For some years, the Oxford Research Group (ORG) has been analysing the likely underlying drivers of global insecurity over the coming years, and ways to develop sustainable responses to these threats. This analysis has focused on four trends that are expected to foster substantial global and regional instability, and large-scale loss of life, of a magnitude unmatched by other potential threats. These are climate change, competition over resources, marginalisation of the ‘majority world’ and global militarisation.

What has become known as a ‘sustainable security’ paradigm rests on an understanding that we cannot successfully control all the consequences of these threats, but must instead work to resolve the causes.

The real threats to global security in the twenty first century

The current security discourse in the West is dominated by what might be called the ‘control paradigm’: an approach based on the false premise that insecurity can be controlled through military force or balance of power politics and containment, thus maintaining the status quo. Such approaches to national, regional and international security are deeply flawed, and are distracting the world’s politicians from developing realistic and sustainable solutions to the most pressing threats facing the world.

Sustainable security focuses on the interconnected, long-term drivers of insecurity, including:

- Climate change: loss of infrastructure, resource scarcity and the mass displacement of peoples, leading to civil unrest, intercommunal violence and international instability.
- Competition over resources: competition for increasingly scarce resources – including food, water and energy – especially from unstable parts of the world.
- Marginalisation of the majority world: increasing socio-economic divisions and the political, economic and cultural marginalisation of the vast majority of the world’s population.
- Global militarisation: the increased use of military force as a security measure and the further spread of military technologies (including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons).

The sustainable security approach goes beyond analysis of these threats to the development of a framework for new security policies. It takes global justice and equity as the key requirements of any sustainable response, together with progress towards reform of the global systems of trade, aid and debt relief; a rapid move away from carbon-based economies; bold and visible steps towards nuclear disarmament (and the control of biological and chemical weapons); and a shift in defence spending to focus on the non-military elements of security. By aiming to cooperatively resolve the root causes of threats using the most effective means available, sustainable security is inherently preventative, as it addresses the causes of conflict and instability well before the ill-effects are felt.

The adoption of a sustainable security approach more widely would represent a substantial change in government and public understandings of the real drivers of insecurity in the 21st century. For such a transformation to be authentic and effective, the perspectives of those whose voices have thus far been on the periphery need to be fully heard.

In a globalised world in which no nation’s security is independent of their region or of the wider international community, the opinions of the majority world can no longer be neglected by global powers.
who seek to dictate global security policies. The likely future drivers of insecurity do not respect national boundaries, and will not be sustainably addressed by unilateral approaches. For example, as competition over energy resources increases with depleting supplies of fossil fuels, it will become more vital that positive collaboration between consumer nations in the West and resource-rich nations in the South occurs\(^3\).

It is in the interests of all parties, including Western superpowers, for the voices of the majority world to be brought to the table. To this end, ORG initiated four consultations to explore the reactions of analysts in the global South to the sustainable security framework: one each covering Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and Australasia, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa\(^4\). This paper synthesises the results of these four consultations, uncovering areas of commonality, and highlighting issues peculiar to their regional context.

**Regional consultations**

ORG’s four regional consultations were hosted with four partner organisations: the Institute for Security Studies, South Africa; the Institute for Peace Studies, Egypt; the Singapore Institute of International Affairs and the Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre (who co-facilitated the Latin America and Caribbean consultation). ORG and the local partner published a report based on each consultation\(^5\).

The consultations applied the concept of sustainable security to the specific political and security dynamics of the regions, and explored how the four drivers of insecurity are already affecting communities in the global South. The workshops focused on three areas:

1) Identifying the regional drivers of insecurity;
2) Exploring the blockages to achieving change in the region and;
3) Developing recommendations for local and international civil society groups and governments.

While these issues inevitably play out in a unique way in each locality, much more continuity than exclusivity is to be found across the regions surveyed.

