

**NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS
ACROSS THE MEDITERRANEAN
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
CHALLENGES AND COOPERATIVE
APPROACHES**

**A Project Report by the
Istituto Affari Internazionali**

**ROBERTO ALIBONI, MOHAMMED KHAIR EIEDAT,
F. STEPHEN LARRABEE, IAN O. LESSER, CARLO MASALA,
CRISTINA PACIELLO, ALVARO DE VASCONCELOS**

AI QUADERNI
March 2003

3

ENGLISH SERIES

ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI

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Preface

Since 2001 the IAI is running an international project looking into “Transatlantic Relations”. Out of this project one important dimension relates to the challenge the governance of relations across the Mediterranean Sea puts to transatlantic relations. The way relations across the Mediterranean border have to be governed is a most important issue - and definitely at issue - in transatlantic relations. This is even more true after September 11th events.

A set of topics and issues concerning the transatlantic perspective on relations across the Mediterranean Sea – an ideally demarcated border with the huge expanse encompassing North Africa and the Middle East – has been taken into consideration in international conferences attended by scholars, analysts and officials. Detailed information on these activities is provided by attachment 2 in this Paper. In it a selection from the papers presented to the conferences is published. Furthermore, the Paper publishes the report generated by IAI on one such conference. The German Marshall Fund of the United States supports the IAI Transatlantic project. In particular, it provided funding for publishing this Paper, All the conferences organised so far have also enjoyed financial support from the NATO Office of Information and Press. The IAI takes this opportunity to thank them very much for their generous support.

Roberto Aliboni
Head of IAI Mediterranean and Middle East Programme

1. The Impact of September 11 on U.S. Policy in the Middle East and Transatlantic Relations

F. Stephen Larrabee¹

The events of September 11 have had a major impact on U.S. foreign policy. The war on terrorism has become the central focus and guiding organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy. It is the prism through which all other issues are viewed by the Bush administration. The key consideration is how these issues facilitate or hinder the war on terrorism.

The events of September 11 have also resulted in a major shift in U.S. military strategy. The new National Security Strategy released by the Bush administration on September 20 essentially junks previous concepts of deterrence and puts a premium on preemption.² Bush administration officials argue that in the new era in which terrorists could acquire weapons of mass destruction, the United States can not afford to wait to be attacked but must strike first in order to assure its national interests and protect its citizens. While the U.S. always implicitly reserved the right to strike first if its vital national interests were seriously threatened, preemption — or “anticipatory self-defense,” as it is being called — has now been raised to a cardinal principle of U.S. foreign policy and national security strategy.

In doing so, the Bush administration has driven the last nail into the coffin of Article 51 of the UN charter, which allows for self-defense *in response to an armed attack*. As Gary Schmidt has noted, in promulgating the concept of “anticipatory self-defense,” Bush is pushing well beyond the traditional justification of self-defense as embodied in Article 51 — that is, that the threat be imminent, leaving no choice or possibility of deliberation. He is making new law — or at least applying an old principle to new circumstances.³

Current U.S. policy in the Middle East should be seen against of this changing strategic context and the impact of the events of September 11. The Bush administration came into office highly critical of President Clinton’s efforts to obtain a Middle East peace settlement and was initially reluctant to engage itself heavily in the peace process. September 11 and the suicide attacks against Israel in the Spring of 2002 thrust the Middle East back onto the U.S. policy agenda and forced the administration to give the region greater attention. However, the administration has seen most of the region’s problems — especially the Arab-Israeli dispute — largely through the prism of terrorism, a fact which has often obscured the deeper roots of these conflicts and problems.

Four issues in particular in the Middle East have assumed greater importance since September 11:

1 The views expressed in this paper are his personal views and do not represent those of RAND or its sponsors. Published as “U.S. Middle East policy after 9/11”, *The International Spectator*, Rome, vol. XXXVII, n° 3, July-September 2002, pp. 43-56.

2 *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, p.15-16. For background see David Sanger, “Bush to Outline Doctrine of Striking Foes First,” *New York Times*, September 19, 2002.

3 Gary Schmidt, “A Case of Continuity,” *The National Interest*, Fall 2002, p. 11.

1. The Arab-Israeli Dispute

The suicide bombings in the Spring of 2002 forced the administration to give greater attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict because they threatened to reignite Muslim passions throughout the Middle East and make it more difficult for the administration to gain Arab support for the war on terrorism. President Bush found himself under strong pressure from many sides — especially moderate Arab states — to get more deeply involved in order to halt the violence and avoid a destabilization of the region. Moreover, the administration increasingly began to recognize that it would not be able to get Arab support for the war on terrorism as long as it took a hands-off approach to the Palestinian problem.

However, the administration's efforts have achieved few visible results, largely because the administration is perceived as pursuing a one-sided policy and is unwilling to put strong pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. In addition, the administration's focus has increasingly shifted from pushing for an Arab-Israeli peace settlement to ousting Arafat and reforming the Palestinian Authority. Its strong support for Sharon also damaged its credibility with the moderate Arab states, not to mention the Arab "street."

The Palestinian problem has been essentially seen as one of terrorism. In the administration's view, until the suicide bombings are stopped, there can be no prospect of peace. This ignores the deeper roots of the conflict and the degree to which Israel's actions have also contributed to the cycle of violence. It also puts the administration four-square behind Sharon, who has tried to portray his actions, like those of the U.S., as a struggle against terrorism.

It may well be true, as administration officials argue, that Arab governments in the Middle East have used the Palestinian problem as a pretext for avoiding much-needed reforms. But the issue has a deep resonance among the populations of the region. There is unlikely to be peace in the region until it is addressed. This will require strong U.S. political engagement — but also a more balanced and nuanced policy.

2. Regime Change in Iraq

Moreover, the Palestinian issue has increasingly taken a backseat to the effort to compel "regime change" in Iraq. Saddam's ouster has become the centerpiece of the Bush administration's Middle East policy, crowding out other issues, including the broader war on terrorism. Some cynics have charged that the campaign against Iraq is a political ploy to deflect attention away from Bush's domestic difficulties in the run up to the Congressional elections in November. While the single-minded campaign for regime change in Iraq has worked to the administration's advantage domestically, the concern with Iraq among the more hawkish members of the administration predates the electoral season — and even September 11 for that matter.

The war on terrorism, however, has lent the Iraq issue greater urgency. Administration officials fear that Saddam may obtain nuclear weapons in the near future and that he may then be tempted to give them to other terrorists. However, most independent studies argue that Saddam does not have nuclear weapons and is not likely to be able to build a nuclear bomb soon. Moreover, the administration's argument assumes that Saddam is irrational and is willing to hand over these weapons to forces over which he has no control, knowing that he would be a target for a retaliatory U.S. nuclear strike if they tried to use these weapons. But why would Saddam put his fate and very existence in the hands of such groups? He is dangerous but not stupid or suicidal. His top priority is his own survival.

Within the U.S. political elite there is a broad consensus that Saddam is a threat and that everyone — the U.S., the Iraqi population, the moderate Arab states of the region, and America's European allies — would be better off if Saddam were removed from power. *The real debate is over how to do this, and how soon.* Four issues have emerged as central in the U.S. debate:

- *Unilateralism vs. Multilateralism.* On this issue, the divisions run across the political spectrum. The Republicans are split. The “old Bushies” (i.e. those associated with President Bush's father) such as Brent Scowcroft and James Baker argue that if the campaign to unseat Saddam is to succeed, the U.S. needs to build a broad international coalition. The “new Bushies” (those in the current administration) welcome international support to overthrow Saddam but are prepared to act alone, if necessary. They calculate that once it is clear that Saddam will not survive, the European allies and moderate Arab states will quickly fall into line and support U.S. policy.
- *Post-Saddam Reconstruction of Iraq.* Many Senators, including some important Republicans, such as Chuck Hagel (R-Nebraska), are concerned that the administration has not carefully thought through the problems associated with rebuilding Iraq after Saddam's overthrow (the “Day After Problem”). To date, the administration has essentially ducked this question, arguing that it will worry about that problem later. The key issue, in their view, is to get rid of Saddam. After that, everything will fall into place. Indeed, one of the administration's main assumptions is that Saddam's overthrow will stimulate a process of democratization throughout the Middle East. While highly desirable, this seems to overestimate both the ease of rebuilding Iraq as well as the knock-on effect Saddam's removal will have elsewhere in the region.
- *The Impact on the Broader War on Terrorism.* Many Democrats — and some Republicans — are worried that the war in Iraq will divert attention from the real issue — the war on global terrorism. Some even believe that Bush is so hell-bent on invading Iraq in order to divert attention from the fact that the war on terrorism is bogging down.⁴ While this is probably too cynical an interpretation of Bush's motives, there is a serious danger that an invasion of Iraq will divert American attention from the broader war on terrorism. A war with Iraq will be costly (current estimates run from \$100-200 billion); it could require months to prosecute; and it will leave a devastated country that will take years, perhaps decades, to rebuild. Faced with these formidable challenges, it will be hard for the administration to maintain a single-minded focus on the war on terrorism.

Some conservative critics argue that the administration is in danger of losing sight of the forest through the terrorist trees. It has focused so single-mindedly on ousting Saddam that it can't see the broader terrorist threat. The real threat, in their view, comes from Iran not Iraq. Thus, they argue, the administration should concentrate on toppling the Iranian regime. This would eliminate the terrorists' greatest source of support and “cut the heart out Islamic fundamentalism.”⁵

- *The Impact on Stability in the Middle East.* Critics and skeptics fear that an attack on Iraq, especially one not sanctioned by the UN, could destabilize the Middle East and lead to the weakening — and possible overthrow — of some Middle East governments such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia. These concerns are shared by many of America's European allies. The

4 This argument has specifically been made by former Vice President Al Gore. See Dan Balz, “Gore Gives Warnings on Iraq,” *The Washington Post*, September 24, 2002.

5 See Michael Ledeen, “The real foe is Middle Eastern tyranny,” *Financial Times*, September 24, 2002.

Bush administration brushes aside such concerns. It argues that Saddam's overthrow will have a positive impact on stability in the Middle East and give new impulse to a process of democratization throughout the region.

The skeptics' concerns, while not inconsequential, are not likely to be strong enough to prevent an attack on Iraq. Iraq's willingness to accept inspectors on its soil has complicated the administration's strategy but is not likely to derail it. The administration sees the Iraqi acceptance as little more than a tactical ploy — a delaying tactic — and it appears prepared to carry out an invasion, with or without a UN resolution. Bush will almost certainly obtain the authorization he needs from the Congress to use military force against Iraq, though the broadly worded draft authorization which the administration sent to the Hill is likely to be amended in order to avoid giving Bush the type of blank check that President Johnson received in the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution.⁶

Most Democrats, especially those with presidential ambitions, are reluctant to be seen as undercutting the President. They remember that the most successful Democrats — Clinton, Gore and Lieberman — supported the Gulf War while the majority of Democrats voted against it. Thus they don't want to be on the wrong side of the fence on this issue. Moreover, the mood in the United States today is quite different than in 1999. The events of September 11 have made many Americans far more sensitive to the dangers of terrorism and more willing to support the use of force to deter these dangers.

3. Relations with Saudi Arabia

One of the most important repercussions of September 11 has been a visible deterioration in U.S.-Saudi relations. The fact that 15 out of 19 terrorists involved in the September 11 attacks were of Saudi origin has greatly contributed to the souring of relations. Once viewed as America's critical ally in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia is today increasingly seen as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. The right wing of the Republican party and its fellow travelers have launched an all-out media assault on the Saudi regime, depicting it as corrupt, undemocratic and supporting — or at least tolerating — anti-American and extremist views.

The Bush administration's strong support for Prime Minister Sharon and its unwillingness to aggressively push the Saudi peace plan have also contributed to the deterioration of ties. The Saudis thought they had Bush's firm backing for the peace plan. But Bush has done little to promote the plan, which has largely languished on the back burner. Instead he has concentrated on trying to oust Arafat — and more recently Saddam.

At the same time, the Saudi leadership is alarmed by the growing anti-Saudi mood in the United States and fears being pushed aside. The leadership is divided on the degree to which the Kingdom should assist the U.S. in any war against Saddam. King Fahd and Defense Minister Prince Sultan are eager to go along with the United States, while others led by Crown Prince Abdullah are more inclined to stand up to the Bush administration.

The strains in relations with Saudi Arabia have increased the importance of Qatar in U.S. strategy. Qatar has established a strong alliance with the United States. The U.S. air base at

⁶ The administration's draft gives the President extensive powers. There are no limits or reporting requirements. Nor is it confined to Iraq. It gives the President freedom to take all necessary action to restore peace and security "in the region." Under this construction, the administration would be free to undertake military action against other states in the region such as Iran or Syria.

Al Udeid has undergone extensive enlargement and has a 15,000-foot runway, the longest in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. Central Command plans to move command and control facilities from Florida in November. The move is officially billed as a biennial exercise but the equipment and personnel are likely to remain after the completion of the exercise. In the event of an attack on Iraq, Qatar will almost certainly serve as a launching pad.

4. Turkey's Critical Role

September 11 has also increased Turkey's strategic importance in the eyes of U.S. policy makers. To be sure, American policy makers began stressing Turkey's strategic importance long before Iraq moved to center stage on the U.S. agenda. But the events of September 11 and the plans to overthrow Saddam have reinforced Turkey's strategic importance. Ankara's support — especially the use of the airbase at Incirlik — is critical for any attack on Iraq. The administration has thus actively courted Turkey lately.

The Turks, however, are unenthusiastic about the idea of a war on Iraq. Ankara has strong economic interests in Iraq, which would be damaged by a war with Baghdad. It is also worried that the collapse of Saddam's regime could lead to the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. Many Turks fear that such a situation could rekindle Kurdish separatism in Turkey and pose a threat to the unity of the Turkish state.

However, Turkish officials appear to have concluded that an American attack on Iraq is inevitable and that Ankara has little choice but to go along with an invasion. The real issue is the price for Turkish support. This time Turkey does not want to be left holding the bag, as it was in the Gulf War, which cost Turkey some \$30-40 billion. Thus it is likely to demand significant compensation for its support — including the stationing of Patriot air defense systems on its soil to protect it against any possible missile attack by Iraq as well as compensation for any economic losses incurred as a result of an U.S. attack on Iraq.

5. The Transatlantic Dimension

In Europe, the events of September 11 initially generated a remarkable degree of sympathy for and solidarity with the United States. However, a year after the events this solidarity has begun to dissipate and be replaced by new tensions and strains. Differences over the Middle East have not caused these strains, but they have clearly contributed to them. Policy differences between the U.S. and Europe have manifested themselves over two issues in particular:

- *The Arab-Israeli conflict.* European governments and the EU tend to give high priority to an Arab-Israeli settlement, and especially the Palestinian issue. The Bush administration, by contrast, sees the Palestinian issue, as a secondary issue whose resolution will be facilitated, not hindered, by Saddam's overthrow. The U.S. and Europe also differ over their approach to Arafat's role. While many European governments do not entirely trust Arafat, they regard him as the elected representative of the Palestinian people. The Bush administration, by contrast, sees him as yesterday's man — as part of the problem, not the solution. They regard his ouster as a precondition for the creation of an efficient, democratic and reform-minded Palestinian Authority and a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement.
- *Iraq.* For the Bush administration, Iraq is *the* central issue and the key to transforming the Middle East. In their view, once Saddam is gone, the rest of the pieces of the Middle

Eastern puzzle will fall into place. But as long as he is in power, there can be no peace in the Middle East. European governments, on the other hand, are much more focused on the Palestinian issue. They don't like Saddam, but they are worried that a war with Iraq may destabilize the Middle East. Most (Britain excepted) want any military action to be approved by the UN. Chancellor Schroeder has gone so far as to say the Germany will not participate in an attack on Iraq even with a UN Resolution.

Depending on how it is handled, Iraq could lead a major rupture in transatlantic relations. Bush's effort to work through the UN has won him points in Europe and helped to restore some sense of harmony in U.S.-European relations. But if Bush goes forward with an attack on Iraq without a UN mandate — which is likely — many European governments (Britain excepted) may not be willing to support the U.S. This, in turn, could lead to a strong anti-European reaction in the United States' Congress, including calls for U.S. troops withdrawals from Europe.⁷

One casualty is already visible: the U.S.-German relationship. Chancellor Schroeder's unilateral refusal to participate in an attack on Iraq under any circumstances — even with a UN mandate — has infuriated Bush administration officials and will not be forgotten. Schroeder is seen as having engaged in irresponsible election pandering and has severely damaged Germany's credibility in Washington's eyes. While the damage to bilateral relations may eventually be repaired, any hopes of Germany being viewed by the Bush administration as a "partner in leadership" are dead for the foreseeable future, even if Schroeder backtracks and tries to mend fences after the election.

It is also unclear what lessons Europeans may draw from Schroeder's actions. Some European leaders may see his unilateral refusal as a lesson in how not to deal with the Americans. Certainly that is the administration's hope. But others may come to the conclusion that standing up to the Americans pays and is good domestic politics. If that is the lesson that is drawn, transatlantic relations could be in for even rougher times.

6. September 11 and the Debate on NATO's Future

The events of September 11 have intensified the debate about NATO's mission and strategic purpose. A number of analysts contend that NATO needs to adapt to a fundamentally new strategic environment. In their view, today the cornerstone of a new European order is largely in place.⁸ The grand strategic issues that dominated NATO's agenda in the past — German unification, Russia's integration into the West, the integration of Central and Eastern Europe into Euro-Atlantic structures, ending the military conflicts in the Balkans — are now completed or in the process of completion. As a result, Europe is now more secure than it has been in the last fifty years.

At the same time, the events of September 11 have made clear that the United States and its European allies are faced with a series of new and deadly threats — terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, failed and rogue states — most of which emanate from beyond European borders. Today as Ronald Asmus and Kenneth Pollack have noted, "the greatest likelihood of

7 Calls for a U.S. troop withdrawal, in fact, have already begun. See William Safire, "The German Problem," *The New York Times*, September 19, 2002.

