CONFLICT TRENDS

CIVILIAN DIMENSION
OF PEACEKEEPING

ACCORD
THE AFRICAN CENTRE FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

MAKE PEACE HAPPEN
2010
www.makepeacehappen.net

Tfp TRAINING FOR PEACE

Promoting peace through training, research and policy development

The Training for Peace Programme (TfP) is an international training and research programme funded and established by the Norwegian Government since 1995. Its primary purpose is to contribute towards capacity building within the broader ambit of peace operations in Africa.

TfP is a joint programme between the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) in Oslo, the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) in Durban, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra. The target groups are personnel within relevant ministries, such as Foreign Affairs and Defence, and the military, police, judicial, non-governmental organisations and media sectors.

Within its overall goal, TfP's objective is broadly twofold:
- primarily, to establish a self-sustaining, multifunctional peace operation capacity in Africa.
- secondarily, to provide advice to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in formulating policies on issues pertinent to co-operative efforts between Africa and Norway regarding peace operations and reconciliation.

Both of these objectives are implemented at the conceptual and the practical level through training, research and policy development activities.

TRAINING

The programme conducts a set of generic and specifically designed training courses in Africa.

RESEARCH

TfP carries out research and studies in support of training and policy development. These activities help formulate, document, analyse and apply innovative ideas and practices from past and current peace operations, and encourage the development of a common understanding and application of peace-keeping doctrine within Africa.

POLICY DEVELOPMENT

TfP conducts seminars, conferences, expert meetings and workshops to develop new understanding, knowledge and approaches that provide the basis for more effective training and education. In addition, Tfp promotes policy development in order to formulate, document, analyse and apply innovative ideas to improve peacekeeping capabilities in Africa.

CIVILIAN ROSTER

To facilitate rapid deployment of personnel with relevant qualifications, the TfP programme is associated with the African Civilian Response Capacity for Peace Support Operations (AFDEM) – an organisation running a regional civilian stand-by roster, which screens, includes, tracks and helps deploy personnel trained in a variety of peacekeeping and peacebuilding skills. The AFDEM Roster is located in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe.

www.trainingforpeace.org

CONTENTS

EDITORIAL

BY **VASU GOUNDEN**

The role of civilians in peacekeeping operations has been increasingly important over the last two decades. With the growing, complex environment in which peacekeeping operations are being deployed, there is a need for peacekeeping to move beyond mere military deployment. In this regard, there is a realisation that many of the new functions that complex peacekeeping operations need to undertake can only be conducted by civilian personnel. As such, civilian personnel within peacekeeping operations are being used better and more efficiently as a means to facilitate the political and post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding processes that are part of the mandate of contemporary missions.

Most missions nowadays have multidimensional and complex mandates that require an array of skills. Peacekeeping operations are now frequently involved in various activities that include, for instance, supporting electoral transitions, facilitating the promotion and protection of human rights, or facilitating inter-communal dialogue through confidence-building processes. As a result of being increasingly involved in such activities, more civilians are required for peacekeeping operations, which has had the direct effect of giving higher profile to peacekeeping areas of specialisation such as civil affairs, political affairs or electoral affairs. It is difficult to imagine how current peacekeeping missions would implement their mandates without engaging in these tasks.

Whilst the engagement of civilians within peacekeeping operations is an emerging trend, there are still many challenges to be overcome. One of the challenges currently faced relates to the need to strengthen the capacity of civilian personnel and enhance their professionalism. For example, the United Nations' 2009 New Horizon Report – which initiated a new process for reforming and strengthening peacekeeping operations – states that "new peacekeeping tasks require high numbers of police and civilian specialists, experts that are in limited supply both at home and abroad". Whilst civilians are increasingly relevant to the running of contemporary peacekeeping operations, there is still a long way to go until their roles are entirely fulfilled and recognised, particularly in terms of current deficiencies and gaps in the recruitment and training of civilians.

It is widely recognised that such inadequacies and challenges are particularly relevant to the African context, as the continent hosts the highest number of multidimensional peacekeeping operations in the world, and is developing its own ambitious continental peacekeeping system. As part of its commitment to promoting sustainable peace in Africa and beyond, the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) – through its Training for Peace (TfP) programme – was one of the first organisations internationally to acknowledge and advocate for the need to enhance the civilian dimension of peacekeeping operations, and has worked extensively over the last 15 years to promote this. ACCORD's main aim has been to promote peace through improving civilian capacity to prepare, plan, manage and monitor multidimensional peacekeeping operations in Africa. The TfP programme at ACCORD is therefore currently engaged in a series of activities that aim to increase the understanding and professionalism of the civilian dimension of peacekeeping operations.

With this aim as a central focus, this *Conflict Trends* Issue focuses on the Civilian Dimension of Peacekeeping Operations. In order to strengthen the civilian capacity in peacekeeping operations, it is essential to understand better the evolution and role of civilians within peacekeeping operations. This arises from the realisation that the challenges that the civilian dimension of peacekeeping faces are not only related to deployment, but are also linked to the overall understanding of the field, both by academics and practitioners. By providing a reflection on the very nature of the civilian dimension of peacekeeping and acknowledging that it is still a largely unexplored field, TfP/ACCORD aims to present new perspectives that contribute meaningfully to enhancing peacekeeping research and field practice. ⚐

Vasu Gounden is the Founder and Executive Director of ACCORD.

THE SIGNIFICANT ROLE OF CIVILIANS IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

BY **GUSTAVO DE CARVALHO AND ZINURINE ALGHALI**

From Traditional to Multidimensional Peacekeeping

In the last 20 years, many changes have occurred in the field of conflict resolution. Analysis of global statistics has shown that the number of violent conflicts worldwide has decreased considerably.[1] There have also been many changes in the qualitative nature of the actions taken to mitigate and resolve conflicts worldwide. These qualitative changes are particularly relevant to peacekeeping operations.

Before the 1990s, peacekeeping forces were mostly deployed to serve as a buffer between two warring parties, focusing usually on monitoring an interim ceasefire to help prevent a resumption or escalation of conflict or violence.[2] As a result of this traditional and narrower approach, peace-keeping operations were composed of limited number of troops, focused mostly on military aspects and ceasefire observations, and the separation of fighting forces by a multinational force.

In the 1990s, a new trend in peacekeeping emerged and evolved both conceptually and operationally, to meet new challenges and political realities. Since then, peacekeeping has become part of political solutions and strategies, not just an alternative.[3] Peacekeeping thus served as one of a

Above: The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) team consisting of Civil Affairs, Human Rights, Police and Military Officers observe a traditional leader advocating for peace between the Misseriya people and their Dinka neighbours, in the village of Goleh, Abyei district.

The United Nations Mission in Sudan's (UNMIS) Joint Mediation Support Team in a meeting in Khartoum, Sudan (2007).

range of international peace and security tools considered against other available response options by the United Nations (UN).

Faced with a rising demand for increasingly complex peacekeeping operations to deal with crises and challenges, the UN was challenged as never before. The UN worked vigorously to strengthen its capacity to manage and sustain field operations. Thus, peacekeeping operations became not only larger, but much more ambitious in their mandates. The UN had to assist communities and nations to make the transition from war to peace within the key and broad role of peacebuilding in complex peace operations.

Some of the missions of the past decade were particularly hard to accomplish because they tended to deploy where conflict had not resulted in victory for any side, where a military stalemate or international pressure had brought fighting to a halt and at least some of the parties to the conflict were not seriously committed to ending the confrontation. Many UN operations thus did not deploy into post-conflict situations but tried to create them in situations where it was difficult to find "peace to keep". In such complex operations, peacekeepers worked to maintain a secure local environment and to make such an environment self-sustaining.

Most of the new peacekeeping operations became more focused on assisting host countries to ensure sustainable peace through comprehensive and holistic support to peace processes. Most of the peacekeeping operations undertaken under the perspective of ensuring such holistic support to peace processes started implementing a dual approach, which combined the deployment of robust military forces with a significant civilian component. This has become known as multidimensional peacekeeping.

Missions that have been created under multidimensional and complex mandates require a varied array of tasks to be implemented by military, police and civilian personnel. Thus, peacekeepers' responsibilities now range from assisting in the implementation of peace agreements to protecting and delivering humanitarian assistance; from assisting with the demobilisation of former fighters and their return to civilian life to supervising and conducting elections; from training and restructuring local police forces to monitoring a respect for human rights and investigating alleged violations; or from building the capacity of state institutions to protecting civilians; or direct military combat to facilitating inter-communal dialogue through confidence-building processes.

As a result, specialised skills such as civil affairs, political affairs and electoral affairs gained a higher profile in the peacekeeping field. Forman accurately presents that, far from being mere technical tasks, these civilian roles are involved in supporting and enhancing core political developments in the countries in which they are operating. As such, these civilian roles require strong leadership, political and interpersonal skills, and knowledge of local languages, politics, culture and norms.[4] This article

therefore aims to present the evolving and increasing role of civilians, and the importance of civilian functions within the peacekeeping field.

Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations and the Involvement of Civilians

Given that conflict is embedded within a political landscape, it became apparent that the military – whose core business in traditional peacekeeping was to serve as a buffer between warring parties – would not be able to address the political aspects of intrastate conflicts. Thus, this opened a space for the involvement of specialised civilians to drive political processes, through dialogue and conflict management for the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

The importance of civilians within peacekeeping operations has thus increased considerably, and they are now a core part in the implementation of peacekeeping mandates. Civilian personnel within peacekeeping operations have been used as a means to facilitate the political and post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding processes that are part of the mandates of contemporary missions.

The importance of civilians within peacekeeping operations can be measured, on the one hand, by analysing the increasing proportion of civilians deployed in peacekeeping operations. Currently, civilian peacekeepers make up approximately 20% of UN peacekeepers deployed.[5] On the other hand, however, the importance of civilians is not only due to their increasing numbers, but must also be assessed for their increasing qualitative significance within the peacekeeping field.

Recognising the important roles and functions of civilians, as well as police, to complement the roles and functions of the military in peacekeeping operations, is the result of a multidimensional approach to peacekeeping. Thus, multidimensional peacekeeping operations provide for a civilian-led multiple-level mission management structure, typically consisting of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG)/Head of Mission, one or more deputy SRSGs/Deputy Heads of Mission, a Force Commander, a Commissioner of Police, various heads of substantive civilian components, and a Head of Mission Support.

This multidimensional management structure is a visible aspect of peacekeeping operations, so to ensure that the military, police and civilians implement the respective broad tasks of ensuring security and stability, instituting the rule of law and assisting local institutions to restart society.

UN PHOTO/MARTINE PERRET

A United Nations Political Affairs Officer with the former United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), sensitises the women of Mongwalu on good governance in Bunia, Ituri.

The SRSG, as the political head of the mission and main representative of the civilian dimension of peacekeeping operations, facilitates the course of action that generates and maintains strategic direction and operational coherence across the political, governance, development, economic and security dimensions of the peace process.[6]

Depending on the type of mission, the civilian component typically includes the following:

Civilian Substantive and Mission Support Functions[7]

Substantive Civilian Functions	
Function	**Description**
Political affairs	Monitor and analyse the political aspects of the peace process and provide the mission leadership and headquarters with advice and reports on short-, medium- and long-term developments and prospects.
Legal advice	Monitor mission planning and operations and provide legal advice to the mission on the legal implications of any intended actions and their consequences.
Planning and coordination	Facilitate the mission planning process (multi-year, annual, phase transitions, special events, drawing down, and so on).
Public information	Develop and implement an effective public information campaign to keep the general public, mission members, stakeholders and partners informed of developments in support of the peace process, and the role and activities of the mission.
Humanitarian liaison	Facilitate the establishment of a positive relationship between the humanitarian community and the various mission components, based on recognition and respect for humanitarian principles, including independence.
Human rights	Facilitate the promotion and protection of human rights, with particular attention to women, children and other vulnerable persons, through human rights monitoring and reporting, advising and educating the parties to the conflict, monitoring and advising new institutions on human rights issues.
Gender	Provide policy and technical advice to the senior mission leadership, the host government and partners on strategies for advancing gender equality and women's rights, in accordance with policies and instruments on gender equality and women's rights, including the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security.
Child protection	Facilitate and promote child protection in the peace process through advising, educating and coordinating the child protection efforts among stakeholders internally, and networking with external stakeholders and partners.
Conduct and discipline	Monitor compliance with the Code of Conduct and the mission's Conduct and Discipline policy, and investigate all complaints according to these policies.
Rule of law	Provide expertise to improve the quality of justice and access to justice through the reform of criminal law, policies, practice and institutions.
Electoral affairs	Provide technical and logistical advice and support to the Electoral Commission, and facilitate and participate in the monitoring of elections.
Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants	In consultation with all stakeholders and partners, assist the parties to the conflict with the design and implementation of the national DDR programme.
Civil affairs	Facilitate liaison between the mission and national, provincial and local authorities and civil society to assist with the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction of social services and the extension of state authority.
Security sector reform (SSR)	Advise the Head of Mission, Force Commander, Commissioner of Police and other relevant components on issues or initiatives associated with SSR.

Mission Support Functions	
Human resources	Human resources services, including the recruitment and contract management of local and international personnel, and managing staff conduct and behaviour.
Financial	Financial management services, including budgeting, accounting, cash management, payments and contractor management.
Procurement	The procurement of all aspects of logistical support, including life cycle management for the mission, the provision of mission assets to all mission components, fleet management, and the provision of an integrated communications infrastructure system (CIS), including design, installation, and so on.
Logistics	Logistics and integrated support, including the distribution of mission assets to all mission components – including vehicles, computers and stationery – and the provision of bulk supplies of water, fuel products and foodstuffs.
Engineering	Provide accommodation, building management and civil engineering services.
Geographical information services (GIS)	Provide geographical information and mapping services.
Information, technology and communications (ITC)	Design, install, operate and maintain mission-wide communications including telephone, radio and data systems, proprietary information management systems, Internet, intramission mail and a diplomatic pouch service.
Transport	Provide fleet management and maintenance services.
Contingent-owned equipment (COE)	Monitoring, database management and inspection of COE.
Security	Provide security services to protect mission staff and assets.
Integrated training services	Provide induction briefings for all military, police and civilian staff, identify training needs and facilitate in-mission training, and act as a clearing house for out-of-mission training opportunities offered to mission staff.

There is also the integrated aspect of peace operations, which combines the core peacekeeping functions highlighted above with aspects of peacebuilding and development through synergies between the peacekeeping mission and UN agencies, trickling down to international and local non-governmental organisations. Although the Secretary-General recently noted that "United Nations peacekeeping missions today are much better designed than they used to be, and have a more integrated understanding of the many different tasks involved in preventing a recurrence of fighting and laying the foundations of a lasting peace"[8], there is, however, no commonly agreed understanding of what qualifies as an integrated mission. For the UN, the system's multiple goals and institutional culture explains some of the main difficulties that arise when trying to define integrated missions as concept and practice. The UN addresses the issue of integrated missions through three approaches:

- restoration of stability, law and order;
- protection of civilians; and
- providing the foundations for long-term recovery, development and democratic governance.

These approaches are ostensibly inter-related. In reality, however, each leads to differing views on the objectives and priorities of integration for different clusters of peacekeeping, development and humanitarian actors.[9]

Expanding the Scope of Peacekeeping Through a Civilian Approach

The increased role of civilians within a multidimensional peacekeeping operation has allowed peacekeeping to embrace a diverse environment and diverse actions that venture beyond the traditional tasks of peace-keeping. As such, peacekeepers now provide a series of support functions that range from "pure peacekeeping"

The United Nations Mission in Liberia's (UNMIL) Chief of Public Information (at the podium), speaks at the launch of the disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) information campaign in Tubmanburg.

to peacemaking and conflict management, as well as peacebuilding.[10]

For example, Civil Affairs – a key functional area in UN peacekeeping – entails tasks that could easily be classified as peacemaking and/or peacebuilding activities. Civil Affairs Officers work at the social administrative and subnational political levels, and aim to facilitate the countrywide implementation of peacekeeping mandates. Their role is aimed at supporting the population and government in strengthening conditions and structures conducive for sustainable peace. Their key activities include promoting confidence-building and dialogue between opposing parties, and supporting the restoration and extension of state authority. Whilst these activities are implemented by a peacekeeping mission, they are typically regarded as peacemaking and peacebuilding activities respectively.