**Drivers of insecurity**

Common themes:

- **Inequality** - Unequal distribution of resources was found to engender marginalisation, resentment and radicalisation in most of the regions analysed. Areas with rich natural resources, such as minerals in Africa and energy sources in the Middle East, have not witnessed a ‘trickle down’ of benefits to their poorest populations. In fact, nepotism has bred antagonism as local elites, land-owning families and ruling tribes appropriate the wealth generated from the ‘fat of the land’.

In Latin America, a dualised class structure in terms of wealth, land distribution and access to basic services feeds political unrest. In Brazil, *favela* (slum) communities constitute almost 20% of Rio de Janeiro, which is also home to communities of vast wealth. Similarly, landless workers organised the largest social movement in South America\(^6\) (1.5million strong) to press for land reform, as the top 10% of properties, in terms of estate size, occupy 78% of the land\(^7\). High levels of landlessness make communities vulnerable to exploitative practices inflicted by arms of the state, large corporations and local elites.

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\(^3\) Many ‘southern’ energy-supplying nations have not had positive relationships with Western powers historically, including Iran, Venezuela and Libya.

\(^4\) These consultations took place between September 2008 and January 2010.

\(^5\) These reports are all available on the ORG’s website. Please visit the ‘Regional sustainable security consultations’ pages of the Sustainable Security programme: [www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/projects/moving_towards_sustainable_security](http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/projects/moving_towards_sustainable_security)

\(^6\) Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (Brazilian Landless Workers Movement). See [http://www.mstbrazil.org/](http://www.mstbrazil.org/)

The Latin American consultation also identified rapid rural to urban migration as compounding this process of marginalisation, as lack of space and resources for new city-dwellers intensifies existing problems if the process is not managed carefully.

Marginalisation can fuel perceptions of injustice, increasing tension between and within communities that may be expressed in social unrest including disorder, violence, criminality or terrorism.

For example, in the Middle East and North Africa, entrenched poverty produces high unemployment and poor education, which is heightened in conflicts areas, making young people in particular susceptible to radicalisation. Their frustration is directed at regional elites\(^8\), but also against perceived Western materialism and greed. Their marginalisation feeds international tension.

Inequality will be further entrenched as climate change and competition over dwindling resources (such as water) affects poor communities\(^9\).

**Relationships with external powers** – As well as creating opportunities for progress, increasing interdependence is, and will continue to be, a source of tension between nations, as thicker connections between states gives more scope for the exploitation of unequal power relations. Sub-Saharan African participants noted their increasing engagement with China as it has grown as an economic power. When Chinese enterprises operate in the region, often Chinese workers come too, thus diminishing the advantages to local African populations, who gain neither employment, nor benefit from their own nation's assets\(^10\).

In Latin America, oil and natural gas reserves that are yet to be exploited are attracting interest. Even in the context of a move away from use of fossil fuels, competition over resources will continue to affect Argentina, Bolivia and Chile (whose combined lithium supplies\(^11\) represent up to 90% of the world total\(^12\)) unless this shift is accompanied by more sustainable levels of energy use.

In the same region, improved communication and business links have resulted in a scaling up of the drugs trade, which feeds inter-state insecurity, particularly between ‘feed’ and ‘consumer’ nations, like Bolivia and the USA.

**Non-traditional pressures** – there is concern that acute natural disasters and environmental stresses will increase with climate change. In Latin America, rural indigenous communities are suffering, and this will ultimately result in high levels migration. The picture is similar in Asia and Australasia, as nations such as Bangladesh and the Pacific Islands are expected to need large-scale evacuation strategies. Already, environmental crises and humanitarian disasters such as the Asian tsunamis of 2004 have placed massive demands on sometimes fragile governments: these demands will continue to, increase as the climate changes\(^13\).

**Entrenched cultures of violence** – in sub-Saharan Africa, marginalisation feeds crime and violence, particularly in slums. Violent conflicts are exacerbated by the widespread availability of small arms and light weapons. War economies thrive, with violent entrepreneurs dominating the local economy. Failure to integrate non-combatants from old conflicts has created the potential for re-emergence of both violent movements and individual fighters. There is also a sense of the inevitability of violence, so long have

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\(^8\) For example, one of Al-Qaeda’s long-term strategic goals is to replace the House of Saud as rulers of Saudi Arabia. (see Rogers, P. (2004) *The intelligence of al-Queda* [http://www.opendemocracy.net/])

\(^9\) A recent drought in Syria caused water and food shortages. Wealthy members of these communities can cope with these problems, purchasing water, energy and transport more readily than poorer households (see *Drought Aggravates Extreme Poverty in Syria* September 25, 2010).

