

# New Challenges for Peacekeeping: Protection, Peacebuilding and the “War on Terror”

## Coping with Crisis

Working Paper Series

Richard Gowan and Ian Johnstone

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## Foreword

Terje Rød-Larsen

*President, International Peace Academy*

The International Peace Academy (IPA) is pleased to introduce a new series of Working Papers within the program *Coping with Crisis, Conflict, and Change: The United Nations and Evolving Capacities for Managing Global Crises*, a four-year research and policy-facilitation program designed to generate fresh thinking about global crises and capacities for effective prevention and response.

In this series of Working Papers, IPA has asked leading experts to undertake a mapping exercise, presenting an assessment of critical challenges to human and international security. A first group of papers provides a horizontal perspective, examining the intersection of multiple challenges in specific regions of the world. A second group takes a vertical approach, providing in-depth analysis of global challenges relating to organized violence, poverty, population trends, public health, and climate change, among other topics. The Working Papers have three main objectives: to advance the understanding of these critical challenges and their interlinkages; to assess capacities to cope with these challenges and to draw scenarios for plausible future developments; and to offer a baseline for longer-term research and policy development.

Out of these initial Working Papers, a grave picture already emerges. The Papers make clear that common challenges take different forms in different regions of the world. At the same time, they show that complexity and interconnectedness will be a crucial attribute of crises in the foreseeable future.

First, new challenges are emerging, such as climate change and demographic trends. At least two billion additional inhabitants, and perhaps closer to three billion, will be added to the world over the next five decades, virtually all in the less developed regions, especially among the poorest countries in Africa and Asia. As a result of climate change, the magnitude and frequency of floods may increase in many regions; floods in coastal Bangladesh and India, for example, are expected to affect several million people. The demand for natural resources—notably water—will increase as a result of population growth and economic development; but some areas may have diminished access to clean water.

Second, some challenges are evolving in more dangerous global configurations such as transnational organized crime and terrorism. Illicit and violent organizations are gaining increasing control over territory, markets, and populations around the world. Non-state armed groups complicate peacemaking efforts due to their continued access to global commodity and arms markets. Many countries, even if they are not directly affected, can suffer from the economic impact of a major terrorist attack. States with ineffective and corrupted institutions may prove to be weak links in global arrangements to deal with threats ranging from the avian flu to transnational terrorism.

Finally, as these complex challenges emerge and evolve, ‘old’ problems still persist. While the number of violent conflicts waged around the world has recently declined, inequality—particularly between groups within the same country—is on the rise. When this intergroup inequality aligns with religious, ethnic, racial and language divides, the prospect of tension rises. Meanwhile, at the state level, the number of actual and aspirant nuclear-armed countries is growing, as is their ability to acquire weapons through illicit global trade.

As the international institutions created in the aftermath of World War II enter their seventh decade, their capacity to cope with this complex, rapidly evolving and interconnected security landscape is being sharply tested. The United Nations has made important progress in some of its core functions—‘keeping the peace,’ providing humanitarian relief, and helping advance human development and security. However, there are



reasons to question whether the broad UN crisis management system for prevention and response is up to the test.

Not only the UN, but also regional and state mechanisms are challenged by this complex landscape and the nature and scale of crises. In the Middle East, for example, interlinked conflicts are complicated by demographic and socioeconomic trends and regional institutions capable of coping with crisis are lacking. In both Latin America and Africa, ‘old’ problems of domestic insecurity arising from weak institutions and incomplete democratization intersect with ‘new’ transnational challenges such as organized crime. Overall, there is reason for concern about net global capacities to cope with these challenges, generating a growing sense of global crisis.

Reading these Working Papers, the first step in a four-year research program, one is left with a sense of urgency about the need for action and change: action where policies and mechanisms have already been identified; change where institutions are deemed inadequate and require innovation. The diversity of challenges suggests that solutions cannot rest in one actor or mechanism alone. For example, greater multilateral engagement can produce a regulatory framework to combat small arms proliferation and misuse, while private actors, including both industry and local communities, will need to play indispensable roles in forging global solutions to public health provision and food security. At the same time, the complexity and intertwined nature of the challenges require solutions at multiple levels. For example, governments will need to confront the realities that demographic change will impose on them in coming years, while international organizations such as the UN have a key role to play in technical assistance and norm-setting in areas as diverse as education, urban planning and environmental control.

That the world is changing is hardly news. What is new is a faster rate of change than ever before and an unprecedented interconnectedness between different domains of human activity—and the crises they can precipitate. This series of Working Papers aims to contribute to understanding these complexities and the responses that are needed from institutions and decision-makers to cope with these crises, challenges and change.



Terje Rød-Larsen

## Uncertain Predictions in Interesting Times

Efforts to predict the future of peacekeeping almost always prove to be unsuccessful. In 1958, United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld reported to the General Assembly on the lessons of the UN Emergency Force deployed to Egypt during the Suez crisis two years before. He surrounded his observations with qualifications, as some “circumstances are of such a nature that it could not reasonably be expected that they would often be duplicated elsewhere. Nor can it be assumed that they provide a sufficient basis to warrant indiscriminate projection of the UNEF experience in planning for future United Nations operations of this kind.”<sup>1</sup> Sure enough, when the UN began to deploy to the Congo two years later, the 1958 report was to prove “not especially pertinent” to the task at hand.<sup>2</sup>

Similar qualifications must be applied to any projections for peacekeeping made today. The time of writing is a particularly uncertain one for peace operations. The summer of 2006 saw the UN Security Council respond to the crises in Darfur, Timor-Leste, and Lebanon with resolutions predicted to “increase UN peacekeeping levels around the world by approximately 50 percent and perhaps increase the overall cost of [UN] peacekeeping from the expected 2006–07 level of \$4.7 billion to possibly \$8 billion per year.”<sup>3</sup> Simultaneously, debates were intensifying over the size and goals of NATO’s deployment in Afghanistan, with the Alliance’s field commander complaining that states had not met force requirements they had known for eighteen months.<sup>4</sup> This round of tensions followed a six month period in which the European Union (EU) had publicly wavered over sending a force to back up the UN’s Congo deployment; the African Union (AU) had warned that it might have to withdraw its troops from Darfur for lack of funds; and plans for an AU-backed deployment to Somalia had been condemned by Islamist warlords.

Yet in spite of the variety and complexity of the peacekeeping challenges experienced over the last year, it is possible to identify a variety of strategic issues which may prove “pertinent” to future peace

operations. Some of these are potentially global in scope: the consolidation of a broader concept of security in international affairs, encompassing human security and an emerging responsibility to protect; a growing recognition of the potential of long-term peacebuilding and state-building as contributions to collective security; and the centrality of the fight against terrorism to global security policy. Other factors—such as the emergence of a new African security architecture, and Australia’s deployment of a series of missions in the Pacific—are regional, raising the question of whether peacekeeping will now follow divergent patterns in different parts of the world. This question has a significant institutional dimension. A wide range of organizations (including the UN, NATO, the EU, the AU, the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS], and others) have become established as players in peace operations, but there is as yet no clear division of labor or agreed sense of comparative advantage among them.

To address both global and regional trends in peace operations, this paper is divided into three parts. The first gives a brief overview of the operational and political evolution of peacekeeping from the mid-1990s to the present. The second provides a more detailed analysis of the conceptual and normative context for current and future operations. The third maps regional trends in the supply of and demand for peacekeepers. We do not attempt to make concrete predictions as to when and where future operations will be required, or how to conduct them. But it is likely that the combination of global and regional factors we identify will shape future deployments.

## From the 1990s to the Present: Continuities and Surprises


If 2006 was a particularly testing year for peacekeeping, it followed and extended a massive growth in the number, scale and diversity of peace operations that began in the late 1990s. From 1999 to 2005, the number of troops deployed in UN missions worldwide rose from 12,700 to 60,200, while the number of international police under its command

<sup>1</sup> United Nations, *Report of the Secretary General, United Nations Emergency Force, Summary of the Study of the Experience Derived from the Establishment and Operation of the Force*, UN Doc. A/3943, October 9, 1958, p. 61.

<sup>2</sup> Arthur H. House, *The UN in the Congo: the Political and Civilian Efforts* (University Press of America, 1978), p. 109.

<sup>3</sup> Security Council Report, Special Research Report No.5, “Twenty Days in August: the Security Council sets Massive New Challenges for UN Peacekeeping,” September 8, 2006, p. 5.

<sup>4</sup> Rachel Morajee and Daniel Dombey, “NATO Request for More Troops Remained Unheeded for 18 Months, Says Commander,” *Financial Times*, September 12, 2006.



almost doubled from 3,100 to 6,100.<sup>5</sup> This expansion of UN activities once again proved the dangers of prediction: in 1997, it had seemed quite reasonable to assume that after the failures of Somalia and the former Yugoslavia “the post-cold war era of large multi-component missions, aimed in effect at nation-building, appeared to be over.”<sup>6</sup>

Nonetheless, the failure to act in response to the Rwandan genocide had provoked second thoughts about the highly restrictive approach to peacekeeping that had emerged in a Statement by the President of the UN Security Council and US Presidential Decision Directive 25, on which the Statement was based.<sup>7</sup> The soul-searching provoked by Rwanda and the fall of Srebrenica, embodied in two self-critical reports published by the UN in the late 1990s, led to the establishment of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, in 2000. Its report heralded new thinking about the nature of peace operations and the need to increase UN capacity to take on the full range of challenges peacekeepers were facing, including the threat of spoilers.

