Demilitarisation of conflict and society is crucial to building sustainable peace in countries emerging from the scourge of civil war. As longstanding conflicts come to an end, a variety of approaches are adopted by international agencies and national governments aimed at supporting processes that facilitate this potentially volatile transition from formal peace to social peace. At the heart of the exercise is the necessity of transforming the instruments of war—and in particular combatants themselves—from soldiers to citizens as well as ridding the wider society of armaments. Thus the process of demilitarisation involves not only a political commitment from the leadership to end hostilities but, if it is to lead to sustained peace, a deeper commitment at a social level amongst individuals (perpetrators of conflict) and communities (supporters or victims of conflict) to move beyond the identities and emblems which serve to perpetuate hostilities. The emergence of a new social contract in post-conflict societies is a vital step towards to re-legitimising the institutions of governance through democratic elections.

However, demilitarisation and democratisation are only possible when constituent elements of society are able to function fully as citizens. Ex-soldiers and their families, while numerically small relative to other vulnerable groups such as IDPs, are not only potentially disruptive elements in the aftermath of war but their reintegration back into society can serve as a litmus test of degree of reconciliation in a post-conflict situation. Social acceptance and economic activity form part of the basis for this reconciliation but these factors must be accompanied by some form of political participation for reintegration to be considered complete. The sublimation of the instinctive resort to arms when conflict rears its head and its substitution by the ‘cut and thrust’ of parliamentary debate and judicial appeals is the key indicator that a democratic peace has been achieved.

The challenges of demilitarisation are most starkly evident in the case of Angola. No other ‘post-conflict’ situation has been host to all the complexities of reintegration and the variety of experiences, ranging from the UN-inspired programme to joint foreign-national efforts (and most recently outright neg-
lect), which accompany that volatile process. In the wake of the death of UNITA’s leader, Jonas Savimbi, in February 2002 and the signing of a ceasefire agreement two months later, formal peace has been established at last in Angola. The first step towards demilitarisation, cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation of combatants, was completed by October 2002. Social peace, however, remains an elusive objective. In particular the failure to follow up demobilisation with the adoption of reintegration strategies that facilitate the insertion of individual ex-combatants (and their families) back into local communities is deeply troubling. Given the brutal nature of the civil war in its waning days, which involved FAA military operations pursuing a ‘scorched earth’ policy to wrench guerrillas from their support base while the increasingly isolated UNITA forces engaged in savage responses, local communities were further alienated from Angolan combatants. Thus, the reintegration of hundreds of thousands of UNITA and FAA ex-combatants back into society without the benefit of substantive support for individual soldiers or host communities is highly problematic and, potentially, seriously disruptive of the long terms aims of achieving social stability.

João Porto and Imogen Parsons have provided a vital ‘road map’ to current efforts aimed at achieving peaceful demilitarisation in Angola. Through their carefully considered study of the dynamics involved in a complex phenomena—made doubly so by institutional density, shifting agendas on the part of various agents and the difficulties of conducting field research in such a vast setting—the authors have presented as complete a picture as is possible of the ongoing demobilisation and reintegration process. For those practitioners and scholars (and I count myself amongst them) concerned with deepening of the peace process in Angola, this study gives us the requisite data, tools and insights to begin to understand the contemporary situation and sets the stage for analysis of the next steps needed to rid Angola of the bitter legacy of war. The authors should be highly commended for this fine study and their work will make compulsive reading for all those engaged in understanding the role of demilitarisation in securing peace.

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London School of Economics
17 February 2003
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In these early days of 2003, as analysts, academics and policy-makers are asked to reflect on the pivotal events of the previous year in Africa as well as to venture predictions for the year ahead, Angola stands to the fore. For if Angola has often been in the public eye, filling glossy magazine spreads and catapulted onto primetime evening news, this has largely been a function of tragic and dramatic events. For the last 27 seven years, this southern African country has been engulfed in cycles of vicious and protracted civil war, racked by poverty and underdevelopment, traumatised by two failed peace processes and the refusal of the parties in conflict to peacefully negotiate their differences. Over 4 million people were displaced within Angola, while more than 450,000 fled across its borders to seek sanctuary in Namibia, Zambia and the Congo.¹

Today, a year after the death of UNITA’s leader, Jonas Savimbi, prompted a cessation of hostilities and eventually the signature in April of a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ reviving the Lusaka peace process, Angola faces the monumental task of sustaining and deepening its newly won peace. Almost 80,000 former UNITA soldiers and around 360,000 of their family members must be reintegrated socially and economically, as must the 33,000 troops due to be demobilised from the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA). Millions of internally displaced people, as well as the hundreds of thousands of refugees outside Angola’s borders, who have begun returning home spontaneously and through official movements, must be assisted to rebuild their homes and livelihoods. State administration must be extended and strengthened in all areas of the country, and Angola’s shattered infrastructure rebuilt from its current pitiful state.

While the historic and emotional significance of the end of armed conflict should not be underestimated, the challenges of post-conflict ‘normalisation’ in Angola carry therefore momentous structural magnitude. To be precise, ‘normalisation’, an expression often used by Luanda’s political and military elites, does not encapsulate in their entirety the challenges faced by every single one of Angola’s eighteen Provinces. In essence meant to describe the
extension of state administration throughout the national territory, ‘normalisation’ has meant the (re) establishment of government structures and functions, in particular in areas previously controlled by UNITA. Yet, the post-conflict environment in Angola raises difficulties which surpass the politico-administrative components of state-(re) building. For if the extension of state administration has unquestionably been a historic priority for the Government of Angola, albeit bereft of real power or resources, the context in which it is being implemented after 27 years of civil war has stretched government capacity, as well as imagination, to its limit. In addition to the task of resettling up to four million displaced civilians, some of the most pressing challenges include ‘deteriorated lines of communication and transport, devastated social and economic infrastructure, limited institutional capacity to respond adequately, land use constrained by access disputes and mines, conflicts over other resources between returning populations and those that remained in the areas of return, and debilitated local economic sector’.2

This monograph focuses on one aspect of ‘normalisation’, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DD&R) process that began following the signature of the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ on 4 April 2002. It departs from the assumption that DD&R are not simply military processes, but critical components as well as reliable predictors of the success or failure of post-conflict peace-building activities, and therefore sustainable peace. While there is considerable agreement on the potential of DD&R in securing the cessation of hostilities, building confidence between former belligerents as well as reducing the potential for violent conflicts in the future, there is also the growing recognition that these processes may also engender new social and political conflicts at various levels.3 There is no consensual blueprint for DD&R processes, which are to a large extent idiosyncratic and situation-specific, however. Deeply embedded in the social, political, economic and historical context of post-conflict situations, DD&R processes must therefore be understood in relation to the specific environment in which they are implemented. This environment determines to a large extent what is possible and what is not, why developments follow a certain path rather than a different one and how effective certain activities are as opposed to others. Perhaps more importantly, DD&R processes must be seen as part of an ‘emergency to relief to development continuum’, where ‘short-term concerns should not be allowed to undermine long-term development goals’, as emphasised by Mats Berdal in an oft-quoted study on disarmament and demobilisation.4

With those caveats in mind, this monograph aims at providing an overview of current DD&R efforts in Angola. This overview will include an evaluation of
the current state of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration on the ground as well as a chronological overview of the various programmes that have been put forward by the government of Angola and international donors, in particular the World Bank. The existence at present of various interlinked and cross-cutting programmes which guide and affect the implementation of DD&R in Angola has resulted in a substantial degree of confusion and misunderstanding, which inevitably limits the capacity of both Angolan as well as outside actors to properly understand, monitor and evaluate these processes. Furthermore, the specific circumstances of the end of war in Angola and the pace with which the disarmament and demobilisation of UNITA’s ex-combatants was completed have fuelled concerns that the long-term socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants may be at risk, with disastrous consequences for reconciliation at local level in the short and medium term.

This monograph will therefore identify and explain the various programmes that guide or affect the current DD&R process, as a basis for future research, monitoring and evaluation. The first section gives an idea of the overall context within which DDR is taking place, raising the issue of basic conditions in areas where internally displaced peoples (IDPs) and ex-combatants alike will be returning and assessing the current situation in terms of population displacement and movement. The second analyses past disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes in 1991–92 and 1994–98, in order to situate the current process and extract ‘lessons learned’. The progress of the current DDR process since the signature of the Memorandum of Understanding in April 2004 is then reviewed in Section Four. Section 5 revisits the development of policies and programmes over 2002, while an outline of plans for the future is given in Section 6. Finally the paper concludes with an analysis of progress and plans so far, and recommendations for the current and future reintegration of post-conflict Angola.
Introduction

…the next three months could be the most decisive in terms of the creation of basic conditions for the normalisation of the lives of displaced populations during the war. For the government of Angola, the current dry season could represent the best opportunity for the implementation of assistance and social reintegration programmes of displaced populations.5

Understanding the challenges, policies and institutional framework that will guide the resettlement and return of a large proportion of Angola’s population must be taken into account if an adequate appreciation of ex-combatant’s reintegration is to be achieved. As will be discussed below, the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants is to a large extent underscored by the same norms that guide the resettlement and return programme currently underway in Angola. Consequently, resettlement and return issues not only provide us with a picture of what in reality ‘normalisation’ implies and therefore a clearer understanding of the challenges facing the government in Angola’s post-war environment, but they also highlight many of the obstacles and challenges that the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants will inevitably produce.

According to data provided by provincial governments in a meeting on 10 June 2002, more than four million people were displaced by the war. If we bear in mind that Angola has approximately 13.1 million people in total with an estimated urban population of about 60%, the challenge as well as impact of resettling and/or returning a third of the total population to its areas of origin and resettlement emerges. Angola’s internally displaced are strongly heterogeneous, having been displaced at different times during Angola’s civil war, resulting in cyclical waves of displacement. Moreover, by the time of the Bicesse Accords in 1991 there were about 800,000 internally displaced people and 425,000 refugees in neighbouring countries. As pointed out by the United Nations, ‘in the period between independence and the Bicesse accords, when the war was fought in remote rural areas, displacement tended
to be quite localised, normally involving short-range movements between vil-
lages and into nearby municipal centres’. Of these, only a fraction returned to
their areas of origin during the period 1991–92 and when war resumed in
1992 and combat spread to major urban centres, an additional 1.3 to 2 mil-
lion Angolans were displaced in large-scale population movements which
tended to flow to the safety provided by coastal cities. In the four years of ‘no
war no peace’ that followed the signature of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, while
some IDPs returned home, ‘the numbers were small, because of continuing
insecurity and lack of confidence on the part of many IDPs in the durability of
the peace process’. By the end of 1997 humanitarian agencies estimated that
more than 1 million were displaced, and when in 1998 the war restarted, only
a limited number of these had been resettled.

The resumption of armed hostilities throughout the national territory at the
end of 1998 aggravated the problem exponentially, with an additional 3 mil-
lion displaced from their homes. To be sure, the tactical conduct of this last
phase of the war by both sides was largely responsible for the situation. In
fact, ‘following a mission in October-November 2000, the Representative of
the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons reported that large
numbers of rural people had been displaced by UNITA forces’ while ‘in the
second half of 2001 and early months of 2002, large numbers of civilians
were forcibly removed from rural areas, particularly in the east of the country,
as part of a FAA strategy to deprive UNITA forces of civilian sources of food’.

As of mid-2002, only 1.4 million of the total number of IDPs had been con-
firmed by humanitarian agencies for assistance, while only 436,000 were in
camps and transit centres and 600,000 were in temporary resettlement sites.
Before the signature of the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ humanitarian
aid reached only 10–15% of the country and humanitarian agencies had
access only to 60% of the 272 locations where displaced peoples were con-
centrated, largely a result of security conditions and logistical constraints.
Angola became the most expensive humanitarian operation in the world, with
10 United Nations’ Agencies, 100 international NGOs and more than 420
national NGOs providing assistance to 2 million people.

Since the signature of the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ on 4 April 2002
the situation has improved although the numbers of internally displaced peo-
ple have grown with thousands emerging from previously inaccessible areas
coupled with the exponential growth in the number of UNITA family mem-
ers reporting to family reception areas. The Provinces of Luanda, Benguela,
Lunda Norte, Huambo and Kwanza Sul stand as the worst affected with a
combined number of close to two and a half million displaced as of June 2002. The cities of Kuito, Malange, Mbanza Congo, Huambo and Uige were identified as being in a particularly acute state. As to characteristics of displacement, the Provinces with the larger number of displaced people to be resettled internally are Kwanza Sul (401,037), Huila (167,399), Malange (167,181), Moxico (145,288), Bie (28,077), Benguela (15,405) and Cunene

Table 3: Internally Displaced People in Angola

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Data Provided by Provincial Governors (10 June 2002)</th>
<th>Reported IDPs (September 2002)</th>
<th>Confirmed IDPs (September 2002)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bengo</td>
<td>179,413</td>
<td>120,070</td>
<td>21,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benguela</td>
<td>453,331</td>
<td>435,013</td>
<td>92,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bie</td>
<td>208,952</td>
<td>523,016</td>
<td>202,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinda</td>
<td>11,877</td>
<td>11,877</td>
<td>Na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cunene</td>
<td>69,278</td>
<td>71,908</td>
<td>10,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huambo</td>
<td>435,000</td>
<td>435,053</td>
<td>140,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huila</td>
<td>229,170</td>
<td>218,073</td>
<td>190,564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuando Kubango</td>
<td>156,445</td>
<td>621,044</td>
<td>76,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwanza Norte</td>
<td>109,587</td>
<td>109,585</td>
<td>24,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwanza Sul</td>
<td>413,341</td>
<td>413,034</td>
<td>113,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luanda</td>
<td>673,526</td>
<td>84,301</td>
<td>17,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunda Norte</td>
<td>438,203</td>
<td>438,013</td>
<td>13,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunda Sul</td>
<td>184,919</td>
<td>184,091</td>
<td>81,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malange</td>
<td>288,536</td>
<td>288,686</td>
<td>70,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moxico</td>
<td>206,297</td>
<td>550,220</td>
<td>80,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibe</td>
<td>24,812</td>
<td>22,275</td>
<td>18,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uige</td>
<td>64,832</td>
<td>186,960</td>
<td>113,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>38,054</td>
<td>23,127</td>
<td>2,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,185,573</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,440,056</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,296,303</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As regards inter-Provincial resettlement, Luanda stands at the top of the list (67,943), followed by Huila (29,487) and Namibe (26,832).

The Government’s ‘Emergency Resettlement and Return Programme’, June 2002

In order to tackle the humanitarian emergency, an inter-agency Rapid Assessment of Critical Needs (RACN) was conducted in 28 locations in 12 Provinces, a process which opened up several important road corridors for humanitarian operations. This was expanded to a ‘vulnerability assessment’ conducted between May and October in 220 locations in 11 provinces. The approval of an ‘Emergency Resettlement and Return Programme’ by the Government of Angola in June 2002 was a critical step in developing a concerted approach to the looming humanitarian catastrophe. Moreover, rather than attempting the gigantic task of dealing with the total number of reported IDPs, this emergency programme prioritised the return, resettlement and social reintegration of those who had been identified by humanitarian agencies. Its target group included 1,550,000 people (approximately 310,000 families) as well as assistance to 350,000 UNITA ex-combatants and their family members. Scheduled to occur between July and December 2002, implementation of this emergency programme was organised in three phases:

1. Return: implementation of an emergency plan to benefit 550,000 people representing 1/3 of the target group;
2. Resettlement: including ‘inter-sector actions’ to raise awareness of mines and other related risks; resettlement of populations in their areas of origin, in previously established areas or in areas defined as centres of agricultural development;
3. Social reintegration: integrate the remainder 2/3 through a social reintegration plan focused on income and employment generation; educational and professional training and finally infrastructure rehabilitation.

In addition, resettlement and return activities were conceptualised in accordance with the strategic and economic development objectives of the government. In this sense, ‘areas of the country considered important from an economic development point of view and offering adequate access and security conditions’ were and are being prioritised. This emergency plan is therefore seen as the foundation for a medium term social assistance programme based
on the following principles: the promotion of the sustainable development of target groups in a context of the development of the community as a whole; the reduction of dependency on humanitarian assistance in favour of self-sufficiency; adaptation of the programme for the objective local reality and, finally, the special protection of children, youth, orphans, widows, the elderly and handicapped. Furthermore, underlying the approval of this emergency programme, was the need to accelerate resettlement and return to take advantage of the agricultural calendar, scheduled to start at the end of August last year. As a matter of fact, the concern in restarting agricultural production as a means to assure the sustainability of resettlement and return in a context where employment opportunities are extremely limited, was expressed to the authors in several interviews with humanitarian partners undertaken in Angola between June and October 2002. While this assumption has been heatedly debated, with strong arguments for and against the prioritisation of agriculture, there are those who pointed out that ‘even in the best case scenario of large scale return before the start of the planting season in October 2002, the humanitarian case-load [is] unlikely to decline significantly until the harvest in April 2003’.

The Norms on the Resettlement of Displaced Peoples, January 2001

While prioritising resettlement and return in areas where economic development is most needed is common sensical, one should bear in mind that these processes are legally bound by a set of norms approved by the government of Angola in January 2001. In what was a truly historic achievement for humanitarian agencies present in Angola under the leadership of OCHA, on 5 January 2001 the Government of Angola issued Council of Ministers Decree N.1/01 on ‘Norms on the Resettlement of Displaced Peoples’. These norms, which were later regulated specifically, identify a number of pre-conditions that must be in place, including access (e.g. mine clearance), land availability, security, extension of State administration and water and basic sanitation facilities before resettlement and return can occur. More importantly, at the root of these norms is the issue of voluntary resettlement in that displaced peoples must have indicated that they are willing to relocate or return voluntarily. Consequently, the monitoring and evaluation of resettlement and return in Angola must be conducted on the basis of compliance with these norms and not solely as regards economic developmental priorities.