\(^10\) Countries may also not benefit fiscally, as many corporations elude tax bills in the countries they operate (see *False Profits: robbing the poor to keep the rich tax-free*, Christian Aid. March 2009).

\(^11\) Lithium is used in the manufacture of energy-efficient ion batteries used in powering hybrid cars.

\(^12\) Neumann, V. ‘Rise of Latin America’, *Diplomat*, September 1st 2010

\(^13\) ‘In particular, heat waves and heavy precipitation events are very likely to further increase in frequency, and intense tropical cyclone activity (e.g., intense hurricanes) is likely to increase in frequency under current expectations for future emissions...the higher are emissions, the more likely are occurrences of these extremes’ *Linking Climate Change to Global Extreme Weather Events*, WWF Blog, June 2010.
communities lived through waves of insecurity, and so great has been the loss of life due to armed conflict in recent years.\textsuperscript{14}

In Latin America and the Caribbean, state and non-state actors are becoming increasingly well armed.\textsuperscript{15} This leads to increased levels of force from the military, police and private security firms (popular for the protection of homes and businesses) as they respond to civil unrest which in turn leads to criminal gangs and insurgents obtaining more high-tech weapons. Militarisation becomes a cyclical driver of insecurity.

**Role of the state** – in many countries, the state is not a stabilising force. Weak states, or states not acting in the majority interest, may resort to ‘divide and rule’ policies adopted from colonialism, exploiting ethnic divisions. A prime example of this is in Kenya, where the post-election violence of 2007/8 saw conflict in rural and urban areas between tribal groups perceived as ruling and marginalised.

Also in sub-Saharan Africa, weak states have been guilty of suppressing opposition voices for democracy and social justice.\textsuperscript{16} This occurs particularly in states where the democratic process has been subverted, and dictatorships imposed e.g. Zimbabwe, where members of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change have endured intimidation and torture at the hands of the ruling Zanu-PF party\textsuperscript{17} despite moves towards power-sharing.

In both Latin America and the Middle East, where states provide ineffective institutions, alternative actors work to fill the void and supply services, thus gaining support from the communities they serve.\textsuperscript{18} This lack of involvement in state functions causes a spiralling of disengagement in democratic politics.

**Role of the military** – in the Middle East and North Africa, Asia and Australasia and Latin America, there are many nations in which the military is a strong and visible force, used to control civil unrest or instability. Examples of this are Palestine-Israel and much of Central America, where governments have tasked the military with assisting the police and intelligence services and often civilian police forces feel marginalised. Similarly, in Asian states like Sri Lanka, Burma and Nepal,\textsuperscript{19} military confrontations are used as a solution to opposition movements (based around separatism, or political and economic rights). In Latin America, military capacity is already being used in the defence of natural resources like gas and water, and this will increase in the future as competition over these resources increases.

Regional distinctions: our consultations exposed a wide range of insecurity drivers that are locally unique; or at least, whilst the issue is not exclusive to the region, it is exceptional in the way it is regarded as a security issue, or in the scale of the perceived problem.

In the **Middle East and North Africa**, the way refugees impact on security in their host nation is cited as a problem, particularly in Syria and Jordan. Furthermore, Palestine-Israel is the site of one of the most controversial struggles in the world. The conflict impacts both on the region and on the wider world. Israel experiences internal and intra-regional conflict: it has been involved in violent confrontations with many Arab nations (engaging in three wars since its 1948 inception), and some neighbouring states not do not recognise the state of Israel as a legitimate entity. The long-standing conflicts within and between states in the Middle East are some of the greatest drivers of insecurity in the region, with implications on bordering nations and on interested constituencies in the wider world.

