Innovations in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration policy and research
Reflections on the last decade

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Abstract
This literature review offers a general overview of policy-related and theoretical innovations in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) over the past decade. Drawing on an extensive review of academic and prescriptive contributions, it teases out key trends in the character and shape of DDR activities. It detects a shift from minimalist (security-first) interventions preoccupied with military and police priorities to maximalist (development-oriented) activities in the present era. It also notes a progressive professionalisation and standardization of DDR practice within the multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental communities. Moreover, the review observes a shift in the focus of research on DDR. Early in the decade, scholars were preoccupied with the process and practice of DDR as a spatially, temporally and socially bounded activity. Whilst establishing useful conceptual parameters, these researchers seldom considered more fundamental issues of causality and correlation, actor agency or intervention outcomes. Meanwhile, the latest wave of scholars are investing in comparative case studies, statistical assessments drawing on large-n samples and more experimental approaches to test counter-factuals. Focusing on a wider case selection these researchers are also exploring new sectoral horizons such as the relationships between DDR and combatant agency, peace agreements, transitional justice, security sector reform, and state-building more generally.
Introduction

More than 60 disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) initiatives have taken place around the world since the early 1990s (Muggah 2009a, 2009b). Most of these were launched in the wake of violent international and civil conflicts and conceived following the defeat of one of the parties or as part of a peace support operation. Whether mandated by a peace agreement, a UN Security Council resolution, or unilaterally by a government, each DDR operation has featured unique characteristics and particularities. Notwithstanding their distinctive origins and bureaucratic manifestations, the shape and direction of DDR evolved in parallel with wider shifts in peacekeeping doctrine and the discourse on security and development. Specifically, peace support operations expanded from a comparatively limited (minimalist) focus on peacekeeping designed to maintain stability between demarcated parties and on the basis of a negotiated ceasefire to include more multidimensional (maximalist) mandates and integrated approaches, with explicit military, policing, rule of law and social welfare objectives.

Since the early 1990s, DDR interventions have shifted from a relatively narrow preoccupation with ex-combatants (‘spoilers’) and reductions in national military expenditure (‘peace dividend’) to a concerted emphasis on consolidating peace and promoting reconstruction and development. Geographically, the vast majority of these have taken place in Africa, though many have also been administered in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South and Eastern Europe, Central and South Asia and the South Pacific. Temporally and institutionally, DDR programmes are getting longer, drawing on an ever larger caseload of combatants and (vulnerable) dependents and becoming better resourced. Because of the way DDR is designed to reinforce and extend the reach and legitimacy of state authority, it has increasingly been singled out by political scientists and specific practitioners for careful investigation. It is precisely because it has the intended consequences of allowing states to reassert their monopoly of violence that DDR is recognised as an inherently political and politicizing process and of special concern to social scientists.

The following literature review offers a range of critical reflections on policy and theoretical innovations in DDR since the early 1990s to the

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1 In the past few years, however, scholars and practitioners are exploring alternative forms of DDR that focus on irregular actors (i.e. militia and gangs) in non-war contexts. See, for example, Muggah (2009a, 2009b), Hazen (2009, 2007).

2 It is useful to recall that several DDR operations took place without assistance from externally-mandated peace operations, but were rather managed by the national government itself, as in Angola, Ethiopia, Rwanda and the Philippines.
present day. Drawing on a wide-ranging (and non-exhaustive) review of the policy and scholarly literature, it highlights key trends in the character and shape of DDR activities. While noting the distinct features and dynamics of DDR processes around the world, it observes a progressive shift from minimalist (security-first) to maximalist (development-oriented) programming. This shift mirrors the expanding engagement of multilateral and bilateral security and development sectors in the DDR enterprise. Although tensions persist over a host of issues – including the merits of cash/non-cash benefits, individual versus collective targeting, and sequencing of interventions – the review nevertheless detects a progressive professionalisation and standardization of DDR practice within key expert constituencies. Likewise, in examining particularly recent theoretical debates, it detects a shifting of priorities and areas of focus from first to second generation scholars. Interest has evolved from a consideration of DDR as a bounded cluster of discourses and practices to a more complex social process connected to actor agency, peace negotiations, justice and security sector reform, state-building and ultimately the prevention of war recurrence. This shift mirrors a widening array of disciplinary perspectives as well as methodological advances. It also highlights evidence of a long-standing practitioner-academic praxis.