8 See Ronald D. Asmus and Kenneth M. Pollack, "The New Transatlantic Project: A Response to Robert Kagan," *Policy Review*, October-November, pp. 1-16.

large numbers of Americans and Europeans being killed no longer comes from a Russian invasion or a war in the Balkans. It comes from the threat posed by terrorists or rogue states in the Greater Middle East armed with weapons of mass destruction, attacking our citizens, our countries, or our vital interests.”⁹

This shift in the focus of threats has raised new questions about NATO’s role and strategic purpose. What is NATO for? Should it be primarily focused on enhancing stability in an increasingly stable Europe? Or should NATO broaden its role beyond Europe and address the new threats that have become more prominent since September 11?

Some observers such as Senator Richard Lugar have argued that preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction should become a central NATO task. Otherwise NATO risks becoming marginalized.¹⁰ He contends that in an era in which terrorist attacks can be planned in Germany, financed in Asia and carried out in the United States, old distinctions between “in” and “out” of area make little sense. Many Europeans maintain, however, that NATO should remain focused on peacekeeping in Europe.

This debate is not entirely new. It has been brewing for some years within the Alliance.¹¹ The Clinton administration sought to get the Alliance to focus more attention on threats beyond Europe, especially from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the run up to the Washington Summit in April 1999. However, it met strong resistance to what Europeans perceived as an effort to “globalize” NATO.¹² Nevertheless, the administration did manage to get language inserted in the Strategic Concept adopted at the Washington summit that officially recognized that threats such as terrorism and WMD could affect Alliance security.

The debate has been given greater momentum by the events of September 11 and the U.S. handling of the conflict in Afghanistan. In the Afghanistan campaign NATO was largely bypassed by the U.S. in favor of dealing with key allies bilaterally. Many Europeans see this as evidence that the U.S. is losing interest in NATO as an instrument of policy and that in the future the U.S. will prefer to deal with crises, especially crises outside of Europe, unilaterally or with a few key allies.

How this debate evolves will have an important impact on NATO’s future evolution and transatlantic relations. In the future, most of the threats NATO will face are likely to come from beyond Europe’s borders. Thus NATO will need to find a way to address these threats more directly and forthrightly. If it does not, American support for NATO is likely to dwindle and the fissures in the transatlantic relationship, evident in recent years, will grow, eroding the sense of common purpose that has been the glue that has held the Alliance together for the past fifty years.

9 Ibid, p. 3.

10 See Richard Lugar, “Redefining NATO’s Mission: Preventing WMD Terrorism,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 3, Summer 2002, pp. 7-13.

11 For early discussions that foreshadow the current debate, see David C. Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee (eds.), *America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997)

12 See William Drozdiak, “European Allies Balk at Expanded Role for NATO,” *Washington Post*, February 2, 1999. Joseph Fitchett, “A More United Europe Worries About Globalizing NATO,” *International Herald Tribune*, December 31, 1998; William Pfaff, “Washington’s New Vision for Europe Could be Divisive,” *ibid.*, December 5-6, 1998. For a European critique, see Curt Gästeyger, “Riskante Doppelerweiterung,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 9, 1999. Karl-Heinz Kamp, “Eine ‘globable’ Rolle für die NATO?” *ibid.*, April 2, 1998.

7. Implications for NATO's Mediterranean Initiative

The events of September 11 and the evolving debate on NATO's future have three important implications for NATO. First, in the coming years, NATO is likely to become more outward looking and less Eurocentric. This means that the Alliance will increasingly focus on threats beyond Europe's borders. Many of these are in or emanate from the Middle East. Second, the distinction between European security and Middle Eastern and European security is likely to become increasingly blurred. As a result, Middle Eastern issues are likely to increasingly intrude on the NATO agenda. Indeed, as the debate over an invasion of Iraq underscores, they have already begun to do so.

Third, NATO's Mediterranean Initiative will take on greater importance. NATO will need to develop closer and more comprehensive security cooperation with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. A better understanding of security perceptions on both sides of the Mediterranean will be necessary if many of the new challenges are to be adequately addressed.

NATO's Mediterranean Initiative provides an important vehicle for conducting a dialogue about these threats and fostering closer cooperation between NATO and the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. But it needs to be updated and expanded in light of the changed security environment. To date, the initiative has concentrated primarily on information sharing. But in the aftermath of September 11 NATO needs to begin to develop closer concrete cooperation in areas such as peacekeeping and counter-terrorism.

In particular, the idea of a "PfP for the Mediterranean" should be explored. When first proposed by Italy some years ago, the idea was somewhat premature. But in light of the new strategic context it may be time to revive it and adapt it to the Mediterranean setting.

There are, of course, major obstacles to closer cooperation between NATO and the countries in the Middle East and North Africa—the most important being the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict and the tension that the conflict engenders. Until this conflict is solved, many countries in the Middle East and North Africa will be reluctant to engage in any multilateral cooperation that involves Israel. Nevertheless, it is NATO's interest to intensify the dialogue with these countries and give it more concrete content. Thus as NATO seeks to draw lessons from the events of September 11, more thought needs to be given to how to deepen and expand its Mediterranean Initiative.¹³

13 For some useful ideas, see Roberto Aliboni, "Strengthening NATO- Mediterranean Relations: A Transition to Partnership," paper prepared for the International Seminar "From Dialogue to Partnership. Security in the Mediterranean and NATO: Future Prospects," sponsored by the Italian Parliament in collaboration with the NATO Office of Information and Press and the Italian Institute of International Affairs (IAI), Rome, Italy, September 30, 2002. See also Ian O. Lesser, Jerold Green, F. Stephen Larrabee and Michele Zanini, *The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative. Evolution and Next Steps* (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND, MR - 1164, 2000).

2. Aftermath of 11th of September: An Arab Perspective

Mohammed Khair Eiedat

1. Introduction

In September 2000 there was a widespread feeling among 'ordinary' Arabs that Arab leaders, perceived to be defensive and on the run, had failed their fellow Palestinian Arabs. Nevertheless, Arab leaders decided to hold a summit meeting and issue a strongly worded declaration condemning Israeli action in the Palestinian territories. A financial commitment to support Palestinians was also declared. Since then, two other Arab summits have taken place, but both have failed equally to lift Arab morale or regenerate self-esteem.

For many Arabs, the balance sheet of the last fifty years of modern Arab history continues to perpetuate a deep sense of failure. They perceive themselves as surrounded by hostile regional and international environments and the tragic events of September 11th and subsequent US responses have only deepened that feeling. From a psychological point of view, Arabs have all the symptoms of paranoia.

It might be a mistake to speak of the 'Arab world' as singular and monolithic because the differences between Arab countries can be as great as the differences between North African Arab states and southern European countries. Amman is certainly not Sana and Jordan is not Saudi Arabia. Yet, beneath the façade of modernity and neon lit streets of various Arab capitals lies a far darker and more disturbing reality. Two issues of major importance, fairness and justice and how to translate the social, economic and political changes taking place into a meaningful political process, are either being ignored or only given lipservice by the various Arab political systems. It is only logical to conclude that the challenges will be overcome only if they are addressed in a consensual and peaceful manner.

2. The Palestinian Issue

It is generally accepted by the rulers, the ruled and the observers that the unresolved Palestinian issue is a source of instability in the Middle East. Many moderate Arab leaders have repeatedly argued that the unresolved Palestinian issue is a major source of radicalization in Arab societies and, one might add, in the Islamic world. For complex historical and normative reasons, it represents a test of legitimacy for many Arab political systems. Indeed, many have justified 'suspension' of some democratic practices because of the unresolved Palestinian issue. In some pan-Arabist regimes, the government's stand on the Palestinian issue has almost become a substitute for democracy and 'Arab masses' seem to have accepted that criterion to define the legitimacy or, for that matter, illegitimacy of the regime. That could partly explain why protests in Arab capitals are not for more democracy but are aimed at supporting the Palestinians and condemning Israel.

Aware of the challenges the unresolved Palestinian issue is creating, various Arab regimes are gradually shifting their bases of legitimacy to economic development and an essentially

domestic agenda. But even if economic performance were to become a source of legitimacy, it would not be trouble free since political regimes would be expected to deliver. It is also doubtful whether economic performance can legitimate a political system without genuine political reform. This could explain the real dilemma Arab political systems are facing and will continue to face .

Solving the Palestinian issue will not end the debate or even the conflict over parameters of political reform in Southern-Mediterranean states but it will focus governments and people on the necessity of addressing that issue. No doubt, solving the Palestinian issue will have a calming effect on the region in the long run. By the same token, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, by addressing the Palestinian issue and becoming more actively engaged in promoting a solution to it, can help the Arab world direct its attention to the issue of political reform.

3. The Iraqi Issue

In many ways, the 'Iraqi issue' has only served to strengthen a feeling of victimization among many Arabs. Even some Kuwaitis, whose country was brutally occupied by Iraq in 1990, are not immune to such sentiment. In fact, many Kuwaitis attempted to assassinate and target American soldiers deployed in Kuwait, supposedly to protect the country from possible Iraqi attack.

How has the Iraqi issue, despite its complexity and in many ways contradictory dimensions, managed to capture the Arab imagination? In what measure is this highly emotional response similar to that of the Palestinian issue?

For many Arabs, Iraq had paid more than its dues for having occupied Kuwait and the Western attitude towards Iraq is seen as a hollow pronouncement of typically hypocritical behavior. As far as weapons of mass destruction are concerned, many Arab would shrug off such matters by pointing out that there is no proof that Iraq continues to possess WMD and by raising two questions: why is it permissible for other states including regional ones to possess nuclear weapons? And what about Saddam Hussein's brutal use of chemical weapons against his own population? Arab cynicism, in response, goes even deeper and many Arabs point out that Western countries allied themselves with Saddam Hussein when it suited their interests and that Iraq is now being targeted because it symbolizes 'Arab defiance' and self-respect.

Furthermore, many Arabs believe that the main US goal is not the democratization of Iraq but rather control of its oil resources and this has outraged them even more.

What kind of implications might an attack against Iraq have on the Arab mood and what will Arab reactions be to US and European attempts to combat terrorism? The answer is that in the long run combating terrorism will require a move towards democratization and political reforms in many Arab states. The question is, will attacking Iraq lead to a promotion of such a goal? Will that impact be immediate? What if an immediate democratization process were to produce 'unintended consequences' which were not acceptable to the US such as the 'Islamization of societies and states'? Will that be an acceptable democratic choice or not?

I personally appeal to caution; it is better to prepare the ground for a long-term change than push for an immediate one.

4. Weapons of Mass Destruction

The debate on Weapons of Mass Destruction seems selective, essentially arbitrary and contradictory from an Arab point of view. There is no power of argument there is only power. Very few would disagree that Weapons of Mass Destruction are a possible source of threat to regional and international security. Precisely because of the unique and indiscriminate nature of their threat, the only way to address the issue of WMD is through multilateral forums. No state should be given the monopoly to decide and identify sources of threat to international security and the right to act accordingly. WMD should be placed and discussed in a clear regional and international context. Is the development of mini-nukes and third and fourth generation nuclear weapons justified? Can it really be defended? Why do certain major powers give lipservice to international conventions and treaties related to WMD? Why have some actors abrogated international treaties, such as the ABM, and how dangerous is that precedent for international stability and security? Is it not time, for example, to review the validity and logic of the NPT which became permanent seven years ago, not because India and Pakistan have joined the 'nuclear club', but to re-examine the logic and value of global nuclear disarmament?

Unless the logic and rationale of dealing with WMD were to become part of a genuine regional and international debate and unless the EU were to play a leading role, whether through the transatlantic debate or in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, with a clear reference to regional and international stability, any action by any state aimed at getting rid of the WMD of another state, no matter how justified, will remain arbitrary and dangerous.

5. Hegemony or World Society?

A security-oriented approach for combating terrorism is important but certainly not sufficient and in the long run sole reliance on such a method is likely to prove counter-productive and not effective.

It is important to promote the notion of a fair global order as an essential part of combating terrorism. An order which is not arbitrary and coercive. It is important for people of underprivileged regions of the globe, including the Middle East, to feel that parameters of 'global order' are designed to offer them hope for a better future and not merely to control them (i.e. threat of immigration).

Europe's intellectual contribution to such a debate is essential but, unfortunately, the EU's economic experience is progressively seen by many southern states as part and parcel of and not distinguishable from the global experience of market efficiency. Europe responded to the challenge of 'globalism' by adopting a 'mean and lean' approach and the imperative of a balanced budget. The EU's model seems to be similar to that of the IMF and the World Bank. The European 'social model', based on social welfare and a sense of community, has all but vanished. What we see now is self-help and market efficiency. This is indeed a pity. For states in which labour shortage is an alien concept, market efficiency can hardly be an appealing concept.

It is also important to be convinced that the debate on a fair world social order is not over and that it should be addressed by the EMP forum, especially considering that Europe is particularly qualified to do it. It would also be unfortunate if the transatlantic forum were to consider discussion of the issue of fairness in the global setting useful merely as an

intellectual exercise. Ultimately defeating terrorism will depend on international legitimacy based on a fair global order.

6. Conclusion

September 11th was not the beginning of history and it will certainly not be its end. Issues of instability in the Arab world are not difficult to identify. The problem has always been how these issues can be addressed and by whom? Conflicts of the priorities and interests of the various players have always given the impression of a vicious circle from which it is impossible to escape.

So far, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has fallen short of addressing these challenges. Indeed, with the growing concern for terrorism, seen progressively through a security prism by both Europeans and their southern partners, it is more likely for the forum to lose its original objective, at least from the European point of view, of being a vehicle for change and reform in the south.

3. Coalition Dynamics in the War against Terrorism

Ian O. Lesser¹

1. Diverse Co-operation against a Trans-Regional Challenge

“Coalition” may be an inappropriate term to describe the constellation of state and non-state actors co-operating in the global struggle against terrorism. The term coalition implies a certain agreement on strategy and objectives, short of a formal alliance. In fact, to the extent that NATO plays an active role in counter-terrorism, the current pattern of co-operation does have elements of an alliance. But the vast bulk of international co-operation on counter-terrorism, before and after 11 September, has involved the routine, sometimes intensive, co-ordination of intelligence, police and judicial activity. Contributions to large-scale military operations in Afghanistan, or elsewhere – although important to current objectives – are exceptional. Most counter-terrorism co-operation has been, and will almost certainly continue to be, of a more prosaic nature. The sheer range of activity – from the most intensive co-operation among European allies, to the ad hoc and often arms-length relations with states such as Libya, Syria and Iran, not to mention Russia and China – makes it difficult to speak of a single grand coalition against terrorism. The reality is a highly diverse pattern of co-operation: some limited, some extensive, some sustained, and some on a case-by-case basis. Modern counter-terrorism is an inherently international, multilateral exercise. As the dramatic events of 11 September demonstrated, and as analysts and policymakers have long been aware, the new forms of terrorism are trans-national, or more precisely, trans-regional. The risks cross borders and may have global reach. As a result, it is difficult to imagine effective counter-terrorism policies pursued on a national or unilateral basis. Again, the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon make this clear. The attacks left victims from over 80 countries. Suspects in the attack have been arrested in some 60 states. Most of the planning for the 11 September attacks, and for Al Qaeda operations outside of the Middle East in general, appears to have taken place in Europe. So even from the point of view of American counter-terrorism policy, understandably focused on “homeland defence”, international co-operation is essential.

2. Some Aspects of Co-operation against the New Terrorism²

Several points are worth noting here. First, contemporary images of coalition warfare are derived largely from the experience of the Gulf war and, more recently, the Balkans. But these are likely to be a poor guide to the evolution of co-operation against terrorism. The

- 1 This paper is based on a presentation delivered in Rome in March 2002, when he was Senior Political Scientist at RAND in Washington. The opinions presented here are his own, and do not reflect the views of the Pacific Council, or RAND. Published as “Coalition Dynamics in the War against Terrorism”, *The International Spectator*, Rome, vol. XXXVII, n. 2, April-June 2002, pp. 43-50.
- 2 For a discussion of changes in the nature of international terrorism and counter-terrorism strategy, see I. O. Lesser et al., *Countering the New Terrorism* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999).

Gulf coalition was far-ranging and assembled for a specific strategic purpose. The US played an overwhelming military and diplomatic role in the Gulf war, but others contributed substantial forces and – as important – allowed the use of their territory to facilitate American and European power projection. In doing so, secondary participants in the coalition accepted significant political and physical risks. In Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, the coalition activity had a strong institutional basis, through the UN and NATO. These were essentially alliance actions in a formal sense.

The “global war on terrorism” is a very different undertaking in coalition terms. To be sure, there are formal, alliance-based elements, most notably the unprecedented NATO declaration of the 11 September attacks as an Article V contingency – an attack on all – despite the fact that NATO has, in strict terms, played a limited role in subsequent military operations and other forms of counter-terrorism co-operation. That is not to say that NATO’s role has been unimportant. On the contrary, the Alliance played and continues to play a critical consensus-building role. The multinational operations in Afghanistan have clearly been facilitated by the planning capabilities and habits of co-operation developed by the Alliance. NATO forces have been deployed to allow the diversion of American assets elsewhere. The use of NATO AWACS aircraft to monitor the North American airspace has considerable symbolic and operational value (it is arguable that more could be made of this contribution as a matter of public diplomacy within the Alliance). If Turkey takes up the leadership of ISAF – not strictly a counter-terrorism operation – in Afghanistan, the planning for this task may well be undertaken with NATO assistance. And looking ahead, NATO will undoubtedly take up the question of whether to develop more substantive and institutionalised co-operation on counter-terrorism, from intelligence-sharing to consequence management, and perhaps even multinational forces for specialised “micro-interventions”.

Second, it is important to bear in mind that counter-terrorism has been an active part of international security co-operation, on both a transatlantic and a North-South basis, for a long time. Co-operation in this area has been gathering pace since the end of the Cold War, and has been evolving in response to a changing threat. The 11th of September has given much greater impetus to these efforts, but they are in no sense new. In recent years, agencies concerned with monitoring and countering terrorist threats have placed greater emphasis on addressing networked and privatised terrorism, including financial interdiction, as well as new tactics, from large-scale truck bombings to the possible use of weapons of mass destruction. The focus of international co-operation has evolved, from an emphasis on containing a well-known set of politically-motivated groups, often with overt state sponsors, to addressing more amorphous, less hierarchical terrorist movements, with more diverse religious or systemic motives.