Subsequent years saw two trends in the deployment pattern of peace operations: the first involving the expansion of peacekeeping by troops from the South in Africa; the second consisting of the deployment of Western forces in Europe, the broader Middle East, and the Pacific. This led to fears of a new “peacekeeping apartheid,” by which “differentiated missions, command structures and equipment” (not to mention political priorities) would create a growing divergence between Western and non-Western operations.<sup>8</sup> The reality has proved more complex.

While the catastrophes of Somalia and Rwanda undercut the UN’s credibility in Africa in the early 1990s, the first years of the next decade saw a growing international acceptance that UN operations had a significant role to play there. By early 2006, African deployments accounted for 80 percent of the UN’s military personnel worldwide. They relied on an increase in African and South Asian personnel contributions to the UN, in contrast to earlier Western commitments to the Balkans.<sup>9</sup> Yet the supposition that operations in Africa were now a matter of troops from the South deploying under UN auspices has been

<sup>5</sup> Ian Johnstone, Bruce D. Jones, and Richard Gowan, “Annual Review of Global Peace Operations: Briefing Paper” (Center on International Cooperation, 2006), pp. 2–3.

<sup>6</sup> Trevor Findlay, “Armed Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution,” *SIPRI Yearbook 1997*, p. 66.

<sup>7</sup> See UN Doc. S/PRST/1994/22, May 3, 1994.

<sup>8</sup> For a summary of this risk, see Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, “Regionalisation of Peace Operations,” in Espen Barth Eide ed., *Effective Multilateralism: Europe, Regional Security and a Revitalized UN* (Foreign Policy Centre, British Council, 2006), pp. 32–37.

<sup>9</sup> As of September 30, 2005, 46 percent of UN troops and military observers were from Central and South Asia, 31 percent from Africa, and fewer than 7.5 percent from Europe and North America: Johnstone, Jones and Gowan, “Annual Review: Briefing Paper,” p. 4.

challenged by the developing roles of the AU, EU, and NATO on the continent.

At the end of the 1990s, meanwhile, it appeared that American and European forces might confine their peacekeeping efforts to the European theater and that they would not participate in new UN-commanded missions elsewhere. NATO's Implementation Force, originally deployed to Bosnia for a few months in 1995, had been replaced by the open-ended Stabilization Force. The deployment of NATO troops to Kosovo and Macedonia in 1999 and 2000 further institutionalized the organization's presence in the former Yugoslavia. In so far as European and American peacekeepers were found outside Europe (and occasional missions to Haiti), it was in residual operations in the “near abroad” of the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. While European troops represented only 7 percent of UN military personnel in late 2005, they accounted for roughly a third of UNIFIL in Lebanon, four-fifths of UNDOF on the Golan Heights, and two-thirds of UNFICYP in Cyprus.<sup>10</sup> Meanwhile, US forces had been stationed in the Sinai as part of a largely forgotten non-UN-mandated Multinational Force since 1981. These deployments provided a precedent for the deployment of large numbers of UN-flagged European troops to Lebanon in 2006—but not for the scale of the new mission.

Prior to 2001, it seemed that Western—and specifically US—policy might involve a further reduction in contributions to peacekeeping. In 1999, future National Security Adviser and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared that the American military was both “not a civilian police force,” and there was no need to see “the 82nd Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten.”<sup>11</sup> In 2002, her Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave a high-profile speech entitled “Beyond Nation-Building,” arguing that the prolonged UN and NATO presence in Kosovo had created a “culture of dependency” there.<sup>12</sup>

Yet through a mixture of US and European policies and their unintended consequences, American-led coalitions and NATO are now fielding a combined total of over 200,000 troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. And there are *still* more than 20,000 US and EU troops in the Balkans. Peace operations—UN and non-UN, Western and non-Western—have been

driven by a process of natural selection rather than intelligent design, shaped by a proliferation of institutional frameworks. These have included the emergence of the AU and EU as strategic actors, the redefinition of NATO as a long-range rather than solely regional deployer, and the use of coalitions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Timor-Leste.

Rather than simply confirm earlier fears of “peacekeeping apartheid,” these processes have resulted in new and complex forms of cooperation, such as EU support to the AU in Darfur. Meanwhile, the Commonwealth of Independent States, led by Russia, has maintained a peacekeeping role in Russia's “near abroad”; sub-regional organizations in Africa—most notably ECOWAS, but also the East African Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC)—continue to develop capacity for peace operations; and ad hoc institutional and operational arrangements have emerged to monitor peace processes in Sri Lanka, Aceh, and the Philippines.

### Peacekeeping is Not a Strategy

The sheer pace and complexity of these changes makes it hard to identify deep trends. But this complication is itself a reminder of the starting point for any discussion of peace operations: peacekeeping is not a strategy per se but rather a strategic tool.<sup>13</sup> “Strategy” is a much-contested word, but one reasonable state-centric definition is “a politico-military, means-end chain, a state's theory about how it can best ‘cause’ security for itself.”<sup>14</sup> In the context of multilateral cooperation, this definition may be extended to include those means-end chains that states agree on to create collective security. It should be clear that the military, police, and civilian means that fall under the umbrella term “peace operations” will be put to diverse ends in diverse contexts by states and organizations. Peacekeeping cannot be an end in itself.

It is now almost a commonplace to warn against mistaking peacekeeping for a stand-alone strategy. As calls for an international force in Lebanon proliferated in the summer of 2006, there was a counter-proliferation of warnings that “peacekeepers are not peacemakers” and that the “role of an international

<sup>10</sup> Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006), pp. 274, 286, and 294.

<sup>11</sup> Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 1 (2000): 53.

<sup>12</sup> Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (Pantheon Books, 2006), p. 151.

<sup>13</sup> Bruce D. Jones, “Preface,” in *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006*, p. ix.

<sup>14</sup> Barry Posen, cited in Hew Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy,” *Survival* 47, no. 3 (2005): 44.



force is fundamentally political.”<sup>15</sup> And from a distinctly traditional military standpoint, it has been argued that peacekeeping can never be a sufficient tool to achieve clear strategic ends in its own right, perhaps by definition: “operations are under-resourced and driven by short-term goals. On the ground, command is divided, rather than united, and forces are dispersed, not concentrated; as a result, the operations themselves are in the main indecisive.”<sup>16</sup>

It can be argued that one reason peace operations are so often indecisive (even relative to their stated mandates) is a lack of clarity in their political and strategic direction. Recent months and years have seen many large-scale missions evolve in ways contrary to strategists’ intentions. The political rhetoric surrounding peacekeeping can also appear to be detached from, or detrimental to, operational practice.

It has, for example, become standard practice for the UN Security Council to mandate both UN and non-UN peace operations “to protect civilians under the imminent threat of physical violence,” typically “within capabilities and areas of deployment.” But as Ian Johnstone has noted, “a mandate without adequate capacity can generate expectations that will not be fulfilled. The qualifying words, ‘within the limits of the mission’s capabilities,’ are aimed at lowering expectations, but is it reasonable to suppose that all concerned—including vulnerable populations—will read the fine print?”<sup>17</sup>

One important step in predicting future patterns of peacekeeping, therefore, is to ask towards what political and strategic ends may peace operations be used as a means—and how clearly-defined those ends are likely to be. Those political and strategic ends, moreover, are not defined in a normative vacuum. The mandate and conduct of peace operations are shaped by the normative climate in which they occur; in turn, the operations shape that climate. We now turn to the current global climate for peace operations, and the norms that are evolving within it.

## Conceptual and Normative Contexts for Peace Operations

“Recent analyses of international peacekeeping operations are marked by a disturbing lack of imagination,” the American academic Oran R. Young grumbled in 1966, “and a tendency toward repetitious rigidity.”<sup>18</sup> He noted that most thinking was “structured heavily and rather inflexibly by a set of concepts, principles and practices stemming from the Hammarskjöld administration at the United Nations.” Since the early 1990s, it has become a cliché that there is a need for new conceptual frameworks for peace operations. But no new orthodoxy has emerged. A variety of perspectives on the role of peacekeeping clash and intermingle; we will consider three that are especially pertinent to contemporary operations and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future: peacekeeping as protection; peacekeeping as a precursor to peacebuilding; and peacekeeping as an element of the “war on terrorism.”<sup>19</sup> Each has explicit and implicit operational ramifications.

### Peacekeeping as Protection

Our first perspective assumes that there is a growing if controversial norm of intervention in international affairs, and that “concepts like the ‘responsibility to protect’ and human security are starting to infuse peace operations practice.”<sup>20</sup> This normative cluster has been linked to interventionism since the 1990s, associated with the statements and practices of many governments and international organizations, driven in part by pressure from non-governmental organizations and public opinion campaigns. Thus the term “responsibility to protect” was coined by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), in response to the challenge laid down by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in a speech of September 1999: “The core challenge to the

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<sup>15</sup> Nancy Soderberg, “Peacekeepers are not Peacemakers,” *New York Times*, August 2, 2006; and Lee Feinstein, “How Peacekeeping in Lebanon can Avoid Disaster,” *Financial Times*, August 7, 2006.

<sup>16</sup> Strachan, “Lost Meaning,” p. 49.

<sup>17</sup> Ian Johnstone, “Dilemmas of Robust Peace Operations,” in CIC, *Annual Review*, p. 7.

<sup>18</sup> Oran R. Young, *Trends in International Peacekeeping* (Center on International Studies, Princeton University, 1966), p. 1.

<sup>19</sup> The phrase “protection” is used here as shorthand for a number of doctrines, including “humanitarian intervention” and the “responsibility to protect.” While the distinctions between these have been the subject of much academic discourse, they can be grouped together for this paper’s purposes.

<sup>20</sup> Johnstone, “Dilemmas,” p. 14.

