-Sholk, 2007). Thereafter the San Andrés agreement was officially ended in September 1996 (Harbom et al, 2006). Thus, the peace agreement was not durable. Dialogue between the parties ended definitively, when the Mexican president Zedillo refused to pass the law on Indian rights. Low-level violence resumed in 1997 between paramilitaries, the police and the EZLN (Womack, 1999).

### 3.5.1 Favourable Conditions in Chiapas

The central government has been involved in negotiations. However, the most important provisions in this accord concern the state of Chiapas. Hence, conditions are analysed for the state of Chiapas. The population of Chiapas was 3.8 million in 1997 (INEGI, 2007), a small population size.

For the balance of population size between segmented groups, the indigenous language-speaking population of Chiapas older than 5 years in 2000 was 809'592 (INEGI, 2007). Hence, the total indigenous population group relevant in the conflict can be estimated at more than one million, even though the *Indio* people speak different indigenous languages (Womack, 1999). Chiapas is mainly populated by *Mestizos* and people of white descent who constitute together the economic and political elite (CIA, 2008; Womack, 1999). The *mestizo* and white population in Chiapas represents approximately 2.5 to 3 million (INEGI, 2007). Based on only two segmented population groups in conflict with one clear majority group, there cannot be a balance of population size.

Regarding territorial isolation of segmented population groups, Chiapas is divided into more than 100 municipalities (Weinberg, 2000). This study is not able to follow the operationalisation and provide group repartition for such a high number of administrative entities. However, Chiapas is divided into very distinct geographical zones,<sup>19</sup> which reflect political and economic power and are the basis for the analysis (Womack, 1999). The central valley and the Western Soconusco plains are the most fertile and prosperous zones. White rangers and *Mestizos* live in these areas, even though a limited number of *Indio* workers have settled there to work on plantations (Womack, 1999). Most *Indios* live in the highlands. In this indigenous heartland, '50 to 90 percent of people speak a Mayan language' (Womack, 1999: 4). This is confirmed by official statistics for 2005 (INEGI: 2007) which show that the indigenous-speaking population represents about 50% in the San Cristobal region and up to 100% in some surrounding villages. *Mestizos* are politically and economically dominant even in the highlands, but have not settled extensively because of poor soil and difficult climate (Womack, 1999). The steep slopes of the Cañadas and the jungle lowland of the Lacandón have been settled by more than 200,000 indigenous people migrating from the highlands, but very few white and *mestizo* people (Weinberg, 2000). From the eastern jungle to the highlands, *Indios* form a clear majority, except in the city of San Cristóbal (Womack, 1999). Therefore, relying on this analysis one can conclude that a territorial isolation of divided groups exists.

Regarding a common perceived threat, EZLN communiqués of subcomandante Marcos made clear that the main security threat for the *Indio* people are neo-liberal exploitation in general and the NAFTA agreement in particular. The authoritarian Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) governments of Chiapas and Mexico as broker of capitalism were seen as part of that threat. These developments are portrayed as threatening the very survival of the indigenous population (Weinberg, 2000; Stahler-Sholk, 2007). On the other hand, the *mestizo* and white group in Chiapas,

<sup>19</sup> Refer to map in appendix 3 for geographical names.

closely linked to the state-party PRI, is more interested in maintaining the liberal and corrupt system. The Zapatista insurgency has been seen as a major threat to state of Chiapas, the PRI and the liberal economy (Weinberg, 2000). Therefore, no common perceived threat exists.

This peace agreement was not durable. It fulfils the two conditions of a small population size and territorial isolation.

### 3.6 Chittagong Hill Tracts Conflict (Bangladesh)

The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) are located in south-eastern Bangladesh and are the only hilly region of the country. Conflict emerged in the 1970s, because of land alienation and the massive arrival of Bengali settlers. The CHT tribal population, collectively called *Jumma*, took up arms against the Bangladeshi government and Muslim Bengali settlers in the region in order to fight for autonomy (Islam, 1981; CHT Commission, 1991). The main political movement on the tribal side has been the *Parbottya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti*<sup>20</sup> (JSS) and its armed wing the *Shanti Bahini* (CHT Commission, 1991). The massive Bangladeshi military reaction led to numerous abuses and atrocities, triggering important flows of refugees (Levene, 1999). In 1992, the end of military rule in Bangladesh facilitated a ceasefire and talks, despite continuing violence (CHT Commission, 1994). After the Awami-League electoral victory, peace negotiations led to a peace agreement signed with the JSS in December 1997 (Rashiduzzaman, 1998; CHT Commission, 1997; 2000). This is the case agreement. It grants autonomy to the region through the creation of the CHT Regional Council with competencies regarding administration, development programmes, tribal rules as well as law and order (CHT Commission, 2000). Executive power-sharing between tribal and non-tribal residents is established at the Regional Council level, as well as within the three District Councils.<sup>21 22</sup> However, this peace accord triggered resistance from nationalist and Islamist parties in Bangladesh and settler movements, as well as *Jumma* groups such as the United Peoples' Democratic Front and *Shanti Bahini* splinter groups asking for full independence (Rashiduzzaman, 1998; CHT Commission, 2000).

According to the UCDP dataset (Harbom et al, 2006), the peace agreement has not been ended, nor has violence resurged between the same parties within five years. Even though the implementation of the agreement was temporarily delayed (CHT Commission, 2000), this power-sharing peace agreement has been durable.