The region also plays host to a conflict that, although acted out on Middle Eastern soil, is a facet of wider international tensions: Iraq. The invasion of this nation was instigated by the USA, but engaged a wider range of forces from NATO members amongst others.

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\textsuperscript{14} Including the 1994 Rwandan genocide, Sierra Leone’s civil war, and conflict in Darfur (Sudan).

\textsuperscript{15} To tackle this, the Venezuelan government is planning to ban under-25 year olds from owning guns, limit the number of bullets an individual can carry, and prohibit the carrying of weapons in public (‘Venezuela May Tighten Gun Laws as Growing Violence Becomes Campaign Issue’ \url{http://www.bloomberg.com/})

\textsuperscript{16} However, there are always attempts to change this, and progress has been made e.g. MARS group in Kenya now publishes a ‘leadership, governance and accountability’ portal that holds the government to account for corruption and policies that are not transparent or democratic.

\textsuperscript{17} For example, see ‘No painkillers, no visitors and no way out: Mugabe’s hospital ward for MDC activists’ \textit{The Guardian} 14th July 2008

\textsuperscript{18} Including Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and gang-controlled areas of Jamaica.

\textsuperscript{19} Respectively: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, the 2007 rising of Buddhist Monks in Burma, and the Maoist insurgency in Nepal.
For the Middle East and North Africa, food and water insecurity is becoming a driver of insecurity. Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority all share one source of water: the Jordan River Basin. Water scarcity will intensify in the future, with growing populations and a changing climate. The related insecurity impacts unequally on rich and poor, for example the Israeli settlers and the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza respectively. As water prices rise, priority will be given to those who can afford to pay more, leaving marginalised communities at even greater risk. The distribution of water must be addressed in any viable peace agreement between the two communities.

**Asia and Australasia** is witnessing a geo-political power shift. The economic power of the US is declining relative to other powers, and China is emerging as a world power. Particularly in relation to arms racing dynamics in Asia, this shift in authority and influence is a source of insecurity. Militarisation could affect the numerous territorial disputes in the region such as over the South China sea and the Gulf of Thailand, and more crucially Kashmir, which is a territory claimed by two nuclear powers: Pakistan and India.

Finally, our *sub-Saharan African* forum raised concerns about the level of fiscal dependence on natural resources, and the lack of opportunity, or drive, for diversification.

### SUMMARY OF THE DRIVERS OF INSECURITY

The common themes to emerge from our four consultations can be grouped into the following categories:

- **Marginalisation** is an issue both between and within nations, with income inequality labelled as a driver of insecurity a common thread, and inequality in power relations highlighted by the role of unelected forces e.g. the military.

- **Militarisation** is an issue both at a local level (the availability of small arms and light weapons, particularly those with an entrenched and seemingly intractable culture of violence), and at a regional level e.g. arms race dynamics in Asia feeding insecurity.

- **Environmental issues** (including climate change and competition over resources) will feed into water and food insecurity, and affect nations that rely on natural resources. Natural disasters will occur more often because of a changing climate, and this will place demands on some already fragile governments.

### BLOCKAGES TO CHANGE

Between drivers of insecurity and blockages to change, there is much crossover. Factors that trigger conflict can also be obstacles to progression. As there are common themes in terms of insecurity, so there are common notions of what represents a blockages to change. Whilst there is little that unites all regions of the ‘global South’, many issues are shared by two or three regions.

Common themes:

**Inadequacy of regional architectures** – in the global North, coherent organisations exist that represent the interests of Western nations. The picture in the global South is more fragmented. In some regions, competing structures and diverse interests (even distrust) within regions hamper the effective cooperation that is needed to address long-term drivers of insecurity. In other regions, comprehensive structures do exist, but either an emphasis on the sovereignty of member states, or a culture of elite self-interest, means that progressive, cooperative work on security issues is rare.