Security Council and to the UN as a whole in the next century is to forge unity behind the principle that massive and systematic violations of human rights...cannot be allowed to stand.”<sup>21</sup>

The concept was affirmed by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, and then in the 2005 World Summit outcome document, though only after a rancorous debate about the scope of the responsibility and on precisely whom it fell. The language that was finally adopted carefully avoided implying a legal obligation on the part of the Security Council or individual states to act when governments failed to fulfill the responsibility to protect their own citizens. No guidelines or criteria were adopted, as recommended by the High-level Panel. Rather, the Summit affirmed that the Security Council was prepared “on a case-by-case basis” to authorize Chapter VII resolutions where states “are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.”<sup>22</sup>

The outcome document was thus considerably less forthright than the AU’s 2002 Constitutive Act, which enshrines “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in the respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”<sup>23</sup> But both statements point to a distinct trend to treat protection as an accepted norm in international affairs.

Statements like these raise questions about the priorities and parameters of peace operations. Advocates of protective action hold that its principles will not only necessitate peace operations in the future, but also affect how they are carried out: “in peacekeeping operations the priority has been peace whereas in counter-insurgency the priority has been military victory . . . In humanitarian operations the priority is the maintenance of human rights and the protection of individuals from threats to their security.”<sup>24</sup>

An obvious manifestation of this is the “protection of civilian” mandates in peace operations. Since late 1999, eight UN missions have been authorized under Chapter VII “to protect civilians under the imminent threat of physical violence,” often qualified by the words, “within the mission’s capabilities and areas of deployment.” France’s *Operation Licorne* in Côte d’Ivoire also has the mandate, as does the AU Mission in Darfur (AMIS). And while the term “protection of civilians” was not used for a number of other operations, the mandate is implicit.<sup>25</sup> Pragmatic versions of the responsibility to protect are also now common in military debate. A recent discussion paper prepared by the European Defense Agency for ministerial discussion thus warns of “despair, humanitarian disasters and migratory pressures” in Africa and the Middle East, concluding that EU forces should “aim for security and stability more than ‘victory.’”<sup>26</sup>

This focus on rights and human security has promoted interest not only in robust, rapidly deployable military forces (to which we will return below) but also in other types of operational capacities. There has been a particular emphasis on the capacity of police forces, including *gendarmerie*, to maintain security in situations in which military force may be too blunt a tool.<sup>27</sup> As of late 2005, the UN was deploying 6,100 police worldwide, and a further 3,400 were serving in non-UN peace operations. In August 2006, the UN Security Council mandated two further operations with significant police components: Resolution 1704 authorized a complement of 1,608 police for Timor-Leste, while 1706 set a level of 3,300 for Darfur. These mandates are part of an expansion of international policing beyond the Balkans—its key locus in the 1990s and earlier this decade—to Africa, Haiti, and the Pacific. In the latter region, Australia has also launched police missions in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea.

In operational terms, the need to balance respect for human rights and security with a more robust attitude toward spoilers has driven institutional innova-

<sup>21</sup> Kofi Annan, Address to the UN General Assembly, UN Press Release SG/SM/7136, September 20, 1999.

<sup>22</sup> UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, GA Res 60/1, UN GAOR, 60th Session, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 (2005). For an analysis of the negotiations on R2P leading to the Summit, see Ian Johnstone, “Discursive Power in the UN Security Council,” *Journal of International Law and International Relations* 2, no. 1 (2005): 81; and Alex Bellamy, “Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit,” *Ethics and International Affairs* 20, no. 2 (2006): 144.

<sup>23</sup> Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4(h), 2002. The EU’s statement is also not legally binding on the member states, unlike the Constitutive Act.

<sup>24</sup> Mary Kaldor and Andrew Salmon, “Military Force and European Strategy,” *Survival* 48, no. 1 (2006): 22.

<sup>25</sup> For example IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia (Security Council Resolutions 1031 and 1088); KFOR in Kosovo (Resolution 1244); INTERFET and then UNTAET in East Timor (Resolutions 1264 and 1272). Victoria Holt and Tobias Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006).

<sup>26</sup> George Parker, “Europe Urged to Cut and Refine Armed Forces,” *Financial Times*, October 2, 2006.

<sup>27</sup> See Johnstone, “Dilemmas,” *passim*.

tion. In a number of cases—including Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Timor-Leste—the international community has established parallel missions by which one actor (in these cases, NATO or the Australian military) maintains a robust presence while another (the UN or EU) does the police work. This can create tensions: a long-standing mutual mistrust between NATO troops and UN police hampered both sides’ response to severe rioting in Kosovo in March 2004. A variety of efforts are now underway to institutionalize and professionalize international policing, including the creation of a UN Standing Police Capacity to help launch missions, a rapidly-deployable EU *gendarmerie*, and the development of the G8-backed Center of Excellence for Police Stability Units in Italy.

As we will note in our section on regional and organizational dynamics, efforts to build the police capacities of the AU and African subregional organizations are under way. It thus appears that the “responsibility to protect,” originally envisaged as a response to massive and systematic human rights abuses, is now converging with an earlier trend towards more use of police and other non-military means to protect human security. Although much of the original rhetoric of protection was rooted in humanitarian language, therefore, it is coming to be associated with law and order more generally. And indeed, it is not inconceivable that other sources of human insecurity will factor into the mandate and conduct of peace operations, such as migration flows, environmental stress, and even public health crises. As such, the protection norm may provide some continuity between interventionism and the development of civil order and governance norms associated with peacebuilding, to which we will turn in our next section.

Before doing so, however, it may be necessary to sound a note of strategic caution: the implications of this new variety of interventionism remain open to dispute. Politically, there is uncertainty concerning how to legitimize and implement interventions. The World Summit’s reference to “case-by-case” decision-making in the implementation of the responsibility to protect suggests that the terms of international interventionism will remain fluid. In January 2006, Kofi Annan called for the UN to deploy to Darfur with a “strong and clear mandate, allowing it to protect those under threat, by force if necessary, as well

as the means to do so.”<sup>28</sup> In August the Security Council passed Resolution 1706, which included a large UN military force as well as a strong police presence—but predicated its deployment on consent from the Sudanese government. After six months of diplomatic pressure, Khartoum assented to a hybrid UN-AU operation in principle, but differences of opinion about its size, as well as command and control arrangements, suggested that there would continue to be obstacles in the way of its deployment.

### Peacekeeping as a Precursor to Peacebuilding

Our second perspective treats peacekeeping as a precursor to peacebuilding, although we are aware of the complexity of sequencing the steps in a peace process,<sup>29</sup> reinforced by recent clashes between intentions and realities. As we have seen, the mid-1990s saw a widespread concern that the days of “nation-building” were gone, a view that crystallized in official US thinking prior to Iraq. However, the prolongation of the American presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with the continued presence of UN missions in Kosovo, Timor-Leste and a number of African countries, has established long-term peacebuilding as a fact in international affairs. The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change argued that peacebuilding was, in effect, the exit strategy for most peace operations:

Deploying peace enforcement and peacekeeping forces may be essential in terminating conflicts but not sufficient for long-term recovery. Serious attention to the longer-term process of peacebuilding in all its multiple dimensions is critical; failure to invest adequately in peacebuilding increases the odds that a country will revert into conflict.<sup>30</sup>

Versions of this argument are now common in international policy statements. The High-level Panel’s argument harked back to Kofi Annan’s 2001 report *No Exit Without Strategy*, which argued that the goal of operations such as those in Timor-Leste and Kosovo should be a state in which “natural conflicts of society can be resolved...through the exercise of state sovereignty, and, generally, participatory governance.”<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Kofi Annan, “Darfur Descending,” *The Washington Post*, January 25, 2006.

<sup>29</sup> See Charles T. Call and Elizabeth Cousens, “Ending Wars and Building Peace,” *Coping with Crisis* Working Paper Series, International Peace Academy, New York, March 2007.

<sup>30</sup> United Nations, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, UN Doc. A/59/565, December 1, 2004, p. 61.

This rhetoric has gained traction. *The European Security Strategy* declares that the EU has helped “put failing states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan and in the DRC.”<sup>32</sup> It goes on to observe that “the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed states. And the 2006 American *National Security Strategy* notes that “military involvement may be necessary to stop a bloody conflict, but peace and stability will last only if follow-on efforts to restore order and rebuild are successful.”<sup>33</sup>

Post-conflict reconstruction and capacity-building (whether termed peacebuilding, state-building or nation-building) have thus become an increasingly accepted framework for the narrower activity of peacekeeping. Indeed, the need to reconstruct and reinforce the capacities of post-conflict states can be used to justify the other conceptions of peace operations we describe here. In the case of Lebanon, European troop contributors wary of Hezbollah insisted that their troops should have a mandate that did not imply a counter-terrorist role. Instead, UNIFIL was authorized “in support of a request from the government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory”—a first step towards state-building.<sup>34</sup>

We have already noted that peacebuilding can also be tied to the idea of peacekeeping as protection. An integral component of the “responsibility to protect” as set out by the ICISS is the “responsibility to rebuild,” emphasizing capacity-building in the aftermath of coercive intervention. In the case of Darfur, the international community has attempted to tie the two together, if largely in vain. Further to the 2006 Abuja peace agreement, the Security Council mandated UNMIS not only to contribute directly to stability, but also to continue AMIS “police training” functions and to assist in “promoting the rule of law...and the protection of the human rights of all people in Sudan through a comprehensive and coordinated strategy with the aim of combating impunity and contributing to long-term peace and stability.”<sup>35</sup> Here we see the logics of human rights and peacebuilding combined and explicitly treated as strategy.