The practical implementation of the norms on resettlement and return poses a number of interesting questions, some of which are pertinent as regards the
socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants. While government compromise on pre-conditions necessary for the adequate return and resettlement is in and of itself an important achievement, the process by which these norms were operationalised ‘on the ground’ must also be taken into account, for as will become clear below, it demonstrates the benefits of close cooperation between government, humanitarian agencies and civil society. In fact, this model of cooperation should be taken seriously where socio-economic reintegration of former UNITA soldiers is concerned.

Moreover, the responsibility for the planning and management of resettlement and return lies at the doorstep of Provincial governments. Article 1 of Decree 1/01 clearly states that ‘the resettlement and return of displaced peoples will be the responsibility of Provincial Governments’ to be undertaken by a ‘provincial humanitarian coordination group’.

However, Provincial governments lack adequate capacity in manpower, know-how and resources to undertake such large endeavour. It is because of these structural obstacles that the norms subsequently recommend the creation of a sub-group specifically dedicated to the displaced, which brings in all NGOs, humanitarian agencies and other institutions operating in a particular Province side by side with all relevant Provincial government agencies. Consequently, a variety of different stakeholders are made responsible for the programming and managing of the resettlement and return, assuring the adequate application of the norms.

The norms are clear in specifying that, before resettlement and return occurs, Provincial governments must assure that state administration is present and functioning, or the situation ‘normalised’ as described above. Following the extension of state administration, the sub-group must undertake, in consultation with local communities and traditional authorities, the identification of adequate available land and proceed with giving ‘1/2 hectare adequate for agriculture to each family’. It is clear that the methodology chosen to implement the emergency programme attempts a degree of decentralisation and ‘de-concentration’ allowing the Provinces the operationalisation of the national plan into local interventions. As is made clear by the programme,

…in the discussion of resettlement issues, decision-making should bear in mind the lowest possible decision-making level because it affects directly and immediately the populations; that is, it should include civil society’s participation in the most representative way.

However, in many regions IDPs have not waited for the implementation of these norms but have been spontaneously returning to their villages regard-
less. 000 estimated to have returned by October 2002, only 15% had returned as part of an organised plan, and 70% were living in places where the ‘norms’ were not yet in place. It is unclear in these cases whether the ‘norms’ will in fact be fulfilled. Many adopted a strategy of ‘keeping two residences—one at the return site where family members constructed shelters and prepared land and the other in provincial and municipal centres where households continued to receive assistance’. This obviously favours return to areas near these centres however, whereas in more remote areas returning populations were considerably worse off.

The PEPARRs

In practical terms, the development of Provincial emergency plans has taken the form of a document prepared by Provincial Governments called PEPARR (Provincial Emergency Plan for Resettlement and Return). Not limited to ensuring that return movements are conducted in accordance with the norms, the PEPARR process represents in itself an important capacity-building action for Provincial governments, as the cases of Huila and Uige Provinces make clear.

In June 2002 MINARS convened the third annual Provincial Planning Workshop in Luanda, with support from UN agencies. Its aim was to agree on a common operational approach to resettlement and return as well as to train provincial representatives in preparation for planning and implementing return movements on the basis of the norms. By the end of July all 18 Provincial authorities had, in conjunction with humanitarian agencies, completed their emergency resettlement and return plans (PEPARRs). These 18 PEPARRs cover 1,749,867 internally displaced people (350,696 families) in 18 Provinces, of which as many as 1,576,587 are considered expected to resettle or return to areas of origin within the provinces they are currently resident. After the completion of these Provincial emergency plans, a clearer picture of the most pressing needs of displaced peoples in Angola emerged. Priority interventions defined for all 18 Provinces included food security (food assistance; seeds and tools’ distribution necessary in all locations); health and nutrition (seven municipal hospitals, 19 health centres and 129 health posts require rehabilitation in ten Provinces); water and sanitation; non-food items and shelter; education; protection; mine action and finally, logistics. PEPARRs were revised in September and October 2002 for phase two of return and resettlement.

According to OCHA, between April and the end of November, approximately 1.1 million people have returned to their areas of origin throughout the
Case Study One: Huila Province

The process by which Huila’s Provincial government developed its PEPARR illustrates some of the challenges and obstacles involved, and could serve as a template for the implementation of socio-economic reintegration of former soldiers. Entrusted with the management of resettlement and return in that Province, the resource-meagre Provincial government was confronted with the tasks of registering displaced peoples throughout the Province; identifying priority interventions and budgeting them; and identifying and coordinating humanitarian agencies, non-governmental organisations and community based organisations present in the Province that could be involved in the resettlement and return. Throughout this process, OCHA provided guidance and orientation, as well as capacity-building.

Huila’s Provincial government recognised that resettlement and return was a multi-dimensional problem requiring the involvement of ‘all forces at the local level’, including humanitarian agencies and civic associations, churches and NGOs, as well as political parties and government agencies. In fact, Huila’s PEPARR states that ‘this must be a multidisciplinary and self-sustaining intervention; only this will stimulate in an objective way the return of populations to their original regions’. Consequently, a large number of organisations and government agencies were identified and grouped into intervention type and geographical area type clusters.

Following identification, the Provincial government began developing ‘practical programmes to support the resettlement and return of these populations to their areas of origin, [in order to] give them a logistical package and possible conditions that will enable them to, in the shortest possible time, restore their dignity, self-esteem, self-sustenance, professional training, a solid and comfortable home, a quality school, preventive and curative health services, fight against poverty, social exclusion and food security that will entail the integration of populations in activities that are socially useful, that create income and are sustainable economically, prioritising agriculture’. In Huila Province, the following areas were prioritised: food security; rural extension and technical assistance; micro credit and micro finance; cooperatives; schooling and, finally, diversification of production in rural areas in terms of non-agricultural activities.
country, particularly in Bengo, Bié, Huambo, Kuanza Sul and Malanje. However, only 15 percent moved under an organised plan and only 30 percent of returnees are living in areas where the pre-conditions specified in the norms and regulation are in place. As of 19 December, OCHA reports that number of people requiring food assistance has reached 1.8 million and an additional 300,000 people may become food insecure in the months ahead. Credible reports indicate that as many as 200,000 vulnerable people may be in critical distress in inaccessible areas. High rates of severe malnutrition exist in at least 15 locations and additional pockets may be present in remote communities. Morbidity and mortality levels remain at emergency and acute levels in many locations and millions of children are vulnerable to killer diseases,

**Case Study Two: Uige Province**

In Uige Province the process has been a little slower as a result of a two month gap between the appointment and swearing in, in January 2003, of a new Provincial Governor from UNITA, as agreed under the Lusaka Protocol. Uige was always one of the most insecure provinces, with large portions of the countryside under UNITA control right until the end of the war and the provincial capital itself passing several times from government to UNITA control. Today the provincial infrastructure is almost completely destroyed and large portions of the province are inaccessible, a situation made worse by the rainy season. In Uige, like in other Provinces, displacement occurred in several waves. In 1992 the number was put at 66,736; between 1992 and 1998 a further 130,456 were registered as internally displaced and between 1998 and 2002, 186,962 are believed to have been displaced in Uige Province. The majority of these were from within Uige itself.

Under PEPARR I, approximately 4 500 returned to their areas of origin by organized means from IDP camps. It is difficult to know how many returned spontaneously from outside camps, or from outside the province. Within the province 59,162 IDPs have declared themselves willing to return under a second phase of resettlement under PEPARR II, which provides for organized resettlement of IDPs located outside camps. Of the three IDP camps in Uige only Quituma still has a (small) resident IDP population, having been turned into a transit camp for ex-UNITA combatants. That the other two were emptied so quickly may be more indicative of problems within the camps than of the attractiveness of return, including poor conditions in Cawafeira and security problems and theft of crops by neighbouring FAA troops in Bengo.
including measles’. According to Government figures, more than 2.8 million people are still displaced in Angola and approximately 290,000 IDPs continue to live in camps and transit centres. Furthermore, mine accidents have increased during the seasonal rains, and as a result, several organisations have reduced or temporarily suspended their operations. In fact, according to humanitarian agencies, approximately 40 percent of the areas where humanitarian agencies are operational may be cut-off during the seasonal rains.

Repatriation of refugees

A final consideration is the repatriation of as many as 400,000 refugees from Namibia, Zambia, Congo-Brazzaville and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Formal repatriation programmes have not yet begun but by mid December around 86,000 were estimated to have spontaneously returned, the majority to areas where basic conditions for return were not in place. Formal repatriation agreements were signed in November and December with Namibia, Zambia and DRC.
While this is the first time since their displacement that large-scale return of IDPs has taken place in Angola, the current disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process is the third in Angola’s history of civil war, following the failure of the 1991 Bicesse Peace Accords and the (temporary) collapse of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol. The manner in which each was implemented (or not) had radical implications for the unravelling of the peace process each time, as well as for the local stability and security of regions around Quartering Areas. Furthermore to a large extent, the current DD&R process builds on the institutions and may benefit from lessons learned from these two previous attempts. As a consequence a brief discussion of these seems appropriate.

The Bicesse DD&R process

The first comprehensive peace agreements between the government of Angola and UNITA, the Bicesse Peace Accords signed in May 1991, contained the origins of the DD&R structures still in place today. Moreover, the accords stipulated the quartering of both UNITA and government troops within 60 days, the creation of a 50,000 strong joint armed forces and the demobilisation of surplus UNITA troops. From an estimated total of 200,000 men in arms on both sides, the new Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) would be composed of 20,000 soldiers from the FAPLA, the government’s army, and 20,000 from FALA, UNITA’s army as well as by an Air Force of 6,000 and a Navy of 4,000. On a political level, the realisation of multi-party elections in September 2002 was made dependent on the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces while completion of disarmament and demobilisation were not insisted upon, however. In retrospect, this was a mistake which aided the return to war, even if it cannot be said to have caused it.

In institutional terms, the Bicesse Accords established three ‘joint commissions’ in order to oversee and verify the process, built around the Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM)\textsuperscript{28}, which was composed of the Government and UNITA, with the Troika (Portugal, Russia and the United
States) solely as observers. A new inter-sectoral body, the Interministerial Office to Support the Demobilized Military of Angola (GIAMDA), was created on 15th of November 1991 by presidential decree with the aim of establishing a broad programme for reintegration of former combatants. Supporting structures in the provinces were then established to co-ordinate the DD&R process. The role of external actors other than the Troika was extremely limited. The signatories of the Bicesse Accords decided to extend the United Nations’ presence in Angola, UNAVEM I, under a renewed mandate. In response to a formal request from Angola for United Nations’ participation, the Secretary General reported to the Security Council and proposed that the existing mandate of UNAVEM I be expanded to include verification of the cease-fire and neutrality of the Angolan police. On 30 May 1991, the Security Council adopted resolution 696 establishing UNAVEM II. While having a new mandate that included overseeing implementation of the various provisions of the Accords, including organising the elections, responsibility for compliance lay firmly with the two parties. As a result, UNAVEM II’s power to intervene in the process was severely limited, being restricted to a supervisory role.

In addition, the United Nations’ abilities were limited by the lack of adequate resources, with an initial budget of only $132m for a seventeen-month period and a staff component of only 350 military observers and 126 police observers. The extent to which UNAVEM II had limited resources for the tasks at hand can be assessed in comparison with the UN presence in Namibia, UNTAG, which cost $383m for a 12 month period, in a country with a significantly smaller population. In fact, the ratio of UN personnel to population for UNTAG was 1:150, whereas for UNAVEM II it was 1:16,000. Margaret Anstee, United Nations’ Special Representative during the Bicesse process, has famously compared this lack of resources to being asked to fly ‘a 747 with the fuel for a DC-10’. In another occasion, Anstee added that ‘adopting a myopic approach to UN peacekeeping, the Security Council gave UNAVEM II a mandate and resources that absurdly underestimated the enormity and complexity of the tasks that lay ahead…UNAVEM II was a misguided exercise in peace-keeping minimalism’.

As a consequence, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process under the Bicesse Accords did not proceed smoothly. Although rapid demobilisation was called for, the accords did not allow sufficient time for proper planning and implementation. In fact, partly a consequence of technical failures in the accords, particularly as regards independent monitoring activities, partly a result of the intransigence of both parties, secret armies...
were maintained in violation of the Accords. Quartering and registration of both government and UNITA troops was never completed and it is not known exactly what UNITA’s fighting strength was at the end of the war, since, although it claimed force levels in the region of 75,000, this number may have been inflated for strategic reasons. In addition, of those that did register, a significant number were believed to be outside normal fighting age as well as unarmed. On the government side, a significant number of troops either ‘self-demobilised’ after registration or went AWOL. In fact, over 12,000 government troops are believed to have gone missing from October 1991 to February 1992.

As regards disarmament, an important achievement during the Bicesse negotiations had been the acceptance by both sides as well as the Troika of observer countries of the so-called ‘triple-zero’ clause in which the parties agreed on restraining from acquiring lethal material, and the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to cease all supplies to any of the parties and encourage other countries to do likewise. However, as relates to existing weaponry, significant numbers of UNITA troops reported to the quartering areas unarmed. The slow rate of disarmament during the Bicesse process may be an indication of both a lack of seriousness or confidence between the belligerents as well as a reluctance to hand over weapons which could be sold for profit in a situation characterised by a lack of employment opportunities. Due to the lack of resources for infrastructure development, a ‘double-key system’ was never introduced in Angola (which could have guaranteed that arms were stored in a safe place, one key remaining in local hands and the other with the United Nations), contributing to the difficulties in verifying disarmament. In fact, on the government side many of the troops that ‘self-demobilised’ took their weapons with them when they left, resulting in a rise in incidents of banditry and crime in particular in areas around the camps.

Demobilization of troops did not, in the end, begin until almost a year after the signature of the Accords, in March 1992. Furthermore, although the parties revised the initial projection of their combined total troop strength to 151,930, by 12 February 1992 only 61% of troops were quartered, corresponding to 50.44% of government troops and 93.75% of UNITA troops. Because quartering and registration had not been completed, of the 25,000 UNITA troops scheduled for demobilisation only 10,402 had been demobilised by September 1992 when elections were due. On the government’s side, 123,887 FAPLA troops had been demobilized in total. Those soldiers that were demobilised received a package including money to the value of about $100 (equivalent to five months salary) and a clothing kit. UNITA com-
batants were demobilised directly, without first being incorporated into the existing FAPLA since the objective was the creation of unified Angolan Armed Forces.

As regards reintegration programmes, although GIAMDA had been created with the intention of creating a multi-sectoral social reinsertion programme for demobilized soldiers, including financial support and professional and vocational training, all plans and programmes subsequently crumbled when, in October 1992, Angola returned to war. In fact, reintegration programmes and schemes approved by the CCPM, and amounting to $447 million, were never implemented. As Margaret Anstee points out, ‘slow demobilisation and the formation of the new armed forces led to the spectre of there being not one, but three armies in place at the time of the election. This combined with the proliferation of weapons among the civilian population, the decline in law and order, and the slow progress in extending the central administration, added up to a very grim prospect’. Nevertheless, because the formation of joint armed forces was one of the pre-conditions for elections, the parties went ahead and nominally created the FAA on 27 September 1992, just two days before elections were held. The experience of Bicesse was a painful one, but with many important lessons, as can be seen in the box below. Some of these were born in mind in the design of the 1994 Lusaka protocol, although with little more success.

The Lusaka Process

When the Lusaka Protocol was signed in November 1994, after two years of high intensity conflict in Angola, a new framework for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration was developed. Moreover, the drafting process had taken note of some of the failings of Bicesse as discussed above, and attempts were made at remediying them. In fact, the Lusaka Protocol reaffirmed the Bicesse Accords setting forth the details of a cease-fire, a second round of presidential elections, demilitarisation, disarmament and the formation of a unified armed force and national police force. The United Nations was involved in the negotiations, and an expanded mission, UNAVEM III, was created by Security Council resolution 976/1995 in February 1995. The timeframe for the process was more elastic, with no firm date set for the 2nd round of Presidential elections to take place. In the meantime, a power-sharing system was devised, whereby members of the government and UNITA would form a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN), where Savimbi would be accorded special status as leader of the largest opposition party. It was 1997, however, before the GURN came into being.
Box 1:
Lessons learned from the Bicesse DD&R process

• Sufficient time for proper planning and implementation of the process is essential—the timetable for the Bicesse process was too rigid. In the headlong rush to demobilise the very important quartering and disarmament processes were neglected and UNITA were able to return easily to war. While this is not now considered a threat, the importance of devising a sufficient (and realistic) timeframe is clear.

• Elections should not be rushed, especially based on a ‘winner-takes-all’ model. In 1992 elections merely continued the polarised military logic of the war, and gave no way to deflect potential ‘spoilers’ to the process. This political/military polarisation and the potential for revival of conflict must be born in mind when elections are scheduled.

• Attention must be paid to conditions within quartering areas and among demobilised soldiers. Under Bicesse, lack of pay and poor conditions led to a mass self-demobilisation of government troops, causing heightened insecurity around the camps. While UNITA troops have proved more disciplined, this is nevertheless still a risk.

• Sufficient resources must be allocated to support a DD&R process. UNAVEM II was severely limited in its mandate and resources and unable to enforce compliance with disarmament and demobilisation, and furthermore the United Nations felt itself disadvantaged since it had not been involved in the process of drafting the accords. This also indicates that participation in the process of negotiation and drafting accords is important in ensuring their success.

• Programmes and projects for reintegration must also be taken seriously and are an integral part of DD&R. Under Bicesse insufficient attention was paid to questions of reintegration and UNITA were not sufficiently involved in the consideration and design of programmes, subsequently resisting the intervention of GIAMDA.