Third, the conventional military component of counter-terrorism is likely to be as limited in the future as it has been in the past. In this sense, the operations against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and perhaps associated groups elsewhere, may turn out to be a special and rather exceptional case. The vast bulk of counter-terrorism co-operation is likely to be in the form of more comprehensive intelligence-sharing among states, and information-sharing among police establishments world-wide. This will be essential to address the very difficult problem of strategic and tactical warning in relation to new forms of terrorism. The problem may become even more difficult to the extent that the post-Afghanistan Al Qaeda, and Islamic extremism in general, fragments and takes on a more diverse and distributed form. In the view of many observers, Afghanistan is unlikely to be a model for future counter-terrorism operations because terrorist networks will be well aware of the exposure associated with an

established, territorial base of operations. State sponsors, and even weak states, will be similarly reluctant to accept such exposure. With regard to radical Islamic terrorism, the future is more likely to be urban – and Western – and this will drive the nature of international counter-terrorism efforts.

Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, the day-to-day business of counter-terrorism co-operation will take place in a strategic context where consensus may be difficult to achieve. The struggle against Al Qaeda has been a relatively uncontroversial test of international solidarity and co-operation. Bin Laden's sweeping, systemic aims threaten an extraordinary range of regimes and interests, from Washington to Tehran. Similarly, the Taliban had few friends on the international scene. The campaign against Al Qaeda is operationally challenging but politically less stressful than many possible future contingencies. Beyond Al Qaeda and its fellow travellers, the strategic consensus is far less clear. How would international opinion react to an American initiative against Hamas or Hezbollah? Who is interested in a coalition campaign against the GIA or GSCP in Algeria itself? Is the FARC in Colombia a terrorist movement "with global reach" or a regional insurgency? What of the residual terrorist movements that are still very much a part of the European scene, including ETA, the Red Brigades, November 17th, and the Real IRA. Or the LTTE in Sri Lanka? To what extent can or should states count on the involvement of international partners in their own, in some cases very long standing, struggles?

Arguably, states with global interests have at least two sorts of stakes in counter-terrorism: a specific national interest oriented toward the protection of their citizens and territory; and a wider, systemic stake in limiting the volume of terrorism world-wide because it interferes with their general foreign and security policy interests. Notwithstanding 11 September, the vast bulk of global terrorism is "domestic" in terms of aims and victims. A more active and comprehensive effort to contain terrorism as a co-operative endeavour will pose continuing problems of definition and relative interest. It also poses a larger, open question regarding the extent to which terrorist risks are shared or divisible. Elements of this are already evident in the debate about terrorism after 11 September. How much of the new terrorism is anti-American, and how much is directed at the West as a whole? Is regime change in the Arab and Muslim "South" a primary or secondary objective of Islamic extremists? Similar questions might be asked in relation to some secular reservoirs of international terrorism, including potential terrorism with an "anti-globalisation" agenda.

3. New Exposures, New Partners

States are not the only entities exposed to terrorist risks. The private sector and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can be severely affected by terrorism aimed at states (witness the disruptive effects of the 11 September attacks on the financial system and the travel industry, world-wide). Sub-state actors may also be the direct target of terrorism, a phenomenon common in places such as Colombia, where terrorist activity often merges with criminal motives. At the most fundamental level, terrorism poses a threat to personal security, with political implications. This is an aspect of terrorism with particular relevance to the current security environment in the Mediterranean, from Algeria to Israel. Moreover, the "hardening" of potential targets within states may encourage terrorists to seek out other, more vulnerable targets, and perhaps those outside the control of governments. As governments world-wide, and especially in the West, take a more active approach to counter-terrorism, this

“displacement effect” may actually spur a shift in exposure from the state to the private sector. This could reinforce an existing trend among NGOs and others regarding an awareness of risks to their often far-flung operations. The need to anticipate and counter terrorist threats is already part of the planning environment for humanitarian NGOs in the Caucasus, the Balkans, Africa, Latin America and elsewhere.

Non-state and sub-state actors, including Diaspora groups, may also be increasingly important partners, alongside states, in counter-terrorism co-operation. NGOs often have quite accurate intelligence regarding the activities of local organisations, including some that may use their humanitarian vocation as a front for political violence. In some key areas such as transportation, enhanced security measures will be impossible without the co-operation of the private sector. Similarly, the tremendous growth in the private security industry world-wide poses the question of the role of these organisations in international counter-terrorism efforts. How will they work with governments? Are they an asset, or in some instances, part of the problem? Certainly, the proliferation of actors with a stake in counter-terrorism policies is producing a much more complicated pattern of co-operation. In the extreme, it is possible to envision an environment in which both terrorism and counter-terrorism are increasingly “privatised”. In areas where the state is incapable of offering a credible response to terrorist risks – as in much of the developing world – private solutions will be sought by those who can afford to do so, with important implications for the “distribution of security”.

Even in the context of states, the post-11 September world may yield some odd and non-traditional patterns of co-operation. In the wake of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, Libya, Syria, Iran and other unlikely partners for co-operation with the US were quick to offer their declaratory support. In some cases, this new co-operation may extend to intelligence sharing, at least on an ad hoc basis. The net effect could be a new pragmatism in traditionally troubled relationships, even if a fundamental change in relations proves elusive. On a larger scale, there has been much speculation about the potential for counter-terrorism co-operation to change the character of Western relations with Russia and China. The experience of the past six months or so suggests that 11 September has done little to alter the basic geopolitical calculus, even if it has “given history a shove” in some areas.

One area where 11 September has undoubtedly given history a shove is in Europe. The terrorist attacks have quickened the pace of EU-wide co-operation on intelligence sharing, as well as police and judicial co-operation. The creation of a European arrest warrant is a clear example. To the extent that Europe continues to develop a more integrated approach to counter-terrorism, at the level of “third pillar” co-operation, as well as within common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and perhaps European security and defence policy (ESDP), Washington may acquire a more tangible European interlocutor in this area, just as terrorism and homeland defence issues come to the fore in American strategy. The result could (and should) be a new pattern of transatlantic co-operation that is less bilateral than in the past.

Counter-terrorism policy – and co-operation – consists of a spectrum of activities, ranging from declaratory statements, through intelligence and police operations, to micro interventions and finally the larger-scale use of conventional military force. Putting aside the question of willingness and interest, some state partners are clearly more capable of contributing at different points on this spectrum. Some actors may also bring specific “niche” capabilities, allowing them to make a contribution to international efforts of a relatively important kind, despite otherwise modest resources. Thus, Norway as a leading source of maritime intelligence, has been able to assist in monitoring the movement of shipping with possible Al Qaeda connections. States of the former Soviet Union, and some in Central and

Eastern Europe, have considerable expertise regarding chemical, biological and nuclear matters. Malta, Cyprus, Switzerland and Bermuda, along with a host of small states, have extensive practical involvement in international financial transactions, and their co-operation may be instrumental in the attempt to monitor and interdict terrorist funding. In sum, new patterns of terrorism will see new and non-traditional dynamics in counter-terrorism co-operation.

4. The Wider Policy Setting – A Search for Organising Principles

In the wake of 11 September, and especially in the US, there has been a natural tendency to see counter-terrorism as a new organising principle for strategy. The already contentious transatlantic and North-South debates on how to proceed in a “global war on terrorism”, suggest that this approach may be counter-productive. The question is not how to reorient policies to serve counter-terrorism ends, but rather the reverse: how can enhanced counter-terrorism co-operation be integrated in existing foreign and security policies, at the global and the regional level? In some cases, this may mean institutionalising mechanisms for monitoring and addressing terrorist risks, and giving counter-terrorism a higher priority in strategy and planning. This is the likely path for both NATO and the EU. In the absence of a clearer consensus on counter-terrorism strategy (focal points, priorities, limits, a sense of what is and is not counter-terrorism), there is a risk that currently effective working relationships among intelligence and police establishments on both sides of the Atlantic – and across the Mediterranean – will become less effective and less predictable as a consequence of disagreements at the political level.

At virtually every level, the problem of terrorism is linked to a strategic context and a wider foreign policy setting. In thinking through strategy and co-operation in relation to the new terrorist risks – and many of the stubborn, residual movements associated with the “old” terrorism – the international community will inevitably confront wider policy questions. In a Mediterranean and transatlantic context, three questions stand out.

First, what is the place of the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation in the new counter-terrorism equation? Almost certainly, it is far too simple to suggest that a resumption of negotiations and a just resolution will “solve” the problem of anti-Western terrorism emanating from the Middle East and from Islamic extremism. But it will certainly help to reduce the reservoir of grievance that fuels key aspects of the new terrorism. One lesson from the failure of the peace process on the Israeli-Palestinian track must be that the traditional practice of incremental negotiation and confidence-building leaves too many opportunities for violent extremists on all sides to use terrorism as an instrument of obstruction. The West and others must also reckon with the risk of terrorist spillovers in the event that conditions in the region continue to deteriorate. In the 1970s and 1980s, much Palestinian terrorism took place outside the Middle East, above all in Europe. Under conditions of withdrawal and separation sometimes discussed as an alternative for Israel, the stage could be set for a continuation of violent struggle elsewhere, with obvious implications for security around the Mediterranean, in Europe, and in the US. In the post-11 September environment, neither the US nor Europe can afford an arms-length approach to the Israeli-Palestinian crisis.

Second, what foreign policy price are we willing to pay for a more effective counter-terrorism posture? As noted above, the campaign against Al Qaeda is a relatively non-controversial case. But looking ahead, the choices are less clear and potentially more costly. More active

counter-terrorism “engagement” (security assistance, training, and in some cases direct intervention) may mean acquiescing in local definitions and approaches that run counter to broader foreign policy objectives. Regional states may seek a political price for cooperating against terrorist movements that threaten Western interests more than their own. Washington already faces this challenge directly in Pakistan. In other instances, states may seek assistance in managing their own internal security challenges under the guise of counter-terrorism. In some cases these challenges may have more to do with separatist insurgencies and transnational crime than with terrorism per se. To what extent will Europe and the US wish to compromise on human rights and democratisation when these interests are perceived to be in tension with the struggle against terrorism? We have not had to confront this dilemma in such a direct fashion since the end of the Cold War.

Finally, how will states keep a growing concern regarding homeland defence from deteriorating into a re-nationalised security environment, and a more unilateral approach to foreign policy? In one sense this is not a new strategic challenge. Since the advent of the nuclear age, Europe and the US have struggled with the problem of “coupling and decoupling”, and the temptation to go it alone out of a sense of reduced risk, or a sense of efficiency. In the end, the long reach of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles left all allies exposed, and the only appropriate strategy was a concerted one. Given the inherently transregional character of the new terrorism, and the difficulty of building counter-terrorism co-operation in isolation from agreement on broader foreign policy objectives, a multilateral approach still holds the best promise of containing the terrorist threat in the years ahead.

4. Western-Mediterranean Security Relations: Issues and Challenges

*Carlo Masala*¹

1. Introduction

Speaking about the issues and challenges of Western-Mediterranean security relations means, first of all, reflecting on the achievements of Western-Mediterranean policy in the past. A realistic look at Western-Mediterranean security relations in the past decade may contribute to a realistic outlook for the future of this relationship.

Instead of giving an overview of the activities of NATO, WEU, EU and OSCE, it seems much more appropriate to evaluate the pros and cons of Western-Mediterranean policy in a general way. This paper argues that the results of Western-Mediterranean security cooperation are – for several reasons – very poor. Ten years after the Italian-Spanish CSCM initiative, not much has been achieved to establish closer cooperation between Western institutions and southern Mediterranean rim states. It is often argued that the Middle East peace process is the main obstacle for closer cooperation and that Western-Mediterranean security relations need to be decoupled from the peace process. Instead of following this traditional line of argumentation, this paper argues that the obstacles are also the Western countries' lack of a common perception and common interests in the Mediterranean.

In a second step, this paper will focus on the future issues and challenges of Western-Mediterranean security relations. I claim that in the future, despite security issues like the proliferation of WMD, illegal migration, inter- and intrastate conflicts and terrorism, developments within the Atlantic Alliance and the EU will pose a problem for Western-Mediterranean security relations. To be more concrete, the development of a European Reaction Force as well as the discussion about NMD or MD or AMD will have a profound effect on the relations between “the West” and the southern Mediterranean rim states. If Western institutions want to avoid the deterioration of the existing frameworks they will have to adapt.

Thirdly, I will focus on future possibilities for improving security relations between Western institutions and countries from North Africa and the Middle and Near East

2. Ten years after

Soberly speaking, one must realize that neither the institutionalized dialogues of NATO, EU, WEU and OSCE nor the various bilateral relationships around the Mediterranean have “adjusted to reflect the new post-Cold War” (Lesser 2000: 55) security environment. Only some members of the Western institutions perceive security developments in the Mediterranean as being of vital importance for their national security. Other member states

1 The paper has been presented during the seminar on “Setting up a nucleus of NATO Mediterranean Dialogue Academic Institutions”, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome July 7, 2001.

still regard such developments as far from problematic or non-existent. Thus, the geo-strategic consensus which characterized Western security politics (also in the Mediterranean) during the East-West confrontation no longer exists. In Southern Europe, this is leading to rising concerns. Considering the numerous crisis phenomena in the southern Mediterranean area and the multiple social and economic interconnections between European and non-European Mediterranean countries, these worries can hardly be dismissed.

The creation of the ambitious Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the modest NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, were clearly demanded and advocated by the Southern Europeans who were vigorously trying to bring into life a political entity called Mediterranean region – which still does not exist today. But the results of both initiatives have been very poor for a number of reasons – not to speak of the OSCE and WEU. The problems are obvious:

- There is no common perception of the importance of the Mediterranean within Western institutions;
- The EMP is highly dependent, with respect to all security aspects, on settlement of the Middle and Near East conflict. Western-Mediterranean security relations and the Middle East peace process are closely intertwined;
- The coordination between southern European states is somewhat arbitrary. There are distinct differences between the security priorities towards the Mediterranean of southern Europeans;
- There is an increasing disillusion among southern partner states about the intentions of the institutionalized dialogues;
- Meaningful cooperation has not been achieved, at least not in the security field. There is strong resistance on the part of some Arab countries and societies to any cooperation that involves Israel, at least at this stage.
- There is no common strategic language in the region. Prejudices, as well as conceptual and terminological misunderstandings prevail (Echeverria 2000: 1);
- A major problem is the lack of coordination between the activities of the EU and NATO, as well as duplications in the field of security initiatives (Masala 2000: 48-50);

To sum up: the Mediterranean remains marginal to mainstream European security thinking and the region is still not perceived as an integral part of European security.

3. New Issues and Challenges for Western-Mediterranean Security Relations

As mentioned in the introduction, I argue that, despite traditional security challenges, the security developments within the Atlantic Alliance as well as within the EU will have a decisive influence on future Western-Mediterranean security relations, for two main reasons.

The EU's intention, expressed in 1998 in Saint Maló and in 1999 in Cologne, to establish a Rapid Reaction Force under the responsibility of the European Council will inevitably

increase the existing mistrust among the southern Mediterranean countries about the intentions and possible areas of action of such an RRF. Arab elites are still convinced that the West is pursuing a Mediterranean policy which is not interested in establishing a genuine security system, but in creating institutions to monitor the south. These perceptions will be reinforced if the EU creates a Rapid Reaction Force without consulting southern Mediterranean governments. As a result, the Western-Mediterranean initiatives already widely criticized by Arab politicians and the strategic community in the South are going to lose whatever credibility they may have (El-Sayed Selim 1998: 15). And if the European Defense and Security Identity is established with a strategic autonomy from NATO, differences between the US and the EU (Rodman 1999) – not only in the Mediterranean – will arise and hamper if not damage Western-Mediterranean policies in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, NATO's New Strategic Concept which states NATO's willingness to act without a UN-mandate, expands the scope for possible future actions of the Alliance to the Euro-Atlantic periphery and calls for the enhancement of the Alliance's power-projection capabilities is going to intensify concerns in the southern Mediterranean states that NATO is concentrating on possible future interventions in the southern Mediterranean.

Another possible obstruction of Western-Mediterranean security policy could result from Turkey's position in this context. Ankara has the potential to play a key role in Western-Mediterranean security relations. It could, given its geography, serve as a link between the West and the Mediterranean. But as a non-EU member, Ankara is more or less excluded from discussions within the EU about ESDI. Turkey is reacting very harshly and is threatening to block European efforts within NATO to use Alliance assets if it is not included in the ESDI decision-making process from the beginning.

To prevent Turkey from blocking EU and NATO efforts in the Mediterranean, Turkey's special concerns about the ESDI should be addressed. Failures to do so could lead not only to a more assertive security policy by Ankara but also to the use of its veto power in NATO. A deterioration of Turkey-Western relations would have a decisive impact on Western-Mediterranean security policy.

The second major obstacle for Western-Mediterranean security relations stems from the ongoing discussion in the US and in most European capitals on National Missile Defense (NMD) or – as it is called today – Missile Defense (MD). Even if Washington is striving to assure that NMD should protect US-territory against ballistic missile attacks from rogues, the unintended effects of such a policy, regardless of whether or not Europeans slip under the NMD or MD umbrella – will be a new worldwide arms race. And even pro-Western Arab countries will be forced to intensify their programs to acquire WMD because, if the US or the Alliance becomes more invulnerable to ballistic missile attack, countries in the South will have to reinforce their own defense to prevent their rogue neighbors from blackmailing or attacking them. The discussion on NMD, MD or AMD (Allied Missile Defense) will spark fear that the southern Mediterranean is considered an enclave of future threat for the security of the Alliance.

Both developments have the potential of deepening the still existing perception that the West considers the South a hostile bloc and that the main objective of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue is to reach a specific agreement with some Arab countries to secure access to their military infrastructure for possible future CJTF Operations, to monitor the flow to southern

Mediterranean states of missile technology which could threaten northern Mediterranean countries and to monitor southern Mediterranean countries' possession of WMD.

All these issues taken together, it is obvious that Western-Mediterranean security relations need to be adjusted to these future developments. The question is: How best to do so?

