Ending Wars and Building Peace

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Foreword

Terje Rød-Larsen  
President, International Peace Academy

The International Peace Academy (IPA) is pleased to introduce a new series of Working Papers within the program *Coping with Crisis, Conflict, and Change: The United Nations and Evolving Capacities for Managing Global Crises*, a four-year research and policy-facilitation program designed to generate fresh thinking about global crises and capacities for effective prevention and response.

In this series of Working Papers, IPA has asked leading experts to undertake a mapping exercise, presenting an assessment of critical challenges to human and international security. A first group of papers provides a horizontal perspective, examining the intersection of multiple challenges in specific regions of the world. A second group takes a vertical approach, providing in-depth analysis of global challenges relating to organized violence, poverty, population trends, public health, and climate change, among other topics. The Working Papers have three main objectives: to advance the understanding of these critical challenges and their interlinkages; to assess capacities to cope with these challenges and to draw scenarios for plausible future developments; and to offer a baseline for longer-term research and policy development.

Out of these initial Working Papers, a grave picture already emerges. The Papers make clear that common challenges take different forms in different regions of the world. At the same time, they show that complexity and interconnectedness will be a crucial attribute of crises in the foreseeable future.

First, new challenges are emerging, such as climate change and demographic trends. At least two billion additional inhabitants, and perhaps closer to three billion, will be added to the world over the next five decades, virtually all in the less developed regions, especially among the poorest countries in Africa and Asia. As a result of climate change, the magnitude and frequency of floods may increase in many regions; floods in coastal Bangladesh and India, for example, are expected to affect several million people. The demand for natural resources—notably water—will increase as a result of population growth and economic development; but some areas may have diminished access to clean water.

Second, some challenges are evolving in more dangerous global configurations such as transnational organized crime and terrorism. Illicit and violent organizations are gaining increasing control over territory, markets, and populations around the world. Non-state armed groups complicate peacemaking efforts due to their continued access to global commodity and arms markets. Many countries, even if they are not directly affected, can suffer from the economic impact of a major terrorist attack. States with ineffective and corrupted institutions may prove to be weak links in global arrangements to deal with threats ranging from the avian flu to transnational terrorism.

Finally, as these complex challenges emerge and evolve, ‘old’ problems still persist. While the number of violent conflicts waged around the world has recently declined, inequality—particularly between groups within the same country—is on the rise. When this intergroup inequality aligns with religious, ethnic, racial, and language divides, the prospect of tension rises. Meanwhile, at the state level, the number of actual and aspirant nuclear-armed countries is growing, as is their ability to acquire weapons through illicit global trade.

As the international institutions created in the aftermath of World War II enter their seventh decade, their capacity to cope with this complex, rapidly evolving and interconnected security landscape is being sharply tested. The United Nations has made important progress in some of its core functions—‘keeping the peace,’ providing humanitarian relief, and helping advance human development and security. However, there are...
reasons to question whether the broad UN crisis management system for prevention and response is up to the test.

Not only the UN, but also regional and state mechanisms are challenged by this complex landscape and the nature and scale of crises. In the Middle East, for example, interlinked conflicts are complicated by demographic and socioeconomic trends and regional institutions capable of coping with crisis are lacking. In both Latin America and Africa, ‘old’ problems of domestic insecurity arising from weak institutions and incomplete democratization intersect with ‘new’ transnational challenges such as organized crime. Overall, there is reason for concern about net global capacities to cope with these challenges, generating a growing sense of global crisis.

Reading these Working Papers, the first step in a four-year research program, one is left with a sense of urgency about the need for action and change: action where policies and mechanisms have already been identified; change where institutions are deemed inadequate and require innovation. The diversity of challenges suggests that solutions cannot rest in one actor or mechanism alone. For example, greater multilateral engagement can produce a regulatory framework to combat small arms proliferation and misuse, while private actors, including both industry and local communities, will need to play indispensable roles in forging global solutions to public health provision and food security. At the same time, the complexity and intertwined nature of the challenges require solutions at multiple levels. For example, governments will need to confront the realities that demographic change will impose on them in coming years, while international organizations such as the UN have a key role to play in technical assistance and norm-setting in areas as diverse as education, urban planning and environmental control.

That the world is changing is hardly news. What is new is a faster rate of change than ever before and an unprecedented interconnectedness between different domains of human activity—and the crises they can precipitate. This series of Working Papers aims to contribute to understanding these complexities and the responses that are needed from institutions and decision-makers to cope with these crises, challenges and change.

Terje Rød-Larsen
Introduction

Ending armed conflict has long been a concern of practitioners and scholars of international relations. Recent years have seen new attention to questions of “building peace” beyond the immediate termination of war, primarily driven by the experience of civil wars in the 1990s and the very mixed record of international involvement—from relative successes like Namibia, Mozambique, and El Salvador through partial successes like Cambodia, Bosnia, and East Timor to abysmal failures like Angola and Rwanda.

The costs of failing to build peace are stark and manifold. By most accounts, a significant number of armed conflicts relapse to war, and many “new” wars occur in countries that have failed to consolidate peace. When peacebuilding fails, parties to conflict often unleash greater violence than in the prior war, as was grimly attested to by the nearly 2 million dead after peace unraveled in Angola in 1991 and Rwanda in 1993-94. War also erases the gains of development in a process that some have called “reverse development,” in turn contributing to further warfare, violence, and impoverishment.1 War-torn societies, characterized by high rates of displacement, damaged infrastructure, and weak or absent institutions, are also more vulnerable to disease. They are further susceptible to other “pathogens” like arms trafficking, illicit commodity flow, transnational crime, and terrorist networks, which can foster broader ills.2

At the same time, there is ground for some encouragement. More wars have ended than started since the mid-1980s, reducing the number and intensity of armed conflicts in the world by roughly half.3 A majority of these (70 percent) have also been concluded through negotiation or petering out rather than outright victory or defeat.4 Although these tend to produce less stable results—indeed, negotiated settlements revert to conflict at roughly three times the rate of victories—at least half of these settlements stick, and they also tend to produce less retributive violence.5 International peace efforts further appear to be a significant part of this story. Of the wars ended since 1988, the UN has exercised some peacebuilding role in half, including in Cambodia, Southern Africa, Central America, the Balkans, West Africa, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Of the nineteen UN peace operations currently in the field, at least ten could be considered to be engaged in or contributing to peacebuilding, along with a few dedicated UN “Peacebuilding Support Offices.”6

Growing recognition of the possibility of success, as well as of the cost of failure, has spurred a range of efforts to reform the practice of international peacebuilding, including the creation in 2005 of a new UN Peacebuilding Commission and its related mechanisms, a Secretariat Peacebuilding Support Office and a Peacebuilding Fund.

However, both experience and scholarship point to a series of chronic weaknesses in international peace efforts, which these and other reforms are meant to overcome and which we discuss below. They also point to more fundamental questions about the complexity of post-conflict transitions, the mismatch between expectations for rapid recovery and processes that have historically taken considerably longer, and the crucial issue of state-society relations as well as the types of state institutions needed to sustain peace, especially in poorer countries where, not coincidentally, most armed conflicts occur. Whether external actors have the knowledge, tools, resources or legitimacy to contribute to what is frequently referred to as “state-building” is, in our view, central to the question of the efficacy of international peacebuilding.

2 Weak states are often seen as a primary “vector of transmission” for such cross-border threats. For a critical analysis, see Stewart Patrick, “Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?” Washington Quarterly 29, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 27-53.
4 Page Fortna, “Where have all the Victories Gone? Hypothesis (and Some Preliminary Tests) on War Outcomes in Historical Perspective,” April 15, 2004, presentation at the Conference on Order, Conflict, and Violence, Yale University, April 30-May 1, 2004. Fortna’s dataset is a modified form of the set found in Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (2000): 779-902. Although the various datasets of post-1945 civil wars conflict in some dimensions, all agree on the dramatic increase in percentage of wars ended without victory or defeat.
5 Licklider finds civil wars that ended through victory (between 1945-1993) recurred only 15 percent of the time, whereas those that ended differently (through both negotiated settlements and petering out) recurred 50 percent of the time. Lacia finds similar figures for internal armed conflicts from 1946-2004: 15 percent for victories and 42 percent for negotiated settlements, excluding petering out, which recurred more often. See Roy B. Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993,” American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (September 1995): 681-90; Bethany Lacia, “Analysis of Uppala War Terminations Data,” memo to Human Security Centre, August 2006.
6 These are UNOTIL in Timor-Leste; UNMIS in Sudan; ONUB in Burundi; MINUSTAH in Haiti; UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire; UNMIL in Liberia; UNAMA in Afghanistan; MONUC in the Democratic Republic of Congo; UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone; and UNMIK in Kosovo.
What is Peacebuilding?