#### 3.6.1 Favourable Conditions in the Chittagong Hill Tracts

Since the power-sharing peace agreement concerns the CHT, conditions only relate to this region. The population size of the CHT in 1991 was 967'420 (CHT Commission, 1994). In 2000 with the repatriation of up to 70'000 tribal refugees from India (Levene 1999) the population is estimated at about 1.1 million (CHT Commission, 1994; 2000). The CHT therefore have a small population size.

Regarding the balance of population size between segmented groups, the relevant and main segmental divide in conflict is between the Muslim Bengali settlers and the tribal Buddhist, Christian or Hindu *Jummas* (Islam, 1981; Levene, 1999). The tribal population is certainly subdivided into different groups, but the conflict has created a sense of *Jumma* identity, even though smaller tribes still fear to some extent the dominance of the largest Chakma tribe (Levene, 1999). It can be

<sup>20</sup> The Chittagong Hill Tracts People Solidarity Association.

<sup>21</sup> The Regional Council is composed of a tribal chair, 12 tribal men (attributed proportionally to different tribes), 2 tribal women, 6 non-tribal men and one-tribal woman, all elected. In the Khagrachari, Rangamati and Bandarban districts, non-tribal residents have to be represented by one-third of the council members (CHT commission 2000).

<sup>22</sup> Refer to CHT map, appendix 4.

reasonably assumed that the balance of population size is bipolar, in particular because the power-sharing institutions are mainly concerned with the tribal and non-tribal population. Due to massive state-sponsored Bengali immigration between 1975 and 1985,<sup>23</sup> the 1991 census indicates that 468'825 residents of the CHT or 48.5 percent are Bengali settlers and 498'595 residents or 51.5 percent *Jumma* people (CHT Commission, 1994). In 2000, the tribal population was estimated at 600'000, the Bengali population at 500'000 (CHT Commission, 2000). Even though there is only a slight majority group, there is no balance of population size, because only two segmented groups compete. This conclusion is confirmed by the composition of the Regional Council in which tribal members clearly constitute the majority.

Regarding territorial isolation of the two segmented population groups, the three districts are considered.<sup>24</sup> The 1991 census indicates that in the Khagrachari district, Bengali settlers represent 52 percent and in the Bandarban district 53 percent of the population. Tribal people represent a 57 percent majority in the Rangamati district (CHT Commission, 1994). Hence, there is a certain geographical concentration of *Jumma* people in Rangamati, but the homogeneity/fragmentation figures for the three districts are very close to the figures for the whole CHT as outlined above. Thus, the CHT do not fulfil the condition of territorial isolation of segmented population groups.

Regarding a common perceived threat, one has to analyse the background of the conflict. For the tribal people, the massive and rapid arrival of Bengali Muslim settlers, land occupation, forced displacement and destruction of traditional tribal agricultural land – for example through the hydro-electrical Kaptai project – all constitute threats (CHT Commission, 1991; Lerche, 2008). The assimilative project of Muslim Bengali nation-building after the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the end of legal guarantees for tribal populations and the massive presence of ruthless Bangladeshi armed forces (Lerche, 2008, Levene, 1999) imply that Bangladesh and Bengali settlers are perceived as the main threat to *Jummas'* economic, cultural, religious and physical survival (CHT Commission, 1991). On the other hand, the Bangladeshi government accuses the *Jumma* people to work 'in the interests of a foreign power [India]' (Levene, 1999: 340). Indeed, India is seen as a threatening hegemon by Bangladesh. The tribal insurgency itself is portrayed as a major threat to the sovereignty of a weak, politically unstable and underdeveloped Bangladesh (Levene, 1999; Rashiduzzaman, 1998). Hence, there is no perceived common threat for the 1997 CHT peace agreement.

Thus, the CHT peace agreement has been durable between the two signatory parties. It fulfils only one favourable condition: a small population size. No other condition is fulfilled.

### 3.7 Conflict in the Comoros

The Comoros archipelago<sup>25</sup> lies in the Indian Ocean, north of Madagascar. Since independence in 1975, it has a history of economic crisis as well as political chaos with a total of seventeen attempted military coups (Africa Research Bulletin, 2001; Walker, 2007). As a former French colony, the state has been very centralised. In the context of socio-economic and demographic degradation, demonstrations took place in Anjouan in 1997. Soon they were spearheaded by the Anjouan secessionist movement, accusing the Comorian president of negligence towards Anjouan and of strengthening the position of his native Grande Comore (Walker, 2007). The secessionist state of Anjouan was proclaimed in August 1997 and the French flag raised. Since neighbouring French

<sup>23</sup> In the late 1970s, tribal population still represented 90 percent of the CHT population (Islam, 1981).

<sup>24</sup> See map appendix 4.

<sup>25</sup> It is composed of the three islands of Grande Comore (Ngazidja), Anjouan (Ndzwani) and Mohéli (Mwali). Mayotte is also claimed by the Comoros, but still administered by France (Walker, 2007). See map appendix 5.

administered Mayotte was far more prosperous, Anjouan asked France for recolonisation, which Paris refused (Africa Research Bulletin, 1997c). Only two days later, the third island – Mohéli – also declared independence (Africa Research Bulletin, 1997c). The government tried to recapture Anjouan by military force, but completely failed. A popular referendum in Anjouan confirmed the independence of the island (Africa Research Bulletin, 1997a; 1997b). The conflict lasted throughout 1998, despite the presence of military observers from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (Africa Research Bulletin, 1997b). The OAU Antananarivo peace initiative in 1999 failed, because Anjouan rejected the proposals. At the same time, concessions by the Comorian president Taki triggered a military coup by Colonel Azali after widespread anti-Anjouanese riots on Grande Comore (Africa Research Bulletin, 1999). After a failed attempt for reconciliation by the military ruler in 2000, the mediation efforts of the OAU led to the 2001 Fomboni agreement (Africa Research Bulletin, 2001) outlining a vague reconciliation process which stalled before legislative elections (Blanchy, 2004).