In sub-Saharan Africa, effectiveness is a key issue: the African Union and the Southern African Development Community are regarded as the best channels for addressing insecurity issues, but their potential is thwarted by the lack of regional coherence and identity. Where solidarity does exist, it is often

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22 Which China, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam each lay claim to parts of.

23 The ownership of which is contested by Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam and Malaysia.

24 These include the G8, NATO and the European Union.
between the ruling elites of these nations, rather than the people they represent. Thus, regional organisations may be utilised to advance the interests only of elites. Moreover, regional groupings in sub-Saharan Africa have on occasion failed to hold governments to account, partly because states shrink from creating a culture of supervision, as this would increase the likelihood of their own regimes being scrutinised.

Latin America is a clear example of competing organisations, with five groups vying for control over the direction of regional approaches. There is a sense of distrust within the region, with some states (e.g. Colombia) politically isolated, which undermines regional stability. Moreover, the main states whose defence policies have implications for the region as a whole (including Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela) are too politically divided to work in concert. There is also a growing divide between the sub-regions of Central and South America. This divide, and that between Latin America and the Caribbean, will affect the possibility of addressing militarism in the region.

The problem in Asia and Australasia is one of inclusivity. There are many regional institutions, but few include all regional powers: China, India and Japan. One reason these institutions are so restricted is the lack of a regional identity, which is closely linked to a strong desire to maintain sovereignty and the principle of 'non-interference'. This desire can assume the quality of obsession, making cooperative approaches difficult.

**Absence of neutral states who will take the lead** – the issue of regional organisations, and lack of a regional identity, links closely to the lack of a ‘driving force’ within regions. Both Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia and Australasia are without a powerful and respected neutral country who can act as a regional leader to promote regional coherence and strategy. The USA is no longer looked to as a leader for Latin America, but there is little domestic political will for Brazil to fill the regional leadership void; instead, domestic actors tend to advocate for a more international leadership role.

Likewise, Asia and Australasia lacks a neutral force to put moral weight behind initiatives. Although China could fulfil this role, currently there is a degree of mistrust in the region, given its lack of transparency. This will become more relevant as arms race dynamics in Asia accelerates.

**Position of civil society** – Civil society can act as a strong and cooperative force between and within nations. This potential can be thwarted, however, either by negative relationships between the state and civil society (such as in some Latin American nations, where there is an entrenched division between civil society and state functions), or by an active suppression of non-governmental groups. The absence of effective civil society groups means issues like the eradication of corruption and the protection of human rights are left to governments in whose interests it may be to uphold the status quo.

**Interventions of other nations** – in an increasingly interconnected world, states are aware of the way in which domestic conditions in other states can affect their own. This has served to justify both long-term involvement in other nations’ development, and direct military interventions. The most obvious examples of these interventions have occurred in the Middle East, which attracts strong interest from external powers given their large oil reserves, and because of the presence of hostile groups willing to attack Western interests. Such risks lead powerful Western governments to sometimes prop up regimes that would otherwise not have the economic and political power to remain in office.

Russia and the United States have been involved in Latin America since the Cold War, and funding streams still flow from each nation, into one or other South American state. Such interference can be a blockage to change if it was only driven by narrowly defined national interests.

**‘Wicked issues’** – the Middle East and North Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean, face well-known, controversial issues that obstruct reform. In the former, the issue is conflict in Palestine-Israel, which hangs over the region blocking progress on related security issues. For the latter, questions of land

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25 e.g. Rather than condemning the violence in Sudan, the AU instead underlined its concern that African leaders are unfairly singled out by the international community.

26 The Union of South American Nations, the Organization of American States, the North American Free Trade Agreement, Mercosur and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America.

27 In George Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address, he spoke of an “axis of evil”: states who pose a danger to the USA by providing weapons to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred.’ The ‘axis of evil’ included Iraq, and later formed part of the justification for the 2003 invasion.

28 Russia has supplied arms contracts to Venezuela and Bolivia, with the USA arming Colombia.
ownership are a generic problem across the region (although coping strategies vary), with the entrenched power of land-owning classes acting as a driver of unrest.