Considerable ink has been expended wrestling with the concept of peacebuilding since the term first entered public usage in Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali’s 1992 Agenda for Peace. Boutros Ghali, drawing on work by Johan Galtung and other peace researchers, initially defined peacebuilding in relation to a conflict continuum that passed from pre-conflict prevention through peacemaking and peacekeeping. Peacebuilding was associated with the post-conflict phase and defined as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”

Over the 1990s, the concept of peacebuilding became more expansive—arguably, to the point of incoherence. This was driven partly by growing awareness of the complexity of post-conflict transitions and the multiple, simultaneous needs of post-conflict societies, and partly by bureaucratic imperatives as more and more international agencies, parts of the UN system, and non-governmental organizations began to incorporate “peacebuilding” into their roles and missions. Boutros Ghali’s Supplement to an Agenda for Peace (1995) dropped the notion of phases and extended the term across the conflict spectrum of pre-conflict prevention, actions during warfare, and post-conflict measures. Many also asked that peacebuilding not just seek to insure against conflict relapse but also redress “root causes,” and not only of the war just ended, but of all potential conflict. While scholarship on civil wars still tended to emphasize the more minimalist outcome of “negative peace” (i.e., no armed conflict), the practitioner and advocacy community and some scholars increasingly emphasized a more ambitious goal of “positive peace” (i.e., inclusive of justice, equity, and other core social and political goods).

This conceptual breadth came at the cost of analytical and practical utility, compounding the more authentic challenge of assessing how to prioritize among a wide array of competing needs in particular post-conflict contexts. Practitioners and scholars debated about peacebuilding while referring to a confusing and overlapping mix of goals, activities, timelines, and contexts. Turf battles within the UN system and in governments further fueled terminological inflation and operational confusion. While there were also voices regularly calling for greater clarity and strategic focus, in general, strategy tended to lose out to “laundry lists” and what could be called a “no agency left behind” notion of peacebuilding. There were no consistently reliable mechanisms to exercise judgment about priorities and the mobilization of resources behind them; nor was there clarity about ultimate goals or specific objectives, or a shared understanding of the standards by which outcomes should be evaluated.

Recent years have seen greater rigor in discussions about peacebuilding as scholarship about international peace operations and war termination generally has matured and as several waves of international peace operations now allow observation of longer-term results and patterns of successes and failures.

We adopt a definition of peacebuilding that reflects the trend among scholars of armed conflict, as well as some practitioners; Peacebuilding is defined as those actions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalize peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict (“negative peace”) and a modicum of participatory politics (as a component of “positive peace”) that can be sustained in the absence of an international peace operation. If there is a trade-off between these goals, the immediate absence of conflict, in our view, should take priority over participatory politics if peacebuilding is the frame of reference. This definition has the merit of defining outcomes that are analytically clear; to an extent, even measurable; and modest enough to make practical sense as an objective for international actors. For the purposes of this paper, we focus only on post-conflict contexts and on external actors. While we devote attention to statebuilding in that regard, we do not address in detail the broader question of fragile, weak, or failed states in the absence of civil war. Furthermore, we do not address questions of democratization and democratic transition, though this, we feel, remains a gap in both analysis and practice, in which the healthy trend to greater focus on states has nonetheless tended to eclipse thinking carefully about regimes.

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9 A relatively small number of scholars have driven this trend, several of whom, importantly, have also served in the UN or other practitioner institutions, including Paul Collier, Michael Doyle, Andrew Mack, Roland Paris, and Stephen Stedman.
Related Concepts and Terms

- **Peacebuilding**: Actions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalize peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict and a modicum of participatory politics. Post-conflict peacebuilding is the sub-set of such actions undertaken after the termination of armed hostilities.

- **Peace implementation**: Actions undertaken by international or national actors to implement specific peace agreements, usually in the short-term. Where operable, usually defines—and either enables or constrains—the framework for peacebuilding.

- **State-building**: Actions undertaken by international or national actors to establish, reform, or strengthen the institutions of the state which may or may not contribute to peacebuilding.

- **Nation-building**: Actions undertaken, usually by national actors, to forge a sense of common nationhood, usually in order to overcome ethnic, sectarian, or communal differences; usually to counter alternate sources of identity and loyalty; and usually to mobilize a population behind a parallel state-building project. May or may not contribute to peacebuilding. Confusingly equated to post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding in some recent scholarship and popular political discourse (as in President George W. Bush’s injunction: “no nation-building”).

- **Stabilization**: Actions undertaken by international actors to reach a termination of hostilities and consolidate peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict. The term of art dominant in US policy, usually associated with military instruments, usually seen as having a shorter time horizon than peacebuilding, and heavily associated with a post-9/11 counter-terrorism agenda.

- **Reconstruction**: Actions undertaken by international or national actors to support the economic, and to some extent social, dimensions of post-conflict recovery. Also a familiar term in the World Bank and US policy circles (e.g., Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction) and reflects roots in the experience of post-war assistance in Europe after World War II.

- **Peace operations**: Operations undertaken by international actors in the midst of or after armed conflict, usually consisting of peacekeeping but may also encompass a range of civilian and political tasks (“multi-dimensional peacekeeping” and peacebuilding).

Measuring Success

Divergent concepts of peacebuilding have meant that there is not yet a generally accepted measure for “success.” Different yardsticks yield different results, though by almost any measure, the record is mixed. It is also important to differentiate between what we know about the relapse to war in general (the prevention of which we see as the primary goal of peacebuilding) and what we know about the relation between such relapse and international peacebuilding activities in particular.

What Do We Know about War Recurrence?

Scholarship is increasingly consensual about patterns of war termination and recurrence, though there is considerably less attention to finer-grained analysis of the causal dynamics by which peace relapses to war.

First, the total number and intensity of wars has globally declined by roughly half since the very early 1990s. Contrary to conventional wisdom and anxieties, this downward trend includes internal wars, even though these represent a larger proportion of total wars than in the past.\(^\text{10}\) This overall decline has occurred mainly because more old wars have ended than new wars begun,\(^\text{11}\) which reinforces the argument that successful peacebuilding may be as important—if not more—than conflict prevention in reducing the fact and toll of war. The trend toward negotiated settlements after the Cold War also created entry points for international peacebuilding: between 1946 and 1990, twice as many conflicts ended through victory than through negotiation, whereas between 1995 and 2004, negotiated settlements were three times as likely to end war as outright victory.\(^\text{12}\)

Second, however, an unfortunate number of wars that end have recurred. There is some divergence in research about the rate of recurrence, which is partly due to the difficulty of determining whether any given conflict is better understood as the recurrence of an old fight or the outbreak of a new one, and partly due to scholars’ defining the universe of relevant conflicts and data differently. Most argue, however, that between one-third and one-half of all ended conflicts

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\(^{11}\) Havard Hegre, “The Duration and Termination of Civil War,” *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004): 244. Hegre also notes that the duration of wars declined, and the rate of war onset remained relatively constant in the 1990s.

revert to warfare within five years. Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom, for instance, indicate a 23 percent chance of reversion within five years, and 17 percent in the subsequent five years. Barbara Walter suggests a similar rate of 36 percent of civil wars that ended between 1945 and 1996 experiencing renewed warfare. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, in the most serious quantitative study of international peacebuilding to date, find that 30 percent of civil wars that ended between 1945 and 1999 relapsed within two years. Mack’s paper in this series indicates a higher reversion rate of 44 percent within five years for armed conflicts that ended with a negotiated settlement. By way of comparison, a poor country that has not yet experienced war has a 14 percent risk of conflict in any given five-year period.

Third, several factors appear correlated with failed peace processes and/or war recurrence. These include the number of warring parties; the absence of an inclusive peace agreement with a sufficient buy-in from all parties; the presence of spoilers; the degree of collapse of state institutions; the number of soldiers; the availability of natural resources vulnerable to looting; the hostility of the neighborhood; and whether the war in question is one of secession or not. Stedman and Downs use these factors to characterize the “degree of difficulty” of specific post-conflict environments, which they persuasively argue needs to be taken into consideration when judging the relative success or failure of international peace operations. A simpler, but compatible, set of risk factors is offered by Doyle and Sambanis for whom degree of difficulty is defined by two composite measures: one, “degree of hostility,” which incorporates the type of war, number of parties, type of settlement, and level of casualties; and two, “local capacity,” which is derived primarily from economic indicators, but which they treat as a partial proxy for institutional capacity. For both Stedman/Downs and Doyle/Sambanis, the greater the difficulty of the situation, the more is required from international actors in terms of troops, money, political engagement, and sustained attention. Doyle and Sambanis make this the third leg of what they describe as a triangular “ecology” of peacebuilding.

Fourth, we have good general indications that international peace operations can help reduce a country’s risk of reversion to war. According to the most serious quantitative study of international peacebuilding to date, the comparative vulnerability of negotiated settlements to renewed conflict can be offset if a settlement is comprehensive and if its implementation involves a multidimensional peace operation. Importantly, this positive correlation between international efforts and enduring peace only characterizes peace operations that include a range of peacebuilding components and not those—such as traditional peacekeeping or more limited diplomatic efforts—that do not.