In December 2003 the representatives of the three islands finally signed the Moroni framework agreement mediated by the African Union (AU). It is the case under consideration (Africa Research Bulletin, 2003). It confirms the autonomy of the islands within the Union of Comoros. It also requests the implementation of executive power-sharing institutions. These institutions include the elected Union presidency composed of a president and two vice-presidents, rotating between the islands, as well as power-sharing government. It settles controversial issues including the distribution of funds, legislative elections, as well as transitional powers of the Union and the autonomous islands regarding police and customs (AU, 2003).

According to the UCDP, the agreement has not been ended. No violence has emerged between the signatories as of 2005 (Harbom et al, 2006). Therefore, the peace agreement is considered as durable. However, Colonel Bacar, who took part in the 1997 secessionist movement and was elected president of Anjouan in 2002 tried to get re-elected in 2007. These elections were considered illegal by the Union, but Bacar refused to step down. He accused the central government of continuing the discrimination against Anjouan (Africa Research Bulletin, 2008b) and threatened with secession (Al-Watwan, 2007). AU troops supported by the Comorian army restored constitutional order in March 2008 by taking Anjouan in a bloodless invasion to remove Bacar (Amir, 2008) despite limited armed resistance. President Bacar escaped to Mayotte and all secessionist flags were removed and replaced by Comorian flags (Africa Research Bulletin, 2008a). Throughout this period the peace agreement was not ended and established power-sharing institutions continued to work, since the Anjouanese population seemingly welcomed the invasion (Soilihi, 2008). Even though not falling within the chosen operationalisation of a durable peace agreement, this use of military force certainly questions to some extent the durability of this power-sharing peace agreement. At this stage, the analysis will address the favourable conditions in the Comoros.

### **3.7.1 Favourable Conditions in the Comoros**

The 2003 peace agreement is a national peace agreement. Conditions are therefore analysed with reference to the whole country. In the 2003 census, the Comorian population was 575'660 (World Food Programme, 2006). Therefore, the population size is small.

Regarding the balance of population size between segmented groups, one has to acknowledge that the Union of Comoros is culturally and ethnically homogenous (Walker, 2007), with 98 percent of Sunni Muslims (CIA, 2010). It has a common language, *Shikomora*, even though each island has a different, but inter-comprehensible dialect (Walker, 2007). Nonetheless, politicians have exaggerated linguistic and cultural differences so that the island-specific identities constitute cleavages relevant to the conflict based on small differences between the islands of Ngazidja,

Mwali.<sup>26</sup> All three are taken into account since independent separatist moves have been registered on both smaller islands against the rule of Grande Comore. Moreover, the accord has been signed by representatives of the three islands. In the 2003 census, the population of Mohéli was 35'751 (6.2 percent), that of Anjouan 243'732 (42.3 percent) and that of Grande Comore 296'177 (51,5 percent) (World Food Programme, 2006). An Anjouanese minority lives in Grande Comore (Walker, 2007; Africa Research Bulletin, 1999). Therefore, none of the three groups has a clear majority of over 50 percent. As a result, a balance of population size between the three segmented groups exists.

Regarding territorial isolation of segmented groups, this case is rather simple. Even though the population of the islands have been mixed over time to some extent (Walker, 2007), the islands of Mohéli and Anjouan are particularly homogeneous. Even though an Anjouanese minority lives on Grande Comore (Africa Research Bulletin, 1999), far more than the national percentages of Shingazidja-speaking people live on Grande Comore (Walker, 2007). Hence, one has to conclude that groups are territorially isolated.

Coming to the common perceived threat, relations with the former colonial power France have to be considered. In particular, 'the illegal occupation by France of this part [Mayotte] of our territory'<sup>27</sup> (Assembly of the Union, 2008: 2), but also the history of French involvement in Comorian affairs have affected the relations. Even though this French 'occupation' is presented as threat to the territorial integrity, France is a major aid donor and French legacy still vivid (Walker, 2007). Moreover, Anjouan asked for recolonisation in 1997 (Africa Research Bulletin, 1997c). Therefore, France certainly does not represent a common perceived security threat for all three segmented groups. Finally, it is important to mention that the major perceived threat to the Comorian nation, as depicted by representatives of Grande Comore, has been Anjouan's secessionist aspirations (Amir, 2008). One cannot speak of a common perceived threat in that regard.

Thus, the 2003 peace agreement has been durable, with the limitation mentioned. This case fulfils the conditions of a small population size, a balance of population size and territorial isolation.

### 3.8 Southern Sudan Conflict

Since independence in 1956, Sudan has been affected by civil war. In the south, from 1955 to 1972 as well as from 1983 to 2005 two civil wars were fought between the central government and southern Sudanese rebels.<sup>28</sup> The causes of these wars are complex. Armed conflict took place in the context of the historic marginalisation of the periphery by the dominant northern Arab elite; economic and political inequality; regional dynamics; religious, cultural and ethnic differences between the centre and the periphery as well as militant Islamist policies by the government (Colins, 2008; Deng, 1995; de Waal, 2007; Johnson, 2003). Different southern Sudanese armed groups have been fighting since 1983 for more autonomy or independence, but the dominant group is the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its army (SPLA). New oil wealth also increased the sense of economic exploitation of the south by Khartoum (Martin, 2002).

