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The Atlantic Council

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The On the Horizon Project is a special initiative of the Atlantic Council to identify, analyze, and report to policymakers and opinion leaders on emerging trends, threats, and opportunities likely to influence U.S. and allied security in the next three to five years, and to recommend practical steps that can and should be taken now to influence positively consequential challenges that will be coming to their inbox soon.

The Michael S. Ansari Africa Center and the On the Horizon Project

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The United States possesses clear and compelling national interests in West Africa, particularly in the region’s maritime domain. These vital security, economic, and humanitarian interests, including reliable long-term access to energy, shared largely by the African people and the international community, are at grave risk from regional instability and the increasing potential for state failures in an economically and politically distressed area of over 250 million people.

In cooperation with our allies, America must work harder, smarter, and better to help responsible West African leaders counter the rampant exploitation of the region’s ungoverned waters by a host of illicit actors, including terrorists, illicit traffickers of drugs, humans, arms and other contraband, oil thieves, pirates, poachers, and polluters.

The continued failure to counter these devastating threats urgently, energetically, and proactively—particularly through the development of sustainable West African will, capability, and capacity to govern and enforce the rule of law effectively—increases the likelihood that in the near future the United States, Africa, and the international community will be required to deal with far greater, costlier, and more intractable challenges to our shared security and development objectives.

Priority U.S. interests in West African maritime security and its land based dimensions are—

- An adequately secure maritime domain that does not provide space for transnational terrorist and criminal organizations to operate or find safe haven

The area’s strategic location, lack of governance, deficient rule of law, glut of corrupt officials, porous borders, insurgent environment, and expansive, largely un-policed maritime domain, are attracting international terrorists, transnational drug cartels, and other criminal elements and enterprises (including large scale polluters and poachers). In particular, massive oil theft and narcotics trafficking abetted by maritime insecurity are generating huge illegal financial flows fueling widespread criminality and corruption with a global reach.

Highly troubled economic and political conditions and regional demographic trends are creating a fertile environment where illicit groups including acolytes of radical Islam can readily win new adherents, sympathizers, and recruits. Osama bin Laden has called on his followers to make Nigeria a priority. Nigeria, the largest nation on the continent, has a population of 150 million people, 40 percent of whom are under the age of 14. Concerns are growing about the increased potential for radicalization, particularly youth, among the country’s large Muslim population.

- The safe, secure, and efficient flow of vessels, cargo, and people bound to or from the United States

West African ports, harbors, and shipping lanes are important components of the highly integrated global maritime transportation linked to U.S. and allied ports and traffic flows. While the region’s waters are a major transit route for international commerce, they are plied by a host of criminal actors engaged in operations, including illicit oil tankers, drug runners, armed robbers, illicit waste dumpers, and pirates. The Gulf of Guinea is second only to Somali waters in the number of attacks at sea, and may even exceed it depending on reporting regimes. In general, the region’s port security and maritime law enforcement fail to meet minimum international standards.

- The unimpeded flow of oil from the Gulf of Guinea and security of energy related infrastructure and assets

West Africa—in particular the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria’s delta—is a major source of high quality oil and natural gas for the United States (18 percent and 14 percent of imports, respectively). The region possesses larger deep-sea oil reserves than the Persian Gulf. U.S. imports from the area are expected to increase significantly in years to come. Adverse security conditions endanger the long-term reliability of this energy supply, the cost of oil, and the stream of revenue energy development can produce for the benefit of West Africa.

- Political development, sustainable economic growth, and enduring stability in the region as a deterrent to state failure, humanitarian crisis, and violent extremism

The potential for state failure and massive migration from West Africa intensifies as the population grows rapidly and economic, political, and living conditions fail to improve significantly. Despite the enormous oil wealth drawn from their country’s waters and a growing GDP, 80 percent of Nigerians live on less than two dollars a day. Good governance, political development and sustainable economic growth are vital for deterring terrorist and criminal proliferation, securing the area’s ports, harbors, and territorial waters, and to ensuring reliable access to oil.

Nigeria and Emerging Democracies. Achieving greater security and stability in West Africa and advancing the interests listed above will depend highly on the long-term viability and stability of Nigeria and other emerging democracies in the region as partners and allies of the United States.

With its sizeable population, vast gas and oil reserves, vibrant entrepreneurship, leadership role in Africa and regional organizations, plus a history of robust military intervention to secure peace in West Africa, Nigeria is the closest to what the area can call a regional hegemon. The critical question is what kind of leader and influence Nigeria will become. Nigeria can be an exporter of criminality and instability, a home to multiple insurgencies, reservoir of ethnic and religious conflict, a hotbed of Islamist radicalization, and a poor influence on the region’s emerging democracies and fragile post-conflict states; or, with the robust support and partnership of the United States and the international community, it can deepen its democracy, combat official corruption to acceptable levels, deepen prosperity, and broaden the numbers with access to it. The latter course is essential if U.S. interests, including long-term access to oil, are to be protected; the people of West Africa are to enjoy a better future; and the international community is to benefit from greater levels of stability in a strategically important area of the world. Given the enormous stakes, enhancing the prospects for Nigeria and other emerging nations in West Africa, including through greater maritime security, must be a higher priority for the United States and our partners.

Regional Insecurity and the Maritime Component. Central to West Africa’s high levels of insecurity and instability is the criminal exploitation of its expansive, largely ungoverned maritime domain, particularly in the form of massive oil theft and an enormous intercontinental drug trade funneling through the region much of it by sea. Revenue and power derived from these illicit activities finances a robust arms trade that facilitates political and criminal violence and provides a deep purse for official graft that is undermining regional development and eroding public order.

These conditions combined with ineffective governance, a dearth of official integrity, and, in many cases, an absence of political will for reform are attracting lethal international actors including Al Qaeda affiliates such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Hamas, Hezbollah, and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), each of which is present and active in the region.

FARC and other South American drug cartels that are hostile to the U.S. and cause much death and destruction in the Western Hemisphere continue to generate billions of dollars a year trafficking drugs to and through West Africa filling their coffers for trouble making in the Americas. Recent arrests and other evidence suggest that dangerous relationships and alliances may be forming between the cartels and Middle Eastern terrorist groups through the development of a West African connection.

- Poor governance, inadequate rule of law, widespread official corruption, and public dissatisfaction in West Africa are attracting criminal, militant, and terrorist organizations
- Revenue from massive oil theft and drug trafficking funds a thriving illicit arms trade, political graft, and widespread criminal operations
- Troubling conditions and adverse trends bearing on public order, economic development, and stability in West Africa will place U.S. security and long-term access to energy at risk
The opportune conditions that draw terrorist groups and drug cartels to West Africa attract other malign actors that exploit the maritime domain for illegal purposes including trafficking, piracy, fish poaching, and illegal waste dumping.

The UN reports that more than 200,000 children a year are trafficked though West and Central Africa, and approximately 5,000 women are illegally transported, including by sea. Cigarette smuggling generates in excess of $775 million—greater than the yearly GDP of some West African countries. Pervasive large scale fish poaching by fleets from Europe and Asia is depriving the people of the region of an important source of food and revenue. Unregulated ocean dumping of solid, toxic, and electronic waste and oil is endangering the health and sustainability of the marine environment on which a large segment of the local population depends for subsistence.

These illegal activities fostered by poor governance, enabled by poor law enforcement, and supported by the complicity, intimidation, or indifference of high-level officials are depriving the people of African wealth and resources critical to their economic and political development, fomenting public dissatisfaction, and fueling insurgency and insecurity to the detriment of West Africa, the U.S. and the international community.

Despite the troubling conditions and sizeable challenges before us, the area’s lucrative resources, enormous human capital, rich cultural diversity, and expanding islands of official integrity hold important potential and offer the opportunity to transform a gathering crisis into a global success story.

Pursuing our strategic interests more purposefully and vigorously is imperative. We must either reinforce the region’s strengths and partner effectively to stabilize it or soon deal with crises that have metastasized into graver, long-term threats.

**Strategic Objectives.** Seizing this opportunity will require a well-defined set of U.S., African, and international goals to promote security and enforce rule of law in the maritime domain and its land based dimensions including:

- Preventing the use of West African waters, ports, and harbors by international terrorists and criminal enterprises as a base of operations, safe haven, and locus of fundraising activity (such as selling stolen oil, etc.)
- Degrading the operational capability of terrorist and criminal organizations exploiting the area.
- Protecting the safety, security, and integrity of vessels and cargo embarking from or transiting through West African waters and ports bound directly or indirectly for the United States
- Protecting the flow of oil and security of related infrastructure in West African waters
- Protecting African waters from poaching and pollution
- Addressing the fundamental causes of poaching and insecurity—including shortfalls in economic, political, and human development

Sustainable security in the region will require an emphasis on initiatives that are African supported and led. Accordingly, the primary strategic objectives in support of our vital national interests should be:

- To foster the will of West African nations and their international institutions to provide for the safety, security, and rule of law in the region’s maritime domain, including ports, harbors, and territorial waters, as a vital component of overall economic, political, and social development
- To help the region develop, deploy, and sustain the capabilities and capacity to self sufficiently provide for safety, security, and rule of law in the maritime domain (including its land-based dimensions)
- To help counter external threats contributing to insecurity in West Africa and threats emanating from the region into the global commons and beyond

**Strategic Challenges.** Among the impediments to achieving our objectives are considerable deficiencies in political “will,” regional governmental “capability/capacity,” and international assistance—

**Will.** Many West African governments rank among the world’s worst in terms of corruption and governance. Efforts to improve conditions must seek to overcome the deeply rooted incentives supporting criminality and take into account the tenacity of certain leaders and high officials who have enormous personal, financial and political stakes in criminal activity. It will also require a commitment to improving the transparency and quality of governance for the people of the region. Moreover, addressing maritime insecurity will require a change in thinking among the region’s security leaders who, traditionally, have been more concerned with ground forces to counter land-based security threats viewed as a greater risk to ruling regimes than dangers arising in the their waters.
**Capability and Capacity.** The West African maritime domain is a vast space—the Gulf of Guinea alone is over 500,000 square miles—and the region’s maritime security services and capability to enforce the rule of law on its waters is grossly deficient.

Among the capabilities that must be developed and sustained to better secure the West African waters are:

- **Intelligence and domain presence and awareness** (deterrence and detection). Physical and electronic surveillance of West African waters and intelligence on criminal networks operating in the domain is sorely lacking.

- **Emergency response** to protect lives and property (response). African maritime services are small, ill equipped, and neglected in resources, prestige, and priority.

- **Rule of law** (enforcement). West African police/security, judicial, and correctional institutions are riddled with abuse and corruption and in many cases dysfunctional.

**U.S. and International Assistance.** The United States and its allies currently sponsor an alphabet soup of programs to help develop West African “will and skill” through naval presence, security sector technical assistance, training, and equipment donation to the region’s governments and their security services. For the most part, the interagency effort is uncoordinated, unfocused, under resourced, and not yet hitting the mark.

U.S. donations of vessels and other security assistance initiatives appear to be aimed mainly at preserving relationships, ensuring political access in the region, and meeting other diplomatic requirements rather than organized as part of a holistic, goal-based strategy to achieve defined and measurable improvements in regional security and stability. On the whole, the U.S. effort lacks coherence, remains un-led by an interagency coordinating body, unguided by an overarching strategic plan and priorities, and un-integrated with allies and other stakeholders to produce economies of effort. Many of the West African security assistance programs administered by other countries suffer from the same shortcomings as U.S. efforts with respect to lack of planning, coordination, prioritization, and holistic, goal-oriented approach.

Understanding the economic and political importance of West Africa, China and other emerging nations are increasingly present and active in West and Central Africa and aggressively providing financial assistance and infrastructure development in the hope that better relations from soft power will expand its influence and access to the area’s resources. These nations will either be part of a fulcrum for transformation or simply serve as the alternative market for West African regimes more interested in oil sales than security and reform. The U.S. and allies must work diplomatically to help China and other nations engaged in the region determine that promoting stability and its enablers is in their long-term interest as much as West Africa’s and ours.

**Recommendations.** Success in building West African “will and skill” requires the highest level of regional cooperation and a closer partnership between African nations, the United States, allies, and other stakeholders, including the private sector, non-government institutions, and civil society organizations. In terms of U.S. policy it means better organizing, targeting, and implementing more effective, holistic, security sector reform initiatives, and approaches. And it means more vigorous diplomacy and initiative to diminish incentives supporting the status quo, while creating and reinforcing dynamics and conditions that favor reform.

Accordingly, this report offers four core recommendations:

**Better Organize the US Interagency to Achieve Our Strategic Objectives in the Region:** To be sure security reform and transformation must be African conceived and led; however, the scope and quality of U.S. and international assistance will be a crucial enabler that could mean the difference between long-term success and failure. Given the stakes, it is imperative that the U.S. interagency be postured and resourced to render efficient and effective assistance to West African nations and regional associations to achieve clear, realistic, and desirable security and development goals. For that reason we recommend the creation of an “interagency policy, strategy, and implementation team” (IPSIT) led by the Department of State and convened under the auspices of the National Security Council to coordinate West African security assistance initiatives, develop strategy, ensure that the effort is sufficiently resourced, and to track and drive progress over time. As part of its charter, the team should be responsible for conducting a holistic, interagency strategic review of West African security, and its maritime component, and produce a strategic plan to advance U.S. security goals and interests in the region.

**Proof of Concept Initiatives:** We recommend that the U.S. establish a comprehensive maritime security assistance pilot (or proof of concept) program in partnership with one or two willing and able West African nations. Under such an initiative the full range of U.S. security assistance and rule of law programs, along with other forms of aid,
would be coordinated and focused holistically to clear and hold the participating nation’s waters and maritime infrastructure against bad actors and sustain the rule of law. The pilot would serve as a regional proof of concept and a springboard for region-wide cooperation as neighboring countries perceive the tangible benefits, including enhanced national revenue, that can be produced by greater levels of maritime security.

**Regional Network:** Concurrently we recommend that the U.S. fully support the effort of Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) and its member states to develop and implement a “regional maritime security network.” U.S. and international security assistance efforts, including planning support, asset donation, and training, should be leveraged to bring the network to fruition as swiftly as possible. The network should provide a mechanism for the regional acquisition and sharing of critical maritime security assets that are too expensive for each nation to possess independently. Participating nations would be vested with discrete roles, missions, responsibilities, and areas of expertise to achieve vital efficiencies and economies of scale. The network would include the necessary command and control protocols to ensure region-wide cooperation and be implemented with the goal of producing significant security and developmental benefits for the participating nations and their people.

**Nigerian and Emerging Nations Partnership:** We recommend that the United States energetically utilize the U.S.—Nigeria Binational Commission and other diplomatic tools to help foster Nigeria as anchor for stability and security in the region. The commission should meet regularly and establish a full array of active and expert working groups in the key areas of governance, economic development, security, and rule of law, including a maritime component. These “centerpiece” initiatives should be undertaken in concert with the full array of recommendations set forth in the report, corresponding to the following objectives—

**Improve U.S. intelligence in the region** to better understand the linkages among criminal enterprises, terrorist organizations, and enabling factors; and to gain a more acute comprehension of the scope, objectives, cause/effect and other dynamics of these associations and synergies.

**Organize the U.S. interagency and our partners more effectively to advance shared interests** more strategically and comprehensively guided by an overall planning body and a well-crafted strategic plan, rather than through uncoordinated lines of effort delivered in programmatic stovepipes.

**Communicate better with African leaders and publics** about U.S. interests, objectives, and intentions.

**Improve the effectiveness of our capacity building programs** by focusing resources holistically to achieve measurable security improvements, rather than merely parceling out assistance across the region predominantly to preserve political relationships and ensure access.

**Enhance operational initiatives to boost West African maritime security** including the establishment of a joint operations center, information sharing regimes, and other partnerships and asset sharing.

**Energize multilateral diplomatic efforts and private sector engagement**, including better integrating the oil industry into efforts to improve maritime security capacity building.

**Engage the NGO and advocacy community** to build constituencies of support and public impetus in the region for reform.

The foregoing objectives could be advanced through the following recommended initiatives:

**Know More, Understand Better**

- Conduct a National Intelligence Estimate for West Africa.
- Improve human intelligence assets in the region.
- Tap outside resources for broader perspectives and increased understanding of the region.
- Establish an incident-reporting and -tracking database for the West African maritime domain.
- Secure a report by a respected international entity analyzing the cost of West African maritime insecurity to West African governments and their populations, and share the report widely among African governments, regional associations, NGOs, the press, and other influential institutions and opinion leaders.
- Create an assessment tool in the form of a matrix to track and evaluate the performance, capabilities, and requirements of West African nations.

Organize and Plan Better for Security

- Establish an interagency policy, strategy, and implementation team (IPSIT) on West African security to develop strategy, ensure the effort is sufficiently resourced, and to track and drive progress.

- Conduct a holistic, interagency strategic review (under the auspices of the IPSIT or other appropriate body) of West African security, and the maritime domain.

- Produce a comprehensive strategic plan to promote West African maritime security.

- Consider appointing an ambassador-at-large or other diplomatic focal point for West Africa.

- Consider appointing a Coast Guard liaison-at-large for the West African region.

Improve the Coordination and Delivery of Security Assistance

- Establish a pilot project, with one or two qualified West African nations to implement a comprehensive maritime security development program to serve as a regional proof of concept.

- In coordination with the nation(s)-specific pilot project recommended above, work with MOWCA and its member states to develop a model “regional maritime security network program” including plans for the sharing of critical assets; the assigning of national contributions, roles, and missions; and other means of achieving economies of scale among the region's coastal nations.

- Establish an interagency Maritime Security Reconstruction Team for deployment to the region.

- Coordinate the various U.S. donation, training, and assistance programs in accordance with the strategic plan recommended above.

- Coordinate international donation, training, and assistance programs tailored to risk-based prioritization of requirements.

- Create a U.S. government clearinghouse to aggregate and display data on programs, personnel, and funding provided for West African security, including the maritime domain.

- Assist regional countries in developing comprehensive national maritime security strategies and implementation plans to help guide the form and scope of U.S. assistance.

- Expand maritime education and training opportunities for West Africans at U.S. training and educational institutions.

- Establish single points of contact within the U.S. government for maritime security assistance.

Enhance Operational Initiatives to Boost West African Maritime Security

- Establish an information-sharing system among operators in the maritime domain and key regional and international authorities.

- Increase the availability and usefulness of electronic surveillance and other technology to enhance maritime domain awareness.

- Establish a regional joint operations center under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS-CEEAC), MOWCA, or other appropriate regional organization.

- Work with Africans to develop a program using cell phones to target illegal fishing and that engage citizens in a Coast Guard auxiliary.

- Consider broader application of train the trainer initiatives under the African Partnership Station and other capacity building programs.

- Increase the role of the U.S. Coast Guard in Africa Partnership Station programs and other training, advisory, and operational programs.

- Assist countries in writing and strengthening their legal authorities and institutions to prosecute wrongdoing.

Communicate Better

- Be clear in messaging about the vital interests, priorities, and intentions of the U.S. government.

- Develop and execute a strategic communications plan for the U.S. government on West African security, including the maritime domain.

- Coordinate message and communications with allies and African partners.

**Energize Diplomatic Efforts and Private Sector Engagement**
- Work with key African partners to push for implementation of security initiatives agreed to by nations that are party to continental, regional, and sub-regional organizations (MOWCA, ECOWAS, ECCAS-CEEAC, African Union, United Nations)
- Make use of the Nigeria-U.S. Bi-national commission to reinforce Nigeria’s regional and continental responsibilities
- Work through diplomatic channels to resolve border disputes that have impeded greater levels of regional cooperation in enforcing the rule of law, including in the maritime domain
- Engage more energetically with African leaders in generating national and regional political will and resources to implement the maritime security pledges of MOWCA and other regional organizations
- Promote greater transparency regarding how oil revenue is used by African nations
- Engage in energetic diplomacy with European partners to invigorate efforts to improve West African maritime security by such means as asset donation, training, and African diplomacy
- Work with the oil industry to determine how it can best support maritime capacity building, such as through special funding and pilot projects, as well as by utilizing energy infrastructure and vessels as sensor platforms or electronic domain awareness systems
- Work with oil companies to improve infrastructure and environmental protection, and help foster sustainable development in the countries from which they obtain oil
- Work through diplomatic channels with China and other nations whose engagement in the region is expected to grow to obtain greater levels of cooperation in fostering anticorruption and security in West Africa
- Work with appropriate institutions to help develop training programs for African journalists to scrutinize the oil industry
- Reach out to young leaders in the region with training, seminars, visits, scholarships, and other programs to reinforce the elements and modalities of good governance and responsible public administration

**Engage the NGO and Advocacy Community Better**
- Engage advocacy groups such as (ENOUGH, ONE, International Crisis Group) to promote messaging, communications, and reform
- Engage the U.S. and African advocacy communities in the policy development process, including the formulation and execution of the strategic plan recommended above
- Develop “government to government,” “people to people,” and “institution to institution” programs to promote communication and mutual understanding, as well as the sharing of information, best practices, and technical support

**Resourcing.** Improving the U.S. effort to promote greater levels of West African maritime security is ultimately a function of properly prioritizing and resourcing the effort. The United States is engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, and within Africa much of the policy attention is focused on Somalia and the Sudan. Moreover, these are fiscally challenging times, and any initiative that demands greater resources is a hard sell. The legitimacy of increasing the national focus, money, and manpower devoted to the West African account must be measured not just by the benefits to be gained with a more vigorous effort but also by the adverse consequences of maintaining the status quo—and both, we argue, are substantial. Of course, such changes in policy must be directed and sustained at the highest levels of our government. Several points should be taken into consideration in marshaling the necessary resources:

- Current resource levels can be used with greater efficiency and effectiveness as per the recommendations offered in this report
- Additional resources can be reprogrammed from lower priorities, including from within the national security and foreign assistance function
- Additional resources can be provided by allies and other stakeholders who possess significant interests in the region—especially Europe, in light of the area’s role in illegal drug trafficking
- Potentially, additional resources can be provided by elements of the private sector, including the oil and gas and tanker industry, that have vital interests in greater regional security. However, given the lack of transparency in how current oil revenues are used by host countries,
any effort to financially partner with the private sector
must ensure that resources are used effectively for their
intended purpose

**Next Steps.** Our next product in this series will be an
implementation road map, which will propose more detailed
guidance on operationalizing the report’s strategic-level
recommendations for the benefit the United States and the
people of Africa.
This report presents the analysis and recommendations of the Atlantic Council’s Michael S. Ansari Africa Center in cooperation with the On the Horizon Project to advance U.S. strategic interests in West Africa. The material presented herein and an implementation report to come address the following question:

**What policies and initiatives should the United States implement to protect its vital national security interests in West Africa, and in particular the West African maritime domain?**

In conducting our work, the Atlantic Council interviewed and consulted more than 50 U.S. government officials, outside subject matter experts from the U.S. and Africa, and other authorities. We thank our contributors for the wealth of information, expertise, insight, and ideas they generously shared in support of this vital project.

