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ENHANCING UNITED NATIONS CAPACITY TO SUPPORT POST-CONFLICT POLICING AND RULE OF LAW

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WILLIAM J. DURCH
MADLINE L. ENGLAND
EDITORS



**ENHANCING UNITED NATIONS CAPACITY
TO SUPPORT POST-CONFLICT
POLICING AND RULE OF LAW**

REVISED AND UPDATED

**WILLIAM J. DURCH WITH MADELINE L. ENGLAND,
EDITORS**

**ORIGINAL REPORT (NOVEMBER 2007) CO-AUTHORED BY
JOSHUA G. SMITH, VICTORIA K. HOLT AND WILLIAM J. DURCH**

**PROJECT ON RULE OF LAW IN POST-CONFLICT SETTINGS,
FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS PROGRAM**

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
BINUB	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
BONUCA	United Nations Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
CLJAU	Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit
CoESPU	Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units
COMPSTAT	Computerized Statistics
DCAF	(Geneva Centre for the) Democratic Control of the Armed Forces
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECPS	Executive Committee on Peace and Security
FPU	Formed Police Unit
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
HNP	Haitian National Police
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (US Department of Justice)
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IPA	International Peace Academy
IPTF	International Police Task Force
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
ITS	Integrated Training Service
JCSC	Justice and Corrections Standing Capacity (UN DPKO)
KA IPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center
KPS	Kosovo Police Service
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MIPONUH	United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MSA	Mission Subsistence Allowance
MSU	Multinational Specialized Units

NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
OLA	Office of Legal Affairs
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAE	Pacific Architects and Engineers
PCC	Police Contributing Country
PJC Reserve	Police, Justice, and Corrections Reserve
PNTL	Timor-Leste National Police Force
PSA	Peacekeeping Support Account
R & R	Rest and Recuperation
RECAMP	Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacity (France)
RoL	Rule of Law
ROLCAP	Rule of Law Capacity (UN)
ROLIP	Rule of Law Indicators Project
RS	Republika Srpska
SAT	Selection Assistance Teams
SG	Secretary-General
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SPC	Standing Police Capacity
SPU	Stability Police Units/Specialized Police Units/Special Police Units
STM	Standardized/Standard Training Module
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNCIVPOL	UN Civilian Police
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in the Sudan
UNMISSET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes
UNOGBIS	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNPR	United Nations Police Reserve
UNSAS	United Nations Standby Arrangements System
UNSMIH	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti
UNSF	United Nations Security Force (West New Guinea)
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group (Namibia)
UNTMIH	United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti
UNTOP	United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding
US	United States
USIP	United States Institute of Peace

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PREFACE

Since 2001, the Stimson Center's program on the Future of Peace Operations (FOPO) has worked to promote sensible US policy toward and encourage greater UN effectiveness in the conduct of peace operations—internationally-mandated efforts that engage military, police, and other resources in support of difficult transitions from war to peace in states and territories around the globe. Such places suffer from many deficits—in education, health, jobs, and infrastructure—but the greatest and most costly, in the long run, is their deficit in the rule of law and security. This deficit affects quality of governance, justice, and other goals of international security and aid institutions that want to promote sustainable peace and development. There is, however, no agreed definition of the term “rule of law.” For purposes of this and other reports in FOPO's series on restoring post-conflict rule of law, we therefore choose to use the relatively comprehensive definition contained in the UN Secretary-General's August 2004 report on rule of law and transitional justice. It defines rule of law as:

A principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to the laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.

– The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, 23 August 2004, para. 6.

Promoting and sustaining the rule of law in war-torn lands requires a multi-dimensional approach that extends beyond the reform and restructuring of local police, judicial, and corrections institutions to:

- Early provision of public security by the international community while local security forces are reformed and rebuilt.
- International support for effective border controls, both to curtail illicit trade and to promote legitimate commerce and government customs revenues.
- Curtailment of regional smuggling rings and spoiler networks that traffic in arms and commodities to finance war and, afterwards, to sustain war-time political and economic power structures.
- Strict legal accountability for those who participate in peace operations, lest their actions reinforce the very cynicism and resignation with regard to impunity that their work is intended to reverse.
- Recognition that corruption can drain the utility from any assistance program and undermine the legitimacy of post-war governments in the eyes of their peoples.

This study is one of five produced by FOPO, each addressed to one of the bulleted items above. It stems from the recognition that establishing public security and bolstering local capacity to maintain that security is a critical component of modern peace operations. Rampant criminality

and dysfunctional or abusive local police forces pose dire risks to fragile peace processes, undermining public confidence in nascent governments, and increasing the likelihood of renewed conflict. The growing numbers of international police authorized by the Security Council to serve in UN missions attests to an increasing recognition of the importance, and challenge, of fostering the rule of law in post-conflict environments. To date, however, the UN's capacity to recruit and deploy highly-skilled officers to the field in a timely manner has fallen far short of what is required to succeed in this task. This study attempts to address present shortfalls in UN capacity through a series of reinforcing proposals, including: an expanded core standing cadre of UN police and rule of law experts to serve as mission leadership and first responders; a UN Police Reserve that offers police forces and governments financial incentives to participate; and a Senior Reserve Roster to promote the availability of highly experienced rule of law professionals for UN peacekeeping mission service and senior advisory roles with the mission host state.

This study and the other four described below are available at www.stimson.org/fopo.

Borders. FOPO's border security study, *Post-Conflict Borders and UN Peace Operations*, is in two parts. For part one, author Kathleen A. Walsh surveyed more than 100 international border assistance and training programs. Her report, "Border Security, Trade Controls, and UN Peace Operations," found both a great deal of overlap and lack of coordination among these programs that, if remedied, could make them much more cost-effective. The second part of the study, "A Phased Approach to Post-Conflict Border Security," by Katherine N. Andrews, Brandon L. Hunt, and William J. Durch, lays out the requirements for coordinated international support to border security in post-conflict states that host international peace operations.

Spoiler Networks. During and after conflict, continued smuggling of small arms and high-value commodities, such as diamonds or timber, sustains war and impedes peace. To disrupt such "spoiler" networks, the UN Security Council has imposed targeted sanctions on some states and individuals and appointed small investigative teams—Panels or Groups of Experts—to monitor and evaluate sanctions implementation. Their work sheds critical light on problems implementing UN sanctions regimes with detailed reports on how these networks operate and recommending measures to counter them and to contribute to building the rule of law. These expert panels face challenges, however, both in the field and in getting the Security Council and UN member states to implement their many practical recommendations. Although they frequently operate where UN peacekeeping operations are deployed, collaboration between these two Security Council creations is not as good as it might be. Two FOPO studies have examined these issues. The first highlights how implementing Panel recommendations could improve post-conflict rule of law, and the second shows how improved collaboration between Panels and peacekeepers could advance the UN's goals of creating sustainable peace. The studies are, *Targeting Spoilers: The Role of UN Panels of Experts*, by Alix J. Boucher and Victoria K. Holt, and *UN Panels of Experts and UN Peace Operations: Exploiting Synergies for Peacebuilding*, by Alix J. Boucher.

Accountability. In 2004, major problems of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo and other operations became a public scandal for the United Nations. Before that story broke, FOPO had begun work on the problem of criminal accountability for personnel in peace operations. Because states retain disciplinary responsibility for their military forces in peace operations, that work focused on UN staff and experts on

mission, a category that includes UN police. As operations become more deeply involved in assisting or substituting for local government, their personnel must be subject to the rule of law, and be seen as subject to it by local peoples. FOPO found, however, that the tenuous reach of the law—any law—covering criminal acts by UN personnel on mission has left a legal and procedural vacuum filled only in part by administrative sanctions (such as fines, dismissal, and/or repatriation) for actions that would be felonies under most states' domestic laws. FOPO looked into the cost and feasibility of other options, some of which would require serious rethinking of criminal jurisdiction in and for peace operations. The study is, *Improving Criminal Accountability in UN Peace Operations*, by William J. Durch, Katherine N. Andrews, and Madeline L. England, with Matthew C. Weed.

Corruption. As a contribution to the many efforts to contain and reduce pervasive corruption in post-conflict settings, FOPO reviewed what the world's specialists in corruption say about how to recognize and fight it in post-conflict circumstances, especially where international peace operations are deployed. The resulting study, a meta-analysis of the English-language literature on the subject, reflects a search for consensus and insight rather than independent field research. Its principal contributions lie in its structured summaries of the literature surveyed and in how it uses that structured assessment to visualize both the patterns of post-conflict corruption and emerging best practices in fighting it. The study is, *Mapping and Fighting Corruption in War-Torn States*, by Alix J. Boucher, William J. Durch, Margaret Midyette, Sarah Rose, and Jason Terry.

All of these studies recognize that the United Nations cannot immediately “create” the rule of law in countries where it does not exist, or transform recalcitrant and abusive police into model protectors of the public trust in a few short months. Such efforts take time. Moreover, even well-equipped peacekeepers will have difficulty totally securing hundreds of miles of border in unfamiliar and rugged terrain against smuggling or spoilers, nor is it likely that the best-coordinated international efforts can completely eradicate corruption in post-conflict circumstances. The UN and its partners can, however, provide critical assistance, guidance, and support on all of these issues, step by step, to fragile governments attempting to develop the capacity and legitimacy to effectively govern on behalf of their peoples. In short, the United Nations, its member states, and other international institutions and aid donors can help fragile states begin the rocky journey towards self-sustaining peace, good governance, and stable economic livelihoods. The common foundation on which such institutions and outcomes must be built is respect for and deference to the rule of law.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Police and other personnel who support the rule of law play a vital and expanding role in United Nations peace operations. Their responsibilities have grown from merely monitoring host state police forces to reforming, restructuring, and rebuilding police forces decimated or discredited by war. Where no effective local police capacity exists, UN police (UNPOL) have assumed primary responsibility for maintaining law and order. Across all missions, they play diverse and critical roles in the effort to (re)establish the rule of law in states attempting to transition from war to a peace that produces safe and stable societies. Indeed, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehénno argued that “(e)xperienced civilian law-enforcement professionals are just as vital to the success of our missions as military forces.” Yet the current system for recruiting and deploying individual police for service in UN missions consistently fails to deliver high quality personnel to missions quickly and efficiently. Resolving this long-standing problem is an increasingly urgent priority for the United Nations. This report offers potential solutions to it that are both feasible and affordable.

UN Capacity: Not Keeping Pace with Demand and Complexity

The importance of UNPOL in modern peace operations is reflected in the growing demand for their services. Through the 1990s, steady demand kept about 2,000 UNPOL deployed. In 1999, however, demand grew dramatically and with it came new tasks. Two new complex peacekeeping missions with interim law enforcement mandates, in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, rapidly quadrupled UNPOL deployments and gave the United Nations direct responsibility for public security in those mission areas. Other peacekeeping missions were subsequently established with significant policing and other rule of law-related elements. By June 2007, the United Nations had over 9,500 police from nearly 90 countries serving in ten peacekeeping missions (and an additional six political and peacebuilding missions) around the globe. The following month, the Security Council authorized another 3,800 individual officers and 2,500 personnel in formed police units (FPUs) for the African Union-UN hybrid force in Darfur, Sudan, as well as 300 police for a UN police-building mission in Chad. In January 2010, the Security Council authorized a further 1,500 UNPOL to supplement current deployments in Haiti and help manage post-earthquake insecurity. These numbers, balanced by mission drawdown in Kosovo, brought total authorized UNPOL strength to roughly 16,500.

The growing demand for international police and increasing complexity of their assigned tasks stem from the recognition of two things: that rule of law is fundamental to lasting and self-sustaining peace, and that competent, professional police—international and domestic—are essential to rule of law. Thus today, UN police not only support post-conflict public security but usually are also involved in building needed local capacity. In Timor-Leste, between fall 2006 and spring 2010, 1,600 UN police served both as primary providers of law and order and as instructor/mentors for the Timor-Leste police (PNTL). In Haiti, 3,400 UN police have helped combat criminal gangs while simultaneously working to build up the Haitian National Police, which suffered 500 casualties in the January 2010 quake. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), roughly 1,100 UN police coordinate with the European Union and others to professionalize the large, fractious, and frequently-abusive Congolese police, and are slated to

grow further with a new mandate to train 22 battalions of Congolese police. UNPOL play similarly diverse and important roles in peacekeeping missions in Sudan, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, and elsewhere.

Yet this recognition of the importance of rule of law and of UN police has not translated into necessary deployable capacity. First, the United Nations faces major and basic gaps in its ability to recruit, prepare, and deploy qualified police to new missions in a timely manner, as well as in its ability to effectively manage police contingents in the field. Stimson analyzed rates of deployment for all UN peacekeeping operations with police components since 1989 and found deployment rates of individual UNPOL to be unimproved over time. After Security Council action, it still takes an average of nine months to get the authorized number of police officers to the field. This delay deprives new peace operations of public security personnel at the most critical phase of a country's war-to-peace transition: its beginning. Stimson also found that peak demand for UN police comes in waves, every six to seven years, with Security Council authorizations rising rapidly in those years, to four or five times average annual levels. These peak-demand years further stress the ad hoc system for recruiting, preparing, and deploying police to UN peacekeeping missions. That system is at the core of present problems. Police must be offered to the United Nations by states, but states have proved quite reluctant to pre-nominate officers to any sort of UN police roster. Since all police have active "day jobs," states also find it hard to part with them, and particularly with their most capable officers. This leaves states with mostly moral incentives to contribute qualified individuals, in contrast to the material incentives offered by the UN for both formed police and military units—although such incentives alone proved insufficient to generate quality FPUs.

The problem goes beyond UN member states, however, to the UN system for managing and deploying personnel. If states did have greater incentives to contribute personnel, under present arrangements the United Nations would still have no advance knowledge of the pool of officers potentially available to it or their operational specialties. Further, if such knowledge were in fact made available, there are too few UN Headquarters staff to use that information effectively. Fewer than 100 non-deployed UN Police Division (UNPD) personnel in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) support all of the elements of UN policing laid out above, from strategy onward, for a deployed force that is nearly 200 times larger, executing over a dozen different mandates. UNPD has grown since 2007, when that ratio was roughly 1:350, but is still not even close to the 1:4 ratio that developed states with internationally deployable police groups try to maintain.¹ UN member states are reluctant to support essential capacities such as criminal intelligence, and UN planners tend to push support posts into the field and onto individual mission budgets, which keeps the Headquarters budget down, but also guarantees that each mission will go its own way in terms of structure and plans to implement its mandate. Yet most large mission headquarters presently take upwards of a year to build. Inconsistency and tardiness are two ways to ensure planning inefficiency, inadequate institutional learning, and repetitive runs up the learning curve in mission after mission—not just on the mission-unique elements of the job but on the basics of UN policy, training, logistics, and field objectives. In a first step toward its own rapid deployment service, in 2006 DPKO was authorized to build a small Standing Police Capacity of 27 persons and, in 2010, authorized to enlarge it by 14 posts and to recruit a complementary standing capacity of five persons in justice and corrections. These are steps in the right direction on which this report builds and for which it offers an end-state: a mature rapid

deployment system capable of meeting UN needs for thorough mission assessment, start-up, management, and learning; and host-state needs for knowledgeable help in reconstituting post-conflict policing, justice, and corrections functions in the context of a broader and better-informed peacebuilding strategy.

Proposal 1: Create a Standing UN Rule of Law Capacity (ROLCAP)

Stimson proposes creating a large standing cadre of police and rule of law experts to help plan, deploy, and fill key leadership posts of new missions in their critical first year and provide support to other, ongoing peacekeeping operations. This standing rule of law capacity (ROLCAP) of roughly 400 personnel would comprise six to eight teams of 50–75 people each. One third of each team would be justice and corrections experts. The remainder would be police experts in a range of specialties. Both groups would include personnel capable of conducting needs assessments, mission planning, and mission management, and capable of running the police and rule of law components of a new operation for the mission’s first year.

The proposed numbers are based on our analysis of minimum UN mission staffing requirements and mission frequency. On average, mission police components have 30–80 key headquarters personnel—from leadership to critical communications personnel, and from managers of UN police operations to mission planners and managers of capacity-building programs for host-state police. Non-police rule of law headquarters components of missions average 20 personnel, for a total of 50–100 key police/rule of law headquarters personnel per mission. To be able to meet surge requirements, ROLCAP should be able to launch at least two new missions per year, with a well-structured program of work for periods in which the main tasks relate to mission sustainment rather than startup. ROLCAP members could, for example, train the police reserve proposed below, lead induction training for the bulk of mission police and other rule of law personnel, and be available to run training initiatives in non-mission countries, as part of DPKO’s role as lead entity within the UN on police issues. A sustainable deployment tempo should not exceed 50 percent—serving 12 months in the field and then 12 months recuperating, being trained, and training others on short-term assignment.

A current DPKO priority is the development of an early peacebuilding strategy, a critical element of which promises to be a stronger emphasis on mission assessments and planning in the first year of deployment to better synchronize with longer-term peacebuilding plans and objectives. Experience has shown that initiating host-state institutional reform prior to developing a thorough understanding of priorities, needs, and culture(s) in the mission area of responsibility can waste resources and damage post-conflict recovery with unsustainable or unwanted initiatives.

Proposal 2: Create a UN Police Reserve (UNPR)

Rather than leave recruitment of the bulk of UN mission police and rule of law personnel to the current, ad hoc system, Stimson proposes creation of a UN Police Reserve (UNPR). The reserve would be composed of officers nominated by countries for deployment in UN missions for fixed terms that are interspersed with rotations back to their home services. Improving the incentives for countries to offer skilled police is fundamental to such a reserve. Thus, we propose that police agencies be offered “retainer fees” for officers selected for the new reserve system and be reimbursed at fixed rates for their deployment, in a manner similar to FPU and military units. The

availability of reimbursement would also give UNPD greater leverage to insist on appropriate skills and performance standards among officers nominated for UN service.

The retainer would be offered in recognition of ongoing demand for police officers at home. We propose that the United Nations offer a police agency (not the national government, but the agency whose officer is placed on the reserve roster) an annual retainer equivalent to 10 percent of the officer's actual annual salary. Five percent of this would be to defray the costs of two weeks annual UN-related training, and five percent would be an incentive fee for placing his or her name on the reserve list and committing to release that officer within 14 days of call up by the United Nations. Officers nominated for the UNPR should be screened by the United Nations (one of the tasks proposed for ROLCAP) and once accepted, should complete an initial UN-certified training program. In further recognition of domestic demand for good police, UNPR deployment tempo would be lower than that of ROLCAP—no more than 33 percent (for example, six months UN duty, 12 months domestic duty; or 12 months UN duty, 24 months domestic). The size of the reserve should reflect shifting demand for police in the field, but should be large enough to meet all demand for individual police by UN operations at the above deployment ratios.²

Proposal 3: Create a Police, Justice, and Corrections Senior Leadership Reserve

Finally, Stimson proposes creation of a Police, Justice, and Corrections Senior Leadership Reserve (PJC Reserve) as a source of senior professionals (D1 and D2 level) who individually volunteer in advance for service in UN missions, as opposed to being seconded by states. Its membership would consist initially of retired or former police, criminal justice, and corrections practitioners, and would assist DPKO in filling senior mission component positions in those areas quickly and efficiently. The PJC Reserve also could fill senior security sector reform posts where a certain amount of “gray”—especially from the mission's region—is needed to advise local ministers, senior judges, and heads of security forces, or to provide follow-on leadership in a mission after rapid responders rotate out. A stipend could be offered to those members on the reserve roster willing to commit to rapid call-up (on the order of 30 days notice), and that stipend might equal three percent of the salary that would be paid to them after call-up. The size of the reserve and the proportion on rapid call-up could be flexible. The PJC Reserve should be configured to complement the work of the DFS Senior Leadership Appointment Section.

Costing These Proposals

The three proposed structures would add some costs to UN operations. However, their adoption would reduce UN response times and thus should reduce overall mission timelines and costs. We estimate the start-up costs of ROLCAP itself at about \$52 million, including support infrastructure, with recurring costs of roughly \$38 million per year for its non-deployed elements. These costs would be pro-rated across mission budgets, much as the cost of DPKO Headquarters operations are at present. We estimate that UNPR would have between \$16 and \$30 million in recurring, non-deployed costs and would add about \$80 million a year to mission budgets in reimbursements to PCCs for individual police. The PJC Reserve would add about \$1.7 million. These annual readiness costs would also be pro-rated across mission budgets. (Actual costs for UNPR would depend on the ratio of developed state participation, since it would reimburse fractions of actual salary to keep officers in the reserve.) Since the approved annual UN peacekeeping budget for 2010–2011 is \$7.3 billion, the price of being ready to deploy well-

trained police and ROL experts rapidly, and doing so consistently, would add less than two percent to overall UN peacekeeping costs, before taking into account the possible longer-term cost savings of launching mission police, justice, and corrections components more quickly and effectively.

To translate these costs into mission impact, we estimated the costs of the proposed systems for the UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL). That mission, mandated by the Security Council in September 2003, was authorized 755 individual police, several formed police units, and about 15,000 troops. Had the proposed systems been in place at that time, they would have added 8.3 percent to UNMIL's budget in its first nine months and about 3.4 percent in its later years. (The impact on other missions would vary with the size of their police/rule of law contingents.) If UNMIL had been able to deploy professional management and training teams for its police and rule of law components, and a full complement of police and rule of law personnel, from its first month instead of nine months later, it would have been better prepared to support public order in Monrovia and to cope with the first attempt to disarm and demobilize Liberian armed groups in December 2003.

Building Responsive and Flexible UN Field Capacity in Police and Rule of Law

This report's proposals aim to overcome the chronic and systemic shortcomings that hobble the UN's ability to carry out its post-conflict policing and rule of law support mandates in a timely and effective manner. These shortcomings include a lack of clear guidance and strategy—which is being addressed by Police Division's Strategic Doctrine Development Framework; insufficient planning for the police component of new operations—which is addressed in part by growth in Police Division's headquarters planning capacity, but which needs deployable counterparts with which to work on more than an emergency basis; and slow deployment times for individual police with the needed specialties. The last problem is fundamentally unfixable given current recruitment arrangements, owing to the UN's present inability to pre-identify, pre-qualify, and pre-train officers for its missions; to the uneven quality of police personnel that are offered to missions by UN member states; and to continuing mismatches between missions' needs and the skill-sets of state-offered personnel.

These proposals are consistent with UN priorities articulated in the 2009 New Horizon non-paper. All match the articulated need for a capability-driven approach, matching resources and needs, and attracting and retaining the correct personnel for timely deployment.³ Success in implementing New Horizon's goals depends on matching the current UN emphasis on a capability-driven approach with a realistic expectation of what those capabilities should be tasked to accomplish. Proactive engagement from the highest levels of the Organization will be needed to push for Member State support, and that support must be leveraged into operational standards, reserve rosters, and standing capacities to achieve the New Horizon recommendations.

To implement these proposals, member states must be willing to trade short-term costs for continuing, longer-term benefits in mission planning, execution, and achievement of mandated objectives. Present trends suggest that demand for qualified police officers and other rule of law personnel is unlikely to slow appreciably in the near future. Nor is domestic demand for police officers likely to slacken appreciably, as populations continue to grow. Therefore, if the United Nations is to improve its performance in international police peacekeeping and its support for

more effective and humane post-conflict justice and corrections institutions in the places where its peace operations deploy, it needs to invest in a new way of doing business in these critical substantive areas. The sooner these investments begin, the sooner UN police and other rule of law personnel will begin to meet the performance standards that UN staff and member states alike expect of them, and the sooner public safety and security can be improved for the victims of violence in the countries where UN peacekeepers serve.

Notes to the Executive Summary

- ¹ Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK), “Review of Conflict-Related International Policing,” Better World, Better Britain, 1 April 2008–31 March 2009.
- ² Interviews suggest that the actual average deployment tempo for seconded national police officers is presently closer to 20 percent; that is, an officer released for a year of UN duty will serve at home for four years before possibly deploying in UN service again. Such gaps are understandable from the perspective of the officer and his or her police service, but also are a factor in the marginal institutional memory within UN police ranks.
- ³ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*, A/63/881–S/2009/304, 11 June 2009. “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping” (New York: UN DPKO/DFS, July 2009).

Summary Chart: Proposals for Enhancing UN Post-Conflict Rapid Deployment Capacity for Policing and Rule of Law				
<i>Proposals</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Primary Challenges this Would Overcome</i>	<i>Primary Tasks</i>	<i>Size</i>
UN Standing Rule of Law Capacity (ROLCAP)	<p>A permanent, standing cadre of police and rule of law experts available for rapid deployment to new missions.</p> <p>Rapid Deployment Teams of 50–75 people each would serve as mission leadership during first 12 months of a new mission.</p>	<p>Slow deployment</p> <p>Uneven quality of police and ROL personnel</p> <p>Lack of pre-deployment training</p> <p>Lack of strategic planning</p> <p>Incomplete needs assessment</p> <p>Lack of institutional memory</p> <p>Need for integrated rule of law approach</p>	<p><u>Non-Deployed:</u> Vet and train recruits for UNPR. Analyze lessons learned. Refine UNPOL/ROL policy & guidance with DPKO HQ. Plan for anticipated missions.</p> <p><u>Immediately pre-deployment:</u> Mission-specific training. Participate in needs assessment missions & mission planning.</p> <p><u>Deployed 7–14 days post-mandate:</u> Headquarters setup, advanced operational planning, including security sector reform planning. Reception and final training of ROL/police personnel arriving from reserves.</p>	<p>400 persons (275 police experts, 125 other ROL experts)</p> <p>Six to eight deployable teams of 50–75 people or as needed.</p>
UN Police Reserve (UNPR)	<p>Replaces current recruitment of individual UN police officers with a system whereby contributing police agencies have financial incentives to place officers on reserve.</p> <p>Police agencies would receive retainers equal to 10 pct of officers' actual salary (five pct to cover annual training and five pct incentive fee) and UN reimbursement when officers deploy, comparable to that given for troops and police in formed units.</p> <p>Officers selected would receive general and pre-deployment training and be available for rapid deployment. Deployed officers would continue to receive UN Mission Subsistence Allowance or equivalent.</p>	<p>Slow deployment of individual UN police</p> <p>Uneven quality of those that do deploy</p> <p>Uneven UN access to needed specialties</p> <p>Lack of pre-deployment training prior to arrival in mission</p> <p>Lack of institutional memory</p>	<p><u>Non-Deployed:</u> Must be certified prior to joining reserve, through completion of UN basic police training program. Availability for 2 weeks of annual refresher training.</p> <p><u>Immediately pre-deployment:</u> Mission-specific training.</p> <p><u>Deployed (14 days of call-up):</u> Would conduct all activities currently carried out by individual UN police. Emphasis on end-of-assignment reporting to capture experiences, and lessons learned.</p>	<p>Based on UN individual police deployments as of mid-2010, UNPR would have roughly 11,500 officers at 33 percent deployment tempo or two officers in reserve for every officer deployed, plus a small cushion for illness, etc.</p> <p>Six months UN deployment would be followed by 12 months at home; or 12 months deployment by 24 months at home.</p>
UN Senior Police, Justice and Corrections Reserve (PJC Reserve)	<p>Senior (retired) police and rule of law experts receive a modest annual stipend (three pct of expected active duty salary) in exchange for being on retainer and willing to deploy on 30 days' notice if needed.</p> <p>Only a fraction of the roster is anticipated to be on short notice and thus on retainer.</p>	<p>Poor availability of police leadership</p> <p>Lack of institutional memory</p> <p>Need for integrated rule of law approach</p>	<p>ROL mission leadership, usually second and later rotations; sometimes as initial leadership.</p> <p>Lead the assistance effort in the reform of local police, prisons, and court systems, with sufficient seniority and experience to be credible mentors and advisors to senior host-state counterparts.</p> <p>Conduct post-mission debriefings to inform future efforts.</p>	Variable

INTRODUCTION

Worldwide, modern peace operations—combining the security elements of peacekeeping and the transforming/reconstructive elements of peacebuilding—attempt to bring stability to war-torn lands. Central to this mission is the (re)establishment of a functioning system to support the rule of law. This report is about equipping United Nations (UN) peace operations—current and prospective—with greater and more responsive capabilities to contribute to that task, both by providing public security as needed in the immediate post-war period and by rebuilding host states’ ability to do so in the longer term.

Virtually every study of post-conflict environments concludes that stable public security is a prerequisite to peacebuilding. Indeed, it is common sense. Yet the supply of police and related rule of law-supporting personnel for peace operations has lagged demand for decades. With the exception of paramilitary police, recruiting sufficient numbers of competent officers in needed specialties is as difficult now as it was 15 years ago, and only partly because the demand for these specialties is higher than ever. Not only the United Nations, but other organizations that need police peacekeepers, like the European Union, have had a hard time staffing their field missions quickly with the right people.

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has been working to improve its policing capacity for nearly a decade, with visible but still modest results. The need to reform UN policing and to integrate police with other post-conflict rule of law support was laid out in the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations in August 2000 (the Brahimi Report). The report called for a “doctrinal shift” in how the UN “conceives of and utilizes civilian police in peace operations” and recommended increased use of “judicial, penal, human rights, and policing experts working together” to uphold the rule of law. The report recommended a series of concrete steps, including creation of an on-call roster of 100 police experts, establishment of national pools of officers to be included in the UN Standby Arrangements System, and development of regional training centers and single “points of contact” in member state governments to facilitate UN recruitment of police for its peace operations.¹

In December 2003, the Future of Peace Operations program at the Stimson Center published an assessment of Brahimi Report implementation, concluding that “the Civilian Police Division’s—indeed, the UN’s—capacity to recruit and deploy in the rule of law areas still falls short of what is needed to meet present, let alone future, mission demands rapidly and effectively.”² The Secretary-General originally rejected the call for a “doctrinal shift,” and member states declined to name individual officers to the proposed police on-call roster.³ By late 2006, the police and other rule of law components of UN peace operations remained hard-pressed to recruit qualified personnel in the numbers required, and were still largely bereft of strategic guidance. In a November 2006 meeting that addressed the UN’s role in promoting the rule of law, the Secretary-

General's high-level Policy Committee stressed "the lack of doctrine and guidance in this field," noting that "[t]he UN had to rely on ad hoc consultants and short-term staff too frequently and thus had trouble building up the institutional memory and continuity required. There was a clear need for dedicated and adequate core capacity..." and a better division of labor among the various parts of the UN system with a program stake in rule of law, both in peace operations and other activities.⁴ By early 2010, a record 13,000 United Nations police (UNPOL) were deployed in new or continuing UN operations, yet roughly 16,500 had been authorized by the UN Security Council—a shortfall or "vacancy rate" of 21 percent.

This study assumes that demand for police and rule of law work will continue undiminished. It reviews UN capacity to support and extend the rule of law through its peace operations and what hinders further development of that capacity. It concludes that the UN's historically ad hoc approach to recruitment and retention of UNPOL—driven not just by resource constraints but also by a lack of vision that has only recently begun to be corrected—is no longer acceptable, if it ever was. The study recommends new approaches for more systematic planning, recruiting, and rapid deployment of larger numbers of quality UNPOL and other rule of law personnel for integrated peace operations. These include a standing UN Rule of Law Capacity, a complementary ready reserve of police personnel, and a Senior Reserve Roster of experienced, retired police officers, judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers. The study assesses the political, operational, and cost implications of these proposed capabilities.

This analysis and the proposals it has generated draw on a wide variety of sources, including interviews with UN officials (in the Police Division, Integrated Training Service, and Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of DPKO), government officials (including members of permanent missions to the UN, officials in the US Departments of State and Justice, officials in other governments' Ministries of Foreign Affairs, and national police agencies), and individuals specializing in international police issues (including scholars, staff of operational non-governmental organizations [NGOs], and private contractors); a review of the international police peacekeeping and rule of law literature; assessment of historical UNPOL deployment rates; and police-related tasks for every UN operation with a police component since 1960. The project also hosted three workshops at the Stimson Center in Washington, DC. These explored trends in UN police peacekeeping and options for improving its effectiveness, including an August 2006 session with then UN Police Adviser Mark Kroeker, and a May 2009 session with then UN Police Adviser Andrew Hughes.

UN police peacekeeping has undergone significant change since initial research for this study began in mid-2004.

First, the UN has dramatically increased its operations' reliance on "formed police units" (FPUs) borrowed from national paramilitary police forces. FPUs have 120–140 well-armed officers whose job is to meet law and order threats that require more muscle than the average patrol officer can muster, but used with more precision than a military response often allows. While some police organized into units were deployed with the UN's executive missions in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, use of FPUs on a broad scale began in 2003, with three FPUs recruited for the mission in Liberia. By 2010, the number of units authorized for deployment was approaching 70, and FPUs served in six missions, substantially altering the character of UN police activities.

Second, since 2003, the mandates of most new UN peace operations have included support for rebuilding local criminal justice capacity. This change has been reflected in UN staffing tables and mission plans. UN operations in Côte d'Ivoire, Timor-Leste, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Haiti, Sudan, and Liberia all have one or more components focused on support to or reform of the host state's courts, prosecutors, corrections, ministries of justice, or ministries of interior. (See Annex I.) Such efforts are likely to be fixtures of future operations, since establishing good governance under the rule of law continues to be a central goal of such operations, in collaboration with other international actors.

Third, in September 2005, the World Summit endorsed the creation of a UN Standing Police Capacity (SPC) of 27 police and police-support experts to assist the planning and start-up of new missions, and to support ongoing UN police activities in peace operations. The concept for the SPC was initially proposed by the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change in late 2004, albeit at a level of 50 to 100 officers. The SPC was welcomed by member states at the 2006 session of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, authorized by the General Assembly, and began recruiting staff in July 2006.⁵ The Standing Capacity is a significant step towards greater UN ability to mount successful police missions and validates, politically, the notion of a standing, deployable UN police/rule of law capability. It is slated to grow in 2010—11 to 37 professionals and four support staff and to be joined by a new, smaller Justice and Corrections Standing Capacity (JCSC) of five professionals and one support staff person.⁶ The SPC has been located since August 2009 at the UN's main peacekeeping logistics base at Brindisi, Italy. The new JCSC will locate there as well.

These developments are all addressed further in this report, which reviews the emergence of rule of law on the peacebuilding agenda, assesses the growing complexity of police tasks, identifies major national contributors of police to UN operations, considers the rise of FPU's in those operations, and discusses how they and other UN police personnel are funded. It does not analyze or make recommendations regarding actual UN police activities in the field, nor does it address how to *do* post-conflict security sector or criminal justice sector reform. Specific recommendations on these subjects have been ably offered elsewhere.⁷ Instead, the report is focused on improving the UN's structural capacity to recruit, prepare, and deploy appropriate police and other criminal justice personnel to the field in a timely manner. This study offers concrete proposals to these ends, acknowledges that getting skilled criminal justice personnel into the mission area in a timely manner is, by itself, no guarantee of success, but also argues that the organization's present inability to deploy them expeditiously increases the likelihood of mission failure and the amount of time a mission is deployed—and thus its cost.