Another major development in the conflict was the 1991 breakaway of important SPLA commanders along ideological and ethnic lines, which led to an internal conflict between southern groups, some used as proxies by Khartoum (Young, 2003). The formed groups include the SPLA-United and the South Ndzwani and Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM). Other armed groups opposed to the

<sup>26</sup> These are the islands' names referring to each local dialect: Grande Comore, Anjouan and Mohéli respectively (Walker, 2007). See map appendix 5.

<sup>27</sup> Original text in French: '(...) l'occupation illégale de cette partie de notre territoire par la France'.

<sup>28</sup> See map of Sudan, appendix 6.

SPLA were created as well, including the Equatoria Defence Force and the South Sudan Independence Group (SSIG) (Arnold, 2007). The National Congress Party (NCP) government managed to isolate the SPLM by signing a peace agreement with these southern rebel splinter groups including the SPLA-United, the SSIM, the SSIG and the Equatoria Defence Force, regrouped in the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF) (El-Affendi, 2001, Young, 2003). This 1997 Khartoum peace agreement constitutes the first case study in Sudan (UCDP, 1997). It follows a governmental strategy of divide and rule, and is based on a patronage logic (Young, 2003). On paper the agreement fulfils many southern Sudanese demands, including the freedom of religion, the strengthening of state competences within a federal structure, the establishment of an autonomous Coordinating Council for the south, an independence referendum and executive power-sharing for southern Sudanese representatives within the presidency and the government in Khartoum (UCDP, 1997). The armed groups were also merged into the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) which continued the armed conflict on the government side against the SPLA (Young, 2003).

Different international peace initiatives were launched to address the continuing war in Sudan. Since 1993 several actors, but in particular the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)<sup>29</sup> was active in bringing the government and the SPLM to the negotiating table (El-Affendi, 2001). New strategies of the conflict parties in the changing international context after 9/11 allowed IGAD initiatives to progress, backed among others by the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway (Johnson, 2003; Young, 2003). Thereafter, the Machakos protocol was signed in July 2002. It established the principles for the peace process. The comprehensive negotiation process led to a series of protocols in 2003 and 2004 on specific issues between the government and the SPLM (Young, 2005). In 2005 the Comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) was signed between the government and the SPLM. It settles many contentious issues between the government and the SPLM, including security, power-sharing and wealth-sharing. It also foresees that South Sudan will vote on an independence referendum within six years (Security Council, 2005). In its power-sharing protocol, the agreement establishes executive power-sharing between the NCP government and the SPLM within the interim national government of Sudan and within the assembly. The interim presidency is allocated to the NCP, whereas the leader of the SPLM becomes first vice-president of Sudan and head of the government of South Sudan. Even after presidential elections, the power-sharing structure would be maintained, since the president has to name two vice-presidents, one from the north and one from the south, with the role of first vice-president reserved for the region not occupying the presidency (Security Council, 2005). Moreover, the agreement guarantees executive power-sharing at the autonomous southern Sudan level and at the provincial state level (Security Council, 2005). It also provides for extensive autonomy in South Sudan and extends the competences of the provincial states within the federal structure (Security Council, 2005).

The 1997 Khartoum agreement faced major setbacks. The SPLA-United commander defected to the SPLA in 1998. The accord was definitively ended in January 2000, when Riek Machar – head of the SSIM – resigned from the power-sharing government in Khartoum, because the agreement was not implemented (Harbom et al, 2006). Hence, this agreement has not been durable.

On the other hand, the CPA between the government and the SPLM has not been ended so far. UCDP data on armed violence is not available after 2005. Based on the available information, it is generally acknowledged that the conflict has not restarted between the same conflict parties, despite limited local violence in southern Sudan (Weber, 2010). Hence, one can assume that this peace agreement has been durable. Nonetheless, the exclusionary character of power-sharing

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<sup>29</sup> The IGAD is a regional organisation including Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti, Sudan and Somalia.

between the NCP and the SPLM has prompted armed resistance by the SSDF, but also by Darfur rebels who massively increased armed insurgency in response to the peace process (de Waal, 2007; Idris, 2005; Young, 2005). Many have warned about the potential for an outbreak of renewed violence in the south and even the break-up of Sudan (Weber, 2010; de Waal, 2007; Young, 2005).

### 3.8.1 Favourable Conditions in Sudan

Favourable conditions are particularly difficult to analyse in Sudan, because the ethnic and political reality is extremely complex. The scarcity of accurate demographic data is also a challenge. Another issue is that two different armed groups claiming to represent southern Sudan have signed the two case accords. Yet, most conditions apply to the two cases which mainly relate to the central government and therefore to the whole of Sudan. In the controversial 2008 census upon which constituencies for the recent elections were based, the population of Sudan was established at 39 million (CBS, 2008; Gustafson, 2010). Thus, it is clear that the population size is big, even though some groups were excluded by the agreements.

