



LITHUANIAN ANNUAL STRATEGIC YEU'IEW









Institute of International Relations and Political Science of the University of Vilnius

STRATEGIC RESEARCH CENTER

LITHUANIAN ANNUAL STRATEGIC REVIEW 2008

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Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2008

This is a peer reviewed annual research publication published by the Military Academy of Lithuania in co-operation with Institute of International Relations and Political Science of the University of Vilnius. The main objective of this publication is to provide the readers with a wide-scale analysis and generalization of the changes, both essential and significant, for the national security of Lithuania at the international–systemic, regional, and national levels. The yearbook also aims to give maximum emphasis to the specificity of Lithuanian national security issues and comprehensively present them to a widely interested and concerned audience.

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Preface

The seventh volume of the "Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review", prepared by the Lithuanian Military Academy and the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, surveys the security aspects referring to the political dimensions of the world, Europe, Lithuania and the eastern neighbours of Lithuania from the end of 2007 to the beginning of 2008 and continues our tradition in informative publishing. As it is true of previous volumes, this publication aims at covering an extensive range of topics along a broad geographical context.

The first part of the publication, called the *Global International System* presents three articles. In the first article, Gintaras Bagdonas analyzes problems of a totally different nature, yet of no less significance, in the study "Relations between Intelligence Services and Policy Makers: An Analysis of Challenges and Their Causes". As a practitioner and former head of the Lithuanian Military Intelligence, the author has an intimate "internal" knowledge of the workings of intelligence services. The article is informative as both a theoretical survey of publications dealing with theoretical issues of intelligence concepts, and as a practical analysis of the problems referring to the relations between intelligence services and policy makers in democratic countries. Bagdonas just touched upon this aspect of Lithuanian problems, but later discussed is Vaidotas Urbelis's article, which presented in part four of this publication and assists in filling the void.

The second article, "China: Rational Expectations and Economic Rationalism", by Dalia Šiukštienė, refers to the economic-cultural phenomenon of China still awaiting the interest of Lithuanian researchers. In this article the author primarily focuses her attention on the growth possibilities and limitations of the economic might of China - its swinging between the free market and principles of its single-party system operation - as well as the pressure caused by these contradictions.

The geography of the publication is also expanded by Egidijus Vareikis's article, "African Security Survey". The very title of the article indicates that the author does not aim to supply a more comprehensive analysis of the situation in Africa, yet, on the global and European levels, he consistently covers many important security problems triggered by the specificity of the continent.

The second part of the "Review 2008" titled, Changing European Security Space comprises two studies. Eglė Elena Šataitė, in the article "Peace Building Operations: the Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina", explores in sufficient detail, and from the perspective of comparative analysis, the very concept and types of peace missions and also presents exhaustive empirical material on Lithuania's participation in international operations in the Balkans with a focus on the analysis of the Bosnia and Herzegovina case. The article also presents the attitude, substantiated by abundant official sources, of different international organizations to international operations.

In the second article of this section, "The Lithuanian Geographical Situation in the EU as the Factor of Strategic Development", Leonas Žitkus conducts a rather original research into criteria and conditions of the competitiveness of states, pointing out "hereditary" and "created" factors of the economic development of countries. A geographic situation is one of the traditional, but significant factors. The author discloses the conditions that enhance the advantages of the geographical situation of the country in employing them for the development of the Lithuanian economy or certain sectors of it.

Two research articles of the third section, titled *Lithuania's Eastern Neighbourhood* are devoted to actualities of Russian foreign and security policy. Dovilė Jakniūnaitė, in her article "Symbolic Foreign Policy Games: Russian – Great Britain Relations in 2006 – 2008", applies the approach of symbolic games to analyze relations between the two countries. It is an interesting methodological and empirical attempt to reveal the dynamics of the relations between these states, emerging pressures and the normalization process. By applying the category of symbolic games, the author analyzes elements and specifics of information warfare.

The study, "The Development of Georgia's Security Strategy: Tough Road Towards NATO", by Tomas Janeliūnas and Laura Kirvelytė explores different aspects of one of the most painful problems referring to the end of 2008 – the state of security and defence in Georgia, its aspirations and perspectives to become a member of the collective security, and also Lithuania's diplomatic attempts to facilitate the resolution of Georgia's problems. By applying the concept of a small state, the author reveals that security guarantees of Georgia have narrowed to a single objective – to become a member of the NATO alliance. Janeliūnas and Kirvelytė pose a question whether the aspiration for the membership of NATO can definitely guarantee security for Georgia. They point out that Georgia is still attempting to settle problems of its national security and territorial integrity, that obstacles to its NATO membership are associated not only with separatist regions but also with the Georgian President Saakashvili's home policy, as well as certain restrictions on democracy.

Studies presented in the fourth section called, *National Security Issues*, renew topics explored within global and regional contexts and actualize them with the analysis of Lithuania's case. The article by Almantas Leika, "The Lithuanian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan: Achievements and Challenges", takes us back to the topic of peacekeeping missions that was touched upon in part two of the publication. The author discusses politically, the largest and most significant international operation of Lithuania – Lithuania's command of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) that has been operating for three years already in Ghor Province of Afghanistan. The author, one of the former PRT rotated commanders, clearly, consistently and in a practical manner analyzes the genuine situation in Afghanistan in overall, putting the most emphasis on the situation in the Ghor Province. The author not only shares his experience, but places the Lithuanian mission within the context of NATO activity and compares the PRT in Ghor with missions of other countries.

In the study, "The Construction of the Model of the Army in Lithuania's Political Discourse", Gražina Miniotaitė provides an exceptionally academic analysis of the changes in the Lithuanian army and analyzes image-formation particularities of the Lithuanian army and also a military person within the political discourse of Lithuania. The author attempts to answer the question whether what is projected in the official discourse conception of the Lithuanian army, as a constituent part of NATO armed forces and its transfer to a professional army, is in harmony with the orientation to a national state typical of the Lithuanian home policy. Changes in the image of the army and a military person are researched in a broader historical cultural context associating them with the interaction of normative attitudes of "modernity" and "postmodernity" within the political discourse of Lithuania. Theoretical insights are verified by using public opinion research data.

Vaidotas Urbelis, in his article "Lithuanian Intelligence System" continues the theme initiated by Bagdonas about the relationship between intelligence services and politics. Urbelis presents a consistent and comprehensive research on both the institutional architecture of Lithuanian intelligence and the intelligence process. The author thoroughly surveys the literature on intelligence activity at different historical periods and further analyzes the establishment process of Lithuanian intelligence institutions after the restoration of the independence of Lithuania. This encyclopaedic article could be recommended to those who would like to become employees of intelligence services and those who are interested and would like to expand their outlook and enhance their knowledge on the subject.

Issues on climate change and the ensuing consequences, that have so far escaped the attention of the "Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review", but have proved urgent during the recent decades, are closely examined by Stanislovas Sinkevičius and Gytautas Ignatavičius in the article "Changes in the Natural Environment and Their Potential Impact for Lithuania". The authors claim that the impact of natural environment change on the development of societies and states constantly calls for a specific analysis and more accurate prognoses. The problem is analyzed at global and Lithuania levels. The authors indicate possible roots of conflicts that might arise because of a change in natural environment: natural resources, risk of an increase in water level, territories and borders, migration. The article is particularly informative due to its graphic materials, which reveal the situation in Lithuania from the point of view of a change in the natural environment.

We wish our readers an interesting acquaintance with the new research studies. We would also like to remind you that these and previous volumes of the "Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review" are at the General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania website.

Global International System and Lithuania

Gintaras Bagdonas*

European Union Military Staff**

Relations between Intelligence Services and Policy Makers: An Analysis of Challenges and Their Causes

This article addresses the relations between intelligence services and political institutions in democratic countries and overviews the main causes of both challenges and the tensions between these issues. The purpose of this publication is to analyze the relations between intelligence services and political institutions of contemporary democratic countries, to determine the fundamental challenges and disagreements of these institutions and to offer suggestions on how to avoid, or at least to reduce, these challenges and their affect on the intelligence activities.

The main dilemmas in these relationships are caused by an insufficient understanding of the role, capabilities, and limitation of intelligence. This is why the article starts with the analysis of the tasks of intelligence and determines its definition. The article deals with the main problems arising in the relationship between intelligence services and political institutions: the lack of clear priorities and requirements provided to the intelligence services; deficiencies in 'feedback'; the over-familiarity or, on the contrary, absence of interaction in the relationship; and the politicization of intelligence.

Whilst acknowledging the inevitable challenge of politicians seeking to affect the process of intelligence, this article aims to avoid the negative effect of politicization of intelligence. It offers a solution to create systematic relations based on confidence and a professional understanding of each other's different responsibilities, capabilities and restrictions. The emphasis is on the balanced divide between domains of politics and intelligence.

Introduction

Although almost two decades have passed since the crumbling of the Soviet Union, the world has not become a safer place. The spectre of threats, risks and challenges to the security of countries and people has become incre-

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^{**} The views and evaluations expressed in this article are purely those of the writer and may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the EU Council and should not be attributed to the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania and its institutions.

asingly varied. Challenges to the safety of democratic societies are posed by both asymmetric threats such as terrorism and organized crime and also by the 'old' threats and challenges originating from totalitarian states and from the collapse of countries due to political crises, emerging military conflicts followed by humanitarian disasters, ethnic cleansing, genocide and migration problems. Additionally, there are new phenomena of the 21st Century creating security problems to the democratic communities, which must also be added to this spectre of threats. Among these are cybernetic dangers, information wars and other use of information in order to get political dividends in the international arena or domestic politics, challenges to energy security and problems originating from global warming. In contemporary democratic countries the role of intelligence in safeguarding national security is more important than ever.

In democratic countries, most public debates on the subject of intelligence are usually connected to the failures of intelligence: for example, when a certain dramatic event or so called 'strategic surprise' takes place, discussions on the efficiency gaps of intelligence are raised. It is not sufficient to organize the intelligence service itself and its inner activity when it comes to the successful execution of tasks given to it. In a democratic state intelligence does not work for itself. Depending on the results of intelligence, other institutions make necessary decisions and initiate appropriate actions. An intelligence organisation of a democratic country works on behalf of the customers of intelligence information: governments, politicians and other decision makers². Intelligence services are authorized to collect and analyze information by institutions that need certain intelligence data. In the terminology of intelligence, these institutions (mainly the institutions of executive government responsible for the foreign, security and defence policy of a country) are often called the 'customers' of intelligence. The success or failure of intelligence may depend on the relationship with these customers. This is why one of the most important conditions of efficiency of intelligence activity is the clearly defined and harmonious relationship between intelligence services and their consumers. An element of these relations is the necessity for customers of intelligence to understand what intelligence services can and what they can not do, to strengthen the security of a country and society and to ensure their national interests. As the historian Walter Laqueur wrote:

Intelligence not only has to train new recruits but also to educate its customers. This is a formidable task because the latter, at a more advanced age, are very busy people, sure of their own judgement [...]. They have to be convinced of what intelligence can, and what it cannot, achieve³.

¹ For more information on the 'strategic surprise' and on it's relation to intelligence look at: Handel I. M. *War, Strategy and Intelligence*, London: Frank Cass, 1989, p. 229 – 281.

Nomikos M. J., "European Union Intelligence Agency: a necessary institution for Common Intelligence Policy?" Look: Koutrakou N.V., Contemporary issues and debates in EU policy. The European Union and international relations. Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York: 2004, p. 39

Laquer, W., A Word of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence, New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers. 1985, p. 343.

The goal of this paper is: to analyze the relations between intelligence: and other governmental institutions, which are closely connected to intelligence services in one way or another; to identify the main challenges and disagreements emerging between these institutions; to determine the reasons for these problems; and to provide possible solutions in order to avoid these challenges or at least to mitigate against them. The scope of the article will only focus on the analysis of relations between intelligence and its customers (i.e. decision-makers). It will not address the issue of parliamentary control and oversight of intelligence services. As far as this function is independent from the role and responsibilities of executive governance in relation to intelligence services.

This article is based on author's personal experience as well as on books and publications released mainly in English. It is confined only to the practice of intelligence services of democratic countries and does not refer to any of them specifically.

1. What is Intelligence?

A frequently occurring problem in the relations between intelligence services and customers of intelligence is the different understandings of the role intelligence plays in safeguarding the national security of a country. It would seem that the easiest way to determine what intelligence can do and what it cannot do is to create a unified definition defining the tasks, functions and spheres of intelligence. The problem is that there are many definitions of intelligence. Even countries with long lasting traditions of intelligence have not created a united clear definition. The United States of America alone has more than ten different definitions of intelligence⁴. Firstly, a distinction between the two words – intelligence and information – is needed. The latter can be used to describe any knowledge regardless of the methods used for obtaining it. In the words of a former long-time US officer of intelligence and the current President of the US Academy of Intelligence and Security and professor of the University of Columbia, Mark M. Lowenthal, intelligence is information that has already been systematized, processed and evaluated, and that satisfies the expressed needs of decision or policy maker⁵. Although it canot be argued against, this definition is not thorough because it does not reveal the reason for collecting intelligence.

The Law on Intelligence of the Republic of Lithuania defines four intelligence related definitions: intelligence, intelligence activity, intelligence information and intelligence service⁶:

⁴ Warner, M. "Wanted: A Definition of "Intelligence"", https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/docs/v46i3a02p.htm, 2008-06-22.

⁵ Lowenthal, M. M., *Intelligence: from Secrets to Policy*, third edition, Washington D.C. CQ Press, 2006, p.2.

⁶ Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, the Law on Intelligence, Article No 2, 2000-07-17, Nr. VIII-1861, Žin., 2000, Nr. 64-1931, p.2., http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_1?p_id=171400, (in Lithuanian), 2008-06-15.

Intelligence – activity of intelligence service that use special and operational methods and means in order to protect a person's, a society's and a state's security from external threats.

Intelligence activity – the collection, procession and analysis of intelligence information and other actions taken by an intelligence service in order to guarantee national security.

Intelligence information – data about actions, plans or intentions of foreign states, organizations or persons which pose or could pose threats, risk factors or dangers to Lithuanian state from exterior, also other data which is relevant in guaranteeing national security.

Intelligence services – subdivision (subdivisions) of institutions with special authorization from the state, which are assigned by this law to carry out intelligence activity.

As can be seen from the above Act, Lithuanian intelligence encompasses three components: intelligence is a service that uses methods of intelligence activity, collects and processes intelligence information, which is important to national security.

Most openly accessible sources refer to intelligence in a similar way. In addition, American political scientists Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt call intelligence (not linking it to intelligence services or activity) the information that is needed to secure a government's policy, to support a country's national security interests and to deal with threats stemming from adversaries or opponents⁷. This definition names the customers of intelligence and outlines the reasons for carrying out intelligence activity, but like the definition of Lowenthal it does not explain the core of intelligence practice. Before trying to define intelligence, it is important to understand that it is a constantly ongoing process (also called 'Cycle') which consists of many closely related processes depending on each others components. In shaping intelligence activity this process is usually presented as below (Figure 1)⁸:




Figure 1. Traditional Process of Intelligence

Shulsky N. A., Schmitt J. G., Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence, Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2002, p. 1.

⁸ Turner A. M., Why Secret Intelligence Fails Dules, Virginia: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005, p. 9.

- Planning and direction In this stage priorities are set down, the intelligence service gets appropriate authorizations, tasks and requirements of decision makers, politicians and other consumers, in order to carry out intelligence activity;
- Collection In this stage subdivisions of intelligence gather the required information. In this stage various means of information collection (e.g. technical intelligence, human intelligence and openly available sources of information) are employed;
- Processing In this stage collected information is evaluated and if necessary translated or deciphered, the relevance and reliability of this information is assessed. Also at this stage, information can be in certain ways sanitized in order to protect the sources of information or the methods used to gather it;
- Analysis and production In this part of the cycle analysts analyze the information, evaluate it, make forecasts and conclusions and work up the appropriate form for delivery of intelligence to the customers;
- Dissemination i.e. submission of final intelligence product to the customer, politician or other decision maker.

This is a simplified and theoretical model of intelligence. In practice, when organizing intelligence activity this process is not necessarily fulfilled in the exact order as presented above. In some cases, for example when generating the so-called 'early warning' about threats, intelligence information on likely short term threats to the security of the society or the state is introduced to consumers straight after receiving it. Another frequent deviation from this process of intelligence happens at the very beginning. While planning the intelligence activity, a politician or another policy maker does not form the requirements of intelligence and does not set the priorities. This has a negative affect on the intelligence activity and distorts the intelligence process. The latter problem will be analyzed in more detail later in the article.

Usually intelligence information and the activity used to gather it is linked to secrecy. There is an issue about whether intelligence and associated activity necessarily needs to be classified? There are different opinions and answers to this question. It is widely known that the intelligence services of contemporary democratic countries collect openly available information from the various sources of media: newspapers, journals, radio, television, internet, etc. Intelligence officers call this type of information open source intelligence (OSINT). But if all intelligence activities and their products were limited to openly accessible information would there be a point for a state to maintain intelligence services? This type of information could be collected and analyzed by those institutions that need it. However, not all information about foreign policy or other spheres of national security is 'open'. As Laqeuer noted, in 1941 many USA intelligence analysts read Japanese newspapers everyday and still did not find a message about the planned attack on the US forces in the port of Pearl Harbour, executed on 7 December 1941. As well, the Soviet newspaper

Pravda did not report on the Soviet missiles⁹. So it is obvious that while the landestine or discrete activity of states, groups or individuals exist, certain institutions must be informed in a timely manner about possible hazardous events, in order to assure the national security of a state or society in order for them to be able to avoid these events or affect them in a useful or at least less damaging manner. Undoubtedly, intelligence services use classified methods and sources to gather overtly unavailable or secret information, which can not be revealed on any occasion. As Lowenthal explains, the reason why states need intelligence is because some have information they donot reveal to others, so the latter obtain it by using secret methods: because of this and collection methods, they are forced to keep the gathered information classified¹⁰. Later, this article will return to the subject of classification and explain why sometimes even intelligence produced on open sources has to be classified.

While analyzing intelligence activity it is necessary to mention its application or the objectives of its practice. Intelligence can be strategic, namely directly corresponding to national demands in the fields of foreign politics, security and defence, for example in the realization or protection of national interests. In short, strategic intelligence can be called an activity that supports the state's decision makers at the national level. In the practice of this activity the products of intelligence usually encompass medium or long term views and are called 'intelligence estimates' (USA) or 'assessments' (Great Britain and Australia)¹¹.

Finally, intelligence products have to embody various different aspects as they are special knowledge. In the contemporary world, intelligence information can be exclusively civilian by its content, but it can rarely be only military. This delineation is especially unsuitable for dividing a strategic intelligence activity and its products into civilian and military. Nevertheless, institutional separation into civil and military intelligence remains mainly because of the needs of both civil and military institutions to receive intelligence fulfilling their different priorities. Intelligence required by the military command is rarely underpinning to a civilian institution. Intelligence assessments supporting contemporary military operations (e.g. military counterterrorist operations, peace establishment and peacekeeping operations, etc.) can involve a very wide spectrum: from traditional military aspects, such as knowledge of adversary's capabilities and intensions, territorial and geo-meteorological peculiarities, to completely 'civilian' factors, for example a region's economic, social and political aspects, biographies of persons involved in the operation, regional levels of terrorism and crime and also diseases, epidemics and the ecological situation, etc.

Intelligence services can be authorized to carry out operational or tactical intelligence in supporting the Armed Forces. For example, in order to execute

⁹ Lageuer, p. 12.

¹⁰ Lowenthal, p.4 – 5.

¹¹ Ibidem, p. 133.

a military operation it is necessary for the command to have certain intelligence on the adversary, its capabilities and intentions, territory of operation, etc. Whereas, in the National level intelligence service (which can also be military) support to the policy makers provides them with current intelligence, the purpose of which is provide customers with the information on the latest 'hot' events. This type of intelligence, just like tactical and operational, usually encompasses a short-term period. Generally, the collected current intelligence assists further development of strategic intelligence production. Since the threat of terrorism has increased, intelligence services of many states give priority to intelligence on terrorism. This type of activity normally falls in the category of current intelligence because of the short-term use of the collected intelligence information. By its nature, current intelligence is usually carried out by giving indication and early warning on possible threats¹². Operational, tactical and current intelligence activities, which require modern and constantly renewable technical means and a degree of professional personnel, are far more costly than strategic intelligence. It would be wrong to believe that in the contemporary world intelligence services of a National level could be only confined to the strategic level of intelligence. Moreover, as it was previously said, final evaluation of strategic intelligence requires daily current information - the 'raw material' of intelligence. From its various and obscure elements, just like in a jigsaw puzzle, a clear image is created. Current threats and challenges to the security of states and societies force states to invest in the creation of complex intelligence capabilities that function at both strategic and tactical levels because sources of tactical threats can become strategic challenges to the security of the country and society. The most obvious illustration of this is the terrorist attacks of Al Qaeda committed in New York, Washington D.C., London and Madrid between 2001 and 2005.

The issue now turns to whether intelligence, its analysis and evaluation need to be regarded as absolute truth? As paradoxical as it would seem, the answer is negative. As Lowenthal claimed 'truth' is such an absolute notion that it would be completely impossible for intelligence services to reach its standard if one was determined¹³. An intelligence service has to collect information, to evaluate certain circumstances which would be difficult to verify - not to mention prove - using other means. If these means existed, it would be more advisable (maybe even less expensive) to use those other, alternative methods. As Michael M. Handel stated:

In the word of intelligence, even technical data concerning performance or the number of weapons, let alone less quantifiable issues such as intentions, military doctrine, and morale, cannot be objectively assessed – which means that clear agreement on their 'meaning' cannot be reached. 14

¹² Shulsky and Schmitt, p. 58-60.

¹³ Lowenthal, p.7.

¹⁴ Handel I. M. War, Strategy and Intelligence, London: Frank Cass, 1989, p. 196.

Because intelligence is connected to collecting information on the conditional probability of individual's actions and the analysis of this collected information, British professors Peter Gill and Mark Phythian suggest naming intelligence 'art' ¹⁵. Because of this, when providing its intelligence assessments an intelligence service takes the risks and responsibility for the likelihood of these evaluations. Usually intelligence assessments are related to probable events in the future, which should be treated as anticipated likelihoods or probabilities. By using their knowledge and collected information, intelligence analysts make certain evaluations and conclusions on processes, which will probably happen under certain circumstances and that, are usually affected by human beings in one way or another. The most important requirement to an intelligence service is that their assessments or evaluations should be reliable, unbiased and not politicized.

Should intelligence services be limited to collecting information? In the theory of intelligence, as in practice, there is no unity over this issue. Some services, like the Canadian security intelligence service, are only authorized to advise their government¹⁶. On the other hand, some services of Western countries have been given the authority to implement certain policy of the state by carrying out the so called 'cover operations' 17. For example, the CIA carried out cover operations in Chile between 1963 and 1973 in order to influence the political processes within the country¹⁸. The extent of a cover operation can be very varied – from influencing through the exploitation of media to organising a coup d'état. Hunting down terrorists in uncontrolled regions (like Afghanistan) can also be called cover operations. Usually cover activity is used by intelligence services because no other organisation has proper arrangements for this kind of activity. By receiving certain information (such as the whereabouts of a wanted terrorist) an intelligence service is authorized to take action on it by itself (in this case - to eliminate or detain this terrorist). In other words, a cover operation is the continuation of intelligence actions and not intelligence activity and it will therefore not be discussed further in this article.

Given the limited extent of this article, counterintelligence will also not be analyzed, although it is concurrent with intelligence activity, not least of all because of the need to protect intelligence activity and to guarantee its success.

In summary, in this article intelligence will be defined as a continuous classified process in which states' intelligence services collect information on foreign countries, external phenomena and processes taking into account the requirements of authorized institutions. This activity involves the timely res-

¹⁵ Gill P., Phythian M., Intelligence in an Insecure Word, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007, p. 15.

¹⁶ Canadian Security and Intelligence Service Act: http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowTdm/cs/C-23///en , 2008-06-30.

¹⁷ Gill, Phythian, p. 5, 13, 47.

¹⁸ Staff report of the select committee to study governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities. 91st Congress session. "Cover activities in Chile". http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/policy/church-chile.htm, 2008-06-30.

ponse to possible threats to a state's or society's security: after being processed and analyzed, this intelligence is presented to appropriate customers with the purpose of strengthening the security of the state and society and to support the planned and implemented policy of the executive government.

2. The Role of Policy Makers and their Impact on Intelligence Services' Activity and Information

2.1. The Role of Politics in Intelligence and Associated Challenges

It would be a mistake to believe that the process of intelligence ends when an intelligence service of a democratic state delivers its product (an intelligence paper) to their appropriate intelligence customers. Lowenthal says that the role of politicians and decision makers regarding intelligence services is not limited to receiving intelligence information – "they shape it"19. In democratic states, intelligence services are connected to institutions of the executive government, which are the main consumers of intelligence. These institutions include: the state's President and/or Prime Minister, government, various ministries (especially those responsible for the state's foreign, defence and security policy), the command of Armed Forces, lawenforcement institutions and often also other ministries and institutions. These may be responsible for economics and the financial system (or the state's economy, trade, internal affairs, transportation, or even on occasions, environmental protection and health services, etc.). Finally, additional connections include those to other intelligence and security services of that country. The role of parliament is to ensure democratic control and oversight of intelligence services²⁰. Put simply, intelligence services are the instruments of government in assuring the national interests of security making, controlling the power and influence of policy formers and other decision makers over intelligence services and its activity – which is self-explanatory. Hence, the role of policy makers and other intelligence customers is one of the main factors influencing the process of intelligence. This role of connecting customers and intelligence obliges both sides to understand each other's tasks, responsibilities and abilities or limitations. When there is a lack of this type of understanding, tension or conflict emerges between politics and intelligence. The reasons for conflict between intelligence services and policy makers are complex. The most dramatic cases happen when

¹⁹ Lowenthal p.174.

²⁰ More about parliamentarian oversight of intelligence services: Bagdonas G., "The Role and Control of Secret Intelligence Services in A Democratic State", *Kardas*, 2006 m. No2 (419) (in the Lithuanian language).

an intelligence service fails (or allegedly fails) to fulfil its expected tasks. Particularly severe consequences may occur when an intelligence service does not provide an early warning and so-called strategic surprise takes place, which results from an unpredicted security crisis: this is perhaps popularly known as an unexpected and successful attack by an adversary. An example of this type of unexpected security crises that resulted in blaming the intelligence services of not providing intelligence about threats, are the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001²¹.

Causes for intelligence failure are usually complex. Reasons for the failure to provide intelligence about threats or in providing only belated intelligence, may be due to mistakes in the organization of intelligence activity. It may also be attributable to the lack of interaction and cooperation between intelligence and security organizations, their subdivisions or individual officers, when, due to undue emphasis on the 'need to know' principle of protecting classified information, important intelligence is not presented to responsible institutions or officers on time or even at all. However, as already discussed in the last part of this article, the contemporary process of intelligence is not just a closed inner activity of an intelligence service. Rather, this process has a strong tendency to engage politicians and other intelligence customers in the intelligence business. In some cases, therefore, state institutions that establish the priorities, present tasks or influence intelligence activity in any other way should share the responsibility for intelligence failures. The main problems emerging between intelligence services and policy makers are the non-formulation of priorities and requirements to an intelligence service. Problems also arise due to the absence of feedback, the over-closeness of the relationship or, on the contrary, absolute and lack of interaction and finally, the politicization of the intelligence process²².

2.2. Planning and Administration of Intelligence

Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the USA, between 1953-1961, acknowledged that even the best planner and head of intelligence cannot foresee everything²³. Precise planning is the most important, but also the most challenging part of the intelligence process. As was already discussed at the beginning of this article, intelligence is carried

²¹ Is spite of critical conclusions about the work of intelligence services of USA by the "9/11 Committee" some intelligence experts contradict accusations of failing to give timely warning about Al Qaeda and terrorist attacks of 9/11, more information: Paul R. Pillar "Good Literature and Bad History: The 9/11 Commission's "Tale of Strategic Intelligence", Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 21, No.6, December 2006, pp.1022-1044. "9/11Commission's conclusions are presented: "*The 9/11 Commission Report*": http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf, p. 353 – 357, 2008-06-29.

²² The term of "politicization of intelligence process" is used by Handel, p.187 – 188.

²³ Dulles W. A., *The Craft of Intelligence*, Guilford, Connecticut: The Lyons Press, 2006, p. 78.

out on behalf of its customers – the decision makers. A frequent problem is that those decision makers do not know what kind of intelligence they need and what questions they should pose²⁴.

What happens when requirements are not presented to the intelligence service and policy makers do not define the priorities and queries? In the words of Lowenthal, in this case an intelligence service might try to establish the priorities and policy requirements by itself²⁵. When this happens the intelligence service risks being accused of participating in policy by taking an active role in the sphere of politics. Besides, when trying to determine a state's priorities by relying only on its own experience and expertise, an intelligence service risks making mistakes and organizing purposeless intelligence activity, which leads to the problem of irrelevance of intelligence.

In the intelligence process, not only is the timely receipt of priorities and requirements important, but also feedback. If absent, an intelligence service is left in obscurity and cannot evaluate its mistakes. In a future chapter the problem of relevancy of intelligence will be discussed more extensively. Ideally, after presenting its first product to politicians an intelligence service receives additional questions and continues the intelligence process by going deeper into the problem and proceeding into a 'second circle' of the intelligence process. At the same time, because of the feedback with the intelligence customers, not only the product of intelligence is improved, but also a better understanding on the decision maker's needs and objectives are reached.

The interaction of intelligence and politics (intelligence officers and policy makers) has to be reciprocal. Intelligence officers (firstly analysts and their leaders) have to know the 'world of politics' - become certain experts of the state's politics so they can see world through the eyes of policy makers²⁶. On the other hand, policy makers have to facilitate the work of intelligence officers by allowing them to be informed about political decisions, but this should not incorporate intelligence officers in the process of decision making. Otherwise, if intelligence officers were obliged not only to provide intelligence, but also to suggest developments on decisions of policy that emerge from the provided intelligence, the service would submerge in the sphere of politics. Intelligence would become politicized and its products biased.

2.3. The Divide between Intelligence and Politics

The occasional tension in the relationship between intelligence services and its customers can be partly related to the close relationship between these

²⁴ Quiggin T., Seeing the Invisible: National Security in an Uncertain Age. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2007, p. 53.

²⁵ Lowenthal, p.56.

²⁶ Davis J., "Intelligence Analysts and Policymakers: Benefits and Dangers of Tensions in the Relations", Intelligence and National Security, Vol.21, No.6, December 2006, p. 1010.

two entities. What distance should there be between intelligence services and policy makers? There are two different opinions in Western countries on the closeness of the relationship between intelligence and politics. The author of the first theory was one of the founders of US intelligence services, Sherman Kent, who saw a threat in the close relations of intelligence services and politicians because of the intelligence officers' 'inadequate independence' on politicians that might possibly develop²⁷. This was referred to in the last chapter. However, Kent acknowledged the danger of too deep a divide, which can influence the emerging of 'inadequate guidance'28. The theory, supporting the great divide between politics and intelligence prevailed in the USA and other Western countries in the years of the Cold War. Realization of this theory in practice was manifested by limiting intelligence services to presenting information to their customers as bare facts, leaving the interpretation of them to politicians²⁹. An explicit divide between intelligence and politics fosters secure objectivity of intelligence products and thus contributes to the reliability of intelligence. This is obtained by subordinating intelligence services to the highest institutions of the executive government, but not including them into the mechanism of making political decisions. For example, one of the former Presidents' of United States, Richard Nixon, used to ask the Director of CIA to make a presentation on foreign countries and their plans to the National Security Council, after which the speaker had to leave the room, which was where then the possible political decisions considering the received information were discussed³⁰. This method of relations was effective during the Cold War, when the world was bipolar and the Western countries had an evident source of threat. When such a strategic security environment dominated, intelligence services had obvious priorities in collecting information and analyzing the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union and its satellites.

In the last decade of the past century however, when the established strategic security environment changed dramatically, the West was faced with new complex security challenges. These have included: military conflicts based on religious and national grounds (which result in collapsing of states, emerging humanitarian crises, mass migration); the spread of terrorism; the danger of proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their components; organized crime (including drug trafficking); the challenges of energy and information security; and also the economically and militarily strengthening of undemocratic and totalitarian states that challenge Western liberal democracy. All this shaped the development of another position, which supports

²⁷ Davis J., "Sherman's Kent's Final Thoughts on Analyst-Policymaker Relations" CIA, Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, occasional papers: Vol. 2, No 3, June 2003, https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/vol2no3.htm, 2008-07-21.

²⁸ Ibidem.

²⁹ Laqueur, W., A Word of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence, New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1985, p. 89.

³⁰ Kissinger, A. H., "When spies meddle in policy", International Herald Tribune, 12 December, 2007.

closer relations between politics and intelligence³¹. The necessity of a closed interaction between intelligence officials and decision makers is dictated not only because of the changing and exceptionally dynamic security environment, but and also because of the latter's impact on the internal politics of democratic countries: external policy is often coherent with internal policy. If in organizing its activity, intelligence services have always had the need to know regarding the state's middle and long term priorities, then after the Cold War an important necessity has emerged. This is to preserve the relevance of the intelligence process to a state's policy within the current period, reflected in the presented intelligence. As was noted by an intelligence expert during a 'round table' forum of politicians and intelligence leaders in Georgetown University in November, 2003, the worst thing is when intelligence is ignored by politicians because then intelligence loses its connection to a state's policy and this is even worse than intelligence mistakes: "Being wrong – if you were wrong for right reasons - is never a particular problem, but being totally irrelevant to the policy considerations was always the thing that you had to fear the most"32.

As was already mentioned above, the very close relationship between intelligence and politics can merge intelligence with politics. This could involve intelligence officers in searching for solutions to problems, which would have a negative effect on intelligence products. This also causing intelligence services to have interests to produce biased and distorted intelligence information, and the intelligence service would thereby loose reliability. There is another negative influence of over-close relations and interaction between intelligence services and the institutions of policy makers. As Laqueur noticed, when an intelligence service approaches policy makers, an unavoidable situation emerges that the latter demands current intelligence³³ (see qualification of intelligence activity and products in Part 1). This might not seem a big issue at the first glance, but in practice the demands of decision makers to provide them with current intelligence can become a serious challenge to intelligence services. This can be explained by the difficulty of effort and expensive resources required to set priorities on current intelligence. Besides the aforementioned, the results are usually inadequate. An intelligence service concentrated on inadequate collection of current intelligence, neglects strategic intelligence activity. This requires long-term effort, usually because of a lack of capability, but sometimes also because of an absence of requirements. This inadequacy of efforts to collect current information is least justifiable as media and other institutions (such as think tanks) duplicate this collection and publicize partially similar current information. In this case, the collection of current information can be influenced by the so-called 'CNN effect'. Another reason why intelligence services should

31 Davis, 2006, p. 4 - 6

³² Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, "Challenging the Red Line between Intelligence and Policy", prepared by Dr. James E. Steiner, March 2004, p.4. http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/stj05/index.html, 2008-02-10.

³³ Laqueur, p. 89.

not focus on presenting current intelligence to policy makers is because this type of information is usually fairly unprocessed 'raw material'. As Dulles states, to provide a politician with this kind of information is dangerous, unless he is warned and understands what he is receiving – an unevaluated report, which an intelligence service cannot guarantee to be reliable and accurate³⁴.

As we can see, both opinions have their 'pro and cons' and there is no clear answer what distance should be placed between intelligence and politics. Handel noticed that in relations between intelligence officers and politicians a lot depends on human and personal characteristics, also on the countries' political culture and the process of socialization35. The divide between intelligence services and institutions of policy makers should be balanced: on the one hand it should secure sufficient informing on politicians' needs and intentions to intelligence staff, on the other hand it should preclude intelligence officials getting involved in politics.

2.4. The Problem of Intelligence Politicization

The politicization of intelligence is a frequent problem defined by the special relations between the two different entities: intelligence experts and politicians. Lowenthal called the separation of politics from intelligence "The Great Divide" ³⁶. Its purpose is the separation of two different functions of government – politics and intelligence – by a 'membrane', whereby politicians participate on both sides while intelligence is restricted to close approaching the membrane of political sphere, but is unable to cross the line.

As was mentioned in the first part of this article, the intelligence process has ambiguities by its nature and this leaves space for obscurity and interpretation, which might lead to distorted intelligence information and to its use for political or other reasons³⁷. Hendel presented a variety of historical examples in his book, such as when during the Vietnam War, US intelligence had the tendency to underestimate the antigovernment forces of *Viet Cong*, which enabled the demonstration of the effectiveness of the US forces combat activities and gave optimistic expectancies³⁸. As Thomas Hughes noticed, frequently analysis of intelligence differs from preconceptions of the policy former and that "almost always there will be a difference between the clear picture seen by a convinced policy-maker and the cloudy picture usually seen by intelligence"³⁹. Given this, a politician might try to enforce his views on the intelligence service by using his power, so that the 'clear picture' he sees would be reflected in intelligence

³⁴ Dulles, p. 151.

³⁵ Handel, p. 195.

³⁶ Lowenthal, p. 5.

³⁷ Handel, p. 196.

³⁸ Ibidem, p. 198.

³⁹ Hughes, T., "The Fate of Facts in a World of Men: Foreign Policy and Intelligence Making", Headline Series, No 233. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1976, p.19.

evaluations. US intelligence expert, Jack Davis, gave numerous examples of the negative effect of politicians' impact on intelligence: influencing intelligence officers in order to change the content or conclusions of intelligence evaluations or trying to force their opinion on intelligence services, so that it was presented later as intelligence information⁴⁰.

In the first part of this article it was mentioned that almost all intelligence (irrespective of its sources) should be classified to some extent, with some exceptions, for example when it is necessary to warn the society on threatening dangers, such as particular threat of terrorism. The necessity of classification is based on the need to protect intelligence services from involvement in politics. Otherwise, openly publicizing intelligence evaluations (like on the threats a certain state poses or, on the contrary, an absence of such threats) an intelligence service can become involved in the state's political process, in some cases without even leaving the possibility to political institutions to take diplomatic or political measures. An intelligence service is the state's secret service that provides its government with intelligence, which helps solve problems or challenges and it is not a political or academic institution that can openly express its opinion. Given a political – diplomatic necessity, a state's political institution can present information received from an intelligence service publicly, of course, provided that it will not compromise the sources of this information or methods that were used to get it.

As intelligence is a delicate process, there has to be mutual understanding between both intelligence officers and politicians or decision makers. When it is absent, it is difficult or almost impossible, to organize intelligence activity properly. Intelligence is provided to customers in order to facilitate the decision making process. Problems might occur when the presented intelligence evaluations and analyses do not support the decision maker's policy (in contrary to its expectations), or when politicians or decision makers ignore the received intelligence. In the above-mentioned forum of intelligence leaders and politicians at the University of Georgetown, it was noted that some politicians and decision makers try to adopt intelligence to their needs, so it would support the decisions they have made or are planning to make⁴¹. As an example, an episode from World War II could be mentioned: in September of 1944 the Allies carried out operation 'Market Garden' in the Netherlands, commanded by Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery. This operation was distinguished by the immense amount of airborne forces used, but it was also probably the only defeat of Allied Forces (at least at such a large scale) during the entire World War II. The Alliance planned to take the main bridges in the city of Arnhem with the help of airborne forces, so they could facilitate the attack of American and British advanced troops. As both political and military leaderships were expecting the

⁴⁰ Davis, 2006, p. 1017-1018.

⁴¹ Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, "Challenging the Red Line between Intelligence and Policy", prepared by Dr. James E. Steiner, March 2004, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/stj05/index.html, 2008-02-10.

quick fall of Nazi Germany, planners of the operation surrendered themselves to the euphoria of the upcoming victory and disregarded intelligence on the real capacities of the enemy. As a result of this the operation failed and joint forces of US, Great Britain and Poland suffered great losses⁴². It is worthy to mention that initially one of the reasons for this defeat was cited as the lack of intelligence about German capabilities. The release of information after its declassification in 1974, however, proved the contrary: the technical capacities of Great Britain's intelligence allowed the unprecedented possibility to read deciphered reports of German military leaders, thereby the planners of the 'Market Garden' operation received accurate enough intelligence on the adversary's forces⁴³.

Handel performed extensive and detailed analysis on the relations between intelligence officers and politicians. He describes intelligence politicization as any political interfering with intelligence process that distorts intelligence information and assessments, which makes an impact on analysis or distribution of intelligence products44. By using a comparison between intelligence, medicine and meteorology, Handel stated that in all these professions, none of them is an exact science, as each has to invoke quantifiable dimensions as well as forecasts, experience and intuition⁴⁵. In the case of any of these three professions, decisions are often made in obscurity, with pressures imposed by responsibility and the understanding that mistakes will have negative consequences. Only the intelligence officer, however, has an additional challenge - the frequent interference of politicians in the process of intelligence⁴⁶. This can be explained (but not justified) by the fact that politicians and leaders make decisions relying on information they have. In the modern world the significance of information has grown considerably - it has become an instrument and a weapon. In the age of information, when information technologies have developed and various private information companies operate in the market (among these are media, many political – analytical agencies of strategic analysis and think tanks), intelligence services have lost much of their monopoly of information, which they had just a few decades ago. Yet in the shape of the government, intelligence services still maintain a certain information monopoly, providing less choice to politicians in search for effective information tools for implementing their policy. Besides, this also furthers the requirement for closer relations between politics and intelligence, which was mentioned earlier in analyzing the divide between politics and intelligence and the approach of internal and external policies. Due to the influence of the current dynamic security environment and conditions of the above-mentioned internal and foreign policy aspects, a

⁴² Bradley, G. Ph. "Market Garden": Was Intelligence Responsible for the Failure?" A research report. Alabama: Maxwell Air Force Base, April 2001, p. 14 – 15. http://www.iwar.org.uk/sigint/resources/market-garden/bradley.pdf, 2008-08-08.

⁴³ Jeffson, J.J. "Operation Market-Garden: Ultra Intelligence Ignored" A Master Thesis,

⁴⁴ Handel, p. 188.

⁴⁵ Laqueur, W., "The Question of Judgement: Intelligence and Medicine", Journal of Contemporary History, No. 18, October 1983, from Handel, p. 188.

⁴⁶ Ibidem.

completely different reality exists in practice: unavoidable interference of politicians in the intelligence process. Therefore, the model of intelligence process presented in the first part of this article is rather theoretical or idealistic. In reality, intelligence is constantly affected by the surrounding environment, in which the state's politicians, decision makers and society all participate. The theoretical model of the intelligence process does not reflect the influence of this environment. Gill and Phythian have offered a more accurate model of the intelligence process, called 'the funnel of causality' (Figure 2)⁴⁷.




Figure 2. Intelligence process according to Gill and Phytian

This funnel shows that not necessarily all analyzed information reaches the consumer. An element of collected information is filtered out as unnecessary, other parts being rejected concerning the specification of demands received through the feedback (or sensed intuitively by intelligence service) and another part is not analysed after processing and sanitization. Unlike the traditional process of intelligence, this funnel graphically demonstrates the environment around the exterior of intelligence that exists in reality, including the policy makers, who influence the intelligence process. In pursuing effective intelligence activity and its successful results, it is necessary to accordingly organize the intelligence process, considering the inevitable interference of policy makers. This interference can have positive effects when it is limited to giving the priorities of policy makers to the intelligence service, acknowledging with it their interests and the affecting circumstances: there is no discussion on undisputable right of politicians to perform the parliamentarian control and oversight of intelligence services. Better knowledge of the political sphere allows an intelligence service to answer the requirements of policy makers more effectively.

⁴⁷ Gill ir Phythian, p. 4.

This supports once again the argument of Laqueur, mentioned in the beginning of this article about the essential necessity of intelligence services to train their customers. An additional measure in securing the impartiality of intelligence services is appropriate professional organization of intelligence. This should be aimed at the professionalism of intelligence officers and the standardization of intelligence activity itself, in order to evade the distortion of intelligence information and its adjustment to political decisions or expectations. In addition, the intelligence service should establish the objective criteria and standards for intelligence analysis, which would be difficult to ignore.

Concluding Remarks

Intelligence services carry out their activity on behalf of policy makers with the purpose not only to respond in a timely manner to possible threats to the state's security, but also to provide their customers (policy makers) with the required intelligence, in order to support the implemented and planned policy of the latter's represented institutions. In other words, most institutions of democratic states (first and foremost those responsible for the state's foreign, defence and security policies and their executive agencies) directly participate in the process of intelligence or affect this process in other ways and its outcome. Such institutions should not ignore the intelligence, as it may have a negative effect on the intelligence process. If an intelligence service's participation in the process of decision making is inadequate (for example, when policy makers use alternative information sources) its activity can become irrelevant to the state's priorities and interests. This is why an adequately close interaction should be organized between intelligence services and its customers. This allows for setting the correct tasks while organizing intelligence activity so that the intelligence process corresponds with the state's primary objectives and interests. Intelligence officers, being informed of politicians' intentions, capacities and problems have to become experts in the 'political sphere'.

The realization of these conditions, however, leads to inevitable participation and even interference from politicians in the intelligence process. In order to avoid the negative effects of politics on the intelligence process, it is necessary to ensure that intelligence services do not get involved in the process of forming and implementing policy. The divide between politics and intelligence must be balanced – intelligence officers should not become responsible for the successful execution and realization of actions and decisions, based on the intelligence information they present. The conditions of effective intelligence – objectivity, reliability and impartiality – can be achieved if sufficient confidence and professional understanding exist between a state's intelligence services and the institutions about each other's capabilities and limitations. Effective intelligence is also predicated on systemic relations based on juridical acts being established which provide executive control of these services and set requirements upon them.

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China: Rational Expectations and Economic Nationalism

China's transformation from the world's economic periphery into its nucleus has been labelled as an example of either the horror of globalization, or of its success. The enormous growth pace of the Chinese economic and political potential had become an important challenge to the *status quo* of the international system. The author of the article, having employed the basic statements of the political economy and official statistical data as well as institutional assessments, is developing the idea that China's comeback to the world's dynamic economy after a number of decades of autonomy has been determined by the ability of the country's political and business elite to choose priorities so as to liberate the market forces, use the surplus of the world capital and its regular movement to the places where marginal profit is the highest, and, at the same time, expediently manipulate the Sino-centric attitudes of the nation. However, it starts to be obvious that the national bureaucracy that is prone to yielding to the dictatorship of the defensive economic nationalism and is striving at unproportionally high benefits for itself may lose the main stimulant of the economic growth, i.e. foreign investment.

Introduction

"It is due to China that goods in European shops are cheaper, business costs are lower, European companies are more competitive, markets are larger for European exporters and interests are lower", happily said Mr. Peter Mandelson, the European Commission member responsible for trade when he was presenting the new document of EC – China strategic relationship on October 24, 2006. His report included statements that Europe is interested in supporting China in both political and economic terms, so that it could successfully become a prosperous, stable and open country where the guiding principles are those of the state of justice and free market. A few years ago, Mr. Supachai Panitchpakdi, Director General of the WTO, said that China was the only economic example in history that could be named as the engine of the world economy and that China itself was the source of inspiration for other developing states².

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¹ IP/06/1454, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/china/index en.htm, 06 02 2008.

² Supachai Panitchpakdi, "Putting the Doha Development Agenda back on track: why it matters to China", Speech at the International Forum "WTO and China", Beijing, 10 November 2003.

After the historic stagnation of the mid-seventies, when China's share of the world's GDP was down to merely 8 percent, China's economy is again "coming on stage". According to data shown in 2007, it is the fourth in the world after the US, Japan and Germany. To paraphrase the idea of Mr. Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the Bank of Europe, it demonstrates a rebirth of China's power in reference to the fact that back in 1820, China and India together were producing about one half of the world's output³.

However, China has often been nicknamed "a ravenous dragon" in the press during 2008. It has been accused of instigating a new wave of colonialism and of trying to leave the developed countries high and dry. While China's unstinting appetite for commodities is super, the International Energy Agency expects China's imports of oil to triple by 2030 creating such a bonanza for farmers, miners, oilmen and bankers that economic novelty phrases like "bull market", "cyclical expansion" or "supercycle" have become a part of their daily vocabulary.

As China's dependence on non-renewable sources of energy increases together with its world leadership in the consumption of coal, steel and copper, with its needs for oil and electric power being only second after those of the USA, the leaders of industrial countries, including political leadership of China itself, become increasingly worried. A steep turn of the industrial structure towards basic industry means an even bigger need for natural recourses and more dramatic consequences for the people of the world. The fact that China's metallurgy consumes over 16 percent of all the country's energy (the basis of which is the burning of coal) and all the households in the country consume only 10 percent of it⁵ gives rise to fears of more acid clouds in the atmosphere and permanent smog for Chinese cities inhabitants. With the blessing of the government, the Chinese banks pay very low interest to their depositors and provide "cheap" loans to state enterprises. While the latter pay only symbolic land taxes and dividends, they are able to allocate more profit to industrial development and expansion of new production, which however is as energyintensive and environment-polluting as ever. It means in fact, that the citizens of modern China – bank depositors and tax payers – subsidize their country's basic industry, which unfortunately is slowly but successfully poisoning themselves.

It would be unfair not to notice amidst all the problems and threats, the ability of the country's political and business elite to choose priorities so as to liberate the market forces and use all the possibilities that can be provided by trade, foreign investment and technological imports to those who seek speedy economic and industrial growth in state and private sectors. In other words, the political and economic phenomenon of China has proven that lagging behind implies certain benefits and the market newcomers may gain a lot by applying aggressive and "incorrect" tactics.

³ Information of the World Bank (see: www.worldbank.org, 12 03 2008).

⁴ "The new colonialists", *The Economist*, March 15th 2008, p. 13.

⁵ Ibid.

The format of the article does not allow one to embrace all the aspects and changes of the phenomenon within the international economic environment and its relationship with major players of the global system – the USA, EU or Russia that are being provoked by the growing power of China. Thus, the author restricts herself to the assumption that the macro-economic policy of the People's Republic of China is the main arena the witnesses his political competition as well as strives at its major goal – to verify the projections of the XX-th century in our modern context (2008). Having experienced that most modern analysts seemingly get stuck in the level of theoretical options and go too deep into national self-respect by scrutinizing the reflections of sustainability of power balance and geo-political changes within the Chinese economic strategy, the author's use of theoretical thoughts is sporadic and based on the information provided by The Economist (2008), which promotes the philosophy of the free market economy, as well as on the data of surveys of international business organizations and statistics. The interpretation of modern facts is presented in three complementary chapters in search of a correlation with two modern theoretical approaches. The first one – the aspect of rational expectations, the importance of which for economics has been acknowledged since Kevnes used the notion of "real vitality" in his "General Theory" while explaining the fluctuations in investments. The second approach is the economic nationalism⁷ that emerges due to the market's feature of accumulating wealth and creating power relationship among the countries of different economic strength. Such an approach of the analysis allows for the identifying of two new opportunities for the development of the Chinese economy as well as two threats that may become obstacles in realizing the vision of the country as "the first among the equal". The opportunities of the "new generation" lie in the utilization of the infrastructure factor as a possible economic multiplier, the "employment" of the world financial capital surplus in the area and in the stimulation of the Sinocentric attitudes of the nation promoting the increase of labour added value. The first threat is the inert bureaucracy at the national level and its strive to be above the regional bureaucrats manifest in the decisions of defensive economic nationalism by nature. The second one is the rising level of the communist and Maoist ideological heritage in internal politics and ideology, which induces anti-Western nationalism and existence of double standards in the minds of a billion-strong nation that is encouraged by the inspirations of a harmonious society but frustrated by social exclusion.

⁶ Blanchard, Oliver, *Macroeconomics*, New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2006, p.387.

⁷ Economic nationalism creates economic rent that goes to interest groups; in other words, economic well-being of the society is sacrificed for the interests of separate groups – it is the deal between the state and the producers. The most earnest advocates of the economic nationalism in all countries have always been the national bureaucrats and local producers representing the interests of their promoted areas of production (see: Rostow, W.W. *Politics and the Stages of Growth*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971, p.189).

1. The Philosophy of Peaceful Rising and the Cognitive Dissonance in Modern Chinese Ideology

While little is known about the origin of and reasons for technological and other types of innovations, often it is being explained on the academic level that innovations have a strong tendency for accumulation with respect to time and location. Allegedly, they turn up at a certain time in the economies of certain countries. It depends only on relative effectiveness and relative advantage for the innovation centres to emerge or decline. It was Leon Trotsky who, in his research on the late stage of Russian industrialization, wrote about "the law of combined and uneven development", when the states are destined to achieve best results in their technological advances if they promote the imports of foreign technologies and are able to accommodate these technologies with the traditional social models8. The structural changes in the world economy of the end of the XX-th century have effectively destroyed the propositions of the political economy in less-developed states being unable to progress in an unreformed system of the world capitalism. China's example forced authors on political economy subjects to distance themselves from the statements so popular a few decades ago, that in the world of national states and political borders it was impossible to avoid conflicts when developing states or separate economy sectors tried to overcome existing barriers. Recently, another thought is more popular, which affirms that the Chinese nation has realized a long while ago how "a well-organized hierarchic state" should exist, and its strive to re-establish the principle of fairness provokes its goal to regain the former regional power, and thus stimulates relevant actions9.

1.1. New Strategy - To be "the First among the Equals"

One should recall that the path of autonomic development based on socialistic reforms was chosen by several countries 5 decades ago. They declared their willingness to participate as little as possible in what they called the capitalist economy of the hostile imperial world. Some advocates of the dependency theory also were proposing that way and supporting the choice of those states at a theoretical level. Some of the states – Cuba, Tanzania and China – have really achieved certain strategic goals of well-being and economic fairness.

However, as Chinese economic analysts say, the anticipated results in

⁸ Knei-Paz, Baruch, The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978, p. 89.

⁹ Castro, R., "Exploring the Prospect of China's Peaceful Emergence in East Asia", Asian Affairs: An American Review, Vol. 33 Issue 2, 2006, p. 86.

the social and economic sectors have not been in place for too long¹⁰, and Mao Zedung's program of "the Great Leap Forward" (1958 – 1961) collapsed when they distanced themselves from the Soviet Union. The rise of the Cultural Revolution destroyed the country's scientific-technical base even further bringing down the entire economy. Decades were needed before Deng Xiaoping, who took over right after Mao's death, started talking about the fact that no nation is able to develop "behind closed doors", as it was isolation that brought China to poverty, backwardness and ignorance¹¹.

When attempts are made at the academic level to determine modern China's place in the world system, its geo-political identity and foreign policy are often explained by the philosophy of regaining "the right place in the world" and by traditional Confucianism values – pride in their history, achievements of civilization, striving for universal and all-embracing harmony. Even Lithuanian political analysts pay attention to the frustration about the fact that China still is not the first country in the world when they discuss the propositions of the Chinese geopolitical identity researchers that ethnocentric rise of their state is a self-explanatory issue¹².

"The peaceful rising" concept of the Chinese foreign policy that came into being at the time of the so-called fourth generation of leaders, reflects the modern imperialistic ideology of China. According to different sources, this type of ideology is based on the objective of economic, military, social and cultural cooperation among the neighbouring states which should be mutually beneficial. That is why the role of China, or "Middle state" as Chinese themselves call it (*Zhongguo* in Chinese), in cooperation is not to control unambiguously but to be the state that is "the first among the equals".

Analysts believe that the feeling of "historic injustice" that is deeply imbedded in the Chinese nation provokes expectations for the lost regional power¹³. The main power of realization of such expectations is the permanent stimulation of a society's dissatisfaction about the existing economic achievements. All social and economic tendencies can be assessed with the help of conceptual mathematical propositions, which makes it appropriate to employ the law of big numbers with respect to the Chinese economy and place any set of events into a clear chain. Thus, by way of careful interpretation and use of 1 percent of 1.3 billion as an example, we can hypothetically assess the potential and influence of the expectations for "historic injustice correction" not only

¹⁰ Rydenfelt, Sven, A Pattern for Failure: Socialist Economies in Crisis, San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985, p. 204-213.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Lopata R., Statkus N., "Empires, the World Order and Small States", *Lithuanian Annual Strategic review* 2005, p. 47

¹³ According to some sources, the Chinese assess the rise of their country as realization of justice – a self-explanatory matter in gaining the once-lost status. The nation takes pride in its historic and civilization achievements and naturally accepts the process of regaining China's power – as if it was historically determined, and at the same time they express disappointment in the present situation [see: Lopata, (note 12)].

for the development of China, but for the world system as a whole. Although the history of economy presents examples as to when people, companies or financial markets stakeholders, having lost the sense of reality, used to become overoptimistic or over pessimistic and their expectations were doomed, all known cases were related to technical-informational limitations. Modern communication technologies, e.g. the Internet, can provide unlimited possibilities for strengthening of individual bilateral relations and increase the possibilities for realization of those expectations.

Political forces in China demonstrate really smart manipulation with the Sino-centric attitudes of the nation and its traditional values in forming the zone of economic, political, and cultural-civilization influence. Five years ago, the Chinese were encouraged to be proud of their first space mission and its achievements that would help them catch up with the USA and Russia; in 2007 – that their compatriots were ready for a mission to the Moon; and in 2008 – that they managed to organize the most lavish Olympic Games in history with unlimited budget and proved to the world that they were not only the largest but also the most sportive nation. For once, they managed to overcome the USA when the Chinese Olympic team received 100 Olympic awards and the largest number of gold medals, and the gold medallists were awarded by the government with the largest financial rewards –1 million USD each.

China had always had many advantages of a strong state, lots of economic resources and a comparatively large local market however, it had not been able to fulfil the strategy of autonomous development. Obviously, after several decades of autonomy China has been able to come back to a dynamically developing global economy only with the help of the economic achievements of other countries – Western investment, modern technologies and free trade. Still, it is also obvious that China's economic revival campaign has been based on the slogan impact that was enforced in the *Mao* era and can be explained by the cognitive dissonance¹⁴.

1.2. Mao's Image – An Instrument for Strengthening the Power of the State

According to those analyzing the China case, there was a single personality in its history, the Emperor *Qin Shi Huang*, who started to erect the Great Chinese Wall by his popularity and influence on the decisions of a billion-strong nation he was comparable to the influence of *Mao* who died in 1976. Although the former leader's ideological heritage impact on economic development is considered symbolic, *Mao's* portraits on Chinese banknotes, travel bags and shopping baskets, brooches and pins, watches and other items on sale is

¹⁴ The campaign slogan "Truth from facts" can be equaled to a Mao slogan "Serve the People", because both create a sincere public cognition of certain things and trust in them, although something different is being done within the country (see: "Staying at the top", *The Economist*, December 22nd, 2007, p.116).

emphatically important. The importance of innovation is being continuously reminded by *Mao* portraits and his slogans to the working and creative people of China ("Let a hundred flowers bloom"), together with permanent competition ("Fear no sacrifice") and relentless self-criticism. As the researchers of the *Mao* phenomenon declare, he was able to avoid rallies and other events where he could have been criticized, and he used to make public speeches only when he had new plans and a vision for the future. It is common to assess the economic achievements of China of those days as shabby, its economic policy as having no "carcass" and its leadership as "brainless"; however, every initiative or a declared innovation seemed to turn into a new centripetal force for the strengthening of the power of the state. The science of management would call this type of influence the impact of restructuring – the broader you disperse the actions and functions, the easier you can hide from responsibility, or if you can't do anything right, do a lot (the broader the better).

The Chinese economy started to recover after the end of the *Mao* era and with the introduction of the botched economic policies, and many other positive achievements, which are related to the name of *Deng Xiaoping*. The rhetoric of this leader of the country helped create the program of the four modernizations and draw the world's attention to the modern socially-focused market economy and the defence system to match the status of a super-state; however, his portrait is not to be seen even on a low-value coin. *Mao's* power is manifest in the unity of thousands of people in the critical situation of the aftermath of the earthquake of May 12, 2008 in the South-West Chinese province of *Sichuan*, when the so-called "middle-class" representatives organized an "express train" made up of their private cars and taxis to drive the victims. The world press sarcastically commented later on that the Chinese Prime Minister, *Wen Jiabao* had "to hurry up in order not to be late for the stage and play a sobbing head of the salvage operations for five days" 15.

It was believed that the leaders of the Chinese economic policies will seek to preserve the impact of the *Mao* image, easily explainable by the cognitive dissonance, for as long as possible in order to manage the minds and work results of a billion people. That would mean successful manipulation by modern instruments of image support, which proved to be so powerful in China. The management science experts would label these instruments as popularizing of the resonant slogans, support for the "spicy" press image, promotion of the circle of the devoted congenial friends and exploitation of the human passion for the creation of plans and visions. As the famous novelist and poet Edgar Allen Poe noted, human life is full of happiness primarily because a man is continuously waiting to become happy soon.

^{15 &}quot;China helps itself", The Economist, May 24th 2008, p.68.

2. The Spirit of the Four Modernizations

The history of the global economic growth and structural changes is an interlacing pattern of the periods of active liberalism, openness and free economy with the stages of stagnation, protectionism and national conflicts. Structural changes within countries provoke economic conflicts; consequently, on a theoretical level there is a tendency to be engaged in the analysis of new internal factors, e.g. by emphasizing the factor of interest groups. Due to the existing relationship between industry and the development of the economy as a whole, between economic independence and political autonomy, between military might and national independence all modern states seek to have modern industry. The Chinese case may be reasoned by a proposition formulated by K. Marx that less developed countries try to employ modern technologies of the dominating state or other developed countries. It means that a few decades ago several well-developed industrial countries showed China, a poorly-developed state, its own vision. Presently, China is using its special advantage – it is able to jump over a couple of economic development stages and overcome any of the economic leaders¹⁶. In order to create an effective economy of scale and receive the needed resources of foreign exchange as well as the core capital base to finance its exports, it actively penetrates global markets. Its successful actions and the structure of lower wages allow China to be not just competitive, but also to weaken the position of economically strong countries in separate economic areas.

If one agrees with the notion that the pace of change and the time of relative diffusion make the greatest impact on the development of a new industrial state¹⁷, one should recall that the Chinese program of the *four modernizations* has been in progress since 1978. Its goal has been the declared strive at creating a modern and socially-focused market economy and the defence system to match the state of a superpower. At the time, there were increasingly more hardships in the world due to the increasing pace of the advantageous change and external shake-ups. When the prices of the energy resources suddenly jumped four-fold, the consumer needs changed and the capital funds of leading industrial nations seemed to be obsolete. Economic analysts and progressive political leaders started to note that backwardness has its own advantages, and it is not that easy to be among the leaders. In a situation like this market newcomers may have the upper hand by adhering to aggressive and "incorrect" tactics¹⁸.

¹⁶ Sen, Gautam, The Military Origins of Industrialization and International Trade Rivalry, New York: St.Martin's Press, 1984, p. 15.

¹⁷ According to G. Sen, before the rise of China, for a relatively short periods of time the lion's share of the glogal industry was taken by Great Britain (after the Napoleon wars to the end of the XIX century), Germany (between 1890 and 1913), the USA (after 1890 m. until now), Japan (recognized in 1981 as the main exporter of capital) [see: Sen (note 16)].

¹⁸ Rostow, W.W. Politics and the Stages of Growth, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971, p.64.

