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Blair A. Ruble
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Independent Ukraine has become a fluid country into and out of which tens of thousands of people have been moving for nearly two decades. According to some estimates, 2.5 million Ukrainians have moved abroad—primarily to Russia, Poland, Italy, the Czech Republic, Portugal and Spain—to live and to work since 1991, sending home $411 million in remittances in 2004 alone. Simultaneously, Ukraine has become a country of immigration as well as emigration. According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, in 2005, Ukraine ranked fourth in the world behind the United States, Russia, and Germany in terms of the total number of foreign born residents (6,833,000). More tellingly, Ukraine that year was nineteenth in the world—between Austria and Croatia—in terms of its percentage of foreign born residents (14.7 percent). Thus, independent Ukraine has emerged as one of the world’s leading migration magnets. This is so even when discounting for the fact that a significant number of the country’s “foreign born” residents were born in the Soviet Union and, therefore, never passed over an international frontier at the time of their arrival in Ukraine.

A great deal remains unknown about the scale of migration into Ukraine despite the seeming certainty with which international agencies present data. Initially, much of the movement appeared to arise from family reunification following the collapse of the Soviet Union, an event which often left relatives stranded on different sides of newly internationalized borders. By the mid-1990s, migrants began to arrive in Ukraine from South Asia and further afield as wars in the Balkans disrupted longstanding migration pathways into Europe. Moreover, a quarter-million Crimean Tatars living in Uzbekistan, after having been banished from Crimea by Joseph Stalin during World War II, returned to their native lands. More recently, thousands of people displaced by conflict in the Caucasus region, Afghanistan, and Iraq have fled to Ukraine, where they have been joined by a growing

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number of traders from Vietnam, China, and Africa. With the exception of the Crimean Tatars, the vast majority of migrants to Ukraine have clustered in a handful of gateway cities such as Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and the Transcarpathian city of Uzhhorod.

Whatever their numbers, transnational migrants are making their presence felt in Ukraine’s major cities. Migrants from Afghanistan, Turkey, and Iraq transformed the Brezhnev-era fringe neighborhood of Troeshchyna in Kyiv into one of Eurasia’s most diverse communities as they developed the city’s largest market, employing over 20,000 Kyivans by 2000. Similarly, the Barabashova Market, built on restricted vacant land above a subway station in eastern Kharkiv, has emerged as Europe’s largest market – employing 80,000 vendors from twenty-three nations and supporting approximately 300,000 people throughout the city. Odesa’s Seven-Kilometer Market on the road from the city to the airport covers 170 acres—making it larger than the Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota—and houses 16,000 vendors from numerous countries who sell their goods every day to over 150,000 customers who travel hundreds of miles in search of a bargain. The market’s central administration, which operates a central website for the market, employs 1,600 workers.

The scale of these markets suggest that migrants, many of whom represent visible minorities in Ukraine, increasingly have become integrated into the everyday life and economy of Ukraine’s major cities. But to what extent is this so? To what extent have migrants to Ukraine entered life beyond the confines of their immediate communities? To what extent have they been able to claim a “right to the city” in which they live? This report seeks to answer these questions by examining how transnational migrants in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa make use of public space beyond the markets which provide economic sustenance for so many newcomers to Ukraine.

CLAIMING A RIGHT TO BE PRESENT

Initially enunciated by French social theorist Henri Lefebvre in 1968, the concept of “the right to the city” has attracted a variety of authors and social activists concerned with the growing social exclusion of the twenty-first century city. The concept as used here appeared in its most developed form through the work of geographer Don Mitchell, who wrote in his 2003 monograph The Right to the City about the right of the homeless
to be visibly present in the city. Mitchell argued, in part, that the dispossessed could assert their possession of the city through physical presence. That presence might take many forms, from walking down a street, through participating in public leisure activities to owning property. Most importantly, as David Harvey has argued, the right to the city “is an active right” that demands action rather than passive acceptance of the status quo.

From this perspective, equal access to public space is an essential element of urban culture. As architect Anthony Vidler wrote in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, the street must be understood “as a site of interaction, encounter and the support of strangers for each other; the square as a place of gathering and vigil; the corner store as a communicator of information and interchange. These spaces, without romanticism or nostalgia, still define an urban culture, one that resists all effort to ‘secure’ it out of existence.” In this context, the comfort with which migrants use public space in major Ukrainian cities reveals important insights into the extent to which they are becoming integrated into Ukrainian life.

One advantage of this approach is that mere presence becomes an indicator of a city’s capacity for accommodating difference. As Anne-Marie Seguin and Annick Germain write about Montreal, residents using that city’s public spaces “seem to respect a code of civility, which enables them to enjoy the diversity of social contact offered within these spaces, while maintaining distance from other users.” Even this minimal threshold of public comfort is often unachievable in post-Soviet cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg where residents who do not appear to be native Slavs frequently fall victim to violent attacks. Migrant comfort in exercising a right to the city through the use of public space in major Ukrainian cities reveals a degree of tolerant acceptance on the part of native residents, if not outright integration into Ukrainian life.

The discussion to follow evaluates the exercise of the right to the city by transnational migrants to Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa on the basis of surveys and focus-group discussions with migrants in these cities conducted during 2007 and 2008. While hardly conclusive, these data provide important insights into the processes by which migrants are—and are not—entering into the mainstream of Ukrainian life.
KYIV

Kyiv’s founders took advantage of its position at the crossroads of east-west trade routes between Central Asia and Europe and north-south river routes from Scandinavia to Constantinople to build one of Europe’s most powerful tenth century cities and principalities. Christianized by Grand Prince Volodymyr in 988, the Rus’ and their capital flourished well into the eleventh century until destructive internecine dynastic warfare fatally weakened the Kyivan state. Sacked by the Mongols in 1240, the city was destroyed several times over by various powers contending for the region until Cossak Hetman Bohdan Khmelnyskyyi and Muscovy’s Tsar Aleksei Romanov formed an anti-Polish alliance in 1654.

Catherine II “the Great” made Kyiv a main supply base for the Russian army during the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774. With the opening of Saint Vladimir’s University in 1834, Kyiv secured its position within an expanding Russian Empire as a center of religious institutions, defense industries, education, and imperial administration. The 18th century city of about 15,000 grew to nearly a quarter-million by the time of the 1897 Imperial Russian Census, in which 57 percent of Kyiv residents reported Russian as their native language, 23 percent Ukrainian, 13 percent Yiddish, 6 percent Polish. Smaller groups of other city residents identified numerous additional native languages as their own. This diversity stands in contrast to the region’s rural population, which remained predominantly ethnic Ukrainian throughout many centuries.