Mapping DDR trends

The scale and distribution of peace support operations is unprecedented in the twenty first century. There are many times more peacekeepers deployed in post-conflict settings today than a decade ago. Global preoccupation with stabilising fragile states is at an all-time high, as reflected in overseas development flows to such contexts. Policy makers and practitioners are investing considerable resources in enhancing their coordination and coherence and integrating efforts where possible. A host of security promotion activities have emerged over the past few decades to guarantee security and, ultimately, development. DDR activities are designed to, inter alia, stem war recurrence, reduce military expenditure, stimulate spending on social welfare, prevent spoilers from disrupting peace processes, enhance opportunities for their livelihoods, disrupt the command and control of armed groups, and prevent resort to the weapons of war.

With more than 60 DDR operations have been launched since the 1990s, most of them in the past five years, DDR can be described as something of a ‘growth industry’. There a host of recurring patterns

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3 OECD member state aid flows to ‘fragile states’ exceeded USD34 billion in 2008. See https://community.oecd.org/community/factblog/blog/2010/04/16/aid-for-fragile-states
4 Note that there are many different iterations of DDR, as well as expanded formulations that account for reinsertion, rehabilitation, repatriation and other activities. See Muggah (2006, 2005).
that unify what are otherwise disparate DDR experiences. Approximately two thirds of these DDR interventions were launched in Africa, with the remainder in Latin America and the Caribbean, South Eastern Europe, Central and South Asia and the South Pacific. Well over a million ‘combatants’ have participated in some aspect of DDR, with annual aggregate expenditure now surpassing USD630 million. Moreover, national DDR interventions have gradually adopted more ‘regional’ or multi-country approaches as recognition of the ‘spillover’ and ‘contagion’ effects of armed conflicts widened. Likewise, the caseload of prospective beneficiaries for DDR has also expanded from ex-combatants alone, to ‘vulnerable groups’ (children, women, disabled), dependents, and others of concern (refugees and internally displaced persons). Now widely considered a pillar of the international peace support and peace building architecture, more than 20 UN agencies and dozens of NGOs are engaged in supporting DDR activities. While unable to directly fund disarmament activities owing to mandate constraints, the World Bank is a lead agency in many DDR activities.

DDR programmes also appear to have converged around a set of conventional assumptions. First, is the critical role attached by policy makers and practitioners to (national) ownership of DDR and the signal importance of predictable and adequate external assistance. In virtually every country where DDR has been pursued, UN and World Bank representatives have sought (sometimes unsuccessfully) to ensure that national authorities assumed a key role in various aspects of its preparation and implementation. Engagement has ranged from deciding on the scope and timing of the exercise through to negotiating eligibility criteria and implementation modalities, management and monitoring. In most cases, an institutional entity – usually a national commission or focal point – was established to articulate strategic direction and filter policy priorities. Second, DDR has been gradually recast as not a ‘technical’ programme but rather a technology of stabilization and state-building, even if not explicitly recognized as such. This process has often come after repeated failures, as in Afghanistan (Bhatia and Muggah 2009; Giustozzi 2008), Eritrea (Mehreteab 2004), or Timor Leste (Peake 2009). Depending on the context, including the duration and severity of the war preceding DDR, practitioners have come to recognize the tremendous political, economic, infrastructural, institutional and social reconciliation challenges entailed in DDR.

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5 See, for example, World Bank (2004, 2002) and the MDRP which includes provisions for more than nine countries of the Great Lakes Region. In some cases, DDR policy makers and practitioners are conscious of the ‘regional dimensions’ of DDR, and are increasingly sensitive to the way ostensibly domestic programmes can generate regional effects.