Whilst the role of civilians in peacekeeping operations, in general terms, relates to the strengthening of states and their institutions after conflict, the specific functions vary considerably, depending on the context and mission environment. This variety can be seen in the roles in which civilian peacekeepers have been involved in the past decade, ranging from political observation and negotiation in El Salvador to technical assistance and advisory services in Mozambique, for instance.[11]

A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO PEACEKEEPING RECOGNISES THE IMPORTANT ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF CIVILIANS, AS WELL AS POLICE, TO COMPLEMENT THE ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The United Nations Mission in Liberia's (UNMIL) civilian personnel distributes election materials in Monrovia, Liberia, as part of a Public Affairs Community Outreach elections sensitisation campaign (2005).

In more extreme cases, civilian peacekeepers have been required to undertake state building activities, wherein the peacekeeping operation not only had to provide support for building state institutions in a certain country, but also had to lead a fully-fledged interim administration in the country. The UN peacekeeping forces in Kosovo and Timor-Leste were instances of this. In Kosovo, for instance, the 10th operative clause of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) authorised the establishment of:

> "…an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo."[12]

Challenges in the Implementation of a Civilian Dimension in Peacekeeping

Whilst the profile of civilians within peacekeeping operations is an emerging trend, there are still many challenges to be overcome. One such challenge is the need to strengthen the capacity and enhance the professionalism of civilian personnel. For example, the New Horizon Report states that "new peacekeeping tasks require high numbers of police and civilian specialists, experts that are in limited supply both at home and abroad".[13] This indicates that, whilst civilians are increasingly relevant for the implementation of contemporary peacekeeping operations, their expertise is scarce. This gap thus results in challenges relating to the recruitment and training of civilians for efficient implementation of mission mandates. This also affects the efficient operationalisation of the civilian dimension of peace operations.

Related to these challenges is the fact that, although peacekeeping operations are increasingly multidimensional, they have not been matched by efforts to increase the availability of the necessary human resources – especially qualified civilian personnel for crucial tasks. According to the Annual Review of Peace Operations, the average civilian vacancy rates in UN peacekeeping missions in 2007 were about 30%, the majority of which were in essential areas such as rule of law or judicial reform.[14] A clear example of this relates to the UNMIS experience, wherein the deployment of police and militaries started in early 2005 whilst the civilian recruitment was further behind schedule, with a vacancy rate of 36.5% at the end of September 2006.[15]

Another challenge relates to the fact that, although the UN and European Union (EU) have developed and continue to refine their civilian recruitment systems, the African Union (AU) is yet to determine the best system that will work for its peace operations within the African Standby Force (ASF) framework. This is reflected in the slow pace of development of the civilian dimension of the ASF, as compared to the military and police aspects.

Conclusion

The role of civilians has been increasingly important in the implementation of complex peacekeeping operation mandates. Civilians continue to provide core support towards conflict transformation in local communities where peacekeeping operations are deployed. However, it is still an area that demands attention and increased support and enhancement from the UN, AU, EU, member states and training institutions, among others. The need to enhance civilian capacity for peacekeeping requires intensive training and enhanced mechanisms, which will allow for both faster and more efficient deployment, as well as professionalism in the execution of tasks.

Some processes are now underway to increase and improve the deployment and professionalism of civilian peacekeepers within the UN and AU contexts. The appointment of a Senior Advisory Group on peacekeeping by the UN Secretary-General, to guide a review of international civilian capacities for UN peace operations, is a step in the right direction. This group is mandated to lead a process that will improve the international response to conflicts by strengthening the availability, deployability and appropriateness of civilian capacities. Whilst there are still delays in the development of the ASF, the civilian dimension is considered a priority aspect on the agenda of the AU Peace Support Operations Division for the ASF processes. It is thus evident that aspects aimed at furthering the civilian dimension development process will be prominent in the ASF Road Map III. This third road map will serve as the guide for addressing the gaps and consolidating the achievements in the ASF process in general, and the civilian dimension in particular. ♙

Gustavo de Carvalho and Zinurine Alghali are the Acting Coordinators of ACCORD's Peacekeeping Unit and TfP programme.

Endnotes

1 Rittberger, Volker (2008) From the Westphalian Peace to Strategies for Peace in a Post-Westphalian Environment. In Rittberger, Volker and Fischer, Martina (eds.) *Strategies for Peace: Contributions of International Organizations, States, and Non-State Actors*. Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, p. 41.

2 Bellamy, A.J., Williams, P. and Griffin, S. (2004) *Understanding Peacekeeping*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 173.

3 United Nations (2009) *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*. New York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping and Department of Field Support, p. iv.

4 Forman, Shepard (2004) *Building Civilian Capacity for Conflict Management and Sustainable Peace*. New York: Center on International Cooperation at New York University, Available at: <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/archive/conflict/Forman-%20 Building%20Civilian%20Capacity.pdf>, Accessed on: 5 June 2010, p. 2.

5 UN Peacekeeping Background Notes, Available at: <http://www. un.org/en/peacekeeping/bnote.htm>, Accessed on: 2 June 2010.

6 De Coning, Cedric (2010) Mediation and Peacebuilding: SRSGs and DSRGs in Integrated Missions. *Global Governance,* 16 (2010), p. 282.

7 This is a revised and summarised version of the Civilian Substantive and Mission Support Functions table, found on pages 16 and 17 of the African Standby Force Civilian Dimension Staffing Training and Rostering Report, published by ACCORD.

8 Eide, Espen Barth, Kaspersen, Anja Therese, Kent, Randolph and Von Hippel, Karin (2005) *Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations*. Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group.

9 Jones, Bruce D. (2001) *The Challenges of Strategic Coordination: Containing Opposition and Sustaining Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars*. International Peace Academy.

10 As a result of this diverse approach, various new concepts have been used to classify peacekeeping operations. Concepts like peace operations, peace support operations, and wider peace-keeping – just to name a few – are frequently used to classify specific types of activities deployed within the peacekeeping field. This article uses peacekeeping in a broader sense, incorpo-rating all of the specific types of operations deployed by different international organisations.

11 Forman, Shepard (2004), op. cit., p. 1.

12 United Nations Security Council, 4011th meeting. Resolution 1244 [On the deployment of international civil and security presences in Kosovo]. Official Record. New York, 10 June 1999. p.3

13 United Nations (2009) A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, op. cit.

14 Center on International Cooperation (2008) *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 7.

15 Bah, Alhaji and Johnstone, Ian (2007) Sudan: Faltering Protection and Fragile Peace. In Center on International Cooperation (2007) *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 31.

ADDRESSING THE CIVILIAN PEACEKEEPING CAPACITY GAP

BY **CEDRIC DE CONING**

Introduction

One of the most significant, but often overlooked, developments in peace operations is the transformation from military- to civilian-focused peace missions. This change has come about as mandates shifted from monitoring military ceasefires to supporting the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements. As these missions became more peacebuilding-orientated, the role of civilians became more central, the number of civilian functions increased, and the role of civilians shifted from a peripheral support role to the core of contemporary peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions.

However, none of the organisations that undertake peace operations, including the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN), have managed to develop the capability to deploy suitably qualified and experienced civilian peacekeepers, in a reasonable time-frame, and in the numbers required. What all these organisations have in common, despite the different AU, EU, and UN contexts, is that they have encountered serious challenges when it comes to the recruitment, deployment and retention of civilians for peace and stability operations.

Above: The United Nations deploys more civilian peace-keepers than all the other multilateral institutions combined.

Former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, addresses staff members on the occasion of the UN's Staff Day (2005). Recruitment at the UN is frequently a slow and bureaucratic process.

This article addresses the civilian capacity challenge in the UN peacekeeping context.

The UN deploys more civilian peacekeepers than all the other multilateral institutions combined. At the beginning of 2010, the EU had deployed approximately 2 000 civilian personnel; the OSCE approximately 3 000 civilian staff, and the AU deployed approximately 50 civilians in its current operation in Somalia. As of March 2010, the UN had approximately 22 000 civilians deployed, including approximately 5 800 international staff, of which 2 400 were UN volunteers.[1]

There is a misperception that the Global South is under-represented in civilian posts in UN peacekeeping operations. Among the top 20 nations from which civilian expertise is recruited, and which contribute 50% of the civilians in UN peacekeeping missions, 31% are in fact from the South.[2] The largest percentage of civilians in UN peacekeeping missions is, in fact, from Africa. There were nine African countries among the top 20 contributors of international civilian staff to UN missions in 2009, namely: 2nd Kenya (4.8%), 7th Ghana (2.9%), 8th Sierra Leone (2.7%), 10th

Ethiopia (2.3%), 11th Nigeria (2.2%), 14th Uganda (1.7%), 15th Cameroon (1.6%), 17th Tanzania (1.5%) and 18th Cote d'Ivoire (1.3%). In addition to the international staff, in 2009 the UN employed 15 442 national professional and general service staff in UN missions, and of these 10 109, or approximately 75%, were Africans.[3]

Recruitment, Rostering and Deployment Challenges

The UN Secretariat's Department of Field Support (DFS) provides support to the UN's peacekeeping operations and political missions, including with human resources. Vacant civilian peacekeeping positions are advertised on the UN website. Individuals apply online, and successful candidates are hired on an individual contract basis. The UN receives approximately 150 000 applications per year for its civilian peacekeeping field positions. This means that the UN receives approximately 1 500 applications for every civilian position advertised, of which approximately 50 are qualified to be considered for the position.[4]

Although the UN's recruitment system generates a large number of applicants, many of them are unsuitable.

The current system is designed in such a way that UN personnel spend much time working on these applications to identify those candidates that meet the minimum requirements.

The large number of applications received by the UN needs to be qualified, Firstly, most individuals are likely to apply for more than one post, so the number of applications received does not relate directly to the number of individuals that have applied overall. Secondly, a large proportion of applicants do not meet the minimum requirements, and should thus not be considered when analysing the number of applicants per post advertised. However, although the pool of qualified candidates is much smaller than the number of applicants, for most categories of staff, indications are that the supply is adequate. In general, we can thus argue that the UN does not have a supply side gap when it comes to the number of applications received for its peacekeeping missions. In other words, there is not a shortage of qualified candidates for most UN civilian peacekeeping and peacebuilding posts.

Secondment versus Direct Hiring Systems

The argument that the UN does not experience a shortage of candidates is interesting, because all the other organisations that undertake peace operations (AU, EU and the OSCE) report that there is a civilian capacity gap, that is,

a shortage of civilian candidates. It is thus not surprising that most initiatives that focus on addressing the civilian capacity challenge are aimed at increasing the number of civilians available for peace operations through targeted training and developing roster systems. If the UN does not experience a shortage of candidates, then increasing the number of candidates is not going to assist the UN to address its particular civilian capacity challenge.

One of the most important differences between the recruitment systems of the UN and the EU and OSCE, is that the EU and OSCE rely on secondments from their Member States. The UN only makes use of secondments for peacekeeping operations in exceptional circumstances, typically when specialists are needed that cannot be recruited through the normal recruitment system. In systems that rely on secondments, the pool of available expertise is typically limited to the civil service. Most civil services do not have sufficient surplus staff to enable them to contribute civilian personnel to international missions. National departments are reluctant to release their staff, especially their best. Highly specialised categories of staff are in short supply.

Countries that manage these challenges best have usually invested in a dedicated effort to provide civilian training and to pre-identify potential candidates in civilian standby rosters.[5] There are only a very few countries in the

The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, addresses the staff of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), 2008.

THE MAIN CHALLENGE FACING THE UN IS PROCESSING THE LARGE NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS IT RECEIVES, SELECTING THE MOST DESERVING CANDIDATES, AND THE TIME IT TAKES TO PROCESS AN APPLICATION FROM THE MOMENT A VACANCY IS ANNOUNCED UNTIL A PERSON IS DEPLOYED TO TAKE UP THE POST

world that can afford to make this kind of investment in civilian capacity development. In order to avoid a situation where the few countries that can afford to second personnel gratis to the UN gain an unfair advantage over countries that cannot afford to second gratis personnel, the General Assembly restricted the use of gratis personnel in 1997 and 1998.[6]

The UN does not experience the same problems as those organisations that use a secondment system, because those individuals that are interested in serving in civilian capacities in UN peacekeeping operations can apply directly to the UN. They do not have to go through a national secondment process, even if they are civil servants. Once they accept a UN offer of employment they need to make their own arrangements with their national employer. The UN's individual direct recruitment approach not only overcomes the deficit dilemma experienced by the EU and others, but it also seems to have resolved a number of representational dilemmas. Those countries that lack the resources to invest in, and second staff to international operations, also often lack sufficient national opportunities to retain staff, and vice-versa.

High Vacancy Rates

It is surprising, however, that despite the fact that the UN is overwhelmed by the number of applications it receives, its peacekeeping missions suffer from high vacancy rates. The average vacancy rate of international civilian staff for UN operations between 2005 and 2008 has been about 22%. In some missions the figures are much higher, especially during the start-up phases. The UN mission in Darfur (UNAMID) had a 56% vacancy rate in 2008, and the UN mission in Sudan (UNMIS) had a 40% vacancy rate in 2005.[7]

In some cases the vacancy rates are caused by the inability of missions, especially in the start-up phase, to absorb more staff. Slow deployment rates in UNMIS, UNAMID and the UN mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT) were partly due to the fact that these missions were not able to absorb additional staff, especially into field offices, as the required security systems, office space, accommodation, equipment, transport, and

so on, were not yet in place. Although mission start-up is particularly challenging, the average vacancy rate seems to indicate that this challenge is not limited to the start-up phase.

As already mentioned, the vacancy rate in UN peace operations is not, with a few exceptions, caused by a shortage of suitable applicants. Instead, this article argues that the civilian capacity gap in UN operations is related to the time it takes to identify, recruit and deploy appropriate staff to the field, as well as its inability to retain staff. The average length of time that a UN Civil Affairs Officer remains on a contract is 24 months. The average number of days to process recruitment in 2000-2001 was 275, and the estimate for 2002–2003 was 200 days. In 2004 this figure was reported as 174 days, but the improvement it suggests seems to be related to how the days are calculated, rather than to an actual improvement in the system. According to the low-level panel, the 174 days in 2004 relates to the period: "...from the day that a vacancy announcement began to be prepared to the day when a selection decision is made by the head of department," as opposed to the date when the recruit actually enters the system.[8]

Despite the large number of applicants, and the thoroughness of the recruitment process, there are persistent complaints from within the system about the quality and appropriateness of the candidates that are eventually recruited. One study highlights a sentiment that is widespread within the UN, namely that people are not selected on merit, but on the basis of who they know in the system.[9] It is difficult to empirically evaluate such claims about quality and merit, but this perception does appear to be common among UN peacekeeping staff, both at headquarters and in the field, as well as among the training and rostering community in general. At the minimum, one can thus argue that it appears as if the UN recruitment system suffers from a lack of confidence, both within the UN system, as well as among its stakeholders.

The core civilian capacity challenge for UN peacekeeping operations thus seems to be processing the large number of applications it receives, and ensuring that the most deserving candidates are selected and deployed within a reasonable time. Throughout this process the UN human resources system must also ensure that its policies that seek to empower women and ensure global representation are meaningfully implemented. Another important consideration is retaining staff that perform well for longer periods on contract, which will in turn reduce pressure on the system to recruit new staff, or to process new contracts. The average time it takes to fill a new vacancy and the average vacancy rate suggests that the system is routinely stressed. The high vacancy rate in new missions suggests that the system is overwhelmed during high demand periods when new missions are established or existing missions are expanded.