**Area of Interest.** The geographic area of interest for our work encompasses the 25 member nations of the Maritime Organization of Western and Central Africa (MOWCA), from Mauritania in the north to Angola in the south, a region of approximately 3,113,023 square miles and a population of over 250 million people [See Appendix I for Maps]. In particular the report focuses on the Gulf of Guinea, an area of 500,000 square miles, the primary locus of maritime-based oil development, commercial shipping, and other activities of concern to the United States and our allies.

**Why it matters.** The United States possesses significant and growing economic and security interests in West Africa. The Gulf of Guinea is a major source of energy for the United States and our allies. As the area’s vast energy resources are further developed, the region’s substantial influence on world energy markets will continue to rise. Moreover, the area is strategically located along important trade, transit, and immigration routes of increasing significance to global commerce and security. It is the home of important allies, fragile post-conflict states, and emerging democracies, at pivotal stages that will define the quality of the region’s future and its influence upon global security.

Unaddressed problems of poor governance, severe poverty, widespread public corruption, and growing insecurity from the presence of criminal and militant enterprises engaged in theft, terrorism, trafficking, piracy, poaching, and pollution will continue to punish local populations and create conditions of instability that undermine public order from greater levels of armed conflict and mass migration and threaten the reliable flow of oil from the region. As noted in a recent United Nations report, the “combination of coups from the top and insurrections from below render West Africa in the opinion of the UN the least politically stable region in the world.”

Our work places a special emphasis on the country of Nigeria which is the most populous country in Africa, home to nearly one-sixth of the continent’s inhabitants as well as an estimated 25,000 Americans. As the world’s sixth-largest oil producer, the country is responsible for nearly 60 percent of West Africa’s GDP. It is the source of a significant portion of the U.S. oil supply, providing almost one million barrels of oil per day, and has the ability to influence global energy prices. The United States receives approximately one-half of Nigeria’s oil exports in exchange for payments of almost $38 billion per year and remains the country’s chief trading partner. Collectively, U.S. companies represent Nigeria’s largest source of foreign investment, and the U.S. government is a major source of aid.

Other countries in the region, including Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Cameroon, are significant oil producers as well. Like Nigeria they rely heavily on revenue from energy development for national income, and will be players of
increasing influence in global energy markets. These “up and comers” to oil development have the opportunity to learn from the Nigerian experience and more responsibly harness their natural resources for national and public advancement.

The U.S. depends on energy from Nigeria, receiving nearly one-half of the country’s annual oil exports in exchange for payments of almost $38 billion per year

can only be achieved if the many significant impediments to the region’s security and development are addressed energetically and soon.

Whether they possess significant underwater oil resources or not, all West African countries have an enormous stake in the region’s maritime domain in terms of security, economic development, and national income. Ninety percent of global trade moves by sea, so all nations, whether coastal or landlocked, seeking economic development, must care about maritime security. And, for the reasons examined in this report, these stakes are an important piece of the global security picture vital to the U.S. and our allies.

Frame of reference. The reader may ask why our security recommendations are confined to West Africa rather than applied to the African continent as a whole, or other areas where other U.S. national interests, security threats, and foreign policy opportunities present themselves.

An endemic and enduring shortcoming of U.S. policy with respect to Africa is a chronically narrow, “one size fits all” mentality. Fresh and targeted approaches are necessary to produce desired outcomes. Africa is a complex and diverse continent. The demographic, economic, geopolitical, social, and security dynamics of its various regions and localities are as varied as their geography. Nigeria alone is home to more than 350 different ethnic groups, with a mixed and rapidly growing population that includes both Christian and Muslim communities. The West African region’s distinct and complex political, economic, and security dynamics pose unique and significant foreign policy challenges to the United States and the international community. Accordingly, these distinct challenges must be addressed in a manner specific to the regional, sub-regional, and even local and demographic circumstances and conditions.

Any evaluation of international security threats, opportunities, and requirements with respect to the formulation of U.S. policy and allocation of limited resources must, of course, be mindful of priorities. The United States and our allies face a range of significant global challenges, each vying for scarce resources and policy attention.

Nevertheless, the nation’s failure to proactively address emerging zones of threat, particularly in West Africa, will only increase the likelihood that evolving challenges will manifest themselves in the form of crisis when problems will be far costlier and more difficult to address. Passing up the opportunity to effect better outcomes in the region will harm long-term U.S. interests.

In Senate testimony on his nomination to serve as Director of National Intelligence, General James Clapper addressed the issue of priority setting and policy focus:

“What about areas that aren’t covered? That has been a classic plague for us. I know what the state of our geospatial databases were on 9/11 in Afghanistan and they were awful; and it’s because at the time the priority that Afghanistan enjoyed in terms of intelligence requirements. So we can’t take our eyes off the incipient threats that exist . . . for example Africa, which is a growing concern to me personally.”

Speaking at a 2010 conference hosted by U.S. AFRICOM on the issue of Africa’s maritime security, Erastus Mwencha, Deputy Chairperson of the African Union Commission stated, “The situation is alarming and requires action not tomorrow, but today.”

On the African continent, Sudan and Somalia currently consume the bulk of U.S. policy focus. Without minimizing the importance of the challenges in these areas, we must recognize that our compelling national interests in West Africa, along with troubling trends and promising opportunities in the region, demand greater levels of strategic thinking, policy development, and action to protect and promote vital U.S. interests—particularly with regard to the region’s maritime domain.

Points underscoring the U.S. strategic importance of West Africa and its territorial waters include:

- West African waters are the locus of vast energy resources and a source of major oil exports to the United States and its allies.
The region, including the maritime domain, is an attractive safe haven and area of operation for international terrorist groups and organized criminal enterprises, attracted by weak governance, vulnerable populations, and access to funds from stolen oil and contraband.

The area is an international transshipment zone for illegal drugs moving from South America to Europe, generating funds for criminal enterprises that pose a potent threat to the United States, and an important route for the trafficking of humans, arms, and a range of other contraband.

The region’s climate of disorder, and troublesome economic, political, and social conditions, fostered by maritime insecurity, place local populations at risk of humanitarian crisis, and can create an environment in which radical groups can more readily gain sympathizers, adherents, and recruits.

The region’s ports, harbors, and shipping lanes are part of the global maritime transportation network including the U.S. facilities and waters, so insecurity in one element can adversely affect security throughout the system.

The region’s vast maritime domain, including its inland waterways and estuaries, is an important source of food and other resources for local populations adversely affected by illegal fishing and pollution.

Despite the troubling conditions, disturbing trends, and enormous challenges in West African waters described herein, the region is showing signs of an increasing appreciation of the need for greater maritime security and the linkage of this objective to improved governance and broader economic development. While only a blip on the radar screen just a few years ago, the increasing focus on maritime security is due not only to highly publicized incidents of piracy, but to alarms about the overall maritime security picture sounded by the UN Security Council, the African Union, African regional and sub-regional organizations, several African national leaders, AFRICOM, international partners, NGOs, civil society organizations and others. A good indication of the importance that African nations are now placing on the maritime domain is requests for the expansion of national Economic Exclusive Zones, including those by Nigeria, Ghana, and Cote d’Ivoire.

The region’s vast human capital, vibrant cultures, and enormous potential hold great promise, and new lines of security cooperation are a hopeful sign of progress to come—but only if the opportunities are seized through the vigorous exercise of African will and development of its capability to provide for the rule of law in the maritime domain and beyond supported by well conceived U.S. policy and assistance.

**Approach.** While this report focuses on the maritime domain, the Atlantic Council approaches the regional security challenges from a broad perspective. Security issues are holistic and must be addressed as such. The dynamics and consequences of insecurity in the maritime domain are part of a wider, more complex political and security dynamic encompassing rule of law, governance, public capacities, and economic and human development across geographic, societal, and national domains. Just as the causes, manifestations, and consequences of insecurity are comprehensive, so too must be the preventative and remedies.

This document provides a broad strategic-level analysis and corresponding recommendations for action that can, and we believe should, be supported and implemented by U.S. and allied policymakers, African leaders, and key stakeholders. The Atlantic Council seeks to follow up this report with a supporting paper proposing specific ways and means of implementing the recommendations offered in the concluding portion of the report.

**Supporting Documents.** Seven supporting documents are appended to this memorandum for the readers’ reference.

- **Appendix I:** Maps
- **Appendix II:** Fact sheet of essential data
- **Appendix III:** List of U.S. and international stakeholders that possess jurisdiction or otherwise have significant equities in the West African maritime domain including a list of the West Africa oil and gas industry
- **Appendix IV:** List of U.S., regional, and international conferences on maritime security
- **Appendix V:** List of key Africa maritime security resolutions
- **Appendix VI:** Summary of illicit financial flows
- **Appendix VII:** List of major ports and International Ship and Port Facility Security Code compliance status for MOWCA nations
- **Appendix VIII:** Chart of West African nations maritime security vessels and assets
The findings and recommendations set forth in this paper, flow from a fundamental concept of U.S. national security interests in the region and the predominant threats to them. An understanding of these interests must define U.S. priorities, which in turn, must inform American policy, diplomacy, strategy, operations, and tactics to achieve desired end states.

**National Interests:** Key U.S. national security interests in the West African maritime domain include:

- Preventing use of the domain by international terrorists and criminal enterprises for recruiting, money laundering, and operations and as a safe haven
- Ensuring the safe, secure, and efficient flow of shipping, people, and cargo bound to or from the United States
- Maintaining the free flow of oil from the Gulf of Guinea, and providing for the security of related infrastructure and assets
- Ensuring long-term political and economic stability in the region to protect against state failure, humanitarian crisis, and violent extremism. (This interest being the overarching enabler of the others)

**Malefactors:**

- Terrorist organizations
- Organized criminal enterprises
- Militant insurgents
- Corrupt African officials
- Corrupt and complicit industry employees (oil, fishing, minerals)
- Foreign-flagged illicit fishing enterprises
- International financial institutions and networks that support the flow of illicit payments and money transfers

**Methods and Modalities:**

- Violence and sabotage
- Piracy
- Theft and robbery at sea
- Kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and intimidation
- Illegal trafficking (drugs, human, arms, commodities, and contraband)
- Pollution
- Poaching

**Causal and Contributing Factors:**

- Harsh regional economic and social conditions
- Unstable regional governments

- Inadequately resourced and poorly led governmental institutions
- High tolerance for graft and region wide culture of impunity
- Inadequate laws and law enforcement in the maritime domain in the countries of concern
- Porous borders and inadequate boundary monitoring and control of the movement of illicit goods
- Lack of follow-through and accountability by African nations and their international partners on commitments to improve security
- Insufficient international partnership and assistance
- A focus of time and resources on planning and conferences rather than on implementation and measuring results

**U.S. Strategic Objectives:** Given the threats, conditions, and evolving trends in the area, advancing U.S. national security interests and foreign policy goals in West Africa will require holistic strategies, policies, approaches, and initiatives tailored to achieve clear strategic objectives that include:

- Preventing the use of African waters, ports, and harbors by international terrorists and criminal enterprises as a base of operations, safe haven, and locus of fund-raising activity (such as selling stolen oil, etc.)
- Degrading the operational capability of terrorist and criminal organizations, including in the areas such as drug trafficking, arms sales, and oil theft, which produce revenue for terrorists or criminal enterprises that pose a threat to the U.S. national security and to regional stability
- Protecting the safety, security, and integrity of vessels and cargo embarking from or transiting through West African waters and ports bound directly or indirectly for the United States
- Protecting the free flow of oil and gas, and the physical security of energy infrastructure within West African waters
- Protecting African waters from poaching and pollution

Achieving these objectives will require much greater levels of will and capability by West African governments to secure the maritime domain and address the underlying factors that contribute to instability throughout the region. Success will be a function of helping these countries enforce the rule of law, not only by being able to perform proficiently the tasks of law enforcement but by meritling public support for law and order through greater levels of official transparency, legitimacy, integrity, and international oversight. Building and sustaining such will and capability will require a high degree of cooperation and partnership between West African nations, the U.S., and allied members of the international community.

These requirements give rise to an overarching set of strategic objectives that should govern U.S. policy to achieve our goals and desired end state:

- To foster the will of West African nations and their international institutions to provide for the safety, security, and rule of law in the region’s maritime domain, including ports, harbors, and territorial waters, as a vital component of overall economic, political, and social development;
- To work with willing partners in the region to develop, deploy, and sustain the capabilities and capacity to self sufficiently provide for safety, security, and rule of law in the maritime domain (including its land-based dimensions); and
- To counter, cooperatively where possible and unilaterally where necessary and as appropriate, external threats contributing to insecurity in West Africa and threats emanating from the region into the global commons and beyond.
Strategic Objectives:
Situation Report and Analysis

OVERVIEW.
Overall, there is much uncertainty regarding the level of progress in achieving U.S. strategic objectives set forth above. From all indications the U.S. government does not have sufficient intelligence on the state of terrorist and criminal networks and their activities in West Africa. From all indications the threats are growing, the conditions and trends abetting them remain unabated, and the ability to protect U.S. interests under the status quo is highly doubtful.

Objective metrics for evaluating the effect of U.S. and allied assistance for West African capacity building are largely non-existent. However, the empirical data that is available, together with an array of compelling anecdotal evidence, is alarming. From all indications the threats are growing, the conditions and trends abetting them remain unabated, and the ability to protect U.S. interests under the status quo is highly doubtful.

While a number of promising initiatives are under way to improve West African maritime security capability and capacity with the help of the U.S., allied governments, and international organizations, generally speaking, progress is piecemeal, ad hoc, uneven, and slow. There remains no significant success stories showcasing a West African government firmly gaining a handle on its maritime domain with substantial gains in the overall security picture. Liberia, Senegal, Cameroon, and Cape Verde are among those countries making a strong effort, particularly considering the enormity of the challenge, the nascent state of their respective maritime security services, the enormous land-based challenges to the rule of law, and severe resource limitations. Well-conceived U.S. and allied initiatives to help build West African security capacity and foster supporting reforms are essential. The success of these efforts, however, remains dependent on the will of West African leaders and their people to demand change and work for progress.

Unfortunately, endemic corruption, including the continued outright theft of oil revenue by political power brokers and their cronies persists. The battle for energy spoils remains a source of national tension, factionalism, and public dissatisfaction. Nigeria is a particularly troubling story. In the 2010 “Failed States Index,” a collaboration of Foreign Policy magazine and the Fund for Peace, Nigeria was diagnosed as being in “critical” condition, with among the worst rankings in the failed state indicators. The United Nations’ African Governance Report II identified Nigeria as having among the continent’s most corrupt leadership, with only 6 out of a total of 32 countries scoring worse.

The World Bank estimates that as a result of corruption, 80 percent of Nigeria’s energy revenues benefit only one percent of the population. National income from the sale of oil since it was first extracted in Nigeria five decades ago exceeds half a trillion dollars. Despite this significant oil wealth, and more than $400 million in annual aid received from the U.S., the percentage of Nigerians living in poverty doubled between 1988 and 1996. The United Nations’ 2009 Human Development Report states that more than 80 percent of Nigeria’s population lives on less than two dollars per day. This despite enormous oil wealth and national GDP that appears to be growing at a healthy clip—an estimated 6.6% in 2010.

Rampant oil theft by officials aided and abetted by criminal enterprises and in some cases corporate insiders generates vast sums of illegal funds that will in turn continue to attract...

Stolen national oil wealth, economic stagnation, poor governance, and failing rule of law fuel public disaffection and higher levels of insurgency . . . and crime.

poverty, instability, and quite likely greater levels of criminal and militant activity.

Official corruption is deeply entrenched and often reaches the top echelons of power threatened by greater levels of transparency and public-minded reform. Accordingly, efforts to improve conditions in maritime security must take into account the tenacity of certain leaders and high ranking officials in maintaining the status quo given the significant personal financial stakes in continued oil theft, drug trafficking, and other criminal activity. Reform must address the deep incentives for criminality, and build internal constituencies for reform by demonstrating the clear national benefits of rule of law, stability, and security on the seas and throughout the region.

Breaking the cycle of corruption abetted by oil and drugs is particularly important for nations in the region that are just beginning to develop their energy resources. It will be vital for them to learn from Nigeria’s oil experience in terms of security, governance, environmental protection, and economic development so that oil wealth can be harnessed for the long-term benefit of the region’s people and not used as a source of official graft and criminal enterprise. Less corruption, and the use of oil revenue to benefit the public at large, will result in greater levels of public satisfaction and stability that, in turn, will serve the national security interests of the United States, our allies, and regional governments.
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: Prevent Safe Haven for Terrorist and Transnational Criminal Enterprises and Operations; Degrade their Capabilities

Although open-source information does not provide detailed data on the estimated number of transnational terrorist groups and organized criminal enterprises in West Africa or on the full size and scope of their manpower, organizations, and operations, experts believe that a diverse array of such groups is present and active in the region. In early 2003, Osama bin Laden encouraged his followers to make Nigeria a global priority. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has identified Nigerian criminal enterprises as the most significant in Africa, reporting that they are among “the most aggressive and expansionist international criminal groups…primarily engaged in drug trafficking and financial fraud.”

Nigerian financial frauds have cost the U.S. alone an estimated $1-$2 billion a year. Generally speaking, conditions throughout broad swaths of West Africa are optimal for attracting terrorist and criminal syndicates, including epidemic corruption, absent rule of law, desperate poverty, public dissatisfaction, and an environment of militancy. The area offers a relative safe haven that is strategically located along key transit routes, and access to illicit money from the theft of oil and other commodities is a strong magnet. Some experts believe that Islamic radicalization, particularly in Nigeria, is on the rise, and that increasingly youth are exposed to radical philosophy.

Among the better-known groups with links to the area are Hezbollah, Hamas, AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), as well as Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), each of which is listed by the United States as an international terrorist organization. The groups are strongly suspected of paying local criminal syndicates for illegal services that include document forgery and the trafficking of people, weapons, diamonds, drugs, and other contraband. Amado Philip de Andres, Deputy Regional Representative for West and Central Africa of the United Nations’ Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), reports that Hezbollah and Al Qaeda affiliates such as AQIM are developing mutually beneficial links with West African crime networks—particularly in Nigeria. Some of these illicit connections and activities are age-old; others are just beginning to take shape and expand.

Hezbollah, for example, has been using the illegal rough diamond trade in West Africa since the 1980’s to raise funds and Al-Qaeda involvement in similar activity dates to the 1990’s. According to the UNODC profits from illicit diamond trading have been used to finance Al Qaeda activities not just in Africa but in the Middle East.

Drugs and Terror. Particularly troubling, however, is the picture that appears to be emerging of West African links between Middle East terrorist organizations and South American narco-terror organization such as FARC, closely associated with Mexican drug cartels, many of which have higher GDP than the West African countries on which they are preying both as conduits for drug traffic and, increasingly as end users of the product.

A top expert testified before Congress in June of 2009 that, “Already in Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and elsewhere we are seeing members of Mexican, Colombian, Venezuelan, Surinamese, and European organizations operating in the same territory and plugging into the same pipeline. Identified members of the FARC, as well as other Colombian organizations, are on the ground in West Africa, protecting shipments and making deals.”

A March 2010 Congressional Research Service noted that, “As Latin American cocaine smugglers seek to exploit emerging markets in Europe, they are allegedly collaborating with Al Qaeda affiliates in the region[.]” Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the UNODC, stated in early 2010 that “there is more than just spotty evidence” of linkages between drug traffickers and terror groups. For these reasons, the UN Security Council has identified drug trafficking and other forms of transnational crime in West Africa as a grave threat to stability and development in the area, and a problem for global security.

Guinea-Bissau is an excellent case study of how narco-influences can push a fragile state into a failed state. In March 2009, the President and Chief of Staff Army were both...
assassinated within hours of one another and high ranking officials of the country have been implicated in a lucrative drug trade. In early 2010 the U.S. Treasury Department accused the Air Force Chief of Staff and former Navy Chief of Staff with helping to bring in a large shipment of cocaine into Guinea-Bissau from Venezuela. As we have seen in other regions of the world, transnational crime abetted by ruling regimes is a recipe for insecurity with global reach.

Large-scale cocaine trafficking in West Africa was first detected in 2004, the result of shifting demand from the United States to Europe, particularly Western Europe, where the UN says that demand has tripled over the past decade. Today West Africa is a major waypoint for drugs flowing from South America to Europe and according to the UN and others, most of it coming and going by sea.

Estimates of the percentage of cocaine flowing into the European market that passes through West Africa range from 25 percent to 60 percent, with a yearly market value estimated to be $6.8 billion in 2008. The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), however, believes that the portion of European cocaine supply is closer to 80 percent.

These organizations pose a well-known threat in our own hemisphere, and contribute to insecurity on the United States’ southern border. In 2008 the UNODC estimated that trafficking to markets in the United States generated about $4.6 billion for Colombian drug cartels. Officials believe “at least nine top-tier Latin American drug cartels have established bases in 11 West African nations.”

The UN’s 2010 World Drug Report states, “Colombian traffickers often transport the cocaine by ‘mother ships’ toward the West African coast before offloading it to smaller vessels. Some of it proceeds onward by sea to Spain and Portugal while some is left as payment to West Africans for their assistance—as much as 30%.”

Exactly how the revenue from the cartels’ activities in West Africa is influencing the drug trade and related violence and criminality in the United States and nearby is an important question in need of greater analysis by U.S. officials.

The continued influx of drugs and drug money into West Africa is expected to bring a new wave of instability and violence to the region that has a history of violent conflict over revenue-producing commodities. The experience in Latin America and the Caribbean demonstrates the numerous social pathologies accompanying cocaine trafficking, not only increased violence, organized crime, and public corruption, but higher levels of addiction, disease, street crime, and misery. In fact, drug use is up in West Africa, as locals aiding traffickers are often paid in the form of drugs rather than cash. It appears that the area is now being used to process narcotics not just package and transport them. Moreover, some officials are concerned that African drug routes are being used not just to send narcotics north and east; but also to bring them back in the form of heroin from Afghanistan to points west including the United States.

The potential connection of these criminal groups with Islamic extremist organizations in West Africa increases the significance of the threat and the importance of addressing it proactively. One expert stated that drug trafficking interests are wary of chaos in the oil sector or from terror groups, which could cause the “boot to come down.” Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence of these connections is building and is deeply troubling. For instance, Interpol, and the United Nations have reported suspected links between South American drug traffickers and Hamas, and in a recent sting operation launched by the DEA, AQIM members believed they were working with members of FARC.

In June 2009 DEA Assistant Administrator Thomas Harrigan testified before the Senate that, “Colombian and Venezuelan traffickers are entrenched in West Africa and have cultivated long-standing relationships with African criminal networks to facilitate their activities in the region.” The Chavez regime in Venezuela is known to have a strong association with the FARC, and evidence suggests that the Venezuelan government is complicit in moving drugs via large cargo aircraft as well as small, modified aircraft from within its border to West Africa. At the same time the regime maintains close ties to Iran, and has allowed Hamas and Hezbollah to set up offices in Caracas to the extent that some in the intelligence community reportedly refer to the Venezuelan capital as Caracastan.
In 2009 testimony before Congress, an expert witness summed up the disturbing connection quite succinctly, “Given Iran’s ties to Hezbollah and Venezuela, Venezuela’s ties to Iran and the FARC, the FARC’s history of building alliances with other armed groups, and the presence of Hezbollah and other armed Islamist groups in Latin America and on the ground in West Africa, it would be dangerous to dismiss the possibility of alliance among these actors.”