6 See, for example, Harpviken (2008).

7 But the extent to which such processes were genuinely owned by national authorities varies. The degree of national ownership frequently depends on the circumstances in which an armed conflict ends or the relative capacity of public (and private) institutions.
Though still often erroneously conceived as a kind of magic bullet that automatically and simultaneously cares for a wide range of development and security challenges (Muggah, 2005; Kingma, 2000: 241), approaches to DDR are being tailored to account for the political economy of (in)security. Indeed, a host of complementary processes such as security sector reform and transitional justice now being consciously examined in relation to DDR programming (Bryden 2009, Grodsky, 2009). Needless to say, it was not always this way.

The positive news is that over the past two decades, those associated with the DDR enterprise have to realise that DDR is as process of social engineering. It is not just a ‘technical’ programme and cannot be treated in isolation of other activities and dynamics underway. Rather most, if not all, aspects of DDR are negotiated and decided in the context of wider political and economic expediencies (Torjesen 2006). An intensely complex process of bargaining invariably defines the parameters of a DDR – including the establishment of what may ultimately represent an appropriate, effective and adequately flexible institutional framework. While some of this negotiation takes place in the ‘formal’ domain – between donors, amongst state representatives and between agencies (defined as ‘turf battles’) – much of it occurs informally out of sight of international actors. But it is ‘informal’ negotiations – between former commanders, erstwhile combatants, elites and community leaders, and families and dependents – that are often key to DDR success or failure. Yet formal conditions are routinely imposed on DDR activities, even if they may not be appropriate or required, while in other instances not all the standard components of DDR are necessary. For example, while it may appeal to some military actors, cantonment may not be appropriate. Ultimately, a common mantra today is that DDR must never be based on a fixed blueprint. Rather innovation and creativity and a sensitivity to ‘context’ always remain important for efficient and effective interventions (Kingma and Muggah 2009).

As noted above, the literature indicates that the international peace-support, peace-building and development architecture has expanded in tandem with international preoccupation over state fragility, stabilization and reconstruction. Often under the auspices of ‘integrated’ or ‘joined-up’ peace support missions, a vast array of multilateral and bilateral agencies have invested in short- and medium-term security promotion efforts, especially DDR and SSR, but also interim stabilization and second generation efforts (Colletta and Muggah 2008). Rather, the presence of armed groups and military expenditures perceived as high push DDR to the top of their agenda. If not for the sheer costs of maintaining a large national army, it might in some cases be attractive to absorb former rebels into the regular (reformed) national army and postpone DDR, whilst other core issues are being addressed.
Regardless of the specific ‘social technology’, a defining characteristic of this emergent stabilization and reconstruction agenda is the explicit merging of security and development agendas, institutions and actors. In practice, this has been achieved through ‘whole-of-government’ and ‘whole-of-system’ approaches, the practical expression of which is most obviously ‘integrated missions’ (Muggah 2009a, 2009b, 2007; IDDRS 2006). As such, DDR can and should be regarded as just one of many instrumental means of preventing states and societies from slipping back into ‘instability’ and ultimately war.

In the twenty first century, DDR is firmly wedded to the logic of stabilization, reconstruction and ultimately reconstituting effective states and state-civil society bargaining. While reflecting wider trends in the privatisation of security more generally, the implementation of DDR is being delegated to private security companies. These trends are hardly surprising since DDR mirrors the strategic and bureaucratic priorities of the security and development sectors and thus the discourse and policy priorities of international donors and power-holding elites. Irrespective of the (apparently now diminished) western appetite for a liberal peace support agenda, the effectiveness of the broad spectrum treatment for contemporary post-war landscapes remains critically untested (Muggah and Krause 2009; Egnell and Halden 2009). And notwithstanding an apparent consensus on the imperative for DDR from Colombia and Haiti to Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan, there are also still fundamental tensions concerning how it expected to be achieved, its indicators of success (or effectiveness), the parameters of targeting, or how to reconcile ‘security’ and ‘justice’ imperatives.