UN peacekeeping has experienced exceptional growth over the last half decade. As of March 2010 the UN had more than 120 000 military, police and civilian peacekeepers

deployed and managed a budget of approximately US$8 billion. It is therefore not surprising that the UN human resources system was overwhelmed by this exceptional growth in demand. What is surprising, however, is that the UN system, including the Member States, through the Special Committee on Peacekeeping of the General Assembly, have not done more to address this critical problem.

Although recruitment challenges have been discussed and mentioned in the Special Committee reports, the Member States have not given the Secretariat the means to seriously address the shortcomings in its human resources system. Likewise, the Secretariat has not produced a convincing proposal to the General Assembly as to how it could meaningfully transform the system. As a result the system is being adjusted piecemeal, which only adds to the general sense of uncertainty and frustration in the UN peacekeeping community. The single most important initiative that can be taken to improve the civilian vacancy rate in UN peacekeeping o perations is to radically overhaul and improve the UN's recruitment system, and to replace it with a system designed specifically for the needs of UN peacekeeping missions.

Specialised Categories

As mentioned earlier, the UN also finds it difficult to identify candidates in certain specialised categories of personnel. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)/DFS July 2009 non-paper, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping,* identified civilian specialists, including in security sector reform, judicial and prisons management, as a critical shortage in contemporary UN peacekeeping operations.[10] This is partly a function of the unavailability of these skills in the marketplace in general. Some categories of staff, for instance, many of those in the Rule of Law professions such as corrections officers, magistrates and judges, can usually only be found in the civil service. To address this problem DPKO has proposed the enhancement of the existing Standing Police Capacity to include justice and corrections specialists.

UN PHOTO/LOIS CONNER

United Nations (UN) staff members are recruited from the organisation's Member States. Seen here is a representative group of the UN headquarters staff.

The former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guehenno (back to camera), addresses participants at the Department of Peacekeeping Operation's (DPKO) Senior Leadership Induction Programme, in New York. DPKO experiences shortages of female candidates for senior management positions.

In some cases new specialised functional needs may develop for which no prior professional category existed. Examples over the years include, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); protection of civilians; integrated planning and benchmarking. As it is rarely possible to find persons with direct experience in these new functions in the market place, persons with similar skills and related experience would need to be identified and trained. DPKO also experiences shortages of candidates for senior management positions (P5 and above), especially female candidates, amongst others, because the other UN agencies offer better terms and conditions, including more family duty stations, than DPKO.[11]

In those cases where the UN recruitment system is unable to find appropriate candidates using its regular system, it has to make a special effort to seek appropriate candidates. In some exceptional cases this may result in the UN approaching Member States that have such specialised personnel potentially available with a request to temporarily second them to a UN mission. In other instances they may approach training centres to arrange special courses to train existing or potential staff in the new areas of expertise, or they may approach civilian standby rosters to assist them to identify such specially skilled individuals in the market place.

Civilian Standby Rosters

Standby rosters are often seen as the obvious solution to general or specific capacity gaps. The idea is that people are pre-trained, pre-identified and placed on a standby roster, where they are then ready to be deployed when the need arises. The theory is that rosters will help to address the civilian capacity gap by pre-identifying civilians and keeping their information on record, so that they can be recruited faster when they are needed. The reality, however, has proven more complex.

There are, in fact, several different types of rosters. The Center on International Cooperation's report, *Rapid Deployment of Civilians for Peace Operations: Status, Gaps and Options*, distinguishes between three categories, namely a standing capacity, a standby capacity and a rostered capacity.[12] A *standing* capacity is one that has staff that are employed full time with the express purpose of being available as a surge capacity when the need arises. DPKO's Standing Police Capacity

and the Mediation Support Unit's Standby Team of Mediation Experts (SBT) are the only two examples of a standing capacity within the UN Secretariat. Another example of a standing capacity is the American Civilian Response Corps (CRC). The CRC aims to have a standing capacity of 100 and a standby capacity of a further 500 by 2010.

Although not a standing capacity in the same sense of the word, it should perhaps also be mentioned in this context that DPKO/DFS proposed to move away from considering most peacekeeping staff as temporary, and to hire approximately 2 500 staff on a permanent contract basis. Unfortunately there seems to have been little support for this initiative among Member States because of the financial implications. This proposal has the potential to improve the UN's ability to have a core professional standing staff capacity that it can use, for instance, to staff a new mission or to fill specific surge gaps. One of the problems that DPKO/DFS faces is that its use of short-term contracts linked to mission mandate review periods, puts it at a disadvantage, especially in those categories

Another standby option is to make use of people already employed, who can be temporarily re-assigned when emergency surge capacity is needed. The problem with this model is that one is faced with the same dynamics as in the secondment model, namely managers that do not want to release their staff, and staff that do not want to deploy to the field because of family commitments, or because of concerns with retaining the positions they are currently holding at headquarters.

DPKO experimented with such a Rapid Deployment Roster (RDR) in 2003 and 2004, that consisted of pre-cleared DPKO headquarter staff that could be deployed to the field for a 90-day period, essentially to assist with the setting up of a new mission. The RDR deployed DPKO headquarter staff to the UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2004. The number deployed was less than originally intended because managers were reluctant to release their staff, mainly due to workload concerns at headquarters. Once deployed, the managers in the field mission were reluctant to allow the RDR members to return to headquarters after the 90 days specified, because the UN recruitment system was not able to fill these posts in the 90 days provided, as was

THE TRAINING OF CIVILIANS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IS ANOTHER POTENTIAL WAY IN WHICH TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF SUITABLY QUALIFIED INDIVIDUALS AVAILABLE TO BE DEPLOYED, OR THAT THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED CAN BE TRAINED TO MEET NEW CHALLENGES

of staff in high demand, such as women and experienced management staff, to other UN agencies that can offer longer-term contracts and better conditions of service, including family duty stations.[13] Poor staff retention is another reason why the UN suffers high vacancy rates, and the proposal to create a standing professional cadre of civilian peacekeeping personnel will address some of the reasons that DPKO staff list for not renewing their UN peacekeeping contracts.

A *standby* capacity consists of persons pre-identified to be deployed when the need arises, usually within a specified time-frame. It represents a higher readiness for deployment than a roster, but as the persons are not yet on contract, they are not as rapidly available as in a *standing* capacity. Standby rosters require considerable resources to maintain as they require close and continuous contact with the persons on standby. A standby roster needs to verify, on an ongoing basis, that there are enough people on the roster that are available to deploy. The kind of people that populate such a roster are highly mobile and often take on various assignments that make them temporarily unavailable. Standby rosters thus need to be tested frequently in order to ensure that they are robust enough to meet demands.

assumed when the model was designed.[14] The RDR concept was a good idea, but it perished due to the same basic secondment system dilemmas discussed earlier.[15] There is no such standby system in place in the UN Secretariat at present.

The third category of rosters is referred to as a *rostered* capacity and is essentially a database of potential candidates. The smaller, mostly national rosters, that typically have a thousand or less candidates, pre-screen applicants and recruit some to the roster on the basis of specified criteria that match the likely deployment needs. The bigger rosters rely on a "just-in-time" search process where potential candidates are selected from the roster, based on sophisticated search criteria, as the need arises. Regardless of the model, all standby rosters basically monitor the deployment needs of their clients, and when vacancies are announced those responsible for the rosters search within the roster to identify suitable candidates. If one or more suitable candidates are available, they are offered to the client, who can then decide whether to make use of them or not. There are several such rosters in existence, and most are either national rosters or civil society based.

The DFS is currently busy establishing several internal standby rosters, including a Political Affairs and Civil Affairs

Civilian training courses are typically conducted by the mission's training cell, but some courses are also conducted by civilian training centres.

roster. These standby rosters will consist of pre-screened and pre-interviewed candidates who would be available for deployment. As the vacancy rates indicate, the speed with which persons are currently being recruited is not sufficient to fill existing vacancies, let alone allow for surplus capacity to be built up, so it is difficult to understand how the UN recruitment system will find the capacity to populate these rosters. Presumably current vacancies will be filled first and then, if additional recruitment capacity is available, additional persons will be screened, interviewed and cleared to be placed on the rosters. However, as mentioned earlier, standby rosters require heavy maintenance and are costly; and it is difficult to see how the UN recruitment system will be able to manage this additional burden without additional resources.

Catriona Gourlay, in a study entitled *Rosters for the Deployment of Civilian Experts in Peace Operations*, finds that the strategies that work best for small national or specialised expert rosters, and that usually rely on pre-screening, does not seem as efficient as the strategies that work best for large international rosters. The latter operates as recruitment services, and makes use of cost efficient "just-in-time" supply systems "to efficiently identify strong candidates, from a wide range of sources, on the basis of merit."[16]

In the UN peace operations context there has been a gap between calls made over the years for the investment in civilian standby rosters - and this call has been repeated again in the latest Secretary-General's report on peacebuilding – and the UN human resources policy that restricts the UN Secretariat from recruiting staff from rosters. The reasoning behind the UN's policy is that it aims to give every candidate an equal opportunity to apply directly to the UN. The UN Secretariat has to ensure that the overall effect of its deployment efforts result in an equitable distribution of posts across all Member States. As most rosters are based in the North, there is a perception in the UN human resources system that cooperating with rosters will thus automatically imply that candidates based in the North have an unfair advantage over candidates in the Global South.

The rostering community is already supporting the development and humanitarian agencies with specialised personnel, and they have on occasion, also assisted them with overcoming sudden spikes in demand. UN peacekeeping operations are more political and thus more sensitive to Member State interests, but the UN peacekeeping recruitment system can still learn valuable lessons from the precedents and working arrangements that have been established between the rosters and the development and humanitarian community.

Most missions offer an induction course for all new staff entering a new mission.

Training

The training of civilians for peacekeeping operations is another potential way in which to ensure that there is an adequate supply of suitably qualified individuals available to be deployed, or that those that have been employed can be trained to meet new challenges. The training of civilians for peace operations has been traditionally neglected. Most peacekeeping training centres have focused on military roles and most mission training cells have in the past focused on training for mission support personnel. However, this situation has changed considerably over the last decade, and there are now a number of centres in Africa, Asia, Europe and North America that specialise in, or also provide training for civilians.

The training centres that specialise in peacekeeping training have an international association, the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC). At the annual meeting of the IAPTC there are also meetings that take place among those that specialise in military, police and civilian peacekeeping training. The civilian training centres thus meet at least once a year to exchange information, learn about new initiatives from each other, and to coordinate new initiatives. There is also an African and European training group that meets in their own regions. The European Training Group has cooperatively developed a number of standard pre-deployment courses for EU civilian staff, and have agreed to a division of courses amongst themselves so that every centre does not offer the same courses. There is thus already a good degree of cooperation and coordination underway among the civilian training community.

Training could occur before recruitment, in preparation for deployment, on joining a mission, and additional in-mission training can be offered to sharpen skills or to address new needs not previously covered. Most of the civilian centres referred to conduct courses for civilians before recruitment. Some, like the German Peace Operations Centre (ZIF) is also responsible for managing a roster of Germans that can be seconded to the EU and other missions, and in these cases the training and rostering is closely interlinked.

The organisation responsible for deployment, for example, the UN, is typically also responsible for the pre-deployment training, and all new UN staff now attend a pre-deployment course at the UN training centre in Brindisi before deployment. In some cases the OSCE and others have outsourced this training to one of the civilian training centres. Most missions also offer an induction course for all new staff. This course will typically be conducted by the mission's training cell, but there have been cases where these courses have also been conducted by civilian training centres. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) did, for instance, commission the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) to facilitate an induction course for all its headquarter staff in February 2009.

In a few cases civilian training centres also conduct in-mission courses, that is, training courses conducted for staff whilst in the operation to hone certain skills, or to learn new skills. The UN, AU, EU and OSCE have thus already established a very close working relationship with the various civilian training institutions.

Conclusion

All the organisations that deploy peace operations, the AU, EU, OSCE and the UN, have experienced similar challenges over the last decade in their respective attempts to develop civilian capacities. It is remarkable that despite the fact that these organisations have employed a range of different approaches in their attempts to overcome these challenges, the core dilemma – an inability to identify, employ and deploy sufficient numbers of appropriately qualified individuals in a reasonable time frame – has remained unresolved.

The UN has been deploying more civilians in peacekeeping operations than all the other organisations combined. The UN experience stands in sharp contrast to the general assumption in the civilian capacity debate, namely that there is a supply-side civilian capacity deficit. Although UN peacekeeping operations suffer from unacceptably high vacancy rates, these vacancy rates are not, bar a few exceptions, caused by a shortage of suitable applicants.

Rather, the main problem facing the UN is the time it takes to fill a peacekeeping vacancy: processing the large nu mber of applications, selecting the most deserving candidates, and recruiting and deploying them to the field. Staff retention is another important consideration, as it reduces stress on filling new vacancies and builds experience and continuity in the organisation.

The UN Secretary-General, in his June 2009 report on peacebuilding, has recommended that the Secretariat work with "roster leads" to facilitate the development of "common standards, training, and guiding principles to enhance the interoperability across expert rosters…", and that "a review needs to be undertaken that would analyse how the United Nations and the international community can help to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian experts to support the immediate capacity development needs of countries emerging from conflict…".[17] The UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) has subsequently initiated a UN system-wide review of civilian capacity in 2010, and the review is anticipated to be completed by the first quarter of 2011.

The review provides a solid basis for engagement between the UN and the international peace operations training and rostering community. It is clear that the civilian capacity challenge in UN peacekeeping operations needs focussed and sustained attention. The current level of focus on this challenge by both DPKO/DFS and the General Assembly has not managed to improve the situation. What is needed is a much higher level of concentrated political and technical attention to this challenge.

It is therefore proposed that a global civilian capacity partnership be established, that brings together the international training and rostering community, the relevant UN Secretariat and Agencies, and interested UN Member States, with the aim of significantly increasing the intensity and focus of the international community on the civilian capacity challenge in UN peacekeeping operations. The objective of the partnership should be to significantly improve the UN Secretariat's ability to identify, recruit and deploy suitably qualified civilian personnel in a reasonable time-frame, and without adverse side-effects on the local community or mission mandate. If the UN system can overcome some of these challenges it may make it easier for the AU, EU, and OSCE to overcome some of the similar challenges they are facing in this regard.

Cedric de Coning is a Research Fellow with ACCORD and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).

Endnotes

1   All peacekeeping-related statistics in this paper, unless otherwise indicated, are based on the DPKO Fact Sheet, Available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/factsheet.pdf>. Accessed on: 16 June 2010, or on correspondence with DPKO and PBSO in June 2010.

2   *2010 Annual Review of Peace Operations,* New York: Center for International Cooperation.

3   Ibid.

4   Durch, W.J. (2004) Strengthening UN Secretariat Capacity for Civilian Post-conflict Response. Article prepared for the Center on International Cooperation and the Government of Denmark's Meeting on Strengthening the UN's Capacity on Civilian Crisis Management, Copenhagen, 8–9 June 2004, p. 9.

5   Korski, D. and Gowan, R. (2009) *Can the EU Rebuild Failing States? A Review of Europe's Civilian Capacities*, London: European Council on Foreign Relations, p.48.

6   General Assembly Resolutions 51/243 of 15 September 1997 and 52/234 of 26 June 1998.

7   Solli, A., De Carvalho, B., De Coning, C.H. and Pedersen, M.F. (2009) Bottlenecks to Deployment: The Challenges of Deploying Civilian Personnel to Peace Operations. *Security in Practice*, 3/2009, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, p. 10.

8   See (2004) *Low-Level Panel, Practical Steps to a More Effective and Efficient United Nations*, Ne w York, p. 5, Available at: www.lowlevelpanel.org.

9   Solli et al, op. cit., p. 10.

10 United Nations (2009) *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*, New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, July 2009.

11 Gourlay, Catriona Gourlay (2006) *Rosters for the Deployment of Civilian Experts in Peace Operations, a DPKO Lessons Learned Study*, New York: United Nations, p. 6.