A number of new institutions were created to oversee and implement the DD&R process. In place of GIAMDA, in March 1995 a new body was created, the Institute for the Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-Military
Personnel (IRSEM\textsuperscript{40}), under the Ministry for Reinsertion and Social Assistance (MINARS). A Joint Commission was again formed, consisting of Government and UNITA as well as a representative of the United Nations, Alioune Blondin Beye who had been the principal mediator of the Lusaka Protocol. A technical working group was created to supervise and advise on the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process, as well as in the creation of the joint armed forces, or Angolan Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{41} Meetings of this group were also attended by UN agencies and NGOs as appropriate to the discussions, allowing a broader dialogue to take place.

UNAVEM III had a two-year mandate extended beyond that of UNAVEM II to include a formal role in overseeing the demobilisation and integration of the armed forces, and responsibility for decreeing when the conditions were appropriate for elections to be held. It was given over 7,000 peace-keeping troops in addition to 350 military observers and 260 police observers. Consequently, UNAVEM III had an expanded role within the DD&R process, with representatives and peace-keeping troops in each assembly area as well as responsibility for troop registration and disarmament, camp co-ordination and production of demobilisation documentation. United Nations’ agencies as well as various NGOs were also present in many assembly areas and assisted in the process.

Although expected to complete its mission and leave Angola by February 1997, UNAVEM III was later given a phased withdrawal, as it became clear that the process was not proceeding as smoothly as had been anticipated. In fact, at a cost of as much as $1 million a day, UNAVEM III was deemed unsustainable and ineffective and peace-keeping troops were gradually withdrawn. As of July 1997, UNAVEM III was replaced by the more modest United Nations Mission of Observers in Angola (MONUA). When war officially resumed at the end of 1998, the United Nations Security Council announced the termination of MONUA’s mandate effective from February 1999. In October that year a new presence was established, the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA), with a mandate ‘to explore effective measures for restoring peace, assist the Angolan people in the area of capacity building, humanitarian assistance, the promotion of human rights and coordinate other activities’.

Despite the knowledge that inefficient quartering and demobilisation under Bicesse had been a factor in the resumption of war, the process was scarcely better handled this time. According to Alex Vines, ‘in 1992 one of the main problems of the peace process was UNITA’s failure to demobilise most of its fighters. During the Lusaka process, the quartering and reintegration process
was also slow. The operation only started in earnest in February 1996. It was incomplete and involved few key UNITA troops; conversely many in camps were civilians.\(^4^2\) The timeframe did indeed allow increased flexibility, but it has been argued by some that this was taken advantage of by UNITA in particular, allowing them to regroup and rearm, and in fact contributed to the resumption of war in 1998.

As regards quartering and registration, the Lusaka Protocol established a minimum number of soldiers to be quartered by UNITA, some 62,500. They were to be gathered in 15 Assembly Areas, later renamed Selection and Demobilisation Centres, where UNAVEM III would assume responsibility for disarming them. There were a further 5 War-Disabled Centres, which were eventually included in the demobilisation process for logistical reasons. Each assembly area contained a United Nations Administrative Centre and United Nations Troops, and a representative from UCAH who was responsible for the co-ordination of camp management, registration of UNITA soldiers and production of demobilization documentation. Included in the registration process was the collection of socio-economic data such as family size and intended destination. Fortnightly head-counts were used for monitoring of soldiers’ movements and for updating information.

Nevertheless, the process proceeded slowly, with UNITA suspending the process in December 1995 in protest at the government’s seizure of UNITA-held territory. In early 1996 diplomatic pressure was applied by the Portuguese President, Mario Soares, and US Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright, with the result that Savimbi promised to increase the pace of quartering and there was a temporary increase in the number of troops registering.\(^4^3\) By July 1996, when the new joint army was officially sworn in, 70,600 had been quartered, but it is believed that many were not in fact soldiers but had been conscripted to make up numbers, and a high proportion were underage or disabled (4,799 and 10,728 respectively, barely short of the eventual totals demobilised). Registration and disarmament of residual UNITA personnel finished on 22 December 1997, with a total of 78,886 registered, of which 8,607 were underage and 11,051 disabled. Of these around 26,000 ‘deserted’, either during the headcount or demobilisation itself.

Disarmament under the Lusaka Protocol was a critical issue, perhaps more so than during the Bicesse process. In fact, when war resumed in 1992, both parties abandoned the ‘triple zero clause’ with the result that weapons procurement sky rocketed on both sides.\(^4^4\) Even so, disarmament of UNITA troops
under Lusaka was a highly ineffective procedure, with a high proportion of weapons unserviceable or in poor condition. No heavy weaponry was handed in, and it was clear that UNITA was maintaining significant arms supplies. As part of the Lusaka Protocol, the government was also required to disarm the civilian population it had distributed weapons to in 1992. As fighting resumed following UNITA’s rejection of the election results, anything up to a million AK-47’s were handed out in Luanda alone, and few had been recovered. In August 1997 the government suspended this process, however, citing UNITA’s reluctance to disarm. The process was to resume once the normalisation of state administration had been completed, but this never happened. Furthermore, despite the stipulation in the Lusaka Accords that neither side was to rearm (Annex 3, Section IV) the government received weapons including tanks and artillery in May 1995, believed to represent purchases made since Lusaka. UNITA similarly continued to receive supplies and weapons via Zaire and Congo-Brazzaville in particular.

Although demobilisation had been planned in two phases, first the demobilisation of underage soldiers and then of adult soldiers (both able-bodied and disabled), in practice the two frequently took place side by side. The majority were demobilised under a Rapid Demobilisation Plan finally agreed upon by the Joint Commission after a number of drafts and revisions in 1996 and early 1997. While the Lusaka Protocol had specified a number of changes from Bicesse in order to minimise the risks associated with rapid demobilisation, a number of these were now deemed impractical and abandoned. It had initially been decided that all UNITA troops to be demobilised would first be incorporated into the Angolan Armed Forces, and the precise numbers for incorporation or demobilisation determined later. In the event, surplus UNITA troops were demobilised directly, without passing through the FAA. And, although the normalisation of state administration was also to have been completed before demobilisation could begin, when it became clear that this was not practical, a phased plan was introduced beginning in the areas around the quartering areas.

The ‘second phase’ of demobilisation, covering adult troops but in practice also many underage soldiers began in April 1997, in Vila Nova, and continued into 1998. The first phase had covered almost 2,484 troops, including 360 underage soldiers from the Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA). By May 1998 a total of almost 50,000 UNITA troops had been demobilised, of which 5,059 were underage and 10,771 disabled. This was out of a total of 76,360 troops registered as eligible for demobilisation, however, after the incorporation of 10,880 into the FAA, meaning an excess of over 25,000 remained. The joint army was sworn in on 10 July 1996.
The process was beset with difficulties, with demobilisation taking place on the basis of a final headcount, two weeks before ‘demobilisation day’. Soldiers not present were to be considered deserters and not eligible for benefits, although this rule was relaxed in some places. It seems that after the repeated delays many had not really believed this time it was real, and were instead working in the fields they had begun to cultivate around the camps. Around 26,000 UNITA soldiers were eventually registered as deserters. UNITA frequently interrupted and delayed the process, sometimes simply refusing to go ahead with demobilisation. At the same time reports emerged that UNITA was regrouping, forcibly recruiting and even training in Jamba. Attacks frequently put down to bandits escalated in 1998, and human rights abuses and revenge attacks by both sides were common. In addition, the resettlement and reintegration of demobilised soldiers was a complex procedure, involving an array of government, UNITA, UN agencies and NGOs. This helped to address concerns about the government’s capacity to implement such a complex programme, but the difficulties of co-ordination frequently led to delays and confusion. Upon leaving the camps soldiers were issued with travel cards (by the International Organisation for Migration, IOM), demobilisation cards (FAA), benefit cards (Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UCAH), subsidies (IRSEM), reintegration kits (IOM), a ‘Portuguese kit’ supplied by the Government of Portugal, a World Food Programme food ration and assistance in returning to a destination of their choice. This assistance was provided to 40,631 UNITA ex-soldiers and 107,197 dependents, and 4,181 resettlement kits were also provided to families of UNITA troops incorporated into FAA.

There were problems in implementation however. Since resettlement assistance was classified as a benefit, and not as a right, soldiers were not able to change their minds about their destinations after the final headcount, unless the destination happened to fall along the same route. On the day of demobilisation many soldiers attempted to change their destinations, often seemingly under coercion from UNITA. Payment of ‘special subsidies for assistance and reintegration’, SEAR) was a further problem, beset with difficulties such as bad management of funds coupled with fraud. At the end of 1998, when war officially resumed, only around 60% of demobilised soldiers had received the second payment and only 25% the third and final payment.

Reintegration programmes were designed on the basis of socio-economic surveys carried out by UCAH following Bicesse and also in the early stages of Lusaka. These gave a profile of the ‘average soldier’ as being ‘a man between 25 and 30 years old, with 4–5 years schooling, literate and able to speak Portuguese. Although from a rural background, where he or she attended
school, many had travelled to the city prior to military service. This mobility continued in the army. During the 8–12 years of service in the army, the average soldier would have been stationed in various provinces and have come into contact with people of various ethnic backgrounds’. This survey was related only to Government troops, however, and the first survey to cover both Government and UNITA was published in 1995. Respondents were asked about their length of service, desire to demobilise, intended future destination and occupation. When asked to prioritise reintegration programmes, the first priority of both FAA and UNITA was training and education (43% and 52% respectively). UCAH warned, however, that ‘the myth that training and education can solve all problems that demobilised soldiers will face during reintegration is slowly becoming established and could possibly lead to the creation of unrealistic expectations not only among demobilised soldiers but also among Government Officials, UN agencies, NGOs or any other organisation involved in the demobilisation process’. The socio-economic profile of ex-combatants during the Lusaka process can be seen below:

However, training did form the backbone of the plans for reintegration. Three major training actions were agreed upon. These were: the ‘Community Counselling and Referral Service for Demobilised Soldiers

Box 2: Ex-Combatant socio-economic profile during the Lusaka Process (sample of 160,000)

- Average age: 26
- 8% below 18 years
- 56% below 25 years
- 27% did not have any education
- Only 12% had more than primary school (4th form); 2% had more than 6th form
- Average families: 6 people
- 27% did not have families
- 60% had three family members
- 89% from rural areas (Huambo 23%; Bie 19%, Benguela 13%, Malange 12% and Huila 10%)
(SeCoR); the ‘Training for Self-Employment for Ex-Military Personnel from Angola (TSE)’; and finally, the ‘Community Based Quick Impact Project (QIPs)’. SeCoR and QIPs were the responsibility of UNDP while TSE was to be handled by UNDP and ILO. The majority of projects never materialised, however, due to the resumption of war in 1998. An additional alternative strategy was the creation of ‘work brigades’, known as the ‘Quarto Ramo’, or fourth brigade of the Armed Forces. This was dedicated to reconstruction projects such as roads and bridges, and intended to provide economic and practical training opportunities for demobilised soldiers as well as providing a readily available workforce for construction and infrastructure projects of this kind. It was an expensive project, however, and the political implications for UNITA of having its people seemingly degraded in this way were too great for Savimbi to agree to it.

In conclusion, although some of the lessons learned during the Bicesse process were incorporated into the design of the Lusaka Protocol and the subsequent demobilization and reintegration processes, a number of mistakes were made. The lessons learned during the Lusaka process can be seen in the box below.

**Box 3:**
**Lessons learned from the Lusaka DD&R process**

- While some flexibility and time for planning is necessary, once agreed timetables should be followed as closely as possible. The schedule for completion of quartering, disarmament and demobilization under Lusaka was too loose, with the effect that UNITA were able to delay the process and regroup and rearm in the meantime. While this is no longer a serious threat, planning and implementation of DD&R programmes are dependent on agreed timetables being followed.
• Delays also have the effect of weakening confidence on both sides. Under Lusaka delays and irregularities in the payments of benefits undermined confidence in the process among demobilizing UNITA soldiers in particular and lessened their inclination to co-operate. The loss of confidence and co-operation on the part of demobilising soldiers may create serious security risks, especially in a heavily armed society.

• Again, sufficient resources are essential to accompany any DD&R process. Although better equipped than under Bicesse, UNAVEM III still did not have the means to effectively monitor disarmament or to prevent UNITA from rearming and regrouping. While this is not considered a threat post-Luena, successful implementation of DD&R requires the commitment and rapid mobilisation of funds.

• The extension and normalisation of state administration is essential to consolidate peace and ensure security. The failure to do this under Lusaka worsened the situation, heightening insecurity, complicating demobilization and obstructing reintegration programmes. In the context of mass return of IDPs and ex-combatants this must be a priority.

• Confidence on the part of leaders of both sides, but also the ex-combatants themselves, is a pre-requisite for successful DD&R. The entire process was conducted in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and distrust, although it is difficult to see how trust could have existed between the two, given the events of 1992. Nevertheless, confidence in the outcomes of the process must be built on a mutual basis and must extend right down to the individual ex-combatants themselves.

• Demobilisation and re-integration are a ‘family affair’: the provision of basic services to soldiers’ dependents should be considered an integral part of the peace process and provided for in the peace agreement. The funding for these services should come from the assessed budget, and any support provided to assembled troops should also be provided to their dependents.53

• Re-integration is a ‘community affair’: community-oriented re-integration programmes need to be evaluated to determine their effectiveness and provide guidance for future re-integration programming.54
The Memorandum of Understanding

National ownership of the DDR process is very high. The Luena peace process is home-grown, resulting from a Government military victory over UNITA. Disarmament and demobilization have proceeded entirely under Government control, with relative success to date.\textsuperscript{55}

The signature on 4 April 2002 of a ‘Memorandum of Understanding for the Cessation of Hostilities and the Resolution of the Outstanding Military Issues Under the Lusaka Protocol’ between the military leaders of the FAA and UNITA put a definite end to Angola’s protracted civil war. To be sure, the circumstances surrounding the signature of this memorandum, including the death in combat of UNITA’s leader Jonas Savimbi in February and this movement’s impending military defeat after more than three years of unstoppable FAA advances, are at the core of explaining the end of Angola’s war. As we have pointed out elsewhere, ‘the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) undeniable victory over a severely weakened UNITA must be considered central to this conflict’s ripeness for resolution’.\textsuperscript{56} And this, more than any other factors, helps explain the pace at which the belligerents agreed on a comprehensive cease-fire agreement as well as their unhindered political will demonstrated in the resurrection and completion of the Lusaka peace process.

In this sense, although sometimes mistaken for a new peace accord for Angola, the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ merely continued the Lusaka peace process, replacing annexes 3 and 4 of the Lusaka Protocol, which remained the accepted and legitimate framework for peace in Angola.\textsuperscript{57} The ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ regulated and updated the military components of the Lusaka Protocol, governing the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of UNITA troops as well as concluding the integration of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{58} Some of its provisions necessarily and inevitably reflect the fact that this was a ‘home-grown’ initiative, the result of a military victory and a product of intensive negotiations between the military leaders of the FAA and UNITA in the eastern Moxico town of Luena. This is its major distinction...
from previous DDR processes, and must not be underestimated. A further reflection of this lies in the reduced role of the international community in the process. There was no provision for formal third-party monitoring, although the Troika (Portugal, Russia and the United States) and the United Nations were invited as observers.\textsuperscript{59} Two institutional structures were created to oversee the coordination and management of this process. The first, the Joint Military Commission (JMC), was composed of the chiefs of staff of the two belligerents and 11 military observers from the United Nations and presided by a military representative of the government. It bore responsibility for promoting and overseeing the application of the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’. A Technical Group (TG) was also created with the responsibility to assist the JMC in the performance of its duties, including the drawing up of detailed timetables and definition of specific activities to be carried out to guarantee the application of the provisions of the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’.

The government of Angola, through the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), assumed the management and financing of this process in the Joint Military Commission, concerned by the need to secure its military advantage and the maintenance of the cease-fire as well as its expressed wish to proceed with the disengagement, quartering and conclusion of the demilitarisation of UNITA’s military forces as rapidly as possible.

**Quartering of UNITA combatants and families**

The quartering, demilitarisation and demobilisation process of UNITA began immediately following the signature of the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ on 4 April. However, while the Memorandum of Understanding planned 80 days for the completion of the quartering, disarmament and demobilisation of 50,000 UNITA soldiers in 27 quartering areas, no one, including UNITA’s Management Commission, anticipated the number of soldiers and family members that presented themselves in the quartering and adjacent family reception areas.\textsuperscript{60}

In fact, on 27 July, a total of 85,585 UNITA soldiers were quartered in 35 quartering areas and approximately 280,261 family members were gathered in family reception areas in 16 Angolan Provinces. These quartering and family areas were headed by a representative of the FAA, with day to day management of the camp assumed by UNITA. The exponential growth in the number of UNITA soldiers and family members can be seen in the graph and table below.
Although positively interpreted as evidence of UNITA’s political will to comply with the provisions of the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’, the unforeseen growth in the numbers of UNITA soldiers and their family members gathered in quartering and family reception areas created serious logistical problems for which the government and humanitarian partners were unprepared. This led to concerns that localised criminal activity would increase, unless assistance to the quartering and family reception areas was substantially enhanced. Jaka Jamba, UNITA member of Parliament observed at the time that ‘it is the government that is in charge of the logistics, because with the speed that they want us to implement the agreement, if they don’t provide the means – the necessary logistics to cover 50,000 military personnel and 300,000 relatives – the people will leave and start to go to the villages’. The table below, based on press statements by the Joint Military Commission, clearly shows the growth in the number of UNITA combatants and their family members that constitute the focus of the current demobilisation and reintegration effort. In addition, as of February 2003, the estimated number of UNITA family members in family reception areas had reached a staggering 350,000 raising the combined number of ex-combatants and family members to approximately 435,000.
At the end of May, the initial 27 quartering areas had been expanded to 35, with seven satellites, and although the movement of UNITA soldiers to quartering areas was expected to end on 7 June, it continued into July and August. Nevertheless, on 21 June, while combatants were still making their way to the quartering areas, a spokesman for the Joint Military Commission announced that the task of assembling and disarming Angola’s former rebels had been completed at a cost of $44 million entirely financed by the government of Angola.