Nonetheless, we still know remarkably little on a more specific level about which international efforts work and which do not, as well as how to calibrate international responses in contexts that are not characterized by comprehensive settlements or likely to attract a major, sustained level of international attention.

What Counts as a Successful Outcome?
Against that background, how high should one set the bar in defining successful peacebuilding?

A Maximalist Standard: Root Causes
The most ambitious measures are those that expect peacebuilding to redress so-called “root causes” of conflict. This is essentially the standard implied by the Security Council in a Presidential Statement on peacebuilding in February 2001:

The Security Council recognizes that peacebuilding is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or the continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, development, humanitarian and human

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14 Collier et al.’s previous—and still widely cited—work gave a higher rate of 39 percent risk of reversion within the first five years and 32 percent within the second. For the updated statistics, see Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Måns Söderbom, “Post-Conflict Risks,” paper delivered to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the World Bank, August 17, 2006. For the previous figures, see Collier and Hoeffler, “Conflicts.”
19 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War, p. 84.
20 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War.
rights programmes and mechanisms. This requires short and long-term actions tailored to address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it. These actions should focus on fostering sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence.21

In After War’s End, scholar Roland Paris similarly adopts a maximalist standard and finds that every major UN peacebuilding operation since 1989 failed except for Namibia and Mozambique.22 Even Central American peace processes—usually included among the success stories of that era—are judged as failures since poverty and land inequality persist alongside citizen insecurity.

There are three fundamental problems with such an ambitious standard. First, the focus on removing underlying, or “root,” causes tends to reinforce simplistic understandings of why specific conflicts occur: many societies are characterized by deep poverty, social exclusion, and other inequities, but relatively few of these experience armed conflict and civil war.23 Second, while these underlying factors almost certainly increase a society’s vulnerability to armed conflict, they are arguably less remediable by the actions of international third parties, especially over relatively short time frames. Third, as Stedman notes, by conflating qualified successes like El Salvador with unmitigated disasters like Angola and Rwanda, such a standard fails to differentiate among very different types and degrees of failure or acknowledge the value of more modest goals, let alone capture a sense of meaningful difference among specific contexts. As such, it does not provide a useful framework for setting priorities or motivating donors and other external actors to mobilize resources for engagement. A maximalist standard of peacebuilding may be philosophically appealing, but as with any ideal standard for a social good—think of “democracy,” “freedom,” “justice,”—it is too blunt to differentiate between modest progress and outright failure and therefore particularly unhelpful for practitioners.

A Minimalist Standard: No Renewed Warfare
At the other end of the spectrum is a minimalist standard. This standard represents the most readily visible indicator of success for efforts to consolidate peace.

As noted above, there is significant evidence that peace operations work to “keep the peace” in the short term whereas the record is more mixed in the medium term. In addition to a high rate of recurrence, war recurrence also accounts for a good portion of the world’s “new” wars. Thus, seven of the nine armed conflicts that broke out in 2005 represented renewed fighting between previous foes.24 This record suggests that peace operations are failing to erect structures necessary for peace in the medium run, addressing only the most visible symptoms rather than proximate or persistent causes of conflict. While we do know about some risk factors for recurrence, as noted above, and while there are some correlations with adoption of certain economic policies, levels of aid and military expenditures, we still know comparatively little about the precise circumstances and causal pathways by which armed conflict recurs. While the minimalist standard may provide a ready indicator of success and failure, more research is required to understand the conditions under which war recurs.

A Moderate Standard: No Renewed Warfare plus Decent Governance
A more demanding definition of “success,” in which peacebuilding is assessed by looking at both war recurrence and quality of post-war governance, also shows a mixed record of outcomes. In their major study, Doyle and Sambanis assess peacebuilding outcomes over both two and five-year time frames.25 They still find that over half of all 121 civil wars ending between 1944 and 1999 resulted in “failed” peacebuilding, whether one measures “success” conservatively (absence of large-scale violence) or more ambitiously (absence also of low-level violence and a degree of political openness).26

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24 This is according to Uppsala’s reputable dataset. See Harbom et al., “Armed Conflict,” 620–21. Walter, on the other hand, finds that several of what she calls “subsequent” civil wars (war recurrence in a single country between 1944 and 1996) involve not the prior foes (a “repeat war”) but new foes, leading her to re-classify eight of twenty-two “subsequent wars” as “new” rather than “repeat” wars. Walter, “Does Conflict Beget Conflict?” 376.
25 This measure of peacebuilding was scored both two and five years after war termination. A low threshold and a higher threshold were also tested, with a failure rate of 65 percent under the higher threshold. See appendix to Doyle and Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding.”
26 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War.
This moderate standard is pragmatically and normatively appealing, though it is important to acknowledge that it is imperfect, difficult to quantify, and leaves important issues about governance comparatively under-examined. For example, we know that the process of democratization is itself destabilizing and that this destabilization can contribute to war onset, and we know that while democracies do not go to war often with each other, they do go to war with non-democracies at relatively high rates.27 More conceptual work and empirical testing will be necessary for this moderate standard of peacebuilding success to gain traction.

Nonetheless, the moderate threshold seems likely to best capture understandings within the policy community. Early discussion among the members of the UN Peacebuilding Commission indicates that something between minimalist and moderate standards will be most helpful in framing their efforts, and they largely reject maximalist standards, although it must also be noted that there appear to be fairly divergent conceptions of what peacebuilding is about in the first place.28 Whatever standard is employed, peacebuilding is complex and vulnerable to reversal, a difficulty that increases when more ambitious indicators are included.

Does International Peacebuilding Make a Difference?

By either minimalist or moderate standards, there is increasingly robust evidence that international involvement can be an important factor in success, though we would argue that the evidence remains largely correlative rather than causal and therefore wanting for finer-grained analysis of causality and impact. First, there is a macro correlation in the dramatic rise in international peace activities, including mediation and peacekeeping, alongside the dramatic drop in number and intensity of wars. Andrew Mack makes this argument particularly forcefully in his paper in this series and in the earlier Human Security Report 2005, which draws on multiple datasets for evidence.29 Doyle and Sambanis, who focus expressly on peacebuilding, also tell a positive story.30 Equally interesting are findings about the comparative effectiveness of the UN. Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl find that the United Nations significantly increases the prospects for successful peacebuilding, in contrast to a more lackluster performance of non-UN operations.31 Similarly, Doyle and Sambanis show that civil wars with any form of UN operation (thirteen out of twenty-seven) had a 48 percent of “participatory peacebuilding” success two years after war termination, as compared to only 26 percent of conflicts (twenty-four out of ninety-four) with no UN operation.32 They find that UN missions, especially those with multidimensional peacekeeping mandates, significantly reduce the chances of large-scale violence and enhance the chances of minimal political democratization.33

Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom develop a model that indicates that doubling peacekeeping expenditures would reduce the risk of war reversion from 40 percent to 31 percent within ten years.34 Former US official James Dobbins also finds the UN more effective when compared to United States’ efforts at what he calls “nation-building.”35 This is even more impressive if one factors in that the UN is often sent into tough cases where national or regional actors are less likely to tread—the 2006 Lebanon war being a case in point.36

30 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War.
31 They also show that this positive effect is greater in the short run, which may have implications for institutional handovers and transition.
32 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War, Table 3.4, p. 90.
33 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War, p. 114. Their results also find differing impacts for differing types of UN operations as noted earlier, and that these have divergent impact based on context variables such as the level of hostility and local capacity.
Where Does State-Building Come In?

Experience of dozens of recent international involvement has increasingly shown that rebuilding or establishing at least minimally functioning state institutions is important to peacebuilding. For some, this means principally institutions to ensure law, order, and the repression of resurgent violence (i.e., armies, police forces, and so on). For others, this means mainly the institutions of decision-making and legitimation (governments, parliaments, constitutional processes, and so on). For yet others, it relates to the foundations for economic recovery in the form of revenue-generation, rule of law, and the creation of stable environments for investment, or to the capacity to deliver core services to a vulnerable population. In particularly damaged or contentious post-war settings, the UN has sometimes been asked to take on aspects of these roles for a transitional period. More often, the UN and other actors (notably, the World Bank) are asked more to facilitate the process by which national actors can assume these roles and functions.