12 Chandran, R., Sherman, J., Jones, B., Forman, S., Le More, A. and Hart, A. (2009) *Rapid Deployment of Civilians for Peace Operations: Status, Gaps and Options*, New York: Center on International Cooperation; United Nations (2009), p.10.

13 Gourlay, op. cit., p.11.

14 Durch, op. cit., p.10 and Gourlay, op. cit., p.16.

15 Gourlay, op. cit., p.6.

16 Gourlay, op. cit., p.17.

17 United Nations (2009) *Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*, A/63/881-S/2009/304, New York: United Nations, 11 June 2009, p.19.

THE ROLE OF AMISOM'S CIVILIAN COMPONENT

BY **LAMII KROMAH**

Introduction

Despite having a homogenous society, religion and language, Somalia has been in turmoil since the overthrow of President Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991. Several attempts at bringing peace to the country have failed, bringing untold suffering to the people. Somalia currently ranks as the world's worst humanitarian crisis, with 1.5 million Somalis displaced from their homes, much of the population in need of humanitarian aid, and more than half a million refugees in foreign countries.[1]

In 2006, international consensus crystallised around three mutually reinforcing policies focused on security, reconciliation and governance. On 6 December 2006, the United Nations (UN) Security Council, in Security Council Resolution 1725, authorised the African Union (AU) to deploy a peacekeeping force to Somalia. Following the UN resolution, the deployment of the AU Mission in Somalia

Above: AMISOM's field hospitals and medical personnel have been rendering medical services to the civilian population.

SOMALIA

○ National capital
◉ Regional capital
○ Town, village
✈ Airport
— International boundary
— Regional boundary
--- Indeterminate boundary
— Main road
--- Track
— Railroad

0 50 100 150 200 km
0   50   100 mi

*The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map
do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.*

Map No. 3690 Rev. 7   UNITED NATIONS
January 2007

Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section

(AMISOM) was authorised at the AU Peace and Security Council's 69th meeting on 19 January 2007.

AMISOM is mandated to provide "support to the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in their efforts towards the stabilization of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation; facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance; and create conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia by performing the following tasks:

- support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders;
- provide, as appropriate, protection to the TFIs and their key infrastructure, to enable them to carry out their functions;
- assist in the implementation of the National Security and Stabilisation Plan (NSSP) of Somalia, particularly the effective re-establishment and training of all inclusive Somali security forces, bearing in mind the programmes already being implemented by some of Somali's bilateral and multilateral partners;
- provide within capabilities and as appropriate technical and other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts;
- monitor, in areas of deployment of its forces, the security situation;
- facilitate, as may be required, within capabilities, humanitarian operations, including the repatriation of refugees and resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs); and

- protect AMISOM personnel, installations and equipments, including the right of self-defense."[2]

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) resolution required AMISOM to "comprise nine infantry battalions of 850 personnel each, supported by maritime coastal and air components, as well as an appropriate civilian component, including a police training team"[3] – making it a modern, multidimensional peace support operation. It is therefore staffed today with military, police and civilian components. The military component comprises 6 120 Burundian and Ugandan troops; the police component has 40 police officers drawn from Ghana, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Burundi, Zambia and Nigeria; while the civilian component is staffed with 33 international staff and 15 national staff. In comparison, the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur in 2009 had a troop component of 8 475, a police component of 2 012 and a civilian component of 721 international staff.

Although the rule of thumb for the number of troops required for stable operations in an environment where the population is largely acquiescent is between five and 10 soldiers per thousand people, in a hostile environment this requirement increases to 20 soldiers per 1 000 people. Somalia's population figures are not entirely known, but it is believed to be about nine million people, which suggests a total occupying force of at least 100 000 to account for varying security conditions.[4] African troop-contributing countries have been reluctant to send troops to AMISOM. The failure of past UN peacekeeping missions in the country has been a major deterrent, and these potential troop-contributing countries also feel that Somalia is currently not ripe for peacekeeping. Burundi and Uganda are the only two countries that have troops in the mission. The current amount of troops is insufficient to fulfil the mission mandate, which covers all of Somalia. The lack of peacekeepers has limited AMISOM's operations to certain parts of Mogadishu. However, there is hope that initiatives such as the Confidence Building Workshop, organised by AMISOM in collaboration with the Training for Peace (TfP) programme at the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) in December 2008, will continue to ensure that AMISOM is able to influence policymakers in African troop- and police-contributing countries (T/PCCs) for their support.

AMISOM represents the long evolution of African peacekeeping that began with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) intervention in Chad in 1982 with 3 000 troops, the lessons the AU learned from the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and Sudan (AMIS), as well as the regional experiences of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau.

While AMISOM's military and police components are based in Mogadishu, the civilian component is based in Nairobi (the hub for the UN country team that does work in Somalia) due to the current challenging security situation in south-central Somalia. AMISOM plays a key role in trying to

The African Union headquarters is situated in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

resolve the conflict, both politically and at local community level, rather than performing a mere observer role like the previous AMIS and AMIB missions.

Role of the Civilian Component

AMISOM's civilian component is what sets it apart from previous AU peacekeeping missions. The AU Special Representative, as head of the multidimensional peace support operation, has the ability to use his "good office" to further the peace process and play a more active role in the resolution of the conflict. So far, AMISOM's civilian component has been active in bringing together factions, which formed a unity government and facilitated the withdrawal of the Ethiopians. The civilian component has also offered support in various forms to the TFIs, such as mediation between government officials, building internal cohesion among members and capacity-building for public sector institutions.

Although AMISOM's ambit is limited due to the security situation, it has been active in supporting the local community. To carry out its mission mandate, AMISOM is organised into three interlinked components: military, police and civilian. There are outlined roles and responsibilities for each of the components, in line with present-day multidimensional peace support operations. Thus,

AMISOM's mandate includes humanitarian, security, political and development dimensions – and the civilian component's tasks include political, humanitarian, civil affairs, public information and mission support that specifically relate to:

- supporting dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders;
- coordinating the efforts of the military and police components in the implementation of the NSSP;
- facilitating efforts aimed at overall development and the re-establishment of governance structures, rule of law institutions and the restoration of both physical and social infrastructure in Somalia;
- providing support to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) processes for sustainable peace in Somalia;
- coordinating with partners, including donors and other international actors, humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs);
- facilitating humanitarian aid and services delivery in Somalia;
- ensuring the integration of military, civilian and contracted resources available to the mission for mission success in areas such as logistics, procurement and budgeting; and

A Somali mother and her daughter walk to the field hospital at AMISOM's base in Mogadishu.

- ensuring the effective management of the mission for the implementation of the mission mandate by harnessing available human and material resources for their optimal utilisation.

Amidst the challenges and dynamics within which AMISOM operates, the mission in general – and the civilian component in particular – have been able to register fair levels of successes on the above-mentioned tasks and responsibilities.

Humanitarian and Civic Actions

The humanitarian situation in Somalia is characterised by a war-weary population, which is constantly being displaced due to the continued fighting between the transitional federal government (TFG) and the insurgent groups. Violence against civilians and humanitarian workers, perpetrated by the extremist groups, has adversely affected humanitarian aid delivery. Natural catastrophes – including flooding,

drought and health epidemics – have also contributed to exacerbating the overall humanitarian situation.

AMISOM's humanitarian mandate is limited to a facilitation role to ensure that key stakeholders are able to deliver much-needed humanitarian services. Amidst this limited role is the fact that, unlike an integrated UN peacekeeping mission – which has a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) who also doubles as UN Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator responsible for all humanitarian activities in the mission area of responsibility – AMISOM has only one Humanitarian Liaison Officer. This may not be unrelated to an inherent lack of capability and capacity, both human and material, of AMISOM to undertake its full humanitarian mandate.

The lack of capacity is one reason why the mission has not been able to coordinate humanitarian activities in Somalia – especially with UN agencies and key international humanitarian organisations operating from Nairobi rather

than being present in Somalia. Since AMISOM's success on the humanitarian aspects of its mandate is not optimal, it has compelled the military present in Mogadishu to take on some of the task of assisting local Somalis, in a bid to salvage the humanitarian crisis. It is an international norm that the military is not best suited to provide humanitarian assistance, which is a professional task that carries with it a number of responsibilities and humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality, but the reality in the country makes this circumstance unique.

In implementing the humanitarian aspect of its mandate, AMISOM has effectively secured all the necessary humanitarian corridors (seaport, airport and streets) in Mogadishu since its deployment in March 2007, thus allowing for access to the population. AMISOM provides essential escorts to humanitarian convoys headed for distribution points in and around Mogadishu. However, these roles have been performed predominantly by the military, although the Humanitarian Liaison Officer plays a facilitation and coordination role.

In terms of coordination and cooperation with humanitarian agencies, AMISOM works closely with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) Somalia, UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) Somalia, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Somalia, World Food Programme (WFP) and other UN agencies and NGOs to establish coordination mechanisms and the sharing of information. On the part of the Somalia TFG, AMISOM collaborates closely with the Somali Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Resettlement, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Family Affairs, Ministry of Social Affairs and an NGO – the Coalition of Grassroots Women Organization (COGWO).

Beyond the context of "winning hearts and minds" as a confidence-building and mission-protection tool, AMISOM's field hospitals and medical personnel have been rendering medical services to the civilian population. Although the facilities were designed to provide medical attention to the AMISOM troops, these facilities have also helped local Somalis in need of medical attention. Given the depth of problems in Somalia, AMISOM's medical facilities have now become the one medical point that the civilian population around Mogadishu can depend on. The three hospital departments treat over 12 000 patients per month, on average[5], with treatments varying from chronic medical diseases to both acute and chronic surgical cases. Over 90% of these patients are from the local population, including TFG troops and officials, with most of them requiring emergency surgical interventions.

The extent of such medical services requires a steady supply of drugs, sundries, consumables, equipment, machines and medical accessories. These needs have largely been met and supported by international partners. The AMISOM Humanitarian Liaison Officer has been responsible for this coordination with the UN Country Team, international NGOs and the international community at large, ensuring that humanitarian resources are available to the mission to enhance the implementation of its humanitarian action.

Public Information Action

Public information plays a vital role in peace support operations. Indeed, this is particularly crucial in the case of Somalia, considering the propaganda activities of the armed groups aimed at demonising and alienating both AMISOM and the TFG from the local population, as well as instilling fear in the population. AMISOM's overall success in implementing its mandate depends greatly on how its information best reaches the various stakeholders in the Djibouti Peace Process, especially the Somali population – both at home and in the diaspora.

In order to respond adequately to this need, AMISOM has an established Public Information Unit, responsible for the implementation of the AMISOM communication strategy. This strategy is aimed at maintaining credible visibility and vibrancy in the media through regular interaction with local and international media on AMISOM activities, and coordination between AMISOM and partners – including the Somalia TFG, UN and other stakeholders. Major tools for the implementation of the AMISOM communication strategy include radio, website, online newsletters and quick impact projects (QIPs), to reinforce the communication activities, which are aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the people.

Also, in line with the mandate of the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) to provide public information support to AMISOM, a consortium of three firms – Bell Pottinger, Albany Associates and Radio Okapi – have been contracted to assist in the implementation of the AMISOM communication strategy. The strategy envisages a campaign based on the principles of building credibility for AMISOM, the Somalia TFG and the UN, as well as ensuring objective reporting on and about issues in Somalia.

Notwithstanding the threats to and risks undertaken by local media practitioners, and the general state of fear

created by the armed groups, AMISOM has continued to be visible and vibrant, both in local and international media. The Public Information Unit has ensured that the work of the mission is shared with stakeholders, including the local population, in a credible manner – in spite of hostile propaganda by armed groups. Media interest in AMISOM – including from giant international networks – has remained high, as evidenced by the numerous visits to and requests by these media organisations to visit the mission area. Such visits, facilitated by the mission's Public Information Unit, have been used to inform a wider public and to correct misrepresentations and misinformation propagated by various armed groups.

Political Action

Through the collective diplomatic efforts of the AU by the AU Special Representative for Somalia and Head of Mission, the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the UN, the peace process in Somalia was brought back on track with the signing of the Djibouti Agreement in 2008. On 19 August 2008, the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), two of the main parties to the conflict in Somalia, signed a peace agreement concurring on expanding the Transitional Federal Parliament and establishing a Government of National Unity.

the country, including Alhu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ). The ASWJ signed a cooperation agreement with the government on 21 June 2009 and, later, a more detailed Framework of Cooperation Agreement was signed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 15 March 2010.

Recognising that a peacekeeping operation is part of a wider political process, AMISOM is thus trying to ensure that it garners political support for the Somali process. The mission also supports the TFG as it strives to include other parties to the conflict in a process that allows for peaceful settlement of the Somali conflict. These political developments have helped the Somali peace process, and continue to showcase the fact that there is hope for a resolution of the conflict through political means. AMISOM is ensuring that the TFG pursues dialogue and reconciliation to guarantee and facilitate the implementation of the mission's mandate, as peacekeeping is not an end in itself.

Capacity-building

Since being plunged into armed conflict more than two decades ago, Somalia has suffered from state failure, characterised by an almost complete erosion of state institutions. Across the length and breadth of the country, government policy and basic infrastructure for transportation, electricity, health, education and

---

ALTHOUGH HAMPERED BY A SHORTAGE OF TROOPS AND FUNDS, AMISOM HAS PROVEN THAT AN AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING MISSION CAN SURVIVE IN THE HARSHEST OF ENVIRONMENTS

The political process that evolved out of the Djibouti Peace Agreement has since undergone periods of high optimism as well as difficulties and uncertainties. The TFG was reinvigorated with the expansion of parliament – from 275 seats to 550 seats, bringing in members of the opposition using the clan-based "4.5 formula"[6] – and the election of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed in January 2009 as president of the Unity Government. This followed the resignation of President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed on 30 December 2008 and the complete withdrawal of the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) from Mogadishu on 15 January 2009, and from Baidoa on 25 January 2009.

With the strong support of the AU Special Representative for Somalia, the TFG has continued to pursue dialogue and reconciliation among the Somali people, through influential clan elders, clerics and traditional leaders – despite the rejection of the government's peace overtures by certain extremist groups, who are also parties to the Somali conflict. With the support of the AU Special Representative for Somalia, the government has also sought to strengthen its domestic support and to reach out to other groups within

communication has severely deteriorated or, in some cases, completely disappeared. Despite the recent positive developments in the Djibouti Peace Process, the TFG continues to be faced with many complex challenges, among which is the rebuilding of state institutions and the capacity of the government to deliver basic social services.

In order to contribute to enhancing the effective functioning of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in Somalia, the AMISOM Civil Affairs Unit is undertaking the rebuilding of the capacity of key ministries and other public sector institutions to deliver basic social services to the people of Somalia. One key step to foster this has been through the development of a strategy to strengthen the TFG and local communities in identifying needs for international community support. In this regard, the AMISOM Civil Affairs Unit continues to interact with various stakeholders – including the Somalia TFG, NGOs, women, youth and local and religious leaders – on effective collaboration for identified priority projects to be implemented in support of local communities. The AMISOM Civil Affairs Unit has also been engaged with the TFG to ensure that there is

balanced clan representation in the selection of trainees for capacity-building, through adherence to the 4.5 formula (clan representation in government).

As part of capacity-building support to the TFG, AMISOM organised a three-day Consultative Needs Assessment Workshop for the Somalia TFG in Kampala, Uganda, from 24–26 March 2010. This workshop set out to articulate the priority needs of public sector institutions in Somalia, with a view to agreeing on a capacity-building implementation action plan aimed at enhancing the effective functioning of TFIs in Somalia. All of these have been achieved amidst the security challenges in the mission area, which severely inhibits the effective implementation of civic action.

Because of the harsh operating environment in Somalia, the mission constantly undertakes capacity-building. Courses coordinated by ACCORD's TfP programme have been aimed at imparting knowledge on theoretical aspects of modern-day, multidimensional aspects of peacekeeping and civil-military coordination, as well as administration management. The aim of these courses is to assist mission personnel with implementing the mission mandate.

