

DDR in Sudan: Too Little, Too Late?

By Ryan Nichols

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Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies

47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland

Edited by Diana Rodriguez and Emile LeBrun

Copy-edited by Alex Potter (fpcc@mtloaded.co.za)

Proofread by John Linnegar (johnlinnegar@gmail.com)

Typeset in Optima and Palatino by Richard Jones (rick@studioexile.com)

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List of abbreviations

CAAFG	Children associated with armed forces and groups
CBO	Community-based organization
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSAC	Community security and arms control
DD	Disarmament and demobilization
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
FAO	UN Food and Agriculture Organization
GIZ	German Society for International Cooperation
GNU	Government of National Unity
GoSS	Government of Southern Sudan
IDDRP	Interim Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programme
IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards
IP	Implementing partner
IUNDDR Unit	Integrated United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Unit
JIU	Joint Integrated Unit
MYDDRP	Multi-Year Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programme
NCP	National Congress Party
NDDRCC	National Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Coordination Council
NFI	Non-food item
NGO	Non-governmental organization

NSDDRC	Northern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Commission
OAG	Other Armed Group
PDF	Popular Defence Forces
PI	Public information
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SDG	Sudanese pound
SNG	Special Needs Group
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army
SSDDRC	Southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Commission
UN	United Nations
UNAMIS	United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
USD	US dollar
WAAFG	Women associated with armed forces and groups
WFP	World Food Programme

I. Introduction and key findings

More than six years have passed since the signing of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005, and yet the country's disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programme—a key element of the CPA—is still in a relatively early stage. After years of political wrangling and onerous planning, the DDR programme was finally launched in Northern Sudan in February 2009, and in August of that year in Southern Sudan. Backed by strong international support from the UN and the donor community, the DDR programme has confronted and endured numerous technical challenges yet continues to lumber ahead. Progress is steady, but slow; less than a quarter of the planned 180,000 ex-combatants have been demobilized and far fewer still have completed reintegration training.

While many of the problems encountered in the early phase of DDR are being addressed, stakeholders have now shifted their focus to the more fundamental concern of whether the overall strategy and design of the DDR programme, particularly in Southern Sudan, remains viable in its current form. Growing concerns among some parties have prompted stakeholders to re-examine both the structure of and the approach to the DDR programme. Given the additional political uncertainties related to the January 2011 referendum on Southern independence and the end of the interim period in July 2011, the parties recognize that this is an opportune moment to review progress and reflect on how best to move forward.

This *Working Paper* takes a critical look at the ongoing DDR programme in Sudan. It reviews the historical background of the programme as well as the key players working to implement it. It examines the programmatic design from a technical perspective and reviews progress to date as well as some of the noteworthy implementation challenges faced. It then examines the DDR programme at both the technical and the strategic levels in an attempt to assess whether its objectives are being achieved. Finally, the paper reflects on current efforts at and requirements for improving the programme, and speculates on the future of DDR in Sudan in 2011 and beyond.

It is important to note that this *Working Paper* is based on research and interviews conducted in September 2010, with relevant figures updated as of January 2011. The study does not address later developments related to the December 2010 Integrated United Nations DDR (IUNDDR) Unit review of the DDR programme or the UN Development Programme (UNDP) audit initiated in September 2010.

Key findings include the following:

- As of January 2011, less than half of Sudanese ex-combatants targeted for DDR have been demobilized, and fewer than 9 per cent of Northern forces—and 5 per cent of Southern forces—have completed reintegration training.
- Despite a very slow start and some technical challenges surrounding candidate verification and eligibility criteria at the outset, the demobilization process is now running relatively smoothly at an operational level, although scope remains for improving certain elements to maximize efficiency and effectiveness.
- The reintegration component is becoming more technically sound, despite existing shortcomings, but the overall strategy, approach, and scope of support remain a source of concern to national stakeholders, particularly in Southern Sudan.
- There is currently no international role in or oversight of the disarmament process, which remains internal to the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), despite UN efforts to provide support.
- A lack of SPLA buy-in, ownership, and confidence in the DDR programme is fundamentally undermining the programme in Southern Sudan, as evidenced by the SPLA's returning some of its demobilized soldiers to its payroll.
- Greater and continued international support is required to overcome present and anticipated challenges. The international community should begin by listening to the concerns of national stakeholders, and prioritizing and strengthening national ownership.
- Communication and information sharing among the IUNDDR Unit, donors, and the Northern and Southern DDR commissions has been inconsistent and problematic, particularly about the expenditure of funds. There are signs that relations are improving, however.

- The failure of the SAF and SPLA leaderships to sensitize their ex-combatants to and adequately prepare them for DDR leads to confusion, inflated expectations, and additional frustration among ex-combatants.
- It is too early to tell whether two recent reviews—the Southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Commission (SSDDRC) DDR Review Conference, held in November 2010, and the IUNDDR Unit DDR Review, completed in December 2010—will trigger a substantive shift in the DDR programme and international support for it.

This *Working Paper* is based on extensive interviews conducted with both national and international stakeholders in Northern and Southern Sudan. While the paper seeks to provide insights into DDR developments in both the North and the South, it has a stronger focus on the South for the simple reason that information has been significantly more forthcoming and available from Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) sources. Furthermore, greater concerns have been expressed over the DDR programme in Southern Sudan, and the implications of its success or failure are more readily appreciated within the context of the fledgling GoSS and the South's pending independence, than over the programme in the North.

The paper takes a 'big picture' approach to reviewing the DDR programme to date. It does not offer a list of specific solutions to the many problems facing the programme, but in providing an overview of progress so far, it reveals some of the technical and strategic areas in which obvious improvements are needed. ■

II. The evolution of the DDR programme

Origins and development

Sudan's CPA, signed on 9 January 2005 (GoS and SPLM/A, 2005), calls for the DDR of armed forces. By signing the CPA, the parties agreed to the 'principles of proportional downsizing of the forces on both sides' (GoS and SPLM/A, 2005, ch. VI, para. 1c, p. 87) and to implement a DDR programme accordingly, with the assistance of the international community.¹ The CPA also calls for the establishment of a National DDR Coordination Council (NDDRCC) tasked with overseeing both a Northern and a Southern Sudan DDR Commission (NSDDRC and SSDDRC, respectively). These commissions were each mandated to design, implement, and manage the DDR process in their respective regions (GoS and SPLM/A, 2005, Annexure 1, para. 25.1, p. 119). In the 'Three Areas' (South Kordofan and Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, and Abyei), joint DDR commissions composed of staff members from both Northern and Southern Sudan are responsible for DDR programming. International support for the DDR commissions is provided principally through the IUNDDR Unit made up of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), UNDP, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the UN Population Fund.

A source of contention throughout the negotiation process was the problem of identifying an appropriate DDR caseload size (see Box 1). As a way of getting the programme started without addressing this question head-on, an Interim DDR Programme (IDDRP) was launched in late 2005 to 'set up and build the capacity of DDR institutions and civil society, while initiating basic DDR processes for selected priority target groups' (IDDRP, 2005, p. 20).² These Special Needs Groups (SNGs), as they were subsequently labelled, include the elderly, disabled combatants, children associated with armed forces and groups (CAAFG; see Box 3), and women associated with armed forces and groups (WAAFG; see Box 2). The IDDRP was to be the initial phase leading to the development of a multi-year DDR programme to return all ex-combatants to civilian life.³

Further details of Sudan's DDR programme were eventually agreed on and elaborated in the National DDR Strategic Plan, adopted by the NDDRCC in November 2007. The plan called for transitioning from the IDDRP into an official phase 1 DDR programme that would cater to those seeking to demobilize voluntarily, and to any remaining SNG caseloads not addressed during the IDDRP. The National DDR Strategic Plan refers to a DDR phase 1 caseload of 90,000 (45,000 each in Northern and Southern Sudan), and indicates that the two armies would later have to provide the caseload for an undetermined number of future phases (NDDRCC, 2007, p. 6). Subsequent discussions among Sudan's Government of National Unity (GNU), the GoSS, donors, and the IUNDDR Unit elaborated what would become the DDR Programme Project Document for the 'Individual Reintegration Project Component'—often referred to as the Multi-Year DDR Programme (MYDDRP), the follow-up to the IDDRP. Discussions and negotiations took place between August 2007 and April 2008, culminating in the signing of the MYDDRP in June 2008 in Geneva (MYDDRP, 2008). The project document outlined a total DDR caseload figure of 180,000, with 90,000 for each side. The MYDDRP was designed to start in January 2009 and complete this caseload, including the reintegration support component, by June 2012 (MYDDRP, 2008, p. 9). Despite the programme's being significantly behind in terms of the numbers who have gone through it, the DDR commissions have since suggested that this number may increase following the referendum on Southern self-determination (see 'DDR in 2011 and beyond', below).

The costs of processing 180,000 ex-combatants are significant. Demobilization process and reinsertion benefits alone are estimated at USD 135 million, with USD 99 million coming from the UNMIS-assessed budget and the remaining USD 36 million from World Food Programme (WFP) (MYDDRP, 2008, p. 15). The budget for the reintegration component, as outlined in the MYDDRP, is a further USD 430 million. The GNU has agreed to contribute USD 45 million, leaving donors to provide USD 385 million (MYDDRP, 2008, p.4). As of January 2011 UNDP had received approximately USD 126 million to fund reintegration activities.⁴

After several years of negotiation and planning, the DDR programme was finally launched in February 2009 in Northern Sudan and in August 2009 in Southern Sudan. It is ongoing at the time of writing.