2.1. Infrastructural Boom – a New Economic Multiplier

The world statistics for 2008 show that the vision, which has been promoted by the industrialised states in the under-developed countries, has been perceived as a realistically achievable goal – the world's largest ever boom of investment into infrastructure of the developing countries has been infer way. According to analysts, the developing countries will witness investments of about 22 trillion USD in the next 10 years for the projects of new highways, railroads, power supply lines and telecommunication. 43 percent (about 9.3 trillion USD) of these investments will go TO China¹⁹. The same sources claim that infrastructural projects in China accounted for about 12 percent of GDP during the last five years, which means that there has been as much real value created in China in those five years as in the whole XX-th century. Although most of the theoretical economists agree that good infrastructure has always been the most important prerequisite to a country's fast economic growth, other opinions exist saying that a state's overspending for infrastructural projects is a consequence of economic growth. It is believed that China's needs for power, housing, sanitary and transportation services grow as better-off "villagers" migrate to cities.

The growing demand always provokes investment in promising areas. Goldman Sachs bank for instance has been actively promoting a model that identifies a correlation between the demand for infrastructural investment and the general level of economy, population and urbanization. He bank's specialists have calculated that if a relative proportion of the urban Chinese people increases by 1 percent, the demand for installed capacity increases by 1.8 percent. If the income per capita in China increases by 1 percent, the demand for power will increase by 0.5 percent, the number of airline passengers will increase by 1.4 percent, etc. This kind of logic evokes projections that the aggregate installed power capacity in China should be increased by 140 percent in the next decade, the number of air-travellers will increase by 3.5 times (which means a boom in the construction of new airports), and the number of mobile phone users may increase by 13 times. In other words, the development of modern China's infrastructure, which is sometimes called either the prerequisite or the consequence of the economic growth, can more correctly be called the most modern economic multiplier.

Firstly, the infrastructure investments offer huge number of jobs in the construction of new roads, railways and telecommunication facilities. Secondly, the income of the society is increased this way as well as fast consumption. Thirdly, as transportation improves, the farmers provide the cities with more raw materials from more remote areas, and the producers export more products. Finally, the growing demand for construction materials and equipment keeps their prices high and, at the same time, keeps the high price level of other consumer goods. All this will stimulate the production development in China

¹⁹ "Building BRICs of growth", *The Economist*, June 7th, 2008, p. 80.

itself and increase imports of additional amounts of goods, which in its turn will decrease the surplus of Chinese current account. If China manages to remain a country with the lowest transportation costs, the country will further enjoy growing indicators of its foreign trade and economy. According the calculations of the World Bank, as investment in China's infrastructure increase by 1 percent, the country's GDP supposedly will increase by the same figure.

It is believed in the business circles that the investment in China yields good financial return. This has been confirmed by the investor surveys conducted by the US-China Business Council and the EU Chamber of Commerce. According to the surveys, 83 percent of the investors in the China's economy received the profit for 2007, which was in line with their expectations, and 23 percent of the respondents pointed out that it was the same as the average figure for their company - the profit level was the same as in other foreign subsidiaries of the company. 84 percent of the respondents pointed out that the Chinese investment was in line with the company's priority strategic goals; 46 percent were creating a platform for their exports to other Asian countries, and 28 percent – for their goods to be exported back to the US. 85 percent of the surveyed businessmen said that the income of their Chinese subsidiaries grew considerably in 2007 compared to the previous year, and 61 percent of them had no doubt that similar income will be generated by their Chinese subsidiaries between 2008 and 2010 20. Thus, we should recall a fundamental assumption of the rational expectations theory - in the long-term, it is the expectation that influences the demand, which consequently determines the production. Assuming that market players formulate their future expectations by using the available information in the best possible way, which sometimes is done indirectly by following public and private expert assessments, we can understand the misgivings of the world economic development researchers about China, a regional competitor, evolving into a global one. The investment program of a massive scale that Chinese economy is ripe for may absorb the volumes of private capital, which have been considered beyond imagination so far. All this as it is projected, will stir up the stock exchange of the country, especially as far as the demand for long-term state bonds are concerned and legitimate the new changes of investment regulation.

2.2. The New Manager of the World Finance

China was started to be called the Financier of the World in 2008, when it was realized that the surplus of its current account increased from 1-3 percent in the beginning of this decade to 9.5 percent and is increasing further on, and the capital account balance has been positive for a number of years and is growing further.

²⁰ "Special Report: Strategic Economic Dialogue Aftermath", http://www.uschina.org, 07 04 2008.

Although the official reports of international institutions assume that business conditions in China still remain rather complicated and that a protectionist policies are pursued in certain sectors, the country's economy attract more and more foreign direct investment inflows. Fully-owned foreign capital companies, it is assumed, are the main target of the foreign direct investment (FDI). The companies of this kind accounted for 78 percent of all newly legalized investment structures in 2007. Although the total number of investment projects that were approved in China in 2007 decreased from 41,485 to 37,888 compared to the previous year, they attracted 13.8 percent more investment financing – the absolute amount accounted for 82.66 billion USD 21. Thus, the investment environment reports believe that, as in previous years, China will remain one of 5 most popular directions of the world capital movement. Despite the fact that the largest share of the foreign capital went to the Chinese manufacturing industry in 2007 – over 40 billion USD, while transport, storage, post, telecommunication and other infrastructure project development employed only about 2 billion USD, it is expected that statistical data for 2008 will show significant shift towards the latter investment area.

However, there are increasingly visible indications that the wave of speculative capital that established itself in China in 2008 will be much greater than ever before in the world's economy. The present market knowledge experience becomes not sufficient enough in order to comprehend the reasons for this phenomenon and its possible consequences. Which ever way the best analysts of the world play with the funds, they are not able to explain where about 214 billion USD turned up from in the Chinese market during the five months of 2008. The country's increasing trade surplus and DFI may explain just about 30 percent of the official foreign exchange increment²². Thus, the idea becomes increasingly popular that the Chinese financial market is not different from other developing markets with their original phenomenon – "hot money". For instance, Michael Pettis of the Guanghua Business School of Beijing University believes that the amount of such funds in the Chinese economy reaches about USD 200 bill. The scientist's number is based on the assumption that many of the foreign companies overstate the declared indicators of export and DFI, and the financial capital flow to China is above the investment needs, so "it works somewhere else"23.

The statistical directories declare that that the main sources of the investment in China's economy have remained the same in the last several years – in accordance with the investment amounts, the top of the list includes Hong Kong, the British Virgin Islands, South Korea, Japan and Singapore. The data of 2007 show that the top ten investor countries that comprise about 87 percent of all investments in China lost the only EU country on the list – Germany. Its portfolio decreased by 63.4 percent – the investment was taken

²¹ Report (note 20).

²² "Hot and bothered", *The Economist*, June 28th 2008, p.81.

²³ Ibid.

over by the investors from Mauritius, West Samoa, the Cayman Islands and the USA. The situation in the Chinese market was called a phenomenon, and raised concern for the Chinese State Administration of Foreign Exchange and the State Administration of Taxation. According to their information, at least 2/3 of the DFI become round-tripping when companies and private persons transfer huge amounts of money to "tax havens" and return to China in the form of DFI²⁴. At that, they surely use the benefits increasingly offered by the Chinese government.

In 2007, new players drew the world financial analysts' attention – PRC's Sovereign Wealth Fund and the Chinese Investor Corporation (CIC). The latter acquired the *Blackstone* share package worth 3 billion USD and 9.9 percent of *Morgan Stanley* shares worth 5 billion USD. It has been announced that during 2008, the Chinese outbound foreign direct investment will account for 37 billion USD of total outbound FDI, when respective amount was 26 billion USD in 2007, and 21.2 billion USD in 2006. Although the share of the Chinese government in the deals is not made public, it is believed to comprise about 86 percent²⁵.

At the time when powerful market forces strive at crossing the Chinese and other countries' borders in the form of trade, funds and foreign investment, avoid political and economic control and integrate societies of different countries, the state bureaucracy interests and state logic enjoy a special status in the arena of the Chinese economic struggle. Like Robert Heilbroner²⁶ predicted two decades ago, the willingness will always remain in the competing states to retain and control the capital accumulation in the hands of the governments and to make it work for the goals projected by the state and for the benefits of powerful influential groups within the state; this is what takes place today in the People's Republic of China.

2.3. Economic Nationalism - Arena of Fight for Greatness

It was projected a quarter of a century ago that as economic leap of Asian countries can be expected when three major conditions will be met in the region. First, a strong national bureaucracy should be formed that would establish what things have to be done first, what kind of trade, investment and other commercial agreements can serve the national interests and meet the conditions that help the national economies interact with the larger world economy. Second, huge investments need to be done in science and human capital. Third, a country should embrace market laws, and the distribution of resources should be based on the price factor²⁷. A policy favourable to industrial development is the basis for the national security and military power of any

²⁴ Report (note 20).

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Heilbroner, Robert L. The Nature and Logic of Capitalism, New York: W.W. Norton, 1985, p. 94-95.

²⁷ Hofheinz, Roy Jr., and Calder Kent E., *The Eastasia Edge*, New York: Basic Books, 1982, p. 24-28.

developing state. However, economic nationalism emerges due to the market feature of accumulating wealth and creating power relationship among the market players of different strength.

There has been no consistent approach to the importance of foreign capital for the state's economy in the Chinese economy – the favourable approach and one of animosity are interchangeable. Thus, the world's business top-ten list of problems and concerns gives a very high rating to the latter aspect of China. The leaders of the Chinese economic policy openly declare that they need to make foreign capital work in the way that it promotes indigenous innovation. The "quality" parameters of the innovations are being discussed in major national political documents, e.g. in the 11-th five-year plan of the development of high-tech industries and the 2007 Guidelines for attracting foreign investment. The Chinese government tries to ensure that more financial resources would be directed to the development of new and modern technologies, that is why 2007 saw the preparation and approval of new edition of a special political document, the Catalogue Guiding Foreign Investment in Industry. The document clearly shows all the investment "places" acceptable to the Chinese government and describes the benefits expected from the country's government once a proposed business area is chosen. However, as in older editions of the document, the country's industries are divided into three categories: where the investment is promoted, where it is restricted. and where prohibited. The new edition's "restricted" category included a few additional businesses – export-processing industries and heavy or rescue intensive areas like chemical, machine and equipment as well as agricultural industries.

Nevertheless, the main concern of foreign capital managers and potential investors in China is the new Antitrust Law which, after 14 years of comparative centralism, is supposed to regulate the economy since August 1, 2008. In their presentation of and the comments on the new document, the Chinese legal experts call it "the constitution of the economy" and declare that, finally, the state centralized policy and state ownership will be substituted with the market relations²⁸. According to the authors, the new law reflects the belief of the government of modern China that economic restructuring, which was started after Mao's death can be continued further only when the local consumers are able to use the benefits of competition – low product prices and higher quality. The government officials say that since 2006, the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, the Price Law and the Consumer Rights and Interest Protection Law have become similar to the laws in many countries, which are "toothless", non-transparent "toys" in the hands of the bureaucracy. They say that the dominant companies of the country impose their price policies on the state not only in strategic industries – energy, transport and metallurgy – but also in providing food products to the country, e.g. in setting the prices for rice, grain and noodles to the consumers and processors alike.

In the context of these and similar assessments, many of the provisions in

²⁸ "Busting trust", The Economist, July 19th 2008, p. 67

the new Antitrust Law sound rather cynical. Firstly, though the validation date of the Law was postponed several times, there were no by-laws in place on the day of its validity to explain the implementation circumstances of separate provisions. Analysts are joking that the "holes" in the Law are as big that China itself²⁹. For instance, the Law establishes sanctions for the monopolies partly owned by the state only when their business presents a threat to economic or national security of the country, but most of the large Chinese companies have always been and will remain to be state-owned. Secondly, on the basis of the EU practices, the Chinese government has given the right by this Law to special controlling institutions to evaluate and bless the companies' applications for mergers or acquisitions if it happens on the Chinese territory or has an impact on other local companies. The businessmen will have to wait for the "blessing" from 30 to 180 days; the main criteria for a favourable decision – "the progress of technology" or "national economic development". It is obvious that the new Law is directed solely at foreign companies that will incur a lot of additional costs if they try to expand their business influence in agreement with the Chinese business owners. Thirdly, the new Law does not give the description of the criteria that would determine that a company is "dominant; that is the reason why in separate cases there will be inevitable conflicts about intellectual property rights. E.g., in the Chinese sectors of software and pharmacy, as it was declared before, several foreign companies are dominant. Direct implementation of the new Law provides for the possibility of restricting their business, e.g. by revoking or restricting their licenses for the production of particular items that, as a rule, is usually related to large initial costs of R&D, which are taken into the product prices for long-term business. Fourthly, the struggle for the institutional rights to control the implementation of the new Law has uncovered an essential problem of the Chinese economy – the inert character of the national bureaucracy and its strive to exercise priority over regional bureaucrats who were empowered until recently to regulate the business of local companies including foreign ones. At the day of the Law coming into force it was not announced, which institutions would control its implementation in the country. The world press projects that the "grand prize" will be given to three institutions that represent certain groups of trade interests and are supported by all means available in the state-controlled economy.

These facts provoke an assumption that the Chinese national bureaucracy that is under immense influence of defensive economic nationalism and is looking for disproportionate economic benefits for itself may lose the basic stimulus of economic growth breakthrough – the foreign investment. Especially that more and more facts emerge to prove that the Chinese economy is much too sophisticated and that the country lacks its own ideas, innovations and

²⁹ Ibid.

technology – everything is owed from bottom to top³⁰ without creating added value. Up till now the country has been competitive not by its innovations and quality but solely by its cheap labour force: e.g. if the cost of an assembled TV set was on the average 73 USD in China in 2003, it was double higher in Malaysia and four-fold in the USA. It shows that the time China needs for the transition from net importer of technology-intensive goods to net exporter is likely to take many decades.

Society Where a Million is Not a Significant Figure

At the background of modern China, two approaches take shape with regard to the perspectives of state power and economic growth. The first one is based on the analysis of the variations of traditional factors, the GDP and foreign investment. The multitude of opinions and projections is formed by international agencies, academic institutions, think-tanks, publications of various deviations and Internet sites. Although it is always reminded that the Chinese press and information is restricted by the government, the publicly available facts include references to the publications in Chinese by internal experts, those from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Another approach is based on the analysis of rarely publicized Chinese memorandums and internal policy documents. Thus, a new wave of assessments and debates is emerging with the focus on the Chinese foreign policy and the internal problems of social divide. More often than not one can hear the idea of the breadth and depth of the Chinese officials and their foreign policy, and the rising importance of the Maoist and Marxist heritage within it³¹. MIT professor *Yasheng Huang* in his study draws attention to the price that the Chinese people are paying for the opportunity to be called a phenomenon; he says that one has to look at China as a dual state³². One side of it is a part of the population that lives an urbanized and state-controlled life; another is vibrant, entrepreneurial and rural that "finances" the urban growth by poor living quality and increasing taxes. According to Yasheng Huang, the social divide and poverty in the Chinese provinces do not show any signs of decline. It is supported by the fact that between 2000 and 2005, when schools and hospitals were closed down on a massive scale in rural areas, the number of illiterate Chinese increased by 30 million.

There is no agreement still on the academic level about the reason for

³⁰ "A special report on technology in India and China", *The Economist*, November 10th 2007, p. 7.

^{31 &}quot;China Analysis: 19", European Council on Foreign Relations, Asia Centre, Sciences Po, http://www.centreasia.org., 14 08 2008.

³² Huang, Yasheng, Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State, Cambridge University Press, 2008, 368 pages.

the poverty of separate states or social groups. All known theories are attempted to bring under three groups: the first one includes assumptions that the poor simply work poorly, and it is only effective economy that is able to free them from poverty; the second one - that the poor do not have the power and thus are being exploited so they should attain the state governing power; the third one – that they have been put into a vicious circle of poverty that can be broken only from the outside³³. However, in our time of modern direct communication it is not difficult for the people who live in most remote areas on Earth to find out about the wealth and benefits of others provided by material progress, and poverty is no more something accepted as a natural state. The Chinese situation shows that the hopes and expectations of millions of people exceed the possibilities of the society to make these dreams come true, so one can say that they are just the regularity of human behaviour³⁴ and cannot be called rational. However, the Law of large numbers becomes very relevant when we speak about the problems of social divide and possible power of the wave of discontent.

On the other hand, a part of the Chinese political elite ideology has always been the will to strive in order to demonstrate to the rest of the world the modernity and financial prosperity of the society and to indirectly ignore the problems of the social divide. The fact of the Olympic Games in the first half of 2008 was mentioned by comparing it to the event of 1936 when the Olympic Games took place in Berlin under the Nazis. However, the publications that voiced the opinions of the Chinese officials and separate citizens repeatedly stated that such a comparison was just another petulant effort by Western foes to thwart China's inexorable rise³⁵.

Common travellers who are fascinated by centennial Chinese religious, cultural and medical traditions notice simpler and more realistic "Olympic" changes³⁶. Millions of people have turned to be "somewhere out there" having no ID, no education and social guarantees, who come from poor provinces and villages overtaken by redundancy in unfertile regions. All of them are the result of the crazy family planning policy that was started back in 1949³⁷. They were exchanged for 500 thousand smiling service-minded "volunteers" mobilized by the state to take care of the guests during the Games.

It seems like the dispersed human mass that by unofficial estimation reaches 200 million, does not fit into the Chinese government's plan of creating a "harmonious society", which it is promised, will be implemented by 2020.

³³ It is assumed that the first to offer this kind of classification of the poverty reasons was Ragnar Nurkse (see.: R.Gilpin, *Tarptautinių santykių politinė ekonomija*, V.: "Algarvė", 1998, p. 487).

³⁴ Hirschman, Albert, Essays in Trespassing: Economics to Politics and Beyond, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 62.

^{35 &}quot;China's dash for freedom", The Economist, August 2nd, 2008, p.11.

³⁶ Dikčius R., "Geltoni raguočiai", *Istorijos*, 2008 m. rugpjūtis, Nr. 8, p.80.

³⁷ For instance, *Mao Zedong* declared the slogan "The more numerous we are, the more powerful we are", and later "a single child policy" was introduced that forced village women to give birth to children and raise them illegally.

The plan is for millions of other Chinese people – for those who, by applying double standards, call the achievements of the liberal Western democracies a sham, accuse businessmen of industrial nations of transferring polluting industrial processes to their country who presently attempt to enjoy the rights of the "new Chinese" for the pleasure of using private cars and freedom of movement. The plans of creation a harmonious society do not include of course, the incidents of either nationalistic nature or the ones provoked by economic reasons. The latest official data include only 9 months of 2006 and show that the number of protests and incidents decreased by 22 percent in comparison to the previous years. However, the number of various protests and incidents in China was calculated at over 74 thousand in 2004, when their number was only 10 thousand back in 199438. Anti-Western nationalistic outbursts that involve millions of Chinese within the country and abroad become in a way useful both for the government that is able to demonstrate to the world that it is capable of managing the masses and for the national bureaucracy which is notorious for high degree of corruption and a special system of permits-bans.

The Chinese government has been able to maintain its grip on power for three decades by painting a vision of economic prosperity to the people. Millions of Chinese are presently enjoying the way of life created by favourable circumstances that their fathers could not even dream about. But the minds of the "new Chinese" need new inspirations, and the government has created a new strategy by promising that their country will get back the "fair" place in the centre of the world economy. Unfortunately, as history shows, any escalation of nationalism very often turns its back on national governments.

Concluding Remarks

The modern PRC's economic, political and cultural-civilization influence denies an essential assumption of political economy that conflicts are inevitable in the world of national states and political borders when a rising state tries to overcome existing barriers. The Chinese people actively show to the world that they strive at recreating the fairness principle in a hierarchic society and regain their former regional and world power; they consistently realize the far-reaching vision through their national and regional bureaucracy. The investment program of immense scope that the Chinese economy is ready for, together with the surplus of the financial capital in the world that is looking, as a rule, for places where it can reach the largest marginal profitability, is in line with the Chinese rational expectations. Having understood the opportunities of the most modern economic multiplier - the infrastructural development - the

³⁸ "A lot to be angry about", *The Economist*, May 3rd, 2008, p. 61.

Chinese national bureaucracy will be able to use further the benefits of foreign investment directing it by administrative and political decisions to the areas that best meet their own interests. China's government will be able to rule the minds and produce of over a billion-strong nation effectively manipulating by the power of the image tools explained by the cognitive dissonance. Thus, it is probable that China will succeed in using a big advantage of an "underdeveloped country" – an opportunity to jump over certain economic development stages and this way surpass any industrial leader.

This assumption is provoked by the analysis of the sources and possible consequences of the world financial crisis of 2008: it becomes obvious that huge debts and bank nationalization can be expected, a long-term recession in the USA and European countries as these countries have been using much more than they produced for a quarter of a century, and they have not been able to manage their deficit problems. However, the communist China has been working profitably; it saved and accumulated wealth. The present financial turmoil opens an opportunity for China to invest the accumulated funds successfully in Western markets – to transfer its dollar reserves, for instance, to the USA assets and this way minimize its losses from the shrinking world production, to change gradually the balance of the world power and eventually take over the world leadership. However, the projections should not ignore an important word in economy – "if"... for instance, exported goods will make an influence on inflation alterations throughout the world if internal prices and wages in China grow considerably slower than in the rest of the world due to the means of administrative control. A more vigorous increase of local demand in 2008 will continue to influence China's BVP growth if the income distribution, which is still rather vague, does not aggravate the country's social tension that is quite visible. China will retain foreign investment, the main stimulant of economic growth, only if the strive of the national bureaucracy to have priority over regional bureaucrats and serve the powerful influence groups, which has been demonstrated by the means of rising economic nationalism, will visibly diminish.

A deeper analysis of facts and figures undoubtedly would help formulate even more assumptions and hypotheses that may cast doubts about the rising might of China's economy. For example, the population growth - if China's economy is at the same level as the USA's by certain parameters, the created income per capita will reach only 1/4 to 1/3 of the American level. Secondly, Western European and American economies have already been "diseased", and the spreading infection unavoidably would decrease China's economic indicators. Thirdly, a serious approaching problem is the incompatibility of the declared socialism in the Chinese society and market relations, which is talked about even by the country's leadership³⁹. China will

³⁹ Hu Jintao, "Building harmonious socialist society", Speech at the Special Discussion Class for Principal Leading Cadres, Xinhua, 30/06/2005.

continue to face a growing problem of energy security due to declining oil resources on Chinese territory, fast growth of industry, urban development, population and speed of economic expansion. The possible future disruptions in the supply of raw materials and the rapid increase in resource prices would not only have serious impact on China's economy but also fuel social issues and provoke disturbances that might weaken the influence of the Communist Party.

September, 2008

African Security Survey

The main goal of this survey is to explain the place of Africa in the global security environment, specificity of African geopolitics, as well as a general understanding of African development in the context of current World Order. In even recent history, Africa was the global periphery – the source of raw materials and a cheap labour force. The global perception of Africa started to change in recent years, however the continent remains insecure and unsafe both for Africans and the World community due to extreme instability on the states and interstate conflicts as well as so called non-military threats including epidemics, low social organization of society, etc. The state stability and consolidation, sustainable development, and implementation of Millennium Development Goals are prerequisites to coming to a solution for the African problems. The world has the possibility to assist Africa in dealing with epidemics, climate change and other issues as well as applying stricter arms control, peace keeping and peace making.

Introduction

Traditionally Africa was (or still is) the World periphery¹. This view on Africa is based on a comparatively late "discovery" of the continent, the legacy of the colonial era and the geopolitical realities of the Cold War period. In recent years numerous attempts to revise the out-dated approaches appear. The idea is to change Africa from the continent of problems to the continent of opportunities.

There is no doubt that the significance of Africa for the World is growing. In the Cold War period it was indeed the "third world", important for "first" and "second" for support to one of them. After the Cold War it simply impossible to ignore African poverty, internal conflicts, epidemics, demography and general insecurity. None of the continents can stay aside in the global world². Africa is now more important for the United States, China, and Russia; there are also important notes on Africa in EU security strategy³.

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¹ The text deals mostly with so-called Sub-Saharan Africa (except some notes), taking in mind, that North Africa politically and in context of regional and international security composes separate region or part of Middle East and Islamic area.

² Vareikis E., Globalusis Futbolas. Emociniai ir politiniai civilizacijų santykiai dabartinėje globalizacijoje, Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2008.

³ Klingebiel S., "Regional Security in Africa and the Role of External Support", European Journal of Development Research, 2000, vol.17, no.3, p. 437-448.

However pathetic declarations about Africa do not changes the grim reality. Africa is at the end of the tables in regards to different economic, political development data level of democracy, and in the group of "weakest" regions. So the talks about African security are related to general understanding African realities. African states are considered as instable, many of tam cannot avoid internal (civil) conflicts, and interstate wars take place as well. Also the non-military threats as epidemics, demography, and natural disasters increase insecurity. Some of the problems have their origins in pre-colonial and colonial times some occurred in the time of establishment and sovereignity of African states.

The main goal of this survey is to overview the security of the African continent in the light of classical and modern concepts of security and to discuss the main security problems of the continent in the beginning of XXI century.

1. Theoretical Background of African Security

1.1. African Geopolitics

The research of security – global and regional – was limited for a long time by the issues related to Euro-Atlantic space. The security of the "third world" was in the Focus of interest just after the World War II, during the process of de-colonization (1950-ies and 1960-ies)⁴, however late it became only part of Cold War security interest.

Africa is unique for the lack of a consistent concept of its geopolitics. It was not created by Africans, nor by any of great civilizations. None of the countries can say they need Africa, and which kind of Africa they need, if the answer is yes.

From a historical perspective, the technical limitations of ancient Rome permitted the control of only the northern part of Africa. After the collapse of the Roman Empire Africa became the no man's land, undiscovered and unknown with the exception of Egypt. Later the same North Africa became the origin of Islamic threat, however the ideologists of the Islamic expansion did not have solid knowledge about what Africa really is and how to manage this land. Islam crossed the Sahara and the equator; however it was expanding in a chaotic manner without any geopolitical motivation and administration.

In the time of geographic discoveries at the end of XV century the great powers - Spain and Portugal – divided equally the entire World. According to the Treaty of Tordesillas, Africa was agreed to be a Portuguese area of interest. Portuguese circumnavigated Africa and "discovered" it, however with limited human resources invested in trade relations, but not into the creation of a

⁴ Akinrinade S. "Democracy as Security in Africa: Towards a Framework of Understanding", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 17 (2), 1999, p. 221.

colonial empire. They colonized small parts of the costal areas without serious penetration into the continent.

Later the Dutch, British and French found the profitable business. Slaves became the most important and desirable African good. There were no major conflicts about the slave market, conflicts that could make Africa important geopolitically. Africa was important as a supplier only, but not the territory for implementation of desirable geopolitical goals.

Colonization later became the continuation of policies of European interests of great powers. During the World Wars, Africa was the battlefield of the war between the great powers, but not the battlefield for Africa itself. The same can be said about Cold War. There were the regimes that were more supporting of one of the competing systems, but the "iron curtains" and "Berlin walls" did not appear. Local politicians often were changing sides in a radical way, declaring their sympathies to Moscow, to Washington or former the metropolis.

The classics of geopolitical thought in recent centuries tried to prove Africa being useless and not important instead of looking for its prospective. Alfred Thayer Mahan, the author of the sea power concept, put Africa and its states into a category of states of continental orientation. There are no conditions for ship construction, local people have no expansionist strategy and are orientated rather to the continental side. So it is clear why Africans never "discovered" Europe or America and never established an aggressive and dynamic empire.

Friedrich Ratzel stated that African society has not enough potential to establish the aggressive states; they don't want to be the masters of nature, preferring to live in harmony with it⁵. Halford Mackinder referred to African states as useless territory, surrounding the "world centre" – Heartland - and adjacent regions⁶.

Africa also was not a part of the various ideologies of paneuropeanistic, panamericanistic, or euroasiatic concepts; in the times of classical geopolitics panafricanism was still not fashionable. Karl Haushoffer proposed to give Africa to Germany in the division of the globe between great powers⁷, however it was never considered seriously. Finally Africa was divided rather accidentally with no attention to the will of local population, ethnic or historic heritage. Unlike USA, which was created according to the classical concept of political liberalism, unlike Asia, where pre-colonial heritage was respected, Africa had none of that. It is not a surprise that the de-colonization of Africa resulted in numerous failed states offered to accidental local leaders.

There are a few exceptions only: the attempts to implement a model of European style society in South Africa, historical reminiscences in Ethiopia and Egypt and of course Islamic North Africa, that generally according to numerous Africanists is the region different from Sub-Saharan Africa.

De-colonized Africa – the periphery of Europe – is the source of regional

⁵ Ratzel F., Politische Geographie, Osnabrück: Zeller, 1923.

⁶ Mackinder H. J., "The Geographical Pivot of History", Royal Geographical Society, 2000.

Haushofer K., Bausteine zur Politik, Berlin, 1928.

and ethnic conflicts and examples of failures in the creation of states and modern nations⁸. There is no state able to take responsibility for solving the geopolitical problems. The states still are not really nation states, and people are mostly indifferent to the destiny of their own states. The problem of simple physical survival is essential. It is necessary to survive in the endless civil wars, and decades of dictatorships. Facing AIDS, poverty and famine – Sub-Saharan Africa is an area of extreme poverty. One can add corruption, a devastated natural environment and the profanation of traditional values. Lagging behind in the speed of development Sub-Saharan Africa is the poorest place in the World.

The hopes of the end of Cold War were not fulfilled as well as hopes of de-colonization. New World Order rejected studies of African geopolitics as outdated – democracy has not to be related to geography and history. The main things factors for development have to be liberal economy and political pluralism⁹.

In the beginning of the XXI century none of the great powers had a geopolitical concept for Africa. In Europe, Central America and Asia there are clear lines of geopolitical interests. But they are absent in Africa. Russia, which for decades was separating Africans into "our Negroes" and "their Negroes" today has no clearly defined supporters and adversaries, has no clear interest to access the resources, and does not look for the markets. Britain maintains some relations with the British Commonwealth; however is hardly able influence even Zimbabwean dictatorship. France is managing governments in some of the rudiments of their colonies and is trying to keep its image of a great power. China comes to Africa with cynical pragmatism to receive raw materials and sell its goods, ignoring human rights and rules of international cooperation. The USA has no geopolitical strategy on Africa as well¹¹; despite this the country is the main partner for many countries. Generally Africa looks not as though being the problem for Europeans. But there will be no new Africa without the new strategy.

1.2. Africa and the World Order

World Order is defined as the set of political, cultural, and ethnic factors acceptable for the international community, respected by it and considered as a norm of international law. Of course this definition is problematic, because it not known precisely what is international law, and what is acceptable for the entire international community.

The results of the previous World Orders are as follows: Congress of

⁸ Akinrade (note 4) p. 224-230.

⁹ Ibidem, p. 233.

¹⁰ Klinghoffer A. J., The Angolan War. A Study in Soviet foreign policy in the Third World, Colorado: Boulder, 1980. Greig I., The Communist Challenge in Africa. An Analysis of contemporary Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban Policies, London: Foreign Affairs Publishing, 1977.

¹¹ Kraxberger B.M., "The United States and Africa: Shifting Geopolitics in an Age of Terror", *Africa Today* 52.1, 2005, p. 64.

Vienna (1815) resulted in the legitimization of colonialism – it was said that it is necessary to discover and to divide everything in entire World. The Order of Versailles (1920) reduced the significance of so called realistic concept of security. The colonial administrations were partially replaced by mandate territories, what permitted the local population to participate in administration. It was introduction into further de-colonization.

The Cold War Order was rather complicated. From one hand it was the universal order based on UN Charter. Using this background, various structures such as NATO were created and peace-keeping operations were sanctioned. The United Nations had to be a universal arbiter and decision maker in the security issues and they sponsored de-colonization. Africa became a continent of independent countries.

New World Order after the Cold War has to be the result of balanced politics, a liberal economy and World peace, invented by rational thinking. In the last decade of the XX century the impression was that there are enthusiastic steps toward it. American Francis Fukuyama wrote¹² that the World is approaching the stage of liberal democracy – the end of history. There are no wars in this stage because democracies do not start wars, and only competition and enhancing prosperity prevails. So it could happen that there is the place for African states in the list of peaceful and democratically managed countries. The new wave of democracy had to come in the beginning of the XXIst century. It had not only to stabilize African states, but to integrate them to a community of non-problematic states as well.

But the predictions were too optimistic. Only a few countries in Central Europe implemented a post Cold War scenario and became an integral part of the West, whereas Africa remains the area of the crossroads of different global and local interests. The spread of the idea of democracy is going too slowly.


1.3. The Chart of the Threats for Africa

The talk about the specific security of any region has to start from the definition of the threats followed by recommendations on how to diminish or annihilate them. Usually there is an attempt to "measure" the threat taking in to account the probability of the threat taking place and the damage it can cause. The Chart of the threats is the two dimensional graph, where the threats are placed according the probability of their occurrence and the damage they make. Modern researchers Klinke and Renn imagine the chart of the threats as a composition of a few typical groups of threats¹³.

¹² Fakuyama F., The End of History and the Last Man, Free Press, 1992.

¹³ Klinke A., Renn O., "Precautionary principle and discursive strategies: classifying and managing risks", Journal Risk Research Volume 4 (2), 2001, p. 159-173.

DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE THREAT



PROBABILITY OF THE THREAT

Figure 1. Chart of threats for Africa

Damocles – these are predictable global disasters like global nuclear war or other project of self-annihilation, invented by human beings. The damage of such disaster is formidable, but today these events look very little probable. It is clear, that Africa can not suffer alone in this case, if the disaster happens the entire globe will be damaged, so Damocles generally is global, but not an African issue. Africa can influence these threat in the scale it influences the global politics.

Cyclops – these are large-scale international conflicts, including World Wars. Their damage and probability can be estimated, however, the causes of war sometimes are far from rational calculation. This is really the threat for Africa, taking into account the fact that local wars are widespread. This kind of threat is even extremely dangerous for this continent.

Pythia – these predictable and "classic" threats, including physical security of persons, state stability, predictability of society, etc. Africa is really full of this kind of threats – the majority of the states are unstable, the social organization of society is in the low level of development, local communities are terrorized and even "run" by organized crime, and people are suffering from epidemic diseases. All this makes the situation totally unpredictable.

Cassandra – These are the threats with an unpredictable outcome, though their causes are generally known. Let's take the destruction of the ozone layer, or increasing the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. The most important Cassandra of our time is the climate change, and its consequences for Africa can be more disastrous as for other regions.

Pandora – the threats that are not expected, but have the high intensity and significant damages – epidemics, "civilization diseases", etc. For Africa – AIDS is a very special damaging case. *Medusa* – the threats that always exist – some level of crime, human insecurity, the illegitimate use of military equipment, regular diseases, etc. In Africa the level of this kind of threats is also comparatively high, thus need be special treatment.

It is possible to fight *Damocles* and *Cyclops* with political instruments. In the case of *Pythia* and *Pandora*, long term strategies are necessary, whereas *Cassandra* and *Medusa* are something that exist eternally. This simply shows that Africa needs specific security policies; that would first of all diminish the probability of threats, especially wars and solve the "technical" problems related to epidemics, organized crime and their damages.

2. Specific Security Problems in Africa

2.1. Global Dimension of Security

After the Cold War, as it was already stated, the General assumption was the impossibility or at least a very little possibility of global nuclear conflict. For two last decades the USA and USSR/Russia do not use nuclear deterrence as the core strategy of their security. One of important tolls to limit the nuclear weapons is the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other international efforts to prevent the growth of "nuclear club".

According the general knowledge, only one state in the continent – South Africa - produced nuclear weapons and dismantled them later, however there in not 100 percent evidence on that. There is some information about nuclear programs of Libya and Algeria; however there is no serious fear that these countries can produce the nuclear weapons in foreseen future.

The other important tool is the creation of nuclear free zones. They are useful for the limitation of deployment (and possibilities to use) of the nuclear weapons. In 1996 the so called Treaty of Pelindaba was signed. It created the nuclear free zone in entire Africa; 51 out of 53 states in continental Africa signed the treaty, however only less than thirty ratified it, so the treaty is not in the force yet. The implementation of this treaty would be an important formal step to strengthen global security.

Recently a new threat in that area appears. These are rumours about the

attempts of the countries like Iran to use the territory of Africa for stationing for nuclear weapons or nuclear testing. Thus the nuclear free zone is a serious element of security policy.

There is no reason to think that someone aims to conquer and colonize the African continent again using military means. There is no substantial external threat. The Military threats in Africa come generally from the African states themselves.

2.2. Instability of States

Instability of states, as it was mentioned, is one of the causes of insecurity. Political scientists often use the term "failed states" to describe the phenomena. It means in essence the definition of the state in which the central government does not administrate the entire country and its population. The state cannot guarantee the survival, administration nor is reliable, there is no physical protection of people, and the state can not fulfil its international obligations.

The World Bank says there are at least fifty failing states, and majority of them in Africa. The journal "Foreign Policy" and The Fund for Peace annually calculates the index of state failure, which permits one to measure the phenomena. The index is based on 12 indicators of social, economic, political and military development¹⁴.

Instability is caused by factors such as demographic trends, integration of refugees and displaced persons, group grievances, uneven economic development, severe economic decline, criminalisation of the state, marginalization of public services, "State within a State", and the military intervention from outside.

Last year Sudan was on the top of the list, followed by Iraq, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Guinea, and the Central African Republic. The data shows, that eight of ten are African states. Among the 32 states qualified as unstable, almost two thirds are from Africa.

¹⁴ The methodology of calculation of index is presented Foreign policy, *The failed State Index 2008*, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4350&page=1, 14 11 2008.

Table 1. The unstable states in the World

Rank	Country	Total index
1	Sudan	113.7
2	Iraq	111.4
3	Somalia	111.1
4	Zimbabwe	110.1
5	Chad	108.8
6	Cote d'Ivoire	107.3
7	Democratic Republic of Congo	105.5
8	Afghanistan	102.3
9	Guinea	101.3
10	Central African Republic	101.0
11	Haiti	100.9
12	Pakistan	100.1
13	North Korea	97.7
14	Burma/Myanmar	97.0
15	Uganda	96.4
16	Bangladesh	95.9
17	Nigeria	95.6
18	Ethiopia	95.3
19	Burundi	95.2
20	Timor-Leste	94.9
21	Nepal	93.6
22	Uzbekistan	93.5
23	Sierra Leone	93.4
24	Yemen	93.2
25	Sri Lanka	93.1
26	Republic of the Congo	93.0
27	Liberia	92.9
28	Lebanon	92.4
29	Malawi	92.2
30	Solomon Islands	92.0
31	Kenya	91.3
32	Niger	91.2

Additional sources of instability in Africa are problems related with the conflicts between the government and society caused by the fact that the ruling tribe is different from the majority of the population, or the different tribes aim to establish their own ruling elite. It causes the uneven distribution of political influence and state budged, or division of international assistance.

Corrupt African states become the criminal organization fighting for the survival of their ruling regimes only. Being created as units of former colonial administration, numerous countries are not satisfied with their boundaries and possibilities to use their natural resources. This tends to predict, that further international conflicts are inevitable.

2.3. Local Conflicts

Talking about local conflicts, one can pick several causes of them – these are conflicts coming from pre-colonial Africa (like hutu – tutsi confrontation), colonial tone conflicts (fight for raw materials in DR Congo), and conflicts from Cold War period (civil war in Angola and Mozambique). According to many commentators, the end of the Cold War reduced the reasons to go for local wars however the number of conflicts did not go down. It is even difficult to say how many conflicts are going on now – long term and so called low intensity wars de facto are not finished in any case.

It is difficult to apply the traditional methods of conflict resolution in the area of Africa, there is the traditional tribal structures end specifically shapers understanding of ethnic identity is in place. The numerous mechanisms of conflicts prevention and solution, proposed by Europeans in recent decades and based on the primacy of liberal democracy are not working in Africa¹⁵.

It is necessary to create the mechanism of conflict settlement and peace keeping. There were attempts, however, African countries spent more on their own national security than on the solutions of regional problems. It is necessary to create a kind of "Helsinki process" with it sown Decalogue of cooperation, like it was done for Europe in 1975. The prevention of conflicts also is not a solution. The UN indeed made a lot of efforts to implement the durable solutions. The numerous UN operations were performed so far¹⁶, but will it bring the long lasting peace is the subject for future development. These are comparatively large scale operations. For example in Liberia there are 15,000, and in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) – even 17,000 persons.

¹⁵ MacFarlane S. N., "Intervention and Security in Africa", *International Affairs*, Winter, 1994, p. 56-58.

¹⁶ Klingebiel, "Regional Security in Africa and the Role of External Support", *The European Journal of Development Research*, Vol.17, No.3, September, 2000, p. 437-448.

Table 2. Completed UN operations in Africa

Dates of operation	Name of Operation	Location	Conflict
1960–1964	United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)	Congo	Congo Crisis
1988–1991	United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I)	Angola	Angolan Civil War
1989–1990	United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)	Namibia	Namibian War of Independence
1991–1995	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)	Angola	Angolan Civil War
1992–1994	United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Mozambique	Mozambican Civil War
1992–1993	United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)	Somalia	Somali Civil War
1993–1997	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)	Liberia	First Liberian Civil War
1993–1994	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR)	Rwanda Uganda	Rwandan Civil War
1993–1996	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)	Rwanda	Rwandan Civil War
1993–1995	United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)	Somalia	Somali Civil War
1994	United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG)	Chad Libya	Aouzou Strip dispute
1995–1997	United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III)	Angola	Angolan Civil War
1997–1999	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)	Angola	Angolan Civil War
1998–1999	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)	Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone civil war
1998–2000	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)	Central African Republic	Central African Republic mutinies
1999–2005	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)	Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone civil war
2000–2008	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)	Eritrea Ethiopia	Eritrean- Ethiopian War
2004–2006	United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)	Burundi	Burundi Civil War

Not all operations were successful. Operations bringing independence for Namibia, transitions in Mozambique, Angola or Liberia are the UN success

stories; good examples are the agreement between Libya and Chad, stabilization in Sierra Leone. Less successful operations, though completed, took place Somalia, Rwanda¹⁷ and Burundi as well as the mediation of Ethiopia – Eritrea conflict. Seven UN operations are still ongoing.

Start of operation	Name of Operation	Location	Conflict
1991	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	Western Sahara	Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara
1999	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)	Democratic Republic of Congo	Second Congo War
2003	United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	Liberia	Second Liberian Civil War
2004	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	Côte d'Ivoire	Civil war in Côte d'Ivoire
2005	United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)	Sudan	Second Sudanese Civil War
2007	United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)	Sudan	Darfur Conflict
2007	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)	Chad, Central African Republic	Darfur Conflict, War in Chad (2005–present)

Table 3. Ongoing UN operations in Africa

One of the operations without success is the Mission that has to solve problem of West Sahara. The country, partially controlled by Morocco, partially by nationalist movement, still has no defined status, and the attempts to organize an election failed. Operation without success works already for eighteen years.

UN operation in Congo Democratic Republic works from 1999. The civil war seems to be going to its peaceful end and much is done, however it is not the final success yet. Similarly it can be said about the situation in Liberia or Cote d'Ivoire. The UN is failing in the Darfur crisis as well as in the conflict between Chad and Central Africa Republic.

Can Africa formulate its strategic goal, the vision of happy Africa, if yes it needs to say how to make that vision a reality, if no – what has to be done to create it. Today many say there is no vision. Is it question of time, or question of mentality? It's a matter worth to reflect and discuss.

¹⁷ Charbonneau B., "Mastering "Irrational" Violence: The Re-legitimization of French Security Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa", *Alternatives* 31, 2006, p. 215.

One more threat, today defined as military threat, is terrorism that has in an extremely good condition prospered in Africa. The intelligence and counter intelligence are weak, almost no internal arms control implemented, so this threat is really serious.

2.4. Problems of Non-military Security

Non-military security is a part of security issues and does not relate to military policy, use of armed forces, as well as other war and peace problems. Part of security as ecological security – climate change, fighting droughts and floods, epidemics, – cultural and economical security from the first glance has nothing in common with the war, however can provoke wars, and the army can be used fighting environmental disasters and protecting people in case of epidemics and other environmental disasters.

The demographic factors such as migration have to do with non-military security as well. The fighting of organized crime is a mission for the police, so it is not a military matter, however it can become military if the level of organized crime is becoming dangerous such as terrorism.

There is only way to solve the problems of non-military security. It is cooperation. It's obligatory - cooperation is extremely necessary – isolation or self isolation can not save the society *vis-a-vis* non-military threats.

The factors of non-military security can be divided into a few groups:

- *Biological-ecological*: environmental threats, climate change (floods, droughts, earthquakes, purity of air, water, food, radiation, ozone layer, etc.) epidemics, and "civilization diseases".
- *Demographical:* demographical "explosion" in the Third World, disproportions between population growths and GDP growth, and migration.
- Civilization: globalization, interaction between cultures, ethnic conflicts and clashes of civilization, crime and terrorism.

It is worth stressing that all of these factors are actually occurring in Africa. While speaking about security, ecologists and eco-politicians pick few contemporary problems, creating insecurity:

- Global warming, wasting of energy resources and gas emission. There are predictions of rising of global average temperatures from 1 to 3.5 this century. Pessimistic scenarios predict that Africa will suffer the most in the world. Despite the provisions of Kyoto protocol, there are still no real changes on the ground.
- The reduction of equatorial forests. Half of them disappeared in the last century. If the trend persists, the food production in Africa will shrink, the deserts ill grow, especially in North and West Africa. There the area of deserts are bigger than some respectable European states. The densely populated territories of Senegal and Nigeria will go under the water.

- Changes of rivers flow dams. In 1950 there were app. 5,000 big dams, changing the river directions. In 2,000 the number grew to 45,000. There are two new dams constructed daily. They change the natural balance of the environment. In Africa the dams are the threat for the natural biosphere of the rivers. For example, the dam planned to be constructed near Angolan-Namibian border can dry, in the future the entire delta of Okwango River can cause the disappearance of river's delta in Botswana and extinction of a unique natural environment and the creation of climate change.
- *Nuclear waste.* There are more than 400 commercial nuclear reactors in the world. They "produce" more than 11,000 tons of nuclear waste annually. They need special treatment; however, app. 160 million people live closer than 100 kilometres from nuclear waste storage. It is no secret that Africa is seen as a potential storage of the waste.

The problems of civilization and demographical security are of crucial significance as well. It is necessary to mention, that the population growth in Africa is the biggest in the world. More than half of the population is under 15 years and the population is doubling in 25 years. The African population creates a so called demographical pressure for Europe and other continents.

According to UN data in year 2000, app. 175 million people can be defined as migrants, and 25 million among them have no legal status of their residence. A significant part of them are people living in Africa or coming from it. For the time being there is a globally acceptable model for dealing with migrants. Generally states are tending to limit migration, though these efforts contradict with human rights, free movement and globalization. On one hand there is the xenophobic trend to avoid "others", however strong the wish to have a cheap labour force, which stimulates encouraging to invite "gastarbaiters". Within highly developed countries there is the social security system applicable even for the illegal migrants, and it seems to be the ground for people who are ready to accept minimal support. The developing countries or countries involved in various conflicts are not able to stop migration out of the country, whereas western states generally lack mandate to assist in these sensitive matters or to solve problems of foreign countries.

In the late 1970-ies the World Health Organization had issued the ambitious project with the name "Health for all in 2000". The idea of the project was to implement the global-scale prophylactic measures against main diseases, and to decrease the prevalence of them significantly, because people will understand that is better, easier and cheaper to avoid the illness, than to cure it. The project showed the hopes put into the progress of knowledge and optimism.

Infection diseases are one of so-called new threats. Global vaccination or antibiotics made progress, but not victory. It is impossible to prevent the trans-border spread of the diseases – the infection can be transmitted by birds, animals, and insects.

Malaria is transmitted in mosquitoes is widespread in Africa, the number

of people suffering is growing, it is also been stimulating by climate change and grooving number of mosquitoes. Tuberculosis takes more than million victims per year, in Africa there are more than 5 million new cases annually.

HIV/AIDS. More than 40 million people died in recent two decades, and the number of people dying still grows. Many die even without the knowledge about the diagnosis. Only 5 percent of HIV positive people there understand what will be the outcome. Though only 12 percent of humans live in Africa, Africa claims 70 percent of AIDS cases in this continent. It decreases the life expectance of Africans on 8-10 years.

It is noteworthy to say that not only technical problems cause the spread of HIV/AIDS in the third world. This "specific" way of life does not permit the implementation of the measures encouraging one to keep the "traditional" family approach. The possible outcome of today's situation is the disappearance of entire generations from the society. As it is clear from demographical prediction in the case of Botswana, made by American experts, soon the generation of 45-55 years will be less numerous than older generation that lived they active life before the virus became deadly. It is highly possible is that the young generation is also endangered because of how many young people are HIV positive.

It may be said by some, that all of these problems are not security but health care issues, however, the diseases are already not only a medical problem. They are discussed in the political foray. Twenty years ago when optimism prevailed and there were predictions that security will be much more cheaper and new threats – terrorism, environmental problems, migration, epidemics – will be easy manageable. Futurology it seems is funny again. Fighting infection and terrorism are more much dangerous.

Biological weapons some time ago were disqualified as ineffective and non selective are now becoming dangerous weapons of mass destruction again. Terrorists know that the new threats can be their weapon – dangerous and effective. In the XIX century, terrorists attacked selected personalities – ministers, emperors. In the XX century terrorists wanted to create turmoil and panic among civil population. In the XIX century terrorists are attacking civilizations, its weak side – physical shape and morality. It is possible to transfer bacteria and viruses threw the security system, to bring them abroad without any major obstacles. It is easier than transferring explosives. It is possible even to mail bacteria in the envelope. There is no need to kill; there is a need to impose panic and mistrust. It is even better for terrorists that not the military, but not guilty civilians are insecure and vulnerable. The XXI century can be extremely insecure in this respect.

3. Strengthening African Security

Looking to the Threat chart it's easy to make the conclusion that the strengthening of security are the attempts to decrease the probability of the threat appearance and minimize the damages it can cause. One and another can be achieved by political and technical means.

As it was said, it is difficult for Africa to prevent *Damocles* type threats. It is possible to do that by political mean only – applying arms control, implementing global security and confidence building measures. Obviously African countries can contribute to the process, especially if the policy of its countries and international organizations will be in harmony with the principles of World Order. The seat for African country in the Security Council of the UN would contribute to the strengthening of the influence of African countries and will encourage them to speak "one voice".

From the other hand, the probability of the *Cyclops* type threats can be reduced by the creation of the effective peace keeping and peace implementing mechanisms. The UN missions are not enough. Thought there are too many conflicts, there is the growing hope that facing international organizations well-organized efforts, it is possible to avoid conflicts or at least reduced the losses caused by conflicts.

In the recent years there is more and more of a will to establish newer and newer international organizations. Copying some good examples they created forms of international cooperation even the African union and Pan African parliament. AU is really the important step towards the structuralization of African security. Previous Organizations of African unity¹⁸ failed in security matters, because it was blocked by enormous respect to sovereignty and non-inherence. AU, created in 2001, took on board all African states except Morocco. What is new in the AU?¹⁹

AU has a right to neglect the principle of non inherence. To the contrary – the problems of security of a particular country or region is the subject for organization to deal with. Organization has the right to intervene in the cases of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity. The relation between security and sustainable development is well emphasized. Security is the prerequisite for development, and the conflicts are one of the main obstacles to the way towards Millennium Development goals. AU declares the independent policy for security guarantees – "African solutions for African problems". The main structural decision maker is the Security Council of 15 members, selected by rotation: five members for three years, ten embers for two years, taking into account the representation of five African regions. The Security Council already made decisions for operations in Darfur, Comorros, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire and others. There is the decision to create the

¹⁸ Naldi, G., The Organization of African Unity. An Analysis of its Role, London: Mansell, 1999.

¹⁹ Klingebiel, "Regional Security in Africa and the Role of External Support", *The European Journal of Development Research*, Vol.17, No.3, September, 2000, p. 439-441.

rapid deployment force of 15,000 men, ready for peace keeping in any place of Africa. Despite the problems of financing, the plan seems to be realistic. AU is been supported in Europe and USA as well as enthusiastically backed by the leaders of the strongest Africa states – Nigeria and South Africa.

The "classic" *Pythia* threats could be less dangerous in the states; there is more stability, prosperity and state's responsibility for the communities. There is the general agreement, that the key element for African security is the achievement of Millennium Development Goals. This is the international program which unites the participation of all the US member states as well as two dozen international organizations, trying to achieve the eight main goals listed in the UN millennium declaration of 2000. The aim is to achieve no later as in 2015 the reduction of famine and extreme poverty, at least the primary education, gender equality, to reduce children mortality and increase the health status of women in reproductive age, as well as to fight AIDS, malaria and other epidemics. Finally the Millennium Development goals foresee the efforts for global environment protection, fair cooperation between states and the transfer of the experience of good governance.

While the program is designed for all of the World, it is clear that it is important first of all for Africa. Even the implementation of a few of elements listen will increase security significantly. Millennium Development goals²⁰ are related to *Cassandra* type threats as well, first of all with the climate change. That is additional argument for emphasizing the importance of the program. From the other hand the *Pandora* and *Medusa* threats can be reduced in the case the state is stable and well administrated.

It is important to note that the biggest and strongest African countries are taking seriously the need to influence the political future of the continent. And it is, of course, the well-promising phenomena.

Conclusions

The strengthening of African security is an important challenge for all global society. It is clear that a secure, predictable and well-managed Africa is the primary interest of the international community. It is clear, that the process is time and resource consuming.

The so called Western World has to contribute to the Millennium Development goals as well, but not only supporting Africa ideologically. It has to strengthen African economies; for example by discarding debts or creating the fair entrance of African products on to the global market. African countries often say that debts do not permit them to invest into modern technologies and start the competition in the world market from a fair starting position. At the same

²⁰ Macmillan P., ed., Studies in Development Economics and Policy. Achieving the Millennium Development Goals, UNU – Wider, 2008.

time it is necessary to maintain strict arms control, to prevent the temptation of many African countries to invest into military strength, and to demand the fulfilment of international obligations. It is necessary to strengthen the sovereignization of African states, and at the same time to encourage them to take international obligations, fighting illegal migration, money laundering, etc.

Finally, it is necessary to stop the wars still in place and prevent conflicts in the future. As it was said, in the area of non-military security more resources have to be allocated to fight epidemics, poverty and illiteracy. The final solutions of global peace is so called democratic peace – the status of the World, there only democratic states are in place, the states that do not start the wars and are only competing each other according the rules agreed. This is like the post Cold War vision of "end of history". The vision, still not implemented, however very attractive, especially for regions as Africa. Thus the question, how to make Africa happy is still open. It will be happy, if it will be safe. And this is very serious challenge.

Changing European Security Space

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Peace-Building Operations: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Peace-building as one of the concepts of peace operations in general, recently is becoming more frequently analysed phenomena in political science and objectives and goals of peace-building more often becomes part of agenda and actions of international and nongovernmental organizations. Today peace-building became an integral part of missions conducted by United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU). These tendencies are evident in NATO too and the largest regional organization - Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) – is active in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict building. The purpose of the article is to analyse concept of peace-building and its measures, mechanisms used in peace operations. The first part of the article analyses how concept peace-building is analysed in UN, EU, OSCE and NATO by having an aim to show the language used by these organizations and what's the content of the terminology. The second part analyses peace-building operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), primary focusing on peace-building mechanisms used by UN, NATO, OSCE and EU. An example of BiH was chosen because of the state's importance both to the European Union and security in Europe as a whole and of special design of political system of the state after Dayton Agreement.

Introduction

Recently peace-building is becoming a more frequently analysed phenomena in political science, and objectives and goals of peace-building more often become part of the agenda and actions of international and non-governmental organizations. Today peace-building missions become as important as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping in United Nations (UN). The European Union (EU) by developing actively it's civilian capabilities and by implementing it's civilian missions, also pursues functions that academic sources characterise as peace-building. These tendencies are evident in NATO too. The largest regional organization – the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) – focus it's actions on early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict building.

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"The purpose of the article is to analyse the concept of peace-building and its measures and mechanisms used in peace operations. The evaluation of missions is not an aim of the article. The first part of the article analyses how the concept of peace-building is analysed in the UN, EU, OSCE and NATO by having an aim to show the language used by these organizations and what's the content of the terminology. The second part analyses peace-building operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), primary focusing on peace-building mechanisms used by the UN, NATO, OSCE and now the EU. The example of BiH was chosen because of the state's importance both to the European Union and security in Europe as a whole and because of the special design of the political system of the state after the Dayton Agreement. In the authors' opinion, the stability of BiH is one of the cornerstones of stability in all of Balkan region.

Evolution and Content of the Term "Peace-Building"

1.1. Peace-Building on the United Nations agenda

The term "peace-building" appeared on the United Nations political agenda with *Agenda for Peace*¹ in year 1992. In this report by the Secretary-General among traditional functions of the UN – preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping² – the concept "peace-building" was discussed for the first time. *Agenda for Peace* stated that one of the primary goals of the UN should be to rebuild "the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife" and "in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression".

In the context of United Nations, peace-building is understood as actions, by which the goals of peacemaking and peace-building are consolidated. *Agenda for Peace* outlines the basic means of peace-building: "disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible des-

An Agenda for Peace. Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, http://www.un.org/Docs/ SG/agpeace.html, 2008 08 14

² Agenda for Peace describes these concepts as follows: Preventive diplomacy - is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur; Peacemaking - is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations; Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace. For more see, for example, Ulozevičiūtė Ž., "Lithuania's Participation in International Peace Operations: Challenges of the NATO and EU Memberships", Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2004, p. 209 – 224, http://www.kam.lt/EasyAdmin/sys/files/strategic_review_2004_2.pdf

truction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation".

In the case of international war, the United Nations recommends to develop not only economic and social projects, but also to enhance confidence between states, for example, to free travel, promote cultural exchanges, youth and educational projects, or simply to improve transportation or utilize resources such as water or electricity that they need to share.

In Agenda for Peace the United Nations also stresses that peace-building should be understood as an integral part of preventive diplomacy. When conflict breaks out and peacemaking and peace-keeping come into play, projects that address economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems should follow. That is peace-building.

After two years in *Agenda for Development* concept of peace-building was developed in more detailed and is presented as one of the preconditions for development. Peace-building is related to economic, social, cultural development in the agenda. Means of peace-building are understood as actions "to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict"³. Agenda outlines basic goals of peace-building: establishment of new or development of existing political, social, judicial institutions, land reform or other measures of social justice, demobilization and defence reform. Agenda also stresses that one of primary goals of peace-building should be food aid, support for health systems, the clearance of mines and logistical support for essential organizations in the field. Another goal according to Agenda should be re-integration of combatants, which have been recruited at the very young age, into society.

It should be stressed, that both in *Agenda for Peace* and in *Agenda for Development* peace-building is associated with the re-building of regions after conflicts. For example, *Agenda for Development* points out that "preventive diplomacy aims to prevent the outbreak of conflict, peace-building starts during the course of a conflict to prevent its recurrence" ⁴.

Whereas in the *Supplement To An Agenda For Peace: Position Paper Of The Secretary-General On The Occasion Of The Fiftieth Anniversary Of The United Nations*⁵ of year 1995 Secretary-General stresses that peace-building "can also support preventive diplomacy" – "demilitarization, the control of small arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development can be as valuable in preventing conflict as in healing the wounds after conflict has occurred".

 $^{^3}$ An Agenda for Development, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/209/22/IMG/N9420922. pdf? Open
Element, 2008 08 14.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Supplement To An Agenda For Peace: Position Paper Of The Secretary-General On The Occasion Of The Fiftieth Anniversary Of The United Nations, http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html, 2008 08 14.

Failures of the United Nations in Rwanda and Somali where followed by the so-called Brahimi report in the year 2000, in which the use of peace-building not only in post-conflict phase is also stressed. At that time, it was suggested to use peace-building means as a follow-on to other peace operations in Tajikistan and Haiti, and as independent initiatives in Guatemala and Guinea-Bissau⁶. As the aim of Brahimi report was to evaluate UN peace operations and to give recommendations, peace-building was not an exception. According to the Report, more emphasis should be given to such goals like support in elections, reform, restructuring and training of the police, training military, police and other civilian personnel on human rights issues and on the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants⁷. The Brahimi report both in terms of scope and relevance stressed the meaning of all four concepts – preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building – on the United Nations agenda and practice.

In the year 2005 the Secretary-General published *In larger freedom*. In this report issues of peace operations were also addressed. Kofi Annan had to admit the mediation and implementation of peace agreements has failed a few times in 1990s and such countries like Angola, Rwanda, and Somali had lapsed back into violence. He stated that:

If we are going to prevent conflict we must ensure that peace agreements are implemented in a sustained and sustainable manner. Yet at this very point there is a gaping hole in the United Nations institutional machinery: no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace. I therefore propose to Member States that they create an intergovernmental Peace-building Commission, as well as a Peace-building Support Office within the United Nations Secretariat, to achieve this end8.

A few months later the Secretary-General issued an *Explanatory Note* by Secretary-General on the Peace-building Commission, Addendum to Report of the Secretary-General, In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all⁹ where purposes and functions of Peace-building Commission were described. According to the report and Resolution 1645 of the General Assembly, Commission should focus on conflict prevention and post-conflict recovery: "provide necessary information to the Security Council and focus attention on development and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery", ensure financing for recovery and development activities, and

⁶ Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/594/70/PDF/N0059470.pdf?OpenElement, 2008 08 16.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/270/78/PDF/N0527078.pdf?OpenElement, 2008 08 17.

⁹ Explanatory Note by Secretary-General on the Peace building Commission, Addendum to Report of the Secretary-General, In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/356/07/PDF/N0535607.pdf?OpenElement, 2008 08 18.

periodically review progress¹⁰. The Peace-building Commission¹¹ works on three principal configurations - Organizational Committee, Country Specific Meetings, Working Group on Lessons Learned - and operates resources and proposes strategies for post-conflict recovery. According to Resolution 1645, Organizational Committee brings together 31 member states: seven members selected by the Security Council¹², seven members elected by the Economic and Social Council¹³, five of the top providers of assessed contributions to United Nations budgets and of voluntary contributions to the United Nations funds, programmes and agencies, including a standing peace-building fund¹⁴, five top providers of military personnel and civilian police to United Nations missions 15 and seven members elected by the General Assembly¹⁶. The main function of the Organizational Committee is to establish the work agenda, including the establishment of the medium-term calendar for the Commission's wide-ranging activities, and development of Integrated Peace-building Strategies. Country Specific Meetings of the Peace-building Commission looks at issues particular to individual focus countries. Today three countries – Burundi, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone - are on the agenda.

Special attention of the United Nations to peace-building is also evident from the fact that together with the Peace-building Commission, the Peace-building Fund and Peace-building Support Office were established to strengthen the peace-building activities of the UN.