Mission Management and Mission Support

Mission management – which includes the Special Representative of the Chairman of the Commission (SRCC), to whom the overall supervision of the mission falls; the Force Commander and the Police Commissioner, who are heads of the military and police components respectively, as well as the various substantive civilian positions including political, civil and humanitarian affairs – has been responsible for ensuring the full implementation of the mission's mandate. At this mission-strategic level, they liaise and coordinate to ensure synergy between the three components, and to ensure that this trickles down to the operational and tactical levels.

The administration and finance civilian staff under the Chief Administrative Officer provide the mission with administrative and logistical support. This is in line with ensuring the mission meets troop logistical needs, management of the AU- and UN-owned equipment and that financial resources are available to the mission. Without such support elements, the mission will not be able to function.

Challenges and Conclusion

Security challenges in the mission area have not allowed for the full deployment of the civilian component in Mogadishu, thus compelling this key component to operate from Nairobi. Although there are some political affairs, humanitarian affairs and finance and administration officers currently based in Mogadishu, while other civilian staff travel regularly to Mogadishu to work for extended periods of time, it has still been a challenge for them to implement their tasks fully. This frequent shuttle between Mogadishu and Nairobi has substantial financial, logistical and other humanitarian

(emotional and psychological) impacts on the effective implementation of the civilian tasks of the mission mandate.

The work of the mission management, in particular the SRCC, is severely hampered because they are unable to interact freely and regularly with the respective stakeholders in Mogadishu, including the TFG officials and ordinary Somalis. This impacts negatively on the implementation of the mission management's tasks on the ground. Every time a civilian staff member has to travel out of the secure zone, they require full military escorts in the armoured personnel carriers (APCs), and this puts a strain on the military component, as the Force Commander has to divert his limited resources (manpower and APCs).

African peacekeeping has come a long way since interventions in Chad and West Africa. The significant lessons from these missions encouraged the AU to develop a highly adaptable and professional civilian component for its peace support operations. Although hampered by a shortage of troops and funds, AMISOM has proven that an African peacekeeping mission can survive in the harshest of environments. The civilian component continues to face severe challenges, but attempts to meet these difficulties with resolve and expertise. In the long run, however, without the continued support of the international community, AMISOM is unsustainable.

Lamii Kromah is a Programme Officer at ACCORD's Peacekeeping Unit.

Endnotes

1 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, 2009 Annual Report.

2 African Union Communiqué of the 69th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, 19 January 2007, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

3 Ibid.

4 Bruton, Bronwyn E. (2010) *Somalia: A New Approach*, Council Special Report No. 52, March 2010, p. 21.

5 Interview with AMISOM civilian personnel, 3 March 2010.

6 The 4.5 formula was developed at a peace conference in Nairobi in the early 2000s. It allows equal quotas for representation in government to the four major clans, and a half-point to the fifth cluster of minority clans. The clan structure comprises the four "noble" clan families of Darod, Hawiye, Issaq and Dir. "Noble" in this sense refers to the widespread Somali belief that members of the major clans are descended from a common Somali ancestor. Two further clans, the Digil and Mirifle (also collectively referred to as Rahanweyn), take an intermediate position between the main Somali clans and the minority groups. Source: *Country of Origin Information Report: Somalia*, Home Office UK Boarder Agency, 19 May 2010, p. 16.

THE ROLE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS IN UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

BY **GUSTAVO DE CARVALHO**

The increasing complexity of environments in which peacekeeping operations are deployed has created the need for constant connection between peacekeeping and local communities. Strengthening engagement with the various actors that operate within a particular sub-national level allows peacekeeping operations to understand better and react to conflict trends that might be occurring in a particular locality. Within this context, the Civil Affairs function has become one of the most important civilian components within United Nations (UN) peacekeeping.

Civil Affairs, as a function within peacekeeping, is considered "the ears and the eyes" of a mission at the local level. It is the peacekeeping component that is tasked

Above: Three civil affairs officers of the joint African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) meet with a group of internally displaced persons at a Women's Community Centre in the Abu-Shouk Camp in Northern Darfur, to hear about their security and health situation in the camp (February 2009).

United Nations Civil Affairs around the World

■ UNMIS - Sudan
■ UNAMID - Darfur
■ UNMIL - Liberia
■ MINUSTAH - Haiti
■ UNOCI - Côte d'Ivoire
■ MONUSCO - Democratic Republic of the Congo
■ UNFICYP - Cyprus

■ UNAMA* - Afghanistan
■ UNMIK - Kosovo
■ UNIFIL - Lebanon
■ UNDOF - Syria/Israel - Golan Heights only
■ UNMIT* - East Timor
■ UNIPSIL* - Sierra Leone
■ MINURCAT - Chad/Central African Republic

* Whilst these missions do not possess typical Civil Affairs Officers, they are considered to have components that perform functions that can, to a large extent, be considered within the same context.

---

to interact with the local communities, understand them and create strategies for supporting conflict management initiatives and enhancing local governance, on a daily basis. It currently composes one of the largest and most important civilian components in peacekeeping operations, with over 500 Civil Affairs Officers deployed in 14 peace operations.[1]

This article presents a brief overview of the Civil Affairs function within UN peacekeeping, and demonstrates its

increasing importance within the context of more efficient implementation of peacekeeping mandates. Most of the information in this article is based on frequent interactions with a number of Civil Affairs officers from most UN missions over the past years.

The Evolving Role of Civil Affairs

The increasing use of Civil Affairs occurred as a reflection of the need for the particular skills that Civil

Makeshift shelters were built in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2008 following an emergency humanitarian assessment mission organised by a Civil Affairs unit from the former United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC) in partnership with local non-governmental organisations.

Affairs could provide. It also fitted with the general complex changes that affected peacekeeping operations in the post Cold-War period. Peacekeeping became more complex within the context of providing strong assistance to countries that were coming out of conflict situations, and it required a more consistent use of specialised civilian functions.

Within this context of changes in the peacekeeping environment, Civil Affairs started being used constructively in the mid-1990s, in peacekeeping missions deployed throughout the world – and particularly in the various missions deployed in the Balkans. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, Civil Affairs Officers were initially tasked with providing support to the mission's police component to understand and deal with parties on the ground.[2] As the mission evolved, their tasks were expanded, and included a larger focus on supporting the strengthening of local structures, particularly those related to the police components.

The evolution of the Civil Affairs concept gained a new and important connotation when the UN became more heavily involved in state-building enterprises in the late 1990s. In the interim administrations that the UN has supported – including the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) – Civil Affairs was part of an important role responsible for directly managing all aspects of civilian life, while simultaneously working to devolve its responsibility to local authorities.[3]

Throughout the 2000s, the UN led the deployment of several new peacekeeping missions, particularly on the African continent. Civil Affairs continued the consolidation of its space within the peacekeeping field. To support the complex mandates that were emerging, Civil Affairs became a key actor in providing local-level interface, including constant interaction with local authorities, civil society and other actors in the UN system. Throughout the decade, Civil Affairs became engaged in a diverse range of tasks, including governance, confidence-building, and conflict management and resolution.

However, for several years, the Civil Affairs function was characterised by a lack of overall clarity concerning its functions and roles within missions. Whilst the Civil Affairs section was broadening its "niches", its roles frequently overlapped with the roles of other substantive sections and departments of the UN – particularly when these other

components were deployed in conjunction with Political Affairs, as they frequently would be at the local level – and would have similar mandates to assess and understand the political environment.[4]

Civil Affairs Defined

In 2008, after some years of consultation with the missions, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) released a policy directive that aimed to strengthen the understanding of what comprised Civil Affairs roles in peacekeeping

1. Cross-mission representation, monitoring and facilitation at the local level;
2. Confidence-building, conflict management and support to reconciliation; and
3. Support to the restoration and extension of state authority.

Table 1 provides examples of activities conducted within the three core roles of Civil Affairs, according to the Civil Affairs Policy Directive.[7]

Table 1: Examples of Activities within the Core Civil Affairs Roles

Core Role	Examples of Activities
Cross-mission representation, monitoring and facilitation at the local level	• Civil Affairs represents the mission and liaises with local actors. • Civil Affairs provides a channel for communicating the priorities and perceptions of different sectors of the population to the mission, concerning both the mission itself and the peace process. • Conflict analysis and early warnings are provided.
Confidence-building, conflict management and support to reconciliation	• Civil Affairs actively supports the development of social conditions conducive to sustainable peace. • This role is conducted by supporting reconciliation and conflict-resolution activities at local and/or national levels, and through efforts to support popular engagement and confidence in the peace process.
Support to the restoration and extension of state authority	• Civil Affairs components support the development of political space at local level that will contribute to legitimate and representative governance, as well as providing operational support to the activities of state institutions. • Civil Affairs work is often focused on supporting participation while representative democracy is being established.

operations, as part of the UN's overall efforts in post-conflict environments. That policy directive provided more clarity in terms of core roles, responsibilities and the scope of Civil Affairs as an independent component of civilian peacekeeping.

According to the policy directive, Civil Affairs is described as "civilian components of United Nations peace operations that work at the social, administrative and sub-national political levels to facilitate the countrywide implementation of peacekeeping mandates and to support the population and government in strengthening conditions and structures conducive to sustainable peace".[5] More specifically, the policy also describes the core roles in which Civil Affairs is mandated to act. These core roles are divided in three main aspects:[6]

Civil Affairs Throughout the Mission Cycle: From Conflict Analysis to Peacebuilding Activities

Experience has shown that the role of Civil Affairs develops according to the evolution of a particular peacekeeping mission mandate and environment. In the early stages of a mission, Civil Affairs Officers are frequently the first civilians to be deployed in the field, and provide substantive support in terms of monitoring and understanding local political environments. As such, these initial tasks include the gathering of information, liaising with local partners, and understanding the environment in which the mission is involved better. It is a crucial component that allows the mission to develop its strategies

A Civil Affairs Officer of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) shows internally displaced women and refugees how to use a solar-powered radio (May 2009).

and understand the requirements that different regions in a particular country might require.

As a mission matures, Civil Affairs frequently becomes more specialised and its functions incorporate additional and complex undertakings, including an increasing focus on conflict management and support to local institutions. These activities, focused on supporting the extension of state authorities, are key, as they aim to allow local institutions to interact better with the local environment. Examples of this type of engagement can be seen through the provision of advice and capacity-building to local authorities, and in supporting the creation of an enabling environment for better dialogue between local authorities and local communities, in particular.

Building Relationships at a Local Level

The extensive presence of Civil Affairs at the local level is one of the component's main strengths. Being located in areas where not all the civilian components are deployed potentially allows Civil Affairs to identify the challenges faced by the country early on, allowing the mission to target critical areas for support in the post-conflict environment.

TO SUPPORT THE COMPLEX MANDATES THAT WERE EMERGING, CIVIL AFFAIRS BECAME A KEY ACTOR IN PROVIDING LOCAL-LEVEL INTERFACE, INCLUDING CONSTANT INTERACTION WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES, CIVIL SOCIETY AND OTHER ACTORS IN THE UN SYSTEM

The United Nations Mission in Liberia's (UNMIL) Chief of Civil Affairs explains the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration programme at the Pakistani contingent's headquarters in Tubmanburg (2004).

A Civil Affairs Officer is thus frequently monitoring and undertaking analytical assessments of the environment in which the section is deployed. This is particularly relevant to inform higher levels in the mission, and to support them in the provision of appropriate responses to needs on the ground. Also, an accurate understanding of the environment allows Civil Affairs to design better and support conflict management and confidence-building activities, and provide support to state authorities.

In its interaction with local authorities, civil society, communities and other components of the UN system, Civil Affairs has assumed the role of a local "enabler", by providing a favourable environment for the consolidation of peace through assistance and with recommendations of ways forward and projects for future implementation.[8] Within this context of close interaction with local actors, Civil Affairs Officers also provide crucial support in advising these local actors and sharing information that may be relevant for tackling issues and concerns that might be arising in a certain area.

If local understanding is a crucial component of the Civil Affairs role, the role of national staff is particularly relevant in the context of this component. The use of local staff has been undertaken in a way that allows Civil Affairs to have a more sensible and targeted approach to the local culture and society, which puts the mission in a better position to understand and react to the environment. Also, being nationals of the country in which the peacekeeping mission is deployed, frequently allows them easier access to local actors.

Some Challenges of Implementing the Civil Affairs Mandate

Many of the challenges faced by Civil Affairs staff are particular to the specific environments and missions in which they are deployed. A few specific challenges can be presented as examples of those faced in peacekeeping missions – including dealing efficiently with local authorities, the existence of spoilers in peace processes, and coordination with local and other international actors.

The precise challenges vary widely from mission to mission, and these examples are by no means exhaustive.

Some other challenges frequently faced by Civil Affairs are related to the challenges also faced by UN peacekeeping. The frequent lack of funding for Civil Affairs provides a general challenge in terms of capacity to run its own activities independently. However, it is important to mention that, whilst it is still a challenge, this situation also allows avenues for collaboration with other partners, such as with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and enables the potential for increasing coordination.

Issues of professionalism and staffing are frequent challenges in the implementation of Civil Affairs tasks. For instance, in terms of recruitment, the challenges in providing timely staffing of the missions frequently place Civil Affairs in a situation where there are not enough personnel on the ground to perform all the core roles efficiently by which the function is defined. Also, the increased need for strengthening professionalism is an important issue – not only for Civil Affairs, but throughout the entire UN system. Some initiatives to strengthen the capacity of Civil

Affairs have occurred, either through the UN or with other partner organisations. For example, DPKO – through its Peacekeeping Best Practices Section – has been developing a handbook, in partnership with the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). This guide will be used by new and experienced staff to understand their roles and responsibilities as Civil Affairs Officers better. ACCORD has also provided conflict management training for Civil Affairs Officers in most missions on the African continent. These trainings aim to strengthen the capacity of Civil Affairs Officers to understand conflict management, and allow them to be more prepared to deal with conflicts that emerge at a local level.

Examples of Civil Affairs in Operation in UN Peacekeeping

Whilst there are common denominators in the overall roles of Civil Affairs, one of this function's characteristics is its flexibility and adaptability to the local environment. Table 2 provides a brief description of some of the largest Civil Affairs components in peacekeeping operations.

A Civil Affairs Officer from the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) facilitates a reconciliation conference in Dilling, Southern Kordofan, Sudan.

Table 2: Profile of Some Civil Affairs Components in Peacekeeping Missions

Country	Description
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	The Civil Affairs Section in the former United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC) was created in 2006 as an evolution of the former Humanitarian Affairs Section. Following a change of mandate, the newly created UN Mission for Stabilisation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) maintained its focus on issues of the protection of civilians within overall support for the completion of the Congolese peace process. Its activities range from support for local civil society and mapping of the conflict, to the engagement and support of local level authorities. As an example, in 2009, the Civil Affairs Section facilitated a civil society national symposium, together with the DRC Ministry of Planning and other international partners, which aimed to establish a credible and organised civil society dialogue platform on aid effectiveness at national and provincial levels.[9]
Sudan	The Civil Affairs Division at the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) has been involved in mapping and monitoring the root causes of conflict in the country. It is currently focusing on preparations for the referendum (planned for early 2011) concerning the secession of South Sudan, as part of the provisions included in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). It has also been involved in facilitating reconciliation processes at the local level, directly supporting and advising local and traditional authorities on governance, and reporting the situation from the field. As an example of its activities, the Civil Affairs Division in UNMIS has created a model for conflict analysis that aims to provide Civil Affairs Officers with better tools for analysing conflicts, assessing responses and identifying strategies.
Côte d'Ivoire	The Civil Affairs Section at the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) was created with the establishment of UNOCI in 2004. It has been working to support the overall mandate of the mission, under the context of supporting the full implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement. The section has been particularly active in supporting local authorities to restore their roles at local level. Local traditional authorities have been supported with conflict management initiatives and through consultations aimed at strengthening their capacity to work in the local environment. For example, in 2010, Civil Affairs organised various meetings to promote dialogue between communities in conflict, and seminars with traditional chiefs on conflict management.