Unfortunately, peacebuilding policies and programs have generally tended to neglect state-building. Early approaches to peacebuilding emphasized either social relations among conflicting groups or economic determinants of peace. They tended to assume state capacity as a given, and did not problematize contestation over state design or function. More recent work has criticized this omission, calling for more attention to public institutions. Paris, for instance, argues that the central weakness of international peacebuilding is its failure to strengthen state institutions before liberalizing politie and economies. A UN policy review in 2005 also called for placing state institutions at the center of post-conflict efforts. Several factors have driven this new attention to the state: learning from particular cases where state capacity or its absence was a particular determinant of results (e.g., Afghanistan); the UN being drawn into transitional authority roles in places like Kosovo and East Timor; even the role of individual policy actors like Ashraf Ghani, the former World Bank official who served as Afghanistan’s first post-war Finance Minister, and has worked to raise the visibility of the issue. Arguably as influential has been rising concern about “fragile,” “weak,” or “failed” states as security problems post 9/11 and the convergence with other policy problems that also shine the light on state capacity such as corruption, organized crime, and infectious disease. Of course, many specific countries at risk of “fragility, weakness or failure” are also post-conflict countries, where state weakness may have contributed to war and vice versa.

Successful state-building supports the consolidation of peace in a number of ways. First, it enhances mechanisms for security and conflict resolution at the national level that should carry legitimacy in the eyes of the populace and the outside world. Such mechanisms—be they justice systems, policing systems, or service delivery agencies—provide a credible arena and framework (or at least a foundation for a framework) for social groups to express their preferences and resolve their conflicts non-violently. If states work mainly to provide public goods rather than line private pockets, they reduce the incentives for populations and political elites to use violence. In post-war societies with an international presence, state-building should also accelerate the orderly withdrawal of international troops and civilians, ensuring stability and popular support for an emergent regime. From the perspective of sustainable economies, functioning and legitimate states also provide the infrastructure for sustainable development with a diminishing role for external actors. All of these factors point to a complementary relationship between peacebuilding and state-building, one which exists in many circumstances and should be nourished.

Yet the difference in values and emphasis between these two concepts should also be noted, and these overlapping concepts can diverge in consequential ways when programs and aid policies are designed around their respective end goal.

39 Paris, After War’s End.
Scrutinizing the Conventional Wisdom on State-Building

If state-building is so important for consolidating peace, what then do we know about building states? In contrast to the relative youth of scholarship on peacebuilding, state-building has long been a subject of academic inquiry. Although there is considerable debate on various issues, some basic common ground is worth highlighting as a starting point for any consideration of state-building in war-torn societies.

First, the predominance of Weberian theories of the state has meant that most consideration of the state focuses on the most visible aspects of formal state institutions and outputs—more or less, what would be seen as effective state capacity.

Second, sociologists and historians tell us that states emerge over decades, even centuries, rather than months or years. The literature on “state formation,” rather than “state-building,” is the bedrock of scholarship on the emergence of states. The term “state-building” itself implies intentional efforts in a concentrated time period, which flies in the face of knowledge about the emergence of European states—which still dominate our collective sense of possible models—and their offspring.

Finally, violence is deemed inherent to the process of state formation. As leading sociologist Charles Tilly puts it, war—not peace—makes states. 42

Renewed concern about “State Failure”

Discussions about state-building took on new urgency after 9/11. The United States and its allies considered the ability of terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda to operate freely in Afghanistan as a reflection of that state’s weakness. “Failed” and “fragile” states re-entered the policy lexicon, where it had not seriously been since the Somalia debacle in the mid-1990s.

The concept of state failure—and its apparent logical policy response, state-building—has made important contributions to our thinking and to international policy. Poor states with weak institutions, previously neglected by Western powers, suddenly acquired new foreign policy importance. In particular, war-torn societies have received greater attention and resources. New attention does not necessarily imply any greater understanding of state weakness in particular contexts; however, nor does it imply new insight into how to strengthen states in ways that mutually reinforce other policy goals, such as long-term peace.

Indeed, the popularity of the concept of “failed” or “fragile” states has encouraged an unhelpful aggregation of different situations which are likely to require very different strategies of response. For example, Foreign Policy magazine’s “Failed States Index” in 2006 ranked Sudan, Yemen, Côte d’Ivoire, North Korea, Somalia, Pakistan, Iraq, and Haiti among their top twenty, a brute measure of instability that tells us little about how to help forge effective and legitimate states in each. 44 These countries reflect breathtakingly disparate social realities. Some are poor and weakly institutionalized. Others are strong on order but weak on freedoms, while still others are moderately democratic polities divided by civil war. Only a rare few might be considered truly “collapsed,” of which Somalia in 1991 is the ur example.

Of particular concern is the temptation to treat post-conflict states as equivalent to “failing states” which risks a second temptation to focus predominantly on questions of order and the state institutions believed to produce it (e.g., militaries, police, judicial systems) rather than, for example, questions of justice or social reconciliation or economic recovery. 46 Admittedly, in most post-conflict cases, establishing security and broader political order will indeed be a priority. However, the track record of international efforts to build security or order-producing institu-

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43 Though, of course, there are other conceivable policy responses that may no longer be normatively acceptable, such as trusteeships or protectorates. On state-building see Francis Fukuyama, State-Building (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur, eds., Making States Work (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2005); and Charles T. Call with Vanessa Hawkins Wyeth, eds., Building States to Build Peace (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, forthcoming).

44 “The Failed States Index,” Foreign Policy (May/June 2006). Other analysts have tried to develop more nuanced taxonomies of state weakness and failure, though none are as yet widely shared. See, e.g., I. William Zartman, Collapsed States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Robert Rothberg, When States Fail; and three reports of the State Failure Task Force from 1995 through 2000, available at http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pit/pitfdta.htm.


46 That the failed state concept emphasizes the value of order over others like justice can be seen in The Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index (FSI). FSI proposes as the solution for all failed states the strengthening of five “core” institutions, three of which—the military, the police and the justice system—directly reflect a concern for order and stability. See Fund for Peace Failed States Index, Frequently Asked Questions #Q9, available at www.findforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsifaq.php#q9.
tions in other countries is not especially encouraging. The poor human rights record of security institutions that were single-mindedly strengthened during the Cold War, at the expense of social and institutional costs, caution against unduly privileging order without careful, context-specific analysis and appropriately calibrated political strategies.

A further issue relates to weakly institutionalized states. Concerns about the weakness of formal institutions may obscure the role of informal or traditional institutions, which are often particularly relevant in post-conflict contexts. The state failure lens—echoing Weber—tends toward excessive focus on formal institutions and their capacities at the risk of sideling both sub-state authorities and broader state-society relations. Yet, traditional and local authorities may be key channels for public service delivery as well as critical actors in re-establishing post-war stability and social reconciliation. Perhaps most important, judgments about building state institutions should be neither externally inspired nor pre-cooked, but rather emerge from careful contextual analysis that is open to alternative forms.

When State-Building and Peacebuilding Collide

These observations point to the importance of not conflating peacebuilding with state-building, as importantly related as they are. State-building can undermine peace by contributing to insecurity and group tensions. Where external donors provide resources to corrupt, predatory central governments in the name of strengthening their institutions (think of Zaire during the Cold War), then state-building only advances abusive authority and fuels resentment and armed resistance. Conversely, efforts at making peace can undermine the emergence of a responsive and representative central state. Where it entails accepting peace deals which enshrine the power of military faction leaders (as in Liberia in 2003), enabling them to divide and capture state resources, peacebuilding can undermine state-building. Strengthening a central state does not necessarily advance the delicate process of ensuring that armed groups do not threaten one another or the governing regime.

Tilly is again helpful here, with his stress on three central components of state formation—coercion, capital, and charisma (or leadership)—which scholars such as Barnett Rubin have successfully used as a prism for examining contemporary post-conflict contexts and international state-building efforts. In each of these areas, there are grounds for concern about tensions, and occasionally contradictions, between peacebuilding and state-building.

On the security front, a sustained international military presence which may be deemed essential to peacebuilding can be at odds with the building up of national capacity to control or counter violence. Alternatively, efforts to establish national coercive capacity—whether in the form of armies, police, or other forces—can end up empowering some segments of the population at the expense of others in a way that militates against political moderation and reconciliation. Conversely, international support for armed parties believed useful for other policy goals (e.g., counter-terrorism), can undermine both peacebuilding and state-building, especially when such groups have an interest in resisting state authority politically, economically, or even militarily.

On the economic front, analysts have criticized neoliberal structural adjustment programs of the IMF and the World Bank for diminishing state resources precisely when post-conflict societies need to boost depleted state capacity. Others call attention to the manner in which aid agencies tend to bypass state structures which, at a minimum, miss an opportunity to strengthen state capacity and can also directly undermine it. Sometimes, this is driven by legitimate concern about corruption in state agencies. For bilateral agencies, it can be driven by requirements to use their own national contractors—or result from more cynical grabs for market share. But the cumulative result is that international actors substitute for a state’s service delivery capacity, with a likely dampening effect on development of sustainable national capacities. In addition, international organizations offer salaries and status to national employees with which post-conflict states cannot compete. Consequently the most competent and best trained personnel are often drawn from the state, weakening already fragile public institutions and agencies.