Since police make up the largest component of the rule of law "teams" in UN peace operations, our analysis of numerical needs and rule of law-related tasks is focused on them. Yet better analysis of UN recruitment and retention of personnel experienced in the other components of the rule of law would also well serve the organization. The mechanisms that we propose to overcome persistent problems in recruiting and deploying police in UN peace operations would enhance the effectiveness and availability of other rule of law components as well.

Notes to Section 1

- ¹ United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, paras. 39–40, 119, 122–125.
- ² William J. Durch, Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle, and Moira K. Shanahan, *The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, 2003), 106.
- ³ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations peace operations*, A/55/502, 20 October 2000, para. 27.
- ⁴ United Nations, “Decisions of the Secretary-General, Decision No. 2006/47, Rule of Law,” 24 November 2006, Attachment: “Policy Committee, 7 November 2006, Summary Record of Discussion—Rule of Law,” para. 3.
- ⁵ United Nations, *A more secure world: our shared responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, A/59/565, 2 December 2004, para. 223, and *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group at the 2006 substantive session*, A/60/19, 22 March 2006, para. 99.
- ⁶ In July 2010, the UN General Assembly’s 5th Committee recommended approval of an expansion of the SPC by 12 professional staff and two field service/support staff. Although less than the 27 new posts requested, this decision enlarged the SPC by 50 percent. The Committee also overruled its own fiscal watchdog to fund a proposed UN Justice and Corrections Standing Capacity. United Nations, *Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. Report of the Fifth Committee*, A/64/820, 18 June 2010, 13.
- ⁷ See, for example, David H. Bayley, *Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It* (Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, June 2001) or Bayley, *Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). See also Otwin Marenin, “Restoring Policing Systems in War Torn Nations: Process, Problems, Prospects,” Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005; Charles Call, “Challenges in Police Reform: Promoting Effectiveness and Accountability,” International Peace Academy, 2003; Annika S. Hansen and Sharon Wiharta, with Bjørn R. Claussen and Stian Kjeksrud, *The Transition to a Just Order—Establishing Local Ownership after Conflict, A Practitioners’ Guide* (Printgraf, Sweden: Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2007).

RULE OF LAW AS A REMEDY FOR POST-CONFLICT INSECURITY

(I)n Bosnia we thought that democracy was the highest priority, and we measured it by the number of elections we could organize...In hindsight, we should have put the establishment of the rule of law first, for everything else depends on it: a functioning economy, a free and fair political system, the development of civil society, public confidence in police and the courts.

– Lord Paddy Ashdown, UN High Representative
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, October 2002¹

Building sustainable peace in societies emerging from violent and protracted conflict is a daunting task. Over the last two decades, experience in post-conflict peacebuilding has tempered overly optimistic assumptions about the ease and speed of transitions from war to stability.² Early international efforts that focused on stopping the shooting and organizing quick elections gave way to an increasingly complex and comprehensive peacebuilding agenda based on recognition that ending open warfare is but a vital first step on a long journey towards ensuring sustainable peace and security.

The revised, ambitious template for transitioning to a stable peace included an array of tasks: disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants; strengthening of government institutions; addressing issues of political impunity and accountability; combating organized crime; reforming dysfunctional economies; resettling refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs); combating spoilers aligned against peace; organizing democratic elections and supporting the development of democratic governing institutions. Thus peacebuilding came increasingly to resemble state-building.³

Among the tasks aimed at consolidating a fragile peace, public security, and the rule of law are increasingly recognized as essential.⁴ Societies that operate under a healthy rule of law demonstrate many distinct yet interrelated characteristics: a functioning and accountable internal police force, civilian control of the armed forces, effective and timely judicial systems, well-run and humane penal systems, a political hierarchy that is answerable to the people, minimal levels of corruption and organized crime, and a culture of respect for human rights. Recognizing the necessary building blocks for a stable and sustainable rule of law system, however, is easier than devising and implementing the policies and mechanisms to create and fit those building blocks together in any particular place. A further challenge lies in identifying the elements of such a system that should—or must—be addressed by peace operations as part of early peacebuilding.

Sidebar 1:**DEFINING THE RULE OF LAW**

While most people embrace the need for rule of law in post-conflict societies, the exact meaning of the term remains disputed and open to conceptual ambiguity. Attempts to define the rule of law are hampered by the fact that the term is intended to describe a concept with many components and potential applications. For the international organizations and individuals attempting to assist its development in the field, rule of law is an operational goal. It is therefore something that necessarily requires a clear meaning so as to provide a common understanding of the end-state that is being sought by what may be a relatively large number of official and unofficial international actors in any given political setting.

In the crudest terms, the rule of law is “the existence of public order maintained through the systemized application or threat of force by a modern state.” The law, understood in this sense, is whatever the sovereign decrees as essential to public order. Such a definition fails to incorporate notions of accountability and equitable application of the law, or even a notion of law as citizens of a modern democracy would understand it. In a democratic context, laws are rules for behavior or transactions that are drawn up by legislative authorities, duly constituted (that is, elected according to established, consistent, and fairly-enforced electoral rules). Moreover, as Thomas Carothers notes, the laws must be “public knowledge,” “clear in meaning,” and “apply equally to everyone.”

In his 2004 report, *The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies*, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan described the rule of law as “a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to the laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness, and procedural and legal transparency.” This definition best captures the complex and interwoven aspects that comprise the rule of law, and most accurately reflects the term as used in this report.

Sources: W. Burnett Harvey, “The Rule of Law in Historical Perspective,” *Michigan Law Review* 59(4), February 1961, 491; Thomas Carothers, “The Rule of Law Revival,” *Foreign Affairs* 77(2), March/April 1998, 96; United Nations, *The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2004/616*, 23 August 2004, para. 6.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND POST-CONFLICT RULE OF LAW

In 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace* first identified an “obvious connection between democratic practices—such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making—and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order.” The follow-on *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, released in 1995, explicitly cited the need for improved UN capacity in “the building up of national institutions,” including police and judicial structures.⁵ UN operations in Cambodia, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti showed the international community the high cost of ignoring rule of law or tackling it piecemeal. Starting in the late 1990s, the UN system took a closer and more critical look at the significance of rule of law in states emerging from conflict. Particularly within DPKO, the gap in addressing police and rule of law issues was recognized. UN leadership knew it needed to reevaluate the organization’s own institutional readiness and approach to developing and managing such programming. In 2000, the “Brahimi Report” gave formal recognition to the importance of the UN’s rule of law work in peace operations, highlighting shortcomings and proposing improvements in the organization’s capacity to undertake that work (see **sidebar 2**).⁶

Sidebar 2:**THE BRAHIMI REPORT AND RULE OF LAW ACTIVITIES IN PEACE OPERATIONS**

2(b) The Panel recommends a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other rule of law elements, and human rights experts in complex peace operations to reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law institutions and improving respect for human rights in post-conflict environments;

10(a) Member States are encouraged to each establish a national pool of civilian police officers that would be ready for deployment to United Nations peace operations on short notice, within the context of the United Nations standby arrangements system [UNSAS];

10(b) Member States are encouraged to enter into regional training partnerships for civilian police in the respective national pools, to promote a common level of preparedness in accordance with guidelines, standard operating procedures, and performance standards to be promulgated by the United Nations;

10(c) Member States are encouraged to designate a single point of contact within their governmental structures for the provision of civilian police to United Nations peace operations;

10(d) The Panel recommends that a revolving list of about 100 police officers and related experts be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days notice with teams trained to create the civilian police component of a new peacekeeping operation, train incoming personnel, and give the component greater coherence at an earlier date;

10(e) The Panel recommends that parallel arrangements to recommendations (a), (b) and (c) above be established for judicial, penal, human rights, and other relevant specialists, who with specialist civilian police will make up collegial “rule of law” teams.

Source: United Nations, *The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, 54–56.

In response to the Brahimi Report, DPKO proposed in August 2001 that a three-person Criminal Law and Judicial Affairs Unit be added to a newly-strengthened Civilian Police Division. The General Assembly authorized a two-person unit in February 2002.⁷ A few months later, the UN’s Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) commissioned a Task Force for Development of Comprehensive Rule of Law Strategies for Peace Operations, which surveyed system-wide UN rule of law expertise and resources. The Task Force report, released in August 2002, catalogued a range of existing programs but also found system-wide shortfalls in the areas of assessment, strategic planning, specialized skill-sets, and oversight.⁸

The UN established a Rule of Law Focal Point Network in 2003, intended to serve as a coordination and information sharing mechanism among the various departments involved in rule of law support. A lack of dedicated capacity limited the network’s effectiveness.⁹ In August 2004, the Secretary-General published an extensive report on how the United Nations could best support rule of law in post-conflict states, ending with a list of proposed activities that was subsequently endorsed by the Security Council.¹⁰ Nearly seven years passed, however, before the Brahimi Report’s recommendations regarding collaboration across UN bureaus and offices that work on rule of law began to be realized.

An August 2006 study commissioned by the Executive Office of the Secretary-General inventoried UN peacebuilding capacities. It found that the United Nations was strong in “mine action and elections, and to a lesser extent DDR, human rights, and law enforcement institutions;” had scattered capacities in need of consolidation in “transitional justice, judicial and legal reform, corrections, good offices and mediation, gender, and protection of vulnerable groups;” and had

limited or non-existent capacity in “security sector governance, defence institutions, and constitution-making.”¹¹

In late November 2006, the Secretary-General endorsed a clear division of labor among UN entities with a stake in promoting various elements of the rule of law, establishing a Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group (ROLCRG), with members from seven UN departments, agencies, funds, and programs. The group was intended to serve as a “(h)eadquarters focal point for coordinating system-wide attention on the rule of law so as to ensure quality, policy coherence, and coordination,” supported by four professional staff and chaired by the Deputy-Secretary-General.¹² The same Decision of the Secretary-General distributed lead and supporting responsibilities across three “baskets” or “sectors” of security and the rule of law: (1) Rule of Law at the International Level; (2) Rule of Law in the Context of Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations; and (3) Rule of Law in the Context of Long-term Development. That Decision was followed in February 2007 by a comparable allocation of lead and supporting roles in security sector reform (see **tables 1a and 1b**).

POLICE AND RELATED FIELD CAPACITY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE

In fully democratic societies, the police play a crucial role in maintaining public security and order and legitimizing the state’s monopoly on the use of force through a commitment to the rule of law. The nexus between good governance, rule of law, and public security makes effective policing an important component of well-functioning, modern societies. In countries emerging from violent conflict, local police capacity is often non-existent, and what does exist is frequently ineffective, highly politicized, and/or abusive.

Thus, there are two distinct yet related demands associated with policing in post-conflict environments: establishing short-term public security and building long-term, effective local capacity to provide security that respects the rights and demands of citizens. International actors in post-conflict settings need tools and strategies for both challenges.

Table 1a: UN Division of Labor for Rule of Law Activities

BASKET/SECTOR	Lead Entity	Other Key Entities, Roles, and Contributions
1) Rule of Law at the International Level		
UN Charter Related Issues	OLA	
Multilateral Treaties	OLA	OHCHR and other agencies within their mandates
International Criminal Court	OLA	OHCHR, UNDP
2) Rule of Law in Conflict/Post-Conflict Situations		
Transitional Justice	OHCHR	
National Transitional Justice Consultative Process	OHCHR	UNDP, DPA
Truth and Reconciliation Mechanisms	OHCHR	UNDP, OLA, UNIFEM
International and Hybrid Tribunals	OLA	OHCHR, UNDP
Strengthening National Justice Systems/Institutions		
Legal/Judicial Institutions*	DPKO in mission areas/UNDP elsewhere	UNDP in mission areas, OHCHR, UNODC, UNIFEM
Police and Law Enforcement Agencies (including Border Security)	DPKO (global)	UNDP, OHCHR, UNODC, UNIFEM
Prisons	DPKO (global)	UNDP, OHCHR, UNODC
Implementing Human Rights Norms	OHCHR	UNDP, UNIFEM
Monitoring	OHCHR	UNIFEM
Other Priority Areas		
Alternative and Traditional Dispute Resolution	UNDP	UNODC, UNIFEM
Legal Education	(No Lead)	OHCHR on human rights, UNDP, UNODC, UNIFEM
Interim Law Enforcement / Executive Judicial Authority	DPKO	OHCHR, UNODC
Security Support to National Law Enforcement Agencies	DPKO	
3) Rule of Law for Long-term Development		
Strengthening Legal System and Institutions	UNDP	UNODC, sometimes OHCHR
Police, Law Enforcement Agencies, and Prisons	DPKO (HQ)	UNDP, OHCHR, UNODC
Monitoring	OHCHR	UNIFEM
<p>Acronym Key: OLA: Office of Legal Affairs; OHCHR: Office of High Commissioner of Human Rights; UNDP: United Nations Development Programme; DPA: Department of Political Affairs; DPKO: Department of Peacekeeping Operations; UNODC: UN Office on Drugs and Crime; UNIFEM: United Nations Development Fund for Women.</p> <p>* UNDP is lead entity on Court Administration and Civil Law even in areas where there is a DPKO-led mission. DPKO is lead entity for all other Legal/Judicial Institutions work in areas where there is a DPKO-led mission.</p> <p>Source: United Nations, Executive Office of the Secretary-General, "Decision No. 2006/47 – Rule of Law," 24 November 2006, annex.</p>		

The Short-Term Challenge of Establishing Public Security

Societies emerging from social upheaval and civil conflict often experience high public insecurity and lawlessness soon after fighting formally ends. Post-conflict transitional periods in El Salvador, Mozambique, Kosovo, Liberia, and Haiti, for example, were plagued by surges in crime. The reasons are two-fold. First, the demobilization of combatants often results in small arms and ammunition flowing from armed groups into the general population.¹³ Second, lacking job opportunities and/or skills, and accustomed to violence and danger, many former combatants resort to crime.¹⁴

Further compounding the challenge is the ready transferability of many paramilitary skills to smuggling or other organized criminal enterprises.¹⁵ Social divisions may also have been aggravated by the conflict and the return of refugees often leads to increased competition over limited resources.¹⁶ Thus, increased crime is a likely by-product of a formal peace agreement in the absence of concrete strategies to prevent it.¹⁷

Second, the state will likely have diminished capacity to address such lawlessness and criminality. As noted, war may have severely depleted local police capacity and the police, as an arm of government, may well have been active partisans in the conflict. The governments they served may have no history of, or experience providing, even-handed protection of the civilian population. Young states may be so ravaged by war that effective internal security institutions will need to be created anew—a major challenge for weak, recently formed, and under-funded post-war governments like those in Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone, for example.¹⁸

Thus, criminal violence may peak at precisely the time that a national government is least able to fight it, a situation that Michael Dzedzic and other experts have referred to as an “institutional gap.”¹⁹ Its repercussions can be far reaching. Failure to create and maintain a secure environment undercuts peacebuilding tasks in all sectors, including public health, infrastructure, education, and the economy.²⁰ Organized crime and illicit trade networks may thrive and, once entrenched, withstand fledgling government efforts to dismantle them.²¹ In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, the international community’s early failure to take on organized criminal networks during the immediate post-Dayton phase allowed them to flourish, despite belated international efforts to rebuild the local police.²²

As Annika Hansen has observed, “security is the key to a ‘new social contract’ between the population and its government or society in which the population is willing to surrender the responsibility for its physical safety into government hands.”²³ Post-conflict insecurity diminishes public trust in governmental institutions, and can lead to vigilantism and private protection forces. Two years after a Liberian peace deal was signed, for example, vigilante groups were roaming the streets of Monrovia in response to increased banditry and a lack of police presence in certain sections of the city.²⁴

Absent effective domestic means to provide such security, outside effort may be needed to maintain law and order, a task that Graham Day and Christopher Freeman have characterized as “policekeeping.”²⁵ In modern peace operations, however, the efforts of international actors to assume responsibility for public security have yielded mixed results.

Table 1b: UN Division of Labor for Security Sector Reform

SECTOR	Lead Support Entity	Other Key Entities and Roles
Support Activities (Policy development, training, institutional capacity building, infrastructure equipment and support, financial management, regulation, and oversight mechanisms)		
Executive Agencies (National Security Councils, Prime Minister/President office)	DPKO in mission areas/ UNDP elsewhere	OHCHR, DPA
Defense Agencies (Civilian and uniformed institutions)	DPKO	OHCHR, UNDP for infrastructure support
Police and Law Enforcement Agencies	DPKO	UNDP, OHCHR, UNODC, UNIFEM
Corrections Agencies	DPKO	UNDP, OHCHR, UNODC
Legal and Judicial Institutions in relation to regulatory oversight and sanctioning authority on the use of force	DPKO in mission areas/ UNDP elsewhere	OHCHR, UNODC, UNIFEM
National Human Rights Institutions and oversight bodies	OHCHR	UNDP
Legislative Agencies (Parliaments, parliamentary sub-committees)	UNDP	OHCHR, DPA, UNIFEM
Civil Society Organizations and Media	UNDP	OHCHR, UNIFEM
Coordination Activities (Activities required to ensure a holistic, coordinated approach to SSR)		
Coordination of UN and, where appropriate, international support to security reform	DPA for DPA-led missions/ DPKO for PK missions/ UNDP elsewhere	DPA, PBSO
Monitoring and review of overall progress in security reform	DPKO in mission areas/ UNDP elsewhere	UNDP, PBSO
Administration of trust funds	UNDP	
Cross-Sector Activities (Activities that must, to be effective, address all components of a national security system)		
Support to peacekeeping/mediation	DPA	DPKO, UNDP, UNIFEM
National security needs assessments	DPKO in mission areas/ UNDP elsewhere	OHCHR, UNODC, UNIFEM
Integration of Human Rights norms and standards across all security actors/processes	OHCHR	UNDP, UNIFEM
Vetting Processes	OHCHR	DPKO, UNDP, UNODC
Monitoring/Investigations	OHCHR	DPKO, UNDP
Long-term institutional development and capacity- building	UNDP	OHCHR, UNODC, UNIFEM
Activities Where Non-UN Partners Lead/Support (Activities that must be undertaken as part of a comprehensive SSR but in which the UN has little or no capacity)		
Public sector financial review and management	IFI (World Bank, IMF), EC	Bilateral actors
Intelligence Agencies	Bilateral actors	UNODC, OHCHR
Combat-training and equipping of armed forces	Bilateral actors	UNDP, DPKO
Source: United Nations, Executive Office of the Secretary-General, "Decision No. 2007/11 – Security Sector Reform," 16 February 2007, Annex B.		

Urgent public security tasks often have been given to military peacekeepers, since they are better able to deploy to insecure parts of the mission area and have traditionally constituted the bulk of peacekeeping personnel. Well-trained peacekeeping forces may be configured to support police work and work closely with civilians. Military police may bridge both worlds as well.²⁶ The UN mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) does not have an executive mandate but has engaged in heavy use of force, with the concurrence of the government and in cooperation with the Haitian National Police, against violent criminal gangs that had controlled significant areas of at least three Haitian cities for up to five years. Military and police elements of MINUSTAH closely coordinated operations and de-conflicted their responsibilities in undertaking these actions.²⁷

Yet many military forces are ill-suited for this role. National militaries are primarily trained to engage organized armed entities like themselves, to destroy designated enemy targets, and to seize and hold territory. Further, the military in international operations may be relatively isolated from the general population for purposes of force protection and protection of the public.²⁸ Effective international police, on the other hand, are trained to be integrated into (or at least to work with) the community in order to build trust and develop relationships that assist in information gathering and deterring criminal activity.²⁹

The Long-Term Challenge of Building Up Domestic Institutional Capacity

Ideally, local police forces should be effective, accountable, and oriented towards serving the public rather than political elites. (Re)establishing domestic capacity to ensure law and order (what some have termed “policebuilding”) is a longer-term effort necessary to facilitate the gradual exit of interim international military and police forces and to establish the foundation for a functioning and stable society.³⁰ International efforts to build up domestic police capacity usually aim to keep the worst known human rights abusers out of the new police force and instill concepts of “democratic policing” (see **sidebar 3**), lest security forces undermine state legitimacy in the eyes of the public.³¹ Thus development of an accountable, indigenous police force and supporting criminal justice institutions capable of maintaining law, order, and public trust is a vital component of peacebuilding efforts.³²

Sidebar 3:

WHAT, EXACTLY, IS DEMOCRATIC POLICING?

“Democratic policing” captures the desire of international mission planners to have peace operations leave behind internal security forces that use policing standards and procedures which would be acceptable in developed, democratic states. What “democratic policing” precisely should entail remains, however, a matter of debate.

International criminologist David Bayley has identified four key criteria that qualify a police force as committed to democratic policing: accountability to the law, rather than to the government; protection of human rights, especially those associated with exercising political freedoms; accountability to people outside the police organization who are empowered to provide effective oversight; and an operational priority to securing groups and individuals. He also argues that a fair and effective police force requires the trust of the public. Countering those who argue that democratic reforms and public trust-building make law enforcement “soft on crime” and less able to deter and punish criminals, Bayley argues that trust often increases public willingness to give the police the criminal intelligence that makes them effective crime fighters.

Sources: Bruce David and Rachel Neild, “The Police that We Want: A Handbook for Oversight of the Police in South Africa,” Justice Initiative, Open Society Institute, 24 January 2005; David Bayley, *Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, November 2005).

Connecting Short- and Long-Term Tasks

The short- and long-term challenges of providing public security and establishing effective indigenous security forces are distinct and require different strategies, but connect in several key ways—in the difficulties of high-crime, high-violence environments, for example. The population at large and the local police are likely to resist reform if they perceive it as a distraction from the primary goal of establishing acceptable levels of law and order.³³ It follows, therefore, that establishing public security early on in the post-conflict period and preventing, if possible, the emergence of a lawless environment is likely to assist the long-term task of developing an effective and democratic local police capacity.

Moreover, the sooner internal security is established, the sooner public confidence in the government and its intention to use its authority to benefit the general population is likely to grow. Creating or restructuring local police forces early on is especially critical when a peace process includes provisions for large-scale DDR.³⁴ Ex-combatants not implicated in gross human rights abuses are likely to view entry into the new force as a good career option, limiting the temptation to turn to crime as a source of needed income.

The importance of establishing public security and building up local police capacity in post-conflict settings is critical for all the reasons outlined in this section. How the United Nations has used police peacekeepers and other criminal justice personnel to carry out rule of law work in modern peace operations is the subject to which we now turn.

Notes to Section 2

¹ Paddy Ashdown, “What I Learned in Bosnia,” *The New York Times*, 28 October 2002.

² “Peacebuilding” was first defined by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, as “action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen peace and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict.” United Nations, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peace-keeping*, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992, para. 21. Use of the term has since broadened to include, in the words of the Brahimi Report, “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war,” A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 13. For further analysis, see Charles Call, “Institutionalizing Peace: A Review of Post-Concept Peacebuilding Concepts and Issues for DPA,” Report for the UN Department of Political Affairs, 31 January 2005.

³ Simon Chesterman, *You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administrations, and State-Building* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Richard Caplan, *International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Charles T. Call, ed. *Constructing Justice and Security after War* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2007); Charles T. Call with Vanessa Wyeth, eds. *Building States to Build Peace* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008); and Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk, *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).

⁴ Miguel Schor, “The Rule of Law,” in David Clark, ed., *Encyclopedia of Law and Society: American and Global Perspectives* (London: Sage Publications, 2005); also Jane Stromseth, David Wippman, and Rosa Brooks, *Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of Law after Military Interventions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

⁵ United Nations, *Supplement to An Agenda For Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*, A/47/277-S/24111, 3 January 1995, para. 59.

⁶ A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 10e.

⁷ Durch, Holt, et al., *The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations*, 29, 31, 82.

⁸ United Nations, *Final Report of the ECPS Task Force for Development of Comprehensive Rule of Law Strategies for Peace Operations* (New York: UN Executive Committee on Peace and Security, 15 August 2002).

- ⁹ United Nations, *The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, Report of the Secretary-General*, S/2004/616, 23 August 2004, para. 57, and *Uniting our strengths: Enhancing United Nations support for the rule of law: Report of the Secretary-General*, A/61/636-S/2006/980, 14 December 2006, para. 31.
- ¹⁰ S/2004/616, especially para. 65.
- ¹¹ United Nations, Executive Office of the Secretary-General, “Inventory: United Nations Capacity in Peacebuilding,” September 2006, 7.
- ¹² United Nations, “Decisions of the Secretary-General, Decision No. 2006/47,” 24 November 2006. ROLCRG includes the Office of Legal Affairs, DPKO, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, UN Development Program, UN Development Fund for Women, and UN High Commissioner for Refugees.
- ¹³ In Liberia and Sierra Leone, for instance, Taya Weiss has observed that “demobilisation and reintegration processes have created their own weapons markets.” Taya Weiss, *Perpetuating Power: Small Arms in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone and Liberia*, ISS Monograph Series No. 116 (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, June 2005), i. See also, Foday B. Fofanah, “Sierra Leone: A Small-Arms Depot,” *World Press Review*, 11 July 2001. A study by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) found that weapons related injuries in Cambodia actually increased in the post-conflict phase. ICRC, “Arms Availability and the Situation of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” 1999. In Guatemala, the number of firearms-related deaths diminished only slightly after the end of the 37-year civil war. Jenny Pearce, “Peace-Building at the Periphery: Lessons from Central America,” *Third World Quarterly* 20(1), 1999, 51–68. In 2000, the defense ministry of El Salvador reported that 165,186 firearms were registered but that 200,000 remained unregistered. Charles Call, “Democratization, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* (35)4, November 2003, 843.
- ¹⁴ Chrissie Steenkamp, “The Legacy of War: Conceptualizing a ‘Culture of Violence’ to Explain Violence after Peace Accords,” *The Round Table* 94(379), April 2005, 264.
- ¹⁵ See, for example, Jaremei McMullin, “Reintegration of Combatants: Were the Right Lessons Learned in Mozambique?” *International Peacekeeping* 11(4), Winter 2000, 626.
- ¹⁶ For a detailed analysis of challenges in repatriating refugees, see Howard Adelman, “Refugee Repatriation,” in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).
- ¹⁷ Charles T. Call and William Stanley, “Protecting the People: Public Security Choices after Conflicts,” *Global Governance* 7(2), Spring 2001.
- ¹⁸ See David Bayley and Robert Perito, *The Police in War* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010).
- ¹⁹ Michael Dziedzic, “Introduction,” in Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg, eds., *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998).
- ²⁰ Seth G. Jones, Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, K. Jack Riley, *Establishing Law and Order After Conflict* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 1, 8–12; Michael Brzoska and Andreas Heinemann-Gruder, “Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Under International Auspices,” in Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi, eds., *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2005).
- ²¹ Colette Rausch, ed., *Combating Serious Crimes in Postconflict Societies: A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2006), 3–8. See also Jock Covey, Michael Dziedzic, and Leonard Hawley, eds., *The Quest for Viable Peace* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 12–13. International sanctions aimed at curbing organized crime are also likely to fall short unless better implementation and enforcement mechanisms are created. Alix J. Boucher and Victoria K. Holt, *Targeting Spoilers: The Role of UN Panels of Experts* (Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, January 2009).
- ²² Kari M. Osland, “The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” *International Peacekeeping* 11(3), Autumn 2004, 554.
- ²³ Annika Hansen, *From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations*, Adelphi Paper no. 343 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), 35. Joseph S. Tulchin and Heather A. Golding, “Looking Ahead: Steps to Reduce Crime and Violence in the Americas,” in Hugo Fruhling, Joseph Tulchin, and Heather Golding, eds., *Crime and Violence in Latin America: Citizen Security, Democracy, and the State* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2003), 260.
- ²⁴ “LIBERIA: Vigilante gangs patrol streets as police force rebuilds,” *IRIN News*, 18 October 2005.
- ²⁵ Graham Day and Christopher Freeman, “Operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect: The Policekeeping Approach,” *Global Governance* 11(2), April-June 2005; Graham Day and Christopher Freeman, “Policekeeping is the Key: Rebuilding the Internal Security Architecture of Postwar Iraq,” *International Affairs* 79(2), March 2003.
- ²⁶ Military police may be trained in forensic investigation, evidence gathering, and the arrest and detention of suspects, but usually for the purpose of policing fellow military personnel, not the civilian population.
- ²⁷ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti*, S/2007/503, 22 August 2007, pp. 5–6.

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- ²⁸ For discussion of conduct and discipline issues in UN operations, see William J. Durch, Katherine N. Andrews, and Madeline L. England, with Matthew C. Weed, *Improving Criminal Accountability in United Nations Peace Operations*, Report No. 65, Rev. 1 (Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, 2009), 1–6.
- ²⁹ Rachel Bronson, “When Soldiers Become Cops,” *Foreign Affairs* 81(6), November/December 2002; Alice Hills, “The Inherent Limits of Military Police Forces in Policing Peace Operations,” *International Peacekeeping* 8(3), Autumn 2003.
- ³⁰ Gordon Peake and Kaysie Studdard Brown, “Policebuilding: The International Deployment Group in the Solomon Islands,” *International Peacekeeping* 12(4), Winter 2005.
- ³¹ Mark Shaw, “Crime and Policing in Transitional Societies—Conference Summary and Overview,” Jan Smuts House, University of the Witswatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, 30 August–1 September 2000.
- ³² Alan Bryden, Timothy Donais, and Heiner Hänggi, “Shaping a Security Governance Agenda in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding,” Policy Paper No. 11, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), November 2005; Chris Ferguson, “Police Reform, Peacekeeping and SSR: The Need for a Closer Synthesis,” *Journal of Security Sector Management* 2(3), September 2004; Neclâ Tschirgi, “Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges,” International Peace Academy, 7 October 2004.
- ³³ David H. Bayley, *Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to do and How to do it* (Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, June 2001), 25; William G. O’Neill, “Police Reform in Post-Conflict Societies: What We Know and What We Still Need to Know” (New York: International Peace Academy, April 2005), 2–3.
- ³⁴ Bryden, Donais, and Hänggi, “Shaping a Security Governance Agenda,” 13–15.

UNITED NATIONS POLICE IN MODERN PEACE OPERATIONS

We learn it again with every mission we do. Experienced civilian law-enforcement professionals are just as vital to the success of our missions as military forces.

*– Jean-Marie Guéhenno, UN Under-Secretary-General
for Peacekeeping Operations, 2000–2008¹*

For over 40 years, UN peacekeeping missions have included police components. Their roles, however, have changed substantially during that period. Drawing on officers seconded from its member states, the UN has deployed police in more than 30 peace operations and assigned them a broad range of tasks related to public security and institution building. The UN Police Division within DPKO plans and manages police activities according to mandates created by the Security Council. UN police contingents in the field have had to patch together, in turn, means of carrying out these increasingly ambitious mandates.

At the same time, DPKO has struggled to enlist member state support and resources, particularly well-qualified personnel. Until recently, planners and donors often treated police peacekeeping as an afterthought for missions, focusing instead on the military aspects of peacekeeping. There are reasons for this lack of enthusiasm: the nature of the UN's work in reforming, restructuring, and (at times) creating local police forces is a long-term process that often runs counter to the desire for a relatively short lifespan for most peacekeeping missions and the episodic attention of the international community.² That long-term work has, moreover, increasingly been supplemented by mandates requiring early and forceful international police peacekeeping presence intended to complement or, on occasion, substitute for local police, roles for which police contributors remain largely unprepared.

The United Nations is, nonetheless, the single largest provider of international police support in the world, outpacing both bilateral training initiatives and regional organizations alike.³

THE INCREASING DEMAND FOR UN POLICE

The size of UN police deployments has changed dramatically over the decades. In January 1988, only 35 UN police officers were serving worldwide, all in a single UN mission, in Cyprus.⁴ As of spring 2010, there were over 13,000 UNPOL officers (individuals and members of FPUs) deployed in 12 DPKO-led missions worldwide and drawn from 83 countries (see **figure 1**). In 1995, police represented only two percent of the total uniformed personnel deployed in UN peacekeeping operations, whereas by 2010 they were 13 percent.⁵ Civilian rule of law personnel, such as judicial and corrections advisors, represent a much smaller percentage of current operations, but play key roles in advising and training their host-state counterparts.


Figure 1: UN Police Deployments, 1989–2010

Figure 1 shows that as UN police deployment levels have risen since 1999, the organization has relied increasingly upon FPUs to meet the demand. As noted earlier, these armed units are intended to be trained and equipped for scenarios too volatile or dangerous for individual police officers, such as major civil unrest. Once used sparingly, FPUs accounted for 47 percent of all police deployed in UN peace operations by early 2010. Police Division proficiency testing of deployed FPUs in the summer and fall of 2008 demonstrated, however, that over one-third of deployed units were seriously deficient in performance; about one-third could meet performance standards with refresher training in the field; and a bit less than one-third were proficient in their duties. These findings led to the development of mobile training teams, largely borrowed from member states, to remedy the fixable deficiencies. They also led to the convening of a Doctrine Development Group, composed of UN policing practitioners and member state representatives, to revamp UN policy for FPUs and establish new stringent standards for training, equipment, and command and control (including unit leadership proficiency in the mission language down to the section level—comprising roughly 10 officers—and prohibitions on decomposition of FPUs below the section level, to prevent FPU personnel from being pressed into duties more suited to individual officers and for which they possess inadequate training). The new FPU policy was signed into effect in February 2010.

THE GROWING COMPLEXITY OF UN POLICE MANDATES

Since the early 1990s, the number and complexity of tasks assigned to UN police by the Security Council have grown dramatically. Much of this can be attributed to the fact that earlier operations have revealed the need for more multifaceted and intrusive police components in mission mandates. With each police peacekeeping mission, the urgency and significance of effectively establishing public security and fostering local police capabilities has been increasingly recognized. While this has led the Security Council to emphasize the importance of police peacekeeping in UN operations, it has not translated to any greater UN capacity to fill this role, particularly in the area of individual police recruitment.

The evolution of UN police peacekeeping can be described in terms of three categories of missions: traditional, transformational, and interim law enforcement (see **table 2**). This typology is helpful for understanding the different roles assigned to UN police forces. It also demonstrates the evolution of UNPOL officers from passive monitors of local police to active reformers and, occasionally, enforcers of internal security in host countries. These three “ideal-types” capture the various roles and responsibilities that UN police have been mandated to assume.