Box 1 **CPA negotiations and the language of DDR**

The issue of DDR first arose as parties from Northern and Southern Sudan were meeting to negotiate the elements of what would eventually become the CPA. DDR was included for various reasons: it was in vogue and seen as a prerequisite for a sustainable peace, and as a way of cantoning and feeding many of the combatants. The commitment to DDR in principle was included in the Protocol on Security Arrangements, signed on 25 September 2003 in Naivasha, Kenya. The first substantive discussions of DDR issues took place in August 2004 in Nairobi, four months before the signing of the final CPA. The delegations to those discussions subsequently became the National Interim DDR Authorities and then the two DDR commissions. The parties participated in a UNDP-organized multi-day training on DDR and small arms control in Nairobi in October 2004. Participants included Northern and Southern Sudanese DDR representatives, as well as other African practitioners. The training fed into the planning for the future DDR programme.⁵

During the initial discussions, proposed DDR caseload estimates were immense—ranging from 300,000 for the SPLA to 1.2 million for SAF. Clearly exaggerated, these original figures sparked concern that DDR would become a social security racket. The preliminary language in the draft CPA similarly presented DDR as a large cantonment process with a huge caseload. Donors and stakeholders eventually agreed, however, that DDR was not going to take place in the form originally envisaged by the CPA parties, and subsequent drafts of the agreement were modified accordingly. In December 2005 the National Interim DDR Authorities and the UN attempted to introduce more realistic programmable language on arms control and DDR, but were refused on the grounds that this would reopen CPA discussions and risk delaying the overall process. Consequently, the text of the agreement fails to provide specific details on issues such as the disarmament oversight of combatants, DDR caseloads, and civilian disarmament. A DDR process was enshrined in the CPA's Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices, however, and so a broad mandate was put in place for the parties to follow.⁶

Motives and expectations for DDR

The official National DDR Strategic Plan developed by the NDDRCC was finally signed in November 2007—almost three years after the signing of the CPA. This plan explains that the overarching objective of the DDR process ‘is to contribute to creating an enabling environment for human security and support post-peace agreement social stabilization across Sudan, particularly war-affected areas’ (NDDRCC, 2007, p. 5). The plan does not indicate specific motives behind or expectations associated with the DDR programme, such as the need to downsize the armed forces or appease former members of Other Armed

Groups (OAGs). In the view of one former NSDDRC staff member, the National DDR Strategic Plan attempts to describe DDR as being a positive event rather than an urgent security measure required to appease potential spoilers of the peace process. Its focus, therefore, is on making ex-combatants a productive, positive part of the economy.⁷

Security

Many stakeholders agree that genuine security motives remain for the DDR programme in both Northern and Southern Sudan, even if these are not laid out in the National DDR Strategic Plan. Specifically, the armed forces need to contend with former OAGs—former militias now absorbed by either of the two armies and which remain a potential security risk.⁸ In Northern Sudan, DDR was designed to deal with members of the Popular Defence Forces (PDF)⁹—a paramilitary force mobilized during the war that maintains a strong influence, particularly in the Three Areas.¹⁰ It remains important for SAF to recover many of the weapons that were distributed to PDF fighters; and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in Khartoum considers it crucial to maintain the loyalty of its members.¹¹

In Southern Sudan, the DDR programme could help the GoSS and SPLA deal with former OAGs that have long influenced security dynamics in the region. These include the White Army (a Lou Nuer militia) and the South Sudan Defence Forces, composed of many smaller groups. The SPLA's own history is one of diverse coalitions and internal power struggles, involving a wide range of groups and power bases. In general, the SPLA is under pressure to provide tangible support for its war heroes, many of whom still have genuine support needs. Because of this, the SPLA had envisaged the DDR programme primarily as a means of social assistance for demobilized personnel.¹² From a security perspective, the SPLA is legitimately concerned that dissatisfied demobilized ex-combatants may rebel against the GoSS and SPLA (see 'DD: technical problems and SPLA buy-in', below). Consequently, the DDR programme should be robust and reliable enough for the SPLA to feel that its heroes are appropriately rewarded and looked after, and to reduce the effect of any potential spoilers. The SPLA has also set up a committee to screen OAG fighters who have been absorbed into its ranks. Some of these fighters have been or will be

sent through the DDR programme, while others remain in the rank and file and are tasked with ‘keeping an eye on those discharged’.¹³

SPLA downsizing and cost cutting

While the SPLA is intent on taking care of its war heroes and appeasing former OAG members who have been absorbed into its ranks, it also needs to cut costs and streamline its forces. In 2006 the SPLA began paying salaries to those in its ranks, and since then has been under mounting pressure to trim the payroll. The obvious entry point for this process was to focus on discharging some of the SNGs, as this would not only reduce staffing costs, but help transform the SPLA into a more conventional and professional army.¹⁴ However, ‘reducing staffing costs’ does not necessarily imply a focus on significantly reducing the SPLA budget. Given continuing tensions with Northern Sudan and ongoing security concerns, it is understandable that the SPLA remains a

Table 1 GoSS budget allocated to SPLA affairs and salaries, 2006–11
(approximate figures)

Budget year	GoSS budget (SDG)	GoSS budget for SPLA salaries (SDG)	% of GoSS budget going towards SPLA salaries	% of GoSS budget going towards SPLA affairs (salaries, running costs, capital projects)	% of SPLA affairs budget going towards SPLA salaries
2006	1.65 billion	319 million	19	33	58
2007	1.48 billion	404 million	27	39	70
2008	5.71 billion	1.12 billion	20	33	60
2009	4.23 billion	1.04 billion	25	33	74
2010	4.48 billion	1.02 billion	23	25	91
2011	5.50 billion*	900 million**	16	41	40**

Note: figures for 2006–09 are based on actual annual expenditures, whereas figures for 2010 and 2011 are based on the respective annual budgets.

Sources: GoSS (n.d.); **Sudan Tribune* (2010); **Rands (2010, pp. 25–26; the figure of SDG 900 million does not include allowances that could account for another SDG 600 million)

budgetary priority for the GoSS. As Table 1 indicates, while the proportion of the GoSS budget for 2011 going towards SPLA salaries has decreased from 2010 levels (from 23 per cent to 16 per cent), the overall GoSS budget has actually increased, as has the percentage of the budget for SPLA affairs (covering salaries, running costs, and capital projects)—which stood at 41 per cent for 2011. Consequently, the 2011 GoSS budget for SPLA salaries remains almost as high as it was for 2010.

Oil is Sudan's main export and source of revenue. The level of financial pressure faced by the GoSS since it signed the CPA, and the tenor of its negotiations with donors on funding for the DDR programme, have fluctuated with the price of oil and the global financial crisis (2007–present). In the latter half of 2007, when oil was selling at nearly USD 130 per barrel, the DDR commissions were negotiating from a position of extreme strength. At one point, in a moment of frustration, they told donors to 'take your money back'.¹⁵ This leverage subsequently dissipated as the price of oil fell to less than USD 50 per barrel a year later. Despite the gradual recovery of oil prices, the latter phases of the global financial crisis have kept donor support essential.

Determining the caseload

DDR programme stakeholders debated long to reach consensus on the caseload figure of 180,000. The initial figures presented in 2005 were clearly hyper-inflated and unrealistic (see Box 1). While the figures came down during negotiations in 2007, the two DDR commissions still presented a combined initial figure of about 700,000, which the UN and donors rejected. SAF eventually provided a figure of 225,000, which was slowly negotiated down to 90,000. The GoSS came down as far as 60,000, but then demanded parity with SAF, so its final figure was raised to 90,000.¹⁶

While 90,000 is significantly less than SAF's original proposal, the NSDDRC appears content with it and now says it is 'precise'. Most importantly, it says that members of the PDF are successfully included.¹⁷ In Southern Sudan, it is widely assumed that the figure of 90,000 is based on guesswork, if not relatively arbitrary, given that the SPLA was not even able to estimate the numbers in its ranks until 2009.¹⁸ The SPLA is now said to include approximately 140,000

Box 2 **Counting Sudan's female fighters and WAAFG**

From the early planning stages, the designers of Sudan's DDR programme knew that many women, both ex-combatants and WAAFG, would be included in the DDR caseload. But while the number of female soldiers could be determined from SAF and SPLA payrolls,¹⁹ estimating the number of WAAFG presented many challenges.

The WAAFG category was created to ensure that women who played active roles in supporting armed forces and groups, but who were not actual combatants, were included in DDR. The UN *Integrated DDR Standards* (IDDRS) defines WAAFG as:

Women and girls who participated in armed conflicts in supportive roles, whether by force or voluntarily. Rather than being members of a civilian community, they are economically and socially dependent on the armed force or group for their income and social support (examples: porter, cook, nurse, spy, administrator, translator, radio operator, medical assistant, public information officer, camp leader, sex worker/slave) (UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR, 2006, 5.10, sec. 6.2, box 2).