While the extent to which AQIM is linked to the broader Al Qaeda network or other terrorist, narco- and criminal enterprises may not be well understood, it remains an organization of growing concern. As noted above, the recent arrests of AQIM operatives suggest potential Al Qaeda involvement in drug trafficking and collaboration with FARC. Moreover, the apprehension of AQIM operatives arrested for narco-terrorism in Ghana and Mali are evidence that AQIM, once limited to the Sahel, is expanding its operations to include other parts of sub-Saharan Africa. In September 2010, the French government sent more than 80 troops to Niamay, Niger to search for seven hostages, employees of French construction company Vinci and nuclear energy firm Areva, abducted from their homes by AQIM. Overall, experts cited in UN documents believe that AQIM is seeking to radicalize regional Islamist sentiment, fomented by the region’s pervasive corruption and criminality, weak governance, and porous borders.

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AQIM. Overall, experts cited in UN documents believe that AQIM is seeking to radicalize regional Islamist sentiment, fomented by the region’s pervasive corruption and criminality, weak governance, and porous borders.

In addition to using Africa as a source of safe haven and fund-raising, Al Qaeda and its affiliates have targeted facilities on the African continent for terrorist attacks. Among them were the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that claimed the lives of 224 people and wounded more than 4,500; the December 2007 twin bombings of the UN offices and a court building in Algiers that left 41 dead; and most recently the July 11, 2010 bombing in Uganda by al-Shabab (an AQ affiliate) that killed 74. Since 2007, AQIM has claimed responsibility for deaths in West Africa, including four Saudi nationals, four French nationals, a British national, and an American missionary; many more have been kidnapped and held for ransom in the region.

While conditions ripen for the activities of AQIM and other better-known terrorist movements to expand, a range of ethnic, nationalist, and religious conflicts also beset the region—a number of which have been accompanied by highly destructive campaigns of insurgency, violence, and terror, adding to the area’s existing and potential instability.

Again, these conflicts and activities are related directly to the maritime domain. Insecure waters provide operating space for terrorist, criminal, and insurgent organizations to move people and contraband freely. Money from this traffic and other illicit sources derived from maritime resources such as bunkered oil fund an extensive and complex chain of illegal activities.

** Trafficking in Humans, Arms, and Contraband.** Illegal trafficking in the maritime domain extends beyond the movement of narcotics to the illegal transport of humans, arms, and contraband. According to the UNODC’s report *Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region*, trafficking other than drugs commonly involves local, small-scale criminal syndicates engaged in the smuggling of agricultural products, cattle theft, auto theft, fraud, and money laundering. These activities prey on law-abiding citizens and enterprises, provide criminal organizations with income and influence, foster corruption, and increase public dissatisfaction with ruling governments.

**Humans.** Human trafficking in West Africa mainly involves women and children. According to information provided at a 2010 African Maritime Security conference hosted by AFRICOM an estimated 60 percent of the world’s human trafficking takes place in sub-Saharan Africa.

The UN reports that more than 200,000 children are trafficked annually through West and Central Africa, some bound for points overseas, and estimates that 3,800 to 5,700 women are moved for illegal purposes from the region to Europe each year. Many are recruited into debt bondage and must turn to prostitution to repay their debt and remain in Europe. Aside from sexual trafficking, approximately 20,000 West Africans entered Europe illegally in 2008 seeking work. Spain in particular has been a key destination for ships illegally carrying people from sub-Sahara Africa to Europe, either for purposes of migration or for illicit activity including prostitution.

Illegal immigrants typically pay criminal networks up to $10,000 for relocation to Europe. Such assistance often includes forged or fraudulent documentation sufficient to acquire the necessary visas, as well as access to job connections and social networks at their destination. Once an illegal immigrant makes it to European soil, the absence of repatriation agreements usually means that they are there to stay.
Arms. According to a 2009 report issued by the U.S. Institute for Peace, large international crime syndicates from eastern Europe, Russia, Australia, Lebanon, the Netherlands, and France often pay local youths to illegally tap oil pipelines in the Niger Delta in exchange for weapons and ammunition or drugs. The chief clients for illicit military-grade weapons are crime groups such as pirates or poachers, combatant militias, and regimes under sanctions. According to Antonio Maria Costa, “There is plenty of evidence of a double flow. (Of) drugs moving, arriving into West Africa from across the Atlantic . . . and the trading—exchange—of cocaine for arms.”

Contraband. Besides arms and ammunition, contraband moved extensively to and through West Africa, including by sea, extends to items such as cigarettes, counterfeit medicine, and diamonds.

In 2003, the United States and other participating countries began implementing the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) to curtail the trade of rough diamonds fueling armed conflict in Africa. While the KPCS and the end of the war in Liberia have significantly curtailed the illegal diamond trade, the outflow of such contraband from the region continues. A Global Witness report, “For a Few Dollars More: How Al-Qaeda Moved into the Diamond Trade,” offers evidence that Al Qaeda and Hezbollah continue to fund terrorist operations via the illegal diamond trade in West Africa.

Measures of trafficking are likely to wax and wane based on official seizures rather than hard intelligence on what’s coming through. Accordingly, officials must maintain a focus not solely on seizure numbers but on a more enduring measure of progress—the social, economic, and political conditions that foster criminality and the quality of law enforcement necessary to combat it over the long haul.

According to the UN, “A major problem in the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime in West Africa is the lack of coordination amongst law enforcement agencies and the absence of intelligence led investigations.” In terms of terrorism the UN diagnoses the need for “… considerable capacity building efforts and the development of national legislative frameworks against terrorism.” In a recent report, the UN observes that while many nations in the region have made progress toward ratifying the 16 international instruments against terrorism, much remains to be done in terms of ratification, the adoption of effective
counter-terrorism legislation, training of officials, application of the legislation, and use of international cooperation mechanisms to fight terrorism.\textsuperscript{46}

Depriving terrorist and criminal enterprises operating space and degrading their capabilities will require a comprehensive tool kit including improved national and regional intelligence, greater domain awareness, and proficiency in the full range of capabilities necessary to enforce the rule of law and address public grievances. Success will also require the international community to be vigilant in ensuring that the rubric of “terrorism” and “organized crime” is not abused by ruling regimes for purposes of suppressing legitimate, peaceful political opposition.
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: Ensure the Safety and Security of Ports, Vessels, and Cargo

The West African maritime domain encompasses the region’s 5,273 mile long coastline and the Economic Exclusive Zones (200 miles out to sea) belonging to the coastal states that are party to the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA)—an area covering over one million square miles of ocean.

The region has over 200 ports, most of which serve local and regional maritime traffic. Approximately 30 facilities are engaged in international trade. The four main ports are Lagos (Nigeria), Abidjan (Cote d’Ivoire), Dakar (Senegal), and Douala (Cameroon) but none is ranked in the top 70 ports worldwide in terms of commercial traffic volume. The yearly total container traffic of MOWCA ports is just under 3 million TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units)—about the same amount that annually passes through the Port of Virginia in Hampton Roads. In addition to international and intercontinental container ships, West African waters are plied by oil tankers and other vessels carrying natural gas and oil directly from West Africa to the United States.

Because the maritime transportation system, like aviation, is global, insecurity at foreign ports can directly affect security across the international network. A container of illegal weapons or other contraband (including weapons of mass destruction) introduced into the system at an insecure foreign port facility or in open waters can make its way via the network to U.S. or allied territory where other layers of security will be required to detect and address the threat.

Piracy and Attacks at Sea. Only a few years ago, the waters off Nigeria were the deadliest in the world. Currently the Gulf of Guinea is second only to Somali waters in numbers of attacks at sea, with some 32 pirate strikes reported in the first nine months of 2009. In early 2010, J. Peter Pham, director of the Africa Project at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, observed that, “The International Maritime Board reports any movement against ships on the Gulf of Aden, but you don’t have the same data from the Gulf of Guinea, there are fishing boats attacked at dockside or close to shore, which don’t meet the definition of piracy on the high seas, and if you add all that, the number of attacks certainly would be equal to those off Somalia.” Indeed, the International Maritime Organization believes that piracy and robbery at sea is grossly under-reported. Piracy and other attacks at sea do not merely affect large foreign vessels transiting the area, it targets small local operators as well. In 2008, for example, the high number of armed robberies at sea and the lack of a law enforcement response capability spurred a refusal by Nigerian trawlers to leave dock.

Many raids at sea are intended to steal cargo or hold it for ransom, others are kidnappings for money, still, other incidents are reportedly political attacks on the Nigerian oil sector. The motives for piracy in West Africa are diverse, but some experts report that it is fostered by anger and the absence of opportunity as the result of poaching and encroachment. Moreover, it’s tolerated by local communities because illicit actors spread money around to win public support.

A growing number of U.S., British, and French ships are patrolling the Gulf of Guinea and conduct joint exercises with the navies of Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Cameroon. But according to some experts, “the scale of the problem has become so vast, and the capabilities of local navies so small, even local officials admit that the pirates have the upper hand.” A task force from the Center for Strategic and International Studies reports that, Countries lack adequate surveillance or response capacity to counter piracy and other crimes at sea.

The ability of West African nations to counter piracy is also limited by insufficient domain awareness, inadequate early warning and intelligence, the lack of a credible deterrent, deficient response capability, and the inability to sustain patrol operations with sufficient reach over extended periods of time. Moreover, a 2010 UNODC report states that, “West African countries currently do not have the adequate legislative framework and enforcement capacities to address such a complex crime where legal obstacles are plenty and action requires important logistics and specialized know how…”

Ports and Harbors. Security at the region’s port facilities varies, but in general is not strong. Of the estimated 30 West African (MOWCA) ports engaged in international trade, only 16 meet the basic requirements of the UN’s International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS)—a set of minimum
security standards for basics such as perimeter and access control.\textsuperscript{52} The ISPS code prescribes responsibilities to governments, shipping companies, shipboard personnel, and port/facility personnel to “detect security threats and take preventative measures against security incidents affecting ships or port facilities used in international trade.”\textsuperscript{53} The U.S. Coast Guard reports that of 150 trading partners around the world, 14 are noncompliant with the ISPS—and 7 of those are in West Africa.

Port facilities in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone lack approved port facility security plans (PFSPs), a component of ISPS code compliance, and seven West African nations have ports currently under a Port Security Advisory for failing to maintain effective anti-terrorism and security measures.\textsuperscript{54} (See Appendix VII for individual port ISPS compliance and current Port Security Advisories.)

Vessels and cargo from countries that fail to comply with the ISPS code are subject to restrictions that include detention, delay, and denial of entry to U.S. and other international ports; and conditions and restrictions are imposed on any vessel that has visited a port under a Port Security Advisory as one of its previous five ports of call.

These security failures have far reaching operational and economic consequences that significantly impede sustainable economic development. Ninety percent of international trade is transported by sea. The failure of ports in West Africa to meet ISPS standards and their listing in a Port Security Advisory by the U.S. Coast Guard precludes countries from obtaining maritime-related insurance and limits the country’s ability to participate in foreign trade. Conversely, where ISPS has gone into effect ports have collected increased customs revenues. Port Lome in Togo, for example, enjoyed a 20 percent yearly rise in its customs revenues after ISPS certification.

ISPS noncompliance and certain operational considerations have inspired some major companies, including oil and rubber firms, to establish private port facilities in West Africa. Doing so enables these companies to write and implement their own security plans and receive independent ISPS compliance reviews. This practice removes a strong incentive for host governments to ensure that their public port facilities meet international operations and security standards—a failure that reduces trade opportunity and impedes the diversification and maturation of the region’s economies at large.
Approximately 18 percent of the oil and 14 percent of the natural gas imported by the United States annually comes from West Africa, mostly from Nigeria; a figure for oil expected to rise to 25 percent by 2015. These volumes exceed those coming to the U.S. from the Persian Gulf.

Moreover, oil from West Africa contains lower sulfur and is generally higher quality than Middle Eastern oil, and given the region’s relative proximity to the Western Hemisphere operational costs should be lower.

A number of large U.S. companies own and operate major assets in the region, including offshore oil platforms and related infrastructure, and vessels such as oil and liquid natural gas tankers (see Appendix III for full list). Companies such as Shell, Chevron, and ExxonMobil continue to invest heavily in the region.

West Africa’s influence on global energy markets is expected to increase in years to come. Nigeria alone has proven reserves of oil and natural gas estimated to be 36.22 billion barrels of oil and 184.16 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Offshore oil reserves amount to an additional 15 billion barrels, making the Gulf of Guinea the largest deep-sea oil reserve in the world.

Insecurity and instability in the Niger Delta, however, could continue to impede energy production and limit the revenue it produces for the region. In recent years, acts of violence, kidnapping, extortion, and theft have significantly constrained operations—resulting in periodic cuts in the area’s maximum production capacity of 3.2 million barrels per day. Insurgent attacks, including those by the Nigerian militant group MEND (Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta) have cut Nigeria’s oil output by approximately 25% since 2008. According to the State Department’s Coordinator for International Energy Affairs, David Goldwyn, “If Nigeria was to produce oil at capacity, it would play a major role in helping to lower and stabilize world oil prices.”

As a global commodity price swing in oil can be caused by disruptions in supply anywhere around the world, volatility that can adversely affect the U.S. economy. In particular, an attack on an oil platform or pipeline, or even the threat of an attack can hike prices swiftly. In April 2008 oil prices hit a record high of $117.76 a barrel following a rocket attack on a Japanese oil tanker off the coast of Yemen and two pipeline attacks by MEND in Nigeria. In May 2008, MEND attacked a Royal Dutch Shell pipeline in the Niger Delta and claimed to have killed 11 soldiers, within a few hours the price of crude oil rose one dollar on world markets. In June of 2009, news of a MEND attack on one of Royal Dutch Shell’s two main export terminals in Nigeria caused global oil prices to rise $2.33 a barrel-3.4%-on the New York Mercantile Exchange.

Economic strength, which is a primary pillar of U.S. national security, relies heavily on a reliable oil supply and stable prices given the nation’s current energy mix. That being the case, energy infrastructure is an inviting target to those wishing to inflict harm on U.S. and international interests. Accordingly, conditions that breed insecurity and political instability in the Gulf of Guinea are a significant concern to the United States and our allies, as well as to Africa.

Oil theft in West Africa continues to be a pervasive problem, linked to the full range of security concerns. Studies commissioned by oil companies estimate that 10 percent of Nigeria’s daily production of 2.5 million barrels of oil is stolen. Between 2003 and 2008 oil theft, often referred to as “illegal oil bunkering,” resulted in a loss of approximately $100 billion to the Nigerian economy, as well as significant losses to international oil companies, including U.S. concerns. In November 2006 the managing director of Shell Nigeria reported that, “the loss of revenues due to ‘unrest and violence’ was $61 million per day . . . amounting to a staggering $9 billion since January 2006.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Proven Oil Reserves (BL)</th>
<th>Proven Natural Gas Reserves (CF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>36.22 billion</td>
<td>184.16 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>200 million</td>
<td>4.77 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>1.6 billion</td>
<td>3.2 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>1.1 billion</td>
<td>1.3 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>2 billion</td>
<td>1 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>15 million</td>
<td>800 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>9.04 billion</td>
<td>9.53 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1.5 billion</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>100 million</td>
<td>1 trillion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Energy Information Administration 2010
According to media accounts, Nigeria has the highest percentage in the world of gross domestic product stolen—mainly oil—and largely by corrupt officials who deposit the proceeds externally. By some estimates up to $400 billion has been lost through corruption and $100 billion moved out of the country since the 1960's. For this reason, Nigeria leads Africa in illicit flows. (See Appendix VI on summary of illicit financial flows) Official complicity in oil bunkering is a significant problem, and one of the reasons some in Nigeria resist efforts such as “oil tagging” to “pipeline metering,” and proper audits that could identify wrongdoing.

In one exemplary case, the former head of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission of Nigeria, Nuhu Ribadu, investigated corruption charges against the governor of the Delta State (an unstable region in Nigeria that accounts for more than 75 percent of Nigeria’s oil export earnings). The governor, whose personal net assets totaled about $700 million, offered Ribadu a $15 million bribe to stop the investigation. The governor was charged but later released. Ribadu also investigated and prosecuted his superior, the inspector general of the Nigerian police force, whose personal assets totaled $150 million. Eventually Ribadu was forced to flee Nigeria, and just recently returned to carry on his anti-graft campaign. As an example of how deep graft has penetrated in some quarters, one former official reported that what he had kept as a highly secret effort to investigate oil theft outside of security force channels so that he could maintain the integrity of the investigation was nonetheless disclosed to the perpetrators by an insider, scuttling the initiative.

In addition to corrupt officials, oil company employees are also believed to be complicit in theft. Large-scale bunkering requires using forged bills of lading—documents issued by a carrier to a shipper that list and acknowledge receipt of goods for transport and specify the terms of delivery. Forging such transfer documents requires the participation of oil company staff and top government officials who grant oil-lifting contracts. One former senior West African official stated that a website was established to market stolen oil, and that tankers are “lined up” to take on illegal shipments.

Corporate and government corruption extends to official contracting in the energy sector as well. In early 2009 a subsidiary of Halliburton pled guilty to charges of paying bribes worth more than $150 million to Nigerian officials for the granting of natural gas development rights.

According to several key reports, funds generated from stolen oil have been linked directly or indirectly to organizations that pose a significant threat both to regional and global security. A UN report, Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region, states that the “oil bunkering syndicates are highly international, including not only other West Africans, but also Moroccans, Venezuelans, Lebanese, French and Russians, for example. The consequences of oil theft are far-reaching, encompassing, and enabling a diverse array of illegal enterprises with a global footprint. By these means oil bunkering links to wider patterns of organized crime, with cash, drugs, and weapons all being traded in exchange for illegal oil.”

Nigeria has the highest percentage of GDP stolen in the world—largely by corrupt officials who transfer the proceeds externally.
Maritime resources are vital both to the ecology and economy of West African nations. Pollution and poaching impede regional development and deprive citizens of material and financial resources. Such deprivation intensifies public dissatisfaction with ruling regimes, further ripening conditions for regional instability, humanitarian crisis, insurgency, and terrorist exploitation.

**Poaching.** Seafood is one of the region’s leading exports as well as job creators. The fisheries sector in West Africa accounts for more than 5,600,000 jobs and the total value of seafood exports is estimated to be more than $711 million. Unregulated and illegal fishing poses a serious and growing threat to the region’s fishing industry and its food security. Illegal fishing accounts for a loss of revenue to sub-Saharan Africa of approximately $1 billion annually and enormous human costs, given that fish account for the majority of protein intake in West African nations.

International environmental groups that have studied illegal fishing in the region call the practice in the Gulf of Guinea “the worst in Africa,” which makes it the worst in the world, and report that illegal trawlers fish off the coast of West Africa 24 hours a day. These trawlers not only steal fish but drag nets and chains along the seabed, damaging ocean habitats as well as fouling the nets of local fisherman. Incidents have been reported of illegal trawlers running over smaller boats and killing local fishermen.

As many as 60 percent of the fishing trawlers off the coast of the Gulf of Guinea are unlicensed and include European and Asian fleets. A single trawler load of fish can net vast sums of money in world markets, a strong incentive particularly when poachers know that the risk of being caught and punished is slim. The ability to curb these practices is hampered by the severely limited awareness of activity in the maritime domain, lack of capacity to interdict offenders, and inability to enforce the rule of law.

**Pollution.** In addition to the harm caused by poaching, significant environmental damage has been inflicted on the region by pollution from oil development operations and the illicit dumping of solid, electronic, and hazardous waste in West African waters.

**Oil.** The Niger Delta, with its 606 oilfields is widely recognized as the world capital of oil pollution. The UN Development Program reports that between 1976 and 2001, more than 6,800 oil spills were recorded in Nigeria. The amount of oil spilled annually in Nigerian waters is equivalent to the amount of oil that leaked into the Gulf of Mexico from the British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon disaster.

The majority of the spills are the result of leakage and illegal tampering with pipelines. Shell recently admitted to spilling 14,000 tons of oil in the Niger Delta in 2009. The company claims that 98 percent of its oil spills are the result of vandalism, theft, or sabotage with only a minimal amount attributable to deteriorating infrastructure. In some cases the spills are caused by locals seeking to create cleanup jobs. Shell reported that in 2009 one of the company’s pipelines was peppered with 300 illegal taps. Regardless of the cause, oil pollution is a significant hazard to fish stocks and their habitat. Its effects can deplete the food supply, destroying subsistence fishing and other sea-based livelihoods as well as contaminating the water supply of local populations.

In a related issue, gas flaring in the Niger Delta, the practice of burning off natural gas brought to the surface when pumping oil, is a serious environmental hazard and poses a significant health risk to local populations. Moreover it has impaired soil fertility in surrounding farmlands diminishing agricultural output. Medical studies have shown that the gas burning in the Niger Delta region contributes to the low average life expectancy of its inhabitants—43 years.

West Africa’s large proven reserves and enormous energy potential, in combination with growing global demand for oil, ensure that the pace of exploration and development will continue to quicken. These trends will increase the need to ensure that energy development activities are conducted with proper security and environmental oversight.
Waste. As environmental laws in industrialized countries become stricter, waste-generating industries are searching for a “path of least resistance” to dispose of hazardous waste.93 “This search has led industries and the governments of developed and industrialized nations to focus on exporting these wastes to developing countries—especially sub-Saharan African countries.”90

Traffickers in electronic and toxic waste are typically professional disposal companies from industrialized nations or contractors, typically with ethnic ties to the destination country, who dump significant amounts of waste at sea where detection is difficult and enforcement lax.91 Exporters commonly falsify customs papers and invoices and even when the destination country has agreed to the dumping the public it is not made aware and it will for the most part be denied if it ever becomes public knowledge. Frequently e-waste traffickers make money on both ends: they are paid to remove the waste from an industrialized nation and then profit from selling “salvageable” material in West Africa.92

According to the UNODC, approximately 95,000 tons of e-waste arrives in West Africa annually.95 Nigeria and Ghana are the primary importers of electronic waste, including used cell phones and computer parts. While electronic waste imports are usually purported to be for the purpose of refurbishing defunct equipment, only a small fraction of these materials is rehabbed and reused. The remainder enters the waste stream often at sea. The United Nations estimates that between 30 percent and 75 percent of electronic goods imported are in fact waste.94 This is a troubling statistic, given that an average computer can contain up to 1,000 toxins, including lead, cadmium, mercury, and other heavy metals hazardous to human health and the environment.95

The multinational oil-trading firm Trafigura is currently on trial for illegally exporting hazardous waste to Cote d’Ivoire.96 In a settlement reached out of court in 2009, the company agreed to pay $45 million to more than 30,000 people who had health problems related to the company’s illegal waste dumping. This settlement was in addition to a $200 million payment made to the government of Cote d’Ivoire by Trafigura in 2007.97 An additional judgment involving Trafigura is expected to be issued by Dutch courts in the near future.
STRATEGIC CHALLENGE: Will and Capability/Capacity

The policies and initiatives undertaken to achieve U.S. strategic objectives in the region’s maritime domain must be guided by a set of core principles.