The United Nations Peace-building Fund was launched on October 2006 at the request of General Assembly and Security Council for post-conflict peace-building. The aim of the Fund is to support direct and immediate interventions to the peace-building process, especially when no other funding mechanisms are available¹⁷. The role of the Fund is to support implementation of peace agreements, efforts of countries in building and strengthening capacities, which help to resolve the conflict, establishment or re-establishment of essential administrative services, related human and technical capacities, and participate in critical interventions designed to respond to imminent threats to the peace-building process (e.g., the reintegration of ex-combatants disarmed under a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme)¹⁸.

¹⁰ Ibid.

According to Resolution 1645 the purposes of the Commission are: to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on the proposed integrated strategies for post conflict peace-building and recover; to help ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and sustained financial investment over the medium to long-term; to develop best practices on issues in collaboration with political, security, humanitarian and development actors.

¹² Belgium, China, France, the Russian Federation, South Africa, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America in 2008.

¹³ Angola, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Luxembourg and Sri Lanka in 2008.

¹⁴ Canada, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands and Sweden in 2008.

¹⁵ Bangladesh, Ghana, India, Nigeria and Pakistan in 2008.

¹⁶ Burundi, Chile, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Georgia and Jamaica in 2008.

¹⁷ Peacebuilding Fund: Terms of Refference, http://www.unpbf.org/beta/docs/TOR.pdf, 2008 08 20.

¹⁸ Ibid.

The budget of the Peace-building Fund is distributed into three "windows": Peace-building Fund Window I includes countries that are on the agenda of the Peace-building Commission, Peace-building Fund Window II includes countries that have been designated by the United Nations Secretary-General, and under exceptional circumstances, the Fund can disburse emergency funding – Peace-building Fund Window III, this facility is activated at the request of the Senior UN Representative in the country. In September 2008 four countries – Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone – received support from Peace-building Fund under Window I; five countries receive support under Peace-building Fund under Window II – Comoros, Cōte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, and Nepal. Under Peace-building Fund Window III projects are funded in Burundi, Central African Republic, Cōte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Haiti, Liberia and Kenya¹⁹.

However Jeniffer M. Hazen in article "Can Peacekeepers be Peacebuilders" makes a conclusion that peace-building in UN context remained a largely amorphous concept, because in most cases goals of peacekeeping, for example, institutional reform, are interrelated with the goals of peace-building and the even United Nations itself declare that peace-building should be integral part of peacekeeping.

1.2. European Union and Civilian Crisis Management

Attempts of European Union member states to be active in peace operations should be dated to Sent-Malo agreement in 1998, when after tragedy in Bosnia both United Kingdom and France started changing positions on common security and defence policy of the EU. It was stated that the EU has to play its full role in the international arena and to this end it "must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises"²¹. The process at EU level was initiated during the Cologne European Council in 1999, where in the wake of crisis in Kosovo member states started Europeanization process of Sent-Malo agreement. At Helsinki European Council meeting in 1999, EU member states set a military capability target known as the *Headline Goal 2003*, whereas Feira European Council in 2000 and Goteborg European Council in 2001 focused on civilian capabilities.

Both military and civilian capabilities are being developed for missions assigned in article 17.2 of the Treaty on European Union and known as Peters-

¹⁹ United Nations Peace-building Fund, Bulletin No. 4, http://www.unpbf.org/index.shtml, 2008 08 20.

²⁰ Hazen J. M., "Can Peacekeepers be Peace-builders?", *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 14., no. 3, 2007, p. 324.

²¹ "British-French summit St-Malo, 3-4 December 1998, From St-Malo to Nice. European defence: core documents", *Chaillot Paper 47*, May 2001, p. 8-9, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp047e.pdf, 2008 08 21.

berg tasks: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. However, as Jean-Yves Haine argues, there were a series of successful interpretations of this legal definition, for example, in Cologne in 1999 it was stated that these tasks include "the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks"²². In sum, EU actions can take many forms from peacemaking to peacekeeping, from "the most modest to the most robust", as Martin Ortega put it²³. European Security Strategy helped to clarify types of peace operations that the EU should be involved in. It identified five major threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. EU member states also stated that:

Our traditional concept of self- defence – up to and including the Cold War – was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous. State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected – as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs." Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early [underlined by author – E. E. Š.]²⁴.

As Haine argues, this means that the EU is capable of being involved in stability and nation-building²⁵. In the case of EU, it means the use of peace-building mechanisms, for example, police and/or civil administration personnel, and/or civil protection capabilities.

In the case of military capabilities, member states agreed to be able to deploy 50,000 - 60,000 troops, within 60 days and be sustainable for a year in support of the Petersberg Tasks by the end of 2003. At Laeken European Council in 2001 heads of states declared that is capable to conduct some crisis-management operations²⁶. This position was reinforced at the May 2003 General Affairs and External Relations Council and Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003, which stated that "the EU now has operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained by recognised shortfalls"²⁷. By stressing that interoperability, deployability and sustainability should be at the core of member states efforts and in the light of European Security

²² Haines J.-Y., "An Historical Perspective", in Gnesotto N., ed., *EU Security and Defence Policy. The First Five Years (1999-2004)*, p. 44, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/5esdpen.pdf, 2008 08 21.

²³ Ortega M., "Beyond Petersberg: missions for the EU military forces", in Gnesotto N., ed., EU Security and Defence Policy. The First Five Years (1999-2004), p. 74, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/5esdpen. pdf, 2008 08 21.

²⁴ A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, 2008 08 01.

²⁵ Haines, (note 22) p. 51.

²⁶ Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, European Council Meeting in Laeken, 14-15 December 2001, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/68827.pdf, 2008 08 22

²⁷ Council of the European Union, *Presidency Conclusions, Thessaloniki European Council*, 19-20 June 2003, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/76279.pdf, 2008 08 22.

Strategy, Brussels European Council in 2004 endorsed Headline Goal 2010²⁸. The key element of HG 2010 is the creation of rapid reaction forces, which will allow the EU to react to all spectrums of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty. Rapid response was already discussed in Helsinki as an important aspect of EU crisis management capabilities and after successful operation Artemis in June 2003 it's development started. On 1 January 2007 the EU Battlegroups reached full operational capability. The battlegroup is the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or of being used for the initial phase of larger operations. The battlegroups are about 1,500 personnel strong. The battlegroups are sustainable for 30 days in initial operations, extendable to 120 days, if re-supplied appropriately. Battlegroups will be employable for Petersberg tasks and those tasks identified in the European Security Strategy, in particular in tasks of combat forces in crisis management. As a part of capability development process, EU worked out five illustrative scenarios for the use of Battlegroups: conflict prevention, separation of parties by force, stabilisation, reconstruction and military advice to third countries, evacuation operations and assistance to humanitarian operations²⁹. Battlegroups generally being part of military component of ESDP is also envisaged of conducting peace-building tasks, e.g. conflict prevention, reconstruction and military advice.

In the case of civilian capabilities, the capacity to develop and deploy civilian police missions was discussed in Helsinki. Later, in Feira, the European Council in June 2000, member states listed four priority areas in which the Union intended to acquire concrete capabilities: police cooperation, strengthening the rule of law, civilian administration, and civil protection. In Feira member states were called to develop the capacity to provide up to 5,000 police officers (from which up to 1,000 police officers within 30 days) by 2003³⁰. Civilian Headline Goal was also developed in "Goteborg European Council in June 2001. The summit set concrete targets for the other three priorities identified in Feira. Member states have undertaken to provide 200 officers (prosecutors, judges, prison officers) in charge of crisis management operations in area of strengthening the rule of law. These types of missions are envisaged to address shortfalls of legal systems in countries where, for example, incompetent judges, widespread corruption and/or laws do not meet international standards, especially in area of human rights, endanger international peace and security. As a last resort such missions may even replace personnel of the legal system with international judges, legal experts, court officers and support staff. Still it's more likely that the EU will help to improve the functioning of the local

²⁸ Council of the European Union, *Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 17-18 June 2004*, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/81742.pdf, 2008 08 22.

²⁹ EU Council Secretariat, Factsheet. EU Battlegroups, February 2007, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Battlegroups_February_07-factsheet.pdf, 2008 08 23.

³⁰ Council of the European Union, *Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19-20 June 2000*, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1.en0. htm, 2008 08 23.

judicial system and will focus on monitoring, mentoring, training officials and assisting the government in reforming laws and the legal system³¹. For example, the EU mission in Georgia EUIUST THEMIS assisted by developing a strategy for reforming Georgian criminal legislation. In the case of civilian administration, member states promised to contribute personnel to a pool of experts, who would be capable of accepting civilian administration missions in the context of crisis management operations and if necessary being deploved at very short notice; functions of civilian administration missions can be establishment or guaranteeing elections, education, water provision, etc. Civil protection consists of three components: 1) 2 or 3 assessment and/or coordination teams, capable of being mobilised around the clock and consisting of 10 experts who could be dispatched within 3 to 7 hours; 2) intervention teams of up to 2000 persons for deployment at short notice; 3) additional or more specialised means which could be dispatched within 2 to 7 days depending on the particular needs of each crisis. Civil protection missions are designed to deal with victims of natural, technical and environmental disasters in situations marked by political violence. Civil protection mechanisms can also be used to support a coordinated EU approach to search and rescue operations, the construction of refugee camps and provision of humanitarian aid³². As for today, member states are able to provide 5,761 policemen, 631 officers for strengthening the rule of law mission, 565 staff for civilian administration missions, 579 civil protection experts and 4445 staff of intervention teams for civil protection missions³³.

At the request of the PSC, the Council Secretariat simultaneously worked on the concept and wider use of monitoring missions. This question became important after EU monitoring missions in Balkans. During May 2003 the PSC prepared the Concept for EU Monitoring Missions. This document described monitoring missions as a generic tool, which would be used in all different phases of crisis management - conflict prevention/resolution and/or crisis management and/or peace-building - and "consists of a mission whose primary activity is to observe, monitor and report to the sending organisation on the general and security situation in the host country or in relation to specific agreement"³⁴. It also includes such activities as contribution in confidence building, low-level conflict resolution, border monitoring, monitoring of refugee returns, human rights monitoring, monitoring of disarmament and demobilisation, and rule of law issues. Member states have committed 505 personnel to monitoring missions.

³¹ Merlingen M. with Ostrauskaite R., European Union Peace-building and Policing, Routledge, 2006, p. 47.

³² Ibid., p. 46-47.

³³ EU Council Secretariat, European Security and Defence Policy: the civilian aspects of crisis management, May 2007, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Background_JPO_2007-Civilian_aspects_compressed.pdf, 2008 08 23.

³⁴ Nowak A., "Civilian Crisis Management within ESDP", in Nowak A., ed., Civilian Crisis Management: the EU Way, Chaillot paper 90, June 2006, p. 28, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp090.pdf, 2008 08 23.

The execution of Petersberg tasks is entrusted to ESDP institutions and mechanisms. The key political decisions are taken at the highest Council level – European Council and General Affairs and External Relations Council (GA-ERC). In addition, Helsinki European Council set up three bodies – Political and Security Committee (PSC), European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and European Union Military Staff (EUMS). PSC is the principal decision-shaping body, but as Antonio Missiroli notes it's decision making role is limited, because for political/strategic decisions it relies on the GAERC and financial aspects of CFSP/ESDP is still the matter of COREPER³⁵. Through PSC both military and civilian crisis management decisions are channelled. It is also linked with the High Representative for the CFSP and the EU Special Representatives in order to ensure full political control and strategic direction to all ESDP missions. EU Military Committee is composed of the Chiefs of Defence, who are regularly represented by their permanent military representatives. It gives military advice and recommendations to the PSC and its Chairman attends Council meetings when decisions with defence implications are to be taken. EUMS is part of the Council Secretariat and works under the direction of the EUMC. It provides military expertise and support to ESDP, including the conduct of crisis management operations, early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for the military aspects of Petersberg tasks.

Decisions concerning institutions in the civilian field were taken at the European Council in Lisbon in March 2000. Member states agreed to create the Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). Its main function is to advice the PSC on the civilian aspects of EU and member states crisis management activities. It's inter-pillar institution that operates under COREPER and gives advice to the PSC on Second Pillar and Member States' crisis management activities and helps to ensure a higher degree of inter-pillar coherence³⁶. CIVCOM is also part of the mechanism for the exchange of information and coordination between the EU and it's member states to facilitate rapid reaction. Still it's role remains of an advisory character – it formulates recommendations to the PSC that has a central role to play in the definition and follow-up of the EU's response to a crisis, as Agnieszka Nowak summarises³⁷.

To strengthen the civilian aspects of ESDP missions, in an informal meeting in Hampton Court in 2005 EU member states decided to create The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and to establish the position of Civilian Operations Commander. It's regarded as new civilian equivalent to the EUMS. Established in August 2007, CPCC is located in Brussels and is part of the Council General Secretariat. The CPCC has a mandate to plan and conduct civilian ESDP missions, under the political control and strategic

³⁵ Missiroli A., "ESDP- How it works", in Gnesotto N., ed., EU Security and Defence Policy. The First Five Years (1999-2004), p. 64, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/5esdpen.pdf, 2008 08 23.

³⁶ Preparatory document related to CESDP: Establishment of a European Union Committee for Civilian Crisis Management, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Preparatory%20document%20 CESDP%20-%20Committee.pdf, 2008 08 23.

³⁷ Nowak, (note 34) p. 23.

direction of the PSC, to provide assistance and advice to the SG/HR, the Presidency and the relevant EU Council bodies and to direct, coordinate, advise, support, supervise and review civilian ESDP operations. The CPCC Director, as EU Civilian Operations Commander, exercises command and control at the strategic level for the planning and conduct of all civilian crisis management operations, under the political control and strategic direction of the PSC and the overall authority of the SG/HR³⁸. CPCC is responsible for nine missions in the areas of police, border assistance management, rule of law and security sector reform as for today: EUPM (Bosnia & Herzegovina); EULEX KOSOVO; EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah (Palestinian Territories); EUJUST LEX (for the Iraqi justice system); EUPOL Afghanistan; EUPOL RD Congo; and EU SSR Guinea-Bissau (it's the first mission entirely planned by CPCC) and European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM).

In sum, in a short time the European Union made considerable progress in framing and implementing both military and civilian capabilities of ESDP. Lately special attention has been given to develop further civilian capabilities, examples of which are creation of CPCC and *Headline Goal 2010* for civilian capabilities. Pedro Serrano³⁹ argues that EU missions can be categorised as follows:

- Stabilisation (military force is deployed to separate of warring parties/ factions or the impose of maintenance of peace in an area affected by conflict; operations *Althea* in BiH and *Artemis* in the Democratic Republic of Congo are good examples of such operations);
- Substitution (international components are required to take over direct management of responsibilities which in normal circumstances are under control of the local authorities, e.g. in the security sector (military, police), area of rule of law (judiciary, prosecutors, penal system);
- Strengthening or reform (the aim is to reform/reconstruct/construct particular branch of state activity through monitoring and mentoring, also inspection; it's done in defence or police fields, can also be extended to rule of law and public administration; examples of such missions are police mission in BiH (EUPM), police mission in FYROM (*Proxima*), rule of law mission in Georgia (EUJUST Themis), police mission in Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL Kinshasa));
- Monitoring (supervision the implementation of an agreement, for example, like in the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) and the EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories (EUBAM Rafah));
- Support to crisis management organisations (support of crisis management efforts led by UN, OSCE, AU, etc.).

³⁸ "Introducing CPCC", *ESDP newsletter*, No. 6, July 2008, p. 24 -45, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/pages24-25-CEU8003ESDP6final_vers.pdf, 2008 08 25.

³⁹ Serrano P., "A Strategic Approach to the European Security and Defence Policy", in Nowak A., ed., Civilian Crisis Management: the EU Way, Chaillot paper 90, June 2006, p. 39-43, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp090.pdf, 2008 08 23.

It should be noted that even until today the EU uses mostly one term – civilian crisis management – to describe many activities EU personnel can be tasked with. Civilian crisis management is described as the intervention of civilian personnel in a crisis having a task to prevent its escalation and to solve it. Civilian and even military EU capabilities, e.g. EU Battlegroups, now have a task to be involved in peace-building as it is understood as a means to prevent from subsequent crises. For the first time this question was discussed in roundtable discussion in Washington D.C. in 2001. In the report of the discussion European Approaches to Civilian Crisis Management⁴⁰ Chris Lindborg notes that experts make distinction between "conflict prevention" - activities that take place before any hostilities have occurred - and "crisis management" - intervention only after violence has erupted. Using UN language, the EU should be engaged in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking activities. Lindborg also emphasises that "post-conflict peace building is seen as another means of preventing subsequent crises", and therefore frequently becomes part of civilian crisis management discussions as well. Lindborg makes a conclusion that civilian crisis management "is comprised of multiple stages and multiple actors; and the lines between CCM and conflict prevention on the one hand, and between civilian and military crisis management on the other hand, are not clearly defined".

While looking at EU missions conclusion that EU is focusing on preventive actions and peace-building can be made. Today the EU conducts 12 missions in the Western Balkans (3 missions), South Caucasus (1 mission), Middle-East (3 missions), Asia (1 mission), and Africa (4 missions)⁴¹. 8 missions are civilian (EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM), European Union rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO), European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia, EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS), EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories (EU BAM Rafah), EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (Eujust Lex), EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANIS-TAN), EUPOL RD CONGO), 2 – military (EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea, EUFOR TCHAD/RCA) and 2 civilian – military (EU mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau), EU security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) according to the language of the EU. Almost all civilian EU mission can be described as peace-building missions. EUPOL RD Congo has a mission to help Congolese Police in its reform efforts and supports all its possible interactions with the judicial system. 39 international staff are now deployed on the ground with the support of 9 local. EUPOL Afghanistan aims at contributing to the establishment of sustainable and effective civilian

⁴⁰ European Approaches to Civilian Crisis Management. A Basic Special Report on Roundtable Discussions Held in Washington, D.C., October 2001, British American Security Information Council, 2002, http:// www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2002ccm.pdf, 2008 08 26.

⁴¹ Data as of September 2008.

policing arrangements under Afghan ownership and in accordance with international standards. The mission is monitoring, mentoring, advising and training at the level of the Afghan Ministry of Interior, regions and provinces. Mission strength is 184 international and 90 local staff. EUJUST LEX in Iraq provides training and professional development opportunities to senior Iraqi judiciary, police and penitentiary officials. The new EU mission in Georgia EUMM Georgia also supports the hypothesis that civilian missions are peace-building operations. After and agreement between Georgia and Russia was reached, the EU sent 200 civilian observers to monitor and analyse the situation.

1.3. Peace – Building Operations in NATO Framework

NATO very briefly outlines what type of missions organisations should be involved in. During the Cold War NATO's basic task was to ensure that the Alliance had the capacity to deal with collective defence operations under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. After the Cold War, the Alliance is involved in conflict prevention, restoration and preservation of peace operations, for example, in former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq. NATO led operations can be categorized in two types: crises response operations and peace support operations. Crises response operations – NATO-led non-Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty operations that include rendering support to civilian authorities, humanitarian, sanctions/embargo implementation and peace support operations. Peace support operations – NATO-led operations covering conflict prevention, peace making, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building operations⁴². In the language of NATO both types of operations are called crisis management operations, in which military and non-military measures can be used. NATO's mission in Afghanistan, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is one of the examples how military and civilian tasks are combined in one operation. NATO declares that its task is to help the Government of Afghanistan to extend and exercise its authority and influence across the country, create conditions for stabilisation and reconstruction, but at the same time reconstruction and development is an integral part of ISAF mission, mostly fulfilled through 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams, composed of military and civilian personnel, with the task for the latter one to engage in peace-building activities. These peace-building activities include: rehabilitation of schools and medical facilities (in 2001 8% of Afghans had access to basic healthcare, whereas in early 2007 the figure is up to 83%, in 2001 only 1.2 million children attended school daily and today 7 million do, including 2 million girls, plus about 45,000 teachers were trained in 2006), the restoration of water supplies,

⁴² Ministry of Defence of Lithuania, "Tarptautinių operacijų apibrėžimai" [Definitions of International Peace Operations], http://www.kam.lt/index.php/lt/144614/, 2008 10 11;Ulozevičiūtė Ž., Lithuania's Participation in International Peace Operations: Challenges of the NATO and EU Memberships, Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2004, Vilnius, 2005, p. 209 – 224.

reconstruction of roads, cleaning territories from mines (88,136 anti-personnel mines and 11,524 anti-tank mines are already destroyed), demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (about 60,000 ex-combatants disarmed and reintegrated, 35,000 - 40,000 officers are serving in the new national police force, 30,000 soldiers are serving in the new national army), restitution of refugees (4.8 million have returned so far (3.5 million with the UN's help))⁴³. NATO's mission in Iraq should be also described as having peace-building mode as the main aim is to train Iraqi military personnel, support the development of the country's security institutions, and coordinate the delivery of equipment. In Afghanistan peace-building is conducted by both military and civilian personnel, whereas in Iraq military is responsible for the mission, but both these case should be regarded as having peace-building mode as it's related to the reconstruction and development of countries and includes classical instruments of peace-building.

1.4. OSCE and Peace - Building

Peace-building is also an instrument used by regional organizations. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the largest regional security organization in the world having 56 member states from Europe, Central Asia and North America. OSCE is active in three dimensions of security - the politico-military, the economic and environmental, and the human dimension. It therefore addresses a wide range of security-related concerns, including arms control, confidence - and security-building measures, human rights, national minorities, democratization, policing strategies, counter-terrorism and economic and environmental activities. So it can be stated that OSCE uses mechanisms of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict building.

As far as it concerns political-military dimension, OSCE is active in arms control (helps to stop the spread of weapons and offers assistance with their destruction), border management (actions range from conflict prevention to post-conflict management, capacity-building and institutional support), combating terrorism, conflict prevention, military reform (OSCE's Forum for Security Co-operation provides a framework for political dialogue on military reform, practical activities are conducted by the field operations), policing. In the economic and environmental dimension OSCE is active in fight against anti-trafficking, promotion of economic activities (combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism, promoting good governance, supporting transport development and security, assisting migration management), also environmental activities. Human dimensions of OSCE activities is related to fight against trafficking, promotion of democracy, human rights, minority

⁴³ NATO in Afghanistan. Reconstruction and development. June 2007, http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/factsheets/reconst_develop.html, 2008 08 28.

rights, freedom of media, tolerance, rule of law, gender equality, education, assistance in elections. All these activities should be regarded as peace-building mechanisms. It also shows how many different forms it can take: from police functions to military reform, from combating money laundering to promotion of good governance, from promotion of human rights to assistance in elections. For example, the OSCE Office in Baku has the tasks to carry-out legislative reforms in the fields of elections, mass media, civil society, to train police and penitentiary officers and others.

2. Peace-Building Efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina

There are many explanations for the failure of the international community to prevent or stop the wars in the former Yugoslavia – lack of cohesion in EU, unwillingness of governments to provide adequate resources, short-termism of politicians. Mary Kaldor in the book, *New & Old Wars Organized Violence in a Global Era*⁴⁴ argues that international community failed to understand why or how the war was fought. Politically and military, author says, war was perceived as a conflict between competing nationalisms of a traditional essentialist type and this was true both in Europe and USA, but such understanding missed the point that this was a conflict between a new form of ethnic nationalism and civilized values. The international community fell into the nationalist trap and contributed to the nationalist goals. Even ethnic cleansing was treated as a side-effect of war.

In the most constituent republics of Yugoslavia nationalists parties gained power through democratic elections in 1991 and formed coalition government despite having conflicting goals: Muslim nationalists want a centralised independent Bosnia, Serb nationalists want to stay in Belgrade-dominated rump Yugoslavia, Croats want to join an independent Croatian state⁴⁵. Governments of Croatia and Slovenia also called for the transformation of Yugoslavia into loose federation or confederation, while Serbia favoured more centralized state. This led to radicalization of nationalists sentiments and Croatia and Slovenia proclaimed it's independence in 1991⁴⁶. The first parliamentary elections in BiH in 1991 led to a national assembly dominated by three ethnically-based parties, which had formed a loose coalition to oust the communists from power. Croatia's and Slovenia's declarations of independence and the war that followed in Croatia starting from 1991 when Serbian rebels backed by Yugoslav military dominated by Serbs proclaimed secession of parts of Croatia with

⁴⁴ Kaldor M., New & Old Wars. Organized Violence in a global era, Polity, 2001, p. 57-58.

⁴⁵ Timeline: Bosnia-Hercegovina, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1066981.stm, 2008 09 02.

⁴⁶ Merlingen, (note 31) p. 53

having a pretext to protect the Serbian minority in Croatia, placed BiH and its three constituent nations - Bosniaks (until 1994 called Muslims), Serbs and Croats - in an awkward position. A significant split soon developed on the issue of whether to stay within the Yugoslav federation (overwhelmingly favoured among Serbs) or seek independence (overwhelmingly favoured among Bosniaks and Croats). The Serb members of parliament, consisting mainly of the Serb Democratic Party members, abandoned the central parliament in Sarajevo, and formed the Assembly of the Serb People of BiH on 24 October 1991, which marked the end of the tri-ethnic coalition that governed after the elections in 1991. This Assembly established the Serbian Republic of BiH on 9 Ianuary 1992, which became Republika Srpska in August 1992. A declaration of BiH sovereignty in October 1991 was followed by a referendum for independence from Yugoslavia in February and March 1992, it was boycotted by the great majority of the Serbs. The turnout in the independence referendum was 63.7% and 99.4% voted for independence. BiH declared independence shortly afterwards in the absence of its Serb members. Following a tense period of escalating tensions and sporadic military incidents, open warfare began in Sarajevo on 6 April.

Following the declaration of independence of the Republic of BiH, the Serbs attacked different parts of the country. The state administration of BiH effectively ceased to function having lost control over the entire territory and Serbs quickly assume control of over half the republic⁴⁷. The Serbs wanted all lands where Serbs had a majority, eastern and western Bosnia. Slobodan Milosevic's aim was to create a Greater Serbia in territory formerly occupied by Muslims⁴⁸. The Croats aimed at securing parts of BiH habited mostly by Croats proclaiming the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia (in Croatian - *Hrvatska Republika Herceg-Bosnia*).

Initially, the Serb forces attacked the non-Serb civilian population in Eastern Bosnia. Once towns and villages were securely in their hands, the Serb forces - military, police, the paramilitaries and, sometimes, even Serb villagers – applied the same pattern: Bosniak houses and apartments were systematically ransacked or burnt down, Bosniak civilians were rounded up or captured, and sometimes beaten or killed in the process. Some 2.2 million refugees were displaced by the end of the war. Men and women were separated, with many of the men detained in the camps. The women were kept in various detention centres where they were mistreated in many ways including being raped repeatedly. The single most prominent example atrocity was the Srebrenica Massacre in 1995, ruled as genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

International recognition of BiH increased diplomatic pressure for the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) to withdraw from the republic's territory which they officially did. However though, the Bosnian Serb members of JNA sim-

⁴⁷ Timeline: Bosnia-Hercegovina, (note 45).

⁴⁸ Kaplan L. S., NATO Divided, NATO United. The Evolution of an Alliance, Praeger, 2004, p. 116.

ply changed insignia, formed the Army of Republika Srpska, and continued fighting. Armed and equipped from INA stockpiles in Bosnia, supported by volunteers and various paramilitary forces from Serbia, and receiving extensive humanitarian, logistical and financial support from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Republika Srpska's offensives in 1992 managed to place much of the country under its control. At that time the United Nations started to be involved in the situation when on 25 September 1991 the Security Council unanimously adopted its resolution 713 expressing concern at the fighting in the country and calling on all States to implement immediately a "general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia"49. A month later UN Secretary-General appointed his Personal Envoy for Yugoslavia, he maintained contact with the Presidency of the European Community, with the Chairman of the CSCE-participating States, with Lord Carrington, then Chairman of the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia, and with other interested parties. Very soon the United Nations agreed to launch a peace-keeping operation. In February 1992 the Security Council by its resolution 743 established UNPROFOR to create conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis within the framework of the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia⁵⁰. UNPROFOR was initially established in Croatia⁵¹. In June 1992, as the conflict intensified and extended to BiH, UNPROFOR's mandate and strength were enlarged in order to ensure the security and functioning of the airport at Sarajevo and the delivery of humanitarian aid. In September 1992, UNPROFOR's mandate was further enlarged to enable it to support efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to deliver humanitarian relief throughout BiH, and to protect convoys of released civilian detainees if the International Committee of the Red Cross so requested. In addition, the Force monitored the "no-fly" zone, banning all military flights in BiH, and the United Nations "safe areas" established by the Security Council around five Bosnian towns and the city of Sarajevo. UNPROFOR was authorized to use force in self-defence in reply to attacks against these areas, and to coordinate with NATO the use of air power in support of its activities. Similar arrangements were subsequently extended to the territory of Croatia. Still United Nations lacked means and were not prepared in 1992 to enforce its resolutions.

⁴⁹ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 713, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/ NR0/596/49/IMG/NR059649.pdf?OpenElement, 2008 09 03.

⁵⁰ United Nations Protection Force, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unprof_b.htm, 2008 09 03.

⁵¹ UNPROFOR had a mandate to ensure that the three "United Nations Protected Areas" (UNPAs) in Croatia were demilitarized. In the course of 1992, UNPROFOR's mandate was enlarged to include monitoring functions in certain other areas of Croatia (called "pink zones"); to enable the Force to control the entry of civilians into the UNPAs and to perform immigration and customs functions at the UNPA borders at international frontiers; and to include monitoring of the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula and to ensure control of the Peruca dam, situated in one of the "pink zones". In December 1992, UNPROFOR was also deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, to monitor and report any developments in its border areas.

European Union approach to protect civilians through UNPROFOR wasn't successful and United Nations asked NATO in 1993 to prepare a detailed plan for implementation of a non-fly zone⁵². On 31 March 1995, the Security Council decided to restructure UNPROFOR, replacing it with three separate but interlinked peacekeeping operations.

By 1993, when an armed conflict erupted between the predominantly Bosniak government in Sarajevo and the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, about 70% of the country was controlled by Republika Srpska.

In March 1994, the signing of the Washington Agreement between the leaders of the republican government and Herzeg-Bosnia led to the creation of a joint Bosniak-Croat Federation of BiH, which absorbed the territory of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and that held by the Army of the Republic of BiH (Bosniak's military). Despite numerous efforts by United Nations and European Union, the conflict lasted more than three years.

A NATO bombing campaign began in August, 1995, against the Army of Republika Srpska, after the Srebrenica massacre. This had together with the joint offensive by forces from Republic of Croatia and Bosniak's Armed Forces led to the military defeat of Serbian forces and close to the collapse of Republika Srpska.

In December 1995, the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina/GFAP) in Dayton, Ohio by the presidents of BiH (Alija Izetbegović), Croatia (Franjo Tuđman), and Serbia (Slobodan Milošević) brought a halt to the fighting, roughly establishing the basic structure of the present-day state. The number of identified victims is currently at 97,207, and the recent research estimates the total number to be less than 110,000 killed (civilians and military), and 1.8 million displaced.

Today BiH is a country on the Balkan peninsula of Southern Europe with an area of 51,129 square kilometres with the population of approximately 4 million⁵³. The country is home to three ethnic constituent nations: Bosniaks (until 1994 called Muslims), Serbs and Croats. The country is politically decentralized and comprises two governing entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (inhabited mostly by Bosniaks and Croats) and Republika Srpska (inhabited mostly by Serbs), with District Brčko as a de facto third entity.

As a result of the Dayton Agreement, the civilian peace implementation is supervised by the High Representative for BiH selected by the Peace Implementation Council, which comprises more than 50 donor countries. The High Representative has many governmental and legislative powers, including the dismissal of elected and non-elected officials. Recently, in the process of transferring part of the jurisdiction from the entities to the state, several central institutions have been established, such as defence ministry, state court, and indirect taxation service. Since March 2002 the High Representative also per-

⁵² Kaplan, (note 48), p. 116-121.

⁵³ Timeline: Bosnia-Hercegovina, (note 45). The official census in 1991 recorded 4.4 million people, while an unofficial census in 1996 by UNHCR recorded a post-war population of 3.9 million.

forms functions of the EU's Special Representative. The current HR/EUSR is Miroslav Lajcak from Slovakia, who was Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (later Serbia and Montenegro), Republic of Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and later worked as Personal Representative of EU High Representative for CFSP to facilitate the Montenegrin dialogue.

The Dayton peace agreement designed the political structure of BiH. The key common state institutions are the Presidency and the Council of Ministers.

The Chair of the Presidency of BiH rotates among three members (Bosniak, Serb, Croat), each elected as the Chair for an eight-month term within their four-year term as a member. The three members of the Presidency are elected directly by the people (Federation votes for the Bosniak/Croat, Republika Srpska for the Serb).

The Chair of the Council of Ministers is nominated by the Presidency and approved by the House of Representatives. He or she is then responsible for appointing a Foreign Minister, Minister of Foreign Trade, and others as appropriate. After elections in 2007 Nikola Spiric, a Bosnian Serb, was asked to form a government after the parties which gained the most votes agreed on a coalition. He resigned in November 2007 in protest at efforts by the High Representative and the EU Special Representative Lajcak to introduce reforms supported by the EU. Spiric said in his resignation speech that Bosnia has been run for too long by foreigners. However, in December 2007 he secured the approval of Bosnia's parliament to return as prime minister, promising to work on reforms that would bring Bosnia closer to membership of NATO and the European Union⁵⁴.

The Parliamentary Assembly is the legislature body in BiH. It consists of two houses: the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives. The House of Peoples includes 15 delegates, two-thirds of which come from the Federation (5 Croat and 5 Bosniaks) and one-third from the Republika Srpska (5 Serbs). The House of Representatives is composed of 42 Members, two-thirds elected from the Federation and one-third elected from the Republika Srpska.

However, the highest political authority in the country is the High Representative in BiH, the chief executive officer for the international civilian presence in the country. Since 1995, the High Representative has been able to bypass the elected parliamentary assembly, and since 1997 has been able to remove elected officials. International supervision is to end when the country is deemed politically and democratically stable and self-sustaining.

After Dayton agreement United Nations, NATO, OSCE started their missions in BiH.

In December 1995 under the Dayton peace agreement NATO established NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) of 60,000 troops for one year to oversee implementation of the military aspects of agreement. IFOR also assisted

⁵⁴ Country profile: Bosnia-Hercegovina, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1066886.stm, 2008 09 03.

the OSCE in preparing, supervising and monitoring the first free elections in September 1996 and supported the Office of High Representative to assist the entities of BiH in building new common institutions after elections⁵⁵. In sum, IFOR not only supervised how forces are withdrawn under the Agreement, but also helped to perform peace-building tasks – preparation, supervision and monitoring of elections and institutional building.

In December 1996 IFOR was replaced with 32,000 strong Stabilisation Force (SFOR), which had a task to provide stability necessary for consolidating peace. In 2003 NATO reduced the size of SFOR to 12,000 troops, but the aim remained the same. In 2004 SFOR was replaced by the military operation of the European Union - EUFOR. EUFOR acts in accordance with its peace enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which was renewed by the Security Council on 21 November 2007 (Security Council Resolution 1785). At the beginning of operation, EU deployed 7,000 troops to ensure continued compliance with the Dayton Agreement and to contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH. On December 2006 Council of European Union reconfigured EUFOR-Althea and today the force numbers some 2,500 troops on the ground⁵⁶. The main objectives of EUFOR-Althea are to maintain a safe and secure environment in BiH and to ensure continued compliance with the Dayton agreement, to support the international community's High Representative/EU Special Representative for BiH and the local authorities. In addition, EUFOR provides support to the ICTY and relevant authorities, including support for the pursuit of persons indicted for war crimes. It also contributes to defence reform in BiH⁵⁷.

As it was mentioned, in the 1995 United Nations decided to start new operation in BiH. On 21 December 1995 the Security Council passed Resolution 1035 and United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) and a United Nations civilian office, brought together as the United Nations Mission in BiH (UNMIBH). UNMIBH's mandate was to contribute to the establishment of the rule of law in BiH by assisting in reforming and restructuring the local police, assessing the functioning of the existing judicial system and monitoring and auditing the performance of the police and others involved in the maintenance of law and order. As Merlingen with Ostrauskaite argue at that time United Nations was the only multinational actor with expertise in the police aid field⁵⁸. The same authors evaluating the work of the UN made during seven years since the deployment of mission and argue that it left authorities of BiH with nationally partial, under-qualified, underpaid and sometimes corrupt police officers, although the quality of police was significantly higher compared to the situation in 1995.

55 NATO Handbook, Public Diplomacy Division, 2006, p. 144-145.

⁵⁶ European Union Council Secretariat, EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFOR-Althea), Factsheet, February 2008, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/080220Altheaupdate10.pdf, 2008 09 04.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Merlingen, (note 31) p. 57.

Until December 2004, when operation EUFOR-Althea was launched, the EU's contribution to the peace-building process after Dayton Agreement was limited. Only in January 2003 EU launched its own Police mission - European Police Mission in BiH (EUPM), which followed on from the UN's IPTF. After EU-Balkans summit in 2003 and Brussels European Council in June 2004, Council of the European Union decided to adjust the mandate and size of the mission. Missions mandate is extended until 31 December 2009. Today 173 (147 police officers and 26 international civilians) staff from 33 countries is serving in the mission. The aim of the mission is to "under the guidance and coordination of the EUSR and as part of the broader rule of law approach in BiH and in the region, <...> through mentoring, monitoring and inspecting, to establish in BiH a sustainable, professional and multiethnic police service operating in accordance with best European and international standards" The purpose is to be achieved through three strategic pillars:

- Support to local police in the fight against organised crime: EUPM contributes to the transformation of the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) into an operational police agency with enhanced executive powers to fight major and organised crime. EUPM is also continuously working on the development of other state-level institutions, such as the Ministry of Security and the Border Police. EUPM officers provide operational advice and support in planning and conducting investigations and operations against organised crime. EUPM also devotes particular attention to reinforcing cooperation between police and prosecutors.
- Accountability of local police: EUPM inspects and monitors police
 operations from the early planning stage, through investigations or
 operations, until the case in question reaches the court. EUPM also
 monitors the situation inside the police, in particular situations which
 are perceived as unlawful, misconducts and contrary to best practice or
 generally applied rules of engagement.
- Support to Police Reform Implementation: EUPM assists the political police reform process by offering legislative and technical assistance, in particular for the implementation of the April 2008 police reform laws. Its Police Reform Department works in close cooperation with its professional counterparts to identify projects aimed at developing the existing police structures, as well as enhancing their operational capacity and effectiveness⁶⁰.

Merlingen with Ostrauskaite go in more details by explaining EUPM reforms, in the article only few examples will be mentioned to demonstrate the

⁵⁹ Council Joint Action 2005/824/CFSP of 24 November 2005 on the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:3 07:0055:0058:EN:PDF, 2008 09 05.

⁶⁰ European Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, (note 56).

content of peace-building operations. Organised crime was named as the biggest threat for the society and the state itself already during meetings of European Council. Mission's programme development department developed reform projects that improved the forensic assessment capabilities of the police, ensured local detectives to receive basic criminal investigation training in specific crime police areas, assisted in the establishment and operation of an IT system that connected all police departments and allowed them to use and exchange crime-related intelligence, etc. 61. Another example is a project initiated in March 2004 by the EU Police Mission's press department called "Krimolovci" (crime catchers). Its anonymous, toll-free 24-hour hotline, which provide the citizens with the opportunity to share information about unsolved cases with the police. In 2007 Krimolovci calls allowed law enforcement agencies throughout the country to submit 61 cases, involving 84 persons, to prosecutors' offices. Most of these reports were related to unauthorised carrying of firearms, drugs production and dealing. In addition, 67 pieces of information were found useful for future intelligence work⁶². EUPM helped to implement other public campaigns: "Va a policija" ("Your Police") prompts citizens to share information with police and in such a way to enhance cooperation between citizens and police, raise awareness about police accountability; "Izaberi Život, Ne Drogu" ("Choose life, not drugs") had an aim to raise awareness about the dangers of drug abuse.

In order to enhance accountability of local police several programmes were created – The Police Education and Training Programme, Internal Affairs Programme. Educational programme focused on basic and middle management education, training on the presentation of investigative reports and training on the criminal procedure code, for example. The aim of Internal Affairs Programme was to establish transparent supervisory mechanisms in the local police forces – creation of professional standards units, public complaints bureaux, elaboration of guidelines for the functioning of these bodies⁶³.

EU achievements of EUPM to date can be described as follows: transformation of SIPA into an operational police agency with enhanced executive powers to fight organised crime; solid development of other state-level institutions, in particular the Ministry of Security and the Border Police; development of local ownership of the police reform process through the establishment of the Police Steering Board, co-chaired by EUPM and local authorities; and progress in implementing the police reform with the mission playing a key advisory role. Stefano Recchia in article "Beyond international trusteeship: EU peacebuilding in BiH"⁶⁴ is arguing that after Dayton Agreement country was very weak and dysfunctional and probably not have survived without international assistance. But the author claims that situation has changed only when EU started its

⁶¹ Merlingen, (note 31) p. 65.

⁶² Krimolovci, http://www.eupm.org/Details.aspx?ID=10&TabID=8, 2008 09 10.

⁶³ Merlingen, (note 31) p. 67.

⁶⁴ Recchia S., "Beyond international trusteeship: EU peace-building in Bosnia and Hercegovina", *Occasional Paper No 66*, February 2007, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/occ66.pdf, 2008 09 11.

missions in BiH in 2003. It's involvement made state institutions self-sustaining and now BiH has all preconditions to become multi-ethnic democracy. On the other hand, Recchia points out that EU needs to improve effectiveness and political co-ordination of the mission on the ground and to support reforms in BiH after office of HR/EUSR will be closed down. Author was expecting it will happen by late 2007, but today office is still functioning.

After Dayton Agreement was signed OSCE in BiH had three main tasks - to organise, conduct and supervise elections as well as establish a permanent Election Commission, to elaborate and implement agreements on confidence - and security -building measures and regional and sub-regional arms control and to appoint a Human Rights Ombudsman and monitor the human rights situation in BiH65. Today OSCE Mission to BiH works on four main areas: democratization, education, human rights, and security. Work in these areas is conducted through various types of projects. In the area of democratization, OSCE is focusing on good governance, civil society and local governments. For example, it has developed special project "Ugovor" to promote local democracy by strengthening links between citizens and municipalities. In the area of good governance OSCE developed several projects, for example, it has a task to help the Parliamentary Assembly through the Parliamentary Support and the Legislative Strengthening Programmes to enhance its institutional capacity and increase public awareness of, and participation in, the legislative process. These programmes offer training and technical support. Training, orientation seminars and workshops focus on developing codes of conduct, dealing with the media, and involving citizens in parliamentary work. In the area of education, OSCE identified main problems - requirement to have schools and teaching materials free from tendentious political influence and bias - and works in developing legislation on education and making education accessible for all. For example, one of important aspects of the Interim Agreement on Returnee Children is to set criteria for school names and symbols that would be non-political. Under the Dayton Agreement OSCE is still responsible for human rights in BiH. The organization works in the following areas: economic and social rights, judicial and legal reform, war crimes, trafficking in human beings, rights of national minorities, and strengthening national human rights institutions. The main work in the security area is related to arms control, establishment of the principle of parliamentary oversight of the armed forces and institutional building (currently main focus is to support all security sector ministries and agencies in implementing the new Security Policy Paper guidelines, which were adopted by the BiH Presidency in February 2006).

⁶⁵ The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.oscebih.org/ overview/gfap/eng/, 2008 09 11.

In loco Conclusions

Today the main stability guarantors in BiH are the international organizations - EU and OSCE - and the political system, created by Dayton agreement. However foreign and defence ministers of EU member states started to discuss the possibility of ending the mission in BiH and this can destabilise not only fragile BiH, but all the Balkan region. As one of the evidences of such thinking can be more frequent attempts of Republika Srpska to express its wish to become independent state or join together with Serbia, especially having in mind problems related to Kosovo status. EU member states have to pay attention to the changing situation in BiH. This problem was also raised during the visit EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn on 10 October 2008. He and HR/EUSR Miroslav Lajcak made strong statements that BiH must stay as united country and no attempts of secession by Republika Srpska would be tolerated⁶⁶. Another problem is organised crime, which was regarded as the primary obstacle for stability in the country already after Dayton agreement was signed, but it should be noted that situation is changing too slow. At the beginning of October 2008 organised crime group exploded a bomb in shopping centre in Vitez; it's regarded as a act of organised crime⁶⁷ and is a clear sign to international community the country shouldn't be left alone to deal with the problems. To end peace-building operations today is too early.

⁶⁶ Delegation of the European Commission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ollie Rehn, European Commissioner for Enlargement visited Bosnia and Herzegovina today, 10 October 2008, http://www.europa.ba/?akcija=vijesti&akcija2=pregled&jezik=2&ID=317, 2008 10 13

⁶⁷ Pincominfo, *Za podmetanje eksploziva u FIS Vitez osumnjičen Suvad Džidić*, 12 October 2008, http://www.pincom.info/bih/opsirnije.asp?ID=60025, 2008 10 13.

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The Lithuanian Geographical Situation in the EU as the Factor of Strategic Development

The long-term development of the country's economy and its sectors are determined by different circumstances regarded as long-term factors. The Lithuanian geographical situation is also referred to as one of these circumstances. This is a very specific factor, constant in its content, however, characteristic of various aspects of its importance. Due to this reason, there is a fairly sceptical attitude towards the potential of this factor in developing and implementation of strategies. This paper highlights the conditions under which the geographical situation of the country can become a strategic factor and utilized in development of economy and its different sectors. The first part, which deals with the competitiveness conceptions of the economic entities, suggests that the conditions, under which these entities can function, can be regarded as strategic i.e. long-term development factors, provided these conditions contribute to enhancing their competitiveness and operate within the system of other factors. The second part presents models of competitive advantage and systemic competitiveness of the nations as a potential basis for developing strategies. These models employ the geographical situation alongside with other factors determining economic development. The third part emphasizes that in many theoretical and practical studies, the 'created' factors, rather than the 'inherited' ones, are identified as strategic factors. Despite this, there exist examples in the world-wide practice that it is these 'inherited' factors that play the decisive role in the development of the country. The paper also suggests that it is essential to take into consideration the problem of demand and competition in the sector where geographical situation is to be referred to as one of the strategic factors.

Introduction

Great attention is currently attached to strategic planning and reflects concern of the political leaders, politicians, experts and researchers about the country's future and efforts to find ways to minimize the present economic backwardness in comparison with Western countries. The concept 'strategic planning' has been frequently used in an economic and political context. Most often it refers to the process, which involves setting long-term development

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goals of the country as the economic entity and finding ways to achieve them. A high level of standards of living and its anticipated growth in the future has been universally recognized as the primary aim of development of any country. According to Michael E. Porter, the precondition for long-term growth of the living standards of any nation is efficiency of economy¹ (or its different sectors). Efficiency, in its turn, is dependent on conditions both inside the country and outside. The management of every country makes efforts to create such conditions for development of economy and its sectors that its efficiency exceeds that of other countries. This results in competition between countries.

Due to the above mentioned circumstances, in most cases the development of strategies is equalized to the search for competitiveness², i.e. strategy is to ensure a higher level of competitiveness than that of your competitors. This approach facilitates the analysis of conditions determining the efficiency of the country's economy and its sectors since it provides the possibility to apply methods to identify and study the reasons of competitiveness.

In the late 1990's, among the competitiveness theories, models and conceptions, the so-called approach of resources and skills³ was formed in which an appropriate combination (system) of material and immaterial resources was considered as the basis for successful performance of the economic entity (including the economy and its sectors). The conception of the creation of competition strategy based on resources suggests that the initial stage of this process is the analysis of skills and resources available and highlighting of those which can serve as the basis for implementation of long-term goals of the economic entity. To define them, scientific literature uses the concept of strategic factors⁴ (elements). According to the authors of this conception, both external and internal factors (with respect to the economic entity) can be strategic factors. The strategic nature of the factor is determined by common criteria, the most important among which are its uniqueness and durability⁵.

Unfortunately, the Lithuanian economy and community lacks exceptional inherited (natural) or acquired features, on the basis of which long-term development strategies can be created and realized, which may lead to the implementation of the task formulated before: more rapid development than other countries. The greatest problem is that Lithuania, like other post-communist countries, joined the competition struggle almost half a century later.

¹ Porter M.E. *Porter o konkurencji ['About Competition']*, Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 2001, p. 198.

² The best example of this statement is book of M.E.Porter "Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors", New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillen Publishing Co Inc., 1980.

³ For example, Barney J.B., "Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage", *Journal of Management*, Vol. 17, No 1, March 1991.

⁴ Amit R., Schoemaker P.J.H., "Strategic Assets and Organizational Rent", Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 14, No 1/1993.

Stalk G., Evans Ch., Shulman L., Competing on Capabilities, in.: de Wit B., Meyer R., ed., Strategy Synthesis. Resolving Strategy. Paradoxes to Create Competitive Advantage, London: International Thomson Business Press, 1999, p. 221-234.

After World War II our country was not in a position to make independent decisions and be responsible as it was then not independent. At the time when the major part of the world was involved in forming modern socio-economic structure, Lithuania was isolated from the Western European economic and social environment which resulted in the lack of competitive experience and modern competitive advantages.

In this context, the difficulties encountered by developers of economy and strategies of its sectors, as well as by experts evaluating the chances of Lithuania in international economic competition, or by politicians making decisions, become very clear: they have to take into consideration a great many of "almost equal" alternative factors of competitive potential without obvious socio-economic advantages at their disposal. In addition, despite "considerable variety of strategic choices", modern development trends of world economy fail to provide a wide choice of tools for implementation of these strategies: numerous studies of competitiveness suggest knowledge, innovations, and high-tech-based areas as decisive factors.

Documents of the Lithuanian strategic development as well as the experts' evaluations contain one more, though not very 'modern', factor of competitive potential (potential of development), i.e. the geographical situation of the country. The geographical situation is a specific factor. Unlike other factors employed in the development of strategies, its content does not change with time. Nevertheless, it does not mean that its effect on strategic goals and their realization remains constant. For example, there are no doubts that sufficient resources of labour, good facilities, favourable administrational and legal environment for business are the factors which always help in seeking strategic development goals, while the geographical situation, depending on circumstances, can be both strength and weakness. It cannot be changed (improved), but rather, can be exploited. Due to these reasons, the role of the geographical situation can be viewed but with scepticism. But then, there is a question to be answered: why do not we utilize what in effect is free of charge? This paper addresses the problem of the assessment of the potential of the geographical situation to be a strategic factor in developing the country's economy and its sectors.

The paper aims to reveal the conditions under which the geographical situation of the country can become the development factor of the country's economy and its sectors.

With a view to this aim, the answers to the following question are substantiated:

 Are there factors making it possible to determine the conditions under which a specific circumstance of the operation of the economic unit plays a strategic role? The answer to this question lies in analyzing the

⁶ KTU Verslo strategijos institutas, VšĮ Žinių visuomenės institutas, Lietuvos ekonomikos augimo ir konkurencingumo šaltinių (veiksnių) kompleksinė studija [Lithanian growth and competitiveness sources (factors) complex study], p. 7, http://www.ukmin.lt/lt/strategija/doc/Kompleksine_studija2006_03_09_galutine.doc, 06 05 2008.

conception of competitiveness of economic units. It has been found that the main criterion to identify this condition as a strategic factor is that it should contribute to the maintenance of competitiveness of this unit and be integrated into the system of other strategic factors.

- Are there competitiveness models applicable in practice where the geographical situation can be included as a separate independent element? Two models, i.e. 1) Porter's 'Diamond' of Competitive Advantage of Nations and 2) the Systemic Competitiveness Model are presented and the place of the geographical situation of the country among the other elements of these models is specified.
- What circumstances should exist for the geographical situation of the country to operate as a strategic factor of the development of the country's economy or its individual sectors?

The paper deals with the role of the positive approach of the strategies' developers to make use of the geographical situation as a strategic factor and with the conditions for the formation of this approach. It also points to the necessity to address the problem of demand and competition in the sectors where the geographical situation could be of importance. Also, the relevant analysis of the Lithuanian transit and transport sector is presented.

The Criteria for the Circumstances of the Operation of the Economic Unit to Become Strategic Factors

The possibility to apply study methods of competitiveness in assessing the factors determining the efficiency of the country's economy and its sectors, as mentioned in the introduction, which is actually being done in preparing different strategies, and calls for theoretical substantiation.

Most of the implemented strategies for the country's economy and its individual sectors are worked out with regard to the so-called 'model approach'. According to this model, following the formulation of strategic goals, the assessment of the situation of the economic unit (in this case, the country's economy and its individual sectors) is carried out. For this purpose, the analysis of the environment and the interior of the unit is carried out, and the strategic factors, which in the authors' opinion have influence on the achievement of strategic goals, are highlighted. The factors are divided into such which:

- Are a threat for the development of the economic unit; or
- Provide possibility for more dynamic development;
- Are strengths; or
- Weaknesses.

⁷ For example, Daff R.L., *Management*, Fort Worth: Dryden Press, 1997, p. 253 and further.

The strategic goals are corrected (if necessary), the tasks (i.e. the ways to achieve these goals) to be implemented are spelled out, the functions of public institutions and other participants of the process are set in the following stages of the development of strategies.

The procedure of the preparation of the strategy is undoubtedly not bad, however, it has one shortcoming. As already mentioned, the modern strategy of the country and its sectors should be the strategy of competition. In other words, the answer to the question 'what is to be done' is not sufficient. The strategy should answer an additional question: what is the way to make the country's economy and its sectors more competitive than those of other countries? In the opposite case, it is possible that strategic goals will fail to be achieved, since all countries seek to occupy most favourable position in the world-wide labour division. It should be noted that at the moment there are no doubts that not only companies, but also countries and country groups are in competition. This fact is acknowledged by one of the most outstanding critics of this approach, the American economist Paul Krugman, who called the application of competitiveness ideology in the international relations a 'dangerous obsession'9. Nevertheless, it is impossible to deny the statement that competition among countries is more abstract: the countries compete in developing more sophisticated ways of organizing national economies¹⁰.

In regards to these statements, the strategic factors including those of the geographical situation, should meet the criterion of enhancing competitiveness of the economy and its individual sectors. This fact, in its turn, leads the authors of enhanced competition-oriented strategies to take into account another feature of competitiveness, i.e. relation with a concrete object, time and location.

Competitiveness, apart from the fact that it lacks uniform definition¹¹, is the property of the economic entity, lacking uniform features providing direct measurement (assessment). Despite its fundamental nature, competitiveness is a theoretical concept. As a concept used in economic and management conceptions, models and theories, competitiveness is characteristic of its abstractness. It means that competitiveness as the property of economic entity cannot be assessed unless this entity is related to definite developments in specific location and time¹². Therefore, the Lithuanian geographical situation as a factor of strategic importance should be assessed with respect to Lithuania being a member of the EU. In international exchange, where economic

⁸ According to this principle the Strategy of Lithuania's industry development is formed.

⁹ Krugman P., "Competitiveness: a Dangerous Obsession", Foreign Affairs, 1994, Vol. 73, No 2, p.28-44.

Meyer-Stamer J. Systemic Competitiveness Revisited, Duisburg, 2005, http://www.mesopartner.com/publications/systemic_revisited.pdf, 17 06 2008, p.6.

The fundamentality of the competitiveness concept in most cases of use does not require any definition or explanation. It should be noted that some well-known researchers while using this concept very often do not present its explanation, either. The most typical example can be Porter, his book "The Competitive Advantage of Nations" being regarded as the most outstanding work in this area.

¹² Gorynia M., *Luka konkurencyjna na poziomie przedsiebiorstwa a przystapienie Polski do Unii Europejskiej* [The competitiveness gap on the level of enterprises in context of Poland's entry to the European Union], Poznan: Wydawnictwo Akademii Ekonomicznej, 2002, p. 69-81.

efficiency makes itself clearly visible, the country participates by following all common rules, so, in the first place, economy of our country in general and its individual sectors should occupy a better position with respect to economies or sectors of other countries.

Of no less importance is the factor of time. Competitiveness as the feature of economic unit can be measured at a specific moment of time, for example, at the beginning or end of the realization of the strategy. Since the development of the strategy by its content is a future-oriented process, the element in the structure of the competitiveness conception should be found, which can express competitiveness not as much as a static state, but rather as a transition 'mechanism' from one state to another which can out perform the competitors, because of its balance, organization and management. This problem can be solved by the possibility of differentiating competition into the following structural elements¹³:

- *Competitive potential* is material and non-material factors which are at the economic units' disposal in the competition struggle. So, competitive potential can also be called *competitiveness of factors*. In literature the concept *factors of competitiveness* is found.
- Competitive advantage is the combination of factors making up competitive potential which allows the economic unit to develop more efficient competition tools than those of others. This is a state demonstrating the potential of the economic unit with respect to other similar objects.
- *Competitive position* is a place which the enterprise or any other economic unit takes among other similar objects in terms of the achieved results. It can then be called *result competitiveness*. The prevailing opinion is that the better the results (higher position in the line), the higher level of welfare can the members of the unit (i.e. the inhabitants, workforce of the company or branch of economy) achieve.

Competitiveness in a broader sense, i.e. the ability of the economic unit to successfully participate in competition, is the wholeness of these features which can relatively be illustrated by the product (Figure 1).

¹³ Žitkus L., "The Analysis of Competitiveness Relevance for Evaluation of Competitive Abilities of Lithuanian Companies" in.: Kriščiūnas K., ed., *Juxtasposition of European Union Enlargement and Liuobon Processes*, Kaunas: Technologija, 2002, p. 91.




Figure 1. Structure of Competitiveness

Such an approach, though incorrect mathematically, best reflects the very essence of competitiveness and importance of its constituent parts: it is evident that the economic unit cannot be competitive if it has no potential for this, or it is not able to create competitive advantage from the potential that it owns¹⁴.

All the specified structural elements of competitiveness show the advantage of one economic unit over another or its disadvantage; however, in measuring these elements, advantages or disadvantages are established for different moments of time: good (quantitatively or qualitatively) factors of competitive potential mean a good start in the competition process, which commences at the moment when the strategy is started. A good competitiveness position means the place gained in competition throughout all the time of strategy implementation. While the competitive advantage is a link between competitive potential and competitive position (beginning and end of strategy realization): during the time of strategy implementation, the competitive advantage as a system of potential factors is developed, maintained and updated, according to internal and external changes in regard of the economic unit. According to some sources those actions are called competitiveness management¹⁵.

Besides, it is to be noted that competition is a dynamic process. Consequently, the allegories of a pyramid¹⁶, diamond (rhomb)¹⁷ or cube¹⁸ chosen for representing competitiveness, or its individual components fail to reflect real situation, as they symbolize stability. Rather, competitiveness is an iceberg (Figure 2), of which only its upper part, i.e. the upper position of the economic

¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 92.

¹⁵ Stankiewicz M.J., Konkurencyjność przedsiębiorstwa. Budowanie konkurencyjności przedsiębiorstwa w warunkach globalizacji [Competitiveness of enterprise. Competitiveness creation in conditions of globalization], Wydanie II, Torun, 2005, p. 175.

¹⁶ Benchmarking the Competitiveness of European Industry, COM- (96)463 final, Brussels, 09 10 1996.

¹⁷ Porter, (note 2).

¹⁸ Garelli S., "Competitiveness of nations: the fundamentals", in World Competitiveness Yearbook, http://www.imd.ch/research/centers/wcc/upload/Fundamentals.pdf

unit is visible, while its stability is ensured by so-called "underwater" part, i.e. factors of competitive potential and the state of competitive advantage constructed from them by the management of the economic unit.




Figure 2. Competitiveness iceberg¹⁹

To secure competitive position in the dynamic environment is possible in two ways: to have a unique competitive potential (i.e. factors ensuring long-term development), or be able to create a unique system of factors expressing competitive advantage. Most of the countries rated highly world-wide, make use of the second way, though it is very often that the system of their competitive advantage is based on one or two strong factors of competitive potential.

2. The Place of the Geographical Situation within the System of Other Factors Determining the Country's Competitiveness

As mentioned above, competitive advantage expresses the state of the economic unit (here, the country's), which provides opportunity to optimally utilize the available resources (competitive potential) and to occupy a better

¹⁹ Žitkus, (note 13) p. 93.

competitive position in future, i.e. to attain higher efficiency of performance than the competitors. This state can be achieved naturally, occasionally though due to appropriate artificial combination (system) of factors of competitive potential. The formation of such combination creates the basis for more rapid growth of economic units and, vice versa, its absence leads to backwardness.

Despite these difficulties, competitive advantage as the system of certain elements (factors of competitive potential) and their interrelations in most cases becomes the basis for development strategies of economic units. Consequently, the developers of the strategy make the assumption that this system of factors of competitive potential and their interrelations can contribute to making the economic unit become competitive. The nations very often tend to focus their strategies on the competitive advantage system of more advanced countries, which are similar in size. This is not a very reasonable approach, since there are major differences in the competitive systems of different countries²⁰. The Lithuanian state and its development strategies as well as their realization programs should make creative use of those factors which are not of importance to other countries.

Presently, theoretically well-developed methods expressing the systemic nature of development factors of the country's economy are known. One of them is the famous Porter's model of competitive advantage of nations. In terms of this model, the countries' (nations) potential in competition should be assessed in accordance with four groups of factors making up the diamond of competitive advantage²¹. These groups are: resources (initial factors), demand conditions, the company's strategies and competition conditions, and supporting sectors.

Alongside with the four main groups of factors, the author distinguishes two auxiliary groups of conditions, which in one or another may influence the competitiveness of the sector and of the economy in general:

- *Force majeur* (unpredicted circumstances), under which the influence of the main groups of factors increases;
- Government's actions influencing all groups of factors forming competitive advantage.

In assessing the content of the group of factors distinguished in the model of competitive advantage of nations, the country's geographical situation should be regarded as a specific resource and initial condition, on the basis of which specific areas of economy can be developed (Figure 3).

²⁰ Porter, (note 2) p.192.

²¹ Ibidem, p.207.




Figure 3. The main factors of competitive potential comprising the system with the geographical situation of the country²²

It goes without saying that these general formulations for a specific sector should be expressed by concrete statements describing what in this particular sector, can be elements of competitive potential.

The second model providing the possibility to analyze the utilization of the potential of geographical situation as a strategic factor and a precondition is so-called model of systemic competitiveness²³. The authors of this model suggest that in order to understand why some countries are subject to more rapid development than others, it is not sufficient to analyze the micro - (enterprises, markets, consumers) and macroeconomic (interest rates, budget deficit, inflation) levels. They suggest using two more levels:

- *Mezzoeconomic* (intermediate) level which consists of factors essential to competitiveness of the companies (and, equally, to the country's or sector's economy), not the ones formed by market economy (Figure 4).
- *Metaeconomic* (super-economic) level which consists of factors of non-economic nature related to the development of the country and society.

²² Addapted from Porter M.E., "The Competitive Advantage of Regions", Presentation at the Indiana Leadership Summit, Indianapolis, May 13th, 2003, www.isc.hbs.edu, 06 06 2008.

²³ Ibidem.