Harsh fighting during the Russian Civil War between 1917 and 1920 destroyed Kyiv numerous times over. The city recovered slowly until the Soviet Government re-located the capital of its Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic from Kharkiv to Kyiv in 1934. Nazi occupation was especially horrific, with 34,000 Jews having been murdered at the Babi Yar/Babyn Yar ravine in the city on the night of September 29, 1941. Overall, more than 100,000 Kyivians were killed by Germans on this site before retreating Nazi and advancing Soviet armies devastated the city yet again in 1943. Kyiv recovered and began to grow as a result of in-migration from the Ukrainian countryside throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Another wave of large-scale population relocation to the city followed the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident just northwest of the city.

Thus, pre-independence Kyiv long had been a final destination for migrants from within Ukraine and from further afield throughout the
Soviet Union. According to the last Soviet census of 1989, which captured the city’s demographic profile prior to independence, more than 55 percent of the city’s residents had moved from other regions. This trend increased following the collapse of the Soviet Union as families scrambled to reunify after suddenly finding themselves on different sides of new international borders.

Following independence, previously unknown categories of foreigners began to arrive in the city including refugees, asylum seekers, workers, bureaucrats, specialists working for joint ventures, businessmen, and illegal migrants. Often, these foreigners represented ethnic groups that had not been present in the city before – at least not in significant numbers. While official estimates varied widely, these new foreigners formally numbered somewhere around 100,000 in Kyiv by 2000. The largest group of city residents associated with this new migration originated from Afghanistan. Other significant communities formed around migrants from Vietnam, Iraq, Pakistan, China, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, together with such post-Soviet states as Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and conflict-troubled regions of southern Russia. These transnational migrants appeared just as Kyiv began to attract a new wave of internal migrants from other Ukrainian cities as well as from rural areas.

Those who arrived during this first wave of post-independence transnational migration generally viewed Kyiv as a city in which standards of public decorum reinforced a general atmosphere of tolerance. In surveys conducted by the Kennan Institute during 2001 and 2002, for example, migrants reported that even those Kyivans who harbored negative attitudes toward newcomers displayed polite behavior when interacting with others who were different from themselves. In other words, the first reaction of the typical Kyivan to someone different from him- or herself was one of quiet forbearance.

The result was a general sharing of public space among all groups in the city—a broad acceptance of everyone’s right to the city—even when meaningful contact among various groups was slight. Indeed, a majority of migrant respondents, with the important exception of African migrants, declared that they would have moved to Kyiv even if they had known all that would happen to them in the process (including 89 percent of the Vietnamese respondents, 65 percent of Arab migrants, 58
percent of Kurdish migrants, 48 percent of Pakistani migrants, 46 percent of Afghan migrants; but only 12 percent of African respondents). The 2001-2002 Kennan Institute Kyiv migrant surveys simultaneously identified two troubling patterns which raised questions about the future acceptance of migrants in the Ukrainian capital. First, broad proclivities toward tolerance were not sustained across racial groups. Initial post-Soviet surveys indicated considerably more distrust and hostility toward visible minorities (Vietnamese, “Arabians,” “Blacks,” and “Gypsies”) than those of European heritage. Moreover, a majority of respondents to the 2001-2002 Kennan Institute Kyiv resident surveys stated that they would not like to have immigrants from Asia and Africa as neighbors, close friends, or family members.

Second, members of the city’s various migrant communities uniformly held branches of the Ukrainian police in considerable disrepute. Two-thirds of respondents to the 2001-2002 Kennan Institute Kyiv migrant surveys—including more than three-quarters of the Afghans and Africans participating in the survey, and more than half the survey participants from the Middle East and Pakistan—reported having either witnessed or heard of injustices committed against migrants. By far the greatest number of complaints of unjust action was lodged against the injustices and abuses committed by the police.

A number of scholars and advocates raised growing concern at the time about the increasingly negative and inaccurate portrayal of migrants in Ukrainian media. The press generally reported on the activities of illegal migrants, emphasizing criminality and disease, rather than covering those who were in the country legally. Ukrainian health and police officials argued in return that migrants were healthier and less prone to criminal activity than native-born Ukrainians. Negative and misleading press reports helped shape disapproving attitudes among the population at large, especially in Kyiv which, as the capital, is the center of Ukrainian media.

Despite these warning signals, the image of Kyiv that emerged from migrants in 2001 and 2002 was of a city in which formal acceptance was the rule on the street, in schools, in hospitals, and in shops. Many Kyiv residents responded to the migrants with some sympathy—especially the large portion of the city’s population who themselves had been born elsewhere in the Soviet Union or within Ukraine. Those Kyvians who had lost their homes during war and other extraordinary disruptions in everyday life, such as
the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster, were especially welcoming of migrants from abroad. Once again, the most significant exception to these patterns remained the racist sentiments among residents, which was paralleled by the hostility felt by African migrants.35

The relative tolerance and acceptance evident in Kyiv during the early 2000s eroded steadily in subsequent years. By 2008, gang attacks by local “Skinheads” on migrants of color were becoming a concern to representatives of international organizations and embassies in Kyiv.36 A series of especially violent murders of Africans mobilized migrant groups and non-governmental institutions to demand aggressive state prosecution of hate crimes. In particular, the June 2008 killings a week apart of a Nigerian migrant and of a Congolese laborer prompted the leader of Kyiv’s African Center, Ghanaian Charles Asante-Yeboa, to join with the pastor of the 25,000 member Embassy of God Pentecostal Church, Nigerian minister Sunday Adelaja, to demand that the Ukrainian capital’s police protect the right of Kyiv’s Africans to be in—and to move freely about—the city.

The success of Adelaja in building a large congregation reflects the complexity of race relations in Kyiv. On the one hand, chilling attacks pointed to rising intolerance and hate. On the other, Asante-Yeboa and Adelaja are prominent and influential figures in the city so that their calls for demonstrations outside the national parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, in support of anti-discrimination laws carried weight with local and national officials.37

The official response was less than heartening for those concerned about the well-being of migrants in Kyiv. In July, Ukrainian Minister of the Interior Yuri Lutsenko—an ally of Orange Revolution hero President Viktor Yushchenko—proclaimed to a meeting of his ministry’s top officers responsible for Kyiv, “You may call me a racist, but I will not allow Kyiv to be turned into another Kharkiv or Odesa!”38

Respondents to the 2007 Kennan Institute Kyiv migrant survey had become very much aware of the injustice and abuse that such attitudes among the country’s senior leaders can foster. Overall half (49 percent) of those surveyed in 2007 reported that they had heard about incidents of injustice and abuse either very often or rather often. As in 2001, African respondents were more likely to report injustices than other groups. Low socioeconomic standing dramatically increased familiarity with injustice and abuse, with 92.9 percent of unemployed respondents reporting having heard of such instances very often and rather often (as opposed to less than half
[45.5 percent] of office workers). As before, migrant respondents identified members of the police (militia) as the most frequent perpetrators of injustice and abuse.39