Regarding the balance of population size between segmented groups another problem emerges. Many scholars reject the explanation of deeply rooted ethnic hatred between the Arab Muslim north and the African animist or Christian south (Branch & Mampilly, 2005; de Waal, 2007; Young, 2005). The south itself is divided into rival ethnic groups, even though a southern self-perception and a politicised identity have developed in the south based on the common resistance to the Arab threat (Deng, 1995; Idris, 2005). The 1997 peace agreement expressly stipulates that southern Sudan – as a region – is sharing power. For the CPA, the SPLM clearly claims to represent the whole population of southern Sudan, which is guaranteed to participate in the power-sharing institutions regardless of SPLM election results. Moreover, in recent elections, the SPLM won 93 percent of votes for the presidency of the Government of South Sudan (BBC News: 2010). Therefore, one can speak about a southern Sudanese group. The 2008 census figures indicate a population in southern Sudan of 7.2 million or about 19% of the total population (CBS, 2008), even though this does not include the southern refugees living in Khartoum (OCHA, 2006).

The second segmented group, the Arab Muslim north which the NCP claims to represent, is even more problematic to delimit. Given the armed conflicts in Darfur and the east, which have been essential parts of the conflict dynamics between the centre and the periphery in Sudan (Johnson, 2003; de Waal, 2007), those regions can certainly not be included in the northern group. If taking off the population of 4.5 million in the 3 eastern states, 7.5 million in Darfur as well as the approximately 1-2 million living in the contested boundary region of Abyei, Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile State (CBS, 2008), the northern group is not bigger than 18 million, which is less than 50% of the total population in Sudan (CBS, 2008). This regional reasoning does certainly not fully correspond to the complex reality on the ground and does not completely match the proposed operationalisation. Yet, it is sufficient to conclude that two population groups, represented by two political parties, are sharing national power and at the same time are excluding population groups relevant to conflict in Sudan. Logical reasoning implies that this situation cannot represent a balance of population size not even between the two represented divided groups. Hence, there is no balance of population size in the sense of a favourable condition for the two cases in Sudan.

Regarding territorial isolation of segmented population groups, it is too complicated to follow the proposed operationalisation and analyse population figures for every administrative subdivision in Sudan. Nevertheless, some useful information can be found in the literature. Southern Sudan is mostly populated by African Christian or animist people. This group does not live in the northern states, except southern refugees living in Khartoum (Deng, 1995; Martin, 2002; OCHA, 2006). Even though the conflict is also about unequal development and political marginalisation, the people of southern Sudan are still territorially isolated from the centre, despite the fact that the border between north and south is a contested issue. On the other hand, the dominant northern Arab population is living in the northern states and Khartoum (Idris, 2005). Therefore, one may assume that the two represented groups in the two peace agreements are geographically isolated.

Regarding a common perceived threat, the agreements have to be analysed separately. For the 1997 agreement, the signatory splinter rebel groups were dominated by the Nuer and Equatorian ethnic groups and perceived a direct military threat from the SPLA in the south-south conflict despite claiming to represent the whole of southern Sudan. Moreover, they feared to some extent 'Dinkanisation' (Arnold, 2007: 503), because the SPLM is dominated by Dinkas, the main ethnic group in the south (Young, 2003), although the splinter groups also perceived the Arab north as a threat (Young, 2003). The SPLA armed insurgency has been the major security threat for the Sudanese government. Even though it is difficult to assess the main perceived threat accurately, ironically the powerful SPLM/A seems to have been a common perceived security threat for the government and splinter groups until the 1997 peace agreement broke down (El-Affendi, 2001).

Regarding the 2005 agreement, the government of Sudan has had strained relations with neighbouring countries including Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda. These states have at some point financed southern Sudanese armed insurgents. The SPLM/SPLA in particular has benefited from variable support from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and the United States opposed to the Islamist regime in Khartoum (de Waal, 2007; Young, 2005). On the other hand, the major perceived threat as depicted by the SPLM to southern Sudanese's cultural and religious survival is Arab assimilationism and Islamist expansionism (Johnson, 2003). The Arab north from the time of slavery to the Islamist government of al-Bashir is portrayed as the main enemy. Southern splinter groups are no military threat to the powerful SPLA (Deng, 1995; El-Affendi, 2001). Hence, for the CPA between the government and the SPLM, there is no common perceived threat.

In brief, the 1997 Khartoum agreement has not been durable. It fulfils the conditions of territorial isolation and a common perceived threat. The 2005 agreement has been durable. This case only fulfils the condition of territorial isolation. No other condition is fulfilled.

The following discussions will take into account that some case studies could not strictly follow the proposed operationalisations and that conditions as well as the outcome variable are at times unclear.



## 4 Discussion of Results

Based on the case studies above, a table is compiled summarising all favourable conditions for each power-sharing peace agreement. This chapter aims to discuss the potential favourable effect of the four conditions on the durability of power-sharing peace agreements. The discussions focus on each condition separately: first the population size, then the balance of population size between segmented groups, territorial isolation of segmented groups and a common perceived security threat. Some explanatory examples from the case studies are given in order to demonstrate potential favourable or unfavourable effects of conditions. The second part of this chapter analyses effects of the total number of conditions fulfilled. Finally, case study evidence is used to identify other important context factors.

The discussion of the conditions has to start with the fact that out of the eight power-sharing peace agreements none has seen violence resurge between the signatory parties within five years. The peace agreement in Chiapas and the 1997 Khartoum agreement have been ended. Moreover, the case agreement in the Comoros has been affected by the events of March 2008, even though they did not end the power-sharing accord. Therefore, only two peace agreements have formally not been durable between the signatories. As a result, there is limited variation on the outcome variable.