Regional distinctions:

Corruption represents a major blockage to change in **sub-Saharan Africa**. Elites have been prone to self-preservation through nepotism and political dynasties. This may mean they have little interest in reform, as they personally benefit from the status quo. Corruption is also not restrained to the upper echelons of power, with a culture of bribes prominent in many levels of public life. For example, according to Transparency International, the Burundian revenue authority is the most corrupt institution in East Africa. There are attempts to challenge this corruption, but such endeavours inevitably meet opposition.

The region is hampered by negative perceptions of its ability to self-govern. These are fed by real and imagined instances of weak leadership, conflict and corruption, and results in exclusionary treatment of African nations at an international level. This lack of involvement perpetuates African ‘otherness’ and prevents these nations from shaping global security solutions.

Moreover, there was concern that climate change is not yet being taken seriously either by African civil society, or many African governments. Whilst there are lobbying groups such as the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance that are trying to articulate the gravity of the issue, they struggle to win support, primarily because of the immediate and compelling nature of other concerns such as HIV/AIDS and hunger/malnutrition.

In the **Middle East and North Africa**, extremist religious fundamentalism threatens development. Radical Islamist groups posit an alternative to Western market-led democracy and consumerism, criticising the materialism and individuality of these cultures, and representing a response to perceived Western Islamophobia. This alternative feels empowering to marginalised individuals, and may also have the effect of obstructing a nation’s cooperation with Western nations with large consumer markets (a key goal of groups such as Al-Qaeda), as that state becomes regarded as a place of risk for Western governments and corporations.

In the **Latin America and the Caribbean**, the power of the military represents a blockage to change and a driver of insecurity. In some areas, the military are the only providers of vital services like healthcare; this presence explains the enduring links between the forces and civilian populations in countries including Peru and Guatemala. This relationship ensures that evolving the connection between the military, civil society and the state may prove difficult.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

The recommendations proposed by the four consultative groups that ORG brought together overlap in significant ways: the improvement of regional institutions and the empowerment of civil society are both key suggestions from our partners in the global South. There are many more suggestions specific to the regions; these include demilitarisation, representation in international institutions, intra-regional relationships, and progress over specific conflicts such as Palestine-Israel.

Common themes:

- **Regional groupings** – each regional consultation highlighted the need for strong regional institutions that can address shared security challenges like climate change and competition over resources.

More effective regional cooperation would be an advantage to Latin American and Caribbean nations, as competition over resources and unstable strategic relationships could be mitigated, benefiting everyone. One way to enhance regional solidarity is for Brazil to accept a leadership role, going beyond its global aspirations, and embracing a more expansive view of regional peace and security.

In Asia and Australasia, strong regional architecture would enable the development of control mechanisms related to arms racing between Asian nations, in seeking negotiated settlements to pre-existing disputes.
and to agree pan-regional responses to the problem of environmental refugees. Similarly, Middle East and North African states would profit from regional institutions that include all key players, as dialogue around climate-induced resource scarcity is desperately needed. It was suggested in our consultation that the Arab League must expand to include Israel, Iran and Turkey.

In the community of sub-Saharan African nations, increased trade links would strengthen regional institutions. Robust regional institutions would allow the region to present a unified international front, with which they could press for debt relief and fairer trading rules. Furthermore a pan-African media – an equivalent to Al Jazeera – would help foster a sense of regional community and identity.

**Benefits of civil society and ‘elder statesmen’** – a strong civil society network would supply a critical voice, able to push for reform in the majority interest. If non-military sustainable security solutions are to be embraced, civilians need to provide the counterbalance to military power, offering oversight of the security forces. In Latin America, it is crucial that public confidence in the state’s ability to meet security needs without resorting to military force is restored; media and civil society organisations can play a key role in this.

In the absence of a strong civil society, Asian and Australasian participants suggested that a panel of respected individuals could champion sustainable security. Likewise, in the Middle East and North Africa, a panel of experts, religious scholars and elders could explore the adoption of participatory democracy, addressing human rights, gender equality and civil society freedoms.