Traditional Police Peacekeeping Mandates

In traditional police peacekeeping operations, unarmed police officers monitor the behavior of domestic security forces and report on human rights violations. They are intended to provide a confidence-building measure, offering some reassurance to a traumatized population that abuses by domestic police will be reduced. These operations are the least intrusive of the three operational types, and are typified by UN operations in the early 1990s, such as those in Namibia (UNTAG), Western Sahara (MINURSO), Angola (UNAVEM II), and Mozambique (ONUMOZ), whose police components monitored their local counterparts, with varying success.⁶

The UN Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ, 1992–1994), a typical traditional operation, began with 128 UN civilian police but increased to 1,144 due to rising crime rates, complaints over human rights violations by the national police, and accusations that demobilized government soldiers were being funneled illegally into that force.⁷ UN police were mandated to “monitor and verify” that police activities were “fully consistent with the general peace agreement” and respectful of the “rights and civil liberties of Mozambican citizens throughout the country.”⁸ UNPOL had no authority to take action in the face of human rights abuses, however. Their only recourse was to file a report with the National Police Affairs Commission, which would relay the complaint to the Ministry of Interior in hopes that something would be done—a hope that was often disappointed. Reports of human rights abuses by the national police continued during and after the operation, and crime rates rose dramatically in the wake of ONUMOZ’s departure.⁹

Sometimes urgent realities on the ground demonstrated the inadequacy of traditional mandates. In El Salvador, for example, some UNPOL were forced to assume limited law enforcement duties in rural areas lacking local police forces, despite their mandate to merely monitor local forces. Similarly, UN police in Cambodia, authorized to “monitor and control” police activities, were temporarily granted powers of arrest and detention as the government’s police grew increasingly uncooperative.¹⁰ These experiences contributed to more intrusive UN mandates for police in operations launched since the mid-1990s.

Table 2: Typology of UN Police Peacekeeping Mandates, 1964–2010

Type of Police Peacekeeping Mandate	Major Area of Responsibility	Specific Tasks	Examples of UN Operations
Traditional	Monitoring and limited training or guidance for indigenous police.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitoring local police forces to ensure compliance with peace agreement and/or respect for human rights • Reporting on violations to designated authority • Providing limited guidance/training to local police 	UNFICYP (Cyprus) UNTAG (Namibia) MINURSO (W. Sahara) UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III & MONUA (Angola) ONUSAL (El Salvador) ONUMOZ (Mozambique) UNTAC (Cambodia)* MINUGUA (Guatemala) UNPROFOR (Croatia) UNCRO (Croatia) UNPSG (Croatia)
Transformational	Reforming, restructuring, rebuilding indigenous police. This category increasingly includes operational support for clearly defined host-state law enforcement responsibilities, such as providing security for elections, crowd and riot control, and protecting refugees as well as protecting UN facilities and personnel.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishing training doctrines and materials • Setting up police training academies • Vetting of prospective police for past abuses • Designing and implementing internal checks on police system • Providing security for election sites, specific individuals, and locations 	UNOSOM II (Somalia) UNOMIG (Georgia) UNMIH, UNSMIH, UNTMIH, MINUSTAH (Haiti) UNAMIR (Rwanda) UNMIBH (Bosnia-Herzegovina) UNTAES (Eastern Slavonia) MINURCA (Central African Republic) UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) MONUC (DRC) UNMIL (Liberia) UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire) ONUB (Burundi) UNMIS (Sudan) UNAMID (Sudan) MINURCAT (Chad and Central African Republic)
Interim Law Enforcement	Primary law enforcement responsibility ('Executive Authority'), while simultaneously developing local law enforcement capacity and institutions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Providing law and order • Conducting investigations, arresting criminals, disrupting organized crime, working with judicial officials • Coordinating the reforming and restructuring of indigenous police forces 	UNMIK (Kosovo) UNTAET, UNMISSET & UNMIT (Timor-Leste)
* UNTAC is categorized based on its primary mission, despite selective law enforcement authority granted by the SRSG but largely unused.			

Transformational Police Peacekeeping Mandates

Transformational mandates involve reforming, restructuring, and/or (re)building indigenous law enforcement capacity. The first goal is to modify local police practice to conform with the principles of democratic policing, and to seek changes in relevant legislation, codes, policies and procedures and offer training in human rights and community relations. The impact of such training is often constrained by larger factors, however: a class on international human rights law may not alter police behavior if the force remains embedded in a larger political culture that lacks accountability norms and rewards protection of state prerogatives over protection of citizens, as UN missions learned in Cambodia, El Salvador, Haiti and elsewhere, nor will police reform take hold if the corresponding ministry that manages the police is not reformed/modernized as well.¹¹

Restructuring aims to depoliticize local forces, purging them of human rights violators, recruiting new police, and establishing effective chains of accountable authority and democratic oversight. The process may involve downsizing forces bloated by war or enlarging forces decimated by war. It may also involve recruiting new police from segments of the population previously victimized by police. In both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, for example, the recruitment of minorities into the local police was a major goal of reform efforts. A comprehensive vetting procedure to ensure that police recruits are not implicated in past human rights abuses has proven critical for better behavior and greater public credibility of new forces. Vetting can, in some cases, rule out rehiring a majority of the old police force. In Liberia, for instance, only one in four members of the old force were cleared for inclusion in the new police service.¹²

The third goal of transformational police peacekeeping—rebuilding—focuses on local police effectiveness. A humane police force that respects human rights will be of little use if it cannot also investigate and deter crime. Indeed, as Annika Hansen has observed, “[i]f authorities cannot counter persistently high crime rates, they will be tempted to use repressive measures, undermining reform and democratization efforts.”¹³ Thus, providing local police with the skills, equipment, and logistical support needed to function effectively has been increasingly recognized as a key component of transformational efforts.

During the 1990s, the UN undertook a number of transformational missions, including those in Haiti and the Balkans. In Haiti, the Security Council authorized 900 UN police to assist in “the creation of a separate police force.” The old police had been instrumental in ousting Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and creating an environment of abuse, impunity, and corruption.¹⁴ The UN mission, UNMIH, collaborated closely with the US Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), assisting in the recruitment, vetting, and training of a new Haitian National Police (HNP) force. Follow-on UN missions aimed at the “professionalization of the HNP,” focusing primarily on training and mentoring HNP specialized units and supervisors, while also providing technical advice.¹⁵ In the absence, however, of parallel efforts to reform the rest of the criminal justice system and the country’s larger political framework, these reform efforts ultimately failed. Partly as a result of that experience, UN operations in this century almost all focus on more than just police reform, addressing the broader criminal justice system as well.

After UNMIH, the UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH) was the most expansive police-transformational operation the UN had ever undertaken. Its International Police Task Force

(IPTF) initially aimed to monitor local police but then was tasked to overhaul those forces, based on the *Agreement on Restructuring the Police of the Federation* and the *Framework Agreement on Police Restructuring, Reform and Democratization in Republika Srpska*.¹⁶ The IPTF eventually reduced local police forces from 44,000 in December 1995 to 17,000 in 2004.¹⁷ It was responsible for ensuring that remaining police met international standards of practice.¹⁸ Local police practice had been to transfer non-compliant officers from operational to administrative posts rather than dismiss them, at times actively resisting UN reform efforts.¹⁹ In response, the IPTF Commissioner gained authority to remove such officers and other officials “from all public security services employment.”²⁰ When the UN handed its police reform responsibilities to the European Union at the end of 2002, the IPTF had certified approximately 16,000 officers to serve in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s police forces, including the State Border Service and court police.²¹

Every UN mission launched since 2003 has included police components with “transformational” mandates of varying scope. The newest development is authority for direct operational assistance to some police forces in maintaining law and order. In Haiti, for instance, the Security Council authorized MINUSTAH in 2004 not only to support the reform of local police, but to “assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety, and public order through the provision, inter alia, of operational support to the Haitian National Police.”²² In the field, this has translated into FPU’s engaging armed gangs (at times leading to casualties), despite the mission’s lack of full executive authority.²³ It has also led to the arming of UN police contingents even in operations where police reform is the primary goal. This move towards including some limited law enforcement responsibilities in transformational police peacekeeping mandates is an important development with implications for future UN police peacekeeping needs.

At the same time, MINUSTAH has also devoted resources to reforming and restructuring the Haitian judicial and corrections systems, aimed at reducing pretrial detentions, and increasing the number of cases that are “finalized through due process” (either release or conviction and sentencing). By mid-2009, however, 76 percent of the prison population nationwide remained pre-trial detainees (86 percent in the national penitentiary), squeezed into little more than a half-square-meter apiece—enough to stand, barely to sit, not to lie down.²⁴

The mission also advises on reform of Haitian laws to bring them into conformity with international treaties and other instruments that Haiti has already ratified, and mentors prosecutors and investigative and trial judges on criminal procedure “including the timely provision of due process.” It offers guidance to civil society and human rights groups on how to monitor and report on the courts, and advises Haitian authorities on providing legal aid to the indigent.

In a similar effort in Liberia, criminal cases began moving forward when the UN mission there offered the services of 12 “national prosecutorial consultants” and 11 “public defence consultants, initially for a period of six months.” Although UNMIL reported a resulting reduction in the backlog of pending cases and “increased public trust . . . in the judicial system,” a 2009 Security Council visit to Liberia noted that the judicial system remained largely “nonexistent” and Liberian authorities sought a lead nation to take over police training currently managed by UNMIL.²⁵

Interim Law Enforcement Mandates

Interim law enforcement mandates give UNPOL direct authority to enforce the law, including powers of arrest and detention. Such mandates require the largest number of UNPOL in relation to local population size. UNPOL in both of the law enforcement missions undertaken thus far have been armed. Major reform and restructuring of local police forces is usually a component of interim law enforcement and the gradual hand-back of law enforcement authority to domestic police is a primary mission goal.

In Kosovo and Timor-Leste, interim law enforcement supported UN transitional governing authority. In Kosovo in 1999, a Military Technical Agreement stipulated total withdrawal of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia police, of Serb ethnicity, from the mostly ethnic Albanian province and stopped the NATO bombing campaign.²⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 1244 then authorized the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) with 4,700 police mandated to “maintain civil law and order,”²⁷ an operational challenge compounded by lack of agreement on applicable law, since Kosovo’s majority ethnic-Albanian population rejected previously prevailing Yugoslav/Serbian law. UNMIK also struggled to respond to the violence visited on the remaining Serb population by Albanian Kosovars and scrambled to develop procedures for policing an environment completely foreign to most of the officers in the mission. UNPOL collaborated with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in the creation of a Kosovo Police Service (KPS), establishing a training academy and developing curricula and recruitment procedures from scratch. UNMIK gradually transferred policing authority to the KPS, while a few remaining operational responsibilities and the role of monitoring, mentoring, and advising KPS were assumed by a European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) at the end of 2008.²⁸ NATO’s Kosovo Force remained in place to provide external security under Resolution 1244 but was scheduled for further drawdown in 2011.

In Timor-Leste, 1,600 UNPOL officers were deployed to fulfill the mandate of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to “provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory.”²⁹ Simultaneously, the mission set out to build a Timor-Leste National Police force (PNTL) of 2,800 officers. Following formal independence in 2002, a follow-on operation (UNMISSET) continued elements of interim law enforcement and full authority for law and order was not officially transferred to the Timor-Leste government until May 2004. UNMISSET left in May 2005. In August 2006, however, violent clashes and a breakdown in the national police force prompted the Security Council to establish a new policing mission (UNMIT) with 1,600 officers and responsibility for “interim law enforcement and public security until PNTL is reconstituted.”³⁰

PRINCIPAL POLICE-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES

As the types of tasks assigned to UNPOL officers have changed, so too have the countries contributing police personnel to UN service. As of June 2010, 88 police contributing countries (PCCs) were seconding (i.e. lending) police officers to UN operations around the globe, just six more than four years ago despite authorized deployment levels having more than doubled. The top 20 PCCs contributed 79 percent of UN police peacekeepers, averaging 500 officers apiece, while 36 PCCs contributed fewer than 25 officers apiece.

The main contributors of police to UN missions have changed substantially over time. Most draw officers for UN missions from national-level police forces. These include Jordan, which has a 25,000-strong Public Security Force, and Bangladesh with a 120,000-strong national police force. **Table 3** lists the top 20 UN PCCs at year's end in 2001, 2005, and 2009. One discernable trend is the UN's increasing reliance on developing states to provide police personnel, mirroring the trend in military peacekeepers. Developed states' share of UNPOL fell from 37 percent in 2001 to less than 10 percent in 2009.³¹

Of the countries contributing police to UN operations, European and sub-Saharan states in 2006 were the most likely to keep their police within their own regions (see **table 4a**). European police participation in UN operations declined as most of UNMIK's roles shifted to the European Union and non-UN police support efforts increased in Afghanistan, but remaining European police contributions to UN missions were more regionally dispersed by 2010, while African police contributions concentrated even more in the UN's Africa missions, and Latin American PCCs focused on Haiti.

Table 3: Top 20 Police Contributors, UN Operations, Year-End 2001, 2005, and 2009

December 2001			December 2005			December 2009		
	Country	Total		Country	Total		Country	Total
1	Jordan	808	1	Jordan	739	1	Bangladesh	1614
2	United States	707	2	Bangladesh	478	2	Jordan	1607
3	India	636	3	Nepal	431	3	Pakistan	866
4	Germany	487	4	Senegal	416	4	Nepal	814
5	Pakistan	379	5	Pakistan	394	5	Nigeria	806
6	Ghana	273	6	India	381	6	India	738
7	United Kingdom	258	7	Nigeria	374	7	Senegal	583
8	Ukraine	255	8	United States	359	8	Ghana	444
9	Portugal	213	9	Germany	252	9	Philippines	405
10	Spain	197	10	Turkey	236	10	Zambia	300
11	France	196	11	Ukraine	202	11	Egypt	286
12	Turkey	182	12	China	197	12	Malaysia	243
13	Bangladesh	178	13	Romania	191	13	Portugal	200
14	Poland	170	14	Burkina Faso	169	14	China	191
15	Philippines	168	15	France	152	15	Uganda	186
16	Argentina	160	16	Canada	136	16	Turkey	169
17	Russian Federation	143	17	Cameroon	135	17	Rwanda	157
18	Bulgaria	142	18	Poland	129	17	Indonesia	156
19	Egypt	130	19	Russia	115	19	South Africa	154
20	Nepal	119	20	Philippines	113	20	Yemen	150

Note: Gray shaded rankings indicate members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, or "developed" states.

Sources: United Nations, "Monthly Summary of Contributors," United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 31 December 2009; United Nations, "Monthly Summary of Contributors," United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 31 December 2005; United Nations, "Monthly Summary of Troop Contribution to United Nations Operations," United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 31 December 2001.

The increase in African contributions to UN police peacekeeping is noteworthy. Only one African state—Ghana—was among the top 20 PCCs in 2001. It is now joined by Nigeria, Senegal, Zambia, Uganda, Rwanda, and South Africa. The total number of UNPOL contributed by sub-Saharan states was five times larger in December 2009 (4,200) than in December 2001 (under 800). Six of the eight major UN peace operations launched since 2003 are in Africa, all with significant police contingents. About 82 percent of the UN police from sub-Saharan African nations are serving in missions on the continent (see **table 4b**). Drawing African police for these missions makes sense, as they are more likely to share some cultural and linguistic affinity with local populations than are police drawn from elsewhere.³² Also, several Western training packages aimed at improving African peacekeeping capacity (such as the US-sponsored Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and the French-led Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacity, or RECAMP) have begun to include policing components, thereby increasing the number of African police available for UN deployments.³³

Table 4a: Origin and Deployment of UN Police by Region, June 2006

Regions	Total UNPOL Deployments to Region		Total UNPOL Contributions from Region		Percentage Deployed within Own Region
	Number	Pct of Total	Number	Pct of Total	
Central & South Asia	6	0.1%	1,847	25%	0.1%
Sub-Saharan Africa	3,559	49%	2,054	28%	69%
Middle East & North Africa	6	0.1%	813	11%	0.2%
Europe & Russia	2,007	28%	1,588	22%	73%
East Asia & Australia	26	0.4%	484	7%	2%
North America	0	nil	392	5%	nil
Latin America & Caribbean	1,687	19%	113	2%	41%
Total Deployed	7,291				

Thirteen countries provided FPUs in UN operations as of May 2010 (see **table 5**).³⁴ Of these, Bangladesh and Jordan have been the most frequent and responsive contributors. Jordanian FPUs were among the first to arrive in Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, and Haiti. China became a contributor in October 2004, deploying its first FPU to Haiti. India committed an FPU to Liberia in January 2007 composed entirely of female officers, a first.³⁵ The UN Police Division has continued to expand the number of countries providing FPUs, with 19 units authorized in for the AU-UN hybrid force in Darfur and at least 6 more units deployed to MINUSTAH following the earthquake.³⁶

Table 4b: Origin and Deployment of UN Police by Region, June 2010

Regions	Total UNPOL Deployments to Region		Total UNPOL Contributions from Region		Percentage Deployed within Own Region
	Number	Pct of Total	Number	Pct of Total	
Central & South Asia	4	nil	4,817	36%	nil
Sub-Saharan Africa	9,024	67%	4,122	31%	82%
Middle East & North Africa	6	nil	1,970	15%	0.2%
Europe & Russia	77	1%	1,132	8%	4%
East Asia & Australia	1,434	11%	1,097	8%	45%
North America	0	nil	214	2%	nil
Latin America & Caribbean	2,969	22%	162	1%	54%
Total Deployed	13,514				

Sources: United Nations, "UN Missions Contributions by Country," United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), 30 June 2006, and "UN Missions Summary detailed by Country," UN DPKO, 30 June 2010.

Table 5: Contributors of Formed Police Units, May 2010

FPU Contributing Countries	UN Missions with Formed Units						Total Units Fielded per Country
	UNAMID (Darfur) Auth'd: 19	MINUSTAH (Haiti) Auth'd: ~17	MONUC (DR Congo) Auth'd: 8	UNMIL (Liberia) Auth'd: 7	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire) Auth'd: 6	UNMIT (Timor-Leste) Auth'd: 4	
Bangladesh	4	2	3		2	1	12
Jordan	2	2		2	3		9
India		1	2	2			5
Pakistan	1	2			1	1	5
Nepal	1	1		2			4
Nigeria	2	1		1			4
Senegal	1	1	2				4
Egypt	1						1
France		1					1
Indonesia	1						1
Italy		1					1
Malaysia						1	1
Portugal						1	1
Total deployed:	13	11	7	7	6	4	49

FINANCING UN POLICE: INDIVIDUAL VERSUS NATIONAL INCENTIVES

The United Nations spent an estimated \$578 million on international police peacekeeping from July 2009 to June 2010, or roughly eight percent of the UN peacekeeping budget for that period.³⁷ This estimate includes headquarters support and the costs of recruiting, training, deploying, and sustaining police officers in the field, both individual officers and FPUs.

A slight majority of UN police deploy as individuals. The UN covers the cost of officers' transportation to and from the mission area, and provides them directly with monthly Mission Subsistence Allowances (MSAs). MSAs, based on local cost-of-living evaluations, are intended to cover the costs of housing, food, and other essentials for individual police, who lack the institutional support that military units or FPUs provide their troops. In 2008–2009, MSAs varied from roughly \$100 per day in Kosovo to \$180 per day in Chad.³⁸ Every individual UNPOL officer in a given mission receives the same amount of MSA, regardless of rank.

Generous even for officers from developed states, the MSA represents a de facto salary that may be an order of magnitude larger than what officers from developing countries receive in pay from their home governments. MSA is thus an incentive for individuals to volunteer for UN police service. Governments, however, do not have an incentive to put individuals forward for service, especially their best officers, since they receive no reimbursement for seconding individual police to UN missions.

The UN does, on the other hand, reimburse member states for officers contributed in formed units. FPUs are expected to be logistically self-sustaining, and states are reimbursed for operating costs and for wear and tear on contingent-owned equipment. Because these units offer special skill-sets to the mission, their governments also receive per capita monthly reimbursements based on the UN's military specialist reimbursement rate, currently \$1,331 per uniformed officer per month. Member states also receive \$68 per officer per month for clothes, gear, and equipment. Officers deployed in FPUs do not receive MSA from the UN. Unlike FPU members, individual UNPOL use equipment purchased by the mission (for example, trucks, fuel, spare parts, communications gear, and office equipment such as computers).

Based on this cost structure, the UN pays significantly more for individual officers than for members of FPUs. Using UNMIL in Liberia as an example, **table 6** lays out the estimated annual costs per officer for individual police and for those deployed in FPUs in peacekeeping budget year 2005–06, when the operation had become fully operational. The results suggest that, on average, it costs UN mission budgets about 75 percent more per capita for individual police officers than it does for personnel in FPUs—plus the recruitment of individual officers is much more labor-intensive for the UN Police Division. These cost differentials were confirmed from the direct budget line expenditure estimates for individual police and FPUs for 12 missions. These numbers, which do not include the apportioned costs of mission operations and infrastructure, indicate an average per capita cost for individual police of roughly \$55,000 per year and for officers in formed units of roughly \$29,000.³⁹

The overall cost effectiveness of FPUs and their potential utility in crowd management and protection of UN personnel and facilities are important drivers of their growing presence in UN

operations. Reimbursements to states that contribute such units give them an incentive to contribute them and the UN has had relatively little trouble soliciting FPUs for deployment, in contrast to its persistent struggle to find appropriate individual officers.

Table 6: Annual UN Cost Comparison, Individual Police versus Formed Units, in UNMIL, 2005–2006

	MONTHLY COSTS/PERSON	ANNUAL COSTS/PERSON
Individual Civilian Police		
Average Monthly Mission Subsistence Allowance*	\$3,860	\$46,320
Average per capita operational costs**	\$912	\$10,943
Travel to/from mission (est.)	—	\$5,803
Total	—	\$63,066
Police Deployed in FPUs		
Personal Reimbursement	\$1,028	\$12,336
Specialist Reimbursement	\$303	\$3,636
Clothes, Gear and Equipment Reimbursement	\$68	\$816
Average per capita operational costs**	\$1,398	\$16,775
Travel to/from mission (est.)	—	\$2,447
Total	—	\$36,010

* MSA in Liberia during 2005–2006 was \$191/day (\$5,730/mo.) for the first 30 days and \$123/day (\$3,690/mo.) thereafter. United Nations, *Performance report on the budget of the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/61/715, 26 January 2007, para. 8.

** Based on UNMIL expenditures (A/61/715). For details see Annex III, Table A3.8.

*** Travel cost estimates are deduced from expenditure calculations. Travel cost for officers deployed in formed units is lower due to their ability to deploy as a group. A/61/715.

While much has changed in terms of demand for police, the tasks they are assigned, and who contributes them to UN missions, some shortcomings in the UN's conduct of police peacekeeping operations are stubbornly constant. Identifying these persistent challenges is the first step in devising strategies for overcoming them.


Sidebar 4:

DO YOU NEED DEMOCRATIC POLICE TO TEACH DEMOCRATIC POLICING?

United Nations policing mandates have increasingly focused on reforming and restructuring local police forces, relying on the model of democratic policing. Given the diversity of policing cultures around the globe, it is worth pausing to consider whether all countries are equally capable of contributing to such missions. DPKO has difficulty recruiting adequate numbers of police for its missions, yet the trend in police contributions in recent years may be cause for concern. The figure below shows the mid-year breakdown of police officers serving in UN missions in 2001, 2006, and 2010, based on the contributing countries' corresponding Freedom House rankings in 2001, 2005, and 2009.

Over the past ten years, the source of most UN police peacekeepers has shifted from “free” to “partly free” states, while “not free” states doubled their share of total deployments. As police deployments nearly doubled over the decade, the absolute number of officers contributed from states rated “free” has dropped by about 1,300, while numbers from “partly free” states have grown by 5,000 and “not free” states by 2,000. Unless the United Nations can induce free countries to provide more police for its operations or can develop a standing cadre of police personnel well-versed in human rights standards and the principles of democratic or community policing, who can in turn authoritatively convey these principles and related norms of practice to the majority of police seconded to UN operations and manage their application, the UN’s legitimacy and effectiveness in fostering democratic policing in post-conflict environments may be at serious risk.

Percentages of Police Contributed to UN Peacekeeping by “Free,” “Partly Free,” and “Not Free” Countries in 2001, 2006, and 2010



Sources: Freedom House, *Freedom in the World* (Washington DC: Freedom House, 2002, 2007, and 2010), for years 2001, 2006 and 2009, www.freedomhouse.org. UN DPKO, Monthly Summary of Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations, June 2001, 2006 2010, www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/.

Notes to Section 3

- ¹ David Sands, "The Thin Blue Line," *The Washington Times*, 24 July 2006.
- ² Edward Rees, "Security Sector Reform and Peace Operations: 'Improvisation and Confusion' from the Field," External Study for UN DPKO, *Peacekeeping Best Practices Section*, March 2006, 10.
- ³ Although other countries and multinational organizations have begun in recent years to deploy police officers internationally to assist in reform efforts, none rival the UN in the size and scope of policing work. See NYU Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2010* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner).
- ⁴ A/50/60-S/1995/1.
- ⁵ These missions include 11 peacekeeping operations (UNFICYP-Cyprus; MINURSO-Western Sahara; UNMIK-Kosovo; MONUC-Democratic Republic of Congo; UNMIL-Liberia; UNOCI-Côte d'Ivoire; MINUSTAH-Haiti; UNMIS-Sudan; UNAMID-Darfur, Sudan; MINURCAT-Chad and Central African Republic; UNMIT-Timor-Leste); and one special political mission led by DPKO (UNAMA-Afghanistan). UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Background Note," May 2010.
- ⁶ The UN deployed police in three peacekeeping missions prior to 1989: the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from 1960 to 1964, the oft-forgotten United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF) from 1962 to 1963, and the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) created in 1964 and still operational. While these missions established the precedent of a police role in UN peacekeeping, the police responsibilities were unique and did not follow a standard model or 'type' of policing mandate.
- ⁷ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique* (ONUMOZ), S/24892, 3 December 1992, para. 53 (b).
- ⁸ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique* (ONUMOZ), S/1994/89/Add.1, 28 January 1994, para. 9.
- ⁹ James Woods, "Mozambique: The CIVPOL Operation," in Oakley et al., eds., *Policing the New World Disorder* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998), 162–163; Amnesty International, "Mozambique: Human Rights and the Police," 1 April 1998.
- ¹⁰ Yasushi Akashi, "Directive from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Establishing Procedures for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Human Rights Violations," Directive No. 93/1, United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 6 January 1993.
- ¹¹ Robert Perito, "Reforming the Iraqi Interior Ministry, Police, and Facilities Protection Service," USIPeace Brief, US Institute of Peace, February 2007; Marina Caparini, "Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Stabilisation: The Case of the Western Balkans," in Bryden and Hangii, eds., *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*.
- ¹² International Crisis Group, "Rebuilding Liberia: Prospects and Perils," Africa Report No. 75, 30 January 2004, 19. Adedeji Ebo, "The Challenge and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia," Occasional Paper No. 9, Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), December 2005; International Crisis Group, "Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States," Africa Report No. 87, 8 December 2004.
- ¹³ Annika S. Hansen, "Strengthening Indigenous Police Capacity and the Rule of Law in the Balkans," in Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, eds., *The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond* (London/Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 186.
- ¹⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 940, S/RES/940, 31 July 1994.
- ¹⁵ The United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1063, S/RES/1063, 28 June 1996; the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1123, S/RES/1123, 30 July 1997; and the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1141, S/RES/1141, 28 November 1997.
- ¹⁶ Based on consultations with UNMIBH, the Agreement on Restructuring the Police of the Federation (also called the Bonn-Petersburg Agreement) downsized the Federation police force from 32,750 to 11,500; it was signed on 25 April 1996. The Framework Agreement on Police Restructuring, Reform and Democratization in Republika Srpska (RS), also brokered by UNMIBH, reduced the RS police force from 12,000 to 8,500 and was signed on 9 December 1998. Heinz Vetschera and Matthieu Damian, "Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Role of the International Community," *International Peacekeeping* 13(1) March 2006, 36.
- ¹⁷ Vetschera and Damian, "Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 41.
- ¹⁸ The IPTF received substantial assistance from the US Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program, which provided curriculum, training materials, and instructors who trained UN and local police in "train the trainer" courses. Robert Perito, United States Institute of Peace, correspondence with authors, 30 November 2006.
- ¹⁹ Michael J. Dziedzic and Andrew Bair, "Bosnia and the International Police Task Force," in Oakley et al., eds., *Policing the New World Disorder*, 286.

- ²⁰ Judy S. Hylton, "Security Sector Reform: BiH Federation Ministry of the Interior," *International Peacekeeping* 9(1), Spring 2002, 156.
- ²¹ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, S/2002/1314, 2 December 2002, para. 11.
- ²² UN Security Council Resolution 1542, S/RES/1542, 30 April 2004, paras. 7(b), 7(d).
- ²³ The authority of FPUs to take on armed gangs was further justified under MINUSTAH's mandate to "protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence." S/RES/1542, para. 7(f). See also, Victoria K. Holt and Tobias C. Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2006), 95–98.
- ²⁴ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti*, S/2009/439, 1 September 2009, para. 45.
- ²⁵ United Nations, *Twelfth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*, S/2006/743, 12 September 2006, para. 43; UNMIL Human Rights and Protection Section, Quarterly Report, May–July 2006, para. 6. *Report of the Security Council mission to the African Union; Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and Liberia*, S/2009/303, 11 June 2009, para. 97.
- ²⁶ Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 9 June 1999, www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm
- ²⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 1244, S/RES/1244, 1999.
- ²⁸ Due to political opposition to an EU mission in the Security Council, and a threatened Russian veto, EULEX remains under the "umbrella" authority of status-neutral UNMIK and Security Council Resolution 1244 but with its own chain of command. See United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo*, S/2008/354, 12 June 2008, Annex I; and S/2008/692, 24 November 2008.
- ²⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 1272, S/RES/1272, 25 October 1999.
- ³⁰ UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1704, 25 August 2006.
- ³¹ "Developed states" are defined here as members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD/DAC"). The 24 current members of the DAC are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea (Republic of), Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.
- ³² UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted this benefit in a 2004 report. United Nations, *Enhancement of African Peacekeeping Capacity: Report of the Secretary-General*, A/59/591, 30 November 2004, para. 21.
- ³³ The effect of GPOI support for African police contributions to peace operations is hard to measure. The primary mechanism for police training under GPOI is the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), which relies on a "train the trainer" approach. It is difficult to track the number and quality of officers who both receive training from CoESPU "graduates" and are deployed to UN missions. RECAMP only began including police training as a component of its program in RECAMP V, launched in mid-2005.
- ³⁴ This increased from 11 in August 2006. New FPU contributors for the UN Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) include Malaysia and Portugal. Official, UN DPKO Police Division, correspondence with authors, November 2006.
- ³⁵ UN News Centre, "UN hails decision by India to send 125 female police officers for peacekeeping," UN News Centre, 1 September 2006.
- ³⁶ The Security Council authorization for additional police in Haiti did not specify FPUs or individual police officers due to the urgent need to deploy officers as soon as possible after the quake. United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1908, 19 January 2010.
- ³⁷ UN peacekeeping's fiscal year runs from July to June. The estimate includes the costs of the UN Police Division and the Standing Police Capacity (about \$18 million or 3 percent of UN policing costs), as well as the police components of ongoing UN missions. See United Nations, *Financial performance report for the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009 and proposed budget for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011. Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions*, A/64/660/Add.1 thru Add. 16, April 2010, part III and annex I; these reports contain staffing and expenditure estimates for budget year 2009–2010. Also United Nations, *Budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010 Report of the Secretary-General*, A/63/767, 16 March 2009; and *Performance report on the budget of the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009 and proposed budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011 Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions*, A/64/753, 3 May 2010, paras. 33–35.
- ³⁸ MSA data drawn from UN Office of Human Resources Management, "MSA rates for 2009," accessible online at: www.un.org/depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/allowances/msa.htm. A higher MSA is provided for the first 30 days in the mission area to defray costs associated with getting situated in the new locale.

³⁹ A/64/660/Add.1–16.

TAKING STOCK: PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS IN UN POLICE PEACEKEEPING

The UN's ability to successfully plan, organize, deploy, and carry out police peacekeeping missions has faced chronic challenges. This section provides a brief overview of these challenges in four distinct yet related categories: issues of structure, doctrine, and strategy; capacity for planning UNPOL components of missions; impediments to rapid and effective deployment; and challenges in measuring progress. Recent reform efforts are also explored and their level of implementation and effectiveness assessed.

OVERARCHING ISSUES OF STRUCTURE, DOCTRINE, AND STRATEGY

Structural shortcomings in doctrine and strategy have limited the operational effectiveness of UN police activities. While some of these problems can be corrected by instituting specific policies, many will only be solved through major structural overhauls, including increasing the police expertise and resources available to the UN on a standing basis.

Structural Challenge of “Borrowing” Police

The UN relies on contributions from member state police forces that are otherwise employed in their domestic capacities. Unlike militaries, which may not be fully utilized in times of peace, police have a permanent domestic role and countries are reluctant to deploy police abroad, especially if they are already short-handed.¹ Recruitment is further hindered by the lack of incentives offered to police contributing states. When candidates are put forward by member states, their quality is uneven. The ad hoc cobbling together of individual officers for each new peace operation dramatically slows deployment times, hinders the UN's ability to obtain officers with needed skill-sets, and inhibits UN institutional learning.

UN Police Peacekeeping Doctrine and Guidance

Doctrine provides concepts and guidelines that help clarify ambiguous operational situations and ensures that all police elements are operating with shared outlooks and common goals. Writing in 2005 for the DPKO Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, experienced peacekeeper and international legal expert Bruce Oswald stressed that,

The absence of doctrine to which peacekeepers undertaking [rule of law] tasks can be held accountable . . . impacts on the capacity to prepare adequate standard operating procedures, mission-specific rules of engagement and force commanders directives, and training regimes. Peacekeepers cannot, and should not, expect that their actions involving the use of force, limiting freedom of movement, and detaining individuals are justifiable solely on the basis of necessity or the ‘fog of peacekeeping’. Rather, their actions must be guided by sufficiently detailed principles and standards so that they and the local population are clear about the parameters within which peacekeepers will undertake law and order functions and tasks.²

Since 2005, DPKO has undertaken a concerted effort to develop its own doctrine for UN police and other peacekeeping mission components, an effort previously resisted by some member states. This “guidance project” is more responsive to the complex and dangerous environments of contemporary police operations than earlier documents, such as the *United Nations Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines* (December 2000) and the *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations* (December 2003).³ The 2000 publication (answering a request from the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations) contained general information on traditional and transformational missions but devoted only a few paragraphs to issues of executive authority and the use of FPUs. The 2003 *Handbook* has a chapter on police components of missions, with an overview of UN police peacekeeping activities; it is presently undergoing revision.