All these factors can undermine not just the capacity of the state but also its legitimacy, especially via the critical vector of revenue. States require revenue to expend on essential services and goods for the population, including security, health care, education, and the administration of justice and the

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47 Sarah Cliffe and Nicholas Manning make this point in a forthcoming chapter, “Public Finance and Peacebuilding” in Call and Wyeth, Building States.
resolution of conflicts.\textsuperscript{50} Citizens are best positioned to monitor and hold accountable states when they are the source of state revenues. When states acquire revenue largely from external sources, their decisions are necessarily constrained by external preferences, usually those of multilateral and bilateral development agencies. When service-delivery occurs outside of the state, and when resources are expended independent of state channels, a crucial mechanism of state-society relations is weakened. External legitimacy can then displace or undermine internal legitimacy even for the most popular government. In short, the international assistance infrastructure is itself a component in the complex and difficult challenge of building peace in weak states.

Finally, when it comes to charisma, or leadership, the international community has real limitations. In many countries, reliance on a crucial leader has been a cornerstone of international strategy—Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan, Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti, Yasser Arafat in Palestine, and Xanana Gusmao in East Timor, to name a few examples. Yet in virtually every case, the temptation to invest in a particular leader has created future problems for peacebuilding, state-building, or both. The opposite strategy—putting international authorities and administrators in place of local leadership for an interim period—has also generally been unsatisfying. East Timor is perhaps just the most vivid example, where the exercise of executive power by international actors, while failing to invest sufficiently in building up local authority, caused resentment, undermined domestic political processes, and retarded positive outcomes. The viability of this option has been further reduced in recent years by growing perceptions that the United Nations—generally regarded as legitimate given its global composition and historical association with decolonization—has grown too close to the United States and associated with interventionist designs of the “West” against the “rest.”

Persistent Problems with International Peacebuilding

Given the varying interrelationship of peacebuilding and state-building, as well as confusion between the two, the mixed record in post-conflict peacebuilding may not be surprising. On the one hand, the international architecture for peacebuilding has improved considerably over the past fifteen years, as noted at the outset. There is a much greater understanding of the complexities of peacebuilding, more self-critique about the limits of international assistance, and increasing appreciation of the unique demands of specific situations, particularly over questions of state-society relations and governance. As peacebuilding has become a comparative growth industry, there have also been waves of effort to reform, streamline, specialize, or coordinate among international actors, both multilaterally and bilaterally. Within the UN system and within donor governments, agencies are much more aware of functional priorities for post-war societies, which has spurred specialization of specific international offices dedicated to tasks including transitional justice; police development; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants; refugee return; and economic recovery.

On the other hand, these advances have not yet sufficiently diminished persistent and serious shortcomings in international responses to war-torn societies, which the Peacebuilding Commission and related bodies have just been created to fill. Whether they are able to do so will be an important determinant of the effectiveness and appropriateness of international architecture on these issues for some time to come. Several issues seem to us the most pressing.

Problems of Will and Attention, Especially in the Medium Term

Peacebuilding requires sustained political attention from actors with resources, yet this attention—whether that of the UN Security Council, key capitals, or international institutions—is generally short-lived, crisis-driven, and prone to weaken when it is needed the most. This may not be avoidable, given the interests of and constraints upon those actors, but short political attention spans translate into hiccups or inadequacies in resource allocation, from troops to money, which can pose major problems for peacebuilding. This compounds a related problem of ensuring that UN and other peacebuilding activities have sustained political and financial oversight from member states and relevant intergovernmental bodies.

This tendency is perhaps most visible at the UN Security Council, but also characterizes other international actors. Governments all too frequently shift bilateral funds from a country once a ceasefire appears

\textsuperscript{50} See Call and Wyeth, \textit{Building States to Build Peace}, for elaboration on some essential functions of states and how to “build” them.
to hold but before peace is self-sustaining, and “new” crises like Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Darfur have gobbled up peacebuilding resources from places like Haiti, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

The risks of a gap between donors’ attention and states’ needs are perhaps greatest in the medium term. In the short run, the UN Security Council generally remains seized of a crisis as active and widespread armed conflict comes to an end. Similarly the donor community tends to act most generously either in the immediate aftermath of armed conflict or in support of long-term development. However, a particularly critical moment for both peacebuilding and state-building tends to be two to three years after the end of hostilities (often after an initial round of elections) but before longer-term development assistance kicks in. Some attribute less than successful outcomes in Haiti, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, and the Central African Republic to this lack of sufficient political attention and resources at a medium-term stage, ironically often precisely the moment when state capacity to manage and administer resources begins to gain traction three to seven years after a war or crisis.51

A related “political will” problem is, of course, that certain crises receive more political attention and financial resources than others, generally reflecting the strategic interests of great powers. The new concern about weak states as vectors of transmission for a range of global ills such as networked criminality, trafficking, illicit arms, disease, and terrorism, has made countries that might earlier have been considered peripheral to great power interests newly important. As noted earlier, however, this does not necessarily translate into smart policy choices about how to strengthen weak states and may in fact resuscitate old habits of investing in autocratic allies or “securitizing” foreign and aid policy in ways that are counterproductive.

Need for More Adequate and Flexible Resources
Peacebuilding also requires prompt, flexible provision of resources, but these still tend to fall between the cracks of peacekeeping and development. The UN system’s principal way to marshal quick resources, for example, is its funding mechanism for peacekeeping. However, the Peacekeeping Support Account, which was naturally designed to support the special requirements of mounting peacekeeping missions, is restricted to funding peacekeepers (and the things they need) but not the programs necessary to jump-start state functions in the weeks and months following the end of a conflict. A few specific programs recognized as a priority for post-conflict peace operations have been granted exceptions: disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR, with emphasis on reintegration); justice and security sector reform (including a minimal foundation for the rule of law); transitional justice; and some activities to help generate and administer state revenues. However, crucial peacebuilding activities still heavily rely on extra-budgetary mechanisms, which are ad hoc, slow, and risk undermining the effectiveness of peacekeeping, let alone longer-term peacebuilding.

In the UN context, peacebuilding activities have alternatively been treated from a budgetary perspective as part of the UN’s development functions or its routine political work, but these budgets lack flexibility and speed in marshalling resources. Peacebuilding activities face similar constraints in bilateral aid budgets. The UN system, international financial institutions, and bilateral donors have increasingly adopted new mechanisms to overcome these limitations and enhance the effectiveness of their post-conflict interventions, including the creation of major new units such as UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, and development or adaptation of tools such as joint assessment missions, the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP), Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP), Common Country Assessment (CCA), United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), Transition Strategies, Roundtables and Consultative Group meetings. These efforts have helped bridge the so-called “relief-to-development” continuum, but much remains to be done.

Gaps in Civilian Capacity
Post-conflict peacebuilding also requires considerably greater civilian expertise in critical functional areas than presently exists, as has been widely noted.52 This is particularly urgent where state-building activities are concerned, which requires specialized knowledge in areas ranging from DDR, justice and security sector reform, transitional fiscal systems, civil service administration, basic service delivery, and transitional

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51 Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap.
52 See the UN Secretary-General’s remarks during the Security Council thematic debate on Civilian Crisis Management and Peacebuilding, September 22, 2004, as well as the resultant Presidential Statement, UN Doc. S/PRST/2004/33.
justice, among others. Bilateral donors have begun to enhance capacities in these areas, though often through the ad hoc use of contractors.53 Though the UN’s capacities have also grown, it still lacks depth in many areas which will need to be bolstered both at headquarters and especially in the field, whether through building this expertise in-house or devising a creative arrangement to mobilize it from elsewhere.54 Importantly, the knowledge needed is more than just technical expertise and should be understood as embedded in the inherently political context of international peacebuilding and state-building assistance.

Some analysts have raised concerns about potential waste and competition generated by overlapping capacities and suggested that international actors ought to invest in specialized capabilities that, over time, will allow them to play more “niche” roles. In our view, this would only be helpful to a limited extent. While wasteful duplication should be reduced, the current problem is not too much capacity but too little. Some degree of duplication is not only inevitable but probably also desirable, since the roles afforded to international actors—whether the UN, the African Union, the European Union, or the OAS—will often be shaped by political considerations, and a minimal capacity will be necessary to handle such eventualities. A useful way to think about capacity development might be to think in terms of flexible, modular capacities that can be put at the service of different institutions depending on context. Under any circumstance, however, this issue puts a premium on having viable mechanisms for judging who can best do what and on then coordinating efforts accordingly.55

**Challenging Interface between Civilian and Military State-Builders**

A further challenge for peacebuilding is the difficult interface between civilian and military state-builders, which has become more of an issue as militaries have gotten more into the business of peacebuilding, and which heavily derives from differences in culture and incentives of military versus civilian personnel.

Importantly, there are also significant differences between national militaries in their doctrine, culture, and training, but these generally are less prominent than what Rubin calls the “interoperability” problems between military and civilian peacebuilding.