4. Policy Recommendations for the Future of Western-Mediterranean Security Relations

As my description of future issues and challenges of Western-Mediterranean security relations suggests, transatlantic security developments will acquire greater importance in the future. This raises the question how Western-Mediterranean security relations can adapt to these developments. In my view, six steps are necessary:

- *Include southern Mediterranean countries in the debate on the future of transatlantic security relations.* To avoid misperceptions and misunderstandings about the West's intentions towards southern Mediterranean countries, it would be helpful to include Mediterranean countries in discussion on a post-summit level. Like NATO's Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Head of States of the EU and NATO should meet following their summits with the Heads of States of the southern Mediterranean countries to inform them about their decisions and the intentions behind those decisions. Such high-level meetings should be accompanied by second-track meetings in which non-governmental actors are brought together and involved in permanent dialogue on security and defense issues.
- *Establish a clear division of labor between Western institutions and coordination of activities.* Constructive relationships between NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership should be established. The EU should concentrate its efforts on social, economic and cultural questions where it has a clear comparative advantage with respect to NATO, while the latter should deal with security and defense issues.
- *Engage southern Mediterranean countries more closely by establishing practical cooperation.* NATO as well as individual member states should offer closer military cooperation, training and joint exercises. Practical cooperation could be fostered by introducing CSBM or joint actions to prevent maritime disasters, to undertake mine clearing or to conduct joint search and rescue missions. The exchange of observers at military exercises will contribute to more transparency in NATO's military activities. Even if some NATO members are reluctant to create a PFP for the Mediterranean, NATO should introduce more PFP elements into the Mediterranean Dialogue. This would contribute to dispelling the impression that the aim of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue is to monitor the South. Another proposal is to open NATO's Academic Fellowship to researchers from the Mediterranean Dialogue countries
- *Set up a Conflict Prevention Network for the Mediterranean.* Joint research on conflicts and security developments in the Mediterranean and joint seminars between military staff from both sides of the Mediterranean is a way to contribute to a common strategic language. Similar to the Mediterranean Academy for Diplomatic Study in Malta, a Mediterranean Academy for Security and Defense Studies should be founded. The main aim of such an academy should be to bring together professionals from the Armed Forces, as well as members of the security communities to discuss and work on common projects.

- *Make Western-Mediterranean Security relations more flexible and focused.* Flexibility could be the key to improving Western-Mediterranean security relations. Given that the Mediterranean is not and never has been a homogenous security region and that the public's as well as the government's acceptance of the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue differs from country to country, NATO (and this applies also to the EU) should deepen its security relations with those countries ready for closer security cooperation. Contemporarily, security relations between the West and the southern Mediterranean countries should focus more on issues of common concern, like terrorism, illegal migration, drug traffic, etc.
- *Build trans-Mediterranean security structures.* The long-term vision of these recommendations is that they contribute to building trans-Mediterranean security structures in the sense that both northern and southern partners perceive the security challenges from the Mediterranean region as security challenges for all. The precondition for such a view is that the north no longer perceives security in the Mediterranean as marginal for European and transatlantic security and that the Mediterranean as a whole be considered Europe's backyard.

The Italian saying *tra dire e fare c'è di mezzo il mare* applies fully to that long-term vision. But it's worth starting to cross that (Mediterranean) Sea.

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5. Seven Points on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

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The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), launched in December 1994 in Barcelona, is by far the most relevant of the various existing Euro-Mediterranean initiatives. The EMP is multilateral and comprehensive, dealing with political and security as well as economic and social issues.

The main goal of the EMP is to promote peace, democracy and development in North-South relations through a process of inclusion, a method that met with great success in Europe (e.g., Portuguese and Spanish adhesion to the EC). This means strengthening ties through trade agreements and political co-operation, although there is no prospect of integration. Thus, while there are not the financial means concomitant with integration, the associated strong political conditionalities are also absent. In this regard, EMP is necessarily a long-term initiative: there is serious lack of progress concerning respect for the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights in southern countries, and southern economies need serious restructuring to compete in an open market. Over the long term, the goal is to create a free trade area through multi-bilateral association agreements. But this has to be accompanied by structural economic and political reform, as well as mutual confidence-building and co-operation measures in the foreign and security policy domains. The final aim is to set up an open regional integration group (the Mediterranean-European Free Trade Area (MEFTA) along the lines of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), albeit with a clear political orientation and social cohesion ambitions. This is to be achieved through EU financed programmes (MEDA) to assist Southern countries with the transition to free trade and increased competitiveness.

More than seven years after Barcelona, the overall assessment of the process is contradictory: its potential and difficulties are clearer. Further, a number of the assumptions underlying the process are also open to question.

1. The Potential

The potential of the EMP is evident and proven. The Barcelona process, or economic integration with Europe, is essential for the participation of southern countries in the world economy and in regional integration processes that can have a potentially strong impact on global regulation. During the 1990s, regionalism proved to be an essential platform for facing and benefiting from globalisation. This is still the essential and by far the most successful trait of the Barcelona process. As the trade ministers noted in Toledo, “the grid of Association Agreements between the EU and its Mediterranean partners [is] about to be completed, with

1 This article is based on a paper prepared for the IAI conference on “Governing Stability Across the Mediterranean Sea: A Transatlantic Perspective, held in Rome on 21/23 March 2002, and sponsored by the NATO Office of Information and Press and the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Published as “Seven Points on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”, *The International Spectator*, Rome, vol. XXXVII, n. 2, April-June 2002, pp. 113-120.

the exception of Syria with which negotiations are still ongoing”. No state in the region questions the relevance of these agreements. Despite the pressure of enlargement to the East, the EU has maintained its financial commitments at a reasonable level (MEDA is endowed with 5.35 million euros for 2000-06).

The EMP is also a vast confidence-building initiative explicitly targeting the North-South divide, but also implicitly tackling South-South relations. It is the only persistently sustained multilateral Mediterranean framework involving both Israel and various Arab countries in a high-level dialogue. This is a remarkable achievement. Dialogue was sustained at the Valencia Euro-Med ministerial meeting (22-23 April 2002), although Palestinian villages were being occupied and Arafat was under siege at the time (only Syria and Lebanon declined to participate). At the same time, however, senior officials in charge of the Barcelona process have had very limited success in actually implementing confidence-building measures, as evidenced in the Valencia declaration.

At the civil society level, the EuroMeSCo network of foreign policy institutes, launched in 1993 with limited membership and enlarged to all EMP member countries in 1996, has been tackling soft and hard security issues since its inception. This may seem modest when considering the ambitious aims of the partnership. Nonetheless, a growing and diversified number of civil society initiatives are being developed that may well contribute to mutual confidence building. Examples are the Human Rights Network, the FEMISE Economic Institutes Network and the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Forum, which has already held three meetings (27-28 October 1998, 8-9 February 2001 and 8 November 2001), and has discussed issues such as the future of the EMP, the role of civil society in the Barcelona process and the Middle East peace process.

2. The Difficulties

There are evident difficulties, nonetheless. They stem from five main root causes:

- The lack of political convergence among the EMP member states and the apparent lack of progress, in some cases even regression, where human rights and democracy are concerned. Democratic transitions, with the exception of processes in Morocco and to a certain extent in Jordan, are at a standstill.
- The collapse of the peace process in the Middle East, which makes security co-operation within the framework of the Barcelona process extremely difficult and led to the failure of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability.
- The weakness of South-South integration. Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean regional group implies South-South integration, particularly free trade flows among southern partners. Progress here has been insignificant, although the free trade area launched in Agadir between Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan is noteworthy. Without South-South agreements, there can be no Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (MEFTA) by 2005.
- The issue of asymmetry. To some extent it is inevitable, as there is a closely integrated group of countries in the North (the EU) and no comparable group in the South. Further, European institutions direct EMP, which raises the issue of “ownership”, as southern partners feel they lack influence over the decision-making process.

- The partnership has been unable to play a significant role in the Middle East crisis, and to deal with other such issues that involve intra-state relations or provoke internal destabilisation, such as the Algerian civil war or the situation in the Western Sahara. These are clearly major obstacles to security and cooperation in the region.

3. Options for the Barcelona Process

One of the crucial assumptions of the Barcelona process, an all-encompassing geometry, is questionable. The holistic nature of its prescriptions for the achievement of peace, prosperity and security has turned out to be misplaced or, at the very least, imbalanced. National peculiarities have to be taken into account. The Maghreb and the Mashreq should be seen as sub-regions of the Mediterranean with entirely different political and security realities and with different levels of proximity to the EU. While three of the partnership members are candidates to accession to the EU (Malta, Cyprus and Turkey), Turkish accession is “on hold”, and it is urgent to redefine its role in the Euro-Mediterranean Process due to its geographical location and its geostrategic relevance. However the fact that Turkey was accepted as a candidate country can make its political elite less suspicious that the Europeans see the EMP as an option for Turkey short of European integration. The challenge lies in making the multilateral holism of the EMP compatible and mutually reinforcing with the more restricted sub-regional frameworks. Of the proposals for action, the most promising are the introduction of the concept of variable geometry, which has been applied in the EU, namely with the euro, whereby not all member states have to be engaged in every project. There are various arenas to which this principle could be applied:

- In the security domain, lessons can be drawn from the participation of southern countries in operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, for future peacekeeping operations.
- In the economic sphere, while free trade may be the aim of the partnership, it is feasible to provide incentives to the formation of sub-regional groups that go beyond free trade (for example, a customs union). The participation of the MERCOSUR as a group in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations is a good example.

In the security arena, the Barcelona process has ignored central issues causing South-South tensions, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the problems in the Western Sahara or the civil war in Algeria. Where North-South relations are concerned (the core of the partnership), problems arise from the negative perceptions and spillover of internal crises, such as those caused by terrorism. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the only hard security issue with a significant North-South impact. The fact that problems are sub-regional in nature, however, does not make them any less relevant for the Mediterranean and international security. Sub-regional problems can seriously affect the EMP, or even provoke its collapse. It is a mistake to assume that Euro-Mediterranean political and security co-operation should be limited to less problematic South-North/North-South relations, when the Algerian conflict has caused more than 100,000 victims. The main problem with EMP political and security co-operation may be precisely the difficulty, almost impossibility, to deal with the South-South dimension.

4. The Changing Circumstances and their Impact on the EMP

The events of 11 September and the US-led coalition against international terrorism have shed light on some of the problems facing the Mediterranean region and, in some cases, aggravated them. The gap between Northern and Southern public perceptions, for example, has become blatant. Very few intellectuals in the South unequivocally denounced the barbaric attack or the totalitarian nature of the radical Islamic movements. The impotence of the EU and, at times, acquiescence of the United States regarding Israeli encroachment on Palestine have only contributed to widening the “perceptions gap”.

The international coalition dedicated to combating terrorism probably includes some states that opportunistically hope to pursue their own internal and regional agendas. In Israel the government of Ariel Sharon tried to link Bin Laden with Arafat. The same has occurred in some Arab countries where authoritarianism has increased, in many cases due to strengthened domestic security legislation that further restricts freedom of speech and association. The result has been a decline in political convergence within the EMP.

The coming months may pose further challenges to the EMP, especially if a US military offensive is launched against Iraq. All the Southern partners and the majority of EU states strongly oppose such an offensive. If the EU states opted for alignment with the US on this issue, the EMP would be badly affected, as would Arab perceptions of the process. Alignment would also contribute to reinforcing the image of the EU’s irrelevance as an international security actor.

5. EU Autonomy: An Essential Factor

The future of the Barcelona process depends largely on the ability of the EU to assert a foreign and defence policy autonomy in the Mediterranean. In order to do so, the Union must:

- Develop its own objective political stance towards Middle East crises, including those in which the United States is involved;
- Refuse to remain hostage to the EMP’s “possible consensus”. It must, for example, develop its own initiatives towards the Algerian crisis or human rights issues;
- Directly address various Mediterranean security concerns, initiating a dialogue about European defence, perhaps by re-launching a modified version of the old WEU-Mediterranean dialogue;
- Insist upon linking the fight against terrorism with human rights and justice. This means strong co-operation among home affairs and justice ministries, and monitoring the implementation of the Barcelona declaration.

To have the capacity and credibility to do this, the EU must overcome the dangerous tendency to deal with migration first and foremost as a security problem rather than as a social and political issue, and must isolate populist and extreme right tendencies in this regard.

6. Involving the United States

The security dimension of the Barcelona process is also weakened by the absence of a fundamental security actor in the Mediterranean: the United States. It should be fully

recognised that the United States is a power in the Mediterranean (as it is in Europe) where security and defence are concerned. The idea is not to enlarge the EMP further but rather to point out that all countries involved stand to benefit from an EU-US Mediterranean dialogue. NATO is probably not the most suitable framework for such a dialogue. The issues that concern both the EU and the US in the Mediterranean clearly transcend the security realm. Further, although this may change, the EU is not a NATO member as a single entity. The EU-US Transatlantic Dialogue could be the ideal forum. It is a comprehensive dialogue that includes political and economic issues, and could consider security matters. There can be no fruitful dialogue, however, without the involvement of all interested parties (notably the Mediterranean countries). An initiative along the lines of the proposed Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), albeit less ambitious in geographic scope, could become the core of the dialogue in the near future. Any initiatives adopted must aim to involve the US and “multilateralise” its international action.

7. Conclusion

The future of the EMP depends not only upon the ability of the EU to assert itself as an autonomous political actor, but also on its capacity to halt nationalistic and xenophobic tendencies in Europe. This implies an active Union that integrates the particular interests of its member states within a “common interest”, and that reasserts the founding principles of European identity. This is a central issue in the current debate on the future of the EU and should be a priority in the ongoing Convention on the Future of Europe. The EU must be capable of taking on board its growing cultural diversity and integrating Muslim immigrants and citizens. Without this there can be no true Euro-Mediterranean partnership based on the principle of an open citizenship of different cultures and civilisations founded upon the rule of law.

6. Upgrading Political Responses in the Mediterranean

Roberto Aliboni¹

A new transatlantic dimension is emerging after 11 September based on the struggle against terrorism in a global perspective. Terrorism is identified as today's central threat to international security and co-operation. As usual, however, at the very time that this new solidarity emerges, it brings with it the germs of fresh divisions. In many European quarters, there are two main perplexities:

- That the new alliances the United States is seeking to set up in the emerging strategic perspective may weaken or trivialise both the transatlantic bond, which remains fundamental in many European security perceptions, and the multilateral pattern of relations developed over time in the Western alliances (by strengthening the post-Cold War tendency towards ad hoc multinational coalitions);
- That the strategic perspective assumed by the United States may emphasise military over political, cultural, social and economic responses as well as strategic alliances over partnership and thus prove inadequate to cope with the root causes of conflicts.

This article is more concerned with the second than the first point. In fact, the assumption of the article is that, in addition to the war against terrorism and its sponsors, the broad post-11 September perspective needs to include the development of co-operation and partnership if allies are to be strengthened and support to terrorists is to be suppressed. While today's emphasis is on the military response, there is no doubt that, in order for an effective and dedicated international anti-terrorist coalition to be set up, it must be consolidated by providing, at one and the same time, institution-building, partnership and political responses, including appropriate social, cultural and economic measures. In sum, the winning strategic approach to the situation generated by 11 September should couple effective military measures, on the one hand, with policies of co-operation inspired by partnership and comprehensive security, on the other.

As global as the new strategic perspective may be, in its context the southern area beyond the Mediterranean Sea, in particular North Africa and the Middle East seems to acquire more relevance from the point of view of both Europe and the United States. This is due to two main factors: First, in the terrorists' eyes, a significant shift in the balance of power towards Islamism in North Africa and the Middle East would open the way to the shift in the global balance of power they are seemingly looking for. Consequently, any Western military achievement would be ultimately void if the West failed to secure stability, manage political transition, and ease the resolution of conflicts in the regions concerned. What is really and

1 This chapter is based on a paper prepared for the IAI conference in Rome on "Governing Stability Across the Mediterranean Sea: A Transatlantic Perspective, held on 21/23 March 2002 and sponsored by the NATO Office of Information and Press and the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Published as "Upgrading Political Responses in the Mediterranean", *The International Spectator*, Rome, vol. XXXVII, n. 2, April-June 2002, pp. 103-112.

primarily at stake in the new strategic perspective is the political transition in the central region of North Africa and the Middle East. Second, Europe's logistical role and its relevance as a target have changed decidedly with respect to the recent past. Since the 1970s, Europe has served as a logistical platform for political activities, including terrorism, aimed essentially at North Africa and the Middle East. Increases in migration have increasingly facilitated this role. On the other hand, Europe has often suffered the spillovers of terrorism. Only very seldom, however, has it been the direct target. In contrast, post-11 September evidence suggests that Europe is becoming a target as well as a logistical platform for actions directed not only at North Africa and the Middle East but also at the United States and Europe itself. In this perspective, and with increasing migration, Europe's proximity to North Africa and the Middle East, previously neutral in its effects, now has an impact on Western security and requires policies suited to manage such proximity.

For years Western countries have made efforts and set up institutions aimed at rendering the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern areas stable and capable of peaceful change. These efforts have set in motion a considerable number of organisations and institutions based on co-operation and partnership. The impact of 11 September on international relations adds new strategic weight and importance to these efforts and suggests their strengthening. The question is how the constellation of initiatives of co-operation that have been established since the end of the 1980s can be reinforced and redirected to make them more effective and able to cope with the new challenges posed by the post-11 September world.

To respond to this question, some comments will be made on recent and current experiences, essentially the ACRS in the Middle East peace process; the EU-initiated Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP); and the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue (NMD). These will be followed by recommendations and suggestions on what to do.

Generally speaking, organisations and institutions have been envisioned in a broad co-operative and preventive perspective. That is why they include some forms of co-operative security regimes, in addition to the other aspects. Conflict resolution has not been seen as their specific task. Indeed, as far as the Euro-Med Partnership is concerned, the Barcelona Declaration expressly rules out conflict resolution. Conflict resolution has been left to bilateral talks.

The ACRS and the EMP, in different times and ways, were assigned the task of accompanying and facilitating the peace process by preparing a regional context that fits the process aimed at achieving peace and consolidates and preserves it once peace has been made. The failure of the Middle East peace process has made the co-operative security regimes contemplated by these organisations and institutions largely inapplicable.