The cumulative effect of these events in Kyiv has been muted as a bare majority of migrant respondents (52 percent) indicated in 2007 that they still would have moved to Ukraine even if they had known all that would happen to them. However, Kyiv respondents were markedly less likely to evaluate their decision to move to Ukraine positively than their fellow migrants in Odesa (83.8 percent) and Kharkiv (70 percent). Once again, considerable variation appeared among national groups in their response to this question – with nearly all Vietnamese (91.7 percent), Chinese (92 percent), and Turkish (76.9 percent) respondents reporting that they would have made the journey, as opposed to minorities among the Pakistani (33.4 percent) and African (44.3 percent) respondents.40 Socio-economic status appears to be a stronger indicator of dissatisfaction than in the past, with only 14.1 percent of the unemployed respondents claiming that they would have come to Ukraine (as opposed to 88.7 percent of wage workers, 76.5 percent of students, and 62.9 percent of merchants).41

More strikingly, nearly two-thirds (62.8 percent) of respondents who had reported instances of injustice and abuse had heard of problems which had transpired in public space. In other words, over the course of a half-dozen years, the city’s streets, parks, transit systems, and market places had been transformed from a relatively civil and benign environment for migrants into primary sites for verbal and physical insult and abuse.42

At a June 2008 press conference following the murders of two Africans living in the city, Nigerian Johnson Aniki told reporters that “foreigners, including Africans, live in fear. People fear going out onto the street; they fear going home after work. Wives fear for their husbands; husbands fear for their children, even when they are at school. We don’t demand special treatment. We demand only one thing: security.”43 In other words, Aniki and his fellow migrants were asking that their right to the city be recognized. In a short number of years, the ability of migrants to assert their right to the city has been converted from a theoretical concern into a daily challenge for increasing numbers of Kyiv’s foreign-born residents.

The Kennan Kyiv Project organized a focus group meeting in Kyiv on the evening of July 31, 2008 just as the city’s African community was beginning to push collectively for local and national governments to respond to
the summer’s disturbing rise in hate crime. As in previous studies, participants in the meeting reported having extensive contact with native-born Ukrainians. Students at the Kyiv Polytechnic and the Kyiv Engineering-Construction Institutes indicated that they study together with Ukrainian counterparts. In general, the participants in the meeting highly value what they see as Ukraine’s functioning democracy and commitment to freedom of expression. They find life in Kyiv to be congenial, appreciate the opportunity for a quality education at a price which they can afford, and consider local women to be especially tolerant of foreigners. However, as in the past, they described constant confrontations with corrupt police officials. Moreover, they reported increasing incidents of aggressive behavior on the part of local young men. Consequently, while group participants reported feeling comfortable moving throughout the city during daylight hours, many are becoming increasingly wary of being on the streets after dark.

Several of the group participants had known quite little about Ukraine and Kyiv prior to their arrival in the city. Some chose the city as a destination because of distant relationships between family members at home and in Ukraine. Conditions in Kyiv, nonetheless, came as a shock. Those who arrived during the mid-1990s found the city to be quite poor in relation to their surroundings in their country of origin. “It was very difficult,” reported one Kyiv focus group participant, “but I am the sort of person for whom pride prevented me from returning home.” Another stated that the conditions of life were unpleasant. “In my country,” the respondent continued, “engineers live well, their expertise is valued, and they are paid well for their work. I wanted to return home right after completing school, as there was no point in remaining here.” In most instances, life conspired to keep them in Kyiv. They valued the opportunities that were presented to them, while simultaneously looking askance at some of the material and social deprivations they felt in their new hometown.

Knowing other ways of life, the migrants participating in the July 2008 discussion resented the constant attention of the police, whom they uniformly characterized as only being interested in receiving bribes. “They [the police] don’t know the laws themselves. They don’t know what documents a foreigner needs. If they see a foreigner with money in a pocket they only think about how to get that money.”

Widespread distrust of the police means that migrants do not view local authorities as possible defenders in conflicts with local residents. “The po-
lice never help us,” one migrant declared. Migrant communities seem to feel as if they are on their own when confronting discrimination, verbal taunts, and violence. Focus group members perceived growing discrimination in housing and in the job market.

Not surprisingly within this context, participants reported growing insecurity. “Skinheads,” declared one Kyiv focus group participant, “have only become numerous now. Under [previous President Leonid] Kuchma, there were no such people. These are youths, 15–16 years old. They say that they want to defend their people, but against whom? We don’t bother anyone.”

One particularly strong message from the group is that their experiences are consistent with the widely publicized growth of hate crimes in Kyiv in recent months. If, not so long ago, migrants reported that Kyiv was a relatively tolerant city—at least in so far as intolerance was generally considered to be bad manners—this sense of quiet acceptance has become less and less evident with the passage of time. As one respondent proclaimed, “The biggest problem of being a foreigner in Ukraine is to be foreign. Not everyone understands or welcomes foreigners. They immediately look askance at foreigners.”

Kyiv is a city in which the fundamental right to be present has been deteriorating in the face of growing expressions of hostility. This trend is increasingly pronounced even as the city presents itself to the world at large as standing at the center of a newly emerging democratic society. More and more Kyiv stands out—even in comparison with other large Ukrainian cities such as Kharkiv and Odesa—as a city which nurtures an antagonistic environment for foreign migrants. “People receive us better in other cities than in Kyiv,” one informant reported. “People arrive in Kyiv from various cities, and find life complex here, and therefore they want to stay, to find a niche. They look at us as competitors.”

KHARKIV

Kharkiv rivaled Kyiv as Ukraine’s preeminent city throughout the early 20th century, serving as the capital of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic between 1917 and 1934. Founded as a fortified settlement in the 17th century, the city historically was a center of industry, research, and higher education. Kharkiv exploded during Stalin’s massive industrialization drive of the 1930s and at the time of the famine that devastated the Ukrainian country-
side early in that decade.\textsuperscript{54} Local factories produced the famous T-34 tank on the eve of World War II and, at this time, the city was arguably the Soviet Union’s third most important industrial and educational center after Moscow and Leningrad.\textsuperscript{55}

The Nazis captured Kharkiv twice during the war, with four major battles sweeping back and forth through its streets between December 1941 and August 1943. Nearly three-quarters of the city was destroyed, and tens of thousands of civilians killed, including some 30,000 Jewish residents, as Kharkiv became the largest Soviet city to fall to German control.\textsuperscript{56} The city rebuilt rapidly following the war and, by the 1950s, Kharkiv had emerged once again among the country’s leading centers for defense production, research and development, and education.