In 2005, DPKO issued a pocket-sized *United Nations Police Handbook: Building Institutional Police Capacity in Post-Conflict Environments*, which treated operational basics in some detail—15 pages on safe driving—but offered only summary introductions to many police peacekeeping tasks—1 page each on training and mentoring, interim law enforcement, and electoral assistance.⁴ In January 2006, the department issued detailed doctrinal guidance on corrections, the first of a new series on rule of law issues. It addresses a range of topics, from pre-deployment planning and guiding principles to specific issues like establishing family visits for inmates and preventing the transmission of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS.⁵

In November 2006, DPKO released much-needed policy guidance for FPUs. The document laid out their organizational and command and control structures, listed generic tasks, and defined several levels of public disorder, distinguishing situations of a “non-military” and “military” nature based on the determination of “sustained use of firearms or military weaponry.” A separate policy directive on “detention, searches, and use of force” provided further details, and specifics on the use of force are spelled out in “rules of engagement” documents issued for each mission.⁶ These proved to be insufficient guidance for FPU operations, however, and a new DPKO Policy was developed and issued in February 2010, as summarized in **sidebar 5**.

In December 2006, DPKO published a primer on judicial support in peace operations described as the “first step in the development of a body of guidance materials designed to assist UN personnel working on judicial and legal issues in the context of peace operations.”⁷ The primer offered advice on increasing the immediate effectiveness of the host state’s criminal justice system, strengthening the national legal framework, providing and reforming legal education and training, reinforcing judicial independence, promoting judicial and prosecutorial professionalism, accountability and transparency, improving court administration and management, developing basic judicial infrastructure, bolstering the integrity of the legal profession, and increasing public access to justice and attention to victims’ rights.⁸ DPKO published its “capstone doctrine” for peacekeeping, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines*, in January 2008 and a new Policy for Justice Components in Peace Operations in December 2009.⁹

Sidebar 5:**IMPROVING QUALITY AND AVAILABILITY OF FORMED POLICE UNITS**

Problems with UN formed police units (FPUs) became obvious in Kosovo in February 2007, when a Romanian FPU used overaged and undersized rubber bullets to disperse a protesting crowd, killing two and wounding others. The operational order for that day did not expressly state whether FPUs were authorized to use rubber bullets, and the chain of command was unclear in respect of who could issue the directive to use them.

The subsequent internal investigation determined that differing legal standards and national rules of engagement for FPUs from different countries, ambiguity in operational planning and lack of clear standards on equipment and weapons had led to the use of obsolete ammunition, breakdowns in chain of command, and insufficient supervision. The report recommended that DPKO “reconsider, as a matter of policy, whether the use of rubber bullets should ever be authorized on a UN peacekeeping mission for crowd control use.” Although prescriptive measures on the training, deployment and equipment of FPUs were beyond the scope of the investigation, the process raised issues that policymakers could not ignore.

In 2008, the UN Police Division sent Proficiency Testing and Training Teams (PT3s) into the seven UN peacekeeping operations with FPUs deployed. The PT3s spent three months in mission testing FPU proficiency in four areas (crowd control management, firearms proficiency, command and control, and logistics/equipment) and also made an overall assessment. Tests showed that only 37% of FPUs then deployed could be considered operational, and even many of those required additional training.

Mobile training teams were dispatched to train the deficient units already deployed and address the most urgent and immediate needs. The Police Division also formed a Doctrine Development Group of police experts with substantial experience commanding FPUs or performing FPU tasks such as crowd control. The DDG first met in December 2008 to hear the PT3 reports, discuss the essential components of a draft Policy on FPUs, and set up working groups to draft sections of the new policy. The full group reconvened in March 2009 to assemble a draft policy, which was completed and sent to Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Alain Le Roy in October 2009.

The new DPKO Policy on FPUs addresses five areas determined by the DDG to require new guidance and standards: FPU tasks and composition; use of force; command, control and coordination; weapons and equipment; and training and unit validation. It defines FPUs as

cohesive mobile police units, providing support to United Nations operations and ensuring the safety and security of United Nations personnel and missions, primarily in public order management. As a coherent part of the United Nations police component, FPUs work in support of the establishment and maintenance of safe, democratic and human rights abiding communities by delivering professional, responsive and more robust policing in accordance with the mandate.

The Policy allows for flexibility in national structures and equipment provided to FPUs while seeking a consistent command and control structure and standards within and across peace operations.

Sources: Robert L. Dean, “Second Report of the Special Prosecutor to the SRSG regarding the deaths and serious wounding of protestors during the 10 February 2007 demonstration in Pristine/Pristina,” 29 June 2007. Andrew Hughes, “UN Police Peacekeeping,” Presentation at the Stimson Center, 5 May 2009. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *Policy on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, Ref. 2010/1 (New York: February 2010).

In October 2007, DPKO stood up its initial Standing Police Capacity. A UN study of the SPC’s first year is excerpted in **sidebar 6**, below.

The United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office has helped fill the doctrinal gap for individual UN police by publishing preliminary guidance on international police peacekeeping in April 2007.¹⁰ A 2009, UK-commissioned review of international police peacekeeping in post-conflict situations evaluated key capacity gaps and noted officer quality and human resources management as major issues. It recognized the need for doctrinal development to support integrated, strategic assessment and planning, and international and national training for police officers. Standing and standby capacities were suggested as potential elements of a comprehensive and effective model of support for international police peacekeeping.¹¹ UNPD

itself launched a multi-tiered Strategic Doctrinal Framework development effort in 2009, recognizing the need for greater consistency and professionalism in how the UN conceives of, recruits and trains for international police peacekeeping. This effort, drawing input from member state police establishments, national and regional training centers, current and former UN police commissioners and independent policing experts, was slated for completion by 2012.

UN Police and Rule of Law Components in Security Council Mandates

Beyond broad doctrine, international police peacekeeping missions are guided by mandate language, strategic guidance from DPKO, and, for armed police and FPUs, rules on the use of force and firearms. Guidance and other directives should clearly specify the expectations, tasks, and responsibilities of the UNPOL component of the mission.

In the past, UN mandates (determined with advice from DPKO) have been vague in describing police peacekeeping tasks and goals. This has led to divergent interpretations of the mandate among contingents in the field and increased the likelihood of “mission creep.”¹² In El Salvador, for example, the police mandate, articulated in the peace agreement and endorsed by Security Council Resolution 693, tasked UN police in ONUSAL (the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador) with “assisting in ensuring a smooth transition and assisting police authorities,” as well as “accompanying officers and members of the National Police in the performance of their duties.”¹³ Translating that charge into operational reality was left to the police component on the ground. In Cambodia, UNTAC’s mandate stipulated that local police were to operate under “UNTAC supervision *or* control” and that UNTAC was to “ensure that law and order are maintained effectively and impartially.”¹⁴ Attempting to “control” local police proved impossible given the intransigence of the parties and the UN’s limited number of unarmed police monitors. Some progress has been made in this area, which can be seen by comparing language from Security Council resolutions authorizing the two major UN missions in Haiti. In 1994, the Council mandated the UN peacekeeping mission, UNMIH, to “(p)rovide guidance and training to all levels of the Haitian police and monitor the way in which the operations are implemented.”¹⁵ Ten years later, in contrast, the Council called on a new peacekeeping operation, MINUSTAH, to

assist the Transitional Government in monitoring, restructuring, and reforming the Haitian National Police, consistent with democratic policing standards, including through the vetting and certification of its personnel, advising on its reorganization and retraining, including gender training, as well as monitoring/mentoring members of the Haitian National Police... [and] in collaboration with other partners ... provide advice and assistance within its capacity to the Transitional Government: (a) in the investigation of human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law, in collaboration with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, to put an end to impunity; [and] (b) in the development of a strategy for reform and institutional strengthening of the judiciary¹⁶

Such clarity is not yet universal among Security Council resolutions but is crucial to ensuring that member states give appropriate attention, resources, and priority to this aspect of an operation.

Sidebar 6:

**UN STANDING POLICE CAPACITY:
From the Report of the Panel of Experts on the SPC's First Year of Operation**

The Standing Police Capacity [SPC] was initially proposed in 2004 in a recommendation of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to establish “a small corps of senior police officers and managers (50-100 personnel) who could rapidly undertake mission assessments and organize the start-up of police components of peace operations” (see A/59/565, para. 223). On 16 September 2005, the General Assembly endorsed, in its resolution 60/1, “the creation of an initial operating capability for a standing police capacity to provide coherent, effective and responsive start-up capability for the policing component of the United Nations peacekeeping missions and to assist existing missions through the provision of advice and expertise” (para. 4) [and] gave [DPKO] authority and funding to establish the SPC in July 2006 (para 5). The SPC would “have two core functions: (a) to start up new United Nations police operations, including participation in pre-mission planning, as required; and (b) to assist existing United Nations police operations with police reform and in capacity-building activities and operational audits” (para. 9). “In an internal directive issued 1 May 2006, DPKO assigned a clear priority to the first function; by early spring 2008, however, the SPC was fielding up to three teams at one time [only one of which involved mission startup]. (para. 10)

“The internal directive envisioned a standing cadre of police and civilian professionals with law enforcement expertise who possess a unique blend of leadership and managerial qualities. Consistent with that emphasis, SPC members interviewed ... tended to see the unit as an elite team distinct from other UN police personnel. However, in DPKO, the SPC tends to be seen as a quick-deploying United Nations police unit as well as the initial police leadership cadre for new missions, rather than as the precursor to the leadership. ... The aim of the SPC is to make the police component of a new operation more effective at implementing its mandate sooner. This involves not only office set-up and equipment for the SPC, but also nurturing relationships within the mission and with the host Government. Such relationships take time to build; rapid rotation of the United Nations personnel involved not only dilutes capacities, but it may lead national officials to reason that they should not “invest their time” until the arrival of regular contingents of United Nations police personnel. Such outcomes may undermine the purpose of the Standing Police Capacity under its first core function (paras. 11, 12).

“Notwithstanding its team members’ skills in peace operations, only one member of the SPC appeared to have personal experience or expertise in setting up a new mission or its police component. This issue, as well as a lack of familiarity with Headquarters planning and management procedures, may have contributed to coordination and logistical challenges related to start-up [of MINURCAT]. Although the role of the SPC in planning for Chad may have been clear to the SPC itself and perhaps within the Police Division, ... responsibilities and reporting chain were not clear to others in DPKO, most critically the Office of Operations Africa Division planning team for Chad.... (para. 31).

“Beyond planning issues, the Chad deployment highlighted the difficulties associated with deploying a rapid deployment capability when similar arrangements are not available and in place for other mission components....The Special Representative of the Secretary-General was not appointed until January 2008 and arrived in early March; the Deputy Special Representative ... was appointed in March and arrived in early May; the Police Commissioner was appointed in July and took up his post in August. Only the remnant of a cancelled advance mission, posted in N’Djamena and augmented after the Security Council authorized MINURCAT, kept the SPC from arriving in N’Djamena even farther ahead of its logistical support. Attacks on the capital at the end of January by well-armed militias also led to the evacuation of MINURCAT staff, including Standing Police Capacity personnel to Douala, Cameroon, for two weeks, less than a month after the SPC had completed its phased deployment to Chad (para. 34).

“In addition to [mission startup in Chad, the SPC] played a central role ... in the investigation of circumstances surrounding a major security incident in Kosovo in March 2008.... In Timor-Leste, the SPC assisted in the implementation of the recommendations of an expert mission on policing, including by restructuring the UNMIT process for advising the Timor-Leste National Police [PNTL] and providing detailed guidance for the resumption of law enforcement responsibilities by [PNTL] (para. 38).

“Notwithstanding the challenges [of the first year], the Panel strongly believes that the establishment of the Standing Police Capacity has been one the most innovative and concrete initiatives of the United Nations in recent memory” (para. 29).

Source: United Nations, *Report of the Panel of Experts on the Standing Police Capacity's first year of operation Note by the Secretary-General, A/63/630, 19 December 2008.*

The Need for an Integrated, Comprehensive Rule of Law Strategy

Post-conflict police peacekeeping activities are not carried out in a vacuum. In the 1990s, UNPOL officers often found themselves tasked with reforming local police forces in post-conflict societies plagued by dysfunctional court and prison systems. UN police would train their local counterparts to catch criminals (humanely), only to have no humane means of detaining or prosecuting them. In Cambodia, reforming the utterly defunct legal system was deemed to be a non-priority and penciled in as something to be sorted out in the post-election, constitution-writing phase.¹⁷ In Haiti in the mid-1990s, it took nearly a year for UN officers to realize that local police were shooting criminal suspects not out of hatred or cruelty but because the broken court system virtually guaranteed that those arrested for crimes would be promptly released.¹⁸ Likewise, in Bosnia, UN police monitors were expected to assist in creating a corruption-free police force but were given little leverage to address the corrupt court system.¹⁹

Recognition that police peacekeeping must be situated within a wider rule of law strategy has expanded dramatically since the late-1990s. As previously noted, the Brahimi Report called for an integrated rule of law effort involving support to a range of institutions, including prisons, courts, and police forces. The Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service (CLJAS) in DPKO started with just two officers in 2002, received two more professional posts in 2005 and, as part of the restructuring of DPKO in mid-2007, acquired another five. It moved into DPKO's Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, which also manages the Police Division, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section, the new Security Sector Reform Unit, and the Mine Action Service. This restructuring brings all of DPKO's previously scattered elements related to rule of law into a single administrative reporting chain.²⁰ As of March 2010, CLJAS was authorized four judicial officers, four corrections officers, one policy officer, one deputy chief of service, and a director. Its proposed output for 2010–2011 included the development of an “initial rapidly deployable justice and corrections capacity to assist with the start-up of new field operations.”²¹

The Security Council has also increasingly recognized the interconnected nature of rule of law support. While references to reforming or strengthening judicial and penal systems were rare in 1990s mandates, the Security Council has, since 1999, made more explicit reference to these rule of law activities (see **table 7**). Beginning with the transitional administration mandates for Kosovo and Timor-Leste, where the UN needed to create judicial systems essentially from scratch, the strengthening of courts and prison systems has become a more prominent feature of UN operations.²² (See **Annex I** for a comprehensive review of mandate language dealing with rule of law issues.)

Table 7: UN Mandates for Peace Operations with Rule of Law Components Since 1999

Mission	Country or Territory	Dates	Mandated to Reform:		
			Police	Judicial System*	Corrections System*
UNMIK	Kosovo	6/10/99–present	X	X	
UNAMSIL	Sierra Leone	10/22/99–12/31/05	X		
UNTAET	Timor-Leste	10/25/99–5/20/02	X	X	X
MONUC	DR Congo	11/30/99–present	X	X	X
UNMISSET	Timor-Leste	5/20/02–5/20/05	X	X	
UNMIL	Liberia	10/1/03–present	X	X	X
UNOCI	Côte d'Ivoire	4/4/04–present	X	X	
MINUSTAH	Haiti	4/30/04–present	X	X	X
ONUB	Burundi	6/1/04–12/31/06	X	X	X
UNMIS	Sudan	3/24/05–present	X	X	X
UNMIT	Timor-Leste	8/25/06–present	X	X	X
UNAMID	Sudan (Darfur)	7/31/07–present	X	X	X
MINURCAT	Central African Republic; Chad	9/25/07–present	X	X	X

* Includes references to judicial and/or corrections reform contained in Secretary-General Reports, in instances where Security Council Mandates explicitly endorse the plan in the Report.

Sources: Data drawn from Security Council Resolutions and Secretary-General Reports for each of the missions listed.

While increased attention to the broader tasks of establishing the rule of law is welcome, much work remains to coordinate, sequence, and effectively carry out efforts to strengthen institutions across the rule of law spectrum. A 2006 report by DPKO's Best Practices Section found that many UN operations are characterized by "competition and discord" between the various UN agencies involved with rule of law work in the field.²³ Rhetorical recognition of the centrality of judicial and prison support has yet to translate into adequate resources and expertise on the ground.

In Liberia, for example, UNMIL created a Legal and Judicial System Support Division and a Corrections Advisory Unit within the mission in 2003. Nonetheless, more than three years later,

the justice system continues to be constrained by the lack of court buildings and a dearth of qualified judicial and legal officers, which have resulted in serious delays in the processing of criminal cases...Court officials often apply legal rules and procedures in an inconsistent manner or fail to observe minimum human rights standards. In addition, corrupt practices involving some magistrates and judicial officials, inefficiency and prolonged pre-trial detention continued...throughout the country.²⁴

In late 2004, prisons were non-functional outside of the capital, Monrovia, and severely overcrowded in the capital. Five years later not much had changed: "Substantial challenges

remain across the legal, judicial, and corrections sectors, owing to the lack of capacity, infrastructure and equipment.” “Insufficient budgetary allocations result in operational limitations and an almost complete dependence on donor funding.” “As the judiciary lacks the capacity to dispose of cases in a timely manner, the backlog in the criminal justice system is increasing.”²⁵ The mission has bent the rules a bit to hire Liberian lawyers to serve as prosecutors and defense attorneys, which has enabled some trials to go forward, but in general it cannot provide direct budgetary support to the Liberian government.²⁶

Similarly, missions in the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, and Burundi have been given ambitious judicial support mandates that are hindered by limited personnel assignments and underfunding. MONUC’s Rule of Law Unit in the DRC, created in 2003, and ONUB’s Rule of Law and Civil Affairs Office in Burundi, were each given three international staff positions for judicial work. These staff levels were insufficient to meet the challenges and geography of both countries. In Côte d’Ivoire, UNOCI was tasked with supporting judicial reform in a country lacking any functional courts in its northern half—with five international staff positions in support of this effort.²⁷ Correctional support has too often fallen short of needs as well, with peacekeeping missions in the DRC and Burundi each having one international post in 2005 dedicated to prison efforts despite the pressing need for major corrections reform. By 2009, MONUC had two corrections officers in its Rule of Law Office but 14 officers seconded from governments (and therefore not salaried by the mission like individual UNPOL) to work with Congolese prisons and prison officials. In 2010, MONUC proposed a major acceleration of its to prison-related activities, proposing a separate Corrections Unit with seven international staff, two UN Volunteers, and up to 64 seconded corrections officers, most intended to be based in prisons in the volatile eastern DRC, promoting release of some of the 70–80 percent of the prison population held in illegal pre-trial detention.²⁸

Accountability of UN Personnel in the Field

Posing an additional challenge on the ground is the problem of criminal behavior by some UN peace operations personnel. Police and other staff deployed in UN missions have been accused of criminal activity in multiple instances. Allegations have included involvement in human trafficking (Bosnia), rape (Kosovo and Timor-Leste), smuggling (Cambodia), and sexual exploitation (DRC).²⁹ Few of these cases have resulted in substantial punishments. The chief weaknesses relate to the procedures and policies of the UN, the capacity and political will of both personnel-contributing states and mission host states, and the legal jurisdictional capabilities of the United Nations. Through the Model UN Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), police and military observers serving in UN missions enjoy the status of “experts on mission,” meaning that they have “functional immunity” from prosecution by the host state for actions taken in performance of their duties.³⁰ The Secretary-General can choose to waive the immunity of UN international staff (including police) so they can be prosecuted by local authorities or prosecuted by their home state. In practice, however, the UN has no clear parameters on when to grant immunity waivers.³¹ There have been a number of cases where police that have been repatriated to their home state for potential prosecution, only to have the allegations ignored.³²

The UN had begun to investigate means of enhancing accountability of its personnel prior to explosive revelations in 2004 about sexual exploitation by military peacekeepers in the DRC. In October 2003, Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued a bulletin on sexual abuse and exploitation

that detailed precise prohibitions on UN staff, and outlined the responsibilities of senior staff for receiving and monitoring allegations, as well as for preventing and responding to alleged abuse.³³ In July 2004, Annan invited Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Husseini, the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations, to undertake a comprehensive investigation of the problem. His subsequent report presented a series of recommendations for confronting the issue.³⁴ The DPKO-adopted strategy for dealing with sexual abuse features a three-pronged approach, involving prevention, enforcement, and remedial action to repair damage already wrought by the misconduct of UN staff.³⁵

Even with significant progress in this area, major gaps in accountability remain. These include limited host-state capacity to investigate and prosecute crimes (and Liberia-like failure to meet basic human rights standards in jails and prisons even if the capacity to prosecute exists); limited extraterritorial jurisdiction (the ability to prosecute nationals for crimes committed abroad) on the part of police contributing countries; and the difficulty of ensuring that contributing countries follow up when such jurisdiction exists and individuals are repatriated for serious misconduct.

Promising developments include the establishment of conduct and discipline units within missions and the creation of a dedicated conduct and discipline division within the UN Department of Field Support in New York. The recent creation of model criminal codes and codes of criminal procedure could potentially improve accountability as well, were they to serve as laws applicable to UN personnel in countries where UN peace operations deploy.³⁶ (A separate Stimson report treats this and other accountability issues and options in greater detail.³⁷)

PLANNING RULE OF LAW COMPONENTS IN UN OPERATIONS

Good planning is critical for complex rule of law support operations. The challenges inherent in attempting to maintain public security and establish sustainable, local law enforcement institutions require strategic decisions about a mission's method of operation, desired goals, guidelines, and end-state prior to deployment. Failure to establish a clear police peacekeeping strategy risks undermining the entire operation.

Planning for UN peace operations reflects the unique nature of the United Nations, where some states (members of the Security Council) task individuals from their own and other states (either volunteers or officers on loan from their home countries) to carry out complex tasks, often on shoestring budgets and with little to no advance warning. Despite this unfortunate mix of ambitions and constraints, some improvements in UN capabilities have been made in recent years. These include the enlargement of the Police Division and other rule of law elements at UN Headquarters in New York, the inclusion of police, judicial, and corrections personnel in mission assessment teams, and the creation of modest rapid deployment capacity in police, justice and corrections.

Effectively matching the size and skill-sets of an UNPOL contingent to the specific policing needs of the host state has consistently proven difficult, however. There is no universal formula for identifying all the policing needs of countries in post-conflict settings. Variables include population size, mandated tasks, land mass to be policed, size and status of local police forces, conditions of the court and prison systems, what the fighting was about, the character and content of the peace agreement (if any) and levels of local corruption.

Absent a clear methodology for calculating the size and shape of a new mission's police component, the UN has employed various techniques. Population size has been a regular guide. Planners for the operation in Cambodia decided that one UN police monitor for every 15 indigenous police officers was a good ratio, whereas in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the chosen ratio was one to 30.³⁸ UNMIK, in Kosovo, measured its personnel needs against the total population, since there was no local police force when it deployed (the remaining Serbian police were ordered out under NATO escort). UNMIK planners sought two international police per thousand local inhabitants.³⁹ This ratio, while common to fully functional and developed states, fell short of the strength actually needed in Kosovo given UNMIK's mandate and the unsteady security environment.⁴⁰ A 2005 RAND study proposed that an ideal international police force should have at least one and a half officers per 1,000 local inhabitants. Few UN missions have included police contingents that have come close to RAND's recommended ratio, except Kosovo and Timor-Leste, although it's worth noting that the RAND authors assumed that international police would be taking the lead in maintaining law and order.⁴¹

Other factors used to calculate force size have been local crime levels, the abilities of the local police force, and anticipated financial resources for the operation.⁴² The UN Police Division has also used mission-specific estimators. For the UN's return to Timor-Leste, for instance, planners totaled up the country's police stations and calculated that each needed eight UNPOL officers, based on two-person shifts of eight hours each around the clock (and factoring for time off), which suggested an end strength of 1,608 officers.⁴³

To improve UN mission planning and better assess mission impact, efforts are also underway to apply new indicators, through the Rule of Law Indicators Project (ROLIP),⁴⁴ to evaluate a host state's legal system, law enforcement agencies, judicial system, and correctional services, as well as community perceptions of domestic law enforcement.⁴⁵ ROLIP pilot surveys have been conducted for Haiti and Liberia,⁴⁶ and when fully operational, it should facilitate planning and evaluation of reform efforts.

RAPID AND EFFECTIVE DEPLOYMENT

The Brahimi Report called for deployment times of UN military and police personnel to be tailored to the recognition that "the first six to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord is often the most critical period for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of the peacekeepers." Unfortunately, police in UN peace operations have been, and continue to be, plagued by lengthy deployment times and dramatically uneven levels of qualifications among seconded police personnel.

Ability to Deploy Rapidly

What Michael Dzedzic and others have dubbed "the deployment gap" can have major consequences for the success of peace operations.⁴⁷ Security is a precursor to reconstruction, democratization, and economic stimulation and, once lost, is hard to regain. Slow international police deployment also hinders rebuilding local police institutions.

Slow deployments have continued to plague recent peacekeeping missions (see **table 8**), driven in part by surge requirements in Security Council mandates. Between September 2003 and March 2005, for example, the Security Council authorized the deployment of roughly 3,000 individual police and another 1,500 in formed units for new operations in Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti, Burundi, and southern Sudan. In 2007, the Council authorized 6,432 UNPOL for UNAMID in Darfur (3,772 individual officers and 19 FPUs) plus 300 individual officers for MINURCAT, in Chad (primarily to train local police to protect camps for displaced persons and refugees). In response to the devastating January 2010 earthquake in Port au Prince, Haiti, the Security Council quickly authorized 1,500 new UNPOL, supplemented by a further 680 in June, which together nearly doubled the size of MINUSTAH's police component.

At the same time that mandate numbers have been surging, the Police Division has put increasing emphasis on quality over quantity, trading higher nominal vacancy rates in missions for more skilled personnel. Moreover, as demand has grown, the pool of potentially available and qualified individual officers has not kept pace nor, with some exceptions, have member states been willing to create the sorts of national pools of pre-qualified officers called for in the Brahimi Report. The exceptions include the Australian Federal Police International Deployment Group (IDG), established in 2004, and the International Peace Operations Branch (IPOB) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The IDG, now with a staff of 1,200, has played a critical role in regional security and includes an Operational Response Group that is ready to deploy rapidly.⁴⁸ IPOB operates within the framework of the Canadian Police Arrangement, an agreement revised in 2006 among Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canadian International Development Agency, Public Safety Canada, and the RCMP. Specifically designed to support international deployment without negative repercussions for national policing needs, the IPOB manages the selection, training, deployment, and emotional and logistical support to Canadian police international deployments.⁴⁹

One approach to addressing deployment delays has been greater reliance on FPUs, which deploy in complete teams. Initially, deployment rates for FPUs were comparable to those of individual officers: Formed units for Kosovo and Timor-Leste did not fully deploy any faster than the rest of their police comrades, for example. FPU deployment rates have improved considerably since then. FPU expansions in Côte d'Ivoire and the DRC, authorized in June and September 2005, respectively, were completed in three to four months. The dispatch of FPUs to Timor-Leste in mid-2006 was also relatively rapid, with two of UNMIT's four units deployed within 30 days of the Security Council's authorizing resolution, and a third within 60 days. (Some of these units were, however, "rehabbed" from the Australian-led security force that deployed to keep order in Timor-Leste, rather than recruited from home.⁵⁰) UNAMID has faced the most challenges in reaching its authorized levels: deployment rates stood at 80 percent for individual police officers and 67 percent for FPUs as of March 2010, more than two and a half years after UNAMID's initial authorization. Delays in this case related at least as much to obstructive Sudanese government policies as to PCCs' willingness to send people or units into Darfur's difficult operating environment. With more favorable politics and a requirement for urgent disaster response, post-earthquake, Haiti in 2010 suggests maximum realistic deployment rates given the UN's current system of recruitment and current deployment levels. Of the 1500-strong increase authorized for MINUSTAH police in January 2010, just 18 percent (46 individual officers and

218 in FPU) had deployed three months later but nearly two-thirds were in place at six months. Of those newly deployed at that time, three quarters were in FPUs.⁵¹

As **table 8** indicates, average time to fully deploy authorized numbers of individual UNPOL (nine to 12 months) has not changed much from the early 1990s to the present. (Further details on deployments by mission are available in Annex II of this report). The Mission Management Service in the UN Police Division is, however, attempting to deploy and manage several times as many officers as in the mid-1990s as well as some 6,000 heavily-armed officers in FPUs, the unique quality control issues of which became ever more apparent as the new decade unfolded.


Table 8: United Nations Police Deployments, 1991–2010: Percentages of Posts Filled at Quarterly Intervals Post-Mandate

	Individual Police	Police in Formed Units	All Police
1991–94:			
<i>Newly Authorized:</i>	5942	0	5942
3 months	14%	N/A	14%
6 months	72%	N/A	72%
9 months	84%	N/A	84%
12 months	92%	N/A	92%
1995–98:			
<i>Newly Authorized:</i>	2990	0	2990
3 months	58%	N/A	58%
6 months	86%	N/A	86%
9 months	88%	N/A	88%
12 months	91%	N/A	91%
1999–2002:			
<i>Newly Authorized:</i>	5288	1390	6678
3 months	35%	0%	28%
6 months	50%	9%	41%
9 months	79%	17%	66%
12 months	81%	60%	77%
2003–06:			
<i>Newly Authorized:</i>	4595	3580	8175
3 months	21%	56%	36%
6 months	46%	75%	59%
9 months	68%	100%	84%
12 months	73%	97%	85%
2007–10:			
<i>Newly Authorized:</i>	4612	4260	8872
3 months	0%	5%	3%
6 months	34%	18%	26%
9 months	38%	16%	28%
12 months	42%	19%	31%

Note: *Newly Authorized* indicates total numbers of individual police and personnel in FPUs newly-mandated by the Security Council in each time period. Percentages deployed are UN-wide averages weighted by size of mission. Further details on these calculations may be found in Annex II.

Figure 2 shows ramp-up curves for nine individual police authorizations of varying sizes, over 12-month periods starting in 2003–04 and running to 2007–08. Heaviest lines (UNMIT and UNAMID) indicate authorizations over 1,000 officers; light solid lines indicate 500–1,000; and dotted lines indicate fewer than 500. There is no essential relationship between size and time to deploy: UNMIT police deploy relatively quickly; UNAMID police quite slowly. Nor is there much differentiation between year of authorization and time to deploy. MINUSTAH reaches 75 percent deployment in six months, whereas MONUC barely breaks 50 percent after a year of seeking one third as many officers in roughly the same period (2004–05). Missions do appear to cluster at three points at the six month mark, however: three missions (MONUC, UNMIS, and MINURCAT) reach only 15–20 percent deployment; three (UNMIL, UNOCI, UNAMID) achieve 40–50 percent; and three (MINUSTAH, ONUB, UNMIT) reach 70–85 percent. The middle three are roughly average for 21st-century UN deployments of individual police. The upper three meet the interests of major powers for particular missions (the United States, Australia) or a regional organization (the African Union) and involve compact areas of operation. The lower three involve large, unstable areas of operation in a swath of west-central to central Africa where fractious internal politics could be considered to raise risks for peacekeepers, especially unarmed police. These are only inferences but suggest how risk and interest calculus play a role in the deployment of international police peacekeepers.

Figure 2: Deployment Rates for Individual Police in UN Peace Operations, 2003–2008



Personnel Quality and Training

Police officers seconded to UN operations have always varied widely in skill, experience, organizational culture, and philosophies of policing. Although the proportion of UNPOL candidates meeting the Police Division's minimum selection standards has risen from perhaps one in five a few years ago to around one in two more recently, this rejection rate is still unacceptably high, imposing undue burdens on the Police Division and reflecting badly on those states that offer unqualified candidates.⁵²

Efforts to improve the quality of police deployed in UN missions are on-going. In the mid-1990s the concept of Selection Assistance Teams (SATs) was developed in response to serious lapses in professionalism amongst seconded UNPOL. The intent of SATs is to take proficiency testing “upstream” to the sending state, to weed out unsuitable candidates before they are sent (at UN expense) to the mission area, only to be repatriated (again at UN expense).

SATs typically consist of three individuals (a Police Division representative, a UN police officer from the relevant field mission, and one other person with knowledge and experience of regional policing needs) who test UN police candidates’ skills.⁵³ The standards they apply begin with certain basics, such as citizenship in a UN member state, ability to pass a mental and physical screening, and personal integrity. They also look for professional qualifications, such as official status as a sworn police officer with a minimum of five years of policing experience, proficiency in the mission language (usually English or French), ability to operate a 4x4 vehicle and, in missions where police are armed, proficiency in firearms.⁵⁴

Despite the use of SATs, however, UN police components in the late 1990s and early years of this century continued to incorporate underachievers and some criminally-inclined individuals.⁵⁵ Shortcomings need not be sinister to be serious, however: Limited language proficiency can cripple a police operation by forcing reliance on potentially unreliable interpreters who may also be security risks. In Haiti, for instance, little more than a third of UNPOL deployed with MINUSTAH as of mid-2006 spoke French—yet MINUSTAH is frequently engaged in deadly encounters with armed gangs and responsible for mentoring local police in the principles of community policing.⁵⁶

At mid-2010, UN police come from 86 countries, still lack a common training background, and represent widely varying philosophies of policing—all serious challenges to mission coherence. As Robert Perito points out, “One can imagine the initial conversations between a London bobbie, an American highway patrol officer, and a Rwandan gendarme on how to organize their police stations, conduct patrols, or make arrests.”⁵⁷ Staffing leadership positions in the early stages of missions has presented a particular challenge.⁵⁸ Occasionally, police contingents have tried to overcome the multinational cacophony much as military contingents routinely do, by mapping out specific geographic areas of responsibility for national contingents. In Timor-Leste, UNTAET attempted something similar by assigning the Baucau District to a single national police contingent, but with mixed results.⁵⁹

The Brahimi Report identified the challenges posed by the lack of a common training regimen for UN police officers. The Panel recommended the formation of regional training centers to provide common police training that complied with “guidelines, standard operating procedures, and performance standards to be promulgated by the United Nations.”⁶⁰ Yet before 2009, few countries offered any UN-specific, pre-deployment training to police offered for UN service, exceptions being Canada, Norway, and Australia.⁶¹ The UN has introduced a Standardized Training Module (STM) on policing in UN peace operations, which is being shared with various police training centers, and also developed a pre-mission training regime in UNAMID, which is becoming standard for all UN police secondees. Since its introduction, the percentage of police coming into UNAMID with pre-mission training has risen from 10 percent to 70 percent.