First, African nations and their various institutions must own their security problems, including maritime insecurity, and solutions must merit their buy-in and be embraced by their leadership.

Second, the United States must clearly understand what it rightfully and effectively can do unilaterally or with outside partners, and what actions require African leadership, cooperation, or both.

Finally, U.S. policy must take into account the relationship between the future quality of life for Gulf of Guinea inhabitants and U.S. energy security. The absence of sustained development and an improved quality of life for the region’s people will endanger the dependability of the area as a stable source of energy.

Fostering security, including in the maritime domain, is the function of a broader dynamic, namely, building and sustaining the will to enforce the rule of law and the capability to do so. But, the requirement for “will” and “capability/capacity” is not solely an African responsibility. It falls also to the United States, our allies, and other stakeholders who must demonstrate the will and capability to be effective partners.

As a general matter, each of the coastal nations of West Africa possesses a maritime security service of some kind, but collectively they lack the size, structure, assets, and training to operate effectively to meet security requirements. Each of the nations has duly appointed port authorities and public officials responsible for the operational administration and physical security of their facilities. Most of the nations have established legal codes and a basic framework for enacting statutes to define criminal acts affecting the maritime domain, as well as institutions responsible for investigating, prosecuting, adjudicating, and correcting crimes. The legal foundations exist, even if the structures are in varying levels of disrepair and decay from disuse, abuse, and improper stewardship. In almost all cases the official authorities, rules, and procedures of their legislative, administrative, and judicial systems are in need of significant modernization and improvement.

With few exceptions the countries have entered into key international, regional, subregional, and bilateral compacts and associations to promote good governance, rule of law, and security. Yet action to fulfill maritime security goals and commitments lags significantly.

The African Union is currently working on an African Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIM) due to be completed at the end of 2011. Strategic planning is also taking place at the regional (ECOWAS, ECCAS, MOWCA), and national levels. Key challenges include:

- Translating strategy into action
- Integrating continental, regional, and national strategies to ensure coherency, efficiency, and effectiveness
- Ensuring that planning does not become an end in itself or an impediment to action as nations, regional authorities, and continental authorities wait upon one another to plan and implement their security strategies
- Ensuring that planning at the national, regional, and continental level is complementary, rather than a source of confusion, jurisdictional turf struggle, or resource conflict

Too often, public graft and institutional corruption driven by official greed rule the day and pervert the institutions responsible for transparent, orderly, and honest conduct of public business...However there are to be found vital islands of integrity that can serve as promising beachheads for transformation and progress.

By far the greatest shortcoming in achieving the hopes of better functioning governments is the human element—more specifically, overcoming the culture of corruption that afflicts much of officialdom throughout West Africa. Too often, public graft and institutional corruption
driven by greed rule the day and pervert the institutions responsible for the transparent, orderly, and honest conduct of public business in which are vested the hopes for a better future for the region’s people. Despite these pervasive problems, there are to be found, to varying degrees in each country, vital islands of personal and institutional integrity that can serve as promising beachheads for transformation and progress.

Will. Security in the maritime domain has not been a priority for most African nations. Historically, African security authorities and institutions have focused mainly on land-based, internal, and transboundary threats. Accordingly, national armies traditionally receive the lion’s share of security funding, resources, and policy attention. Navies and other maritime security services, though sources of national pride and symbols of state sovereignty, remain subordinate to armies and other land-based security forces in the prestige, resources, and attention they enjoy. More often than not, the focus of the state security apparatus is not so much on protecting the nation but rather on protecting the regime.

Nevertheless, attention to maritime domain security appears to be on the rise. In part, this evolution is the result of global attention and diplomatic pressure stemming from acts of piracy. Moreover, African authorities exhibit a growing awareness of the damage that maritime insecurity inflicts on the region, including its economic interests including:

- The massive loss of national revenue due to oil theft, illegal fishing, and the nonpayment of resource fees
- The increased costs from higher insurance rates, reduced direct foreign investment, limited access to capital, diminished trade and tourism, and the loss of other opportunities exacerbated by maritime security and corruption concerns
- The depletion and destruction of natural resources including national fisheries by polluters and poachers
- The growing threat to stability and security posed by local crime syndicates, international criminal cartels and terrorist groups that exploit the maritime domain

The region’s publics and leaders understand that revenues from illegal maritime activity, in particular stolen oil (“bunkering”) and drug trafficking, provides material support (extending to arms) that fuels insurgency in the region; they also recognize that the corruption, deprivation, and other consequences of maritime insecurity are contributing to public dissatisfaction that undermines support for governing administrations and regimes.

Resolutions approved by the African Union, the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) demonstrate a growing understanding that maritime security is imperative, an understanding that must now be translated into the will to act (See Appendix V for key West African maritime security resolutions). Sustaining the will to fight corruption, build effective governmental institutions, and provide for rule of law at the national, regional, and continental level will be decisive for Africa’s future.

This will not be an easy task. West Africa is one of the most politically unstable and least developed regions in the world. The countries within the region include many corrupt governments with fragile judicial and civil society structures.

Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perception Index ranked seven West African nations in the bottom 20 of 180 nations surveyed. Seven West African countries are listed as “critical” and most in danger of state failure by Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace’s “Failed States Index;” six others are listed as “in danger.”

The 2009 Index of African Governance ranks the quality of governance in all 53 African countries. Among the 10 worst performing governments were Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Angola, and Guinea, with Nigeria, Liberia, Equatorial Guinea, and the Republic of Congo not far behind. The Millennium Challenge Corporation scores many of the MOWCA nations as significantly deficient in the control of corruption. While most of the nations in the region (12 of 15 ECOWAS countries) are party to the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), according to the UN “implementation of the legal and institutions frameworks required by UNCAC is often lacking and/or ineffective.”

Where properly incentivized, African states have demonstrated the capability to perform the functions of government ably. The key element, therefore, is to encourage the will to perform them in an environment of responsibility, transparency, and leadership. To that end, important challenges for the U.S. and the international community is to determine how to address the economic, political, and social incentives fostering the status quo, and to identify and help empower reform minded and capable statesmen and potential leaders in the region.
An important element of mustering will is to predicate maritime security on the imperative of meeting the needs of the regions’ people, rather than for the benefit of external interests even though in many instances they coalesce. The goal of the strategic plans being developed by African nations and their regional institutions ought to reflect legitimate priorities. In general, the goal could be stated in a manner that highlights the key incentives for Africa to secure its waters as: to recapture and harness the enormous wealth being stolen from the African people by criminal enterprises, terrorists, oil bunkerers, polluters, poachers, and pirates; and transparently employ the wealth for the broad economic and social development of the African people.

The will of the international community is also a major part of the equation. Piracy, poaching, and illegal waste dumping are not merely violations of African law they are international crimes. There’s much the global community can and should be doing to help prosecute piracy under international law, and flag countries can do more to stop their vessels from engaging in illegal fishing.

The United States, our allies, regional stakeholders such as energy development companies, along with key international bodies must exhibit the resolve to sustain strategic attention, devote sufficient investment and assistance, and, importantly, exercise the patience necessary to sustain progress toward desired end states.

Maritime security training, equipment, and other forms of assistance to West Africa will mean little if they are not applied for public good or are wielded by corrupted official. Translating will into effective action must be empowered by a holistic, partnership-based approach that respects the sovereign prerogatives of African nations and is mindful of public needs, expectations, attitudes, and rights.

**Capability/Capacity.** Just as capability without a will to act is meaningless, good intentions without the sufficient capacity to implement them are fruitless. Three chief capabilities are necessary to secure the maritime domain:

- The ability to develop and utilize accurate and actionable information, intelligence, and domain awareness to track who is operating in and around African coastal waters and national exclusive economic zones

- The ability to respond to emergencies swiftly and effectively to protect lives and property in and around African waters

- The ability to enforce the chain of justice and rule of law, through investigation, apprehension, detention, adjudication, and corrections

In general, West Africa’s maritime domain is immense and the capability of the region’s nations to monitor the domain physically and electronically, respond swiftly to emergencies, and enforce the rule of law pales to the task.

U.S. Coast Guard officials stress that improving security in the West African maritime domain cannot be achieved by relying on a single strategy of either electronic monitoring or patrol—a mix is required. Domain awareness without the ability to act on the information is meaningless; conversely, patrol and deployment capability cannot be efficiently utilized without electronic awareness and targeting. However, experts note the important deterrent value provided by the physical presence of security services at sea and for that reason believe patrol capability is more important than electronic monitoring—though each must complement the other.

It’s unreasonable to expect that each West African country will have the full suite of resources and capabilities to perform the many functions necessary to secure the region’s waters. Success, particularly in the short- and mid-term will require cooperative arrangements that create economies of scale through sharing of assets and capabilities, the assignment of roles and missions, and the creation of interdependencies.

KEY CAPABILITY: Maintaining accurate and actionable information, intelligence, and domain awareness to track who is operating in and around African coastal waters and national exclusive economic zones

Maritime domain awareness (MDA), a key enabler of maritime security, is the product of three capabilities: (1) the ability to sustain a relevant and accurate picture of presence and activities in a nation’s maritime domain, (2) the ability to communicate this information in a clear and timely fashion to those responsible for acting on the data, and (3) the ability to interpret, understand, and act on the information.

The West African maritime domain is large and resources to provide situational awareness are minimal. Attempts to improve maritime domain awareness through electronic means such as participating in the Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS) described below have been piecemeal. Where participation in the system has been implemented, its actual contribution to improved security is uncertain given that illicit actors such as illegal fishing trawlers, pirate vessels, and bunkered oil tankers don’t broadcast signals via the Automated Identification System (AIS).

Strategically, securing the maritime domain should take cues from the counterinsurgency doctrine of clear, hold, and build. Clearing the domain of bad actors and holding it depends heavily on achieving and maintaining sufficient domain awareness. This is not to suggest the need for 100 percent coverage of the domain by electronic assets or by sea and air patrols. Initially, coverage should be focused on areas where risk is greatest and then expanded until sufficient to produce quantifiable security improvements as gauged by interdictions, arrests, rescues, fishing fee collection, and other relevant measures of success.

While maintaining sufficient MDA is a challenge globally, the difficulties in West Africa are particularly serious. A recent report issued by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy cited West Africa as a geographic blind spot where "radar, satellite, and other forms of surveillance are limited or non-existent." It further noted that “operating from such blind spots traffickers can run fleets of ships, planes, and trucks with limited fear of detection or disruption.”

MDA is a multifaceted discipline requiring the integration of “all-source intelligence, law enforcement information, and open-source data from the public and private sectors. It also depends on cooperation among the government, public, and private sectors, both nationally and internationally. . . . MDA is not just a navy, coast guard or military function. It must be embraced as a whole-of-government function if it is going to be successful.”

Given the expanse of the maritime domain, electronic communications are a critical element of MDA—one that requires financing, maintenance, operational expertise, and cooperation between adjoining jurisdictions. West African capacity in these areas is constrained by lack of resources, mistrust among nations, and corruption.

Of particular utility are surveillance and communication suites such as MSSIS—an Internet-based system that enables participating nations to openly share electronic data generated from ship-borne identification beacons, coastal radar, and AIS.

MSSIS was developed by the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center at the U.S. Department of Transportation and is administered by the U.S. Office of Global Maritime Situational Awareness (OGMSA). More than 50 nations currently participate in the system, which incorporates AIS—beacon technology required by the terms of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) to be fitted aboard international voyaging ships with gross tonnage of 300 or more tons, and all passenger ships regardless of size.

Under the MSSIS program, vessels owned or flagged by participating nations transmit AIS data gathered by electronic receiving units into a single data stream through secure Internet-based servers. Participating governments can view real-time AIS data globally, and thereby gain a more complete picture of who is present in the maritime domain. A significant limitation on the efficacy of MSSIS is
that any ship engaging in illicit activities can simply disable its AIS beacon. Moreover, most of the vessels operating illegally fall under the tonnage required to participate.

Various West African nations are working with the U.S. Navy to acquire AIS and participate in MSSIS. Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Mauritania, Sao Tome and Principe, and Senegal currently use the system; Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone are seeking to do so. However, the pace of implementation is slow. Impediments such as the high cost of acquisition, maintenance, and operations; mistrust among neighboring countries whose cooperation is vital to the effective use of the system; and the failure to activate and utilize the tracking equipment by authorized ships (operators report information at their discretion) have impeded region wide implementation. Greater participation in MSSIS combined with enhanced situational awareness of vessels failing to broadcast on the system through the use of radar and reporting regimes would help the region’s maritime security services better focus law enforcement attention on potential illicit operators.

In most cases West African countries must rely on the United States to provide the systems, install the equipment, and train the operators. Funding for AIS comes from multiple U.S. government sources. Security equipment is customarily supplied through funding provided under Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, while funding to train AIS operators is provided under Title 22, the foreign relation and intercourse section of the U.S. Code. Lack of coordination in these funding streams and programs can result in significant waste and inefficiency. For instance, Mauritania’s AIS system was delivered and installed—but before training could begin a coup took place in August of 2008, disqualifying the country from U.S. assistance. By the time the country was reinstated to the United States’ assistance eligibility list, training funds had been allocated elsewhere, stranding the technology. Moreover, there is no publicly available reporting on the effectiveness of initiatives funded under these authorities.

Nigeria has two fully functioning complexes that utilize MSSIS/AIS; these Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC) suites were put in place with U.S. funding made available in 2006. The Nigerian government is looking to spend previously unused FMS (foreign military sales) funds to sustain and expand the system’s coverage to a broader geographical area, as it seeks to install three more fully operational RMAC suites as well as an RMAC repeater station on the Benin border.

Unfortunately, the AIS units in the existing RMAC suites neither receive input from nor transmit data to MSSIS, because of missing lines of computer code. AFRICOM’s Naval Forces Africa (NAV-AF) is working with the Computer Science Corporation to fix this software glitch and expects Nigeria to be fully integrated with MSSIS in the near future.

A U.S. Navy officer involved with the program says, “The Nigerians have proved themselves to be very capable operators; they just need parts and training to maintain the systems and they are willing to find funding to do that.” Important priorities for maximizing the benefit of domain awareness technology include: (1) mapping MSSIS/AIS to ensure that priority areas in the West African maritime domain are properly covered; (2) utilizing these systems and aligned technology to integrate information collected from authorized ships operating in the domain; (3) ensuring proper operational training, maintenance, and use of the technology to enhance security; (4) ensuring that national legal codes adequately address criminal behavior in the maritime domain; (5) developing efficient commercial licensing systems to enable legitimate maritime operators to pay their fees transparently and without harassment, so that legal operators have an interest in reporting illegal competitors; and (6) developing initiatives whereby AIS operators share information with authorities on visual and radar contacts with surrounding vessels to help complete the domain picture.

While many of the region’s nations prefer to acquire technology to promote MDA, its emphasis on systems must not take resources and priority away from developing the capability to physically patrol the maritime domain. Such patrols are vital for enhancing awareness of activity on the seas, but also for deterring wrongdoing by maintaining a visible presence, as well as maintaining the capability respond swiftly to illegal activity or emergencies.
KEY CAPABILITY: Responding to emergencies swiftly and effectively to protect lives and property in and around African waters

In general an effective region wide response capability does not exist in West African waters. The sizes and capabilities of the various maritime security services in the region vary significantly. (See Appendix VIII for a chart of vessels/ maritime security assets owned by key MOWCA countries)

The region’s largest maritime security service is the Nigerian Navy, a force of 8,000 personnel with fewer than 35 ships of uncertain operational readiness. Nigeria has considered creating a dedicated coast guard, but for now its navy is vested with law enforcement missions, supplemented by a ports authority police command. A more typical force is that of Equatorial Guinea: a navy of a few hundred personnel and a handful of patrol boats that may or may not be operational. An estimated 85 percent of the ships registered to Gulf of Guinea states are more than 20 years old, compared to the global average of 15 percent.

According to a top expert, “African maritime security forces are currently misaligned to meet the security threats they face. They have navy bureaucratic affiliations and training programs but have a predominance of coast guard missions, operate in coast guard zones, and require “coast guard partnerships.” Traditionally, navy training is concerned primarily with the skills required to perform foreign policy missions and national defense, while coast guard training focuses on more relevant and necessary domestic missions such as fisheries management, law enforcement, and search-and-rescue operations.

The most promising regional effort stems from a 2006 agreement entered into by 11 of the 20 coastal MOWCA states, with the support of the United Nations’ International Maritime Organization (IMO), to establish a subregional integrated coast guard network, a center for information and communications, and a regional maritime fund. The initiative is a joint IMO/MOWCA effort aimed at reinforcing cooperation among participating countries to counter mounting problems with piracy, armed robbery, and other illicit acts addressed by international conventions and treaties. These include the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA), the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships (MARPOL), the United Nations Conventions on Maritime Security and Safety (SOLAS), the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS), the Search and Rescue Convention (SAR), and the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

### Nigeria’s Maritime Assets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF SHIP</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEKO 360 Class Frigate, “Aradu”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Listed as having serviceability in doubt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vosper Mk 9 Corvette, “Enymiri”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Listed as having serviceability in doubt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian “Lerici” Class Coastal Minesweeper, “Ohue” and “Marabai”</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Non-operational in 1996 and no sign of activity since</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Combattante Fast Missile Craft “Siri,” “Ayam,” and “Ekun”</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Listed as having serviceability in doubt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balsam Ocean Patrol Craft (ex bouy tenders)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Listed as having serviceability in doubt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inshore Patrol Craft, “Yola”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Lurssen Coastal Patrol Craft</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defender Patrol Boat</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing Ship Tank, “Ambe”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Vessel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tug Boat</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Ship, “Ruwan Yaro”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Listed as having serviceability in doubt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warship, “Ologbo,” “Nwamba,” “Obula”</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Yacht and Training Ship, “Amariya”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While an excellent sign of cooperation, the effort to establish national coast guards and an integrated subregional network remains embryonic and progress is slow, to the best of our knowledge this initiative remains in the conceptual stage. Of the 25 MOWCA nations, only Cape Verde, Liberia (when legislation is finalized), and Sao Tome and Principe will have maritime forces that identify themselves as coast guards instead of navies.112

Too often the patrol assets that West African nations do possess are port bound due to lack of maintenance, trained personnel, or both. The inability to patrol inhibits the ability to deter illicit activity, respond to emergencies, and enforce the rule of law on the sea. Moreover, conflicting maritime laws and disputes among West African nations over territorial claims and exclusive economic zone boundaries impede the regional cooperation and partnerships necessary to serve common interests and objectives, not only in policing and emergency response but throughout the chain of “rule of law”—investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and corrections. M. T. Addico, the Secretary General of MOWCA, also pointed to the absence of a sub-regional pact on right of hot pursuit as a significant impediment to emergency response.113
KEY CAPABILITY: Enforcing the chain of justice and rule of law, including through investigation, apprehension, detention, adjudication, and corrections

Generally speaking, the ability to enforce the rule of law in West African countries is poor in each aspect of the process, often beginning with the absence of a legitimate, up-to-date, and comprehensive body of law. Where proper statutory authorities do exist, enforcement is hampered by lack of resources and ineffective institutions of policing, adjudication, and corrections, as well as by official corruption.114

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies reported that Africa in general “…has the lowest percentage of police officers (180 per 100,000 population) and judges per capita of any global region.”115

According to a 2009 United Nations report, “Though there is considerable diversity in conditions between states, by most definitions the rule of law is weak throughout West Africa. Due to poverty, most states in West Africa lack the capacity to effectively enforce the law throughout their territories. . . Of course, some states in West Africa have far more capacity than others, and the governance situation is not uniformly dire. But the entire region remains, to a greater or lesser degree, subject to a set of structural vulnerabilities that render it vulnerable to the development of organized crime.”116

The report went on to say, “Corruption in law enforcement agencies is widely recognized and as a result these agencies are not well respected. In every West African country graded in Transparency International's 2007 Global Corruption Barometer, the police were rated as the most corrupt sector of society (except Senegal, where they were narrowly eclipsed by political parties), and police in West Africa received lower ratings than anywhere else in the world.”117

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and other global institutions have also reported on West Africa’s significant deficiencies in all categories related to the rule of law. The State Department’s 2008 and 2009 Human Rights report on Nigeria cited significant problems with election fraud, executive influence on the courts, endemic security service abuse (including arbitrary and extrajudicial killings, rape, and torture), judicial corruption, and abusive prisons.118 Amnesty International labeled the Nigerian justice system “a conveyor belt of injustice, from beginning to end.”119

The text ends with a reference to the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and other global institutions reporting on West Africa’s significant deficiencies in all categories related to the rule of law. It highlights the State Department’s 2008 and 2009 Human Rights report on Nigeria, which cited significant problems with election fraud, executive influence on the courts, endemic security service abuse, judicial corruption, and abusive prisons. Amnesty International labeled the Nigerian justice system “a conveyor belt of injustice, from beginning to end.”
KEY STRATEGIC REQUIREMENT: Capability and Capacity Building

As stated earlier in this report, reform cannot be imposed on African countries. It must emanate from Africa at the national and regional levels—the product of a determined will reinforced by a strong ethic of transparency and cooperation, and supported by the partnership and assistance of friends and allies.

As the United States more clearly defines its own national interests and more vigorously seeks to advance them, policymakers must take stock of what unilateral steps the United States can rightfully and effectively take to improve security with respect to threats affecting West Africa, as distinguished from those efforts that are the primary responsibility or legal domain of individual nations and regional authorities. Given the sovereignty of African nations, the main thrust of the U.S. effort must be in helping build capacity, fostering cooperation, and facilitating partnership in a manner that meets common interests and objectives.

**Capability and Capacity Building.** The United States and the international community sponsor a broad range of programs designed to improve West African maritime security capacity, via three main lines of effort:

- Ship and maritime equipment donation
- Maritime security training
- Security sector reform curricula and programs

**U.S. Initiatives.** The primary U.S.-sponsored security assistance programs to the region are implemented by the Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Justice. The U.S. Navy conducts the lion’s share of maritime security capacity building in West Africa, even though the skill sets in demand are more in line with those concentrated in the Coast Guard.

In general, the various U.S. capacity building initiatives are well intentioned but diffused, uncoordinated, ad hoc, and not comprehensively reviewed and assessed for effectiveness. The programs and their sponsors operate in bureaucratic stovepipes absent the orchestration of a responsible lead agency. Moreover, the overall effort is not governed by an overarching strategic planning process that identifies priorities, rationalizes budgets, and drives and tracks progress toward defined strategic outcomes. In addition, U.S. initiatives usually are not designed to fit into the national plans and strategies of individual African nations.