Conclusion

Whilst Civil Affairs is becoming more specialised in its function and there is now more clarity in its roles and responsibilities within peacekeeping operations, its adaptability to understand and interact with different local environments is its main strength. Without being able to understand and engage with the particularities of an environment fully, peacekeeping will inevitably fail. As such, the Civil Affairs function is a tool that allows the UN to be more efficient in its support of post-conflict environments throughout the world, through a flexible approach in local level interaction. ☖

Gustavo de Carvalho is an Acting Coordinator of ACCORD's Peacekeeping Unit.

Endnotes

1   Information available at:< http://monuc.unmissions.org/Default. aspx?tabid=2x115>.

2   United Nations Secretary General Report pursuant to Resolution 1035, S/1996/210.

3   United Nations, Civil Affairs chapter, *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations*, p. 35, Available at: <http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org>.

4   Ibid., p. 36.

5   United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support. Policy Directive: Civil Affairs, 1 April 2008.

6   Ibid.

7   Ibid.

8   Available at: <http://www.unv.org/en/current-highlight/peace-keeping-roles/doc/eyes-and-ears-civil.html>.

9   Example received from MONUSCO Civil Affairs Section via email.

THE CIVILIAN DIMENSION OF THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE: ASSESSING PROGRESS AND IDENTIFYING GAPS

BY **ZINURINE ALGHALI**[1]

Introduction

Since 2003, the African Union (AU) Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) has been developing policies and implementing initiatives aimed at developing an AU African Standby Force (ASF). The ASF is envisioned as a continental rapid-response standby peacekeeping capacity, which the AU can invoke to intervene in a conflict situation to prevent the escalation of conflicts. The military conception of the ASF (as a result of the stereotype that peacekeeping is a military affair) resulted in a largely military approach to its development. Upon realising this in 2006, the AU PSOD incorporated civilian and police dimensions into the ASF.

Thus, the AU PSOD, with support from the African Peace Support Trainers' Association (APSTA) and other partners,

initiated a project that same year to develop the civilian dimension of the ASF, with the overall aim of building the capacity of the AU to undertake multidimensional peace operations. Much has been achieved in the development of the civilian dimension of the ASF, with the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), through its Training for Peace (TfP) programme[2], supporting the AU PSOD in the implementation of this project.

Whilst the Civilian Dimension Project has generated some successes at various levels, it also has fundamental

Above: The misconception that peacekeeping is a military affair only, resulted in a largely military approach to the African Standby Force's development.

gaps and challenges that need urgent attention to ensure the development of a consolidated civilian component and multidimensional ASF. This article assesses the progress achieved thus far on the development of the civilian component of the ASF, and also identifies the gaps and challenges in the process. It provides recommendations to address these challenges and gaps to ensure the eventual development of a fully established and consolidated civilian dimension that will guarantee a multidimensional ASF.

Assessing Progress

Most of the initiatives that have been undertaken within the Civilian Dimension Project have been in the form of policy formulation and problem-solving workshops and training. Thus far, what has been achieved – in terms of the development of the ASF at both the AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regional Mechanisms (RMs) levels – has been policy adoption, with the following policies having been formulated:

- AU ASF Civilian Dimension Policy Framework, 2006;
- AU ASF Civilian Dimension Implementation Plan, 2007;
- the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force (SSF) Civilian Dimension Policy Framework, 2007;
- the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) Civilian Dimension Policy Framework, 2008;
- a Concept Note on ASF Conduct and Discipline Policy, 2008;
- Recommendations on the Staffing, Training and Rostering (STR) of the ASF Civilian Dimension (Kampala Report), 2008; and
- Recommendations on the ASF Civilian Standby Roster (Dar es Salaam Report), 2009.

The ASF Civilian Dimension Policy Framework, developed in 2006, is one of the fundamental documents of the ASF's civilian dimension. It clarifies the policy context, the multidimensional management structure

Regional Economic Communities

Southern African Development Community (SADC)

Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

The African Union / African Standby Force Civilian Staffing, Training and Rostering Workshop was held at Speke Resort Munyonyo, Kampala, Uganda in July 2008.

and decision-making process, the main civilian roles and responsibilities, the mission support functions and the main police roles and responsibilities that need to be in place to support the civilian dimensions of AU peace operations.[3] It is based on the idea that AU peace operations are likely to operate in close cooperation with the UN and that, in some instances, the UN may take over responsibility of AU operations.[4]

The ASF Civilian Dimension Implementation Plan was developed from the ASF Civilian Dimension Policy Framework in April 2007, as a detailed map of processes for the development and operationalisation of the civilian dimension of the ASF. It focuses on the development of eight policies and actions to be taken to ensure the full establishment of the ASF Civilian Dimension. These are:

• Integrated missions[5];
• Human resources;
• Gender;
• HIV/Aids;
• Conduct and discipline;
• Training;
• Capacity-building; and
• Awareness-raising of the civilian dimension of the ASF.

In 2007, the AU PSOD also developed a Training Plan for the ASF by collating the training schedules of the Regional Standby Forces (RSFs) into one continental training schedule, leading up to the ASF continental Command Post Exercise (CPX)[6] – code-named Exercise Amani Africa –

planned for October 2010 to test the operational readiness and multidimensional capacity of the ASF. It was then realised that the RSF's training plans were quite squarely focused on aspects of military training, and unreflective of an integrated approach to training for the ASF. It revealed the need for more work to be undertaken with regard to creating awareness and familiarising the political, diplomatic and military decision-makers – particularly at the sub-regional level – with the multidimensional approach to complex peace operations, and the civilian roles within these operations.

The AU, with support from ACCORD, conducted a workshop from 10–12 July 2008 in Kampala, Uganda, on the Civilian Staffing, Training and Rostering (STR) Report.[7] This Kampala Report, as it is often referred to, presented an account of the recommendations relating to the staffing, recruitment, rostering and training of civilians for the ASF. It addressed issues relating to these four key areas to foster a harmonised approach of the AU and RECs/RMs with regard to the civilian component of the ASF. It highlighted issues relating to a generic civilian structure, recruitment methods and whether to recruit civilians via direct hiring or on a secondment basis, the type of training necessary for these civilians, and the issue of maintaining a live and dynamic civilian roster system for ASF deployment.

Considering that no firm recommendation was made by the STR Report with regard to the type of civilian roster model that should be adopted for the ASF, the AU and ACCORD organised a Civilian Dimension Technical Rostering Workshop from 1–3 July 2009 in Dar es Salaam,

Tanzania. This workshop addressed the roster-related issues highlighted by the Kampala Report in more detail. It recommended an AU-REC/RM Integrated Roster model, with the AU as overall coordinator and each of the RECs/RMs responsible for their respective hubs of the roster. It further called for the roster to be developed and managed in close cooperation with the respective human resources departments of the AU and the RECs/RMs, taking into consideration the present capacity of the AU and RECs/RMs and the type of peace operations the ASF is likely to implement.

Despite these achievements, the civilian dimension of the ASF is still trailing behind the military and the police dimensions, for two reasons. First, there is a general lack of understanding of the civilian dimension of peace operations in general, and of the ASF in particular, among politicians and senior officials in ministries of foreign affairs and other relevant ministries in member states, the police, the defence forces and among officials in the AU and RECs/RMs. As a result, the political will and understanding necessary to engage these government ministries, as well as the relevant departments within the AU and RECs/RMs, in the work on the civilian dimension of the ASF, is lacking. To address this, the AU PSOD needs to undertake an awareness campaign

> THE CIVILIAN DIMENSION OF THE ASF IS STILL TRAILING BEHIND THE MILITARY AND THE POLICE DIMENSIONS

aimed at increasing understanding of the civilian dimension of the ASF, and for generating a support network among a broad range of "civilian capacity" stakeholders within the AU, RECs/RMs, member states and African civil society.

Second, there is a lack of civilian capacity within the AU PSOD and regional standby arrangements. Currently, the EASF is the only RSF that has filled the four civilian positions recommended by the STR (Kampala) Report[8] for the AU and REC/RM Planning Elements (PLANELMs).[9] The AU has experienced unforeseen challenges in recruiting a Civilian Planning and Coordination Officer. It was only in April 2010 that it succeeded in filling this position, through a secondment from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)-funded TfP in Africa programme at ACCORD, and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). Similar initiatives need to be undertaken to ensure the full civilian capacity within the AU and the respective RECs/RMs. Having a full in-house civilian capacity within the PLANELMs of the AU and the RECs/RMs will ensure direction of the civilian dimension development process at a continental level, as well as fostering the implementation of the required processes at a regional level.

More specifically, the reasons for the slow progress in the development of the civilian dimension have also resulted in the slow implementation of the processes. Whilst the Civilian Dimension Policy Framework, Civilian Dimension Implementation Plan and Civilian Dimension STR Report have been approved by the AU Chiefs of Defence staff that serve as the vetting committee for policies and processes of the ASF, the Recommendations for Civilian Standby Roster and Concept Note on ASF Conduct and Discipline Policy are yet to be approved. The same reasons apply for the non-implementation of the processes relating to the issues of gender mainstreaming and HIV/Aids within the ASF concept and processes. Considering that approval does not simply imply immediate or full implementation of these policies, it is important to note these reasons for the slow progress on the development of the civilian dimension at continental level.

The same challenges are evident at the regional level. There are also similar slow processes, as well as a lack of direction from the continental level on the approval of key policies and processes for the development of the civilian dimensions of the respective RSFs. This has resulted in delays in the full implementation of the Civilian Dimension Policy Frameworks of the SSF and EASF by their respective RECs/RMs. The slow processes and lack of political will, and the lack of direction from the continental level, have also delayed the development of the civilian dimension policy frameworks and other related policies within the RSFs in the North, West and Central regions. As a result, it is important that the AU, as well as RECs/RMs, revisit the approach of the ASF development process and take the necessary corrective measures to ensure that the ASF is established as a truly multidimensional mechanism, to which the civilian component forms an important and integral part.

Identifying Gaps

The lack of civilian capacity at the continental and regional PLANELMs has delayed the implementation of the civilian dimension project and processes and has led to varied interpretations of policies and processes by the respective RECs/RMs, resulting in the implementation of diverse approaches towards the development of the respective RSFs. One key reason for this relates to the fact that military and police planners within the AU and REC/RM PLANELMs have been taking the initiative to develop the civilian dimension of the ASF. Whilst this facilitates civilian dimension processes, it risks the use of models incompatible to the civilian dimension of the ASF in particular, and peace operations in general.

These misconceptions of the civilian dimension have resulted in the implementation of processes that do not ultimately reflect its fundamental principles and perspectives. As a result, there is a need to prioritise the hiring of specialised civilian personnel to fill the civilian positions at the AU and RECs/RMs that are still vacant. This will ensure consistency and coherence, and guarantee full implementation of the civilian dimension of the ASF within the ambits of core principles and experiences in the field. It will also position the ASF to undertake tasks in the

In assessing the operational readiness and multidimensional capacity of the African Standby Force, the Regional Standby Forces's training plans are focused on aspects of military training and unreflective of an integrated approach to training.

medium to long term – including stabilisation tasks and the facilitation of political processes for dialogue and conflict resolution.

Another issue that poses a challenge to the establishment of the civilian dimension of the ASF relates to the sourcing of civilian specialists for the ASF. Since the start of the ASF Civilian Dimension Project in 2006, the AU and RECs/RMs have portrayed the intention to utilise the services of civil servants of member states to fill ASF civilian positions within the AU and REC/RM PLANELMs and standby roster. Whilst this is a welcome move to ensure member states' ownership of the ASF processes at every level, it might not be the best approach. Peace operations practitioners have been calling for the inclusion of civilian personnel outside government institutions in the AU and REC/RM PLANELMs and standby roster. This call is based on UN peace operations experience that, unlike military and police personnel, it will be challenging for member states to take on the pledging of civilians to serve in peace operations. This is based on the fact that civilian specialists required for peace operations are sparsely scattered across many disciplines and entities including government, civil society institutions and the private sector. Thus, the fact that there is no single entity (state, civil society or private sector) like the police and military referred to or considered as a civilian component within member states, makes it difficult to consider this as a workable and sustainable approach or trend.

Although this is a new initiative that can be tested, it does not guarantee the availability of civilians that can be called upon at short notice for an ASF or REC/RM operation. Considering this – and the fact that the ASF is designed to respond to crisis situations on the continent according to the ASF scenarios and deployment timeframes of 14, 30 and 90 days duration[10] – the exclusive use of civil servants presents the challenge of having available personnel for AU peace operations. This is based on the experience that, most of the time, civil servants find it hard to obtain clearance and confirmation from their line managers – who find it difficult to release their most valuable personnel for ASF/REC/RM assignments and activities during crucial and long periods. This issue needs to be urgently addressed, as it will affect the timely organisation and deployment of ASF operations if the AU and RECs/RMs have to depend on the limited capacities of government ministries. It would, therefore, make sense also to have well-trained and qualified civilian specialists on the ASF standby roster, contracted on an individual basis and readily available for ASF deployment – or to be called on in place of a qualified civil servant, who might not be available at a particular time of need – to avoid delays in generating civilian capacity for deployment.

The civilian component also tends to be following a complex peace operations model that undertakes long-term peacebuilding activities relating to issues of transformation of conflict societies. Whilst this is a welcome move, aimed

at ensuring that the AU is capable of responding to conflict situations in a manner that allows for a system-wide approach that covers the various stages of peace, stability and post-conflict processes, it would be more beneficial for the AU to first ensure that the ASF is able to address current peace operations challenges on the continent effectively.

Such challenges and gaps relate to the successful and effective implementation of short- to medium-term stabilisation operations, which can create an enabling environment for a political process and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Thus, at this stage, it will be more advantageous for the ASF to follow a stability operations model and be designed to address such a specific and tangible need, which can be realistically achieved and sustained with the AU and REC/RM current capacities. Such stability operations can be scaled up to undertake additional tasks if the AU generates the necessary support from the UN or other institutions.

Additionally, the AU can facilitate the transformation of an ASF operation to a UN integrated peacebuilding operation that can utilise the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) framework. This will foster a closer AU/UN partnership and synergy. It will also provide the opportunity to utilise the comparative advantages of both institutions to ensure successful peace operations on the continent.

The African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and Sudan (AMIS) serve as examples of the type of peace operations the AU is likely to undertake.[11] Their transformation to UN missions and AU-UN hybrid operations respectively demonstrates the fact that the AU can utilise the support of the UN for the conduct of integrated/system-wide and long-term peacebuilding operations on the continent. The current AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) also portrays another dimension of this trend, with the UN having a political office for Somalia and providing much-needed administrative and logistical support through the established UN Support Office for AMISOM. Whilst these various dimensions might have challenges in implementation, they offer opportunities for cooperation between the AU and the UN, and facilitate the exchange of experience, expertise, strengths, capacities and capabilities in a complementary manner.

Conclusion

It is evident that the AU and RECs/RMs are making progress in the development of the civilian dimension of the ASF. However, more needs to be done to consolidate the gains achieved thus far. Ensuring consolidation means that the AU and RECs/RMs need to address the gaps and challenges for the establishment of a functional and effective civilian component and multidimensional ASF. Thus, the AU and RECs/RMs should ensure that, as the RSFs work towards conducting Exercise Amani Africa, plans should be underway to take note of the challenges and gaps in the

civilian dimension and multidimensional capacity of the ASF, with the aim of addressing them after the exercise. This should feed into the process to develop the ASF Road Map (Phase) Three.

The opportunity that Exercise Amani Africa offers both the AU and RECs/RMs to assess practically the progress and status of the civilian component and the ASF as a whole should not be ignored. The need to capitalise on this window of opportunity to channel the review of the civilian dimension and ASF multidimensional processes should not be underestimated or under-utilised.