The UN created the term WAAFG; armed forces or groups on the ground do not necessarily understand the concept. From the outset, the two armies were not clear how to define and identify WAAFG, let alone estimate how many of them might be eligible for DDR. At no time prior to the start of DDR did either force have anything resembling a WAAFG list.²⁰ SAF has stated bluntly that no such women are associated with its armed forces. The NSDDRC explains that within SAF all support functions are conducted by uniformed, salaried men and women.²¹ The UN is concerned that the real reason SAF is denying it has any WAAFG is that it is taking the term exclusively to mean 'sex worker/slave', only one of many qualifying criteria. The stigmatization and confusion surrounding the WAAFG category might have been avoided if the term had been properly presented and understood in Northern Sudan during the DDR planning process.²² The NSDDRC continues to reiterate that no WAAFG exist; the UNMIS DDR Unit remains unconvinced.

The WAAFG issue has been less controversial within the SPLA, although identifying the WAAFG caseload remains challenging. Initially, in preparation for the launch of DDR in Northern Sudan, UNDP hired a local non-governmental organization (NGO) in the region to help identify both SAF- and SPLA-aligned WAAFG in the transitional areas. As anticipated, the NGO failed to identify any SAF-aligned WAAFG. It did manage to produce figures for SPLA-aligned WAAFG, but the SPLA rejected these because the NGO was from the North. Nonetheless, once disarmament and demobilization (DD) commenced in Ed Damazin (South Kordofan) and Julud (Blue Nile), approximately 1,000 WAAFG were demobilized, although weak criteria and verification generated concerns over the legitimacy and comprehensiveness of the caseload.²³

The SPLA has been in charge of producing its own WAAFG lists. There have been concerns from the outset that this might lead to some eligible women slipping through the cracks—particularly any who have fallen out of favour with their comrades—and

ineligible women being included. Furthermore, if a prime motive of the SPLA for engaging in DDR is to remove salaried soldiers from its payroll, it might lack the motivation for comprehensively including WAAFG within the process who are not on the payroll.²⁴

In an effort to improve the WAAFG situation, the IUNDDR Unit and the SSDDRC agreed on a new Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) in February 2010 that clearly outlines WAAFG identification and verification procedures for Southern Sudan (SSDDRC and UN, 2010).²⁵ As part of the SOP, the IUNDDR Unit contracted an implementing partner (IP) to help steer the WAAFG identification process. The SPLA is still responsible for drawing up an initial list of potential WAAFG candidates, but the IP then works with the SPLA, a verification team, and community members to refine the final WAAFG caseload list (SSDDRC and UN, 2010, p. 4). The first WAAFG verification exercise following the drawing up of the SOP was completed in September 2010 in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and appears to have been successful: more than half of the original WAAFG candidate names on the SPLA list were disqualified for not meeting the appropriate criteria, while a small number of other women who did not appear on the SPLA's original list were identified as being eligible and were subsequently included.²⁶

personnel (Rands, 2010, p. 23), but it should be remembered that it is at root a voluntary army with minimal documentation. A comprehensive and strategic defence review of the SPLA would have helped it to clearly and intelligently identify its optimum size and structure.²⁷

To help identify eligible candidates for phase 1 of DDR, a pre-registration process took place in both Northern and Southern Sudan between 2006 and 2008. While conducted with IUNDDR Unit support, it was largely an internal process, culminating in the two armies and the DDR commissions producing master lists of candidates. The precise eligibility criteria for inclusion on the master lists are unknown. Moreover, the master lists fall far short of the target 180,000: the NSDDRC produced an initial master list of some 26,000 names in South Kordofan, while the Southern list included some 35,000. These lists were intended to serve as a starting point for identifying SNG candidates, on the understanding that names would be added as the process evolved.²⁸ Table 2 reflects current UNMIS planning figures for the demobilization of approximately 52,000 troops in Northern Sudan and 36,000 in Southern Sudan.²⁹ 📄

III. Key DDR players

Before examining the design and implementation of the DDR programme, it is useful to take a closer look at some of the key players involved in the process and their interrelationships.

DDR commissions

The two DDR commissions—the NSDDRC and SSDDRC—are the driving force behind the DDR programme, and the more operational they are, the greater the chance that the programme will be a success. The commissions were originally called National Interim DDR Authorities and were set up with support and funding from UNDP. Not long after the disbursement of funds, however, accusations of corruption and a lack of transparency emerged from the National Interim DDR Authorities, particularly in Southern Sudan, and this precipitated power struggles and conflict within both organizations. These institutions had effectively ceased to function by the latter half of 2005, when implementation of the IDDRP was to begin.³⁰ The commissions remain beset by these problems, but their functioning has improved greatly.

The NSDDRC now has a significant number of competent and technically skilled staff members, although nepotism may have influenced the hiring and placement of unqualified people. A more general challenge within the NSDDRC is the absence of a clear and accepted managerial system. This has resulted in some confusion among staff members concerning operational procedures. As one NSDDRC staff member explained, developing a management culture is particularly difficult because the commission staff includes members drawn from the military, the civil service, NGOs, the UN, and elsewhere.³¹ Interviewed NSDDRC staff members think that the commission's budget is sufficient for it to operate, although there is some concern that too much of it is being spent on high salary and administration costs and an excessive number of vehicles. Nonetheless, the general view is that the headquarters and state offices have

at least the minimum capacity required to function.³² Importantly, many staff members appear to have a very positive attitude and are motivated to do their work.³³ As one senior NSDDRC staff member explained, '[w]e must do our jobs with honour. With ownership comes leadership.'³⁴

The SSDDRC has had a more difficult time building its capacity to the point where it is fully functional, although the situation has vastly improved over the past two years and continues to do so. When the current chairperson, William Deng Deng, took over from his predecessor in September 2008, he inherited an institution that lacked a coherent operational approach, staffing structure, and programmatic strategy. Since his arrival, he has made improvements in all of these areas. Significant hurdles remain, however, with the biggest one being financial. According to Deng Deng, the SSDDRC's budget is consistently too small for its operational needs, which is having a negative impact on the commission's state office in particular. Part of the problem, he believes, is that the GoSS does not understand how much money the SSDDRC actually has. The GoSS sees millions of dollars allocated for DDR from the UNDP-administered reintegration trust fund and assumes that the commission is well financed as a result. In reality, the SSDDRC does not see these funds, as they are channelled through UNDP to pay for reintegration activities.³⁵

In response to these budget constraints, Deng Deng has sought bilateral support from the donor community, which has responded generously. Canada, Egypt, the European Union, Germany, Norway, and the UK have recently provided capacity-building support. This has come primarily in the form of equipment (boats, bikes, computers, and V-Sats) and staff members, although bilateral donors have also funded a team of auditors to help the SSDDRC improve its financial planning and operations.³⁶

The SSDDRC has found it difficult to recruit and maintain qualified and competent national staff. There has been a very high turnover rate of staff members, who have been trained by the commission and have then left to work for the UN or other organizations that offer higher salaries. The SSDDRC continues to hire replacement staff members and currently has sufficient personnel, but these often lack training and are inadequately qualified.³⁷ More on-the-job training is required and a greater number of qualified staff members need to be deployed to the state offices.³⁸ To help mitigate the staffing problem, Deng Deng

is currently seeking donor funding to lure members of the Sudanese diaspora back to Sudan with the promise of decent salaries—paid directly from donor funds.³⁹

IUNDDR Unit

Similar to the two DDR commissions, the IUNDDR Unit is also trying to build capacity and improve its operational effectiveness. But the IUNDDR Unit includes both UNMIS and UNDP, and these bodies are not easily integrated. The organizations have been working together in Sudan since June 2004, when the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) created the UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) to support CPA talks and lay the groundwork for UNMIS, which oversaw the CPA's implementation (UNMIS, n.d.). UNAMIS was also given funding for the creation of a DDR support structure within the UN. Before that time, UNDP had been the main body working with government parties on DDR and arms control issues. As a sign of a difficult relationship to come, UNDP staff members in Khartoum were given no prior notice that UNMIS DDR staff had been recruited and were setting up offices in their midst.

The UNMIS head of DDR became the IUNDDR Unit chief, with the head of UNDP DDR as deputy. Beyond this hierarchical arrangement there were few administrative procedures for the co-management of the unit, such as clear reporting lines within and between the two organizations. These institutional uncertainties, combined with clashing personalities, threatened to sink the IUNDDR Unit from the outset and triggered a hardening of institutional positions within the 'integrated' unit.⁴⁰ Positions on either side were unlikely to soften without a substantial reworking of the institutional arrangements at the most senior level.