Figure 4. Place of countries geographical situation in systemic competitiveness model²⁴

Unlike in the model of the nations' competitive advantage discussed above, the place of the factor of the country's geographical situation as of the factor influencing development, within the model of systemic competitiveness, is not finally defined. On the one hand, it can be understood as a factor enhancing the competitiveness of individual economic units and the factor of mezzo level. There exists a certain similarity to the model of competitive advantage of nations, because a geographical situation falls among such factors as infrastructure, technologies, education, etc. On the other hand, the country's geographical situation by nature can be ascribed to the meta-level as other inherent, as well as country and society-related, factors: change and improvement-oriented values, abilities to form strategies, social cohesion, etc. Consequently, the geographical situation as other factors of this level becomes an initial precondition and prerequisite ensuring dynamic development of the country.

3. Analysis of the Potential of the Lithuanian Geographical Situation to be One of the Strategic Factors

As mentioned above, such instrument, which to a certain degree can contribute to the growth of the economy of the country, or its sectors, can be referred to as a strategic factor. Besides, its function is to provide a specific

²⁴ According to Meyer-Stamer, (note 10) p. 3.

advantage against its competitors (i.e. economies of other countries or their sectors), since these countries seek to create conditions ensuring better conditions for their economic units in the international labour division. In this respect, it is essential to spell out what makes the authors of strategies identify some factors as strategic, and others as unimportant, some as strengths or possibilities, others as weaknesses or threat.

Developers of strategies differentiate these factors as threats or possibilities on the basis of their knowledge and experience, though a considerable role here is played by a mere intuition. In analyzing strategies of the Lithuanian economy sectors and the strength of their realization, a clear tendency has been observed to rely on the examples of more advanced countries; therefore, the strategies mentioned above identify such factors as scientific potential, good infrastructure, abilities to create new products and services, potential to internationalize activities, etc., as the strengths of Lithuania. A knowledge-based economy, implementation of technological and other innovations, attraction of direct foreign investments, i.e. developments characteristic of advanced economies are considered as main preconditions of development and, on the contrary, the absence of these conditions is considered as a weakness threatening development of one or another sector.

The modern conceptions of managerial competitiveness, which serve as the basis to create new conceptions as said in the first part of this work, also stress the created elements of competitive potential rather than inherited, i.e. from educated society to modern economy of the country. The authors of the conceptions present examples of such countries as Japan, Switzerland, Germany and South Korea²⁵. These countries lacking exceptional long-term natural (inherited) resources, which could be the base for economic growth, have achieved high level of development. Some authors of competitive advantage conceptions maintain that resources, even the 'created' ones, fail to provide any advantages in the long run. According to these authors, everything is determined by the ability to consolidate all resources and acquire 'core competencies' providing potential to perform more efficiently than the competitors²⁶. Such approach substantiates the idea of the former sections of this work, to regard the strategy forming factors as a whole system.

In scientific literature Peter Maskel's work is an exception. The author admits that small but open economies based on low and medium - low technologies are capable of successful development due to "local possibilities". Though the author relates the concept of "possibilities" with the developed resources, the basis of their emergence and, what is most important, their utilization is considered the inheritance of earlier times²⁷. This, for example, might be the geographical situation.

²⁵ Porter (note 1), p. 196.

²⁶ Prahalad C.K., Hamel G., "The Core Competence of the Corporation", Harvard Business Review, May-June, 1990

²⁷ Eskolinen H., Hannibalson J., Malmberg A., Maskell P., Vante E., Competitiveness, Localised Learning and Regional development: Specialization and Prosperity in Small Open Economies, London: Rontledge, 1998, p. 50-58.

The discussed situation of the understanding, of geographical situation as the factor of competitive potential, can partly be explained by the fact that the creators of commonly recognized competitiveness theories, conceptions and models have never faced the unique situation of the Baltic States. According to Borisas Melnikas, "the application of western models under the conditions of transformations occurring in the East and Central European countries, can be regarded as an area of independent study"28, whereas the above theories dealing with the competitiveness phenomenon were developed at the time when success in the international competition was determined not by inherited, but, rather, by created elements of competitive potential (more exactly, their systems and complexes). Under the present conditions of globalization of competition, and competitiveness becoming a certain ideology of the country's development, new specific phenomena of competition and their regularities emerge, which are to be comprehended and summarized²⁹.

It has to be noticed that in the practice of economic development there are examples revealing another extremity. The most significant among them are the countries of the Persian Gulf, which possess huge resources of oil. The basis of welfare in Norway, one of the richest countries of the world, is also natural, i.e. inherited resources³⁰. It goes without saying that natural resources are essential, but at the moment are not the only factors of economic development. They meet the criteria of a strategic factor (i.e. they are unique and long-term), but the most important thing is that they are only a constituent part of the factor system of the development of the countries, which partly ensures competitive advantage.

An obvious practical example illustrating how 'passive' inherited conditions, such as geographical situation and civilization heritage, can be utilized as factors of competitive potential is the tourism sector of Egypt. This sector involves about 51% of the available workforce, and its contribution to the country's GDP is 45.1% which is higher than those of industrial sector (41.1%) and agriculture (13.8%)³¹. It is evident that the activity of this sector is based on historical values. Despite this, holiday tourism is dominating over educational one, the former attracting about 86% of holiday-makers. Certainly, favourable climatic conditions, beaches, warm sea, etc. also contribute to the success of this sector; however, it is commonly recognized that services marketing, good facilities, human resources, (i.e. created elements of competitive potential) have become a driving force of the tourism sector in recent years. Also, new business niches are being searched for; for example, sports, and healthcare, as well as shopping tourism are being developed³².

²⁸ Melnikas B., *Transformacijos [Transformations]*, Vilnius: Vaga, 2002, p. 541.

²⁹ Melnikas, (note 28) p. 542.

³⁰ The fact that Norway is not a part of EU (it doesn't want to 'share' possessed resources with other European countries), shows that large nature gases and fish resources in the North Sea is an important factor of the Norwegian economy's development.

³¹ Central Intelligence... (note 23).

³²American Chamber of Commerce In Egypt, *Tourism Sector Developments In Egypt*, March, 2008, http://www.amcham.org.eg/BSAC/studiesSeries/Report51.asp, 12 06 2008.

It is only natural that the geographical situation in Lithuania as a strategic development factor, in terms of its strength fails to be equal to the resources presented in the above examples. It is due to the factors of oil of Persian Gulf countries and gas resources of Norway, followed by cultural heritage of Egypt, because there is a lack of competition for this factor. Despite this, the Lithuanian development strategies, government programs, expert's evaluations and numerous studies identify the geographical situation as a basis (potential) for the expansion of activities to the east, west, south and north. This relates to the functions of the 'bridge' or 'transformer', the execution of which is facilitated by other circumstances which in the 1990's were understood as Lithuanian business strengths: good knowledge of Eastern markets and awareness of the necessity for competition, which led to readiness to overtake the Western methods of work and all market economy philosophy in general³³.

The opinion of the mentioned authors, that the Lithuanian geographical situation can be the factor of the country's economic development, is by virtue correct, however it requires substantiation.

Firstly, some questions should be answered, such as: is there a demand for the sector in which the Lithuanian geographical situation can be utilized as a specific strategic factor for products and services? Is the demand sufficient? Is it a long-term demand? A limited scope of this work and its theoretical character are a stumbling block for the search of answers to these questions, but even generalizing facts show that some sectors of the Lithuanian economy have the potential to make use of the geographical situation to achieve strategic goals.

The Lithuanian geographical situation as an element of competitive potential is most closely related to the sectors of transportation and logistics. In the country's "Transport and transit development strategy" it is referred to as "favourable for transit" and ranks first among the strengths of the sector³⁴. Also, of interest is the fact that the two European countries leading in the area of transit, Austria and the Netherlands also make use of their geographical situation to their best advantage: the Netherlands is situated on the delta of the Rhine, and in Austria there is the biggest passage in the Alps between the north and the south. It is obvious that the situation of Lithuania between the European Union and Russia (and Asia in general) is related to the possibility to participate in exchange between these two geo-economic areas. The study carried out by the Finnish transport and Communications Ministry shows that the dynamics of transport flows between the EU and Russia will be dominated by the tendencies of rapid growth in volume for the coming few decades with the remaining constant distribution of these flows (Table 1).

It should be noticed that the Lithuanian sector of transport and transit can expect benefit not only from exchange between the EU and Russia, but

³³ Melnikas, (note 28) p.542.

³⁴ Lietuvos Ükio ministerija, Ekonomikos augimo ir jos struktūros plėtotės strategija iki 2015 m., dalis "Transporto ir turizmo plėtotės strategija" ["Long-term economic development strategy of Lithuania until 2015", part "Transport and transit development strategy"], 2004, p. 1.

also from transport flows between the European east and west. The Eurasian continent demonstrates great differences in distribution of natural resources and their demand: the carriers of raw materials and energy are concentrated in the centre of the continent, while density of population and level of industrial development are higher in the east and west. Such a situation is a guarantee for long-term demand for energy resources, raw materials, and the transportation of their initial processing products. Besides, differences in living standards and costs (especially, labour) ensure the flow of consumer goods from East to West³⁵. As European Conference of Ministers of Transport indicates "transport flows from East to West grow more than 6% per year and double every 10-12 years"³⁶.

Table 1. Scope and distribution of transport flows between European Union and Russia³⁷


Russia-West direction						
Year	Scope		Ports of	Ports of	Ports of	Corridor II
	mln t per vear	%	Baltic states, %	Russia, %	Finland, %	DRUŽBA, %
2003	74	100	36	54	5	5
2030	169	100	37	52	3	8
West-Russia direction						
2003	26	100	39	43	7	11
2030	97	100	37	48	3	12

The existing demand for transportation and transit services cannot be analyzed in isolation from another very important question, which is: what are the possibilities to meet this demand? Figure 5 represents maps, which show not only the growth of this demand, but also the fact that Lithuania is far from being the only applicant to perform the function of the 'bridge' between the East and the West. It is obvious that Lithuania can claim only a small portion of flow of goods. Even though the predicted growth of land transport flows through Lithuania is the greatest (Table 2), it cannot be regarded as the guaranteed competitive advantage. Much will depend on the behaviour of competitors. It is very important under such circumstances that the Lithuanian geographical situation be seen as a constituent part of the system of competitive advantage of the sector being analyzed requiring 'support' from other elements of that system.

³⁵ Ministry of Transport and Communication Finland, *Transport Connections between EU and Russia. Current Status and Outlook for the Future*, Helsinki, 2005, http://www.lvm.fi/web/en/publication/view/278729, 17 06 2008, p. 21.

³⁶ European Conference of Ministers of Transport. Transport Links between Europe and Asia, 2006, p.23.

³⁷According to Ministry of Transport..., (note 35) p. 42-44.






Figure 5. Transport flows through Lithuania and neighbour countries and their changes³⁸

Probably the most important 'supporting' element in the arena of transportation and transit is the appropriate external relations in transportation and transit development, which ensures the demand for transportation of cargo through Lithuania. The development of such relations falls into the group of elements of the government's activities within the Porter's Model of Competitive Advantage of Nations, or is the element of meta-level (ability to formulate

³⁸ According to Ministry of Transport..., (note 35) p. 42-44.

and execute relevant policies) within the model of systemic competitiveness. It is natural that other factors making up competitive advantage of transportation and transit sectors should not be neglected; however, it is obvious that for Lithuania, the biggest problem now is not the infrastructure of the sector, human resources or interrelations with other sectors, but rather the geopolitical situation of the central part of Europe characterized by the attempts of Russia to isolate the Baltic countries and Poland, which tend to be critical towards it and the wish of the greatest powers of EU to 'punish' those disobedient, pro-American Member States.

2003 2030 Growth Direction mln t per year mln t per year in times 25 Finland 62 2.48 10 25 2.5 Estonia 18 39 Latvia 2.16 10 Lithuania 44 4.4 Poland 7 25 3.57

Table 2. Changes of land transport flows between European Union and Russia in 2003-2030³⁹

The geopolitical situation of the country and of all Central as well as Eastern Europe plays a significant role in Lithuania's economic marginalization process, since it prevents the country from becoming a "nobody's land"⁴⁰. Lithuania, like other countries of the region, is within the zone of direct contact with Russia and the Euro-Atlantic system, so it was forced to make a choice. Lithuania's choice of integration into the Western European structures could not but lead to Russia's discontent. There are signs that since 2000 Russia has sought cooperation with separate countries of the organization, rather than with the European Union as a whole⁴¹. The biggest countries, as Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy have been chosen for cooperation. Such a situation is beneficial to Russia in order to influence Brussels' decisions through bilateral agreements with other states⁴² neglecting the interests of smaller countries, especially, the new member states. The attempts of the latter to stop this process give rise to discontent of Russia and unfortunately, of Western allies.

The 'bridge' conception occurred at the moment when Russia and other

³⁹ Ibidem, p. 42-44.

⁴⁰ Milczarek D., "Jaki system bezpieczenstwa dla Polski? Uwarunkowania modelu europejsko-euroatlantyckiego" [Which system of security for Poland? Preconditions for Euro-Atlantic model], in Machinska H., Milczarek D., Skoczny T., eds., *Studia Europejskie*, Warszawa: Warszawski Uniwersytet Europy Centralnej, 2/2002.

⁴¹ Legocka A., Rosyjska wizja Unii Europejskiej [Russian vision of European Union]. Bezpieczeństwo narodowe, I-II-2007/3-4.

⁴² Bodio M., Stosunki miedzy Unia Europejska a Federacja Rosyjska. Stan i perspektywy rozwoju [Relations between European Union and Russian Federation. State and development perspectives], Warszawa: Elipsa, 2005, p. 50-51.

republics of the former USSR made attempts to get over great internal economic difficulties. The import of goods from the West in exchange for raw materials and energy resources at that time seemed a logical and realistic way to overcome these difficulties. Lithuania and other countries of the Baltic region saw themselves as mediators in this exchange. Currently, due to positive changes in economy and especially to political reasons, these countries (especially Russia) do not wish for the Baltic countries to act in some significant role in their relations with West European countries. The latter, in dealing with their economic problems, follow the principles of pragmatism, rather than seeking benefit of all Europe as an integrating power. The best example is the project of constructing a gas pipeline from Russia to Germany on the bottom of the Baltic Sea. This project is a clear indication that the absence of common power development policy steer the states of the eastern part of the EU towards the situation of energetic isolation dangerous to their security.

The most characteristic example illustrating these suggestions is the project of the construction of the gas pipeline on the bottom of the Baltic Sea. In addition, there are plans to extend the wide railway-line from Kosice town in Slovakia to Vienna. A major cargo terminal capable of receiving and distributing goods flows from Russia, China, and other Asian countries is being planned in Vienna⁴³. This will establish a new and very competitive route of transportation of goods from the East to the EU countries. The decision is very advantageous to West European countries (specifically to Germany), but it completely ignores the interests of such countries as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

Undoubtedly, the new EU Member States do not have sufficient influence to change the situation by means of direct actions (i.e. 'forbid' the West European countries such behaviour), nevertheless, their actions lack rational approach. The countries like Poland and Lithuania should abandon the role of a disturber of peace, but, rather, take the position of a 'stiff negotiator'. In their relations with Russia, they should try to forget the past wrong, the way it was done by France and Germany in due time and take the course of a pragmatic dialogue. Hopefully in the future, the Lithuanian foreign policy will make a more significant contribution to the economic growth of the country.

Conclusions

In spite of the specific nature of the factor of the geographical situation in the development of the country's economy and its individual sectors, its attribution to strategic (long-term) factors employed for development of strategies in economics and its sectors, is determined in effect by the same criteria as of other

⁴³ Kowalski B., Szerpkie tory do Wiednia i geopolityka [broad railing to Vienna and geopolitics], 2008 04 13, www.blog.boguslawkowalski.pl/szerokie-tory-do-wiednia, 06 06 2008. Note: Boguslaw Kowalski was Poland's Minister of Transport from 2006 May 23 until 2007 November 23.

factors: there should be the possibility to see the geographical situation of the country among the elements of competitive potential which can be included into the system of competitive advantage, i.e. 'manageable' combination of all factors of competitive potential leading to development, maintenance and improvement of the competitiveness of the country's economy and its individual sectors in the process of strategy realization. In a dynamic international environment, the geographical situation within the system of other strategic factors is supposed to maintain consistent development and achieve strategic goals.

The competitive advantage of the country's economy and its sectors as the system of factors of strategic development should be the basis for the formation of relevant strategies. We assume that such system can assist all economy in general and its individual sectors in becoming competitive and occupy a more favourable position in international labour division. The creation of the system of strategic factors determining competitiveness is possible on the basis of two models which are developed theoretically, i.e. Porter's 'diamond' of competitive advantage of nations or the systemic competitiveness advantage model. In both models, the geographical situation falls into one group with such factors as physical, technological, financial, etc., facilities, also, technologies, research, human resources, etc. The model of systemic competitiveness reveals one another feature of the geographical situation as of the strategic factor: in some cases the geographical situation becomes a necessary prerequisite for development of some activity. For Lithuania, this can be the transit of sources of energy, raw materials, and industrial production.

The developers of strategies, in attributing the operation conditions of the economy or its sectors to the strategic factors, more often than not are guided by knowledge and experience gained in studying theoretical aspects of developing strategies and practical examples. It should be noted that both theoretical and practical examples stress the importance of the 'created' strategic factors (elements of competitive potential), rather than the 'inherited' factors, which, in fact, is the geographical situation of the country. In the practice of world-wide economic development there are numerous examples that it is inherited factors, i.e., huge natural resources or historical and cultural heritage that serve as the basis for development of the country. This is the main argument for utilizing the geographical situation as the factor of strategic development. For Lithuania, the utilization of the geographical situation as the strategic factor is for the most part associated with the sectors of transit and transportation. Currently, there is a sufficient long-term demand (economically) for the services of this sector; accordingly, there is competition between other countries of the region. The division of transit flows will be stipulated by conditions created and to be created by the countries competing for these flows. Besides, government actions are also of importance in developing relations with the countries of the East, in the first place, with Russian Federation which, in terms of politics, can ensure the demand for transit services through Lithuania.

Lithuania's Eastern Neighbourhood

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Symbolic Foreign Policy Games: Russian – Great Britain Relations in 2006 – 2008

The article analyses the problems of bilateral relations between Great Britain and Russia in 2006–2008 through the conception of foreign policy symbolic games. It shows how Russia managed to create and sustain the asymmetrical relations, which allowed Russia having the initiative to define these relations and formulate the rules of the game. The article reveals how a seemingly simple story can become the long–term event of the bilateral relations, as well as demonstrates how it is possible to 'loose' the symbolic game in foreign relations first of all because of misapprehension what kind of game is played.

Introduction

By the end of the year 2007, the representatives of Russian government have gotten more and more assertive by expressing their discontent in the activities of the British Council and demanding the closure of all non–Moscow branches of this institution by 1 January 2008.¹ What was the offence of this financially supported by the Great Britain agency, which the declared mission of, is to teach the youth the English language and provide the students with the study scholarships in Britain (i.e. "providing educational opportunities"²)?

The majority of the observers of the events not residing in Russia and the Britons themselves were certain that the accusations about the unclear legal status or the tax evasion meant just that behind all the demands and blames is nothing but 'political' motives.³ The description of the motive as political in

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See, for example: Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации, Комментарий официального представителя МИД России М.Л.Камынина в связи с решением Британского Совета приостановить деятельность региональных отделений в России 2007, 12 декабря, http://www.mid.ru/ns-reuro.nsf/348bd0da1d5a7185432569e700419c7a/432569d80022027ec32573d400384fc8?OpenDoc ument, accessed 2008–08–04.

² British Council, *About us*, http://www.britishcouncil.org/new/about-us/, accessed 2008–07–12. Also the website of British Council in Russia, http://www.britishcouncil.org/ru/russia.htm, accessed 2008–07–12.

³ Wingfield–Haye, R., Russia's new front in UK spat, *BBC News*, 2007, December 13, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7141708.stm, accessed 2008–09–12.

this situation implied the attitude that Russia attacks the British institution because of a totally different reason, that it is lead by unknown/secret/untold motives. The main reason to think so was, "The Law on the terms of the establishment and activity of the foreign cultural and information centres in the territory of the Russian Federation," adopted in 1995 and again remembered more than ten–years later to attack the British Council⁴. Thus, very reasonable questions have arisen – why the attacks have intensified by the end of 2007 and not at the time the law was adopted, and what were the 'real' reasons for the displeasure by Russia with the institution?

It is also important that the problems encountered by the British Council in Russia were not just the problems of this institution. This issue in the context of the deteriorating Russian – British relations became the perfect example illustrating the growing mutual tensions that emerged in January 2006 during the 'spy' scandal and strengthened even more after the 'poisoning case' in London in the fall of 2006.

The diverse tensions⁵ did not cease till the middle of 2008, when the attention of both states was attracted by the more important events on the international arena (first of all the conflict in Georgia which started in the beginning of August 2008). Almost three years lasting unremitting disagreements have not evolved into the stormy conflict or the problem of international relations. However, these tensions were enough to create the mutual mistrust that all the time was on the verge of the open hostility.

This case allows formulating at least two questions about the analysis of the bilateral state relations that require deeper consideration. First, what does it mean and what is going on when the technical, routine, disagreements become the indicators of interstate relations and problems? Second, why do the states get involved in such conflicts? The assumption of the article is that through the analysis of the particular 'micro' issues and the micro strategies of the states in these problematic areas allows the better understanding of the behaviour of a state, its foreign policy and a more exact description of bilateral state relations in general.

The state interactions in this article are approached through the idea of symbolic games. Varios games, the main goal of which is to send the indirect message for the other side, are far from being the great news in international politics. Various diplomatic strategies are used for that. It is the prevalent understanding that the diplomacy can be used and often is used, in a symbolic way, implicitly seeking the strategic advantage in the foreign policy. On the other hand, not all events of everyday bilateral foreign policy usually become the problem of public diplomacy. What is chosen as a matter of public attention and how it happens, is as important as the efforts to grasp the reasons for such activities.

⁴ Комментарий официального представителя МИД России М.Л.Камынина.

⁵ Starting with various 'spy' scandals, 'name calling' and ending with the commercial disputes.

Thus, the aim of the article is through the analysis of the Russian British bilateral tensions ('games') during the three years to show the role of the symbolic games in foreign policy and to demonstrate how Russia has managed to create and keep the asymmetrical relations with Great Britain, which allowed Russia to have the initiative to define the bilateral relations and formulate its own rules of the game. The article not only reveals how superficially insignificant news can become the story of the week, or even the month, but also shows how it is possible to 'loose' the symbolic game of foreign policy first of all because of the misapprehension on what kind of game is played.

The first part of this article explains the notion of the analysis of the foreign policy interaction through the symbolic games approach. Further the analysis of relations between Russia and Great Britain in 2006 – 2008 is executed with the purpose to clarify the bilateral tensions using the three–stage model, which approaches the games states play through the normative context (background knowledge), facts, and dialogue analysis. The last part of the article discusses the importance and perspectives of the symbolic games in foreign policy analysis.

1. Games and the Everyday of the Foreign Policy

The biggest part of a state foreign policy consists of the routine every-day activities and procedures. The documents are prepared, the bilateral and multilateral visits are organised, the positions in international organisations are formed, the formulation of the opinions are coordinated, and the meetings take place where the majority of the speeches made and documents signed do not become publicly important. Of course, the latent, not visible nature of many foreign policy events does not imply that they are irrelevant. They can influence the groundbreaking changes and other significant events, even if they themselves are incremental and for the most of us, invisible. Many perceptible things in foreign policy – the summits of the state leaders, celebratory signing of the agreements, the loud threats or critique – are the consequence of these mostly unseen everyday processes of foreign policy.

The public side of the foreign policy usually attracts more attention from the commentators and researchers. It is an easily accessible material allowing interpreting the actions of the states, their motives, identifying their interests and long-term goals. At least the assumption is very often made that such policy discloses the 'real' state interests and strategic plans. Another analytical strategy can be also chosen: one may have the system of theoretical propositions

⁶ The time scope of the analysis is almost three years (from 2006 till the middle of 2008). The first incident which indicates the chronological beginning of the analysis happened in yearly 2006 and, as it became clear later, was just one among many signs of the worsening bilateral relations. The data for the analysis consist of the public statements by both states regarding the analysed issues and the bilateral relations in general. The effort was made to collect the majority of the statements.

on why the states behave one way or another and relying on them he or she may interpret the particular everyday or occasional events. In both cases the epistemological ground is that it is possible to know and identify the states' interests, that these interests are more or less stable, defined, and naturally stem from the certain characteristics of a state.

Such thinking is based on the idea that state foreign policy is instrumental in defending the national interests and at the same time expressing these interests or signalling about their changes. This perspective looks at the agency of the states as strategic, mainly consistent, systemic behaviour. In the context of this article such a view can be called a 'macro' view because first of all it defines the general principles of the state behaviour, and after that, uses them to explain the particular events.⁷

Such an approach by itself is not faulty. The statements about the state actions that are taken as given, have anyway been formulated analysing state practices. However, this way of thinking is problematic because of two reasons. Firstly, the general patterns of state actions are frequently accepted as laws, and secondly, these patterns are formulated so that the general theories of the state agency do not provide with any tools to analyse the particular interactions of the states (or in other words, do not indicate how to perform the empirical research).

It is also possible to look differently at the public disagreements of the states and, in general, at the foreign policy events – to consider them as social practices through which the states not only declare (implicitly) their goals, but at the wider extent are formulating the definitions of themselves and their relations, constructing them in the public 'micro' battles. At the same time during these public confrontations the rules of these interactions are also frequently constructed.

Social practices are important in any social interaction, because they are the regularities and activities that connect the social structure with the actions of the actors. Social practices are also the indicators allowing the distinguishing of structural constraints and the subjectivity of the actor. The concepts and their meanings (through the naming) are created through practices as well. According to McSweeney, we rely on their usual capability to reproduce their meaning in certain situation or action in order to confirm or modify it.

Thus, no initial premise is made on what the state, behaving one way or another, seeks. Instead, the action itself has to disclose the meaning of the agency and interactions. This perspective asks how the states themselves inte-

Of course, the traditional term 'realism' also can be applied here. In this case, the most relevant is its emphasis on the states as predictable, familiar, and relatively stable entities of the international relations and on their goals and interests determined by their capabilities, frequently understood as power. The biggest methodological flaw of this attitude is the self-fulfilling hypotheses.

⁸ For more elaborate version of this argument see: Jakniūnaitė, D., Kur prasideda ir baigiasi Rusija: kaimynystė tarptautinėje politikoje, Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 2008, Ch.1.

⁹ McSweeney, B., Security, *Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, P. 161.

racting with each other formulate their interests, goals and objectives, and at the same time create and/or modify the rules of the game, the mutual definitions and the main concepts of their interactions. Mostly the bilateral interactions shape the mutual interpretations. That is why at the centre of the analysis is the practice analysis.

Practice analysis allows also defining the relation between visible and invisible foreign policy processes. According to this approach, the public space of the game builds the ground and the context that make the majority of the everyday, invisible activities possible.

Action is impossible without the ideas. Laffey and Weldes call them "symbolic technologies", emphasising that they are "intersubjective systems of representations and representation–producing practices"¹⁰. That is the ideas are social, they are not the individual level phenomena, they are collective and shared. Ideas come into existence because of the collective social actions. They are the systems of representation formed in the specific spatial, temporal, and cultural relational environment where more or less clearly articulated systems of meaning are circulating.

What options this approach on the role of the ideas (meanings) in the social practices provides for the analysis of the bilateral interactions among the states? It gives the understanding about the importance of the meanings in the social interaction. Here the understanding of foreign policy proposed by Barnett is very useful. He asserts that to understand foreign policy is to understand "the normative structure that constitutes and constrains actors also provides the wellspring for social practices and allows for strategic action", and "such strategizing occurs in a normative and an institutional context"11, meaning that any action has its own normative and institutional constraints. It describes the boundaries of the agency, and does that through the established values and procedures. The structural constraints, however, do not allow ignoring the fact that actors play strategic games. Thus, the everyday state interactive practice can be defined as a game. This term emphasises the mutuality of the notions – from one side the existence of certain rules of practice, on the other side, their formation during the process of the game – and, finally it pays the attention to the consciousness of the actors in that process, that is to their strategic and purposeful behaviour.

The strategic games, however, rarely are direct and obvious games about the clear goals. The games in foreign policy often are symbolic, i.e. the object of the particular game is not the most important goal, and the game appears to be played because of the different motives. Relatively 'insignificant' problems of foreign relations (in the sense of their everydayness and commonness) when they become the issues defining the bilateral relations are especially useful for

¹⁰ Laffey, M., Weldes, J., Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations, European Journal of International Relations 3 (2), 1997, P. 208.

¹¹ Barnett, M., Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo, European Journal of International Relations, 5 (1), 1999, P.5.

the analysis of the symbolic games. So, the bilateral interactions between Russia and Great Britain are defined as symbolic games because these interactions initially being the part of the everyday foreign policy during the interaction have become symbolically important for both sides, and in this way marked the start of the different game. The analytical part of the article tries to understand what kind of play has been started and how.

Analysing symbolic games the model of language games analysis proposed by Duffy, Frederking, and Tucker¹² is used. The analytical instrument for the language games can be used for the symbolic games as well. The games become games first of all and mainly through the language in certain time and place. 13 According to the authors mentioned, any language game must be analysed through the three steps: first, the values and attitudes of the actors, second, the facts of the game, and, third, the dialogue itself. The values and attitudes of the actors in this case are the states conceptualisations on what is important in international politics, what their place is and how they should act in this environment. This explanation about the place of the country in the world reveals the structural constraints of the state behaviour (as understood by the state itself). Inventory of the facts is far from straightforward activity, it helps to identify what is held as important in any event and how it is done. Dialogue analysis encompasses the analysis of the situation which has arisen from the interaction and the evaluation of the dynamics of the bilateral games in the context of their foreign policy.

2. Normative Context of the Russian – British Relations

The first step analysing symbolic games is to comprehend the system of the main normative and value positions of two players. The system first of all encompasses the conceptualisations of the international politics by the states and the description of their place there. Such conceptualisations and descriptions show the (perceived) structural constraints of each state. In the foreign policy analysis the normative context is best represented in the foreign policy conceptions or programs (not necessary officially called as such). For the goals of the article it is important to understand the essential differences (and similarities as well) between the world–views of Russia and Great Britain. It will indicate the limits that could and would not be overstepped even by the most pragmatic foreign policy strategy.

Recently the leadership changed in both countries: in 2007 in Great Bri-

¹² Duffy, G., Frederking, B.K., Tucker, S.A., Language Games: Dialogical Analysis of INF Negotiations. International Studies Quarterly 42, 1998, p. 271–294.

¹³ More about the importance of the language in international relations analysis see: Fierke, K. M., "Links Across the Abyss: Language and Logic in International Relations", *International Studies Quarterly* 46, 2002, P. 351.

tain and in 2008 in Russia. The change of the political leaders combined with the changing international environment was a good opportunity to review the foreign policy principles or to give more precise wording. Neither of two states made any radical turns, it was more a 'codification' of the established foreign policy practices.

At the end of the summer of 2008, the President of Russian Federation Dmitriy Medvedev summarized the principles of Russian foreign policy: Russia accepts the primacy of the international law and thinks the multi–polarity should prevail in the world. Russia does not want any confrontation with any state, its main priority is to defend the citizens of Russia all around the world, and finally he acknowledged that "Russia, like other states in the world, has regions where it has the privileged interests" In the New Foreign Policy Conception, besides these issues, the accent on the importance of the national sovereignty was put and the attention to the Commonwealth of Independent States was indicated. In the New Foreign Policy Conception, besides these issues, the accent on the importance of the national sovereignty was put and the attention to the Commonwealth of Independent States was indicated. In the New Foreign Policy Conception, besides these issues, the accent on the importance of the national sovereignty was put and the attention to the Commonwealth of Independent States was indicated. In the New Foreign Policy Conception, besides these issues, the accent on the importance of the national sovereignty was put and the attention to the Commonwealth of Independent States was indicated.

Russia understands and tries to stress its subjectivity in international politics by emphasising its territoriality and the geopolitical worldview that is expressed through the identification of the clearly defined geographical sphere of influence. However, the respect for the principle of sovereignty has one, but important exception – it can be overshadowed by the necessity to protect the citizens anywhere and at any time. It was possible to observe the peculiar implementation of this principle during the Georgian events that started in August 2008 when Russia acknowledged the independence of two Georgian territories. Thus the declared respect for the international relations principles, especially for the institution of the United Nations notwithstanding, Russia persistently attempts to influence the formulation and modification of the international rules and demonstrates the desire and demand for the respect as the influential player of the international system.

The new Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, David Miliband, outlined the foreign policy priorities and conception in the summer of 2007. He declared that Britain should respond to challenges, "by using our strengths so that we are a force for good for Britain by being a force for good in the world"¹⁶. The power of the country was described as the combination of hard and soft power, which is devoted towards the strengthening of international security and prosperity, not avoiding international involvement and solving security problems. This position on international involvement is defined as 'liberal interventionism'¹⁷, because

¹⁴ Интервью Дмитрия Медведева телеканалам «Россия», Первому, HTB, 2008, 31 августа, http://www. kremlin.ru/appears/2008/08/31/1917_type63374type63379_205991.shtml, accessed 2008–10–13.

¹⁵ Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации.

Miliband, D., New Diplomacy: Challenges for Foreign Policy, Speech at the Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2007, July 19, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/10188_190707miliband.pdf, accessed 2008–09–12, P.2.

¹⁷ Lawson, D., David Miliband, *Prospect Magazine*, 2008, October, Issue 151, http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=10395, accessed 2008–12–01.

"if we are to continue to be a force for good, we need to be smart about how and when we combine the soft power of ideas and influence and the hard power of economic and military incentives and interventions"¹⁸. The agency of Britain in international politics, according to its Foreign Affairs secretary, is primarily based on the winning the battle for ideas, after the influence in the international institutions follows ("[m]ultilateral action is not a soft option"), only then incentives and sanctions may be used, keeping in mind that "there will be cases where direct intervention will be right"¹⁹. It is acknowledged that the shared values are not enough; they have to be embodied in the shared institutions.²⁰

So, despite Russia's attention to its 'own' regions, the emphasis on the national sovereignty principle and British efforts to become 'force for good' and 'responsible sovereignty'²¹, the difference in the normative positions of these two states cannot be straightforwardly described as the difference between the realist and liberal world–view. At least two factors create the overlapping space for understanding and shared interpretations: on one hand, both states recognize the importance of international institutions (in the Russian case, especially with regards to the UN), on the other hand, there is a common understanding how important the 'hard' power still is. Both states see the interconnected world with the problems that are mostly transnational and cannot be solved by the efforts of the single actor.

Grasping with the differences between the normative positions superficially, the distinction between the protection and preference, for interest (Russia) and values (Great Britain) seems valid. The differing language about the international politics would suggest such a conclusion. However, this distinction in foreign policy conceptions can hardly be considered as important. First, there is no theoretical opposition between the values and interests of the state. The understanding of the national interests does not come by itself; the interests are based on the value statements about the self, the goals and the surrounding world. Second, such a distinction creates the asymmetrical opposition between two positions where the value position is treated as moral and the interest politics frequently – as immoral, thus, consequently the states are divided into good and bad ones. Any analysis has the goal to avoid that.

Still, speaking about the politics of one's state the particularities in the proposed argumentation allow the distinguishing of an important difference in foreign policy conceptualisations. When Great Britain's politicians speak about the place of their country in the international politics they emphasise the outside (e.g. how it will contribute to the solutions of the world problems). Meanwhile, Russia's language is much more defensive and suspicious, Russia starts from itself, from inside, and the outside relations just validate or should

¹⁸ Miliband, New Diplomacy: Challenges for Foreign Policy, P. 3.

¹⁹ Ibidem, P. 5-6.

²⁰ Miliband, D., Speech to the 2007 Labour Party conference, 2007, September 25, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk politics/7012356.stm, accessed 2008–11–07.

²¹ Lawson

²² More see: Finnemore, M. National Interests in International Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.

validate the internal conceptions of the state (whereas Great Britain gets more of internal definitions from the results 'out there'). To what extent these normative similarities and differences influence the differences in the everyday foreign policy behaviour, and even more importantly, how they do that is shown in the next sections.

3. Chain of Bilateral Disagreements

The second step analysing the games according to Duffy, Frederking and Tucker²³ is making of an inventory of the facts. This does not mean the finding out what truly happened. The goal is to highlight what became significant in the Russian British relations during the analysed period, what events have been treated as meaningful and worth to be used as defining these same relationships. In other words, the symbolic game not only includes the way how it is played but also how it is chosen which game to play.

It is impossible not to notice the fact that during the last several years many states would negatively describe their relations with Russia. The list of the disagreements is rather extensive – the yearly disputes about gas supply, US missile shield in Europe, deferring views on Iran nuclear programme and fight with the terrorism, commercial disputes and boycotts, border disagreements, discussions about Russian speaking population, etc. Many of these problems, even if they may be solved bilaterally, are shared and are applicable to the majority of European states. Even in such a strained context, the Russian – British relationships appear to be special, and both states admit that their communication is 'especially not normal'.

The new Russian Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation of 2008 is very telling. Here is the paragraph devoted to the Russian relations with European countries:

The development of mutually advantageous bilateral relationships with Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway and some other West European states is an important resource for promoting Russia's national interests in European and world affairs... Russia would like the potential for interaction with Great Britain to be used along the same lines.²⁴

The Survey of Russian Foreign Policy one year earlier stated even more directly: "Great Britain stays an important, though difficult partner" Thus, Russia 'codified' very quickly the disagreement with one European country as worth singling out.

²³ See Duffy, G., Frederking, B.K., Tucker, S.A., Language Games.

²⁴ Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации.

²⁵ Обзор Внешней Политики Российской Федерации, 2007, http://www.ln.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/0e9272b efa34209743256c630042d1aa/d925d1dd235d3ec7c32573060039aea4?OpenDocument, in English – http://www.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/0e9272befa34209743256c630042d1aa/cef95560654d4ca5c32574960036cdd b?OpenDocument, accessed 2008–09–12.

The same caution can be seen in the British position as well. One of the most recent examples happened in July 2008, before the meeting of new Prime Minister of UK Gordon Brown with the freshly elected President of Russian Federation Dmitriy Medvedev at the G8 meeting. Just before this meeting the report was disseminated, which stated that British security services have identified Russia as the third most serious threat to UK, placing it after al–Qaeda terrorism and Iranian nuclear proliferation. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons in its turn already in 2007 asserted that the "state—to—state relationship between the UK and Russia has deteriorated markedly in recent years" and "there has been a string of irritations". British propositions have been more cautious when declaring rough relations (unofficially through the reports or softer wording), still however, no other state with which the routine foreign policy activities are maintained has not been singled out in such a way.

What 'micro' events have created the basis to describe the British – Russian relationships as bad and deteriorating? What strategic actions ('moves') have been made and how has each party been constructing this relationship game? The bilateral tension started during the first months of 2006 when Russian secret service accused the British diplomats of spying. This was done publicly, through the press. As proof the artificial stones with the electronic spying devices found in one of the Moscow parks were presented. Soon after that, Federal Security Service (FSB) publicly accused the embassy of United Kingdom of using the nongovernmental organizations for spying. As one British diplomat evaluating the situation contended, the systemic "pattern of unofficial and deniable acts of hostility towards UK interests" has started. British officials refused to comment on the accusations, Russia did not proceed further and the incident disappeared from the public discussions.

The explosion in bilateral relations happened in November 2006, when the 'Litvinenko case', as it was named later, began.³⁰ Aleksandr Litvinenko, the former agent of Russian security services, died from the radioactive poisoning and just before his death he accused Vladimir Putin, the President of Russian Federation at that time, of a conspiracy against him. After Scotland Yard's investigation the main suspect that emerged was the former KGB agent Andrey Lugovoy. The story became even more complicated after the request by British policy to extradite Lugovoy and Russia's refusal to do that. The principal

²⁶ Webster, P., Russia rated UK's biggest threat after al—Qaeda and Iran, TimesOnline, 2008, July 4, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article4265569.ece, accessed 2008–10–01.

²⁷ Global Security: Russia, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report of Session 2007–2008, London: The Stationary Office Limited, 2007, http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/Russia-Global-Security, accessed 2008–09–14, P. 43.

²⁸ UK diplomats in Moscow spying row, BBC News, 2006, January 23, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/euro-pe/4638136.stm, accessed 2008–08–02.

²⁹ Global Security: Russia, P. 43

³⁰ The chronology of the events can be found here: http://www.litvinenko.org.uk/news/en/chronology/; or here: Timeline: Litvinenko death case, *BBC News*, 2007, July 27, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6179074. stm, accessed 2008–07–20.

argument against that was the provision of the Russian constitution, which prohibits the extradition of Russian citizens if there is a possibility they might be brought to the court. The Russian side also asserted that British officials not providing proof are behaving inappropriately and forget that Russia has many times requested in wane to extradite Russian citizen resigning in Great Britain. Great Britain tried to appeal to the principles of justice and not to move away from juridical discussions (the mentioning of the Russian exiles in Britain, especially keeping in mind the notorious Boris Berezovskiy, did exactly the opposite: it politicized the questions even with juridical terminology).

The majority of the incidents have begun by being initiated by Russia, or only indirectly by Great Britain. However, in July 2007 Great Britain made its first open diplomatic demarche against Russia. Britain, still very dissatisfied with the uncooperative behaviour of Russia investigating Litvinenko's death and the extradition refusal, has expelled four Russian diplomats from the country.

Russia taking little time to think took "analogous and balanced" ³² countermeasures and sent four British diplomats from Russia (besides, officially froze the cooperation between security services, negotiation on cultural centres, and with this move created favourable condition for the subsequent British Council 'scandal' ³³) and commented their actions in this way:

Moscow's measures ... are balanced and necessary. The Russian side was forced to make them taking into account the conscious choice by London to aggravate the relations with Russia ... In such cases the principle of reciprocity has to work ... [The British position] is based on anything except the common sense usually typical for British pragmatism and the rule of law. The demand to change the Constitution in order to get one suspect in the 'Litvinenko case' is the perfect example ... We hope that finally the common sense will prevail and Russian – British relations will not be hindered by artificial obstacles – may it be domestic political junctures, or the use of "Russian card" in European and Euroatlantic political context.³⁴

In the parliamentary report by the House of Commons these events were commented as "the most serious deterioration in bilateral diplomatic relations since the end of the Cold War"³⁵.

The British Council 'scandal' that began in the end of 2007 attracted similar public flames and media attention. This institution has been active in Russia since 1992 and at some point had the diplomatic status. In 2004, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation made a statement that

³¹See, for example, Стенограмма ответа на вопрос СМИ Министра иностранных дел России С.В.Лаврова на пресс–конференции в Лиссабоне 19 июля 2007 года, http://www.mid.ru/ns-reuro.nsf/348bd0da1d5a 7185432569e700419c7a/432569d80022027ec325731e001fe7ff?OpenDocument, accessed 2008–10–02.

³² Ibidem.

³³ Ibidem.

³⁴ Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации, *Комментарий МИД России по российско-британским отношениям*, 2007, 19 июля, http://www.mid.ru/ns-reuro.nsf/348bd0da1d5a7185432569e 700419c7a/432569d80022027ec325731d004ad280?OpenDocument, accessed 2008–09–04.

³⁵ Global Security: Russia, P. 11.

it does not consider the offices of the council part of the diplomatic mission. Then the attack was overtaken by the Ministry of Interior Affairs that accused the institution of the illegal activity (illegal teaching) and tax evasion. The reaction of the British council was quick, the problem seemed to be solved and the case was dismissed.³⁶

However, in October of 2007 Russia demanded to stop the activity of all non Moscow offices from January 1, 2008, indicating the Law on the terms of the establishment and activity of the foreign cultural and information centres in the territory of Russian Federation adopted in 1995. The political accusations have been also uttered. For example, in Krasnoyarsk the local powers accused the Council of 'brain drain' because the institution was seducing Russian students with the scholarships in UK universities.³⁷ At the meantime, Great Britain has been trying to prove that the Council is part of the embassy and has to have the diplomatic immunity³⁸ or has been emphasising the political nature of the demands.³⁹ From the other side, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov in a statement on 14 December 2007 confirmed that the attack is connected with the 'Litvinenko case', so, in a way proving the assumptions by British. However, later the statements of such kind have not emerged again.

January 2008 the ambassador of the UK was informed that Russia would take "strict measures" if the British Council offices in St. Petersburg and Yekaterinburg would not stop working and the eventual British resistance was called "the planned provocations to worsen the relations between Russia and Great Britain"⁴⁰. Next day FSB called several employees of the Council for questioning, and after a couple of days – on January 17 – the offices of the British Council were closed.

During these several months of confrontation the officials from both sides made a lot of strong and harsh assertions. The ambassador of Great Britain Anthony Brenton said that "Russia is the only one who lost in this case" and that night when the British Council employees had been questioned they were making references to the Cold War and the Soviet methods in order to deal

³⁶МИД РФ проводит антисоветскую политику, *Коммерсанть*, 2007, 14 июня, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=773984, accessed 2008–09–25.

³⁷ Buckley, N., Moscow steps up pressure in Moscow, *Financial Times*, 2007, 14 June, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5f94d026-1a86-11dc-8bf0-000b5df10621.html?nclick_check=1, accessed 2008-10-12.

³⁸ Franklin, K., Russia to restrict British Council, *Telegraph*, 2007, 13 December, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1572370/Russia-to-restrict-British-Council.html, accessed 2008–10–02.

³⁹ Wingfield – Haye.

⁴⁰ Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации, О вызове в МИД России посла Великобритании, 2008, 14 января, http://www.mid.ru/ns-reuro.nsf/348bd0da1d5a7185432569e7004 19c7a/432569d80022027ec32573d00042fa0e?OpenDocument, accessed 2008–09–16; Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to Second Report from Foreign Affairs Committee Global Security: Russia, 2008, February, http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/FAC-Response, accessed 2008–09–16.

⁴¹ Посол Великобритании о Британском совете: "Единственной пострадавшей в этой истории оказалась Россия", Коммерсанть, 2008, 1 января, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=843045, accessed 2008–09–12.

with the problems. Miliband was accusing Russia of a direct threat and called the story the stain in Russian foreign policy. He emphasized that the UK will take the position of "moral high ground"⁴², by adding: "I have decided not to take similar action against Russia's cultural activities in the UK"⁴³.

Meanwhile Lavrov, while commenting the activities of British Council in Russia, contended that it is the "reflection of nostalgia for colonial times" and stated that "this is not the language to talk with Russia"⁴⁴. And again there were the accusations of indoctrination of Russians and seduction efforts to make them leave the country.⁴⁵

Thus, in the middle of 2008 both parties had nothing left to do, but to conclude that relationships are absolutely bad and the perspectives for improvement in the nearest future are grim. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation:

Currently [May 2008] the Russian—British relations are far from being good. On 16 July 2007 the British government, on the ground that Moscow allegedly refuses to cooperate in the so called 'Litvinenko case', announced that it is starting to take unfriendly measures against Russia. ... Just after officially expelling four Russian diplomats, London informed that it is limiting the cooperation in the fields of visas, military technical cooperation, and is freezing the relations with the FSB, which is threatening the bilateral antiterrorist cooperation that has been developing during the last years. 46

In the Survey of Foreign Policy in 2007 it is also stated that "all the scope of our cooperation notwithstanding the bilateral relations and activities on the international scale, are restrained by the messianistic attitudes of the majority of the British political elite, including the attitudes regarding the internal political processes in Russia"⁴⁷.

The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office was equally sceptic:

We recognise that there is a divergence in Russian and UK positions on certain issues, including the UK's greater willingness to countenance external engagement with states' internal affairs, particularly as these pertain to human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The UK strongly believes that external engagement can be an important element in ensuring international peace and security. We will continue to advocate this to Russia... Where we do have policy disagreements, we will continue to explain why we take such positions. We need to be clear, however, that Russian behaviour is sometimes not in line with the international commitments to democracy, human rights and the rule of law to which Russia has voluntarily subscribed.⁴⁸

⁴² In full: Miliband Russia statement, BBC News, 2008, January 18, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7194258.stm, accessed 2008–09–21.

⁴³ Ibidem.

⁴⁴ Russia, Britain in slanging match over cultural centres, AFP, 2008, January 15, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jH4TWhgv1gQmM6utJgvlvurivZGA, accessed 2008–09–16.

⁴⁵ E.g. Buckley

⁴⁶ Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации, *Российско-британские отношения (справочная информация)*, 2008, 15 мая, http://www.mid.ru/ns-reuro.nst/348bd0da1d5a7185432569e700419 c7a/4fac8df9d8f7ddaf43256d4f00202087?OpenDocument, accessed 2008–09–04.

⁴⁷ Обзор внешней политики Российской Федерации.

⁴⁸ Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to Second Report from Foreign Affairs Committee *Global Security: Russia*, 2008, February, http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/FAC-Response, P.3–4, accessed 2008–09–18.

Of course it is difficult to say if the year 2008 has been the last of such foreign policy games. However, this quite short period of bilateral relations provides enough material to analyse the bilateral interactions between Russia and Great Britain and understand what kind of symbolic game has been played by both states.

4. Political Games as the Expression of Symbolic Power

The analysed events demonstrate that the foreign policy interactions are connected not only as the chain of events, but also through their discursive meanings. They appear to connect at first sight as 'illogical', unconnected phenomena and events. During the last several years, thanks to these discursive meanings, two states managed to move from reasonable bilateral relations towards the relations by both sides described as difficult. Thus, the last step of the analysis is to reveal what kind of the game was going on and the way the problems were talked about. What game was played by both sides? What 'message' each side wanted to send to another?

The first feature of the game played by the two states is its asymmetrical nature. The almost three—year story showed that it is Russia who was the one who played *with* Great Britain. The later, as a matter of fact, tried several times to take the initiative over, or at least to level the balance, however, did not manage to play games *with* Russia. That is why the reactive politics of Great Britain were defensive, angrier, and appealing to the morals and values.

Russia, in turn, formulated the firm position and did not allow any thinking about the possibility that others might mix with its matters. This asymmetric condition was of course strengthened by the fact that the stage of the political spectacle was in the most cases also in Russia and any change in scenery did help to gain the lead in playing the game. Metaphorically, such a situation can be described as the 'cat and mouse' game where Great Britain succeeded in neither swapping the roles nor changing the plot of game (for example, starting to play the not so traditional cat and mouse game, like 'Tom and Jerry').

Second, it is important to emphasize that the game played was *symbolic* and the hypothesis made at the beginning of the article was justified. The particular bilateral problem was not important by itself because almost always the prevailing attitude was that either the opponent that was doing something actually had in mind something else, or the player itself was playing for different reasons and having some other thoughts (sometimes even direct comments alluded to that – like such descriptions of the behaviour: 'colonial', 'undemocratic', 'wrong' etc. that have nothing to do with the situation at hand). It is not even important if the opinions of both sides, on what the *real* problem was, coincided or not. It was enough that it was imagined that they

did. This logic of reasoning is apparent in 'spy scandals' or in the case of the British Council.

The 'Litvinenko case' however, was initially, a different interaction. At the beginning of the story, the events have evolved on the territory of Great Britain, therefore for the British side the event was not a foreign policy interaction at all. It was more the matter of human safety and societal security, thus the problem was more corporeal and more tangible. For Russia, the case increased in importance after its main actor, Litvinenko, accused Russia's President of conspiracy against him. At this moment it became not only the story about the disobedient and unreliable citizen, but a matter of the respect for the state and its leader, and later for its citizens (in Lugovoy's case) as well. Later comments by Great Britain trying to disentangle the case and attempts to stay in the limits of the legal discourse also demonstrate how the poisoning case, also for Britain itself, gradually became the question about the respect for the country and its values.

The 'Litvinenko case', mostly because the event became the story about the mutual respect, friendliness, and trust (more exactly, about the absence of these elements in the bilateral relations), stays the focal symbolic game. It is the main disagreement references to which are constantly made in any efforts to solve the relations.

Here, also the third characteristics of the Russian – British symbolic game unfolds – the symbolic game has the defining power.

Thus, foreign policy through such symbolic games, reveals itself as an identity formation process⁴⁹. In the case of Great Britain and Russia, particularly important is the part of the process, which deals with the creation of the definitions of the Other. For example, using the term 'colonialism' Russia attempted the radical redefinition of the opponent. To accuse Britain that it cannot forget its colonial past and it still tries to implement imperial politics means to choose the same discursive strategy which is used by the British for the descriptions of Russia. This choice is the perfect way to neutralize the term 'neoimperialism', which is more and more often used to describe the Russian foreign policy. Indication that the opponent behaves in the same manner is the attempt to create the balance and basically to leave the only trump card for Britain - "the democracy and human rights discourse" which Great Britain often uses dealing with Russia. 50 However, in the cases analysed here, this strategy appeared difficult to apply because of the content of the games - Russia managed to resist their normative conceptualisation according to Britain's wishes and tried to stay in the framework of neutral, objective and legalistic language.

Thus, Russia took the initiative to mould and formulate the bilateral relations not only designating the issue questions but also indicating the tone of the talk, its cycle and limits. Even by creating the equivalence in mutual

⁴⁹ See, for example: Campbell, D., Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992.

⁵⁰ See, for example: Global Security: Russia.

descriptions (e.g. colonial–imperial opposition) Russia, in fact, got the advantage because this way it managed to destroy the asymmetrical, unfavourable and threatening to become the dominant, description of its behaviour in the international politics.⁵¹

Finally, another important feature of the symbolic game analysed in this article is that, again, Russia was the one who used the legal rhetoric to its advantage. Legal terms helped to resist normative language because it was easier to accuse the opponent of emotionalism (for example: "British efforts to politicize the topic, distort facts and use unprofitable rhetoric do not help to improve the bilateral relations" ⁵²). The usage of legalistic language stresses the rationality, 'common sense', and objectivity. The fact that these qualities usually are attributed to the British and in the analysed cases Russia was the one claiming them for itself makes the situation even more intriguing, because we see the similar strategy again: to deny, neutralize the 'traditional' virtues of the opponent by applying them to itself.

It is worth noticing that this positional imbalance can also be explained by looking at the normative context of both states analysed in the second section. The strategic foreign policy behaviour of Great Britain based principally on the need for the external validation and successful results in the outside was not realised during the symbolic games with Russia. Meanwhile, the self–conceptualisations of Russia do not require the initial confirmation from anybody – the function of its foreign policy strategy is to manifest its identity to others. Its symbolic goal, which the development of relations with Great Britain demonstrates, is to make that the Others would also accept its self–interpretation, i.e. the idea that Russia is strong, firm, rational state, that it knows this and therefore will seek the respect and will not let itself be 'pushed' around.

Thus, the 2006 – 2008 events between Russia and Great Britain have been not only the direct conflicts about several different questions, they have also been the games, because it was *understood* that the struggle is not about the direct win on the particular question, but about different and much important issues. Thus, the words uttered during the disputes more important were meaning than the disputes themselves. The words did not only describe the positions on the issue, they also have been the tools to consolidate the relative position in the common discursive field of bilateral relations. That is the words and reciprocal actions had the symbolic function. Thus, it means that the fluctuation in the bilateral relations can be understood analysing the descriptions of the problems and situations and the arguments that are offered by both sides.

⁵¹ It is necessary to notice that the strategy to seek balance in mutual categorisations was relatively successful in the context of this analysis; however, it should not be taken as a proof that this strategy is working or has worked in the broader context of Russian foreign policy activities.

⁵² Комментарий официального представителя МИД России М.Л.Камынина.

Concluding Remarks

The position that diplomats easily deny or renounce their words, and this does not necessarily create the consequences, is the dominant and popular view about the role of the words in the diplomatic language. In this article it was demonstrated how the uttered words become and stay as the actors in the political game. They become the participants in this game not only because they are remembered, but firstly because by their constant repetition, quotation and rehashing they start 'living their own life'. They can disappear for some time from the discursive context, but they can be easily 'reanimated' as well and made into the actors again. This, for example, happens with the Litvinenko's accusations and alleged or real Lavrov's swearing while talking to Miliband.

The processes of meaning creation analysed in the article of course are not the only ones that form and define the relations between the states. Many factors – the everyday interactions, the exceptional, celebratory events, the context of international politics, domestic processes – influence the foreign policy and help to understand it. The analysis of the symbolic games in foreign policy demonstrates how the states are acting strategically and creatively inside the limits of international politics through the naming, definitions of the self and others, and the language strategies leading or loosing the lead in the bilateral relations and solving the problems.

It is difficult to sustain such a tension for a long time without going somewhere further. So, it is likely that the relations between Russia and Great Britain will come back to being 'normal' and becoming similar to the relations between other European states. This conclusion is not supposed to mean that the symbolic fights are going to disappear from the relations between these two states, as they are not disappearing from many bilateral interactions. They usually just manifest over a longer time and through more indirect actions.

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Development of Georgia's Security Strategy: Tough Road Towards NATO

Georgia's security alternatives in recent years have narrowed to a very concrete goal – NATO membership. This kind of choice seems to be logical for a small state. Nevertheless, security strategy, based on the key goal of alliance with stronger partner, may cause several problems. In the case of Georgia, security dilemmas are even more complicated. Unresolved problems with separatist regions were permanent key obstacles for Georgia to become reliable NATO candidate. The more Georgia was streaming towards NATO, the more relations with Russia deteriorated. The flashpoint of growing tension was the blitzkrieg of August 2008 between Georgia and Russia. Nevertheless the results of war may seem to provide the possibility for Georgia to resolve internal problems: however they failed to provide any guarantees for NATO membership. In this research paper the question - whether striving for NATO membership could guarantee Georgia's security - is analyzed. Also, the main obstacles for the realization of Georgia's security strategy and key dilemmas for NATO, in dealing with Georgia's case, are discussed.

Introduction

The *Blitzkrieg* between Georgia and Russia at the time of Beijing Olympic Game unfolded the most painful aspects of Georgia's security strategy. From the moment of the disintegration of the USSR and the proclamation of Georgia's independence in 1991, until now, Georgia has been solving its problems of ensuring national security and guaranteeing territorial integrity. Russia's aggression and harsh defiance of the territorial integrity of a sovereign state once more proved fears to Georgia's government that frozen conflicts could anytime turn into bloody wars. What seemed to be impossible to happen in XXI ct., turned into a painful reality. When Russian armed forces penetrated further and further into Georgia's territory, the threat, that a sovereign democratic state can be fully occupied by other state, appeared. After Russia unilaterally recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia may claim the Russia was purposefully dividing the state.

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The government of Georgia, by the help of mass media, encouraged the international community not to leave indifferent in relation to a state suffering from aggression. Russia's aggression had to be a kind of confirmation, that Georgia's efforts to become part of NATO and to get collective security guarantees as soon as possible were well-grounded. From the time of the Rose revolution and Mikheil Saakashvili becoming the president of the state, this small South Caucasian state has chosen a difficult, but clear-cut way towards NATO. This goal of Georgia is unsatisfactory to Russia and a great "headache" for bigger part of Alliance. The results of the Bucharest summit in the spring of 2008 showed several members of NATO avoided irritating Moscow and refused to give the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia and Ukraine.

The conflict between Russia and Georgia for most states of the EU and NATO was the turning point to re-evaluate Russia's actions and the stage of relationships with Moscow. Representatives of NATO and even several of the most faithful partners of Moscow in Europe (for example, Germany) were the first to state that the conflict does not cancel the possibility of Georgia becoming a NATO member. Nevertheless, until no clear decision of the perspectives of Georgia's NATO membership are taken, the question - will Georgia ever get collective defence guarantees from NATO - is still present. When the hottest of the emotions cooled down, it became clear that the NATO members who doubted Georgia's reliability at the end of 2008 strengthened their arguments why it is not worth it to be in a hurry, granting Georgia and the Ukraine MAP. Even the USA declared that to press the granting of MAP for Georgia means to raise the voltage in relations with Russia, and at the same time, to minimize the possibility of restoring stability in the South Caucasus. For this reason at the eve of the summit of NATO, foreign ministers in December of 2008 the State Secretary of the USA, Condoleezza Rice, stated that the USA has stepped back from the demand for NATO to prepare the plan of admission of Georgia and Ukraine. Nevertheless, it was stated, that the perspective of NATO membership has not been cancelled and both states are encouraged to start the necessary reforms without the official MAP.

In this research paper, key challenges and threats for Georgia, also Tbilisi's efforts to ensure its security, will be overviewed. Georgia's security strategy has transformed several times during the period of independence. Every time, the security strategy reflected efforts to find an optimal balance between internal security problems and defence from external threats. It is not easy to find the right solution; Georgia carries not only the problem of separatism, but also has a huge and unfriendly neighbour who is likely to manipulate with the leverages of the security of other state.

Even before the August war, Georgia encountered a difficult dilemma, to stream towards NATO, but because of Russia's ambitions, the risk of finally losing the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or to go to concession in relations with Moscow and to hope that it will not stimulate tendencies of separatism in Georgia.

Georgia has chosen the way of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and has attained a aggressive response form Russia. Till now Georgia's

NATO, and even more, their EU membership, is only at the stage of a goal to reach. From the security perspective Georgia is vulnerable more that ever before. For this reason the question, can Georgia's choice of NATO membership guarantee the security of the state, arises. This question is the key point of the research paper. The answer to this question will be researched analyzing the theoretical opportunities of security of a small state and the development of Georgia's security strategy. Also the main reasons complicating Georgia's efforts to ensure their national security will be discussed. Viewpoints of the main actors of the international community toward Georgia's security strategy will be reviewed.

The war between Russia and Georgia highlighted the vital need for a small state to ensure its national security with the help of international organizations or alliances. Lithuania reacted very sensitively to the events in Georgia, because Russia's aggression reminded them that a small state can anytime become the victim of the aggression of great power or the object of manipulations. Nevertheless Lithuania now is a full member of NATO, yet it does not eliminate the sense of insecurity because the impact on a small state can be reached not only using military tools. What is more, in the context of Russia's - Georgia's war the discussions on the efficiency of NATO as a collective defence alliance took place. To be more exact, solidarity in implementation of collective defence for Lithuania was the key stimulus to strive for NATO membership. In fact, the same argument is the main stimulus for Georgia's NATO membership. But efforts of Georgia to become a NATO member as soon as possible disclosed not only the internal security problems of the state, but also the different position of current NATO members on potential obligations in the sphere of security. This cleavage raises a more serious question – does the NATO membership really guarantee the security for a small state?

Security Strategy of a Small State: Possibilities and Limits

1.1. Insecurity – Permanent Problem of a Small State

Reflecting contemporary tendencies, it can be stated that one of the main characteristics of a small state is its vulnerability. Although when evaluating the qualitative parameters (GDP per capita, parity of purchasing power (PPP), mean salary, etc.), small state can be equal or even more developed than big state¹, a small state disposes a small amount of quantitative resources: area,

Brautigam, D. and Woolcock, M., Small states in a global economy. The role of institutions in managing vulnerability and opportunity in small developing countries. United Nations University, July 2001, 2 (Discussion paper No. 2001/37)

financial, human resources. That is the key reason why a small state is vulnerable by pressure from the outside.