Regional training programs for police officers have been slow to materialize. The Vicenza, Italy-based Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) was established in 2005 to train high-level and mid-level officers using a curriculum modeled on common paramilitary police standard operating procedures.⁶² Graduates were expected to return to their countries of origin and prepare formed police units for peacekeeping duties. Few graduates of the program have gone on to serve in UN-led operations, however, and the impact of the program's "train the trainer" approach is otherwise difficult to verify.

Beyond CoESPU, regional training centers such as the Pearson Peacekeeping Center in Canada and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana have begun to offer specific courses for prospective police officers modeled on UN guidelines. These centers are capable of training only a small fraction of the officers that UN operations need annually, however. The limited number of officers currently enrolled in such programs limit the quality and consistency of training that prospective UNPOL receive before induction into specific missions.

Although SATs are designed to screen out incompetence, heretofore they have not been used to "screen in" those skill sets that a mission needs most. Even experienced police can have trouble performing duties that exceed the bounds of their training and home jobs. Police peacekeeping is not a monolithic endeavor; specific aspects of the profession require specific skills. Matching the skills required for a mission with the skills on offer from member states has been a continual challenge.

MEASURING PROGRESS TOWARD MISSION GOALS

The UN has struggled to develop useful indicators for measuring progress towards its short- and long-term mission goals of establishing public security and reforming, rebuilding or restructuring local law enforcement institutions, respectively. Regular progress checks are critical for improving UN police field performance, for guiding strategic planning, and for generating lessons learned and best practices. Where UN missions have had an executive mandate, measuring the short-term task of ensuring public security has been undercut by lack of detailed crime statistics and the chaotic environment that often faces a thinly stretched UN police force arriving (slowly) in a foreign, post-conflict environment. Where the mandate is to "assist" the host government in its law enforcement functions, it can be difficult to single out the impact of such assistance, except in situations where UN forces are used en masse to achieve public security goals, as in Haiti (2006–07) or, less successfully, in the DRC (2007 onward), where UN field support activities on behalf of government forces became entangled with those forces' disregard for public safety, absorption of ex-militiamen without vetting or training, and penchant for looting.⁶³

Efforts to measure the success of the UN's long-term police reform activities (and broader rule of law elements) have traditionally been ad hoc and inconsistent. The challenges related to this task are numerous. Police peacekeeping is a complex phenomenon that includes tasks as disparate as deterring violence, investigating crime, establishing community ties, and mentoring local counterparts. Even in stable and well-functioning states, measuring the successes and shortcomings of police forces has been a contested question among policing experts.⁶⁴ In North America and Western Europe, many of the most widely praised police performance assessment systems, such as the Compstat (Computerized Statistics) program utilized in New York City, rely primarily on the tracking of crime statistics.⁶⁵ In post-conflict environments, however, replicating

such an assessment model is difficult due to a lack of reliable crime data and to the advanced technology required. Measuring the progress of police reform also requires metrics for tracking factors other than crime rates, such as community relations, corruption, accountability, and respect for human rights.

In Timor-Leste, the UN relied on performance reports to benchmark the number of local officers trained and the number of hours of training. While useful, such metrics fail to measure the effectiveness of reform in actually producing positive outcomes such as reduced crime and increased public confidence in the police force. Other assessment techniques employed by UN police have included spot checks on police departments to ensure compliance with various reporting techniques and bookkeeping requirements (Sierra Leone) as well as public opinion polls (Kosovo).⁶⁶ The lack of standardized mechanisms for assessing police reform efforts has limited the UN's ability to be flexible in adjusting policy in the field and hindered efforts to develop best practices that can be used to inform the planning and implementation of future missions.

Recognition of these challenges has led to a series of innovative initiatives in New York and in missions, yet truly addressing the remaining gaps will require significant structural reforms in the way the world body recruits and maintains highly-skilled police and other rule of law experts for these missions.

Notes to Section 4

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ANTICIPATING UN PEACE OPERATIONS’ NEED FOR POLICE PEACEKEEPERS

The first step in crafting a more effective UN police peacekeeping capacity is to identify the needs that future UN operations are likely to encounter. Such an exercise is challenging on several fronts. First, as noted earlier, there is no universally agreed upon basis or formula for generating force estimates for police peacekeeping. The diversity of post-conflict settings makes any generic formulation—police-to-population ratios or international-to-local police ratios—less useful than some measure of local police and judicial functionality, crime rates, arms availability, and other local factors.

Mission assessment teams can attempt to measure these factors in the field—security conditions permitting—before a new operation receives its formal mandate. As noted earlier, the UN-supported ROLIP is being piloted to measure local law enforcement needs and capabilities. Initial results will reflect what a two-week technical assessment mission can produce, depending on local records and interlocutors, as well as what the team’s experts can observe and analyze directly. A composite of that research and subsequent mission experience, across many missions, can help inform the design of any standing police/rule of law capacity as well as the training modules for police and other rule of law mission personnel.

Short of gathering such knowledge in advance for all possible areas of UN police peacekeeping, other sources offer insights for planning an UNPOL contingent. UN mandates (influenced in part by on-ground mission assessments) and the periodic reports to member states published by operations once deployed are the next best sources of trends. The mandate trends and reporting can be used to project mission type (traditional, transformational, or executive), force size and force mix (individual officers or FPU’s), skill set mix, and sense of deployment urgency for each skill set. We analyze recent mandates and mission reports in this chapter to estimate future needs of UN peace operations and to inform the later discussion of standing and reserve forces.


ANTICIPATING MISSION TYPES

Since the mid-1990s, transformational operations have become the dominant type of UNPOL mandate (see **figure 3**). It is likely that UN police will continue to be called upon by the Security Council to both monitor the performance of *and* lead efforts to reform, restructure, and rebuild local police. The main question is whether interim law enforcement operations will become more common.

Given the difficulty, costs, and sensitive nature of interim law enforcement mandates, the UN Secretariat would prefer to avoid them. There are a number of reasons for this reluctance: the requirements for effective law enforcement often outstrip the UN’s ready capacity, local police

can become dependent on the organization, and blame may fall on the UN when crime continues or escalates during the mission. United Nations police planners therefore face the same “unpleasant dilemma” described in the Brahimi Report in reference to transitional administrations as a whole. The UN, the report argued, can choose “to assume that transitional administration is a transitory responsibility, not prepare for additional missions and do badly if it is once again flung into the breach, or prepare well and be asked to undertake them more often because it is well prepared.”¹ Despite the challenges posed by interim law enforcement missions, recent history has shown that the Security Council will mandate the UN to assume at least some responsibility for law enforcement within the context of transformational missions.


Figure 3: Frequency of Types of UN Police Mandates 1989–2010



Peacekeeping missions undertaken since 2003 have required that the UN “support” domestic police forces while simultaneously working to restructure, reform, and rebuild them. This can involve UN police in active policing jobs (at the government’s invitation) in niche areas beyond the reach of nascent local forces. Roles have included dealing with civil disturbances, securing borders, conducting investigations (particularly those requiring forensic analysis), and tackling organized crime and smuggling. It is therefore necessary to assume that the ability to enforce the law will be a selective but essential task in future UN peace operations. Having more specialty policing skills available would significantly enhance the operational capacity of UN police contingents.

PROJECTING NUMBERS REQUIRED, OTHER THAN FORMED UNITS

A key question, then, is how many new police the UN can expect to need in a given year. **Figure 4** depicts new UN police authorizations annually since 1989. The chart includes authorizations in 2010 for Haiti. It does not include officers required to meet already-established deployment needs or for rotation and replacement of those already-deployed personnel.

Figure 4: Annual New UN Police Authorizations, 1989–2010

In the absence of better prognostic data, it is reasonable to expect that future demand will mimic the past, and thus reasonable to use average demand as a planning factor. (An average is a statistical “expected value.”) The average demand for new individual UN police officers since 1989 has been roughly 1,400 annually. Since 2003, it has been about 2,000 annually. The chart shows that the United Nations has faced major surges in police demand since 1989. In surge years, the Security Council has authorized deployments of individual UNPOL—between 4,000 and 5,000—that are four to five times higher than average requirements for new police peacekeepers in non-peak years. The between-peaks average for individual officers has been lower in this century owing to the UN’s greater use of FPUs. The 20-year off-peak average for individual officers—roughly 750 new posts authorized per year—can be considered the expected future recruiting requirement for planning purposes, unless the circumstances of international police peacekeeping change radically, through sharp changes in either the size of UN policing operations or in the degree of reliance on FPUs in those operations.

Recent UN peacekeeping missions have also employed about 125 international personnel per year (UN professional staff and UN volunteers) in support of legal, judicial, corrections, and related security sector reform mandates. Some operations, such as MONUC/MONUSCO, have also begun to recruit government-seconded non-police personnel (for example, corrections officers). Given the parlous state of detention and prison facilities in most of the places that UN peace operations deploy, and their implications for justice and compliance with international human rights norms, the corrections and criminal justice components of UN operations are likely to grow in size and importance over time.

ESTIMATING NEEDED SKILL-SETS

Experience from past operations makes clear that matching skill-sets to the needs of a mission is crucial to its success. A traffic officer is not a homicide investigator. A patrol officer may not be competent to establish police academy curricula or to train novice officers. Large UN police contingents also must be managed, develop operating procedures, and enforce discipline. It is essential, therefore, that attempts to identify UN police peacekeeping needs take into account the diversity of tasks that UN police undertake and the diversity of environments into which they may deploy.

A survey of UN operations over the past two decades yields a long list of tasks for UNPOL officers. Many of these tasks require special skills and preparation. Being able to identify the specific skill-sets needed and to recruit and deploy the officers who possess them is critical to future UN success in filling out police components and carrying out their mandates.

For non-police components in the rule of law/criminal justice fields, the differential professional skill-sets needed are relatively clear. A judge or magistrate, a prosecutor, a court clerk, a defense lawyer, a corrections officer, and a ministry administrator have clearly different professions and backgrounds. Differentiating amongst policing specialties is more difficult for the average policy maker, however, and so we emphasize that differentiation here.

Table 9 presents a breakdown of police-related tasks in UN peace operations that we estimate to be the most important to deploy in the first 90 days of a new operation, based on interviews and reviews of mission reporting. The tasks are listed by relative frequency (how often missions have included the task). There may be other skills that may be needed infrequently but that are critically important when needed, such as those required for interim law enforcement (firearms proficiency and detention center management, for example).

This skills-based assessment of UN police peacekeeping needs, built from past operations and current trends, suggests that, if present trends continue, future UN missions are likely to require a broad range of specialties and skills, from forensic investigators to classroom instructors. UNMIK was the first UN mission to begin to distinguish between types of police needed for various aspects of the mission, calling upon member states to provide “regular” patrol officers, specialized police units for riot control, and border police.² Efforts to enhance UN police capacity should ensure that the UN has access to police officers with these skill-sets. Note that for many tasks involving close or frequent interaction with the host-state public, local-language capability or reliable local-language to mission-language interpretation may be critically important and in short supply.

Table 9: UN Policing and Other Rule of Law Tasks, First 90 Days of Mission

Tasks	Skills	Frequency*
Advise national (or other non-UN) police	Police advisors (senior and mid-ranking), interpreters	12
Mission planning support	Mission/operations planners	12
Monitor/assess host-state police conduct and performance	Police advisors, evaluation specialists, human rights monitors, interpreters	12
Mentor local police forces	Training specialists, police information & administration specialists, senior patrol officers, interpreters	11
Crowd/riot control	Formed units, interpreters	8
Joint patrols (with local police)	Patrol officers, police advisors, interpreters	8
Recruitment assistance (including screening and certification)	Police human resources specialists, lawyers, human rights monitors, interpreters	8
Community policing	Patrol officers, negotiators, interpreters	7
Support or conduct criminal investigations	Investigators, forensic specialists, interpreters	7
Border/customs control	Border/customs police, interpreters	6
Conduct independent patrols	Patrol officers, formed units, interpreters	6
Humanitarian/UN personnel security	Close protection officers, formed units	6
Investigate host-state police and government abuses and corruption	Human rights investigators, police internal affairs specialists, organized crime analysts, interpreters	6
Needs/capacity assessment	Police information analysts, evaluation specialists, anthropologists	6
Women's & children's rights, domestic violence unit development	Human rights monitors, child protection and women's rights specialists, interpreters	6
IDP security/repatriation (minority protection)	Formed units, patrol officers, interpreters	5
Register local police	Police administration specialists, interpreters	5
Detention	Corrections officers, interpreters	4
Joint patrols with international military	Patrol officers, formed units	4
Law enforcement with powers of arrest	Patrol officers, formed units, interpreters	4
Airport/Seaport security	Patrol officers, airport security specialists, border/customs police, interpreters	3
Anti-gang operations	Formed units, organized crime information analysts	2
Anti-trafficking operations	Border/customs police, formed units	2
Media monitoring, communications, public relations	Police public information specialists, interpreters	2
Assist Illegal checkpoint removal	Patrol officers, formed units, interpreters	1
Organized crime prevention/disruption	Criminal information analysts, o/c investigation units, formed units	1
Secure cantonment sites	Formed units	1

* Frequency refers how often this task has been included in mission mandates since 1999. Missions include UNMIL, UNOCI, MONUC, MINUSTAH, UNMIS, UNMIT, UNTAET, UNMIK, ONUB, UNMIS, UNAMID, and MINURCAT.

NOTE: This chart was compiled through an analysis of every Secretary-General report and Security Council Resolution related to these 12 missions since 1999. Only tasks reported in these official UN sources have been recorded.

Based on this data, we conclude that improvements in the deployability and initial effectiveness of UN police and related rule of law personnel should be based upon assumptions that:

- Establishing effective and accountable local police is likely to be the primary objective of most UN police peacekeeping, followed closely by reforms in the rest of the local criminal justice system.
- As part of such transformational efforts, UN police will be called upon to provide *active support* to the maintenance of law and order, particularly in niches beyond the capacity of nascent domestic police (for example, in border security, customs, and fighting organized crime).
- Peace operations where the UN takes on full responsibility for law enforcement will be rare but, if deployed, will be sent where no legitimate law enforcement capacity exists (e.g., secessionist conflicts and/or total state failure).
- Demand for qualified individual police will remain at least 800 new officers annually (in addition to rotation/replacement needs for ongoing deployments; these may decline as older operations draw down); peak demand may periodically approach 5,000 officers.
- Demand for police in formed units has been growing dramatically, averaging nine units (about 1,200 officers) per year most recently; if greater numbers of qualified individual officers are made available to the UN, then demand for FPUs may level off.
- Finally, although future police peacekeeping will call for a wide range of specific skills, these will be roughly predictable skill sets.

Demand for highly-trained UN police with diverse expertise shows no signs of abating in the foreseeable future. While existing initiatives such as the SPC and the Rule of Law Indicators Project aim to improve the UN's performance, they are not enough. At present, there are no credible, comprehensive proposals for addressing the underlying structural deficiencies that the UN faces in attempting to implement the police and rule of law elements of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates. What is needed are reform efforts that would dramatically improve the UN's ability to recruit and deploy top-notch officers, pre-screened and pre-trained, into the field in the critical first weeks of a new mission. The following section lays out a series of proposals intended to do promote such reforms.

Notes to Section 5

¹ A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 78.

² Hansen, *From Congo to Kosovo*, 55.

IMPROVING UN CAPACITY TO DEPLOY POLICE AND OTHER RULE OF LAW PERSONNEL RAPIDLY AND EFFECTIVELY

I have no doubt that the world should eventually have an integrated police force which will be accepted as an integral and essential part of life in the same way as national police forces are accepted. Meanwhile, we must ensure that developments are in the right direction and we can also meet critical situations as and when they occur.

– U Thant, UN Secretary-General, 13 June 1963

Historical shortcomings in UN capacity to quickly deploy well-trained, well-coordinated, and capable individual police continue to appear when new missions are authorized, despite incremental changes in policies and procedures intended to nudge the system along. Although the UN Police Division has been working to improve the quality of candidates put forward and accepted for mission service, the demand for officers has escalated faster than good ones can be recruited. Even if overall demand for UNPOL were to diminish by half, however, there would still be demand for several thousand skilled and professional personnel every year.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE NEED FOR DEEPER CHANGE

The complementary approaches laid out below address the need for substantive reforms. These measures shift early responsibility for new mission deployments from the traditional state-seconded model to one in which UN DPKO has direct access to many of the individual officers needed to launch new police peacekeeping efforts. Transforming a criminal justice system—from judiciary, to prisons, to police—is a daunting task, requiring unique skills, cultural sensitivity, political savvy, high-quality leadership, and the ability to constantly assess progress and adjust strategies. The current, ad hoc system of piecing together a UN mission’s rule of law components over the course of many months is poorly suited to creating such transformations. The United Nations itself has recognized this fundamental problem.

We propose instead a combination of standing and reserve capacity. It would be a known quantity to UN mission planners and can be trained and mobilized rapidly for pre-agreed terms of service. The proposal outlined here has three components—a standing UN Rule of Law Capacity, a UN Police Reserve, and a Police, Justice, and Corrections Senior Leadership Reserve. These tools are designed to give both member states and experienced individuals an incentive to participate in UN operations and to give the UN more reliable sources of qualified personnel for those operations.

While UN operations clearly need a quicker and better-trained response to have an immediate, positive impact on fragile peace processes, such capacity may also shorten mission duration,

lower overall costs, and lay better groundwork for longer-term peacebuilding objectives. Such capabilities would also strengthen the UN's ability to support criminal justice capacity outside the framework of peacekeeping missions as well.

These proposals are consistent with UN priorities articulated in the 2009 New Horizon non-paper: all match the articulated need for a capability-driven approach, matching resources and needs, and attracting and retaining the correct personnel for timely deployment.¹ Success in implementing New Horizon's goals depends upon matching the current UN emphasis on a capability-driven approach with a realistic expectation of what those capabilities should be tasked to accomplish. Proactive engagement from the highest levels of the Organization will be needed to push for Member State support, and that support must be leveraged into operational standards, reserve rosters, and standing capacities to achieve the New Horizon recommendations.

1. Building a Standing, Deployable UN Capacity to Support Rule of Law

We propose creation of a standing UN Rule of Law Capacity (ROLCAP) of 400 individuals, to institutionalize the knowledge, training, and mind-set necessary for transformational missions. ROLCAP would be sufficiently large to provide leadership cadres for every element of police peacekeeping and security sector reform in the first year of new, integrated missions with these mandated elements. Recruited and trained by the United Nations, ROLCAP could help establish up to four missions per year, matching most recent peak demand. This standing capacity could improve the organization's ability not only to plan and manage new transformational or transitional administration operations, but also to launch their police and related rule of law components quickly and conduct them for the first year (in conjunction with an effective reserve).

The benefits of a standing capacity include: specialized training and vetting; familiarity with UN goals and procedures; eventual experience with multiple missions; rapid deployment of police mission leadership even under pressure of two-plus simultaneous deployments; greater initial coherence of mission rule of law components; and greater institutional memory and expertise for mission startup and initial execution. The main tasks would be planning for and providing initial management of new operations' rule of law components; contributing to the vetting and training of reserve personnel; and doing the induction training of these personnel as they deploy.

While creating ROLCAP would entail up-front costs, its ability to help launch new missions and affiliated security sector reform would make it *cost-effective* over the long term. Rapid deployment capability would enable the UN to use the political windows of opportunity that open after a peace agreement is signed but slide shut again as local actors see few benefits from keeping an agreement and no penalties for violating it.

ROLCAP personnel would themselves need to be held accountable for their actions. Past abuses and disciplinary infractions by UNPOL and other UN mission members have proven hard to punish owing to legal and political constraints—and vacuums. Creation of new UN standing and reserve forces would make the need for better accountability even more urgent.

2. Building an Effective, Incentive-based UN Police Reserve

To complement and supplement the standing service, we propose creation of a UN Police Reserve. This Reserve would be a standby arrangement that supplies the bulk of skilled personnel needed to staff the rule of law components of peacekeeping operations.

Under the current system for recruiting individual UNPOL, states have only moral incentives to contribute officers to UN operations; they continue to pay the salaries of their officers deployed, but receive no UN reimbursement. Individuals have financial incentive to volunteer because they receive UN MSA directly.

More than three decades ago, the United Nations opted to establish a regime of fixed per capita reimbursements for personnel in military units contributed to UN peacekeeping. That system continues to function in modified form to this day and has been extended to cover FPUs.

The impact of this incentive structure can be seen in comparative rates of police deployment to UN operations. While individual police continue to be slow to arrive, FPU deployments are increasingly brisk. There is no proven link between their respective compensation mechanisms and their availability to missions, but clearly there is a correlation. We therefore propose a compensation mechanism for individual police that would give states greater incentive to offer quality personnel to UN operations in a timely fashion.

The effectiveness of such a reserve system would depend on its having a roster of named individuals. This will enable the United Nations to offer training at regular intervals when reservists are not on deployment, as well as to identify those who are to receive special mission-related training as new missions loom. There were no real incentives for states to participate in the last (failed) effort to create an on-call police roster. More tangible incentives could help overcome such resistance or indifference.

3. Building a Police, Justice and Corrections Senior Leadership Reserve

This separate reserve of individually-contracted, senior personnel would serve two main functions. First, it would advise and assist in restructuring host-state criminal justice systems; second, it would provide replacement leadership for mission rule of law elements at the end of a mission's first year, as ROLCAP personnel rotate home; and third, it would be a source of senior, specialized expertise for new operations when needed. The goal is to give the UN a direct line to an array of senior personnel in a structured and predictable fashion. The envisioned reserve could include former (likely retired) police officers, criminal court judges, prosecutors, criminal defense lawyers, corrections officers, and corrections system managers. Its members would contract directly with the United Nations, initially to affirm their availability to serve, then as active duty mission personnel on a 12-month rotation.

Since retired personnel are no longer employed by their local or national governments, a distinct system from the UN Police Reserve described above would be required to identify, recruit, and deploy senior rule of law expertise. A reserve of this type would be particularly useful for meeting needs for senior (D1 and D2) police, judicial, and corrections advisors and operational mentors and would allow the UN to identify qualified personnel to be called upon when required.

When members of this reserve become active, they would serve as international civilian staff, at UN salary scales. The only added cost of this reserve would be any annual retainers that may be paid to reserve members in exchange for their commitment to deploy on agreed notice, and the cost of periodic refresher training.

DEEPER CHANGE: THE DETAILS

Given the dominant numbers of police in the rule of law components of UN peace operations, our proposals are sized and shaped to focus on police and police work, especially in the large reserve component. Both the standing and senior reserve elements are, however, intended to include a substantial proportion of non-police criminal justice and institution-building expertise.

The proposals that we put forward here are designed to address past challenges in implementing change, to overcome well-known shortfalls, and to offer realistic means of moving more swiftly to increase UN effectiveness in this area. The discussion that follows delves into the details of how these three ideas might be operationally structured, sized, and funded.

Structuring and Costing ROLCAP²

A permanent, standing UN ROLCAP would conduct advanced mission planning and strategic needs assessments for all aspects of mandated rule of law support to a host state. ROLCAP would contribute personnel to the Technical Assessment Mission that is dispatched to inform the S-G's initial report to the Security Council that in turn informs mandate formulation. Prior to deployment, ROLCAP would also participate in the DPKO/DFS Integrated Mission Planning Process to develop a mission concept and concepts of operations for police and rule of law mission components. It would be responsible for the timely dispatch of core leadership for police and other rule of law elements within 7–14 days of mandate approval, and headquarters elements of all rule-of-law-related components within 14–21 days. In addition to facilitating mission setup, these teams would begin building relationships with key host-state actors (i.e. ministries of interior and justice, judicial leadership, police leadership, and key civil society actors), to help flesh out the mission's understanding of its operating environment and the condition and capacity of police, courts, and detention/prison facilities. The ROLCAP team would set up coordination mechanisms with other components of the operation (particularly in areas of DDR and human rights) as they arrive in the mission area and would use early-arriving reserve police personnel—in collaboration with any FPU and the military contingent—to institute high-visibility patrols to renew the host public's sense of security, mandate permitting. Once its own support structures are operational, it would help set up the process for reforming, restructuring, and rebuilding local police forces, courts, and corrections in coordination with other mission components (such as political and civil affairs), the UN Country Team, and other potential donors and partners. To ensure continuity in new missions, the ROLCAP deployment team should have a 12-month tour of duty.

ROLCAP should reflect present and anticipated demand for rule of law and police specialties. Thus, we propose that ROLCAP be built around mixed-capacity rapid deployment teams composed of two-thirds police specialties and one-third other rule of law specialties. This is roughly the current ratio found in many headquarters structures of integrated missions. The police tend to have the most urgent public order tasks and constitute a far larger field contingent than

non-police rule of law elements of most missions. Examples of this proportioning include UN police headquarters in Liberia (with about 50 key posts) and Sierra Leone (about 30 such posts).³ Non-police rule of law headquarters elements for six current missions range from eight to 34 posts, depending on mandate, so 20 is a conservative average estimate for key non-police rule of law staff.⁴ Given these numbers, the average ROLCAP deployment team should probably comprise about 50 persons: 30 to 35 police/civilian police support personnel and 15 to 20 non-police rule of law personnel.

ROLCAP also needs to be large enough to meet maximum anticipated demand for new missions. It should therefore have the ability to establish up to four missions in any given 12-month period, which is about the peak demand level of 2003–2004, when new missions were established in Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi, and Haiti. It should have sufficient additional capacity to vet and train new recruits to the reserve system; to offer refresher training to reservists and mission personnel; to train its own people when they are not on field rotations; to create and absorb collective lessons learned and modify best practices; to plan for the next mission; and to allow for time off.

Sidebar 7:

ALTERING STATES’ INCENTIVES TO CONTRIBUTE FORMED POLICE UNITS

Over the last several years, FPUs have required significantly less time to deploy than individual police and about the same amount of time as military peacekeepers. This is likely a reflection of the similar financial incentives member states face when contributing FPUs and troops. As noted in Sidebar 6, however, in the absence of strict quality controls those same incentives led to serious deficiencies among deployed FPUs. It remains to be seen whether quality controls instituted in 2009 will hold in future cases of urgent demand for FPUs.

To reduce the severity of quality/availability trade offs, the UN could offer to subsidize standardized training of FPU leadership cadres at regional training centers and work with donors to promote greater interoperability among FPUs. Fully equipping an FPU is estimated to cost about US \$6 million, but currently there is no international mechanism to help defray such costs for countries with the will but not the funds to equip one or more FPUs. To increase the global supply of FPUs, developed countries should consider such funding in their bilateral assistance programs and arrange in negotiation with recipients that the resulting FPUs meet UN weapons and equipment guidance for the deployment of FPUs (forthcoming as of this writing). The United States, for example, spent \$634 million on international police assistance in 2004, a sum that could have trained and equipped about 50 FPUs. Donor costs for equipping an FPU could even be offset over time by allowing the UN to provide reimbursements for “contingent owned equipment” (roughly \$750,000 per year of operation for one FPU) directly to the donor instead of the country providing the unit, until the equipment in question had depreciated to an agreed extent, with remaining COE payments to the FPU provider earmarked for new FPU equipment.

In exchange, states receiving such support could commit to make trained FPUs rapidly available to future missions—less than a reserve system but more than a shot in the dark. ROLCAP personnel could monitor training and periodic testing of these FPUs and ensure that those trained are those that deploy to UN operations.

Sources: Michael Dzedzic and Col. Christine Stark, “Bridging the Public Security Gap: The Role of the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) in Contemporary Peace Operations,” USIPeace Briefing, US Institute of Peace, June 2006. David H. Bayley, *Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

ROLCAP also could be utilized to help fulfill DPKO’s new global responsibility to “make its HQ [headquarters] expertise available to support law enforcement and police related assistance being provided in countries that do not have UN missions.”⁵ The directive allows DPKO to meet requests by member states for technical assistance in implementing police reform efforts, for instance, if an appropriate funding mechanism were to be developed for it.⁶

An important component in sizing ROLCAP is appreciating the right tempo of deployment for its personnel. This proposal is structured for a deployment tempo—the percentage of time that people actually spend in field positions or otherwise working away from home for extended periods—of 50 percent over a two-year duty cycle (effectively one year deployed and one year not). Although ROLCAP will not be deployed to fight wars, part of its job will be to lay the groundwork for re-establishing post-conflict public security and/or public order in tough environments, a difficult and potentially dangerous task creating stresses from which no one is immune. We think, therefore, that a 50 percent deployment rate for this standing service would be a maximum sustainable rate. (The initial UN SPC was planned to be deployed as much as two-thirds of the time, on shorter cycles: four months on, two months off.⁷ This tempo would be considered an unsustainably high deployment rate for comparable military forces, regardless of whether they were facing peacekeeping duty or combat.⁸)

We calculated deployment tempo conservatively, counting only days in which team members would actually be on the ground in missions or on temporary duty vetting and/or training members of the UN police reserve or members of ongoing missions. We do not count annual leave or rest and recuperation leave to which they likely would be entitled under UN rules for field personnel (see **table 10**).

The size and composition of ROLCAP deployment teams would be key to its effectiveness. To enable it to set up as many as four missions in the same calendar year, ROLCAP would need a structure of eight teams of about 50 persons each, for a total of 400 deployable personnel. A normal configuration of two-thirds police would scale up to a total standing police capacity of roughly 275, with 125 other rule of law personnel. Each team should be fully deployable but flexible enough to allow partial deployments based on specific mission needs or for short-term assignments at regional training centers or to advise ongoing missions, for example.

Deployable personnel should be supported by a small, non-deploying headquarters staff of about a dozen, who would recruit personnel for the standing capacity, arrange for training, and manage team deployments. Logically, this headquarters ROLCAP Support Unit should be situated organizationally within the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) in UN DPKO, and be based in New York. Non-deployed ROLCAP personnel at its home/staging base would rotate through counterpart administrative positions there.

The head of ROLCAP should report to the Assistant Secretary-General for OROLSI but collaborate closely with the UN Police Advisor and the Police Division in DPKO. The ROLCAP administrative unit in New York should work closely, for example, with the Police Division Strategic Policy and Development Section and Mission Management Service, and the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service in OROLSI.

ROLCAP personnel would be individually recruited and trained by the United Nations. Persons who apply for police-related posts should have at least five years of policing experience; others should have demonstrated career experience in their respective fields. All should be proficient in one or more mission languages (to date, English, French, and Spanish).⁹ The standing capacity should offer a clear career path to encourage members to stay in the service, so that they and it accumulate experience and knowledge.

Table 10: Deployment Tempo of ROLCAP over a Two-year Cycle

Total Days in Two-Year Cycle:		730		
Activity	Duration (days)	Frequency, over two years	Total Days per activity in each two-year cycle	% of time spent in each activity
De facto field mission presence over a 12-month deployment	258	1	258	35%
Conducting overseas training/vetting	12	9	108	15%
Team training/exercises	5	4	20	3%
After mission reporting	20	1	20	3%
Individual learning/training	5	7	35	5%
Next-mission assessment & planning	45	1	45	6%
R&R leave while on deployment*	14	5.6	79	11%
R&R accumulated on training/vetting	14	1.8	25	3%
Annual leave, non-deployed	28	2	56	8%
Weekends, non-deployed, non-leave	2	34.8	70	10%
Sick leave, used	5	2	10	1%
Summary				
Total time deployed in field, not counting R&R (aka “Deployment Tempo”)**			366	50%
Total time in training			55	8%
Total time planning and assessing missions			65	9%
Total leave, R&R, sick, and “weekend” time			239	33%

* Deployed UN personnel are entitled to 14 days rest and recuperation leave (R&R) for every two months deployed; table assumes a seven-day work week when not on R&R.

** Includes time deployed to the field, both in year-long missions as well as conducting short-term overseas training and vetting missions

Note: Percentages do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

ROLCAP teams would serve 12-month mission-startup tours. Individual end-of-mission reports should be required upon rotation out of the field and each returning team should distill its experience, jointly, in after-action debriefing sessions for which the individual reports would be feedstock. Frank participation should be encouraged and valid criticisms, wherever directed, should incur no penalty. Team reports should be distilled into institutional memory and used to modify DPKO policy and standard operating procedures for mission startup.

Given the challenges imposed by long-distance deployments in volatile environments, adequate time between deployments must be ensured and the housing, educational, and employment needs of members’ families must be taken into consideration. Hence table 10 takes into account not only active time but down time. The latter numbers represent two years’ worth of weekends (some taken as rest and recuperation leave while on mission status), annual leave, and a modest average amount of sick leave taken. Considering the disease burdens in areas into which most UN integrated missions deploy, sick leave taken could easily be greater in practice.

The mission’s rule of law needs for year two and beyond—and special needs for periods of particularly intense startup activity—should be met from the proposed Senior Ready Reserve (below). There should be several weeks deployment overlap for more effective handover of

responsibilities from year one to follow-on personnel. In years with fewer mission startups, ROLCAP teams could be replaced after 12 months from within the standing capacity itself, to maintain a 50 percent deployment tempo for all. Other needed replacement staff for missions' police component headquarters elements could be drawn from the UN Police Reserve. Year two-plus replacement personnel for non-police, rule of law components could be recruited in the normal manner for international civilian staff.

The costs of sustaining ROLCAP as an institution, and the costs of non-deployed personnel, should be treated similarly to other system-wide mission support costs that are presently apportioned (pro-rated) across all missions as a common peace operations asset. At present, these include the Peacekeeping Support Account, which funds most of UN peacekeeping's New York headquarters costs, and the operating costs of the UN Logistics Base at Brindisi.¹⁰ With half of deployable personnel not assigned to missions and a dozen staff who manage the institution but do not deploy, we estimate the apportioned cost of ROLCAP's first year (allowing for such things as facilities purchase and refurbishment) to be about \$45 million 2006 US dollars and about \$33 million 2006 dollars per year thereafter (**table 11**).

Because ROLCAP members assigned to missions would both add to and offset current mission personnel costs, it would not be correct simply to define their cost as a summation of salaries, benefits, and Mission Subsistence Allowances. Some individuals would fill posts already budgeted but they would arrive earlier than under the current mission recruitment system, pushing the mission "vacancy rate" in their areas of specialization toward zero. Their marginal (additional) cost to the mission would be that extra 90–180 days that they are available to the mission as compared to prevailing recruitment/deployment timelines. Their marginal cost *beyond* 90–180 days would be nil, because the posts that they would fill quickly might well be filled by then under the current recruitment system.

Some ROLCAP personnel, however, would represent entirely new costs to the mission, particularly those in the police component, where at present only a handful of leadership and other key personnel occupy UN-salaried posts. Although the marginal costs of ROLCAP for the police component would be considerable, so would their marginal benefits to the mission. As early-arriving, knowledgeable personnel, they would be able not only to set up a new police component quickly but also to manage the influx of the main body of police—which, if the proposed police reserve is implemented, would be large and fast.