A new UNMIS DDR chief, Sidi Zahabi, arrived in mid-2010 and has sought ways to improve performance.⁴¹ The DDR programme review completed in December 2010 has provided some recommendations to this end. It is clear that the IUNDDR Unit needs to continue to work as a unit as well as possible. As one staff member explained, a great deal of coordination is required to ensure that the DD and R components of the DDR programme are properly synchronized, and for this to happen effectively all staff members need to keep in mind

the bigger picture and how their role fits within it. It is also noteworthy that on occasion the unit has functioned as a well-integrated entity. In Southern Sudan, for example, joint public information efforts in the states are working well; in the North, strong cooperation and communication among the IUNDDR Unit gender focal points are producing positive results.⁴²

DDR commissions and IUNDDR Unit

The working relationship between the DDR commissions and the IUNDDR Unit over the years has been relatively strained, but as implementation of the DDR programme has improved, so too has the level of cooperation between these two key organizations. The IUNDDR Unit recognizes, for example, that there was a lack of trust with the commissions at the outset of the DDR planning process. Since then, it has made a conscious effort to involve the commissions in all aspects of the work, to keep them informed of all activities, and to respect their ownership of the process. It has taken time, but both commissions and the IUNDDR Unit agree that the relationship has improved.⁴³

Some tension remains, however, with frustration on both sides. Staff in the IUNDDR Unit sometimes feel as though the commissions are focused on relentlessly squeezing the UN for everything they can get, and that they make working relationships difficult by being unreliable and inconsistent—for example, by reneging on agreements made in meetings.⁴⁴ IUNDDR Unit staff are often confused over what activities the commissions are undertaking, although this has improved in Northern Sudan as UN staff members have based themselves part-time at the NSDDRC office.⁴⁵

The commissions, in turn, have to contend with the high turnover of IUNDDR Unit staff, making it difficult to maintain a sense of continuity or to foster trusting and lasting relationships. Both the SSDDRC and NSDDRC have been unhappy in the past with the capacity and skill level of some IUNDDR Unit staff members, although the northern commission could have been more involved in the hiring of advisory staff.⁴⁶ Staff in the NSDDRC also feel that there has been insufficient provision of capacity-building support to the joint UNDP–NSDDRC offices in the states and that UNDP is too focused on leading the DDR process rather than on training and supporting commission staff. State

offices in Ed Damazin (Blue Nile) and Kadugli (South Kordofan) were cited as examples of where local capacity is tremendously weak and in need of stronger and sustained UNDP support.⁴⁷

Funding is a significant and ongoing source of tension (Kron, 2010). In both the North and the South, there appears to be some confusion over expenditures and available funds, particularly as they relate to UNDP and reintegration programming. This has led to accusations that the UN is misspending DDR funds and withholding expenditure reports.⁴⁸ As one staff member at the SS-DDRC explained, 'we are tired of the UN eating our money'.⁴⁹ This is not to say that the commissions are seeking to control the funds; they are simply seeking a greater understanding of the funding process and its details.⁵⁰ Until such clarity is provided, frustrations with UNDP in particular will continue.

While these criticisms are understandable, UNDP's role as implementing agency with fiscal oversight and management has a number of potential advantages. By channelling funds through UNDP, donors collectively support a comprehensive approach to reintegration programming, which is structured by a holistic project document. This approach is aimed at preventing parallel and piecemeal programming, ad hoc support from donors, and general disarray. In moments of frustration, however, commission members have sought alternative sources of support. In Southern Sudan, there is an ever-greater focus on working bilaterally with donors, for example, and both the SSDDRC chairperson and his deputy talk of potentially bringing in the World Bank or other donors to eventually replace UNDP.⁵¹ Yet there is certainly no indication from the World Bank's track record that it would do a better job than UNDP.⁵²

Donor community

The international community was a pivotal driving force behind Sudan's peace process and the development of the CPA and, as such, has felt a strong commitment to supporting its implementation. The DDR programme is seen as a tangible and critical element that can help bring a sustainable peace to Sudan, and is considered of great political and social importance. If only for this reason, the donor community has felt compelled to support the DDR programme.⁵³ While the DDR programme has slowly grown and evolved since its inception,

the donor community has monitored it with interest and continues to be its principal programme sponsor. Encouragingly, donors appear to be relatively united in their approach to supporting and working with the IUNDDR Unit and commissions, and have repeatedly expressed their commitment to the DDR programme as a key element of the CPA.⁵⁴

They have, however, also experienced frustrations over the course of the programme thus far. They know about many of the struggles within the IUNDDR Unit and the DDR commissions, and of the often-strained relationship between them. They are fully aware of the transparency and verification problems that brought the DD process to a halt in late 2009 (see 'Challenges' in section IV below). Indeed, some also remain significantly disenchanted with the lack of transparency and external verification of the disarmament process.⁵⁵ A further concern is that the IUNDDR Unit does not provide clear, consistent, and comprehensive information, particularly regarding expenditure on reintegration activities. This was exacerbated when UNDP approached donors in early–mid 2010 to ask them to transfer committed funds earlier than initially anticipated, which suggested that UNDP was running short of cash. In recent months donors wrote to the IUNDDR Unit asking for specific answers to a comprehensive list of concrete questions—a rather unusual request that is indicative of continued exasperation. They also made it clear that they were not prepared to provide further funding until they understood how the previous funding had been spent.⁵⁶ UNDP has since improved its dissemination of information.

It should be noted that it is not just a lack of information from the IUNDDR Unit that concerns donors, but also the poor data surrounding government (i.e. GNU and GoSS) support—both financial and political—for the DDR programme in Northern and Southern Sudan. Acquiring accurate information from the DDR Coordination Council or from knowledgeable and reliable sources within government has proven to be problematic, particularly in Northern Sudan.⁵⁷

While donors have experienced frustrations with the DDR programme to date, they have also generated some themselves. Most specifically, there has not always been a consistent level of engagement. As one SSDDRC member explained, donor officials seem prone to showing up at times of crisis and hibernating in between; also, they tend to vacillate between panic and tranquillity.⁵⁸ From the perspectives of the IUNDDR Unit and the commissions, it

is exasperating dealing with donor officials who may have minimal if any technical experience of DDR issues or who are new to Sudan and unfamiliar with the country, its history, and the general context in which the DDR programme operates.⁵⁹ 🗨️

IV. Disarmament and demobilization

Design

Sudan's DD process was designed to be as quick and efficient as possible. Unlike similar programmes in other post-conflict environments where DD has involved feeding and sheltering ex-combatants for multiple days in cantonment sites, the process in Sudan was designed to disarm and demobilize participants in a single day.⁶⁰ Each day, the two armies are responsible for gathering their forces who are to be disarmed and demobilized at an 'assembly area', typically situated up to 30 kilometres from the actual demobilization site. It is at the assembly area that the troops are organized, registered, verified as being on a 'master list', and issued with a discharge certificate. A Joint Monitoring Team, composed of SAF or SPLA members, the relevant DDR commission, and the IUNDDR Unit, as well as UN military observers, is on hand to oversee and verify the process. The ex-combatants are then transported to the demobilization site by the relevant army and/or UNMIS, where they spend the remainder of the day, before being discharged as official 'civilians'. Notably, any actual disarmament is conducted by the two armies according to their own procedures, prior to the ex-combatants' gathering at the 'assembly areas' (see Box 4).

UNMIS, operating with the support of DDR commission state coordinators and other implementing partners, funds and organizes the demobilization sites. Upon arrival at the demobilization sites, ex-combatants receive a reintegration briefing, undergo a medical and disability screening, are provided with an ID card, and are given an assortment of non-food items (NFIs), food ration vouchers, and a reinsertion grant. All the information collected from the ex-combatants is entered into the UN's database (referred to as the DREAMS database).

The medical screening is designed to diagnose and treat basic illnesses and to provide an opportunity for voluntary counselling and testing for HIV/AIDS. It also serves to identify those with serious physical disabilities who can be referred to other support services. The reintegration briefing is conducted by

UN and commission staff members and is designed to help the ex-combatants understand what the reintegration phase entails, and to clarify any misconceptions and misunderstandings. Ex-combatants are asked to identify their existing skills, education levels, and vocational preferences, and to state where they would like to resettle. They are then given an appointment to visit the Information, Counselling, and Referral Services Unit within their state DDR commission office to obtain further details on reintegration programming, or are told that DDR commission staff will contact them (see Box 5). In cases where the IPs providing reintegration support are already in place, ex-combatants may be able to meet IP staff directly and can register for a reintegration programme without further delay.

NFI kits, food ration vouchers, and reinsertion grants are provided to support ex-combatants' transition into civilian life and to help bridge the gap until reintegration programming commences. The NFI kits have an approximate local market value of SDG 500 (USD 200) and include items such as a mosquito net, plastic sheeting, and a radio. The food ration, provided in the form of a one-time voucher redeemable at WFP state offices, is intended to support a family of five for a period of three months (SSDDRC, n.d., p. 13).⁶¹ The reinsertion grant of SDG 860 (USD 345) in cash is meant to cover transportation costs for ex-combatants (to return home) and other living expenses for two months (SSDDRC, n.d., p. 11).