It must be pointed out, however, that in a more limited and less politically engaging perspective, some elements of co-operative security could be implemented nevertheless. In fact, co-operative security is inapplicable today in a purely multilateral context and with a view to the implementation of structural confidence-building measures and related measures of arms control and limitation. While waiting for more favourable conditions, however, the implementation of some declaratory and even operational confidence-building measures is possible, in particular in non-multilateral, that is, bilateral, sub-regional and multi-bilateral contexts.

More in general, if the ultimate purpose of co-operative security is to provide security "through institutionalised consent rather than through threats of material or physical

coercion”², the functioning of co-operative security agendas within the organisations and institutions remains important, even if their current profile is low. Thus, while the ACRS is definitely at a standstill, what survives of the EMP and what can potentially be done in the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue are valuable and sensible assets.

In the Western view of these institutions and organisations, especially in the EMP, the above-mentioned concept of co-operative security prevails. Consequently, security is understood in the broad sense and is based on a comprehensive approach which, in addition to military, also includes non-military factors. The attainment of security is thus regarded as dependent not only on disarmament and other measures of security co-operation but, more importantly, on the long-term achievement of structural stability in the societies and polities concerned. According to the EU Commission, “The characteristics of structural stability are sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures and healthy environmental and social conditions, with the capacity to manage change without resort to conflict.”³ Thus, structural stability and comprehensive security imply a need for transition to democracy by the Southern partners. And democratisation means the adoption by the countries concerned of a set of principles (the ones listed by the 1993 Copenhagen Declaration) relating to the respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms and minorities by means of full establishment of the rule of law. The implementation of democracy is expected to bring about, as it did in Western Europe itself, the end of violence in intra- as well as inter-state relations, and by the same token to provide security and stability to Western Europe and the Western alliances in general.

The Barcelona Declaration has outlined a broad agenda of democratisation, similar to the one currently being implemented in Eastern Europe. However, this agenda is perceived by the Arab partners as a factor of political and cultural intrusion as well as a risk for domestic destabilisation. Furthermore, it is regarded as a project that, while intended to provide Europe with the stability it seeks in the North-South dimension, does not necessarily provide the Arabs with the solution to the intra-regional, South-South conflicts they badly need from their national security perspective. Security is thus regarded as unevenly distributed between partners.

Almost since its inception, the EMP’s development as a forum for political dialogue and security co-operation has been hindered and almost blocked by this difference. The lack of progress in the peace process has made things worse. Still, the real reason for the poor performance of the EMP today is less the failure of the peace process per se than the Arab’s perception of existing institutions and organisations as pursuing security agendas that fail to encompass their problems, while seeking Arab co-operation to solve European problems. Furthermore, these agendas are perceived as asking for sweeping reforms without solving the regional security problems and conflicts that weaken governments and prevent them from proceeding with reforms without the high risks of becoming their victims.

Can comprehensive security be applied to Euro-Med civilian relations in more or less the same way as co-operative security regimes are applied to military relations? As a matter of fact, while the link with democratisation has created many tensions and prevented the EMP

2 Janne E. Nolan, “The Concept of Cooperative Security”, in Nolan, J. E. (ed.) *Global Engagement. Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1994) pp. 3-18, p. 4.

3 Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, COM (2001)211 fin., Brussels, 11 April 2001, p. 10.

from finding a common ground and taking common action so far, the emphasis entailed by the comprehensive security perspective on non-military factors has proven broadly conducive to co-operation between the Northern and the Southern partners. This is an important result in any case. It can promote forms of security co-operation and be used as a platform for enlarging and consolidating such co-operation.

In sum, a fully working common ground can, in principle, be based on a trade-off between political and economic reform in the South to secure more stability for the North and peace in the South to provide regional countries with security internationally and domestically. In this trade-off, however, peace in the South looks like a pre-condition for carrying out reform there and then assuring stability in the North-South dimension. Lacking peace in the Middle East, the organisations and institutions will continue to have no more than the modest results they have reaped so far with respect to the goal of security cooperation. Nonetheless, this is only meant to show that there are significant second-best common grounds that the parties involved can adopt. Let's consider them.

From the South, many suggest that the EU should renounce its security perspective in the EMP – that is, structural stability and its implications in terms of democratisation – and promote an agenda to support social and economic development in the South that would be delinked from any short-middle term expectations about political reform. However, the Europeans, in particular Northern European states and social democratic governments, could hardly accept such a perspective. In fact, many would perceive it as a policy fostering authoritarian regimes without returns. Furthermore, the European perception of increasing spillovers from the Southern Mediterranean countries in the short-term can hardly be overlooked. The 11 September developments have deepened these perceptions and increased the need for more stability in the South in order to obtain more stability and broad security in Europe and the West. An agenda limited to the extension of economic aid and co-operation cannot be sufficient.

A possible second-best common ground could be based on a pragmatic and selective approach. This would involve identifying specific “files” central to broad regional stability and security. Economic co-operation and development is definitely one of them. However, further “files” also concern soft security issues like immigration, international crime and trafficking, as well as issues like terrorism, which have in the post 11 September perspective acquired a strategic dimension in some respect closer to hard security. Certainly, Northern and Southern views are more often than not opposed to one another on these issues. Suffice it to think, for example, of immigration and terrorism. A pragmatic, issue-by-issue approach, however, would have the merit of comparing interests without making binding reference to values. By referring to interests, this approach would allow for negotiations and political compromise. This kind of agenda, based on non-military factors, as limited as it might be with respect to EU ambitions, seems very important in the post-11 September perspective. The Europeans would not need to drop their ideas about structural stability and its implications. At the same time, they would avoid linking present policies of co-operation too stringently or affirmatively with expected results in terms of middle-/long-term changes in the South (and consequent stability for the Union and the West).

In summary, first, it is clear that the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab conflicts puts a strong limit on any multilateral or collective co-operation between the West and the North African and Middle Eastern regions. Second, while the institutions and organisations set up till now are helpful in supporting a possible peace process, it is also clear

that they are not and cannot be geared to conflict resolution tasks. Third, although their effectiveness is constrained and reduced by the lack of a solution to the Middle East conflict, those organisations and institutions can still provide for the implementation of broad co-operative security in the sense underscored above; consequently, they can secure a more or less important degree of security co-operation in the short term and pave the way for long-term changes and co-operation. It is in this perspective that they can be made more functional as a tool of dialogue and reinforced as an instrument of partnership in order to support co-operation in the post-11 September situation. Fourth, to reinforce existing organisations and institutions and generate more co-operation, flexibility and variable geometry have to be used. What previous experience with these organisations and institutions suggests is that:

- Multilateralism proper must be turned into forms of multi-bilateralism; in the same way as the latter governs relations between NATO and its Mediterranean partners in the NMD; in the EMP multilateralism still governs political relations, but economic bilateral relations between the EU and individual partners in the framework of the Association Agreements are definitely becoming more important than the multilateral relations envisaged by the Barcelona Declaration;
- Sub-regionalism must be given more room besides regionalism; the two formats should not be mutually exclusive, but complementary, allowing for things to work in sub-regional frameworks when and where they cannot in the pan-regional circle; in this sense, initiatives relating to the Maghreb (the group of Five plus Five), or the Arab countries (the Agadir Agreement), or Turkey and Israel, or the Eastern Mediterranean are, in fact, acquiring more importance; undoubtedly, sub-regionalism requires good management to prevent these initiatives from turning into regional disruptions;
- Declaratory confidence-building measures should be increased and partnership-building measures used to strengthen flexibility so as to increase transparency and cohesion, even though these measures may prove unable to generate common actions and structured security co-operation in the short term.

Fifth, being more flexible, the organisations and institutions can provide working security relationships in many ways:

- Military security co-operation in the multi-bilateral framework of the NATO MD, essentially aimed at increasing transparency and dialogue; operational measures could be enforced bilaterally or by groups willing to do so;
- Mostly civilian comprehensive security co-operation in the multilateral framework of the EMP, fundamentally aimed at setting the conditions for co-operation on soft security in the short term and “structural stability” in the long term;
- Reinforced political dialogue, in institutional or semi-institutional form, in all the frameworks involved;
- A set of sub-regional frameworks for co-operation, where more advanced forms of security co-operation could be implemented.

All told, a more marked shift to partnership is needed today, yet its acceleration is limited by the weakness of conflict resolution in the Middle East. Still, within such limits, a transition from simple dialogue to partnership is possible where the necessary non-military co-operative response is provided in addition to military responses.

Given these general orientations, what should be done today?

While waiting for the possibility of restoring talks on restructuring regional relations in the Middle East – which remains the crucial challenge to deal with – there are three specific tasks to be seen to: (a) continuously remoulding the EMP so as to enable it to respond to civilian and soft security challenges; (b) strengthening the NMD partnership with respect to the very simple role it is performing today of providing transparency; (c) setting out some co-ordination between EMP and NMD in a transatlantic perspective.

The EMP is largely and bravely redirecting its activities towards a comprehensive security concept in which emphasis is given to co-operation relating to civilian, economic, social and cultural factors. The EU and its partners increasingly regard the EMP as a framework for preventing conflict in the long term. This perspective demands the achievement of structural stability and exposes the EMP to tensions over the promotion of democracy and its implications. However, the long-term perspective helps smooth these tensions. Furthermore, the “root causes” of instability and the promotion of democracy to remove them are discussed in a bilateral context, that is in the Association Agreements, rather than in the EMP’s overall multilateral context. This allows for compromise and mediation and prevents tensions and strong opposition between the parties. More in general, it is clear that the EU is getting used to a less value-laden and assertive behaviour. In this more pragmatic context, many otherwise dividing “files” such as terrorism can be discussed in a more constructive environment and can lead to common action and compromise.

As for the NMD, it seems high time for it to move more from a dialogue intended to improve information and transparency closer towards partnership tasks. At its Prague Summit in November 2002, NATO should be ready to shift from a Mediterranean Dialogue to a Mediterranean Partnership. In order to begin to do this, the Mediterranean Co-operation Group (MCG, the 19 NATO-nation body at the level of diplomatic counsellors presently in charge of the NMD and the formulation of its agenda) should make a specific effort to identify key issues pertaining to a higher political and security profile for NMD, to be proposed by NATO to its partners as part of an enlarged NMD agenda.

Enhanced co-operation in the context of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue would have to draw on those co-operative activities undertaken successfully by NATO throughout the years under the Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP). The idea would be to select some of them, which could then be specifically tailored to the realities of the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. This does not mean extending PfP to the Mediterranean Dialogue countries but, rather, developing a new and smaller-scale Partnership for the latter. In particular, by taking advantage of its multi-bilateral format, the NMD should be able to make progress in the field of declaratory and transparency CBMs and to enter the field of operational CBMs.

Once the initiatives of this new enlarged agenda are identified by NATO nations, the MCG should ask for an intensification of NMD meetings at the ambassadorial level to consider them. The aim of this upgrading of the NMD would be to have the ambassadors of the Mediterranean Dialogue countries meet periodically (3-4 times a year) in a kind of 19+7 “Mediterranean Co-operation Council” which, by its very denomination, would represent a regular political partnership between NATO and the non-NATO Mediterranean countries. The adoption of these measures would constitute a strong signal of NATO’s willingness to upgrade security co-operation with its southern partners.

Co-ordinating the organisations and institutions mentioned in the beginning of this article is not an easy task because governments, in particular Western governments, are divided about objectives and policies with respect to the areas concerned. The question must be considered in the middle- to long-term as well as in a short- to middle-term perspective.

As things stand today, it is possible to envisage in the shorter term a kind of division of tasks between the EMP, expected to specialise in civilian and soft security and act as an essentially regional organisation, and the NMD, with a clearer attitude towards developing security with respect to military instruments and closer to a global vantage point. Whatever the weaknesses of co-ordination in the longer term, in the shorter term these organisations and institutions and their agendas of co-operative security, with all their limits, need to be reinforced. This division of tasks, although limited, can help with respect to two urgent challenges: 1) preventing instability in the region and preserving the possibility of a long-term democratic political transition in it, and 2) increasing the possibilities of co-operation against terrorism in both the EMP and the NMD.

As wise and effective as this division of tasks might be, however, the political impact of both is bound to remain limited unless the stumbling block of the Middle East conflict is cleared and a closer political understanding is assured between the United States and Europe on the different issues and crises of the region. Without this transatlantic political understanding, the division of tasks mentioned above will remain uncertain and unsteady. Consequently, their political impact will remain uncertain and unsteady as well. Thus, whatever the co-ordination in the short term and its effectiveness, long-term co-ordination in the framework of regular, possibly institutionalised transatlantic co-operation remains an open question and – at least from a European point of view – a necessary requirement (which the post-11 September US seems to downplay).

APPENDIX 1

After September 11th, Governing Stability Across the Mediterranean Sea: a Transatlantic Perspective¹

Cristina Paciello

The conference, organized by the International Affairs Institute and sponsored by the NATO office of Information and Press, and the German Marshall Fund of the United States, was held to discuss the question of governing stability across the Mediterranean Sea in the post-September 11th environment. It focused on three broad themes: governing stability in the Mediterranean; challenges to stability; and governance and partnership in the Mediterranean.

1. Opening Remarks

Rocco Buttiglione, Minister for Community Policies, Italy, discussed the broad lines of the policy that the Italian government is pursuing in the framework of the European Union and NATO. He first called attention to the process of constitutionalisation of the new Europe. Reporting on the debate on the EU's institutional framework, the Minister remarked that, rather than institutions deduced from theoretical principles, what is needed is a flexible constitution to accompany the development of the specific consciousness of a European people. In this perspective, he pointed out that external and internal security are fundamental problems of the Union. "We are convinced that the new European Union must have a tremendous impact on world affairs, but we do not envisage a world in which there is a polarity between the European Union and the United States", the Minister said. The European Union is a part of the broader Atlantic community.

With regard to the Mediterranean region, the Minister stated that the Italian government believes that attention should be shifted from Eastern European to Mediterranean countries, where problems are cultural and political. Referring to the famous paradigm by Samuel Huntington, he did not exclude the possibility of a "clash of civilizations" with Islam in the Mediterranean, but this will depend on what takes place in Islam and the policy we are able to adopt to favor dialogue. Indeed, civilizations are not objects, but complicated historical phenomena in which there are always inner struggles and different possibilities for their development. In particular, the Minister suggested that the West should help Mediterranean countries develop the ideals of the *petite bourgeoisie* and create within this context a home for human prosperity. Otherwise, integralism may become a real problem. He also questioned that Islam does not recognize the role of civil society and the distinction between religion and politics. He noted that, at the beginning, Christians did not recognize this distinction either, but learned it with time when they realized that they had to create institutions during the period of

1 Conference Report, Rome 21-23 March 2002.

transition before the second coming of the Lord. Something similar took place in Islam: After the caliphate was abolished, more secular forms of Islamism developed upon which the existing Islamic states are based. Of course, he noted, forms of fanatic fundamentalist movements persist since there is always the hope that the prophet will come back.

The Minister suggested that the best way to contrast such movements is within Islam and, in particular, by opening a dialogue of peace with Islamic countries in the Mediterranean. If we really want the second wave of the struggle against terrorism to bring peace and prosperity in the Mediterranean, we must be ready to spend more money to give force to our policies towards underdeveloped countries and, in particular, the Mediterranean countries. The European Union should strive to govern globalization not in abstract but concretely. Moreover, the solution of the Palestinian question, which implies two states in one land, seems to be the pre-condition for the development of this area and may help to avoid the clash of civilization. In his final note, the Minister stressed that the West must offer people in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean the same chances of prosperity and peace we have had in our past.

Amedeo De Franchis, Ambassador, NATO Permanent Representative of Italy, focused his opening remarks on the NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, in particular highlighting the significant progress registered in recent months. The Mediterranean Dialogue was launched in 1994 in Brussels and has been consistently supported since its inception by Italy and some other NATO countries. The need to develop NATO's Mediterranean initiative further was confirmed at the highest level during the Washington Summit in 1999 where the increased role of Mediterranean cooperation as an integral part of Euro-Atlantic stability and security was emphasized. When the 11th of September came, the awareness of the need for cooperation with respect to new transversal global threats was obvious to all, both to NATO partner states and the seven Mediterranean partners. The need to enhance the political and practical aspects of the initiative was recognized during an informal "brainstorming" meeting of NATO Ambassadors last October and, subsequently, in a round of political consultations with the seven partners. Following these consultations, a NAC meeting with the Dialogue countries took place in the multilateral 19+7 format. Ambassador De Franchis noted that the interest of the Alliance members and partners in upgrading and speeding up the Mediterranean cooperation process after September 11th was not expressed in a vacuum: the principles, instruments, programs and mechanisms for further development of the initiatives were indeed already in place as a result of the work done in previous years.

Ambassador De Franchis pointed out that the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue is a forum particularly well suited to dealing with subjects in which NATO possesses unique experience and competence. The principle is that the Mediterranean Dialogue can also take place bilaterally, between NATO and individual countries, and between NATO and partner countries together. This - a major difference from the Euro-Med Partnership - allows the process to go forward even at times when great difficulties in the Middle East peace process hamper the multilateral dimension. He also underlined that the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Euro-Med partnership are complementary to each other.

Ambassador De Franchis concluded with some remarks on the future of the Mediterranean Dialogue. He noted that the security scenario resulting from the events of September 11th is not the only factor influencing the future of the Mediterranean Dialogue. There are also

internal NATO dynamics that favor the development of the Dialogue, namely its reform and external outreach processes launched in view of the Prague Summit next November, where important decisions are expected to be taken regarding enlargement. A decision in Prague to enlarge the Alliance further would also lead to a thorough redefinition of the geographical dimension of NATO's partnership. The specific relevance of the Mediterranean initiative would be increased since this region would be recognized as even more closely linked to Euro-Atlantic security. Against this background, as Ambassador De Franchis argued, it is legitimate to envisage that the countries that are now part of the Mediterranean Dialogue may enter the more general framework of the Partnership for Peace.

In his final notes, Ambassador De Franchis stressed his conviction that Italy will continue to contribute to the growth of this initiative because of the indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic and Mediterranean security. He also pointed out that security challenges have to be addressed collectively within the European Union and NATO, and within the partnership, and that the security of Europe cannot be addressed without a transatlantic link with the United States.