What is today Kharkiv National University, which was established by Tsar Alexander I on the same day as Kazan University in 1804, was one of the oldest institutions of higher learning in the Russian Empire and is currently the second oldest in Ukraine after that of L’viv.\textsuperscript{57} The city’s medical and law schools were among the most prestigious in the Soviet Union and its industrial plants could be counted among the ranks of the country’s leading producers of nuclear energy turbines, tanks, tractor engines, rockets, and locomotives.\textsuperscript{58}

The 1989 Soviet census reported a pre-independence population of 1.6 million residents, half of whom were ethnic Ukrainians. Nearly 43 percent of the city’s residents at the time were ethnic Russians. The remainder of the city’s once robust Jewish community accounted for 3 percent of the population in 1989, while twenty-six nationalities made up the balance. Tied more closely to Moscow economically and socially than to Kyiv, the city was predominantly Russian-speaking.\textsuperscript{59}

Khakiv’s economy suffered greatly during Ukraine’s post-Soviet industrial collapse, with the city’s population declining by nearly 200,000 during the first decade-and-a-half of independence.\textsuperscript{60} The city’s economic and demographic difficulties were amplified by the reality of a new international border thirty kilometers away, which cut Kharkiv off from much of a natural hinterland now located in the Russian Federation.\textsuperscript{61} The city’s dozen national institutions of higher education managed to adapt, enrolling 150,000 students each year—including 9,000 foreign students from 96 countries—who were trained by 17,000 faculty and research staff. By the early years of the 21st century, a reviving industrial base of nearly 400 enterprises reportedly employed another 150,000 workers.\textsuperscript{62}
With the population declining and the economy reviving, Kharkiv faced significant labor shortages. The presence of numerous foreign students provided a natural connection to potential labor reserves abroad, while the relatively unfettered border with Russia encouraged migration from the north and east. Kharkiv became a magnet for transnational migrants, both documented and not. Moreover, in comparison to Kyiv, migrants indicated being more integrated into the larger society. Two-thirds of the Kharkiv migrants participating in the 2007 Kennan Institute migrant survey reported business contacts with native residents, while nearly as many (60 percent) responded that they spent at least some of their leisure time with life-long residents of the city.63

This degree of integration into city life supports enhanced levels of migrant satisfaction with living in Kharkiv. For example, 70 percent of the respondents to the 2007 Kennan Institute Kharkiv migrant survey in the city reported that they would have moved to Ukraine even if they had known all that would happen to them in the country.64 However, as in Kyiv, migrants viewed access to public space as a problem. Nearly half (49 percent) of all respondents very often or rather often had heard of instances of injustice and abuse towards immigrants, with the majority of those instances involving either public space or interaction with the police.65 As in Kyiv, the right to the city for migrants was being challenged.

The Kennan Kyiv Project organized a focus group which met in Kharkiv on the afternoon of July 28, 2008.66 Given that Kharkiv is home to one of the largest percentages of foreign born residents of all Ukrainian cities, the respondents reported the existence of extensive business and social networks among migrants as well as sustained contact with native-born Ukrainians. Intermarriage with Ukrainian women was seen as a regular occurrence. The participants identified the city’s prestigious institutions of higher education and its massive Barabashova Market as dominant forces in migrant life. Nonetheless, migrants reported being segregated from the mainstream of local society in ways that differed profoundly from the experience of focus group participants in Kyiv. For example, students were enrolled in special programs for foreigners and did not attend class together with their Ukrainian counterparts.

Many of the migrants selected for the focus group reported having come to the city in pursuit of inexpensive, high quality professional training. Knowledge of such educational opportunities frequently proved to
be a legacy of political ties with home countries during the Soviet period. As students, migrants often knew very little about the city and its history. Thinking Kharkiv to be less industrial and more picturesque than is the case, respondents expressed disappointment at discovering a city that was less “European” than they had imagined.

Focus group participants traveled around Ukraine more than their counterparts in Kyiv, and generally found economic opportunity upon graduation from university-level institutes. They uniformly valued Ukraine’s and Kharkiv’s commitment to freedom of expression, which represented a departure from regimes in many of their countries of origin. Those participants who had completed their education remained in Ukraine primarily due to growing personal and family ties. “I stayed here because of my child,” one respondent responded forthrightly.67

Despite extensive experience living in Ukraine, participants found life to be difficult because the legal regime governing the lives of foreigners remains muddled. As a result, foreign residents must constantly seek to straighten out their legal status in the country, often facing a bureaucratic gauntlet of paperwork and bribes. These complexities at times drove migrants to homelessness and into conflict with the police. One group member complained that the police “stop foreigners at every step checking documents. If someone is enrolled at a university, then they are registered. Police go from apartment to apartment to check on foreigners. It is impossible to live quietly.”68

Based on the focus group discussions, the experience of foreign migrants in Kharkiv appears to be more nuanced and complex than in Kyiv. Foreign residents—who frequently arrive to study and remain after marrying into Ukrainian families—are more integrated into local life than appears to be the case in the capital. At the same time, networks of economic ties and support systems among migrants themselves are more robust than in Kyiv. Migrants are both more connected to the daily lives of their Ukrainian neighbors and more connected to one another. The city is, in many ways, more comfortable with the presence of foreigners.

Nonetheless, the right to the city is challenged even in Kharkiv. Tensions are high between migrants and the police, who are viewed as parasites feeding off of the legal ambiguities of migrant life in Ukraine. Landlords are seen as preying on migrant uncertainties as well. More troubling, hate crimes are becoming more frequent. “I lived on the border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan,” one participant reported. “We have a constant state of war there. And yet, there is no such thing as a ‘Skinhead.’ When I came here, I heard about these sorts of people who may kill you. We sought refuge here from our homes so that we could lead a normal life, but it turns out that we could have stayed there fearing for our lives just like here. The only difference is that there we always go around with an automatic weapon and here—without it. It is better to have a gun at arm’s reach to be able to defend yourself. But here if you are attacked, then it’s only your problem, the authorities are ready to deport you and that’s it.”

Less dramatically, a migrant from Pakistan noted that “Just two days ago I went to the local medical clinic because I had a stomach ache. My doctor didn’t want to treat me after he saw me. Why? Because I am from Pakistan and he had fought in Afghanistan and Pakistan hadn’t fought on his side.”

Despite reliance on foreign students, foreign traders, and foreign professionals to sustain an urban economy damaged by the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kharkiv remains a city in which the presence of foreign migrants is contested. It is, in the words of one migrant, “difficult to live in the city materially, morally, and psychologically. We can’t go out normally at night. We can’t simply walk around the city, even in company, and certainly not alone. Just to go out at night is scary.” As a fellow interlocutor concluded, “There simply is discomfort with being out at night. One doesn’t know what will happen.”

Kharkiv has become a city in which foreigners value access to affordable quality education and the opportunities such training affords. They value an atmosphere of free expression and free speech. They oftentimes marry Ukrainians and form Ukrainian families. “Ukraine gave us the possibility to have an education, to know another culture,” one migrant declared. “The people here don’t hold a grudge,” he continued. “Only the police hold a grudge against us.” Thus, Kharkiv is a city in which the primary threat to the right of foreign migrants to be present in the city is challenged primarily by corrupt officials rather than by native-born neighbors.