Progress

The DD process was officially launched in Sudan in February 2009 and is ongoing at the time of writing. Table 2 provides an overview of the number of participants who have been demobilized at the various sites, in both the North and the South, as well as the balance remaining for phase 1 and the current status of operations. The first demobilization site to begin operations was in Northern Sudan, in Ed Damazin (Blue Nile). As this proceeded relatively smoothly, other sites became operational. In August 2009 demobilization started in Kadugli (South Kordofan), as well as in the first location in Southern Sudan, in Mangala, near Juba (Central Equatoria). Demobilization has subsequently been launched in Julud, Kauda, Khartoum, and Kadugli (second phase) in

Table 2 **Status of demobilization as of 23 January 2011**

Demobilization site	Total anticipated caseload	Total demobilized to date	Balance remaining	Status of DD operation
Ed Damazin	5,790	5,442	348	Completed
Ed Damazin (phase 2)	3,500	0	3,500	Planned
Julud	3,047	3,023	24	Completed
Kauda	4,705	4,705	0	Completed
Kadugli	9,900	9,900	0	Completed
Kadugli (phase 2)	7,217	1,887	5,330	Ongoing
Kadugli (phase 3)	9,970	0	9,970	Planned
Khartoum	6,500	2,461	4,039	Ongoing
Abyei	2,000	0	2,000	Planned
SUB-TOTAL (North)	52,629	27,418*	25,211	
Juba (Mangala)	2,116	2,116	0	Completed
Juba (phase 2)	2,756	0	2,756	Planned
Rumbek	3,752	3,675	77	Completed
Aweil	2,844	2,844	0	Completed
Torit	2,613	1,077	1,536	Ongoing
Wau	3,600	1,310	2,290	Ongoing
Kwajok	5,450	0	5,450	Planned
Bentiu	2,926	0	2,926	Planned
Malakal	4,276	0	4,276	Planned
Bor	6,308	0	6,308	Planned
SUB-TOTAL (South)	36,641	11,022	25,619	
TOTAL	89,270	38,440 (43%)	50,830 (57%)	

* The total figure of those demobilized at sites in Northern Sudan also includes some ex-combatants from the SPLA (e.g. in Julud and Kauda).

Source: Email communication from IUNDDR Unit staff member

Box 3 **Children involved in DDR**

One of the Special Needs Groups prioritized for DDR is Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (CAAFG). The DDR programme for children is a distinct process being overseen by the DDR commissions with ongoing support provided by UNICEF. The process is entirely separate from the DDR for adults; for this reason it is not addressed in detail in this paper. In Northern Sudan, both SAF and the PDF paramilitary group deny ever having any CAAFG in their ranks. In Southern Sudan, the SPLA has been working steadily to identify and demobilize any children in its ranks for several years, and according to the SSDDRC, approximately 3,000 have already been demobilized. The total number remaining is a matter of debate, but is thought not to be large. The SPLA-UN Action Plan has been putting pressure on the SPLA to complete the demobilization process as soon as possible. The reintegration challenges for CAAFG are as significant as for those going through the regular DDR programme, and are a major focus of both the SSDDRC and UNICEF.⁶²

Box 4 **Disarmament: where have the weapons gone?**

In typical DDR programmes, the disarmament component is viewed as a visible indicator that the parties to a conflict are making a tangible commitment to peacebuilding and a sustainable cessation of hostilities. As such, DDR stakeholders, and in particular the international community, want to be reassured that a robust disarmament exercise is taking place. The most effective way to provide this reassurance is to provide evidence of the weapons collected and, ideally, destroyed. Indeed, many associate disarmament in a post-conflict setting with the image of a burning pyre of AK-47s.

Weapons collection and destruction expectations are not always realistic. In Sudan, both armed forces are statutory armies, not rebel groups, and, as such, they are capable of and responsible for disarming their own personnel. The manner in which they do so is their prerogative. There is no mandate in the CPA for international involvement in the disarmament process, presumably because insufficient attention was given to the details of this process when the agreement was drafted. In light of this, the international community's continued efforts to press for more involvement in the disarmament process are unjustified and will accomplish little more than fuelling their own frustration.⁶³

To its credit, the IUNDDR Unit made a sound initial effort to engage the two armies on disarmament. It drafted a well-argued and detailed joint SOP on disarmament verification in a bid to provide some technical support, which, if accepted, could have fundamentally strengthened the DDR programme by promoting transparency and building a degree of confidence in the process. The request was submitted to the respective DDR commissions in early 2010 for their comment, but neither responded.⁶⁴ The IUNDDR Unit has now seemingly accepted being frozen out of the disarmament process, although some donors continue to voice a need for their involvement.⁶⁵ A better tactic might be to work with the two armies to explore what kind of assistance might be needed for managing weapons stockpiles and inventories, or for improving civilian disarmament and arms control efforts.

Northern Sudan, and Rumbek, Aweil, Torit, and Wau in Southern Sudan. As of 19 December 2010 demobilization is ongoing in Khartoum, Kadugli, Torit, and Wau. Of the anticipated caseload for phase 1 of approximately 90,000, a total of 38,440 (around 43 per cent) have been demobilized since the start of the DDR programme, leaving an outstanding balance of 50,830.⁶⁶

Challenges

While DD has been progressing without significant technical problems, the process has not been without its share of shortcomings and challenges. Indeed, an independent assessment conducted in November 2009—nine months after its launch—expressed serious concern over how DD was unfolding (Rowe, Banal, and Berhe, 2009).

The greatest concern related to the candidate caseload, and specifically, whether the appropriate candidates were being allowed into the programme. Members of the Joint Monitoring Teams were to crosscheck a candidate's discharge certificate against names from master lists provided by the commissions. The value of this authentication exercise was minimized, however, when it became clear that master lists were not being prepared. Instead, daily lists of names were being produced on a seemingly ad-hoc basis and shared with the IUNDDR Unit almost immediately before the start of DD, as opposed to a month in advance as agreed. This eliminated any possibility of verifying candidate eligibility and opened the door for rampant fraud, since anyone could have his/her name added at the last minute. This reportedly led to many women entering the DD programme as WAAFG candidates, despite not meeting the official WAAFG criteria (Rowe, Banal, and Berhe, 2009, p. 16).

Following the release of the assessment report, a high-level committee of key stakeholders (including staff from the DDR commissions, SAF, the SPLA, the IUNDDR Unit, and donors) was formed to review the findings. The committee decided to temporarily suspend the DDR programme in December 2009 until adequate measures could be put into place to remedy key problems. Encouragingly, this led to the fairly rapid development of two comprehensive SOPs, one on general candidate eligibility verification, and a second specifically on WAAFG identification and verification in the South.⁶⁷ Both documents provide

detailed and clear procedures to guide the verification of DDR candidates and were designed in an effort to screen out any ineligible participants. With these new SOPs in place, DD restarted in February–March 2010 and has been much improved ever since.⁶⁸ For example, in Rumbek, the new measures caught individuals who were trying to enrol twice. There is room for improvement, however, and the IUNDDR Unit plans to increase its spot checks to ensure that specific SOP measures are being implemented.⁶⁹

Other technical challenges continue to hamper DD. A significant problem on the UN side is that the IUNDDR Unit has struggled to obtain sufficient and sustained logistical support from UNMIS. This is because DDR competes with other mission priorities, such as support for Sudan's elections and for the referendum on Southern self-determination. When the mission does provide the required support, IUNDDR Unit staff members complain that they are made to feel as though they are being done a significant favour by UNMIS rather than being entitled to the assistance.⁷⁰

Environmental factors, such as heavy rains and flooding, have also adversely affected DD operations in Aweil and Kauda. Roads have been washed away, assembly areas submerged, and transport trucks immobilized, while malaria has been widespread. Other logistical factors such as the breakdown of generators and vehicles, a lack of available drivers, and long distances between assembly areas and demobilization sites have also slowed the process or brought it to a temporary halt. WFP food stores—used to provide the ex-combatants' food rations—have not always been available, and DD planners have had to wait for stores to be replenished before demobilizing further ex-combatants. The two armies' lack of full compliance with the new SOP on programme entry criteria has also caused delays. In such cases, the IUNDDR Unit is obliged to wait until the DD participant lists are prepared and presented following the agreed-upon procedure before proceeding.⁷¹

At the demobilization site, each ex-combatant has his/her detailed information entered into the UN DREAMS database, and this has also posed a challenge. UNMIS made considerable efforts to modify DREAMS to suit the Sudan context and to train local staff members to enter data at each demobilization site. Nonetheless, at times the information collected and entered into DREAMS has been incomplete or unreliable. For example, data related to the medical screening

and disability assessment of ex-combatants has not always been comprehensive. Also, when asked where they would like to return to or resettle, some ex-combatants simply explain where they are from, even when they do not intend to return there. This has caused serious problems for those planning reintegration programming (see Box 5). While UNMIS has tried to ensure that the DREAMS data is accurate and reliable, it acknowledges that part of the problem is that those collecting the information (UNMIS) are not the same as those who use it (UNDP).⁷²

Among ex-combatants themselves there has been a tremendous amount of confusion about the DD process and their entitlements. Consequently, some ex-combatants have exited from the DD process unhappy with the value of the NFI kits and the demobilization package.⁷³ This has been more evident in Southern than Northern Sudan, although the UN and the DDR commissions have strongly criticized both armies for failing to sensitize their ex-combatants to the process.