After the major changes in XX ct. in the international system took place (especially - World War I, the collapse of colonial system, the end of Cold War and the collapse of USSR), more opportunities for a small state's self-sufficiency were present. Nevertheless, the majority of small states, especially - new formed, found themselves in "the zone of high geopolitical voltage" - in the space of intersection of interests of great powers. So, under such tense circumstances and in the absence of convenient geopolitical position, small states have been hustled to maintain their national security in an active way, searching for external sources of security. As Steven L. Spiegel emphasized, in the international arena big states (great powers) use to act like a "suppliers" of power/security, at the same time small states fulfil the role of the "consumers" of power or additional security guarantees². "Supplier" and "consumer" are connected by the symbiosis relationship: "consumer" (the small state) gets from the "supplier" (great power) additional security guarantees, which enables the small state to maintain it's statehood, while the "supplier", by the help of this process, gets an opportunity to spread it's influence and attain additional leverages of structural strength. It is worth mentioning that the "supplier" of power/security to a small state can be not only a big state, but also another entity recognized as the actor of international relations (for example, the EU, NATO, etc.). Olav F. Knudsen is even more radical in this question. He describes small states as "net security importers", or actors of the international arena, which trying to preserve its maintenance, needs more support from the outside that they can give back³.

Because of the vital need of the external source of security, small states, which appeared as a result of a formation of a contemporary international system (new small states, appeared after the end of the Cold War), can be defined by one more feature – adaptivity. When the source of security weakens, the small state faces the need to reconsider its security choices. Adaptivity for the small state is of the same importance as power for big state because it guarantees maintenance of statehood.

In addition, the compulsory circumstance for the small state to get additional security guarantees is its importance to the supplier: the small state must be objectively important to "supplier" or to present itself as an important actor in relation to great power and convince the "supplier" of its importance (subjective criterion). The idea that will be developed further in this research paper is that the emphasis of Georgia's importance for the West (especially – for the USA) and permanent efforts to attract the attention of the Western partners became the key elements of Georgia's security policy.

² Spiegel, S. L., Dominance and diversity. The international hierarchy, Boston, 1972, p. 133, 136.

³ Knudsen, O. F., "Small states, latent and extant: towards a general perspective", *JIRD*, 2002, No. 5(2), p. 187

1.2. Security Strategy - Reflection of Behaviour of a Small State

There are discussions in the academic space regarding whether small states are able to choose self-sufficient directions of its foreign and security policies, or do great powers overtake the right of decision making from the small ones. It is agreed, that the impact of small states for the world politics is not big because of a disproportion of powers (both relational and structural dimensions) between big and small states. But the most attractive seems to be the "middle" position, which states that nevertheless international conjuncture sets several restrictions on the choices for security of a small state, the final combination of choices belongs to the competence of the state. This combination of choices is considered to be the security strategy – the complexity of long-term political choices in the sphere of foreign and security policy, being fixed in the strategic documents (Concept of national security, Strategy of national security, Strategy of foreign policy, Military strategy) and constantly appearing in political practice. If permanent political practices do not coincide with the principles fixed in the strategic documents, then the principles, which are evident in political practices, are taken as a background of security strategy.

Security strategy fulfils two functions. First, it informs other actors in the international arena about the directions of the foreign and security policy of the state. It increases transparency and the level of predictability of the state, which is what defines the state as more trustworthy. This is especially important for small states, because it helps to create prestige in the international arena and to increase structural power disposed by the state. Second, the security strategy, especially if fixed in strategic documents, helps to ensure the continuality of foreign and security policy. It is especially important in the process of the changing of ruling elites.

Security strategy is composed of two categories. The first category – is the directions of foreign policy and security policy, chosen by the small state and recognized by the "supplier of security" (guarantees in the sphere of foreign policy and security). But if security strategy would include only guarantees, the concept would be very narrow. As far as security strategy it includes not only the position of the state in relation to other actors of international arena, but also the manner of the behaviour of the state in the international arena. The second category of the security strategy – aspirations – is also very important. Aspirations define potential (possible) future guarantees (if small state continuously seeks some guarantees, it is a possibility, that one day it will obtain them). Also aspirations act like a determinant of the ways and manner of policy of small state. So it can be said that both the existing guarantees and aspirations can be considered as long-term political choices.

Alliance – one of the most popular security strategies among small states (neutrality and complementarism also are considered to be typical security strategies for small states). Alliance as security strategy can assume different forms: great powers' alliance, alliance of small states and mixed alliance (of

small and big states)⁴. The main advantage of alliance are a clear-defined course, aims and priorities of foreign and security policy. Because of clear-defined "supplier of security", consensus on the directions on foreign and security policy is being reached more easily inside the state. By such conditions, the rotation of ruling elite does not act like a threat to the continuality of the security strategy of the state. What is more, the alliance is more stable than the other two security strategies: the state, once having made its choice, does not have to overlook periodically its decision. The main shortcomings of this security strategy are the – strong dependence from the "supplier of security" and lack of alternatives. In the case of the weakening of the "supplier of security", the small state is forced to look for the new "supplier" or to change the whole security strategy. A certain level of dependence from the possibilities of the partner of alliance (or even from strategic goals of the partner of alliance) in the long run can restrict small state and turn it into the hostage of the fall of great power, or of the shift in it's grand strategy.

Georgia, which in their particular period was doubting its final choice and trying to balance between great powers, the after year 2003 had chosen their security strategy based on an alliance with NATO and extremely intensive relations with USA. This choice of Georgia was not easy both because of difficult internal security situation of the state and also complicated external circumstances. Nevertheless the directions of Georgia's security strategy in the level of aspirations are very clear-cut, Georgia still has no guarantees from the side of "supplier" of security. This vacuum between "demand" and "supply" for security is the main source of concern for Georgia.

2. Georgia's Security Policy until the "Rose Revolution"

After the end of Cold War, newly independent Georgia was faced with a very difficult security situation; the state not only had two unsuccessful wars with separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in consequences of what have faced permanent threat to its territorial integrity, but also had to reconcile to Russia's influence.

Nevertheless the period after the Rose revolution seems as a clear breakpoint from a balance between Moscow and Washington towards security strategy of alliance with Washington, it would be more exact to name Georgia's security policy till Rose revolution as step-by-step shift towards alliance with the West. As it has already been said, one of the most vital criterions for alliance – enduring consensus between inner political forces and in the society for the main vector and issues connected of the foreign and security policy. In the case

⁴ Wiberg, H. "The security of small nations: challenges and defences", *Journal of Peace Research*, 1987 Vol. 24 No.4, p. 343.

of Georgia, differences between political forces have been on national issues only, to be more exact – on the scope of freedom for national minorities. At the same time Russia has never been considered as serious security guarantee by any of the relevant political forces in Georgia.

2.1. Gravitation of Separatist Regions towards Russia

The first tensions in Georgia, which was historically multicultural (in the territory of Georgia inhabitants of different nationalities – Abkhazians, Ossetians, Armenians, Azeris – have lived) took place at the period of *perestroyka*. Nevertheless tensions at this time were present in relations with all national minorities, the most intensive tensions, which turned to conflicts later, were present in relations with those ethnic minorities, which had no "mother" state⁵. For example, the number of Armenians in the Samckhe-Javakheti region, or the amount of Azeris in the Kvemo Kartli region, were significant bigger than the number of Abkhazians or Ossetians, tensions with Armenians, as far as with the Azeris they did not reach the stage of conflict. It can be supposed, that the desire of the Abkhazians and Ossetians to guarantee self-security, and for this reason to demand autonomy or even independence, was greater because those nations had less alternatives for the long-lasting existence.

Both the conflicts in Abkhazia and south Ossetia hold ethnic character. One of the main impulses of these conflicts was the nationalistic policy of the first president of newly independent Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia. On the one hand, Russia had immediately used the factor of newly-emerged tensions, which led to the long-tem freeze of these conflicts. On the other hand, the causes of both conflicts came from within the country.

In 1991, Georgia proclaimed itself an independent and unitary state (without autonomous regions). After the abolishment of the possibility for autonomy, unrest with Abkhazia, which previously had the status of autonomous republic, began. It is worth mentioning, that frozen conflicts in post-soviet space – were phenomenon caused by several reasons. The first reason is the fact that after the disintegration of USSR, only soviet republics got independence. Autonomous republics, which were formed on the basis of ethnicity, had no right to independence. The second reason, why frozen conflicts emerged, was the efforts of Russia to turn these ethnic tensions to long-lasting conflicts.

Abkhazia, which historically never has been the part of Georgia, was incorporated in year 1931 into Soviet Georgia by the order of Yosif Stalin. After the disintegration of USSR Abkhazia, following the existing rules became an integral part of newly-independent Georgia. But at the end of ninth decade of XX ct. the threat of separatism seemed not to be an issue because the number of ethnic Abkhazians in the regions was slightly lower than 20 percent. Neverthe-

⁵ Svante C., Authonomy and conflict. Ethnoterritoriality and separatism in the South Caucasus – cases in Georgia, Dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Uppsala University, 2002, p. 173.

less, the nationalistic policy of Gamsakhurdia was an impetus for the Abkhazian minority to rethink the possibilities of maintaining their identity. The intent to secede from Georgia has been clearly shown in March 1989 already and in July of the same year clashes with the central authority began. The turning point, which led from ethnic tensions to clashes, was the attempt to open the branch of Tbilisi University in Abkhazia's regional centre Sukhumi.

In year 1992, Georgia's military forces entered Abkhazia. Military actions began. Nevertheless Tbilisi was expecting *blitzkrieg*, military actions took place till 1993. During this period Abkhazia received many-sided assistance from Russia; Russia supported breakaway region by weapons, humanitarian aid and human resources (Abkhazian military forces were strengthen by Chechen militaries⁶). In October of 1993 Georgia and Abkhazia signed a Russian-supported cease-fire agreement. Russian peacekeepers (under the mandate of CIS) were dislocated in the region and the conflict became frozen⁷.

Negotiations for the settlement of the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia took place in bilateral format. The separatist region was demanding full independence from Georgia, but Georgia was ready to offer not more than a broad autonomy. Also the process of negotiations had been frozen because of a disagreement over the question of internally displaced persons (IDP): Georgia had stated, that the legal status of the region will be resolved only after all IDP will be returned to Abkhazia, but Abkhazia had demanded the resolution of legal status as an obligatory precondition for returning of IDP to the region. Abkhazians have feared that after the returning of non-Abkhazian IDP to the region, Abkhazians would again become the only ethnic minority and would not be able to protect their interests anymore.

One of the greatest problems in the process of the regulation of Georgia's -Abkhazia's conflict is the asymmetry of power, caused by the huge influence of Russia and poor international involvement. The only international organization, which has been involved in the process of resolving the conflict, is the United Nations (UN). In 1992, a month after the beginning of military actions, the UN sent a fact-finding mission to the region. In the spring of 1993, a special envoy was nominated of UN going to Abkhazia (Swiss diplomat Eduard Brunner took this position). The same year Georgia asked the UN to dislocate the peacekeeping mission in Abkhazia. The UN Security Council decided to make a compromise decision (Russia – permanent member of UN Security Council) and sent to Abkhazia not peacekeepers, but military observers, United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia – UNOMIG. The main task of UNOMIG was to monitor how Russian peacekeepers implement cease-fire regime⁸.

When international attention towards the Abkhazian conflict increased,

⁶ Sabanadze N., *International involvement in the South Caucasus*, European Centre for Minority Issues, February 2002, p. 12 (Working paper no. 15).

⁷ Lynch D., Why Georgia matters, Institute for Security Studies, February 2006, p. 17-18 (Chaillot paper No. 86).

⁸ Bartuzi W. et. al. Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh: frozen conflicts between Russia and the West, Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, 09 07 2008, p. 5.

one more international actor became involved in the conflict regulation process – a Group of friends of the UN Secretary General, composed of diplomats from the USA, Great Britain, Germany, France and Russia. The function of the Group of friends has been to mediate the dialogue between Georgia and breakaway Abkhazia.

In the case of South Ossetia, such a harsh interethnic tension has not taken place. South Ossetia also had never been a historical region of Georgia. It was separated from contemporary North Ossetia and integrated into Georgia in 1922. In 1989, the Supreme Council of South Ossetia asked the central authorities of Georgia to grant the region a status of an autonomous republic (the same as for Abkhazia), but demonstrated desire to remain within Georgia, So the request of South Ossetia was rejected. What is more, it was decided to abolish the status of an autonomous region. President Eduard Shevardnadze later called this step "the greatest mistake of Georgia".

The abolishment of the status of an autonomous region provoked military reaction from the side of South Ossetia. Military actions started in 1990 and were "frozen" in 1992, when Shevardnadze and Russian president Boris Yeltsin signed cease-fire agreement¹⁰. In the same year, a mixed peacekeeper contingent composed of Georgian, Russian and South Ossetian peacekeepers was dislocated in the region. Peacekeepers have been supervised by the Joint Control Commission (JCC), which is composed of Georgian, Russian, South Ossetian and North Ossetian representatives. Georgia permanently demanded to improve this format, abolishing the asymmetry of power, because Russia in JCC really has three voices, and Georgia – only one. But any changes in the format can be made only by unanimous accord of all members. For this reason no improvements were ever made.

Russia step-by-step expanded its influence in the zones of frozen conflicts, increasing the level of *de facto* integration of these regions into Russia. First, separatist regions during the war with Georgia were widely supported by Russia¹¹. Second, even after cease-fire agreements were signed, Russia has never stopped arming separatists regions to make the peace process as slow as possible. Third, Russia has always supported *de facto* regimes, for example, paying salaries for representatives of *de facto* authorities. What is more, Russia, whose citizens are more than 80 percent of inhabitants of breakaway regions¹², has been paying pensions, allowances and other social payments to them. Fourth, Russian business enterprises are well represented in the region. So, Russia, by the help of political, social, military tools, also – the policy of citizenship, has encouraged separatist regions to gravitate towards Russia, at the same time complicating the perspectives for reintegration of Georgia.

⁹ Sabanadze, (note 6) p. 15.

¹⁰ Lynch, (note 7) p. 18.

¹¹ Sabanadze, (note 6) p. 13, 17.

¹² Bartuzi W. et.al., (note 8) p.5-6.

It is worth mentioning, that the policy of Russia towards ethnically different regions is very ambivalent. In the framework of it's own territory Russia is speaking about the principle of total territorial integrity, not being ready to make any concessions for, for example, republics of North Caucasus. But, in relation with other states sensitivity of Russia towards the question of nationality increases enormously. This dichotomy between values in internal and external policy appears because frozen separatist conflicts - one of the strongest leverages maintaining Russia's influence in post-soviet countries. For example, Georgia, like Azerbaijan, after proclamation of independence rejected to enter newly-established CIS. But after an unsuccessful war in Abkhazia, Russia "encouraged" Georgia to enter the CIS. What is more, the agreement of dislocating four Russian military bases in the territory of Georgia was also signed. What is interesting is that even cease-fire agreements, which normally are signed between conflicting states, in both cases were signed between Georgia and Russia. It supports the idea that it is more precise to consider Russia as a conflicting part than as a neutral mediator.

2.2. Shevardnadze's Equilibrium between Russia and the West

After the restoration of independence, Georgia has chosen a pro-Western vector of foreign and security policy and in 1992 became a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. But in 1993, after unsuccessful military actions in Abkhazia, Georgia was forced to enter CIS. Nevertheless joining a Russia-dominated organization restricted possibilities of development for pro-Western foreign policy, in 1994 Georgia was involved in a NATO-led Partnership for peace programme.

All during the last decade of XX ct. Georgia was forced to balance between the desire to intensify cooperation with NATO and the need not to irritate Russia, whose influence because of frozen conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, significantly increased. What is more, Georgia at that time was totally dependent on Russia's oil and gas.

Shevardnadze's efforts to maintain the balance between Russia and the West gave the results at the period of Yeltsin's presidency, but when Vladimir Putin became the president of Russia, Russia's pressure on Georgia began to increase. In the year 2000, expressing dissatisfaction with Georgia's pro-Western policy, Russia introduced a visa regime for Georgia. At the same time a visa regime for Abkhazia and South Ossetia was not introduced, and this served for further separation of the breakaway regions from Georgia and for stronger *de facto* integration of them into Russia.

In 1999, in Istanbul, a meeting of the heads of OSCE took place during which Russia took responsibility to withdraw its military bases from the ter-

¹³ Falkowski M., Russia's policy in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia, Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, June 2006, p. 51.

ritories of Georgia and Moldova. But Russia simply ignored these obligations for many years (military bases from the territory of Georgia were withdrawn only at the second half of 2007). Georgia's dissatisfactory with Russia's policy was increasing.

The tension between Russia and Georgia started to grow in 1999 already, when second Chechen war started. Russia requested Georgia to give permission for Russian military forces to enter Georgian territory and to attack Chechnya from the side of Georgia (Georgia – the only foreign state, which borders Chechnya). What is more, Russia was asking for permission to use the military airport of Vaziani (nearby Tbilisi) and Russian military bases, dislocated in the territory of Georgia, for the purposes of attack on Chechnya. All these requests were based on the premise, that Chechen fighters receive backup through the Georgian-Chechnya border, which goes by the Great Caucasian Mountains. All requests of Russia were rejected by Georgia as groundless, because according to representatives of Georgia, it is mostly impossible to cross Georgian-Chechen border, and in the winter Great Caucasian Mountains become impenetrable. According to such conditions, the premise of carrying weapons through mountains is absolute nonsense.¹⁴

In the year 2002, Russia again addressed the authority of Georgia with the request for allowance to introduce its military forces to Pankisi gorge, which according to Russia, Chechen terrorists are hiding. ¹⁵ Georgia, instead of giving permission for Russian military forces to enter the Pankisi gorge, decided to organize two security operations in Pankisi – in January and August of 2002. According to the results of these operations, none of the Chechen terrorists were hiding in the gorge. But these conclusions did not calm Russia: Russia criticized security operations as carrying demonstrative character and being ineffective.

Both Georgia and USA were worried about Russia's military air forces, conducting unsanctioned violations of Georgia's air border. Several times Russian air forces, claiming to cross Georgia's air border inadvertently, bombed Georgian villages. In August 2002, after the last Georgian-led security operation in Pankisi gorge, Russian air forces invaded into Georgia and bombed Pankisi gorge individually. This was the last step, which forced Shevardnadze to take the decision for Georgia's integration to NATO.

On the $1^{\rm st}$ of November 2002, a special governmental commission prepared the programme of Georgia's integration to NATO in military, economic and political spheres. In the same year at the Prague summit Georgia for the first time officially declared its desire to become a member of NATO in the future and intent to join the new programme - Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP).

¹⁴ German T., Faultline or Foothold? Georgia's relations with Russia and the USA. Conflict Studies Research Center, UK Defence Academy, January 2004, p. 2-3.

¹⁵ German, (note 14) p. 3.

3. "Go West!": NATO Membership as Keynote of Security Strategy

3.1. Victory of Saakashvili and Striving for NATO Membership

At the end of 2003, after mass protests because of election frauds, the regime of Shevardnadze was forced to step down. After newly organized elections, the new president of Georgia became pro-Western Mikheil Saakashvili, who got absolute majority of the votes.

In the sphere of security policy, Shevardnadze's regime faced several difficulties. The greatest shortcoming of the system and ruling regime was that Georgia had no control of its own borders: separatist Abkhazia and South Ossetia operated as "black holes", and the crossing of the borders of breakaway regions was totally uncontrolled. What is more, internal security structures suffered the shortage of attention and money.

Georgia's NATO membership became the leitmotiv of Saakashvili's regime. Even at the time of Shevardnadze's regime, the tendency to rely on USA more than on Russia was clear. Nevertheless it has not grown to systematic vector of foreign and security policy of Georgia. But newly-elected Saakashvili overturned this balance immediately, declaring NATO membership the final goal of Georgia's foreign and security policy.

It is worth to mention, that the orientation of Georgia toward NATO was caused not only by internal factor – pro-Western regime of Saakashvili, but also by an external factor – the increase in Georgia's importance to the West. This happened because of four reasons:

- After the enlargement of NATO, the Alliance began to view Georgia as important link in the process of ensuring peace and security in South Caucasus. Unresolved conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, frozen relations between Armenia and Turkey, the threat of potential separatism of the breakaway regions of Georgia – these facts have always warned, that the South Caucasus anytime may become the flashpoint of cross-border conflicts.
- Strategic importance has increased after the USA has been involved in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Also, more and more tensions between USA and Iran have been rising. Potential help for stabilizing Iraq and especially – support during the conflict with Iran increased the level of attention of the USA towards Georgia.
- It was thought, that pro-Western Georgia, supported by NATO, would serve as a barrier, which would obstruct the spread of Russia's influence to South Caucasus. Together with the Ukraine, which had gone through Orange revolution, Georgia became an important element in blocking Russia's influence.

• Georgia became relevant in the Western agenda for the wide-range projects in the sphere of transportation of oil and gas, which were operated in South Caucasus. The efforts of hydrocarbon-rich Azerbaijan to deliver oil and gas to world markets not only through Russia, turned Georgia into important transport link and guaranteed Western attention. In the middle of 2006, oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan began operating, at the end of the same year gas pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum started functioning.

Nevertheless not all NATO members supported Georgia's membership, strong domination of USA in NATO let to the rapid development of Georgia-NATO agenda.

In the year 2004, Georgia signed an Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO. Signing of the IPAP was a signal of stepping to the second phase in the way to NATO. IPAP included cooperation in four spheres: political and security issues, issues of defence policy and military issues, issues of public information, scientific research and nature protection, civil crisis management, administrative, defence, security and resources management.

When IPAP was signed, intensive works of preparation began. In 2005, the special commission was established, which had to monitor the implementation of IPAP.

One of the key aspects in the way towards NATO was the establishment of the system of strategic documents. Shevardnadze was avoiding starting the preparation of such documents, because by the help of such documents the vectors and the most important long-term priorities of foreign and security policy of the state had to be fixed. In a situation, when it was lack of will to name Russia as strategic partner of Georgia, and the lack of ground to name USA as guarantee of Georgia's security, the optimal solution was to wait.

In 2005, Georgia's parliament passed and president approved the first National security strategy of Georgia, which has been the main strategic document of the country. In 2006, the National security strategy was modified, stepping from the principle of territorial defence to the principle of total and unconditioned defence. At the end of 2005 the National military strategy was passed. In this document, NATO membership was named as a guarantee of successful deterrence strategy. The last accent in the hierarchy of strategic documents became Threat assessment document 17, which is reviewed annually.

In all these strategic documents it is emphasized, that Georgia seeks to become a part of USA-dominated alliance of collective defence and is not intended to allocate any resources for the development of Russia-dominated structures (CIS).¹⁸ The state's loyalty to USA is also proven by the fact that

¹⁶ Ministry of Defence of Georgia, Strategic defence review. Final report 2007 unclassified, http://www.mod.gov.ge/2007/downloads/The_Strategic_Defence_Review(www.mod.gov.ge).pdf, 2008 09 10, p. 65.
¹⁷ Ibid., p. 65.

National Security Concept of Georgia, Tbilisi, 2006, http://www.mod.gov.ge/?l=E&m=3&sm=1, 2008 04 20.

Georgia, which has had relatively week military forces, has been contributing to the NATO mission in Iraq and has allocated the best-prepared forces to this mission. This kind of super-loyalty definitely gives some dividends in the political and economic sphere. In recent years Georgia became one of the main receivers of aid from the USA. From 1992, when Georgia began to get aid from USA, in the sphere of economy and social sphere Georgia received about 774 million dollars of aid. What is more, in September 2008, the Congress of USA confirmed a 1 bn. dollars aid package (which does not include aid for military sector), which will be provided for war-worn country within two years. It is worth to mention, that this amount of money over three times exceedsaid, which is being provided annually for all the region of South Caucasus and Central Asia²⁰. For implementation of military reforms Georgia, as far as other states of South Caucasus, annually gets aid from the budget of USA. What is more, to provide help for military reforms in South Caucasus, the USA has initiated the foundation of South Caucasus Clearing House.

Nevertheless, super-loyalty in relations to USA also can have several shortcomings. First, it is not clear how long Georgia can keep special attention of USA and how the position of USA towards Georgia would change, if the USA should ask support connected to any international issue, from Russia. The risk remains that the USA, in the name of good relations with Georgia, would not be intended to worsen relations with Moscow.²¹ Secondly, it is not clear if the USA, which now finds itself under huge economic recession, be able to support Georgia financially in the nearest future. For Georgia, which now is only at the halfway of reforms, financial support is vital.

In the fall of 2006, after two years of signing IPAP (normally, the implementation of IPAP lasts two years), during the summit of foreign ministers of NATO, Georgia was offered to enter Intensive dialogue with NATO. It is important to mention that granting Georgia with Intensive dialogue shows the shift in the status of the state in relation to NATO from the partner to candidate. Intensive dialogue – bilateral package of instruments, designed to help the state to prepare for Membership Action Plan (MAP).

Summit of NATO heads, which took place on 2nd - 4th of April 2008, was the greatest hope of Georgia to make grand jump towards NATO. Representatives of Georgia and Ukraine were expecting to be offered MAP. Unfortunately, due to lack of unanimity among members of alliance, two candidate countries were not offered MAP. Nevertheless, heads of NATO declared that NATO membership for Georgia and the Ukraine is only the question of time.²²

Strong aspirations of Georgia and big progress in relations with NATO

¹⁹ United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Georgia, *About Georgia*, http://georgia.usaid.gov/index.php?m=7, 2008 10 02.

²⁰ Eurasiainsight, Kucera J., Georgia: US Congress approves reconstruction aid package for Georgia, 2008 09 30, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav093008b.shtml.

²¹ Civil Georgia, Russian, U.S. Diplomats Discuss Conflicts, 2007 05 15, www.civil.ge, 2007 05 20.

²² Eastweek, Ukraine, Georgia and Russia on the results of the NATO summit in Bucharest: reactions and forecasts, Issue 13(122), 9 April 2008, Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, p. 4.

(USA) leaves the hope, that someday Georgia will get firm security guarantees from NATO. The decision on MAP was delayed till the December of the same year. But how it got clear later, the last summit also has only weakly supported the vision of Georgia's NATO membership.

3.2. Attempts to Solve the Problem of Separatism and Deterioration of Relations with Moscow

Saakashvili has inherited from the regime of Shevardnadze not only wide-spread corruption, but a very weak influence of central authority on regions. As *The Economist* noticed, Shevardnadze's Georgia was more like the combination of separate feuds, than modern unitary state.²³ So, one of the first initiatives of Saakashvili was designed to strengthen core-periphery relations and to increase administrative effectiveness.

Adjaria, located on the coast of Black Sea, after the restoration of independence became one of the richest regions of Georgia. But political elite and administrative apparatus of the region was not only corrupt, but also involved into the actions of organized crime. So when Saakashvili came into power, ruling elite of Adjaria became afraid of the future changes and separatist moods began to appear. The ground to secede from Georgia for Adjaria was not present, because adjarians – ethnical Georgians, who were occupied by Ottoman Empire in the XIX century and overtook Islam. In March of 2004 elections to the local parliament of Adjaria had to take place. Saakashvili demanded free and fair elections, otherwise threatened with blockade of the region. Leader of Adjaria, Aslan Abashidze, panicked, exploded bridges, connecting the region to the rest of Georgia and withdrew to Moscow. In May of the same year, parliamentary election in Adjaria was held. After the elections Georgia restored its control in Adjaria and granted the regional with broad autonomy.

After the successful case of a peaceful conflict solution in Adjaria, Saa-kashvili decided to apply the same framework for regulation of the conflict in South Ossetia. Unfortunately, the result this time was totally opposite. Why?

Nevertheless the case of Adjaria from the first glance seems similar to he cases of two other separatist conflicts in Georgia, the framework, which lead to restoration the control of Georgia in Adjaria, led even to more harsh resistance in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This difference in results has been caused by several reasons:

 Adjaria, different from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, has no borderline with Russia. This factor restricted physical possibilities for Russia to interfere and to support separatist regime.

²³ Lynch, (note 7) p. 17.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 27-28

²⁵ Svante, (note 5), p. 215

- The conflict between Georgia and Adjaria took place in 2004, when at least
 minimal standards of democracy and the frameworks of behaviour of society
 were already formed. For this reason the influence by the help of demanding
 free and fair elections was possible. In the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
 these regions separated from the influence of Georgia just after the dissolution
 of USSR, so they preserved the soviet style of political participation.
- The conflict in Adjaria had no ethnic aspect. At the same time people in Abkhazia and South Ossetia still remember nationalistic policy of Georgia after the restoration of independence and looks toward new initiatives of the central government with distrust.

In 2004, Saakashvili came to lead the country, which had two very deeply frozen conflicts that were not only a threat for the security, but also the main obstacle for integration of Georgia into Euro-Atlantic structures. So, the restoration of the territorial integrity of the state became the main task of the newly-elected president. In order to change harmful *status quo*, Saakashvili began intensive actions. Four directions of such actions can be distinguished.

- First, Saakashvili began to strengthen executive power. The powers of president were increased. What is more, the position of state minister (minister without ministry) for conflict resolution was established.
- Second, military capabilities of the state were also strengthened. After the Rose revolution, the decision to decrease the number of military forces from 38 thousand to 20 thousand was taken. According to the recommendation of USA International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), 13-15 thousand of regular military forces would be enough for Georgia. But, in reverse, the number of regular military forces has been gradually increased and at the end of 2007 reached 32 thousand. Expenditures for the military needs also have risen and now it takes the biggest part of budget. In the fall of 2007 Georgia's parliament passed initiative to increase the number of military forces by an additional 2.5 thousand soldiers. Since for NATO membership the quality of military forces is more vital that quantity, such a sharp rise in military forces without any doubts signalled that Georgia is ready to resolve frozen conflicts as fast as possible, not rejecting even military means.
- Third, Saakashvili's regime made clear distinction between *de facto* regimes of breakaway regions and inhabitants of the regions. So, the pressure has been made only on separatist regimes, at the same time inhabitants have been treated as citizens of Georgia.
- Fourth, in the search for effectiveness, there was an attempt to increase international involvement. One of the major tasks in the process of regulating frozen conflicts became the internationalization of formats of conflict resolution. Unfortunately, the task of internationalization of

²⁶ RFE/RL, Fuller L. and Giragosian, R., Georgia: what is behind expansion of armed forces?, 2007 09 19, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1078720.html.

the formats was not fulfilled, because any change in the format must be accepted unanimously. This means, that both Russia and separatist regions must accept the change in format, and this never happened. Nevertheless, in other spheres the efforts to increase international involvement gave results: the EU became the biggest financial donor in Abkhazia, peacekeepers in Abkhazia are monitored by UN (Geneva process), in South Ossetia OSCE is monitoring, how cease-fire regime is being implemented.

But, even with the presence of huge efforts from Georgia, the process of the regulation of frozen conflicts stays deeply frozen too. What it is more important, breakaway regions get more and more distant from Georgia. On the other hand, unsuccessful efforts of Georgia to normalize the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia gave Moscow a chance to interfere into internal politics of Georgia and to increase bilateral tension.

It could be said, that the situation created irresolvable strategic contradiction for Georgia: the more Georgia strived towards NATO, the more Russia increased tensions between Georgia on the one side, and breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the other side, and the more deep *de facto* integration of these regions into Russia took place. At the same time sceptics of Georgia's NATO membership have stated that Georgia could become the member of Alliance only after the restoration of territorial integrity. But the decrease in Georgia's aspirations for NATO membership could create favourable conditions for Russia to increase its influence in Georgia and in the long run, it could disrupt all plans of Georgia to become the part of the Alliance.

The decision of Georgia to improve the situation by the radical means in August 2008 could be inspired by political desperation: Saakashvili saw that political means were helpless both in trying to resolve separatist conflicts and in changing the opinion of NATO members, doubting of the possibility for Georgia's NATO membership. It makes no difference who would be named the initiator of military actions, political situation after August 2008 significantly differed from the situation in April 2008.

4. Promise of NATO Membership and Challenges for Georgia's Democracy

4.1. Lithuania – Advocate for Georgia's NATO Membership

Lithuania, which is a small state and also faces the security dilemmas of the small states, has actively supported Georgia's security strategy from the very beginning. The same way as Georgia, but much earlier, Lithuania chose security strategy of alliance with great power and has successfully implemented it.

Lithuania's NATO membership became "the story of success", how a small state during relatively short period of time can transform its security systems and make integrate into Alliance. Lithuania's story strengthened the desire of newly-formed pro-Western regime of Georgia to follow the same framework and to strive for NATO membership. These intentions were strongly supported by Lithuania. What is more, Lithuania became the main advocate for Georgia's NATO membership in the Alliance.

On 14th of October 2004, during the official visit of Saakashvili in Lithuania, a Joint declaration on regional cooperation and support for European and Euro-Atlantic integration was signed, in which Lithuania took an obligation to support Georgia's efforts for European and Euro-Atlantic integration and to provide assistance in the sphere of internal reforms.²⁷ From this time a big number of bilateral and multilateral agreements and declarations were signed, in which clear support of Lithuania for Georgia's NATO membership is present. Lithuania has supported Georgia's efforts to transform its military and security system not only in political level, but also - by the help of practical actions. On the 8th of February 2001 Lithuania and Georgia signed a bilateral agreement on cooperation in defence (military) sphere. Ministers of the defence on both sides of the agreement are meeting annually to discuss the main issues of the cooperation.

As declared in the reports of ministry of defence of Lithuania, practical cooperation is concentrated in the sphere of education of soldiers: officers of Georgia are taught in Lithuanian military academy and in Baltic Defence College at the expenses of Lithuania. What is more, specialists from Lithuania consult Georgia on the issues of public relations, in the spheres of logistics, standardisation and codification, shares experience in the sphere of introduction of new communication standards. Also, representatives of military forces of Georgia are being invited to observe military trainings in Lithuania and to also take part in traineeships in the sphere of defence planning and protocol. Since the spring of 2006, Lithuania has nominated a special advisor for the issues of preparation Georgia's Membership action plan (proto MAP).²⁸

It is not surprising, that representatives of Lithuania were among the most active members, who supported the initiative of USA to grant MAP for Georgia and the Ukraine during the summit of heads of NATO in Bucharest in April 2008. The President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus was actively involved in search for a compromise and contributed to the fact, that a phrase without precedent about the future prospects for NATO membership of Georgia and Ukraine was involved in final declaration.²⁹ In the final declaration, the heads

²⁷ Lietuvos Respublikos užsienio reikalų ministerija. Lietuvos ryšiai su Gruzija, http://www.urm.lt/index. php?-1615992752, 2008 10 04.

²⁸ Lietuvos Respublikos krašto apsaugos ministerija. Bendradarbiavimas su ne NATO šalimis. http://www.kam.lt/accessibility/index.php/lt/144572/.

²⁹ Lietuvos Respublikos Prezidento spaudos tarnyba, "Atėjo laikas čia ir dabar pakviesti Gruziją ir Ukrainą pradėti įgyvendinti NATO Narystės veiksmų planą", - sako Prezidentas V.Adamkus Šiaurės Atlanto Tarybos Viršūnių susitikime, 2008 04 03, http://www.president.lt/lt/news.full/8919.

of Alliance stated that the membership of Georgia and Ukraine in Alliance is the question of time. Nevertheless, the decision, whether to grant the states with MAP, was delayed. The nearest date, when such a decision could be taken, was the summit of foreign ministers of NATO in December 2008.³⁰ During the summit in Bucharest, one more condition for Georgia to get MAP was named – commitment to preserve principles of democracy during the parliamentary elections in May 2008.

4.2. Promise for NATO Membership in the Context of Unresolved Dilemmas

During the NATO summit in Bucharest, differences between the positions of NATO members on the question of Georgia's and Ukraine's NATO membership became especially visible. USA, together with the closest allies Britons, Poles and representatives from Baltic States, obviously protected the possibility for Georgia and Ukraine to receive MAP as soon as possible. At the same time the heads of France, Germany and Italy, who are traditionally avoiding irritating Moscow, claimed, that it would be fair to consider interests of Russia this time and not to be in a hurry with giving NATO membership promises to Georgia and Ukraine. It was clear even before the Bucharest summit that it will be not easy to find compromise between those two opposing positions.

Sceptics of the quick granting of MAP to Georgia and Ukraine had enough arguments. Lack of stability in internal politics, sharp division in society and low support for the NATO membership were named as the biggest shortcomings of the Ukraine. The most essential shortcoming of Georgia was considered inability to resolve territorial conflicts in peaceful way.³¹

Trust in Georgia was decreased also because of the political crisis, which took place at the end of 2007, during which president Sakashvili made international community to doubt on his faithfulness for democracy. Protests of opposition, which took place in Georgia from September 2007 reached the peak in November, when police officers used force against the members of one protest action. This unrest encouraged Saakashvili to introduce a state of emergency. On the 7th of November, a state of emergency was introduced: political meetings and translations of non-state TV stations were forbidden.³² The president and his representatives tried to explain, that unrest could be initiated by Russia, and that the state of emergency was necessary, trying

³⁰ Bucharest Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e. html.

³¹ Rytų Geopolitikos studijų centras. "Kokį poveikį NATO viršūnių susitikime Bukarešte priimti sprendimai gali turėti geopolitiniams procesams Rytų erdvėje?", žr. *Rytų Pulsas*, Nr. 1 (3), 2008 04 04, http://www.rytugeopolitika.lt/multisites/rytugeopolitika/images/stories/rytu_pulsas13.pdf.

³² BBC, Georgia under state of emergency, 2007 11 08, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7083911.stm.

to keep stability in the state. But this time even the closest supporters of the Saakashvili regime – Americans – doubted the argument of the possible involvement of Russia in internal unrest of Georgia. Supporters of Georgia in international community, including Lithuania, were encouraging Saakashvili to respect principles of democracy and pointed, that presidential elections at the beginning of 2008 will be attentively observed.

Events at the end of 2007 disclosed controversial, but very effective in the past Saakashvili's tactics, how to maintain attention of the West. Bilateral tension between Georgia and Russia and permanent signals of threat, sent from Tbilisi, made allies of Georgia, especially – USA, "keep an eye" on the state. It can be said, that the escalation of tension matched interests of Georgia, and in some moments probably was even stimulated. Only being at the heart of tension or even balancing on the edge of the conflict, Georgia could hope for extraordinary attention of USA. Otherwise the USA, busy with conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, problems with Iran, could simply "forget" about Georgia.

Political crisis of the end of 2007 could lead international community to doubt the rationality of the heads of Georgia. Permanent emphasize of the threat of Russia, which was not always grounded, strengthened sceptical moods amongst NATO members. How events of August 2008 showed, Georgia has been very sensitive to the provocations from Russia, and the reaction chosen was probably inadequate.

One of the most important factors, increasing Georgia's attraction for the West, is the fact that Georgia distinguishes from the general context of South Caucasus as having very strong European identity. If Armenia, in a lesser extent – Azerbaijan, shows aspirations to be considered as belonging to Europe, at the same time Georgia demonstrates clear and strong European identity and desire to integrate in European structures. The identity of Georgia serves as some kind of Guarantee for the West, that the state will not easily shift towards alliance with other great power (for example, Russia) and that "political investment" of the West to Georgia would not be easily eliminated.

In recent years Georgia made sufficient progress in the sphere of military reforms (shift from IPAP toward intensive dialogue witnesses about it). The biggest efforts in reforming military forces were directed to meet the standards of NATO, especially – in the sphere of international crisis management. On the other hand, it weakened Georgia's readiness to perform territorial defence or the ability to take part in a wide-range conventional war. The war with Russia raised some doubts, whether the direction of the reformation of military sector has been chosen rationally and, even more, whether this direction is suitable for such a state like Georgia. Only small professional army was left inside the country, when the main part of military forces served outside the borders

³³ REUTERS, U.S. says doubts Russia involved in Georgia strife, 2007 11 13, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL1367375720071113.

³⁴ Tsisikarishvili S., "On the Southern Caucasus' perspectives of becoming Euro-Caucasus" in *LithuanianF-foreign Policy Review*, No. 17, 2006, p. 144-151, 144-145.

of Georgia (in Iraq served 2,000 soldiers of Georgia). What is more, internal military forces in Georgia were based on reservists who passed only minimal military trainings. Matthew Bryza, assistant deputy of State Secretary of USA, stated that after the war with Russia Georgia probably should rethink the structure of the military forces.³⁵

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer during the visit in September 2008 emphasized, that the way to NATO is still open for Georgia, but further reforms are necessary. Sheffer reminded for Georgia's authorities both parliamentary elections, which were not without frauds and slow the way to democracy.³⁶

Russian-Georgian conflict, which broke out in August 2008, has raised many concerns for the West, but also raised a big number of issues, concerning the future of the security of Georgia. The states of NATO countered the dilemma: to surrender the moral pressure of Georgia and to admit the state to NATO as soon as possible, and, as a consequence – to take the responsibility for "hot" conflict in South Ossetia, or not to hurry, providing Georgia security guarantees, but at the same time to show indirectly, that Russia this time was able to block decision on the expansion of NATO.

4.3. Paradoxes of the Risky Strategy

After the summit in Bucharest and the promise for future NATO membership, given to Georgia and Ukraine, tensions between Georgia and Russia started to rise. But it is worth to mention that rise of tension between those two neighbours is nothing new (embargo for Georgian wine and mineral water in 2006, scandal of spies in 2007 in Russia's embassy in Georgia). Even more, high tensions in bilateral relations in the past few years became a norm. So this time nobody expected anything extraordinary.

In August 2008, Sakashvili decided to take serious steps to restore territorial integrity of the state and for this reason, introduced military forces to South Ossetia. Now it seems that Russia was waiting for such a decision from the side of Georgia. After this, Russia tried to make view of the "operative reaction", and introduced its own military forces, which had been accumulated for some time already. According to the opinion of military experts, if Russia was truly reacting to the moves of Georgia, counterattacks would have taken place much later, because Russian troops and military equipment could reach South Ossetia only through Roki tunnel.

Military actions between Russia and Georgia started on the 8^{th} of August and lasted till the 22^{nd} of the same month. Nevertheless Russia was stating

³⁵ Eurasia Insight, Kucera J., Georgia: US Congress approves reconstruction aid package for Georgia, 30 09 2008, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav093008b.shtml, 05 10 2008.

³⁶ Eurasia Insight, Lomsadze, G., *NATO to Georgia: membership road still "open", but reform needed*, 2008 09 16, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav091608f.shtml.

that it was only defending its citizens in the region, however the actions showed that it was a war against Georgia. From the very beginning, Russia had two opportunities to respond to the actions of Georgia: to push back military forces of Georgia from the territory of South Ossetia (it could be considered as a protection of citizens), or to spread military actions in all the territory of Georgia (this is how it actually behaved). Russia's actions gave real grounds to accuse Russia of war against sovereign state.³⁷ The war was useful for Russia for several reasons:

- Russia was seeking to frighten both the ruling regime of Georgia and society by showing what happens when the interests of Russia are ignored.
- Russia sought to destroy the military and economic infrastructure of Georgia (in the time of military actions, Senaki military base, Poti port, part of important railroad links were fully destroyed).
- Russia sought to demonstrate, that Georgia is an unstable state, in which development of economic or other wide-range projects is too risky. Assumed or real, bombing of an oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyahn had to frighten potential investors and to deter them from further development of Russia-bypassing projects (for example, gas pipeline Nabucco).

Military actions were stopped by the mediation of the president of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, who offered the so-called six-point plan. The President of France stated that the main goal for Europe was to stop military actions as soon as possible, not to search for a guilty side or to punish Russia for the use of force. Nevertheless, after the end of military actions, representatives of the West (for example, Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel) emphasized, that recent military actions do not close the door for Georgia to enter NATO. These declarations could be evaluated as: (a) a clear decision to fasten the process of admission of Georgia to NATO; or (b) as signal to Russia that it can not alter the agenda of Alliance or have "veto" right in the questions of expansion of NATO.

Nevertheless, when the tension decreased, in the West the declarations on future NATO membership of Georgia became more cautious and even the question about Georgia's responsibility for the August events was raised.

Promises of a NATO membership, given to Georgia in Bucharest, had to calm down Georgia. But later events, which reached their culmination in August, showed that the promise of membership was just the opposite, it stressed Georgia even more. Georgia interpreted this promise not as the evaluation of the country's efforts, but as a clear signal that without rapid restoration of territorial integrity, Georgia will not enter the alliance. We should remember that representatives of Georgia were going to Bucharest to sign MAP, not to listen to abstract promises on even more abstract perspectives. The famous

³⁷ Emerson M., *Post-mortem on Europe's first war of 21st century*, Centre for European Policy Studies, Policy brief No. 167, August 2008, p. 1.

formulation, which both for the West and for Russia sounded as very brave and unprecedented declaration, for Georgia was the great loss.

As it has been mentioned already, the security strategy of Georgia is not grounded, because the level of security guarantees is being missed. The more aspirations increase, the more "vacuum" of security guarantees is seen. Radical steps of Georgia can be explained by the existence of such a "vacuum": Georgia has already used all the leverages in relations with NATO (geopolitical position, European identity), so it is impossible to gain more influence in relations with the Alliance from the side of Georgia. So, in such a situation it is vital for Georgia to gain any security guarantees or to revise all the security strategy.

One more factor, which perhaps had influence for the decision of Georgia to use military force for resolving of frozen conflicts, was the presidential elections in USA. The victory of the candidate of Democrats, Barack Obama, was very possible. If Obama would come to White House, Georgia could wait the cut in financial aid from USA. Financial aid is necessary for Georgia to proceed military and other reforms, because the state itself has very few of its own resources. So, these tendencies made Georgia raise the task of getting MAP before the end of 2008.

The situation became even more complicated after Russia *de jure* recognized separatist Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On the one hand, Russia got the right to keep normal interstate relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Georgia does not face the problem of separatism anymore. On the other hand, the recognition of breakaway regions has not gained international support and has not caused a "domino" effect, and the international community is treating Abkhazia and South Ossetia as the regions of Georgia. So, in result, frozen conflicts in Georgia became even more frozen: earlier the issue of legal status of these regions was of primary importance, now the contradiction between actors of international community on evaluation of the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia worsens the situation. From the perspective of international law, this situation is much more complicated that before the recognition of breakaway regions: Russia cannot take back it's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the international community cannot step back from the principle, that these regions are integral part of Georgia.

But *de facto* situation can be interpreted much easier. Both the West and Georgia understand that Tbilisi has no possibility to return to Abkhazia and South Ossetia anymore. It can be seen as a new possibility not to waste energy on resolution of hopeless conflicts, but to concentrate the efforts towards the preparation for NATO membership. Looking from the perspective of Tbilisi, the present situation has solved the dilemma of Georgia, although in a very painful way, and left only one opportunity – to seek for NATO security guarantees and to become NATO member, although without Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Nevertheless the situation formed by itself, it does not leave any other opportunity for Georgia.

Conclusions

As it has been mentioned before, alliance security strategy is a special one because it provides very clear benchmarks for foreign policy and security policy and leads to the formation of a strong relationship between small state and great power as a "supplier of security". The biggest shortcoming of an alliance security strategy is the absence of alternatives. When a small state finds itself in such a difficult security situation as Georgia today, the only possibility left is the implementation of foreign and security policy, designed according to destinations chosen and the goals raised. Now Georgia can only wait for the decision from the side of NATO. Nevertheless, this decision should be guite rapid, because Georgia can not base its security strategy only on aspirations. If NATO will decide to provide Georgia with security guarantees, it will be possible to say, that Georgia has reached its goal to establish strong alliance relationships with Western powers (first – with the USA) at any expense. In the case of negative answer from NATO or the decision to delay the question of Georgia's membership for indefinite period of time, it would mean the need for Georgia to reshape its security strategy. Unfortunately, at the end of 2008 the last scenario seems more possible, because the summit of foreign ministers of NATO in December showed that there are even more doubts on Georgia's membership now than before the events of August.

The internal situation of Georgia is also a very important factor. It is not worth forgetting that changes in security strategy can be projected by the new authority of Georgia already. If Saakashvili will fail to fulfil the promise to ensure the security of the state through NATO membership, his regime may totally loose support in society.

A result of the events in Georgia deepened dilemmas of NATO and widened the cleavage between the members of Alliance even more that before. On the one hand, Russia's actions in Georgia should intensify the process of NATO expansion, trying not to upset membership seeking countries. On the other hand, NATO should be the guarantee of security and stability in the international arena. Georgia's case showed, that the expansion of Alliance could lead to the new wave of conflicts (for example, problem of Crimea in Ukraine), what would discredit the whole Alliance.

The decision of Russia to go to war with Georgia and to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia withdraws the possibility for Russia to manipulate the "card" of frozen conflicts anymore. It was thought that unresolved separatist conflicts are the strongest leverage or Russia to block the expansion of NATO. For now Russia also has no leverages to influence NATO policy anymore and has only to wait for the decision of NATO on the future membership of Georgia and Ukraine. What is more important, Russia showed itself as unreliable actor of international community and increased the level of tension in relations with USA. Looking globally the decision to go to war with Georgia made Russia choose a narrower way, leading to confrontation with the West. This can lead

to dangerous international isolation and unpredictable aggressiveness. Is Georgia's NATO membership worth such a high price? For Moscow maybe yes. Foreign and security policy in Russia has been evaluated by the narrow geopolitical aspect, so any loss in Georgia or Ukraine can be taken as the signs of fall of great power in Moscow.

Both Georgia and Russia have chosen a risky strategy, which widely restricted their own possibilities to change anything in the nearest future in the question of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At the same time such choices of Tbilisi and Moscow leave no other possibility for NATO as only to act radically. Having in mind, that all the decisions of NATO has to be taken unanimously, the probability, that consensus will be found on more moderate decision, remain very high. Nevertheless this decision that might be called as a moderate one at the moment in the nearest future can appear as a critical hesitation.

To sum it up, the clear choice of Georgia to become a member of NATO, even scarifying possibilities to restore territorial integrity, is not sufficient to guarantee the security of Georgia. Only strong aspirations of Georgia are not enough to convince all the members of Alliance that Georgia is worth to be the member of NATO. Georgia's tactics to increase geopolitical importance of the state and by such a way to keep permanent attention of the West (especially – of the USA) reached it's culmination in August 2008. But at the same time, such tactics created the image of Georgia as an unpredictable and unreliable country. Nevertheless Georgia *de facto* has lost the opportunities to return back breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the great risk that NATO would not be willing to take the responsibility for the Georgia's security ever has not been eliminated.

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National Security Issues

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The Lithuanian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan – Achievements and Challenges

The author who from November 2006 to May 2007 commanded the Lithuanian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan's Ghor Province discusses PRT achievements and challenges. The article provides information on the PRT mission, organization, tasks and the ways to implement them. It is recognized that the PRT is given a mission that requires efforts in the stabilization and reconstruction areas. While outlining the main challenges – the small number of troops, inadequate counternarcotics effort, the gap between stability and reconstruction, low capacity of the Government of Afghanistan – it is suggested that the PRT has achieved significant results in a stabilization area while achievements in the reconstruction domain are not so impressive. In order to be successful, the PRT needs to focus mostly on stabilization tasks involving local authorities and other partners while looking for larger international donors who could focus on reconstruction.

Introduction

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., the USA and the UK initiated attacks on Al Qaeda and its leader Osama Bin Laden who were granted refuge by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. As a result the Taliban regime fell and the country, after almost three decades of wars, found itself in a complex and complicated situation. There was no government left in the country. The economy was in ruins. Education system was almost non-existent. It was obvious that international assistance was required in order to establish governance, ensure security and rebuild the country. Initially international support was defined by the Bonn agreement. This agreement requested the international community to deploy a UN mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in order to

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assist the Government of Afghanistan ensuring security in and around Kabul with a further perspective to expand to other areas as required.¹

Initially ISAF consisted of a coalition of nations that were willing to contribute to the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan. In August 2003 NATO took over the responsibility for ISAF. The expansion of ISAF area of responsibility outside Kabul started immediately. The ISAF expansion process consisted of four phases with NATO taking responsibility of the northern, western, southern and eastern regions of the country. As part of Phase 2 ISAF expansion when NATO forces assumed responsibility over the western region in the summer 2005 Lithuania started her most significant deployment to international operations becoming the lead nation of PRT Chaghcharan in Ghor. Though purely numerically the Lithuanian contribution might not be considered significant it must be argued that qualitatively and complexity-wise it is a significant and challenging commitment for a small-size nation.

The mission of ISAF (the Lithuanian-led PRT Chaghcharan is a part of it) is to conduct military operations in the assigned area of operations in order to assist the Government of Afghanistan in the establishment and maintenance of a safe and secure environment with full engagement of Afghan National Security Forces², in order to extend government authority and influence, thereby facilitating Afghanistan's reconstruction and contributing to regional stability³.

The mission recognizes and emphasizes the primacy of security, which is supposed to be achieved by conducting military operations and fully engaging Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). It could be insisted that the ANSF needs to achieve at least initial operational capabilities in order to operate with ISAF forces. Security is intended to be a precondition for nation's reconstruction. ISAF activities are intended to promote the Government of Afghanistan, its authority and influence all over the country. The success is considered to be achieved by addressing these areas and having a well balanced approach towards them but maintaining and preserving the primacy of security.

The aim of this article is to overview the achievements of the Lithuanian-led PRT and to identify the challenges encountered in accomplishing the mission paying special attention to stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Initially, an overview of the operational environment is presented. After that, challenges are addressed along the lines outlined in the mission – security, reconstruction, and Government of Afghanistan promotion.

Though the Lithuanian military has participated in international operations since 1994, it is for the first time that Lithuania took responsibility of an operational area. Before that units and soldiers were deployed as part of other nations' bigger units that were responsible for an operational area.

¹ Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, December 5, 2001, http://www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn. htm, 25 08 2008.

² Abbreviated as ANSF.

³ International Security Assistance Force, September 01, 2008, http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf placemat.pdf, 01 09 2008.

The Lithuanian military also carries out tasks that require close interaction with members of other governmental agencies. This interaction is crucial as it contributes to the success of the operation. It must be recognized that this unique operational experience generated numerous observations and lessons. The Lithuanian-led PRT Chaghcharan in Ghor possesses a great potential for research and analysis. The PRT could be discussed and analyzed from various perspectives. It might be extremely rewarding to discuss how the decision to initiate this operation was made. Additionally consultations and interaction with the nations that later deployed their troops to the PRT might be a topic of interest. It might also be valuable to address the significance of this operation for the ongoing transformation of the Lithuanian military. But the author while expressing only his personal views chooses to leave these topics for further analysis and not to be part of this article focusing on PRT's contribution to stabilization and reconstruction.

Environment

The operational environment for the Lithuanian-led PRT is extremely unusual and very challenging. Ghor is an area possessing physical and political characteristics that are strange for international personnel operating there. It takes time to adapt oneself to the conditions. It takes even more time to become familiar with and understand intricacies of Afghan people and politics.

1.1. Physical Environment

The Ghor province is located in the central western part of Afghanistan. Chaghcharan, province's capital, is located between the two Afghan major cities. It lays approximately 350 kilometers East of Herat and 400 kilometers West of Kabul. While the distances are not so large physically there are factors that make the both cities almost inaccessible for the people of the province. The roads to the either cities from Ghor are almost nonexistent. Abundant snow stops any land travel outside the province. The way to get into and out of the province during most of the year is by air only.

The province is located high in the Hindu Kush Mountains. Temperatures range from extreme high to extreme low (see Table 1). High altitudes and extreme temperatures even more complicate the life in the province.

Temperature	-40 - +40°C
Altitude	2,000 – 4,000 m
Administrative subdivision	10 districts
Population	585,900¹
Size	36,657 km ² ; 5.67 % of Afghanistan's territory ²
Ethnic groups	Tajik - 58 %; Hazara - 39 %; Pashtun - 3 % ³
Religious Groups	Suni – 70 %; Shia – 30 % ⁴

Table 1. Physical Features of the Ghor Province

Despite the fact that the province is a home for three ethnic groups as well as Shia and Suni sects (see Table 1) no conflicts due to belonging to different ethnic groups or different Muslim sects in Ghor were observed. All the clashes recorded in the province are due to other reasons – mostly because of disputed land ownership or unresolved inter-tribal conflicts.

The province covers a territory, which is over half the territory of Lithuania and is subdivided into 10 districts. It is noteworthy to observe that the boundaries between the districts in the official maps do not coincide with the boundaries that really exist in the minds of local people. Some of the boundaries on maps separate tribes but in practice the people and provincial officials do not recognize these divisions and consider the boundaries that do not separate tribe areas. A similar phenomenon could be observed with the provincial boundaries. One could often hear provincial officials saying that there are no Pashtuns in the southern part of the province. When reminded of the areas in the province inhabited by Pashtuns they would repeatedly insist that these areas are outside the province.

The province is one of the poorest provinces in Afghanistan. Most of the people rely on subsistence farming, which depends on favourable weather conditions. The amount of snow or rain might significantly affect most of the provincial population.

1.2. Political Environment

In the aftermath of the Taliban regime collapse, Afghanistan did not have any governance system. Currently it is being developed.

The highest government official in the province is the Governor (see Table 2). He is appointed by the President of Afghanistan and formally works for the Minister of Interior and is responsible for coordination of governmental organizations' activities in the province. The Lithuanian-led PRT works with a second governor. Both of them are not originally from the province. They have totally different personalities but what they have in common is a strong desire to take their responsibilities seriously and improve life in the province. Having in mind that Ghor is not an attractive place for government officials to work in, the Government succeeded in finding these two qualified public servants as provincial governors.

2001-2004 Dr. Ibrahim Malekzada		Dr. Ibrahim Malekzada
	2004-2005	Abdul Qadir Alam
2005-2007 Shah Abdul Ahad Afzali		Shah Abdul Ahad Afzali
	since 2007	Baz Mohammad Ahmadi ⁵

Table 2. Post-Taliban Governors of the Ghor Province

While the Governors changed, the Deputy Governor has remained the same since June 2005 ensuring continuity. Due to the fact that he is a native of Ghor he provides local knowledge and expertise.

Provincial administration has 25 departments. They do not formally report to the Provincial Governor and talk only to their respective Ministries. Governors need to be skilful managers to direct provincial department activities towards a coordinated effort. The department staffs have a large number of employees but only very few of them possess the needed qualifications. As a result of such low capacity they cannot deliver. Most of them occupy their positions not because they possess necessary qualifications but as a result of inter-tribal deals. In June 2004, warlords and tribal chiefs started a war over power when one of them was not satisfied with the results of their negotiations. It is no surprise that their decisions are influenced by their tribal loyalties. It could be argued that employees who are not originally from the province, and are not bound by the local tribal loyalties, can better represent public interest.

Due to a very low provincial officials' administrative capacity, the PRT makes an effort to build and increase it. It is one of the ways to empower local officials to manage provincial affairs more effectively.

The provincial Afghan National Police (ANP) – the biggest and most visible security organization in the province – is in a developing phase. It has approximately 750 men. About 60 % of them are recruited from 2 tribes. The PRT pays a special attention to the police that they acquire required capabilities and receive needed equipment. It could be suggested that despite all the efforts the police remain mostly weak and only partially effective. It is a long way till they develop into a trusted police force that is able and willing to accomplish their tasks. The provincial organization of the National Directorate for Security (NDS) is more developed but lacks equipment and suffers from shortage of trained employees.

Ten district administrations in the Ghor Province mirror the provincial administration, but they cannot deliver as they even more suffer from the lack of qualified personnel and competing tribal interests.

The security situation in the Ghor province, despite relatively rare inci-

⁴ Amir Shah, 10 Die As Warlords Overrun Afghan Town, June 18, 2004, http://nucnews.net/nucnews/2004nn/0406nn/040618nn.htm#300, 22 08 2008.

dents when compared to other regions of Afghanistan, is very good.⁵ Despite this the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) with PRT support has a challenge to prevent a spill-over of instability and insecurity from the neighbouring instable Farah, Helmand and Oruzgan provinces.

2. Lithuanian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team

2.1. Mission

The mission of the Provincial Reconstruction Team is to assist the Provincial administration in establishing a stable and secure environment in order to foster reconstruction. As it was the case with the ISAF, the PRT mission emphasizes the primacy of stability and security. A stable and secure environment is recognized to be a precondition for further reconstruction efforts.

Elements of stabilization and reconstruction are a part of the PRT mission statement. In the context of a stabilization and reconstruction discussion stabilization is defined as "the effort to create a secure and stable environment and to provide for the basic human needs of the population to include food, water, sanitation, and shelter." Reconstruction is considered to be "the effort to create a stable and self-governing polity by establishing the rule of law, rehabilitating the economy, and otherwise improving the welfare of the people."

2.2. Organization

The first PRT in Afghanistan was established by the USA in February 2003 in Gardez, located in the eastern part of Afghanistan. Since then there have been established 25 more PRTs by a number of nations – Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand,

US Department of Defense Report (U.S. Department of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Stability and Security in Afghanistan: Report to Congress in Accordance to 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181)*, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/Report_on_Progress_toward_Security_and_Stability_in_Afghanistan_1230.pdf, 23 08 2008) classifies the Ghor province as one of the 14 of the 34 Afghanistan provinces where less than 20 kinetic attacks took place during the period of 01 January 2007 and 08 March 2008 (p. 11). For the sake of comparison it could be mentioned that there were 500-2500 kinetic attacks, i.e. 25-125 times more than in the category which Ghor belongs to, in the provinces of Helmand, Kunar, Kanahahar and Paktika during the same period. The Ghor province witnessed only 3 security incidents during 2007 (see *Ghor Provincial Overview: Updated October 23, 2008*, p. 1, http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Ghor/Ghor Provincial Overview.pdf, 12 11 2008).

Watson, B. G., Reshaping the Expeditionary Army to Win Decisively: The Case for Greater Stabilization Capacity in the Modular Force, Carlisle, PA.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005, p. 7, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB621.pdf, 01 10 2008.

Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and UK.⁷ The situation in their respective areas varied significantly. As a result every nation had different approach to the organization and operations of this non-doctrinal organization from the military point of view. PRTs are exclusively task-organized units established to accomplish tasks in Afghanistan.

PRT Chaghcharan has two distinct parts – military and civilian (see Figure 1). Command and control, patrol/manoeuvre, security, support and logistics elements make the military part of the PRT. The civilian part of the organization is comprised of individual representatives of various governmental agencies.




Figure 1. Organization of PRT Chaghcharan⁸

The Lithuanian-led PRT excelled in a number of areas that allowed it operate effectively. The first and the most important feature of PRT Chaghcharan is the presence of a large number of civilians. In this respect the Lithuanian-led PRT significantly differs from other PRTs. The presence of civilians in PRTs is a crucial element in accomplishing the mission as there are certain areas where the military do not possess required expertise. At various periods of time there were 9-12 civilians from 3 nations representing 7 governmental agencies (see Table 3). Such an array of expertise seriously contributes to the military effort assisting the provincial administration to create a stable and secure environment.

⁷ International Security Assistance Force, September 01, 2008, http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf placemat.pdf, 01 09 2008...

⁸ The organizational elements listed in Figure 1 do not outline the structure of the PRT. They are rather logical organizational elements than structural ones.

Table 3. Civilian Members of PRT Chaghcharan

Lithuania	Lithuanian civilian expertise resides in the Special Mission to Afghanistan. Among other tasks the Mission supports PRT activities. Chief of the Special Mission is a diplomat from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; a civil servant from the Ministry of Defence is the Deputy Chief and political adviser; development adviser; 2 policemen (in 2007 they joined the European Union's Police Mission to Afghanistan).
Iceland	2 development advisers from the Icelandic Crisis Response Unit (left PRT in 2008).
USA	A diplomat and a representative of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); ANP mentors.