ODESA

Despite its Old World location on the site of the ancient worlds surrounding the Black Sea, Odesa is a young city. Founded by imperial decree on May 27, 1794, Odesa was from the very beginning a place in
between. Empress Catherine II “the Great” devoted much of her reign to trying to extend Russia’s reach to envelope the Black Sea and secure Constantinople. Toward the end of her life, she approved a proposal from a wealthy Naples-born soldier of Spanish and Irish stock, Joseph de Ribas, and a Dutch military engineer, Franz de Voland, to build a garrison city at the site of the Ottoman fortress of Teni-Dunai at Khadzhibei.\textsuperscript{75} Foreigners rushed in, as did traders large and small, both respected and dissolute.\textsuperscript{76}

One of Catherine’s last decrees, issued only upon her death, pronounced the entire province of Novorossiia in which the city was located to be an amnesty zone for runaway serfs. About three thousand Russian and Ukrainian serfs immediately moved to the area around Odesa during the last years of the eighteenth century so that they could live in freedom.\textsuperscript{77} An air of religious tolerance took hold with Christian and Muslim former Turkish subjects joining with Christian and Jewish Russian subjects. Just three years after its founding, a third of Odesa’s residents lived without appropriate legal documentation.\textsuperscript{78}

Catherine’s son, the Emperor Paul I, eagerly set out to dismantle much of what his mother had achieved, including Odesa. Paul dismissed de Ribas and de Voland, allowing the city to languish until his assassination a few years later. In 1803, Catherine’s grandson Tsar Alexander I named a thirty-six-year-old Frenchman who had fled the revolution in his own country—the duc de Richelieu, a great nephew of the famed Cardinal—to preside over the increasingly rambunctious frontier town in the far southwestern reaches of his empire.\textsuperscript{79}

Over the course of the next 11 years, Richelieu secured Odesa’s fate. Russian and Ukrainian peasants, Cossacks from Chernihiv and Poltava, Jews from the overcrowded “pale” of settlements, Ottoman Christians (Bulgarians, Gaguazy, Moldavians, Serbs, Greeks and Armenians), Roma, Catholic Germans, Swiss Protestants, Mennonites, Hungarians, Poles, Italians, and Islamic Nogai Turks converged on the boomtown port at the edge of so many different worlds.\textsuperscript{80} Richelieu eventually returned to France—he became Prime Minister for the restored Bourbon Monarchy—leaving behind what he himself called “the best pearl in the Russian crown” on the shores of the Black Sea.\textsuperscript{81} Odesa continued to be a raucous, wide-open city, becoming the port through which the grain riches of Ukraine’s and Russia’s vast Black Earth steppe passed to reach the outside world.\textsuperscript{82}
Odesa managed to remain an entrepôt despite the violence of the Russian Civil War, Stalinism, and World War II. Occupied by Romanians and Germans in 1941, some 60,000 Odesans—primarily Jews—were exterminated or deported before the Red Army returned in 1944. By the 1960s, the city had experienced another growth spurt as Soviet authorities invested heavily in the city’s shipbuilding, oil refining, chemical, and food processing industries, and port. The city nonetheless lost much of its Jewish character as many Jews left for Israel and the west. Odesa became home to about one million people at the time of independence in 1991, nearly half of whom were ethnic Ukrainians (while four of every ten residents were ethnic Russians). The historic Jewish community had fallen to roughly 6% of the population by the time of the last Soviet census in 1989, which captured a pre-independence demographic baseline of the city.

The post-independence period proved to be a difficult one for a city that historically had only the most limited connection to Ukrainian language and culture. The economic and symbolic place of a historically Russian and Jewish city in a newly independent Ukrainian state has proven difficult to define. Overall, the population fell by nearly 10% during the first decade of independence. Most significantly, 140,000 ethnic Russians and 50,000 Jews left the city for good. The hemorrhaging of Russians to Russia and Jews to Israel threatened to undermine the city’s already teetering economy even further. The massive port nonetheless served as a point of entry into Ukraine as well as a place of departure. Migrant traders from Africa and Asia began to arrive as soon as Soviet-era border controls broke down.

Recent migrants to Odesa report being highly satisfied with their lives in the city, despite some significant misgivings about all that transpires there. For example, 83.8 percent of the respondents to the 2007 Kennan Institute Odesa migrant survey indicated that they would have moved to Ukraine even if they had known all that would happen to them. Significantly, less than half of the migrant respondents to the survey had heard of cases of injustice and abuse very or rather often. However, nearly all (81.6 percent) of the respondents who reported knowing of such incidents recorded that they had occurred in public space. Consequently, the right to the city for migrants is challenged in Odesa, as elsewhere in Ukraine, despite relatively higher levels of satisfaction with the migrant experience.
The Kennan Kyiv Project organized a focus group meeting in Odesa on the evening of July 29, 2008 to explore further the relatively high levels of migrant satisfaction in the city. Unlike the discussions in Kyiv and Kharkiv, the Odesa focus group included migrants from Belarus and Moldova. In contrast to migrants from further abroad, these participants moved to the city to escape confining authoritarian environments in their own countries and have integrated quickly into the mainstream of local life. Their experience suggests that the place of Russian-speaking former Soviet citizens in a predominately Russian-speaking city such as Odesa is qualitatively different from that of migrants from more distant cultures. As in Kharkiv, the twin bases for migrant life in the city are educational institutions and markets – each attracting migrants of rather different socioeconomic backgrounds. Overall, the Odesa focus group participants described a far more hospitable environment with a higher degree of goodwill than their counterparts in either Kyiv or Kharkiv.

As with their peers in the other focus groups, members of the Odesa discussion reported knowing very little about either the city or about Ukraine prior to their arrival. “Before I came here to study,” one participant admitted, “I knew nothing about the city. 85 percent of the students who come here don’t know anything about this country. They come simply to receive an education that they can not obtain at home.” Moreover, some admitted to thinking that Odesa was part of Russia.

Once in Odesa, focus group members began to develop positive attitudes towards their new home. Many have been lured in by the attractions of living near the sea in a port town that is full of colorful people and places. In some instances, a few years of being a student became several years as a resident.

The Odesa migrants are outspoken about their problems, yet are more willing than their counterparts in Kyiv and in Kharkiv to see that their difficulties are endemic to Ukraine as a whole. Indeed, one declared, “you have a bigger problem with your state than we have. We can leave and return to our homeland, but you live here and this is your country. Those in power don’t respect you—native born citizens—so what do they think about us?” Yet, they find Ukraine’s political openness to be a major benefit. “Here, in this country, there is political chaos for simple people and this is good. It is possible to work for oneself and no one will bother you. In Belarus, there is only one boss.”
“Odesa,” one participant reported, “is a sufficiently pleasant and hospitable city. The single concern that demands attention is the coarse relations with representatives of law enforcement agencies.”