**Table summarising favourable conditions**

Agreement	Population size	Balance of population size	Territorial isolation of groups	Common perceived threat	Total of conditions	Durable peace
BAC agreement, 1993, Bodoland	Small	Yes	No	No	2	Yes
Washington agreement, 1994, Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina	Small	No	Yes	Yes	3	Yes
Dayton agreement, 1995, Bosnia-Herzegovina	Small	Yes	Yes	No	3	Yes
San Andrés agreement, 1996, Chiapas	Small	No	Yes	No	2	No, ended in 1996
CHT peace agreement, 1997, Chittagong Hill Tracts	Small	No	No	No	1	Yes
Framework agreement, 2003, Comoros	Small	Yes	Yes	No	3	Yes
Khartoum agreement, 1997, Sudan	Big	No	Yes	Yes	2	No, ended in 2000
Comprehensive peace agreement, 2005, Sudan	Big	No	Yes	No	1	Yes

## 4.1 Testing the Favourable Conditions Separately

All the power-sharing peace agreements have been signed in countries or regions with a small population size except the two cases in Sudan. The 2005 CPA has been durable so far in Sudan, a country classified as big. Could one then conclude that a small population size, *a contrario*, is not a favourable condition? Having only one case of a big country which on top of it is characterised by highly complex regional and national dynamics implies that it is methodologically inadequate to make such a conclusion. The five other durable case agreements not including the agreement in Sudan have been signed in a country/region with a small population size. The ended San Andrés agreement in Chiapas potentially benefited from two favourable conditions, including a small population size. In this case, the small population size could not make the agreement more durable, since it failed after only a few months. It is indeed unclear how a structural small population size could save power-sharing peace agreements in the short term (Pappalardo, 1981). Only in the long term could the small population size potentially favour durability. In general, there is neither methodologically sufficient variation nor clear-cut evidence from the case studies to confirm the favourable effect of a small population size.

Regarding the balance of population size between segmented groups, the ended peace agreement in Chiapas and the 1997 Khartoum agreement could not benefit from this favourable condition. This provides some evidence in favour of the condition. Nevertheless, neither the Chittagong Hill Tracts agreement nor the Washington agreement could benefit from that condition. Only three durable accords in three states or regions fulfilled the balance of population size condition. Nonetheless, the Croat-Bosniak Federation provides some evidence that this favourable condition matters. Indeed, the demographic size of divided groups is not in balance in the Federation. The refusal by the Bosnian Croats to be closely allied to the Bosniaks during different stages of the war is often explained by the fear of being dominated by the Bosniak majority (Kumar, 1997). Hence, a balance has been created in politics, since Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks have exactly the same political power under the Washington agreement regarding the executive presidency and the assembly (UCDP, 1994). Attempts to change electoral rules in 2000 and 2001, which would have affected this political balance between segmented groups within the Federation, were strongly opposed by Bosnian Croats threatening even with secession (Belloni, 2004). This example indicates that the balance of population size between divided groups matters for the durability of power-sharing peace agreements. Evidence can also be found in the Comoros. Walker (2007) argues that the peace agreement only restored a fragile historic balance between the islands that has been destroyed before and during the conflict. Both cases point in the same direction: when the size of segmented population groups are such that a political balance is likely, the condition might be considered as favourable for the durability of a power-sharing peace agreement. Even if this conclusion is not clearly supported by the case studies, some empirical evidence is consistent with the favourable effect of the balance of population size between segmented groups.

Regarding territorial isolation between segmented groups, only the agreements in Bodoland and the Chittagong Hill Tracts do not fulfil this condition. Both regions have witnessed a massive influx of immigrants into tribal areas. It seems that the intermingling of divided communities, even though a cause of conflict, has not affected the durability of the peace agreements in particular in the CHT (CHT Commission, 2000). These cases question the favourable quality of the condition. On the other hand, all other six power-sharing peace agreements fulfil the condition of territorial group isolation, including the ended agreement in Chiapas. This may again be evidence against the favourable character of territorial isolation. Moreover, in the Comoros territorial isolation is most clear-cut, because of physical separation by sea between the islands. If one considers the March 2008 invasion, such clear territorial isolation of divided groups can be interpreted as a hindrance to the durability of power-sharing peace agreements. President Bacar of Anjouan could easily threaten with secession after the row about presidential elections in Anjouan because of the territorial isolation. Therefore, the physical isolation between groups has not been favourable. It could in fact even

favour partition (Kaufmann, 1996). Based on this analysis, case study evidence is rather inconsistent with the favourable effect of territorial isolation between segmented groups.

Coming to the last condition of a common perceived threat, it is noteworthy that in internal armed conflicts the warring opponents often perceive each other as the main security threat (Spears, 2002). As predicted by Pappalardo (1981), this condition is European-centric, because it is induced from a very specific European situation during and after the two World Wars. However, two out of the eight power-sharing agreements benefited from this condition: the Washington agreement between Croats and Bosniaks and the 1997 Khartoum agreement. These cases show that this condition is still relevant in the contemporary world, even though few peace agreements will benefit from it. Regarding the favourable effects of the condition, one should analyse the Washington agreement. After heavy military clashes between Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks as well as major population displacements, the 1994 Washington agreement was durable particularly because both groups were threatened by Bosnian Serb nationalism and military offensives until 1995 (Kumar, 1997). At that time, there was no meaningful international presence in the Federation, which could have enforced the peace agreement. For the unlikely 1997 power-sharing peace agreement between the southern Sudanese splinter groups and the government in Khartoum, the role of the common perceived threat is less clear, despite the fact that both signatories perceived the SPLA as a common security threat (Young, 2003). Even though this favourable condition only applies to two agreements, evidence from Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular tends to be consistent with the favourable effect of a common perceived threat, although this factor might not be sufficient to sustain a power-sharing peace agreement over the long term.