Presence of military and civilians in one organization in an operational area is a great challenge both for the military and civilians. It is in rare cases when such a combination could be observed on operations. Neither civilians nor military are used to operating together. Neither have proper training for cooperation. During pre-deployment training the military usually does not meet their civilian counterparts. The military and civilians possess totally different organizational and working cultures. As a result, friction could be expected. Civilians and military need to have at least part of pre-deployment training together and meet each other before the deployment. When deployed the military and civilians need to spend extra time to develop a common understanding of the tasks and activities. It is not easy but at the end of the day it pays off. With only minor exceptions civilians and military must conduct planning, preparations and execution of tasks together. There should be a clear understanding who is in the lead and who is in support of a specific activity. Trust and mutual understanding are the preconditions for effective cooperation.

Another feature that the Lithuanian-led PRT excelled and utilizes to its advantage is multi-nationality. The military part of the organization benefits from the soldiers of various nations utilizing their strengths. In the beginning of the operation the PRT had soldiers from Denmark, Iceland⁹, Lithuania and the USA. Later the PRT was joined by Croatian, Georgian and Ukrainian military personnel while Iceland withdrew her service members.

⁹ Icelandic personnel were not military. They were members of Iceland's Crisis Response Units who were able to conduct military/paramilitary tasks in a relatively safe and secure environment.

2.3. Tasks

In order to accomplish its mission, the PRT maintains regular contacts with the Provincial authorities attending formal and informal foray to assist enhancing security and develop local capacity. Here the civilian-military nature of the PRT proves its utility. The military are usually in the lead of preparing for and participating in Provincial Security Council and Provincial Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) Council meetings while civilians take responsibility of Provincial Development Council (PDC) meetings. The military utilize these activities mostly to contribute to the stabilization effort by assisting local authorities to address security issues. Civilian members are more focused on reconstruction but it might be argued that their efforts still fall under stabilization since what they do in this area is meant to ensure that basic human needs are met.

Training and mentoring ANP and developing their capabilities are the ways to establish Afghan capacity to ensure initially security and stability and later law and order. It is without a doubt that while accomplishing these tasks the PRT contributes to stabilization. The ANP currently is not a usual police organization. They are considered to be one more organization to counter Taliban. It remains mostly weak and only partially effective. Engaging ANP and developing its capabilities must remain a high priority among other PRT activities. The PRT with the assistance of US and EUPOL mentors must continue to train and mentor ANP and conduct operations together with them. A capable and willing ANP force must comprise a part of an exit strategy.

Supporting the DIAG process is another important PRT activity. This activity is part of the stabilization effort. After almost three decades of wars the Afghan society is abundant with a large numbers of weapons. The focus of the DIAG is to convince the individuals who have the potential to compete with provincial authorities to become or remain loyal to the legitimate authorities. The weapons are not the biggest issue. The problem is the people who might seek to base their power and influence on illegitimate use of weapons. Supporting the DIAG process requires plenty of time spent convincing people to be loyal to the legitimate authorities. As a supplementary activity weapons should be collected or properly registered. Numbers of collected and registered weapons demonstrate population's trust in stability of the current situation. In Ghor the success in the DIAG process suffers from inadequate attention of the GOA and under-funding.

Engaging International Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations (IOs/NGOs) is very important in order to become updated on their reconstruction and development efforts and avoid duplication. This activity is a clear contribution to the reconstruction effort. PRT civilian members are extremely helpful in coordinating with IOs/NGOs. Their presence in the province and cooperation is considered as a testimony of a good security situation. Expectedly their numbers will eventually increase with the intensified activities of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) Field Office in Chaghcharan.

The PRT plans, prepares and implements various reconstruction projects. These projects are on the junction between the stabilization and reconstruction effort as they are meant to contribute to a secure and stable environment, provide for basic human needs and partially create a self-governing polity.

Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are conducted in support of military operations. They are meant to address the immediate interest of a PRT commander and allow him operate with fewer constraints. Not much preparation is required to implement QIPs. The projects are planned and implemented mostly by PRT CIMIC personnel. QIPs fall under the category of stabilization activities as they directly contribute to the establishment of a secure and stable environment.

PRT civilian members possess funds to implement larger projects. These projects cover a longer perspective and are meant to ensure mid-term stability. They require more time and efforts to plan, prepare and implement. Civilian development advisers are in the lead. The enduring effects of the projects depend on a number of factors. Knowledge of the area, technical expertise, planning capacity and Afghan involvement are some of the factors that determine the staying effect of the projects. Disregarding any of them will reduce effort effectiveness. If properly implemented larger projects are supposed to fall under the category of reconstruction effort in a limited location. It could not be classified as a project that contributes to a reconstruction effort since it still mostly addresses security issues and is meant to win local people's hearts and minds and prevent adversaries to exploit people's dissatisfaction with lack of improvement.

Very large projects that have a long term impact and are meant to be part of a reconstruction effort are implemented by IOs/NGOs that have ample financial means. In this case preparation takes more time. PRT Chaghchran does not possess the required means or expertise to plan, prepare and implement these type of projects. The PRT can contribute to very large projects with local area knowledge and other required expertise.

It is of utmost importance that any reconstruction activity adheres to the following principles:

- Ownership (build on the leadership, participation, and commitment of a country and its people);
- Capacity building (strengthen local institutions, transfer technical skills, and promote appropriate policies);
- Sustainability (design programs to ensure their impact endures);
- Selectivity (allocate resources based on need, local commitment, and foreign policy interests);
- Assessment (conduct careful research, adapt best practices, and design for local conditions);
- Results (direct resources to achieve clearly defined, measurable, and strategically focused objectives);
- Partnership (collaborate with government, communities, donors, non-

- profit organizations, the private sector, international organizations, and universities);
- Flexibility (adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of opportunities, and maximize efficiency);
- Accountability (design accountability and transparency and build effective checks and balances to guard against corruption).

The Lithuanian-led PRT has an outstanding example where most of the mentioned principles were applied. As a result, the project significantly contributed to the stabilization effort in the Ghor province and reconstruction in a limited location. The Lithuanian Special Mission had funds to construct a number of small hydro-power plants. Site surveys were conducted in order to determine the locations suitable for power plants. A project description was developed which stated that Lithuania would buy all the required hardware and pay qualified personnel to supervise construction of a power plant and install the equipment. Local labour was required to construct a power plant and provide construction materials. The project also stated that the contractor was supposed to train two people to conduct user maintenance of the equipment. The project description required the local community development council (CDC) to determine who would receive electricity. After that the Provincial Development Council (PDC) was approached in order to receive their opinion what locations could be considered as a priority for them. Later identified local CDCs were contacted in order to receive their attitude towards the project. When CDC agreed to the project conditions and PDC made final decision the contractor was selected. A power plant was constructed using local labour and the contractor installing the required equipment.

As a result of this project one village in Ghor received electricity. Afghan ownership was ensured at least on three levels by a PDC decision, CDC decision and local people constructing the power plant. It was ensured that the people felt that it was their own power plant and that their contribution was essential. Local capacity was built on various levels. PDC became aware of the issues related to power plant. The provincial department of water and energy was involved in acting as secondary technical supervisors. The local CDC became more knowledgeable about power plant construction. Two men from the village acquired the needed skills to conduct user maintenance on the plant equipment.

It takes plenty of time and requires extra effort to go through all the steps in order to achieve multiple effects through a small project. It is much easier to contract others to build a power plant instead of having local people involved in receiving enough labour when required. It is much easier to decide by ourselves where to build a power plant. But had we done the things in an easy way we would not have achieved much. We might have even developed

Natsios A. S., "The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development", Parameters, Vol. XXXV, No. 3, 2005, p. 5-17.

a long-term dependency of the supported on our support. While it is easier it does not mean it is better.

Since PRTs usually do not possess significant financial resources they should be viewed as a platform for reconstruction. A PRT can assist IOs/NGOs or any other potential donor to implement large projects. A PRT can provide security and possesses knowledge of the area and provincial needs. It is one of the ways how a PRT could support transitioning from stabilization to reconstruction, which is as important as ensuring stability. A vacuum that might occur between the stability and reconstruction by being inconsistent or under-resourced could be a breeding ground for instability.

3. Challenges and the Way-Ahead

There are serious challenges for the Lithuanian-led PRT and ISAF that need to be addressed in order to move forward with consolidating stabilization results and transitioning to reconstruction. These challenges are directly related to the international efforts to make its Afghanistan strategy work.

3.1. Troop Numbers

Troop numbers have a direct impact on security situation in Afghanistan. It is one of the most significant factors in ensuring stability. The ISAF reportedly suffers from a lack of troops. ¹¹ Currently there are 53,000 NATO troops belonging to ISAF. Additionally there are 13,000 troops separately deployed on US-led Operation Enduring Freedom. Additionally there are 53,000 Afghan National Army (ANA) and 80,000 ANP personnel. ¹² ANA and ANP numbers must be taken with caution as they qualitatively cannot equal to NATO troop numbers. Both of them remain weak and only partially effective.

With these international troop numbers in Afghanistan, there is 1 international soldier per 618 local people or 1 international soldier per each 12.21 sq km. Compared with other stability operations (see Table 4) Afghan numbers do not look impressive. In previous stability operations there was 1 soldier per 50 (in Kosovo) to 375 (in Haiti) local people. Troop to area ratio ranged from 1 soldier per each 0.3 sq. km in Kosovo to 1 soldier per each 8 sq km in Liberia. This ratio worse than in Afghanistan was only in Somalia where there was 1 soldier per each 16 sq. km. It could be insisted that currently deployed troops are neither an appropriate nor adequate force to meet the objectives.

¹¹ Weitz R., "Post-Bucharest: NATO's Prospect in Afghanistan." *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, Vol.10, No. 8, 16 April 2008, p. 10-12, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4837, 20 08 2008.

¹² Katzman, K., Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008, p. CRS-39, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/108306.pdf, 26 08 2008.

Troop numbers are too low. ISAF is not an overwhelming force as defined by the Powel doctrine and practiced during deployments to the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991 and Bosnia in 1995-1996.¹³

Iahle 4	Comparison of Pa	eak International Tro	ons by Territor	v and Population ¹⁴

Location	Peak number of international troops	International troops per square kilometer	International troops per persons
Kosovo	40,000	1 per 0.3 sq. km	1 per 50
Bosnia	60,000	1 per 0.85 sq. km	1 per 66
East Timor	9,000	1 per 1.6 sq. km	1 per 111
Iraq	155,000	1 per 2.8 sq. km	1 per 161
Somalia	40,000	1 per 16.0 sq. km	1 per 200
Liberia	11,000; 22,000 (MEF ⁶)	1 per 8.0 sq. km	1 per 265
Sierra Leone	18,000	1 per 4.0 sq. km	1 per 300
Haiti	20,000	1 per 1.5 sq. km	1 per 375

Troop numbers remain mostly absolute without addressing force utility. The utility of the troops deployed in Afghanistan depends on how they are used and how they are equipped. The troops that are not ready for operations in Afghan conditions (especially without addressing a mobility challenge) do not contribute to the achievement of operational objectives. The units must be versed in Afghan culture. Without a significant cultural awareness block during pre-deployment training the troops might make the situation worse instead of improving it. The units that deploy to Afghanistan need to be the type of the units that are required there. Firstly and mostly, light infantry units with an augmented CIMIC capability are needed there. The units need to have the required equipment. Deploying extra troops without equipment is a waste of resources and a futile effort. Equipment must match the task and situation where they are supposed to operate. The equipment that might send a message of a too aggressive troop posture in a relatively benign environment is not the right equipment. It might unnecessarily escalate the situation and send a totally wrong message to the local people.

The troops that have significant and numerous national restrictions are of limited utility. National caveats reduce troop and critical equipment utility.

Shorter tours of duty in Afghanistan do not contribute to troop effectiveness. Different nations have different policies related to the length of tours of duty. Previous experiences and practices could not be fully applied here.

¹³ Cohen E. A., *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime*, New York: Free Press, 2002, p. 219.

¹⁴ Bhatia M., Lanigan K., Wilkinson P., Minimal Investments, Minimal Results – Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan: Briefing Paper, June 2004, p. 10, http://www.cmi.no/pdf/?file=/afghanistan/doc/AREU-Brief-2004-June-security.pdf, 29 08 2008.

It takes more time for NATO troops to become oriented and acquainted to the Afghan environment.

There are a number of aspects why troop numbers in Afghanistan are considered important. Historically the type of operations conducted in Afghanistan requires larger troop numbers than conventional military operations. Afghanistan is a very difficult terrain. To cover it adequately a larger number of troops are required. It could be suggested that the most important aspect related to troop numbers is local people's perception of our commitment to stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan. The local population must perceive NATO as a reliable and credible partner. Inadequate troop numbers and reduced utility do not contribute to the required perception. The troops that only provide base camp security or support operations inside base camps do not contribute to the creation of this perception either. If local people do not perceive our force as credible it will negatively affect our stabilization effort.

The number of Lithuanian-led PRT personnel might not look so impressive in absolute numbers. There are approximately 200 American, Croatian, Danish, Georgian, Lithuanian and Ukrainian soldiers. It makes troop to population ratio 1 soldier per 2,930 local people. It is almost 5 times lower than the international troop in Afghanistan average. The troop to area ratio is 1 soldier per 183.29 sq km which is 9 times lower than the average ratio for Afghanistan. But these are only absolute numbers. Having in mind force utility it could be argued that while not being an overwhelming force it is an adequate and appropriate force in the current situation. Lithuania and the other nations supporting ISAF efforts in Ghor could deploy the right mix of troops with required and adequate equipment and almost no national restrictions to conduct PRT operations in support of stabilization. PRT troops are visible in most of the areas of the province. They send the right message that NATO really cares about the province by committing adequate number of troops.

There might be one area to improve. Since PRTs contribute to stabilization efforts by assisting the Provincial authorities in establishing stable and secure environment it could be considered feasible and adequate to deploy Afghan troops in the province. They could be ANA or Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) units. They should be stationed in the districts that have the biggest potential of spill-over from the neighbouring unstable provinces like Farah and Helmand. Conducting training for these units and conducting joint operations with them would be in the spirit of the mission, demonstrate unity of effort of NATO troops and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and allow contribution to the stabilization effort.

3.2. Counternarcotics Effort

Narcotics are another factor that negatively influences the security situation in Afghanistan. ISAF is not authorized to conduct counternarcotics operations.

This restriction witnesses inconsistency in ISAF's stabilization effort.

The Post-Taliban era saw a tremendous growth of poppy cultivation and opium production in Afghanistan. The two phenomena – opium poppy cultivation and narcotics trafficking – almost non-existent during the Taliban rule re-emerged and gained ground after 2001. During the Taliban rule the areas used for opium poppy cultivation ranged between 54,000 hectares in 1995 and 8,000 hectares in 2001. Currently 193,000 hectares are used for poppy cultivation making Afghanistan the largest cultivator of poppies with up to 82% of global poppy cultivation. ¹⁶

One of the most alarming negative impacts of poppy cultivation and opium production is that drug trade became a way to secure funds for Taliban operations.

In January 2006 the GOA supported by the UK as a lead supporting nation in this area adopted the National Drug Control Strategy where the ways to deal with drugs for next 5 years are outlined. The aim of activities in this area is to secure a sustainable decrease in cultivation, production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs with a view to complete and sustainable elimination. The Strategy establishes national priorities in the counternarcotics activities.¹⁷

The counternarcotics efforts against poppy cultivation are subdivided into centrally directed eradication and governor-led eradication. The former is a GOA-led effort conducted in provinces that have largest poppy areas. The latter is a provincial effort to decrease poppy cultivation. The GOA in support of a centrally directed eradication could deploy a special eradication force. While conducting a governor-led eradication ANP is involved together with provincial official and local leaders. The effectiveness of poppy eradication is rather dubious as it develops farmers' negative attitude towards the government and widen Taliban recruitment base. Besides this counter-stabilization effect poppy eradication might also produce a counter-reconstruction effect by denying farmers a way to earn money.

The Ghor province is not considered a major cultivator of opium poppy. In 2007 there were 1,503 hectares used for poppy cultivation with a significant decrease from 2006 and 188 hectares of poppies eradicated.¹⁹ The tendency witnessed from the 2005-2006 growing season to the 2006-2007 season is that

United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime; Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Government of Afghanistan, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007 – Executive Summary, August 2007, New York: UNODC, 2007, p. 3, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFG07_ExSum_web.pdf, 30 08 2008.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 1.

¹⁷ Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *National Drug Control Strategy – An Updated Five-Year Strategy for Tackling the Illicit Drug Problem, January 2006*, Kabul: Ministry of Counter Narcottics, 2006, p. 17, http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf18/fco_nationaldrugcontrolstrategy, 25 08 2008.

¹⁸ Cordesman A., Losing the Afghan-Pakistan War? The Rising Threat, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008, p. 95, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080917_afghanthreat. pdf, 19 09 2008.

¹⁹ United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime; Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Government of Afghanistan, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007 – Executive Summary, August 2007, New York: UNODC, 2007, p. 6, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFG07_ExSum_web.pdf, 30 08 2008.

the percentage of arable land used for poppy cultivation decreased while the percentage of arable land used for other crops as wheat, vegetables and fruit increased or remained the same.²⁰ This is the reason why a centrally directed eradication was not used in the province. Instead the Provincial authorities were encouraged to conduct governor-led eradication.

The provincial authorities are concerned with drug trafficking through the province. The opium that transits through Ghor mostly originates in Badakhshan and other northern provinces. All the opium that arrives to Ghor leaves it as there are no opium processing facilities in the province. In 2004 it was estimated that the total amount of the transited opium through Ghor was 120-240 t annually. It could be assumed that with different dynamics in poppy cultivation in various regions of Afghanistan the opium transit volume through Ghor remained the same or the decrease was insignificant. The total amount of opium that leaves the province adding opium potentially produced in Ghor makes 175 - 295 t or 2.12 - 3.67 % of the total opium produced in Afghanistan. Taking into consideration that ANP, which has the main responsibility to deal with drugs in the province, is weak it could be stated that capabilities to counter drug trafficking in Ghor are hardly credible.

It might be insisted that there must be steps made to make an Afghan counternarcotics effort in Ghor more effective and consistent. First of all, it must be a balanced approach as most of the people who are currently engaged in poppy cultivation and drug trafficking have their income only from these activities. With an unbalanced approach the international community and the plan might lose their credibility. Secondly, if poorly implemented any activities might develop unnecessary local people's hostility. Undesired effects could seriously undermine stability.

ISAF needs to become involved in the counternarcotics effort as it directly supports stabilization efforts by assisting the GOA to establish and maintain a stable and secure environment. Poppy cultivation works against the stabilization effort as Taliban receive their financial means from the drug trade. It is confirmed by the latest tendency in poppy cultivation when there was a significant increase in poppy cultivation in the provinces where Taliban controls some areas while the other provinces either stabilized or decreased poppy cultivation.²³

²⁰ Mansfield D., Beyond the Metrics: Understanding the Nature of Change in the Rural Livelihoods of Opium Poppy Growing Households in the 2006/2007 Growing Season – A Report for the Afghan Drugs Inter Departmental Unit of the UK Government, May 2007, London: Inter Departmental Unit of the UK Government, 2007, p. 17, http://www.davidmansfield.org/data/Field_Work/UK/FinalDrivers0607. pdf, 27 08 2008.

²¹ United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Government of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Survey, February 2008*, New York: UNODC, 2008, p. 37, http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghan-winter-survey-Feb08-short.pdf, 28 08 2008.

²² United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, World Bank, Afghanistan's Drug Industry – Structure, Functioning, Dynamics and Implications for Counter-Narcotics Policy, New York: UNODC, 2005, p. 83-87, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/publications/afghanistan_drug_industry.pdf, 24 08 2008.

²³ Cordesman A., Losing the Afghan-Pakistan War? The Rising Threat, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008, p. 95, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080917_afghanthreat. pdf, 19 09 2008.

The other reason why ISAF needs to contribute to the counternarcotics effort is that it would support reconstruction. This is also relevant to Ghor. PRTs and other organizations contributing to reconstruction rebuild infrastructure (roads, bridges, schools, etc.). It is very much appreciated by local people. But the rebuilt infrastructure in most cases facilitate better drug trafficking. To remain consistent while performing stabilization tasks and contributing to reconstruction ISAF must develop a feasible and balanced approach how to assist the GOA both in poppy eradication and drug trafficking prevention.

3.3. Reconstruction

As it is clearly seen from the PRT mission statement, PRTs in Afghanistan rely on a "security first" concept. It assumes that first of all the efforts are marshalled towards establishing a stable and secure environment. After that, reconstruction activities are conducted in order to ensure mid-term stability for the population, build independent local capacity and ensure that larger reconstruction projects are implemented. Transitioning from the situation when mostly stabilization tasks are conducted towards the situation when reconstruction is mostly addressed is very crucial.

It was already mentioned that the security situation in Ghor is very good (see p. 6). Ghor is the only province in the Western region which is considered stable and secure (see Figure 2). It proves that PRT's stabilization efforts in Ghor yielded desired results. The other three Western Region provinces – Farah, Badghis and Herat – are on the unsecure province list with more than 20 kinetic attacks during the period of 01 January 2007 to 08 March 2008. The worst security situation is in the provinces of Helmand, Kunar, Kandahar and Paktika. These provinces witnessed 500 – 2,500 kinetic attacks during the same period.




Figure 2. Kinetic Activity in Afghanistan from 01 January 2007 to 08 March 2008²⁴

It should be understandable that reconstruction efforts must be focused in the provinces that are not displayed in Figure 2, i.e. where the security situation is the best, in order to consolidate the achieved and swiftly transition into reconstruction. Even after a superficial analysis of the security situation and money spent on reconstruction in individual provinces (see Figure 3) it becomes obvious that the data in the both Figures demonstrate contradictory tendencies. It could be noted that 10 provinces (Helmand, Kandahar, Paktika, Uruzgan, Zabul, Kapisa, Logar, Parwan, Badghis, and Herat) out of 20 listed in Figure 3 received more reconstruction funds than Ghor. It becomes rather difficult to understand when big sums of money for reconstruction are spent in hostile environment. First of all, it is not an effective way to spend reconstruction money. Extra sums of money spent to ensure contractor security might be unbelievably high. Secondly, it looks as if we reward the provinces that fail stabilization. It might even be perceived by Afghans as our desire to (unsuccessfully) buy Taliban's and other hostile elements' compliance. One of the Ghor Governors when assessing the situation in his province often joked that he needed a dozen Talibs to bring more reconstruction into the province. The situation when more money is spent in insecure and unstable provinces does not add to the credibility of NATO and other international actors in Afghanistan.

²⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Stability and Security in Afghanistan: Report to Congress in Accordance to 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2008, p. 11, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/Report_on_Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan 1230.pdf, 23 08 2008.




Figure 3. Completed, Ongoing, Planned and Funded PRT Spending
Per Capita Per Province²⁵

This situation deserves to be addressed by ISAF, international community and the GOA. They must ensure that funds for reconstruction are prioritized to the provinces where the situation is receptive for such projects, including Ghor. In case this point is missed credibility of reconstruction effort is seriously undermined and the whole concept why we are in Afghanistan becomes distorted.

3.4. Government of Afghanistan Capacity

An inadequate attitude from the GOA to provincial needs and from provincial authorities to the district needs and from district authorities to village needs, usually strikes as the most amazing and shocking fact. Provincial authorities are left on their own to deal with challenges (e.g., support to the DIAG process) and even with the consequences of serious natural disasters. They are forced to use scarce resources that are available within the province. The situation is totally unacceptable in Ghor which is one of the poorest provinces in Afghanistan. The inability of the GOA to project services into the provinces and make ordinary people feel that the GOA cares for them in stable and secure environment is one of the causes why we currently see the resumption of insurgent operations in Afghanistan. As a result when insurgent groups

²⁵ Waldman M., Falling Short – Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan, London: Oxfam, 2008, p. 14, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/debt aid/downloads/aid effectiveness afghanistan.pdf, 24 08 2008.

resumed operations they encountered little of government infrastructure or popular commitment to resist them. 26

This situation to some extent could be explained by a low administrative capacity of civil servants at all levels. In Ghor it is felt very acutely, as the province became bereft of educated people, as a result of long lasting wars and is not attractive due its low economic development. Despite this, it is a rather poor explanation for the GOA's inability to deliver.

Dominance of tribes also explains a reduced local capacity. Mostly people loyal to their tribe and clan interests, but not the ones who can perform and deliver, are promoted to public posts. But it is a weak argument explaining GOA's inability to demonstrate its care for the people.

It could be argued that the main reason related to the Government's low output is the nature of the Afghan society and the way how it developed. The main unit in the Afghan society remains tribe. Tribes ensure security and meeting the needs of their members. It became obvious during the rule of last Afghan kings during the period of 1880 - 1973. The kings were rulers who had their areas of responsibility but they were not supposed to interfere with the areas belonging to tribes. Tribes became even stronger after the Soviet invasion in 1979. They provided security for their members and inspired them to fight against Soviets. Tribes acquired very special status during the violent and turbulent years of Civil Wars during the period of 1992 - 1996 and the Taliban rule during the period of 1996 - 2001. During these periods there was no functioning government in the country. Tribes had to assume the functions that are usually performed by the states. They ensured security and delivered the services to their members. They fought wars with other tribes whenever member security was threatened. National cohesion was at risk but people felt relatively safe living in these rather primitive formations. Some of the tribal leaders became warlords with their own armed militias.

Today tribal primacy tradition is being continued as the most acceptable and natural way of life of Afghan people. Currently it could be witnessed as tribes "delegate" their representatives into the GOA, provincial administrations and other bodies in order to ensure that their interests are taken into consideration and defended. The best way to accomplish this is to prevent any interference into the traditional tribal structure by the governmental bodies.

Ghor is no exception. It was already discussed what effects exist within the provincial administration due to the tribal organization primacy. The best way for PRT members to understand the provincial authorities is to become familiar with what tribes provincial officials belong to.

The newly established model of governance in Afghanistan and supported by PRTs in the provinces is more familiar to the people from Europe than to Afghans. The current government model does not fully reflect or integrate

²⁶ Dobins J., Poole M. A., Long A., Runkle B., After the War: Nation Building from FDR to George W. Bush, Santa Monika, CA.: Rand Corporation, 2008, p. 103, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG716/, 01 09 2008.

the traditional tribal system. As a result some tribal leaders who were very influential before 2001 now might feel threatened. Their reactions may vary. They might accept the new system and consider it as an advantage. Others might take the opportunity and "delegate" as many his tribesmen as possible in order to maintain influence. Few might consider conducting hostile activities in order to demonstrate their importance and maintain previous influence. In Ghor for example, there is a troublemaker who constantly lets others know about him. The way he does it is totally unacceptable. In this case he must be contained and the rules of the game need to be explained to him.

Currently when in Ghor the PRT deals primarily with stabilization tasks promotion of democracy and, to some extent, promotion of ineffective GOA might become counter-productive. As a consequence some people could turn against the international troops or the authorities that we support and start openly support Taliban. Since changing the nature of the society is difficult or even impossible existing traditional governance needs to be exploited and accommodated. It is not democracy with free elections, but ensuring security and addressing reconstruction are the issues that the Afghan people are mostly interested in and concerned with.

Conclusions

Being in the lead of a PRT in Afghanistan for Lithuania is a significant challenge. Nevertheless, PRT Chaghcharan achieved a lot and possesses great potential for further positive development. It was instrumental in the situation stabilization in the province. Its operations ensured a stable and secure environment. Conditions for transitioning to dominant reconstruction are created. The PRT's strength is integrated and coordinated activities with civilian members. It must be preserved and further exploited. The PRT integrates various national approaches and takes advantage of it. Familiarity with and knowledge of the Afghan culture and the province is considered PRT's advantage.

From the previous discussion it could be concluded that a PRT as a military organization with a robust civilian element is hardly able to address both stabilization and reconstruction areas consistently. Stating otherwise would be considered too ambitious. A PRT possesses neither capabilities nor resources to effectively conduct reconstruction and consequently are not able to ensure a staying effect. Stabilization tasks are more feasible with a presence of robust CIMIC and civilian elements contributing to these efforts. Generally, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan are Provincial Stabilization Teams. In order to further remain successful PRTs must mainly focus on the full spectrum of stabilization tasks. The PRT should also become involved in counternarcotics effort as narcotics in Afghanistan is a serious security threat. Contacts with other players in the province, especially provincial authorities, must remain an important activity. PRT operations should not be limited by

national restrictions. PRT needs to possess required resources as adequate financial means, equipment and enough military and civilian personnel in order to be successful in performing stabilization tasks.

There might potentially emerge a serious threat to stability if there is no transitioning to reconstruction. While focusing more on stabilization activities, the PRT should reserve the responsibility for reconstruction to larger international donors. PRT's role in this area must be engaging IOs/NGOs and assisting them to implement reconstruction projects. Civilian members are extremely instrumental in establishing initial contacts and attracting IOs/NGOs to ensure a smooth transitioning to reconstruction. Special mission members in Kabul must be insistent in convincing ISAF, GOA and other international partners to use their funds in stable provinces, including Ghor.

PRT lead nations should agree to apply the same policies with regard to where reconstruction funds are used. It is required to be consistent and to reward the provinces that are able to establish and maintain stable and secure environment. As a major troop contributing nation Lithuania could seek the implementation of this approach in other parts of Afghanistan in order to ensure stabilization, especially in the provinces bordering with Ghor.

With a review of current activities and better understanding of the environment, PRT operations will become more effective and efficient. Innovative thinking and determination are needed to capitalize on the achievements.

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The Construction of the Model of the Army in Lithuania's Political Discourse

This paper considers the peculiarities of the construction of the image of the army and the soldier in Lithuania's political discourse. It raises the question regarding whether the conception of Lithuania's army as part of NATO military forces and the objective of transforming Lithuania's army into a professional one can be reconciled with Lithuania's domestic policies' general orientation to the nation state. The changes in the image of the army and the soldier are analyzed in the broader historical/cultural context in order to relate them to the interaction of modern/postmodern normative attitudes in Lithuania's political discourse and to the peculiarities of Lithuania's attempts at creating its international identity. An analysis of public opinion polls on issues of the transformation of the military supports the conclusion of our analysis of the main strategic documents, namely, that Lithuania is currently undergoing a transition from the normative attitudes of a modern nation state to those of the postmodern model of society. This circumstance should be heeded in reforming Lithuania's armed forces.

Introduction

Recent years saw a proliferation of studies on the transformation of the image of the army and the soldier in democratic countries after the Cold War. In the words of Moskos and Burk, "The ideal form of a national military, associated with universal male conscription, masculine virtues, and national patriotism, has been transformed into a 'high-tech' professional armed force, providing military power for temporary international coalitions". These changes in the military are often conceptualized as the transition from the

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¹ See.:Latham, A., "Warfare Transformed: A Braudelian Perspective on the "Revolution on Military Affairs", European Journal of International Relations, 2002, vol. 8(2), p.231-66; Moskos Ch. C., Williams J., Segal D., eds., The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War, New York: Oxford: Oxford University press, 2000; Heurlin B., Kristensen K., Rasmussen M. & S. Rynning, eds., New Roles of Military forces, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2003; Clearly L.R., McConville T., eds., Managing Defence in a Democracy, London: Routledge, 2006; Jabri V., War and the Transformation of Global Politics, Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Moskos, Ch., Burk, J., "The Postmodern Military" in Burk J., ed., The Military in New Times. Adapting Armed Forces to a Turbulent World, Boulder: West View Press, 1994, p. 145.

modern to the postmodern military. The source of the conceptualization is the division of societies into modern and postmodern that is now prevalent in social sciences and the humanities.³

The criteria used in characterizing the military as either modern or postmodern, are not only those of the technological capacities of military forces, but also those of their functions - of their relation to the society at large and of their image of the soldier4. These specific features are linked to the different conceptions of the relation of the nation to the state, of the basis of sovereignty and of the international system entertained in the modern and the postmodern epoch. Modernity, which is associated with the industrial revolution in Europe and with the normative attitudes of the Enlightenment⁵ is said to have created the Westphalian states system, in which identity is stabilized as a nation state, with borders as clearly defined territorial lines and with order as a stable distribution of power among sovereign states⁶. This system remained dominant until the end of the Cold War; the essential dichotomies that constitute it are those of "inside/outside", "anarchy/hierarchy", "self/ other". The world is divided into the safe, rationally controlled inside of the national state and the dangerous, anarchic, unpredictable outside, into the zones of peace and threat.

In the Westphalian model, sovereignty is the main principle for the organization of the political system. The state is seen as the ultimate goal of any nation, not a mere means for its cultural and social development. In a modern state the source of the legitimacy of its sovereignty is the nation. The idea was expressed by the theoretical founders of the modern state, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, in their metaphor of the hypothetical contract between the nation and the government. In order to provide for the security of the nation and the state the nation, via the social contract, grants the government monopoly in the use of force. This conception of the source of sovereignty led to a profound change in the way the army and the relation of the state and the citizen was legitimized. As the source of the state's sovereignty, the nation imposes upon itself the duty of defending the state. This view on the relation of the nation to the state led to the emergence of a new conception of the soldier and to the emergence of the institution of military draft (conscription). In conjunction with the *duty* to defend the state the soldier was granted the *right* to kill in the name

³ Historically some scholars divide societies to pre-modern, early modernity, modern and postmodern. See: Baudrillard J., *Simulacra and Simulation*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994; Moskos Ch. C., "Towards A Postmodern Military: The United States as a Paradigm" in Moskos Ch. C., Williams J., Segal D., eds., *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, New York: Oxford: Oxford University press, 2000.

⁴ Moscos (note 3), p. 15.

⁵ See Habermas, J., *Modernybės filosofinis diskursas*, Vilnius: Alma littera, 2002.

⁶ Mathias A., Jacobson D., and Lapid Y., eds., *Identities, Borders, orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory*, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2001, p. 7.

⁷ Browning, Chr. "From modern to Post-Modern Region_Building: Emancipating the Finnish Nation from the State" in Lehti M., & Smith D., eds., *Post-Cold War Identity Politics: Northern and Baltic Experiences*, London: Frank Cass, 2003, p.108.

of the state and the nation. In the modern state the issue of national defence, its justification and the institutions involved has become a major factor in the construction and maintenance of the nation itself, a part and parcel of national solidarity (identity).

The postmodern epoch is associated with the contemporary processes of international integration and globalization, and with the decrease of the role of the nation state as the main form of the organization of the political space. National identity is losing its ontological naturalness and comes to be seen as just another social construct. The emergence and the spread of the idea of overlapping identities have been destructive of Herder and Hegel's notion that the essence of the individual is the nation and that the essence of the nation is the state. These changes have been accompanied by calls for the tolerance of otherness, by attempts at justifying decentralization and fragmentation, all based on the postulate of universal human rights. The severing of national identity from territorial sovereignty led to changes in the conceptions of national security, sovereignty and the role of the state. Accordingly, this led to changes in the conception of the social role of the military and in the image of the soldier.

As many authors have emphasized, a contemporary postmodern society that accords the highest value to human rights finds itself in a difficulty when faced with the issue of social solidarity. Can respect for human rights be the basis for solidarity with the distant "alien"? Is a global social contract, based on human rights, possible? Is the postmodern soldier ready to die for humanity?8 Making tolerance of "otherness" the ultimate value seems to lead to the erosion of distinction between good and evil. The soldier, in the current image, is not so much fighting a concrete evil as fighting for an abstract good (force for good). With tolerance being extolled and with the ensuing political correctness one finds that there is no way to precisely define the enemy. The concept requires cultural determinacy that is being avoided, as after 9/11, with the enemy defined as global terrorism. A paradoxical situation is thus created, with the postmodern soldier, embodying the "force for good", who makes use of it in pre-modern and modern societies based on opposite conceptions of security and threats, and the result is the growing alienation between the soldier fighting for that good and those he is protecting from threats. The soldier fighting for the spread of global human rights and democracy finds himself confronted with *local* problems of a population in Somali or Afghanistan for whom piracy or poppy growing is just a way of surviving, not at all a criminal activity.9

Lithuania's political analysts and the society at large are quite concerned

⁸ Kaldor, M., Global Civil Society. An Answer to War, Cambridge: Polity, 2003, p.136.

⁹ See.: Enterline A.J. and J. M. Greig, "The history of imposed democracy and the future of Iraq and Afghanistan", *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2008, vol.4/4, p. 321-347. The paper investigated 43 cases of the imposed democracy in 1800-1994. It concludes that "the survival of imposed democracy is by no means assured", p. 322.

with the changes in Lithuania's military. Restored after 1992, Lithuania's armed forces soon had to reorient from the idea of self-relying territorial defence of the nation to the requirements of the idea of a collective defence. Kestutis Paulauskas, Vaidotas Ūrbelis, Algirdas Gricius, Tomas Jermalavičius and others have studied these changes and the ensuing problems. 10 Jūratė Novagrockienė argued that the dichotomy of modern/postmodern army could be effectively used in analyzing the transformation of Lithuania's armed forces. 11 This paper, based mostly on the analyses of other authors, deals with the question of whether the official discourse that construes Lithuania armed forces as part of NATO and is intent on remaking the army as a cohort of paid professionals does not conflict with the attitude of extolling the nation state that is prevalent in the discourse on domestic policies. In the paper, as in the works referred to above, we analyze the changes in the image of the army and the soldier within a broader historical/cultural context; we also relate these images to the mingling of the modern/postmodern normative stances in Lithuania's political discourse and to the peculiarities of Lithuania's quest for international identity. As argued in our previous studies, 12 since Lithuania joined ES and NATO, the Lithuanian state has acquired ever more features of a postmodern state. And yet the construction of the country's political identity has followed the vision of a modern state. Our analysis of the transformation of the image of the army and the soldier, based on the constructivist analysis of current political discourse in Lithuania, is supplemented by an excursion to the history of Lithuania's armed forces.

Discourse is here understood in the broad sense of the unities of discursive practices creating and organizing social relations according to a definite structure of meanings. ¹³ The theory of discourse analysis is premised on the idea that discursive practices are ideological, since they buttress the naturalization of arbitrary distinctions. Though ideological discourse contributes to the maintenance of current social and political order, it can also lead to its transformation. The aim of a discourse analysis is an exposure of the links of the meaning of public statements to institutional formations, to

Nee: Paulauskas K., The Driving Logic Behind the Defence Reform in Lithuania: Building the Future Military', Baltic Defence Review, 2003, vol.9/1, p. 126-134; Urbelis V., "Impact of NATO Membership on Military Service in the Baltic States / Service to Country" in Gilroy C., Cindy W., eds., Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006; Urbelis V. "Democratisation and integration: DCAF in the Baltic states" in Vankovska B., ed., Legal aspects of Civil-Military relations in Central and Eastern Europe, Geneva: Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, 2002, 109-124; Jermalavičius T., "Karo prievolė Lietuvoje: orientyrai diskusijai" in Novagrockienė J., sud., Profesionalioji kariuomenė: Vakarų šalių patirtis ir perspektyvos Lietuvoje, Vilnius: Lietuvos karo akademija, 2005, p.8-29; Gricius A., Paulauskas K., "Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Lithuania", Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2002, p. 233-253.

¹¹ Novagrockienė J., "Armed Forces Transformation in the 21st Century: a Case of Lithuania", *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2004*, p. 189-207.

¹² See: Miniotaite G., "The Baltic States: In Search of Security and Identity" in Krupnick Ch.,ed., Almost NATO: Partners and Players in Central and Eastern European Security, Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, p. 261-296.

¹³ Žr.: Foucault M., *The Archaelogy of Knowledge*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1972.

political decision-making and to the constraints on their implementation. This kind of analysis can reveal discrepancies between the ideas and the structures created for their realization, and thus make it possible to judge the effectiveness of the structures as to the goals they should attain.

In the constructivist theoretical context, one can plausibly treat the transformation of Lithuania's armed forces as the result of the interaction of the modern and the postmodern discourse. In our analysis of official documents on security and on the functions of the army we have attempted to find out which of the two discourses is the dominant one. A text's belonging to either the modern or the postmodern discourse is shown by the different ways that the nation, the state, security / defence, threats, the structure of the military, the mission of the military and of the soldier are conceptualized.¹⁴ These differences do not exhaust the whole list of criteria suggested by Ch. Moscos. As the author himself notes, his model only covers the military of developed Western democracies. By contrast, here we consider the evolution of an army that came into existence only in 1992. Having ascertained which concept of the military is being constructed in official documents we then compare it with the popular image of the soldier and the army as revealed in public debates and public opinion polls. Accordingly, the paper is divided into three parts. The analysis starts with an excursion to the inter-war history of Lithuania's armed forces. The focus is mainly on those features of the military that have influenced the construction of the current model of the armed forces. Next we analyze the official documents defining Lithuania's security and foreign policies as well as some other official texts revelatory of the promoted image of the army and the soldier. The third part of the paper is devoted to an analysis of the public attitudes towards Lithuania's military forces.

1. The Role and Status of Lithuania's Army in the First Republic of 1918-1940

The transition from modern to postmodern military, though characteristic of most contemporary developed states, acquires specific features in particular countries depending on their historical narratives and the mythologies of motherland's heroic defenders. For Lithuanians, the key story is that of the defence of the Pilenai castle related in the crusader chronicles. In 1336 the defenders of the castle, after a long and shifting battle, unwilling to surrender to the crusaders, set fire to the castle and burned themselves alive together with the people gathered in the castle. Later, the Great Duchy of Lithuania won a number of spectacular battles with the crusaders, and yet it was that lost battle, portrayed in numerous artistic works, that has become part of Lithuanians' identity. The story eminently features the spiritually unflinching, deeply patriotic figure of the

¹⁴ See Novagrockienė (note 11), p.194.

soldier as the defender of the country. Despite the hoariness of the story it was a source of inspiration for the defenders of Lithuania's independence in January 1991, when the very survival of the Lithuanian state was at stake.¹⁵

The vitality of the Pilėnai story in Lithuania's political discourse shows that Lithuanians tend to conceive national defence as total defence, with every inhabitant of the country taking part. The armed forces are a tool in the country's defence whose effectiveness can be boosted in critical situations by the support of the whole population. On the other hand, there was another image of the 'defender of Motherland', alongside this one, that of the professional warrior. This is related to the historical peculiarities of the Lithuanian state. After its formation in the 13th century the Lithuanian state was, for several centuries, among the most powerful European states. Being a pagan realm, it ruled over Christian territories several times its size, which was unique for the historical period. During the period of its flourishing Lithuania "maintained the dual policy of vigorous defence against the Teutonic Order in the West and territorial expansion into Russian lands in the East, the latest being affected by a series of victories against the Tatars and a policy of judicious intermarriages with Russian princely families".¹⁶

Such an expansionary policy required a well-armed professional army that was recruited from different ethnicities living on the territory of Lithuania at the time. In Lithuania's contemporary political perceptions, the dual character of the policies of that time finds its reflection in being proud of the heroism of the defenders of *ethnic land*, but also in the admiration for the professional army for its victorious exploits in *conquering new territories* (expanding one's security space, in current jargon). One can say that Lithuania's medieval history legitimizes both the image of warrior-defender and that of the warrior-conqueror. However, the formation of the image of the contemporary military was most directly affected by the experience of security and defence policies of interwar Lithuania (1918-1940), the story of the formation and the collapse of its military.

Since the very first days of Lithuania's declaration of independence in 1918 the existence of the state was in grave danger. Lithuania's ethnic territories were militarily claimed by both Poland and Soviet Russia. A speedy creation of viable armed forces was absolutely necessary for the survival of the state. In the spring of 1918 the army was formed from volunteers. In 1918-20 Lithuania's

¹⁵ In January 11-13, 1991 the Soviet Union made an attempt at a *coup d'etat*, with the aim of suppressing Lithuania's independence declared on March 11, 1990. There was little doubt that Soviet commandos would try to seize the parliament. Had the assault been attempted the parliamentary building, equipped with 'Molotov's cocktails' and other defensive weaponry, would have become another burning Pilėnai. Despite the grave danger the parliamentarians remained within, with numerous volunteers. The building was surrounded by a live wall of people from all of Lithuania, determined to defend Lithuania's independence. Probably because of this determination of the people to enact another feat of Pilėnai, no assault on the building was attempted.

¹⁶ See.: Smith D., Pabriks A., Purs A., Lane T., *The Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania*, London and New York: Routledge, 2002, p.XX.

armed forces successfully fought the Bolshevik Russia, the Bermontians, and the Polish armed forces. Lithuania's armed forces were created under most extreme conditions: the state borders were defined not by the League of Nations, but drawn by the armed struggle between Lithuanians and their adversaries. By defending the country's independence the soldiers defined its territory. Because of tense relations with Poland, Lithuania had to maintain a large military force. Early in 1922 Lithuania had 52 965 soldiers on the alert. The army comprised 13 infantry, 3 cavalry, 4 artillery regiments, an aviation squadron (12 aircrafts), a regiment of armoured vehicles, an engineering battalion, and border control units.¹⁷

The structure of the military, its place and role in the society were tightly linked to Lithuania's political regime whose particular characteristics found expression in the Constitutions of 1922 and 1938. The first Constitution was expressive of the "founding fathers'" orientation towards West European constitutions: "The result was a highly democratic form of government in which the legislature was dominant, the executive was week, and the President was largely a figurehead". The democratic principles of the Constitution of 1922 found their reflection in the relations of the military and the society at large. The decree of April 1919 by the Minister of Defence prohibited the military to participate in politics; the armed forces were gradually downsized.

However, it soon became obvious that the Western democratic model fitted badly Lithuania's realities. The inefficiency of the executive, the immaturity of the party system, the frailty of the civil society, as well as the discontent of such influential social groups as the Church and the military¹⁹ created conditions for the coup d'etat of 1926. The regime that was introduced by the coup was legitimized by the Constitution of 1938. In contrast to the first Constitution, this one legitimized the priority of the executive, controlled by President Antanas Smetona. The Smetona regime can be defined as authoritarian nationalism. It was characterized by restraints on political and civil rights and by the cult of the leader, all based on such ideas as national will, national solidarity, loyalty to the common cause, and discipline.

The Smetona regime effected a gradual militarization of the society, with the military gaining ever more prominence. This is evidenced by the outlays on the military: during the years of independence they grew from 17,50 (1930) to 25,95 percent (1938) of the state budget.²⁰ The meddling with politics by the military is indirectly indicated by the participation of high-ranking military officers in the Valdemaras' putsch of 1934. The ban on the participation of the military in politics was only reinstated in the 1930s, as Stasys Ra tikis became commander in chief of the army. At the time particular attention was paid to the

¹⁷ Surgailis G., Lietuvos kariuomenė: 1918-1998, Vilnius: LR kra to apsaugos ministerija, 1998, p.21.

¹⁸ Smith (note 16), p. 19.

¹⁹ The reduction of the military that began in 1922 and that was sped up after the 1926 elections provoked intense discontent on the part of army officers. The top military supported the coup of December 1926.

²⁰ Surgailis (note 17), p.26

improvement of the army's public image, to the closing of the gap between the military and the public at large. In order to boost the authority of the military in the wider society the government used the radio, the press, it organized various public events and "open doors" days. Most popular were annual festivals promoting the solidarity of the military with the society. However, the interwar Lithuanian press was practically "blind to the issues of soldiers' professional responsibility, to both individual and collective responsibility of the military to the larger society".²¹

Love for the Homeland, patriotism, and discipline were considered as highest virtues of the soldier. The institutions of military training were required not only to instill professional military skills but also "to educate young officers in the spirit of committed Lithuanians, reflecting the heroic spirit of our great ancestors". 22 Military officers were supposed to constitute the elite of new Lithuania. Yet, as the historian Petrauskaitė notes, ultimately "an officer's mind was dominated by the conviction that soldiers were beyond society (i.e. above it), and that the soldier's profession was not so much a profession as a "way of life"". 23 Colonel Žukas wrote: "the so called 'military honour' is a distinct kind of honour, for it is the honour of a 'caste', the virtue of an 'estate'", since "we, the officers, the professionals, constitute a distinct estate, even more than an estate - a caste, so that alongside the common understanding of honour and virtue we have our own understanding as a caste".24 The detailed and rigid regulation of the soldier's behaviour by disciplinary statutes and courts of honour buttressed the exceptional status of the military profession. Family members of the officers were also subject to the regulation.

The military under the Smetona regime were expected to perform two functions: first, to be the guarantor of the state's independence, of its security against the main external enemy, Poland, and, secondly, to be the force for the consolidation of the state (nation) conceived as an organism. However, after 1920 the army has never been used in its direct function of defending the country's independence. There was no military resistance to the Polish ultimatum of 1938, to the German invasion of Klaipeda in 1939, or to the ultimatum of the Soviet Union in 1940. The army served not so much as a means of counteracting external threats as a means of guaranteeing internal stability of the country under Smetona's authoritarian rule. The army performed the merely instrumental role of supporting the regime.

²¹ Petrauskaitė A.. "Karininkijos dorovinių problemų sprendimas Lietuvoje 1918-1940 m." in Ažubalis A., R. Kazlauskaitė-Markelienė, A. Petrauskaitė, B. Puzinavičius, F. Žigaras, *Karo pedagogika Lietuvoje* (1918-1940m.), Vilnius: Lietuvos karo akademija, 2007, p. 291.

Žigaras F., "Lietuvos kariuomenės karininkų rengimo ir jų kvalifikacijos tobulinimo sistema (1918-1940m.)", ." in Ažubalis A., R. Kazlauskaitė-Markelienė, A. Petrauskaitė, B. Puzinavičius, F. Žigaras, Karo pedagogika Lietuvoje (1918-1940m.), Vilnius: Lietuvos karo akademija, 2007, p.27.

²³ Petrauskaitė (note 21), p.287.

²⁴ Ibid, p. 286.

The army's passivity in 1940 is a painful reminiscence in contemporary Lithuania. The foreign policies pursued by the Baltic States at that time are a matter of dispute among the historians²⁵ and public figures. Most of them, convinced that the international situation in the 1940s left no chances for Lithuania to keep her independence, nevertheless maintain that "Lithuania had an alternative to the shameful capitulation."26 In 1940 Lithuania's had a fairly well equipped army of 32 thousand soldiers (with mobilization, the number could reach 150 thousand), supported by 70 thousand men of Siauliai paramilitaries,²⁷ and the population at large was highly patriotic. However, in the critical situation both national and military leaders demonstrated a lack of confidence in the nation, leaving the nation no role in their own political calculations. In his appeal to the army (March, 1939) S. Ra tikis, commander in chief of the army, pronounced: "Independence is the most precious asset of the nation that should be defended by any means available, including the military ones. In this fight it is better to die with honour or to honestly lose the armed struggle with the stronger enemy than to surrender impotently". 28 And yet in June 1940 General Ra tikis, at that time no longer commander in chief, was among those who argued for the acceptance of Moscow's ultimatum. The invasion of the Red army into Lithuania in June 1940 was the death toll to the Lithuanian armed forces. The liquidation and destruction of the Lithuanian military was effected by arresting and sending about 2000 officers and 4.5 thousand soldiers to Soviet concentration camps where most of them were killed or died because of unbearable conditions.²⁹ A part of the military was incorporated into the Soviet army.

In judging the tragic events of that time, Finland's stance is often referred to as the alternative to Lithuania's surrender policies. The stiff resistance of the Finns to the Soviets is presented as the example of there being alternatives. Yet those presenting this alternative are forgetful of the fact that Finland was a democratic presidential republic while Lithuania lived under an authoritarian rule. In the period of independence, Lithuania was mostly ruled by a military regime that was hostile to the emergence of civil society. This is why at in the crucial junction no alternative political forces were to be found in Lithuania. The fact that the military, held in such high esteem during the whole period of Lithuania's independence, at the critical moment for the existence of the state, complied with the command of not resisting the invasion of a foreign army is now commonly interpreted as a historical blunder and felt as national trauma. The resolve not to repeat it has found its reflection in most strategic documents

²⁵ See: Kirby D., "Incorporation: The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact" in Smith G., ed., *The Baltic States: The National Self-Determination of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania*, London: Macmillan, 1994, p.80-81.

²⁶ Truska L., *Lietuva 1938-1953 metais*, Kaunas: Šviesa, 1995, p. 58.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid, p.55. (LVVOA. – F. 1771. – Ap. 1. – B. 23- L. 2-3).

²⁹ Surgailis (note 17) p.72.

of the re-emerged Lithuanian state. The lost dignity of Lithuania's military has been partly recuperated by acknowledging the valour of its soldiers and officers in the guerrilla fight against the Soviets in 1944-1954.³⁰

After this brief historical excursion one gets a mixed impression of the interwar Lithuanian army. On the one hand, the army was a typical institution of a modern state oriented to the task of defending the nation and the state from well-defined enemies. The army was also the school for the fostering of national feeling and patriotic education, and as such it was a major factor in buttressing national identity. On the other hand, the fact that at a crucial moment the army became a hostage of irresponsible politicians is an indictment against top commanders of the army, who have distanced themselves from the very people they were trained to defend. As Vytautas Vardys, former professor at Wisconsin university, notes, the interwar Lithuania's army was "too much dependent on the politicians". 31 However, this dependence was not dependence of the military on civilians, as is customary in democracies, "it was rather the use of the military for partisan agendas, for politicking in the struggle for posts, and thus was not at all democratic but mostly demoralizing". 32 These contradictory judgments on the army of interwar Lithuania have their repercussions in contemporary attempts at constructing an updated model of Lithuania's armed forces.

2. The Grounding of the Contemporary Model of Lithuania's Army in Strategic Documents

Lithuania was the first republic of the former Soviet Union to declare its independence on 11 March 1990. However, it was only after the bloody events of January 1991 in Lithuania and the failed Moscow putsch in August 1991 that Lithuania received widespread international recognition. On 17 September 1991 Lithuania was granted membership in the United Nations. The declaration of independence was met by Soviet threats to destroy Lithuania's economy, to rip off some of the country's territories and to spark an internal strife in the society. Lithuania's government asked for negotiations, and despite the threats proceeded with the formation of institutions buttressing the state sovereignty. The next day after the declaration of the restoration of the Republic of Lithuania Lithuania's Supreme Council adopted a resolution making the Soviet law on conscription invalid for Lithuania's citizen. A law on the certificate of the citizen of the Republic was adopted, the demarcation and control of the borders was set off, and the Department for Land Defence was created (April 25, 1990). As in 1918 Lithuania's army was to be formed not only as the symbol of the

32 Ibid.

³⁰ See: Gaškaitė N., Kuodytė D., Kašėta A., Ulevičius B., Lietuvos partizanai 1944-1953 m., Kaunas: Šviesa, 1996.

³¹ See: Vardys V., "Generolo Raštikio memuarai ir jo vaidmuo Lietuvos politikoje", Aidai, 1973, no 4, http://aidai.us/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=870&Itemid=126, 2008 11 03.

state, as the guarantor of democracy, but also as the defender and protector of independence. In November 1992 Lithuania's Supreme Council solemnly declared the reestablishment of Lithuania's armed forces.

The formation of an army, its structure and its functions depend on the general vision of the state, on the perception of threats and on conceptions of security. The reestablishment of the Lithuanian proceeded under very complicated conditions, with Russia's troops remaining on her territory till autumn 1993, other vital tasks of social and institutional transformations were urgent. So from the early days of the Lithuanian state building security was of utmost concern. This is evidenced by the profusion of official documents related to security and defence policies. The shifting international environment and the changing status of Lithuania on the road to NATO and EU constantly demanded new revisions of the security situation and adjustments in state policies. The documents constitute a kind of condensed history of the state after the restoration of independence. They reflect not only the story of Lithuania's integration in NATO and EU but also the processes of the country's Westernization and Europeanization accompanied by shifts in security and defence conceptualizations. From this point of view let us consider the following documents: Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, 1992 (Constitution); Law on Fundamentals of National Security 1996 (LFNSL 1997), Law on organization of the National Defence and the Military Service, 1998; National Security Strategy (NSSRL 2002, NSSRL 2005), Military Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania (MSRL, 2004).

2.1. Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, 1992

The new Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, adopted by the referendum of October 25, 199233, laid the foundation of Lithuania's political, legal and economic system and defined the principles of state security and defence. The Constitution, in stressing that its legal roots are "the Lithuanian Statutes and the Constitutions of the Republic of Lithuania" (Constitution, Preamble), emphasizes the historical continuity of contemporary Lithuania with the Great Duchy of Lithuania and interwar Lithuania. In its main provisions the current Constitution resembles Lithuania's Constitution of 1922 which was based on the Westphalian model of state sovereignty. Security is conceived as national security, while defence is "the defence of the state of Lithuania from foreign armed attack" (Article 139). The Constitution employs a rather static concept of the external enemy, based on Lithuania's historical contingencies. Indirectly, this is confirmed by the appendage to the Constitution (adopted on 8 June 1992), the Constitutional Act "On the Non-Alignment of the Republic of Lithuania with post-Soviet Eastern Alliances" (Article 150). The intention behind it is to legally dissociate once and for all from Russia and the post-Soviet space.

³³Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania 1992, Vilnius: Publishing house of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 1996.

The basic constitutional provisions on national defence (chapter 13) outline the character of the civilian/military relations. According to Article 140, the State Defence Council, consisting of the President (Head of the Council), the Prime Minister, the Chairman of the Parliament, the Minister of National Defence, and the Commander of the Armed Forces co-ordinate the main issues of national defence. The Constitution establishes direct accountability of the government, the minister of national defence and the commander of armed forces to the Parliament for the management of the armed forces of Lithuania. The Parliament is also granted the right to impose martial law, to declare mobilizations, and to decide on the employment of the armed forces for the defence of state or for the implementation of international commitments (Article 142). The Constitution forbids the appointment of active servicemen as ministers of national defence and names the President as the Supreme Commander of the armed forces. These constitutional provisions constitute the legal basis for the application of the principle of civilian control over the armed forces. The constitution calls for one year of compulsory military training or alternative service. Article 139 of the Constitution states: "The defence of the state of Lithuania from foreign armed attack shall be the right and duty of every Citizen of the republic of Lithuania". In essence, this is a fairly typical Constitution of a modern state establishing the principles of territorial defence.

2.2. The Basics of National Security of Lithuania (1996)

The Law on the Basics of National Security of Lithuania was the outcome of protracted discussions on issues of security and defence.³⁴ The envisaged structures and the functions of defence and the armed forces are highly expressive of Lithuania's security concerns of that time. The document is an attempt at grounding security and defence policy of Lithuania both as a nation state (modern discourse) and as a potential member of NATO and EU (postmodern discourse). On the whole, in the document the modern conceptions of the state and the nation, of security and defence are predominant. The task of national security is conceived as that of identifying and neutralizing of the objective threats to the state and the nation. One can discern in it, normative tensions between the orientation to the nation state in domestic policies and the integration with the West (at the expense of losing some sovereignty) in foreign and security policies, even though concerns for the security of the nation state predominate. This is particularly evident in the conception of defence as based on the principle of total and unconditional defence:³⁵

³⁴ See.: Miniotaitė G., Jakniūnaitė D., "Lietuvos saugumo politika ir identitetas šiuolaikinių saugumo studijų kontekste", *Politologija*, 2001, vol. 2, p. 21-43.

³⁵ Lietuvos respublikos nacionalinio saugumo pagrindų įstatymas "(Law on the Basics of National Security of Lithuania) Valstybes zinios, 1997, 2: 2-20.

Total defence means that Lithuania shall be defended with arms by the armed forces, that all the resources of the state shall be employed in the defence effort and that each citizen and the nation shall offer resistance by all means possible.

Unconditional defence means that defense of Lithuania shall not be tied to any preconditions and no one may restrict the right of the Nation and each Citizen to resist the aggressor, invader or anyone who encroaches by coercion on the independence the territorial integrity or the constitutional order of Lithuania (Chapter 7).

In the event of aggression or other forms of coercion against the State of Lithuania, no State institution or official shall be allowed to make a decision or issue an order forbidding the defence of the sovereignty, the territorial integrity or the constitutional order of Lithuania. Such resolution or order shall be considered null and void, and defiance towards them shall incur no liability" (Chapter 7).

As the quotations show, the concept of defence is obviously influenced by the spirit of the Pilėnai story and the polemics with the defeatist policies of 1940. One can also notice the contrast drawn between the Nation and the State, one that grants the nation the right to resist state institutions if they refuse to defend Lithuania's sovereignty and its constitutional order. This means that defence comprises defence against both external and internal enemies. Such a conception of defence naturally leads to the division of defence into military defence, guerrilla warfare and civil defence. The latter comprises "non-violent resistance, disobedience and non-collaboration with the unlawful administration, as well as armed resistance". The role accorded to civilian resistance in the document representing Lithuania's defence policy is quite unique in defence conceptualizations currently predominant in the world.³⁶

Besides providing the definitions of security and defence the document defines the goals and the functions of the armed forces. The Armed forces "shall be loyal to the Republic of Lithuania, its Constitution, serve the State and society, obey the state government democratically elected by the Lithuanian citizens" (chapter 18). The armed forces comprise regular armed forces, the Voluntary National Defense Service (SKAT) and active reserve forces. The structure of the armed forces indicates that they are oriented towards territorial defence. The backbone of the armed forces are the servicemen whose "civil consciousness and morale, professional skills and military ethics" have to be fostered. The "mutual understanding and trust between servicemen and the civilian population" should also be encouraged.

A section of the document is devoted to issues of "democratic control over the armed forces" (chapter 8) and is based on the relevant provisions in the Constitution. It is stressed that all decisions on defence policy and armed forces are to be made by the democratically elected civilian government. The document underwrites the publicity of decisions on defence policy and defence expenditure; it also establishes the main principles and procedures of the civilian control of the armed forces. However, as Paulauskas and Gricius emphasized,

³⁶ See Miniotaite G., "Civilian resistance in the security and defence system of Lithuania", *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review* 2003, p.223-238.

the document "failed to establish a clear definition of the parliamentary overview and provided only limited tools of accountability and control".³⁷

In general, one can say that *The Basics of National Security* universalized and legitimized the conception of political reality prevailing in 1992-1995. At the time Lithuania's membership in EU and NATO seemed to be a distant and hardly attainable aspiration. No wonder that the document is focused on territorial self-defence and on the appropriate vision of the patriotic soldier. The document was eventually superseded by the *National Security Strategy* and the *Military Strategy*, more consonant with the spirit of the time.