But questions still remain over the relationship

and distinctions between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. If the latter is meant to set the strategic terms for the former, how far is it possible to distinguish between the two? This is a matter of operational as well as theoretical importance, as it must influence how missions are designed and how authority and resources are distributed in the field. While long-term peacebuilding embraces a very broad range of activities—especially in the fields of public finances, governance and development—a number of immediate tasks are now frequently assigned to peacekeepers in addition to the provision of security. These fall into two categories. The first is security-related, including civilian policing, the rule of law, demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR), and security sector reform (SSR). The second is political: overseeing negotiations and participatory forms of governance, often including referendums and elections. In 2005, UN missions alone supported polls open to a total of over 56 million registered voters.<sup>36</sup>

This double focus on security reform and elections has not evolved in a smooth or linear fashion in many missions. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, MONUC was initially tasked in 2000 with verifying a ceasefire agreement and human rights monitoring, but as it has expanded it has taken on oversight of referendums, elections, and DDR. The UN mission in Haiti, while tasked from its initiation with assisting an electoral process, nonetheless had to significantly alter its military and civilian structure so as to run polls in early 2006. This included a reduced focus on security threats in the capital, Port-au-Prince. And if peacekeepers’ contributions to peacebuilding are often ad hoc, doubts have also been raised over whether they are a sufficient basis for security.

Three reasons for this uncertainty about how much the relatively short-term presence of peacekeepers can contribute to sustainable peace stand out. The first is political. In 2000, the Brahimi Report warned that “elections need the support of a broader process of democratization and civil society building...lest elections merely ratify a tyranny of the majority or be overturned by force after a peace operation leaves.”<sup>37</sup> This theme has gained traction in

<sup>31</sup> United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, *No Exit Without Strategy: Security Council Decision-making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peace Operations*, UN Doc. S/2001/394, April 20, 2001, p. 2.

<sup>32</sup> European Council, *A Secure Europe in a Better World* (2003), p. 6.

<sup>33</sup> United States, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (March, 2006), p. 16.

<sup>34</sup> UN Doc. S/RES/1701, August 11, 2006, OP12.

<sup>35</sup> UN Doc. S/RES/1706, August 31, 2006, OP8(k).

<sup>36</sup> UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Fact Sheet” (DPKO: New York, September 2006), p. 2.



recent years, as in Richard Haass’s dismissal of “electocracies” in which voting is common but real democracy is lacking, and Ian Johnstone’s contention that the foundations for sustainable peace depend as much on deliberative principles and methods as representative ones.<sup>38</sup> Even more ambitiously, Michael Barnett proposes an alternative to “liberal” peacebuilding, involving “the use of the republican principles of deliberation, constitutionalism, and representation to help states recovering from war foster stability and legitimacy.”<sup>39</sup> Such arguments certainly appear relevant in a case such as Haiti, presently scheduled to hold seven different elections in the next five years, all funded by an increasingly unenthusiastic international community. It is possible that peace operations practice will be affected by a reduction in emphasis on referendums and elections. These alternative strategies in effect split the difference between those who would place democratization at the center of peacebuilding and those who see it as a “pipedream.”<sup>40</sup>

A second reason to question the contributions of peacekeepers to peacebuilding is a growing awareness of the limitations of DDR and SSR, especially where armed groups are disorganized, decentralized, or simply blur into the civilian population. In 2003, for example, it was calculated that there were between 330,000 and 460,000 guns in Kosovo (excluding those of KFOR and UNMIK).<sup>41</sup> Of these, fewer than 10,000 were held by legal police and paramilitary organizations and no more than 17,000 were in the hands of illegal militias. Efforts to promote disarmament were thus bound to founder on the ubiquity of such weapons. Even where peacekeepers might hope to disarm specific groups, the flow of illegal weaponry can quickly undermine their efforts. In Haiti, where the UN collected fewer than 200 weapons in the period 2004–2006, gun-smuggling from Florida is rife, and “automatic and semi-automatic weapons have also been sourced from the Dominican Republic,

Brazil, Jamaica, South Africa and Central America.”<sup>42</sup>

The third reason for skepticism on the role of peacekeepers in peacebuilding is the problem of tying security reform and democratic politics to economic development. While poverty is endemic in most of the countries in which peace operations are deployed, there are frequently problems in tying the activities of peacekeepers to those of donors and limited local sources of income. In some cases, peacekeeping missions have become involved in economic management, as through the economic pillar of the UN Mission in Kosovo, and the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program in Liberia. In the latter case, a steering committee including the national government, UN donors and regional organizations has oversight of—and the right to intervene in—financial management and budgetary and expenditure issues.<sup>43</sup> But while this model may be adopted elsewhere, it is an exception rather than a rule at present.

The relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding thus remains convoluted. The need to manage an expanding array of security, humanitarian, political, and economic tasks has had two, apparently contradictory, effects on peace operations in recent years. The first is centripetal. There has been an emphasis, especially within the UN system, on the need to integrate the activities of international agencies so as to give them clear strategic direction. This is sometimes a matter of rhetoric rather than substance: a recent report commissioned by the UN Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs found a “very general assumption that integration is the way of the future,” but “little specific agreement about what compromises an integrated mission in practice.”<sup>44</sup> In the UN system, Kofi Annan has emphasized the primacy of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General in making strategy. Although this is not necessarily honored in the field, it has been mirrored in other organizations. The EU, for example,

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<sup>37</sup> United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000, p. 7.

<sup>38</sup> See Richard Haass, *The Opportunity: America’s Moment to Alter History’s Course* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005); Ian Johnstone, “Consolidating Peace: Priorities and Deliberative Processes,” in Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007).

<sup>39</sup> Michael Barnett, “Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States After War,” *International Security* 30, no. 4 (2006): 89.

<sup>40</sup> For a summary of the debate, see Richard Ponzio, “Tracking Political Authority: UN Democratic Peacebuilding in Afghanistan (2001–05),” paper presented at the 19th annual meeting of the Academic Council of the United Nations System, 8–10 June 2006.

<sup>41</sup> Anna Khakee and Nicolas Florquin, *Kosovo and the Gun: A Baseline Assessment of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Kosovo* (UNDP, June 2003), p. 11.

<sup>42</sup> Ploughshares, *Armed Conflicts Report: Haiti* (updated January 2006), available at [www.ploughshares.ca](http://www.ploughshares.ca); on SALW proliferation see generally Keith Krause, “Small Arms and Light Weapons: Towards Global Public Policy,” *Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series*, International Peace Academy, New York, March 2007.

<sup>43</sup> See Renata Dwan and Laura Bailey, *Liberia Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP)*, (New York/Washington DC: United Nations/World Bank, 2006).

<sup>44</sup> Espen Barth Eide, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent and Karin von Hippel, *Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations* (Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group, May 2005), summarized in *Annual Review 2006*, p. 24.

has bolstered the roles of its own Special Representatives. In Bosnia, Paddy Ashdown (simultaneously the High Representative and European Special Representative) was given “political oversight of the EU police and peacekeeping missions and huge de facto influence over reform priorities and related conditionality. He . . . also played a major role in informally coordinating EU positions in the IMF, World Bank, UN and NATO towards Bosnia.”<sup>45</sup>

While peacebuilding may offer a coherent framework for peacekeeping in theory, international capacities, however, remain splintered in practice. Efforts to provide strategic guidance in spite of this have won international support in recent years, most obviously through the decision of the 2005 World Summit to establish a Peacebuilding Commission and Support Office within the UN. But while this appeared to be an affirmation of the High-level Panel’s emphasis on the topic’s importance, it should not be assumed that the primacy of peacebuilding is now secure. Following Timor-Leste’s reversion to violence in May 2006, US ambassador to the UN John Bolton argued that “there is no argument that UN forces should stay in a country . . . forever.”<sup>46</sup> He added that “responsibility and democratic control of your own government means doing it on your own.” While this might be read as confirming the need for capacity-building, it might also act as the basis for avoiding entanglement in peacebuilding altogether. Donors remain wary of the long-term costs associated with reconstructing states: between 2000 and 2003, for example, international grants to Kosovo fell from €161 million to €25 million, while reconstruction assistance from international NGOs dropped from €635 million to €270 million.<sup>47</sup> While the NATO force in Kosovo was being drawn down in manpower terms, resources for peacebuilding were thus also in decline. This dual reduction of international involvement engendered economic pessimism and violence.<sup>48</sup>

Moreover, a second, centrifugal effect can be observed in current peace operations. The variety of challenges in post-conflict countries is now often matched by the diversity of non-military operations deployed to respond to them. Thus in the Democratic

Republic of Congo, the UN’s MONUC is co-located with two separate small EU missions handling police training and SSR issues, plus an EU military force. In Iraq, the US-led multinational force is supported by a 150-strong NATO military training mission, the UN’s own assistance mission, and—remotely—an EU legal training team. In Haiti, MINUSTAH involvement in elections was predicated on a registration process conducted by personnel from the Organization of American States.

The widespread emphasis on integration is thus off-set by the distribution of peacebuilding tasks among such operations: of the fifty-four UN and non-UN peace operations listed in the 2006 *SIPRI Yearbook*, forty were deployed in countries or territories hosting at least one other mission.<sup>49</sup> We have already noted that missions may be co-located where there is a need to mix military and police security provision, and in some cases, such as Côte d’Ivoire, two missions may undertake military activities simultaneously. However, a majority of cases of co-location involve political, civilian, or training missions operating alongside larger, military forces. This is particularly significant where those military forces are engaged in robust and potentially unpopular operations—an issue that we now address in the context of the challenge of terrorism.