In the next part the cumulative effect of favourable conditions is analysed, which is central to confirm or reject conclusions for separate conditions as discussed above.

## 4.2 Testing the Cumulative Effect of Favourable Conditions

This working paper considers the total of favourable conditions fulfilled for each case agreement. The summarising table has shown that two power-sharing peace agreements only fulfil one favourable condition, three agreements were signed in the context of two favourable conditions and three other accords fulfil three conditions. No agreement fulfils zero or four conditions. Can evidence be found regarding the positive effect of a high number of favourable conditions on the durability of power-sharing peace agreements? In fact no pattern between favourable conditions and the durability of peace agreements is observable. Some particularly relevant cases are used as evidence.

The Chittagong Hill Tracts agreement with only one favourable condition was a durable peace agreement. Indeed, this conflict has been largely settled despite limited violence by splinter groups (CHT Commission, 2000). The Chiapas agreement was ended in the context of two favourable conditions, whereas the durable 2005 Comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan fulfils only one condition. If this agreement survives the 2011 independence referendum, it will constitute further evidence against the cumulative effect of favourable conditions. The accord in the Comoros benefited from three favourable conditions out of four. Yet, the March 2008 military operation questions at least the cumulative favourable effect. All this evidence is inconsistent with the cumulative effect of favourable conditions. The Dayton peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the context of three favourable conditions has been durable. At the same time this case is rather particular due to the very strong international presence as will be developed below. Based on the evaluation above, it seems rather doubtful that the number of favourable conditions affects the durability of power-sharing peace agreements. In brief, there is little evidence from the case studies that agreements are more likely to be durable if many of the four favourable conditions are fulfilled. This last finding casts doubts on the very favourable character of separately analysed conditions. Indeed, if separate conditions are favourable at least to some extent, they should logically also have cumulative effects.

### 4.3 What Else Does Case Study Evidence Tell Us?

Based on the case study evidence this paper identifies a number of other context factors as established in the literature which could be taken into account in regard to the durability of power-sharing peace agreements. This is an expansion of the research question, which might be particularly relevant for practice and further research. The politico-military context, including international presence and involvement (Bose, 2005; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, Walter, 1997; 1999) as well as the existence of splinter or other armed groups not party to a power-sharing peace agreement (Stedman, 1997; 2002; Tull & Mehler, 2005), is identified as particularly relevant based on the case study evidence.

First, the international presence or third party involvement is probably a context factor, which is very relevant to think about. It is commonly acknowledged that the Dayton peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been so durable because of the massive international NATO, OSCE and EU presence (Bose, 2005; Chandler, 2000). The international High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina is the highest instance to oversee the Dayton peace agreement and, therefore, has important prerogatives. He can for example remove public officials or impose laws if the power-sharing bodies are blocked (OHR, 2010). Bosnia clearly seems to indicate that strong international involvement even though often contested and criticised (Belloni, 2004; Bose, 2005; Chandler, 2000) is one very important option (Papagianni, 2008) in order to ensure the durability of power-sharing peace agreements. As context factor it most probably plays an important role. This conclusion is consistent with the case in the Comoros. The African Union supported by Comorian troops launched a military operation in March 2008 in order to topple Anjouan's president Bacar after he held illegal elections. The stated aim was to end the secessionist aspirations so that the threatened power-sharing peace agreement could be maintained. Without consequent AU involvement this could not have been possible (Al-Watwan, 2007; Alfeine, 2008; ARB, 2008a; ARB, 2008b). This example shows again the importance of international involvement to make power-sharing peace agreements more durable. At the same time, in other durable agreements such as in the CHT no international involvement has been registered at all. International involvement therefore seems important but not necessary.

The politico-military context relevant for durable power-sharing peace agreements and of particular importance for practitioners also includes the presence or absence of armed rebel groups not party to the agreement as well as splinter groups (Stedman, 1997). New armed groups may also be created as a response to power-sharing peace agreements (Tull & Mehler, 2005). Indeed, the signing of a power-sharing peace agreement often does not imply stable peace and may even trigger other conflicts. In Sudan, for example, the flare-up of conflict in Darfur is also explained by the exclusion of Darfur rebel groups of the central power-sharing institutions created by the CPA. The 1997 Khartoum agreement also fuelled conflict in the south between the SSDF and the SPLA (Colins, 2008; de Waal, 2007; Idris, 2005). Other case studies are also characterised by armed splinter groups. In Bodoland more radical armed groups such as the National Democratic Front of Bodoland, not party to the 1993 agreement, as well as the newly created Bodoland Liberation Tiger Forces continued the armed struggle for full independence after the agreement was signed between the ABSU, the Bodo People's Action Committee and the government of Assam. Local conditions have been far from peaceful even though the particular power-sharing peace agreement was classified as durable (Dasgupta, 1997; Bhaumik, 2000). To a limited extent the Chittagong Hill Tracts case, where splinter groups continued sporadic armed struggle after the power-sharing peace agreement was signed, is also consistent with the importance of the role of armed groups not party to the accord (Rashiduzzaman, 1998; CHT Commission, 2000). This context factor is particularly relevant to look at for practitioners and academics. Power-sharing peace agreements indeed have an exclusionary character, which may trigger further armed violence. This complex interplay between power-sharing peace agreements and insurgency by other armed groups is an important aspect to be considered in future research.