Not surprisingly, some critical scholars have examined how the labels and terms of DDR are also freighted with political connotations. For example, in some countries, the concept of DDR is fundamentally rejected in favour for less ‘securitized’ terminology. Maoist fighters in Nepal and Moros combatants in Mindanao fundamentally rejected the ‘discourse’ of DDR (Colletta and Muggah 2009).

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9 See, for example, Zyck (2009) and Bhatia and Muggah (2009) for a review of DDR and its consequences for nation-building in Afghanistan or Vines and Oriuitemeka (2008) for a consideration of how former UNITA combatants have reintegrated politically in Angola.

10 Dyncorp and other private actors are playing a key role in DDR throughout Afghanistan, Liberia, Sudan, Haiti and elsewhere. Likewise, quasi-UN agencies such as IOM and a widening group of non-governmental actors are also adopting a central function as subcontractors in executing DDR activities.

11 See, for example, Ucko for a review of US efforts to promote DDR, and specifically political reintegration, of former armed forces of the deposed Iraqi regime and the Kurdish and Shia militia.
Policy innovations

Over the past five years an array of policy initiatives have sought to distill core lessons emerging from DDR policy and practice. Many of these processes yielded prescriptive international guidelines and standards. For example, in 2006 – after a process of several years of analysis and internal and external consultations – a UN interagency working group generated a set of Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (UN-IDDRS). The IDDRS represent the agreed guidelines and procedures of the UN for preparing and executing DDR programmes in peacekeeping operations (United Nations 2006b). These guidelines acknowledges the inherent complexity of DDR and its essentially political dynamics. The IDDRS also demonstrated the inherent tension between UN policy guidance on DDR and the need for national ownership of DDR processes. As many hardened UN veterans know too well, during peacekeeping operations it is difficult to live up to the demands of ‘national ownership’. Although the IDDRS is the most comprehensive set of good practices in DDR and offers a loose doctrine for decision-makers and practitioners alike, it also risks fueling ‘template thinking’. This could unintentionally inhibit flexibility in responding to the specific needs as they occur or result in the disempowering of national institutions.12

Meanwhile, new IDDRS modules are being added and old ones revised. For example, the latest module to be established aims to clarify the nexus between DDR and SSR (Bryden 2009; Knight 2008; Bendix and Stanley 2008). The expectation is that these and other inputs can assist host governments and associated agencies in converting former combatants into legitimate security providers. A variety of important entry-points relate to the design and sharing of management information systems (MIS) between DDR, SSR, and transitional justice and related planners and managers. At a programmatic level, it is assumed that these same actors can usefully establish clear and transparent criteria for the integration of former combatants into the security sector (that reflect national priorities and stipulate appropriate skills and backgrounds). In addition to clarifying roles and re-training requirements of different security bodies, DDR, SSR and transitional justice planners can purportedly better ensure transparent (and equitable) chains of payment to existing and newly integrated security sector and justice personnel.13

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12 Also in 2006, the Swedish Government produced the results of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR). It included the conclusions of a two-year discussion process to contribute to the creation of a predictable framework in which DDR processes can be planned and implemented. The SIDDR Final Report and the various background papers are not as operationally oriented as the UN IDDRS, but outline very clearly the complexity of the operations and processes and the required linkages with other elements in the peace process, such as security sector reform and transitional justice.