### Peacekeeping and the “War on Terrorism”

Our third perspective places peace operations in the context of the post-9/11 strategic environment, and often specifically US strategy and the “global insurgency” of radical Islamism.<sup>50</sup> It stresses the extent to which current large-scale peace operations are now deployed in countries where the US and its allies face what they consider to be terrorist threats. The most obvious examples are Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon, but the phenomenon may spread: there have been threats by al-Qaeda to attack UN troops in Darfur and Islamist opposition to a peace force in Somalia. As a result, both UN and non-UN peace operations could increasingly face violent opposition from terrorist groups even if their mandates are not explicitly counter-terrorist (as tragically demonstrated by the

<sup>45</sup> Julian Braithwaite, “State-building and the European Union,” in Malcolm Chalmers, ed., *Global Europe Report 3: Rescuing the State: Europe’s Next Challenge* (Foreign Policy Centre, British Council, 2005), p. 36.

<sup>46</sup> Evelyn Leopold, “Bolton Opposes Need for UN Peacekeepers in Timor,” *Reuters*, June 19, 2006.

<sup>47</sup> Economic Strategy and Project Identification Group, *Towards a Kosovo Development Plan: The State of the Kosovo Economy and Possible Ways Forward*, ESPIG Policy Paper No. 1, Pristina, August 2004, p. 8.

<sup>48</sup> Richard Gowan, “Kosovo: In Search of a Public Order Strategy,” in *Annual Review* 2006, p. 27.

<sup>49</sup> *SIPRI Yearbook 2006*, pp. 164–182. “Territories” is used here to denote the fact that some missions (such as UNMOGIP and the EU Monitoring Mission in the Balkans) are deployed in two or more countries, while others are confined to limited parts of a country (such as KFOR in Kosovo).

<sup>50</sup> John Mackinlay, *Defeating Complex Insurgency: Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan* (London: RUSI, 2005), p. xi.

2003 bombing of the UN’s compound in Iraq).

On this strategic logic, peace operations are likely to be heavily influenced by US concerns. In spite of the administration’s earlier skepticism towards peacekeeping, the 2006 US *National Security Strategy* thus highlights the need for multilateral efforts to address the fact that “recent experience has underscored that the international community does not have enough high-quality military forces trained and capable of performing these peace operations.”<sup>51</sup> The significance of US choices to current peace operations cannot be doubted. Washington not only pays 26.7 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget, but also has (*inter alia*) provided training and funding for regional and subregional peace operations in Africa, and has driven the gradual transformation of NATO into a global rather than merely regional deployer. It has been reported that at various points in the run-up to and immediate aftermath of the Iraq War, US policy-makers thought that either Arab or Indian forces might contribute to a peace force there; some commentators still hope that “the United Nations might obtain...five contingents of 3,000 men each from Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt” to fill the gap.<sup>52</sup>

Nonetheless, situating peace operations in the context of the war on terrorism is not that great an extension from recent trends. As discussed above, the effective “protection of civilians” often requires robust military action against spoilers. Moreover, a number of recent missions—UN and non-UN—have taken on operational aspects of counter-insurgency, and these include missions very unlikely to encounter radical Islamist threats. We have cited the traditional military complaint that peacekeeping demands that “forces are dispersed, not concentrated,” but it is possible to cite recent cases in which the UN has concentrated its forces to take on specific opponents. These include Sierra Leone, where UNAMSIL was mandated to “deter and, where necessary, decisively counter the threat” posed by Revolutionary United Front (RUF); the Democratic Republic of Congo, where MONUC is instructed “to use all necessary means” against militias in the east; and Haiti, where UN forces have engaged in fairly intensive operations against urban

gangs.

The need to develop a capacity for peace enforcement against these sorts of threats has been on and off the UN agenda since Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s *Agenda for Peace*.<sup>53</sup> But the central doctrinal issue raised by the failures in Somalia and Bosnia and highlighted in the 1995 *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* was the blurring of the line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement: are they “alternative techniques” or “adjacent points on a continuum, permitting easy transition from one to another”?<sup>54</sup> The implicit answer in the Brahimi Report is that they are on a continuum, and while transition from one to another may not be easy, UN operations must be prepared to deal effectively with spoilers: they must have bigger and better equipped forces “able to pose a credible deterrent threat in contrast to the non-threatening presence that characterizes traditional peacekeeping.”<sup>55</sup> This was reaffirmed by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which stated forthrightly that the distinction between Chapter VI peacekeeping and Chapter VII peace enforcement is “misleading,” and that the difference between the two should not be exaggerated. “There is a distinction between operations in which the robust use of force is integral to the mission from the outset...and operations in which there is a reasonable expectation that force may not be needed.” But the usual practice now is to give both a Chapter VII mandate, on the understanding that even the most benign environment can turn sour.<sup>56</sup> The need for robust contingents for peace enforcement has been loudly echoed by other organizations, as in the EU’s proposal for battlegroups intended, in part, to reinforce beleaguered UN missions.

But if peace operations are coming to resemble counter-insurgency, and if the tool is going to be enlisted more actively in the war on terrorism, then the doctrinal issue is quite different. The line being blurred is not between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, but peace enforcement and war. What are US, British, Canadian, and Dutch ISAF troops doing in Afghanistan? Are they engaged in a peace operation, where force may be used for limited purposes, such as protecting civilians or enforcing

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<sup>51</sup> *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (March, 2006), p. 16.

<sup>52</sup> George S. McGovern and William R. Polk, “The Way out of War,” *Harper’s*, October 2006, p. 32.

<sup>53</sup> See Ian Johnstone, Benjamin Cary Tortolani and Richard Gowan, “The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Unfinished Business,” *Die Friedens-Warte*, 80, 2006.

<sup>54</sup> United Nations, *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* (1995), UN Doc. A/50/60 - S/1995/1, January 3, 1995, para. 36.

<sup>55</sup> *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (2000), paras. 21 and 51.

<sup>56</sup> *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, paras. 211–213.

compliance with a peace agreement? Or are they engaged in war, where the objective is to defeat an identified enemy?<sup>57</sup> And if they are engaged in both, as seems to be the case, is it possible to transition back and forth between the two without undermining the effectiveness of the peace operation?

### Overlapping Perspectives and Hybrid Peace Operations

The three strategic perspectives we have considered are all both incomplete and overlapping: none can fully explain the evolution of peacekeeping, and many current missions are expected to carry out a mixture of protection, peacebuilding, and counter-insurgency. As we have seen, this complexity of purpose frequently translates into institutional complications, meaning that hybrid peace operations (those incorporating personnel and missions from a range of organizational, national, and ad hoc origins) will continue to be important. This is increasingly accepted by policy-makers: in 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali played down the role of regional organizations in *An Agenda for Peace*, for example, but the 2005 World Summit made a specific and favorable reference to “the efforts of the European Union and other regional entities to develop capacities such as for rapid deployment, standby and bridging arrangements.”<sup>58</sup> As Bruce Jones and Feryal Cherif have argued, if there is a trend towards hybrid operations, “the central concern should be with the quality of capacity provided for any given conflict responses, not the organizational framework through which the response is provided.”<sup>59</sup>

Yet, the protection of civilians, peacekeeping as a prelude to “nation-building,” and peace operations that spill over into counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism all raise normative as well as operational concerns. Whose agenda is being served by these trends? How widespread is the consensus behind them? If capacity is a constraint and hybrid operations are the solution, the form these operations take, who participates, who authorizes them and to whom they are accountable all matter. Institutional complexity may be a pragmatic and innovative response to operational challenges, but it should not be allowed to overshadow the political and normative choices these arrangements represent. If, for example, the African Union is committed on paper to protecting civilians

in need, that is not a license for any state or organization with the capacity to intervene to do so. If participatory governance is widely viewed as central to effective peacebuilding, that does not justify speedy democratization at all costs, let alone at the point of a gun. If counter-terrorism is now a security priority for many states and international organizations (including the UN), that does not mean that troop contributing countries are all sanguine about the blurring line between peace enforcement and war.

Nonetheless, if we are to make any predictions concerning likely capacities for future peace operations, it is necessary to consider the institutional and informal frameworks that may generate those capacities in particular regions. Hybrid operations between the UN and regional organizations may become more common, for example, but this insight has little predictive power unless one distinguishes between the EU, AU, OAS, and other entities. The remainder of this paper surveys the current political geography of peace operations, and their likely development, on a region-by-region basis.

### Mapping Peace Operations and Capabilities

To map current peace operations and capacities for peacekeeping, it is necessary to consider not only specific regions but a variety of institutional arrangements that only partially correspond with geography. At present, UN-mandated peace operations include missions launched under the command of the UN itself; missions launched by regional and subregional organizations within their own area (such as the AU mission in Darfur); missions launched by regional organizations outside their own areas (such as the EU deployments in Congo and Aceh); and operations by ad hoc coalitions and single nations. Some significant institutional players such as NATO and the OSCE cover regions so broad—or broadly defined—as to defy easy definitions of regionalism.

Nonetheless, it is possible to consider specific regions according to a series of criteria to roughly assess their need for, and provision of, peacekeeping capacity. These include the existence of current deployments; significant national and institutional military and non-military resources; and capacity-

<sup>57</sup> “In Afghanistan, Canadian troops are not engaged in peacekeeping,” one Ottawa-based columnist complained in early March 2006. “They are involved on one side in a civil war.” J. Laxer, “Why Canada Should Get Out of Afghanistan,” *Toronto Globe and Mail*, March 5, 2006.

<sup>58</sup> United Nations, *2005 World Summit Outcome*, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, September 16, 2005, p. 23.

<sup>59</sup> Bruce Jones with Feryal Cherif, *Evolving Models of Peacekeeping: Policy Implications and Responses* (United Nations, 2004), p. 25.



building programs that may shape future capabilities. We will consider five regions: Europe and the North Atlantic area; the Middle East; Africa; Asia and the Pacific; and Latin America and the Caribbean.