For the IUNDDR Unit and the DDR commissions, the challenge has been to improve the dissemination of clear and accurate information to both ex-combatants and the communities absorbing them in an effort to combat misinformation and minimize frustrations. Public information (PI) efforts have been improving as DD continues; the UNMIS radio station, Radio Miraya, transmits radio programmes; and group sensitization forums have been conducted in target communities. During these exercises the extent of the confusion and misunderstanding among ex-combatants and civilians alike has become abundantly clear. A fundamental confusion equates DDR with civilian disarmament—also referred to as community security and arms control (CSAC)—although callers to Radio Miraya are showing a progressively greater understanding of what DDR actually entails. The IUNDDR Unit is working with the DDR commissions to further strengthen PI efforts, but a lack of dedicated staff members at the commission state offices hinders progress. In Southern Sudan, the commission has no budget for PI activities and is thus completely reliant for support on the IUNDDR Unit and bilateral donors. The commission has also invited the SPLA to discuss potential sensitization activities, but so far has received little response.⁷⁴ 🗨️

V. Reintegration

Design

Upon being demobilized, ex-combatants are supported as they seek to develop a sustainable livelihood and successfully reintegrate into their communities as civilians. While SAF ex-combatants are eligible for pension support, such assistance is not yet provided for SPLA veterans, making reintegration training much more important. Details of Sudan's reintegration process are laid out in the MYDDRP, which provides for an individualized reintegration approach in which each ex-combatant is provided with a reintegration package worth USD 1,750 (MYDDRP, 2008; SSDDRC, n.d., p. 11).⁷⁵

Reintegration packages are organized and delivered by an array of IPs who have been assessed and then contracted by UNDP. These IPs provide training in a variety of sectors, ranging from agriculture and animal husbandry to vocational skills and small business ownership. The training may also include some elements of formal education, if required, such as literacy and numeracy courses. Training programmes last six to nine months, although support is provided for up to a year in Northern Sudan for those who choose to forgo vocational or business training and enrol instead in a formal continuing education programme (MYDDRP, 2008, p. 18). Participants who are sick or disabled and unable to work can name a friend or relative as a proxy to receive reintegration support on their behalf (SSDDRC, n.d., p. 17).

Some concern has been expressed in Southern Sudan over the lack of an economic recovery and development plan, and the implications this may have for the availability of economic reintegration opportunities for ex-combatants.⁷⁶ Reintegration programming has not been designed in a way that strongly links it to relevant GoSS ministries, for example, nor is it founded on a comprehensive understanding of economic realities on the ground. Consequently, there is a risk of reintegration activities proceeding ad hoc, with the burden of economic reintegration falling on communities.⁷⁷

Progress

The reintegration programme officially began in June 2008, with the signing of the MYDDRP. DD was scheduled to begin just seven months later. Since the MYDDRP stipulates that DDR participants should be contacted within six months from the date of demobilization with details of their reintegration support package (MYDDRP, 2008, p. 17), this left little time for finalizing reintegration options.

In addition to the time pressure, progress was hindered from the outset by other factors. Reintegration funding did not start to flow until early 2009 and UNDP was slow to recruit staff. Then, in March 2009, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir on war crimes charges, and he retaliated by expelling 13 international NGOs from the country (BBC News, 2009). This significantly reduced the number of potential IPs available for reintegration projects. The NSDDRC then compounded the problem by requesting—for capacity-building reasons—that only national IPs or UN bodies (such as the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, or FAO) be contracted for reintegration projects. Given the extremely low capacity of most local partners, this posed an enormous challenge to UNDP.⁷⁸

Despite these setbacks, the first reintegration project was finally ready in Northern Sudan in August 2009, but the government had outstanding concerns and delayed signing it into effect until November. It finally began in December 2009, catering to the first caseload of about 4,500 demobilized combatants from Ed Damazin, Blue Nile state. Reintegration planning efforts continued, with projects subsequently starting in Kadugli in February 2010.⁷⁹

To contend with the dearth of qualified national IPs, UNDP started a pre-qualification process in Khartoum, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan to identify and train potential national partners. While painstaking and slow, this innovative approach eventually began to show dividends. In the first phase, 17 local NGOs were trained and pre-qualified to submit proposals for reintegration projects, and five were eventually awarded contracts in May 2010. Combined, these five NGOs catered for 4,500 ex-combatants and significantly supported the reintegration process. This exercise in training and pre-qualifying potential local partners is continuing successfully in Northern Sudan. Thus far it seems

reintegration preparations are keeping pace with the continuing demobilization of ex-combatants and SNGs. The risk remains of over-burdening some of the national NGO partners who continue to receive fresh caseloads, but to date they appear to be coping well.⁸⁰

In Southern Sudan, reintegration programming is easier due to unrestricted access to a variety of robust international partners such as the International Organization for Migration and the German Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). In Juba, for example, one of the principal and most successful reintegration training programmes appears to be at the Multi-purpose Training Centre, implemented by GIZ.⁸¹ Attendance rates and satisfaction levels are high, although it remains to be seen if this will translate into successful employment and livelihood opportunities for graduates.

The programme has also suffered from delays, however. Indeed, DD started in Southern Sudan in August 2009 with the Mangala (Juba) caseload, and up to a year later some of those ex-combatants were still waiting for their programme to start.⁸² This gap has been a source of significant frustration for all involved and has triggered significant criticism of UNDP (see Box 5).

Table 3 provides an overview of reintegration progress as of January 2011. Of the 38,440 ex-combatants demobilized across the country, about 11,000 have completed reintegration training, with a further 16,000 or so currently registered for or engaged in training.

Table 3 Status of reintegration programming as of January 2011

	Total demobilized	Total who have registered with IPs or are currently in training	Total who have completed reintegration training
Northern Sudan	27,418	8,115	7,647
Southern Sudan	11,022	7,771	3,304
Total	38,440*	15,886	10,951

* Provided by UNMIS DDR Unit.

Source: Email correspondence with UNDP Sudan

Challenges

In planning and implementing reintegration programmes for thousands of demobilized ex-combatants, the DDR commissions, UNDP, and contracted IPs have had to contend with multiple problems.

Box 5 **Mind the gap: reintegration in Mangala**

Critics of the DDR programme often point to the delay between DD and the start of reintegration. UNDP in Southern Sudan has been criticized from the beginning for disorganization and slow delivery of reintegration programming, despite having had years to prepare for it. In fairness, the causes of the delay were not all of the organization's own making, as outlined below.

In the lead-up to the launch of the DD process in Mangala, the SPLA and SSDDRC informed UNDP that those being demobilized would be seeking to settle primarily in Central Equatoria, with small numbers looking to return to Eastern and Western Equatoria. UNDP therefore prioritized these areas in reintegration planning. Once the demobilization process started, however, ex-combatants expressed a desire to reintegrate into a total of nine of Southern Sudan's ten states, with no state having a significant majority. UNDP suddenly faced the logistical and bureaucratic nightmare of identifying and contracting appropriate IPs in almost all Southern states simultaneously.

The data emerging from the DD sites concerning ex-combatant reintegration preferences was unreliable. When queried about where they wanted to undertake their reintegration training, ex-combatants often misunderstood the question, did not know how to answer it, or subsequently changed their minds after leaving the DD site. Data collectors might not have realized the importance of obtaining clear answers, and ex-combatants were unaware of the ramifications of their answers. As a result, the data that was passed on to UNDP from the DD sites was not very helpful for planning purposes. For example, UNDP was informed that 108 ex-combatants were seeking to return to Western Equatoria and planned accordingly, but only 23 eventually showed up—a very small caseload, given the time and efforts required for UNDP to find and contract an IP in the area. In Eastern Equatoria, approximately 120 ex-combatants were left waiting for reintegration activities to start because no IP was interested in submitting a bid to offer support to such a small caseload. Meanwhile, many of those demobilized and who would have liked to go back to their native states instead felt obliged to return to the SPLA in search of further salaries or information. This is symptomatic of the SPLA's failure to sensitize those it has discharged.

Through UNDP's continued efforts, the infamous 'reintegration gap' that has plagued the agency has begun to close.⁸³ Slowly but surely, the small numbers of ex-combatants still awaiting reintegration are being catered for as additional IPs become operational, and in the more recent DD operations IPs have been on site to deal with the ex-combatants from the outset, thereby virtually eliminating any gap.