2. Governing Stability in the Mediterranean

For many years, the Western countries have made efforts aimed at turning the Mediterranean and Middle East into stable areas capable of peaceful change. These efforts have led to the setting up of a considerable number of organizations and institutions based on cooperation and partnership. The impact of September 11th on international relations adds new strategic weight and importance to these efforts and suggests the need for their strengthening. The first session of the conference focused on the ways the current schemes of security cooperation, in particular the NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the Euro-Med Partnership, can cope with challenges to Mediterranean peace and stability.

Roberto Aliboni, Vice president of the International Affairs Institute (IAI), addressed the question of how such a constellation of initiatives of co-operation, in particular the Euro-Med Partnership (EMP) and the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue (NMD), has to be reinforced and redirected to make it more effective and able to cope with the challenges posed by the events of September 11th. Besides effective military measures, the broad post-September 11th perspective needs to include the development of co-operation and partnership if allies are to be strengthened, and support to terrorists suppressed.

Although the effectiveness of multilateral organizations (ORGs) is constrained and reduced by the lack of a solution to the Middle East conflict, they can nevertheless implement limited measures of security cooperation both in a military and non-military sense. In this perspective, the ORGs should be reinforced as instruments of partnership in order to support co-operation in the post-September 11th situation. In particular, flexibility and variable geometry should be used: multilateralism should be turned into forms of multi-bilateralism, sub-regionalism should be given more space beside regionalism, and declaratory confidence-building and partnership-building measures should be multiplied so as to strengthen flexibility, and increase transparency and cohesion.

As far as the EMP is concerned, it should keep on redirecting its activities towards a comprehensive security concept where emphasis is given to co-operation relating to civilian,

economic, social and cultural factors. While such an agenda, which is aimed at attaining structural stability and is linked to democratization, has exposed the EMP to considerable tensions, the emphasis included in the comprehensive security perspective on non-military factors has proved broadly conducive to cooperation. Moreover, as the root causes of instability and the promotion of democracy are discussed in a bilateral context rather than in the EMP's overall multilateral context, compromise and mediation between the parties are possible. Finally, in a more general way, it is clear that the EU is getting used to a less value-laden and assertive behavior. This more pragmatic, issue-by-issue approach, identifying specific "files" central to broad regional stability and security, such as economic development and soft security issues, allows for common action and political compromise.

As for the NMD, it should move from a dialogue intended to improve information and transparency towards partnership tasks. By taking advantage of its multi-bilateral format, the NMD should be able to make progress in the field of declaratory and transparency CBMs and enter the field of operational CBMs even in a framework that is as politically narrow as the present one. Making political dialogue a regular feature of the NMD could be the first step towards enlarging the NMD and directing it towards partnership. The next aim should be the establishment of a Mediterranean Co-operation Council at ambassadorial level to meet periodically on the basis of an agenda prepared by the Mediterranean Co-operation Group.

Finally, Aliboni highlighted the importance of setting up some kind of coordination between the EMP and the NMD in a transatlantic perspective. ORGs are indeed difficult to co-ordinate because governments, in particular Western governments, are divided about objectives and policies with respect to the areas concerned. He pointed out that, even though it is possible, as things stand today, to envisage in the shorter term a kind of division of labor between the EMP and the NMD, the political impact of both ORGs is bound to remain limited unless a closer political understanding is assured between the United States and Europe on the different issues and crises of the region. Nevertheless, whatever the weaknesses of longer-term co-ordination, in the short term the ORGs and their agendas of cooperative security, with all their limits, need to be reinforced. The division of tasks illustrated above - also limited - can help with respect to two urgent challenges: (a) preventing instability in the region and preserving the possibility of long-term democratic political transition; (b) increasing the opportunities of co-operation on terrorism in both the EMP and the NMD.

Nicola de Santis, Information Officer for Mediterranean Dialogue and Partner Countries at NATO, spoke on the aim and scope of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue. In his presentation he stressed how the terrorist attacks on the United States have significantly transformed the security environment in which the transatlantic Alliance operates in. NATO faces again, just a few years after the end of the Cold War, an existential threat to its peoples, represented by new and transnational threats such as weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism. Consequently, at the Prague Summit NATO will need to push even further its process of ongoing adaptation to the fast changing security environment in order to deal more effectively with these asymmetric threats, by adapting its military doctrine and developing the capabilities needed to fulfill the full spectrum of its post Cold War new missions. At the Prague Summit in November 2002 NATO will also need to reach consensus on which applicants should be invited to join the Alliance and the modalities to do so, ensuring the success of its second enlargement process. At the same time the Atlantic Alliance will need to

continue to develop its new qualitative relationship with Russia and enhance its partnerships with the Ukraine and, most of all, with its Mediterranean Dialogue partners. The Mediterranean Dialogue is NATO's near abroad (as a US scholar put it). To enhance NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue the Allies at Prague will need to move from Dialogue to Partnership. The Mediterranean Dialogue is based on the same cooperative approach to security which NATO has successfully put in place projecting stability to the Euro-Atlantic Area, bringing back to Europe the countries that for too long had been unnaturally separated from the rest of Europe, doing so in security and peace through "variable geometries" arrangements. The same cooperative approach to security has allowed to promote a better understanding of NATO's post Cold War reorientation in Mediterranean Dialogue countries, building at same time mutual trust. But this process is just at the beginning. NATO is still hill-perceived in Mediterranean Dialogue countries. The Alliance needs to continue to reach out to Mediterranean Dialogue partner countries' elites and policy makers, to correct prejudice and realign misperceptions. At Prague NATO's top policy makers will look at practical ways to move from Dialogue to Partnership. Discussions within NATO have already started to identify how to adapt some of the PfP activities to the specific realities of Mediterranean Dialogue countries, which are different from those of PfP countries. A major public diplomacy effort will also be needed to accompany the enhancement of the Mediterranean Dialogue, moving from Dialogue to Partnership. But to promote both a better understanding of NATO's Post Cold war agenda and the Mediterranean Dialogue partnership, NATO will need adequate resources. The issue of resources is key to NATO's continuous adaptation aimed at meeting current and future challenges affecting its members' security. That is why at the Prague Summit NATO will also modernise its political-military processes and structures, while it will overhaul the defense capabilities initiative to make sure that the Alliance continues to develop those political and military capabilities enabling NATO to deal with new challenges and threats. The speakers noted that it was thanking to NATO's capabilities that: the Cold War ended; two major military crises such as Bosnia and Kosovo were managed successfully, a third one in Macedonia was prevented from escalating and turning into a blood-shed; furthermore it was thanking to NATO capabilities that Milosevic is now before the ICTY, that NATO continues to provide for a security environment in which the political, social and economic reconstruction of the Balkans can take place and the reason why_9 new countries want to join the Atlantic Alliance.

After describing the achievements of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue so far, due to the work of the 19 nations' Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG) and to the activities put in place through the adoption of an annual Work Programme for practical cooperation between NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue countries, the speaker reported that, as a reaction to the events of September 11th, there seems to be momentum among Arab countries in cooperating in the security field with NATO, this for the first time involves also "hard security" areas of cooperation. NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue partners will need to follow up this momentum by identifying the practical initiatives that at the Prague Summit that could be useful to further enhance NATO's Mediterranean security Dialogue. Another issue the Allies will have to look at in the future, as NATO and the EU are working more closely to promote the complementary between NATO's ESDI and the EU's ESDP, will be how to make complementary NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the EU's Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the Barcelona Process).

Finally, the speaker stressed that NATO also has a role to play in encouraging activities involving the "civil society" in Mediterranean Dialogue countries. This is an area to which

NATO has paid increasingly more attention allocating to it each year more resources, allowing to bring to the Alliance's Headquarters parliamentarians, media representatives and opinion leaders to meet with the Secretary General of NATO and other Alliance officials, or through co-sponsoring international events, such as this conference, bringing together academics, parliamentarians, opinion leaders and the media from NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue countries to discuss common issues of security concern, exposing participants to each others' perceptions and realities.

Alvaro de Vasconcelos, Director of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies of Lisbon (IEEI), focused on the Barcelona process, discussing the reasons for its slow progress and suggesting ways in which it could be reinvigorated. The main goal of the Euro-Med Partnership (EMP) is to expand the area of peace, democracy and development in the North-South direction, through a process of inclusion. In terms of its potential, the EMP is the only framework for the participation of Southern countries in the world economy and is the sole multilateral Mediterranean framework in which a consistent, high-level dialogue involving both Israel and a significant number of Arab countries has been pursued. However, despite the process' proven potential, enormous difficulties are evident. Firstly, there is a lack of progress in the chapter on human rights and democracy. With the exception of Morocco, democratic transitions are at a standstill. Secondly, the collapse of the peace process in the Middle East makes security cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona process unfeasible. Thirdly, South-South integration, which is a necessary condition for creating an Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, is still weak, even though the initiative launched in Agadir of a free trade area between Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan is noteworthy.

The events of September 11th and the vast US-led coalition against international terrorism have brought some of those problems into the limelight and have, in some cases, aggravated them. In particular, the international coalition built to fight terrorism has in many cases entailed the opportunistic collaboration of a number of states in the MENA region, which have hoped to pursue their own internal and regional agendas. In other words, those regimes have become even more authoritarian. The events of September 11th have also contributed to further widening the perception gap between public opinion in the North and in the South. It is therefore important to try to understand what it is really happening in the MENA region after the events of September 11th. In relation to that, de Vasconcelos called attention to the importance of discussing what would be the impact on the Euro-Med Partnership and the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue of a military operation against Iraq, as negative perceptions of the West in the Arab public opinion would likely further increase.

The issue of how the Barcelona process can face its structural difficulties was also discussed. Firstly, the speaker suggested that the EMP should put aside the holistic approach prescribed for the achievement of peace, prosperity and security, and take into account national peculiarities when assessing the measures to be implemented. Within the EMP, a debate on this issue has already started. Secondly, a South-South approach should be adopted within the EMP. This means that the EMP should begin to discuss and face the problems regarding South-South countries and those internal to specific South countries, which constitute the real security problems in the region. Thirdly, as Southern partners feel that they lack sufficient influence in the decision-making process within the EMP, ways have to be found to give them more ownership. Moreover, in the security field, the EU should commit itself to doing something that goes beyond the Barcelona process. De Vasconcelos argued, however, that NATO can

hardly provide the right answer to security because problems in the region transcend the realm of security and the perceptions of NATO in Arab countries are not as positive as they are in Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, even though the transatlantic Dialogue seems to be the right forum for such a dialogue to bear its potential fruits as far as Europe and the United States are concerned, no dialogue will be entirely fruitful unless it involves all the interested parties, i.e. the US, the EU and the Mediterranean countries themselves. An initiative along the lines of the Italian-Spanish CSCM project, although less ambitious in geographical scope, may be more likely to emerge as a cornerstone in the near future.

Finally, the future of the Barcelona process largely depends on the Union's ability to assert an autonomous role in foreign and defense policy *vis-à-vis* the US and the EMP itself. The Union should refuse to remain hostage to the limited consensus achievable within the EMP and develop its own initiatives on human rights and democracy issues, differentiating between countries. Moreover, in the fight against terrorism, it should integrate issues such as human rights and justice in both dialogue and cooperative initiatives. Yet, as far as security policy is concerned, the EU should initiate a dialogue with Mediterranean countries on the issue of its own defense policy.

Discussion

The discussion that followed the three presentations focused mainly on the questions of how NATO and the EU can contribute to Mediterranean security and stability and, in particular, what role NATO should play in dealing with the security problems in the area.

One participant pointed out that, in dealing with the future of the NATO-Mediterranean relationship, one should first ask the broader question of what the future of NATO will be and what kind of role it will play. The same participant recalled that NATO was set up for dealing mainly with security challenges and therefore, has a role to play in dealing with regional conflicts, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

A comment was also made on the possible role of NATO in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It was argued that it would be unrealistic to send international observers without military forces to ensure their security. Unfortunately, neither the UN neither the EU would be able to mount such a force quickly. The only possibility would be a multinational force based on a coalition that includes three components: NATO countries, the countries of the region and possibly Russia. Moreover, if there were a strong international force in the field, assistance in re-constructing the area would be possible. In addition, the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, which involves important countries, could provide the framework for confidence-building measures in the region.

However, with regard to NATO's role, one participant questioned the juridical basis for NATO's fight against terrorism, pointing out that, despite connections, there is a very clear distinction in the EU between the use of military forces (the second pillar) and the fight against terrorism (the third pillar). Another participant noted that, while it is true that terrorism, like other new threats, is not part of NATO's institutional duties, it is now considered an area of interest. Consequently, the real question seems to be whether NATO is going to acquire a competence or a mission to fight terrorism. Moreover, one speaker argued that NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue is not the proper framework for promoting state-society

relations and political transition in MENA countries. In as much as security concerns are legitimately addressed within the right framework that is NATO, it is important to de-link state-society issues and the political agenda from security concerns. The Euro-Mediterranean framework is probably the arena in which Arab governments would be more comfortable to raise such issues, and promote political and economic reforms. It was remarked, however, that many elements of Arab civil society are against the goals of democratization.

All participants agreed that NATO and the EU should coordinate their policies with respect to the Mediterranean non-European countries and work out an explicit division of tasks to complement each other. It was pointed out that NATO can be complementary to the EU in the security field by bringing in the US. Moreover, while coordination between the EU and NATO is difficult, they have already worked together in practice, for example in Macedonia, and, four working groups within NATO are trying to find ways to establish this complementarity.

However, conflicting views were expressed on the issue of transatlantic relationships with regard to the Mediterranean. Some doubts were raised about whether NATO can live and prosper under the Bush' doctrine. One participant made the point that, while the Mediterranean dialogue between the US and the EU is important, in the current period there is need for a different and strongly autonomous EU policy in the Mediterranean *vis-à-vis* the US. According to the same speaker, there is too much Mediterranean dialogue between the US and the UE which has contributed to inhibiting the EU's autonomy in the region. Nevertheless, one participant questioned how an autonomous position of the EU *vis-à-vis* the US could promote stability, peace, democracy, security and human rights in ways that coordination with the US or following in the US' path could not. Another remarked that, even though NATO plays a fundamental complementary role to the EU, the latter needs its defense autonomy in order to be accountable to European citizens and to be in a position to intervene if the US is not interested in doing so. Yet, only if the EU acts collectively and in an autonomous way, will it be able to influence the US - the fundamental actor in the international system - with its vision. It was also noted that the development of EU security and defense policy works in the interests of NATO anyway.

3. Challenges to Stability

The second theme was discussed in four sessions: Islamism's roots and prospects; transnational risks and soft security cooperation; globalization trends; and new and traditional terrorism.

3.1 Islamism: Roots and Prospects

Béchir Chourou, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Tunis I, examined the issue of Islamism, highlighting in particular the reasons behind its emergence and popular support, and the prospects of radical Islamic movements after September 11th. According to Chourou, although some of the Islamic fundamentalist movements maintain informal contacts with each other, there is no structured international Islamic movement. Islamic fundamentalist movements are local organizations that were created to deal with local

issues, have very little interest in international issues and are not very actively involved outside the borders of their respective countries. In particular, Islamic groups were often sponsored by ruling regimes in the beginning to counteract leftist opposition movements but, subsequently, when they entered the political arena and became leading opposition forces in their respective countries, were subjected to even harsher treatment than that given other opposition movements. By contrast, as he noted, after the events of the September 11th, the West has interpreted the Islamic movement as a “diffuse and trans-national” movement and, consequently, has reacted to it by building up another international movement – the international coalition behind the US leadership.

However, he cautioned that fundamentalist movements are likely to attract more and more local sympathizers and activists should the West fail to convince Israel to accept the creation of a Palestinian state and convince current Arab regimes to adopt meaningful political reforms. In particular, he called attention to the fact that Western countries are not credible to the populations of the MENA region because they are perceived as the root causes of their problems: even though their regimes are unaccountable, illegitimate and unresponsive to public needs, they continue to prosper because of Western support. As far as the actions undertaken after September 11th are concerned, popular attitudes towards the West in Arab countries seem not to have changed. In its efforts to mobilize support for its war on terrorism, the US asked for and received full cooperation from most Arab countries. Moreover, even though the US launched a campaign to convince public opinion in the world that the war is against terrorism and not Islam, it is unlikely that such discourse can receive much credibility in Muslim countries. The average man on the street in Muslim countries considers such a campaign as highly hypocritical. In fact, before September 11th, no attention was paid to Muslims and their culture, the Palestinian conflict had been ignored for years and authoritarian regimes in the MENA tolerated by the West. The speaker furthermore observed that there is no evidence that the West, and in particular the US, is interested in putting pressures on Arab regimes to adopt political reforms. Yet, he pointed out that, with respect to human rights, there seems to be a discrepancy between what the West says and how it behaves, as the case of the al-Qaida prisoners shows. This is likely to reinforce the image of the West that Osama bin Laden wants to convey.

Chourou concluded by expressing concern that the way in which the US is trying to play on people’s emotions with respect to the dramatic events of September 11th may have costly consequence if there is a return to continuous dis-respect for fundamental human rights and inconsistency between what the West says and does. Both the US and the EU should realize that the fundamentalist movements are – for now at least – by and large local opposition movements whose appeal and popularity are based more on the concern they show for the common man than on the real desire to harm the West. So, the most effective way of challenging the fundamentalists is to adopt proactive policies designed to improve standards of living, to put an end to corruption and repression and, more generally, to reduce the number and the impact of the factors that appear to be leading the world towards a “clash of civilizations”.

Discussion

Attention was drawn first to soft security issues and the importance that they be handled within the right framework. According to one participant, many soft security issues relating to civil society, democracy issues and economic prosperity, have been mishandled for so long

that they have reached the point of hard security. The same speaker also pointed out that there is no reason for anyone from outside to interfere in soft security issues since they are domestic issues and, therefore, should be handled at the domestic level. In particular, in the coming years, two issues should be addressed at the domestic level: integrating Islamic political parties and finding a way to adjust the modernizing agenda in Muslim societies. However, one of the negative consequences of the events of September 11th is that governments in the MENA region have pushed aside the agenda of the so-called donor community that aims at promoting civil society, democracy and human rights, in favor of the other international agenda, the security agenda, which requires military and intelligence cooperation.