13 For a review of training experiences of former combatants, see Ozerdem (2003).
Two other relevant documents that currently guide DDR processes focus primarily on children (below the age of 18). Endorsed at a ministerial meeting held in 2007, these include the Paris Commitments to Protect Children Unlawfully Recruited or Used by Armed Forces or Armed Groups and the Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups. These documents build on the Cape Town Principles adopted in 1997 and the ongoing experience of UNICEF and other national and international agencies (Houseden 2009). They underscore the humanitarian imperative for unconditional release of children from armed forces and armed groups at all times, even in the midst of violent conflict. It is also important to note that several years of activism and research has led to the adoption of the UN Resolution 1325, which urges the international community to enhance the role of women at all levels in peace processes. It includes indications of how women’s role should be strengthened in relation to DDR design and implementation.14

Despite the emergence of prescriptions and guidelines, many decision makers operating in the security and development sectors continue to wrestle with the conceptual dimensions of DDR (Kilroy 2008). Whilst norm setting exercises offer important signposts, they only take planners so far. As was indicated above, each DDR exercise needs to be designed and negotiated according to the specific circumstances on the ground even if most operations are guided by supply-side matrices and check-list thinking. At the international level, a lingering concern among some UN agencies and governments, for example, relates to the institutional and bureaucratic ‘integration’ of disparate multilateral and bilateral agencies mandated to deal with DDR and the best ways of ensuring the ‘reinsertion’ and ‘reintegration’ of former fighters and associated groups. In the context of wider UN reforms, there is a vibrant debate over how best to coordinate the international DDR architecture amongst disparate security and development agencies, and whether they can practicably ‘deliver the goods’. Nevertheless, the choice of which international agency(ies) would play a role in a specific DDR operation remains dependent on their specific comparative advantages and the preference of local actors, in particular the relevant government.

Although peace-keepers and civilian personnel working in the face of simmering violence are struggling to generate results, the priority is naturally more toward delivery than regular monitoring and evaluation. Even so, in a donor climate increasingly dominated by results-based management, many operational agencies are also con-

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14 See, for example, BICC (2001) and Hauge for a review of the literature on women and DDR.
scious of the critical importance of moving away from prescriptive approaches toward evidence-based interventions that promote genuine safety and security but have few examples of how to move the agenda forward. Appropriate metrics of success, the indicators, impacts and outcomes of DDR – together with analysis of what and why it does or does not work – are all urgently required.

**Programming innovations**

A recurring dilemma for DDR planners and practitioners relates to the issue of ‘targeting’ of disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration support. It is widely accepted that in most DDR operations the ex-combatants receive an initial assistance package, usually entailing a monetary component. Whether reintegration support within the DDR programme should be provided specifically to the ex-combatant and her/his family unit has long been a point of debate. Related to this is the difficulty of discerning between combatants and non-combatants – a problem certainly not limited to DDR programming and one aggravated by the so-called ‘new wars’ of the past Cold War era. As research has amply shown, targeted direct support to ex-combatants and their immediate family is likely to contribute more effectively to immediate stabilization, but it can and does routinely engender disquiet among the wider population. Most reintegration support efforts have sought to achieve a balance.

An alternative (non-monetary) mechanism includes the provision of specific information, counseling and referral services to ex-combatants. Such assistance can potentially assist ex-combatants consider their needs and preferences and be guided towards appropriate reintegration opportunities – whether through some specific legal advice, participation in a rural development programme, the opportunity to return to school, or an economic opportunity in the market. Although conventional individual approaches to targeting reinsertion and reintegration assistance persist, alternative approaches have emerged over the past two decades. These build on the ‘collective’ approaches and also include ‘community-centered’ and ‘area-based’ interventions including in Haiti, Mozambique, the Philippines, the Republic of Congo and Sudan (Specker 2008). The core innovation of these approaches is not necessarily in their specific institutional or even programmatic design, but rather the pragmatic acknowledgement that they flow from a diagnosis of the context in which they operate. Very generally, they recognise that individuated incentives can not only fuel resentment and communal tension, but they are often inadequate, wasted and contribute to moral hazard. Collective targeting – from weapons lotteries and inter-community competitions to quick impact
projects and scaled-up sector assistance – seemed to circumvent many of these challenges.