**Freedom** – democratic reform is an imperative; this includes freedom of the media and judiciary. In sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa, these reforms will help address concerns of marginalised communities and alleviate frustration at corruption. In the case of China, the development of a free civil society would accelerate their inclusion into the international community, facilitating relationships of trust between them and other powers e.g. the USA.

**International representation** – a perception of global marginalisation is fostered by the absence and marginalisation of global South states in international institutions. No nations from Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, or sub-Saharan Africa are represented as permanent members of the UN Security Council, and representation on financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank is marginal. Full inclusion of Southern nations would be an important symbolic gesture, signalling a more equitable international society, and assuaging concerns regarding the marginalisation of the global South.

Regional distinctions:

Demilitarisation should be a key priority in **sub-Saharan Africa**. Both actual and cultural demilitarisation is required, with comprehensive disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of individuals involved in violence, coupled with a tackling of the endemic cultures of conflict. This consultation looked particularly to their youth, hoping they could evolve a shift in thinking around conflict.

In **Latin America and the Caribbean**, a more holistic response to security concerns is needed. For example, there needs to be poverty-sensitive alternatives to coca, which recognises that whilst these crops (or the drugs they yield) create significant problems in consumer states, for grower communities, they may be the most viable option. Alternative livelihoods need promoting.

Crucial for the future of the **Middle East and North Africa** is progress towards peace in Palestine-Israel. The best chance for peace is the creative long-term solutions, such as the Arab Peace Initiative, which aim to pacify relationships between Israel and the rest of the region in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, a “just solution” to the Palestinian refugee crisis and the formation of a Palestinian state. The sense of intransigence needs to be lost, and opportunities for the cessation of the conflict taken.

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32 Including freedom of the press, freedom of association through trade unions, respect for human rights.


In Asia and Australasia, cooperative relations between states are crucial to the future management of insecurity. China must be accepted as a regional power by all parties (including extra-regional nations like the USA), and trust fostered. One of the most pressing issues that this new-found communion will have to address is climate change, particularly climate migration. China and India must recognise their responsibilities vis-à-vis emissions, and fully and publicly appreciate that economic development cannot come at the expense of environmental security.

**Voices from the global South**

These perspectives will play a vital role in establishing sustainable security as a valid project. Sustainable security posits equity as a requirement for a positive paradigm shift in security thinking. The implementation of this approach must begin with a close engagement with thinking from developing world regions in the work of western organisations. ORG and others will continue to collaborate with their counterparts in the minority world.

It is essential that voices from the global South take a greater role in the foundation and execution of security solutions in general. Security issues are increasingly global in nature, and thus security paradigms will neither be representative, nor effective, until this is the case.

The four likely global drivers of future insecurity: climate change, marginalisation of the majority world, militarisation and competition over resources will not be played out along the boundaries of traditional nation states. They will instead involve a wide array of communities, countries, regions and identity constituencies that bear little resemblance to the 18th - 20th centuries, when the nation state was in it’s ‘hey day’\(^{35}\). It is essential, therefore, that policy makers listen to the views of actors throughout the world, not just Western analysts.

Many future security problems, and also the solutions, will be found in the global South, within the very populations whose marginalisation has resulted in much contemporary insecurity. Whilst climate change, for example, will hit the poorest communities first and worst\(^{36}\), it is with emerging economies like China, India and Brazil that the West must engage if mitigating climate chaos is to have any success at all. These non-Western perspectives must be addressed in concrete policy changes.

The challenge for the sustainable security project now is to build links between thinkers, policy makers and activists in the South, and feed the results of the consultations into Western policy making circles. Building a more sustainable future, which transforms tensions at their root rather than attempting to control violent conflicts, rests on a more receptive and cooperative security sector in the West, which takes account of majority world opinion.


\(^{36}\) ‘The most difficult revelation is that climate change is harming the poorest first and worst - those that contribute virtually nothing to global warming but are the least able to deal with its repercussions.’ from Climate Action Network Europe (2009) *Report on Climate Change and Development.*