Table 11: Estimating Annual Apportioned Cost for a 400-Strong Standing UN Rule of Law Capacity, as of 2010

	Year One/Start-Up	Annual/Recurring
Total Apportioned ROLCAP Personnel Costs*	\$30,880,000	\$30,880,000
Basing Costs	\$16,440,000	\$3,050,000
Training Costs	\$1,540,000	\$1,540,000
Total Cost Estimate	\$48,860,000	\$35,471,000

* Based on 2010 UN salary and benefits. Rounded to nearest \$10,000. Apportioned personnel costs assume a mission deployment tempo of 50 percent and recurring costs of non-deployed personnel are reflected above. Costs of personnel assigned to missions would be figured into mission budgets (see table A3.6). Details on the derivation of these cost estimates may be found in Annex III, Tables A3.1–A3.3.

ROLCAP personnel would be equipped by the missions in the same manner as all other individual police and civilian personnel. Since ROLCAP and reserve personnel would deploy faster, the mission would have to more quickly spend on equipment. Also, equipment demands on the Brindisi logistics base may be proportionately greater each time a new mission is launched.

The price of a 400-person standing capacity would not be high by comparison to other costs of police peacekeeping and police assistance. For example, the United States alone spent roughly ten times as much (\$634 million) on international police assistance in 2004.¹¹ If, moreover, ROLCAP had been available when the United Nations was given responsibility for peacekeeping in Liberia, one ROLCAP team plus mobilized police reservists might have met all of the mission's police needs competently within a month or so of mission startup. Instead, the actual mission had less than ten percent of its authorized police on hand in the critical first 90 days, and those officers did not arrive fully trained on UN procedures or fully briefed on the mission. Less than half of the authorized number of police had arrived even six months after mission start-up (see **table 12**). Deploying a ROLCAP team and a full complement of police reservists within a month of mission launch would have added about 8.3 percent to UNMIL's initial, nine-month budget. Continuing to draw from the police reserve would have cost the mature mission about 3.4 percent more per year than it actually spent.¹²

In exchange for the added expenditure in its first year, UNMIL would have had much greater police capacity and greater initial credibility with the people of Liberia at a difficult time in the country's transition from chaos, when there were no police in the capital city (or elsewhere). In particular, the availability of a full complement of experienced individual police, backed up by FPUs, might have helped prevent the disorder that accompanied the first phase of UNMIL's disarmament and demobilization program in December 2003.¹³

Structuring and Costing a UN Police Reserve (UNPR)

We envision the proposed UN Police Reserve system as the standard mechanism for recruiting individual UN police officers in quantity. It should therefore be rather substantial in size, able to handle both the requirements of new missions and the rotational and replacement needs of already-established missions.

The average marginal demand for individual UN police over the past 17 years—that is, the change from year to year—has been nearly 2,000 officers. Ongoing missions also must be restaffed at least annually since deployed officers' tours end every six to twelve months and if the mission continues, they must be replaced. As of mid-2010, there were about 13,500 UN police of all types deployed with UN peace operations, about 6,800 not in formed units. The proposed reserve system would need to be able to sustain that presence. The number of officers on reserve at any one time could be adjusted in accordance with average trends in demand (perhaps a three-year moving average) and corresponding limited-term commitments of three years, staggered so that a third of the reserve comes up for renewal or termination in any given year. Since the UN may be mandated to assume interim law enforcement authority, or be given an assistance mandate where its police force would need to bear sidearms, a substantial percentage of the reserve personnel (say, about 25 percent) should be experienced in armed law enforcement work.

Table 12: Estimating Costs to UN Mission in Liberia of Using ROLCAP and UNPR, at Start-up and in Budget Year 2005–06

UNMIL's Actual Costs for Professional Posts and Individual Police Officers	
UNMIL's Costs for Police/Rule of Law Budgeted Posts (Actual)	
Personnel Costs (Salaries and Benefits)	\$1,175,850
Travel (estimated)	\$36,000
Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA)	\$20,424
Operations Costs (estimated)	\$259,061
Total Police/Rule of Law Professional Posts - Actual Costs	\$1,232,274
UNMIL's Costs for Individual Police (Actual)	
Travel (estimated)	\$853,500
Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA)	\$10,373,910
Operations Costs (estimated)	\$4,283,498
Total Individual Police Officers - Actual Costs	\$15,510,908
UNMIL's Hypothetical Costs if Start-Up Covered by ROLCAP and Police Reserve	
UNMIL's Costs If Startup Covered by ROLCAP (Hypothetical)	
ROLCAP Personnel Costs	\$4,063,500
ROLCAP Travel	\$75,000
ROLCAP MSA	\$1,879,500
Operations Costs, ROLCAP	\$809,565
Total ROLCAP - Hypothetical Cost	\$6,827,565
UNMIL's Costs If Startup Covered by Reserve (Hypothetical)	
Reservist Per Capita Reimbursements to Sending State Police Agency	\$7,055,440
Reservist Travel	\$1,237,500
Reservist MSA	\$25,194,450
Operations Costs, Police Reserve	\$10,830,181
Total Police Reserve - Hypothetical Costs	\$44,317,571
UNMIL's Apportioned Share of ROLCAP/UNPR Basing, Training, and Related Costs****	\$12,280,585
Summary**	
Total actual UNMIL expenditures, 1 August 2003–30 June 2004	\$548,278,700
Total Marginal Cost of Using ROLCAP/Reserve in UNMIL Start-up, 03–04	\$46,682,538
Marginal Cost in Percentage Terms:	8.5%
Financial Impact of Using Reserve System on Mature Mission Costs***	
Total actual UNMIL expenditures, 1 July 2005–30 June 2006	\$707,368,900
Total actual UNMIL expenditures for individual police, 2005–06	\$36,550,100
Estimated additional MSA and travel due to full deployment of police from reserve	\$4,949,205
Estimated cost of reimbursements to reserve-participating police contributors	\$9,551,532
UNMIL's share of non-deployed ROLCAP (same as mission's 2005–06 share of the Peacekeeping Support Account and Logistics Base, Brindisi)	\$9,282,508
Total Marginal Cost of ROLCAP and UN Police Reserve to UNMIL, 2005–06	\$23,783,245
Marginal Cost in Percentage Terms	3.4%
* UNMIL authorized on 19 September 2003 and launched 1 October.	
** For sources and details of analysis on mission start-up costs, see Annex Table A3.6.	
*** For sources and details of analysis on mature mission costs, see Annex Table A3.7.	
**** Assumes that 25 percent of UN Police Reserve are officers from developed states, which was those states' actual share of deployed officers as of December 2006. Should the percentage of reservists from developed countries increase or decrease, support costs for non-deployed reservists would be higher or lower.	

All officers nominated for the UN Police Reserve should be screened for professionalism and qualification prior to acceptance. They should be given preliminary certification training (carried out by the DPKO Integrated Training Service or a UN-accredited training center, perhaps with the assistance of ROLCAP personnel). Once selected for mission service, they should be available for deployment within 14 days.

To increase states' incentives to name quality individuals to the reserve, we propose, first, that governments be paid retainers for individuals who qualify for the reserve force and, second, be paid fixed levels of reimbursement for officers who are called to UN duty. The retainers should be paid to officers' national, provincial, or local police agencies to cover two weeks cumulative annual training for police reservists—about five percent of their time—and thus five percent of their annual salary. The same contributing agencies should receive a further five percent incentive payment to encourage nomination of quality personnel (since rejected candidates generate no revenue). In exchange, the reservists' agencies would agree to release them on the required notice for an agreed length of service in a UN peace operation, for example, for 6 or 12 months, followed by 12 or 24 months, respectively, of normal national policing duties following brief readjustment leave. That would make UNPR deployment tempo about 33 percent.¹⁴

Retainer payments would cease when reservists deploy, to be replaced by the fixed per capita reimbursement. Reimbursements should be comparable to those paid by the United Nations for military and police personnel in formed units, and similarly adjusted for officers with “specialist” skills. Equipment for deploying reservists would be provided by the UN mission where they deploy, as at present for individual police, and mission per diem (MSA or equivalent) should continue to be the same as that paid international civilian staff and military observers.¹⁵

Sustaining a deployment of 5,000 individual police¹⁶ at a deployment tempo of 33 percent would require two officers in waiting for every officer deployed from the reserve, or 10,000 non-deployed reservists. Some officers will not be available when needed (for example, due to illness, pregnancy, or an unstable security situation at home) and the numbers of particular specialties needed at any given time will vary. The system should have some slack built into it, say ten percent (roughly 1,500 officers). That implies a total UN Police Reserve, both deployed and non-deployed, of roughly 16,500—smaller than the pool of invisible/unknown individual officers that the United Nations must tap into annually to meet its present police peacekeeping mandates.

That anonymous pool may appear to be a free good to the United Nations but the organization pays a heavy price in lack of overall quality, in lack of timely deployment, and in lack of advance knowledge as to available specialties. These deficits hamper planning, undercut mission effectiveness, waste the time of UN headquarters and field staff, and ultimately increase total mission deployment times and thus total costs.

Estimating the costs of the proposed salary-based retainers to be paid reservists' employers is complicated by the wide diversity in policing salaries around the globe.¹⁷ Precise costs would depend on the mix of nationalities in the reserve. We estimate the average costs of developing state police salaries using, as a proxy, a mix of the higher mid-level government salaries paid by several states and territories hosting UN peace operations, as gleaned by the 2006 *Economic Impact of Peacekeeping* study for the DPKO Best Practices Section. The average mid-level salary

of these locales (Haiti, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste) is \$185 per month. For average developed state salaries, we used a mid-size California (US) town as a proxy, at roughly \$4,750 per month.¹⁸

Assuming that officers from developed states account for 10–25 percent of deployed individual UN police, the average annual salary across the force would be \$7,700–\$15,900.¹⁹ The costs of annual retainers at 10 percent of annual salary for the non-deployed portion of the reserve (11,500 persons) would be about \$9 million for the first mix and \$18 million for the second. Training costs, equivalent to five percent of salary, as for ROLCAP, would add \$4.4 to \$9 million per year. The Police Division, which should have policy and overall management responsibility for a UN Police Reserve, would need a modest bump-up in posts for managing the reserve—let us say one post per thousand reservists, or about 15 additional posts altogether.²⁰ These would add about \$2.8 million a year to the cost of the reserve system, for a total annual cost of \$16 to \$30 million. As with ROLCAP, these costs of maintaining the reserve system should be apportioned across UN missions as common assets. They are built into the calculations in table 12. (See also **Annex III, table A3.4.**)

The marginal costs of deploying police reservists to missions would equal the costs of the new reimbursement structure, as police seconded to UN missions are already transported to and from the mission and allocated MSA. The annual costs to reimburse sending agencies for 5,000 deployed reservists would range from about \$66 million (if all were reimbursed as non-specialists, at \$1,100 per month) to about \$84 million (if all were reimbursed as “specialists,” at \$1,400 per month).²¹ Actual costs would fall somewhere in between, depending on the number of specialists in the active force.

Developed states’ police agencies would make real money from retainers (for the one to two years that officers spend on reserve status in each cycle), but they would not recover their costs when those officers are deployed for UN work, despite the reimbursement system. They would therefore tend to bet that officers placed on the reserve would not be needed and might need high-level encouragement to nominate high-quality people. Developing states’ police agencies would make a little from the retainers but a lot from deployments. They would thus nominate officers in hopes that they *would* be called up and would have significant incentive to nominate qualified and capable personnel. The difference between salaries and reimbursements could be enough in the latter cases that, where reimbursements substantially exceed (by, say, a factor of three or more) the real salaries of seconded officers, sending agencies and the United Nations should enter into a memorandum of understanding that the surplus be reinvested in the capabilities and professionalism of the sending force itself.

As with the standing capacity, a comprehensive strategy for ensuring accountability should accompany the creation of a UN Police Reserve. These officers should abide by the laws they are hired to support or to enforce, and conduct themselves as professional civil servants with respect to the local population, which is critical to the success of the proposed arrangements.

Structuring and Costing a Police, Justice and Corrections Senior Leadership Reserve

The PJC Reserve would provide experienced, international civil servants to UN operations. Former heads of mission and other senior personnel with valuable management skills and

effectiveness based on their experience in previous UN operations could be encouraged to enroll in the PJC Reserve. Maintaining a roster of highly-qualified senior personnel, particularly those with previous UN service, would give the organization an ability to predictably and effectively fill critical posts in new and ongoing missions, a capacity that has been attempted with only mixed success since being recommended by the Brahimi Report.²² The PJC Reserve should include persons with experience in security sector reform, especially in the areas of security sector governance and management.

A retainer system may or may not be needed to ensure availability of the right people at the right time. Using such payments to buy specific availability might be worthwhile. Retainers could be paid directly to the individual in exchange for willingness to serve a 12-month mission appointment upon agreed notice. The size of such an annual retainer might be keyed to agreed call-up notice and range from, say, 3 percent of expected active-duty salary for agreement to deploy on 30 days notice to no fee for agreement to deploy upon notice of six months or longer. When called up, members of the PJC Reserve would be UN international civil servants on fixed-term appointments.

To assure quality of service, all members of this reserve should be certified by the DPKO Integrated Training Service or by a regional training program using UN training standards. Periodic refresher training should also be offered, with the UN bearing transport and meeting costs. The size of this reserve should be equivalent to the upper tier of ROLCAP, which it would be intended, in most instances, to replace as they rotate out of the field, with room for police, judges, or other criminal justice experts who, having retired from their local or national positions, wish to offer their services to the United Nations directly. Thus it could range in size from a minimum necessary 50 people (counterparts to the D1's and P5's in ROLCAP) to as many persons as might be considered useful to have on call to fill out and sustain operations. If 20 percent of the PJC Reserve was available for rapid deployment and training costs are assumed equivalent to 5 percent of deployed salary and benefits, then the average per capita cost of the reserve would be roughly \$16,000 (see **Annex III, table A3.5**).

Together, these three elements—the UN Rule of Law Capacity, a UN Police Reserve, and a Police, Justice and Corrections Senior Leadership Reserve—would provide core competency to the police and rule of law components of peace operations deployed by the United Nations, while adding roughly 2 percent to the total annual cost of UN peacekeeping.²³ Such a system is long overdue, yet clearly possible, given the ongoing desire of UN member states to address the organization's ability to deploy police and rule of law personnel in peace operations. Implementation of these proposals would improve prospects for longer-term stability, justice, and peace where such missions serve.

Notes to Section 6

- ¹ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*, A/63/881–S/2009/304, 11 June 2009. “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping” (New York: UN DPKO/DFS, July 2009).
- ² Cost data have been updated from the original 2007 report to reflect 2010 costs, except that the costing examples using the operation in Liberia (UNMIL) remain set in 2003–04 (its start-up year) and 2005–06 (at full deployment). The net impact of global exchange rate and inflation on UN regular budgets for 2006–2007 (+0.9 percent), 2008–2009 (-0.1 percent) and 2010–2011 (-1.2 percent) suggest that there would be little net exchange rate or inflationary impact on the costing of our proposals as between 2006 and 2010. UN salaries and benefits have increased by about 14 percent, on average, so personnel and training costs change by roughly that amount when recosted for 2010. On exchange rates and inflation effects, see United Nations, *Second performance report on the programme budget for the biennium 2006–2007: Report of the Secretary-General*, A/62/575, 11 December 2007, p. 2; *Second performance report on the programme budget for the biennium 2008–2009: Report of the S-G*, A/64/545, 25 November 2009, p. 2; and *Revised estimates: effect of changes in rates of exchange and inflation: Report of the S-G*, A/64/756, 16 December 2009, para. 5, Table 1. Also United Nations Office of Human Resources Management, “Salary Scale for the Professional and higher categories showing annual gross salaries and net equivalent after application of staff assessment,” as of 1 January 2010, online at www.un.org/Depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/index.html.
- ³ MINUSTAH, in Haiti, with significant operational as well as capacity-building responsibilities may require 60–75 headquarters personnel to start up both functions. MINUSTAH’s police headquarters, fully staffed, has roughly 250 personnel (A/63/630, para. 14). This kind of mission might require policing elements from two ROLCAP teams.
- ⁴ Missions reviewed include Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Haiti, Liberia, Sudan, and Timor-Leste. These numbers include professional posts and UN Volunteers but not UN Field Service, General Service, or local personnel. United Nations, *Budget for the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/61/783, 6 March 2007; United Nations, *Budget for the United Nations Mission in the Sudan for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/61/745, 15 February 2007; United Nations, *Budget for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/60/728, 28 March 2006; United Nations, *Budget for the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/61/773, 1 March 2007; United Nations, *Budget for the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste for the period from 25 August 2006 to 30 June 2007, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/61/759, 23 February 2007; United Nations, *Budget for the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste for the period from 25 August 2006 to 30 June 2007, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/61/767, 23 February 2007.
- ⁵ United Nations, “Decisions of the Secretary-General, Decision No. 2006/47,” Annex 2: “Rule of Law—Baskets and Sectors.”
- ⁶ A likely mechanism would be voluntary extra-budgetary funding from individual member states. The firmest political grounding for exercise of responsibilities assigned by S-G Directives would, however, be a legislative mandate from the General Assembly to provide the kinds of assistance outlined in the Directives.
- ⁷ Interview, UN Police Division, 19 April 2007.
- ⁸ A detailed RAND Corporation study of US Army deployment tempo from 1997 through October 2000—now somewhat wistfully referred to as the Army’s “peacekeeping phase”—and its impact on military readiness for combat found that the average, pre-9/11 deployment tempo for 1,400 deployable Army units was about 23 percent—segmented as 17 percent for training away from barracks (about 60 days/year) and six percent for operations. In 1998, US Army Forces Command set a standard of 120 days—33 percent—“as the maximum desirable level of annual DEPTEMPO [deployment tempo] for its units.” Ronald E. Sortor and J. Michael Polich, “Deployments and Army Personnel Tempo,” MR-1417 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), xii, 11, 60, 71. Those units sent to Bosnia in the 1990s, at most four percent of the total force, exceeded that standard with six month (180-day) field rotations. If training time for those deployments is included, their DEPTEMPO was probably closer to 75 percent for the twelve month period that included their time in the Balkans. Moreover, a few light infantry units were used repeatedly for peacekeeping in that decade. But since 9/11, and especially operations in Iraq, the regular Army’s average deployment tempo has increased to roughly 50 percent and Special Forces commanders have been struggling to bring their troops’ rate *down* to 50 percent. In the fiscal year 2003 defense authorization bill, the US Congress, recognizing the added stress of high deployment tempos, added financial compensation of \$100/day for each day over 400 that a soldier was deployed—to training or operations—over the course of two years (730 days), so compensation is triggered by a DEPTEMO above 55 percent. Congressional Budget Office, “An Analysis of the U.S. Military’s Ability to Sustain an Occupation of Iraq,” 3 September 2003, 35, www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/45xx/doc4515/09-03-Iraq.pdf. Carl Conetta, “Fighting on Borrowed Time: The Effect on US Military Readiness of America’s post-9/11 wars,” Briefing Report No. 19 (Cambridge, MA: Project on Defense Alternatives, 2006), 10.

- ⁹ Additional language skills would of course be advantageous, to facilitate direct communication with both population and host-state counterparts in the mission area. Rapid language training facilities should be considered as an element of ROLCAP's home base infrastructure.
- ¹⁰ For an example of pro-rating, see United Nations, *Financing of the Support Account for Peacekeeping Operations; Financing of the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy—Note by the Secretary-General*, A/C.5/61/31, 28 June 2006.
- ¹¹ David H. Bayley, *Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 8.
- ¹² Based on 2005–06 mission expenditures. UNMIL was initially authorized roughly 750 individual police, three FPUs, and about 15,000 troops. Incremental costs for other missions would vary with the size of the police/rule of law presence in their structures and its proportion of total mission personnel. See Annex III for further details on how the existence of ROLCAP would have impacted UNMIL costs.
- ¹³ “Due to a lack of preparedness and inadequate security, the situation in the cantonment site got out of hand, leading to looting and violence in the camp and elsewhere in the city.” Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, “Lessons Learned Study on the Start-up Phase of the United Nations Mission in Liberia,” UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, April 2004, 16.
- ¹⁴ The contemplated deployment tempo for police reservists is lower than that for ROLCAP in recognition of governments' own need for capable police officers and the officers' likely reluctance to undertake back-to-back deployments. Trained officers who remain on the reserve list would be expected to undertake a further field rotation, however, after their home time has been fulfilled. We are agnostic as to whether the most desirable deployment period would be six or 12 months. For current police secondees unfamiliar with UN procedures and mission area alike, 12 months is a more efficient deployment period that allows for a period of familiarization in which value-added to mission may be relatively low. But pre-trained reservists may be effective on the job much sooner, six months absence may be more acceptable to their supervisors at home, and re-availability to the UN after 12 rather than 24 months would mean that they return to UN service with fresher memories of their prior field experience.
- ¹⁵ MSA and its de facto supplementary function as hazardous duty pay are separate and involved issues beyond the scope of the analysis here, as are questions about whether some sending states quietly “tax” MSA that is wired home. Appropriate safeguards and/or escrow accounts for that portion of MSA not taken in cash in the mission area might circumvent or deter such practices. For analysis of MSA, see Carnahan, et al., *Economic Impact of Peacekeeping, Final Report*, 18–19.
- ¹⁶ This is slightly more than were deployed at the end of 2006 but fewer than the 6,800 deployed at the end of 2009, on the assumption that the UN is looking to reduce numbers in favor of higher-quality “smart policing.”
- ¹⁷ Consider, for example, that the average police salary in Monrovia, Liberia, is roughly \$60 to \$90 per month, while the average police salary in Monrovia, California, is roughly \$4,164 to \$5,315 per month. United Nations, *Report of the Panel of Experts submitted pursuant to paragraph 9 (e) of Security Council resolution 1647 (2005) concerning Liberia*, S/2006/379, 7 June 2006, and City of Monrovia, “Police Officer Recruitment,” brochure, www.ci.monrovia.ca.us/city_hall/human_resources/Police%20Officer.pdf.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, and Carnahan, et al., *Economic Impact of Peacekeeping*, table 5.2.
- ¹⁹ Developed states were contributing 25 percent of individual UNPOL at the end of 2006 but short of 10 per cent by the end of 2009, so this range reflects recent deployment realities.
- ²⁰ In managing the police reserve, the Police Division would be assisted by ROLCAP, whose non-deployed personnel could assist with testing, managing, training, and rotating UN police reservists.
- ²¹ United Nations, *Review of the rates of reimbursement to the Governments of troop-contributing States, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/57/774, 3 April 2003, table 1.
- ²² /55/305-S/2000/809, paras. 95–96, 101. On prior attempts to establish rosters and procedures for selecting mission leadership, see Durch, Holt, et al., *The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations*, 67.
- ²³ The total budget for UN peacekeeping in its 2009–2010 fiscal year was roughly \$7.9 billion. United Nations, *Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010. Note by the Secretary-General*, A/C.5/64/15, 22 January 2010.

CONCLUSIONS

In this study, we have focused on current (indeed, longstanding) gaps in UN capacity to meet its mandated requirements to provide public security and/or promote the rule of law through integrated operations deployed in post-conflict environments. These shortfalls, in turn, affect the ability of UN peace operations to rapidly and effectively constitute programs for rebuilding and reforming the host-state security sector, which is a prerequisite to effective, legitimate post-conflict governance and sustainable peace. Given the centrality of international police and other rule of law support to effective post-conflict peacekeeping and peacebuilding, we have argued that the time has come to develop policies and institutional responses to finally resolve the UN's longstanding deficiencies in these fields. We have offered a series of recommendations that reach well beyond what has been proposed to date with regard to either standing or reserve UN capacity in this area. We have argued that part of the solution lies in giving the UN greater standing capacity to manage the rule of law elements of its operations, and that part lies in giving UN member states incentives to contribute qualified police in the needed numbers to UN missions. In making these recommendations, we have attempted to balance long-standing operational needs against the financial and political costs that meeting those needs may entail. Our proposals—for a Standing UN Rule of Law Capacity, a standby UN Police Reserve, and a Police, Justice, and Corrections Senior Leadership Reserve—are designed to improve the timely execution of increasingly complex mandates handed down by the UN Security Council for the rule of law components of UN peace operations, with minimum necessary cost and maximum cost-effectiveness.

The United Nations remains the organization of choice for comprehensive management of post-conflict peacebuilding. Although other institutions have become engaged on the military side of peace operations, and the European Union is developing a deployable police peacekeeping capacity, the UN is still the dominant global provider of immediate post-conflict support to societies and governments attempting the difficult transition from often long-running war to lasting peace. No other entity is so frequently called upon to provide law and order support, and in particular, to provide direct assistance to local police forces in their law enforcement tasks, while seeking at the same time to transform them into successful and accountable providers of public safety who also enjoy the public's trust. It is critical that the United Nations improve its ability to carry out these essential tasks.

These needed improvements require the commitment and support of member states. Over the years, states' willingness and ability to offer the UN qualified individual police officers in a timely manner has consistently fallen short of the organization's operational needs. Willingness to contribute names to individual-ready rosters has been minimal, yet states have proven increasingly responsive to requests for formed police units, in part because they can recoup at least some of the costs of those contributions, which they cannot now do with regard to individual

officers. Solutions to the shortfall in individual UN police officers must address state incentives as well as UN needs, and our proposals do so. Indeed, if a ready reserve system were to be established as proposed here, states may insist on contributing officers only through that system, because of the participation incentives built into it, reversing present attitudes toward roster-like arrangements.

Local populations increasingly bear the brunt of the suffering and destruction unleashed by contemporary conflicts. These populations deserve to feel safe from the crime and chaos that often erupt in the wake of war. They deserve domestic police forces that are accountable, respectful, and effective in resurrecting law and order from the ashes of violent conflict. They deserve, in turn, timely and competent international support that will train, guide, support, and where necessary insist that those local forces move in these directions. To promulgate the mandates but not provide the means to achieve these objectives in a timely and professional manner risks raising false hopes that turn into disillusionment among those who have already suffered from too much of both.

ANNEX I: RULE OF LAW MANDATES AND TASKS IN UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Table A1.1: Key Rule of Law Language in Security Council Mandates Since 1964

Dates, Place & Mission Name	Key Language from Mandates or Relevant Documents
<p>March 1964– August 1974, Cyprus, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)</p>	<p>Resolution 186 (1964): To contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order, and a return to normal conditions. (Mission continued with a more limited observer mandate after Turkish forces bisected Cyprus in August 1974 into de facto Greek and Turkish Cypriot sectors).</p> <p>Security Council Resolution 355 (1975), as outlined in Report to the President of the Security Council transmitting the text of the Geneva Declaration S/11398 (1975): “...[T]he following measures should be put into immediate effect: (c) In mixed villages the functions of security and police will be carried out by UNFICYP.</p>
<p>April 1989– March 1990, Namibia, United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)</p>	<p>S/20412 (S-G Report) (1989): 40...As regards UNTAG’s civilian police <i>monitors</i>, the concept was first described in paragraph nine of the Settlement Proposal (S/12636): Primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in Namibia during the transition period shall rest with the existing police forces. The Administrator-General (UN)...shall ensure the good conduct of the police forces and shall take the necessary action to ensure their suitability for continued employment during the transition period...[and] make arrangements...for United Nations personnel to accompany the police forces in the discharge of their duties.</p>
<p>January 1991– May 1997, Guatemala, United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)</p>	<p>General Assembly Resolution A/RES/48/467: Authorized verification mission with mandate delineated in Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights for Guatemala: X-16-B: Offer its support to the judiciary and its auxiliary organs, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Counsel for Human Rights, and the Presidential Human Rights Committee in order to contribute to the development and strengthening of institutions for the protection of human rights and due legal process. Resolution 1094 (1996): Authorized mission with mandate outlined S/1996/1045 (S-G Report): B-8: Any police activities within these zones [security zones around URNG assembly points] will be subject to coordination with the United Nations verification authorities B-12: Police activities may be carried out [in security zones] subject to coordination with the [UN] verification authority”</p>
<p>April 1991–Present, Western Sahara, United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)</p>	<p>Resolution 690 (1991), with mandate as outlined in S/21360 (S-G Report): (b) To monitor activities of the existing police forces so as to ensure that they are acting in strict accordance with the settlement proposals and the present implementation plan, which are intended to secure the organization of a free and fair referendum without military or administrative constraints, and to prevent any possibility of intimidation or interference from any quarter.</p>
<p>May 1991– February 1995, Angola, United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)</p>	<p>Resolution 696 (1991): Authorizes mission with a mandate “in line with the Peace Accords of Angola”: III- 2.1: The neutrality of the police...shall be the object of verification and monitoring by teams of monitors composed of two members designated by the Government of the People’s Republic of Angola, two members designated by UNITA and one expert in police affairs to be designated by and subordinate to the United Nations command structure. III- 2.2: Within the sphere of their authority, the monitoring teams shall have as their specific mandate the duty to visit police facilities, examine their activities, and investigate possible violations by political rights committed by the police.</p>
<p>July 1991– April 1995, El Salvador, United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)</p>	<p>Resolution 693 (1991): Authorized mission with mandate specified in Agreement on Human Rights-El Salvador: 14 (h): to offer its support to the judicial authorities of El Salvador in order to help improve the judicial procedures for the protection of human rights and increase respect for the rules of due process of law. Peace Agreement of 1991: II-1-B: The organization of the National Civil Police and the general outlines of its staff profile shall be determined...under close international cooperation and supervision, coordinated by the United Nations. II-3-B (d): International legal advisory services shall be staffed by suitable personnel and high-level specialists...coordinated by the United Nations. S/23402 (S-G Report): CIVPOL were to: 7. ...Work closely with the Salvadorian police, monitoring their activities in order to ensure that they are conducted with professionalism, objectivity and impartiality....Mobile monitoring ...by accompanying police patrols and monitoring their activities by random checks ...to deter intimidation, reprisals, or other violations of the civil rights of all sectors of the population.</p>

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<p>February 1992– March 1995,</p> <p>Former Yugoslavia,</p> <p>United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)</p>	<p>Resolution 743 (1992): Mission authorized as outlined in S/23592 (S-G Report), 17 (c): “To monitor the work of the local police forces, in accordance with paragraph 12 of the plan,” and S/23280, (S-G Report, Annex III):</p> <p>12: “The role of the United Nations police monitors would be to ensure that the local police forces carried out their duties without discriminating against persons of any nationality of abusing anyone’s human rights [but only within the United Nations Protected Areas].”</p>
<p>February 1992– September 1993,</p> <p>Cambodia,</p> <p>UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)</p>	<p>Resolution 745 (1992): Authorized mission with mandate outlined in the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict:</p> <p>B-4 (b): “All civil police will operate under UNTAC supervision or control, in order to ensure that law and order are maintained effectively and impartially, and that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully protected. In consultation with the SNC, UNTAC will supervise other law enforcement and judicial processes throughout Cambodia to the extent necessary to ensure the attainment of these objectives.”</p>
<p>December 1992– December 1994,</p> <p>Mozambique,</p> <p>United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)</p>	<p>Resolution 898 (1994): Authorized CIVPOL deployment “with the mandate and deployment described in paragraphs 9 to 18 of document S/1994/89/Add. 1 (S-G Report),</p> <p>9 (a): to monitor all police activities in the country, including those of PRM and any other police and security agencies and verify that their actions are fully consistent with the General Peace Agreement;</p> <p>9 (c): to provide technical support to the National Police Commission;</p> <p>9 (e): to verify the strength and location of government police forces, their materiel, as well as any other information which might be needed in support of the peace process;</p> <p>9 (f): to monitor and verify the process of the reorganization and retraining of the quick reaction police and its activities, as well as to verify their weapons and equipment;</p> <p>9 (g): to monitor, together with other ONUMOZ components, the proper conduct of the electoral campaign and verify that the political rights of individuals, groups and political organizations are respected, in accordance with the General Peace Agreement and relevant electoral documents.</p> <p>12. ...CIVPOL’s functions would be carried out by stationing United Nations teams in the vicinity of the Mozambican police stations, posts, and by extensive patrolling. In order to monitor certain activities, police observers would be deployed at various national police headquarters. At the same time, ONUMOZ would have unrestricted access to the general public and would be able to gather information as well as to receive complaints from individuals and organizations. CIVPOL would conduct its own investigations, on the basis of such complaints, as well as independently, into politically motivated offences and, when necessary, recommend corrective action. Information about such investigations would be provided promptly to the National Police Affairs Commission and the national authorities.</p> <p>13. Special attention would be given to the systematic verification of weapons and equipment in the possession of the national police and of private agencies and to monitoring the activities of the quick reaction police force, whose facilities would also be visited on a regular basis; ONUMOZ would also examine the latter’s role and structure.</p> <p>14. ...All violations of the Criminal Code will be investigated by the Mozambican police, with the possibility of parallel investigations being conducted by CIVPOL, when the latter considers it appropriate...It may be necessary to familiarize local police with the international concepts of rights, civil liberties, and fundamental freedoms, as well as the codes of conduct the political parties might agree to observe during the electoral process... United Nations police observers would assist the electoral observers of ONUMOZ in monitoring the registration process and the electoral campaign. In this context, they would also monitor security at the polling stations, including the security arrangements for the storage, counting, and transporting of ballot papers and other election material.</p>
<p>March 1993– March 1995,</p> <p>Somalia,</p> <p>UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)</p>	<p>Resolution 814 (1993):</p> <p>4 (c): To assist in the re-establishment of Somali police, as appropriate at the local, regional, or national level; to assist in the restoration and maintenance of peace, stability, and law and order, including in the investigation and facilitating the prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law.</p> <p>Resolution 897 (1994):</p> <p>4 (d): Assisting in the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial system.</p>
<p>August 1993– June 2009,</p> <p>Georgia,</p> <p>UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)</p>	<p>Resolution 1495 (2003): Authorized 20 CIVPOL officers with mission, as outlined in S/2003/751 (S-G Report), (19) ...[T]o build the capacity of local law enforcement by coordinating and facilitating assistance with respect to training and equipment; the provision of advice to and monitoring of local law enforcement agencies; and the facilitation of cooperation across the ceasefire line.”</p> <p>S/2003/1019 (S-G Report): [CIVPOL]... will advise UNOMIG civilian and military leadership on law enforcement issues; coordinate and facilitate assistance in training and equipment for the local law enforcement agencies; monitor and provide on-the-job training and advice to local law enforcement agencies; and facilitate cross-ceasefire-line cooperation through joint activities and on-the-job-training.”</p>