### The Humanitarian situation

The levels of malnutrition and disease evidenced by a vast number of UNITA soldiers and their family members arriving at quartering and gathering locations contributed to a dire humanitarian situation, recognised by the Joint Military Commission during May 2002 as well as by several humanitarian agencies present on the ground. Malnutrition rates were initially very high, with mortality rates well above emergency thresholds and in some places a famine situation. The United Nations and other NGOs have been accused of being slow to react (famously by Medecins Sans Frontieres), as OCHA insisted on first securing government permission to enter the quartering areas. This may reflect

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**Table 1: Evolution of the Quartering Process to 27 July**

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<th>5 May</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24,070</td>
<td>58,250</td>
<td>89,281</td>
<td>110,825</td>
<td>115,953</td>
<td>142,588</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>17 May</th>
<th>21 May</th>
<th>24 May</th>
<th>28 May</th>
<th>2 July</th>
<th>27 July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNITA Soldiers</td>
<td>55,618</td>
<td>65,343</td>
<td>67,967</td>
<td>76,654</td>
<td>84,618</td>
<td>85,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Members</td>
<td>106,763</td>
<td>145,819</td>
<td>159,659</td>
<td>212,881</td>
<td>264,225</td>
<td>280,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>162,381</td>
<td>211,162</td>
<td>227,626</td>
<td>289,535</td>
<td>348,843</td>
<td>365,846</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in part at least the government’s reluctance to significantly involve the UN in the process after the experience of Lusaka. On the other hand, the remoteness and inaccessibility of a large number of these quartering locations may partially explain the difficulties involved in tackling the critical situation described.

Responsibility for assistance to ex-combatants was firmly the responsibility of the FAA, while family members could be supported by NGOs and humanitarian agencies. The World Food Programme has taken the lead in providing food aid, while other international and local NGOs have been active in distribution of food, non-food items, seeds and tools, family tracing and reunification and so on. Conditions have generally now stabilised, resulting in the closure of therapeutic feeding centres and the withdrawal of many NGOs. The situation with regard to access has only worsened, however, as the rainy season has set in, with many quartering areas (since the disbandment of UNITA called gathering areas) difficult to access and at least one, Sambo in Huambo Province, cut off from assistance due to a serious landmine incident. WFP continues to distribute food aid to populations in the gathering areas, as does the Government. Seeds and tools have also been provided, although following a lengthy debate between agencies as to the potential political and social effects of this. It was feared that this may result in the creation of permanent ‘UNITA settlements’, in a situation where conflicts have already been reported between ex-combatants and surrounding communities.

**Demobilisation and integration of ex-UNITA into FAA**

Although the quartering process was still ongoing, albeit slowly, the Joint Military Commission made public on 11 July that the demobilisation of 84,000 ex-soldiers would begin in earnest on 20 July, when a number of UNITA soldiers (approximately 5,000) would be integrated into the FAA and the National Police in accordance with a selection process that had been initiated on 15 July.

The Joint Military Commission went ahead with the integration of the agreed UNITA contingent into the FAA while the conclusion of the demobilisation stalled, leading Presidential spokesman Victor Carvalho to announce that demobilisation had been ‘postponed sine die’ and that technical teams were being sent to the quartering areas to assess the situation. Yet, less than two weeks later, on 2 August 2002, the Joint Military Commission announced that the demobilisation and demilitarisation process was complete and that UNITA military forces had ceased to exist, having been administratively absorbed into
the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) only awaiting reintegration. At an official ceremony to mark the extinction of UNITA armed forces, government and UNITA officials announced the formal end of rebellion, and Defence Minister General Kundi Pahyama observed that ‘from now on, the conditions have come together for stability in Angola’.

However, eye-witness accounts have pointed out that the demobilisation process was far from complete at this date and that in fact, quartering areas exhibited contrasting degrees of logistical capability for the collection of personal identification information as well as for the registration and verification of weapons, actions at the root of any demobilisation process. In this regard, the World Bank led mission to Angola during August 2002 observed that the FAA had just initiated registration of ex-combatants and had begun the process of taking photographs for military ID cards, while the collection of socio-economic data in 24 of 35 quartering areas had also been initiated. The mission also confirmed that information on demobilisation was being entered into a pre-existing database (dating from post-Lusaka) and that the data was being analysed for reintegration planning. Even in January 2003 not all ex-combatants had received all their demobilisation documentation, after the official closure date for the Gathering Areas, which the government had set for 31 December 2002.

**Disarmament**

A similar picture characterised the disarmament of the FMU, which can partially be seen in the table below. As pointed out by the World Bank,

International observers from the Troika indicated relative satisfaction with disarmament of FMU. In total some 30,000 small arms were collected – proportionate, according to some observers, to actual number of active FMU at the time of the cease-fire agreement. Troika also reported that FMU has cooperated in identifying large weapons caches which in some instances have been destroyed in situ. Verification of disarmament activities has been undertaken to the extent possible although UN military observers have had a very limited role in the verification to date.

Yet, a UK Department for International Development (DFID) technical assistance mission report points out that although the overall man to weapon ratio was considered satisfactory, ‘given the strong command and control structures
within UNITA/FMU, which had submitted itself by units as opposed to individuals, there would be a need at some point to review rations as well as the quality of weapons submitted. There is a possibility that not all weapons were collected from the combatants with many weapons in the civilian population’. This is an issue that warrants further research, partly because DD&R processes are usually not sufficient to reduce the number of arms in circulation in post-conflict environments, and partly because they often do not deal with arms in the hands of civilian populations. Interviews conducted in Luanda during February 2003 revealed that close to 90% of UNITA’s weapons had in fact been submitted during the DD&R process, while the remaining 10% are thought to be in the hands of civilians and small groups that are increasingly turning to crime (in particular illegal alluvial diamond exploration).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of quartering areas</th>
<th>Arms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uige</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuanza-Norte</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malange</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunda Norte</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunda Sul</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moxico</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huambo</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bie</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benguela</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuanza Sul</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huila</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunene</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuando Kubango</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
<td><strong>23,450</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The issue of weapons in the possession of civilians presents perhaps the most pressing security threat in the short to medium term as regards the sustainability of the peace process. Rough estimates point to between 3 and 4 million small arms and light weapons in the hands of civilians throughout the country. The Angolan National Police (PNA) and the FAA have expressed concern that such weapons might jeopardise stability in the country and compromise development at local and Provincial level. Reflecting on this issue in other contexts, Kees Kingma has correctly point out, that ‘a direct link between [the] demobilisations and the potential for future conflict at various levels exists through the availability of small arms and light weapons’.71 The economic and security value attached to weapons in the hands of former combatants and civilians in the context of deprivation that characterises Angola must therefore be taken into account if effective alternative arms control measures are to be implemented. As Berdal points out, ‘disarmament and weapons-control measures have limited value unless those that are being disarmed are reasonably satisfied with the security and economic incentives offered in return’.72

As to the breakdown of figures, table three indicates that slightly over one of every four interviewees (in a sample of 30,000 ex-combatants) delivered a personal weapon or military hardware. The most common weapons collected were AK-47 and AKM assault weapons, with few AK-74 and AKCs. No record was made in the registration forms about collected ammunition or other heavy military equipment.

Return and reintegration

The demobilisation and demilitarisation of ex-combatants has been largely ad-hoc in nature, a result of the scale and complexity of the operation as well as the government’s announced priority of closing all quartering areas as rapidly as possible. Of the 35 gathering areas scattered in 16 provinces, however, only 5 have been closed as of 18 February 2003 (Malonge and Passe in Benguela Province; Ionde in Cunene Province; Amboiva in Kwanza Sul Province and Mimbota in Buengo Province). This uncertainty has had a negative effect on ex-combatants morale, as well as, in some locations at least, preventing them from beginning agricultural activity which they could by now have harvested, had they known the real length of time they would be forced to stay in the gathering areas. In December 2002 OCHA reported that a combined total of approximately 45,360 ex-combatants and families were relocated from gathering areas during November and December 2002, and a further 3,700 spontaneously returned.74 Two months later, in February 2003, the Minister of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK-47</td>
<td>4,626</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKM</td>
<td>2,773</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK-74</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKC</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKM</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGS-17</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-3</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCHK</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPK/RPD</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L Granada</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistola</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP-25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-79</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M 200</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missil</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPG-9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauser Carab</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVD</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sterling</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,333</strong></td>
<td><strong>27.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing/None/NA</td>
<td>21,976</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>30,309</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Assistance and Social Reintegration, Joao Baptista Kussumua, declared that 22,643 ex-combatants and 70,694 UNITA family members had been resettled and returned.\(^75\)

As a consequence, there are still 30 gathering areas, with only slightly more than 20% of the estimated total either resettled or moved to transit camps. In addition, as of end of January 2003, it is estimated that close to 80% of all ex-combatants have received demobilisation documents and have been paid 5 months of salary by the Angolan Armed Forces. In this respect, Joao Baptista Kussumua has said that the 5 month salary component was paid to 71,434 ex-combatants at a total cost of approximately $26 million, while 9,500 ex-combatants are still to receive this payment.\(^76\) The result of this, however, was a ‘consumer boom’ in the gathering areas, with prices in markets leaping and ex-combatants celebrating by buying alcohol and goods such as radios.

As to the delivery of resettlement support kits, the coming of the rainy season made the distribution of these kits very difficult and only a few ex-combatants have received them. According to IRIN problems also occurred in procurement, as the Presidential associate contracted was unable to complete the work, and the job has now been re-allocated. Distribution of contingency money has also not yet taken place and will not be done until international support is approved.

The future of social and economic reintegration and of reconciliation with communities is as yet impossible to predict as very few ex-combatants have as yet returned home, those who have being primarily women family members.
The programme for the socio-economic and professional reintegration of ex-UNITA military, 23 May 2002

Immediately following the signature of the Memorandum of Understanding, the government of Angola initiated the development of a demobilisation and reintegration strategy, while the Angolan Armed Forces was tasked with the practical management of the quartering, disarmament and initial demobilisation of UNITA ex-combatants.

The development of reintegration policy by the government was also a requirement of the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’, pertaining to the section on the ‘Vocational Reinsertion of Demobilised Personnel of the Ex-UNITA Military Forces into National Life’. The first clearly defined policy made public by the Government of Angola came under a two year programme entitled ‘Programme for the Socio-Economic and Professional Reintegration of ex-UNITA Military’. Approved by the Permanent Commission of the Council of Ministers on May 23 2002, this programme followed the recommendations of the Council of Ministers in its session of 17 April, where the preparation of an instrument for the social reintegration of UNITA military was requested. This programme was supposed to have been implemented during the second semester of 2002 (starting in July 2002), and covered what at the time was the estimated number of UNITA military and para-military in the quartering and family gathering areas: 50,000 ex-combatants and 250,000 of their dependents. Under the implementation control of the Inter-Sectoral Commission for the Peace Process and National Reconciliation (CIPP), this programme was estimated at a total cost of $55,479,531, of which the government would contribute $27,739,765 and other donor sources $27,739,765.

The government regarded this as a sub-component of previous demobilisation and reintegration efforts interrupted with the resumption of the war, under the ‘General Reinsertion Programme’. As a result of the circumstances in the country, the current programme was aimed at improving the quality of the package of benefits and opportunities given to ex-military demobilised...
from active service during the Lusaka process. Furthermore, as was the case with the emergency plan for resettlement and return, the reintegration of former UNITA combatants was conceptualised within a socio-economic development perspective and in the context of the consolidation of peace and national reconciliation.\textsuperscript{79} In this regard, priority reintegration activities were identified through an initial assessment of the expectations of the target group.\textsuperscript{80} The programme also foresaw the need for a specific set of actions directed at child soldiers focusing on the localisation of families, psychological support, general education and professional training.

The programme considers a number of priority intervention areas centred on training and professional reconversion. These included education, support to the creation of small income generating activities, road and social infrastructure rehabilitation, rehabilitation of energy sources, creation of jobs in the public and private sectors, support to the resettlement and community development of rural populations. In this regard, UNITA’s demand for an immediate absorption framework for ex-combatants who wish to work in the education and health sectors, as well as in public administration, was positively considered and the creation of 6 specialised brigades/units is also foreseen. Priority was also placed in the rural areas to enable the ‘social decompression’ of cities through the re-launching of agricultural production and cattle farming. In parallel to these, the programme highlights the need to raise awareness of the target population and of society in general towards the acceptance of a ‘new way of conducting social relationships’. Resettlement support is prioritised with the attribution of food assistance, clothing and domestic utensils kits; agricultural inputs kits and an emergency monetary contribution of USD 100 equivalent.

As regards execution, the political management of the programme was to be the responsibility of the Inter-Sectoral Commission for the Peace Process and National Reconciliation (CIPP). Implementation would be undertaken by IRSEM although an important role would be played by provincial, municipal and communal administrations. In practical terms, the activities enumerated above would be undertaken through a web of area-specific sub-programmes, suggested by several government ministries and departments. Two examples of this are the ‘sub-programme of actions in the agricultural sector’ and the ‘sub programme on professional training’. In this way, each priority activity is planned according to a specific area.\textsuperscript{81}
International technical assistance: The World Bank and the Angola demobilisation and reintegration plan

...demobilisation will help the GoA [government of Angola] to reduce the risk of renewed conflict. By increasing security in remote parts of the country, where most of the conflict was fought, it will also encourage spontaneous return of displaced civilians to the rural areas, the re-establishment of civilian administration, and the resumption of poverty-reducing agricultural growth. In addition, the consolidation of the peace process would enable the GoA to reduce the size of its own armed forces and to reallocate public resources to social sectors.\(^82\)

International technical assistance to the DD&R process in Angola has been led primarily by the World Bank under the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme.\(^83\) In fact, under its coordination, a group of donors was invited to Angola by the Ministry of Planning to initiate the preparation of an Angolan Demobilisation and Reintegration Plan (ADRP), shortly after the programme described above had been approved. The objectives of this mission, carried out between 14 May and 4 June, were to review and support the government’s own plans for the demobilisation and reintegration of combatants as well as assess the government’s eligibility to receive support within the framework of the Bank’s Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP), by discussing financing options with MDRP partners.\(^84\)

At the time of this visit, demobilisation activities were already well under way. In fact, during the twenty days that the mission spent in Angola, the number of soldiers and family members in the quartering areas increased more than two-fold, from 51,354 soldiers and 91,234 family members on 15 May to 84,618 soldiers and 264,225 family members on 2 July. In view of developments in Angola, the mission considered that demobilisation should not take more than one to two weeks per quartering area and should be completed by 31 August, therefore sharing the government’s concern that demobilisation should be completed as soon as possible. Nevertheless, the mission warned that this should follow completion of essential registration, identification and counselling activities. Undoubtedly, the mission was aware of the potential risks that a long stay in quartering areas could engender.

Faced with the existence of two seemingly uncoordinated efforts (e.g. the FAA demobilisation programme under the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ and the reintegration programme of the Inter-Sectoral Peace Commission discussed...
above), the mission felt that an Angolan Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (ADRP) should in fact integrate both into one single national programme. Consultations with the government for the development of such unified programme were subsequently initiated. In addition to current UNITA ex-combatants, both FAA troops to be demobilised under the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ as well as ex-combatants identified following the Bicesse and Lusaka Accords (termed ‘old-caseload’) were also to be included in one single national programme. Consequently, the government should ‘identify different groups of ex-combatants within the old case-load, clarifying what benefits they received and what additional benefits they will be eligible to receive if any’.85 The rationale underlying the concern with the old case-load has primarily to do with the need to support the reintegration of all ex-combatants demobilised under the Bicesse and Lusaka Agreements (some 92,000) who continue to be socio-economically vulnerable.86

Another concern related to the equitable treatment of all ex-combatants to be demobilised under a unified programme, irrespective of previous military affiliation. The Joint Military Commission and IRSEM should therefore ensure that demobilisation procedures are consistent and equitable for all parties. Procedurally, and in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol, combatants to be demobilised would be incorporated into the FAA for administrative purposes prior to their demobilisation and then legally discharged from the FAA. To guarantee the fairness of the process, demobilisation entitlements would be based on decree 9/1996, and therefore depend on the type of discharge: for physical reasons; discharge into the reserve; retirement or special assignments. Some of the mission’s recommendations as regards demobilisation are summarised in the box below.

**Box 4:**
**ADRP Demobilisation Recommendations**

- Identification and verification of those to be demobilised must be undertaken upon arrival in quartering areas;
- Provision of non-transferable identification cards (proper identification system essential to ensure target group integrity during implementation);
- Collection of socio-economic data (socio-economic questionnaire to be administered to all ex-combatants during demobilisation process);
A second issue of concern regarded the planning of the re-insertion phase to ‘enable ex-combatants to sustain themselves and their families for a limited period immediately following demobilisation’. Reinsertion assistance in the form of a transitional safety net (TSN) was suggested, to cover the basic needs of all new caseload ex-combatants to be demobilised for a period of 12 months. The TSN should take the form of a monetary allowance for all ex-combatants under the ADRP, and differences on the levels of TSN would be solely based on rank, with ranks of FMU would be equivalent to those of FAA. The importance of what is termed ‘demobilisation payments’ (as opposed to reintegration assistance) should not be underestimated. In fact, not only do such payments represent the ‘primary means by which soldiers readjust to civilian life’ but they also serve political purposes ‘notably that of defusing potential unrest among ex-combatants’, therefore encouraging a greater acceptance of demobilisation.