Although the number and intensity of armed conflicts has declined since the mid-1990s, post-war violence simmers on. Certain lessons associated with preventing and reducing armed violence in multiple contexts are being learned. Over the past decade, security promotion activities are adjusting to the dynamic landscapes of post-war armed violence (Muggah and Krause 2009). Both ‘second generation peacekeeping’ in the wake of operations in the former-Yugoslavia and Somalia and more recent ‘stabilization’ missions following interventions from Afghanistan and Iraq to Timor-Leste and Haiti have emphasised the value of joining-up military and civilian activities. Such evolution and adaptation is suggestive of an element of experimentation and pragmatism. Together with mainstream post-war activities, such as mine clearance, truth and reconciliation interventions and international criminal courts, interventions seeking to promote safety and security are flourishing (Knight 2008). In some cases, security promotion activities once confined to war zones are now being applied in ostensibly non-war environments. And while evidence of ‘success’ of these newer practices remains comparatively thin, these interventions potentially complement and reinforce conventional strategies.

As indicated above, at least two clusters of emerging practices – interim stabilization and second generation activities – are suggestive of a new horizon of experimentation (Colletta and Muggah 2009b). Interim stabilisation measures feature clear and immediate objectives. These are to dramatically reduce armed violence; consolidate peace and real and perceived security; build confidence and trust and; buy time and space for the macro conditions to ripen for more conventional security promotion activities such as DDR and SSR to take hold, including second generation initiatives. Meanwhile, second generation security promotion approaches are fast emerging as alternatives and compliments to DDR and SSR, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean. They tend to be evidence-led, focusing at the outset on identifying and mitigating demonstrated risk factors, enhancing resilience and protective factors at the metropolitan and community levels, and constructing interventions on the basis of identified needs.

**Theoretical innovations**

While not necessarily a discipline or field of enquiry in its own right, the study of DDR has expanded considerably over the past two decades. Beginning with a relatively modest number of specialists with
expertise in international relations and political science, the landscape has widened to include experts in development studies, security, policing and military studies, econometrics, anthropology, sociology, criminology, psychology and behavioural studies, human geography, public health, and others. Much of this expansion was inspired by policy and programming interest expressed in multilateral and bilateral policy arenas. Action-oriented researchers frequently imparted ‘lessons from the field’ in the academic environment, including international conferences. Likewise, practitioners have also in some cases been encouraged to invest in evidence-based policy and programming, thus advancing the exchange. DDR research could therefore be characterised as a classic case of research-practice praxis – a fully iterative and dynamic exchange.

Research and practice on DDR has been motivated predominantly by programmatic and operational concerns rather than more esoteric scholarly interests such as war recurrence (Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008). Academic investigation has focused on practical aspects of the project cycle – from designing robust DDR interventions to monitoring and evaluating outputs and outcomes. In what amounts to the first generation of DDR research from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, researchers from predominantly US, UK and Western European institutions (both university and research institute-based) focused on more qualitative and case-specific phenomenon in Africa. This first wave began with general assessments of DDR and its relationship with wider peace-building and state-building processes (Berdal 1996). Researchers were mobilised to examine specific aspects of combatant and ex-combatant motivations and skill-sets, access to and availability of weapons and munitions, the relative trade-offs between cash and non-cash incentives for participation, absorptive potential in areas of return and repatriation, long-term dividends of reintegration assistance, the trade-offs between individual and collective renumeration and recidivism of DDR participants. In some cases, findings have featured in both scholarly and practitioner oriented journals.

A major focus of first wave scholars was with the specific institutional features of DDR itself – namely disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. As such, research focused on the dynamic outcomes of each phase, the logic of sequencing, and the dilemmas associated with each activity rather than the wider array of processes occurring before, after or in parallel with DDR. Theoretical approaches tended to assume rational agency models and focused, if at all, on primarily economic criteria of demobilization and reintegration effectiveness. First

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generation scholars were especially preoccupied with defining the target groups (Jensen and Stepputat 2001), the security dilemmas associated with asymmetrical disarmament (Spear 2001), the perils of partial demobilization (Colletta et al 1996; Kingma and Sayers 1994), the adequacy of reintegration assistance inputs (Kingma 2000), and the consistency of funding (Ball and Hendrickson 2005). As such, DDR was conceived as a bounded activity, spatially, temporally and socially remote from other activities. While drawing important conceptual parameters around the debate on DDR, these early studies did not address fundamental questions of causality or correlation, actor agency, or intervention outcomes.