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<p>October 1993– March 1996, Rwanda, UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR)</p>	<p>Resolution 872 (1993): 3 (h): To investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and police. Resolution 965 (1994): 3 (b): Assist in the establishment and training of a new, integrated, national police force.</p>
<p>September 1993– June 1996, Haiti, United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)</p>	<p>Resolution 867 (1993): 3. Provide guidance and training to all levels of the Haitian police and monitor the way in which the operations are implemented. Resolution 940 (1994): 9. ...Assist the democratic Government of Haiti...with...(b) The professionalization of the Haitian armed forces and the creation of a separate police force.</p>
<p>February 1995– June 1997, Angola, United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III)</p>	<p>Resolution 976 (1995): Mission established “to assist the parties in restoring peace and achieving national reconciliation in Angola” with mandate outlined in the Lusaka Protocol: 2.1 Verification and monitoring of the activities of the Angolan National Police, placed under the legitimate authority, in order to guarantee its neutrality. 2.2 Verification and monitoring of the process of quartering the Rapid Reaction Police and the adaptation of its armament and equipment to the nature of its mission. 2.3 Establishment of the timetable and the identification of the quartering areas for the Rapid Reaction Police on D-Day +10, jointly with the Government and in the presence of UNITA and the Representatives of the observer States. 2.5. Verification and monitoring of the protection, storage, and custody of all the armaments in the hands of civilians, by the Angolan National Police. 2.6 Verification and monitoring of the neutrality of the activities of the Angolan National Police relating to the commitments made in matters of security arrangements guaranteed for the UNITA leaders. 2.7 Verification and monitoring of the neutrality of the activity of the Angolan Police in their task of protecting the Polling Station Officers and the candidate agents of the participating candidates.</p>
<p>March 1995– February 1999, Macedonia, United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP)</p>	<p>Resolution 983 (1995): UNPROFOR within the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia shall be known as the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force ... with the mandate set out in paragraph 85 of the Report of the Secretary-General of 22 March 1995 (S/1995/222): “The same responsibilities and composition as UNPROFOR has at present in those Republics,” per Resolution 743, as outlined in S/23592 (S-G Report): To monitor the work of the local police forces.</p>
<p>March 1995– January 1996, Croatia, United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO)</p>	<p>Resolution 990 (1995): Mission authorized with mandate specified in S/1995/320 (S-G Report): IV-15 (f): Civilian police monitors (CIVPOL) will supervise the local police which, under the ceasefire agreement, is obliged to assist UNCRO in the prevention of crime and maintenance of law and order in the area between forward troop deployment lines. IV- 15 (g): CIVPOL will patrol the area between the forward troop deployment lines in order to enhance confidence and identify policing requirements. IV- 15 (i): UNCRO will conduct liaison activities with military and policing authorities at all levels. IV- 20 (e): UNCRO will contribute to deterring human rights abuse by maintaining an overall presence; closely monitor and co-locate with local police forces; monitor judicial institutions to enhance respect for human rights.</p>
<p>December 1995– December 2002, Bosnia and Herzegovina, United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)</p>	<p>Resolution 1035 (1995): Authorizes UN International Police Task Force (UNIPTF), as mandated in the General Framework Agreement for Peace, Annex 11, Article III, para. 1: (a) Monitoring, observing, and inspecting law enforcement activities and facilities, including associated judicial organizations, structures, and proceedings; (b) advising law enforcement personnel and forces; (c) training law enforcement personnel; (d) facilitating, within the IPTF’s mission of assistance, the Parties’ law enforcement capacities; (e) assessing threats to public order and advising of the capability of law enforcement agencies to deal with such threats; (f) advising governmental authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the organization of effective civilian law enforcement agencies; and (g) assisting by accompanying the Parties’ law enforcement personnel as they carry out their responsibilities, as the IPTF deems appropriate. Resolution 1088 (1996): Incorporate tasks referred to in the Conclusions of the London Peace Implementation Conference (PIC): “Improving the effectiveness of the International Police Task Force (IPTF) by allowing it to investigate or assist with investigations into allegations of misconduct by police and to propose the sanctioning of offenders; ensuring police reform and providing material and financial support conditional upon implementation of democratic policing principles and cooperation with the IPTF; obtaining additional resources from the international community.” Additionally, UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</p>

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	<p>(UNMBIH), which by this time oversees the IPTF, is charged with providing assistance in the “setting up” of “effective institutions without delay; amending laws inconsistent with the Constitution; [and] creating the conditions for a viable and democratic civil society.”</p> <p>Resolution 1144 (1997): Mandate revised to incorporate tasks from the Conclusions of the Bonn PIC: I-2-a: The judicial appointment process must be reformed to ensure that selection is based on merit rather than political or ethnic criteria...A facility for judicial training ...established and ...the judicial system [monitored]. I-2-b: support for the “ongoing criminal justice reform effort within the Federation” and promoting “consistency and co-operation between the Two Entities in the area of legal reform” and “cooperat[ion]” with the Council of Europe and OSCE in a “program of judicial and legal reform;” IV-3: To train Bosnian police to address more effectively key public security issues, such as refugee returns; organized crime, corruption and terrorism; and public security crisis management (including crowd control); IV-5: To “train the Entities’ police forces in the detection of financial crime, smuggling, and corruption, in co-operation with those international organizations involved in customs training.</p> <p>Resolution 1184 (1998): Calling for “the establishment by the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) of a programme to monitor and assess the court system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as part of the overall programme of legal reform outlined by the Office of the High Representative,” pursuant to S/1998/314 (9 April 1998) transmitting the Ninth Report from the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement: “A comprehensive process is needed to ensure that judicial appointments are based on merit rather than political criteria, and to ensure that all ethnic groups are fairly represented in the judicial system. At the same time, training programmes for legal professionals, including the initiative to establish a judicial training institute for Bosnia and Herzegovina, should be supported” (para. 82).</p>
<p>January 1996– January 1998,</p> <p>Croatia,</p> <p>UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Serium (UNTAES)</p>	<p>Resolution 1037 (1996): 11 (a): To establish a temporary police force, define its structure and size, develop a training program and oversee its implementation, and monitor treatment of offenders and the prison system, as set out in paragraph 16 (a) of the Secretary-General’s report (S/1995/128): 16 (a): ...[T]o establish a temporary police force; define its structure and size; develop a training program and oversee its implementation; and monitor treatment of offenders and the prison system...[m]onitoring law enforcement institutions, border monitoring, training and monitoring the prison system. Much of the work would need to be done on a 24-hour basis and would include an element of human rights monitoring. 11 (b): to undertake tasks relating to civil administration as set out in paragraph 16 (b) of the Secretary-General’s Report (S/1995/1028): 16 (b): ...[T]o oversee local judicial procedures.</p>
<p>July 1996– July 1997,</p> <p>Haiti,</p> <p>United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH)</p>	<p>Resolution 1063 (1996): 2. [To] assist the Government of Haiti in the professionalization of the police and in the maintenance of a secure and stable environment conducive to the success of current efforts to establish and train an effective national police force. S/1996/416 (S-G Report) specified, in para. 34: (a): Assistance to the Haitian authorities in the professionalization of the Haitian National Police; (b): Assistance to the Haitian authorities in maintaining a secure and stable environment conducive to the success of the current efforts to establish and train an effective national police force; [and] (c): Coordination of activities by the United Nations system to promote institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation in Haiti.</p>
<p>June 1997– February 1999,</p> <p>Angola,</p> <p>United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)</p>	<p>Resolution 1118 (1997): Authorized mission “with the objectives, mandate, and organizational structure recommended by the Secretary-General in section VII of his report of 5 June 1997” (S/1997/438): 36...[C]ontinue to verify the neutrality of the Angolan National Police, the incorporation of UNITA personnel into the national police, the quartering and occasional deployment of the rapid reaction police, as well as the free circulation of people and goods...special attention should be given to respect for civil and political rights and freedoms. With a view to generating confidence among the population, the civilian police would be called on to carry out joint patrols with the Angolan National Police, especially in areas formerly controlled by UNITA, to inspect prisons and, if need be, to establish its temporary presence at national police posts and stations. 37. The Mission’s civilian police unit would continue to monitor and verify the collection of weapons recovered from the civilian population, supervise proper storage or destruction of these weapons and oversee security arrangements for UNITA leaders.</p>
<p>August 1997– November 1997,</p> <p>Haiti,</p> <p>United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMH)</p>	<p>Resolution 1123 (1997): [T]o assist the Government of Haiti by supporting and contributing to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police, as set out in paragraphs 32 to 39 of the Secretary-General’s report of 19 July 1997” (S/1997/564): 38. During the forthcoming four months, the civilian police element would gradually shift its tasks to the training of three of the HNP specialized units—crowd control, rapid reaction force and Palace security...The Mission and UNDP would also continue to prepare a technical assistance programme. 41. ...A follow-on presence in order to provide advice and active support in the fields of public security and judicial reform, ... monitoring of human rights, will be required for at least the medium term.</p>

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<p>December 1997– March 2000,</p> <p>Haiti,</p> <p>United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)</p>	<p>Resolution 1141 (1991): To assist the Government of Haiti by supporting and contributing to the professionalization of the Haitian national police, ...including mentoring Haitian national police field performance, set out in paragraphs 39–40 of the Report of the Secretary-General of 31 October 1997. (S/1997/832):</p> <p>3. The proposed mission...would oversee the technical assistance to the Haitian National Police funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).</p> <p>5. [G]ive special emphasis to assistance at the supervisory levels and to training specialized units of the national police force. In addition, they would, periodically and in selected areas, continue to monitor the performance of the Haitian National Police, guide agents in their day-to-day duties and maintain close coordination with technical advisers to the Haitian National Police funded by UNDP. They would not undertake patrolling activities.</p> <p>6. Technical assistance to the Haitian National Police will be carefully monitored by UNDP...with special attention to the professional conduct and management of the police force, as well as respect for human rights.</p> <p>Resolution 1212 (1998): To extend the present mandate, including the concept of operation of MIPONUH...in order to continue to assist the Government of Haiti by supporting and contributing to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police in accordance with the arrangements set out in paragraph 32 of the Report of the Secretary-General of 11 November 1998 (S/1998/1064), including mentoring Haitian national police field performance and strengthening the capability of the central directorate of the police force to manage aid provided to it from bilateral and multilateral sources”:</p> <p>32. ...In addition to monitoring the field performance of the Haitian National Police, the principal tasks for the Mission during the new mandate period, if so authorized by the Council, would be to reinforce training already given to middle and senior cadres of the force, to reinforce the creation of a proper command structure and administration, and to strengthen the work already done on community policing. It will be essential at the same time to ensure that, on the eventual departure of MIPONUH, the central directorate of the police force has a functioning capability.</p>
<p>January 1998– October 1998,</p> <p>Croatia,</p> <p>United Nations Police Support Group (UNPSG)</p>	<p>Resolution 1145 (1997):</p> <p>13. To continue to monitor the performance of the Croatian police in the Danube region, particularly in connection with the return of displaced persons, in accordance with the recommendations contained in paragraphs 38 and 39 of the Report of the Secretary-General (S/1997/953), and in response to the request by the Government of the Republic of Croatia.”</p> <p>S/1997/953 (S-G Report):</p> <p>38...[M]onitoring investigations by the Croatian police of any allegations of police misconduct in connection with the return of displaced persons to the region and the provision of limited on-the-job training to improve professional capability of the local police.</p>
<p>April 1998– February 2000,</p> <p>Central African Republic,</p> <p>UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)</p>	<p>Resolution 1159 (1998):</p> <p>10 (b): To assist the national security forces in maintaining law and order and in protecting key installations in Bangui;</p> <p>10 (e): To assist in the coordination with other international efforts in a short-term police trainers program and in other capacity-building efforts of the national police, and to provide advice on the restructuring of the national police and special police forces;</p> <p>14 (e): To provide advice and facilitate technical assistance in the areas of good governance and the rule of law.</p>
<p>July 1998– October 1999,</p> <p>Sierra Leone,</p> <p>UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)</p>	<p>Resolution 1181 (1998):</p> <p>8 (a): To advise, in coordination with other international efforts, the Government of Sierra Leone and local police officials on police practice, training, re-equipment and recruitment, in particular on the need to respect internationally accepted standards of policing in democratic societies; advise on the planning of the reform and restructuring of the Sierra Leone police force, and monitor progress.</p>
<p>June 1999– Present,</p> <p>Kosovo,</p> <p>United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK)</p>	<p>Resolution 1244 (1999):</p> <p>11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include:</p> <p>(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections;</p> <p>(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo’s local provisional institutions and other peacebuilding activities;</p> <p>(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement;</p> <p>(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo;</p>

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	<p>S/1999/779 (S-G Report), further specified:</p> <p>VI-2-60: Two main goals will define UNMIK's law and order strategy in Kosovo: provision of interim law enforcement services, and the rapid deployment of a credible, professional and impartial Kosovo Police Service (KPS).</p> <p>VI-2-61: ...UNMIK's civilian police will advise KFOR on policing matters and establish liaison with local and international counterparts. The special police units under UNMIK control will also establish liaison with local and international counterparts and protect United States installations, if needed. UNMIK border police will advise KFOR units stationed at the border.</p> <p>VI-2-62: ...UNMIK civilian police will carry out normal police duties and will have executive law enforcement authority. At that time, UNMIK civilian police will be armed. To the extent that trained local police become available through the police academy through UNMIK's institution-building component, UNMIK civilian police will initiate on-the-job training, advising, and mentoring. UNMIK special police units will carry out public order functions, such as crowd control and area security.</p> <p>VI-2-64: UNMIK will begin developing a professional Kosovo Police Service immediately, recruiting candidates on the basis of stringent standards for selection and conducting ongoing screening and background checks. ...Training for selected candidates will include basic training organized under the police academy, as well as field training under the supervision and guidance of UNMIK civilian police...UNMIK civilian police will, moreover, maintain the capacity and authority to conduct independent investigations of alleged human rights violations or other misconduct by members of KPS. It will also be responsible for developing an effective and transparent command structure for KPS in accordance with international standards of democratic policing.</p> <p>VI-2-65: [O]nce properly trained and selected local police in sufficient strength are available, UNMIK will transfer responsibilities for law and order and border policing functions to the Kosovo Police Service. At that time, UNMIK civilian and border police will revert to training, advising, and monitoring functions.</p> <p>VI-3-67: Under its civil administration component, UNMIK will have a Judicial Affairs Office, with four major areas of responsibility: the administration of courts, prosecution services, and prisons; the development of legal policies; the review and drafting of legislation, as necessary, for the goals and purposes of UNMIK; and the assessment of the quality of justice in Kosovo, including training requirements.</p> <p>VI-3-69: Newly appointed judges should receive continuous training, particularly in the area of the law and application of international instruments on human rights...In addition, it will be important to provide immediate "quick start" training programs in domestic and international law for those Kosovo Albanian lawyers who were trained during the time of the "parallel institutions" or were banned from practicing their profession in the past decade. These efforts will be supplemented by the dissemination of international instruments in local language.</p> <p>VI-3-70: UNMIK will also establish a technical advisory commission on the structure and administration of the judiciary and prosecution service.</p> <p>VI-3-71: UNMIK will re-establish the Supreme Court of Kosovo, which was abolished in 1990, to hear, <i>inter alia</i>, appeals against decisions of the current five district courts in Kosovo. Similarly, a General Prosecutor's Office will be re-established.</p> <p>VI-3-73: The establishment of strong and independent judges and prosecutors associations in Kosovo is an additional and essential institutional safeguard for building and securing an independent judiciary. At the same time, UNMIK will sponsor the revival of the Kosovo Bar Association to help identify and build legal capacities and further support the creation of an effective judiciary.</p> <p>VI-3-74: UNMIK is also planning to establish a legal aid scheme to facilitate equal access to courts and ensure the provision of legal assistance, where required.</p> <p>VI-3-75: UNMIK will initiate a process to amend current legislation in Kosovo, as necessary, including criminal laws, the law on internal affairs and the law on public peace and order.</p> <p>VI-3-76: UNMIK will address on a priority basis the problem of identification and documentation of all people in Kosovo, particularly returnees and IDPs. This process will contribute to maintaining law and order, facilitate the restoration of social services and help to resolve a number of potential legal problems, including property rights.</p> <p>VI-3-78: UNMIK, with the support of other international organizations and agencies, will establish a standard registry of property claims; redress legal measures on property taken in recent years and that in any way discriminate against any ethnic group; and rebuild the property and cadastral records. UNMIK will also establish a court to review property disputes.</p>
<p>October 1999– May 2002, East Timor, United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</p>	<p>Resolution 1272 (1999):</p> <p>2 (a): To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor;</p> <p>3: Decides further that UNTAET will have objectives and a structure along the lines set out in part IV of the Rpt. of the S-G (S/1999/1024): 58. To maintain law and order; to recruit, train and establish an East Timor police force.</p> <p>59. . . . A civilian police unit will consist of 1,250 officers holding executive enforcement functions. An armed border/marine police unit . . . will be deployed to designated border crossing points . . . Two armed rapid reaction units . . . will provide specialized capabilities for crowd control and operational support, and standby rapid response capacity to the civilian police unit."</p>

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(UNTAET)	<p>Additionally, Press Release SC/6745, outlined the role of UNTAET as described in S/1999/1024: “UNTAET will be responsible for the administration of courts, prosecution services and prisons, the development of legal policies, the review and drafting of legislation for the goals and purposes of UNTAET, and the assessment of the quality of justice in East Timor, including training requirements...An independent judicial commission will be established to advise the Special Representative on judicial appointments” and “The Transitional Administration will develop interim law enforcement services and rapidly develop a credible, professional, and impartial East Timor police service...International police will be deployed, commanded by a Police Commander, to maintain law and order, recruit, train, and establish an East Timor police force, and monitor and assist in the safe return of displaced persons and refugees.”</p>
<p>October 1999– December 2005, Sierra Leone, United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)</p>	<p>Resolution 1289 (2000): 10 (d): “To coordinate with and assist the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities,” as specified in S/2000/13 (S-G Report): 36. [A]dvise and assist, in close cooperation with other international efforts, the Government of Sierra Leone and local police officials on the restructuring and training of the Sierra Leonean police forces...[B]e deployed at the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration sites and population centres to provide advice on the maintenance of law and order. 37. UNAMSIL should be prepared, if needed, to assist the Government in its efforts to maintain law and order at the [disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration] sites as soon as possible.</p>
<p>November 1999– June 2010 Democratic Republic of Congo, United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)</p>	<p>Resolution 1355 (2001): 31: Approves the updated concept of operations put forward by the Secretary-General in paragraphs 84 to 104 of his report of 8 June 2001 (S/2001/572): 98. [C]onduct a more in-depth assessment of the policing institution, its needs, and capabilities [and] to prepare recommendations for an eventual expanded MONUC Civilian Police component wherever MONUC military personnel are deployed and to advise and assist the local authorities in the discharge of their responsibility to ensure the security of the population. Resolution 1565 (2004): 5. <i>Decides</i> that MONUC will also have the following mandate, in support of the Government of National Unity and Transition: (a) To contribute to arrangements taken for the security of the institutions and the protection of officials of the Transition in Kinshasa until the integrated police unit for Kinshasa is ready to take on this responsibility and assist the Congolese authorities in the maintenance of order in other strategic areas, as recommended in paragraph 103 (c) of the Secretary-General’s third special report... 7: To provide advice and assistance to the transitional government and authorities, in accordance with the commitments of the Global and Inclusive Agreement, including by supporting the three joint commissions outlined in paragraph 6 of the Secretary-General’s third special report, in order to contribute to their efforts, with a view to take forward: (a) Essential legislation, including the future constitution, (b) Security sector reform, including the integration of national defence and internal security forces together with disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and, in particular, the training and monitoring of the police, while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.</p> <p>Special Report of the Secretary-General (S/2004/650): 103 (c): Contribution to the maintenance of order in strategic areas through active monitoring and mentoring of local police units such as the integrated police unit in Kinshasa (74 officers) and the new police forces in Ituri (43 officers). Together with the necessary headquarters and support staff (32 officers), this would require an increase in MONUC civilian police strength to 507 officers.</p> <p>Resolution 1856 (2008): 3. <i>Decides</i> that MONUC shall, from the adoption of this resolution, have the mandate, in this order of priority, working in close cooperation with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in order to: (a) Ensure the protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel, under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular violence emanating from any of the parties engaged in the conflict; (e) Carry out joint patrols with the national police and security forces to improve security in the event of civil disturbance; (p) Provide assistance to the competent customs authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in implementing the provisions of paragraph eight of resolution 1807 (2008) [in which the Council “<i>Decides</i> that, for a further period ending {31 December 2008}, the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the one hand, and those of States bordering Ituri and the Kivus on the other hand, shall take the necessary measures: (a) To strengthen, as far as each of them is concerned, customs controls on the borders between Ituri or the Kivus and the neighbouring States”]; 4. <i>Decides</i> that MONUC will also have the mandate, in close cooperation with the Congolese authorities, the United Nations Country Team and donors, to support the strengthening of democratic institutions and the rule of law and, to that end, to: (c) Assist in the promotion and protection of human rights, with particular attention to women, children and</p>

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	<p>vulnerable persons, investigate human rights violations and publish its findings, as appropriate, with a view to putting an end to impunity, assist in the development and implementation of a transitional justice strategy, and cooperate in national and international efforts to bring to justice perpetrators of grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law;</p> <p>(g) In coordination with international partners, advise the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in strengthening the capacity of the judicial and correctional systems, including the military justice system;</p> <p>5. Authorizes MONUC to use all necessary means, within the limits of its capacity and in the areas where its units are deployed, to carry out the tasks listed in paragraph 3, subparagraphs (a) to (g), (i), (j), (n), (o), and in paragraph 4, subparagraph (e);</p> <p>6. Emphasizes that the protection of civilians, as described in paragraph 3, subparagraphs (a) to (e), must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources, over any of the other tasks described in paragraphs 3 and 4;</p> <p>Resolution 1906 (2009):</p> <p>5. Decides that, from the adoption of this resolution, MONUC, working in close cooperation with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, shall have the following mandate, in order of priority:</p> <p>(a) Ensure the effective protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and United Nations personnel and facilities ...;</p> <p>(c) Support the security sector reform led by the Government of the [DRC];</p> <p>13. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that technical support is provided, in pre-deployment and in theatre, to MONUC's troop- and police-contributing countries to include guidance and training for military and police personnel on the protection of civilians from imminent threat and appropriate responses, including on human rights, sexual violence and gender issues;</p> <p>34. <i>Urges</i> the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to expeditiously adopt legislation related to the reform of the FARDC, the High Defence Council and the status of the FARDC military personnel by the Parliament, as well as the legislation on police reform, <i>urges further</i> the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to ensure progress in their implementation within the timeframe of this resolution, and <i>urges further still</i> the adoption of a comprehensive national strategy for the security sector on the whole territory;</p> <p>39. Requests MONUC and the United Nations Country Team to continue their support to extend State authority in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular within the framework of the Government's Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan (STAREC) and the United Nations Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (UNSSSS), with a particular emphasis on strengthening democratic institutions and building effective rule of law capacity, including justice and corrections.</p>
<p>May 2002– May 2005,</p> <p>East Timor,</p> <p>United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET)</p>	<p>Resolution 1410 (2002):</p> <p>2 (b): To provide interim law enforcement and public security and to assist in the development of a new law enforcement agency in East Timor, the East Timor Police Service (ETPS).</p> <p>Report of the Secretary-General (S/2002/432) further specified mandate:</p> <p>III-A-64 (b): To assist in the development of a law enforcement agency in East Timor operating in accordance with international human rights standards.</p> <p>III-A-76: To continue to assist in the conduct of investigations and court proceedings to bring to justice those responsible for serious crimes committed in 1999.</p> <p>III-A-79: To continue providing executive policing after independence, and to support the development of the East Timor Police Service through training, co-location and the timely and coordinated handover of responsibilities.</p> <p>III-A-85: Throughout the transition period, specialized training, including training in human rights, and management skills, would be provided. UNMISSET would continue to develop the organizational capacity and integrity of the East Timor Police Service, and review its entire organizational structure. Upon endorsement of the organizational structure and handover of the headquarters..., the national police commissioner would assume full executive responsibility over the police, while a limited number of UNMISSET police would remain in an advisory role.</p> <p>Resolution 1543 (2004):</p> <p>3 (i): support for the public administration and justice system of Timor-Leste and for justice in the area of serious crimes;</p> <p>3 (ii): support to the development of law enforcement in Timor-Leste; and</p> <p>3 (iii): support for the security and stability of Timor-Leste.</p>
<p>March 2002– Present,</p> <p>Afghanistan,</p> <p>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)</p>	<p>Resolution 1868 (2009):</p> <p>4. <i>Decides</i> further that UNAMA and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, within their mandate and guided by the principle of reinforcing Afghan ownership and leadership, will continue to lead the international civilian efforts... to, namely:</p> <p>(b). Strengthen the cooperation with ISAF at all levels and throughout the country, in accordance with their existing mandates, in order to improve civil-military coordination, to facilitate the timely exchange of information and to ensure coherence between the activities of national and international security forces and of civilian actors in support of an Afghan-led development and stabilization process, including through engagement with provincial reconstruction teams and engagement with non-governmental organizations; ...</p> <p>(c) Support and strengthen efforts to improve governance and the rule of law and to combat corruption at the local and national levels, and to promote development initiatives at the local level with a view to helping bring</p>

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	the benefits of peace and deliver services in a timely and sustainable manner;
<p>August 2003– Present, Iraq, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)</p>	<p>Resolution 1883 (2009): 2. <i>Decides further</i> that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAMI...shall continue to pursue their expanded mandate as stipulated in resolutions 1770 (2007) and 1830 (2008); Resolution 1770 (2007): 2. <i>Decides further</i> that, as circumstances permit, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAMI, at the request of the Government of Iraq, shall: (a) Advise, support, and assist: (iv) The Government of Iraq on facilitating regional dialogue, including on issues of border security, energy, and refugees; (v) The Government of Iraq at an appropriate time and in connection with progress on reconciliation efforts, on planning, funding and implementing reintegration programmes for former members of illegal armed groups; (c) And also promote the protection of human rights and judicial and legal reform in order to strengthen the rule of law in Iraq.</p>
<p>September 2003– Present, Liberia, United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)</p>	<p>Resolution 1509 (2003): 3 (n): To assist the transitional government in the monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia, consistent with democratic policing, to develop a civilian police training program, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police, in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations, and interested States; 3 (q): To assist the transitional government in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international partners in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions.</p>
<p>April 2004– Present, Côte d’Ivoire, United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)</p>	<p>Resolution 1528 (2004): 6 (p) To assist the Government of National Reconciliation in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international organizations in restoring a civilian policing presence throughout Côte d’Ivoire, and to advise the Government of National Reconciliation on the restructuring of the internal security services; (q) To assist... in re-establishing the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law. Resolution 1609 (2005): 2 (s): “To contribute, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment, to the security of the areas where voting is to take place; 2 (w): “to assist the Government of National Reconciliation in conjunction with the African Union, ECOWAS and other international organizations in restoring a civilian policing presence throughout Cote d’Ivoire, to advise the Government of National Reconciliation on the restructuring of the internal security services, <i>and to assist the Ivorian parties with the implementation of temporary and interim security measures in the northern parts of the country</i>, as provided for in paragraph 6 of the Pretoria Agreement; 2 (x): To assist the Government of National Reconciliation in conjunction with the African Union, ECOWAS, and other international organizations in re-establishing the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law throughout Cote d’Ivoire. Resolution 1739 (2007): (j): To contribute, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment, to the security of the areas where voting is to take place, (m): To assist the Government of Côte d’Ivoire in conjunction with the African Union, ECOWAS and other international organizations in restoring a civilian policing presence throughout Côte d’Ivoire, and to advise the Government of Côte d’Ivoire on the restructuring of the internal security services, To assist the Government of Côte d’Ivoire in conjunction with the African Union, ECOWAS and other international organizations in re-establishing the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law throughout Côte d’Ivoire</p>
<p>June 2004– Present, Haiti, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)</p>	<p>Resolution 1542 (2004): I (b): To assist the Transitional Government in monitoring, restructuring, and reforming the Haitian National Police, consistent with democratic policing standards, including through the vetting and certification of its personnel, advising on its reorganization and retraining, including gender training, as well as monitoring/mentoring members of the Haitian National Police. I (d): <i>To assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order through the provision <i>inter alia</i> of operational support to the Haitian National Police...</i>, as well as with their institutional strengthening, including the re-establishment of the corrections system.</p>
<p>June 2004– December 2006, Burundi, UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB)</p>	<p>Resolution 1545 (2004): 6. – To carry out institutional reforms as well as the constitution of the integrated national defence and internal security forces and, in particular, the training and monitoring of the police, while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms... – to complete implementation of the reform of the judiciary and correction system, in accordance with the Arusha Agreement; 7. – Extending State authority and utilities throughout the territory, including civilian police and judicial institutions.</p>
<p>March 2005– Present, Sudan,</p>	<p>Resolution 1590 (2005): 4 (vii): To assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in coordination with bilateral and multilateral assistance programmes, in restructuring the police service in Sudan, consistent with democratic policing, to develop a police training and evaluation program, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian</p>

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<p>United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)</p>	<p>police;</p> <p>4 (viii): To assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in promoting the rule of law, including an independent judiciary, and the protection of human rights of all people of Sudan through a comprehensive and coordinated strategy with the aim of combating impunity and contributing to long-term peace and stability and to assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to develop and consolidate the national legal framework.</p> <p>Resolution 1706 (2006):</p> <p>8. <i>Decides</i> that the mandate of UNMIS in Darfur shall be to support implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement of 5 May 2006 and the N'djamena Agreement on Humanitarian Cease-fire on the Conflict in Darfur ("the Agreements"), including by performing the following tasks:</p> <p>(j) To assist the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement, in coordination with bilateral and multilateral assistance programmes, in restructuring the police service in the Sudan, consistent with democratic policing, to develop a police training and evaluation programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police;</p> <p>(k) To assist the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement in promoting the rule of law, including an independent judiciary, and the protection of human rights of all people of the Sudan through a comprehensive and coordinated strategy with the aim of combating impunity and contributing to long-term peace and stability and to assist the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement to develop and consolidate the national legal framework;</p> <p>Resolution 1870 (2009):</p> <p>19. Encourages UNMIS, consistent with its mandate, and within authorized levels of civilian police, to continue efforts to assist the parties to the CPA in promoting the rule of law, restructuring the police and corrections services throughout Sudan, assisting in the training of civilian police and corrections officers.</p>
<p>April 2005– May 2006,</p> <p>Timor-Leste,</p> <p>United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL)</p>	<p>Resolution 1599 (2005):</p> <p>2. <i>Decides further</i> that UNOTIL will have the following mandate:</p> <p>(i) To support the development of critical State institutions through provision of up to 45 civilian advisers;</p> <p>(ii) To support further development of the police through provision of up to 40 police advisers, and support for development of the Border Patrol Unit (BPU), through provision of up to 35 additional advisers, 15 of whom may be military advisers;</p> <p>(iii) To provide training in observance of democratic governance and human rights through provision of up to 10 human rights officers.</p>
<p>January 2006– September 2008,</p> <p>Sierra Leone,</p> <p>United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL)</p>	<p>Resolution 1620 (2006):</p> <p>1 (a): To assist the Government of Sierra Leone in...</p> <p>(v) strengthening the rule of law, including by developing the independence and capacity of the justice system and the capacity of the police and corrections system;</p> <p>(vi) strengthening the Sierra Leonean security sector...</p> <p>1 (b): To liaise with the Sierra Leonean security sector and other partners, to report on the security situation and make recommendations concerning external and internal security threats;</p> <p>1 (c): To coordinate with United Nations missions and offices and regional organizations in West Africa in dealing with cross-border challenges such as the illicit movement of small arms, human trafficking and smuggling and illegal trade in natural resources.</p>
<p>August 2006– Present,</p> <p>Timor-Leste,</p> <p>United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)</p>	<p>Resolution 1704 (2006):</p> <p>4 (c): To ensure, through the presence of United Nations police, the restoration and maintenance of public security in Timor-Leste through the provision of support to the Timorese national police (PNTL), as outlined in the Secretary-General's report, which includes interim law enforcement and public security until PNTL is reconstituted, and to assist with the further training, institutional development and strengthening of the PNTL as well as the Ministry of Interior, and also assist in the planning and preparing of electoral-related security arrangements to adequately prepare the national police for performing their roles and responsibilities during the conduct of the 2007 elections;</p> <p>4 (d): To support the Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, to liaise on security tasks and to establish a continuous presence in three border districts alongside armed United Nations police officers assigned to district police stations, through the impartial presence of United Nations military liaison officers;</p> <p>4 (e) To assist the Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste in conducting a comprehensive review of the future role and needs of the security sector, including... the PNTL and the Ministry of Interior... through the provision of advisers and in cooperation and coordination with other partners, in strengthening institutional capacity-building, as appropriate;</p> <p>4 (i): To assist in the implementation of the relevant recommendations in the Secretary-General's report on Justice and Reconciliation, including to assist in the Office of the Prosecutor-General of Timor-Leste, through the provision of a team of experienced investigative personnel, to resume investigative functions of the former Serious Crimes Unit.</p> <p>Resolution 1802 (2008):</p> <p>8. Requests UNMIT to continue its efforts, adjusting them as necessary to enhance the effectiveness of the judiciary, in assisting the Government of Timor-Leste in carrying out the proceedings recommended by the Commission of Inquiry;</p> <p>10. <i>Further calls upon</i> the Government of Timor-Leste, assisted by UNMIT, to continue working on a comprehensive review of future role and needs of the security sector, including the Ministry of Interior, PNTL, Ministry of Defence, and F-FDTL; given the sector's importance to long-term stability, <i>request</i> UNMIT to intensify its efforts in support of the review in close coordination with the Government of Timor-Leste and</p>