The nature of the Islamic movement and its roots were further discussed. Some comments underscored the fact that Islamic movements have a national and specific agenda. Two factors have contributed to the distortion of political development and the rise of radical elements in the MENA region: the nature of governance and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As one participant noted, the latter cannot be excluded from any discussion on the Islamic movement. With regard to the most radical Islamic movements, it was pointed out that, in most cases, for instance in Egypt, they are on the decline because of lack of popular support and are acknowledging the failure of using violence as a political strategy.

As far as trans-national Islamic organizations are concerned, one participant argued that the criminal network has developed and prospered in a specific context, in which a number of factors came together to allow it to organize in a particular space. In particular, as a result of their defeat on a local basis, a few of the most radical elements of the Islamic movements of Egypt went to Afghanistan where they found the economic support of Osama bin Laden. Moreover, the same speaker highlighted that, despite popular sympathy for al-Qaida, the trans-national movement does not relate in any substantial way to what goes on domestically. Popular sympathy with al-Qaida in MENA countries has to do with the people's discontent and resentment. According to another participant, a more global crisis of identity also has to be considered as a factor in explaining the emergence of the trans-national strain of fanatical Islamic groups. In particular, the participant drew a link between the old generation of Islamic groups related to Afghanistan and the new generation of immigrants. Islamic groups have indeed found new ground within the fresh generation of immigrants in the US and the EU. However, another comment was that, in order to avoid confusion, it is very important to distinguish clearly between the two phenomena that have emerged after September 11th and that now dominate the international agenda: one is the wider ideological issue that generated the events of September 11th and involves issues in the Islamic world, and the other, which is developing in parallel with it, but is quite separate, is the radicalization of immigration in Europe.

A participant also called attention to another important feature of Muslim society today. While Islamic movements are failing, Islamic institutions, which are the legitimate representatives of Islam, have gained a lot of influence in the last years. As a result of the erosion of their legitimacy, governments have had to negotiate each and every issue with them. However, even if it is too early to say, as a result of the events of September 11th and the consequent pressures from outside, governments have started challenging the religious establishment on some issues.

Finally, a debate took place on how the spread of radical Islamic movements can be avoided and if unconditional support of current regimes – in the name of security – is the only or most

acceptable alternative. Participants agreed that there is a need to integrate Islamic groups into the political sphere and that it is no longer possible not to allow these societies to express their views democratically because authoritarian regimes are considered a lesser evil than the spread of radical Islam. At the same time, how this dilemma should be addressed is still not clear. Doubts were raised as to how the West can ensure that it is not supporting a peaceful way to a totalitarian power. On the attitudes of the US and the EU on political Islam, a participant highlighted that, after the September 11th, while the US is globalizing the phenomenon, the EU is trying to differentiate and analyze it, although it is still very cautious about political change. However, while sharing the concern that all Islamic movements, whether moderate or violent, aim at establishing an Islamic state, another comment was that communist parties were successfully integrated into the democratic system in Western societies. It was also stressed that if the West wants to do something to avoid the spread of radical movements, it has to stop legitimating Arab regimes or, at least, dissociate from them.

3.2 Trans-national Risks and Soft Security Cooperation

George Joffé, Centre of International Studies, Cambridge University, UK, explored the issue of trans-national risks. He first shared with participants some reflections on problems of definition, noting that trans-national risks seem to involve non-state actors and are fundamentally non-conventional political criminal activities. He also highlighted the importance of distinguishing between international and trans-national risks.

Four different categories of trans-national activities were identified: terrorism; smuggling and trafficking; international crimes, particularly organized international crime; and financial activities, either money laundering or the use of financial havens. Trans-national risks are typically seen to operate as a South-North phenomenon and, in particular, as an East-West European phenomenon. However, the speaker noted that there are also North-South trans-national risks that are more general, such as the process of globalization. Moreover, trans-national risks should not be considered only as the consequences of push factors, such as employment, remittances and demography, but also as the consequences of pull factors such as demand for drugs in developed countries.

As far as trans-national terrorism is concerned, the speaker argued that, even allowing for the implications of September 11th, in European terms it is still a minor concern. Statistics indicate that the actual incidence of terrorism either in Europe or in the Middle East is small. So, regarding the question of how to respond to terrorism, he stressed that terrorism is a phenomenon that deserves intelligence and police control rather than military control. Concern was also expressed about the great danger of the West adopting the agenda of governments in the South that have specific reasons for wishing to see terrorism trans-nationalized. Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria are cases in point.

With regard to drugs, Joffé pointed out that, contrary to what is generally presumed, the Mediterranean is a transit area, not a producer. Only cannabis originates mainly in Morocco where it represents one tenth of the country's total gross domestic product and fifty-six percent of its visible exports. Given the important role that cannabis plays in the local economy, it is difficult for the Moroccan government simply to dismantle production. A much more serious risk, according to the speaker, is that the drug transiting into Europe through the

South Mediterranean is a powerful engine for the growth of integrated organized crime networks in Europe. Moreover, as for the trafficking and smuggling of people, he noted that, in some respect, it can be considered the most serious and dangerous trans-national risk we face. Figures and recent facts in Britain, France and Italy show that there is a massive population movement to Europe. In particular, the problem of illegal workers is one that European states have "to consider very carefully". Indeed, the aging of the European population, the changing patterns of labor and the problem of European pension structure mean that labor is required. Finally, associated with it, is the question of international organized crime. Organized international crime groups can be found in Russia, Eastern Europe and the Balkans, where they are very sophisticated and collaborate with each other. Since they generate a large amount of cash, money laundering is also becoming an important associated activity. While regulation has been inadequate, the OECD and the US recently respectively introduced a convention.

Lastly, the speaker addressed the question of control of trans-national risks. With regard to the smuggling of people, he pointed out that, at the national level, even in the most developed states, controls in legal terms are very weak. For example, there are countries of destination, like UK, where there are no specific laws on trafficking and smuggling. At the international level, on the other hand, control has been constructed. For example, last year, the US put through an act attempting to control the trafficking of persons, while the UN brought in a convention on trans-national organized crime with two associated protocols, one on trafficking and one on smuggling. However, with regard to Europe, he noted that it is still unequipped to deal with the smuggling of people, organized crime and terrorism. At the level of national and EU integration, there is still a lot to be done.

In conclusion, he underscored the needs for the EU to put into place the instruments with which to control international or trans-national risks and, at the same time, for European states to take great care that what they do does not actually worsen the situation of their domestic population and those involved in trans-national risks.

Discussion

Attention returned to the question of the definition of trans-national risks. On the issue of actors, one participant argued that the emphasis on non-state actors can lead to confusion about what the appropriate response is and whether the threat should be seen as a problem of criminality or security. With respect to terrorism, for example, such a distinction seems to skirt a major problem that has to do with state support, encouragement or toleration of terrorist actions, and, at the very least, with the state's inability to exercise sovereignty within its borders. In relation to non-state actors, one comment was also that, after 1989, there have been two main changes: first, increasing deregulation and privatization of terrorism, which was previously state-controlled, while it is now much more state-aided; and second, a freeing of criminal resources from the Russian area.

Another participant pointed out that definitions of trans-national risks tend to include everything, with the result that they become non-sensical and inefficient. What creates a real category of trans-national risks is the fusion of both traditional and non-traditional categories. To categorize trans-national risks, the same participant proposed a new acronym - the MPPTM - which is a synthesis of the actors involved in them: Mafia, Politicians,

Priests, Terrorists and Managers. In other words, the perpetrators of trans-national threats can be defined as “people managing political activities as business, justified by political and, sometimes, religious means, and using terrorism as war against the state”. Due to globalization and the failure of the state, the new actors responsible for trans-national threats are capable of dealing with the state as a non-governmental actor but at the state level.

Conflicting views were expressed on what, among trans-national risks, should be considered of priority security concern. Consequently, different points were also raised about the strategies to deal with trans-national risks. One participant emphasized that the smuggling of technology, smuggling of substances and organized crime are security risks that, if not managed, can become security threats. As a result, they also have to be addressed within the NATO framework. However, one participant argued that NATO is not the appropriate vehicle to deal with such risks. For instance, as far as the smuggling of substances is concerned, the problem has to do more with intelligence than with the materials themselves. Yet, with regard to international crime, the same speaker noted that, while it is true that organized crime can take on a dimension that threatens the existence of the state, people involved in international crime actually do not want to change the state but to exploit it.

With regard to migration, one participant remarked that it does not have to be brought into a discussion on security cooperation since it is not a security threat; migration issues can be better addressed within the EU framework. The point was also made that, even though NATO is a hard military organization, one should not overlook that soft security issues are being covered in NATO and that partners are looking for cooperation on these issues. Finally, a participant pointed out that the real trans-national risk to the world community today is the future of Afghanistan. The country’s persistent instability is likely to have international consequences in terms of drug trade, terrorism and migration. NATO and MENA countries could play an important role in helping to restore stability in Afghanistan.

Concrete suggestions on how to respond to trans-national risks were also made. According to one participant, based on the premise that criminal groups are fundamentally conservative, and, paradoxically, created by the state, to respond to trans-national risks, one could try to restrict those actors’ activities through legalization (in the case of drugs, for example), policing the international off-shore financial system, effecting cross-border arrests rather than waiting for the slow process of extradition, and promoting co-operation among national judicial systems. In addition, a participant warned against the seduction of using quick and effective means at the beginning. On terrorism, in particular, it was noted that, once the network has been dismantled, nothing will stop people from rebuilding it if social and political conditions do not change in their countries.

3.3 Globalization Trends

Michael Intriligator, Director of the Burkle Center for International Relations of the University of California, dealt with the process of globalization of the world economy, evaluating both the potential costs and benefits stemming from globalization as well as suggesting policy responses to offset such dangers. Globalization is understood to mean major increases in worldwide trade and exchanges in an increasingly open, integrated, and

borderless international economy. There have been several sources of globalization over the last past decades: technological advances that have significantly lowered the cost of transportation, communications, data processing and information storage; economic liberalization that has led to a more liberal world trading system; changes in institutions; a convergence of beliefs in the value of the market economy and a free trade system; and, finally, cultural developments with a move to a globalized and homogenized media, and the widespread use of the English language.

As the speaker argued, globalization has both positive and negative effects. As far as the benefits are concerned, they stem from the effects of competition that globalization entails. In particular, they include widening of markets, increase in production and efficiency, specialization and division of labor, and mutual gains by all parties from trade. With regard to the costs, globalization has led to an increase in polarization between countries. The reality is that only a small group of nations, “the tiger economies” of East Asia, have grown at rapid rates. A second problem related to globalization is the fragility of the international economic system that leads to mutual vulnerability. This means that local economic fluctuations or crises in one nation can have regional or even global impact. Intriligator noted that this is not just a theoretical possibility, but was seen in the financial crisis in Asia, which started in Thailand in 1998 and then spread to other Southeast Asian economies. A third type of problem is that control of national entities is seen by some as possibly shifting from sovereign governments to other entities, including the most powerful nation states, multinational or global firms, and other international organizations. The result is that some perceive national sovereignty as being undermined by the forces of globalization.

Intriligator concluded by suggesting some ways of responding to the challenges of globalization. He argued that, overall, the dangers stemming from globalization could be offset through wider international cooperation, and the establishment of new international institutions or the expansion of existing ones. For example, a supranational institution based on global cooperation could address the first of the problems stemming from globalization. It would, in effect, tax the nations gaining from globalization and use the proceeds to provide financial and technical assistance to those losing out from it. Moreover, with regard to the second problem, international cooperation could lead to the implementation of the Tobin tax, a small tax on foreign exchange transactions that could play a valuable role in limiting destabilizing currency speculation. Thus, while globalization can cause international conflicts, it can also contribute to their containment through the beneficial effects of competition and the potential of global cooperation to treat economic and other threats facing the planet.

Discussion

The discussion began with comments on the definition of globalization and its effects. A participant noted that the definition of globalization provided by the presentation basically focused on economic aspects, but technological development also fosters exchange in people’s information and ideas with widespread political, cultural, social and economic effects. The same speaker furthermore outlined some of the non-economic effects stemming from globalization. As far as the benefits are concerned, it was pointed out that, thanks to internet and satellite dishes, it is now much more difficult than before for governments to prevent the free flow of ideas and information. Human rights values have also been universalized, and international institutions and international law are now playing a greater

role. With regard to the negative effects, it was stressed that in addition to inequality between nations, there has been massive growth in inequality within nations. Moreover, inequality should not be attributed to governmental fiscal policies, as Intriligator seems to suggest. In fact, governments have to pursue these policies if they are to retain access to international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Elite migration can be considered a further damaging effect of globalization for exporting countries. Another participant commented on the definition of globalization. While agreeing on the definition that highlights openness, the same participant pointed out that it does not underline what makes this globalization different from that of a century ago, that is increasing growth in international investment in manufacturing and services related to manufacturing. It was also noted that this process of restructuring has had an asymmetric impact. In particular, MENA countries, with the exception of Tunisia, have not been able to take advantage of the opportunities stemming from globalization.

Some participants tried to explain why MENA countries lag behind in the process of globalization. One participant stressed that equity problems have to do more with the inability or unwillingness of certain states to bring their countries into the process of globalization, than the dynamics of globalization *per se*. So, referring to MENA countries, the problem with inward capital flows in the region has to do with bad governance. However, another speaker noted that certain elements in the globalization process provide the opportunity for those faults on the part of individual governments. The point was also made that a number of political and cultural factors such as the existence of a conflict in the region and the cultural intensity in this area should be taken into account.

Finally, a debate took place regarding the key issue, as one participant said, on how to cope with globalization and, most importantly, how to create processes and structures to ensure that the globalized world is not marked by instability on the one hand, and inequality and injustice, on the other hand. In particular, comments focused on the proposal of global cooperation as a way to counteract the negative dimensions of globalization. One participant noted that international institutions are dominated by the US and, perhaps, one or two other Western countries. As far as the Middle East and Southern Mediterranean countries are concerned, this is a very important dimension that very deeply affects the way in which the international system is seen and the kind of role international institutions are expected to play. The same participant also expressed concern that a proper response to the challenges of globalization is not possible without the political scenario required to achieve international cooperation. So, there is a need to see how public opinion and forces both in the South and on the underside of the North may be mobilized to press for this kind of change. Another participant pointed out that international cooperation does not mean only international institutions. Decentralized decision-making could be even more effective than central international institutions to deal with certain issues. Thus, future international cooperation could involve very different levels of intervention - multilateral, but also regional and in some cases bilateral - that should be made compatible and, if possible, complementary to each other. The key problem to be addressed is therefore how to make these different levels consistent. Lastly, someone commented that, in order to change the situation of inequality and thereby the implicit security threat, macroeconomic policies have to be accompanied by actions that allow populations to exploit the globalized world. Populations indeed require services that have to be provided by the states and not by the globalized economy.

3.4 New and Traditional Terrorism

Ian Lesser, Senior Analyst, International Policy Department, RAND, explored the issue of terrorism, examining how it has changed and is changing, and how it can be counteracted. After the transforming and shocking events of September 11th, generalizing about terrorism is difficult. Alongside new aspects, a lot of other traditional aspects of terrorism persist. The speaker, in particular, noted that the lethality of what happened on September 11th is in fact a trend that has been going on for a long time. In the last decade, since the 1990s, although the total volume of terrorist incidents worldwide actually went down, the lethality of terrorism has increased steadily. The general explanation accounting for such extensive use of violence can be linked to new motivations. The political agenda of the old terrorist organizations had specific goals that led to a rather specifically - tailored politically - motivated violence that was highly calibrated. Whereas, as is the case with the new terrorist organizations, if the aims are broad, systemic, global and not very coherent, all sorts of violence, in particular with religious connotations, can become more intense. Terrorism has also become more diverse in its forms and less isolated as a phenomenon: in addition to terrorism motivated by political goals and, at the end of the spectrum, systemic objectives, there are also a lot of other forms of terrorism that are associated, for example, with drug trafficking and international crimes.

Moreover, looking at the Afghan experience and the operations against al-Qaida after September 11th, Lesser argued that they can be considered a special and rather exceptional case. From the point of view of the international coalition, al-Qaida was the best possible adversary: it was easily targetable and visible, and was associated with a specific regime. Bin Laden's systemic aims threaten an extraordinary range of regimes and interests. Building up an international coalition against al-Qaida was therefore easy. However, he continued, al-Qaida is now different since it is a much more dispersed phenomenon. Finally, he remarked that the old terrorism has not gone away.

As far as the issue of counter-terrorism strategies is concerned, he argued that, in the post-September 11th environment, a national counter-terrorism strategy is inappropriate and ineffective. After September 11th, for example, arrests of terrorists were carried out in sixty countries around the world. Moreover, future counter-terrorism activities in general will not consist of large-scale military responses, but rather in police co-operation and intelligence-sharing among states. On this point, he noted that, after September 11th, cooperation of police and intelligence-sharing between the EU and the US has been very good. However, it is not clear for how long cooperation between the EU and the US is going to persist and be effective if there is no agreement on a common foreign strategy. Finally, he pointed out that the risk of terrorism should not be seen as the organizing principle for foreign strategy. While it is an important strategic problem to be dealt with, it should not be discussed and addressed in isolation from other strategic problems.

Discussion

Participants first commented on the nature of trans-national terrorism. According to one intervention, four elements have made terrorism new after September 11th: globalization that, through the global spreading of finance and communication, has facilitated the networking of terrorist groups around the world; high levels of knowledge and education due to the growth of the educational system around the world; sophistication of education; and a feeling of

frustration resulting from lack of democracy and economic development. Moreover, the same participant argued that, after the events of September 11th, the escalation from locally focused terrorism to globally focused terrorism has to be related to the specificity of radical Islam. In particular, three elements explain the globalization of the fight of radical Islam: first, historical and political factors such as colonization, the Iranian revolution, authoritarian regimes, and some economic problems; second, the specificity of the *shaid* (martyr) and, third, immigration which made it possible for some radical groups to settle in Western societies and develop their own strategies inside the Muslim community.