In brief, based on case study evidence the politico-military context, in particular international involvement as well as the presence or absence of other armed insurgent groups have been identified as relevant context factors which may affect the durability of power-sharing peace agreements.

## 5 Conclusion

### 5.1 Summary of Findings

Lijphart's favourable conditions have never been tested in the particular context of power-sharing peace agreements. This paper provides empirical evidence regarding those favourable conditions and contributes to the debate on favourable conditions. Eight case studies were carried out in order to provide evidence on the four selected favourable conditions of a small population size, a balance of population size between segmented groups, territorial isolation of segmented population groups and a common perceived security threat. The testing of these conditions was challenging due to the lack of accurate data in order to follow the proposed operationalisation and limited variation in the outcome variable (durability of power-sharing peace agreements). Only two out of eight agreements have not been durable. This is certainly a limitation to the analysis, but is compensated by the great diversity of cases. At the same time the finding that some power-sharing peace agreements *have been* durable is a rebuttal of those authors arguing that power-sharing is not a workable model in practice. Evidence from a great diversity of cases ranging from the Chittagong Hill Tracts to Sudan show that power-sharing can be established and is not doomed to fail.

The potentially favourable effect of Lijphart's four conditions on the durability of power-sharing peace agreements was tested. As predicted by critics (Bogaards, 1998; Pappalardo, 1981), case study evidence is rather inconsistent with the favourable character of Lijphart's conditions. The evidence for the effect of a balance of population size between segmented groups and of a small population size on the durability of power-sharing peace agreements was inconclusive. Territorial isolation of segmented groups does not seem to have a favourable effect. Finally, discussions highlighted some evidence showing the favourable effect of a common perceived security threat at least in the short term. The main finding of this working paper, however, is that no cumulative effect of the four favourable conditions is mirrored in empirical evidence. This finding casts serious doubts on the favourable nature of separate conditions as well. Any favourable effect of the four separate conditions is therefore limited at most. This finding implies that the durability of power-sharing peace agreements does not depend upon a particular structural favourable context as developed by Lijphart based on European examples. As a result, the importance of (un)favourable structural conditions for power-sharing peace agreements should not be overstated. Nevertheless, the politico-military context as identified in this working paper may play an important role for the durability of power-sharing peace agreements. This has important practical implications.

### 5.2 Practical Implications

The finding that the durability of power-sharing peace agreements is probably not dependent on Lijphart's four favourable conditions has important practical implications. It implies that power-sharing institutions in peace agreements are probably not dependent upon specific structural conditions as existing in European cases. Critics arguing that power-sharing institutions can only work in Western democracies, such as Switzerland, therefore seem to be wrong. Political institution engineers, mediators and consultants cannot dismiss or reject power-sharing institutions just because a country context does not seem to be favourable or 'European' enough. Power-sharing arrangements in peace agreements can potentially be durable regardless of the structural context, as confirmed by evidence provided in this working paper.

For the idea that political institutions can be engineered in divided societies affected by armed conflict, the durability of peace agreements is probably the most serious test. However, the findings and practical implications put forward in this working paper do not imply that Lijphart's model should be applied rigidly and used as a single one-size-fits-all model. Neither do they suggest that power-sharing solutions should be introduced in every peace agreement. One should not

overemphasise the possibility to manage armed conflicts between divided groups through power-sharing mechanisms. Power-sharing is no panacea to end armed conflicts. Yet, power-sharing should be considered as valuable option when negotiating and drafting peace agreements, since they are not doomed to fail and may work even outside a favourable European context.

Efforts to develop general guidelines for a range of power-sharing mechanisms in peace agreements need to be intensified. Indeed, the quality of engineered power-sharing arrangements adapted to the local conflict reality matters most – not favourable or unfavourable structural conditions. Therefore, this working paper prepares the ground for guidelines on various forms of power-sharing solutions. Amongst the specific conflict reality, the presence or absence of armed groups not party to the accord and the willingness of international actors to get involved have been identified in this paper. These changing politico-military context factors should be taken into account when thinking about power-sharing solutions to resolve armed conflict.

As a step forward, future guidelines should consider all major critiques of power-sharing and consider what measures or adaptations could be found to avoid adverse effects. Recent work (Papagianni, 2007; 2008; Töpperwien, 2010) as described in this paper has already shown that power-sharing clauses in peace agreements should only apply to a transitional period, whereas a more participative decision-making process including a larger number of constituencies should decide on the long-term political institutions. Yet, many other challenges and obstacles related to power-sharing institutions have to be overcome. A particularly arduous one will be to avoid power-sharing agreements setting a bad example (Tull & Mehler, 2005). What can practitioners do, how might power-sharing mechanisms look like so they will not motivate other actors to take up arms in order to get their share of power? This relates to the major problem of splinter and other armed groups not party to power-sharing peace agreements. Guidelines on political power-sharing should therefore certainly take on board those issues in order to become useful working tools.

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
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## Appendices


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
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### Appendix 3: Map of Chiapas (Mexico)



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#### Appendix 4: Map of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (Bangladesh)



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