### **Europe and the North Atlantic Area**

It may be controversial to treat Europe and North America as a single region. But as we noted at the beginning of this essay, much debate on peace operations prior to the Iraq War concerned the balance of responsibilities between Europe and the United States (this was itself a new phase in a much older debate about transatlantic burden-sharing dating back to the 1940s). In the 1990s, US and European forces were drawn into the Balkans in large numbers, and this had a significant effect on institutional structures as well as national commitments. The aftermath of Yugoslavia's collapse drew the UN into Europe, but also significantly damaged its credibility there. While the UN remains in Kosovo, it is planning for its likely departure, preparing to yield the field to NATO, the OSCE, and the EU. In turn, NATO's role in European peacekeeping is shrinking due to a US desire to deploy troops elsewhere, and the EU's desire to develop a strategic presence in its vicinity. Meanwhile, the OSCE's rapid operational growth in the 1990s has largely given way to stasis—while it still fielded ten missions in 2006, only one of these had been initially mandated later than 1999.<sup>60</sup>

The EU has begun to take on both the military duties in Europe previously associated with NATO (specifically through operations in Macedonia and Bosnia) and the policing and civilian roles linked to the UN and OSCE (as in its police mission to Bosnia, border-monitoring in Moldova and a justice mission in Georgia). In so doing, it has not displaced the other organizations entirely: NATO is expected to maintain military security in Kosovo for some time to come, and NATO command structures continue to service the EU troops in Bosnia. It has not been suggested that EU take over the role of UNOMIG in Georgia. Nonetheless, these missions rely heavily on troops and financial support from EU members, and much of the financial aid necessary for peacebuilding comes from EU member states and the European Commission. The only significant US peacekeeping unit now in

Europe is in Kosovo, and consists of 1,500 national guards.

But this Europeanization of peacekeeping within Europe is off-set by the growing commitment of the US, EU, and NATO to peacekeeping deployments beyond the continent. NATO's largest single deployment is in Afghanistan. Of the twelve EU missions underway in the last quarter of 2006, half were outside Europe. In spite of EUFOR R.D. Congo, and the earlier *Operation Artemis* to the same country, long-range European deployments are typically civilian and involve monitoring (as in Aceh and Gaza) or security sector or justice reform (as in the Congo and Iraq). By contrast, NATO has continued to focus on military operations. The primary conduits for European military involvement in long-range peacekeeping as of early 2006 were NATO's mission in Afghanistan and the Iraq coalition. Eleven EU members were contributing to the latter.<sup>61</sup>

While the new European contribution to UNIFIL II alters this picture, five significant questions concerning European and US contributions stand out. The first centers on the relations with the UN: how far will the Lebanese experience, combined with close cooperation between EU and UN troops in the Congo, affect Western attitudes to operating within UN frameworks? A 2004 EU-UN paper on Cooperation in Military Crisis Management Operations argued that the use of EU reinforcements to back up beleaguered UN forces must “involve complicated coordination” and so be “limited in its usability.”<sup>62</sup> It remains to be seen whether tactical coordination in Kinshasa and strategic coordination in New York will develop a greater degree of EU-UN interoperability.

This issue points to a second question, which is to what extent the EU, having pursued both military and civilian missions will now balance its priorities. In spite of the largely civilian and policing profile of its missions to date, the EU has emphasized its development of military assets, such as the battlegroups for rapid insertion into crisis zones. But there is some evidence that this military focus is creating strains within the Union. The European Council took three months to approve this year's Congo deployment, and it is clear some member states remain wary of long-

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<sup>60</sup> *SIPRI Yearbook 2006*—the exception being an advisory mission in Serbia and Montenegro. For an analysis of the OSCE's present position, see Pál Dunay, “The OSCE in Crisis,” Chaillot Paper no. 88, Institute of Security Studies, April 2006.

<sup>61</sup> Christopher Langton, ed., *The Military Balance 2006* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies and Routledge, 2006), p. 192.

<sup>62</sup> Richard Gowan, “The Battlegroups: A Concept in Search of a Strategy,” in Sven Biscop, ed., “E Pluribus Unum? Military Integration in the European Union,” Egmont Paper 7, Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB), Brussels, June 2005, p. 16.

range deployments—a Czech-Slovak battlegroup, scheduled for 2009, will “not [be] equipped for Africa or arctic missions.”<sup>63</sup> While there may thus be significant political obstacles to launching European missions with tough counter-insurgency and protection mandates, it may be easier for the EU to promote largely civilian peacebuilding activities.

Political doubts over long-range deployments among European governments also raise a third question over the future capabilities role of NATO as well as the EU. As we have noted, the Alliance’s adoption of a de facto counter-insurgency role in Afghanistan raised questions over whether it was being dragged into a civil war. On the ground, the force has been hampered by national caveats on the use of troops, as was KFOR in Kosovo—the Pentagon complained in September 2006 that only six of NATO’s twenty members placed no such limitations on the use of their soldiers.<sup>64</sup> These problems have been exacerbated by a lack of high-tech resources such as helicopters and a shortage of strategic capacities such as lift: while EU member-states have approximately 2 million troops under arms, they can only deploy some 100,000 of these externally. Both NATO and the EU have struggled to improve their capacities, and EU members are attempting to achieve military and civilian “headline goals” to improve their capabilities by 2010 and 2008 respectively. But the defense expenditure among NATO members (excluding the US) has fallen from a combined total of 2.42 percent of GDP in 1995 to 1.87 percent today.<sup>65</sup>

There is thus an outstanding question over whether NATO and the EU will expand their resources to take on new missions. And this points to our fourth question: whether the US, having drawn back from institutionalized peace operations prior to Iraq, will or will not return to them in the future. Current trends are confusing. At the beginning of 2006, it was rumored in Washington that the Bush administration wanted “to be able to form ‘coalitions of the willing’ more efficiently for dealing with future conflicts rather than turning to existing but unreliable institutional alliances such as NATO.”<sup>66</sup> But as the Alliance has deployed into Afghanistan, the US has now placed 12,000 troops under its control—the

largest American force under a non-American field commander since Kosovo. Just as there are outstanding questions over how European troops will deploy under UN and EU flags, it remains to be seen how the US will operate with NATO.

The Euro-Atlantic area thus faces questions left unresolved before the Iraq war: the balance between counter-insurgency and peacebuilding in its strategies and the nature of burden-sharing between the US and Europe, complicated by their institutional options. The focus of these debates has moved from the Balkans to the Middle East and Africa.

### The Middle East

The peacekeeping geography of the broader Middle East has altered radically over the last five years. Prior to the American interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, peace operations in the region were largely confined to the UN’s three long-standing inter-positional missions (UNTSO, UNDOF, and UNIFIL) and the non-UN Multinational Force of Observers in Sinai. As we have noted, these operations represented the main loci for European and US peacekeepers outside Europe, but their mandates and ambitions remained limited. These were primarily military missions (in late 2005, UNDOF’s 1,030 troops were accompanied by just 37 international civilians) and they did not engage in the complex peacebuilding emerging in Europe and Africa.<sup>67</sup>

Three sets of events have upset this situation: First, the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq initiated two large-scale stability operations, in which large-scale military forces have provided a framework for faltering efforts at peacebuilding. Second, the Israel-Palestine peace process has prompted smaller-scale EU peace operations aimed at compensating for the weakness of the Palestinian Authority: these include a police support operation and border monitors at the economically crucial crossing-point at Rafah, Gaza. Finally, the 2006 hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah have prompted a rapid expansion of the UN presence in Lebanon, supported by naval monitoring. In all three cases there has been a clear shift towards state-building, but as we have noted in previous sections, there is also an all-too-obvious

<sup>63</sup> Radek Khol, “Czech Perspective on European Integration and Security,” *Kernvraag* 134, p. 89.

<sup>64</sup> Jim Michaels, “Nations Limit Use of NATO Troops,” *USA Today*, September 29, 2006.

<sup>65</sup> Langton, *Military Balance*, p. 56.

<sup>66</sup> Tobias Buck and Guy Dinmore, “US Sees Coalitions of the Willing as Best Ally in Times of Conflict,” *Financial Times*, January 5, 2006.

<sup>67</sup> See *Annual Review*, p. 128—by contrast, the UN’s residual presence of 1,396 troops in Sierra Leone was accompanied by 218 international civilians plus 83 UN volunteers.

counter-insurgency element to these operations—be it actual as in Afghanistan and Iraq, or potential as in Lebanon.

The future of this new generation of missions in the broader Middle East is currently extremely unpredictable. In Afghanistan, NATO’s field commander publicly stated in October 2006 that the country was at a “tipping point” and that his forces had six months to prevent a major shift of support to the Taliban.<sup>68</sup> It is possible that further severe violence against international forces may lead to a significant retraction in Western-led peace operations in the region.

In this context it is worth underlining the simple fact that the vast majority of peacekeeping personnel in the Middle East come from outside it. While we have noted that US policy-makers have been hopeful that the UN might mobilize Arab forces for Iraq, there is no tradition of Arab forces engaging in peace operations in their immediate vicinity. This clearly reflects the politics of the long-standing deployments on Israel’s borders, although Qatar has recently broken with precedent to provide three hundred troops to UNIFIL II.<sup>69</sup> Aside from Iraq, it has been mooted that Egyptian police might be deployed into Palestinian Authority areas alongside the EU’s missions—Cairo has contributed forces to the UN mission in Sudan, indicating its interest in peace operations in its neighbors. But Jordan is the only Arab state with extensive peacekeeping experience, and questions remain on capacities for regional deployments.