However, one participant contended that, while it is true that Islamic terrorist groups are motivated by global issues, grassroots causes at the domestic and national levels are more relevant in explaining their move towards more systemic goals. One should not forget that such groups have a history and come from a society with history. In fact, they were initially influenced by domestic problems and the Arab-Israeli conflict, and they then moved toward more systemically motivated goals as a result of their local defeat in the 1980s and 1990s. The same speaker furthermore underscored the importance of distinguishing between al-Qaida and other organizations like Hamas that have more specific and clear goals. Another participant further emphasized the importance of looking at the history of Islamic movements and argued that al-Qaida has specific targets and specific reasons. In particular, it was noted that there was a progression in al-Qaida's construction: from the specific complaints about the American presence in Saudi Arabia in 1992 through the Committee of Legitimate Rights, of which Osama bin Laden was a member; the first *fatwa* against the US issued upon Osama bin Laden's initiative in 1996; to the *fatwa* against Jews and Christians issued in 1998. Finally, another participant questioned the view that groups like al-Qaida have moved from a national agenda to a global one arguing that the September attack was not a world attack against the global order but was directed against the US.

The issue of how to counteract Islamic terrorism was discussed at length. It was argued that there is no one strategy to counteract terrorism as a tactic, but there have to be many different strategies. One comment was that the globalization of the fight makes it very difficult to defeat Islamic terrorist organizations quickly. Moreover, since al-Qaida has the strategic goal of imposing an Islamic order worldwide, one of the main characteristics of the new terrorism is that there is no possibility of negotiation and dialogue. To defeat those organizations, some strategies were suggested: using traditional means like prosecution; cutting finance; cooperating at the level of intelligence; early warning and prevention; and, at the military level, using special forces capable of dismantling these groups without risks for themselves and for the society in which they operate. Another intervention stressed that a long-term fight is essential to defeat these groups, rather than the war that was started. Islamic terrorism, as participants agreed, has indeed used the strengths of the West (open borders, access to technology and democracy) to transform them into weaknesses. The case of al-Qaida prisoners in Cuba was put forward as an example of wrong counter-terrorism response. The fact that justice was not applied in the way it should be in Western societies gave Islamic terrorist groups further arguments for their fight. Lastly, according to another speaker, in the long run, the only way to reduce the magnitude of Islamic terrorism is by addressing the problems of good governance and economic development in the MENA region, as well as finding a solution to the Palestinian-Israel conflict. In particular, there is a need for a comprehensive policy package and gradual reforms that introduce some elements of good

governance since those countries are still not ready for full fledged democracy. The same participant argued that the approach developed by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is still the right one. So, the experience of EMP should be studied to see how this approach can be made more productive in order to address instability and terrorism. In particular, governments in the MENA region need more insurance from outside that they will be assisted in facing any kind of problem.

Finally, a few comments were made in relation to the specific cases of Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. On Saudi Arabia, one participant commented that it is the most destabilized country in the region after September 11th. While it was suggested that the question of the US bases should be faced because it is a cause for dissent and anger among Saudi people, someone else noted that there are also other sources of discontent in the country that need to be taken into account. With regard to Iran and Iraq, the point was made that targeting the two countries would contribute to increasing the tension in the Gulf region. So, the US should swallow its pride in dealing with these countries and try to accommodate them. According to another participant, the US needs to solve the Palestinian conflict before taking any action against Iraq. If Iraq is destroyed, there is the risk of new forms of destabilization in the region. The same speaker also pointed out that designating Iran as a bad and pariah state only works in favor of the conservative forces in the country. As for Afghanistan, one participant suggested that federalism may be a solution for maintaining the integrity and unity of the country. Others agreed, however, that the real problem is Pakistan more than Afghanistan.

4. Round Table

The round table session, which was held by **Alvaro de Vasconcelos**, **Béchar Chourou**, **Ian Lesser** and **Tom Farer**, discussed the theme of Governance and Partnership in the Mediterranean.

Alvaro de Vasconcelos began the round table by giving a brief overview of the main problems of the Middle East and North Africa. He first called attention to the region's lack of structures and institutions: the Middle East process has failed, the Euro-Med partnership is still a weak process, and the NATO's Mediterranean dialogue, while interesting, is not a multilateral process and involves a limited number of countries of the region. Moreover, the region suffers from deep economic and social problems, and is marginalized from the process of globalization. In addition, there has been no progress in the process of democratic transition and, after September 11th, the regimes that entered the international coalition have become even more authoritarian. However, as he noted, Europe and US are now aware that there is an urgent need to support real reforms in the region. He also remarked on some of the points that had been raised during the discussion: the importance of differentiating between trans-national terrorism and Islam, between Islamic groups and al-Qaida, and trans-national groups and national groups; and the fact that participants recognized that Islamic groups should be integrated in the process of democratic transition. He underlined, however, that transition has to be prepared and a better understanding of how to deal with the issue of political Islam is required. In this perspective, fundamental issues like the question of the Algerian crisis and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must receive a response. According to de Vasconcelos, the solution of the Palestinian problem could facilitate democratic transition in

the region. He concluded by noting that there is great scope for cooperation between the EU and the US on the Palestinian conflict, but it is fundamental that the EU plays its own role and maintains its point of view *vis-à-vis* the US.

In his intervention, **Béchir Chourou** focused on three points. First, the importance of identifying and addressing the so-called root causes of terrorism. Second, attention was drawn to the more general environment in which the events of September 11th took place. In particular, Chourou pointed out that there is a growing disenchantment with the political process and politicians both in the North and in the South. As an alternative to this disenchantment, people are either withdrawing from the public space, especially if they do not face personal problems, or are looking for unconventional ways of expression. Chourou argued that acts of terrorism can be considered as part of this general trend of resorting to unconventional means of expression. As a third point, he discussed the main problems faced by the Euro-Mediterranean process that have to be solved. A first problem is that the EU suffers from a lack of credibility in Southern Mediterranean countries, which in turn suffer from a lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the EU. Second, negotiations between South and North are not fair. So, to avoid future radicalization of those who oppose the Partnership, Chourou underscored the need to address the lack of balance between the partners. Moreover, MENA is one of the areas in which military tension remains high and the accumulation of weapons is among the highest in the world. Why do these countries keep on buying arms and weapons? How are these weapons going to be used? Are suppliers of arms willing to decrease tension and increase security by not selling arms? According to Chourou, such questions need to be addressed if we want to avoid future problems. Finally, the problem of South-South cooperation was mentioned. The Euro-Med partnership will not succeed unless South-South cooperation is encouraged. If the South wants to avoid greater marginalization and poverty, the only solution is to create a regional block.

Ian Lesser brought two questions to the attention of participants: with regard to security cooperation and the management of internal security, how can the problem, especially in the South Mediterranean area, of strong states that do not want to compromise their sovereignty be dealt with?; and how much risk are we willing to tolerate in pursuit of social change in the South? For example, in some instances, states may seek assistance in managing their own internal security challenges under the guise of counter-terrorism. In other cases, states may seek a political price for cooperating against terrorist movements that threaten Western interests more than their own. Lesser also warned of the tendency after September 11th to believe that it is possible to respond to terrorism only if there is political and cultural change in the South. This may be valid for the long but not for the short term, he said. As far as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is concerned, he pointed out that, after September 11th, it is likely that the US, which has always been jealous of the peace process, will be more open to the EU's approach to the problem. Finally, he highlighted that security problems have not changed since September 11th. Thus, regarding the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and the Euro-Med Partnership, their agenda is still the same.

Tom Farer discussed the implications of the events of September 11th for the framework of international relations. He highlighted some of the concrete measures that would seem to fall within the Bush doctrine: the US might parachute troops into countries to seize suspected terrorists or might eliminate them by means of air strikes, rather than working through the

often slow and unpredictable process of extradition. Within Iraq, it might launch an attack and provide protected zones in which to arm and train indigenous forces. In the case of Iran, it might employ cruise missiles against nuclear reactors or other facilities relevant to the production of nuclear chemical or biological weapons; and it might blockade the country to force agreement on international weapons inspections or to prevent importation of dual-use technologies. Although it has to be seen whether or not Bush will do this, Farer argued that all these measures would break the UN Charter norms which have served as the framework of international relations for the past half century. However, a conceivable alternative framework, as he suggested, could be the establishment of a Condominium that would involve an unparalleled degree of cooperation between states and would require the inclusion of certain additional states such as India, Brazil and South Africa.

5. Concluding Remarks

Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, Deputy Secretary General of NATO, concluded the conference with a brief overview of NATO's current political agenda and specific considerations on the Mediterranean region. With regard to NATO's current activities, he reported that the Alliance is busy preparing for a Summit meeting of Heads of State and Government in Prague in November, where important decisions are expected to be taken regarding enlargement. Even before Prague, NATO hopes to have in place a new framework that will allow NATO and Russia to go beyond consultation.

Commenting on the events of September 11th and their aftermath, he noted that they have underlined the need for improving NATO's capabilities. While it is clear that the fight against terrorism requires a broad approach in which military means are just one element, the case of Afghanistan has shown that military means are important. This means that the Alliance, as the world's most effective military organization, has a role to play in the fight against terrorism.

As far as NATO's response to terrorism is concerned, he pointed out that NATO is working hard to maximize the Alliance's terrorist fighting potential by increasing intelligence-sharing among the Allies. The Allies' defense capabilities are also being reviewed to tailor them more specifically to the requirements of combating terrorism. In addition, NATO is also focusing more systematically on the dangers of weapons of mass destruction, on the protection of their forces and populations against these lethal weapons, and on ballistic missile defense. Finally, NATO is attaching a lot of importance to the engagement of all its partners - not just the 27 that form part of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, but also the seven that take part in the NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue.

More specific remarks were made on the Mediterranean region and its importance to the Alliance. After having highlighted that the Mediterranean has always played a significant role in the European security equation, he pointed out that the Gulf War, the break-up of Yugoslavia and - most recently - the threat of terrorism, have all shown that security and stability in and around Europe is still very much a work in progress, and have reinforced the notion that security in Europe is linked to security in the Mediterranean region. These developments have therefore led the Alliance to focus more specifically on the region as one with unique characteristics and dynamics, and presenting specific security challenges. In

particular, the Deputy Secretary General outlined five problem areas presented by the Mediterranean region. A first is the rift between Europe and the Mediterranean region in terms of their democratic and economic development. A second is the persistence of several regional tensions. He argued that, more than any other conflict, the Middle East crisis has implications that go far beyond its point of origin. This means that, without a serious Middle East peace process, a major obstacle to sound relations between the Western and Arab worlds will remain. The other three problems were related to limited resources, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. On the last one, the Deputy Secretary General noted that terrorism is not a specifically Mediterranean phenomenon, nor one linked with any particular religious beliefs. At the same time, he continued, it is clear that the lack of democratic and economic reforms combined with a lack of fundamental freedoms and human rights, all provide a fertile breeding ground for terrorism in many parts of the Mediterranean.

Finally, in order for the Mediterranean to become a more stable and prosperous region, NATO has its part to play. While the EU offers what the region undoubtedly needs most, that is economic cooperation, the EU alone cannot deal with the scope and diversity of the region. Moreover, the EU does not include several key players in Mediterranean security, notably Turkey and the US. In particular, through the Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO currently offers opportunities for both political consultation and practical cooperation in a wide range of areas to a total of seven non-NATO Mediterranean countries. Yet, the Dialogue, as the Deputy Secretary General underlined, is a two-way channel of communication that after September 11th has only become more important. He concluded by pointing out that, as terrorism is a security challenge that threatens Allies and non-Allies alike, there is a need for a cooperative approach. This is why, he said, NATO attaches so much importance to engaging all its partners – our 27 European partners as well as the 7 partners of the Mediterranean Dialogue.

APPENDIX 2

Activities of the IAI Project on Transatlantic Perspectives on Relations across the Mediterranean border

1. Seminar on “Setting up a nucleus of NATO Mediterranean Dialogue Academic Institutions”, Rome on July 7, 2001

Papers

- Think Tanks As A Cooperative Factor In Nato’s Mediterranean Dialogue, *Roberto Aliboni*
- Le rôle des institutions academiques dans le renforcement de la coopération en matière de sécurité autour de la Méditerranée, *Jean François Daguzan*
- Western-Mediterranean Security Relations: Issues And Challenges, *Carlo Masala*
- Report on the Seminar “Setting up a nucleus of NATO Mediterranean Dialogue Academic Institutions”, Rome, July 7th, 2001, *Daniela Pioppi*

Participants

From NATO Mediterranean Dialogue Countries:

- Abdel Monem Said Aly, Director, ACPSS - Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Egypt
- Shai Feldman, Director, JCSS - The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Israel
- Mazen Gharaibe, Acting President JID - Jordan Institute of Diplomacy, Jordan
- Khalid Alioua, Senior Researcher, GERM - Groupement d’Etudes et de Recherches sur la Méditerranée, Morocco
- Khaled Kaddour, Directeur de veille stratégique, ITES - Institut Tunisien des Etudes Stratégiques, Tunisia

From NATO Countries:

- Carlo Masala, Senior Researcher ZEI - Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, Germany
- Stefano Silvestri, President, IAI - Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy
- Roberto Aliboni, Director of Studies, IAI - Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy
- Maria do Rosario de Moraes Vaz, Senior Researcher IEEI - Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, Portugal

- Ian O. Lesser, Senior Researcher RAND, USA
- Michael Intriligator, Professor of Political Science, UCLA 's Burkle Center for International Relations, USA

From NATO:

- Nicola De Santis, Italy Liaison Officer for Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries, Belgium
- Rapporteur: Daniela Pioppi, Junior Researcher IAI - Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy

Observers

- Gabriele Tonne, Assistant Editor of The International Spectator, IAI-International Affairs Institute, Rome

2. International Conference on “Governing Stability Across the Mediterranean Sea: a Transatlantic Perspective”, Rome on 21-23 March 2002

Papers

- Between Dialogue and Partnership: What North-South Relationship, Across the Mediterranean? *Roberto Aliboni*, [published as “Upgrading Political Responses in the Mediterranean”, The International Spectator, Rome, Vol. XXXVII, No 2, April-June 2002, pp. 103-112.]
- Islamism: Roots and Prospects *Bechir Chourou*
- Ten points on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, *Álvaro de Vasconcelos*, [published as “Seven Points on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”, The International Spectator, Rome, Vol. XXXVII, No 2, April-June 2002, pp. 113-120.]
- Globalisation of the World Economy: Potential Benefits and Costs and a Net Assessment, *Michael D. Intriligator*,
- Coalition Dynamics In The War Against Terrorism, *Ian O. Lesser*, [published as “Coalition Dynamics In The War Against Terrorism”, The International Spectator, Rome, Vol. XXXVII, No 2, April-June 2002, pp. 43-50.]
- Conference on “After September 11th, Governing Stability Across the Mediterranean Sea: a Transatlantic Perspective”, Rome, 21-23 March 2002, A Conference Report, *Cristina Paciello*

Participants

- Roberto Aliboni, Vice President, IAI-International Affairs Institute, Rome
- Giancarlo Aragona, Director General, Directorate of Political Affairs, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome
- John Berry, Dean, NATO Defense College, Rome
- Rocco Buttiglione, Minister, Ministry for Community Policies, Rome
- Béchir Chourou, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Institute of Modern Languages, University of Tunis I
- Jean-François Daguzan, FRS-Fondation de la Recherche Stratégique, Paris
- Amedeo de Franchis, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Italy, NATO, Brussels
- Nicola de Santis, Information Officer for Mediterranean Dialogue Countries, NATO, Brussels
- Tom Farer, Dean, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver
- Paolo Guerrieri, Vice President, IAI-International Affairs Institute, University “La Sapienza”, Rome
- Mark Heller, Principal Research Associate, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv
- Michael Intriligator, Director, BCIR - Burke Center for International Relations, University of California, Los Angeles
- George Joffé, Centre of international Studies, Cambridge University, UK
- Bassma Kodmani-Darwish, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office, The Ford Foundation, Cairo
- Ian Lesser, Senior Analyst, International Policy Department, RAND, Washington D.C.
- Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, Deputy Secretary General, NATO, Brussels
- Tim Niblock, Director, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter
- Alessandro Politi, Strategic and OSINT Analyst, Rome
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- Alessandro Silj, Director, Italian Council for Social Sciences, Rome
- Gamal A.G. Soltan, Senior Researcher, Al-Ahram CPSS – Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo
- Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Director, IEEI-Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Lisbon
- Maria Cristina Paciello, Rapporteur, Research-Fellow, IAI-International Affairs Institute, Rome

Observers

- Massimo Ambrosetti, Counsellor, Permanent Delegation of Italy, NATO, Brussels
- Amy M. Bliss, Assistant Cultural Attache, Embassy of the United States, Rome
- Giovanni Brauzzi, NATO Head Office, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Rome
- Hassen Hamdani, Attaché, Embassy of Algeria, Rome
- Vincenzo Nigro, Journalist, “La Repubblica”, Rome
- Gabriele Tonne, Assistant Editor of The International Spectator, IAI-International Affairs Institute, Rome

3. International workshop on “Trans-Atlantic and Trans-Mediterranean Relations: Perceptions in the Aftermath of September 11th”, Rome, October 1st, 2002

Papers

- After September 11th: Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East in a Transatlantic Perspective, *Roberto Aliboni*
- Aftermath of 11th of September: An Arab Perspective, *Mohammed Khair Eiedat*
- After September 11th, *Mark A. Heller*
- The Impact of September 11 on U.S. Policy in the Middle East and Transatlantic Relations, *F. Stephen Larrabee*

Participants

- Dr. Roberto Aliboni, Vice-President, IAI, Rome
- Prof. Béchir Chourou, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Institute of Modern Languages, Université de Tunis I, Tunis
- Dr. Thanos Dokos, Director of Studies, ELIAMEP - Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, Athens
- Dr. Jean-François Daguzan, Maitre de Recherche, FRS - Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris
- Dr. Mohammed Khair Eiedat, Director, Amman Center for Peace and Development, Amman, Jordan
- Dr. Mark Heller, Principal Research Associate, Tel Aviv University, JCSS - The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, - Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv
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