Military organizations are above all concerned with order. They are uniformly trained to destroy enemy armed forces. Most armed forces personnel are accustomed to distrust nationals of foreign lands; to privilege results over process; and to believe their organization can deliver results better than any civilian organization, thus preferring to do things themselves rather than letting or encouraging others to carry out tasks. These traits tend to contradict the notion of state-building, which requires that external actors support processes that rest primarily with national and local-level state-builders, even when these processes may seem inefficient.

Of course, specific military units are also trained in policing, in training other armies, in working with civilian populations, and in interfacing with civilian authorities.56 Even these specialized units, however, are often judged based on their delivery of results and have difficulty overcoming the general traits listed above. Furthermore, international military units often distrust international civilian agencies, even from their own government or organization. Civilian agencies have converse challenges. They tend to distrust military organizations and to privilege process more than do military organizations.

Much analysis and progress has occurred in recent years in how international military forces work with civilian agencies in post-conflict or weak states.57 Communication and coordination are much improved in donor capitals and within organizations like the United Nations and NATO. Both sides of this interface understand the mindset and skills of the other, thanks to years of meetings, workshops, and accumulated field experiences. Nevertheless, the functions of military organizations remain concentrated on establishing and maintaining security, a vital condition for any civilian agency to operate. Aside from providing security, their comparative advantages in state-building lie with training other military

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55 The recent G8 statement calling for coordination both among G8 members and between the G8 and the Peacebuilding Commission is worth noting. See G8 Declaration on Cooperation and Future Action in Stabilization and Reconstruction, Moscow, July 19, 2006.


personnel in military skills and in providing logistics. Civilian agencies generally comprehend the logic of state-building, with national or local actors in the driver’s seat, better than armed forces. Yet because of resources, security and institutional interests, military organizations often end up playing an important role in building not just foreign military institutions, but also procedures, capacities, and skills of foreign civilian entities as well.

Gaps in Contextual Knowledge of Specific Post-Conflict Societies

International actors now almost uniformly recognize the need to avoid “cookie-cutter” approaches in favor of strategies tailored to specific contexts. This requires investing in a different type of knowledge and society-specific expertise beyond functional skills. External actors need to understand the history, politics, and cultures of the countries in which they are attempting to “build peace,” whether societies are emerging from statelessness, highly institutionalized authoritarian regimes, highly informal predatory states, divided territory or occupation. Without understanding something about how state-society relations have evolved, how war may have changed things, or who has power and how power works, any generic peacebuilding strategy is likely to be a poor fit. In particular, traditional sources of authority and governance must be well understood—both their assets and liabilities. This may mean that external actors need to involve national staff more integrally in peacebuilding planning and implementation, or that they need more actively to engage historians, anthropologists or other observers who speak local languages and are deeply knowledgeable about local culture and context. Given the importance of supporting rather than supplanting national and local actors, knowledge of the local is particularly important for discerning how best to support initiatives and processes rooted in the societies in question.

However, more than a few factors make context-sensitive peacebuilding a challenge. First, the very growth of peacebuilding and its increasing professionalization, ironically, makes cookie-cutter approaches more likely. The UN has worked hard in recent years to develop standard operating procedures that allow it to act quickly at the beginning of a post-conflict transition, largely in response to criticism that the Organization acted too slowly in the past, particularly in peacekeeping. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has also worked to evolve general doctrine in order to reduce latitude for lapses in judgment and to build upon and integrate lessons from prior operations. Yet standard procedures are essentially templates, and doctrine tends to give universal guidance, that works against case-specific approaches. One sees this clearly in security sector reform programs, for instance, which tend to follow templates for reforming institutional structures, oversight mechanisms, and training, with too little regard for local language, political economic reality, or social setting.

Second, the real or perceived urgency of decision-making after conflict also inclines institutions like the UN to rely not just on standard procedures but also on a small number of “standard people,” who also cannot be expected to be knowledgeable about every unique context.

Third, in the UN setting, there are serious resource constraints that limit its ability to develop context-specific knowledge. Within the system as a whole, there is probably more context-specific expertise than in virtually any other international institution, given the multinationality and considerable field experience of its staff. But the human resource systems within the UN, along with bureaucratic stovepipes, make it exceedingly difficult to identify and mobilize these people in a timely way. Moreover, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA)—to which the UN looks formally for “country expertise”—rarely has the level of detailed knowledge necessary for strategy or planning relevant to field operations. Many desk officers cover multiple countries and regional organizations, few have had desirable field experience, and most have principally diplomatic training which tends to under-appreciate social, economic, or cultural dynamics. They are also strikingly few in number: in 2004, DPA had fewer staff than Indonesia (sixty-six) than all of DPA’s country officers (fifty-two desk officers). The World Bank had more staff covering country developments (fifty-two desk officers) than the non-governmental organization Human Rights Watch (sixty-five country monitors). The World Bank had more staff covering Indonesia (sixty-six) than all of DPA’s country officers combined. Moreover, a significant portion of these

58 One of the more egregious examples being the US Government’s 2003 strategy for “de-Ba’athification,” which reportedly copied its 1945 strategy for dealing with the Nazis so closely that the word “Germany” was mistakenly left in the Iraq planning documents.


60 This paragraph draws on Call, “Institutionalizing Peace.” DPA’s fifty-two desk officers included non-payroll Junior Professional Officers and research assistants.
are dedicated to tracking developments in countries and regions—e.g., Norway, Sweden, the European Union, Canada—having little to do with armed conflict.

Finally, peacebuilding programs tend to be underpinned by an implicit universalism. They generally privilege formal institutions over informal or traditional structures, prefer technical solutions over culturally specific approaches, assume that international standards will always be applicable, and rather inexplicably underestimate the fiscal pressures on post-war states that make it hard to sustain expenditure on critical institutions at the same level as international donors.

**Problems in Evaluating State Capacity, Legitimacy and Effectiveness**

Aside from the measurement problems generated by unclear overarching aims, international actors confront specific problems in measuring progress in building state capacity and, especially, state legitimacy. Given the conceptual abstraction of “the state,” measuring progress in state-building is challenging. Taxes, of course, provide one measure. How much revenue does the state collect as a portion of all monies spent on public goods? How agile is the state in tracking and expending that money? Similar measures of core state competencies also offer some indicators: to what extent does the state exercise a monopoly over the legitimate use of coercion in the territory? To what extent do informal, non-state sanctioned forms of authority exist alongside formal state institutions? To what extent are basic goods like education and health provided by a system overseen, even funded, by the state? These indicators do not preclude state-regulated private mechanisms of state functions. How many hours or days does a sampling of particular state functions take (e.g., processing a business license application, recording a birth, obtaining a license for driving or hunting, filing business or individual taxes, etc.)? Even if the data described above exists—and most of it does not, on a discriminating, detailed, comparative scale—it is difficult for analysts to agree on how to combine these for an overall indicator of state effectiveness.

Legitimacy poses other problems. Even if polling data exists on public attitudes about the state, these are only viable to the extent that people feel comfortable reporting their preferences. The more afraid they are of the state, the less reliable is this sort of data, posing a special dilemma for weak or divided states. And even where reliable polling data exist for public attitudes about state performance, public support for state institutions, or popular images of the state, it remains difficult to discern the extent to which such results reflect external or internal deliberate attempts to bolster state legitimacy, versus other factors that shape the public’s attitudes (i.e., public relations campaigns or externally-generated propaganda). These obstacles to measuring state-building outcomes pose challenges for garnering and retaining support for such programs.

**Recent Institutional Reforms—What Prospects?**

After over a decade of international peacebuilding, certain persistent weaknesses were thus clear. Powerful external actors—the UN Security Council, key member states, and leading donors—tended toward too short an attention span for the longer time frames needed to build peace. Critical resources—whether troops, money, or diplomatic attention—tended to be absent at some of the most vulnerable phases of a peace process. Strategies of major external actors tended not to be coordinated or mutually reinforcing, particularly between political/security actors like the Security Council and major donors, like the international financial institutions. Within institutions, there were persistent problems with inter-agency and departmental stovepipes. This compounded a general difficulty in prioritizing among competing needs and making careful judgments about sequencing different forms of international involvement (elections, demobilization and disarmament, economic reconstruction, constitutional processes, etc.). Knowledge about local context was often particularly lacking and impeded the development of peacebuilding strategies tailored to specific environments. This unhelpfully reinforced a tendency to design peacebuilding efforts in the absence of national and local input of “ownership.”

In the international donor community, recognition of these weaknesses has propelled moves toward integration or at least tighter coordination between development, political, and security actors in addressing conflict-vulnerable contexts. Interestingly, many of the leaders in this trend are also among the

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61 Patrick and Brown’s study, *Greater than the Sum of Its Parts?*, forthcoming in 2007, reviews the track record of these efforts among seven international donors.
governments for whom fragile or failed states are
major policy priorities.