Given this limited capacity, it also remains to be seen how the external organizations now engaged in operations in the Middle East will balance their responsibilities. NATO’s deployment to Afghanistan and the EU’s presence in Palestine seemed to suggest that the UN’s operational role in the region was in decline. Its political significance seemed more secure, given the role of its political missions in Afghanistan and Iraq and long-standing mediation role in conflicts involving Israel, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority. With the case of Lebanon, it was invested again with a major operational challenge for largely political reasons—although many observers argued that UNIFIL should be replaced by a non-UN-commanded force, this was unacceptable to Beirut. The actual mission structure is a compromise, supported by a *sui generis* strategic cell in New York. It thus seems likely that the evolution of peace

operations in the Middle East will promote further complex hybrid arrangements within and between international organizations.

Nonetheless, these problems of building internal and external peacekeeping capacities for the region may well be overshadowed by ongoing debate about the aims of operations there. Iraq and Afghanistan have represented particular challenges to the already frayed assumption that a mixture of elections and security sector reform are a solid initial base for peacebuilding. We have noted that UNIFIL has been tasked with supporting the Lebanese armed forces and the EU is working with Palestinian police. Yet in operational environments characterized by ongoing violent political competition, the viability of peacebuilding strategies based on constructing strong central governments remains to be ascertained.

### **Africa**

In spite of the recent expansion of peacekeeping in the Middle East, Africa remains an equally complicated theater for peace operations. It differs from the Middle East in that it is not only a region of significant deployments, but contains a number of major deployers and has developed a complex indigenous peacekeeping architecture. Nonetheless, the capacity of that architecture to manage current and future challenges is unconfirmed, and there are still questions on the distribution of responsibilities between the UN, AU, subregional organizations such as ECOWAS, and individual states. The latter include not only regional powers, such as South Africa and Nigeria, but the former colonial powers Britain and France. We have already seen how these powers are channeling peacekeeping efforts through the EU and NATO, but they continue to play independent roles in Africa outside both European and African security structures, as in Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Chad.

Nonetheless, European donors and the US have been broadly supportive of developing both the UN and other organizations as the primary peacekeeping agents in recent years. Since 1999, the SC has mandated seven UN missions in Africa, and these have increasingly been large-scale missions: of the five UN missions fielding more than 5,000 troops at the end of 2005, four were in Africa. In military terms, the largest were those in the Democratic Republic of Congo

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<sup>68</sup> Associated Press, “General Warns of Afghan Defection,” *Financial Times*, October 9, 2006.

<sup>69</sup> “Qatar Pledges Troops for Lebanon,” *BBC News Online*, September 4, 2006. It should be noted that Turkey also pledged troops to UNIFIL, having not previously been a significant contributor to UN operations.

(MONUC, then at 15,369) and Liberia (UNMIL: 14,674).<sup>70</sup> The development of these missions has required a fusion of African and external capabilities:

At of the end of December 2004, almost 25,000 of the nearly 58,000 military personnel who were participating in the current 17 UN peacekeeping operations were from the twenty-two African troop-contributing nations. (African nations provided over half of the military personnel—roughly 24,000 of 47,000—in the seven UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.) Africa's military contribution to UN peacekeeping at the end of 2004 was over double that at the end of 2000 . . . African contributions to the UN international civilian police pool (CIVPOL) remained just about the same over those four years: 1,213 in December 2004 (of a total of 6,765 from all nations) compared to 1,088 in December 2000.<sup>71</sup>

While the majority of Africans deployed on UN operations thus remained on the continent, they continue to receive considerable external reinforcement through the UN. The extent to which this is true varies between missions. In late 2005, half of the top ten contributors to UNMIL were African states (Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, Namibia and Senegal), accounting for 6,837 troops, 45 percent of the total force.<sup>72</sup> By contrast, four of the top ten contributors to MONUC were African (South Africa, Morocco, Senegal and Ghana), but they provided only 3,133 troops or 21 percent of the force total.<sup>73</sup> The repetition of Ghana and Senegal in both lists points to a further capacity issue: African peacekeepers tend to come from a relatively small number of states—in 2004, 98 percent of African troops in UN missions came from just ten states combined.<sup>74</sup>

There has thus been significant international concentration on expanding the pool of African troops available for peace operations. The G8's Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)—initiated by the US—has set a target of 75,000 troops trained for peace operations to be met by 2010, with a particular emphasis on African forces. It is likely that these forces

will require ongoing international support: defense expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa has fallen from 2.53 percent of GDP in 1999 to 1.69 percent today.<sup>75</sup> But where money has been earmarked by donors for building and sustaining African capacities, difficulties have been encountered in devising and implementing suitable projects, and there is widespread agreement on the need to develop more effective funding channels.

But this raises further debates: what capacities should the AU and subregional organizations aim to build? The GPOI has concentrated on military training, and to a lesser extent training *gendarmerie*. But as we have noted, the AU has deployed over 1,500 civilian police to Darfur. In the spring of 2006, it deployed a mixture of military, police, and civilian monitors to oversee elections in Comoros. Questions have been raised over whether African organizations should concentrate on military development or the full range of tasks necessary for peacekeeping as a precondition for peacebuilding. ECOWAS has, for example, argued that it should develop a range of tools covering issues such as security sector reform. Yet donors have not taken a coordinated approach to this, and some argue that it risks duplication across organizations.<sup>76</sup>

This question of capacities has spilled over into questions of hybrid activities and the sequencing of peace missions. In 1999 and 2000, ECOWAS and the UN failed to reach a satisfactory hybrid arrangement in Sierra Leone, causing the former to withdraw its troops and the latter to come under a major attack by the RUF. By contrast, 2004 saw a smooth transition from the AU to the UN in Burundi. Progress on a similar transition in Darfur has created some inter-institutional frictions—including political as well as technical problems—but has also resulted in notable innovations. As it became increasingly clear that there were political obstacles to the rapid replacement of AMIS by a UN force, the UN devised new plans to insert a preliminary support package into AMIS, so as to initiate a phased transition to a hybrid AU-UN force structure.

Meanwhile, the planning and technical support provided by the EU and NATO to the AU in Darfur has raised questions about the best routes for direct

<sup>70</sup> Johnstone, Jones and Gowan, "Annual Review: Briefing Paper," p. 3.

<sup>71</sup> Nina Serafino, *The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress* (Congressional Research Service, February 2005), p. 7.

<sup>72</sup> *Annual Review*, p. 209.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 236.

<sup>74</sup> Serafino, *Global Peace Operations Initiative*.

<sup>75</sup> Langton, *Military Balance*, p. 350.

<sup>76</sup> For an overview of donor relations with ECOWAS, see Bastien Nivet, "Security by Proxy? The EU and (Sub-)Regional Organisations: the Case of ECOWAS", Occasional Paper no. 63, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, March 2006



European support to African missions. If events in the Middle East have spawned complex institutional compromises, therefore, African conflicts are also driving new experiments in hybrid cooperation. As before, we should note that these experiments are rarely the preferred option for mission planners: innovation is often a response to political and operational constraints rather than the implementation of strategies for better peacekeeping.

### **Asia and the Pacific**

If the political circumstances of Africa and the Middle East are thus nurturing hybrid options, those of Asia and the Pacific have done likewise. This vast region represents something of a paradox in terms of global peacekeeping capacities: it is the single largest contributor of personnel to UN missions, but UN deployments within it remain limited. This has led to a surprising variety of institutional arrangements. In Indonesia, the EU has partnered with five members of ASEAN on the Aceh Monitoring Mission. In Sri Lanka, Nordic monitors are deployed without a specific institutional mandate. The Organization of the Islamic Conference has observers in the Philippines; and as we have noted, Australia has launched a number of operations in the Pacific.

In many of these cases—Aceh, Sri Lanka and the Philippines—the missions are small-scale and have limited mandates to observe political processes. In Asia, the concept of peacekeeping as a precursor for peacebuilding or state-building has largely won traction only in Australia’s area of action: most obviously Timor-Leste, but also the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea.<sup>77</sup> The latter cases have a strong emphasis on policing.

By contrast, Asian states continue to contribute to much larger-scale peace operations elsewhere. Up until recently, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh collectively contributed roughly a third of UN forces; and they still remain its top three troop contributors after the growth of peacekeeping forces following the crisis in Lebanon. However, there is also a new generation of Asian contributors emerging. These include Indonesia, which has pledged 1,000 troops to UNIFIL II and had previously been reported to have offered a similar number of police for Darfur. Malaysia also assigned 360 troops to the Lebanon mission. Yet the new force in Asian peacekeeping that has gained most

attention is China. Even before the Lebanon crisis, Beijing had more than doubled its military and police contributions to the UN to over 1,660 personnel in less than a year, building on an earlier increase in 2004. It then committed a further 1,000 troops to UNIFIL, although the mission’s operational requirements meant that only 400 of these were eventually dispatched. Having broken with precedent to send soldiers to carry out peaceful tasks in Iraq, Japan is another potential resource.

While African and European forces are thus very heavily committed to peace operations at present, it is possible that Asia and China in particular will be able to expand contributions in the future. But this may have as yet unforeseen political ramifications: for long-standing political reasons, both China and Japan might find it difficult to deploy their troops in robust roles. Prior to its UNIFIL commitment, China had focused on providing engineers, medical personnel, and police but not infantry to the UN. In Iraq, other coalition forces were tasked with protecting the Japanese contingent. And while Japan remains close to the US, China has raised doubts about the viability of a robust peace operation in Darfur. While Asia may thus be a potential source of troops, they may be deployed on a selective basis, reflecting precise mandates.