The final yet perhaps one of the most important objectives of the technical assistance provided by the World Bank and its partners regarded the successful social and economic reintegration of demobilised UNITA and FAA. Sensitive to the context in which social and economic reintegration is taking place (i.e. the return of up to four million displaced civilians and the initiation of broader recovery efforts) reintegration assistance should be provided in such a way that is beneficial to the wider community while guaranteeing ex-combatants’ freedom of choice. Consequently, demobilisation and reintegration should be implemented in close coordination with local and provincial administrations to ensure that all activities targeted at ex-combatants remained consistent with overall integration activities at local level, in particular as regards national reconstruction and poverty reduction. To this effect, as can be seen in the box below, the mission recommended the provision of

- Basic medical screening (including HIV);
- Pre-discharge orientation (to provide ex-combatants with essential information about programme);
- Payment of a travel allowance;
- Distribution of transitional safety net assistance (TSN);
- Transport to the community of choice.
information and counselling about social and economic conditions in areas of return (a factor that impaired the return in the Province of Uige, as pointed out above) as well as assisting ex-combatants secure employment and improve the educational level and skills of vulnerable ex-combatants. Reintegration assistance would also be extended to the old case-load, particularly to those evidencing a high degree of vulnerability.

As regards institutional structure and programme implementation, the mission considered that while the overall political responsibility remained with the government, a single civilian agency should coordinate all reinsertion and

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**Box 5:**
**Initial ADRP Reintegration Recommendations**

- Development of socio-economic profiles (complete data collection and analysis);

- Develop information, counselling and referral services (develop the capacity of IRSEM to provide ICR services);

- Offer of financial assistance through a vulnerability support facility (VSF) on a grant basis in the form of sub-projects, particularly targeting vulnerable ex-combatants such as children, women and disabled soldiers including:
  - Vocational training (MAPESS; INEFOP) to be undertaken by existing facilities rather than creating new ones (assess the capacity and quality of non-formal education, vocational training and business development sectors);

  - Business advisory services;

  - Apprenticeship schemes: assist skilled and unskilled ex-combatants to find jobs (identify economic opportunities at Provincial level);

- Target social reintegration assistance: promote reconciliation between ex-combatants and civilians in the communities of settlement;

- IRSEM to be the coordinating agency for the provision of reintegration assistance to ex-combatants.
reintegration activities. As will be discussed below, at the time of this first technical assistance mission, the CNRSPDD had not been yet been created so the mission recommended that the Inter-Sectoral Peace Commission be responsible for overall programme oversight and the provision of policy guidance, while IRSEM should operationalise policy instructions and prepare a costed technical proposal. In this sense, while recommending reliance to the extent possible on existing government and civil society structures with a view to building on the experiences of various organisations who have supported previous reintegration efforts in Angola, the mission did not consider the possibility of using the Provincial sub-groups that are working on the resettlement and return of displaced peoples at local level, for the reintegration of ex-combatants. As was previously discussed, these sub-groups developed Provincial emergency plans for resettlement and return (PEPARR) by bringing together NGOs, humanitarian agencies and other institutions side by side with all relevant Provincial government agencies. If one of the main targets of reintegration assistance is the promotion of reconciliation between ex-combatants and civilians in the communities of settlement, it would be logical that such integration be conducted by the same institutional structure at local level. We will return to this issue in the pages to follow.

As regards demobilization, the FAA and UNITA would continue to be responsible for the implementation of disarmament and demobilization, while IRSEM should be responsible for key demobilisation activities (see box 4 above). To this end, IRSEM should contract an independent Financial Management and Procurement Unit (FMPU) to administer all procurement and to effect reinsertion payments through an integrated management information system (MIS). Collaboration between the FAA and IRSEM was considered in urgent need of being strengthened particularly regarding registration, identification, and pre-discharge orientation:

... given the complexity surrounding implementation of the MOU and the underlying Lusaka Protocol, there remains uncertainty as to the exact timing of the closure of the quartering areas and the transportation of ex-UNITA soldiers to their community of settlement. To ensure that the registration and identification of ex-combatants to be demobilised is credible and transparent, that pre- and post-discharge counselling is appropriate, that transportation logistics are adequately prepared, and that reinsertion assistance is available according to a confirmed schedule following demobilisation, the mission strongly recommends that the FAA and IRSEM strengthen their collaboration on these key matters.89
When the technical mission left Angola, it recommended that the government should prepare a draft demobilisation and reintegration programme along the lines of the ADRP; recruit key personnel to strengthen IRSEM’s capacity, particularly in the areas of counselling, management information systems and provincial office administration; contract reputable international consultants to constitute the FMPU and contract consultants to undertake other critical start-up activities. And in fact, on July 2002, the government formally requested an IDA Project Preparation Facility (PPF) advance to support, inter alia, the recruitment of a Financial Management and Procurement Unit (FMPU) and an Management Information System specialist, thereby fulfilling the second and third conditions of appraisal.

Institutional conflation of displacement, demobilisation and reintegration: the CNRSPDD

... It is widely understood that a demobilization and reintegration program cannot in and of itself stabilize the country, and that reconstruction efforts on a large scale are also needed to consolidate the peace.90

The practical recognition that the problems of resettlement, return and reintegration of internally displaced civilians were in many aspects similar to those faced by ex-combatants finally led to the creation of a single coordinating agency at central level, the CNRSPDD (National Commission for the Social and Productive Reintegration of the Demobilised and Displaced). This was to a large degree a result of suggestions by international humanitarian agencies as well as by the donor community led by the World Bank, as was discussed above. The creation of a single government agency to manage both civilian and ex-combatant reintegration stems, inter alia, from the need to guarantee that reconciliation at the local community level is not jeopardised by linking ex-combatants to broader community-based economic recovery and rehabilitation. In this sense, while ex-combatants are considered a special group with specific needs, they also share many of the problems that affect displaced communities in Angola. The difficulty here seems to be, as Kingma points out, that ‘the support to these people has thus to strike a balance between dealing with their specific needs and, on the other hand, not creating discontent among their communities’. Consequently, ‘support for reintegration should be aimed as much as possible at the entire community and be part of general post-war rehabilitation efforts’.91

At least in theory, the CNRSPDD seems to address this problem. On 4 June 2002 the Presidency created the CNRSPDD to replace the old Inter-Sectoral
Commission for the Peace Process and National Reconciliation. As justification, the Presidential decree that created it highlights the need to ‘organise and adequately follow the social and productive reintegration of the demobilised that resulted from the various peace accords signed by the Government of Angola as well as the displaced’. As a close reading of this piece of legislation makes clear, the preoccupation in creating a new institution was essentially related to the need for adequate management of demobilisation and reintegration as related to the circumstances prevailing after the signature of the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’, in particular the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the ‘new caseload’. This new agency is given the following structure: a National Commission; an Executive Committee; a Technical Group and finally Provincial Commissions.

The management of the social reintegration of the demobilised is therefore assigned to the National Commission, under article 4. The National Commission is presided by the Minister of the Interior, deputised by the Territorial Administration Minister and integrates the following entities: Minister of Assistance and Social Reinsertion (MINARS); Minister of Planning (MINPLAN); Minister of Finance (MINFIN); Minister of Health (MINSA); Minister of Public Administration, Employment and Social Security (MAPESS); Minister of Education and Culture; Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development; Secretary of the Council of Ministers; Chief of the Military Office of the President; Chief of Staff of the FAA and finally, the Director General of the COSSE.

Box 6:
CNRSPDD’s National Commission attributes

- Coordinate the special social reintegration programme and the general reintegration programme of the demobilised;

- Coordinate the social and productive reintegration programme of war displaced peoples with the necessary articulation with all other programmes and sub-programmes;

- Assure the adequate articulation between Government and their institutions, in particular those that have a direct relation with the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol within the framework of the implementation of the special reintegration programme, and that of the General Reintegration of Demobilised Programme;
An Executive Committee is assigned the tasks of supervision and control of both reintegration of the demobilised as well as of the displaced, including supervision of IRSEM’s activity. The Executive Committee which meets every two weeks is coordinated by the minister for Assistance and Social Reinsertion and will integrate the following entities: Minister of Public Administration, Employment and Social Security; Minister of Planning; Minister of Finance; Minister of Health; Minister of Education and Culture; Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development; Vice-Minister of Territorial Administration; Vice Minister of the Interior; Secretary of the Council of Ministers; Chief of the Military Office of the President and finally, the Chief of Staff of the FAA. The Technical Group is assigned the task of administrative support for the whole process. Finally, article 13 defines the duties of the Provincial Commission. Accordingly, it is the ‘local management structure of the National Commission’ and is to be presided by the Provincial Governor.

By the time a second World Bank led mission returned to Angola from 5 to 16 August, it had become clear that donor involvement under a possible ADRP would only relate to re-integration support, since the government had effectively managed the quartering, demilitarisation and demobilisation single handedly. The demobilisation process was said to have been completed, the Joint Military Commission had announced that all FMU had been absorbed into the FAA and the UNITA as an armed movement ceased to exist.95 The government made public its intention to close all quartering areas as rapidly as possible, charging Provincial governments with the responsibility of organising transportation out of the quartering areas and the FAA with the responsibility to provide the transport. Furthermore, on 26 August and in the presence of United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, the Government and UNITA signed a Memorandum of Commitment, agreeing that all remaining provisions of the Lusaka Protocol would be implemented by October 15, 2002.

On the ground, the FAA effectively continued to manage logistics in all 35 quartering areas. As to demobilisation procedures, the FAA had in fact initiated registration; the taking of photographs for ID cards; the collection of socio-
economic data in 24 of 35 quartering areas (with the remaining 11 to report by August 31). Information on demobilisation was being entered into a pre-existing database (dating from post-Lusaka) and that the data was being shared with IRSEM for analysis and reintegration planning. At this time, the government estimated that following completion of military discharge by FAA, up to 45 days were required to complete pre-discharge orientation and national ID card distribution. IRSEM was also preparing a civic education programme. As regards disarmament of the FMU, the mission concurred with ‘international observers from the Troika [who] indicated relative satisfaction with disarmament of FMU’. In terms of reinsertion assistance, the government indicated that it planned to provide ex-combatants with a severance payment in the form of a three month salary payment in addition to one cash payment of USD100 equivalent, which was termed contingency subsidy. This assistance would be complemented by an in-kind kit including clothes, domestic utensils, agricultural tools and basic foodstuffs. The government also pledged to finance this reinsertion component itself without external assistance. Consequently, the ADRP would now be expected to support a range of social and economic reintegration activities targeted at ex-combatants and their communities. In fact, after having consulted numerous agencies engaged in reconstruction and reconciliation, the mission highlighted that because reintegration activities would be provided in the context of resettlement and return, as well as reintegration of other war-affected peoples, attention should be centred on the PEPARRs.

As regards progress towards satisfying conditions of ADRP appraisal, although the mission was given a third draft of a unified demobilisation and reintegration programme on 27 July, a number of outstanding issues needed further negotiation: government’s financing; ADRP targeted group; type of transitional assistance and finally, institutional arrangements. Finally, the mission noted that overall central coordination of the integrated programme, both at technical level (IRSEM) and at the level of the CNRSPDD remained weak. It had become clear that IRSEM did not have the capacity to implement projects on its own and therefore it was expected to serve as the coordinating agency with the responsibility of defining sub-projects to be implemented by line ministries.
PUBLIC DISCOURSE AND INTERVENTION  

The general demobilisation and reintegration programme (PGDR) and the ADRP

On 10 October 2002, the Government of Angola made available a final version of its General Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (PGRD). This general reintegration programme stemmed largely, as was previously discussed, from the compromises made by the government and UNITA in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), Annex 4. In addition, the PGDR mirrors the concerns of the World Bank and other donors by incorporating required MDRP criteria, as will be seen below. In fact, a comprehensive understanding of this programme is only possible in conjunction with the reading of the World Bank led multi-donor mission last Aide-Memoire on the Angola Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme. These two documents remain at present the most reliable sources of information on the subject under discussion.

Moreover, when the World Bank led multi-donor mission returned to Angola for a follow-up visit from 28 September to 17 October, one last condition for appraisal was needed. This last condition was the provision by IRSEM of a draft unified demobilisation and reintegration plan. Such programme, entitled ‘General Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme’ (PGRD) was presented to the mission. The PGDR is a three-year programme (including the period from April 2002), which prioritises the reintegration of the new caseload of UNITA ex-combatants, which at that time was constituted by 85,585 FMU gathered in 38 quartering/gathering locations. Because the emphasis is placed almost exclusively on the reintegration of the new case-load, in opposition to the technical recommendations given by various partners, ex-combatants demobilised in the previous processes will be included within a larger programme of assistance to the reintegration of peoples displaced by the war. The practical conflation of resettlement and socio-economic reintegration of former combatants became in this way a reality. Yet, are special provisions for the reintegration of ex-combatants considered in the PGDR?
Although the PGDR’s ‘guiding principles’ are to a large extent similar to those that underpinned the ‘Programme for the Socio-Economic and Professional Reintegration of ex-UNITA Military’ (see box below), three substantial political actions are prioritised:\(^{100}\)

- Demobilisation of 85,585 ex-soldiers of the ex-FMU in a first phase and in a second phase, after an evaluation of the strategic security needs of the government, gradual demobilisation of 33,000 of the FAA;

- Support to the social and economic reintegration of all ex-soldiers demobilised in the localities they choose to settle, to be achieved through the granting of support that will cover basic socio-economic reintegration needs during the process of returning to civilian life;

- Facilitation of the reallocation of government military expenditures to social and economic sectors by supporting the socio-economic reintegration of all ex-soldiers that are eligible within the programme, contributing therefore to the optimisation of the government’s military expenditure.

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**Box 7: PGDR Guiding principles**

- The PGDR is considered an intrument of social and economic stabili-
  sation and is a contribution to the process of peace consolidation and
  national reconciliation in the short term; its success depends on the
  consistent political will of the government of Angola, of the support of
  the international community within the framework of the programmes
  as well as within the framework of the MDRP;

- The PGDR includes all ex-soldiers demobilised within the framework
  of Peace and National Reconciliation, with emphasis on the post-
  Luena period. The framework of this programme integrates all other
  programmes that until now have been designed for the target group;

- Equal opportunities and specialised assistance is guaranteed to all ex-
  soldiers and they will have the opportunity to choose the most appro-
  priate option for reintegration. The PGDR will allow for ex-soldiers to
  freely choose the place of resettlement or return and the modalities of
  economic reintegration;
Although the demobilisation and demilitarisation phases were by then complete, this programme retains elements and references to both, which create a certain degree of confusion. After all, for most part of the year, this programme was under continuous revision and updating, partially a result of the speed at which quartering proceeded, partially a result of donor pressure in the negotiations under the MDRP programme. Consequently, although the programme’s provisions on demobilisation have to be considered retrospectively, they provide clues on the actual procedures implemented during the period from April 2002 to October 2002. In addition, as was pointed out above, only two years remain in the implementation of the PGDR, corresponding to the implementation of its reintegration components.

The programme makes clear that the rapid demobilisation of UNITA ex-combatants in the current context was a result of the need to ‘sustain the Peace, minimise the costs of quartering, facilitate the economic recovery of rural areas and reduce the risks of insecurity in the QAs/FAs’. In fact, as pointed out by the mission, the statement that all remaining provisions of the Lusaka Protocol would be implemented by October 15 was ‘widely interpreted to mean that the quartering areas occupied by the former military forces of UNITA (ex-FMU) would be closed by that date’ but the government announced that the closure of quartering areas would only begin on October

- All issues as regards pensions and social security will be dealt with outside the programme;

- Implementation is open to partnerships with public and private entities, including NGOs, religious organisations, churches and civic organisations.

- Execution of reintegration activities shall respect the following principles:
  - allow for the preferential opportunity for execution to local groups with experience in community reintegration activities;
  - tenders for partnerships that require special qualifications;
  - approval of projects will be done by a special committee within which IRSEM will coordinate; this committee will also monitor reintegration under coordination from IRSEM.
20. However, as was previously pointed out, there are still 30 gathering areas and the latest available information provided by the Minister for Assistance and Social Reintegration points to the month of April 2003 as the most likely deadline for the closure of the gathering areas.\textsuperscript{103}

As regards financing, the PGDR confirms that the government financed in total the disarmament, demobilization, and reinsertion components of the programme. Consequently, only the reintegration component was (at the end of last year) expected to be supported by a mixture of IDA credit, the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), donors providing financing outside the MDTF, and government counterpart funds. The estimated overall cost of this programme, including the Government-financed components, was then estimated at about $145 million. Of this, the government’s contribution would constitute approximately $60 million, the IDA credit about $30 million, the MDTF about $40 million, and donors providing financing outside the MDTF the remaining $15 million. On October 8, 2002, a PPF advance (PPF Q342-0 ANG) in the amount of $1,250,000 was signed. The expected refinancing date for the PPF advance is February 28, 2002. However, as of February 2003, the government announced that it had spent $125 million of its own funds in the process so far, with no mention of .

The mission had some concerns about the progress of demobilisation related activities, however, which were under the control of FAA and IRSEM and in October were still underway.\textsuperscript{104} Disarmament had already been completed, as noted above, but registration of ex-combatants who had previously been overlooked (including disabled who were not in the quartering areas and those who had been captured or fled during 1998–2002), collection and analysis of socio-economic data and taking of identity card photos were still underway. This was of concern because targeted reintegration assistance requires that every ex-combatant possess a unique and non-transferable ID card. Consequently the mission recommended that ‘discharge from the quartering areas await the distribution of a discharge certificate that will enable ex-combatants subsequently to acquire unique non-transferable military ID cards and ADRP benefit cards in a secure manner’.\textsuperscript{105} In addition, concerns were voiced in terms of pre-discharge orientation. In fact, although IRSEM was developing an updated detailed information, counselling and referral programme (PRONAI SAR), in some quartering areas pre-discharge orientation was being given on the basis of the earlier 23 May government programme referred to above. There was still a significant lack of accurate information about the ADRP in the quartering areas while a number of uncoordinated civic education and information activities by different agencies and govern-
ment ministries could lead to unrealistic expectations and undermine the credibility of the government’s programme. The mission therefore recommended that pre-discharge orientation materials be revised in order to ‘manage ex-combatants expectations regarding the scale, timing and composition of future reintegration assistance’.106

Another issue of concern related to the transportation of ex-combatants from the quartering areas upon their resettlement and return. Provincial governments were tasked with this responsibility as part of their oversight of resettlement and return in their provinces, but they proved unable to adequately undertake this task. It was for this reason that the management of the process was given back to the FAA in late November early December, which explains delays in the closure of quartering areas.