In the UN community, recognition of these
weaknesses underpinned the recommendation made
by the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change, that there needed to be
a center of strategic gravity on peacebuilding that
would bring leading external actors together around
the table with national actors. The result, after
torturous negotiations, was the Peacebuilding
Commission (PBC) of thirty-one member states, the
UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), and the
Peacebuilding Fund, which began to function in mid-
2006.

Expectations were initially high for the
Peacebuilding Commission, though these observably
lowered after protracted negotiations in 2005-06
about who would be a member and delays in hiring
sufficient staff for the PBSO. It also may be unfair to
judge progress at a time when UN leadership is in
transition, which seems to be inclining many member
states and Secretariat officials to go into a holding
pattern on multiple issues, including peacebuilding. As
of early 2007, the best case outcome is that the two
cases on the Commission’s agenda—Burundi and
Sierra Leone—will attract a high quality of strategic
engagement in a timely fashion and result in the
mobilization of sufficient and well-targeted resources
to support the consolidation of peace.

The bigger picture gives one cause for concern,
however, if the larger worry is about global recurrence
of war and the toll this exacts on development, human
welfare, and global security. If the PBC is likely to have
a carrying capacity of two-to-three small-to-mid-
sized conflicts—even if it handles them superbly,
which is not guaranteed—what does this imply about
the wider universe of conflict contexts, from East
Timor and Haiti through Afghanistan, the DRC,
Sudan, Lebanon, and potentially Iraq?

Of course, the PBC does not
literally have to handle all such cases in order to
succeed, and it may be that success in improving
international assistance in just a few cases like Burundi
and Sierra Leone can exert a “demonstration effect” to
improve responses elsewhere.

Future Trends and Scenarios
This brings us to the question of future trends and
scenarios. Elaborating singular scenarios of best case,
worst case or “muddling through” makes less sense
across the universe of post-conflict environments than
it does in specific cases or clusters of cases, and the
latter, while valuable, would require a level of
specificity that is not possible in this paper. However,
if the underlying concern is whether existing crisis
management mechanisms can deal successfully with
the range of situations requiring post-conflict
stabilization, and the implications if they cannot, then
we offer a few observations.

What Does “Disaster” Look Like?
First, we know a fair amount about what different
types of peacebuilding “disaster” scenarios look like
with even a minimalist standard for success. The
emblematic peacebuilding disasters are Angola and
Rwanda in the early 1990s which led to nearly 2
million new dead as the direct result of resurgent
violence, along with the panoply of secondary effects
of renewed war. Somalia was a different kind of
disastrous outcome, as has been the slow-burn, iterated
failure of international efforts in Haiti for the past
fifteen years; though both “disasters” were manifest less
in the scale of human suffering than in the failure to
build stable states. Arguably, the attempt to do so—at
least in Somalia—was a fool’s errand to begin with.

We also have instances of best case outcomes, such
as El Salvador and Mozambique. These have not
experienced anything as halcyon as implied by a
“golden” scenario, but the wars that respectively
devastated each country for years show no sign of
returning.

We more often know what “muddling through”
looks like, whether this takes the form of a relatively
stable outcome in Bosnia that has nonetheless come at
a disproportionate—and non-replicable—cost in
international military and civilian expenditure, or the
relatively unstable *modus vivendi* in the Democratic
Republic of Congo that continues to require new

62 Patrick, “Weak States.” The PBC and affiliated mechanisms are unlikely to play much of an effective role in dealing with weak, non-conflict states compared to bilateral and regional actors (as well as private and non-governmental entities) who are likely to have far greater leverage.
infusions of international personnel and whose long-term positive outcome is questionable.

Where a case resides on the success-failure spectrum is, of course, partly a matter of time frame: Until 2006, most would have judged East Timor a success, now, there is ground for question; and only time will tell whether this represents a temporary setback on an otherwise positive trajectory or the first sign of a failure in the making. It is also a matter of interpretation—e.g., Iraq, seen as a manifest failure by many observers is proclaimed as a potential success by others.

Judgments about success, failure and relative disasters, importantly, also need to take account of how the actual outcome would compare to alternative paths not taken: thus, some might question our characterization of Bosnia as muddling through if compared to alternative scenarios without international intervention.

**Location, Location, Location**

Second, we know that failure in single countries does not necessarily define the full scope of “disaster” since resurgent conflict and/or protracted state weakness can enable, accelerate, or exert spillover effects that increase the vulnerability of others to a wider range of global risks.

We know, for example, about the regional dynamics of certain conflicts, even if these are not widely written about by analysts or incorporated into operational plans.

Networks of armed groups, traffickers, and commercial actors, and flows of arms, population and disease can powerfully accelerate and amplify vulnerability to armed conflict as well as resistance to its resolution. Think of the linkages among the countries along Africa’s Mano River basin or the Great Lakes region, or consider the regional conflict formation of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and parts of Central Asia, or the crucible of instability in the North Caucasus. Failure to build peace in Côte d’Ivoire may put Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone at risk. These risks also extend to linkages with other security threats if we think of disease (e.g., the role of peacekeepers in spreading HIV/AIDS in Africa), terrorism, or the spread of conventional or nuclear arms.

Conversely, success in Liberia might exert a positive spillover effect. Regional factors seem undeniable in the longevity of “zones of peace,” at least for interstate war, in Europe and South America. Nevertheless, the drivers of peace are generally more fragile than those of criminality and war, and deadly internal conflicts can clearly afflict Europe and South America. Negative regional linkages also tend to become more potent where states are weak and cannot exert control over their full territory or population.

Where the strategic interests of extra-regional players are at stake, the costs of peacebuilding failure in a country with such regional linkages is that much greater. Thus, a peacebuilding failure in Lebanon puts not only Lebanese and their neighbors at risk, but could destabilize the broader Middle East, with obvious escalatory potential. A similar level of risk may be present if peacebuilding fails in the neighborhood of weak but populous or otherwise strategically significant states—e.g., Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia—and, though this paper does not address state failure in the absence of armed conflict, the reverse dynamic is equally worrying in which an imploding Pakistan or Nigeria could draw smaller neighboring countries down with it. Already, Pakistan’s weaknesses—or, rather, the relative strength of some constituencies within the state in relation to others—appear to exert a powerful destabilizing effect on Afghanistan.

There is a further distributional concern which relates to the disproportionate concentration of conflict in Africa, where most recurrent wars or wars that resist termination have been in the last fifteen years. Several factors argue for some continuation of that trend, having largely to do with an unfortunate clustering of risk factors and the vicious circle of probability created by already having a high concentration of armed conflicts, weak states, and dependence on primary commodities. Failure to begin to reverse these trends can have a variety of ripple effects in terms of human suffering, disease, criminality, and lost opportunity for development.

The risks, finally, go beyond armed conflict and, largely through the vector of weak state control of territory, include weapons proliferation, smuggling, and terrorism.

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63 Notable exceptions include Barnett Rubin’s work in the Regional Conflict Formations project at the Center for International Cooperation; Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper and Jonathan Goodhand, *War Economies in a Regional Context* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004); and the work of the International Crisis Group. See also Chester Crocker, “Peacemaking and Mediation: Dynamics of a Changing Field,” *Coping with Crisis* Working Paper, International Peace Academy, New York, March 2007, which gives prominence to regional dynamics and actors. The UN has also begun to try to deal with the mutual, interlocking vulnerabilities of its peace operations in West Africa through mechanisms such as the establishment of a UN regional office for West Africa (for at least this purpose, however, mystifyingly based in Dakar) and regular meetings of SRSGs and Force Commanders.
Are We Heading in the Right Direction?
To anticipate scenarios that test the sufficiency of existing mechanisms requires looking at both “demand” and “supply.” Let us start with the demand side. First, as noted earlier, many analysts have observed the decline in armed conflict over the past fifteen or so years, but the durability of this trend is a question, especially if one sees at least a portion of that decline as attributable to larger shifts in world politics such as the end of the Cold War, the drying up of proxy conflicts that were otherwise not sustainable, and the possibility of new cooperation among global actors in resolving those that remained. If we head further into a period in which proxy war (against terrorists or groups described as such) comes back into style, or prospects for cooperation between major players diminish, there is a risk that this trend will be shorter-lived than hoped.

It takes little stretch to imagine a cascade of demand for peacebuilding in the Middle East, for instance, between the war in Lebanon, failed state-building in Palestine, the vortex of conflict in Iraq, and the risk of turbulent regime change and/or state collapse in the broader region (e.g., Syria, Iran, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia). Afghanistan and Pakistan are another center of potential instability. In Asia, there are questions about whether relatively small-scale conflict in places like Nepal, southern Thailand, the Philippines, and Myanmar will escalate or dampen. There are risks of new rounds of conflict in Latin America after comparative stability in 1990s, and, of course, this paper does not even touch on the question of inter-state conflict or the question of state failure in strategically pivotal states.