More recently, scholarly attention to DDR has evolved to begin testing assumptions, undertaking comparative assessments and breaking new disciplinary ground. In what could be described as the second wave of DDR research (from the mid-2000s to the present), a growing number of academics are investing in statistical assessments drawing on large-n sample studies and more experimental design to test counter-factual arguments with examples from Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans, South Asia and the South Pacific. Specifically, researchers have begun to examine large numbers of DDR interventions (from 1989-present) to examine the determinants of DDR and the strength of their statistical contribution to war (non)recurrence or homicide reduction (ECP 2007; Blake 2009; Restrepo, Muggah 2009; Gilligan, Mvukiyehe, Samii 2010; Tajima 2010. This expansion in research mirrors, in part, a widening of engagement in DDR from multilateral and bilateral development agencies, foreign policy establishments and policy think tanks (Muggah 2009a, 2009b).

The sheer diversity of theoretical and practical innovation is bewildering. The list of topics of interest has expanded to include not just core aspects of DDR, but also wider inter-sectoral relationships between DDR and transitional justice16, security sector reform17, and state-building processes. More focused investigations include micro-economic assessments of demobilised combatant behaviour/outcomes in comparison to non-participant cohorts (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006, 2009; Christensen and Utas 2008; Pugel 2009). Others might include randomised survey-based assessments of the incentives shaping child involvement in armed groups and the likely determinants of their successful exit (Blatman and Annan 2009; Wellman 2006). Meanwhile, some DDR specialists began focusing on assisting programmers on influencing the ‘design’ and ‘implementation’ of inter-

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16 See, for example, the long term project of the ICTJ and Patel (2009) as well as Morgenstein (2008).
17 See, for example, Berdal and Ucko (2009) and Bryden (2009, 2007); and Egnell and Hal-
ventions so as to better measure programme effectiveness. In Aceh (Barron 2009), Burundi (Sami 2009; Douma and Gasana 2008), Liberia (Pugel 2009), Sierra Leone (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006, 2009; Mitton 2008), and elsewhere, researchers sought to encourage the randomisation of DDR entitlements to identify the actual probability of effective political and economic reintegration outcomes. Even as it may have stirred up controversy, their work has also served to refine the metrics of reintegration success and failure.

In the course of these two waves of academic enquiry, a professional field of experts has emerged to help guide DDR design, management, outputs and outcomes. Many of these specialists work directly for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2005), the World Bank (2004, 2002), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and various bilateral partners. Composed of a military and police, development practitioners, social science researchers and many others, this nascent epistemic community is fast producing lessons that reveal some common trends and patterns across time and space. For example, there is an emerging consensus that DDR should be considered early-on in a given peace process (preferably in negotiations and in the peace agreement itself), that it be meaningfully owned and managed by legitimate national institutions (with attention to political economies), that it combine a combination of cash and non-monetised incentives targeting individual and collectives, and that the division of labour for its various components be based on a coherent vision and according to the comparative advantages of the actors involved (in a so-called ‘integrated’ approach or otherwise) (Green et al 2008; Muggah 2009a, 2009b). Another important lesson relates to humility and effective communication, especially concerning what can be realistically achieved by DDR in usually complex environments (Berdal and Ucko 2009; Muggah 2009a, 2009b).

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18 See, for example, EU (2006), GTZ (2008, 2004), USAID (2005) and others.
19 See, for example, Buchanan, C. and Widmer, M. (2006) and Baare and Muggah (2009).
20 See, for example, Ozerdem and Podder (2008) and Willibald (2006).
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