2.3. National Security Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania (2002, 2005)

The National Security Strategy (2002), though still keeping the main provisions of the Basics of National Security, was much more expressive of Lithuania's transatlantic orientation. In the new document the referent object of security remains "state sovereignty and territorial integrity" while the main objective of security arrangements is threat prevention to be achieved by joining the "common European security and transatlantic defence systems", i.e. "The Republic of Lithuania considers international security indivisible and seeks own security as an inseparable part of the wider regional, European and global security of the community of nations".³⁸

In delineating security threats, dangers and risks the document blends together the conceptions of cooperative security and national security. On the one hand, it is stressed that under conditions of globalization security is "indivisible", that "the fight against terrorism, corruption, organized crime, trade in people, drug trafficking, illegal migration, and smuggling" is a high priority for Lithuania. The document emphasizes: "Republic of Lithuania does not perceive any immediate military threat to its national security and so does not regard any state as its enemy". On the other hand, the document is indirectly bent on Russia's securitization because of the "overwhelming dependence of the Republic of Lithuania on the strategic resources and energy supplies of one country". Though not explicitly named, Russia is considered the main security threat for Lithuania. The document also keeps in place the principle of total territorial defence, comprising both military and civilian resistance. A comparison of the 1996 document on national security and the 2002 security strategy shows a turn towards the concept of collective security, though defence is treated as a problem for particular states, not as a common one (for NATO, EU). In the document's amendment that was adopted when Lithuania joined NATO and EU, an attempt was made at eliminating this ambiguity.

³⁷ Gricius (note 10), . p.241.

³⁸ National Security Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania (2005), http://www.kam.lt/index.php/en/34381/, 30 09 2008.

First of all, the new edition is premised on a more extensive legal basis. The Strategy is based on the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, the Law on the Basics of National Security, the North Atlantic Treaty and the Treaty on European Union (my emphasis - G.M.). As a member of NATO and EU, Lithuania perceives its national security as a constituent part of the security policy of these organizations and refers to the analysis of threats set out in NATO Strategic Concept, the Strategy of the European Union, and other strategic documents of NATO and EU. The definition of Lithuania's security interests now comprises not only "sovereignty, territorial integrity and democratic constitutional order of the Republic of Lithuania" but also wider concerns: "global and regional stability", "security, democracy and welfare of NATO Allies and European Union Member States", and "freedom and democracy in the neighbouring regions of the European Union".

In the new document, the concept of military defence is quite radically modified. The principle of total unconditional defence that pervaded all previous documents is dropped.³⁹ The principles of defence are supplemented with the principles of "deterrence and collective defence" and "crisis prevention and stability development". With the principle of total defence gone, the idea of civil resistance is also dropped. It is replaced by the requirement of "civil training" that would help "consolidate democratic and civic values and to strengthen civil society". The law asserts: "Civic training enhances patriotism, resolution to defend the Homeland, national freedom. Awareness of the importance of national identity and civic training is a condition of ensuring national security".

2. 4. The Military Defence Strategy, 2004

The evolving attitudes towards the foundations of national security and strategies of national defence were made more explicit in the *Law on Organization* of the National Defence and the Military Service⁴⁰ (1998) and in The Military Defence Strategy⁴¹ (2004). The law of 1998 sets forth the fundamentals of organization, command and control of the national defence system, and establishes the procedures for the implementation of military and civilian service within the national defence system. The law defines the status of the serviceman: "A serviceman is a defender of the Lithuanian State" (Article 21). Military service "requires a high degree of loyalty to the state". The servicemen enjoy the constitutionally

³⁹ A statement of National Security Strategy of 2005: "To secure vital interests, every possible means of protection are employed" (note 38, 3.1) can be treated as some allusion to a principle of total and unconditional defence employed in the document of 2002.

⁴⁰ LR krašto apsaugos sistemos organizavimo ir karo tarnybos įstatymas 1998 (Law on Organization of the National Defense and the Military Service), http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter2/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_ id=56646, 11 10 2008.

⁴¹ The Military Defense Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania 2004 http://www.kam.lt/EasyAdmin/sys/files/military%20strategy.doc, 10 11 2008.

guaranteed human rights and liberties. The "serviceman's human dignity" should be respected, a serviceman may not be "forced to serve another person or group of persons". Moreover, he need not blindly comply with orders; he should not comply if the order violates "universally recognized principles and norms of international law" (Article 27). On the whole, judging by its contents the law is transitory in nature. It blends together the elements of national and collective defence. The structure of the national defence system is still oriented to total territorial defence and the serviceman is conceived as the defender of the state: these constructions are expressive of the earlier stance on national defence. On the other hand, the envisaged preparation of the military for the "interoperability with NATO structures" shows that the law is also responsive to the needs of collective defence.

By 2004 Lithuania's military strategy was already firmly based on the idea of collective defence: "By participating in international peacekeeping and crises response operations, the Armed Forces of Lithuania, an active member of NATO and the European Union, strengthen the national security as well as the security of the whole Euro-Atlantic community". ⁴² There is a shift from a defence policy based on the perception of threats to the one based on capacity. Accordingly, there are changes in the goals of Lithuania's military forces; they are now oriented to action unrelated to Article 5, and not only in the Euro-Atlantic area, but also beyond it. This leads to radical changes in the structure of armed forces. Priority is given to the development of the Reaction Brigade

These changes and the accompanying problems were quite accurately portrayed by Renatas Norkus, former Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence: "Armed forces should be ready for deployment anywhere in the world when dealing with problems caused by terrorism. The defence of Lithuania today starts in Afghanistan rather than within Lithuania's borders." However, in his view, such concepts as crisis management, peacekeeping or reconstruction of a remote Afghan province are slow to enter Lithuania's public mind. People find little reason in having armed forces engaged in forest fire extinction or an environmental cleaning. The soldier is losing the image of the nation's and the country's defender. And it is becoming more difficult to obtain public support for the increased funding of the military: "One of the most difficult challenges has been a mental one: to start thinking in terms of collective defence of the Alliance instead of a collective defence for Lithuania". "

44 Ibid.

⁴² Ibid

⁴³ See: Norkus R., "Defense Transformation: A Lithuanian Perspective", 11 April 2006, Garmisch-Parten-kirchen, Germany, http://www.kam.lt/index.php/lt/96062/, 25 10 2008.

3. The Transformation of the Army as Perceived by Lithuanian Society

Let us consider how the transformation of the military – the shift from a conscript army defending the nation to that of flying squads of professionals engaged in social and political "fire fighting" all over the world – is perceived and received by the society. Is the society convinced by the claim, employed in NATO strategic documents and widely used by local politicians, that in a global world it is the spreading and defending of Western values (i.e., human rights), which is the most effective way of securing peace? Does not the transformation in fact erode national self-consciousness, an important component of which is the national army of a sovereign state? An exhaustive answer to these questions would require a wide-ranging investigation of the current political and social transformation. I will confine myself to a brief comment on public debates and public opinion poll concerning two issues directly related to the reforms of the military: 1) public attitudes towards compulsory military service and professional army and 2) attitudes towards Lithuania's military participation in international operations.

3.1. An Army of Conscript or/and Professionals?

The principle of total defence, as espoused in the strategic documents of 1996-2002, requires a large reserve for mobilization. Total defence is based on the conscript army, on the draft law and compulsory military service. A preparation for this kind of defence imposes significant costs on wide strata of society, so it is no wonder that public opinion polls show considerable public interest in the matter. Before Lithuania's membership in NATO and the subsequent reforms the Lithuanian armed forces had 22,796 servicemen, among them 4,497 conscripts. In 2008 the total number of servicemen in the national defence system dropped to 13,534, with mere 1,874 of them being conscripts. It is planned that by 2009 the transition to a professional army will be complete. However, such a transition would contradict Lithuania's Constitution that envisions compulsory military or alternative public service.

The government, favouring the transition to a professional army, initiated a discussion on the issue in Seimas in 2006. The proposed program involved a gradual reduction of the number of conscripts in the army, so that only those willing would do compulsory service. The proposal was favoured by both the

⁴⁵ Factis and Figures: Personnel size in 1998-2009. See: http://www.kam.lt/accessibility/index.php/en/154585/ , 02 09 2009.

serving conscripts⁴⁶ and the society at large.⁴⁷ According to the analysts of the Ministry of Defence, compulsory military service in time of peace would no longer be a universal duty but only a necessary condition for becoming a serviceman in active reserve or for getting employment in other defence structures (e.g. border control). The conservatives held a similar view, considering a complete abandonment of compulsory service inexpedient, for a purely professional army would become self-absorbed and lose its ties to the society.

The Conservative party (renamed as the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats since May 2008) elaborated the idea in its election program of 2008. The army is envisaged as a three-pronged structure consisting of: (1) mobile forces of professional (8-8.5 thousand strong); (2) active reserve of volunteers (12 thousand strong); (3) individual reserve of volunteers and conscripts (7 week long training courses for young men in the age of 18-24). Supposedly, in a year's time it would be possible to train up to 7 thousand men in individual reserve fit for mobilization in case of a conflict. Professional army is also considered an important part of the system of national defence; it would consist of 8-8.5 thousand servicemen, supplemented by 12 thousand servicemen of the active reserve. 48 It seems that after the 2008 Seimas election the stance on the issue by the Homeland Union - Lithuanian Christian Democrats is going to be the dominant one. This issue, though seemingly local, has in fact questioned the compatibility of certain strategic approaches of NATO and Lithuania. As Laurynas Kaščiūnas has pointed out, the traditional threat of Russia is much more important for Lithuania than the global threats referred to in NATO strategic documents. 49 The discussion has shown that Lithuania's politicians consider the issues related to Lithuania's armed forces not merely from the functional but also from the normative point of view. The contents of the discussion are indicative of the fact that Lithuania's political discourse is still dominated by the value orientations of modernity.

3.2. Participation in International Missions

Since 1996, Lithuania has been participating in international peacekeeping missions. In the period more than two thousand Lithuanian soldiers have participated in ten international operations and two OSCE missions. Lithuania

⁴⁶ Žr.: Novagrockienė J., Janušauskienė D., Kaminskaitė A., Mokslinio tyrimo "Būtinosios tarnybos karių nuostatos" ataskaita [Report on the research "The Attitudes of Army Conscripts"], Vilnius, 2002. According to the data of the research, 52,1 percent of the respondents favor the army of hired service persons.

⁴⁷ Lietuvos gyventojai apie Lietuvos kariuomenę, [Lithuania's Public on Lithuania's Armed Forces], Baltijos tyrimai, June 2006, Vilnius 2006. According to the data of the research, 39 percent of Lithuania's population, of more than 18 years of age, consider that Lithuania needs both a professional and a conscript army, while 51 percent favor the purely professional army. 10 percent of the adult population have no opinion on the issue.

⁴⁸ Tėvynės sąjungos – Lietuvos krikščionių demokratų programa, Vilnius, 2008.

⁴⁹ See.: Samoškaitė E. "Koks skirtumas, kokia bus kariuomenė?" www.delfi.lt, 18-08-2008.

now plays a particularly important role in Afghanistan. In 2005 Lithuania assumed the leadership of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan as a part of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Lithuanian soldiers assist the central government of Afghanistan in strengthening its control over the Ghor province, in reforming its security forces, and they help maintain the dialogue between the central government, international organizations, and local leaders. Presently, more than 200 Lithuanian troops are active in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo. The troops on the missions are usually replaced each half-year. The international missions are manned by professionals, volunteers and also by persons in the civilian defence service. ⁵⁰

Lithuania's population is divided on the issue of missions abroad. According to the opinion poll carried out by *Spinter tyrimai* in April 2007, 40 percent of the respondents approve this policy, while half of the respondents do not. At the same time 52 percent of the respondents consider that Lithuania benefits from participation in military missions abroad because its troops get more experienced, because the country contributes to the strengthening of international security and thus improves its own international image. When queried specifically about the mission in Iraq, more than half of the respondents (56 percent) favoured the withdrawal of Lithuanian troops from that country. Withdrawal is more often favoured by women, older, less educated, lower income people⁵¹. Readers of the DELFI website have also been polled on the issue. From 12 thousand participants of the poll 74 percent were against the troops being sent to Iraq.⁵²

The changes in the armed forces have not affected the generally positive attitude of the population towards Lithuania's military. The dynamics of trust in the army for the period 1998-2006 show that the trust grew from 30 percent in 1998 to 54 percent in 2006. Accordingly, distrust fell from 28 to 12 percent. On the data provided by "Baltijos tyrimai" (June 2006) the Lithuanian population considers Lithuania's military as youthful (80%), positively representing Lithuania to the world (63%), better than the Soviet army (59%).⁵³

Conclusions

This brief analysis of the ways the vision of Lithuania's military is construed in official documents and of the public response to the ideas propounded

⁵⁰ See: http://www.kam.lt/index.php/lt/144606/, 03 11 2008. Since July 1, 2004 service persons have been appointed for service in international missions, not chosen according to consent. As Valdas Tutkus, commander in chief, observed, since Lithuania has joined the system of collective defense "participation in international operations has become a duty" (Stasys Gudavičius, "Lietuvos kariai nenori į Iraką", Kauno diena, February 19, 2007).

⁵¹ See: "Spinter tyrimai", http://search.delfi.lt/cache.php?id=F55643E2C4B28568, 2008-10-25

⁵² See: "74 proc. DELFI skaitytojų prieš karių siuntimą į Iraką", 21 02 2007, http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=12216401, 20 10 2008.

⁵³ See: note 47.

there shows that the conception of the army and the soldier has not transcended the extant cultural images of the soldier, those of the soldier as the patriotic defender of Homeland (Pilenai) and the soldier as a mercenary [professional] fighting battles on foreign lands. This is indicative of the power of historical stereotypes and normative assumptions in any construction of the model of the exemplary soldier. The republic of Lithuania, restored in 1990, was from the outset oriented to the experience of interwar Lithuania. In setting up the armed forces and tackling the issues of the relations between the military and the society at large such interwar institutions as Riflemen's Union (Šaulių sąjunga), Ramove (a network of officers' clubs), and [military] press have been restored. Quite in line with interwar Lithuania, the army was perceived not so much as a neutral defender of democracy as rather the institution for instilling patriotism and loyalty to the state.

The image of the soldier as a patriot, an unreserved defender of Homeland as well as the idea of total defence are expressive of Lithuania's orientation towards the modern nation state. In official political discourse this orientation has been dominant till about 2000-2001. The commencement of Lithuania's negotiations for membership in EU and a more active participation in NATO action plans were the chief incentives for changes in the normative assumptions of Lithuania's strategic documents. The most recent documents, still partly characterized by contradictory attempts at reconciling the idea of defending the closed space of a nation state with that of defending the space of common values, are indicative of the transitory character of the state. A survey of public opinion polls on the transformation of the military confirms the conclusion of the analysis of the basic strategic documents, namely, that contemporary Lithuania is in a transitory stage leading from the value assumptions of a modern nation state to the political discourse of a postmodern society based on common civic values.

The generally positive attitude to Lithuania's armed forces, to their renewal and becoming more professional, does not necessarily [contradict] [clash with] the modernist image of the army as the defender of the state. The much less enthusiastic attitude to the Lithuanian military participation in military operations abroad shows that the image of the soldier as the defender of human rights anywhere in the world is still quite alien for the contemporary Lithuanian society. The rhetoric of universal human rights and a global prevention of threats is not much welcome in a society bent on keeping its national identity. The shift from the army of conscripts to the army of professionals is not merely an institutional reform leading to the reduction of the number of soldiers. It depends on the character of the shift whether the army will remain an important part of national identity or will become just another profession.

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Lithuanian Intelligence System

The article describes and explains the evolution of Lithuania intelligence system and the main phases of its development. The article analyzes function and responsibilities of the two most important actors in this field - the State Security Department and the Second Investigation Department under the Ministry of Defence. Special attention is devoted to the implementation of the intelligence cycle and the division of responsibilities between two intelligence institutions. The article concludes that in 20 years Lithuanian managed to create a functioning intelligence system that can support the decision making process and satisfy the needs of intelligence consumers, although serious weaknesses remain.

Introduction

Intelligence is a widely discussed topic in the public domain. Activities of intelligence services give raise to conspiracy theories and popular misunderstandings. Imaginative powers of intelligence services and their links - political, business or cultural elite - is a matter of speculation in the mass media in all countries of the world, including in Lithuania.

Several decades ago the art of intelligence became an increasingly important subject of academic studies. The theory and practices of intelligence falls largely within the realm of political science, but the application of intelligence methods links it to other disciplines such as economics or finances. Intelligence services of the US, the United Kingdom, France or Russia are analysed in numerous books and other publications, however experiences of smaller nations, like Lithuania, are mostly neglected.

Little attention by the academic community is paid to the intelligence activities of small and medium size countries contributes to misunderstandings that exist in this very sensitive area of national security. It is true that the intelligence services of smaller nations are not able to operate globally; their means of collection are limited. On the other hand they can provide specific expertise in their immediate neighbourhood that is more accurate than of their counterparts from bigger states. For example, Lithuania may have a deep insight of the latest development in Kaliningrad oblast of Russia but a very limited understanding of situation in Chad.

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In addition, the role of intelligence agencies is particularly sensitive in small states. Small states are particularly receptive to the issues of national security, for them the matter of national survival is not only a theoretical issue. This allows intelligence services to play more important role in politics comparing to bigger states. As Edward Lucas noted, "it is hard to find an ex-communist country in Eastern Europe in which the intelligence and security services are depoliticized and uncontroversial.¹⁷"

Lithuania is a wonderful example of a country where intelligence agencies became an integral part of political life. The influence is felt across a whole range of issues - from foreign policy formation, to participation in the impeachment procedure, of the President of the State. This particular issue exaggerated public debate on the role of intelligence services in politics. It sparked a heated discussion on the use of intelligence products by law enforcement agencies and by politicians.

Public interest in intelligence service rose even higher after a high ranking Lithuanian spy posted to Belarus, Vytautas Pociūnas, was found dead in mysterious circumstances. He is believed to have fallen out of the hotel's ninthstory window in Belarus, yet many suspect murder. The Parliament launched the parliamentary investigation, which led to a very critical assessment of the State Security Department. The parliamentary investigation also pointed out some fundamental problems with the overall structure and procedures in intelligence community.

This article is the first attempt to decribe and understand the Lithuanian intelligence system, and also to specify its strenghts and weaknessess. This article discerns to show the different dimensions of the Lithuanian intelligence agencies and their influence over the decision making process in the area of security and defence. This case study also tries to show how Lithuanian intelligence system fits in the overall pattern of intelligence activities in the world.

Every country is unique, so is its intelligence system. Modern Lithuanian intelligence system reflects her historical experience and preparations to deal with modern challenges. Two most important players in this field – the State Security Department (SSD) and the Second Investigation Department (SID) under the Ministry of Defence - have undergone major restructuring since their establishments, but roles and functions are under constant review. The author looks at the Lithuanian intelligence system from a holistic perspective with the understanding that intelligence is only one side of the national security equation.

The limited amount of publicly available information remains an important factor that limits the scope and depth of this article. For these reasons, the Lithuanian capabilities to collect information using human or signal intelligence could not be discussed in sufficient detail. Information on these issues is always classified and unavailable to the public.

¹ Lucas E. "State Insecurity", *The Economist*, December 20, 2006, http://edwardlucas.blogspot.com/2006/12/spy-stories.html

1. Overview of Literature

The Lithuanian intelligence system is not a popular subject in the Lithuanian academic community. Leading national newspapers from time to time come up with sensational news about activities about the Lithuanian intelligence services but no major publication on the role and scope of their activities exist so far. Historical perspective dominates the whole debate on intelligence.

The only successful attempt to link intelligence theory and practice remains the article, "The role of secrets services in democratic states and their control" written by Gintaras Bagdonas, former chief of SID and currently the Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence of the European Union Military Staff.² Although successful from theoretical perspective, Bagdonas's official position limits his ability to discuss openly sensitive issues surrounding the interaction of politics and intelligence. The SSD official Arūnas Paukštė in his PhD thesis "Terrorism and its prevention in Lithuania" introduced a separate chapter for the role of intelligence in fighting terrorism but fails take a critical look at the role of his own employer, the SSD. The relation between intelligence and the prevention of terrorism is discussed in the monograph by Egdūnas Račius, Asta Maskaliūnaitė, Deividas Šlekys and Vaidotas Urbelis "Challenges of international struggle against terrorism to Lithuania".⁴

Parliamentary investigation of the SSD activities conducted in 2006 resulted in the release of publicly available information on the internal structure and processes inside the SSD. The investigation also sparked public discussions and generated interest of politicians in intelligence services. One indirect outcome of this investigation was a set of suggestions and evaluations prepared in 2007 by the Conservatives party "Problemos VSD ir galimi jų sprendimo būdai [Problems in the SSD and possible ways to solve them]"⁵. Other political parties so far have not gone beyond making several public statements on the current state of affairs in the SSD. Intelligence is not even mentioned in their election manifestos or party programmes.

Military intelligence enjoy even less attention than the SSD. Directors of SID are almost absent in the mass media, their activities rarely provoke open reactions of politicians. The only book on the subject of military intelligence is "Žvalgybų intrigos Lietuvoje, 1994-2006 [Intelligence intrigues in Lithuania],

² Bagdonas G. "Slaptųjų žvalgybos tarnybų vaidmuo ir kontrolė demokratinėje valstybėje [The role of secrets services in democratic states and their control] ", Kardas, 2 (419), 2006, p.10-16.

³ Paukštė A. "Terorizmas ir jo prevencija Lietuvoje [Terrorism and its prevention in Lithuania]", PhD thesis, Romer University. - Vilnius, 2006.

⁴ Račius E., Maskaliūnaitė A., Šlekys D., Urbelis V. *Tarptautinės antiteroristinės kovos iššūkių Lietuvai analizė* [Challenges of international struggle against terrorism to Lithuania], Vilnius, Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 2007.

⁵ Tèvynės Sąjunga "Problemos VSD ir galimi jų sprendimo būdai [Problems in the SSD and possible ways to solve them]", http://www.naujadarbotvarke.lt/?id=23&pg=&nid=40

1994-2006"⁶, written by journalist Gintaras Visockas and former SID official Kestutis Kaminskas. Although well written, this book contains huge doses of untrustworthy information and cannot be regarded as a reliable source of information for this article.

The history of intelligence is more widely discussed topic in academic community. In 1993 Arvydas Anušauskas published a comprehensive survey of interwar intelligence "Lietuvos slaptosios tarnybos, 1918-1940 [Lithuanian secret services], 1918-1940". In his study Anušauskas describes the scope and activities of Lithuanian intelligence service before WWII with special emphasis on their internal structure and relations with foreign intelligence services. The special issue of the journal "Krašto apsaugos [National Defence]" looks even further – to the times of Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the role of intelligence in the Middle Ages⁸.

Post war period and the fight against Soviet occupation is less covered when interwar years. Lithuanian historians frequently discuss methods used by NKVD (later KGB) to suppress Lithuanian armed resistance but fail to describe in more detail organisational structure of partisan movement and their intelligence collection capabilities.

For the Cold War period, the additional source of information are recollections of former members of intelligence services. Not all of them are entirely reliable but most of them provide us with very practical and concrete examples of intelligence activities. Quite a number of such publications directly or indirectly mention Lithuania. Most known examples are the book based by information provided by the former KGB officer Sergey Tretyakov *Comrade J.*, recollections of the former member of the CIA Milt Bearden, *The Main Enemy. The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB*¹⁰, Christopher's Andrew book based on documents smuggled by Vasilyi Mitrochin *The Sword and the Shield*¹¹ and even the first publication of former Lithuanian KGB officer Ričardas Vaigauskas *Slaptajame protų kare: tarybinio žvalgo prisiminimai [Secret War of Minds: Recollections of a Former Soviet Spy]*¹².

Overall, the Lithuanian intelligence system has not become a subject of academic analysis. Interwar period is satisfactory covered by the publications of Anušauskas but modern intelligence system is of interest only to the dozen of politicians and former members of intelligence services.

Visockas G., Kaminskas K. Žvalgybų intrigos Lietuvoje, 1994-2006 [Intelligence intrigues in Lithuania, 1994-2006], Vilnius: Spauda, 2006.

Anušauskas A. Lietuvos slaptosios tarnybos, 1918-1940 [Lithuanian secret services, 1918-1940], Vilnius: Mintis, 1993.

⁸ Žvalgyba Lietuvos didžiojoje kunigaikštystėje [Intelligence in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania]. Krašto apsauga, Nr. 18 (147), 2008, p.17-18.

⁹ Early P. Comrade J, P.Putnam's Sons, New York, 2007.

¹⁰ Bearden M., Risen J. The Main Enemy. The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB. New York: Ballantine Books, 2004.

¹¹ Andrew Ch, Mitrokhin V. The Sword and the Shield, Basic Books, New York, 2001.

¹² Vaigauskas R. Slaptajame protų kare: tarybinio žvalgo prisiminimai [Secret War of Minds: Recollections of a Former Soviet Spy]. Vilnius: Politika, 2005.

2. Institutional Structure of Lithuanian Intelligence

The history of modern intelligence in Lithuania starts in 1990. On 26 March 1990, the Government of the Republic of Lithuania established a State Security Department under the Government. The SSD several time changed its name but the present system was codified in 1994, when the Seimas passed the Law on the State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania and on the same year the Government adopted the Statute of the State Security Department. The Law claims that the SCD objective is "to protect the sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania and its constitutionally established system of government". The Art.1 of the Law declared that the SSD is a state institution accountable to the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania and the President of the Republic. Such double accountability later became persisting problem for overall intelligence system.

After reestablishment, the first immediate task for the SSD was to recruit and train newly appointed inexperienced personnel to undertake intelligence missions. In the first years SCD accepted people with different background,, some of them were former members of Soviet economic police or even KGB¹³. The SSD lacked training facilities while international cooperation was just beginning to emerge. The CIA was the first to show interests in setting up contacts with newly established intelligence agency. CIA official Michael Sulick later recalled that at that time Lithuanians had no clue on the collection, processing and production of intelligence:

Laurinkus, [the chief of the new Lithuanian intelligence service] and Butkevicius [the new minister of defence] [...] both confessed to knowing little about intelligence. Laurinkus, who spoke some English and had visited friends in Massachusetts several times in the recent past, showed me two paperbacks. "This is all I know about intelligence. They are my guides but I think we need more," he laughed nervously. Neither book would make CIA's recommended reading list. One was the "CIA Diary" by Philip Agee, an exposé by an Agency-officer-turned-traitor who cooperated with Cuban intelligence to reveal the identities of CIA officers. The other was "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" by John Marks and Victor Marchetti, a harsh critique of the Agency published in 1974. Max¹⁴ had bought both in a Boston bookstore after learning he would be tapped to run the nation's spy service.¹5

In addition to the lack of experience, the SCD also suffered from rapidly changing leadership. Until 1993 the SCD was led by Mečys Laurinkus, Danukas Arlauskas, Viktoras Zedelis, Balys Gajauskas, Petras Plumpa. Only in 1993 with the appointment of Jurgis Jurgelis, the SSD entered the era of

¹³ Interview by Visockas with Virginijus Česnuliavičius, "Slaptieji takai [Secret Paths]" "XXI amžius", 20 November, 2007, N.9.

¹⁴ MAX – Nickname of Laurinkus.

¹⁵ Sulick M.J. "As the USSR Collapsed: A CIA Officer in Lithuania Remembering 15 Years Ago", Studies in Intelligence, 50(2),

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-50no2/html files/CIA Lithuania 1.htm

relative stability. Jurgelis served as Director General for five, his successor Laurinkus – for six years.

The military intelligence officially was re-established on 1 June 1990. The Second branch of the National Defence Department (which later became Ministry of Defence) was tasked to monitor location, movement and activities of remaining Soviet armed forces. Later responsibilities were more clearly divided. The SID was tasked with strategic intelligence and counterintelligence, while the armed forces developed integral intelligence capabilities for their own operational needs. Military intelligence was confronted with similar challenges as the SSD – it lacked experienced and trained professionals.

Newly re-established intelligence institutions several times changed their names, functions and responsibilities but since 1994 only minor changes occurred. The SID transferred several not intelligence related function to the Armed forces (e.g., protection of VIP's, interrogation) but its main functions remained intact. Armed Forces intelligence was slightly reorganized in 2008 when J2 was moved from the Defence Staff of Ministry of Defence to Joint staff, which is responsible for conduct of operations and exercises. The SSD also conducted several internal reorganizations and in 2006 established Department for the Fight against Terrorism.

Creation of a legal and institutional framework was completed after the Parliament in 2000 passed the Law on Intelligence. The Law stated the principal goals of intelligence are as follows:

- To supply the State institutions, which safeguard the national security of the Republic of Lithuania, with the intelligence information, necessary to perform their functions;
- To create favourable conditions for the implementation of the national security and foreign policies of the Republic of Lithuania;
- To determine, reduce or eliminate the threats to national security and the risk factors arising from abroad

These tasks could be interpreted quite widely. First of all, the Law speaks about "creation of favourable conditions," which implies an active role of intelligence services in political, economic, financial and other areas of political life. This principal goal could also encompass non-intelligence related matters such as image building or investment climate. In these areas intelligence services may be important but not the leading institution.

Secondly, the Law emphasizes a close linkage between intelligence and foreign policy. Intelligence information is vital for making foreign policy decisions. Surprisingly this important statement is not reflected in other articles and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Law is not mentioned at all.

Thirdly, the Law asks intelligence services to determine, reduce or eliminate the threats from abroad. This statement encompasses not only counterintelligence but also active measures including covert action in foreign countries. Surprisingly, the Law mentions only threats that come "from abroad" but does not mention threats "from inside". Considering that the SSD has considerable

powers in the area of law enforcement, the Law fails to mention one important activity of intelligence agencies.

All these contradiction do not preclude intelligence service from performing their principal tasks. Although not entirely sound, Lithuanian legislature established a solid legal framework for successful functioning of intelligence community.

2.1. Institutional Arrangements

All intelligence agencies are organized according their tasks, methods, issues or domains their where they have specific authority to act. Types and numbers of intelligence services vary from country to country. This article distinguishes following dividing lines between different services:

- According to area of expertise military and non-military intelligence services;
- According to information collection methods all source intelligence agencies and specialized agencies (e.g. signal or communication information);
- According to aim to gain information (intelligence) and to deny information (counterintelligence).

In practice, the number of intelligence agencies range from 16 in the US to just 1. Bjorn Muller-Wille suggested that almost all countries have one or several agencies that support decision-makers in the following intelligence functions¹⁶.

- Military intelligence collects and assesses information on actual and potential activities of foreign military forces within and outside its own territory. National agencies producing this kind of intelligence are in general placed under the authority of the ministry of defence.
- Security intelligence surveys (domestic) threats targeting the governmental functions defined in the constitution (or equivalent). It is, amongst other things, engaged in surveying counter-espionage, left-wing' and `right-wing' extremist activities and terrorism.
- Criminal intelligence engages in the fight against serious and organised crime. It differs from the other functions in the respect that it is linked to criminal investigations, which aim at producing evidence that can result in conviction in a court of law.
- External or foreign intelligence, finally, focuses on the development in foreign countries. It supports decision-making on foreign policy in general and produces situation assessments on issues in the fields of security, defence, foreign and economic policies.

¹⁶ Muller-Wille B. "For our Eyes Only? Shaping an intelligence community within the EU", European Union Insitute for Security Studies, Occasional paper N.50, January 2004, p. 8-9

Almost no country in the world could maintain a number of intelligence agencies for each intelligence function. In most countries separate military and non-military security agencies exist but in Norway, Finland, Sweden or Denmark all foreign intelligence collection falls under the responsibility of the Ministries of Defence¹⁷. Many countries maintain intelligence agencies that specialise in one collection method (e.g. signals intelligence) but most small countries are not in the position to allow themselves such a luxury.

Despite different institutional arrangements most European states maintain at least a security intelligence / counterintelligence service (similar to the SSD in Lithuania) and military intelligence service (similar to SID). In addition most countries maintain intelligence services that serve operational needs of the armed forces. The US Army Intelligence or Intelligence Corps in the United Kingdom are good examples of such organisations. Intelligence community could also include criminal or economic intelligence services such as Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence under the Department of the Treasury or Drug Enforcement Administration under the Department of Justice in the US.

The Law on Intelligence states that in Lithuania, only two state institutions shall have intelligence services: 1) The State Security Department; 2) The Second Investigation Department under the Ministry of National Defence. According to the Law the SSD and the SID are all source intelligence. They both have separate counterintelligence divisions and they are allowed to collect necessary information abroad and inside the country.

According to the Law, the SSD and the SID divide their responsibilities strictly along functional lines. The SID is purely military intelligence, while the SSD performs all remaining function, including foreign intelligence and security intelligence / counterintelligence. Surprisingly, the Law does not include into intelligence community armed forces intelligence or criminal and economic intelligence.

The institutional framework of the Lithuanian intelligence system has a number of advantages. The responsibilities and functions of both services are clearly divided and intelligence community is not fragmented into many competing agencies. From the other side, the SSD functions are too broad and combine foreign / security / counter intelligence and law enforcement functions. This arrangement is not typical for democratic countries.

Lithuanian politicians quite frequently come up with ideas on how to change the current arrangement. For example the former chief of the SSD Laurinkus suggested separating foreign and security intelligence. In his opinion "we shall have a fresh look at the functions of the SSD. The SSD has to maintain

¹⁷ Gintaras Bagdonas, Žvalgybinės ir teisėsauginės veiklos tarpusavio santykio nustatymo svarba: užsienio šalių patirtis [Relations between Intelligence and Law enforcement: experience of other nations], Conference "To be or not to be: the Place of the Law on Operational Activities in Lithuanian legal system", 26 May 2006, Vilnius

only foreign and counterintelligence functions". ¹⁸ The ruling Conservative party suggest separating intelligence from counterintelligence. In their opinion the SSD could became counterintelligence service. ¹⁹

Different modifications to the current arrangements could be implemented in Lithuanian, although reform of intelligence system must respect several important principles. On one hand, there is no need to create a highly fragmented system with many competing agencies. Creation of new services increase administrative burden and not always enhance effectiveness of the system. On the other hand, the creation of one intelligence service would abolish healthy competition between the SSD and the SID (e.g. security in Russia currently is of interest to both services). Most countries try to maintain competitive analysis. Mark Lowenthal claims that "there is belief that by having analysts in several agencies who have different backgrounds and perspectives work on an issue, parochial views more likely will be countered—if not weeded out and proximate reality is more likely to be achieved." Forced consensus could lead to acceptable to all parties, but not provocative or acute intelligence.

Most likely the Lithuanian intelligence community will be restructured and enlarged by new members. However this enlargement must take place only in the areas where is considerable lack of intelligence information. The current institutional arrangements could be revised but they shall not fundamentally change the current system.

2.2. Subordination

Almost all intelligence services in the world are subordinate to heads of states and governments, while ministers of defence in most cases exercise control over military intelligence. Subordination to the highest state officials is necessary due to the extreme sensitivity of intelligence matters (especially in the case of covert action). A high level of subordination also assures that security / foreign policy decision makers can assure political control of their activities.

In Lithuania, subordination of the SID to the Minister of Defence corresponds to the practice of most democratic states. The Minister of Defence has the right to task the SID, evaluate its performance and appoint or dismiss Director of the SID. Direct subordination does not imply that the Minister in person is the main consumer for intelligence, but he shall maintain political control over the agency.

The SSD is accountable to the Seimas and the President of the Republic. Such double accountability creates many questions about tasking, control and

¹⁸ Slaptieji agentai neišsivaduoja iš įtakų verpeto [Secret agents cannot escape whirlwinds of different influences]. Kauno diena, 16 September, 2006, 212 (17976).

¹⁹ Juknevičienė Rasa: Rimtų problemų sprendimas tik imituojamas [Solutions of real problems is simulated], May 15 2008, http://www.bernardinai.lt/index.php?url=articles/78819

²⁰ Lowenthal M. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, (3rd Edition), Washington DC: CQ Press, 2005, p.8

supervision of the SSD. The question asked by Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister of Great Britain in 1940 "Who is in charge?" or in other words "Who speaks on behalf of intelligence agencies?" is extremely acute in Lithuania.

No clear subordination mechanism raises irritation among experts and even politicians. Member of Seimas and vice chairwomen of the Conservative party Rasa Juknevičienė once noticed "first of all we have solve subordination issue. Nobody gives the SSD clear guidance and nobody is held accountable for what they are doing". The Conservative party rightly notices that the President's only adviser on intelligence issue is seconded from the SSD and the Seimas is too busy to exercise day-to-day control of the SSD. As a consequence the SSD operates separately from other institutes of the Government.

Former chief of the SSD, Laurinkus, also raises similar concern. In his opinion now the SSD feeds with information three highest state officials and it is not quite clear who gets what kind of information and when. Laurinkus suggest establishing one institution that would supervise activities of the SSD.²⁴

The majority of experts suggest making the SSD directly accountable only to the Prime Minister. Such an arrangement would help to supply the Government with timely intelligence information. Juknevičienė pointed out that according to the Constitution, the Government is responsible for the safeguarding of the state security therefore is it logical that the SSD would be place under the Prime Minister. ²⁵ Others argue that current arrangements could be kept, but the Government shall every year issue some kind of guidance to the SSD. The third option is the establishment of British type Cabinet Office Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and assuring better involvement of Minister of Foreign Affairs into intelligence guiding process. The forth option would delegate more responsibility to the President who according to the Constitution shall decide the basic issues of foreign policy and, together with the Government, conduct foreign policy. Such an arrangement would be logical if the SSD is relinquished from security intelligence function and becomes foreign intelligence service.

2.3. Coordination of Intelligence Activities

Coordination of intelligence efforts could be conducted using two basic concepts: hierarchical and non-hierarchical coordination. The JIC and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) represents the difference between the British system of cabinet government based on consensus and the American Presidential system of greater personal power and responsibility.²⁶

²¹ Herman M. Intelligence Services in the Information Age. London: Frank Cass, 2005. p.132

²² Juknevičienė, op.cit.

²³ Tėvynės sajunga, op.cit.

²⁴ Slaptieji agentai neišsivaduoja iš įtakų verpeto. op.cit.

²⁵ Juknevičienė, op.cit.

²⁶ Herman, op.cit., p.133

- Non-hierarchical coordination. Overall intelligence coordination of MI 5, MI 6, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) is undertaken by the JIC²⁷. Great Britain does not have a central analytic agency. British rely on departmental rather than central arrangements, and to interdepartmental consensus as epitomized in the working of the JIC.²⁸
- Hierarchical model. The US system clear defines DNI as the highest intelligence official. DNI is the United States government official subject to the authority of the President and responsible for Overseeing and directing the National Intelligence Program²⁹. Two other important actors secretaries of state and defence control significant intelligence assets other which DNI has only very limited control.

The Lithuanian system does not correspond to either of these models. In Lithuania there does not exist the "director of national intelligence" and a JIC type coordination system is also missing. Existence of only two intelligence agencies in theory makes the coordination process mush easier but still many discrepancies exists.

According to the Law on Intelligence, the State Defence Council (SDC) is responsible for coordination of intelligence activities. The SDC consists of the President, the Prime Minister, the Chairman of the Seimas, the Minister of Defence and the Commander of the Armed Forces. However the Law on the State Defence Council clearly states that decision of the Council are not obligatory and the Council has no executive powers. Furthermore, the absence of ministers of foreign affairs and internal affairs preclude the SDC from becoming even unofficial coordination mechanism.

Exclusion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) from the intelligence process is extremely ridiculous keeping in mind that MFA is the main consumers of foreign intelligence. Timely intelligence has essential value in complex international negotiations. The MFA also has a large network of embassies that collect vast amounts of information. Despite these obvious facts, the Law on Intelligence does not even mention the MFA. Consequently the MFA has no internal structure, which could request, task, or evaluate intelligence information. The MFA tries to fill this gap by procuring some services from think tanks but this could not be considered as a substitute for intelligence.

Other consumers of intelligence production, the President and the Prime Minister, are even less involved in the intelligence process. Their staff do not contain personnel dedicated to work with intelligence (one SSD officer works for the President but it is doubtful that he can provide the President with independent advice). Bearing these circumstances in mind it comes as no surprise that confirmation procedure of the Annual Intelligence Plan in the SDC is pure formality.

²⁷ Todd and Boch, op.cit. p.105.

²⁸ Herman, op.cit, p.132

²⁹ Stratfor US: Strenghtening the Power of ODNI. 31 June 2008, http://www.stratfor.biz/analysis/u_s_strenghtening power odni.htm

2.4. Internal structure

Intelligence agencies rarely disclose their internal structure and methods of collection. But despite secrecy some obvious common principle exist how intelligence agencies organise their work. It is highly unlikely that Lithuania would constitute an exception from this general rule. The author presumes that both the SSD and SID have the following division:

- Foreign intelligence division that using secret, diplomatic, foreign and open channels makes analytical assessments on foreign countries or territories.
- Counterintelligence division. The SID is responsible for counterintelligence only within defence structures while range of activities for SSD is much broader.
- Security service division that do not fall under the counterintelligence. The SSD for this purpose has established divisions that deals with economic security and fight against terrorism. The SID is unlikely to focus on this function but most probably has dedicated staffs that observe the psychological atmosphere in military units or operations.
- International cooperation departments. Their importance increased after Lithuania became member of NATO and the EU and the information exchange with allies and partners increased substantially.
- Divisions specialising in one information gathering method (e.g. signal intelligence). Lithuania is not able to procure most sophisticated and expensive information collection systems (e.g. satellites) but in certain areas her abilities are quite impressive.
- Administrative divisions responsible for financial issues, personnel policy, public relations, etc.

Armed forces intelligence is organised differently – they usually have a small central headquarters. The rest of their personnel is serving in military units ("second sections") and are subordinated to local commanders while central staff is responsible for their preparation as intelligence officers. In the Lithuanian armed forces each military unit also has "second section", but none of intelligence officers could be called as Chief of the armed forces intelligence. Chief of J2 in the Joint Staff is the highest intelligence officer by rank but Joint Staff's responsibilities are limited only to the organisation of exercises and conduct of operations.

2.5. Resources

Capabilities of intelligence agencies largely depend on available human and financial resources to conduct their activities. Modern technologies are expensive, therefore large intelligence agencies allocate huge amounts of money for acquisition and modernisation projects. But the most important is the human factor, including motivation and quality of staff. Intelligence agencies compete in the open market with private and other governmental institutions for qualified personnel. For example, a specialist of signal intelligence is welcome in telecommunication sector, cryptanalysts may easily apply their knowledge in personnel security or banking sectors. Strong competition with the commercial sector forces intelligence agencies to allocate increasing amount of funds to personnel expenditures instead of investing in technological development.

In Lithuania the first people to join the intelligence service in the early nineties were specialists with security or law enforcement backgrounds (economic police, military, police, etc.), also physicist and historians. In 1997, after the establishment of the Special Investigation Service most people with economic background left the SSD for the new agency. In late nineties both intelligence services started to admit increasing number of social science students, especially from Vilnius University, Institute of International Relations and Political Science. The SSD is still inviting young students to join the service in the hope to prepare them as intelligence specialists later. Not surprisingly, the average age in the SSD is only 30 years.³⁰ Lack of experience for several decades will remain a limiting factor for the production of quality intelligence.

The financing of Lithuanian intelligence agencies is constantly increasing. Allocations for the SSD are open for public while SID's budget is classified.

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
The SSD	9.6	13.0	13.6	10.1	15.9	18.8	19.7	22.0	18,3
Communication Centre under the SSD	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.8	1.8	2.0	2.2	3.3	2,3

Table 1. Budget of the SSD (mln. euro)

Compared to other countries, Lithuania's expenditures on intelligence are small. Investment budget of the SSD is only 5.8 mln. euro (this does not include expenditures for infrastructure). It is highly unlikely that the SSD is able invest into modern surveillance and information collection technologies or buy expensive services from private sector.

Budget data allows making approximate estimation of the number of people working for intelligence services. Taking into consideration that the SSD spends on personnel 10 mln. euro, it is reasonable to assume that less when 600 people are working for the SSD. In total, including the SID and other related services, Lithuanian intelligence community most probably does not exceed one thousand personnel.

³⁰ VSD bandys atsikratyti jiems nebūdingų funkcijų [The SSD will get rid of not typical functions], January 30, 2006, http://www.sekunde.lt/content.php?p=read&tid=27947

3. Intelligence Cycle in Lithuania

In their daily work all intelligence agencies follow a five-step process called the Intelligence Cycle. Intelligence cycle refers to the steps in intelligence from the perception of requirements to the delivery of production. As the CIA describes it, this process ensures the agency does the job correctly through a system of checks and balances. The following stages are essential:

- *Setting requirements*. It means defining area and issues that policy makers and intelligence communities consider requiring intelligence support.
- *Collection.* Information is collected overtly (openly) and covertly (secretly). It includes all available collection methods from open sources to satellite collection.
- *Processing*. All the information collected is processed (interpreted) before it is put into an intelligence report. This could be anything from a translating a document to a description of a satellite photo.
- Analysis and Production. During this step intelligence agencies take a closer look at all the information and determine how it fits together, while concentrating on answering the original tasking.
- Dissemination. In this final step, intelligence agencies give final written
 analysis to a policymaker, to the same policymaker who started the
 cycle.

Lowenthal, in his book "Intelligence: from Secrets to Policy" adds two additional steps: consumption, and feedback³¹. He claims that policy makers are not blank slates that are impelled by the actions of intelligence. Policy makers consume intelligence in different ways and these differences might lead to diverse understanding on what intelligence production is saying. After all, policy makers can give intelligence feedback of how their requirements were met and what improvements could be made.

In the modern era, almost all intelligence professionals study the Intelligence Cycle as a kind of model of how intelligence functions. Yet it is not a particularly strict model, since the cyclical pattern does not always describe what really happens. Hulnick noted that the practice is frequently different from theory: Policy officials rarely give collection guidance. Collection and analysis, which are supposed to work in tandem, in fact work more properly in parallel. Finally, the idea that decision makers wait for intelligence before making policy decisions is equally controversial. In the modern era, policy officials seem to want intelligence to support policy rather than to inform it. ³² Despite criticism, in the absence of alternative approaches, the intelligence cycle remains the main intellectual tool of producing and delivering intelligence to decision makers.

³¹ Lowenthal, op.cit., p.54..

³² Hulnick A.S. What's Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle, Intelligence and National Security, (6) 216, 2006, p.959-960

3.1. Setting the requirements

Setting requirements is the first important step in the intelligence cycle. Requirements derive from national policies and are closely tied to security policy objectives and national interests. In some cases they are clearly articulated in official documents, e.g. national security strategies, but frequently they are dictated by current events. Policy makers have a constant need for tailored (meaning written for their specific needs), timely intelligence that will provide background, context, information, warning, and an assessment of risks, benefits, and likely outcomes. Their needs are met by subject matter experts – namely the intelligence community. ³³

Earlier chapters already highlighted that Lithuania lacks mechanisms for setting requirements to intelligence services. The President, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs do not possess dedicated staff and authority to fulfil this important task. Consequently intelligence services are left for themselves, i.e. they set requirements, produce intelligence and evaluate their own performance. Malakauskas once declared that:

The problem in Lithuanian is setting the requirements. [...] Nobody set tasks and goals for the SSD, nobody recommends what information has to be collected and where to do this – in the north or in the south. We should establish mechanism [...] It is not intelligence responsible for what we investigate, it is political decisions. These decisions have to be made and we all have to agree before proceeding further.³⁴

Similar problems exist also in the Ministry of National Defence. The Minister formally sets goals and requirements to the SID but in really he does not possess qualified personnel able to advise him on these issues. In such circumstances, implementation of the intelligence cycle becomes extremely dependant on the personality of the minister. If he thinks he does not need intelligence information or intelligence information contradicts his political aims, the SID starts working almost in vain.

Policy officials also tend to concentrate their attention on current issues and forget long term developments on which they rarely give collection guidance. Therefore intelligence could not be limited to very strict tasking, some kind of flexibility must be kept. Malakauskas once notices "if I would sit and wait for orders until I received formal tasking, it would already be too late to do something". ³⁵ In his opinion the SSD must become proactive, not consequence management services:

If an intelligence service will just wait for request for information this will not work because you cannot request something until you have some information. Intelligence services must supply decision makers with information that can allow them to make judgements and formulate requests. The world practice shows that if we do not

³³ Lowenthal, op.cit., p.57.

³⁴ Seimas discussion on the appointment of Povilas Malakauskas as the Director General of the SSD. May 24, 2007.

³⁵ Lithuanian Television "Be Pykčio [Without Anger]", October 9, 2007.

do this, we will receive tasking only after the new threat has already materialised and we have to deal with its consequences. 36

Such a challenge is common for all intelligence services. The only solution is frequent but not too intimate contacts between intelligence producers and consumers. In Lithuania this would mean more active participation of key decisions makers in setting requirements phase of intelligence cycle and more active role of intelligence agencies in educating their consumers on value and specifics of their production.

3.2. Collection

In theory, collection derives directly from requirements. Once requirements and priorities have been established, the necessary intelligence must be collected. Not every issue requires the same types of collection support. Some requirements will be better met by specific types of collection, but most of them may require the use of several or even all types of collection. As Lowenthal pointed out, the key question is who is doing what and how much can or should be collected to meet each requirement. For example, concerns over a possible threat from cyber attacks likely derive little useful intelligence from imagery but much better intelligence might be derived from signals intelligence, which can reveal capabilities or intentions of possible adversary.³⁷

Collection methods are so important that even professionals often chose to categorise intelligence according to the means by which it was collected. According to Bjorn Muller-Wille this distinction makes perfect sense, since one must utilise different means and methods to collect different kinds of information. The most common categories of intelligence sources or collection disciplines are³⁸:

- Human intelligence (HUMINT), which is derived from human sources, is the oldest form of intelligence collection. It can be obtained through espionage, but the bulk is provided by diplomatic reporting, own field staff, or by the local population.
- Imagery intelligence (IMINT) is information from various kinds of images (from photographic, radar, infra-red and other types of imaging devices) that are taken by e.g. persons, aircraft or satellites.
- Signals intelligence (SIGINT) intercepts electronic signals of all type. It provides the ability to "listen" to communications (when needed after encryption), as well as to locate the source of the emission.
- Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is published media and other publicly available information, e.g. internet.

³⁶ Seimas discussion on the appointment of Povilas Malakauskas as the Director General of the SSD. May 24, 2007.

³⁷ Lowenthal, op.cit., p.59.

³⁸ Muller-Wille, op.cit.

Each collection method can provide unique perspective to one or another issue. One of the major advantages of having multiple means of collection is that one system or discipline can provide tips or clues that can be further collected against by other systems. Intelligence community answer to this call by producing all-source intelligence, or fusion intelligence, that is, intelligence based on as many collection sources as possible³⁹.

In theory the SSD and the SID are allowed to collect intelligence using all available means but in practice due to their small budget and lack of well trained people. They must to a high degree rely on information provided by allies and partners. Small size and limited financial capabilities prevent them from developing independent satellite intelligence or extensive human intelligence networks.

- SIGINT has long traditions in Lithuania her intelligence started to listen to phone conversation already in 1921.⁴⁰ There is no reliable information on current SIGINT capabilities although Visockas and Kaminskas mention radio intelligence division within the SID.⁴¹
- IMINT relies in domestic capabilities within the SSD and the SID and on information provided by allies. Some IMINT activities because of their closely link to HUMINT operation are kept in high secrecy.
- HUMINT is the most secret area of intelligence activities. It is widely believed that intelligence services of foreign countries, especially Russia, has invested strongly into developing their HUMINT networks in Lithuania. Lithuanian capabilities are not well known although Russia from time to time accuses her citizens for spying for Lithuania. For example, in 2008 Russia accused Vasiliy Chitriuk for selling information about Russian armed forces and location of their units. 42
- OSINT is cheapest (although not as cheap as one might imagine) intelligence collection discipline. Lithuania is paying considerable attention to this area and is quite hard investing in preparation of OSINT specialists.

3.3. Processing

Collection alone produces information, not intelligence. Information must undergo processing and exploitation before it can be regarded as intelligence and given to analysts. This step in the intelligence cycle involves translating raw data collected by collection discipline into understandable material or data that could be used by analysts. Processing involves decoding

³⁹ Lowenthal, op.cit., p.70

⁴⁰ Anu auskas, op.cit., p.56.

⁴¹ Visockas, Kaminskas, op.cit.p.109-110.

⁴² "Kaliningrade - tariamos Lietuvos žvalgybos byla [In Kaliningrad – supposed case for Lithuanian intelligence]", *Vakarų ekspresas*, January 17, 2008.

encrypted signals, interpreting photographs or translating foreign language material. Not surprisingly, processing requires huge workload and not all collected information is processed in a way suitable for further analysis. As a result a lot of collected information is never being used and efforts to collect the date are in vein.

Processing of available information for small countries is a real challenge. Small countries in order to understand and explain acquired information must recruit wide range of specialists from interpreters to photographers. In many cases intelligence services have to rely solely on the expertise of their colleagues from other countries, e.g. interpretation of satellite images.

Translation from foreign languages puts additional strain on limited human resources. Terrorism expert from the SSD R. Valančius once admitted "we have troubles with foreign languages but situation is getting better. SSD's officials are studying Arabic, Turkish"⁴³. Language specialists are also crucial in international operations for tactical human intelligence functions. Lithuania's strength is a good knowledge of Eastern European especially Slavic languages. Taking into consideration Russia's expansion into former Soviet Union space, this may become serious advantage, even specialisation, of Lithuanian intelligence services.

3.4. Analysis

Identifying requirements, conducting collection, and processing it is meaningless unless the intelligence is given to analysts who are experts in their respective fields and can turn the intelligence into reports that respond to the needs of the policy makers. Analysis in an intellectual exercise that translates collected and processed information into a final product – assessment, forecast or evaluation of current or future state of affairs. There are two type of intelligence analysis: current intelligence focuses on issues that are at the current political agenda and require immediate attention. Long term intelligence deals with trends and issues that are important but not receive current attention of policy makers. Constant tension exists between long term and current intelligence. Lowenthal claims that a 50-50 ratio could be the goal⁴⁴.

Intelligence agencies conduct their analysis trying to exploit data provided from human, technical or open sources. Analysts add to this his knowledge, experience and in some cases common sense. Good analyst does not base his analysis merely on technical data – to understand the world of international security the analysts must employ high degree of common wisdom or even personal feeling of particular situation. Intelligence is first of all about human decisions, therefore good analysts always takes into account human factor and cultural aspects of certain scenarios.

⁴³ Valančius R. Terorizmo prevencija [Prevention of Terrorism], seminar on Suicide Terrorism, Lithuanian Military Academy, May 19, 2006.

⁴⁴ Lowethal, op.cit., p.61.

It must be noted, that methodology of producing long term or current intelligence is in no way different from methodology used by social sciences. Therefore, as Shulski observed, in the absence of a particular piece of secret information, or of a specialized method of analysis, the intelligence analyst's judgment often does not have any special entitlement to be accepted over the judgment of anyone else. 45 A certain amount of intelligence analysis may be no more sophisticated than current conventional wisdom on a given issue. For example, long term analysis on the future developments in China or Russia prepared by intelligence agencies has almost the same value as the publication of major think tank based in America or Europe unless intelligence analysts have particular type of secret information that substantially changes his forecast. Another example: diplomatic reports on the political situation in the host country can be important inputs to any political analysis. A diplomat who has good access to major political figures in a country or a sophisticated appreciation of the country's history and political makeup should be able to provide insights into the internal political situation that would not be found elsewhere. 46

Not surprisingly the former US secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld went to great lengths to define the limits of the analysts' opinions. "If you think about it, what comes out of intelligence is not fixed, firm, conclusions. What comes out are a speculation, an analysis, probabilities, possibilities, estimates. Best guesses." ⁴⁷ Due to inherited unreliability of intelligence (especially on longer term developments) policy makers are free to reject or to ignore the intelligence they are offered. They may suffer penalties down the road if their policy leads to bad outcomes, but policy makers cannot be forced to take heed of intelligence. After all they are responsible for good or bad decisions, not intelligence community.

Notwithstanding serious shortcomings of long term intelligence, Lithuania is heavily investing into analysts, who are able to understand and draw conclusions from nationally or with the help of allies collected information. Investment into analysis is the investment into people, their motivation and skills. Lithuanian strength in this area could be excellent knowledge history and geostrategic environment of her neighbours, comprehension of their political culture and languages. Small countries frequently have much better understanding of their regional peculiarities comparing to larger but more distant states.

Until now Lithuania is not making the best use of its analytical assets. For example the decision to assume command of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in the Ghowr province of Afghanistan was made without requesting any support from intelligence agencies. Therefore the first stages of preparation for the mission did not fully take into consideration culture, history and traditions of local population and it took years to rectify this problem.

⁴⁵ Shulski, op.cit., p.137.

⁴⁶ Shulski, op.cit., p.39.

⁴⁷ Jack D. "Intelligence Analysts and Policymakers: Benefits and Dangers of Tensions in the Relationship", Intelligence and National Security, (6)21, 2006, p.1001.

3.5. Dissemination

Dissemination involves moving intelligence production from producers to consumers. The product line ranges from bulletins on fast braking and important events to studies that may take a year or more to complete⁴⁸. Current intelligence is especially important for diplomats that are engaged in complex negotiations, where knowledge of your opponents' position may switch the balance in negotiations to your favour. In contrast military force planners are more interested in long term forecast that could influence armed forces development plans.

Diverse needs and bureaucratic culture determined different approaches to whom and how much intelligence is distributed. In most case intelligence is distributed to top decision makers – presidents, prime ministers, ministers and their staffs. For example, the US intelligence community distributes the following intelligence products:

- President's Daily Brief is delivered every morning to the President of the US;
- Senior Executive Intelligence Brief is distribution more widely and is prepared by CIA;
- The Military Intelligence Digest is prepared by DIA and concentrates on military issues but to certain extend overlap with Senior Executive Intelligence Brief;
- National Intelligence Estimates represents consolidate opinion of intelligence community on long term developments. It attempts to estimate the likely direction of an issue in the future.

Down the chain of command officials received more focussed and tailored intelligence that meets their specific needs.

All these products must be timely and understandably transmitted to intelligence consumers and it is up to them to decide where and how to use this information. In Lithuania, intelligence agencies are making only the first steps in establishing operational system for dissemination of intelligence production.

	aan	(ID)	
	SSD	SID	
Long term analysis	No	Annual threat assessment	
Midterm analysis	Informational briefing (several times a week) to highest officials.	Evaluated of geostrategic trends (not regularly) to highest defence officials.	
Short term analysis	Assessment of current events submitted to highest officials and their staffs.	Assessment of current operations (several time a week) submitted to the Minister of Defence and his staff	
		Assessment of moods in the armed forces submitted to Minister	

Table 2. Intelligence products of the SSD and the SID

⁴⁸ Lowenthal, op.cit., p.62.

Model of dissemination in Lithuania is not very different from other countries but several unusual characteristics could be observed:

- The SSD does not produce long term analytical documents. This cold be explained by the absence of tasking (nobody asked) and by involvement of the SSD into law enforcement affairs. Law enforcement function requires the SSD to collect evidences that could be used in courts and limits its ability to produce long term analysis;
- Absence of joint intelligence estimates. Joint activities could be pursued in many areas, e.g. assessment of Russia's security policies or situation in Lithuanian led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan;
- Existing long and mid-term intelligence is not linked to strategy. For example, Lithuanian national security strategy was prepared without taking due account of threat assessment prepared by intelligence community;
- The President and the Prime minister do not receive daily intelligence brief.

Existing shortcoming reveal that the intelligence community enjoy a vast scope of unused opportunities to satisfy needs of intelligence consumers. The SSD and the SID must create more sophisticated dissemination process and educate users how to use it. Otherwise their job is useless. Former chief of the SSD Laurinkus speaking about the role of the SDC noted:

In the process of state long term planning, capabilities of the SSD to collect analyse and plan remain underused. [...] I cannot understand why in the most important meetings on the strategy and long term plans of the country, officials of the SSD are not invited? I tried to change this attitude but unfortunately governments were changing very frequently. ⁴⁹

This remark by Laurinkus reveals other problematic issues – intelligence services should be proactive and present information that could go against current policies. Seclusion of intelligence services from "the process of state long term planning" allows politicians avoid hearing unpleasant and uncomfortable information. On the other hand, intelligence agencies cannot go too far and start influencing political decisions or even implementing them. This would go beyond their tasks and responsibilities and would violate democratic values of the country. Lithuania must find a delicate balance based in mutual understanding between politicians and intelligence community on each other needs and methods of work.⁵⁰

3.6. Consumption

Intelligence products after being delivered are interpreted by policy makers. Policy makers are not blank slates or automatons who are impelled

⁴⁹ Bačiulis A. "Lietuva dar neišmoko naudotis savo žvalgyba [Lithuania so far has not learned how to make best us of intelligence]", *Veidas*, 34, 2002 08 22.

⁵⁰ Bagdonas, "Slaptųjų žvalgybos tarnybų vaidmuo ir kontrolė demokratinėje valstybėje, op.cit., p.12.

to action by intelligence. How they consume intelligence - whether in the form of written or oral briefings - and the degree to which the intelligence is used are important issues. Hulnick noticed that policy makers only have 10 or 15 minutes a day to absorb intelligence products. Consumer surveys consistently show that this is about all the time policy officials have for such things – current intelligence is rated as the most useful product from the Intelligence Community 51 .

Intelligence community must also not overburden policy makers with highly classified and groundbreaking intelligence. Although the intelligence community picks up warnings and threats all the time, it must not over exaggerate their importance. Many of those that turn out to be true are vague⁵². For example before 09/11 in spite of official awareness of the threat, the Washington Post reported that by "late July, according to one national security official, Tenet had delivered so many warnings with so much urgency that some administration colleagues grew tired of hearing them." ⁵³ In such circumstance it came as no surprise that warning on terrorist plot on 09/11 was missed.

Lithuanian politicians until now have not shown satisfactory interest in routine activities of intelligence services. Laurinkus in 2002 confessed:

[..] with the President our relations are very close – once per week I myself or another authorised person present information. The President's staff also makes considerable number of request for information. But with the Government our relations are somewhat fragmented. With every new Prime minister we start our relationship from scratch. When they ask me questions I understand that these people with few exceptions for the first time hear about intelligence.⁵⁴

Other consumers of intelligence – staffs and planners have more time to consume intelligence. It is this people that have to tie intelligence with policy and long term plans. Their ability to use intelligence is a matter of skills and competence. Intelligence community in its part must invest in training these people to understand its product and to be able to use it.

3.7. Feedback

Communication between intelligence officers and decision makers greatly enhance efficiency of intelligence cycle. Feedback does not occur nearly as often as the intelligence community might desire, but a dialogue between intelligence consumers and producers should take place after the intelligence has been received. Policy makers should give the intelligence community some sense of how well their intelligence requirements are being met and discuss any adjustments that need to be made to any parts of the process. Ideally, this

⁵¹ Hulnick, op.cit., p.965..

⁵² Parker C., Stern E. "Bolt from the Blue or Avoidable Failure? Revisiting September 11 and the Origins of Strategic Surprise", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 1, 2005, p.309.

⁵³ Parker, Stern, op.cit. p.311.

⁵⁴ Bačiulis, op.cit.

should happen while the issue or topic is still relevant, so that improvements and adjustments can be made. Failing that, even an ex-post facto review can be tremendously helpful.

Difficulty in giving feedback is common problem for small countries like Lithuania. There are several underlying reasons for this. First of all, intelligence consumers have difficulties in recruiting personnel that is able to advice their masters on intelligence matters. Secondly, the quality of feedback largely depends on the accuracy of requirements. In their absence, feedback could at best reflect personnel judgement but not more.