Let us then turn to the question of the “supply” of international peacebuilding efforts in relation to this uncertain demand: how confident can we be in the existing machinery? We have already noted the disproportion between the expectations for the UN’s new peacebuilding institutions, which are likely to have a carrying capacity of just a few, relatively small-scale, strategically peripheral conflicts, and the much larger universe of post-conflict cases. This is less worrying if one looks to the UN more to demonstrate a better approach than to implement it, but the question then becomes one of alternative peacebuilding providers, their relative capabilities, and the intelligence of mechanisms to ensure that suppliers are appropriately matched to demand.

Here, the prospects are also mixed. Regional organizations are potentially important actors, though the African Union is far from having resources or operational capabilities that begin to match needs on the continent; the Organization of American States has high regional credibility but is largely untested operationally; and most other regional actors were not conceived to play operational roles of this type. The European Union and NATO are potentially more promising as regional actors with global reach, and both institutions can command greater resources than most other actors, including the UN. However, their operational engagements have to date been relatively limited, and an obvious question is whether European populations would accept the EU, in particular, taking on a more robust and internationally extended role, with all the risks that might entail. The G8 has recently flexed its policymaking muscles with respect to peacebuilding, though how it will relate to the new UN mechanisms is an open question.64 The Bretton Woods Institutions and regional development banks are another locus of policy and financing, though still unquestionably “joined up” with political, security, and other operational actors. The BWI’s slow and insufficient reformulation of neoliberal recipes for the requirements of state-building reminds us that systemic factors—such as pressures from the international financial system or global standards favoring the free flow of conventional arms—offer an underappreciated arena for influencing the outcome of post-conflict state-building.

Overall, there remain real constraints of will and capacity across this range of institutions, which relate variously to resources, flexibility, ability to scale up or down in relation to need, and ability to partner with other institutions. In policymaking settings, there appears to be a crude rule of thumb that each can only handle two or three crises at a time. As a former official in the US National Security Council staff recently put it, “the worst thing to happen to Darfur in 2006 was Lebanon.”65 It is not at all clear that we are anywhere close to having international policy machinery or instruments that can reliably handle multiple high-profile peacebuilding operations successfully, especially if they are in difficult environ-

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64 The 2006 G8 Declaration cited above emphasizes the importance of working with the UN and the Peacebuilding Commission, though apparently only after being raised by a single G8 government.
ments, let alone turn its attention simultaneously to the prevention of or response to state collapse.

We can also be sure that civil war or state collapse in a country like Nigeria or Pakistan or North Korea would require a stabilization and reconstruction effort that would almost certainly overwhelm existing net peacebuilding (and peacekeeping) capacities. If one had to identify a disaster scenario, this would be it.

Finally, all of the above remains premised on what we propose is still comparatively shaky empirical evidence about war-to-peace outcomes and especially about the effectiveness of international peacebuilding efforts. While there has been considerable deepening of analysis about conflict trends in recent years, both data and analysis of the dynamics of war recurrence remain surprisingly limited. This “evidence deficit” is compounded by a tendency to look for conclusions based on the policy instruments one already has. As the old vaudeville line has it: Why does a man who has dropped his keys on the street look for them under the lamppost? Because that is where the light is. Thus, analysts and practitioners tend to neglect the regional level of analysis because international actors have few policy tools to engage regionally, even though this is the level at which one is likely to see a clustering of knock-on effects of failed peacebuilding in terms of state fragility, imploding or criminalized economies, displacement, and disease. And missing from virtually any analysis of international peacebuilding—including, frankly, our own—is discussion of economic policy instruments that could have a powerful effect in combating state fragility and reversion to war, such as terms of trade, monetary policy, management of currency fluctuation, and so on. Over the long term, these and other more systemic issues may exert a greater effect on the vulnerability to war or state weakness, but such issues tend to be decided or driven by considerations of interest and power having little to do with the risk of recurrent war.
Further Reading


This volume contains case studies (including Afghanistan, Somalia, Bosnia, East Timor, Liberia, and Palestine) of the diverse challenges of crafting effective and legitimate state institutions as part of efforts to end armed conflicts. The case studies illustrate core substantive areas of post-conflict state-building, which are then analyzed in thematic chapters. The volume provides guidance about how post-conflict peacebuilding should be rethought to incorporate state-building, while identifying tensions between the two enterprises.


Chesterman, a legal scholar, examines the experience of the UN in assuming state administration of territories. Written on the heels of the UN’s experiences in Kosovo and East Timor, the book raises cautionary notes about the capacity and the wisdom of the UN to assume the mantle of the state, even for a few years, given its financial, political, and human resource constraints. Chesterman provides historical antecedents for UN interim administrations, and then explores recent UN forays into exercising partial state powers.


Drawing on World Bank research, the authors explore multiple causal relationships between civil wars and development processes. Just as civil wars impede development, efforts to advance development make at-risk countries less likely to fall into the “conflict trap,” where poor countries with poor economic policies tend to experience recurrent wars. The authors challenge the idea that civil wars are inevitable and argue that civil wars have significant negative consequences for neighboring countries as well. The study recommends specific measures to reduce the global incidence of civil wars.


In one of the earliest assessments of international peacebuilding, the authors examine five case studies (Bosnia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Haiti, and Somalia) and argue for an integrated approach to peacebuilding that is rooted in a greater understanding of local context and that puts a premium on political dynamics and the importance of reestablishing a social compact among divided groups and between societies and states.


Doyle and Sambanis, in the most comprehensive quantitative study of post-conflict transitions to date, argue that while the UN has been ineffective at imposing peace by force (making war), it has been efficient in mediating and implementing comprehensively negotiated peace settlements (making peace). Sustained “participatory peace” is dependent on the peacebuilding triangle consisting of three main factors characterizing post-civil-war environment: the degree of hostility between factions, the scope of local capacities, and the level of international capacities and assistance. Making War and Building Peace posits that given the particularity of each conflict, practitioners should design each mission with appropriate resources and authority to fit the specific conditions on the ground.

This book is an accessible primer on the concepts and principles by which outside actors can contribute to strengthening state institutions. At the same time, it is a sound treatment of the academic literature on political institutional engineering and public administration as it applies to weak states in the twenty-first century. It usefully distinguishes between the strength and scope of state institutions, and it provides a practical treatment of how international organizations interface with the challenges of state-building.


This report—the first in what is planned to be an annual mapping of the incidence, intensity, causes, and consequences of global violence and policy responses to that violence—argues that many positive trends in advancing peace have been overlooked. It describes the changing face of violence, offers new political violence datasets, assesses the impacts of violence on women and children, and examines the indirect and long-term ramifications of wars.


Jackson develops a theoretical framework for analyzing states in the developing world with attenuated sovereignty. He calls these countries “quasi-states” enjoying “negative sovereignty,” as opposed to the “positive sovereignty” that emerged in Western Europe and institutionalized norms of traditional statehood. Quasi-states foster illiberal regimes unwilling or unable to provide their citizens basic human rights and services and are supported and indulged by the international community.


This second edition of the biennial global report from the Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) Program provides major trends in armed conflicts, accounts of current wars, movements for self-determination and democracy from 1946-2002. The report also includes an assessment of peacebuilding capacity for each individual state.


Paris examines fourteen UN peacekeeping operations launched between 1989 and 1999 in order to assess the relationship between liberalization, institution building, and peace in countries emerging from civil conflicts. Paris argues that these peacebuilding efforts, in pushing for immediate democratization and marketization, undermined the consolidation of peace. Identifying present-day peacebuilding models with Wilson’s legacy of liberalism, he identifies deficiencies in these models and solutions for overcoming them. He argues that democratization and marketization may be sound policies to promote peace in the long run but should not be promoted too rapidly because of their destabilizing effects. Paris suggests an alternate strategy of “institutionalization before liberalization.”


One of the first major comparative studies of third-party implementation of peace agreements, this book is based on a multi-year project looking at thematic issues across sixteen civil war cases, and involving practitioners and policymakers integrally in the research, in order to understand what determines successful outcomes.
The editors place an emphasis on evaluation, and they focus especially on international actors and their chosen strategies, functional tasks (such as demobilization and disarmament, post-conflict elections, refugee repatriation, human rights, and reconciliation), and what they call “low-cost, high payoff” opportunities for stabilizing transitions.


In an admirably accessible stocktaking of the concept of fragile states, Woodward gives a persuasive account of the origins of the concept, its analytical utility and limits, and the implications for aid programming. She places particular emphasis on international political economy and the pressures of globalization on fragile states.


In this essay, Woodward links her analysis of state fragility to conflict management. She argues for a nuanced analysis of post-conflict states that begins from a precise understanding of historical context and that examines the pressures on a given post-conflict state with respect to the causes of fragility, usually rooted in some aspect of “developmental failure”; the demands on it to address particular social vulnerabilities that derive from that failure; and the demands of post-conflict transition itself. She sees a further burden on post-conflict states arising from the demands of international actors for states that can be a partner in international processes (what she terms the model of an “internationally responsible state”), which risks undermining peace.
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