The array of assistance programs is dispersed across many countries without a clear and concentrated geo-graphic focus or strategic goal. In some cases U.S. donation and training programs appear to be more a matter of token diplomacy rather than serious, outcome-oriented planks of a comprehensive strategy to produce bona-fide improvements in security. In all, this “mile wide and inch deep” approach may achieve political objectives but will not materially advance security. Generally speaking when it comes to maritime security assistance relevant to West Africa the Coast Guard possesses most of the expertise; the Navy has most of the resources, and the State Department has most of the authorities. This dynamic cries out for interagency cooperation and/or realignment of expertise, resources, and authorities to meet national objectives.

In early 2009, the State Department, Department of Defense, and USAID completed a Security Sector Reform (SSR) guide. The document provides the three agencies with guidelines to coordinate, plan, and implement SSR programs with foreign partner nations. It defines SSR as: “the set of policies, plans, programs and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice.” The document is a general model and while helpful it is not focused on the maritime domain or tailored to West Africa.

**Department of State.** National Security Presidential Directive 41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13 designates the Secretary of State to lead the international maritime security outreach effort. Accordingly, the State Department is developing a Maritime Security Sector Reform (MSSR) Assessment Guide and Tool in partnership with USAID and continues to refine its West Africa counternarcotics strategy including a maritime component.
The MSSR Guide, expected to be published in late 2010, will help evaluate and analyze a country's maritime security sector in terms of the following six functions: governance, security, defense, safety, mobility, response/recovery, and economy. The tool will be used to help identify shortcomings and requirements, and could be employed to better focus U.S. assistance.

The State Department also participates with AFRICOM's Africa Partnership Station (APS) on projects to provide outreach and training to African nations (described further below). Close cooperation and coordination between the Department of State and Department of Defense on African maritime security capacity building is intended to enable African maritime forces to effectively and self-sustainably secure and govern their respective maritime domain. While the State and Defense departments have established a post for a full-time Naval Attaché in Abuja, Nigeria, to advance the effort, the position is currently vacant from lack of funding. However, a 'maritime assistance officer' is currently posted to the U.S. Embassy in Nigeria.

In addition to APS, another area where the Departments of State and Defense cooperate is the International Military Education & Training Program (IMET)—a low cost component of U.S. security assistance that trains students from allied and friendly nations. The program's funding is appropriated by the State Department and the programs are conducted by the Defense Department. It presents young African officers the opportunity to come to the United States to train in various security related areas of expertise and return to their home nation with instant credibility. Currently African participation in the IMET program is limited, and should be considered for expansion particularly in the maritime arena.

In addition, the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) operates programs in Ghana, Senegal, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Nigeria to improve border enforcement, customs, and related policing. While not a maritime program per se, the initiative strives to improve overall rule of law that should help improve the maritime security picture.

In April 2010 Secretary Clinton launched the U.S.—Nigeria Bi-national Commission to provide for cooperation in the development of good governance and transparency, regional cooperation and development, energy reform and investment, and food security and agricultural development.

**Department of Defense.** In early 2005, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) launched the Gulf of Guinea Guard Initiative. Initially administered by Naval Forces Europe (NAV-EUR) the 10-year program aims to assist Gulf of Guinea nations in protecting the region's natural resources and achieving their long-term security and stability goals through asset donation, training, and coordination. Under the program, the U.S. Navy has increased its presence in the region as a deterrent and provides training, renders technical assistance, and conducts community relations activities, such as renovating schools.

In addition AFRICOM established the Africa Partnership Station (APS), a flagship maritime initiative of the United States and international partners. APS sponsors military and nonmilitary cooperative activities designed to build the skills, expertise, and professionalism of African militaries, coast guards, and mariners through training, exercises, cruises, and port calls. The APS staff consists of naval personnel from several African, European, and South American nations, and the training will continue to include "professional exchanges on maritime security, seamanship, environmental stewardship, and maritime awareness, along with numerous humanitarian and civic outreach opportunities."

The first deployment of APS vessels took place in November 2007. Allies such as the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Portugal and others have contributed to the program and greater levels of partnership and participation are being sought.

The Commander of AFRICOM, General Ward, declared in his 2010 posture statement that APS's "training and assistance focuses on strengthening four pillars of maritime sector development: a competent and professional maritime security force; secure infrastructure to sustain maritime operations; maritime domain awareness; and maritime response capability."
In 2008 APS engaged 15 West and Central African nations, conducted information-sharing operations with four West and Central African nations (Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ghana, and Senegal), successfully completed a sea-basing demonstration of the Improved Navy Lighterage System off the Liberian coast, and deployed/delivered 30 weather drifter buoys provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and trained partners on their use in order to study the Gulf of Guinea's oceanography; more than 1,500 maritime professionals participated in over 1,700 sessions of courses of instruction. On April 6, 2010, the USS Gunston Hall dropped anchor in Dakar, Senegal, becoming the flagship for APS West 2010.

Eight countries are currently participating in the various training exercises: Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Togo. The program will broaden the scope of its activities and participants in 2011. APS is an important, transparent program doing good work with growing levels of African buy-in and support. It has enjoyed numerous successes and continues to harness the participation of maritime allies, methodically expanding the initiative’s scope and reach. Nevertheless, given the region’s overwhelming need for security assistance the program is highly limited, and not yet established as a component of well-tailored African national, regional, and continental maritime security plans or a comprehensive U.S. strategic plan.

In addition to training and diplomatic value, APS also provides a naval presence that serves as a deterrent to illicit activity in the maritime domain, though highly limited. Such presence, however, must continue to be managed carefully. According to DoD’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Many friendly African governments regard any large and visible U.S. military presence as a handicap and potential magnet for both domestic political opponents and terrorists in search of high value targets…”

In addition to programs and operations of the two combatant commands, the Department of Defense provides various West African nations with military equipment through the foreign military financing (FMF) program, the foreign military sales (FMS) program, and the donation of excess defense articles (EDA).

Of the $6 billion in military equipment financing provided by the United States to foreign countries in 2009, a total of $3.75 million (0.06% of the total) was earmarked for 5 of the 25 countries in the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa, most of which was not directed to maritime assets. A 2010 request for $1.2 million in FMF, continent wide, was made for “Africa Maritime Security.” No foreign military sales have been earmarked for West Africa so far in 2010. Over the past 20 years, the U.S. government has provided EDA equipment to only four MOWCA nations (Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal). Of the 6,456 pieces of equipment, predominantly firearms and ammunition, only 8 items related directly to maritime security:

- Two 65-foot aluminum patrol boats to Ghana in 1999
- Two Balsam-class buoy tenders (i.e., 180-foot seagoing buoy tenders) to Ghana in 2000
- Four Balsam-class buoy tenders to Nigeria in 2001

The EDA program continues to be viewed skeptically by those who argue that we are not helping African nations by giving them old, poorly conditioned military assets for which the recipient nation has neither the training to use nor the resources to maintain. Of the boats provided to Nigeria, less than a quarter are able to put to sea as of the date of this report.

The Departments of State and Defense also cooperatively provide funds to equip and train foreign military and maritime security forces under section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006. For fiscal years 2006 through 2010, the United States authorized $1.3 billion in section 1206 funds. Of that amount, West African nations in conjunction with several North African nations received $53.1 million.
The U.S. government possesses neither a publicly available study or analysis of how these expenditures fit in to overall requirements of the recipient nation nor an assessment of their contribution to regional security. In April 2010 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) warned that, “The long-term impact of Section 1206 projects is at risk because U.S. agencies have not fully addressed how to sustain these projects.”\(^{129}\) The report went on to point out that 76 percent of 1206 projects are in low- to lower-middle-income countries; the GAO believes these projects could be “potentially threatened by the unwillingness or limited means” of recipient countries to sustain them.\(^{130}\)

**Department of Homeland Security.** In accordance with the U.S. National Maritime Security Strategy, the U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for conducting Port Security Assessments in Africa to determine whether ports engaged in international shipping are ISPS compliant. If a port fails to meet ISPS minimum requirements, the USCG recommends actions to remedy the deficiency, so that ships and cargo passing through the facility may enter the United States. While the Coast Guard conducts the ISPS assessment, the U.S. Navy is responsible for conducting the port risk assessment.

In addition, the USCG is working with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to address illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the region. These efforts have included training national fisheries observers in Ghana in 2008 and Senegal in 2009.

The USCG also administers the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP), in association with AFRICOM and other elements of the Department of Homeland Security. The program is designed to help host nations develop the capability to conduct operations such as boardings, search and seizure, and arrests through training, tactical demonstrations, and practice exercises.

AFRICOM conducted the first two AMLEP exercises with Cape Verde in 2008 with U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Dallas, the third and fourth exercises conducted in 2009 included the Sierra Leone Maritime Wing and Fisheries Ministry and resulted in several fisheries interdictions including the seizure of an illegally operating vessel.\(^{131}\) AMLEP programs have been conducted with the support of the State Department and French Maritime Air Forces, the latter helping in training exercises to demonstrate the integration of patrol aircraft capabilities with surface operations.

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1206 Funding for FY 2006-2009*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
<th>FUNDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon, Gabon, Senegal, Sierra Leone</td>
<td>West Africa Maritime Security Capability Enhancement</td>
<td>$10.9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Gabon, Ghana, Sao Tome &amp; Principe, Senegal, Togo</td>
<td>West and Central Africa Maritime Equipment Package</td>
<td>$9.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria, Sao Tome &amp; Principe</td>
<td>Gulf of Guinea Maritime Awareness</td>
<td>$6.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad, Nigeria</td>
<td>Multi-national Information-Sharing Network Aid</td>
<td>$6.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome &amp; Principe</td>
<td>MDA and Territorial Water Threat Response Capability Establishment</td>
<td>$5.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Light Infantry CT Equipment</td>
<td>$5.1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal</td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations Training in Support of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Program</td>
<td>$3.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Counterterrorism Capacity Building for Military Forces and Equipment (light infantry vehicles, comms)</td>
<td>$2.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Tactical Airlift Capacity Training</td>
<td>$1.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, and Senegal</td>
<td>Partner Nation Intelligence Capability Aid</td>
<td>$1.1 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the request of the Department of Defense and Department of State, the USCG deploys training teams that possess the necessary authorities and funding to provide international security cooperation and capacity-building assistance. In 2009 the USCG sent 17 mobile training teams to Africa, and it is on track to send 34 in 2010. As part of its international assistance efforts, the agency has developed a Model Maritime Service Code.

Finally, over the past two years, the USCG’s International Affairs and Foreign Policy Division has helped train mariners from 25 African nations under the auspices of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy International Cadet Program.

**Department of Justice.** The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) maintains four offices in Africa, including facilities in Nigeria and Ghana. The agency is working closely with U.S. law enforcement, military, intelligence, and diplomatic counterparts to “counteract the wave of drug-related crime impacting many African nations.”132 DEA is also engaging foreign law enforcement agencies and governments to better coordinate international counter-narcotics strategies in Africa.133

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is working to combat money laundering and terrorist financing in West Africa, with particular focus on Nigeria. In August 2010, the FBI and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) held a two-week training program in Karu, Nigeria that involved Nigerian Police, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) and the State Security Service (SSS). The program has trained participants on interrogation, hostage crisis negotiation, basic forensics, and major case management. EFCC Chairman Farida Waziri declared the program “part of the continuing partnership between Nigeria and the United States in the fight against the twin evils of money laundering and terrorist financing.”134 Victor McCollum of the FBI said, “the cooperation between the Nigerian law enforcement agencies and the FBI has been quite outstanding.”135

The Department’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) focuses on law enforcement development and training to combat human trafficking, gender-based violence, and public corruption. Since 2002, ICITAP has provided “training and technical assistance in criminal case management and investigations” in Benin.136 Since 2002, ICITAP has worked in Nigeria to provide training on civil disorder management and election security; as well as providing technical assistance on the recruitment and training of the Police Service Commission’s criminal investigators.137 ICITAP is also working with the State Department on a program to combat human trafficking in Nigeria.138

The Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT) administers criminal justice assistance programs under which U.S. prosecutors serve as Legal Advisors in Benin and Cameroon, and maintains other programs in Nigeria and Ghana. OPDAT works with the State Department, USAID, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, Department of Treasury, Department of Defense, and ICITAP.139 The program’s challenge is to “design and implement criminal justice assistance programs that are relevant and that will bring enduring value to criminal justice systems that may be challenged by corruption, transnational crime, failed infrastructure, or lack of resources.”140

**Congressional Action.** In its report accompanying the fiscal year 2011 Defense Authorization Act (S. 3454), the Senate Armed Services Committee directed the Department of Defense, including U.S. Africa Command, to develop a West Africa maritime security initiative that will include: (1) training in maritime domain awareness; (2) increasing the capacity of partners to patrol and enforce sovereignty in their own maritime space; and (3) improving the sustainability of their respective organizations with responsibility for maritime law enforcement.141

**International Initiatives.** In addition to U.S.-sponsored capacity-building programs, the broader international community administers an array of West African assistance programs primarily focused on economic development, facilities, governance, rule of law, and maritime capacity building through training, equipment donation, and other forms of assistance. The programs are wide-ranging but not coordinated to avoid duplication and ensure that priorities are properly served.

**European Union:** The European Union and the African Union (AU) have entered into an Africa-EU Strategic Partnership that aims to provide “an overarching long-term framework for Africa-EU relations . . . implemented through successive short-term Action Plans and enhanced political dialogue at all levels.”142 The Partnership was adopted by members of the African Union and European Union at the Second African-EU Summit in 2007. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy outlines the following objectives: strengthen institutional ties and address common challenges, particularly peace and security, migration and development, and a clean environment; work with African nations to
ensure that all millennium development goals (MDGs) are met by 2015; jointly promote and sustain a system of effective multilateralism, with strong, representative, and legitimate institutions; and create the conditions that would empower nonstate actors to play an active role in development, democracy building, conflict prevention, and the post-conflict reconstruction processes.

In addition, Europol has partnered with the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) to undertake a comprehensive review of how cocaine is produced and trafficked into the EU. The report, published in April 2010, highlights the three main smuggling routes into Europe, one of which is through West Africa.

Assistance programs are also sponsored at the national level. For example, the French Defense and Security Cooperation Directorate (DCSD) provides security training in West and Central Africa through 14 training centers located throughout the region.

**United Nations:** The United Nations sponsors a wide array of programs in the West Africa to include the deployment of peacekeeping troops.

In 2009, the UN launched its West Africa Coast Initiative—a partnership between ECOWAS and a number of key UN agencies, including the Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Office for West Africa (UNOWA), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), INTERPOL, and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). The program is aimed at "strengthening national capacities and cross-border cooperation to tackle the organized crime and drug trafficking undermining peace and development in the fragile sub-region."

The initiative supports the implementation of the “ECOWAS Regional Action Plan to Address the Growing Problem of Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organised Crimes, and Drug Abuse in West Africa.” An area of particular emphasis is on illicit trafficking in post-conflict countries, the initial phase focuses on Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d’Ivoire—and intends to cover law enforcement, intelligence gathering, border delineation and management and corruption.

A key element of the program is the establishment of Transnational Crime Units designed to create unity of effort among national agencies responsible for Political Framework, Judiciary and Prosecution, Forensics, Law Enforcement Capacity Building, Border Management (includes a Joint maritime Coordination Committee), and Money Laundering. TCUs have proven successful in the Pacific region, the Caribbean, Central and Southeast Asia.

The United Nations, which has appealed to member states for short-term technical and financial assistance for West Africa to help the region regain control of its air, sea, and land space, views long-term development assistance as the best safeguard against narcotics trafficking and the creation of drug-dependent economies. As part of the program, Interpol plans to provide its expertise in key areas such as global communications networks and criminal database services.

UNODC is particularly active in the area maintaining a regional office for West and Central Africa (ROSEN) in Dakar, Senegal and a country office in Nigeria. The office sponsors national programs in Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Burkina Faso, as well as a special regional program seeking to improve cooperation and development in four areas: organized crime, illicit trafficking and terrorism, justice and integrity, drug prevention and health, awareness and research. Its programs include asset donations, such as police watercraft, assistance with best practices, yearly meeting with liaison officers, and a circuit of law enforcement authorities to share information and analysis.

Another important maritime related effort is the UN’s Container Control Programme, developed by the UNODC and the World Customs Organization (WCO), designed to help states “create sustainable law enforcement structures in selected seaports to minimize the exploitation of maritime containers for illicit drug trafficking and other transnational organized criminal activities.”

In addition, the United Nations’ International Maritime Organization (IMO) provides programming to the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD)—an African Union-sponsored economic development program seeking to improve governance, democracy, human rights, and conflict resolution.

Since 2006, the partnership’s Integrated Technical Cooperation Programme (ITCP) has organized conferences, workshops, and training courses on various aspects of maritime safety and security (facilitation of maritime traffic, international safety management, marine pollution prevention) throughout the Gulf of Guinea region, as well as providing technical assistance on maritime and port security to Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Gambia, Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, and Liberia. Moreover, the program has sponsored
multiple fellowships so that nationals of Cape Verde, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Liberia can study abroad at international maritime legal institutions.

Interpol has partnered with the West African Police Chiefs Committee (WAPCCO) on the Africa Sub-Directorate, which aims to support regional and national crime-fighting activities in Africa by providing day-to-day operational and administrative services to national and local governments.

**World Bank:** The World Bank is working to address illegal fishing through the West Africa Regional Fisheries Program. The program, which donated $55 million to West African nations in 2010 and will increase the amount in fiscal year 2011, aims to strengthen the capacity of Cape Verde, Liberia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone to “govern and manage key fisheries, reduce illegal fishing, and increase local value added to fish products.” To accomplish these objectives, the World Bank is focusing on building the capacity of local governments and stakeholders to ensure that fish stocks are used in an environmentally, socially, and economically sustainable manner; developing ways to combat illegal fishing; enhancing the benefits of the fisheries to the region by increasing the value-added share captured in the region; and continuing to help countries implement the program and monitor the results.

**International Monetary Fund:** In 2002, the International Monetary Fund launched the Africa Capacity Building Initiative. The program promotes strengthening “the capacity of African countries to design and implement their own poverty-reducing strategies, as well as improving the coordination of capacity-building technical assistance.” Under the program three African Regional Technical Assistance Centers (AFRITACs) have been established. The West AFRITAC center is located in Bamako, Mali, and serves Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. The centers host a team of up to five resident experts who work closely with the African Development Bank to monitor ongoing technical assistance programs in the beneficiary countries. While not focused on the maritime domain, its poverty reduction goals are important enablers of security at sea and on land.

**China:** Understanding the economic and political importance of this region, China is increasingly present and active in West and Central Africa, aggressively providing financial and infrastructure development assistance, including port and harbor facilities, in the hope that better relations from soft power will expand its influence and access to the area’s resources. China and other BRICSA nations can be an important force multiplier in the effort to improve security, stability, and development in the region. Indications are that China is alienating some of their African partners by insisting on the use of Chinese labor for the infrastructure projects they fund. Whether or not China and others are willing to push for reform, better governance, sustainable development, and greater levels of security remains to be seen—though a strong argument can be made that its long-term interests, like ours, are aligned with those objectives.

In totality U.S. and international programs are generally uncoordinated and supply driven. African countries receive what donor countries are willing to give in excess equipment (often degraded assets nations are eager to divest themselves of), training capacity, and other forms of assistance. Far better would be an integrated, demand-based approach in which requirements are identified, prioritized, and resourced by the international community and African nations in a coordinated fashion. With regard to U.S. initiatives, while there is diplomatic value in the approach of doing a little for many nations, achieving sustainable security will require focusing efforts in a targeted country holistically, proving the effectiveness and desirability of a implementing a comprehensive approach, and building on success to cover an ever-wider geographic area.

In applying the full breadth of security, governance, and rule of law assistance programs both the U.S. and the international community must continue to be mindful of the absorptive capacity of the nations we seek to help. A keen understanding of national and regional limits will help us tailor more effective and realistic plans and deliver better assistance. Assistance programs must be guided by other key considerations, including:

- A candid understanding of what levels of capacity are “good enough,”
- What capabilities and capacities are desirable and achievable in the short-, mid-, and long-term so we neither set expectations too low nor impede progress by allowing the perfect to be the enemy of the good, and
- A clear understanding of priorities
KEY STRATEGIC REQUIREMENT: Cooperation and Partnership

Illicit operators make their livelihoods exploiting gaps. Given this reality, the cross jurisdictional and trans-boundary nature of maritime threats, the regional and global implications of maritime insecurity, and the extent of African nations’ capacity requirements, it’s clear that cooperation and partnership must define the national, bilateral, regional, continental, and international approach to improved maritime security.

National. In most West Africa’s nations maritime issues fall under the jurisdiction of multiple agencies and authorities. Cooperation and partnership begins at the national level and is essential to achieve effective management of national maritime domain. As noted above, the UN is working to establish special coordination units harnessing a “whole of government” effort in several nations to fight transnational crime. This is an important effort and could serve as a model for interagency cooperation that could be duplicated throughout the region, not only in fighting transnational crime, but also in other areas of security involving the maritime domain. Partnership and cooperation must characterize the full scope of effort to achieve maritime security, and include consultation with the full range of stakeholders to ensure maximum buy-in, involvement, and support—an objective that should inform U.S. and international bilateral assistance efforts.

Bilateral. Bilateral cooperation will continue to be a critical component of U.S. strategy in the region. As a regional hegemon and significant source of oil Nigeria is strategically vital to the United States, as are fragile emerging democracies, post conflict states, and up and coming energy producers. Greater levels of partnership and cooperation will be required to keep West Africa on a sustainable path toward economic, political, and social stability, and to achieve U.S. vital interests in the area, including security and stability in the maritime domain.

With its sizeable population, vast gas and oil reserves, vibrant entrepreneurship, leadership role in Africa and regional organizations, plus a history of robust military intervention to secure peace in West Africa, Nigeria is the closest to what the area can call a regional power. The critical question is what kind of power Nigeria will become. The answer to this question is key to overall U.S. national security interests in the area. Nigeria can be an exporter of criminality and instability, a home to multiple insurgencies, ethnic and religious conflict, and a hotbed of Islamist radicalization. Or, with the robust support and partnership of the United States and international partners, it can deepen its democracy, combat official corruption to acceptable levels, deepen prosperity, and broaden the numbers with access to it. The latter course is crucial for U.S. interests in the long-term, meaning that Nigeria must rise as a higher priority in terms of senior policymakers’ attention.

As Secretary of State Clinton pointed out during a 2010 speech in Abuja, Nigeria, “…Nigeria is at a crossroads…The capacity for good governance exists in Africa and it exists right here in Nigeria. We have seen it in many places, and we have seen it here in Nigeria. I know that it doesn’t sometimes feel like it’s possible because the climb is so high, but I have great confidence in what Nigeria is capable of doing.” Providing sustained diplomatic focus and support will be critical to bringing these capabilities to fruition.

Regional and Continental. Progress in achieving greater levels of security and law enforcement at the national level can simply push criminal activity into adjoining jurisdictions making regional efforts and cooperation a must. Numerous regional meetings and conferences on regional maritime security cooperation have been hosted by the African Union, the Gulf of Guinea Commission, Economic Community of West African States, and Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa, along with their development partners (the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, France) and highly regarded think tanks (See Appendix IV for list of recent maritime security conferences). Some of these efforts have produced official resolutions comprehensively defining problems, identifying requirements, and pledging commitment to action. Progress, however, has been both piecemeal and slow. Regional cooperation and coordination continue to be hampered by political mistrust between countries, shortage of resources, and lack of political will to carry out the agreements that do exist or to enter into important accords where they are absent. For instance, no regional agreement exists on the right of hot pursuit across boundaries. As a result, states find it difficult to seize suspects. This is a significant problem given that many illicit actors operate near international boundary line so that in the unlikely event of being pursued they need only sail into an adjoining jurisdiction to find safe harbor.

Even so, there are some examples of successful regional partnerships. For instance, the states of Cape Verde, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, and Senegal have formed a Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC) through which they promote fisheries cooperation and share vessel-monitoring systems (VMS) to regulate commercial fishing activities. Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe have established a Joint Development Zone to jointly develop maritime resources. These are helpful but highly limited.

One important measure of cooperation would be for the chiefs of the regional maritime security services to consult regularly. According to speakers at a 2010 AFRICOM African Maritime Security conference many maritime security service chiefs have not even met one another much less partnered.

Another useful approach that should be considered is for West African nations to adopt an agreement akin to the Djibouti Code of Conduct under which numerous African nations in the north and east agreed to a set of cooperative efforts to stem piracy and the armed robbery at sea. Lessons learned from the DCC could be applied to a West African equivalent addressing a full range of maritime security threats including drug trafficking, oil theft, poaching, pollutions and others.

These are promising signs—but without greater capability, partnership, and cooperation, efforts to promote security will be incommensurate with the gravity of the threat and the consequences of failure. Regional cooperation is a must and achieving it will require overcoming longstanding distrust among the countries of the region. Helping bridge differences and build greater levels of trust in the region must a constant agenda item for U.S. diplomacy.

On the continental level, the African Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIM) being developed by the African Union is the keynote partnership effort. African officials hope that this long-term strategy, due to be finalized by the end of 2011, will identify priorities, gaps, required resources, and desired partnerships, as well harmonize continental maritime security efforts. This is a promising effort but a number of hurdles are lurking. Strategies at such a grand scale are notoriously general. Ensuring that the strategy is accompanied by a specific, phased, and enforceable implementation plan would be an important contribution. Moreover, regional organizations such as ECOWAS and ECCAS/CEEAC, which are undertaking their own maritime strategic plans, are politically independent and don’t report to the AU. This dynamic could create jurisdictional tensions that impede timely progress. A key challenge will be knitting together the various strategic planning processes at the national, regional, and continental levels to avoid duplication, inefficiency, and misaligned effort while still respecting sovereign and institutional authorities and prerogatives.

Strategic planning is essential, but success will not be determined so much by the development of plans, as the resolve to implement them and, most importantly, on the ability to achieve the strategy’s stated objectives.

International. Partnership and cooperation must also characterize efforts by the U.S. and allies to assist Africa in addressing insecurity and instability. Better donor coordination, for example, is one of the most important tasks the international community can undertake to more efficient and effective training and asset assistance.

The U.S. cannot and should not do it alone. Diplomacy, advocacy for political, economic, and governmental reform, and capacity building must be multi-lateral. It must include the participation of important security institutions including NATO, the EU, and the UN to share the responsibility and costs. Such initiatives must be guided by a candid understanding of which nations and institutions have the best standing in which West African countries and to harness these attitudes to enhance community buy-in. International partnership will be particularly important in winning African support for the greater transparency and higher levels of international oversight necessary to help achieve the shared security and development objectives crucial to the U.S., the international community and the people of West Africa.
The importance of U.S. national security interests in West Africa, and the troubling trends and serious consequences of regional maritime insecurity endangering these interests suggests a number of initiatives that can and should be taken to achieve a clear set of strategic objectives.

While some recommendations can be implemented immediately, others will require longer-term investment of resources (financial, human, and organizational). In many cases, the initiatives demand energetic diplomatic coordination with African partners and the international community.

In general, the U.S. government would be well served by defining more broadly its vital interests in West Africa and addressing in a more comprehensive and coordinated fashion the conditions necessary to protect them. As set forth in the body of this report, many factors contribute to West Africa’s instability, including a lack of political will and governmental capacity to address them. To recap, the main factors are:

**INSECURITY** from the presence and activity of terrorists, criminals, insurgents, and, in some cases, corrupt officials

**ECONOMIC NEED** from endemic poverty, food insecurity, environmental degradation, and unemployment

**POLITICAL AND SOCIAL UNREST** from governmental corruption, unaccountability, and incompetence

In most cases, the threats are not immediate, but the trends are alarming. Conditions and circumstances that the U.S. government and its allies fail to address now could be far more intractable and perhaps insurmountable in years to come. It is therefore vital to U.S. interests that we foster security, and stability in West Africa through a proactive ethic of prevention rather than awaiting a crisis that will demand action certain to be costlier, more time-consuming, and less likely to succeed.

Security is not something that the United States can impose on West Africa. It must be advanced and achieved in partnership with the West African people and their governments. This is achievable because at their core our mutual long-term goals and interests are well aligned. Efforts that place the United States government in front of West African partner governments without their support and partnership will prove futile.

In general, the United States and international partners must highlight to West Africa the many benefits of greater maritime security and foster the appropriate incentives for them to establish the will, capability, and self-sufficiency to achieve it; while working to weaken the many tenacious disincentives for reform, transparency, and accountability.

**Key incentives for improved maritime security:**

- Increased revenue to national treasuries from resource fees and the reduction of illegal fishing
- Increased national revenue from legitimate oil sales and increased oil production capacity
- Increased revenue from customs collections
- Lower port insurance
- Greater levels of public satisfaction; reduced levels of militancy and insurgency; increased domestic legitimacy and popularity of ruling governments

- Greater legitimacy of West African governments in the international arena
- Increased trade opportunities and access to capital and tourism that would accompany more transparent governance, broader economic development, and safer waters and ports
- Increased access to foreign markets
- Increased security assistance and cooperation
- Increased development assistance for infrastructure, including in modernizing ports, dredging harbors, and helping to clean waters
- Increased foreign investment

Obstacles to reform and progress:
- Pernicious poverty and corruption
- The connection of many political elites to criminal enterprise, including oil bunkering and the drug trade
- Fear of change by those vested in the status quo
- The belief of perpetrators that oil theft is justified because Nigeria’s oil belongs to Nigerians in general, not to the foreign oil companies who purchase it or the ruling elites who receive the revenue
- “Dirty” oil may touch more lives than “clean” oil
- Crime pays particularly when legitimate economic opportunity is hard to come by
- Resentment of U.S. and international energy interests viewed as responsible for the exploitation of African nations’ natural resources and degradation of the region’s environment
- U.S. reticence to spotlight problems and advocate reform because of the country’s reliance on oil from the area
- The reluctance of China to participate in the push for West African economic, governance and security sector reform, preferring to exercise significant levels of soft power to garner favor in accessing the areas natural resources

Requirements for overcoming these obstacles:
- Realistic expectations and patience without complacency by the United States and its partners
- Respect and constancy in our advocacy for reform
- Improved diplomatic and economic means of promoting African will and capability
- Strategic communications to African publics and elites on U.S. desires and objectives, the benefits to Africans of reform, and the dangers to Africa of the status quo
- A coalition of the international community, including China, to fight official corruption, promote reform, foster security, and advance development

With these important caveats and parameters in mind, the Michael S. Ansari Center and On the Horizon Project offer the following recommendations.

FEATURED RECOMMENDATIONS

Among the full scope of recommendations offered below, we highlight four overarching flagship ideas with the strategic objective of helping West African nations, and their sub-regional and regional organizations to achieve self-sufficiency in providing for the safety and security of their ports, harbors, territorial waters, and exclusive economic zones. These highlighted suggestions must work in concert with the other supporting recommendations to succeed, but are the major vehicles through which the U.S. can best achieve shared strategic objectives with respect to security in the maritime domain.

INTERAGENCY PLANNING AND EXECUTION

As highlighted throughout the report, security reform and transformation must be African conceived and led; however, the scope and quality of U.S. and international assistance will be a crucial enabler that could mean the difference between long-term success and failure. Given the stakes, it is imperative that the U.S. interagency be postured and resourced to render efficient and effective assistance to West African nations and regional associations toward the achievement of clear, realistic, and desirable security and development goals. For that reason we recommend the creation of an interagency policy, strategy, and implementation team (IPSIT) led by the Department of State and convened under the auspices of the National Security...
Council to coordinate interagency strategic planning and implementation on the West African security account, develop strategy, ensure that the effort is sufficiently resourced, and to track and drive progress over time. As part of its charter, the team should be responsible for conducting a holistic, interagency strategic review of West African security, and its maritime dimensions, and produce a strategic plan to advance U.S. security goals and interests in the region.

**PROOF OF CONCEPT INITIATIVE**

Also among our chief recommendations is for the U.S. to establish a pilot (or proof of concept) project with one or two qualified West African nations to implement a comprehensive maritime security assistance program. Under the project the various lines of U.S. maritime and rule of law assistance would be synergized and focused holistically to clear, hold, and build the maritime domain as a regional proof of concept that can be sustained and expanded as tangible benefits are realized and buy-in achieved.

Our assessment is that the various lines of current U.S. effort, including equipment donation, are guided primarily by the legitimate desire to build political goodwill with the various national governments, rather than by well-defined security objectives. An across-the-board effort should continue as appropriate. Above and beyond current initiatives, however, the United States and its allies should design a vigorous, holistic, goal-based program for a qualified country or countries where United States has significant interests and where the host nation or nations demonstrate the will and commitment to partner in accordance with a detailed agreement that sets forth objectives, initiatives, roles and mission, benchmarks, metrics, and resources.

It should incorporate national and local incentives to promote buy-in and ensure sustainability, demonstrating increased revenue from licensing together with other benefits transparent to the public as well as the governing regime. The pilot should not merely entail initiatives to improve domain awareness, patrolling and maritime law enforcement; it should encompass programs to address enablers of maritime crime including money laundering and corruption. Optimally the demonstration could encompass neighboring maritime nations to demonstrate the modes and benefits of maritime security cooperation.

Some will criticize this initiative on the basis that success in one area can mean failure for another. As one particular nation succeeds it enforcing the rule of law in its waters and beyond, trafficking and other illicit activity could migrate to neighboring countries. First, we do not recommend pursuing a one or two nation pilot as a replacement for a regional approach. On the contrary we highlight the necessity of a regional component below. However, it must be recognized that different nations in the region have different levels of interests, incentive, urgency, and capability. Awaiting a predominantly regional response is a recipe for overall delay and inaction, while the problems regionwide grow worse. Second, the expectation that enforcing the rule of law in one area will push illicit actors elsewhere is an uncompelling argument for inaction at the national level. Third demonstrating the national benefits of maritime security is a must if regional approaches are to receive the support and buy-in they will require for long-term success.

Because enhanced maritime security can increase national revenue from fishing, energy development, and other pursuits, the pilot can demonstrate that maritime security is a direct and indirect revenue-producing enterprise squarely in the interest of West Africa. The pilot should engage major private sector players to help resource the effort by means of a well-monitored and transparent escrow account to ensure that revenues are used for the agreed purposes.

**REGIONAL ORGANIZATION**

Concurrent with the nation-specific pilot project, we recommend that the U.S. work energetically with the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) and its member states to implement its “regional maritime security network program.” U.S. and international security assistance efforts, including planning support, asset donation, and training, should be leveraged to bring the network to fruition as swiftly as possible. The network should provide for the acquisition and sharing of critical assets that are too expensive for each nation to possess independently (including vessels, maintenance facilities, and electronic systems); the assignment of national contributions, roles, and missions in support the regional maritime security; the necessary arrangements to achieve efficiencies and economies of scale among participating nations; and, of course, regional command and control mechanisms to ensure cooperation and produce significant security and development benefits for the people and countries of the region. Considerations should be given to establishing such a network, or at least some component, under the auspices of the AU/ECOWAS Standby Force.
**Nigerian Partnership**

**Critical States:** The U.S. must utilize the U.S. – Nigeria Bilateral commission to promote partnership and cooperation with Nigeria, and other tools to engage with post-conflict nations and new democracies in the region to help ensure that they serve as anchors for regional stability and the continued political and economic development of the area. The commission should meet regularly and establish a full array of active and expert working groups in the key areas of governance, economic development, security, and rule of law, including a maritime security working group.

These centerpiece initiatives should be undertaken in concert with the full array of recommendations to follow.

**Full Recommendations**

Organizing, planning, and executing plans and initiatives to improve West African maritime security will require a deeper understanding of the threats, trends, and dynamics at play and how they are evolving.

**Conduct a National Intelligence Estimate for West Africa**

- Obtain a clearer picture of the presence and activities of terrorist networks
- Obtain a clearer picture of terrorist financing and operations in the area
- Obtain a clearer picture of terrorist links with illicit traffickers and other criminal networks both in Africa and other regions, including with drug cartels in South America

**Improve human intelligence assets in the region**

- Draw lessons from Europeans who have strong intelligence-gathering networks in the region
- Increase coordination with allies in developing and analyzing intelligence on the region
- Coordinate U.S. government intelligence assets among the elements of the U.S. intelligence community and agencies such as the DEA that are present, active, and effective in the region

**Tap outside resources for broader perspectives and increased understanding of the region**

- African experts
- Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working in the region
- Private companies working in the region

**Establish an incident-reporting and tracking database for the West African maritime domain**

- Coordinate the database with African partner nations
- Log known acts of piracy, trafficking, violence, sabotage, and other illicit activities
- Consider linking the system into official emergency response systems
- Consider linking the system with MSSIS

**Secure a report by a respected international entity (such as the International Crisis Group) analyzing the cost of West African maritime insecurity to West African governments and their populations and enumerating the full range of impacts**

- Lost revenue from corruption, illegal fishing, oil theft
- Cost of lost trade, tourism, and direct foreign investment
- Enhanced corruption, drain of hard currency reserves, inhibited economic growth, reduced tax and fee revenues, degraded natural resources, higher levels of poverty, greater public dissatisfaction, and increased support for insurgencies

**Create an assessment tool in the form of matrix to track and evaluate the capabilities and requirements of West African nations**

- Compliance with international maritime and security treaties
- Progress in meeting commitment under regional and sub regional resolutions
- Capabilities and needs, including strategic planning, equipment for electronic surveillance (radar, communication, intelligence), physical surveillance and response (patrol, interdiction capability), and enforcement (statutes, investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and corrections)
To achieve our national goals, the U.S. interagency must be better organized to work with West African nations to secure their maritime domain. The U.S. government must plan more comprehensively and effectively to achieve priority objectives.

Create an Interagency Policy, Strategy, and Implementation Team (IPSIT)
- Engage all relevant U.S. government agencies in a “whole of government” planning team
- Place the Department of State or National Security Council in the lead to drive and track progress
- Include the participation of AFRICOM, EUCOM, and SOUTHCOM
- Ensure that the IPSIT is properly resourced
- Ensure that the IPSIT is supported by national leadership

Conduct a holistic, interagency strategic review (under the auspices of the IPSIT or other appropriate body)
- Conduct the review in the context of security priorities specified in this report
- Consult Congress in undertaking the review and developing the plan described below

Produce a comprehensive strategic plan to promote West African security, especially maritime security
- Set clear priorities aligned with U.S. interests, the immediacy of threats, probability of risks, and severity of consequences
- Establish short-, medium-, and long-term goals,
- Establish benchmarks and measures of success

NOTE: Although AFRICOM includes interagency participation, we believe that shaping strategic policy and gaining the support of decision makers and resource providers will require an entity established under the direct auspices of national leadership. A July 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit of AFRICOM reports that AFRICOM has had difficulty “obtaining interagency officials to work at the command at the numbers desired.” The report cites that as of June 2010 the current interagency personnel at AFRICOM headquarters is 27 people—2% of the total staff.

AFRICOM does not set U.S. policy but is a tool. The command and its interagency components should, of course, play a key role in planning and implementation, but the primary entity responsible for designing, resourcing, and overseeing the strategy should be closer to the full range of disciplines and decision makers relevant to a bona fide interagency approach. A properly resourced and supported IPSIT would bring greater levels of coherence, coordination, and energy to the maritime security effort. Such a body would help ensure proper resourcing of the effort and, given the range of U.S. government programs and initiatives in the region, such a mechanism would help reduce bureaucratic infighting and turf wars over policy and resources.

Consider appointing an ambassador-at-large or other diplomatic focal point for West Africa (similar to the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan and Special Envoy to the Great Lakes region)
- To help coordinate country teams and advocate U.S. policy positions and interests across the policy spectrum, including security in general and maritime security in particular

Consider appointing a Coast Guard Maritime Security Development Liaison at large for the West African region
- To work with U.S. defense attaches, AFRICOM, and host countries to coordinate regional requirements, assess capabilities, and track progress

Improve Security Assistance Coordination and Delivery
A multitude of agencies implement programs or possess equities in the West African maritime domain. Increasing the transparency, coordination, and integration of these various programs will be essential to ensure that they work together to achieve national strategic objectives.

Establish a pilot (or proof of concept) project with one or two qualified West African nations to implement a comprehensive maritime security program as a regional proof of concept
- The program should include a robust and holistic security assistance package, including the transfer of assets such as maritime domain awareness technology, watercraft and related equipment, and possibly aerial reconnaissance; training and technical assistance in the full scope of rule of law; governance initiatives;
economic development; and other elements necessary to bring greater levels of security to the domain on a self-sufficient and sustainable basis.

The project should be guided by a return on investment methodology that takes into account security threat and consequences, the receptivity of the country to assistance, its ability to absorb the assistance, and its willingness and capability to politically and financially sustain the effort for the long term.

In coordination with the nation-specific pilot (or proof of concept) project recommended above, work with MOWCA and its member states to develop its “regional maritime security network program, including plans for the sharing of critical assets; the assigning of national contributions, roles and missions; centers of excellence, and other means of achieving economies of scale among the region’s coastal nations

- Shared assets could include a regional training facility, a regional maintenance facility, among others

- The United States should seek partnership for such a program with a functional regional body properly staffed and authorized to plan and execute the regional network, and with the UN which possesses significant legitimacy throughout the region

- U.S. and international donors should coordinate to provide material support for the regional network

NOTE: The concept of a regional coast guard network is not a new idea. Essentially it is a four-year-old IMO/MOWCA commitment that has seen very little progress to date. It is highlighted here because the creation of such a network should be a high diplomatic and security assistance priority. Lack of progress in regional approaches gives further credence to the need for a bilateral proof of concept pilot recommended above.

Establish a maritime security reconstruction team for deployment to partner countries in the region

- Holistic interagency components of the team could include Navy, USCG, civilian police, rule of law advisors, and subject matter experts who work in unstable states to support reconstruction efforts

Coordinate the various U.S. donation, training, and security assistance programs in accordance with the strategic plan recommended above

- As feasible, coordinate these efforts with allies to meet shared strategic objectives

Coordinate international donation, training, and assistance programs tailored to risk-base prioritization of requirements

- Work to organize and lead an effective set of willing and able donor nations in a well-coordinated maritime security assistance effort, including a binational m. Create a U.S. government clearinghouse to aggregate and display data on programs, personnel, and funding provided for West African security, including the maritime domain

- The database should include development assistance, security assistance, rule of law training and technical assistance programs, FMF, FMS, EDA, IMET, sections 1206 and 1207 funding, etc.

Assist the region’s countries in developing and executing national maritime security strategies and implementation plans

- Ensure that U.S. plans can complement and support the maritime security plans of nations we assist

Expand education and training opportunities for West Africans at U.S. academic and security cooperation training institutions

- U.S. Coast Guard Academy International Cadet Program
- The International Military Education and Training (IMET)

Consider the potential for establishing single points of contacts within the U.S. government and recipient nations for maritime security sector assistance, including asset donation, training, and technical assistance

ENHANCE OPERATIONAL INITIATIVES TO BOOST WEST AFRICAN MARITIME SECURITY

As described in the main body of this report, the United States and various allies are engaged in a wide range of initiatives to improve the operational capacity of regional partners to provide for security in the West African maritime

domain. The following set of recommendations identifies key operational initiatives that should be considered, in the context of the three vital skills identified above: intelligence/domain awareness, emergency response, and rule of law.

Domain Awareness: Establish an information-sharing system among operators in the maritime domain and key regional and international authorities

- Create an “international maritime safety and security exchange,” to collect and analyze information on activity in the West African portions of the global maritime domain to provide situational awareness, identify anomalies, and close vulnerabilities
- Enlist the support of host countries, commercial operators, and vessels transiting the region.

NOTE: More comprehensive information sharing in the global maritime domain has been advocated by Admiral Henry Ulrich III, USN (Ret.) former Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe as described in an Atlantic Council paper he authored that can be viewed at the following link: http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/3/International-Maritime-Security-Atlantic-Council-Issue-Brief.pdf

Increase the availability and usefulness of technology to enhance maritime domain awareness

- Align equipment donation, training, and maintenance initiatives, often funded under disparate programs, to ensure that domain awareness technology—including identification beacons, radar, and communications—is used effectively to produce demonstrable improvement in maritime security, particularly emergency response
- Consider including more advanced technology—as part of the pilot (or proof of concept) project recommended above—to provide for enhanced coverage of fused AIS, radar, human reporting, and communications
- Consider eligibility requirements for U.S.-sponsored equipment donation (AIS, MSSIS) to ensure that recipients have an assured power source and Internet access, and provide operational oversight and reporting
- Consider requiring regular assessments of the extent to which U.S.-donated equipment is contributing to higher levels of maritime security

Establish a regional joint operations center under the auspices of ECOWAS, MOWCA, ECCAS/CEEAC or other appropriate regional organization

- Provide for maximum participation by African nations to promote regional cooperation and shared domain awareness
- Work with African nations to include the participation of appropriate continental and international bodies in the Joint Operations Center

Work with Africans to develop a program using cell phones to target illegal fishing

- Consider linking such a program to MSSIS and an Internet-based situational display to enhance transparency

Consider broader application of train-the-trainer initiatives under the African Partnership Station and other capacity-building programs

- Maximize the presence and participation of African trainers and other personnel on APS vessels

Better integrate the U.S. Coast Guard into Africa Partnership Station programs and other training, advisory, and operational programs

Assist countries in writing and strengthening their legal authorities to prosecute wrongdoing

- Maritime statutory authorities
- Criminal code and procedure

COMMUNICATE BETTER

Achieving national security goals in the West Africa maritime domain will require vigorous U.S. and allied diplomacy supported by effective strategic communications to inform and energize the African public and African governmental and nongovernmental institutions.

Be clear in messaging about the vital interests, priorities, and intentions of the U.S. government

Messaging should stress U.S. vital national interests in:
- Ensuring supply of energy and assets in the region
- Thwarting terrorist attacks on U.S. soil or citizens

- Preventing drugs and other illicit materials from entering the United States or from being used to generate income or materiel for terrorist or criminal elements
- Promoting long-term security and stability in the region

Develop and execute a strategic communications plan for the U.S. government on West African security, including the maritime domain
- The plan should be developed by IPSIT as a component of the recommended strategic plan
- The plan should emphasize the African interests at stake and the importance of African will and responsibility in achieving greater measures of maritime security
- The plan should incorporate the recommended international report on African consequences
- The plan must be integrated with diplomatic efforts in Africa and coordinated as much as possible with African partners
- Communications pursuant to the plan must be clear, consistent, comprehensive, and well coordinated throughout the interagency
- Communications must be directed not only at ruling elites but also at general populations, along with local, regional, continental, and international NGOs and institutions

Coordinate message and communications with allies and African partners
- The message should be coordinated among allied nations with key equities, including Europe and Latin America

ENERGIZE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS AND PRIVATE SECTOR ENGAGEMENT

Because African leadership and buy-in on the requirements for improving West African maritime security is crucial, U.S. efforts must better coordinate and energize diplomatic efforts to encourage and facilitate reform.

Work through the U.S. – Nigeria bilateral commission and other tools to promote partnership and cooperation with Nigeria, to help ensure that it serves as an anchor for stable, secure region the continues to develop politically and economically.

- The Commission should have a maritime security component
- Utilize the Nigeria-U.S. bi-national commission to reinforce Nigeria’s regional and continental responsibilities

Work with key African partners to push for implementation of security initiatives agreed to by nations that are party to continental, regional, and sub-regional organizations (MOWCA, ECOWAS, ECCAS/CEEAC, African Union, United Nations)
- Advocate for and assist with the development of a transparent, comprehensive, and candid implementation mechanism to include identification of specific impediments to progress where it lags

Engage more energetically with African leaders in generating national and regional political will and resources to implement the maritime security pledges of MOWCA and other regional organizations

Work with international partners to provide as much assistance as possible to African nations and their regional & continental organizations who request advice and assistance in developing maritime security strategic plans

Promote greater transparency regarding how oil revenue is used by African nations
- Employ energetic diplomacy to gain the West African nations’ participation in and compliance with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) where such industries operate
- Enlist the private sector in the effort to gain participation in and compliance with the EITI by African nations where extractive industries operate. Greater transparency would support anticorruption efforts, assure U.S. taxpayers that security assistance money is properly employed, and encourage foreign direct investment in the region.

Engage in energetic diplomacy with European partners to invigorate efforts to improve West African maritime security by such means as asset donation, training, and diplomacy
- Raise the profile of the impact of illegal drugs on European countries
Work through diplomatic channels to resolve border disputes that impede greater levels of regional cooperation in enforcing the rule of law, including in the maritime domain.

Work with the oil and high tech industries (e-waste concerns) to determine how it can best support maritime capacity building, such as through special funding and pilot projects, as well as by using energy infrastructure and vessels as sensor platforms or electronic domain awareness systems.

Work with oil companies to improve infrastructure, prevent environmental damage, and foster economic development in the countries from which the industry obtains oil.

- Highlight the role that political instability and extreme poverty play in insecurity including attacks on oil infrastructure.

Work through high-level diplomatic channels with China and other BRICSA nations to engage full strategic cooperation in advancing security, anticorruption efforts, effective governance, and development in West Africa.

- Highlight the mutual interest in stable world oil prices and the security and stability of West Africa.
- Consider the opportunity for China and other BRICSA nations to participate in AFRICOM’s APS program and other U.S. and allied efforts.

Work with existing institutions or develop new ones to develop and implement programs to train African journalists to scrutinize the oil industry.

Conduct outreach to young leaders in the region with training, seminars, visits, scholarships, and other programs to reinforce the elements and modalities of good governance and responsible public administration.

Engage advocacy groups (ENOUGH, ONE, International Crisis Group) as part of a messaging and communications plan.

- Send the broad message that maritime security in West Africa is vital to the long-term interests of African nations and their people.
- Stress the responsibility of African nations to demonstrate their will and establish the capability to provide security in the maritime domain.

Engage the U.S. and African advocacy communities in the policy development process, including the formulation and execution of the strategic plan recommended above.

Develop “government to government,” “people to people,” and “institution to institution” programs to promote communication and mutual understanding, as well as the sharing of information, best practices, and technical support.

RESOURCING

As stated at the outset of this report, improving the U.S. effort to promote greater levels of West African maritime security is ultimately a function of properly prioritizing and resourcing the effort. Clearly these are fiscally tight times and any initiative that demands more resources is a hard sell. The legitimacy of increasing the focus, money, and manpower to this end must be measured not just by the benefits of enhancing the effort but also by the adverse consequences of maintaining the status quo—and both, we argue, are substantial. Of course, such changes in policy must be directed at the highest levels of our government.

Several points should be taken into consideration in marshaling the necessary resources:

- Current resource levels can be used with greater efficiency and effectiveness in combination with the recommendations offered earlier in this report.
- Additional resources can be reprogrammed from lower priorities, including from within the national security function.
- Additional resources can be provided by allies and other stakeholders who possess significant equities in the region—especially Europe, in light of the area’s role in the trafficking of illegal drugs.

BEETR ENGAGE THE NGO, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND ADVOCACY COMMUNITY

NGOs and CSOs play a significant role in West Africa and can credibly and effectively advocate for change without the stigma of national agendas.
Potentially, additional resources can be provided by elements of the private sector, including the oil and tanker industry, that have vital interests in greater regional security. However, given the lack of transparency in how current oil revenues are used by host countries, any effort to financially partner with the private sector must ensure that resources are used effectively for their intended purpose.
Again, the Michael S. Ansari Africa Center and On the Horizon project would like to thank the numerous experts, officials, and authorities who provided their information, input, and expertise, which were critical to the development of this report and the formulation of its recommendations.

As noted in the opening, future products could include an implementation road map, which will provide more detailed recommendations to implement the strategic-level recommendations listed above and more target.

The Atlantic Council will seek to establish a webpage to receive comments and other inputs bearing on the issue of West African maritime security. All inputs are welcome and encouraged—whether critique, correction, opposition to material presented in the report, additional data, analysis, or ideas related to this topic so important to the United States and the people of Africa.
APPENDIX I

Source: National Geographic
APPENDIX I

Selected regional trafficking patterns in West Africa

APPENDIX I

COCAIN FROM SOUTH AMERICA TO EUROPE

## APPENDIX I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Label Number on Map</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Start Point</th>
<th>End Point</th>
<th>Diameter (Inches)</th>
<th>Length (km)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>F10</td>
<td>Belier</td>
<td>Abidjan</td>
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<td>16,24</td>
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<td>Gabon</td>
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<td>Cap Lopez</td>
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<td>Tchengue</td>
<td></td>
<td>16,20</td>
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<td>Tchengue</td>
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<td>Angola-DRC</td>
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<td>Moanda</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<td>F9</td>
<td>Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline</td>
<td>Doba Basin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghana-Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>F29</td>
<td>West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) Extension</td>
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<td>Abidjan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria-Ghana</td>
<td>F41</td>
<td>West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP)</td>
<td>Agos</td>
<td>Takoradi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1033</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

African Ports, by Size

APPENDIX II

ESSENTIAL FACT SHEET

Demographic

- Region has a population of over 250 million people
- Region is approximately 3,113,023 square miles
- Coastline of over 5,000 miles
- Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perception Index ranked seven West African nations in the bottom 20 of 180 nations surveyed
- Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index list seven West African nations as “critical” (most in danger of state failure) and 6 as “in danger”
- 2009 Index of African Governance, ranks the quality of governance in all 53 African nations, among the 10 worst performing governments were: Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Angola, Guinea; just above Guinea is Nigeria, Liberia, Equatorial Guinea, and the Republic of Congo
- Of the 33 independent maritime nations in sub-Saharan Africa, only five-Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Mauritius, Liberia, and the Republic of Seychelles-have maritime forces that identify themselves as coast guards rather than navies

Nigeria

- Accounts for ½ the population of West Africa and 1/6 of the continent’s inhabitants
- Home to over 350 different ethnic groups
- Home to an estimated 25,000 Americans
- 40% of the population is under the age of 14
- UN 2009 Human Development Report states more than 80% of Nigeria’s population lives on less than two dollars a day
- The percentage of Nigerians living in poverty doubled between 1988 and 1996
- The World Bank estimates that as a result of corruption, 80% of Nigeria’s energy revenues benefit only 1% of the population
- Accounts for 60% regional GDP
- World’s twelfth-largest oil-producer and eighth-largest oil exporter
- Third largest OPEC supplier of crude oil to the U.S.

- Oil revenue comprises 95% of the country’s foreign exchange earnings and 80% budgetary revenues
- Offshore oil production accounts for 16% of Nigeria’s oil production, it is expected to account for 90% of future growth
  - That is 1.25 million barrels per day of new offshore production planned in the next 6 years
- It is estimated that 10 % of Nigeria’s oil production of nearly 2.5 million barrels a day is stolen
- Niger Delta has 606 oilfields and is considered the world capital of oil pollution
- Oil theft, “illegal bunkering,” has resulted in a loss of approximately $100 billion to the Nigerian economy between 2003 and 2008
- It is estimated that since the 1960s up to $400 billion has been lost through corruption and $100 billion moved out of the country
- Nigeria imports roughly 85% of its fuel needs because of the disrepair and mismanagement of its four state-owned refineries
- U.S. is largest foreign investor in Nigeria and receives approximately ½ Nigeria’s oil exports
- In 2008 U.S. imports from Nigeria were $38 billion
- U.S. aid to Nigeria is more than $400 million annually

Oil/Energy Development

- 18% of oil and 14% of natural gas (LNG) the U.S. imports annually comes from West Africa
- The percentage is expected to rise to 25% by 2015
- West African oil is low in sulfur content. Consequently, it provides high gasoline yield, which is the preference of American refineries that are under strict environmental laws.
APPENDIX II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Proven Oil Reserves (bl)</th>
<th>Proven Natural Gas Reserves (cf)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>36.22 billion</td>
<td>184.16 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>200 million</td>
<td>4.77 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>1.6 billion</td>
<td>3.2 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>1.1 billion</td>
<td>1.3 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>2 billion</td>
<td>1 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>15 million</td>
<td>800 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>9.04 billion</td>
<td>9.53 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1.5 billion</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>100 million</td>
<td>1 trillion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Drugs

- In 2007, an estimated 60% of the cocaine in the European market (estimated market value $6.8 billion) had passed through West Africa
- AFRICOM estimates that 80% of the cocaine destined for Europe transits West Africa
- The UNODC estimates an annual volume of 25 tons (equivalent to 50,000 lbs.) of cocaine are trafficked from Latin America (mainly Columbia, Peru, and Bolivia) to Europe, via West Africa (mainly Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, and Nigeria)

Arms

- The estimate of ammunition entering West Africa is close to $160 million and approximately $7 million worth of weapons

Human Trafficking

- UNODC estimates 3,800 to 5,700 women trafficked from West Africa to Europe annually
- UN estimates 200,000 children trafficked annually through West and Central Africa
- West African trafficking victims comprise 10% of the forced sexual labor pool in Western Europe
- Illegal Immigration of Workers

- Approximately 20,000 West Africans entered Europe illegally in 2008

Contraband

- Profits from cigarette smuggling, valued at $775 million dollars, surpass the Gambia’s entire GDP

Ports

- Goods loaded from West and Central African ports constitute close to 40% of all goods loaded for sea-born movement from Africa
- Waters off Nigeria are the second deadliest in the world, Somalia’s waters are first

Ships and Cargo

- Gulf of Guinea maritime traffic:
  - 40 ship departures/day and approximately 280/week
    - Tankers: 11/day
    - General Cargo Ships: 8/day
    - Container Ships: 7/day
- Annual container traffic of MOWCA ports is just over 2.5 million TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units)
- An estimated 85% of ships registered to Gulf of Guinea states are more than 20 years old, the global average is 15%
APPENDIX II

Illegal Fishing
- Loss of revenue to sub-Saharan Africa of approximately $1 billion annually
- West Africa fisheries sector accounts for more than 5.6 million jobs

Pollution
UNODC estimates 95,000 tons of e-waste arrive in West Africa annually

Piracy
- Waters off Gulf of Guinea are the second deadliest in the world after Somali waters
- Seaborne attacks on the Gulf of Guinea oil platforms since 2006 have progressively cut Nigerian oil exports from 2.2m barrels/day to 1.6m/day*

Criminal Acts at Sea
- December 2007 - Armed raiders in speedboats stormed two banks in Bata, grabbing cash and shooting passers-by.
- June 11, 2008 - Pirates ambushed and abducted a Cameroonian official and five soldiers.
- June 2008 - Attack of Shell’s $3.6 billion offshore Bonga platform, forced the plant capacity of 220,000 barrels per day to shut down.
- September 28, 2008 - Seaborne gunmen attacked Limbe, a coastal town near the port city of Douala, Cameroon, killing one person and robbing four banks.
- September 2008 - Gunmen attacked the Cameroonian port town of Limbe, shooting their way into banks, killing one person as they fought off the security forces and made off with large amounts of money.
- October 19, 2008 - Cameroonian security forces fought off an attack by pirates.
- October 31, 2008 - Gunmen saying they objected to the return of the Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon kidnapped 10 crew members of an oil supply vessel.
- January 4, 2009 - Gunmen hijacked a vessel belonging to French oil services group Bourbon off Nigeria’s Niger Delta as it traveled toward a Royal Dutch Shell offshore oilfield with four expatriates.
- January 24, 2009 - Approximately 30 pirates seized a Greek fishing vessel off Kribi, killing a Greek sailor.
- February 17, 2009 - Seaborne gunmen attacked oil-producing Equatorial Guinea’s island capital, shooting their way into the presidential palace before they were repelled by security forces, backed by helicopter gunships. The government blamed militants from Nigeria’s Niger Delta for the raid.
- March 14, 2009 - Gunmen attacked a supply vessel kidnapping four crew.
- October 10, 2009 - Cameroonian military forces repel attack on fishing vessel Rose Three, killing four gunmen and capturing three. Former rebel leader says Bakassi Freedom Fighters were responsible.
- November 24, 2009 - Pirates attacked a Monrovia-flagged tanker carrying Nigerian crude oil, killing an officer.
- March 13, 2010 - A Chinese fishing vessel with seven fishermen aboard hijacked off the Bakassi Peninsula. The Africa Marine Commando demand ransom and the sailors were released.
APPENDIX III

STAKEHOLDERS

United States

- National Security Council
- Department of State, Department of Defense, USAID
  - Completed a Security Sector Reform document in 2009 that details guidelines for coordinating, planning, and implementing security sector reform programs with foreign partner nations
- Department of State
  - MSSR (Maritime Security Sector Reform) Assessment Guide and Tool expected to be published in 2010
  - Developed in partnership with USAID, the matrix will evaluate and analyze a country’s maritime security sector in terms of the following 7 functions: governance, security, defense, safety, mobility, response/recovery, and economy
- Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)
  - Has programs in Ghana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria and Senegal working with law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges on various initiatives
  - U.S.-Nigeria Bi-national Commission established April 2010
  - Appropriates the funding for the IMET (International Military Education and Training Program) that is administered by the Department of Defense
- USAID
  - Senior Development Advisor position at AFRICOM
  - Has engaged in joint planning with World Bank regional fisheries program and AFRICOM
- Department of Defense
  - U.S. Navy
    - MSSIS, AIS systems
  - U.S. Naval Forces Europe
  - U.S. Naval Forces Africa
  - European Command (EUCOM)
    - Launched Gulf of Guinea Guard in 2005
  - Africa Command (AFRICOM)
    - Africa Partnership Station (APS)
  - U.S. and international partners, sponsors military and non-military cooperative activities designed to build skills, expertise, professionalism of African militaries, coast guards via training, exercises, cruises, port calls
  - Executes the IMET program that is funded by the Department of State
  - Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF)
  - Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS)
  - Excess Defense Articles (EDA)
- Millennium Challenge Corporation
- Department of Justice
  - Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
    - Offices in Nigeria and Ghana, working to enhance intelligence collection and address drug trafficking in the region
  - Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
    - Working to combat money-laundering and terrorist financing in Nigeria
- ICITAP (International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program)
  - Has had ongoing programs in Benin and Nigeria since 2002
  - Working with the State Department on a program to combat trafficking in persons in Nigeria
- OPDAT (Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training)
  - Has criminal justice assistance programs in Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria
- Department of Treasury
  - Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes
- U.S. Department of Commerce
  - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
APPENDIX III

- Has conducted observer training programs in West Africa addressing the issue of IUU fishing with the support of the AFRICOM

**Department of Homeland Security**
- African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP)
  - Designed to help host nations develop capability to conduct operations like boardings, search and seizure, and arrests
- U.S. Coast Guard
  - Port Security Assessments for ISPS compliance
- MARSEC, Maritime Security System
- U.S. Coast Guard Academy International Cadet Program
  - Working with NOAA on IUU fishing

**United Nations**
- West Africa Coast Initiative
  - Intends to cover law enforcement, intelligence gathering, border management, and corruption
  - Key element is establishment of Transnational Crime Units (TCUs) in individual countries to address: political framework, judiciary and prosecution, forensics, law enforcement capacity building, border management, money laundering
- Regional Programme for West Africa 2010-2014
  - Supports ECOWAS’s Political Declaration on the Prevention of Drug Abuse, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in West Africa
- International Maritime Organization (IMO)
  - Supporting NEPAD with its Integrated Technical Cooperation Programme (ITCP)
- UNODC-WCO (World Container Organization) Container Control Programme
- United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA)

**Countries**
- France
  - Defense and Security Cooperation Directorate (DCSD)
- United Kingdom
  - Department for International Development (DFID)
- China
  - 2008 bilateral trade totaled US$107 billion, +45% from 2007

**International Organizations**
- African Union
  - New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)
  - AIM (Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy)
- ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States)
  - West African Power Pool (WAPP)
  - Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA)
- ECCAS/CEEAC (Economic Community of Central African States/ Communauté Économique des États d’Afrique Centrale)
- MOWCA (Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa)
  - Sub-regional Integrated Coast Guard Network
  - Supported by the IMO

**Department of Energy**
**Intelligence Community**

**International Organizations**
- African Union
  - New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)
  - AIM (Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy)
- ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States)
  - West African Power Pool (WAPP)
  - Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA)
- ECCAS/CEEAC (Economic Community of Central African States/ Communauté Économique des États d’Afrique Centrale)
- MOWCA (Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa)
APPENDIX III

DIRECTORY OF THE WEST AFRICA OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY

Benin Republic

- BENIN SCAPHANDRIERS S.A.R.L.
- BUREAU VERITAS BENIN
- COTECNA BENIN S.A.R.L.
- NEXANT
- ORYX BENIN S.A.
- RMT BENIN
- SBEE (SOCIETE BENINOISE D'ENERGIE ELECTRIQUE)
- SHELL BENIN
- SOBEGI (AIR LIQUIDE)
- SONACOP (SOCIETE NATIONALE DE COMMERCIALISATION DES PRODUITS PETROLIERS)
- TEXACO BENIN
- TOTAL BENIN

Republic of Congo

- ABB
- AIR LIQUIDE SCGI
- AMOSCO CONGO
- BAKER HUGHES CONGO
- BJ SERVICES COMPANY FRANCE S.A.R.L. CONGO
- BUREAU VERITAS CONGO
- COTECNA INSPECTION CONGO S.A.R.L.
- ENI CONGO HOLDING BV
- FUGRO TOPNAV S.A.S.
- HALLIBURTON AFRIQUE S.N.C.
- INTELS CONGO S.A.
- IPEDEXX CONGO
- MIOL CONGO – WEST AFRICA DISTRICT
- PERENCO CONGO
- SAIPEM CONGO
- SEABULK OFFSHORE - CONGO
- SMITH BITS
- SOCIETE NATIONALE DES PETROLES CONGOLAIS S.A.
- SOUTHEY CONGO
- TIDEWATER CONGO
- TOTAL E & P CONGO
- VETCO GRAY CONGO

Côte d'Ivoire

- ABB TECHNOLOGY S.A., ABIDJAN
- ADDAX PETROLEUM (CÔTE D’IVOIRE) LTD.
- BJ SERVICES COMPANY AFRICA LTD.
- BJ TUBULAR SERVICES
- BUREAU VERITAS
- COTECNA CÔTE D’IVOIRE S.A.R.L.
- HALLIBURTON – IVORY COAST
APPENDIX III

INTEROIL LOGISTIC SERVICES (I.L.S.)
M-I OVERSEAS LTD. IVORY COAST
MITSUBISHI CORPORATION BUREAU DE LIAISON D’ABIDJAN
PETROCI (SOCIETE NATIONALE D’OPERATIONS PETROLIERES DE LA COTE D’IVOIRE)
SAHARA ENERGY RESOURCES – IVORY COAST
SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC
SHELL COTE D’IVOIRE
SOCIETE IVOIRIENNE D’OXYGENE ET D’ACETYLENE
TIDEWATER IVORY COAST
WEATHERFORD IVORY COAST

Equatorial Guinea

AMPCO – ATLANTIC METHANOL PRODUCTION COMPANY
BAKER HUGHES
BAKER OIL TOOLS EQUATORIAL GUINEA
BJ SERVICES COMPANY AFRICA LTD. GE
BUREAU VERITAS EQUATORIAL GUINEA
CMS ENERGY
CMS NOMECO
COOPER CAMERON EQUATORIAL GUINEA
ENERGY OVERSEAS INT.
EXXONMOBIL EQUATORIAL GUINEA
FMC SUBSEA SCES
GLOBAL SANTA FE EQUATORIAL GUINEA
HALLIBURTON – EQUATORIAL GUINEA
M-I EQUATORIAL GUINEA S.A.
OCEANEERING WORLDWIDE
RACAL SURVEY EQUATORIAL GUINEA LTD.
SEAWELD ENGINEERING
SMITH BITS EQUATORIAL GUINEA
TIDEWATER EQUATORIAL GUINEA
TRITON
UNITED MERIDIAN CORPORATION
WEATHERFORD EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Gabon

AMERADA HESS
AMOSCO GABON LTD.
ANADARKO GABON COMPANY
BAKER HUGHES GABON
BAKER OIL TOOLS GABON
BOSKALIS INTERNATIONAL – GABON
BUREAU VERITAS GABON
CAMERON GABON
CAO (CONTROLE ET AUTOMATISME DE L’OUEST)
CHANTIER NAVAL DES BAUX
CKS ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPAGNIE GENERALE DE GEOPHYSIQUE
CUDD PRESSURE CONTROL
DIETSMANN TECHNOLOGIES
ENERGY AFRICA GABON
ENI GABON S.A.
ENSIGN INTERNATIONAL ENERGY SERVICE
EQUIPEMENT & CONTRÔLES
FORAID GABON
FUGRO TOPNAV S.A.S. GABON
GEOINDUSTRIES
GEOSERVICES GABON
GLOBAL SANTA FE GABON
GSMP
GULF OF GUINEA PETROLEUM CORPORATION INC. (GGPC)
HALLIBURTON – GABON REPUBLIC
HELI-UNION
HYDROCARBONS, REFINERY, DISTRIBUTION, PARTICIPATIONS AND MARKETING
INTEGRATED PETROLEUM SERVICES
INTELS GABON S.A.R.L.
IPEDEX GABON
ISCO
JAVA BOAT CORPORATION
KCA DEUTAG
MARATHON OIL GABON
MAUREL ET PROM
M-I GABON S.A.
MID WESTERN
MINISTRY OF OIL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION
APPENDIX III

OIL & GAS ENGINEERING
ORTEC SERVICES INDUSTRIES
PANAFRICAN INC.
PETROGAS WORLDWIDE SERVICES
PIONEER RESOURCES GABON
PIZO SHELL
PIZOLUB (SOCIETE PIZO DE FORMULATION
DE LUBRIFIANTS)
ROCKOVER OIL & GAS
ROMFORT INTERNATIONAL
SASOL PETROLEUM WEST AFRICA
SEACOR WORLDWIDE INC
SHIPPING LOGISTIC INC. (S/C PERENCO)
SINO GABON OIL & GAS LTD.
SINOPEC INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
SERVICES CORPORATION
SMIT TERMINALS
SMITH BITS GABON
SMX
STAR INTERNATIONAL DRILLING
STOLT OFFSHORE GABON
SURF
SWIRE PACIFIC OFFSHORE
TESIGA
TINWORTH LTD.
TRANSOCEAN OFFSHORE
TRANSWORLD EXPLORATION GABON LTD.
TULLOW OIL ENERGY AFRICA
VAALCO GABON ETAME
WEATHERFORD GABON

Ghana
ABB GHANA
BOSKALIS INTERNATIONAL – GHANA
BUREAU VERITAS GHANA
EXXONMOBIL GHANA LTD.
FUGRO AIRBORNE SURVEYS LTD.
GATEWAY SERVICES LTD.
MIDWAY RESOURCES
SAHARA ENERGY RESOURCES – GHANA
SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC GHANA
SHELL GHANA LTD.
TOTAL GHANA LTD. (DISTRIBUTION)
VANCO GHANA LTD.

Namibia
ASEA BROWN BOVERI LTD.
BP NAMIBIA LTD.
FUGRO SURVEY NAMIBIA LTD.
IGL LTD.
SOUTHEY NAMIBIA

Togo
BUREAU VERITAS TOGO
COTECNA INSPECTION S.A.
TOTAL TOGO S.A.(DISTRIBUTION)
APPENDIX IV

CONFERENCES CONCERNING MARITIME SECURITY ISSUES IN WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA (2005-2010)7

- **October 2010** (Stuttgart, Germany): AFRICOM Maritime Safety and Security Towards Economic Prosperity. Co-sponsored by the U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense, hosted by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). The focus of the conference was on forging partnerships, identifying projects that support maritime security activities, and strengthening collaborative strategies. More than 170 participants attended, over 20 African nations and the AU were represented as well as U.S. government agencies, international and inter-governmental organizations.

- **June 2010** (Tema, Ghana): 1st West and Central Africa Ports Environment Managers Working Conference. This conference was part of the African Ports Environment Initiative, formed by the Ports Environmental Networks Africa (PENAF) in collaboration with the Port Management Association of West and Central Africa (PMAWCA) and the Port Management Association of East and Southern Africa (PMAESA). Theme: “Creating a Platform for Exchange of Experiences to Improve Environmental Performance in the Port Area and its Hinterland Logistics.”

- **May 2010** (Banjul, Gambia): 33rd Annual Council of the Port Management Association of West and Central Africa (PMAWCA). The PMAWCA is a sub-regional intergovernmental economic organization established in 1972 by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). It is made up of 21 member ports located along the west coast of Africa, from Mauritania to Angola, as well as nine associate members and two members with observer’s status. Panel discussion: “Challenges of the City-Port Relationship.”

- **April 2010** (Lagos, Nigeria): International Conference on Promoting Maritime Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution in the West and Central African sub-region. Organized by the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) in conjunction with the Maritime Arbitrators Association of Nigeria (MAAN). The conference promoted the inclusion of Arbitration and ADR training into the curriculum of universities and Faculty of Laws as a first option resolution for maritime disputes. It also established a Maritime Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Center in the West and Central African regions.


- **April 2010** (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania): Maritime Safety and Security Seminar. Hosted by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. The seminar’s main theme was “Capacity Building for Maritime Security in Africa: Comprehensive and Coherent Strategic Approaches. Participants from 24 countries attended the seminar including senior civilian and security sector officials.

- **March 2010** (Johannesburg, South Africa): Maritime Safety and Security Consultative Workshop: Southern, Central, and Eastern Africa. Hosted by the Brenthurst Foundation, discussion led by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. The focus of the workshop was on the role of maritime security on economic development. Attendees were high-level African officials and participants as well as U.S. government and European observers and international experts. Concrete recommendations for a proposed African maritime strategy were presented to the African Union (AU).

- **February 15-17, 2010** (Freetown, Sierra Leone): West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI) Ministerial Conference. Attended by Ministers from WACI countries, senior representatives of ECOWAS, UN representatives, Interpol delegates, and development partners. Resulted with the signing of the “WACI Freetown Commitment” by Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

- **February 2010** (Douala, Cameroon): 28th Annual Council meeting of Port Management Association of West and Central Africa (PMAWCA). Theme: “New Port Cooperation Within the Framework of New Security and Safety Regime.” Attended by numerous related international organizations and companies, some
APPENDIX IV

managers of ports in Europe, and port authorities of PMAWCA.

- **November 2009** (Dakar, Senegal): **Combating Narcotics Trafficking in West Africa.** Regional workshop held by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies in partnership with the U.S. Embassy in Dakar. Participants discussed threats to African national and regional security posed by drug smuggling, the challenges facing African and international efforts to address the problem, and the impact of drug smuggling on ongoing democratization, anti-corruption, development, and public health efforts in West Africa. Attended by 60 participants including representatives from key regional and international organizations like ECOWAS, the African Union, UN, Interpol.

- **October 2009** (Durban, South Africa): **Second Annual African Union Conference of Ministers Responsible for Maritime Transport.** The conference adopted the Africa Maritime Transport Charter, the revised Plan of Action, the Durban Declaration on Maritime Safety, and Security, and the MOWCA initiative on the integrated Coast Guard network for Africa. Attended by 34 African Union member states (19 of which are MOWCA nations).

- **September 2009** (Dakar, Senegal): **Maritime Safety and Security Consultative Workshop: North and West Africa.** Hosted by the Council on African Defense and Diplomatic Studies (CADSS) in conjunction with the Commission of the African Union. Other partners included: London-based Royal United Services Institute, the Dubai-based Gulf Research Center, The Center for Policy Research and Dialogue from Ethiopia, the Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, India’s Observer Research Foundation, and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. The goal of the workshop was to address maritime policies and programs at the national, regional, and international levels; and to explore key threats facing Africa’s maritime domain. Concrete recommendations for a proposed African maritime strategy were presented to the African Union (AU).

- **July 2009** (New York, NY): **Africa Partnership Station (APS) main planning conference for 2010.** Organized and led by U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa (NAVEUR-NAVAF). The conference’s goal was to design a program that helps African naval and coast guard activities strengthen their maritime safety and security capabilities. Participants included more than 170 officials from 14 African and four European countries.

- **March 2009** (Cape Town, South Africa): **Third Seapower for Africa Symposium.** Eight papers were presented at the conclusion of the symposium, six presenters from Africa, one from India, and one from Brazil. The papers addressed issues including the need to co-operate in the fight against maritime crime and piracy, the requirement to co-operate in maritime training and to operationalize collaborative, multi-national utilization and interoperability of naval assets.

- **October 28-29, 2008** (Praia, Cape Verde): **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Ministerial Conference.** Supported by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) and the European Union. The conference addressed the threat of drug trafficking to sub regional security, out of that came a Political Declaration and Regional Action Plan that provides the basis for a strong political commitment and detailed cooperation framework to address drug trafficking and organized crime in the region.

- **October 2008** (Oslo, Norway): **Oslo Maritime Security Seminar 2008.** Hosted by Den Norske Krigsforsikring for Skib (DNK) and the Norwegian Shipowners’ Association. Key topics included the risk development in the Gulf of Aden and Nigeria. Over 140 participants representing Norwegian and international shipowners, insurance managers, risk analysts, brokers, and military officials discussed the development of maritime threats to the shipping industry. They all agreed that maritime threats have their origin, and hence their possible resolution, on land rather than on water. Increased international collaboration and combined efforts on commercial as well as political level were emphasized as the only alternative to cope effectively with the major threats burdening the industry.


- **February 2007** (Abuja, Nigeria): **First African Union Conference of Ministers Responsible for Maritime Transport.** Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo urged fellow African leaders to develop the continent’s maritime sectors to promote economic development.
APPENDIX IV

technological advancement, and international trade. The theme of the conference was: “Capacity Building, Finance, Ship Acquisition, Flag Administration, and Port State Control.” Other areas addressed were maritime security, safety, coast guard, and pollution.


- **October 2006** (Dakar, Senegal): The 13th annual **Assembly of the International Maritime Organization/Maritime Organisation for West and Central African States.** The recommendations to come out of this meeting included: (a) the need to establish an integrated coastguard function network of the west and central coast of Africa, (b) the importance of harmonizing legislation, practices and procedures, which together provide the security necessary for the safe and secure operation of port facilities and ships at all security levels, (c) the value of instituting national mechanisms for intra and intergovernmental agencies and other relevant stakeholders cooperation and coordination, and (d) the importance of appropriate national maritime security policies to safeguard maritime trade from all forms of unlawful acts.

- **August 2006** (Libreville, Gabon): **Gulf of Guinea Commission Heads of State meeting.** Leaders of eight West and Central African countries met to formally launch the organization and reiterate their continued sub-regional commitment to conflict resolution, socio-economic prosperity, environmental protection and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

- **May 2006** (Abuja, Nigeria): **Second Africa Sea Power Symposium.** Heads of African navies met to discuss modalities to enhance professionalism, improve focus, and increase collaboration. They agreed on the need to: (a) enhance maritime domain awareness by adopting appropriate technology like automated identification systems, (b) set up a permanent structure at continental level to manage maritime related issues, (c) improve public awareness, and (d) take steps to adopt and implement international conventions.


- **August 2005** (Cape Town, South Africa): **Sea Power for Africa Symposium.** Concept initiated by Chiefs of Navies of Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa at the International Sea Power Symposium held in 2003 in Rhode Island, USA. The focus of this first symposium was on the establishment of a collective approach to collaboration and co-operation to address the maritime challenges that face Africa.

- **October 2003** (Newport, Rhode Island): **International Sea Power Symposium.** The theme was “Seapower for Peace, Prosperity and Security.” Fifty six Chief of Naval Operations counterparts attended the Symposium with an overall number of 203 delegates representing 69 nations in attendance.

- **August 2003** (Abuja, Nigeria): **International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code implementation meeting.** Participants were managing directors and chief executive officers of ports and maritime administration of West and Central African sub-region.
APPENDIX V

RESOLUTIONS

- 1998/10/30: The Abuja Memorandum on Port and State Control
  - Maritime authorities of: Angola, Guinea, Benin, Liberia, Cameroon, Mauritania, Cape Verde, Namibia, Congo, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Equatorial Guinea, Sierra Leone, Gabon, South Africa, Gambia, Togo, Ghana

- 1999/08/06: Abidjan Maritime Charter
  - Maritime Organisation of West and Central Africa (MOWCA)

  - Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

- 2005/08/25: Abuja Declaration for Sustainable Fisheries and Aquaculture in Africa
  - African Heads of State at NEPAD’s (New Partnership for African Development) “Fish For All” Summit

- 2006/05: Sea Power for Africa Symposium Resolutions
  - Abuja, Nigeria

- 2006/11/15: Communique of the Gulf of Guinea
  - Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of Ghana, Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe, Togo

- 2007/02/19-23: Abuja Maritime Transport Declaration
  - African Union

- 2008/07/29: Resolution on the Establishment of an Integrated Coast Guard Function Network for Member States of the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa
  - MOWCA

- 2008/10: ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) STRATEGY: Securing the vital interests of the ECCAS States of the Gulf of Guinea Structured Around COPAX and Contributing to Synergy Within the Gulf of Guinea Committee and ECOWAS
  - ECOWAS

  - Abuja, Nigeria
  - Derived from the “ECOWAS Political Declaration on Drug Trafficking and Other Organised Crimes in West Africa” and the “African Union Action Plan”

- 2009/10/12-16: African Maritime Transport Charter
  - African Union

- 2010/04: Africa’s Maritime Security and Capacity Building Solutions
  - AFRICOM
APPENDIX VI

ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS FROM AFRICA

**The following information is from a 2010 Global Financial Integrity report “Illicit Financial Flows From Africa: Hidden Resources for Development” that was presented at the third annual African Union Ministers Conference in March of 2010**

Illicit money is defined as money that is illegally earned, transferred, or utilized. This money is intended to disappear from any record in the country of origin, and earnings on the stock of illicit financial flows outside of a country do not normally return to the country of origin. The majority of unrecorded flows violate national criminal and civil codes, tax laws, customs regulations, VAT (Vulnerability Assessment Team) assessments, exchange control requirements, or banking regulations of the countries from where the outflow originates.

There are two ways to trace illicit financial flows. The World Bank Residual model reflects illicit capital that has left a country through its external accounts by comparing a country’s source of funds with its recorded use of funds. The Trade Misinvoicing model uses IMF Direction of Trade Statistics to show illicit flows generated through the mispricing of trade transactions—by overpricing imports and underpricing exports on customs documents, residents can illegally transfer money abroad. This model compares a country’s imports from the world to what the world reports as having exported to that country. Neither of these models account for smuggling which bypasses custom authorities and their recording systems completely. These models are also unable to capture illicit flows generated by drug trafficking and human trafficking.

It is estimated that between 1970 and 2008 Africa lost $1 trillion in illicit financial flows, the continent’s illicit financial outflow rate has grown at an average of 11.9% annually. Cumulative illicit flows from the continent increased from $57 billion in the 1970s to $437 billion in the years spanning from 2000-2008, this sharp increase was driven mostly by the illicit flows from Western and Central African countries, this region has the largest outflow numbers on the continent.

Nigeria ranks number one out of all African countries for illicit outflows. Cumulative illicit flows for Nigeria from 1970-2004 are estimated at $165,697,000,000. In 2008 the country’s illicit outflow was estimated to be $50 billion. Angola is ranked second, followed by Côte D’Ivoire at third, Democratic Republic of Congo at fourth, Cameroon at fifth, the Republic of Congo at ninth, Gabon at thirteenth, Ghana at fourteenth, Sierra Leone at eighteenth, and Burkina Faso at twenty.

The massive outflow of illicit capital explains why donor-driven efforts to drive economic development and reduce poverty have been underachieving in Africa. Global Financial Integrity’s (GFI) recent study found that for every $1 developing countries receive in external assistance they lose $10 through illegal flight capital. GFI’s report states: “So long as illicit capital continues to hemorrhage out of poor African countries over the long term at a rapid pace, efforts to reduce poverty and boost economic growth will be thwarted as income distribution becomes ever more skewed leading to economic and political instability.”
### APPENDIX VII

#### MOWCA NATIONS PORT LISTINGS AND ISPS COMPLIANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>PORT</th>
<th>ISPS COMPLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANGOLA</td>
<td>Luanda</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANGOLA</td>
<td>Lobito</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANGOLA</td>
<td>Malongo</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANGOLA</td>
<td>Namibe</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENIN</td>
<td>Cotonou</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURKINA FASO</td>
<td>LANDLOCKED</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMEROON</td>
<td>Douala</td>
<td>April 14, 2010—The USCG has determined this port is not maintaining effective anti-terrorism measures and has placed it under a Port Security Advisory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE VERDE</td>
<td>Praia</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE VERDE</td>
<td>Mindelo</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC</td>
<td>LANDLOCKED</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAD</td>
<td>LANDLOCKED</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CÔTE D’IVOIRE</td>
<td>Abidjan</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CÔTE D’IVOIRE</td>
<td>San Pedro</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPUBLIC OF CONGO</td>
<td>Pointe-Noire</td>
<td>April 14, 2010—The USCG has determined this port is not maintaining effective anti-terrorism measures and has placed it under a Port Security Advisory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO</td>
<td>Matadi</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUATORIAL GUINEA</td>
<td>Bata</td>
<td>April 14, 2010—The USCG has determined these ports are not maintaining effective anti-terrorism measures and has placed it under a Port Security Advisory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUATORIAL GUINEA</td>
<td>Malabo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GABON</td>
<td>Port Gentil</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GABON</td>
<td>Libreville</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>THE GAMBIA</td>
<td>Banjul</td>
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<tr>
<td>GHANA</td>
<td>Tema</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHANA</td>
<td>Takoradi</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUINEA</td>
<td>Conakry</td>
<td>Yes, but on 2009-12-24—President Obama removed Guinea from a list of African countries receiving trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) after democratic “backsliding” in 2009.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

April 14, 2010—The USCG has determined the above port is/is not maintaining effective anti-terrorism measures and has placed it under a Port Security Advisory.
### APPENDIX VII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>PORT</th>
<th>ISPS COMPLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GUINEA-BISSAU</td>
<td>Bissau</td>
<td>April 14, 2010 - The USCG has determined that ports in Guinea-Bissau are not maintaining effective anti-terrorism measures and has placed the country’s ports under a Port Security Advisory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUINEA-BISSAU</td>
<td>Bolama</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBERIA</td>
<td>Monrovia</td>
<td>April 14, 2010 - The USCG has determined this port is not maintaining effective anti-terrorism measures and has placed it under a Port Security Advisory, with the exception of the Firestone facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALI</td>
<td>LANDLOCKED</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAURITANIA</td>
<td>Nouakchott</td>
<td>Yes; as of 2010-01 - Mauritania began receiving trade benefits from the U.S. under AGOA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAURITANIA</td>
<td>Nouadhibou</td>
<td>April 14, 2010 - The USCG has determined this port is not maintaining effective anti-terrorism measures and has placed it under a Port Security Advisory.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIGER</td>
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<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>Apapa</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>Port Harcourt/Onne</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE</td>
<td></td>
<td>April 27, 2010 - The USCG determined that all ports in the country are not maintaining an effective anti-terrorism watch. They have been placed under a Port Security Advisory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENEGAL</td>
<td>Dakar</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>Freetown</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOGO</td>
<td>Lome</td>
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### WEST AFRICA MARITIME ASSETS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Frigate</th>
<th>Corvette</th>
<th>Large Patrol Boat</th>
<th>Small Patrol Craft</th>
<th>Landing Craft</th>
<th>Major Suppliers</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>China</td>
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<td>Cape Verde</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>China, Germany, U.S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S., U.K.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S., Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
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<td></td>
<td>France, Germany, U.S., Italy, U.K., Singapore</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>Togo</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Peter D. Burgess, Strategy and Plans Officer, Counternarcotics & Law Enforcement Assistance, US AFRICOM
In June 2010 drug bust, Gambian police, aided by British investigators, seized two tons of cocaine, destined for Europe, valued at $1 billion—the largest-ever drug seizure in West Africa. Twelve people were arrested, including Venezuelan employees of a Gambia-based fishing company that served as a front for the drug smuggling operation.


5 James Clapper, Director of Intelligence nomination hearing before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, Washington, D.C., July 20, 2010, CSPAN.org, http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/294635-1


11 Ibid.


14 Ibid.


20 In June 2010 a joint operation by the U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York and the government of Liberia culminated in the arrests of a group seeking to bribe Liberian officials to facilitate the movement of cocaine from South America to Europe. One of the defendants in the case testified that the drugs were supplied and protected by the FARC. According to the indictment, "During the last decade, drug trafficking organizations based in South America have increasingly used countries along or near the West African coast as transshipment hubs for importing massive quantities of cocaine to later distribute in Europe or elsewhere in Africa."


39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.


44 UNODC, DPKO, UNOWA (DPA), INTERPOL Partnership in support to the implementation of the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan on ILLlicit drug trafficking and organized crimes 2008-2011,” UNODC Programme Concept, (2010).

45 Regional Programme for West Africa 2010-2014, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

46 Regional Programme for West Africa 2010-2014, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.


49 Ibid.


52 A requirement of the UN’s ISPS Code pursuant the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Guinea-Bissau is not a signatory of SOLAS/ISPS

53 ISPS Code, Part A, 1.2.1.


71 Personal Interview with former African government official, July 2010.


73 Personal Interview with West Africa Oil Expert, July 2010.


83 Ibid.


85 Vidal, John, “Nigeria’s Agony Dwarfs the Gulf Oil Spill, The U.S. and Europe Ignore It,” The Guardian, (May 20, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/30/oil-spills-nigeria-niger-delta-shell


87  Vidal, John, “Nigeria’s Agony Dwarf the Gulf Oil Spill, The U.S. and Europe Ignore It,” The Guardian, (May 20, 2010), http://www.theguardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/20/oil-spills-nigeria-niger-delta-shell


89  Ibid.


91  Ibid.


93  Ibid.


96  "Traficgu Accused Over Ivory Coast Toxic Waste," BBC, (June 1, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10204209

97  Ibid.


99  Ibid.

100  Fiscal Year 2010 Country Scorecards, Millennium Challenge Corporation, Micc.gov

101  Regional Programme for West Africa 2010-2014, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.


103  Ibid, 3.


106  Personal interview with Captain John Lussier, NAVAF LNO to AFRICOM, June 4, 2010.


111  Ibid.

112  Ibid.


117  Ibid, 71.


121  Ibid, 3.


127  In 1993, Senegal Received 52 bridge boats, for the purposes of this paper we have defined those EDAs and infrastructure development rather than Maritime Security since they were for Inland Waterways.


129  Ibid, 19.

130  Ibid, 19.


133  Ibid.


135  Ibid.


137  Ibid.

138  Ibid.

139  Ibid.

140  The United States Department of Justice, „ DOJ/OPDAT Africa and Middle East Programs,” http://www.justice.gov/criminal/licitap/worldact-programs/africa-mideast.html


142  The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 2.

143 Ibid.
146 The UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme, UNODC and World Customs Organization.
148 Ibid.
150 Speech of Secretary Clinton, United States Department of State, Abuja Town Hall Meeting, August 20, 2009.
152 Ibid.

Appendix VIII Endnotes

<table>
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<tr>
<th>CHAIRMAN</th>
<th>*Chuck Hagel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD</td>
<td>Brent Scowcroft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESIDENT AND CEO</td>
<td>*Frederick Kempe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAIRMAN EMERITUS</td>
<td>*Henry E. Catto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VICE CHAIRS</td>
<td>*Richard Edelman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TREASURERS</td>
<td>*Ronald M. Freeman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECRETARY</td>
<td>*Walter B. Slocombe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRECTORS</td>
<td>*Robert J. Abernethy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HONORARY DIRECTORS</td>
<td>David C. Acheson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIFETIME DIRECTORS</td>
<td>Lucy Wilson Benson</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*members of the Executive Committee
List as of September 8, 2010
The Atlantic Council is a non-partisan organization that promotes constructive U.S. leadership and engagement in international affairs based on the central role of the Atlantic community in meeting the global challenges of the 21st century.