As in other cities, the police are described as “constantly demanding to see documents in the street. Why do they have to do this?” Furthermore, another group participant reported that, “I meet with the police a hundred times every day. We hardly catch up paying all the bribes for them to leave us alone. I am registered, all of my documents are in order, I have a solid base and I have work here in Ukraine. Yet, I have to worry all the time about this. I think that your police are simply racists.”

The Odesa respondents are less dramatic in their expression of concern about hateful language and violence on the streets. Yet, they too have begun to change how they move about the city. Increasingly, they avoid being on the streets at night. “Let me give you a situation,” one participant declared. “I go out late to buy some bread at one o’clock in the morning to the single little stall that is open at that hour. About 20-30 young men are milling about drunk. There has to be a problem. And if you call police they will ask, ‘Why would you have to buy bread at one a.m. at night? It’s your own fault – you provoked it!’ What kind of freedom is this?” As another participant added, a migrant being out on the streets at night “is like a lottery. Sometimes you win, and sometimes you lose.”

Despite these problems, the migrants in the focus group feel an attachment to Odesa that is absent in the conversations in Kyiv and Kharkiv. “This is a place where people are optimistic by nature. Odesa, in any case, is a city that is clean and beautiful. It is very hot at home, while here the climate is pleasant. There is good education, of a high quality.” As in the past, Odesa continues to stand out as a special place.

**LOOKING TO THE FUTURE**

Phil Wood and Charles Landry eloquently argue in their book *The Intercultural City* that successful cities more often than not have historically been diverse cities. Diversity in and of itself, they continue, is not a sufficient condition for urban success; this is so even at a time when global forces are creating unprecedented human multiplicity in cities throughout the world. “For cities to unlock the benefits of cultural diversity—to realize the diversity advantage or dividend—they need to become more intercul-
tural,” Wood and Landry argue. “They need,” they continue, “to become stages upon which the free interplay of different skills, insights and cultural resources may take its course.”105

From this perspective, a precondition for such success must be for all city residents to feel that they can exercise their right to the city—and to the city’s public spaces—free from fear of physical and verbal abuse. Even the most vulnerable minorities must move about the city with a minimal degree of comfort. To what extent do the three contemporary migrant-magnet Ukrainian cities of Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa nurture and sustain this most necessary of conditions for urban success? To what extent are they able to convert diversity from a condition into an advantage?

There is growing evidence that foreign residents of such migrant-magnet cities as Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa believe that their right to their city is receding. Migrant observations about a general atmosphere of polite tolerance evident a decade ago are giving way to expressions of fear over venturing onto the streets, especially at night. The portrait that emerges from the Kennan Institute’s most recent migrant surveys and focus group sessions in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa is one of a growing intolerance that is accepted, even promoted, by authorities. Increasingly, Ukrainian cities appear to be the sorts of communities in which diversity no longer can be converted from a condition into an advantage.

Significant differences in the migrant experience in these cities demonstrate how local conditions matter a great deal. The migrant presence is more meaningful in Kharkiv and in Odesa than in Kyiv, with relations between migrants and local residents being more complex and varied. Migrants in Kharkiv and in Odesa have recourse through informal connections which do not seem to exist in the capital. Tensions with the police, landlords, and employers thus take on different meaning when extensive networks of personal ties offer alternative levers for survival.

Similarities among the experiences of migrants in these three cities are more troubling. A distinct rise in fear of attack by young thugs, verbal abuse, and of rapacious police runs through the recent surveys and discussions presented here. If Wood and Landry are correct—and one of the primary challenges for cities and nations at the outset of the twenty-first century must be to “unlock the benefits of cultural diversity, to realize the diversity advantage or dividend”106—then Ukraine could well be wasting important resources that it needs to nurture instead.
Most disturbingly for a nation with democratic pretensions, the visible willingness of national and local authorities to tolerate bureaucrats and police who are corrupt and senior officials who mock racism undermines whatever democratically-inspired institutional and constitutional arrangements are taking shape. Ukraine has made considerable strides towards building a democracy. The country’s political system has become genuinely competitive; its media outspoken. The migrants interviewed for this project uniformly praise the country’s atmosphere of free expression. By seeking to examine democracy from below though the lens of what happens on city streets—by approaching Ukraine through the perspective of the right to the city—startling countetrends emerge. Post-independent Ukraine appears to be a state that often fails to respect the human dignity of migrants even if its citizens do.

Ukraine has left behind Soviet-enforced isolation to become ever more integrated into a global economy that is predicated on the relatively free flow of capital, goods, and humans across international boundaries. This process exposes Ukraine and Ukrainians to new challenges that were unimaginable just two decades ago. At every turn, Ukrainians at all levels of society must struggle to convert their startling new realities into assets. The rich diversity of its migrant community represents one such opportunity. After all, very few countries around the world can afford to squander the professional talent being turned out by local engineering and medical schools. And yet, if the migrant experiences reported here are any indications, this is precisely what Ukraine is doing.

Ukraine can capitalize fully on its historic opportunity following independence only by acknowledging the benefits to be secured from diversity. Desired international alliances are unlikely to bring prosperity to a country that fails to protect basic human dignity from assault by its own bureaucrats and law enforcement authorities. Establishing a new right to the city for those of difference is one area in which Ukraine can begin to unlock the benefits of the most dynamic forces dominating the world today: globalization, migration, and urbanization.
NOTES

1. The research for this project was conducted within the context of a multi-year effort to record the experience of immigrants in Ukraine. A number of related research projects are mentioned in the notes to follow. I would like to thank my fellow research team members who are listed below for their encouragement, support, and intelligence. More particularly, I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to Olena Meshcherina, and Maiya Pozniak of the Image Control Corporation of Kyiv for conducting the focus groups on which this article is based.

2. For an analysis of the number of Ukrainians estimated to be living abroad, see Olena Malynovska, “International Labour Migration from the Ukraine: the Last Ten Years,” in New Waves: Migration from Eastern to Southern Europe (Lisbon: LusoAmerican Foundation, 2004), pp. 11–22; as well as Institute of Public Affairs (Poland) and International Centre for Policy Studies (Ukraine), White Paper: Ukraine’s Policy to Control Illegal Migration (Warsaw/Kyiv: Institytut spraw publicznych and Mizhnarodnyi tsentr perspektivnikh doslidzhen’, 2006), pp. 9–10. The data on remittances are reported in the 2008 wall chart released by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, International Migration 2006 (New York: UNDESA Population Division, 2008).


4. Ibid.


6. The author has made numerous site visits to the Troeshchyna market during the past decade. For further discussion of the Troeshchyna market, see Blair A. Ruble, “Kyiv’s Troeshchyna: An Emerging International Migrant Neighborhood,” Nationalities Papers, vol. 31, no. 2 (June 2003), pp. 139–55.