In the North, UNDP's pre-qualification initiative is helping to overcome the requirement to use only national IPs or UN bodies. But some of the local IPs have minimal capital at their disposal and require significant initial funding when contracted to provide reintegration services. The NSDDRC is pushing to have more funds released up front, but UNDP regulations restrict the front-loading of contractual payments. The organization is, however, trying to expedite payments by identifying a series of agreed-upon milestones with IPs, which can help lead to the timely disbursement of funds.⁸⁴

In addition, there are remote areas in both Northern and Southern Sudan where it is difficult for UNDP to identify suitable IPs that can provide reintegration programming. NGOs will not work in some remote areas, while in others the NGOs present are unable to provide the required training. UNDP is working to address this problem in Northern Sudan by building the capacity of community-based organizations (CBOs) with small grants. Grants were initially given to a handful of CBOs in September 2010, and UNDP is closely monitoring this pilot initiative to see if the recipients will build enough capacity to become potential IPs. In Blue Nile and South Kordofan, the Japan International Cooperation Agency has provided capacity-building support to help existing state colleges deliver vocational training programmes. UNDP faces pressure to develop additional creative and novel initiatives to help deliver comprehensive programming across Sudan.⁸⁵

In Southern Sudan, despite having the luxury of being able to contract international NGOs, UNDP struggled initially to cater for the demobilized ex-combatants looking for reintegration support (see Box 5). As organizational planning caught up with caseload demand, however, the situation improved relatively quickly. In fact, UNDP has signed contracts with Southern IPs for more ex-combatants than have actually been demobilized. This is indicative of a larger challenge in pacing and phasing DDR programmes. Compounding the timing problem, the proposed dates of DD often change as the process is delayed for one reason or another.⁸⁶ Recent delays have affected DD in Torit, Khartoum, and Wau, for example. 📌

VI. Assessing the DDR programme to date

DD: technical problems and SPLA buy-in

One of the most serious shortcomings of the DD process in Southern Sudan is that the SPLA is not sufficiently involved. This is evident both in the SPLA's lack of involvement in the technical planning and implementation of DD and in its failure to sensitize the participants going through the process. If the SPLA were to work closely with the SSDDRC, both these issues would be addressed, but so far this has not occurred. The key SPLA brigadier general with whom the SSDDRC has been working is no longer attending the DD technical coordination committee meetings regularly chaired by the commission. Consequently, the SSDDRC's main links to the SPLA are through its own staff member serving as a liaison officer, as well as through an UNMIS liaison officer who works closely with the SPLA. Neither of these connections is strong enough to elicit greater SPLA engagement.⁸⁷ As one IUNDDR Unit staff member observed, at the moment the SPLA sees itself as a provider of ex-combatants rather than a key partner in the DDR process.⁸⁸

A more engaged SPLA could better prepare its ex-combatants for the DDR programme. This would help to eradicate erroneous, preconceived expectations and reduce frustration. Some symbolic recognition and acknowledgement from the SPLA and GoSS would also mitigate feelings of abandonment and frustration on the part of the ex-combatants, as would a peer-to-peer support mechanism. All of these measures would serve the SPLA by decreasing the likelihood that demobilized ex-combatants would attempt to rejoin the army. At present many ex-combatants feel confused, abandoned, and neglected, and have been venting their frustrations with the SPLA after being demobilized.⁸⁹ They complain that the food ration and allowance are insufficient, and some reportedly believe that the support on offer is to be provided monthly. This, understandably, is generating tensions between the SSDDRC and the SPLA—with the latter believing that it is the responsibility of the commission to keep

the ex-combatants satisfied. In the SPLA's view, those who have been demobilized 'should not be coming to bother us'.⁹⁰ These tensions have been exacerbated by long gaps between DD and reintegration.

Part of the problem is that the DDR benefits in general may be too small to appease ex-combatants, which makes it difficult for the SPLA to generate enthusiasm for the process. The reinsertion grant of SDG 860 (USD 345) is equivalent to less than three months' salary for an average SPLA soldier, and scepticism abounds over whether livelihood opportunities can realistically be developed through reintegration training (Rands, 2010, p. 43). Moreover, the programme has no mechanism for differentiating participants of different rank: a three-star general is currently treated no differently from a WAAFG. This is perceived as disrespectful and is deterring some senior officers from going through DDR. Consequently, the programme needs to be disaggregated to accommodate the more senior officers, many of whom reportedly would like to join the process, but are awaiting a scenario where they will feel suitably acknowledged and important.⁹¹ This problem might have been obviated had the SPLA been more involved in the development of the DDR process from the beginning.

Other criticisms of the DD process focus on the application of standardized DDR. In recent years the UN has synthesized DDR best practices into the IDDRS, and this publication is now the guiding template for UN-supported DDR initiatives around the globe (UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR, 2006). IDDRS standards are not always applicable or easy to implement, however. Yet in Sudan there are indications that on some points the IDDRS are being followed blindly. For example, assembly areas and demobilization sites are situated at least a few kilometres apart, if not significantly more in some cases, following the IDDRS rationale that having them any closer together would constitute a security risk. This makes programmatic sense in places such as Liberia, where the ex-combatants are ill-disciplined and unpredictable and must be disarmed before entering the demobilization areas. In Sudan, however, the armed forces pose minimal security threats. The relatively large distance between assembly areas and demobilization sites only creates an unnecessary logistical challenge.

A similar logic drives the dissemination of NFI kits, procured from Europe at great expense and with considerable logistical difficulty. Compared to Liberia,

where rebels emerging empty handed from years in the bush benefit from an NFI kit to help them survive in the short term, the situation is different in Sudan. The vast majority of Sudanese DDR participants are already comfortably established in their communities and have no urgent need for NFI kits. Indeed, many ex-combatants are reportedly selling their kits for cash at local markets. Providing a cash equivalent of the kits, or nothing at all, would reduce DDR costs and have few negative consequences.⁹² This is another example of the unnecessary blanket application of IDDRS in Sudan.⁹³

Overall, despite challenges and shortcomings, UNMIS and the commissions appear to have done a remarkable technical job in getting the DD process launched and running. For much of the planning process they were hampered by a somewhat secretive SAF and a disorganized SPLA, which gave them very little advanced warning of the types and numbers of participants they were suddenly expected to demobilize. It is encouraging that UNMIS is making an effort to learn from its operations by conducting after-action reviews at demobilization sites, including Mangala, Rumbek, and Aweil.⁹⁴

Reintegration: an evaluation of technical components

At the time of writing, UNDP and the two commissions are working to address several technical reintegration issues. The first involves the greater sensitization of ex-combatants to the details of the reintegration packages on offer. This requires both armies to become significantly more involved. In Southern Sudan, in particular, it is reportedly not even clear to the SPLA, let alone the DDR caseloads, what the reintegration packages offer in terms of training and materials.⁹⁵ It is encouraging, however, that public information and sensitization initiatives are being increased. UNMIS radio programming is continuing, UNDP has hired a graphic designer to help create effective visual materials, and the SSDDRC is working to disseminate 'key messages' in local languages.⁹⁶ At the end of 2010 the IUNDDR Unit and the SSDDRC produced and began disseminating a comprehensive brochure on the DDR process and its benefits.⁹⁷

A second issue is the variation among reintegration packages offered by different IPs. While each IP is providing reintegration support worth the same amount per combatant, the IPs have some degree of flexibility in how the funds

are spent. This has proven problematic in one case in which an IP gave ex-combatants a monthly stipend during their training programme, whereas other IPs provided no such support.⁹⁸ A lack of standardization of tool kits and other training materials provided by the IPs is another source of concern, given that an ex-combatant training to be a carpenter in Juba might receive different tools from his counterpart in Aweil. Any variations and discrepancies in reintegration programming are quickly discovered by the ex-combatants

Box 6 **Catering for female ex-combatants and WAAFG**

A significant percentage of the projected DDR caseload in Sudan was expected to be women—either female combatants or WAAFG. As such, DDR planners were required to anticipate their special needs and make suitable preparations. UNMIS, together with the DDR commissions, worked to ensure that the design of DD was gender sensitive. This meant making efforts to ensure that female staff members were present at the DD sites—including as security guards, doctors, and nurses, as well as speakers, trainers, and HIV/AIDS and reintegration opportunities counsellors. An NFI kit specifically designed for women was also to be distributed in an effort to make it more useful to them. Finally, in Southern Sudan, a specific registration certificate was to be issued to WAAFG by the SPLA, as opposed to the regular discharge certificate for ex-combatants.⁹⁹

Few of these plans have been fully implemented on the ground, however. DD planners have, quite simply, been unable to find enough qualified women to meet the demand.¹⁰⁰ Part of the difficulty lies not only in the range of positions that must be filled, but that women from different tribes and ethnic groups are needed for different locations. UNMIS DDR planners are aware of the issue and acknowledge that they have not been fully aware of how problematic the female staff shortfall has been at the DD sites. In essence, while the gender component was strongly considered during the DD design process, follow-up and monitoring and evaluation have been weak. For example, the special NFI kits for women have on occasion run out at some DD sites, with a lack of clarity over whether and when additional kits were expected.¹⁰¹

UNDP and the commissions also keep gender considerations in mind for the reintegration programming being provided to women. For example, IPs are being encouraged to cater for women with infants who need some kind of child support in order to participate in reintegration training. UNDP is also working to implement some WAAFG-specific initiatives focusing on community-based reintegration activities, although these remain at the pilot stage.¹⁰² The NSDDRC is also working to put together a psychosocial component for reintegration support specifically for female ex-combatants.¹⁰³ All of these efforts are encouraging, although they need to expand and be strengthened to ensure that adequate support is provided to female participants.

and that can trigger serious problems. Disgruntled ex-combatants have held protests and caused security incidents in both Aweil and Rumbek, in the latter case resulting in the governor of Lakes state suspending reintegration programming until the SPLA could restore order.¹⁰⁴ UNDP can mitigate these problems by disseminating clear information to combat false rumours and, most importantly, by harmonizing the packages being provided by all IPs. In Southern Sudan, UNDP has been working to resolve the standardization issue, one idea being to provide stipends universally.¹⁰⁵

UNDP and the commissions acknowledge that weaknesses remain in the reintegration programme. For example, the psychosocial needs of ex-combatants have not been adequately addressed. UNDP has hired a consultant to examine some of the psychosocial needs and mental health issues with a view to developing an action plan. The SSDDRC, through support from the German government, also conducted an empirical assessment of psychosocial needs among ex-combatants, completed in November 2010 (Winkler, 2010). Physically disabled ex-combatants are catered for as well as possible with prosthetics provided by partner organizations, and the SSDDRC is working to establish a system whereby ex-combatants can be referred to and treated for eye problems at the Juba teaching hospital.¹⁰⁶ All of these measures, it is hoped, will lead to a greater number of successful reintegration stories.