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	<p>relevant donors, and <i>welcomes</i> the establishment of a three-tier coordination mechanism established in August 2007 to address the broader challenges in the security sector;</p> <p>11. <i>Requests</i> UNMIT, working with partners, to intensify its efforts to assist with further training, mentoring, institutional development and strengthening of the PNTL with a view to enhancing its effectiveness, including with respect to addressing the special needs of women, while continuing to ensure, through the presence of UNMIT police component, the restoration and maintenance of public security in Timor-Leste through the provision of support to PNTL, which includes interim law enforcement and public security until PNTL is reconstituted;</p> <p>Resolution 1912 (2010):</p> <p>7. Requests UNMIT to continue to ensure, through the presence of UNMIT police component and the provision of support to the PNTL, the maintenance of public security in Timor-Leste, which includes interim law enforcement and public security until the PNTL is fully reconstituted, and, working with partners, to intensify its efforts to assist with further training, mentoring, institutional development and strengthening of the PNTL with a view to enhancing its effectiveness, including with respect to community policing, and to address the special needs of women, and recognizes the importance of ensuring that UNMIT personnel have the appropriate profile and specialized skill sets for these tasks, and the potential need for civilian experts for the above purpose;</p>
<p>July 2007– Present,</p> <p>Sudan (Darfur),</p> <p>African Union/United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)</p>	<p>Resolution 1769 (2007):</p> <p>1. Decides...the mandate of UNAMID shall be as set out in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007;</p> <p>Report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (S/2007/307/Rev.1):</p> <p>(a) support for the peace process and good offices: (g) To assist in the promotion of the rule of law in Darfur, including through support for strengthening an independent judiciary and the prison system, and assistance in the development and consolidation of the legal framework, in consultation with relevant Sudanese authorities;</p> <p>(b) security: (i) To promote the re-establishment of confidence, deter violence and assist in monitoring and verifying the implementation of the redeployment and disengagement provisions of the Darfur Peace Agreement, including by actively providing security and robust patrolling of redeployment and buffer zones, by monitoring the withdrawal of long-range weapons, and by deploying hybrid police, including formed police units, in areas where internally displaced persons are concentrated, in the demilitarized and buffer zones, along key routes of migration and in other vital areas, including as provided for in the Darfur Peace Agreement;</p> <p>(ix) To support, in coordination with the parties, as outlined in the Darfur Peace Agreement, the establishment and training of community police in camps for internally displaced persons, to support capacity-building of the Government of the Sudan police in Darfur, in accordance with international standards of human rights and accountability, and to support the institutional development of the police of the movements;</p> <p>(c) Rule of law, governance, and human rights: (i) To assist in the implementation of the provisions of the Darfur Peace Agreement and any subsequent agreements relating to human rights and the rule of law and to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to respect for human rights and the rule of law, in which all are ensured effective protection;</p> <p>(iii) To support the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement in restructuring and building the capacity of the police service in Darfur, including through monitoring, training, mentoring, co-location and joint patrols;</p> <p>(iv) To assist in promoting the rule of law, including through institution-building, and strengthening local capacities to combat impunity.</p>
<p>September 2007– Present,</p> <p>Central African Republic and Chad,</p> <p>United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)</p>	<p>Resolution 1778 (2007):</p> <p>2 (a): To select, train, advise, and facilitate support to elements of the Police tchadienne pour la protection humanitaire referred to in paragraph 5;</p> <p>2 (b): To liaise with the national army, the gendarmerie and police forces, the nomad national guard, the judicial authorities and prison officials in Chad and the Central African Republic to contribute to the creation of a more secure environment;</p> <p>2 (e): To contribute to the monitoring and to the promotion and protection of human rights, with particular attention to sexual and gender-based violence, and to recommend action to the competent authorities, with a view to fighting impunity;</p> <p>2 (g): To assist the Governments of Chad and, notwithstanding the mandate of BONUCA, the Central African Republic in the promotion of the rule of law, including through support for an independent judiciary and a strengthened legal system, in close coordination with United Nations agencies;</p> <p>Resolution 1861 (2009):</p> <p>6 (a): To select, train, advise, and facilitate support to elements of the Détachement intégré de sécurité referred to in paragraph five;</p> <p>6 (b): To liaise with the national army, the gendarmerie and police forces, the nomad national guard, the judicial authorities and prison officials in Chad and the Central African Republic to contribute to the creation of a more secure environment, combating in particular the problems of banditry and criminality;</p> <p>6 (h): To assist the Government of Chad in the promotion of the rule of law, including through support for an independent judiciary and a strengthened legal system, in close coordination with United Nations agencies;</p> <p>Report of the Secretary-General (S/2009/535, 14 October 2009):</p> <p>21. 248 United Nations police officers from 20 countries, including 26 women, continued to mentor, monitor and advise the Détachement intégré de sécurité. Those international police officers also continued supporting</p>

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	<p>DIS in policing refugee camps in eastern Chad and conducting motorized and pedestrian patrols around key towns in eastern Chad.</p> <p>30. During the period under review, MINURCAT conducted numerous investigative and monitoring visits to the 12 refugee camps and 13 sites for internally displaced persons in eastern Chad.</p> <p>32. During the reporting period, MINURCAT continued to observe non-compliance with the 48-hour legal limit for initial preventive detention by local police officers.... MINURCAT continued to advocate with judicial authorities for urgent follow-up on cases of arbitrary and prolonged pretrial detention.</p> <p>33. During the reporting period, MINURCAT also provided technical support to the Ministry of Human Rights for the organization of a national human rights forum.</p>
<p>October 2008– Present, Sierra Leone, UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL)</p>	<p>Resolution 1829 (2008):</p> <p>3. <i>Requests</i> that UNIPSIL focus on and support the Government of Sierra Leone in the following areas:</p> <p>(b) Monitoring and promoting human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law, including efforts to counter transnational organized crime and drug trafficking.</p>
<p>July 2010– Present, Democratic Republic of Congo, United Nations Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO)</p>	<p>Resolution 1925 (2010):</p> <p>12. <i>Decides</i> that MONUSCO shall have the following mandate in this order of priority:</p> <p><i>Protection of civilians:</i></p> <p>(b) Ensure the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment;</p> <p>(f) Implement the United Nations system-wide protection strategy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, operationalizing it with MONUSCO’s protection strategy built on best practices and extend useful protection measures, such as the Joint Protection Teams, Community Liaison Interpreters, Joint Investigation Teams, Surveillance Centres and Women’s Protection Advisers;</p> <p><i>Stabilization and peace consolidation:</i></p> <p>(l) Taking fully into account the leading role of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, support, in close cooperation with other international partners, the efforts of the Congolese authorities to strengthen and reform security and judicial institutions;</p> <p>(n) Support the reform of the police led by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including by providing training to battalions of the Congolese National Police (PNC) and mobilizing donors to provide basic supplies, recalling the urgent need for the Congolese authorities to adopt the appropriate legal framework;</p> <p>(o) Develop and implement, in close consultation with the Congolese authorities and in accordance with the Congolese strategy for justice reform, a multi-year joint United Nations justice support programme in order to develop the criminal justice chain, the police, the judiciary and prisons in conflict-affected areas and a strategic programmatic support at the central level in Kinshasa;</p> <p>(p) Support, in close cooperation with other international partners, the efforts by the Congolese Government to consolidate State authority in the territory freed from armed groups through the deployment of trained PNC, and to develop rule of law institutions and territorial administration, with respect to the Government’s Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan (STAREC) and the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS).</p>

Table A1.2, continued

Types of Training Provided	UNMIL	UNMIK	UNMIT	MONUC	MINUSTAH	UNOCI	UNTAET	MINURCAT	UNMIS	UNMISET	UNAMID	ONUB	Task frequency
Human Rights and/or Intl Human Rights Law	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	10
Senior & Management	X		X	X	X		X		X	X		X	8
Gender, Sexual Exploitation, Domestic Violence	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X	8
Election Security	X	X	X	X	X		X					X	7
Traffic Management	X	X		X		X	X					X	6
Public Order	X			X		X	X	X		X		X	6
Train the Trainer Course			X	X	X	X				X		X	6
Community Policing	X					X	X	X		X	X	X	6
Border Control/Customs	X	X	X							X		X	5
Judicial Police	X			X	X							X	4
Forensics		X				X				X		X	4
Investigation	X	X		X								X	4
Close Protection		X			X	X				X			4
Counter-Terror / Insurgency Training		X	X	X						X			4
Child Protection	X			X		X		X					3
Airport/Seaport security		X					X					X	3
Patrolling	X	X						X				X	3
Corrections	X											X	2
Firearms	X				X								2
Money Laundering						X							1
Organized Crime		X											1
Intelligence & Surveillance										X			1
Task frequency records how common this task has been among the twelve missions analyzed (UNMIL, UNOCI, MONUC, MINUSTAH, UNMISET, UNMIT, UNTAET, UNMIK, ONUB, UNMIS, UNAMID, and MINURCAT). 12 = all twelve missions included this task.													
Sources/Methodology: This chart was compiled through an analysis of every Secretary-General report and Security Council Resolutions related to these 12 missions since 1999. Only tasks reported in these official UN sources have been recorded.													

ANNEX II: ANALYSIS OF UN POLICE DEPLOYMENT RATES, 1991–2010

This Annex tracks the deployment rates of UN police in peace operations undertaken between 1989 and 2010. The following summary chart compares deployment rates from five distinct time periods: 1991–1994, 1995–1998, 1999–2002, 2003–2006, and 2007–2010.

These figures were compiled by analyzing police deployment rates in every UN-led peacekeeping mission with at least 100 authorized UNPOL officers since 1991. The exceptions: UNTAG (Namibia) and UNPROFOR (Balkans) were excluded due to lack of data; and ‘follow-on missions,’ such as UNMISSET (East Timor), were excluded since police personnel were already in the field at the creation of the mission as part of a previous operation. Data for this analysis were obtained from United Nations Security Council Resolutions, Reports of the Secretary-General, and monthly troop contributor charts published by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

A complete description of the methodology used in this analysis, individual mission data charts for all operations, and brief narrative descriptions of police deployments in each mission are at http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Stimson_AnnexII_UNPOL.pdf

Table A2.1b: United Nations Formed Police Unit Deployment Rates, 1991–2010												Total Authorized	Weighted Percentage Deployed
1991-98												0	
1999-2002													
	UNMIK [A]	UNTAET											
Date(s) authorized	Jun-99	Oct-99											
Number(s) authorized	1150	240											
Percent deployed at:													
3 months	0%	0%											0%
6 months	0%	50%											9%
9 months	0%	100%											17%
12 months	52%	100%											60%
2003-06													
	MONUC [D]	UNMIL [A]	UNOCI [B]	UNMIL [B]	UNOCI [B]	UNOCI [C]	MINUSTAH [A]	MINUSTAH [B]	MINUSTAH [C]	UNMIT [A]			
Date(s) authorized	Oct-04	Sep-05	Jul-06	Jul-06	Jun-05	Jun-06	Apr-04	Nov-04	Jun-05	Aug-06			
Number(s) authorized	100	625	125	125	375	375	750	125	125	500			3580
Percent deployed at:													
3 months	0%	100%	0%	0%	99%	67%	0%	0%	0%	85%			56%
6 months	0%	100%	99%	99%	100%	67%	54%	32%	100%	85%			75%
9 months	120%	100%	99%	99%	100%	100%	100%	95%	100%	100%			100%
12 months	0%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			97%
2007-10													
	UNMIT [B]	UNAMID	MINUSTAH [E]	UNMIL [F]	UNMIL [G]	UNMIL [C]							
Date(s) authorized	Feb-07	Jul-07	Oct-07	Oct-09	Jan-10	Sep-08							
Number(s) authorized	140	2660	140	120	960	240							4260
Percent deployed at:													
3 months	81%	0%	0%	100%	11%	0%							5%
6 months	94%	5%	0%	100%		49%							18%
9 months	43%	5%	0%			49%							16%
12 months	42%	5%	0%			100%							19%

**ANNEX III:
ESTIMATING COSTS OF A UN STANDING AND RESERVE POLICE CAPACITY**

Table A3.1: Estimating Annual Personnel Costs for a Standing Rule of Law Capacity

Personnel Rank	Apportioned ROLCAP Personnel Costs	Mission-budgeted ROLCAP Personnel Costs (four teams deployed, on avg.)
D-2 (Head of Standing Capacity)	1	
D-1 (Team Leaders)	4	4
P-5	21	20
P-4	62	60
P-3	67	60
P-2	58	56
P-1	0	0
Basic Salary*	\$17,521,000	\$16,416,000
Post Adjustment*	\$4,595,000	(+MSA in lieu)
Estimated Benefit Costs*	\$8,761,000	\$8,208,000
Total Personnel Costs*	\$30,877,000	\$24,624,000
<p>*All numbers rounded to the nearest thousand dollars.</p> <p>Base Salary Cost: Uses Step I gross salaries (shown in US Dollars) for each Professional and Director Grade Level, as of 1 January 2010. Source: United Nations Office of Human Resources Management (OHRM), "Salary Scale for the Professional and higher categories showing annual gross salaries and net equivalent after application of staff assessment," 1 January 2010.</p> <p>Post Adjustment: The post adjustment is intended to give UN staff the same purchasing power at all duty stations. This chart relies on the 2010 post adjustment multiplier for Brindisi (33.9% of net salary) with Step I net salaries as of 1 January 2010. Source: International Civil Service Commission, "Consolidated Post Adjustment Circular," ICSC/CIRC/PAC/427, 1 July 2010, and UN OHRM, "Salary Scale for the Professional and higher categories...", "above.</p> <p>Estimated Benefit Costs: Above calculation uses 50 percent of gross base salary as an estimate of total benefits.</p> <p>Cost of HQ Support Staff: This costs assumes a ROLCAP support staff of 12 personnel (1 P-5, 2 P-4s, 7 P-3s, and 2 P-2s). Costs include base salary, post adjustment, and estimated benefits.</p>		

Table A3.2: Estimating Annual Basing Costs for a Standing UN Rule of Law Capacity

ROLCAP Size (including HQ support staff)	412
NON-RECURRING COSTS	
Low Estimate	
Facilities refurbishment	\$2,818,080
Acquisition (IT, admin. equipment, vehicles, etc.)	\$9,393,600
Total	\$12,211,680
High Estimate	
Facilities construction	\$11,272,320
Acquisition (IT, admin. equipment, vehicles, etc.)	\$9,393,600
Total	\$20,665,920
RECURRING COSTS	
Low Estimate	
Facilities maintenance	\$563,616
Equipment maintenance	\$1,878,720
Total	\$2,442,336
High Estimate	
Facilities maintenance	\$845,424
Equipment maintenance	\$2,818,080
Total	\$3,663,504
TOTAL ESTIMATED BASING COSTS (Average of High & Low)	
Non-Recurring (First Year)	\$16,438,800
Recurring (Second Year Plus)	\$3,052,920
<p>Note: Low estimates for non-recurring costs are based upon estimates for housing the 27-strong Standing Police Capacity at the Brindisi Logistics Base (\$6,000 per person for facilities and \$20,000 per person for administrative support, vehicles, communications, information technology, etc), assuming refurbishment of existing facilities. The much larger ROLCAP would likely need new facilities and our high estimate for non-recurring costs multiplies the refurbishment line by a factor of 4 to allow for potential construction costs.</p> <p>Estimates for recurring costs assume that they will be 20-30 percent of initial expenditures. The original estimates for the 2007 version of this study, based on 2006 data, were increased here by 14 percent, the average increase in UN gross base salary, as a proxy for increased construction and maintenance costs at the Brindisi base. Original source: Official, United Nations Logistics Base, Brindisi, Italy, correspondence with authors, 12 October 2006.</p>	

Table A3.3: Estimating Annual Training Costs for a UN Standing Rule of Law Capacity

Size of ROLCAP		400		
Apportioned Personnel Costs (from Table A1)			\$30,877,000	
Training Costs as Percent of Total Personnel Costs			Per Capita Training Costs	Annual Training Costs
UN mission average	1%		\$770	\$308,000
ROLCAP option 1	2%		\$1,540	\$616,000
ROLCAP option 2	5%		\$3,860	\$1,544,000
US Army average, 2000	11%		\$8,490	\$3,396,000
US Army average, 2006	7%		\$5,400	\$2,160,000
<p>Note: In large current UN missions, training averages less than 1 percent of total personnel costs for international civilians and UN police not in formed units. (MONUC=.83%, UNMIL=.85%, MINUSTAH=.41%; UNMIS invests a larger fraction of personnel costs in training, 1.28%, but mostly in materials, while travel dominates training costs in the other three operations). The US Army's training expenses were roughly 11 percent of total personnel costs for active duty personnel in fiscal year 2000 and 7 percent in fiscal year 2006. Two to five percent training costs for a standing UN police/rule of law support service reflect much more training than common at present for UN missions on the whole, but that a well-trained force would not need as extensive or as costly a training regimen as the US Army.</p>				
<p>Sources: Table A3.1. International Institute for Strategic Studies, <i>The Military Balance</i>, 2000–01 and 2006 eds, 25–34 and 29–40, respectively. US Department of Defense, <i>President's Budget</i>, FY 2001 and FY 2007, Exhibits M-1, O-1. United Nations, <i>Budget for the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, Report of the Secretary-General</i>, A/60/653, 19 January 2006; United Nations, <i>Budget for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, Report of the Secretary-General</i>, A/60/728, 28 March 2006, United Nations, <i>Budget for the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, Report of the Secretary-General</i>, A/60/840, 8 May 2006; United Nations, <i>Budget for the United Nations Mission in the Sudan for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, Report of the Secretary-General</i>, A/60/726, 20 March 2006.</p>				

Table A3.4: Annual Apportioned-Cost Estimates Associated with an Incentive-Based UN Police Reserve System

Deployed reservists*	5,000				
Non-deployed reservists**	11,500	***Average Salary A	****Average Salary B	Annual Retainers, Case A	Annual Retainers, Case B
Retainer costs at two assumed rates of average salary		\$7,700	\$15,900	\$8,855,000	\$18,285,000
Training costs as percentage of average salary	5.0%			\$4,427,500	\$9,142,500
Police Division support for the reserve (15 posts):	\$2,785,000				
Cost range: low average salary and non-specialist police versus high average salary and all specialists:				\$16,067,500	\$30,212,500

Note: Estimated annual salary from developing countries is calculated as an average of mid-level 2005 government salaries in Haiti, Timor-Leste, and Kosovo, based on Carnahan, et al., *The Economic Impact of Peacekeeping* (DPKO, 2006). Estimated annual salary for officers from developed states is proxied by a mid-size California town (Monrovia).

* Working assumption for planning purposes.

** Assumes a maximum 33 percent deployment tempo (2 reservists non-deployed for every one deployed) and a 10 percent margin for illness and other sources of non-availability.

*** Assumes 10 percent of individual reservists are from developed states; roughly the 2010 UN average.

**** Assumes 25 percent of individual reservists are from developed states; roughly the 2006 UN average.

Table A3.5: Police, Justice and Corrections Senior Leadership Reserve, Marginal Annual Per Capita Costs

Assumed base salary and benefits when activated (for training and retainer cost calculations)		\$290,000
	Senior Officer Contracted for Rapid Deployment	Senior Officer Not Contracted for Rapid Deployment
Retainer Cost for Officers Contracted for Rapid Deployment (within 30 days)	\$8,700	\$0
Training costs, incl. transport	\$14,500	\$14,500
Total annual per capita cost, non-deployed	\$23,200	\$14,500
<p>Notes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Retainer cost is set at 3 percent of estimated salary and benefits when deployed, including UN post adjustment. (Percentage could be raised or lowered based on changing demand for senior personnel willing to deploy on short notice.) Calculation assumes that one third of those contracted for rapid deployment would be compensated at UN D2 level and two thirds at D1 level. For methodology used to calculate base salary and benefits, see notes to Table A3.1. - Training cost estimates are based on 5 percent of salary and benefits when fully deployed. It assumes an annual training session for all members of the PJC Reserve. The 5 percent assumption is based on a blend of average training costs for UN missions and the United States Army. (See Table A3.3 for more details.) 		
<p>Sources: United Nations Office of Human Resources Management, "Salary scale for the professional and higher categories....," effective 1 January 2010. International Civil Service Commission, "Consolidated Post Adjustment Circular," 14 July 2010.</p>		

Table A3.6: Estimated Costs to the UN Mission in Liberia of Using ROLCAP and Police Reserve, for the Mission Start-up Period, October 2003–June 2004

	31-Oct	30-Nov	31-Dec	31-Jan	29-Feb	31-Mar	30-Apr	31-May	30-Jun	TOTALS
Police and Rule of Law Professional Posts Authorized*	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	-
Professional Posts Assumed Filled	0	0	0	24	24	24	24	24	24	-
Individual Police Authorized	755	755	755	755	755	755	755	755	635	-
Personnel Actually Deployed	0	41	72	168	278	311	392	550	569	-
Hypothetical ROLCAP/Reserve Deployment										
Core ROLCAP Deployment Team	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	-
Mobilized UN Police Reservists	500	705	705	705	705	705	705	705	585	-
Total ROLCAP + Reservists Deployed	550	755	755	755	755	755	755	755	635	-
UNMIL's Costs for Police and Other Rule of Law Professional Posts										
Personnel Costs	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$179,888	\$179,888	\$179,888	\$179,888	\$179,888	\$179,888	\$1,079,325
Travel**	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$36,000	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$36,000
Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA)**	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$4,584	\$2,952	\$2,952	\$2,952	\$2,952	\$2,952	\$19,344
Estimated Operations Costs	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$43,177	\$43,177	\$43,177	\$43,177	\$43,177	\$43,177	\$259,061
Total Mission Costs, Police and Other Rol Professional Posts	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$220,472	\$152,840	\$152,840	\$152,840	\$152,840	\$152,840	\$1,134,669
UNMIL's Estimated Costs If Startup Had Been Supported by ROLCAP										
Personnel Costs	\$451,500	\$451,500	\$451,500	\$451,500	\$451,500	\$451,500	\$451,500	\$451,500	\$451,500	\$4,063,500
Travel**	\$75,000	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$75,000
MSA**	\$286,500	\$184,500	\$184,500	\$184,500	\$184,500	\$184,500	\$184,500	\$184,500	\$184,500	\$1,762,500
Estimated Operations Cost	\$89,952	\$89,952	\$89,952	\$89,952	\$89,952	\$89,952	\$89,952	\$89,952	\$89,952	\$809,585
Total Estimated Costs of Using ROLCAP	\$813,000	\$636,000	\$636,000	\$636,000	\$636,000	\$636,000	\$636,000	\$636,000	\$636,000	\$6,710,565
Marginal Costs of Using ROLCAP (total costs less actual mission costs for the same functions)										\$5,575,896

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Table A3.6: Continued

UNMIL's Costs for Seconded Individual Police										
Travel**	\$0	\$81,500	\$46,500	\$144,000	\$166,000	\$49,500	\$121,500	\$237,000	\$28,500	\$853,500
MSA**	\$0	\$234,930	\$328,920	\$815,760	\$1,250,220	\$1,214,910	\$1,811,720	\$2,351,820	\$2,138,370	\$9,846,660
Operations Costs (estimated)	\$0	\$73,760	\$128,530	\$302,238	\$500,131	\$569,496	\$705,221	\$889,468	\$1,023,850	\$4,283,488
Police	\$0	\$308,690	\$458,450	\$1,117,998	\$1,750,351	\$1,774,409	\$2,316,941	\$3,341,288	\$3,162,020	\$15,083,648
UNMIL's Estimated Costs If Startup Had Been Supported by Police Reserve										
Per Capita UN Reimbursement to Sending State Police Agency ^a	\$686,000	\$826,260	\$826,260	\$826,260	\$826,260	\$826,260	\$826,260	\$826,260	\$826,260	\$7,055,440
Travel**	\$750,000	\$307,500	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$1,237,500
MSA**	\$2,886,000	\$3,019,650	\$2,601,450	\$2,601,450	\$2,601,450	\$2,601,450	\$2,601,450	\$2,601,450	\$2,158,650	\$23,652,000
Estimated Operations Costs	\$898,517	\$1,288,318	\$1,288,318	\$1,288,318	\$1,288,318	\$1,288,318	\$1,288,318	\$1,288,318	\$1,052,434	\$10,830,181
Total Estimated Costs of Using Police Reserve	\$5,100,517	\$5,421,728	\$4,696,028	\$4,696,028	\$4,696,028	\$4,696,028	\$4,696,028	\$4,696,028	\$4,076,704	\$42,775,121
Marginal Costs of Using Police Reserve (total costs less actual mission costs for the same functions)										
UNMIL's Apportioned Share of ROLCAP and UNPR Basing, Training, and Related Costs:^{a,a}										
Percentage Improvement in Individual Police Capacity Using Reservist-augmented ROLCAP	(infinite)	1741%	949%	349%	172%	143%	93%	37%	12%	
Notes: ^a UNMIL was also authorized three FPIUs, the first two of which arrived in December, the 3rd unit did not arrive until June, when a fourth was authorized and also deployed.										
^{**} Travel cost estimate = \$1,500 one way. MSA for UNMIL: first month = \$101/day; following months = \$123/day.										
^a Police Reserve reimbursement estimates based on standard UN reimbursement rates: Pay and Allowance = \$1,028/mo; Specialist allowance = \$303/mo; Personal gear = \$68/mo. This estimate assumes 25 percent of deployed police reservists are specialists.										
^{**} Assumes that 25 percent of UN Police Reserve are officers from developed countries, which was the actual proportion as of December 2006. Should the percentage of reservists from developed countries increase, support costs for non-deployed reservists would be higher.										
Financial Impact of Using ROLCAP and Reserve on Mission Startup Costs:										
Total UNMIL expenditures through 30 June 2004: \$548,278,700										
Total Marginal Cost of Using ROLCAP/Reserve in UNMIL Start-up, 2003-04, plus Apportioned Share (21%) of the basing, training, and related costs of each: \$45,647,953										
Added cost of using and supporting ROLCAP and Police Reserve, as percentage of actual mission expenditures, 1 August 2003-30 June 2004: 8.3%										

Sources: United Nations, *Budget for the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the period from 1 August 2003 to 30 June 2004*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/58/538, 29 October 2003; United Nations, *Performance report on the Budget of the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the Period from 1 August 2003 to 30 June 2004*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/624, 20 December 2004; United Nations, *Performance report on the budget of the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/61/715, 28 January 2007, para. 8; Michael Camahan, William Durch, and Scott Gilmore, "Economic Impact of Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, March 2006."

Table A3.7: Calculating Marginal Costs of UN Police Reserve, Applied to UNMIL, 2005-06

UNMIL Police 2005-06		31-Jul-05	31-Aug-05	30-Sep-05	31-Oct-05	30-Nov-05	31-Dec-05	31-Jan-06	28-Feb-06	31-Mar-06	30-Apr-06	31-May-06	30-Jun-06	TOTALS
Average number deployed	577			\$4,343.59 monthly										
Average per capita personnel cost	\$52,123			\$935.17 monthly										
Average per capita operations cost	\$11,222			\$5,276.76 monthly										
Total cost	\$36,550,100													
UNMIL with UN Police Reserve and Senior Reserve Roster on 12 month rotations.														
Average number deployed	635	635	635	635	635	635	635	635	635	635	635	635	635	675
Senior Reserve Roster	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
UN Police Reserve	629	629	629	629	629	629	629	629	629	629	629	629	629	869
Marginal travel costs (assumes 12-month rotation)														
	\$78,000													
Cost of UNPR reimbursements	\$737,188	\$785,817	\$785,817	\$785,817	\$785,817	\$785,817	\$785,817	\$785,817	\$785,817	\$785,817	\$785,817	\$785,817	\$785,817	\$9,551,532
Marginal cost of full-deployment UNPR, MSA and operations	\$346,689	\$240,509	\$240,509	\$240,509	\$240,509	\$240,509	\$240,509	\$240,509	\$240,509	\$240,509	\$240,509	\$240,509	\$240,509	\$4,657,245
Combined annual total:	\$1,161,777	\$1,026,325	\$1,026,325	\$1,026,325	\$1,026,325	\$1,026,325	\$1,026,325	\$1,026,325	\$1,026,325	\$1,026,325	\$1,026,325	\$1,026,325	\$1,026,325	\$14,208,777
Cost of non-deployed ROLCAP, 2d year onward (derived from table 12)														
	\$33,509,200													
Cost of non-deployed UNPR, derived from table A3.4 (low est/cumulative developed state participation)														
	\$28,395,727													
Share of Non-deployed ROLCAP (from PSA/Brindisi cost allocn), DS-06														
	\$9,966,693	16.1%	=	percent of UNMIL's apportionment for PSA/Brindisi, based on Table 2 in A/61/796 (expenditures)										\$9,966,693
Financial Impact of Using Reserve System on Mature Mission Costs:														
Actual UNMIL personnel and operational costs for individual police, 2005-06:														
	\$36,550,100													\$36,550,100
Estimated additional MSA and travel due to full deployment of police from reserve														
	\$4,657,245													\$4,657,245
Estimated cost of reimbursements to reserve-based police contributors:														
	\$9,551,532													\$9,551,532
UNMIL's share of non-deployed ROLCAP, based on its 2005-06 share of PSA/Brindisi:														
	\$9,966,693													\$9,966,693
Total UNMIL expenditures 1 July 2005-30 June 2006:														
	\$707,365,900													\$707,365,900
Reserve-based cost difference as percentage of UNMIL expenditures, 2005-06:														
	3.4%													3.4%

SOURCE: UN Performance report on the budget of the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006 -- Report of the Secretary-General, A/61/715, 26 January 2007, and Stimson Center operations expense allocations.

Table A3.8: UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia) Expenditures, 2005–2006

	Mission Total	Troops in Formed Units	Police in Formed Units	Military Observers	Individual Police	International Civilian Staff	UN Volunteers	National Officers	National General Staff
Mission average deployment:	17,557	14,686	479	200	577	525	337	34	719
Staff distribution:		83.6%	2.7%	1.1%	3.3%	3.0%	1.9%	0.2%	4.1%
Personnel costs, from budget report (000's US\$):		\$325,248	\$11,449	\$10,648	\$30,075	\$83,534	\$14,595	\$11,492	
Formed unit personnel costs, less cost of contingent-owned equipment (000's US\$):		\$269,827	\$9,214						
Formed unit COE costs (000's US\$):		\$55,421	\$2,235						
Formed unit self-sustainment costs [a] [b] (000's US\$):		\$60,814	\$2,217						
Total mission operational costs (000's US\$):	\$220,065								
Operational costs applicable to all personnel [c] (000's US\$):	\$93,181								
Operational costs applicable only outside formed units [e] (000's US\$):	\$60,805								
Mission share of Headquarters support & of Logistics Base, Brindisi [f] (000's US\$):	\$38,145								
Average per-capita personnel cost (US\$):		\$18,373	\$19,236	\$53,240	\$52,123	\$159,112	\$43,309	\$29,987	\$14,565
Average per capita operational costs (US\$):		\$15,395	\$16,775	\$10,943	\$10,943	\$10,943	\$10,943	\$10,943	\$10,943
Total per-capita costs (US\$):		\$33,768	\$36,010	\$64,183	\$63,066	\$170,056	\$54,252	\$40,931	\$25,509

Sources: United Nations, Performance report on the budget of the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006, A/61/715, 26 January 2007; The Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007), 204.

Table A3.9: UNMIL Estimated Mission Costs Worksheet

	(in 000's USD)		
[a] Major Operational Cost Categories Encompassing Self-Sustainment :	Total Category Costs	Self-Sustainment, by Category	Totals, Net of Self-sustainment
<i>Facilities and infrastructure</i>	\$78,710	\$33,153	\$45,558
<i>Communications</i>	\$21,293	\$14,257	\$7,036
<i>Medical</i>	\$16,691	\$11,843	\$4,848
<i>Special equipment</i>	\$3,800	\$3,779	\$21
<i>Subtotals, these categories</i>	\$120,494	\$63,031	\$57,463
[b] Calculating Shares of Self-Sustainment Costs:			
Military share of formed unit personnel	0.968		
Military share of formed unit Contingent Owned Equipment	0.961		
Average of military share of personnel and COE (for calculating share of self-sustainment)	0.965		
Total formed unit self-sustainment costs	\$63,031		
Military self-sustainment	\$60,814		
FPU self-sustainment (assumes equivalent operating tempo)	\$2,217		
[c] Major Operational Cost Categories Excluded from all Distributions of Operational Costs*:			
<i>General and temporary assistance</i>	\$2,634		
<i>Consultants</i>	\$414		
<i>Subtotals, these categories</i>	\$3,049		
[d] Major Operational Cost Categories Included in all Distributions of Operational Costs:			
<i>Ground transportation</i>	\$17,168		
<i>Air transportation</i>	\$61,830		
<i>Naval transportation</i>	\$2,479		
<i>Information technology</i>	\$3,578		
<i>Other supplies, services, and equipment</i>	\$8,126		
<i>Subtotals, these categories</i>	\$93,181		
[e] Major operational Cost Categories Applicable Only to Personnel Outside of Formed Units:			
<i>Official travel</i>	\$2,342		
<i>Quick-impact projects</i>	\$1,000		
<i>Categories encompassing self-sustainment, NET of self-sustainment:</i>	\$57,463		
<i>Subtotals, these categories</i>	\$60,805		
[f] Mission pro-rata share, Peacekeeping Support Account** and UN Logistics Base, Brindisi:			
<i>Peacekeeping support account</i>	\$31,191		
<i>UN Logistics Base, Brindisi</i>	\$6,954		
<i>Subtotals, these categories</i>	\$38,145		

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Table A3.9 Continued

[g] National Staff Calculations	Salary and Allowances	+25% Hazard Bonus	
National Officer	\$22,539	\$28,174	
National General Services staff	\$10,900	\$13,625	
Salary ratio:		2.1	
Number National Officers	34		
National Officer "GS-equivalents" (number x salary ratio)	70		
National GS staff	719		
Total national staff "GS-equivalents"	789		
National Officer fraction of national staff personnel costs	0.089		
National GS fraction of national staff personnel costs	0.911		
<p>Notes: *Excluded because these are separate personnel categories as well as 'operational' categories **Pays for UN Headquarters support to peacekeeping.</p> <p>Sources: United Nations, <i>Financing the support account for peacekeeping operations, Financing of the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, Note by the Secretary-General, A/C.5/59/33, 6 June 2005</i>; www.un.org/Depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/salaries/liberia.htm; United Nations, <i>Performance Report on the budget of the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006, Report of the Secretary-General, A/61/715, 26 January 2007</i>.</p>			

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The *Future of Peace Operations* program builds a broader public dialogue on the role of peace operations in resolving conflict and building lasting peace. Peace operations comprise peacekeeping, the provision of temporary, post-conflict security by internationally mandated forces and peacebuilding, those efforts undertaken by the international community to help a war-torn society create a self-sustaining peace.

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The program is led by Director William Durch, and supported by Deputy Director Alison Giffen, researchers Alix Boucher, Madeline England, and Guy Hammond, and program management specialist Nicole Dieker. To learn more about the program or to offer feedback on our work, please visit www.stimson.org/fopo or contact us at 202-223-5956.

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