### **Latin America and the Caribbean**

While continental Latin America has never been a theater for significant peacekeeping, Central America and the Caribbean were a major locale for UN action at the end of the Cold War, including missions to El Salvador, Guatemala, and (repeatedly) Haiti. Today the only UN operation in the region is that in Haiti, where the Organization of American States also has a small mission. The OAS also has a limited number of monitors in Colombia. While regional demand for peacekeeping is thus limited, it has nonetheless had the effect of increasing Latin American contributions to peacekeeping. Of the top ten contributors to MINUSTAH in Haiti, half are Latin American (Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, and Peru), accounting for 3,299 troops or 53 percent of the force strength.<sup>78</sup> Some of these countries—especially Argentina and Uruguay—are also significant deployers in Africa and Europe, and not only with the UN (Argentina has 113 troops under NATO command in Kosovo).<sup>79</sup> However, it is arguable that while Haiti is presently the

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<sup>77</sup> An exception in the 1990s being UNTAC in Cambodia.

<sup>78</sup> *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006*, p. 191.

<sup>79</sup> Langton, *Military Balance*, p. 330.

main locus for Latin American peacekeeping, it may help stimulate further out-of-area operations.

## Conclusions and Policy Options

This paper opened with a caution against attempting to make excessively detailed predictions on the future of peace operations. Nonetheless, we can bring together the thematic, global and regional trends we have discussed here to suggest a number of policy options for the UN and the international community in sustaining peacekeeping in the medium term. At a time of increased demand for peacekeepers, making the choices on these options is essential to avoid overstretch.

### Thematic Concerns

1. The UN has reemerged as the single most significant organizational actor in peacekeeping on a global scale, and its current deployments in Haiti, Timor-Leste and southern Lebanon show that its role is not necessarily confined to Africa. However, the UN does not and cannot have a monopoly over peace operations, and must continue to explore ways to better coordinate hybrid operations with other institutions such as the AU, EU, and NATO. Ultimately, hybrid operations are liable to evolve on a case-by-case basis, but they can be better prepared through creating enhanced liaison mechanisms and formal processes for initiating and implementing cooperation.

2. So as to sustain the coherence of its own operations and cooperate better with partner organizations, the UN needs to clarify and develop its peacekeeping doctrine further. A particularly fraught area remains the use of force in peace operations—and this is of great significance in hybrid operations where the UN may provide a non-military component alongside a separate military force (as in Kosovo and Timor-Leste). Given the potential blurring of the line between peace enforcement and war in operations such as Afghanistan, a doctrine for “peace enforcement” as the use of robust force for limited purposes—short of defeating an enemy—must be developed.

3. However, the UN and other actors should not allow the recent surge in military-led peace operations to obscure the need for further exploration of non-military priorities in peacekeeping. This requires a greater understanding of the options for establishing

transitional security, transitional justice, and transitional governance (including economic governance) in the relatively limited periods during which most peace operations deploy—and bearing in mind the inevitable limitations on their resources. A more realistic analysis of “what peacekeeping can really do” is necessary if future operations are not to be overburdened with unrealistic mandates. And here again, doctrine or “guidance” for the non-military components of peace operations must be developed.

4. The ongoing increase in the importance of policing in peace operations should be factored into the capacity-building and operational planning of the UN and other organizations. The significance of cultural awareness to good policing means that it is an area in which regional and subregional organizations have a significant role to play. However, the UN can now draw on considerable experience in police operations (including the use of formed police units) to offer a framework for future operations. This framework often needs to include a well-delineated distinction and careful coordination between military and police roles, relating to the issue of force raised above.

5. In recognizing the time and resource limitations faced by most peace operations, it is necessary to ask how effectively peacekeepers can engage in long-term processes of SSR. Where an operation is expected to deploy for only a few years, it may be best for actors outside the mission (be they other organizations or bilateral actors) to take on operational SSR duties from the start, while coordinating with the mission on security sector governance.

### Institutional Issues

1. The international community needs to continue its efforts to develop African peacekeeping capacity, in spite of perceived set-backs in Darfur. The primary focus of this capacity-building (other than sustaining UN operations) is now the AU. While subregional organizations continue to have an important role to play on the continent, the AU provides a framework by which larger African countries can deploy troops beyond their own subregions (as in the ongoing Nigerian deployment in Darfur). The difficulties of relying on subregional arrangements have recently been demonstrated in efforts to devise a force for Somalia.

2. The increasing importance of East Asian and Latin American countries as significant contributors to

peace operations is an encouraging development. They offer new means to sustain UN operations, and there is an opportunity for dialogue between established and emerging peacekeeping actors on issues such as doctrine.

3. One area in which both established and emerging peacekeeping actors may be able to cooperate is the development of a more effective strategic reserve system for the UN, by which major troop contributors could keep forces on stand-by to reinforce operations under pressure at very short notice. For reasons of interoperability, it would be natural for established contributors such as India and Pakistan to have reinforcements available for their contingents wherever possible. However, emerging contributors might also be able to support this strategic reserve by offering specialized units to enable rapid and flexible deployments. Funding arrangements would have to be worked out so that those providing the strategic reserve do not bear the entire financial burden.

4. The EU has rapidly established itself as a significant actor in peace operations, capable of launching both

light-weight missions (as in Aceh and the Palestinian territories) and larger-scale multidimensional peacebuilding exercises (as in the Western Balkans). Its ability to field integrated military, police, and civilian missions, and the financial strength of the EU's members gives the organization a major comparative advantage. But the EU cannot “go it alone” in Africa and Asia, where it needs the legitimacy and support of the UN or other regional organizations. It should continue its experiments with hybrid operations, as in Aceh (with ASEAN), Darfur (with the AU), and the DRC (with the UN).

5. Given NATO's focus on military operations, it does not provide the best agency for long-term, multi-dimensional peace operations with a strong civilian component. However, its military focus means that it may be the only organization capable of sustaining operations like that in Afghanistan for some time to come. In its long transition from Cold War alliance to peacekeeping organization, NATO should continue to reach out to other entities—including the EU and UN—to plan for and implement complex missions in the toughest environments.

## Further Reading

Bellamy, Alex, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin. *Understanding Peacekeeping*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004.

*According to the authors of this treatise, a great deal has been written on the strengths, weaknesses, and experiences of peacekeeping, but little on what this tells us about global politics more generally. They seek to redress that imbalance by dividing opinions on the role of peacekeeping into Westphalian and post-Westphalian perspectives. In the former, stable peace is achieved by creating spaces and institutions for states to resolve their differences on the basis of consent; the latter sees the Westphalian order as collapsing and as a result, peacekeepers are in the business of rebuilding war-torn societies, if necessary without the consent of the government concerned. Two of the authors edited a volume along similar lines that first came out as a special issue of the journal *International Peacekeeping: A. Bellamy and P. Williams, Peace Operations and Global Order* (2005).*

Center on International Cooperation. *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* (Annual Series). Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006–.

*This yearly volume, launched in 2006, is best described as a “state of the world’s peacekeepers.” It combines case studies with extensive data on all UN and non-UN peace operations. Each volume leads with a thematic essay on a central issue facing peace operations in the year in review, as well as a strategic summary of all important developments. Other annual or biannual series that provide useful information on recent developments in peace operations include the Stockholm Peace Research Institute Yearbook and the Human Security Report.*

Chesterman, Simon. *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-Building*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

*This collection of essays focuses on one of the most striking developments in recent peace operations: the increasingly proactive role peacekeepers and peacebuilders play in rebuilding states. At the far end of the spectrum, these operations come in the form of international transitional administrations, where outsiders assume governing functions for a temporary period. But as the author points out, promoting the rule of law, running elections and assisting in economic reconstruction and many other elements of multidimensional operations entail external involvement in governance. Other works along similar lines include Roland Paris, *At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) and Richard Caplan, *International Governance in War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).*

Doyle, Michael and Nicholas Sambanis. *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

*This comprehensive examination of the effectiveness of peace operations is based on sophisticated empirical analysis. The authors identify three key factors that impact the prospects for success of a peace operation, in what they call the “peacebuilding triangle”: the level of hostility between the factions; the local capacities remaining after the war; and the level of international assistance. Their core finding is that the deeper the hostility and the less local capacity, the greater is the need for international assistance to establish a lasting peace. This, combined with qualitative analyses of a number of cases, leads them to propose a seven-step plan for effective peacebuilding, ranging from the establishment of internal security to fostering democratic participation and psychological reconciliation.*



Durch, William ed., *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, forthcoming 2007).

*This volume is the latest in a three-part series of case studies edited by Bill Durch. It contains essays on peace operations in Bosnia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan, with an introduction and conclusion by the editor. The earlier volumes are entitled The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Cases Studies and Comparative Analysis (1993) and UN Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (1996).*

Findlay, Trevor. *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

*Findlay's book offers a detailed examination of the evolution of one of the central doctrinal principles in peacekeeping: the limited use of force. Consistent with the Brahimi Report, the author argues for a more robust approach, entailing the use of force beyond self-defense. To that end, he makes the case for updating peacekeeping doctrine in the UN, which had not progressed much beyond recitation of the traditional principles: consent, impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defense.*

United Nations. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (the Brahimi Report) May 2000. UN Doc. A/55/305 – S/2000/809, August 21, 2000.

*This is the latest comprehensive statement on peace operations to come out of the United Nations. The report includes many recommendations aimed at building capacity to meet contemporary challenges, including the ability to act robustly against spoilers, an important doctrinal innovation. It is the starting point for a major effort currently underway in the UN to develop doctrine for the multiple tasks performed by modern peacekeepers. The recommendations of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* (December 2004) and the Secretary-General's own report to the World Summit, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All* (March 2005) reinforce the doctrinal and institutional implications of the Brahimi report.*

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