In terms of transitional support, there are contradictory stipulations in the PGDR and the World Bank October 17 Aide-Memoire. In fact, the PGDR stipulates that ex-combatants in the quartering areas (the new caseload) were to receive transitional support to cover their basic needs and their dependent’s during their initial social and community reintegration. This would include a contingency support payment of $100 in Kwanza equivalent and a resettlement kit including food items (to be distributed by MINARS). In practice however, the government ‘decided that all registered ex-FMU in the QAs who will be discharged from military service will first receive, at discharge, five months of salary (to cover the period from April through August) in one lump-sum payment’. And, has was previously pointed out, as of February 2003, the government had paid the 5 month salary component to 71,434 ex-combatants at a total cost of approximately $26 million, while 9,500 ex-combatants are still to receive this payment.

The mission had viewed with concern the impact that a large lump-sum payment in the quartering areas well in advance of transportation to areas of return might have. In the event, the distribution of this money had the effect of raising prices in markets in quartering areas exponentially, disadvantaging those who were not paid, and it is unlikely that much will remain for resettlement purposes. Furthermore, the payment of the five months of salary equivalent to the stay in quartering areas (from April to August) has the potential to create expectations that further payments will be made, to cover the period from August 2002 to the end of the quartering period, now estimated to be in April 2003. In any case, it is anticipated that after resettlement and return, reintegration assistance cannot possibly be made available to all ex-FMU for the initial 12 months.107
Profile of ex-combatants

Ex-combatants profiles and expectations are critical for the adequate planning of reintegration activities. While the World Bank’s Aide Memoire provides a comprehensive analysis of the preliminary data gathered in the quartering areas, the information provided in the PGDR is not only incomplete but is based on socio-economic profiling from earlier demobilisation attempts. In fact, the PGDR considers that, based on general observation, the target group (new caseload) demonstrates a small degree of heterogeneity and the majority of ex-combatants are young and in active age (although incapacitated technically and professionally). The majority have spent many years in active combat (more than 10 years service), have a very low standard of education and evidence high levels of psychological trauma as well as varied disabilities. In terms of expectations, the majority are anxious to stop being a soldier and prefer options geared towards agriculture, professional training, education, industry and commerce. The majority were rank and file soldiers and minor officers and have a family larger than the average (6 people). Expectations for residency in rural areas where they originate were the rule. For the operationalisation of reintegration activities, the PGDR then uses the profile that characterised the average soldier to be reintegrated under the Lusaka Protocol (see box 2 above).

On the other hand, the World Bank’s Aide-Memoire contains a much more detailed and comprehensive analysis of the socio-economic data gathered in the quartering areas. The sample used was constituted by 30,309 ex-combatants from 20 quartering areas out of a total of 36 quartering areas, and therefore should be taken as preliminary. Consequently, although the mission points to some of the dataset’s limitations it strongly recommends that the full dataset, covering all 85,500 ex-FMU be processed and analysed as rapidly as possible, so that detailed planning for ADRP implementation can be completed in a timely manner. This concern follows expert recommendations based on other DD&R processes that,

...in order to help ex-combatants to reintegrate it is vital to identify both the aspirations and capabilities of the demobilized population. Indeed, the success of the transition from demobilisation to reintegration is closely linked to the number of comprehensive and meaningful surveys of the population previously undertaken.

Initial analysis of the data indicates that the vast majority are male (99.8%) and single (59.7%), with less than a quarter of a percent being female. The
average age of the ex-combatant is close to 33 years while respondents’ ages ran from 15 to 65 years old. Average period of service is slightly over 14 years and over half of the interviewees claim to have fought for a period from 6 to 22 years. As regards education, over 70 percent did not receive formal education above the fourth grade, although ‘even when the majority claimed to have attended up to fourth grade of basic education, their age and length of service may have rendered them functionally illiterate’. In addition, another 10 % acknowledged not having received any formal education at all. Women (although represented in a small number) evidenced a higher level of education, with close to 7 % of them considered at the “middle” level.

Interestingly, in terms of the activities that ex-combatants were engaged in before joining the FMU, a significant number, 41%, said they were doing nothing, while only 22% declared to have been involved in a productive activity. The most important areas of activity before joining the FMU were as students (14.5%), nurses (21.3%), agriculture (7.9%), mechanics (8%) and drivers (5.8%). UNITA ex-combatants also included carpenters, traders, electricians, brick-layers and radio technicians. Nevertheless, the mission alerts to a possible methodological error in the survey in that the distribution of areas of involvement prior to joining the FMU shows several coincidences with expectations for future activities, revealing possible confusion in the responses from the interviewees. A similar survey carried out by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM)/IRSEM covering 4,731 ex-combatants in 8 quartering areas in 4 provinces found 55% had been ‘self-employed’ before joining UNITA, of which almost half (48%) were working in agriculture.110 This indicates that over a quarter of all respondents had been employed in agriculture.111

When asked about immediate needs and assistance requirements, many veterans opted for all the available options put before them. Because the focus was not on assessing the status of the population and thus identifying its needs, but rather a direct question around ‘what do you want’, over 60% of the respondents claimed to be in need of housing assistance and also in need of job placement assistance. When asked about their interest for vocational training, once again the vast majority identified this as a high priority. In fact, 72% deemed training as an immediate need. Finally, when asked about the possible areas for further training, the most popular responses included agriculture (19.1%), formal education (20.5%), nursing (10.3%); farm activities (8.7%) and mechanics (8.1%).112 And, in spite or as a result of many years of military life, a small proportion of ex-combatants surveyed expressed interest in continuing involvement in military life through their permanent incorpora-
tion into the FAA. In fact, slightly less than one out of every ten respondents showed interest in remaining active as a member of the Angolan Armed Forces.

As regards resettlement and return, over 80 percent indicated that they came from either Bié, Benguela, Huambo, Huíla or Kwanza Sul and over 75 percent that they intended to return to one of those provinces. There is not yet a clear detectable pattern in terms of possible inter-provincial migrations. Most of the interviewees expect to Resettle in the same province where they joined the FMU or where they are currently quartered.

Socio-economic reintegration: from soldiers to civilians

...the demobilisation and resettlement might have to be implemented quickly, but reintegration is by nature a slow social, economic and psychological process. Successful reintegration into civilian life depends to a large extent on the initiative of the ex-combatant and their families and on the support they receive from their communities, the government, NGOs, or foreign development cooperation. In the longer-term the reintegration also depends on the process of democratisation, including the recovery of a weak (or collapsed) state and the maturing of an independent civil society.113

The PGDR’s clearly identifies the peaceful coexistence between ex-combatants and residents of areas of resettlement and return as a critical priority for the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants. In the Angola case this is especially important because the majority of soldiers stayed for long periods of time in the armed forces. This also applies to their families who moved constantly as a result of the conflict. To facilitate peaceful coexistence at local level the PGDR suggests that an evaluation of the perceptions of local communities of ex-combatants and vice-versa be undertaken, in conjunction with awareness raising of rural communities by churches and traditional authorities of national reconciliation priorities. In addition, the PGDR plans to inform and sensitise ex-combatants to the content and ‘spirit’ of the PGDR including a discussion of the rights and duties of ex-combatants in the community; civic education programmes (i.e. HIV/AIDS, etc) and promote debates, as well as use the media to promote educational messages.

Literacy courses as well as practical courses and civic education are considered key to all reintegration activities. Consequently, a first priority is increasing the
capacity of IRSEM’s provincial offices including the development of functional links at provincial and municipal level with other organisations. In addition, activities complementary to socio-economic reintegration should be introduced, especially for the socialisation of ex-combatants. As regards economic expectations of the target group, the programme continues the emphasis on a re-launching of the agricultural sector, emphasising the urgent need for a sub-programme centring on support to agriculture. In terms of reintegration, the main activities will consist of PRONAISAR services which will provide psycho-social support to ex-combatants during what is anticipated to be a difficult transition phase; support to economic reintegration; focused assistance to social reintegration and support to the medical and economic rehabilitation of disabled ex-combatants as well as to child soldiers. Each ex-combatant will have access to a single reintegration opportunity and the choice of reintegration option will be a function of the socio-economic profile of the ex-combatant as well as his or hers expressed wish. In this regard, the PRONAISAR is critical as a way of helping ex-combatants to know about the opportunities made available by the programme. In addition, an effort is made to allow ex-combatants to work for the public administration sector in community activities, rehabilitation and project development. The PRONAISAR will also give psycho-social support during the difficult phase of transition.

The PGDR also intends to support ex-combatants to find income generating activities and employment through agreements with private entities as well as micro-credit activities. A special component of this will be counselling and referral advice on small business development. To this end, IRSEM’s provincial offices will establish partnerships with entities whose vocation is training on business skills. In addition, because many ex-combatants expressed their wish to return to their rural areas, access to land is a key element for the successful reintegration in the rural areas. Access to land will be in accordance with Angolan law and facilitated by community participation. Other sub-projects will include additional employment generation activities (public works, promotion of micro and small businesses); adult formal and non-formal education; agricultural rehabilitation (access to land, instruments, demand and service extension); medical rehabilitation services and family reunification services. In addition, the PGDR foresees additional socio-economic support to vulnerable ex-combatants (child soldiers, soldiers with disabilities and women) through a ‘reintegration fund’ (Fundo de Reintegracao).

The World Bank mission report clarifies and expands the main highlights of the PGDR, as discussed above. In this sense, overall reintegration assistance will fall into four main categories:
- Economic reintegration
- Social reintegration
- Special assistance to vulnerable groups such as underage ex-combatants and disabled ex-combatants
- Information, counselling and referral services

Moreover, as was previously pointed out, the Bank and its MRDP partners defined their intervention as a short-term measure, intended to merely begin the process of long-term economic recovery with special emphasis on the ‘mending of the social fabric’, and to the extent possible, such support would assistance would be provided to ex-combatants at the community level and in such a way as to enhance community reintegration. Activities should therefore be relatively short-term (i.e. support is provided for a planting season or a 4–6 month training program), relevant to the local economy (such as through traditional apprenticeships), and implemented by existing partner organizations currently active in the different areas of reintegration as defined below. In this sense, the ADRP will make available two different types of opportunities to ex-combatants as regards reintegration assistance: a primary opportunity (based on the ex-combatants personal preference and guided by his or hers socio-economic background and chosen places of return) and complementary opportunities (types of assistance that would further support the economic reintegration of ex-combatants—for instance through micro-credit, job placement, etc.—and for which an ex-combatant would have to qualify).115

As regards implementation, IRSEM will contract out the provision of reintegration activities to a number of different implementing partners (including UN agencies, NGOs, CBOs, churches, government institutions and other agencies working in relevant areas of assistance). It is expected that the majority of reintegration activities will be contracted out to larger “primary” contractors that would be responsible for sub-contracting out services and activities to smaller “secondary” sub-contractors such as training institutes, agricultural NGOs, churches, and so on. According to the mission, ‘the purpose of the primary contractors is to supplement IRSEM’s contract management capabilities and help rapidly expand extension of services, provide specific technical know-how in a given area of reintegration, ensure quality control of the service provision by secondary contractors, and support capacity building of service providers. An estimated 75–80% of the total value of the reinte-
tion component will be implemented in this manner, while the remaining 20–25% will be directly contracted by IRSEM with specific retailers for geographic or technical areas not covered by the primary contractors’.116

**Economic reintegration**

...economic reintegration contributes to financial independence and self-reliance which is viewed as essential for achieving objectives of demobilisation at the social and political level. Demobilised soldiers have to cope with an environment which is characterised by high rates of urban and rural unemployment or underemployment.117

In terms of economic reintegration, the ADRP will provide support to demobilized soldiers for productive and income-earning activities in four main areas: agriculture, training, community works activities and finally, promotion of income generating activities (see box).

### Box 8: ADRP Economic Reintegration Priorities

- Agriculture (subsistence agriculture kit, small animal husbandry/fishing, gardening, and food processing);
- Training (traditional apprenticeships, on-the-job training, and formal vocational education);
- Community works activities (road repair, rehabilitation or reconstruction of public infrastructure, garbage collection, reforestation);
- Promotion of income-generating activities (micro-business training, advisory services, job placement, access to tool kits, and possibly micro credit).

**Agriculture**

We have previously pointed out that agriculture is high on the government’s agenda for the economic recovery of the country and has been prioritised as the economic activity of choice for internally displaced peoples being resettled
and returned. After all, Angola had once a diversified and prosperous agricultural sector, producing surplus coffee, sisal and cotton for export, and possesses an unparallel natural resource endowment in the form of fertile and varied agricultural lands. The same rationale has been used for the economic reintegration of ex-combatants. In addition, the mission points out that the emphasis on agriculture is also a result of the fact that 19.1% of the sample surveyed had preferred training in agriculture and that therefore ‘the ADRP expects that a large portion of reintegration support will be provided through the agriculture sub-component’. In order to provide basic inputs that will guarantee the self-subsistence of ex-combatants and their families in the period immediately following resettlement and return, the ADRP will make available a subsistence agriculture kit to all ex-combatants returning to rural areas. This agriculture component will be implemented by partners already working in the agricultural sector (FAO, WFP, GTZ, CARE) through the provision of support to returning ex-combatants and their families as well as the provision of appropriate seeds, tools, and basic inputs such as fertilizer, veterinary drugs, and technical assistance. In addition, the Ministry of Agriculture’s extension services under the Instituto de Desenvolvimento Agrário is identified as a potential source of complementary support. Nevertheless, this emphasis on agriculture is not without its difficulties and obstacles. Among others, the mission highlighted the existence of conflicting land tenure laws and disputes over access to land as individuals and communities return to former home communities, and the existence of mines which are a considerable obstacle for agricultural development. Land conflict in particular has been highlighted by a number of NGOs as a major potential source of conflict in the future. A controversial new law on land tenure is currently under review, with NGOs claiming it is likely to further prioritise the rights of commercial farmers over the historical owners of the land and that it does not sufficiently consider customary law or the rights of communities, as opposed to individuals to own land.

The prioritisation of agriculture has met with a fair deal of criticism, if not concern, by observers of this process. Experiences elsewhere, namely in Mozambique, showed that the resettlement or ex-combatants in rural areas for the purposes of agricultural activity may be easily reversed. Mats Berdal has pointed out that ‘in Mozambique, a steady stream of demobilized soldiers in search of employment have, since early 1995, moved from rural communities (where they had been transported in 1994 as part of the demobilization package) to urban areas where there has since been a marked increase in social unrest and criminal activity’. However, in the absence of adequate surveys of employment opportunities in both the formal and informal sectors (even though anecdotal evidence points to severe scarcity in employment...
opportunities throughout the country), agriculture becomes the activity of choice since ultimately it guarantees some form of subsistence livelihood.

Community works activities

Another component of the economic reintegration of former UNITA combatants, the rehabilitation or construction of essential infrastructure (schools, health posts, feeder roads, small bridges, markets, administrative buildings, agricultural infrastructure, water supply and sanitation systems) is prioritised as a means to sustaining the demobilised soldier for an average of six-months. As the mission points out, there are already a number of initiatives at community level currently being undertaken by provincial governments (such as the Bank-supported Social Action Fund, FAS), by national and international NGOs, as well as churches and community-based organizations. As was pointed out above, the involvement of returnees in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of their chosen areas of resettlement has been emphasised in the norms for resettlement and return. In fact, the involvement of ex-combatants in the reconstruction of their communities of resettlement and return is one of the possible ways to promote reconciliation at the local level by making individuals responsible for the development of their communities also allowing for a deeper contact between IDPs and ex-combatants resettled in the same area and diminish the differences between returnees and resettled. In this regard, the mission points out that, ‘a secondary objective is to support social reintegration and promote reconciliation, as the ex-combatants will be integrated into work projects with other community residents, IDPs or returnees’. However, donors have traditionally voiced concerns on the sustainability of creating a ‘public works’ force composed of ex-combatants, viewing it as unsustainable in the long term. In fact, this was largely the reason why the idea of a Fourth Branch of the FAA did not go ahead during the Lusaka Process. Consequently, it is crucial that if ex-combatants are to be involved in physical reconstruction and rehabilitation that this should be done in their areas of resettlement and for a limited period only.

Training

Training has been considered a fundamental element in successful reintegration policies. However, experiences in other settings, including the experiences of the International Labour Organisation, have emphasised that ‘training of ex-combatants for direct employment has to be based on labour market studies
and should be strictly demand-driven’. Furthermore, training will only be beneficial if supported by adequate surveys of existing skills in the target population, which should go beyond formal technical skills to include other less obvious skills such as practical knowledge and abilities, as well as attitudes and norms. In fact, Irmgard Nübler has found that while data on existing skills is mainly collected in interviews, ‘the literature on empirical research methodologies discusses a range of reasons why the data obtained from self-reporting may not be reliable’ in that ‘the world of skills is diverse’. Nevertheless, the results of the socio-economic survey undertaken seem to point to an excessive preoccupation in assessing formal and technical skills of ex-combatants (as students, nurses, mechanics, etc) in detriment of an analysis of competences.