Conclusion and Recommendations

After reestablishment of independence, Lithuania intelligence agencies evolved into functioning state security institutions. From 1994 institutional framework remained stable, but functions and public attention to intelligence matters were growing substantially. Lithuanian intelligence services established good contacts with their counterparts from NATO and the EU countries, recruited young and skilful staff and created procedures for handling of classifies information. Despite many successes and relative stability, intelligence cycle in Lithuania is still not working properly. Deficiencies exist almost in all areas – from setting requirements to receiving feedback. Not clear chain of command, duplication of effort, separation of intelligence from strategy remains inseparable features of Lithuanian intelligence system.

This article clearly showed that there are many areas where capabilities of Lithuanian intelligence services could be strengthen. Several most important strands of work could be distinguished:

- Continue investment into people. People are the backbone of intelligence agencies; their quality can diminish impact of small budgets. Education of intelligence consumers and general public should not be forgotten;
- Revise implementation of intelligence cycle. Intelligence cycle is not ideal model but it allows logically assign duties and responsibilities. Requirement setting, dissemination and feedback remain weakest steps in Lithuania;
- Revise functions and subordination. Double subordination of the SSD has to be abolished. The SSD has to stop acting as the law enforcement agency and concentrate on intelligence;
- Allocate sufficient resources. Small financing seriously weakens ability
 of intelligence services to attract best people and hampers their ability
 to invest into modernisation of their equipment.

Changes in the Natural Environment and Their Potential Impact for Lithuania

The notion of the natural environment embraces a whole of functioning interrelated elements (land surface and subsurface, air and water, soil and biota, organic and inorganic matter, as well as anthropogenic components) and natural, semi-natural and human-made systems linking these elements. The state development and conservation of Lithuanian natural environment components and resources make the core of the problem that the state and the community encounters under the conditions of the integrated and advancing impact of climatic changes and anthropogenic (technogenic) activities. The current climate changes cannot be dissociated from the challenges by economic globalisation, depletion of energy and resources, abatement of poverty, social inequality and lack of security; therefore, partial solutions would not remove the problems endangering the stability of the future. Analysing the processes taking place in the environment is very important in order to reveal the basic causal relationships of the environment and the factors affecting it. We shall never be able to solve successfully the environmental problems without understanding the whole system of relationships between the cause and the effect.

Introduction

World scientists acknowledge that during last 200 years, the processes in the Earth's ecosphere (a wider term for the natural environment) have been unbalanced by human activities that turned into a factor of negative global impact on the environment. The technogenic expansion proceeding for the good of the every kind of progress is depleting the natural resources, changing the structure of environmental systems and the processes occurring there, thus, causing the deterioration of environment's quality that determines the existence and/or further evolution of human society. According to Ulrich Beck, the welfare of some human societies was created by an extensive use of nature resources and formation of ecological problems and environmental risk that, due to their technological origin, differed greatly from the former one, and all this leads to doubts about the institutional capability of modern

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society to control the environmental risk penetrating into all spheres of the society¹.

Of late decades, not only in the world and European Union (EU), but also in Lithuania, it is acknowledged that the global climate changes observed together with increasing anthropogenic impact is hazardous for the people, their living and, especially, the natural environment, as well as further development of the states. In Lithuania, the environmental changes are related to multiple economic and social effects on the state and its population².

Changes in the global environment taking place due to climate changes inspire economic and social problems of two types. Firstly, the losses suffered directly from unfavourable environmental phenomena, anomalies or disasters. They are huge and difficult to be controlled and forecasted. Nevertheless, the programmes to fight against climate and environment changes often create also rather impressive economic and social problems. The implementation of these programmes is related to additional costs to introduce environmental solutions into production, technological constraints in selecting production mode, market sales problems, additional taxes and new changes in social sphere. It should be accepted that the payment the society begins to do for its "aggression" against the environment is the pay for its long-lasting nihilistic approach to the nature and the drain of nature potential.

Integrated investigations of environmental changes are being performed in the world, and their generalised results can be considered as an indirect indicator that can be used to forecast future changes in Lithuania's natural environment, where such investigations last a very short time. It should be noted that there are also some specific regional differences in spatial peculiarity, uniqueness and complexity of nature ecosystems and their components. As for Lithuanian landscapes, according to Prof. Kavaliauskas³, the geochemical (agricultural and urban areas), slope (urban areas), littoral (sea coast), karst (North Lithuania) and biogenic (various aquatic systems) processes seem to be the most relevant.

Nearly all global environmental problems in the world are reflected in a geographically small area of Lithuania (destruction of biological variety in the physical nature systems and their components, hyper-exploitation of nonrenewable and renewable resources, pollution of nature spheres with all the related consequences, as well as newly being formed and expanding phenomena not only in the environment, but also in certain social sphere units). Negative global anthropogenic impact is manifested not only via direct degradation of

¹ Beck U, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, London: Sage, 1992.

Nacionalinė mokslo programa "Lietuvos ekosistemos: klimato kaita ir žmogaus poveikis", Bendrosios nuostatos, 2008 01 15, projektas, Vilnius, VU Ekologijos institutas, 2008. [National Science Programme "Lithuania's Ecosystems: Climate Changes and Human Impact", General provisions, 15 01 2008, draft, Vilnius, VU Ecology Institute, 2008] (in Lithuanian)

³ Kavaliauskas P., "Kraštovaizdis" ['Landscape'] in "Lietuvos gamtinė aplinka, būklė, procesai ir raida" [Lithuania's Natural Environment, State, Processes and Development], Aplinkos apsaugos agentūra [Environment Protection Agency], Vilnius, 2008, p.p. 102-103.

the natural environment, but also via other indirect mechanisms causing long-term and often irreversible changes. One of them is the global climate change initiating a chain of conversions, restructurings and adaptations. It should be noted that these changes proceed in a differently way and in a rather small spaces, such as areas of ES member states.

The climate changes are related, first of all, to the additional emissions of gases, increase of their content in the atmosphere and related greenhouse effect. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) established by the United Nations (UN) World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) presented the report on the emissions of greenhouse gas and other climate-affecting ones, where four potential development scenarios (A1, A2, B1 and B2) are given⁴. These scenarios for the emission variations are based on the projection of social and economic development of the mankind, depending on the ability of certain states to introduce and adapt modern technologies and other institutional novelties in order to change the impact on the natural environment. Scenario A1 projects very rapid economical growth, increase in population by mid-21st century followed by a decrease, and sharp introduction of modern technologies.

Three subgroups are distinguished here (A1F1 – prevailing burnt nature resources which are not fast recoverable, A1T – prevailing burnt nature resources which are fast recoverable, and A1B – balanced fuel use is planned). Scenario A2 projects a highly heterogeneous world with constantly growing population, slow economical growth, and new technologies being introduced only in some better developed regions. Scenario B1 models a rapid globalisation with population growth similar to that in Scenario A1B, but the economic system turns very fast into an informational and less consumer-type society with intensive introduction of new clean technologies. According to Scenario B2, the world is oriented to a more active integrated solution of local economic, social and environmental problems. The highest greenhouse gas content is predicted to be in the case, if the mankind developed according to the Scenario A2, while the implementation of Scenario B1 would cause small changes in the climate sphere. Nevertheless, the intermediate Scenario A1B is most realistic, being a bit closer to Scenario A2.

The data presented by the above scenarios embrace the GCM (*General Circulation Model*) input data used by world climate research centres to model future climate changes. Global models HadCM3 (by Hadley Climate Research and Forecast Centre in the United Kingdom) and ECHAM5 (by Max Planck Meteorology Institute and German Climate Calculations Centre) are most often used to forecast climate in separate European regions. According to Dr. Rimkus, the output results of the three scenarios (A1B, A2 and B1) models were used for prognostication of Lithuania's climate. However, the size of the climate model grid cell was too large that regional variations in Lithuania's climate were reflected in the forecasts. In order to make a transfer from the global scale to the local one, the statistical enhancement of the model grid resolution was

Nakicenovic N., Swart R., (eds)., Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, 2000, www.ipcc.ch/pub/reports

performed with the linear and multiple regression method applied. Forecasts of climate indices for the 21st century have been made for 16 meteorological stations in Lithuania. In order to show the range of potential changes, the forecasts on air temperature, precipitation and wind direction are given according to the HadCM3 model Scenario A1B (large changes predicted) and ECHAM model Scenario B1. Data obtained by Prof. Bukantis and Doc. Rimkus air temperatures according to HadCM3 model Scenario A1B should grow already in the first three decades of the 21st century (if compared to the 1971–2000 average). In winter, air temperature should rise in all Lithuania by 1.3°C; in maritime area they become positive (0.5°C), while in east Lithuania, remaining negative, they are to rise to -3.1°C. In spring, the air temperature would rise just by 0.5°C to 6.2–7.4°C. In summer air temperature is to rise by 0.6°C; air temperatures in the Žemaitija Upland and east Lithuania are to be 16.2°C and 16.6°C, correspondingly, and the major part of Lithuania is to be under temperatures higher than 17°C. In autumn, average air temperature changes will be more significant in the western part of Lithuania with 0.9-1.2°C rise, while the air in other areas will be warmer by 0.4-0.8°C. The average autumn air temperature in the maritime region would be close to 10°C, whereas east Lithuania would see 6–7°C. According to ECHAM5 model emission Scenario B1 lower changes in air temperature are predicted. Air temperature in winter is to rise by 0.8°C; air temperatures ranging between 0 and -2°C would prevail in the major part of the most area and about -3.5°C would hold in the eastern part. Spring temperature is to rise by 0.2-0.3°C in average. In summer and autumn, air temperature would grow by 0.3°C and 0.5-0.7°C in average. According to HadCM3 model Scenario A1B, during the nearest three decades winter precipitation would increase by 6 mm, in average, in all area of Lithuania. The biggest changes (8-9 mm) are projected for the southeast area and the Žemaitija Upland, where winter precipitation would reach 140-180 mm. The increase in spring precipitation should be smaller-3 mm, while the southeastern part should see a slight decrease in precipitation. Summer and autumn precipitation would decrease in all of Lithuania by 6-7 mm per season. In maritime area, precipitation changes would be smaller. With air temperature rising, the number of days with snow cover is to decline. During the nearest two decades, the period with snow cover would become shorter even by 10-15 days. Probability of formation of constant snow cover also would go down: about the year of 2030, snow cover in the maritime region is expected to occur once in 4–5 years, and the probability of constant snow cover in the eastern part would decrease to 70%.5 Et.6

The present-day climate system became more complicated because due to the reduction of self-regulating ecosystems, such as global forests, and rapid

⁵ Bukantis A., Klimato kaitos priežastys {Causes of Climate Change]. In "Globali aplinkos kaita", Vilnius, 2007, p.p. 77-105

⁶ Rimkus E., Klimato kaitos prognozės (Prognoses of Climate Change]. In "Globali aplinkos kaita", Vilnius, 2007, p.p. 107-132.

expansion of agricultural and urban areas providing increasing pollution and additional greenhouse gas emissions, the Earth's ozone layer goes thinner, alternations in hydrological systems and soils speed up, irreversible changes in biological variety take place, while human health becomes more vulnerable. With awareness and consciousness of the growing society, of late decades, the understanding of environmental pollution in a whole world is related to intensification of the society's approach to global climate change and its results and radical reappraisal of consumer-type values taking into account the requirements raised by the sustainable development and prevention of climate changes. Several decades ago scholars and environmentalists of different countries paid their emphatic attention and efforts to the analysis of separate climatic anomalies and their aftermath, the protection of nature and civilisation values; however, the last decades of the 20th century due to increasing scale of environmental pollution and more often appearance of nature anomalies and disasters followed by serious losses and threats for security of people, the necessity emerged to make an integrated study on the causes and results of climate changes and their consequences (European Commission, 2008)7.

Based on the data available in Lithuania and the world on climate change monitoring and further development, it is still difficult to make impartial determination which natural environmental processes related to human activities and climate changes are most important in Lithuania, and what consequences of these processes can be expected to have on the environment and the man.

Often the question appears: what is the monetary expression of losses and additional costs suffered by the society of a state due to inevitable consequences of changing natural environment. According to EU experts, there is some estimation that the damage caused by inactivity can reach 5%-20% of the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per year, whereas the proper investments into clean technologies by the year of 2050 would demand only 0.5%–1% of the global annual GDP with the additional benefit for nature and human health obtained. There is no single answer to a question: How much would mankind and Lithuania spend to prevent climate changes? Looking from the short-term assessment positions, climate change might be useful for such economy spheres as agriculture, tourism, utilities. But choosing this way we would take part in a race where life quality, security and competitive ability is set on a cast.

World scholars and authorities in this field acknowledge that the models and studies of this problem are based on a series of reservations and the principle "if", hence, causing their conventionality and programmed digression from real situation. Such conventionality is caused by intricacy of differential

⁷ Europos Komisija, Vyriausiojo įgaliotinio ir Europos Komisijos dokumentas, Europos Vadovų Tarybai. Klimato kaita ir tarptautinis saugumas, [European Commission, Document of High Representative and European Commission, European Council, Climate Change and International Security], 2008, www. consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/LT/reports/99402.pdf.

⁸ Using the ODD protocol for comparing three agent-based social simulation models of land use change., Polhill, J.G.; Parker, D. C.; Brown, D.G.; Grimm, V., Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2008, 11(2).

equation systems used in mathematical models and simplification of multifactor interactions to elementary linear equation coefficients.

In spite of the above reasoning about the complicacy in the financial assessment of the losses and preventive measures, in general it is acknowledged that the man will pay a very high price for his careless invasions into the nature done in the past and often continuing even now; and exact figures of losses in the future will depend on the way the mankind is to choose now. If we manage to turn our economical and social development and reorient our demands towards the sustainable development, the losses will decrease and we shall be able to control the negative consequences of global change in the environment. Otherwise, the most pessimistic scenarios of the future can be realised—even the decay of civilisation on the Earth.

Global Climate Change and Its Threats on the Natural Environment

The impact of climate change on a global scale is observed already now: global geochemical cycles of basic substances are disturbed, thus, causing the rise in temperature, melting and shrinking glaciers in the mountains, ice fields in polar and sub-polar shelf areas, extreme meteorological phenomena are not only more often manifesting, but they are more intensive and their geography is changing. The forecasts show that after 90 years, average global temperature can exceed that fixed in 1990, i.e. 1.4–5.8°C. Temperature changes on inland areas will be bigger than on the sea and growing with the higher latitudes. The amplitudes of their diurnal, seasonal and long-term variations will also grow, as well as precipitation distribution in time and space will change⁹.

A northward movement of various biological species areas–6.1 km per a decade–is observed in northern continents. Many experts predict that the taiga forests can shift northwards by several hundred kilometres, while the tundra zone will shrink and its role as a biome area will be less significant. The permafrost disappearing in tundra will set the gases accumulated there, thus, providing additional impulse for greenhouse effect in the climate sphere. Rapid degradation of Alpine ecosystems is expected, and the rest 84% of coral reefs can vanish. Even 85% decrease in area of various wetland ecosystems is possible. Desert areas will expand and occupy the present areas of savannah and land eroded due to improper farming. Being unable to leave the unfavourable climate zone and resist against more frequent fires, forest areas can shrink as well.

⁹ Mc Carthy et al., (eds), Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press., 2001

At present time, the fact of climate change raises no doubts and is generally acknowledged (discussions take place only on the reasons, development and potential consequences). To control its intensity is a long process; therefore, it is necessary to create environment management strategies of new quality, which should include not only the reduction of climate change intensity and elimination of causes, but also the control of its outcomes with simultaneous protection of nature values and population.

Environmental problems are notable for their global character, and they cannot be solved at the level of a certain enterprise or a production process, this should be done in a complex way at the level of cities, industrial districts, regions, a state or a group of states. Another important feature in dealing with climate change problem is that it must be considered a complex one. Its complexity is caused by intricacy of a system, since it is determined by three components: natural environment, society and production. Moreover, the development of the system is impossible without a comprehensive assessment of social, environmental, technological, legal and international aspects.¹⁰

The climate change-caused risk is real, and the outcomes of its impact are global. A report presented by a UN Commission in 2007 shows that all, except one, urgent appeals for humanitarian aid were related to climate. The IPCC conclusions show that even if by 2050, the emission of pollutants into the atmosphere was reduced to the level lower than a half of the 1990 year level, it would be difficult to avoid temperature rise by 2°,C if compared to that before the industrialisation. Such a rise of temperature will cause serious security risk that will grow further, if the warming continues. Without the mitigation of climate change, temperature will rise by more than 2°,C and unprecedented problems of security will appear, since there will probably be not the only crucial change that will cause acceleration of climate alternations, which will become irreversible and often unpredictable. In order to avoid such scenarios, the investments into the mitigation of the impact as well as measures of adaptation to the inevitability should be an imperative in solving the problem of threats caused by climate change to international security; and both should be considered a preventive part of security policy¹⁰.

The best way to assess the climate change is to treat it as a threat factor enhancing the present tendencies, stress and instability. A key difficulty is that the climate change is to cause additional burden to the states and the regions, which already are vulnerable and conflictive. It is important to understand that the rising risk is not only of humanitarian character; it is also related to political and security risk having direct impact on European interests. Moreover, taking into account the human security concept, it is obvious that the majority of issues related to the impact of climate change on the international security are interconnected and to solve them an integrated policy is necessary. For instance, there is a serious risk to achieve the Millennium Development goals, since the developmental activities performed for years can lose its sense, if the climate change is not mitigated. Among the key factors mentioned there are such as population variations, energy

¹⁰ Ed. by Pachauri K et al., Climate change 2007. Synthesis Report, WMO, 2007, 104 p.

consumption, peculiarities of technological development with a further scatter of emerging processes in some world regions takes concrete forms as:

- Local and interstate conflicts for nature resources use and control;
- Economic damage brought by sudden floods on coastal towns and rising risk for infrastructure units of primary importance;
- Loss of a territory and disputes on borders;
- Population migration due to environmental problems;
- Vulnerability and radicalisation situations;
- Strains due to energy resources and supply of energy;
- Pressure on international control system.

The importance of land use changes and environmental policy also should be mentioned. The objective to minimise the intensification of climate change due to human activities and control negative environmental, social and economic consequences caused by this phenomena with minimum negative impact on the man prompts to make differently oriented political solutions, which might be of both adaptive (accommodating to natural systems or social-economic) and mitigating (minimising various-type human impact on the environment, e.g. gas emission, reduction of highly hazardous pollution).

However, even if the best and most efficient measures of climate change mitigation are implemented, the climate change and related impact on different spheres will not cease. Therefore, in order to safeguard secure functioning of economic, social and environmental spheres it is necessary to elaborate and implement adaptation to climate change strategies. The implementation of such national strategies would enhance the resistance to the impact of climate change.

2. Some Aspects of Natural Environmental Changes in Lithuania

2.1. Assessment of Lithuania's Economic Growth in the Climate Change Context

Historically, quite a few years have passed in Lithuania since the restoration of its independence, but there is a fundamental turn in its national economy. Initially, a rather serious slump was suffered (Fig. 1) with hyperinflation and unemployment, starting emigration, and when the economy began to recover, there was a negative affect due to Russia's economic crisis. In about 2002, new tendencies showed up—a rapid rise in consumption, and a decrease in unemployment. From 2003, the development of internal demand and exports as well as a boom gaining momentum lead Lithuania to a European leader according to the growth of GDP and the unemployment rate decrease.




Figure 1. Gross Domestic Product percentage variations¹¹

Unfortunately, the world economic crisis did not bypass Lithuania, and the changes in its social-economic spheres (especially energy) will affect climate change mitigation for long years.

When assessing the impact of Lithuania's economy on the climate change there is another very important thing which should be talked about, i.e. the structure of the national economy. It is rather diversiform, but it has significantly changed during the independence years (Fig. 2)—a major part of GDP is being formed by the spheres of services and high technologies, whereas the part of energy- and raw material-consuming industries decreased significantly.




Figure 2. Gross Domestic Product structure in Lithuania¹²

¹¹ Data source: Statistics Department.

¹² Data source: Statistics Department.

Speaking about energy, the problems due to Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP) closure and the related increase of greenhouse gas emission should be especially noted. During the last five years the INPP produced from 77% to 85% of the total electric power in Lithuania. After INPP is closed at the end of 2009, the consumption of air-polluting oil and gas will increase in the initial energy balance. Since oil and natural gas are considerably more polluting the environment, from the greenhouse gas emission viewpoint, consequentially, the emission of greenhouse gas in Lithuania is thought to grow and the contents of this gas is expected to grow by 9% in 2010, and after ten more years the emission would be by 28 percent higher than that in 1990 (Fig. 3).




Figure 3. Carbon dioxide (CO₂) amounts and their forecast in Lithuania¹³

On January 18, 2007 Lithuanian parliament Seimas approved the energy strategy, the fourth one from the restoration of independence, with the stress laid upon strategic priority goal to build a new nuclear power plant by 2015. If the EU energy bridges are not taken into account, before 2015, the basic fuel for the Lithuanian Power Plant might be natural gas from Russia or black oil, as a reserve version, also from Russia and partly from Belarus, Venezuela or some new sources. Therefore, in order to reach maximum mitigation of greenhouse gas emission growth, a great regard is to be paid to the use of renewable power sources in Lithuania's energy system. In this respect, focal attention is given to power production from wind, water and biomass in the energy sector

Jaskelevičius B., Žiugžda V., Energetika ir atmosferos tarša Lietuvoje, Lietuvos mokslas ir pramonė: Šilumos energetika ir technologijos, KTU pranešimų medžiaga, 2001 vasario 1-2 d., Kaunas ['Energy and Atmospheric Pollution in Lithuania, Lithuanian Science and Industry': in Heat Energy and Technologies, KTU Conf. Reports, 1–2 February, 2001, Kaunas], Technologija, 2001, p. 249–252 (in Lithuanian).

and fuel production from a biomass in transport sector¹⁴. The best prospects in Lithuania's future energy system by 2010–2020 seem to be linked to wind and water power that would comprise, respectively, up to 39% and 50% from all renewable energy resources.

The present priorities in the Environment Protection Policy of Lithuania are closely related to sustainable development in Lithuania, i.e. the reduction of impact from basic economy branches on the environment and human health, mitigation of global climate change and its consequences. So, special heed is paid to the climate change. The National Sustainable Development Strategy, approved in 2003, envisages improvement of environment quality assessment and control systems in order to safeguard the air quality needed for human health and ecosystems in all area of Lithuania.

2.2. Lithuanian Climate Change Prognoses in 21st Century

Lithuanian climate variations are a part of the processes taking place in the whole climate system of the world. Thus, Lithuania is potentially open for both global climate variations and the results achieved reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

Lithuania's climate is caused by zonal (global) factors and local geographical conditions (azonal factors). The zonal factors include geographical position of Lithuania and prevailing air mass transport from the west in all troposphere and lower part of stratosphere. Features of Lithuania's climate depend on distribution of adjacent land areas, oceans and seas, absolute height of relief, soil properties, and underlying surface type. West of Lithuania, there are huge areas of the Baltic Sea and the Atlantic Ocean and rather small land areas—Scandinavian and Jutland peninsulas with islands. East of Lithuania the Eurasian continent stretches for several thousand kilometres. Hence, Lithuania is constantly receiving pollutants from the west with the air mass transport.

In spite of the fact that there are quite a few prognostic scenarios and models of climate change in the world, it should be acknowledged that none of them can depict real development scenario instead of hypothetic one¹⁵. Therefore we shall rely in this chapter upon data and conclusions by the authoritative Lithuanian researchers. Studies on climate change records and its prognostication have been consistently carried on in Lithuania from the past

¹⁴ Katinas V., Atsinaujinančių energijos išteklių vartojimas energijos gamybai ir plėtros galimybės Lietuvoje,, LEI. pran. konferencijoje "Šilumos energetika ir technologijos". KTU, 2006 m. vasario 2-3 d. ['Use of Renewable Energy Resources to Produce Energy and Development Potential in Lithuania' LEI Conf. Reports: in Heat Energy and Technologies, KTU, 2–3 February, 2006], (in Lithuanian).

¹⁵ Gómez-Hernández, J.J., Complexity or stochasticity? Proper labels and ways to handle uncertain inputs in environmental modeling. Report on NATO ASI Uncertainties in environmental modelling and consequences for decision making. Vrsar (Croatia) September 30–October 10, 2007.

century. 16 The results are published in the research transactions, 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 and all they contain clear scientific opinion that the climate in Lithuania is changing and will be changing in the future.

According to climatological data, mean annual air temperature in Lithuania indicates a rapid warming of the climate. The most clear warming trends are seen in the north and west parts of Lithuania. Mean annual air temperatures show obvious growth, depending on their topographical position (Fig. 4).




Figure 4. Mean annual air temperature and linear trends of its variation (dash line) in Klaipėda, Kaunas and Vilnius in 1961–2006²²

¹⁶ Rimkus, E., Klimato kaita: modeliai, prognozės, faktai. Geografijos metraštis, T 32, Vilnius, 1999, p.p. 16-25. [Climate Change: Models, Prognoses, facts. Geographical Yearbook, 32] in Lithuanian.

¹⁷ Rimkus E., Analysis of winter climatological indices change in Vilnius (1893-1995). Proceedings of the international conference on climatic dynamics and the global change perspective, Cracow, 1995, p. 309-312.

¹⁸ Bukantis A., Rimkus E., Lietuvos agroklimatinių išteklių kaita ir prognozės, Lietuvos klimato ir dirvožemio potencialo racionalaus naudojimo perspektyvos, Mokslinės konferencijos pranešimai, Vilnius, 1997, p. 5-11. [Lithuanian Agroclimatic Resources Change and Prognoses, Perspectives of Rational Use of Lithuanian Climate and Soil Potential, Sci. Conf. Report (in Lithuanian).

¹⁹ Bukantis A., Rimkus E. The Lithuanian climate in the 18th-21st centuries. Long term ecological research Baltic conference, 2004, p.14.

²⁰ Bukantis A. Climatic fluctuations in Lithuania against a background of global warming, Acta Zoologica Lituanica, vol. 11 (2), Vilnius, 2001, p. 113-120.

²¹ Bukantis A., Valiuškevičienė L., Oro temperatūros ir kritulių kiekio ekstremumai, Meteorologija ir hidrologija Lietuvoje: raida ir perspektyvos, Mokslinės konferencija, Vilnius, 2005, p. 29-30. [Air Temperature and Precipitation Extreme, in Meteorology and Hydrology in Lithuania: Development and Perspectives, Sci. Conf.] (in Lithuanian).

²² Data source: Lithuanian Hydrometeorological Service.

Analysis of monthly air temperature variations showed that in 1991–2006 mean air temperature nearly in all months was higher than that in 1961–1990. Cooler weather in all Lithuania was only in November (0.1–1.0°C), in the maritime region this was also in October and December (0.1–0.8°C). The Žemaitija Upland cooled down in May, October and November (0.1°C). The highest increase of mean air temperature was observed in January, February, April, July and August (1.3–2.5°C) (Fig. 5). This is also related to precipitation distribution and amounts.




Figure 5. Mean annual air temperature (°C) in 1961–1990. The isolines show air temperature difference (°C) between 1961–1990 and 1991–2006. ²³

Of late decades, the probability of air temperature extremes is also rapidly changing. Heat above 30°C (maximum diurnal air temperature) and cold down –20°C (minimum diurnal air temperature) causes risk for human health and damage to nature, transport, agriculture and other economic sectors. At the end of 20th century number of extremely hot days began to increase. Their probability in 1991–2006, if compared to that in 1961–1990, showed a 2–2.5-fold increase and lasted 2–6 days per year. Their highest probability was observed in south and southwest regions of Lithuania, i.e. 4–6 days per year. At the same time, number of frosty days in Lithuania decreased considerably: if in 1961–1990 such days happened 12–15 times per winter in eastern regions, of later years

²³ Data source: Lithuanian Hydrometeorological Service.

this was observed only 8–9 times per season. Probability of frosty days in the maritime region decreased to 0.5 in winter, i.e. the frost is probable there only once in two years. Changes in probability of heat and frost are related to more frequent repetition of anticyclone processes in summer and rarer in winter.

According to scientific forecasts, air temperature in 21st century will rise further, but unevenly in different seasons. Depending on global social and economic development scenario to be performed, mean annual temperature in Lithuania is to rise by 2–5°C. Especially big changes are expected in winter with this season's mean air temperature to rise by 4–8°C. The biggest temperature changes are expected to be in the maritime region and on the southern slopes of the Žemaitija Upland. The changes will be bigger than those forecasted for Central and West Europe, but smaller than in Scandinavia and North-East Europe.²⁴ This is expected to affect social, economic and energy sectors.

The least air temperature changes are forecasted for summer with the season's mean air temperature to rise just 1.5–3°C. However, assessing the changes from the viewpoint of normal distribution, the air temperature alterations in summer will not give up to those in winter and in many cases, they show two-fold excess above the mean square deviation. At the end of the 21st century, mean temperatures of summer months in Vilnius and Klaipėda will range in 18–20°C.

Distribution of precipitation in Lithuania depends mainly on the relief, slope position in regard to prevailing air streams and the distance from the sea. Therefore the mean annual precipitation level in Lithuania ranges from 850-900 mm on the windward slopes of the Žemaitija Upland to 570-590 mm in the Central Lithuanian plain. Average precipitation amount is about 675 mm (44 km 3).

Mean annual precipitation in 1991–2006, if compared to that in 1961–1990, decreased by 12–56 mm in western and central regions of Lithuania, while it rose by 20–66 mm in southern and north-eastern regions (Fig. 6). The precipitation in the warm season was found to decrease, while that of cold season was observed to rise in all Lithuania, except for the Žemaitija Upland. The biggest changes in precipitation amount were observed in the maritime region during warm season (–9%), in the Žemaitija Upland and central Lithuania during cold season (respectively, –10% and +9%). Precipitation during different months in 1991–2006, if compared to 1961–1990, varied differently: in all Lithuania precipitation decreased in September, November and December, and rose in January, February and October. Other tendencies in precipitation variations are of regional character. So, the July precipitation in the western region of Lithuania decreased even by 18–35%, while the June precipitation in central and eastern regions of Lithuania decreased by 21–22%.

²⁴ Solomon S., Qin D., Manning M., Chen Z., Marquis M., Averyt K. B., Tignor M. Miller H. L. (eds.), IPCC, 2007: Climate Change. The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.




Figure 6. Mean annual precipitation (mm) in 1961–1990 m. Isolines show mean annual precipitation difference (mm) between 1961–1990 and 1991–2006²⁵

Making forecasts on precipitation during the present century, Lithuanian researchers acknowledge that precipitation is one of the most varying meteorological elements that depends greatly on a year's season and a society development scenario used. Subject to behaviour of the society and its development in the future, different prognoses are made: some scenarios forecast increase in mean annual precipitation by 30–85 mm, but also an opposite process might be observed, i.e. decrease in precipitation by 40 mm. Nevertheless, all available climate change models for Lithuania show the rise in winter precipitation (from 5 to 60 mm per century) and less intensive increase in spring (from 5 to 38 mm per century). All the scenarios, without an exception, also show the decrease in precipitation in summer (to 0.3088 mm/year). In general, climate modelling results show that winter and summer precipitation should grow in all northern Europe and decrease in southern Europe; as for Lithuania being in an intermediate position, variations of different sizes are forecasted for different seasons.

Mean annual wind velocity (10 m above surface) in Lithuania is in the maritime region (4.5–5.5 m/s), decreasing eastwards to minimum values (2.7–3 m/s) in the forest and hilly districts of east and southeast Lithuania. Comparison of mean annual wind velocities for two periods–1971–1990 and 1991–2006–a slight tendency of wind weakening is observed, i.e. by 0.2–0.4 m/s.

²⁵ Data source: Environmental Ministry, Lithuanian Hydrometeorological Service.

However, it is quite possible, that such changes could appear due to changes in the environment of the meteorological stations (build-up, forestation etc.), not because of peculiarities of atmospheric circulation. The most obvious weakening of wind (0.5–1.1 m/s) was observed in Klaipėda at the end of summer and autumn. Maximum wind velocity in flows can reach 35–40 m/s on the Baltic Sea coast or 25–28 m/s in other areas of Lithuania. The maximum fixed wind velocity was 40 m/s. Most often and severe storms take place in October–January. Analysing maximum wind velocities in 1971–2006, no significant long-term change tendencies were observed Fig. 7). However, in 1999–2006 three cases were fixed on the coast, when wind velocity exceeded 30 m/s. While in 1971–2006, in total 8 cases of wind exceeding 30 m/s were fixed. Thus, it can be assumed, that with warming climate the hurricane-level winds can be observed more frequently.




Figure 7. Maximum wind velocity in flaws (m/s) and linear trends of its variation in 1971–2006²⁶

In autumn and winter S, SW and W winds prevail in Lithuania, while in summer W and NW winds dominate. Comparison of mean frequency of wind directions between 1961–1990 and 1991–2006 m. showed that SE wind frequency in Lithuania decreased by 1.6%–4.5%, S, W and N winds became more frequent in the west and central Lithuania by 1.3%–4.5%, W winds were less frequent in Klaipėda by 2.4%, but SW, NE and E wind frequency increased here by 2%–2.6%. The frequency of calm periods halved in central and eastern

²⁶ Data source: Lithuanian Hydrometeorological Service.

Lithuania with their probability reaching just 2%. Probability of calm periods without wind in the maritime region increased from 0.7% to 1.4%.

Forecasting by variations in wind direction and intensity, the western region winds are to be more frequent on the Baltic Sea coast. In the summer NW wind should blow, while other seasons would see SW winds more often. Average wind velocity is thought to change insignificantly in 21st century, but it can increase slightly on the coast. This is necessary for planning wind power plants as an alternative energy source. The increased sea level and wind direction affect the inflow of saline water into Kuršių Marios (the Curonian Lagoon).

The number of sunny hours per year on the Kuršių Nerija (Curonian Sand Spit) and the coast (about 1860 h) decreases going eastwards to 1690 hours. The months from May to August are most sunny (230–270 h per month, in average), the least number of sunny hours was observed from November to January (30–45 h per month). During last 16 years (1991–2006 m.), if compared to 1961–1990, the number of sunny hours grew by 80–200 h with the maximum in west and south-west Lithuania and the least growth was in the east (Fig. 8). These additional prognoses are related to development of recreation and tourism in certain regions. Nevertheless, too high duration of UV radiation (erythemal 280-315 nm radiation) can cause skin and eye diseases, weaken immune system (due prognosis and information of people is necessary).




Figure. 8. Mean numbers of sunny hours per year in 1961–1990 m. (colour scale). Isolines show difference in sunny hours between 1991–2006 and 1961–1990 ²⁷

²⁷ Data source: Lithuanian Hydrometeorological Survey.

The available climate change modelling results indicate that mean annual sunshine duration in the $21^{\rm st}$ century is to grow. The growth is expected to be the highest from May to September, but in winter it should be lower. Moreover, the forecasts show that, due to territorial unevenness in sunshine intensity, the sun in Vilnius will shine half shorter than at present.

2.3. Changes in the State of Surface and Subsurface Water Bodies in Lithuania

Environmental problems related to the state of groundwater should be mentioned separately, since it is the main source of drinking water (~77% of all groundwater used). There are no exact data about fresh water demand by the mankind for the next 20-25 years, but approximate assessment shows it might be ~ 28,000 km³ per year. Lithuania is one of few countries, where people drink only groundwater. Climate change should be linked not only with the world ocean level variation but also with that of the groundwater. Soil degradation causes fall of shallow groundwater level and draining of larger areas. There are also specific environmental problems related to groundwater-with its balance changing the living niche conditions also change thus partly causing the degradation of biological variety, as well losses in agriculture and forestry. Atmospheric pollutants raise the acidity of precipitation and groundwater; fortunately, up to now the acidity is neutralised in surface deposit layers in Lithuania. The dispersed and point pollution of the land surface can cause variation of shallow and deep groundwater chemistry. In Lithuania, due to wrong choice of dug wells with regard to pollution sources and their improper control, more than 30%-40% of dug wells in the villages and settlements contain water polluted with nitrates (>50 mg/l)²⁸. The state of groundwater, especially shallow one, was found to be depending directly on meteorological conditions, which were unfavourable during the last two decades and causing lower groundwater levels, which were the lowest in 2003, 2004 and 2006.

Climate change, intensifying use of groundwater, and soil amelioration are thought to disturb the water balance in the North Lithuanian karst region and changed the rate of gypsum bed denudation, thus creating conditions to more rapid formation of underground voids and sinkholes. All this worsened the conditions for territorial planning and use, as well as made life of local people less safe²⁹.

Due to climate change, surface water quality problems appear in Li-

²⁸ Drulytė I., "Vanduo ir sveikata (kokybė, sauga ir priežiūra)...['Water and Health (Quality, Protection, Treatment']", Seminar: "Vanduo kasdieniam vartojimui ir pramonės poreikiams – efektyviausi aprūpinimo ir tvarkymo būdai" ['Water for Everyday and Industrial Use–Most Efficient Supplay and Treatment Ways'], Vilnius, 2007, p. 3-27.

²⁹ Lietuvos gamtinė aplinka, būklė, procesai ir raida [Lithuania's Natural Environment, Its State, Processes and Development], Aplinkos apsaugos agentūra [Environment Protection Agency], Vilnius, 2008, 238 p.

thuania, with the eutrophication of Kuršių Marios Lagoon and some lakes and the overgrowth of river channels in all basins being the crucial one. The reasons of these phenomena are mainly related to human activities causing large amounts of waste to enter the rivers and brooks running via towns and settlements. Untreated wastewater from living houses having no centralised sewerage creates a problem because it often reaches surface water bodies. Since the wastewater is not diluted enough, even when wastewater treatment plants are arranged according to European Union standards, the pollutant content exceeds maximum permissible concentrations in river water. Such situation is, for instance, in the Kulpė River at Šiauliai.

All river basins in Lithuania are international; therefore the pollutants being brought from other countries make a negative impact on the quality of Lithuanian rivers. The situation is aggravated by the fact that pollutants come from Russia and Belarus, which are not obliged to keep to the EU directive requirements. Thus, additional hazards appear for river biota, stability of hydrological systems, recreation and, sometimes, human health. For instance, appearance of bloodsucking midges, due to climate change, and the outburst of their population in southeast Lithuania is a serious problem not only for wild and house animals but also for recreation in the Druskininkai resort.³⁰

In order to improve conditions for agriculture, in Soviet times, small rivulets were drained on a wide scale. Therefore, these measures changed dramatically the stream channel processes, river load composition, water hydrochemical and hydrophysical properties and aquatic biota. Most of such streams were in the central and northern regions of Lithuania–the key zone of Lithuania's agriculture. Such radical transformation of the surface affects greatly water balance and extreme runoff values and, hence, the production intensity of the agricultural complex.

Among other new factors (input of nutrients from wastewater and surface drainage, etc.) inducing eutrophication of Lake Drūkšiai, constant warm water inflow from nuclear power plant should be mentioned, as all this changed the fish biomass, total and of separate species. River channels overgrew in central Lithuania, where the effect of nutrient inflow from agricultural fields is enhanced by slow water flow and regime of higher temperatures. Therefore, thermophilic fishes prevail in the rivers.

Due to climate change and unfavourable habitats, areas suitable for cold water fishes (salmonidae, coregoninae, gadidae) shrunk significantly. Due to additional man-made barriers (dams) the spawning areas decreased significantly for migrating fishes (salmon, bull-trout, vimba).

Although during the last decade, a tangible progress is made in reducing water pollution and supplying good-quality water, but wastewater treatment and drinking water perfecting still is one of the key problems. To deal with

³⁰ Žalakevičius M., Klimato kaitos poveikio ekosistemoms ir jų sudėtinėms dalims pastarųjų dešimtmečių tyrimai Lietuvoje ['Investigations of Climate Change Impact on Ecosystems and Their Components during Last Decades'], "Biota ir globali kaita -II" ['Biota and Global Change–II'], Vilnius, 2008, p. p-31.

them and control water quality and quantity, the legal base with the administrative and control structures is formed and regularly improved keeping to the European Union directives: General Water Policy, Drinking Water, Nitrates, Urban Wastewater, Freshwater Fishes, Bathing, etc.

In 1990, according to the then requirements in Lithuania, only 25% of collected wastewater was treated. With the restoration of independence, the focal attention of the government in the environment protection field was paid to urban wastewater treatment. During last 14 years, the investments into the construction of wastewater treatment plants of the biggest cities made, was about 1.2bn LTL, therefore now 69% of wastewater collected by centralised systems is treated. Wastewater from small towns and villages is not sufficiently treated or untreated; this portion is small if compared to the total wastewater collected, but the number of such units is very high, thus, the relative cost (e.g., investment demand per capita) to solve this problem is considerably higher than that in the big cities. In Lithuania the centralised collection and treatment of wastewater is available only for 58% of population, and in rural areas this indicator is pretty lower. The problem is to remain in the nearest future, and the climate change (air temperature) will worsen the state of waters polluted. From 1990 there was nearly no consideration shown for the rural water treatment units. Municipal enterprises took over these units from kolkhoz and sovkhoz administrations without any inventory and assessment of the property. Due to economic hardships and great number of small water supply enterprises, about a third of Lithuania's population cannot obtain drinking water from reliable (controlled) sources. The preliminary investigations show that up to 60% of rural population uses drinking water of low quality and is hazardous especially for children.

The situation is worsening due to poor economic state of rural regions. People are incapable to pay for water supplied at such sums, which were sufficient to maintain the old and inefficient water supply system. Therefore, many such systems are not operated now, and people are forced to find alternative drinking water sources. The situation of wastewater treatment in the villages is even worse.

With means lacking to repair the installations, improper maintenance, old unproductive or dismantled equipment, and smaller volumes of wastewater, about 600 treatment units in the settlements do not operate or they treat the wastewater without reaching the quality requirements.

Lithuanian river water investigations carried out in 1992–2006 showed an obvious tendency of decrease in total nitrogen, total phosphorus and ammonium nitrogen ($N_{\rm total}$ $P_{\rm total}$ and $N_{\rm NH4}$ decreased by 2 mg/l, 0.1 mg/l and 0.2 mg/l, correspondingly). However, nitrate content in river water was growing from 1986 to 2004 m. and only from 2005 it showed significant fall. This could be due to the decrease in river water runoff (a continuing descent of shallow groundwater level) and smaller washout of nitrogen compounds from agricultural fields.

About the content of organic matter in water it can be judged according to Biochemical Oxygen Demand in 7 days (BOD₇), dissolved oxygen quantity necessary to oxidise biochemically the organic matter.

The analysis of the 1986–2006 period shows marked tendency of decrease in BOD_{77} its content in Lithuanian river water fell by 1 mgO₂/l.




Figure 9. Tendencies in changes of BOD, content medians in 1986-2006 m. 31

According to conditionally chosen concentration intervals, total nitrogen in 50% investigation sites on the rivers ranged from ranged from 0.75 to 2.5 mg/l. it should be noted that from 1995 total nitrogen values exceeding 7.5 mg/l decreased by 10%, and this makes up only about 10% of all river investigation sites. Total phosphorus values were lower than 0.1 mg/l in about 50% of all river investigation sites, ranged from 0.1 to 0.25 mg/l in 40% sites, and exceeded 0.5 mg/l in 10% sites. BOD $_7$ values ranged from 2 to 3.5 mgO $_2$ /l in more than 50% of river investigation sites.

Before 2002, BOD₇ values exceeded 5 $\rm mgO_2/l$ in about 20% of river investigation sites, and only after 2002, number of such sites decreased to 10%. From 1992, BOD₇ values were observed lower than 2 $\rm mgO_2/l$ in 20% of all investigation sites.

Maximum values of total nitrogen, total phosphorus and organic matter (BOD_7) are determined in the river sites downstream the towns and in low water streams accepting untreated wastewater from towns (Obelė, Kulpė, Sidabra, Šalčia, Laukuva, Lėvuo mouth area, Nevėžis, intensive agriculture areas and the large rivers of Nemunas and Neris.

Rivers having clean water, i.e. organic matter, nitrogen and phosphorus values do not exceed or exceed slightly maximum permissible concentrations (MPC), are these: Minija, Jūra, Šešupė, Šventoji, Akmena upper reaches, Veiviržas, Šelmena, Žeimena, Būka, Strėva, Bartuva, Birveta, Laukesa and Šventoji falling into the Baltic Sea.

The studies performed on Lithuania's river water in 1992-2006 show

³¹ Data source: Environment Protection Agency.

obvious decrease tendencies according to copper, nickel, mercury and lead content with especially sharp fall tendency for nickel and chromium from 1997. Copper, nickel and lead content rose only in 2002. Increase of heavy metals was favoured by a decrease in water volume in the rivers and, hence, a lower dilution of them.

When analysing variations of Lithuania's river water indices during the 1992–2006 period, we can see increase in zinc content in 2001–2004 and its sharp decrease starting from 2005.




Figure 10. Tendencies in changes of copper (Cu) and zinc (Zn) content annual medians in 1992–2006 ²¹




Figure 11. Tendencies in changes of chromium (Cr), nickel (Ni) and lead (Pb) content annual medians in 1992–2006 ²²

³² Data source: Environment Protection Agency.

³³ Data source: Environment Protection Agency.

In 1997–2004 m. simazine was detected in Nemunas only once (1.15 $\mu g/l)$, lindane determined in Nemunas, Lokysta and Nemunėlis ranged from 0.01 to 0.06 $\mu g/l$. DDT was detected in 23 cases in 15 rivers ranging from 0.01 to 0.96 $\mu g/l$. Phenols (pentachlorphenol) were determined in nine rivers (Nemunas, Šešupė, Venta, Mūša, Sidabra, Nemunėlis, Lėvuo and Birvėta) with their content ranging from 0.01 to 0.4 $\mu g/l$. Other hazardous substances were detected in 1997–2004 only very rarely or they were undetected. 29

Analysing data on species composition of river hydrobionts (macrozoobenthos) for the period of 1994–2006 we can see that water quality improved, i.e. the number of river sites under the state monitoring the Class I (very clean water) and Class II (clean water) increased significantly. From 2002, about 11% of rivers studied belonged to the Class I, while in 1994–1998 and 2001, no Class I sites were detected. In 1994, the Class II sites comprised 9.4%, while in 2006, such sites made up 67%. In 1994 there were 26% of Calls V river sites (heavily polluted water), but in 2006 they made up only 1%.

The data show long term tendencies of a decrease in contents of basic pollutants from 1992.

2.4. Variation in Kuršių Marios Lagoon and Baltic Sea Nearshore Water

The Lithuanian part of the Baltic Sea shoreline makes just about 100 km, and its territorial and economic zones make up only 1.5% of the total Baltic Sea area. Lithuania also has 25% of the Kuršių Marios (Curonian Lagoon) area (413 km²), i.e. a part of its central and northern areas with the national port in the Klaipėda Strait, where the most urgent water pollution and eutrophication problems occur.

Kuršių Marios is a eutrophicated water body affecting the state of the Baltic Sea near the shore. The quality of the Kuršių Marios water depends on municipal, industrial (with rain) wastewater, as well as agricultural, shipping and other-type pollution and nature conditions. Water from about 75% of Lithuania's area falls into the lagoon, thus draining 5.8% of the Baltic Sea river basins area. The increase in biological productivity is determined by high nutrient (nitrogen, phosphorus) input with wastewater from towns and settlements by Nemunas and other rivers, from the atmosphere and other pollution sources. Other specific pollutants, such as oil hydrocarbons and heavy metals, also reach the Kuršių Marios lagoon and the Baltic Sea. Due to the ability of some of them to accumulate in living organisms, there is a potential risk for human health as well.

According to the long-term investigation data, saline water enters the lagoon from the Baltic Sea more often than before. During all the year, there is dynamical water exchange in the Klaipėda Strait between the sea and the lagoon. A major part of fresh water brought by the rivers into the lagoon flows

to the Baltic Sea. Salinity data obtained at the Juodkrantė and Nida posts situated at the lagoon shores show rather frequent invasions of saline water into the Kuršių Marios. From 1981, the salinity increased by 0.31‰ at Juodkrantė (about 29%) and by 0.01‰ (about 12.5%) in the central part of the lagoon at Nida. In 1995–2005, number of days with fresh water (<0.5 ‰) at Juodkrantė was by 7% lower than that in 1984–1994. ²⁹

The increase in lagoon water salinity is caused mainly by hydrometeorological conditions, i.e. prevailing and becoming more frequent stormy NW winds forming a wind-induced surge in the south-eastern part of the Baltic Sea, changes in North Atlantic atmospheric circulation, lower runoff of the Nemunas River and climate change-related rise of world ocean level. Dredging in the Klaipėda harbour also creates conditions favourable for sea water being denser to penetrate into the lagoon and stay there longer. Frequent invasions of saline seawater into the lagoon may be hazardous for biota. Freshwater species of aquatic flora and fauna are replaced by brackish water species with significantly lower variety (even more lower from the economic viewpoint) as new fish species are competitive to the local fishes. Climate change makes ice cover lasting shorter in Kuršių Marios and the lower reaches of the Nemunas. Terms of fish migration and spawning change. Due to low water level and high temperature in July and August, fish migration to the deeper part of the lagoon beyond the Russian Kaliningrad Region border is observed-the outcome unfavourable for Lithuanian fishermen.34

Water quality in the Lithuanian near shore areas of the Baltic Sea is caused mainly by water flow from the Kuršių Marios Lagoon, wastewater disposal into the sea, directly or indirectly via rivulets, as well as quality of water in the rivers running into the sea, In summer, during the eutrophication period, due to decay of algae, recreation and angling conditions worsen in the Klaipėda Strait, where pollutions is inevitable because of port activities, in the harbours of smaller rivers and other sites polluted with wastes. Organic chlorine pesticides are still detected, since such pesticides as DDT and HCH accumulate not only in water and deposits, but also in biota. However, several decades ago, when these substances were banned, only low contents are detected in biota, and a tendency of further decrease is observed, thus indicating that these substances are successfully being removed from the natural environment.

2.5. Baltic Sea Shore Erosion

The state of the Lithuanian seaside depends on interaction of natural and anthropogenic factors. The shore zone is negatively affected by an unbalanced performance of human activities, as well as natural phenomena (for example

³⁴ Repečka R., Globaliosios kaitos poveikis žuvų ištekliams it tvarus žuvų išteklių vartojimas [Impact of global change on fish resources and sustainable use of fish resources], "Biota ir globali kaita I" ['Biota and Global Change'], Vilnius, 2007, p. 197-210.

storms, hurricanes, etc.), which erode the shores, make beaches narrower, and speed up dune movement. The climate change in the 21st century is expressed not only in more frequent extreme weather cases, but also in more rapid rise of water level as the tendencies unfavourable for Lithuania's Baltic shores. With water level rising, larger land areas suffer the eroding impact of waves with more rapid changes of the shoreline and more frequent invasions of seawater (especially, together with concurrent winds favourable for such a phenomenon) into the Kuršių Marios Lagoon. The Baltic Sea shore erosion induces some serious problems related to:

- Shrinking Lithuania's area;
- Contracting of recreational space and worsening of its state;
- Secure maintaining of hydro-engineering units;
- Risk for the buildings situated near to the seashore and infrastructure.

The best indicator of the Baltic Sea shore state is the seashore dynamics that shows whether the shore-composing matter is eroded or accumulated and that is calculated using the data on the mean long-term sea level, as well as shore changes in time and space. It reflects best the long-term trends in shore state dynamics (after local and seasonal shore state variations are excluded). This is the basic indicator for substantiation of environment protection measures planned.

The data available shows that the fastening of Palanga promenade pier had augmented the shore zone by 450 m and favoured formation of a wide fine sand beach. In 1997–1998, when a part of this shore fastening was removed, sand erosion took place under the pier, and hurricane waves washed again the sandy shore with the outcome being three times narrower beach. Due to Klaipėda harbour gate reconstruction in 2001–2002, the erosion became more active at Melnragė and Kopgalis. Moreover, due to weak fastening works the shore erosion zone expands north of Kaliningrad. Moreover, the shore erosion on the mainland is more active.

In 1961–2004, mean annual water level variations in the Klaipėda Strait and the Kuršių Marios at Nida show water level rise tendency. From 1997, mean annual water level is higher than that in 1961–1990. In 2004, it exceeded the long term mean annual level by 15.6 cm at Nida and 12.9 cm in the Klaipėda Strait. Lately, the water level rise is directly related to such problems as shore erosion, security of the hydro-engineering, land inundation and ecological balance disturbance. Calculations showed that sea level rose by 15 cm during the last century.




Figure 12. Variations of mean annual water level in Klaipėda Strait and Lagoon of Kuršių Marios at Nida in 1961–2004³⁵

The shores suffered catastrophic erosion by the hurricanes in 1967, 1983, 1999 and 2005, when water level rose above the 150 cm mark. The slopes on the mainland shore were fastened in 2003–2004, which slowed the erosion process. If the area near the shore dune ridge were not fastened with tree branches, the 2004 storm waves would erode this protective ridge at Palanga by 10 m more. From 1998, even 40 m of the dune ridge (of the total 100 m) was eroded in Palanga at "Voveraité". Each year the cliff at Olando Kepuré retreats by two metres. The hurricane Anatoly that ravaged the Baltic Sea coast, swept away 30 ha of dune ridge, and later 13.5 more hectares had been lost, with only 10% regained up to now.




Figure 13. Seashore sand total losses caused by erosion in the mainland part of the Baltic Sea coast in 2000-2004 36

³⁵ Data source: Centre for Marine Researches.

³⁶ Data source: Centre for Marine Researches.

In 2002–2004, due to intensification of cyclone activities, shore erosion strengthened nearly on all length of Lithuania's seashore, and the extent of eroded shores exceeded the long-term values. The most intensive erosion takes place in the shore sites situated at the Latvian border, the Palanga promenade pier (from Rąžės Stream to Birutė Hill), Olandų Kepurė and Kopgalis. During the last 30 years (1976–2006), the total length of lost accumulative shores on Lithuania's seacoast made up 1100 m per year, and the total length of erosional shores rose by 367 m per year.²⁹

The state of the shore is predicted to worsen in the near future. Shore erosion intensity will be favoured by the rise in air temperature, as warming winters usually determine in our latitudes. Taking into account the present dynamics in certain shore zone sites and their potential changes, the most problematic shore sites can be distinguished on the Lithuanian seacoast.

The recreation load in the Palanga zone is increasing each year, the development of urban areas is intensifying. Due to the deficit in deposits on the shore and areas near the shore, the Palanga shore zone is predicted to be vulnerable to the climate change.

The Klaipėda recreation zone also experiences constantly increasing recreational load. The planned construction of deep harbour and climate change may cause the morphological state of the zone to worsen. Under the present geodynamical situation and due to strengthening erosion on the Kuršių Nerija sand spit, the most problematic is the shore site at Kopgalis.

2.6. Impact on Biological Variety and Man

The pressure of climate change on biological variety is going on constantly via mechanisms specific for each species, but the living nature systems (for example populations, communities, etc.) are not always able to preserve their species composition and variety. During the present period, the losses are more common than the appearance of new species favourable for humans or adaptation of the former ones. With the natural environment changing in Lithuania, new potential risks arise, such as:

- Degradation of present ecosystems/habitats: retreat and/or disappearance of species, spreading of new exotic species, including undesirable ones causing new diseases and spreading them, new food chains in the ecosystems and potential consequences (e.g., lower productivity of ecosystems), which can be difficult to prognosticate;
- Likely rapid change of plant associations and forest ecosystems will
 change conditions for fauna, especially amphibians, insects, reptilians,
 and birds, areas of which will dramatically change, followed by rapid disappearance of species and further change in community composition;
- According to temperature optima, the pace of succession for land and water invertebrates and other communities will change; species disappearance rate will depend on the pace of climate warming and the rate of scattering and/or spreading of these species;

Due to changed conditions, rare species will leave the protected areashence, new risks and barriers will appear to protect these species; many environment protection and management measures commonly applied now will not be efficient, therefore, new concepts, methods and measures (reform of protected areas network) will be necessary; and there will be an especially high demand in the international protection and international cooperation to create and regularly revise general systems and networks of protected areas.

Discussing environmental factors causing a significant impact on certain national economy sectors linked with biological variety (forestry, fisheries, partly agriculture), the potential changes can be stated. Given further increases of environment pollution and climate change, two different processes are expected to take place in the forest ecosystems: (1) due to increase in content of ozone and sulphur oxides, as well as acidification of atmospheric precipitation, the state of tree canopy is to worsen and structural relations of micro-arthropods in the soil are to increase, whereas the variety of macrobenthos in forest hydro-systems is to lessen, etc.; (2) due to increase in atmospheric precipitation and air temperature, the resistance of these biota components to pollutants is to be higher (wider species variety, larger numbers of individuals in the communities).³⁷

Temperature and precipitation conditions are to determine different formation of population's needle-eating and young forest stand pests. Species of forest pests (various weevils, pine moth, pine beauty moth, conifer sawfly) are affected by differences in both temperature and precipitation. Warm and dry weather intensifies expansion of pest focuses and rapid growth of population. This is well seen in the data of the last two decades.

Heat and cold waves, or some other long lasting phenomena (droughts) are to impact severely productivity of plants (especially in agriculture) and cause economic losses, new problems related to introduction of new adaptive (to changing climate conditions in separate regions) breeds as well as formation of new agriculture strategy.

The majority of meteopathology experts say that nearly all meteorological factors can raise meteotropic^{38*} reactions in the organism. Atmospheric pressure variations and winds are of great importance. Influence of separate meteorological factors on human health is not clear enough. Variations in electromagnetic field intensity can change bioelectric activity of tissues and organs. Statistical data show that cardiovascular diseases flare up with falling atmospheric pressure; hypertensive crises, strokes and heart attacks become more often.

³⁷ Sąlygiškai natūralių ekosistemų kompleksiškas monitoringas [Comprehensive monitoring of conditionally natural ecosystems], 2006, Aplinkos apsaugos agentūra [Environment Protection Agency], Vilnius, p. 97-98.

^{38*} Meteotropic-related to meteorological conditions, weather, climate

With appearance of new species the spreading of infectious diseases become more probable. With warming weather appearance and transfer of infectious diseases and their carriers with water and food accompanied by disturbance of local ecological balance is more likely.

Due to climate warming and pollution of the atmosphere with chemical compounds and biological substances (pollen, spores, etc.) cases of asthma and allergic reaction are more often observed.

Series of scientific works and studies have been performed in the world to find out the impact of climate factors on human mortality and hospitalisation for heart attack or stroke. Now, with climate rapidly changing, such studies become more important for both meteolabile^{39*} people and clinicians. People having blood pressure disturbance are most vulnerable to changes in atmospheric pressure and high winds, especially in the case of association of these both factors, as well as atmospheric fronts. Heart attacks, as a rule, occur with cold front passing, usually, at night or morning. Stroke cases are vulnerable to daily extreme variations in atmospheric pressure⁴⁰. The association between air temperature and the risk of stroke and acute myocardial infarction can be explained by such factors as changes in clotting mechanisms, lipid levels, and blood pressure. However, seasonal variation in lipid levels seems to be an unlikely explanation for the large seasonal variation in the incidence of stroke recorded in the study.

Blood pressure shows marked seasonal variation, it is higher in winter (colder) months. The increased blood pressure is a strong risk factor for stroke.⁴¹ The strongest meteotropic reactions are typical of those having disturbance of blood pressure, myocardial ischemia, cerebral atherosclerosis and rheumatism.

About 50%-80% of people with cardiovascular diseases are meteolabile. Taking this into account, the analysis of dependence of EMT^{42*} admissions for myocardial and brain infarctions, as well as stroke cases on such climatic parameters as daily air temperature, atmospheric pressure and their variation, relative air humidity and sun radiation in 2005–2007 in Vilnius City showed the following results: the increase of EMT admissions for myocardial infarction took place at low diurnal temperatures and high amplitudes of air temperature variations from day to day (–10 degrees or even more). Moreover the correlation of these climatic parameters showed high confidence coefficient – p<0.001¹⁸. EMT admissions for myocardial infarction in 2005–2007 in Vilnius City were most frequent due to low daily air temperature (when average daily air tem-

^{39*} Meteolabile – sensitive, with pathological reaction to meteorological conditions.

^{40 (}Klimato kaitos poveikio šaliai įvertinimo studija ir pasekmių švelninimo strateginis planas, 2007) [A Study on the Assessment of Climate Change Impact on the Country and Its Outcome Mitigation Strategic Plan] (in Lithuanian), (http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/329/7469/760-d)

⁴¹ Prušinskaitė A., 2008, Klimato įtaka kai kurių ligų paūmėjimui, bakalauro darbas [Influence of Climate on Some Disease Flare-up, Bachelor Thesis], VU, GMF, Ekologijos ir aplinkotyros centras [Centre for Ecology and Environmental Studies], 47 p.

^{42 *} EMT - emergency medical treatment

perature is below -10° C), extreme variations of atmospheric pressure (<970 hPa or >1020 hPa), as well as duration of sun radiation (at sun radiation lasting 0 h, number of admissions increased by 1.5 times per month).³⁹

EMT admissions for brain infarctions in 2005–2007 in Vilnius City showed no association with the climatic factors studied. Nevertheless, at high average daily temperatures (>25°C), low relative air humidity (<41 proc.) and high atmospheric pressure (>1020 hPa) a slightly higher number of admissions have been fixed. EMT admissions for stroke in 2005–2007 in Vilnius were best related to the relative air humidity; so, with the increase of humidity the number of admissions for stroke increased (p<0.01; r=0.67) and with shorter solar radiation the number of admissions also increased (p<0.07; r=-0.54). Seasonal distribution of EMT admissions was detected only for the cases of myocardial infarction—the number for admissions increased in winter and spring months.

Summary

By analysing the processes taking place, together with climate change and their perspectives in Lithuania's environment, it can be said that in spite of strategies and programmes approved for improvement of the environmental state and measures applied, climate change processes will go on. This is mainly due to global factors, not regional or single-state factors affecting the environment. Therefore, the scenarios of climate change will be imminently linked to the strategy the humans will implement to exist on the Earth and the related political, social and economic development. In fact, the development of the natural environment will be determined by two components—climate change and anthropogenic load intensity. Up to now we encountered the global problem of adaptation to the impact of climate change or impact-mitigating local solutions. These processes take place in the natural environment constantly, but the solution of this problem in separate social life spheres is quite a different thing.

Climate change processes in Lithuania already induce the intensification of extreme nature phenomena (storms, hurricanes), affect mean annual solar radiation duration and seasonal character, as well as UV radiation levels, Baltic Sea and Kuršių Marios Lagoon water level increase, eutrophication of surface water bodies and acceleration of their ageing, decline in biological variety, changes of species composition, productivity, appearance of undesirable and hazardous exotic species, air quality and near-surface ozone, pollution spreading in Lithuania's cities and other processes.

Climate change and anthropogenic load, affects environment pollution with all the outcomes of this process, general transformations and losses of landscapes and separate areas, depletion of nature resources, and other processes. Finally, this is extremely important for socio-economic and demographic development, technology innovations, management, and chiefly for human health.

It should be acknowledged and understood that only the maximum cut of the negative impact of anthropogenic load on the environment and the implementation of balanced preventive measures to mitigate the inevitable outcome of nature degradation affected by climate change will help us to at least stabilise the state of natural environment in Lithuania and, hence, to partly preserve its valuables.

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