**Zinurine Alghali is an Acting Coordinator of ACCORD's Peacekeeping Unit.**

Endnotes

1   The issues discussed in the article are the author's personal account and reflections.

2   The TfP programme at ACCORD is an African peacekeeping capacity-building programme funded by the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

3   The earlier intention – to implement the civilian and police dimension processes simultaneously – resulted in the inclusion of police dimensions in the Civilian Dimension Policy Framework Document.

4   The AU ASF Civilian Dimension Policy Framework Document is available at: <http://www.accord.org.za/our-work/peacekeeping/reports.html>.

5   Integrated missions refers to a system-wide approach of combining the operations of a peacekeeping mission with those of the humanitarian community, through a systematic mechanism of collaboration with the UN Country team. In UN integrated missions, the UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator serves as Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Humanitarian Coordination.

6   CPX refers to a simulation exercise to test the command structure of a peacekeeping force.

7   The STR Report is also widely referred to as the Kampala Report.

8   The four civilian positions in the PLANELM are: Head of Civilian Component, Planning and Coordination Officer, Training and Rostering Officer, and Logistics Officer.

9   PLANELM refers to the structure at the AU and REC/RM headquarters comprising civilian, police and military specialists, who are responsible for developing policies and the capacity of the AU and RECs/RMs with regard to the respective RSFs that make up the ASF, and the implementation of all ASF processes and activities thereof.

10 The ASF has six scenarios that it can be mandated and deployed to address. See paragraph 1.6 of the ASF Policy Framework Document, available at: <http://www.accord.org.za/our-work/peacekeeping/reports.html>.

11 The AMIB and AMIS were African missions conducted to create stability in Burundi and Sudan respectively, at a time when there was no peace agreement in place in these countries. These missions were thus mandated to create stability in these countries and facilitate a process for dialogue among the fighting groups, for a peaceful resolution of the respective conflicts.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN DIMENSION OF THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

BY **ZINURINE ALGHALI**

The Establishment of the African Standby Force

The African Standby Force (ASF) structure is divided into the five regions of Africa (North, East, Central, West and Southern). The five regions serve as the building blocks of the ASF through their Regional Standby Forces (RSFs). As not all countries in a particular region are part of the same Regional Economic Community (REC), and since some member states belong to more than one economic grouping, they formed the Regional Mechanisms (RM) for the ASF.[1] The following map[2] depicts the RSFs, member states[3] and the location of Force headquarters.

ASF Regions

North
1. Western Sahara
2. Mauritania
3. Algeria
4. Tunisia
5. Libya
6. Egypt

West
1. Mali
2. Cape Verde
3. Senegal
4. Gambia
5. Guinea-Bissau
6. Guinea
7. Sierra Leone
8. Liberia
9. Côte d'Ivoire
10. Ghana
11. Togo
12. Benin
13. Nigeria
14. Niger
15. Burkina Faso

East
1. Sudan
2. Ethiopia
3. Eritrea
4. Djibouti
5. Somalia
6. Kenya
7. Uganda
8. Rwanda
9. Tanzania
10. Comoros
11. Seychelles
12. Mauritius

Central
1. São Tomé and Principe
2. Equatorial Guinea
3. Cameroon
4. Central Africa Republic
5. Gabon
6. Chad
7. Congo (Brazzaville)
8. Burundi
9. Democratic Republic of the Congo

Southern
1. Malawi
2. Zambia
3. Zimbabwe
4. Namibia
5. Swaziland
6. Lesotho
7. Botswana
8. South Africa
9. Angola
10. Mozambique
11. Madagascar

Current Status of the ASF

The development of the ASF has followed a phased approach to ensure a systematic process. During the **first phase (2005 – 2008)**, the baseline policy and legal documents on the establishment, purpose and operation of the ASF at continental and regional levels were developed. The **second phase (2008 – 2010)** consolidated the policy and legal documents, developed concepts of operation and the identification of capacities, and developed capabilities for deployment.

However, the civilian dimension in peacekeeping has not followed this approach. This is due to the fact that the building of an ASF civilian process was only initiated in 2006. Apart from a late engagement in developing a civilian dimension process at the AU, it has also not had the support and capacity required to ensure its full integration into ASF processes and structure. As a result, the AU will be developing a **third phase**, which will address these and other issues to ensure the full development and integration of the civilian dimension, thus enabling the establishment of a multidimensional ASF. The table below illustrates the status of the ASF civilian dimension processes at both continental and regional levels.

Status of Civilian Dimension Processes

Processes	AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD)	East African Standby Force (EASF)	Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC)[4]	ECOWAS[5] Standby Force (ESF)	SADC[6] Standby Force (SSF)	North Africa Regional Capabilities (NARC)
Framework documents	Have developed key documents and continue to generate the others required	Not yet approved	Not yet developed	Not yet developed	Not yet approved	Not yet developed
Civilian staff in Planning Element (PLANELM)	One position filled	All four positions filled	Two positions filled	Initiated the process to fill all four positions	One position filled	Planning to fill all four positions
Centres of excellence/training institutions	Utilises the regional centre of excellence and training institutions	Have one centre of excellence	None	Have tactical, operational and strategic centre of excellence	Have one centre of excellence	Have one centre of excellence
Civilian components	Utilises the civilian components of RSFs	Developing	Not yet developed	Not yet developed	Developing	Not yet developed
Civilian training for the ASF	Relies on APSTA[7] to coordinate training conducted by regional centres of excellence and training institutions for the ASF	Some conducted	Not yet initiated	Not yet initiated	Some conducted	Not yet initiated
Completion of Map Exercise (MAPEX)/ Command Post Exercise (CPX)	Completed a continental MAPEX and will be conducting a continental CPX in October 2010	Completed	Not yet conducted	Completed	Completed	Not yet conducted
Completion of Field Training Exercise (FTX)	To be conducted in the future	Completed	Not yet conducted	Completed	Completed	Not yet conducted
Standby roster	Have initiated the ASF Standby Roster process and will coordinate the RSF's hub roster	Developing database	Not yet initiated	Not yet initiated	Developing database	Not yet initiated

**Zinurine Alghali is an Acting Coordinator of ACCORD's Peacekeeping Unit.**

Endnotes

1   Alghali, Zinurine and Mbaye, Mamado (2008) The African Standby Force and Regional Standby Brigades. *Conflict Trends*, special edition on peacekeeping, 3/2008.

2   This map was included in a presentation delivered at an ACCORD Civilian Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Course in Nairobi, Kenya, in November 2008. The presentation was delivered by Simon Mulongo, former Director of the Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM).

3   Some member states, irrespective of their regional location, are part of other RECs/RMs/RSFs. For instance, Tanzania, Mauritius, Seychelles and Madagascar are part of both EASF and SSF, while the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola are part of both FOMAC and SSF.

4   The acronym FOMAC is based on its French title: Force Multinationale de l'Afrique Centrale.

5   Economic Community of West African States.

6   Southern African Development Community.

7   The African Peace Support Trainers' Association.

CIVILIAN PEACEKEEPERS SHARE THEIR EXPERIENCES

COMPILED BY **GUSTAVO DE CARVALHO, TAMARA J.KIRKWOOD AND BHAVYA JEENA**

ACCORD asked some civilian peacekeepers to share their personal experiences from the field. These peacekeepers shared their perspectives on their roles, missions, host countries and how their civilian status affects and enhances the way their daily tasks and activities are performed. The following "perspective boxes" represents the range of responses received.[1]

Sulaiman Momodu

Public Information Officer, United Nations Mission in Liberia

Sulaiman Momodu works as a Public Information Officer with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Momodu's work takes him to remote parts of post-war Liberia and puts him in contact with a network of civilian professionals. Momodu shares his impressions of his role as a Sierra Leonean journalist, working as a civilian peacekeeper in UNMIL.

I am a Sierra Leonean national currently working with UNMIL as a Public Information Officer. I am in my thirties and hold a Master of Arts degree in communications, media and public relations, in addition to other qualifications in mass communication.

I worked as a print journalist and then became the editor of *Concord Times*, one of Sierra Leone's leading newspapers. I also reported for the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) African Service programme on a freelance basis, and worked for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Sierra Leone as a Public Information/External Relations Assistant for nearly four years before joining UNMIL which, at its peak, had about 15 000 personnel.

As a writer for the UN mission's flagship publications (magazine and newsletter), my job takes me to all parts of post-war Liberia, including very remote areas. I cover the activities of all categories of UN peacekeepers: military, police and civilian. The Public Information Section of UNMIL comprises units such as Radio, Publications, Video, Media and External Relations, Media Monitoring and Development, and Community Outreach.

All personnel in the section are civilian professionals, whose role has been critical in disseminating information to both internal and external audiences.

The contribution of civilians in peacekeeping operations cannot be overemphasised. Whilst various contingents of military and police peacekeepers in UNMIL have contributed to disarmament and relative peace and stability, civilians in the mission possess a wealth of

Sulaiman Momodu (second from left) with Liberian farmers.

experience and are experts in diverse fields, which are needed for sustainable peace and development. Human rights, political affairs, civil affairs, legal affairs, engineering and medical are among the professional areas where civilian peacekeepers in UNMIL have been crucial, and whose activities I have covered. In post-war Liberia, where there is a dearth of professionals, civilian peacekeepers have been vital in providing support to the government, civil society organisations and others, in capacity-building and mentoring.

Working in a peacekeeping environment can, however, be stressful. Usually, one deploys in a country where infrastructure, basic services and facilities have been destroyed, or are basic. When I arrived in Liberia, I slept on a tiny bed that even my little daughter would frown to sleep on. Liberia is also a non-family duty station for peacekeepers, and separation from loved ones

can be hard. Notwithstanding the challenges, there are opportunities for a civilian peacekeeper to acquire new skills and knowledge while serving in a multicultural environment, which could be useful in future assignments. Having spent four years in Liberia, it is always satisfying to see the former epicentre of conflict rebuilding, and it is satisfying that I, a civilian peacekeeper, am making my own humble contribution.

NOTWITHSTANDING THE CHALLENGES, THERE ARE OPPORTUNITIES FOR A CIVILIAN PEACEKEEPER TO ACQUIRE NEW SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE WHILE SERVING IN A MULTICULTURAL ENVIRONMENT, WHICH COULD BE USEFUL IN FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Quick Impact Projects Coordinator, Civil Affairs Section, United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti

Several weeks after the earthquake in Haiti occurred in January 2010, Carmen Echeverria was appointed Quick Impact Projects (QIP) Coordinator for the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). QIPs are short-term, small-scale, rapidly implemented projects that are designed to have an immediate impact on communities.

In her five years of experience working in the Civil Affairs Section at the MINUSTAH mission, nothing could have prepared Echevarria for the task that lay ahead: to rebuild MINUSTAH and the Haitian way of life for the many inhabitants on the island. Echevarria shares her views on how civilian involvement has impacted the rehabilitation process in Haiti following the January 2010 earthquake.

OGAN ABASS/MINUSTAH

The United Nations Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) funded a Quick Impact Project (QIP) to recreate a forest in Madrasse, 30 kilometres from Cap Haitian, north of Haiti. The QIP planted over 1 200 seedlings.

The participation of civilians in the accomplishment of MINUSTAH's mandate has been fundamental. Civilians have maintained close relationships with local authorities and other actors to strengthen their capacities in various ways. For instance, MINUSTAH's Civil Affairs Section has worked closely with municipal authorities, assisting them through training and advice in good governance, in the elaboration of local development programmes for their regions, and on the administration of their local budgets. Also, civilians have coordinated regional work with the United Nations Police (UNPOL) and military contingents, providing them with information on the political and social developments of the region.

I have been working in MINUSTAH since 2005. The earthquake we suffered on 12 January 2010 has been the most difficult moment experienced by the Mission during all its time in Haiti, and possibly the worst situation in Haitian history, causing more than 220 000 deaths, destruction of state buildings, houses, roads and other infrastructure. MINUSTAH itself suffered directly, losing 101 colleagues, among them the Special Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG), Deputy SRSG and most of its senior management.

The QIP programme was strongly impacted by the earthquake. Like everybody else, the QIP's implementing partners suffered severe damage during the earthquake. Some implementing partners died, others experienced collapsed houses and offices and had to move to tents in provisional camps under precarious conditions.

After the earthquake, the impoverished slums of Port-au-Prince, the capital city, were at risk of sliding back to the pre-2007 situation with armed gangs dominating the neighbourhoods.

The movement of around 600 000 internally displaced persons to other areas created urgent needs and strong pressure in the regions receiving them.

When I became QIP Coordinator for Haiti, several weeks after the earthquake, the QIPs represented an essential instrument to contribute in a visible manner to the reconstruction efforts for MINUSTAH. The implementation of QIPs in the post-earthquake period allowed the mission's implementing partners to see that Civil Affairs and other MINUSTAH sections' efforts were actively and vigorously supporting them in their difficult environment. Through this continuous presence on the ground, MINUSTAH's sections were able to assist the implementing partners in developing good projects that would impact communities.

For example, as an immediate measure after the earthquake, in an effort to contribute and expand the reconstruction process, the time limit of three months for the implementation of QIPs was exceptionally expanded to six months. Also, the budget for the projects – originally set at US$25 000 – was increased to US$100 000 until the end of 2010. The changes in the implementation of QIPs have enhanced assistance to the country at various levels, including local authorities, non-governmental organisations and local committees, with larger-scale projects that focus on improving the life conditions of victims and diminishing risk in certain areas. Also, the extension of QIPs has allowed for the creation of jobs with high labour intensity projects and the development of areas in the ravines surrounding Port-au-Prince and Artibonite (areas that were affected significantly by tropical storms).

MINUSTAH's civilian staff have several years of accumulated experience with such rehabilitation projects. As a result of this experience, they are able to maintain close working relationships with local authorities, have a good political assessment of the region, and have the capacity to coordinate with all MINUSTAH contingents for the implementation of QIPs.

We are certain that developing good QIPs will help us in building confidence in MINUSTAH, in its mandate, in the reconstruction process, and in our efforts to strengthen local authorities' capacities. This will result in alleviating the desperate conditions of the earthquake victims.

Djénéba Bénédicte Kouassi-Dosso

National Civil Affairs Officer, United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire

As a National Civil Affairs Officer with the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), Djénéba Bénédicte Kouassi-Dosso works closely with issues of confidence-building, conflict management and reconciliation in the country. As a UN national staff member, Kouassi-Dosso elaborates on the comparative advantages of using the host country's nationals in supporting the understanding of cultural norms and values, before pressing forward with the mission mandate.

Before joining the UN in May 2008, my professional experiences were completely different from the humanitarian field. I started my career as a Claim Manager in a marine transport company for five years, worked as a cotton trader for another five years and my last position was as Special Advisor to the Human Rights Ministry in Côte d'Ivoire, which lasted a period of two years.

I am currently based at UNOCI's headquarters, after spending six months in the field where I worked

Above: Kouassi-Dosso explains, through pictures, the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire's (UNOCI) Civil Affairs mandate to traditional leaders and authorities in Brobo (June 2010).

as the focal point of social cohesion activities in the Civil Affairs Section. I have to formulate strategies and implement activities through nine field offices, with the aims of confidence-building, conflict management, reconciliation and supporting social cohesion among communities.

In Côte d'Ivoire, tensions between communities have become exacerbated since the political-military crisis of September 2002. Causes for the crisis are rooted in land ownership disputes, the return of displaced persons, identity problems, cattle breeding and farming related conflict, and group identity conflicts.

During the 2010 fiscal year, our Civil Affairs Section initiated an innovative approach, by designing our activities to take into account the cultural context. As a result, we have organised, for example, intercommunity meetings to promote dialogue between communities in conflict and seminars with traditional chiefs on conflict management in different localities.

These intercommunity dialogue meetings positively challenged my work as a national staff member. For instance, from preparations until the implementation of activities, I could give guidance to my international colleagues on the context and organisational rules of communities. Côte d'Ivoire is a multicultural country and each community has its own codes. The way to communicate, the way to approach traditional leaders, and women's roles vary widely from one community to another. These meetings have also revealed to many in the mission how traditional conflict management dynamics are different from theoretical approaches. It has also revealed that traditional approaches to resolving conflict are very important in the consolidation of reconciliation processes.