7. This information is based on a site visit to the market by the author on April 16, 2008.

8. Steven Lee Myers, “From Soviet-Era Flea Market to a Giant Makeshift Mall,” New York Times (May 19, 2006). This information was confirmed during a site visit to the market by the author of September 2, 2008.

9. www.7km.net.


16. For a discussion of the roots of racialist thought and violence in contemporary Russia, see V. A. Shnirel’man, “Chistil’shchiki moskovskikh ulits:” skinkhedy, SMI i obshchestvennoe mnenie (Moscow: Academiia, 2007). For discussion of an example of such attacks, see “Four Get Lengthy Terms in African’s Slaying,” The Moscow Times (June 20, 2007).

17. These data are collected in conjunction with a larger study of transnational migration in Ukraine conducted over the past decade by the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute and its offices in Kyiv as well as in Moscow.

In 2001-2002, the George F. Kennan Fund of the Woodrow Wilson Center supported surveys in Kyiv with the assistance of the U.S.–Ukraine Foundation and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). These surveys sought to establish a baseline portrait of transnational migrant communities in the Ukrainian capital. The surveys were supervised by a research team made up of the following members from Ukraine and the United States: Olena Braichevska (Kyiv Slavic University), Olена Malynovska (Academy of State Government of the Office of the President of Ukraine), Nancy E. Popson (Kennan Institute, Washington), Yaroslav Pylynsky (Kennan Kyiv Project), Blair A. Ruble (Kennan Institute, Washington), and Halyna Volosiuq (Ministry of Labor and Social Policy of Ukraine). The team’s findings appeared in a number of publications, including: Netradytsiini Mihranty u Kyievi (Kennan Kyiv Project, 2002); Nontraditional Immigrants in Kyiv (Woodrow Wilson Center, 2003); Creating Diversity Capital: Transnational Migrants in Montreal, Washington, and Kyiv (Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); Kapital Rozmaïitosty: Transnationalni Mihranty u Montreali, Washingtoni ta Kyievi (Krytyka Press, 2007); and, articles in the journals Problemy mihratsii, Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, Urban Anthropology, and Nationalities Papers.

The Kennan Institute conducted three surveys in Kyiv at that time: a survey of 233 immigrant households carried out between June and December 2001; a survey of 1,000 Kyiv residents in May 2002; and a survey of forty-six specialists and officials working with migrants in the city that was conducted throughout 2001 and 2002. More information about the research design and methodology of the surveys may be found in Olena Braichevska, Halyna Volosiuk, Olена Malynovska, Yaroslav Pylynsky, Nancy Popson, and Blair A. Ruble, Nontraditional Immigrants in Kyiv, pp. 161-165; as well as in Blair A. Ruble, Creating Diversity Capital. Transnational Migrants in Montreal, Washington, and Kyiv, pp. 199–204.

The Kennan Institute and its George F. Kennan Fund, together with the Kennan Kyiv Project, initiated follow-on studies in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa and other cities during the period 2007 – 2008 under the direction of bi-national research team members: Volodymyr Anderson (Odesa National University), Andrei Artemenko (Kharkiv National University of Internal Affairs), Olена Braichevska (Kyiv Slavic University), Renata Kosc-Harmatiy (Kennan Institute, Washington, D.C.), Mary Elizabeth Malinkin (Kennan Institute, Washington, D.C.), Olена Malynovska (National Institute on International Security Issues of the National Security and Defense Council
of Ukraine), Yaroslav Pylynski (Kennan Kyiv Project), and Blair A. Ruble (Kennan Institute, Washington, D.C.). The International Organization for Migration and the International Renaissance Fund have supported portions of this research.

The survey instrument used in the second round was based on that which was used in the 2001 survey of migrant households in Kyiv. The 2006–2008 questionnaires were administered to samples of 100 households in Kyiv, 50 in Kharkiv, and 68 in Odesa. As in the earlier survey round, the research team used a chain method for sample selection: a well-respected third party would introduce the interviewer to a respondent and describe the nature and goals of the survey. Each respondent found through this initial introduction would in turn indicate several other potential respondents.

As in 2001, this technique led to a sample that was disproportionately male (73.4 percent). This imbalance is in part a reflection of the large number of males within the migrant community overall as a significant majority of transnational migrants in Ukraine are young males who were unable to find employment in their home country. Moreover, men are considered to be the most appropriate household spokesperson in some of the religious and ethnic communities under examination.

Only one-fifth of the households included in the samples selected in all three cities consisted of family members born in more than one country. Accordingly, 79 percent of the households consisted of family members born in the same country, outside of Ukraine. The mean number of household members was 2.56 members, although there was considerable variation across cities and countries of birth.

Among the other significant characteristics of the samples in all three cities is the fact that 60% of all respondents were from either the capital city of their country, or from another large city. 37.2 percent were Sunni Muslim, 14.2 percent Shiite Muslim, 11.9 percent Orthodox Christian, 11.0 percent Atheist, 7.8 percent Roman Catholic, 7.8 percent Buddhist, 6.0 percent Protestant, 1.4 percent Hindu, 0.9 percent Yazidi, and 1.8 percent of other faiths. Finally, 46 percent of all respondents had arrived in Ukraine since 2002, 24 percent between 1997 and 2001, 18 percent between 1992 and 1996, while the remainder had arrived prior to independence.

In 2006–2008, the largest percentage of respondents in Kyiv were born in Afghanistan (37 percent), followed by African countries (20 percent), China and Bangladesh (8 percent each), Vietnam and Iran (6 percent each), as well as a number of other countries (15 percent). The largest percentage of respondents in Kharkiv were born in countries of the former Soviet Union (28 percent), followed by Iran (14 percent), Afghanistan, China, and African countries (12 percent each), Vietnam (8 percent), and other countries (14 percent). The largest percentage of respondents in Odesa were born in countries of the former Soviet Union (46 percent), followed by China (16 percent), Turkey (13 percent), African countries (10 percent), and other countries (15 percent). These patterns reflect the different composition of the general migrant communities in all three cities.

Further information about focus groups convened in late July 2008 in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa is found below.

22. Ibid., pp. 634–637.
26. Ibid., pp. 9–12.
27. Ibid., pp. 83–105.
28. These findings are discussed in Blair A. Ruble, Creating Diversity Capital.
29. Ibid., pp. 164–165.
34. For further discussion of these issues, see Blair A. Ruble, Creating Diversity Capital. Transnational Migrants in Montreal, Washington, and Kyiv, pp. 175–183.
35. Ibid., p. 184; and, Olena Braichevska, Halyna Volosiuk, Olena Malynovska, Yaroslav Pylynski, Nancy Popson, and Blair A. Ruble, Nontraditional Immigrants in Kyiv, pp. 119–141.
36. Elisabeth Sewall, “Racist Attacks on the Rise,” The Kyiv Post (June 18, 2008).
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
44. The July 31, 2008 Kyiv focus group was conducted by Olena Meshcherina, and Maiya Pozniak of the Image Control Corporation of Kyiv, a respected survey research firm. As with focus group discussions conducted in Kharkiv and Odesa that week, the session examined the participants’ sense of security in moving through public spaces.
The heightened tension in the city at the time of the focus group session could well have contributed to the refusal of citizens of China, Vietnam, and South Korea to participate in the discussion at the behest of community leaders.