The training component has also been prioritised in Angola, and seen as guaranteeing the employability of former combatants. While the ultimate objective of training is to enable ex-combatants to successfully enter into and participate in the formal or informal job markets, it should be emphasised that there are other beneficial elements to training, which are not often discussed. In fact, training can serve as a vehicle for the social reintegration of the ex-combatant, by giving him or her skills which are considered valuable to the community as a whole. The potential integrative effect of training directed at the needs of the community as well as the socialisation benefits provided to ex-combatants by training environments should not be underestimated. In addition, as pointed out by Irmgard Nübler, ‘training settings can contribute to developing a sense of identity that is not linked to the previous roles in the military’.

Within the ADRP, the emphasis is placed on short-term, flexible and cost-effective training, geared especially for self-employment and other skills needed for reconstruction. Such training is devised in three different ways: traditional apprenticeship, on-the-job training, and formal training. In this regard, it points out that, ‘based on an assessment of the current economic conditions, and the initial profile of the ex-combatants, the areas of likely training will include: rural/agriculture-based skills such as food processing/preservation, repair of agricultural tools, soap making; small-scale construction skills including carpentry, masonry, brick-making; basic auto/motorcycle repair, bicycle repair, panel beating, tin-smith; and other skills or services as the market dictates’. The mission alerts to the need for training that mirrors local labour opportunities and uses existing training structures, such as skilled artisans, government training institutions, public and private co-operation facilities, private sector partners (for on-the-job training), NGOs, CBOs and religious organizations. Training should be given, to the extent possible, at local level for the reasons highlighted above. As regards formal training, the National Institute of Employment and Professional
Training (INEFOP) should be strengthened to respond to expected demands. In the employment process, existing employment centres of the Ministry of Public Administration, Employment and Social Security (MAPESS) are considered the main implementing partner for on-the-job placements.

**Income Generating Activities**

The promotion of income-generating activities is regarded as a complementary benefit to ex-combatants who meet minimum qualifications, to be determined by IRSEM and primary implementing partners. The ADRP envisages four types of support: business management training, micro-credit assistance, job placement services and possibly the provision of tool kits. Activities under this sub-component would also be initiated on a limited basis and only after the primary reintegration opportunities are up and running sufficiently well. Nevertheless, all ex-combatants would be eligible to apply for this type of assistance regardless of what other assistance they have received under the reintegration component. The mission considered that in the case of micro-credit, the ADRP will also take advantage and support existing successful credit schemes currently operating in Angola, such as the micro-credit program of Development Workshop, or that of Banco Sol. Job placement services would likely be provided through the Government’s Employment Centres, for which the ADRP suggests the sharing of marginal operating costs. Business training may be provided as a stand-alone activity or in the context of skills training for those ex-combatants that demonstrate an aptitude and inclination toward self-employment.

**Implementation**

The ADRP developed an innovative scheme for the implementation of economic reintegration activities. In this sense, as the main implementing organisation, IRSEM will work in close partnership with a number of what are considered large implementing partners (termed ‘primary contractors’) who will then either develop specific activities themselves or identify and contract local-level sub-contractors (termed ‘secondary contractors’). According to the mission, ‘IRSEM, the GoA [government], and the MDRP partners agreed that this two-tier implementation structure is required, given the large scale of the operation, the need to mobilize as many different types of service providers as quickly as possible, the desire to promote horizontal parity in the benefits distributed to different needy groups (ex-combatants, refugees, and IDPs), and the limited technical capacities of IRSEM in the various reintegration areas’.128
Social reintegration

The objective of the social reintegration sub-component is to promote the peaceful return and reintegration of demobilized soldiers into their communities of choice, prioritising the following actions:

- to sensitise communities to the return of demobilized soldiers;
- to discuss and improve ex-combatants’ understanding of their civic rights and responsibilities;
- to inform and provide counselling to ex-combatants about sexually-transmitted diseases, HIV/AIDS, and other health-related issues;
- to complete conflict analysis and reconciliation activities in areas of real or potential tension; and
- to support joint activities, works, cultural events, and so forth that will help rebuild social capital in the communities of return.

Support for the peaceful return and reintegration of demobilized soldiers into their communities of choice is an extremely critical element in Angola. The protracted nature and the severity of civil war in this country has produced a fragmented and deeply scarred society, which now must learn how to live peacefully together. The enormous pressures that will inevitably result from the simultaneous resettlement and return of displaced peoples as well as reintegration of ex-combatants at local level constitute perhaps the most serious threat to peace in Angola in the medium term. Consequently, these diverse groups, which may have specific grievances against one another, must learn to accept each other if reintegration is to be successful. The need to address trauma and fear at the community and individual level is therefore an imperative. Will the pre-discharge orientation program (PRONAISAR) that IRSEM’s provincial offices are expected to implement with community-based organizations, churches, and other networks and initiatives currently promoting peace-building facilitate the harmonious reintegration of ex-combatants and displaced peoples? One must bear in mind that the average ex-combatant spent close to 14 years in the armed forces, and therefore actions directed at psycho-social support for the reintegration, reconciliation and healing at local level are paramount (see box). In reality, reintegration should mean that the soldier becomes not only a civilian but also a citizen, equal to all other Angolan citizens. And this requires a strong civic education component. As
highlighted by the mission, ‘this coupled with the lack of previous work experience and low educational levels of many of the former soldiers, will require social support starting in the quartering areas and following them to their return communities’. In addition, the mission adds that ‘working on joint community initiatives at a village level can bring ex-combatants, IDPs and war affected families together to address common problems. Civil society organizations, churches and traditional leaders are important in this process’.129

**Assistance to vulnerable groups**

The ADRP emphasises the need to support disabled ex-combatants and underage ex-combatants. While existing socio-economic data initial indicates a very low percentage of disabled (less than four percent), the mission considers that this is largely inconsistent with reports from both the FAA and UNITA as well as with historical data on the Angolan conflict and conflicts in other African countries. In fact, the preliminary findings may be a result of the

**Box 9:**
**ADRP Social Reintegration Activities**

- Community level sensitisation and confidence building programs;
- Awareness on civic rights and responsibilities with ex-combatants and the communities;
- Mine awareness programs;
- Information and counselling on STDs, HIV/AIDS, health and sanitation;
- Media campaigns through radio, posters, pamphlets and print media;
- Conflict analysis and reconciliation activities in areas of real or potential tensions to develop concrete interventions to diffuse potential conflict; and
- Community activities (cultural, sporting events or work projects) which promote social cohesion and help to rebuild social capital in return communities.
fact that ‘a large number of disabled ex-FMU were too weak to participate in the quartering exercise’ and therefore were not represented in the survey.

As regards under-aged combatants, the ADRP will, in close coordination with MINARS and the child protection network in Angola, assist child soldiers and other minors associated with both armed forces. In this regard, the mission estimated that the target population under this sub-component will reach 6,000 (of which about half are under-aged combatants and half are other minors). And, ‘as there was no registration of underage combatants in the QAs (underage males were simply evicted from the QAs for registration in the family areas (FAs)) and estimates of the number included in this group are still preliminary, the projected target population is a best-guess estimate based on previous Angolan and international experience’. In this sense, ‘assisting underage ex-combatants and other separated minors in the QAs/FAs, implementing partners, including UNICEF, Christian Children’s Fund, Save the Children, the Red Cross, the Catholic Church, and others would provide assistance in identification, family tracing, temporary shelter and care, mediation and family reunification. Activities are already underway to this end and reunification underway. In addition, the program of assistance to be jointly developed by the child protection network (CPN) and MINARS will include support for psychosocial counselling, education support and vocational training. It is expected that the CPN will be able to provide complementary financial support for this sub-component of the ADRP’.¹³⁰

**Information, sensitisation, counselling and referral services (ISCR)**

The ADRP will also support services that inform and sensitise ex-combatants to the challenges and opportunities in their new lives. This service would assist demobilized soldiers in several ways. First, it would respond to inquiries about access to reintegration opportunities that are available under the ADRP; to counselling on job-seeking strategies; and to information and counselling on training and employment opportunities. Second, it would serve as a mechanism to refer ex-combatants to such opportunities (e.g., demining activities, public works, community infrastructure rehabilitation, etc.), thereby seeking to ensure the integration of the demobilized into broader recovery efforts. In particular, this service would proactively identify opportunities and negotiate placement of demobilized soldiers in both public and private jobs as they became available. The ISCR service would also identify and inform the demobilized soldiers about other public services for which they may be eligible, such as health care,
education, or pension benefits. IRSEM Provincial offices will take the lead responsibility for this service and liaise closely with the Employment Centres (Centros de Emprego) of the Ministério da Administração Pública Emprego e Segurança Social (MAPESS), and the Governor’s and Municipal Administrators’ offices to identify specific public works opportunities.

**Institutional responsibility**

The CNRSPDD is given the political management of the programme while IRSEM and the FAA (in accordance with their institutional responsibilities) will be responsible for its implementation and follow-up. Consequently, the CNRSPDD will be responsible for the legal sustenance as well as political orientation of the programme while not being involved in its practical execution. Its responsibilities are to:

- advise government in questions related to demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants;
- identify and solve problems regarding substantive policies related to the reintegration of ex-combatants;
- monitor the work of IRSEM and other government agencies;
- assure the inter-ministerial commission required by the programme; and
- develop other activities that assure the successful realisation of the programme’s objectives

We had pointed out earlier that the Joint Military Commission (FAA/FMU) continued to be responsible for the coordination of ex-combatants in the quartering areas and that the FAA were responsible for the disarmament, registry, selection and licensing of the demobilised; the preparation of ID cards; the collection of socio-economic profiles; logistics within the quartering or gathering areas and the incorporation of the 5,047 military within the FAA. MINARS and IRSEM continue to be responsible for pre-demobilisation orientation in the quartering areas; the distribution of resettlement kits; the payment of the contingency subsidy and the transportation of the licensed military to the areas of destination. These groups will be organised by provincial commissions of the CNRSPDD in accordance with its directive 01/GC/CNRDPDD/02.
In addition, IRSEM’s responsibilities will include:

- to prepare annual detailed implementation plans;
- to implement and coordinate the PGDR in its reintegration component for which it will establish cooperation with other government departments, local and international organisations, private sector and donors;
- to transparent and responsible management of the PGDR’s resources; and
- to monitor and evaluate the PGDR on the basis of a data base that incorporates all the information gathered in the QAs. An Information management System will be established by IRSEM.

Following World Bank’s advice, reintegration projects will be sub-contracted by MINARS and IRSEM to ‘large agencies’ who will then be responsible for contracting ‘small agencies’ capable of implementing specific reintegration sub-projects. For this end, IRSEM in cooperation with the multi-donor community and the ‘large agencies’ will prepare a strategy as well as a annual budget for the identification and formulation of profiles for the type of services needed bearing in mind demand and supply factors.

The Financial Management and Procurement Unit (FMPU) will be an autonomous body that provides services to IRSEM for the implementation of the Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program (ADRDP). The ADRP is expected to be effective for a three-year period, starting in or around January 2003. The FMPU will ensure that all contracting, procurement, disbursement and financial management functions required under the ADRP are carried out in accordance with standard and accepted guidelines of the donor agencies supporting this program. It will also have responsibility, on behalf of IRSEM, for internal control functions for donor and Government counterpart funding of the ADRP. It is estimated that the FMPU will have responsibility for overseeing the management of up to US$ 100 million, of which approximately $80 million may finance sub-projects implemented by partner organizations active in the areas of reintegration, training, etc. These activities will be funded through sub-contract arrangements for which the FMPU will have financial monitoring responsibility. IRSEM will remain responsible for managing all technical aspects of the program. Implementing partners may be non-governmental organizations, line ministry units, or community-based organizations currently active in Angola. It is expected that some 75 percent of the total value of ADRP sub-projects will be contracted through larger national or international primary contractors (15 to 25
contracts), while the remaining 25 percent will be contracted through smaller service providers that will directly implement integration activities (50 to 100 contracts) (see GoA Project Document, “Implementation Arrangements”, for further details). The proposed financial mechanisms for the disbursement and control of funds through these sub-contracts will be discussed in detail in the administration and accounting manual of procedures which remains to be prepared.

Box 10: ADRP Final Recommendations

- The government should establish a joint technical working group with dedicated staffing including FAA, MINARS and IRSEM to conduct integrated planning of the demobilisation process, the hand-over to civilian authorities and the management of ex-combatants’ expectations;

- Discharge of ex-combatants from the quartering areas (planned to begin on October 20) should proceed only following the photographing of each ex-combatant and the distribution of a discharge certificate that will enable ex-combatants to acquire unique non-transferable ID cards and ADRP program benefit in a secure manner;

- IRSEM’s pre-discharge orientation materials should be revised as needed to reflect more accurately the 10 October programme especially in relation to reintegration activities;

- Child protection agencies should be permitted meaningful access to underage ex-combatants in the family areas (FAs) to register them and initiate the provision of specialised reintegration assistance;

- The government should strengthen planning for transportation of ex-combatants and their dependents from the QAs to their areas of return by incorporating the experiences and logistical knowledge of the FAA at provincial and national level into the planning process and by seeking technical assistance from international agencies with experience in population movements;

- Government should consider improving transitional assistance provided to ex-FMU following discharge, in particular by agreeing the payment of one or two further cash payments in the ex-combatants areas of return.
Overall, good intentions have proved insufficient to sustain effective implementation of the DD&R process, with the result that today the situation is highly confused and, on the ground, very tense. The Angolan Armed Forces have once again regained control of the process as a result of the inability of MINARS and IRSEM’s to provide adequate provision to the gathering areas as well as transport of ex-combatants to their chosen areas of resettlement and return. The process as a whole has therefore been subject to continuous alterations and back-tracking which have had a negative effect on the confidence and morale of the ex-combatants in camps as well as hindering planning and implementation of projects by government, NGOs and UN agencies. This is despite previous similar experiences in 1996 in the negotiations and revisions of the Rapid Demobilisation Plan. A case in point is the distribution of seeds and tools which were meant to reduce dependence on food aid—due to constant changes in dates for closure of camps seeds have not been planted and food aid will continue to be necessary for those still in camps. There are also cases of ex-combatants being sent to transit camps to receive resettlement kits, transport and the final $100, and then remaining there waiting for several months. Tensions in many camps are therefore running high, as people wait for news, no longer trusting the news they do receive.

Furthermore, despite all previous experiences of self-demobilisation from camps and a concurrent rise in insecurity in surrounding areas, high levels of malnutrition were reported for several months in the camps. While the situation has now stabilised ex-combatants still claim of insufficient food rations. This is in part a consequence of the inaccessible locations of many, of mine accidents and of the rainy season, which cannot be blamed on either the government or NGOs/UN agencies, but has not helped the morale of the ex-combatants, nor prompted good relations between them and local officials which will be necessary for effective reintegration. Completion of demobilisation documentation must be made a priority as ex-combatants are unable to do anything without them.

At the same time it must be remembered that ex-combatants and IDPs will be returning to the same villages in some cases, and the provision of significant
support for the former but not the latter may cause conflicts in itself, especially in the context of a still highly politically polarised society. Large numbers of IDPs have returned spontaneously, therefore not receiving resettlement support, as some ex-combatants have also been reported to have done in the Central Highlands in particular. Furthermore return and resettlement of IDPs is not proceeding evenly to all areas within provinces, and since the norms have rarely been fully actualised in many areas there is a backwards and forwards movement as people realise the depth of the problems they will face. This also indicates that the extension of services such as water, health and education by the government will be essential to an effective reintegration of the country, and to slow, if not reverse, the urbanization trend.

As time goes on it will become increasingly difficult to effectively implement projects targeted at ex-combatants or returned IDPs and refugees in remote rural areas in particular. It is therefore essential that work begin immediately on the reconstruction of roads and bridges and de-mining. This has perhaps been the greatest impediment to the provision of support to gathering areas and to returning IDPs so far. There is a risk that grandiose projects with little chance of being properly implemented will do more harm than good, raising expectations and then disappointing ex-combatants who have the potential at least to be a destabilising force on society. These are not statistics to be manipulated but people with real and traumatic histories.

Finally, while national ownership of the process has been one of its strengths in political terms, the government must recognise its own limitations and form partnerships with international NGOs and UN agencies in order to ensure implementation of projects and even outstanding demobilisation related activities such as transport. In addition, both the government as well as the international donor community should look at the experiences of Provincial governments in developing and implementing their emergency plans for resettlement and return. In this regard, the strengthening of existing capabilities at Provincial level, in particular the already existing sub-groups working on internally displaced peoples should be prioritised. This would in fact be consistent with the government’s policy of increasing the responsibility of Provincial and local government structures in dealing with their own challenges. It would also allow for an integrated approach at local level, where the potential for future conflict is highest.

The problems of resettlement, return and reintegration of both civilians and ex-combatants cannot and will not be solved easily or expeditiously. These are challenges of great magnitude, which represent true structural change in
Angola while affecting real lives of real Angolans. The case for monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of these programmes in the next two years is therefore self-evident.


7. Ibid.


11. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Angola (OCHA), *Humanitarian Update*, 19 December 2002. The conclusions of the vulnerability assessment were presented to donors in December. These included: 1) Despite an improvement in food security, approximately 1.8 million persons, representing 12 percent of the population, is food insecure. The highest concentrations of food insecure populations are in Huambo and Bié Provinces. 2) Forty-three percent of the locations assessed, particularly in the northern and central regions of the country, are at moderate or high risk of food insecurity. 3) Vulnerable residents in newly accessible areas, new IDPs, returnees and demobilised soldiers and their families who did not have access to agricultural inputs for the current
agricultural campaign may face food insecurity during the “lean period”. 4) Monitoring of food security and more complementarity between emergency assistance and medium-term rehabilitation activities are necessary to prevent further deterioration.