Personally, I have learned many lessons from the intercommunity dialogue meetings. First, working on intercommunity conflicts in Africa requires awareness of one's cultural environment – sometimes even concerning the roles of what I see as "irrational" elements like mysticism and some beliefs. There is no doubt that a deeper understanding of the cultural environment provides an advantage for national staff, as we have to build confidence among communities, especially in the current post-crisis period. Communities are more comfortable and consequently more involved in the resolution dynamics when they can see that some aspects of their cultures helped to address and/or solve the conflicts.

Second, it gave me the opportunity to learn more about my own country. It was important for me, during these activities, to have a better understanding of the key role of women in conflict resolution in Côte d'Ivoire. Contrary to common views, women have a crucial role to play in promoting conflict resolution activities, which should be promoted without undermining the social balance of the community. As an Ivorian woman in the peacekeeping mission, I alert and educate local communities that the role of women is moving forward.

I will conclude that it is very important during this peacebuilding process to capture the organisational structure of a country and build strong peace foundations through local communities. National staff members can be reliable drivers for peace. Of course, the main challenge is to remain neutral. This awareness needs to be considered by the UN to give a better chance of success to peacekeeping missions, especially in West Africa.

Laurent Guepin

Officer in Charge, Civil Affairs Section, United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Laurent Guepin works as one of the main representatives of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo's (MONUC)[1] civilian dimension, namely the Civil Affairs Section. He is responsible for the management of a range of activities that include the protection of civilians, support for the restoration of state authority, and support to civil society organisations. Guepin shared his views with ACCORD, via email, on MONUC's Civil Affairs Section (CAS) and its roles in supporting the implementation of the overall mission's mandate for peace in the country.

ACCORD ARCHIVE

With 18 years of professional managerial experience in development projects (Republic of Congo), social housing development policy (France) and emergency humanitarian operations in crisis regions (Balkans, Middle East and Africa), Guepin has witnessed CAS playing an increasing and crucial role in the DRC's post-conflict environment. "CAS is central to the implementation of MONUC's mandate as a key interlocutor between MONUC and the population, local government and civil society… and development of the joint-protection teams," he writes.

Guepin's Civil Affairs Section was created as an evolution of the former Humanitarian Affairs Section and, in the last years, has had an increasing role in strengthening the mission's mandate, particularly with regard to its role in the protection of civilians, strengthening of democratic institutions and in reconciliation. The particular role of MONUC in enhancing the national capacity to protect civilians came in 2008, after the UN Security Council Resolution 1856 (2008) gave a direct and specific mandate to the mission to work for the protection of civilians.

CAS has been central in the process of transition and possible withdrawal of the mission in the country. The central role of MONUC has been particularly relevant in undertaking various activities that empower and strengthen the local capacity to provide a viable administration in the country. UN Resolution 1906 (2009) provided for the progressive handover to the United Nations Country

---

1   The interview with Laurent Guepin occurred prior to the change of mandate that modified the name of MONUC to the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). As such, all references to MONUC are related to activities prior to July 2010.

Team (UNCT) and bilateral and multilateral partners in the west of the DRC. The successful handover to these actors is essential to Guepin, as he believes the mission's withdrawal depends on the existence of viable local administration and newly decentralised entities.

One of the activities conducted presently by CAS, which is seen to be crucial for the successful handover to UNCT, relates to mapping the presence and the field of activities of UN agencies in the 11 provinces. It is believed that one of the main benchmarks for MONUC's withdrawal is the setting up of coordination mechanisms for development and recovery activities by Congolese authorities – involving UN agencies, non-governmental organisations and civil society organisations at local and provincial levels through the Provincial and Local Development Committee (*Comités provinciaux et locaux de Developpement*).

Guepin highlighted that CAS roles in the DRC are affected by the fact that, whilst discussions for withdrawal of the mission are being undertaken, the DRC is still facing many challenges. "The peace process is not yet fully consolidated in the DRC. The continued presence in the east of the FDLR [Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda] and other armed groups, militias and ex-combatants remains a significant source of insecurity, and continues to cause massive displacement of populations in the eastern part of the DRC."

Guepin concludes by writing: "MONUC's withdrawal depends on the existence of viable local administration and newly decentralised entities." The restoration and extension of legitimate state authority to areas controlled by armed groups continues to pose significant challenges, despite the creation of newly elected government institutions at the national and provincial levels.

Maria Cecilia Icaro

Deputy Chief Training Officer, United Nations Mission in Chad.

As Deputy Chief Training Officer with the United Nations Mission in Chad (MINURCAT), Icaro works within the mandate to enhance the training needs that cut across or affect large areas of MINURCAT's work. Her experience with training in different peacekeeping operations, namely in Chad and Côte d'Ivoire, has given her the possibility of enhancing the capacity of national and international staff to understand and implement their respective missions' mandates more effectively.

Icaro indicates that, in both her experiences with ONUCI and MINURCAT, she did her best to ensure that staff members, and especially the training team members, understood the mandate of the missions they work in. She emphasises that civilians who know their mandates well and who are convinced of the strengths of the UN mission will be great implementers of its mandate, both at the personal and professional levels.

The importance of having civilian peacekeepers that are able to understand and implement the mission's mandate fully is central to the induction courses that are conducted by MINURCAT's Integrated Training Cell. Icaro states that this is particularly important in the context of UN national staff. "In every induction,

In her training, Maria Icaro emphasises understanding of the mission mandate.

which we organise twice a month, the first briefing topic is always about the mandate. In every training topic I deliver for UN staff members, I make sure that they understand the mandate – especially the national staff members. As civilians, I personally believe they are our first-hand ambassadors to our host population."

"Civilians have a huge impact on the local population. They see how we work, how we behave, how we are guided by the objective of our presence. This has been my experience in dealing with the people. When they know that we work according to a certain 'mandate', guided by honourable principles and noble aims, they understand the reason why we are here and thus, we become more credible, more acceptable and welcomed by them."

MARIA EMPHASISES THAT CIVILIANS WHO KNOW THEIR MANDATES WELL AND WHO ARE CONVINCED OF THE STRENGTHS OF THE UN MISSION WILL BE GREAT IMPLEMENTERS OF ITS MANDATE, BOTH AT THE PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LEVELS

Gustavo de Carvalho is the Acting Coordinator of ACCORD's Peacekeeping Unit.

Tamara J. Kirkwood is a Special Projects Officer in the Knowledge Production Department at ACCORD.

Bhavya Jeena is a Communication Officer at ACCORD.

Endnote
1   ACCORD received this information from the various respondents via email.

AMBASSADOR DAUDI NGELAUTWA MWAKAWAGO

BY **TAMARA J. KIRKWOOD**

On 1 December 2003, then-United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced the appointment of Ambassador Daudi Ngelautwa Mwakawago of Tanzania as Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and Chief of the United Nations (UN) Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) – posts served successfully by Ambassador Mwakawago until the mission drew down on 31 December 2005. After a distinguished career, he passed away on 25 February 2010 in Dar es Salaam. This profile pays tribute to Ambassador Mwakawago's work as a veteran politician and diplomat, and exemplifies an SRSG who made a significant contribution to African peace and development in his lifetime.

In discussing the role of an SRSG, De Coning argues that their primary role in today's integrated missions is that of a "process facilitator".[1] According to De Coning, an SRSG's power and influence does not reside in the resources that he or she can directly bring to bear in a specific situation – but in the ability to muster and align the resources of a large number of agencies, donors and countries to support the peacebuilding effort in a given context. An SRSG is ultimately responsible for leading a process that generates a strategic framework which effectively manages the processes and coordinates the various interdependencies, actors and stakeholders in an integrated mission. Thus, in addition to having experience or knowledge of the type of context in which integrated missions generally occur, De Coning proposes that the personal attributes and leadership qualities of an SRSG are also of great significance in their selection and possibly their success as an SRSG.

Considering De Coning's SRSG profile description, it is clear why the then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan elected Ambassador Daudi Ngelautwa Mwakawago as the SRSG to UNAMSIL in 2003. Prior to his appointment in Sierra Leone, Ambassador Mwakawago served as the Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the UN from 1994 to 2003 – during which time he gained significant experience of the UN system and the challenges and solutions being faced by the various missions around the world. In 1997, Ambassador Mwakawago chaired the "Group of 77" developing countries in the UN. Prior to becoming an Ambassador to the UN, Ambassador Mwakawago held a number of prominent positions in the parliament of his country, including the posts of Minister for Information and Broadcasting (1972-1977), Minister of Information and Culture (1982-1983), Minister of Labour and Manpower Development (1983-1987), and Minister of Industry and Trade

(1987). Ambassador Mwakawago also served as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee (1989-1990) and held various positions in the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) ruling political party in Tanzania. Through his various career posts, Ambassador Mwakawago gained immeasurable experience in issues and activities that ranged from global security to grassroots challenges and opportunities being faced by villages across Africa. Up until his death, Ambassador Mwakawago was Tanzania's longest serving civil servant in the history of his country, with over 40 years of service in Tanzania and abroad. Accordingly, he earned a certain reputation among his colleagues as a respected diplomat, and he inherently commanded a level of respect and attention from all those with whom he worked.

When Ambassador Mwakawago assumed the position of SRSG of UNAMSIL in 2003, the mission was beginning to draw down and inevitably consolidate all the processes and activities that UNAMSIL was committed to, in order to consolidate peace in Sierra Leone. Although the various successes of the mission cannot be wholly attributed to Ambassador Mwakawago's leadership (as he was preceded by SRSG Oluymeni Adenjii of Nigeria), he undoubtedly played a significant role in upholding the mission's mandate and facilitated various processes that effectively enabled the mission to complete most of the tasks that had been assigned to it. Such tasks and successes were namely the

ALTHOUGH AMBASSADOR MWAKAWAGO MAY BE REMEMBERED FOR HIS ROLE OF SRSG AND SUCCESSFULLY FULFILLING HIS MANDATE AS "PROCESS FACILITATOR" IN UNAMSIL, HIS CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE IN SIERRA LEONE IS ONLY ONE PART OF THE LEGACY HE LEFT BEHIND

disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of more than 72 000 combatants; the return of over half a million refugees and internally displaced persons; the restoration of government authority throughout the country; the organisation of national and local elections in 2004; the retraining and restructuring of the national security apparatus; and the delivery of various infrastructural development and income-generating projects through quick impact initiatives. Ambassador Mwakawago was a vocal proponent of the "two-pronged approach" to developing both justice and peace and encouraging a "durable peace" in Sierra Leone.[2] Under his stewardship, the mission also significantly supported – by way of technical assistance – the establishment of a Special Court and a Truth and

Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone. During his tenure as SRSG, Ambassador Mwakawago remained committed to, and his actions seemed guided by, the UN Security Council Resolution 1562 (2004), which effectively accords primacy to issues relating to good governance, justice and the rule of law, in addition to bolstering the security sector.[3]

Following the drawdown of UNAMSIL, the Security Council noted "with satisfaction" that the mission made various contributions to the UN system, by way of adopting innovative methods of operation and potentially developing "new" best practices that could charter the way forward for more effective and efficient operations. Moreover, the actual drawdown and exit strategy was considered exemplary and a "testimony to the triangular partnership between regional organisations, troop contributors and the UN".[4] The drawdown of UNAMSIL has been referred to as one of the more successful in the recent history of UN missions, as it was based on specific benchmarks for the drawdown of a complex integrated mission that dealt simultaneously with the various governance, developmental and humanitarian elements and actors. The drawdown overseen by Ambassador Mwakawago ensured the appropriate level of cooperation and coordination with other UN peacekeeping operations and offices in the region and the mission that would assume UNAMSIL's post-mandate capacity (the UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone – UNIOSL).

Ambassador Mwakawago was and continues to be highly respected for his understanding of the complexities in Sierra Leone and, as a result, was sometimes tasked with advising UNIOSL between 2005 and 2010. During this time, Ambassador Mwakawago also engaged with various civil society organisations and organisations dedicated to the cause of peace and justice on the African continent.

Although Ambassador Mwakawago may be remembered for his role of SRSG and successfully fulfilling his mandate as "process facilitator" in UNAMSIL, his contribution to peace in Sierra Leone is only one part of the legacy he left behind. Until his death, Ambassador Mwakawago remained active in promoting peace and justice globally through his involvement in various professional organisations related to peace, security, justice and development, specifically related to Africa. On the announcement of his passing, scores of messages and tributes were sent to Tanzania's *Daily News*.[5] All the messages spoke of having lost a "great man", a "humble and kind man", a "source of real knowledge and immeasurable experience and advice". Ambassador Mwakawago was undoubtedly highly respected, and his death is considered a great loss for the cause of peace and justice in Africa. 🔔

Tamara J. Kirkwood is a Special Projects Officer in the Knowledge Production Department at ACCORD.

Endnotes

1   De Coning, Cedric (2010) Mediation and Peacebuilding: SRSGs and DSRSGs in Integrated Missions. *Global Governance*, 16 (2010), pp. 281-299.

2   The "two-pronged approach" is widely covered and debated in literature, and refers to not prioritising peace over justice or vice versa but to having dual policies and strategies that are complementary and cohesive with one another and that seek improvements in both peace and justice.

3   Samu, Marian (2004) 'Truth and Reconciliation Commission Presents Report', The Republic of Sierra Leone State House online, 5 October 2004, Available at: <http://www.statehouse-sl.org/trc-fin-rep-oct5.html>.

4   United Nations Security Council (2005) 'Security Council Commends Peacekeeping Missions' Contribution to Sierra Leone's Recovery as it Approached 31 December Exit', 20 December 2005, Security Council 5 334th Meeting (AM), Relief Web, Available at: <http://ocha-gwapps1.unog.ch/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/KHII-6KA3BY?OpenDocument&query=DAUDI%20MWAKAWAGO>.

5   (2010) Ambassador Mwakawago is No More. *Daily News*, 25 February 2010, p 1, Available at: <http://www.dailynews.co.tz/home/?n=7766&cat=home>.

WRITE FOR ACCORD

The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) is a civil society institution working throughout Africa to bring creative African solutions to the challenges posed by conflict on the continent. ACCORD specialises in conflict analysis, prevention, resolution and management and intervenes in conflicts through mediation, negotiation, facilitation and training. Since 1992, ACCORD has trained over 15 000 people in conflict resolution and management skills.

For over 10 years, ACCORD has published two key publications, *Conflict Trends (CT)* and the *African Journal of Conflict Resolution (AJCR)*. *Conflict Trends* is a quarterly publication that explores trends in current and emerging conflicts and their resolution in Africa. ACCORD welcomes submissions to the magazine from writers in Africa and beyond. Prospective authors are encouraged to submit well-balanced contributions that address the contemporary challenges faced by African states and societies to bring about sustainable peace. The *African Journal of Conflict Resolution* is a biannual peer-reviewed journal for the multidisciplinary subject field of conflict resolution. Contributors are encouraged to reflect on theoretical approaches and engage practical aspects of preventing and managing armed violence and peacebuilding, from a scholarly perspective. Visit our website to learn more about writing for these flagship publications.

ACCORD also publishes subject-specific reports and studies. An example of such a publication is *Mediating Peace in Africa*, a research report based on a seminar held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 4 March 2009, organised by ACCORD and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. The purpose of the seminar was to focus on strengthening the mediation and conflict prevention aspects of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Participants reviewed the role of mediation within the peace and security architecture of the African Union (AU) and explored mediation support challenges and opportunities in Africa.

All publications are free and may be downloaded from our website.
For information please visit <http://www.accord.org.za>

ACCORD's address is:
Physical: ACCORD House • 2 Golf Course Drive • Mount Edgecombe 4300 • South Africa

Post: Private Bag X018 • Umhlanga Rocks 4320 • South Africa
Tel +27 (0) 31 502 3908 • Fax +27 (0) 31 502 4160

African solutions for African challenges

ACCORD
THE AFRICAN CENTRE FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES