Islam “Symbolic Politics”¹, Democratization and Indonesian Foreign Policy

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“If someone is able to separate sugar from its sweetness, he will be able to separate Islam religion from politics” (Wahab Chasbullah)²

“The Islamic movement should detach itself from involvement in politics. Islam is a moral force, a way to promote morality” (Abdurrahman Wahid)³

Introduction.

The two quotations, above, clearly suggest an endlessly debate about the political role of Islam in Indonesia’s politics. This article discusses the role of political Islam⁴ in Indonesian politics and the dynamics of the interaction between the Muslim society and the State in the Indonesian political system. It provides the domestic context of the role Islam in Indonesia’s politics, which serves as the platform of the position of political Islam in Indonesia's foreign policy in the post-Soeharto era. It will also briefly elaborate the development of Indonesia’s external environment (globalization) as an integral element of foreign policy. However, the extent to which the Islamic—as a “religio-politics”⁵-- factor played a significant role in Indonesian foreign policy has been subject to debate. Therefore, this article will assess the hypothesis that “foreign policies are also influenced by the religious views and beliefs of policymakers and their constituents”.⁶

¹ Symbolic politics can be defined as “collective process of construction, distribution and internalization of political symbols (Phrases, images, norms, rules etc) which present a significant influence on foreign policy during the democratization process”. See Corneliu Bjola (2000). The Impact of “Symbolic Politics” On Foreign Policy During The Democratization Process. Paper presented at the Kokkalis Graduate Student Workshop On Southern and Eastern Europe, Harvard University.p.3.
³ Asiaweek, 18 January 1999.
⁴ In this writing, political Islam is defined as “a form of intrumentalization of Islam (ideas, symbols, and values) by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives. It provides political responses to today’s societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition”. This definition comes from Guilian Denoux as quoted from Mohammed Ayoob. 2004. Political Islam: Image and Reality. In World Policy Journal. Fall.pp.1-14.
⁵ This term is defined as “relations with God provide shape and meaning to political actions and orientation”, quoted from Angel M.Rabasa.2004. The Muslim World After 9/11. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.p.1.
It is widely agreed that world politics has changed so rapidly and dramatically since the end of the Cold War era. To be more specifically, the management of foreign policy has been dramatically challenged by the new strategic environment following the September 11 terrorist attack. The rapid changes in world politics, of course, pose a tremendous challenge for any nation-states, particularly in new democracies such as Indonesia, in managing both the process of democratization in domestic politics and its impact on their foreign relations. At this point, the role and the task of the state in managing Indonesia’s foreign relations is becoming more crucial and more complicated as it is sometimes required to deal with problems beyond its normal sphere of competence.

During the Soeharto era— as MacIntyre argued— the policy making was heavily ‘state-centred’. As a result, the possibility for ‘extra-state actors’ (society, for example) to play a major role in (foreign) policy formulation was very limited. It was due to two main strategies which were applied by the Soeharto’s regime: *inclusionary*, aimed to co-opt the larger society into conditional participation in domestic political process which was principally controlled by the State; and *exclusionary*, seek to mitigate or even deny the role of society in influencing the wider political community through political repression.

The resignation of President Soeharto in May 1998 which was then followed by the mushrooming of Islamic political parties and Islamic radical groups in Indonesia has propelled a bigger role of wider society in policy making process. This phenomenon was believed to be one of the crucial indicators of dramatic changes in Indonesia’s domestic political map and of the re-emergence of Islam as a political force in Indonesia’s domestic politics and foreign policy.

The discussion of this article is divided into several parts. The first part will delineate the conceptual framework of symbolic politics and its impact to Indonesia’s foreign policy in the post Soeharto authoritarian regime. The main purpose of elaborating the conceptual framework is to help explain how domestic politics, particularly the growing demands of certain elements of society and the competing power and interests between the State and society affect foreign policy behavior. The next part will discuss the role of Islam in Indonesian politics. The discussion on this section is structured on several subdivisions, such as the position of political Islam during the New Order era (Soeharto era), the establishment of

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ICMI\textsuperscript{8} as the new political legitimacy for the New Order, and the re-emergence of political Islam in the post-Soeharto’s politics. The rise of political Islam and the globalization era is discussed in the next section and followed by the examination of the State-Muslim society relation in the post Soeharto’s foreign policy. The next part is devoted to examine the role of Indonesia’s Muslim society in influencing the post Soeharto’s foreign policy with a specific case of war on terrorism.

**Conceptual Framework: “Symbolic Politics” and Competing approaches in Foreign Policy.**

Literally, foreign policy can be defined as the actions of a state toward its external environment and the conditions under which these actions are formulated. The state ultimately has to adopt to its domestic and external/international environment. According to Rosenau, governments/states need to balance domestic institutional tensions with external demands and priorities or risk failure which in fragile countries could lead to political and socio-economic instability.

Just as it is in the domestic arena, the societal factor\textsuperscript{9} is one of crucial elements in foreign policy making and behaviour. Consequently, this factor at the domestic level\textsuperscript{10} has frequently motivated and influenced the ruling elites (the policy makers) to manage foreign policy and external relations of states. However, its exact impact on foreign policy is not easily determined because in many cases, it is only one determinant factor and not even the most important one. The impact of societal factor is often boosted and mitigated by other factors such as geopolitical and geo-strategic considerations, economic needs, and regime interests. However, many literatures in foreign policy studies maintained that the state can not entirely neglect the role of societal factor in the foreign policy making process.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{8} Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia or the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellecuals.
\textsuperscript{9} Societal factor in foreign policy analysis includes culture, history, and social structure. Other theorists of foreign policy, such as Patrick MacGowan and Howard Shapiro noted it also includes political culture and ideology and belief system. In reality, it consists of elements in domestic communities which have interests in the making of foreign policy.
\textsuperscript{10} The domestic level consists of the society, the political process, the goals, motives and priorities of state leaders and when and under what conditions the societal groups are most likely to exercise it. For further elaboration on this matter, see David Skidmore, Valerie M Hudson. 1993. Establishing the limits of state autonomy: contending approaches to the study of state-society relations and foreign policy making. In David Skidmore, Valerie M Hudson. eds. The limits of state autonomy: societal groups and foreign policy formulation. Colorado: Westview Press. p.6.
\textsuperscript{11} See for example the special issue of International Studies Review. 2001. Leaders, Groups, and Coalitions: Understanding the People and Processes in Foreign Policy Making. Vol.3 No.2.
The current internal and international conditions have, to large extent, required the government to comprehensively deals with problems that are sensitive to both domestic and international criticism. The emergence of new issues—such as democratisation, drugs trade, environment, human rights, labor, people smuggling and terrorism—in the Post Cold War world politics demand a new alternative approach from the government in the foreign policy making. Obviously, the state alone will not be able to comprehensively manage the above non-traditional issues.

At this point, the need to strive toward a comprehensive foreign policy will not only involve other ministries/government agencies but also invite larger elements of Indonesian society. There is even a need to incorporate larger public participation in the formulation of Indonesia’s foreign policy. In other words, the state-society relations will, to a very large extent, affect the making and the effectiveness of Indonesian foreign policy.

In order to provide a more comprehensive explanation of the state-society relations in the making of Indonesia’s foreign policy in the post Soeharto era, this article will use the concept of “symbolic politics” as a tool for analyzing certain elements of society in the process of democratization and foreign policy making process. This concept concerns with the political cultural conditions as well as the degree of engagement of political elites and wider society in foreign policy making. It also presents both cognitive and affective features which allow the society to understand and respectively develop an attitude toward foreign policy issues based on their values (beliefs). In this context, “symbolic politics” will fulfill certain functions/roles for both political elites and the society. In the foreign policy making process, the “symbolic politics” plays not only as an instrumental role (yielding political support for certain policies; diverting attention of the wider society from certain political issues; providing filters for containing dissent; and strengthening legitimacy) for decision makers to influence the society in foreign policy issues, but also as an interpretative role (object appraisal in which the society can understand and tolerate the complex situations of foreign policy; and social adjustment in which the people can rely on political symbols for coping with dissatisfaction and frustration generated by changing domestic and external socio political conditions). In other words, symbolic politics will lead to the debate and contention between pragmatism and rationalism in foreign policy making.

13 Ibid.pp.2-12.
From the literatures of foreign policy study, there are at least three alternative approaches of state-society relations in foreign policy analysis, which might be relevant to Indonesia’s foreign policy. These approaches are less focused upon the policy itself and more intent on the dynamic processes of policy formation, evolution, and change.

The first model is “Statist”. This approach which closely corresponds to Realist theory assumes that “state decision makers formulate foreign policy largely autonomously of societal influences”. In other words, the state is assumed to be much stronger than the society so that the role and the influence of society in foreign policy can be neglected. This model argues that states have full authority (institutional autonomy) in managing their foreign relationships and tend to neglect the role of societal in foreign policy making. In this context, the state demonstrates its role as ‘domestic agential power’ or ‘the state’s ability to shape domestic realm and construct foreign policy relatively free of domestic social structural constraints’.

The second approach is the “Societal approach”. In contrast to the first approach, “Societal approach” assumes that societal groups within state play a dominant and continuing role in foreign policy. This approach consists of two models: The pluralist model and Social Blocs model. The pluralist model is based on the assumption that “political leaders care most about maintaining a high level of domestic political support” which is “a prerequisite both for maintaining and for maximizing their influence on and effectiveness of foreign policy decisions. The latter model involves “a variety of alternatives to pluralism, including elite, Marxist, corporatist and sectoral blocs” of society. This approach emphasizes the role of press, non-government organizations and other groups in society as pressure groups in controlling and even directing the issues and contents of foreign policy making.

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15 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
The last approach is “The Trans-national approach” which emphasizes the existence of a global society. This approach assumes that “societal groups with similar interests (or even common interests) and objectives will form political coalitions which surpasses national boundaries”\(^{20}\). These networks of cooperation, then, provide issues, which foreign policy actors should take into account in foreign policy formulation. The goals of trans-national society may vary from transformations of particular regimes (to battle authoritarian regime), mediating and settling international conflict (Arab-Israeli conflict), putting new issues in the global agenda (environmental issue) and changing global values, standards and norms (democratisation and human rights).

Theoretically, the interactions and linkages between domestic and external environments may produce three major types of linkages\(^{21}\): the “penetrative”, the "reactive", and the "emulative". Further, it may also produce two types of domestic political objectives\(^{22}\) namely: building political coalitions and retaining political power. The first consequence assumed that foreign policy decision makers “need to build domestic support for any proposed policy initiative”\(^{23}\). Building political coalitions played a very important role in many Third World foreign policies since the interaction between domestic support and foreign policy making is a primary value in domestic political standing.

The significance of ‘building policy coalitions’ is also mainly due, as noted by Hagan, to the fact that “many Third World governments are quite institutionally complex” and the political regime is “dominated by a single predominant leader but are actually racked by political infighting among contending factions”\(^{24}\). Thus, foreign policy decisions become “political resultants” which reflect “the political strategies necessary to build agreement” with the domestic structure “to support implementation of policy”\(^{25}\).

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\(^{20}\) Ibid. p.14.

\(^{21}\) The “penetrative linkage” is the direct participation or influence of the external and domestic environment in the foreign policy decision-making process of a country. The "reactive linkage" is caused by boundary crossing without direct participation made within the unit (state). While the “emulative linkage” is a foreign policy respond similar to the action that triggers it. See James N Rosenau ed. 1969. Linkage Politics. New York: Free Press.p.44


\(^{25}\) Ibid. p.122.
In the second domestic political consequence, foreign policy decision “should be adjusted so that it imposes fewer domestic costs” 26. This is mainly because “retaining political power” is based upon “the Value of holding the leadership position” 27. So in order to stay in the office, a national leader, who faces a significant domestic opposition from the wider domestic structure, needs to raise public perception of foreign policy issues. In many Third World foreign policies, retaining political power is a more dominant theme than coalition building. Yet many Third World countries might always be able to impose rational foreign policy initiatives without worrying about the political opposition from the domestic political society.

The above conceptual frameworks are significant in order to help explain how domestic politics, especially the growing demands of particular elements of society and the competing power and interests between the State and Society, affect foreign policy behavior. This is mainly because “the foreign policy behavior of the regime will, under certain circumstances, depend on the regime’s response to domestic activities taken by a particular society at a given time” 28. The above frameworks also suggests that “the choice of regime response, in turn, depends on two clusters of variables”, namely “the regime’s agenda of needs” and “the capabilities of domestic societies/groups to disrupt the pursuit of this agenda” 29. It is due to the fact that the state’s conduct of foreign policy is a function of its current internal political dynamics. By adopting the above conceptual frameworks, this paper, then, will highlight the state-society relations in the current development of Indonesia’s foreign policy.

**Political Islam and Indonesia’s Political System: A brief Review of Indonesia’s Politics.**

Political Islam itself is a modern phenomenon. Many studies revealed that it has roots in the sociopolitical conditions of Muslim countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 30 In the history of Islamic involvement in Indonesia’s politics, most of it has been colored by the tension and conflict between the government/the ruling authorities (State) and Islam (Society) and between society itself particularly between Islam and non-Islam. From the pre-independence to the post-Soeharto

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26 Ibid.p.124.
28 Ibid.p.55.
29 Ibid.p.55.
period, Indonesian Muslims utilised Islam both as their banner of resistance to colonialism, exploitation, repression and as a source of (religious) nationalism. It is often argued that during the Soeharto’s authoritarian New Order, for instance, Islam became more radical than ever before.

Those periods also marked disunity among Indonesian Muslims. As the Islamic world is not monolithic, Islam in Indonesia was also split along “ideological and generational line” which divided Indonesian Islam into different Muslim communities, such as: Modernists and Traditionalists; radicals and moderates; Shiah and Sunni; and the level of religious consciousness among them, as labelled by Geertz, in Abangan, Santri and Priyayi. In doing so, Indonesia’s Muslim society is neither a monolithic community nor a single political entity. The following sections elaborate the dynamics of state-society relations in Indonesia’s politics.

- **The New Order and Islamic Community: A Fragile Alliance and Controlled Participation.**

In the beginning of the New Order era, the government perceived Islam as “the most important civil force in society”. Together with the army, Islamic groups were the largest political forces which strongly supported the New Order in crushing the communists. The 1966-1969 period was a “honeymoon” between the government, military, students and anti communist groups, including Islamic organizations.

However, in expecting that its political power in the period of the New Order would increase, the Muslim community had seriously miscalculated. The military/ABRI (now TNI), which was dominated by officers from (secular) nationalist group, still had the perception that Islam could threaten political stability and that the Muslim community still wanted to establish an Islamic state. The “temporary alliance” between the New Order and the Muslims was over in 1969 particularly when government attention was fully concentrated on the 1971 general election.

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As Ramage explained, there are at least three characteristics of the New Order’s changing perceptions of Islam in 1970-1980s. First, the defeat of communism in Indonesia left Islam as the only major ideological alternative to the New Order itself. Second, the New Order government still had a strong perception of the possibility of the intention of Islamic parties to impose the establishment of an Islamic state, or at least, the implementation of Islamic laws in government policies. Lastly, since the Pancasila had become asas tunggal or the sole foundation of all organizations in 1982, then political development should be put behind the need to accelerate the pace of economic development. In other words, the New Order regime put economic development and political stability as the top priority of national development. Anti-political Islamic attitudes, then, crystallized in the New Order regime, particularly the military. As Liddle noted, this attitude of the New Order to the political Islam led to the perception of Islam as “political enemy number two” after communism\textsuperscript{35}.

The New Order regime produced several policies to eliminate the possibility of political instability which were categorized by many Muslims as anti Islam\textsuperscript{36}. The policies, as Santoso argued, were aimed at positioning Islam on the periphery of Indonesia’s political life. The perception of Islam as a threat to the political system of the New Order pushed the regime together with the military to adopt a policy of containment and of the de-politicisizing of Islam.

One strategy applied by the New Order to contain Islam as a political power was “divide and rule”\textsuperscript{37}. The major aspect of this strategy was that Islam could continue to develop its religious and cultural dimensions without entering the political arena (de-politicisation of Islam). This policy caused ‘internal conflict’ among Muslims in which, as Starkey argued, Soeharto successfully divided the Islamic community\textsuperscript{38}.

The inability of Islam to further play a significant role in politics – domestic and international – was due to the absence of any strong political party, organizations, or institution, which united all Indonesian Muslims\textsuperscript{39}. This was not

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.p.104.
\textsuperscript{39} This statement was argued by Dr. Deliar Noer, one of Islamic scholar who has very critical to the New Order regime. The Jakarta Post, 30 January 1995.
only because of internal conflict within Islamic groups but, more importantly, because the government successfully prevented the emergence of such an organization. Even though PPP was the only Islamic political party, it was unable to unite all Indonesian Muslims. This was mainly due to PPP being established by the New Order. Deliar Noer notes that numerous Islam organizations such as the government sponsored Indonesian Council of Ulama, the Council of the Propagation of Islam, and other social organizations like NU and Muhammadiyah had failed to represent Indonesian Muslims’ interests. In this context, as Hassan argued, the relationship between the state and religion is influenced by the internal dynamics of Muslim societies.

Despite the New Order regime’s success in de-politicizing Islam, in the late 1980s a revival of Islam as a political force was underway, particularly among the young generation. Some observers believed that one of the factors behind the re-emergence of political Islam was the demands of the Muslim community for a stronger political voice in domestic politics. Another important factor was the Iranian revolution. But others argued that the most important factor was the change in Soeharto’s perception of the Muslim community, as discussed in the following section.

- **The Establishment of ICMI: the Revival of Political Islam or New Source of Political Legitimacy for the New Order?**

From the late 1980s to the 1990s, Soeharto changed his domestic policy and tried to re-build a stronger political coalition with Islam by introducing an Islamization strategy. This strategy—which focused on “the accentuation of Islamic symbols in public discourse and the accommodation of religious socio-political powers”—was believed by many scholars as a way of Soeharto’s regime to contain the spread of its crisis of legitimacy after more than two decades of power. As part of it, the Soeharto’s regime introduced the Islamic Court Bill, Islamic sharia banks and the presidential decree of the Compilation of Islamic Law.

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40 Ibid.
42 Ibid. p.164.
46 Ibid.
There were two major reasons for Soeharto’s policy changes to Islam. The first was Soeharto’s political need to respond to what he perceived to be declining political support for him from the military. Much like his predecessor who once looked to the communists to counteract unhappy army officers, Soeharto looked to Islam to play the same role. The second reason was the external impact of the political revival of Islam globally. From the late 1970s and early 1980s, Islam popularity began to rise significantly in Indonesia. As a source of spiritual, ethical, social, and political advice, the Islamic revival in Indonesia was also part of a movement occurring throughout the world, in places such as in Iran and Egypt.

The major result of this new relationship between Islam and the New Order occurred in December 1990 when Dr. B.J Habibie, the Minister of Research and Technology, with the support of President Soeharto established and chaired ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia or Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals). ICMI played a significant role in sponsoring the expansion of the authority of Islamic courts, greater Muslim programming on television (including lessons in the Arabic language), the appointments of ICMI leaders to high offices such as cabinet ministries and provincial governorships, the establishment of the Islamic Bank Muamalat in 1991, the Abdi Bangsa Foundation and the Center of Information and Development Studies (CIDES), considered the association think tank, as well as the Islamic daily newspaper Republika. With all the above instruments of ICMI, Islam was becoming more assertive politically and economically.

The establishment of ICMI, as Liddle has argued, was the clearest step taken by Soeharto in accommodating the desires and sensitivities of the Muslim community and deepening his own identification with Islam. Even though the establishment of ICMI invited some public debates and controversies, ICMI, which

47 For a clear chronological elaboration of the ICMI, see Hefner, ibid. See also Abdul Azis Thaba .1996. Islam dan negara dalam politik orde baru (Islam and state in the politics of new order). Jakarta: Gema Insani Press.p.290-300.
50 There are at least three different interpretations on the purposes of ICMI—namely: political; social and economic. Firstly, some groups of Indonesian society (Christian minority and non-santri) perceived ICMI as “the opening wedge in a new attempt to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state” and as “a typical example of New Order bureaucratic politics”. Secondly, the main goal of ICMI is “to improve the quality of human resources in Indonesia”. Lastly, ICMI can serve as “a weapon in a struggle of ordinary Indonesians
gained support from almost all government officials and prominent Muslim political activists and intellectuals, can be regarded as the “sign of the new centrality of Islam in Indonesian public life”\textsuperscript{51}. He further argued that the establishment of ICMI was a mere political tool of those in power. Moreover, it was also a “political move by the government” which accidentally met a Muslim community demand for a greater position in politics\textsuperscript{52}.

The establishment of ICMI was actually an illustration of the ‘accommodation’ policy of Soeharto in managing the Indonesian Islamic community. This policy aimed to please the Muslim community in order to have it express its support and loyalty toward the existing power holder. However, even though the pressure of the Islamic community was getting stronger in policymaking, Soeharto still had the ultimate authority to control it for the sake of his political interests.

Some elements of the Islamic community such as Nadhalatul Ulama, and the military, however, strongly resisted the creation of ICMI. KH Abdurrahman Wahid of NU contended that “I am ready anytime to enter and join ICMI, if the fundamentalists, the militants, do not control it, if Professor Habibie does not use it for group interest politics”\textsuperscript{53}. These critics perceived ICMI “not as a vehicle for Muslim penetration of the state but for state penetration of Islam”\textsuperscript{54}.

In the military itself, there was also resistance to acknowledging ICMI due to the fear of re-politicising the Islamic community\textsuperscript{55}. The secular-nationalist faction of ABRI perceived that the establishment of ICMI would push the reemergence of Islam as a political force in Indonesian politics which in turn would jeopardize political stability and national unity. This faction also suspected the revival of Islam as indicated by the establishment of ICMI “would re-open old and divisive debates on whether Indonesia should be an Islamic state”\textsuperscript{56}. This resistance led to the creation, initiated by Gen. Edy Sudrajat, of ICKI (\textit{Ikatan Cendekiawan Kebangsaan Indonesia} or the Association of Indonesian Nationalist Intellectuals) which was non-sectarian. However, this association did not get approval from President Soeharto against the predatory business elite of the New Order-style capitalist development”. See William. R Liddle. 1996. ‘The Islamic turn in Indonesia: a political explanation’. In \textit{The Journal of Asian Studies}. No.3, August, p.613-634.

\textsuperscript{52}Interview with William Liddle, in the Jakarta Post, 13 March 1995.
\textsuperscript{53}Adam Schwarz. 1999. p.142.
\textsuperscript{54}Robert Heffner. 1999. In Schwarz, Adam. p.50.
\textsuperscript{56}Adam Schwarz. 1999.p.173.
until it changed its name to PCPP (*Persatuan Cendekiawan Pembangunan Pancasila, Intellectuals’ Association for the Advancement of the Pancasila*)\(^57\). It was mainly because the former name of the association could give a negative image to the public that there was a conflict between the military and the Indonesian Muslims.

This phenomenon indicated that there were endless suspicions by the military of the emergence of Islam as a major political force in Indonesian politics which they perceived could jeopardize national unity and stability. Moreover, this also reflected the competition for power between the Muslim community and the secular-nationalists in the military in the policy making of the New Order regime.

- **Political Islam and The post Soeharto’s politics.**

Despite the marginalisation of political Islam during most of the Soeharto era, one of the major developments that may have a significant impact on state-society relations in the late New Order period was the revival of of Islamic-oriented middle-class politics\(^58\). The young Islamic generation began to significantly speak about the need for a greater role for Islam in domestic politics and foreign policy making.

The fall of Soeharto in May 1998 has opened up new opportunity for political Islam\(^59\) to re-enter to Indonesia’s politics. This was indicated, for instance, by the establishment of new Islamic political parties and their participation in June 1999 General Election. Many of new political parties adopted Islam as their ideological orientation and utilized Islam as their political linkage between the party, Muslim communities and the state. As Rabasa argued this period also produced political disorder which created tactical alliance between some elite and military factions and Islamist extremist to expand their political influence in policy making and implementation\(^60\).

The most interesting feature of the establishment of new Islamic political parties is that most of the parties do not endorse the creation of Islamic state as

\(^{57}\) Ibid.
\(^{59}\) As Azra. 2001. points out, the rise of political Islam is “the most visible political developments in the era of post Soeharto Indonesia. See his article ‘The Challenge of Political islam to Megawati’. The Jakarta Post, 22 November.
their primary objectives but to advocate Islamic values as a source of inspiration in democratisation discourse\textsuperscript{61}.

The resignation of Soeharto, on the other hand, also provided a significant momentum for the emergence of Muslim radical groups, such as Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Waljama’ah (FKWAW) with its paramilitary group, Laskar Jihad, Front Pembela Islam (FPI or the paramilitary force of the Defender of Islam)\textsuperscript{62}, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (the Indonesian Holy Warrior paramilitary force) which is chaired by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (now under police detention for his alleged involvement in the Bali bombing), and the Jama’ah al-Ihkwan al-Muslimin (JAMI) and the Front of Hizbullah.

Many of them are new groups which have emerged since the interregnum of President B.J Habibie. These groups tend to adopt literal interpretation and understanding Islam. There are reports that members of the leadership have been close to certain Army Generals, sponsored, or at least assisted, by certain circles within the “Green” faction of the Indonesian military\textsuperscript{63}. Moreover, these groups have been untilized by this faction to justify its own political agenda\textsuperscript{64}. The major goal of these groups is to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia or, at least, to implement Islamic law (Shariah) as a state ideology in Indonesia.

However, the main reasons of the increased radicalism of these groups were the government’s failure to enforce the law and solve a number of ethno-religious conflicts, and the rampant corruption at all levels of society. Therefore, Azra points out that one of the important solutions to mitigate the rise of radicalism was “to restore government authority and re-strengthen law enforcement agencies”\textsuperscript{65}. Besides that, another scholar also reveals that the rise of these radical groups was “a consequence of interrelated developments at both domestic and the international levels… and a combination of different factors, both religious and political, in forging its activism and militancy”\textsuperscript{66}. Eventhough it is important not to

\textsuperscript{62} Laskar Jihad and FPI have been dismissed just a few days after the Bali Bombings.
\textsuperscript{64} This statement has been raised by Munir, Chairman of Kontras, Jakarta, 30 November 2002.
\textsuperscript{65} Azyumardi Azra. 2002.p.13-22
\textsuperscript{66} Noorhaidi Hasan. 2002.p.151.
overemphasize the role of violent radical groups, these groups have performed an alternative voice in the policymaking process in which cannot be abandoned at all by the state.

Martin Van Bruinessen has appropriately commented on radical Islamic groups in Indonesia under four regimes in Indonesia by arguing that:

...Of the post Soeharto governments, Habibie’s depended even more on the support of the Islamist than Soeharto did, and it was under him that radical Muslims were given arms and were employed as paramilitary auxiliaries of the police and army. Abdurrahman Wahid had to face these violent radical groups and attempted to bridle them but failed because of his weak control over the armed forces. There was little doubt that the armed groups were sponsored and given free rein by Wahid’s military and civilian opponents. President Megawati has even less legitimacy in the eyes of the Muslim radicals, not only because she is a woman but also because her party is perceived to be dominated by anti Muslim elements. This has given the conservative Muslim elements in her coalitions extra leverage, that may result in some Islamizing measures. It has also made her dependent on, if not hostage to, the military. The arrest of Jaffar Umar Thalib in may 2002 and the absence of serious protests against it suggest that it may well possible to contain the radical groups—but at the cost of the military’s return to power.  

Globalisation and the rise of Political Islam.

As discussed above, the rise of many Islamist radical movements in Indonesia initially emerged in the wake of specific social and political crises in the Muslim world, particularly as a societal-political phenomenon. Yet, they are also a result of the politics of globalisation. In the words of Holton, the revival of political Islam in many Muslim countries could be interpreted either as “a deglobalising trends towards localism and regionalism, or as a reglobalising movement challenging the credentials of Western approaches to globalisation”. In other words, the political Islam in this respect is simultaneously global, regional, national, and locally specified. To borrow the study of Angel M. Rabasa et al (RAND Corp), the sources of Islamic Radicalism can be classified into three classes: conditions, process and catalytic events as follow:

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The Sources of Islamic Radicalism

Conditions
Failed political and economic models
Structural anti-westernism
Decentralization of religious in Sunni Islam

Processes
The Islamic resurgence
Arabization of the non-Arab Muslim world
External funding of religious fundamentalism and extremism
The convergence of Islamism and tribalism
Growth of radical Islamic networks
Emergence of the mass media
The Palestinian-Israeli and Kashmir conflicts

Catalytic events
The Iranian revolution
The Afghan war
The Gulf war 1991
September 11 and the global war on terrorism
The Iraq war 2003

On the other side, the revival of political Islam can also be seen as a unifying factor and a focal point for the rallying political resistance against the international system and the State itself in the era of globalisation. In other words, the globalisation of Islamic revival can also be interpreted as a part of domestic as well as trans-national and international process\(^{72}\). It was basically a response to the global conspiracy against Islam or global hegemony of the Western world, particularly the US. Since the end of Second World War, the US has been taking positions of dominance and hegemony in the Muslim world\(^{73}\). The West exercised its influences through a variety of financial and military means a good deal of hegemony on the internal politics of Muslim countries, including support for regimes that are less supported by the majority of their own people\(^{74}\). The Islamic revival was also a refusal to the process of political and cultural homogenisation of the Western world \(^{75}\).

\(^{72}\) For further elaborations on socio-spatial networks of social interactions in today’s global politics, see Michael Mann. 1999. Has globalization ended the rise and rise of the nation-state?. In, T.V Paul, John A. Hall. International order and the future of world politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.p.239.


The significant rise of political consciousness of Islamic organizations in many part of both Muslim and non-Muslim countries, for example, is one of the crucial indicators of the Islamic revival in the last decade. This also may lead to the effort of the establishment of the “non-territorial Islamic state” or the cross border flows of political Islam between (Muslim) groups/entities operating in different countries. This phenomenon concurrently applies with the proposition of ‘the hyperglobalist thesis’ that new forms of religious (social) political organizations will supplant traditional nation-states as the primary political units of world society.

State-Muslim Society relations in the Post-Soeharto’s Foreign Policy: The case of ‘War on Terrorism’.

“Even though Islam has formally not been a factor in Indonesia’s foreign policy, the Indonesian government seems to take careful consideration when issues relating to Islam and Muslims appear at front. It is correct that Jakarta seems to consistently play down the Islamic factor in its foreign policy. But on the other hand, there are some cases where Islam seems to have been taken into serious account by the Indonesian government”.

The September 11, 2001 and the global war on terrorism have dramatically altered the political and security environment in the Muslim world. It was not only the terrorist attack itself that has changed the environment, but more importantly, the US policy and the ways it conduct its policies on fighting terrorism that have invited critical concerns of the Muslim world. The support of Muslim countries to the war on terrorism is also varied. Some Muslim countries gave their total support such as Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan, some countries gave verbal support, namely Tunisian and Morocco, while some countries gave support with criticism, such as Egypt and Indonesia. The different reactions to the war on terrorism also accured in Southeast Asia. Some countries like Thailand, Singapore and Philippine seized on the war against terrorism as an opportunity to strengthen closer military

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cooperation with the US. While Malaysia utilized it as legitimate effort to weaken the Islamic political opposition by suggesting an association with terrorist groups. From the Indonesian standpoint, dealing with Islamic radicalism/extremism posed a more complicated and complex political challenge to the Megawati government.  

The massive reactions of some elements of Indonesia’s Muslim society toward the war in Afghanistan, the wave of anti-Western (US), and the war on terrorism mass demonstration were clear examples of the use of jihad as an Islam “symbolic politics” in international affairs. Further, those massive reactions also became the concerns’ of Muslim society of the strong willingness and demand of domestic participation in Indonesia’s foreign policy. On the other hand, the government was very concerned that the war in Afghanistan and the policy of war on terrorism could increase domestic support for Islam radical groups such as Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front), Hizbut Tahrir, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and Laskar Jihad (Jihad Troops).

However, the response of some Indonesian radical Muslim society was inconsistent when the UN informally requested Indonesia to join the peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan. They refused the plan by arguing that Indonesia’s participation will only be used as “a buffer for the US in dealing with the people in Afghanistan”. Moreover, they even organized massive demonstrations to “sweep” Indonesia (clean) of Westerners (Americans). Daily demonstrations were taking place in front of the US Embassy. Even though these demonstration have been largely peaceful, the Muslims likely to perceive a jihad (holy war) in the literal sense of using violence against the US in the event of attack against Afghanistan. Ja’far Umar Thalib, the leader of Laskar Jihad even stated strongly that

"We would like to sorrow over the US, you should learn from your arrogance. For Muslims, we would like to congratulate you for the revenge upon terrors commited by the biggest terrorist nation in the world, the united States, on Muslim nations.”

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82 This term has a broad spectrum of meanings, including fight against one’s own innermost selfish tendencies. For further discussion on this term, see for instance, Bruce B.Lawrence.1989. Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revold Against the Modern Age. Columbia: University of South Carolina.p.217.
The above critical voice of Islamic militant group, the anti-American demonstrations and unfortunately, the slow response of President Megawati have, to some extent, damaged Indonesia’s political stability. During President Megawati’s visit to US just a few days of 11 September attack—she was the first leader of a Muslim country to visit the US after the attacks--, she joined the condemnation of the terrorist attack and expressed her government’s readiness to cooperate in the war on terrorism. But at home, her statements have invited strong rejections from the Islamic hard line groups and compelled President Megawati to state that no country can attack another country for whatever reason.87 Within her government itself there was an intra-cabinet dissent on her support of US policy. Vice President, Hamzah Haz and several Muslim political elites blamed the terrorists attack on America’s ‘sins’ and refused to acknowledge that despite militant Muslim groups record violence such as Jemaah Islamiyah and Laskar Jihad might be a threat to national, regional security.88

As one argued that President Megawati seems to have preferred adopting a middle way policy in the war on terrorism. While supporting international cooperation to fight against terrorism, she has also became critical at the US policy to attack Afghanistan. This middle way policy, to some extent, has contributed to calming down the anger of Muslim hardliners.89 President Megawati Sukarnoputri in one of her speeches urged Indonesia’s Muslim to uphold the peaceful ideals of Islam and resist thoughts that “justify terrorism or any acts of violence.” The speech was the example of Megawati’s efforts to simultaneously support the U.S.-led war on terrorism and reach out to moderate Muslims, who are extremely wary of her government’s efforts to crack down on Islamic militants.90

Azyumardi Azra, a leading Islamic intellectual and a political commentator, argued President Megawati has not done enough to reach out to moderate Muslims and seems timid in confronting terrorism for fear of a political backlash. He further said "She should not be afraid to be critical of the radicals, because the radicals are not supported by many Muslims.91 The dynamics of international environment and

91 Ibid.
domestic situation, however, have in many respects put the government in a
delicate and even a dilemmatic situation to balance the development process of
democratic practices in (foreign) policy making and ensuring domestic security in
Indonesia.

Even though radical Islamist organizations and Anti American protests did
not enjoy the support of the majority of the population and their followers are not
significant in number, their Islamic discourse has affected the image of Indonesian
Islam from global perspective. Thus, the increasing leverage of radical Muslim
groups in Indonesia’s politics has shaped the image of Indonesian Islam. This is
mainly because the government’s lack of action against the campaigns by hard-
liner Muslim groups. This situation then drew more deeply into the accusation that
Indonesia and its neighbouring countries in the region is the hotbed of militant
Islam and international terrorism. Indonesia has even also been perceived as the
weakest link on the fight against terrorism. These accusations, of course, have
not only had a negative impact on Indonesian Islam but also to Indonesia's
credibility in the eyes of international community.

However, President Megawati’s more recent tougher and firmer policy
toward the radical Muslim groups in the post Bali bombing has helped the
government to restore its credibility. The government has been able to convince the
public and more importantly, the parliament on the need for anti-terrorist
legislation. Yet, some analysts maintained that the inability of the government to
take the matter very seriously and its lack of strong enthusiasm for curbing militant
groups made Indonesia one of the weakest links in international coalition against
terrorism. This was illustrated by criticism that the government is not preventing
the activities of the militant groups and restricted in it’s possible response, not
wishing to appear ‘anti-Islamic’. Further, international community, particularly
US, still also perceived that Indonesia has not done enough efforts to crack down
the radical Muslim groups. These perceptions is not totally wrong mainly because
the hard-liner Muslim groups still could threaten the survival of the government as
well as domestic economy and political agenda. These critics are mainly due to the
fact that the government’s incapacity to dealing with militant groups is related to

92 For further discussion on this issue, see for example John Gersham (2002).Is Southeast
93 See John McBeth. 2002. Weak link in the anti-terror chain. In Far Eastern Economic
94 Landry Subiyanto.2002. Jakarta Must Get Tough On Terror. In South China Morning
Post.October 19.
95 J. Hindryati Solomon R. 2001. Indonesian Radicals Rally In Support of bin Laden—Western
the government’s domestic political calculations. President Megawati herself viewed Muslim support as an essential part of her political legitimacy.96

The changing nature of both domestic and international environments since the late 1980s and particularly in the post September 11 have also had a significant impact on Indonesia’s involvement in the multilateral forum of Islamic countries of Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). Indonesia has re-evaluated its participation in OIC and taken a more assertive role. Since the administration of President Megawati, Indonesia has not only widen its involvement but it has also deepened its level of commitment in the OIC.97

As stated above, the Indonesia’s (radical) Muslim community demands for a greater participation in foreign policy making can be clearly seen as ‘a desire for recognition’ of the Muslim voice in Indonesia’s foreign policy which it perceived as part of significant ‘public sphere’ in state-society relationship. Despite most efforts of Islamic revival have initially directed to Muslim societies, its effects have coloured and even complicated some issues of international affairs98. As Azra99 revealed that the revival of political Islam may continue to affect the course of Indonesian politics as a whole, including foreign policy.

Thus, The growing militancy and power of the Islamic political pressures from the Muslim community has put the government in a huge policy dilemma. Moreover, it will always place the government/state in a position to ‘accommodate’ their wishes in the policy making process. The government faces more political risk from domestic radical Islamic opposition, if the government —for instance— cooperate too closely with the US on the issues related to political Islam. This concern comes from a question whether the US campaign on war against terrorism is going to become a war against democracy. Even Amnesty International reported that the US-led war on terror has more effective in eroding international human

96Landry Subiyanto 2002.


rights and democracy than in fighting terrorism. This is mainly due to the fact that the (national and international) public, particularly the Muslim society perceived the US has applied double standard policy—one that Indonesia cannot whole heartedly support-- in democracy and human rights to different areas of the world, such as in Middle East and Southeast Asia. Indonesia so far has condemned, for instance, US foreign policy toward Israeli-Palestinian conflict and viewed the US as the source of problem in the Middle East.

Many Indonesian Muslim intellectuals even argued that “while some of their more authoritarian neighbours, like Malaysia or Pakistan, have suddenly become the new darlings of Washington, Indonesia is being orphaned because it is a messy, but real, democracy” A stronger statement expressed by militant Islamic groups, argued that the US policy in Afghanistan was no more than a war against Islam. Even moderate Muslim leaders objected to the way US is conducting its war against terrorism and the way its handled foreign policy. Abdullah Gymnastiar—known as Aa Gym—the most popular preacher on Indonesian television, said “I am very sad that a big country like America could have the heart to oppress and destroy small countries without any reasons, it has raised hatred against America among the international community”. A similar statement was also voiced by Syafii Ma’arif, the head of Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s second largest Islam organization, that “Mr. Bush was a “war criminal” for invading Afghanistan and Iraq without United Nations support”.

The above statement clearly illustrate the tension between security and democracy in the war on terrorism. The US need Indonesia as a Muslim ‘ally’ in the fight against terrorism but on the other hand, the US cannot erect a security state and foster democracy at the same time. At the street level, the anti-American feeling was significantly increased which has complicated and made the governmental position much more difficult. As a result, Indonesian foreign policy

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100 See the annual report of Amnesty International 2005. In this annual report, Amnesty International says the war on on terror has eroded human rights standards and allowed governments to openly defy international law in the name of national security.
105 Ibid.
makers need to think very carefully about how to manage Indonesia’s long-term relationship with the US particularly in connection with one of Indonesia’s major interests: economic recovery.107

However, the role of Muslim community in foreign policy issues largely depends on the condition of domestic politics. Many fragmented and fractious Islamic groups could possibly provide the basis of ‘moderate’ foreign policies for the government. It is a common phenomenon in many developing countries that the governments can easily exploit the links between their domestic political stability and that of the states to increase their leverage over domestic politics. Such an assumption is mainly based on the fact that the governments have their own political needs and agendas and seek to maintain them in the name of domestic political stability and security. To borrow the words of Acharya, “concerns for domestic stability and regime security proved decisive”108 in the case of state-society relations in today’s Indonesia’s foreign policy.

However, the development of international issues which is pertinent to the Muslim world also play a significant role in influencing foreign policy process. The anti-US demonstration held by thousands of Indonesian Muslim on the alleged desecration of the the Muslim holy book Koran by American troops at Guantanamo bay prison camp has also pushed them to endorse the government to freeze Indonesia’s relations with the US109. On the other hand, there is also a misperception in the US that there are radical Islamic components in Indonesia that support terrorism.110 This becomes one of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s crucial tasks to explain in his visit to US from 25-27 May 2005. As the Jakarta Post writes in its editorial that “Expression of Indonesia’s desire to intensify relationships (with the US)—trade and security—should not prevent the sending of a clear signal that we stand opposite the US on many international issues”111.

The level of public participation, particularly from the Muslim community, in foreign policy will be determined by the government’s response to its domestic activities as well as its trans-national networks. While, the government’s response

111 See the editorial of the Jakarta Post, 25 May 2005.
itself depends on the government’s political agenda of needs and the capabilities of domestic societies to involve in the foreign policy.

**Conclusion**

From the above discussion, it is quite clear that the need to include non-governmental mechanism in Indonesia’s foreign policy of the post Soeharto’s era is not only reflecting the changes of the government’s paradigm in foreign policy, but it is also a significant response to the rapid development in the domestic arena in which the societal factor (Muslim societies) plays crucial role in foreign policy making and on the other hand, the challenges of the politics of globalisation.

Furthermore, engaging greater public participation in Indonesia’s foreign policy will change the old paradigm in Indonesia’s foreign policy from ‘the state leading society’ which is a strong state guiding an organic society toward adaptive foreign policy for the purpose of maintaining the power of the state to ‘society leading the state’ which the role of the society in foreign policy will have greater access and level of participation in foreign policy making. However, there will be some other crucial aspects that need to be taken into account on this issue.

The Indonesian domestic political map has significantly changed when the political awareness of the Muslim community, the number of Islamic political parties and groups have significantly increased in the late 1990s. The political Islam which was represented by some Islamic radical groups has also been used as political symbols and a marker of political identity in policy making process and even in certain foreign policy implementations. So far, Indonesia has been a shining example of democracy for developing countries and “Islamic countries. Yet, a strategy to implement the vision of democratization agenda in Indonesia’s foreign policy, to a large extent, will be based upon consensus building between the state and the larger society as well as the domestic and international level. In this context, the degree of “secularization of polity” and “religionization of polity” concerning the relationship between the state and society (religious community) at the national level will remain debatable in the making of Indonesia’s foreign policy in the post Soeharto era.
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