Women represented only 10 percent of the overall sample in the three July 2008 focus group sessions. This figure is consistent with official data indicating that only 8 percent of temporary workers in the country are female (though the presence of women in transnational migrant communities in Ukraine is undoubtedly larger). As in previous sociological examinations of transnational migrant communities in Ukraine during the past decade, women remained especially averse to discussing their experiences with strangers. Consequently, the July 2008 Kyiv focus group consisted of eight men and one woman from Turkey, Nigeria, Ghana, and Syria between the ages of 23 and 33. The group included both migrants who had come to Ukraine to study, and those who had come to work (the latter group was comprised of entrepreneurial small business owners).

The second category of the focus group did not consist of those who had come to Ukraine intending to work; rather the group consisted of individuals who originally came to Ukraine to study but have since then received a degree and have stayed in the country to work either as small business entrepreneurs or as employees of their more successful immigrant colleagues.

45. July 31, 2008 Kyiv migrant focus group.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.

54. Ibid.
60. The impact of these processes on municipal administration are discussed in detail in O. N. Iarmish and O. M. Holovoko, Kharkivs’ke mis’ke samovriaduvannia na zlami stolit’': XIX-XX i XX-XXI. Dosvid istorii ta suchasnosti [Do 350-richchia Kharkova] (Kharkiv: Vydvnytzvo Natsional’noho universytetu vnitrishnykh sprav, 2004), pp. 167-293.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. The July 28, 2008 Kharkiv focus group was conducted by Olena Meshcherina, and Maiya Pozniak of the Image Control Corporation of Kyiv. As with focus groups discussions conducted in Kyiv and Odesa that week, the session examined the participants’ sense of security in moving through public spaces. Only men participated in the session. The ten group participants ranged in age from 20 to 37. They had arrived in Ukraine from Pakistan, India, Madagascar, Sudan, Syria, and Jordan both prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent to it. The group included both migrants who had come to Ukraine to study, and those who had come to work (the latter group was comprised of entrepreneurial small business owners).
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Admittedly, there were Moldovan, Ukrainian and Ottoman settlements in the area dating back at least to the 1500s. Moreover, Odesa—as the city exists today—has been constructed on the site of an Ottoman fortress. Empress Catherine II established the city by imperial decree only at the very end of the 18th century. Tanya Richardson, Kaleidoscopic Odessa: History and Place in Contemporary Ukraine (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), p. 4.
77. Patricia Herlihy, Odessa: A History 1794-1914, p. 15.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid., pp. 21-48.
80. Ibid., pp. 23-34.
86. “Raspredelenie naseleniia g. Odessy po natsional’nosti v 1989 gody (chelovek),” in Gosudarstvenny komitet Ukrainsoi SSR po Statistiki, Naseleienie Ukrainskoi SSR.
87. Tanya Richardson, Kaleidoscopic Odessa; History and Place in Contemporary Ukraine (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008).
88. For an excellent discussion of the troubled symbolic place of Odesa within contemporary Ukraine, see Tanya Richardson, Kaleidoscopic Odessa: History and Place in Contemporary Ukraine.
90. Tanya Richardson, Kaleidoscopic Odessa: History and Place in Contemporary Ukraine, pp. 36-37.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. The July 29, 2008 Odesa focus group was conducted by Olena Meshcherina, and Maiya Pozniak of the Image Control Corporation of Kyiv. As with focus groups discussions conducted in Kyiv and Kharkiv that week, the session examined the participants’ sense of security in moving through public spaces. The participants included seven men and two women ranging in age from 20 to 35. The group embraced a range of backgrounds from students to businessmen and white collar employees. They had migrated to Ukraine from seven countries: Moldova, Belarus, Syria, India, the Arab Emirates, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka.
95. July 29, 2008 Odesa migrant focus group.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
105. Ibid., p. 244.
106. Ibid.
THE EURASIAN MIGRATION PAPERS

The Eurasian Migration Papers is a series of reports—produced jointly by the Kennan Institute and the Comparative Urban Studies Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.—that examines migrant communities in Eurasian cities. The series features the results of Wilson Center-supported research examining the lives of migrants in contemporary Russia, Ukraine, and surrounding states.

According to the United Nations, the number of people living in countries other than their birth is approaching 200 million worldwide, up from 80 million three decades ago. While the scale of migration has grown, the nature of international population movements and patterns of migrant adaptation have changed. Migration movements have become part of the permanent fabric of modern society, and bring with them questions of economic, political, and social significance.

Migration is an especially pressing issue for the countries of Eurasia, in which large-scale international migration is a relatively new phenomenon. While the collapse of the Soviet state brought with it expanded freedom of movement, it also resulted in increased restrictions at many destination points for migrants, providing new administrative challenges. Some citizens are driven to leave their places of origin because of conflict, political ambiguity, or economic deprivation. As the region continues its integration into global economic networks, it becomes an increasingly desirable transit route and destination for migrants from Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.

The Kennan Institute has sponsored a number of activities—such as lectures, workshops, working groups, seminars, and survey research among different migrant communities, native-born populations, and officials—intended to explore the social and official reaction to the presence of migrants within Eurasian countries and to trace the evolving response of migrant communities to life in their new homes. The Eurasian Migration Papers publication series seeks to make the results of these efforts widely available to specialists, policy-makers, and citizens in Russia, Ukraine, the United States, and elsewhere.
Printed copies of the Eurasian Migration Papers are available upon request from the Kennan Institute in Washington, D.C. They are also available for download in PDF format on the web pages of the Wilson Center’s:

Kennan Institute, www.wilsoncenter.org/kennan,
Comparative Urban Studies Program, www.wilsoncenter.org/cusp,
the Kennan Moscow Project, www.kennan.ru,

Please also look for the forthcoming second volume of the Eurasian Migration Papers:


In addition to the Eurasian Migration Papers, please also see the Kennan Institute’s previous publications concerning migration and tolerance in Ukraine:


• Mihratsiia i tolerantnist v Ukrainy [Migration and Tolerance in Ukraine], Kyiv: Stylos Press, 2007, edited by Yaroslav Pylynskyi. [Ukrainian; no longer available in printed form]

• Aktualno: Tolerantnist! [Current Issue: Tolerance!], Kyiv: Stylos Press, 2008, edited by Yaroslav Pylynskyi. [Ukrainian]