12. While the budget for this emergency six-month programme was calculated at approximately 89.044.698 USD, the total cost of resettlement and return for this case-load was calculated at 267.134.094 USD. It should be noted that the 350.000 UNITA people are considered in a separate programme. The breakdown for the global resettlement and return plan for 1.550.000 people is as follows: Mine Clearance (INARROE: USD 5.264.911,15); Food security for 6 months: USD 76.794.750,00; Child protection and demilitarisation of child soldiers: USD 1.170.000,00 (50.000 people); Food production kits: USD 43.341.100,00 (310.000 families); Health: USD 5.890.000,00 (1.550.000 people); Nutrition: USD 960.000,00 (66.200 people); Education: USD 10.333.333,33 (516000 people); Shelter kits: USD 46.500.000,00 (310.000 families); Water and sanitation: USD 4.030.000,00 (310.000 families) and Transport and logistics: USD 54.250.000,00.

13. Including: preliminary evaluation of the conditions in the resettlement areas; organization and registering of target groups and transport of populations at local and inter-provincial level.

14. Provincial and local administrations: with the implementation of the decentralisation strategy approved in 2001, local and provincial administrations will have the responsibility of coordinating and implementing reconstruction activities. UNDP plans to foster local capacity to implement reconstruction activities under a project entitled ‘Pilot Reintegration and Recovery Programme’ to foster the reintegration of internally displaced people in eight municipalities in the two provinces of Huambo and Kwanza Sul.


17. Ibid.

18. This sub-group is called ‘Sub-Grupo de Deslocados e Refugiados’. In this regard see, Conselho de Ministros, op cit, article 2.

19. Conselho de Ministros, op cit, article 3 and article 5.

20. This is particularly the case with the choice of housing areas, agricultural areas, water supply and basic sanitation facilities as well as construction of social infrastructure which should be defined by local administrative authorities, including traditional authorities. See ‘Programa para o regresso e reassentamento das populações afectadas directamente pelo conflito armado’.

22. Ibid.


24. The workshop brought together more than 150 government, UN and NGOs representatives from all 18 Provinces.


26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. The other two were the Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (CMVF); and the Joint Commission on the Formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (CCFA).

29. As Margaret Anstee points out, ‘the CCPM was to be the apex of a complex network of joint monitoring mechanisms at every level, in every region, and on every subject germane to the Peace Accords…in keeping with the concept that responsibility for implementing the Peace Accords lay with the Angolans, the only full members of the CCPM were to be representatives of the government and UNITA, and meetings were to be presided over alternately by each side with decisions taken by consensus’. See M Joan Anstee, Orphan of the cold war. The inside story of the collapse of the Angolan peace process, 1992–93, MacMillan Press LTD, London, 1996, p 11–12.

30. The first United Nations Angola Verification Mission, UNAVEM I, had been created in order to oversee the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, a process which lasted from 1989 to 1991.


33. Financial Times, 11 May 1992


37. D Sogge claims government troops probably left due to lack of pay and food supplies in the camps whereas UNITA were more likely to stay due to the presence of their families and children nearby. D Sogge, op cit.

38. Saferworld, op cit.


40. IRSEM: Instituto de Reintegracao Socio-Profissional dos Ex-Militares is the government’s agency in charge of the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. It was created by decree in 1995, replacing the Gabinete Inter-Ministerial de Apoio aos Desmobilizados das Forcas Armadas (GIANDA) formed in response to the provisions of the Bicesse Peace Accords of 1991. It responds to MINARS (ministerio da Assistencia e Reinsercao Social). IRSEM board of directors is composed of members of FAA and UNITA (one deputy director). It does not have any institutional link with the Ministerio dos Antigos Combatentes. During the initial phase of implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, IRSEM (with support from UNDP, OIM, GTZ and others) took responsibility for implementing a number of projects and activities in the areas of vocational training, infrastructure, community resettlement, and micro-credit. Its projects have had limited impact.

41. Lusaka Protocol, Annex 4, Section III

42. A Vines, op cit, p 9.

43. Saferworld, op cit.

44. For example, without the need to comply with the ‘triple zero clause’, the government greatly strengthened its armed forces with the purchase of close to $3.5 billion worth of arms and ammunition, as well as commissioning the retraining of its armed forces and critical support services to Executive Outcomes, a security firm based in Pretoria.


47. N Howen, Peace-building and civil society in Angola: A role for the international community, DFID/FCO, October 2001


50. UCAH/DRO, Study for the identification of social and economic expectations of demobilised soldiers, First Draft Report, December 1994

51. Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination (UCAH/DRO), Identificação das expectativas sociais e económicas dos militares e desmobilizados das FAA e da UNITA,

52. UCAH/DRO, Reintegration strategies for demobilised soldiers under the Angolan peace process, United Nations Angola, 1995


54. Ibid.


57. In the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’, the parties reiterate their unequivocal acceptance of the validity of the relevant legal and political instruments, in particular, the Lusaka Protocol and the resolutions of the United Nations’ Security Council relative to the Angolan Peace Process.

58. It defines an amnesty law for all crimes committed within the framework of the armed conflict; the modalities of the cease-fire; the disengagement, quartering and conclusion of the demilitarisation of UNITA’s military forces; the integration of UNITA generals, senior officers, captains and junior officers, sergeants and men in accordance with existing structural vacancies; the integration of generals and senior UNITA officers into the national police; the demobilisation of excess UNITA military personnel and disbanding of UNITA military forces and finally, the vocational re-integration of demobilised personnel of the ex-UNITA military forces into national life.

59. In fact, a number of Portuguese, American and Russian military experts joined the Technical Group providing technical assistance as regards disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration components of this process.

60. In fact, on 30 March UNITA had declared its combined force levels at 54,583. See also Annex 1 to the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ entitled ‘Document Relating to the Quartering of the UNITA Military Forces’. This document specifies that ‘the quartering of the UNITA military forces must provide the living conditions necessary for the stay of the military in a total number of up to 50,000, comprising about 12 General and 47 Brigadiers, about 1,700 Senior Officers, about 17,350 Captains and Junior Officers, about 3,150 Sergeants and about 27,740 men, for the duration of a period of time from the welcoming of the personnel
until their integration into FAA and the National Police and the vocation reinsertion of the demobilized personnel; and that ‘the quartering of the UNITA military forces implies, also, on the one hand, the accommodation of 12 Generals and 47 Brigadiers, in cities close to the quartering areas and, on the other hand, the organization and securing of areas for the accommodation of the families of the military, close to the quartering areas, in a total of up to 300,000 individuals, including men, women and children’. In a subsequent interview with General Paulo Lukamba held in Luanda during October 2002, the authors were told that the discrepancy between the initial declared 50,000 troops and the final 85,585 troops quartered was not deliberate misinformation by UNITA but a consequence of the fact that no single UNITA regional commander knew exactly the total number of UNITA soldiers.

61. Data based on press statements by the Joint Military Commission.


64. Data based on press statements by the Joint Military Commission.


68. Ibid.

69. Data provided by the Joint Military Commission.


72. M Berdal, op cit, p 36.

73. In this regard see World Bank, Aide-Memoire. Angola Demobilisation and Reintegration Program, Luanda, August 16, 2002.

74. OCHA, Humanitarian situation analysis, November–December 2002.

76. Ibid.

77. See Annex 4, ‘Memorandum of Understanding Addendum to the Lusaka Protocol for the Cessation of Hostilities and the Resolution of the Outstanding Military Issues under the Lusaka Protocol’. In this Annex, the vocational reinsertion of the demobilized is includes specific mention of civic training and socio-economic promotion. The following are considered pressing needs: (i) guarantee initial assistance to the demobilized personnel of the ex-UNITA military forces; (ii) guarantee general and specific training for the demobilized personnel of the ex-UNITA military forces; (iii) ensure their supported reintegration into national life. In addition, the process of vocational reinsertion of the demobilized personnel of the ex-UNITA military forces will be conducted through the following methods: (i) the vocational reinsertion of the demobilized personnel of the ex-UNITA military forces as part of the national Reconstruction Service; (ii) the vocational reintegration of the demobilized personnel of the ex-UNITA military forces, as part of the national labor market, in particular, in the public and private sectors; and finally, (iii) the vocational reinsertion of the demobilized personnel of the ex-UNITA military forces as part of the Populations Resettlement Program.


79. In this regard, the programme is clear: ‘it is necessary to uniformise unity of action, of thought and delivery of resources, so that, reintegration activities become part of the fight against poverty, of diminishing socio-political and economic disparities, and national reconciliation’. In this regard, the immediate objectives of the programme are: to contribute to the consolidation of peace and national reconciliation; to contribute to the speedy social, economic and professional reintegration of the target population in the civilian, family and communitarian context; to contribute to the reduction of the poverty of the target population; to contribute to the social decompression of urban areas/centres, by attracting the target population to rural areas by offering better living conditions; the promotion of development centres in areas where populations are forced to settle and finally, the promotion of professional training of UNITA’s ex-military so that they can, in the short term, compete in conditions of equality in the job market. See Comissao Intersectorial para o Processo de Paz e Reconciliacao Nacional (Comite Executivo), ‘Programa de Reintegracao Social dos Desmobilizados dos Ex-Militares da UNITA’, Abril 2002.

80. Please note that the target population considered in this programme totals 43,408, not counting the 5007 that will be absorbed by the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and the 40 that will integrate the National Police. Following initial observations of the target group, the programme’s working profile of UNITA ex-
combatants is as follows: mostly young males in active/working age with low levels of education; majority are rank and file soldiers and low ranking officers with an average of between 5 and 10 years of service in the military; majority support demobilisation and prioritise reintegration options in the agricultural, education and industry sectors; majority expects to be resettled in rural areas of origin and finally, the majority have a family larger than 6 people.

81. The sub-programme on agriculture for example, targets 2260 ex-military and spells out the activities that the immediate integration of ex-combatants as workers in the agricultural sector should entail: monitoring of forestry and livestock resources; forestry repopulation and fight against desertification. It also includes elements of income generating activities in the areas of fishing, creation of forestry perimeters and flower cultivation. The sub-programme on professional training, costed at USD12500000 and with a two year duration is meant to provide for the swift training of UNITA’s ex-combatants in skills which, as was previously mentioned, will improve the socio-economic life of the country and provide work for the trainees. The executing agency is INEOP as well as other private entities. Yet another sub-programme regards the ‘absorption’ by the Ministry of Health (MINSA) of new specialists and old professionals that may have been victims of the armed conflict, focusing on capacity-building and training of individuals who might need re-qualification in order to be incorporated in MINSA.


83. The Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (MDRP) operationalises a comprehensive strategy for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities in the greater Great Lakes region of central Africa by outlining measures to structure and channel international assistance in support of efforts that assist ex-combatants to return to peaceful, sustainable livelihoods. Note that the World Bank’s role in implementing the strategy and program of the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (MDRP) is threefold: (i) as manager of the MDRP Secretariat; (ii) as administrator of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund; and (iii) as co-financier of national programmes. In this regard, see World Bank, Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilisation and Reintegration, Report No. 23869-AFR, March 25, 2002, p.iii and iv.

84. In this regard see World Bank, op cit.

85. Ibid.

86. A unified national demobilisation and reintegration programme able to provide targeted support to all ex-combatants, would include the numbers considered by the ‘Programme for the Socio-Economic and Professional Reintegration of ex-UNITA Military’ discussed above (now up to 80,000 UNITA ex-combatants, reflecting the unforeseen growth in the number of quartered soldiers), 33,000 Angolan Armed Forces and approximately 160,000 combatants identified for
demobilisation and reintegration under the two former peace processes. Nevertheless, the fact that an ADRP should consider this combined number should not detract from implementation and financing limitations obtaining in Angola.

87. The mission considered cash to be the preferred option for the delivery of TSN for the following reasons: the government has paid cash in previous demobilisations; cash has lower transaction costs; it is easy to distribute; it empowers combatants; it stimulates a supply response from local producer and traders. Furthermore, because the banking system is inexistent in the majority of Provinces, the payment of a TSN could be effected by a Financial Management and Procurement Unit contracted by IRSEM. To encourage the optimal use of TSN the programme would provide extensive counselling on the use of reinsertion assistance prior to demobilisation.


89. World Bank, op cit.


93. Ibid, p 514.

94. Ibid. Article 5.

95. In this regard see World Bank, Aide-memoire. Angola demobilisation and reintegration program, Luanda, August 16, 2002.

96. Ibid.

97. A discussion of a final draft will be developed below.

98. Ministerio da Assistencia e Reinsertcao Social, Instituto de Reintegracao Socio-Profissional dos Ex-Militares, Programa geral de desmobilizacao e reintegracao, 10 de Outubro de 2002.


100. Ministerio da Assistencia e Reinsertcao Social, op cit.


102. In this regard see World Bank, op cit.

104. According to the PGDR, procedures for demobilisation included: the quartering of eligible soldiers; verification and identification of military to be demobilised; design of non-transferable identification cards; gathering of socio-economic data; medical examinations; PRONAI SAR (actions on information, awareness, advice and reference including civic and moral education modules); attribution of a social kit; attribution of a USD$100 equivalent called ‘contingency value’ upon return to destination areas and finally, support to transport to destination areas and finally, under aged soldiers (SMI) will be separated from adult soldiers and transferred to adjacent areas. The government had also claimed, however, that demobilisation had already been completed.

105. Following the government’s announcement that discharge from the quartering areas would begin on October 20, the FAA and IRSEM established a plan for ensuring the secure delivery of military ID and program benefit cards. The process will include the following steps: (i) every ex-combatant will be photographed before discharge and issued a discharge certificate; (ii) the FAA will prepare unique non-transferable photographic ID cards and IRSEM will prepare program benefit cards in Luanda; (iii) these cards will be sent to IRSEM provincial offices for distribution in areas of return; (iv) on reporting to an IRSEM provincial office, (a) the veteran will present his discharge certificate, (b) the corresponding ID card and benefit card will be located, (c) a printout of the ex-combatant’s registration form will be located, and (d) the photograph on the ID card will be verified against the ex-combatant’s face. To ensure system integrity, no documents will be delivered to third parties or representatives of the ex-combatant (all processing will be done with the ex-combatant himself). In addition, where the photographic image is not clear enough, the ex-combatant will be questioned about the information recorded in the registration form (e.g. father’s name, mother’s name, date of birth, and so on). Once a positive identification is made, the ID card and the benefits card will both be delivered to the ex-combatant; an annotation of the delivery will be made in the copy of the registration form, and the ex-combatant will sign or thumbprint the record. For all cases presenting special problems (missing cards, incorrect names, and so on), a special mechanism involving referral of the matter to the FAA will be implemented. In the judgment of the mission, these procedures, if properly implemented, will suffice to ensure the integrity of the program’s ID system.

106. World Bank, op cit.

107. International experience indicates clearly that ex-combatants will make good use of cash payments to further their own reintegration. A series of cash payments over time will enable an ex-combatant to cover his own and his family’s basic material needs during the early part of his transition to civilian life; it will also enable him to finance the initial investments needed to start generating his own income. Cash payments provide the time necessary to allow an ex-combatant to make his own plans for reintegration and they also empower him to make choices according to his own priorities. Ibid.
108. For the mission’s assessment of the limitations of this survey refer to World Bank, op cit.


111. This may reflect the possible errors in the World Bank study, or perhaps the geographical location of the study which was exclusively carried out in the Central Highlands

112. Many of the veterans were involved during the conflict in landmine laying and demining activities, presenting a valuable pool of expertise and information for future landmine removal activities. Over half of the respondents claim to have past experience in this field, with 59.4% saying that they have participated in laying landmines and 60.9% confirming they have participated in demining activities.


114. It should be noted that these guidelines were developed bearing in mind the general expectations of the target group and the studies undertaken in previous demobilisation attempts.

115. As the mission notes, ‘a complementary opportunity would not be an entitlement, but rather a form of assistance that would be available to those ex-combatants that meet minimum criteria’. A third category of general assistance would be available to all ex-combatants regardless of their access to either primary or complementary opportunities. This includes social reintegration support as well as information, counselling and referral services.


117. I Nübler, ‘*Human resources development and utilization in demobilization and reintegration programs*, Bonn International Center for Conversion, Paper 7, January 1997, p 3

118. The ADRP expects that this sub-component will focus on a few different areas of production or processing, including food crops such as maize, beans, manioc and potatoes; small animal husbandry; gardening; apiculture; artisanal fishing; or provision of equipment to groups for rice hulling, fish smoking, or other areas of food processing.

119. See IRIN, *Angola: Call for more consultation on draft land law*, 7 February 2003; IRIN, ‘*Angola: Land reform needed*’, 26 April 2002. Land was nationalised after independence but the switch from a planned to a market economy in 1991 and the associated privatisation of land resulted in commercial farmers gaining access to large quantities of land and the customary rights of many being ignored.
120. M Berdal, op cit, p 40.
122. Given that many community works and rehabilitation projects are in the planning phase, it is anticipated that this sub-component will increase its outputs during the timeframe of the ADRP. The indicative targets are 2,000 placements in year one of the program, 3,000 placements in year two, and 5,000 placements in year three. In the preparatory phase of the ADRP, a study must be undertaken of existing and projected community works initiatives that may be potential partners.
123. I Nübler, op cit, p 18.
124. Ibid., p 12.
125. The type of training that a ex-combatant will have access to will be determined by three factors: their individual preference, their aptitude, and the opportunities to apply the training following completion. This selection process will be handled through the counselling and referral arm of IRSEM, with the support of the identified prime contractor and local-level training providers.
127. In addition, the report says that ‘while there are many potential obstacles to absorbing ex-combatants into the small-scale formal and informal economy, the overall improvement in the security situation as well as the general increase in economic activities throughout the country will provide positive impetus to reintegration along these lines’. World Bank, op cit, p 22, 23.
130. Ibid, p 11.3