Assessing the DDR programme: the views of participating forces

From a technical perspective, the DDR programme has its balance of strengths and weaknesses, but can be said to function as well as possible. From the perspective of the participating forces, however, the view is different. Before presenting a broad assessment of the programme as a whole, it is instructive to examine some of the broader issues of concern to the organizations that are most involved.

In Northern Sudan, the NSDDRC has not provided any comprehensive assessment of the DDR programme to date, although it often complains about the low level of support from the IUNDDR Unit. Yet the lack of information shared by the commission would seem to imply a positive view of

both the manner in which the DD process has been progressing and the nature of the caseloads being handled at each DD site. As mentioned above, it has expressed some frustration with the pace and nature of reintegration support, but is not nearly as outspoken as its southern counterpart. It is difficult to determine whether the lack of feedback from the northern commission is an indication of quiet progress or simply a lack of accurate and available information. The IUNDDR Unit is aware of worrying reports, such as the movement of demobilized ex-combatants to Darfur and cases where PDF members have claimed to have paid to be included in the DDR programme (and then still been left out of it). It is not possible at present to gauge the scale and veracity of these reports.¹⁰⁷

In Southern Sudan, there is some concern within the IUNDDR Unit that the core SPLA fighters who should be demobilized have not yet entered the programme. While the priority has been on SNGs and some former members of OAGs, there is certainly an opportunity to begin including the main SPLA rank and file. This is not happening, presumably for two principal reasons: first, the SPLA is assumed to be reluctant to demobilize too many of its core forces lest renewed conflict with SAF erupt. Second, the SPLA is still worried that the DDR programme is not significantly robust enough to adequately take care of those demobilized; it is not prepared to discharge soldiers from its ranks into a DDR programme in which it has no confidence.¹⁰⁸ This sentiment was expressed at the opening of the SSDDRC headquarters on 31 August 2010 by the vice-president of the GoSS, Riek Machar, who hinted at how hard it was to let soldiers go. At the same event, the undersecretary of SPLA affairs explained that the army is 'not comfortable with the DDR process right now' and is 'concerned there is not reconciliation work happening and that reintegration is not sustainable'.¹⁰⁹

The SPLA is not only finding it hard to let its soldiers go, but has recently moved some who have been through DDR back onto its payroll.¹¹⁰ This is of tremendous concern and suggests that the southern DDR process is fundamentally failing. Yet this development is not indicative of SPLA unwillingness to demobilize its troops, but rather of the army's dissatisfaction with the programme and its effectiveness. As one IUNDDR Unit staff member summed up the situation, 'the SPLA does not care about DDR anymore.'¹¹¹ The accuracy

of this assessment is debatable, but it remains clear that SPLA buy-in and ownership of the process has been lacking from the outset.

Much of the SPLA's frustration stems from its having demobilized some of its troops only to have them return to their commanders, up to a year later, complaining that they had still received no reintegration support. These returning ex-combatants from the Mangala caseload were the first to be demobilized in Southern Sudan, at a time when reintegration had yet to be fully set up (see Box 5). Given that the gap between DD and reintegration has since narrowed, there should now be fewer disgruntled ex-combatants pressuring the SPLA to put them back on its payroll.¹¹²

A concern of a more fundamental nature, in Southern Sudan especially, is that the individual reintegration approach is inappropriate and should be shifted to a community-based approach, or at least to a mix of both individual and social components. The SSDDRC feels strongly that DDR should contribute to the government's goal of improving overall stability, and there are fears that the individual reintegration approach will not accomplish this.¹¹³ Given the great uncertainty surrounding the efficacy of reintegration training and the delicate Southern Sudanese economy in which ex-combatants are expected to find jobs, these fears are fully justified.

The NSDDRC also has misgivings about the reintegration approach. In the view of one former staff member, formal reintegration raises expectations, is tremendously costly, and is unnecessary for northern ex-combatants, given that most will succeed in spontaneously reintegrating into society, if they have not done so already. This is how reintegration took place prior to the signing of the CPA, when SAF discharged ex-combatants over the years. In one former NSDDRC staff member's view, the international reintegration model is not appropriate in Northern Sudan.¹¹⁴

If both the NSDDRC and the SSDDRC find elements of the reintegration approach problematic, how did they come to be enshrined in the MYDDRP—a project document that the UN, GNU, and GoSS signed jointly in 2008? The answer, it seems, is that the UN drafted the MYDDRP without sufficient input from the two commissions, and in particular from the SPLA and SAF. The IUNDDR Unit faced pressure to get the DDR process moving and preparations for reintegration in place. An accepted project document was also needed

as a precursor to raising donor funds. Consequently, the IUNDDR Unit pushed the national partners to accept the MYDDRP despite their misgivings.¹¹⁵ It is thus ironic that the first guiding principle of the MYDDRP, written in bold print, is ‘national ownership and leadership’ (MYDDRP, 2008, p. 10).

With these unfortunate beginnings, it is little wonder that national partners have been unhappy with, if not disengaged from, the process from the outset. The SSDDRC has pushed for a review of the reintegration strategy, much to the frustration of the IUNDDR Unit and donors, who are weary of revisiting fundamental programme elements and approach, such as social versus individual reintegration.¹¹⁶ While their frustration is understandable, they may be reaping what they themselves have sown.

Gauging success to date

In light of these conflicting views, how does one begin to evaluate the success of the DDR programme to date? The National DDR Strategic Plan lists specific objectives, which monitoring and evaluation specialists within the DDR commissions and IUNDDR Unit continue to use to analyse and report on progress. This will help shed light on progress to date, particularly in terms of technical details and facts and figures. But the criteria for ‘success’ might be distinct for different stakeholders.

It is tempting to look to the numbers as indicators of progress to date. In Sudan, the numbers, unfortunately, paint a bleak picture. Since the DDR programme was created in January 2005—almost six years ago—tens of millions of dollars (the exact figure is unavailable) have been spent by UNMIS, UNDP, the GoSS, and the GNU to demobilize 38,440 combatants (of a planned 180,000), with only 10,951 of these having completed reintegration programming. Critics of the DDR programme are right to point out that this is a deplorable record.¹¹⁷ This assessment should, however, be balanced by other qualitative and contextual measures.

From a donor perspective, the DDR programme seems to be a source of frustration and disappointment. As one individual explained, donors feel that they have been encouraged to support a programme that has neither substantively improved security nor led to any significant downsizing of the armed forces

in Sudan. This adds to their annoyance over the lack of any verifiable and transparent disarmament.¹¹⁸ In Southern Sudan, 'downsizing' through the discharge of SNGs is proceeding, but there is a feeling that this produces little benefit other than slightly reducing the SPLA payroll. There are also concerns that core SPLA fighters are not being included in the programme, and for all intents and purposes DDR is simply helping 'trim the fat' from the SPLA, thereby making it a stronger fighting force.

In terms of security, does the DDR programme address potential community troublemakers or spoilers of the peace process? In Northern Sudan, there is a heavy focus on demobilizing fighters from the PDF, which suggests that SAF is taking advantage of the opportunity to recover weapons from them while simultaneously providing them with some support. The assumption is that this will help generate greater peace and security in PDF areas.¹¹⁹

In Southern Sudan, however, some feel that the opportunity provided by DDR to deal with former OAG members, many of whom are thought to pose the greatest threat to security, was wasted.¹²⁰ Several points should be kept in mind in this regard. First, despite the strong initial focus on SNGs—as planned—the SSDDRC claims that a significant number of OAG ex-combatants have also gone through DDR to date. According to its chairperson, William Deng Deng, many OAG commanders are well absorbed within the SPLA ranks; thus discharging their former forces does not present a security risk.¹²¹ Second, many OAG ex-combatants absorbed into the SPLA might pose a greater security threat if they were demobilized and removed from the army's command and control structure. This is especially the case if the reintegration package is perceived to be an inadequate reward for war heroes and insufficiently robust to allow for sustainable livelihood alternatives. In essence, these potential spoilers have already been dealt with by their having been forced to join the SPLA, and perhaps this remains the best place for them.¹²²

In gauging the success of DDR to date, it is vital to keep the recent and current political context in mind. Indeed, the context of Sudan's DDR programme is unique, given the ongoing fear of renewed conflict between the NCP and the SPLM/A. Even throughout the CPA period, any expectations of DDR taking place quickly or smoothly were unrealistic. As one IUNDDR Unit staff member pointed out, the CPA is simply a peace accord, and it in no way sets

all the required preconditions for successful DDR.¹²³ After all, while the war is technically over, relations between the NCP and SPLM/A are extremely volatile. It could be argued that even to try to implement DDR in such a setting is somewhat absurd—particularly if the goal is to have the parties significantly disarm or downsize their armies.

Finally, in assessing the DDR programme, one of the intangible but noteworthy benefits it has generated is that planning and implementing the national DDR programme has forced the two former enemies to work together. When the CPA was signed, DDR was seen as a concrete component of CPA implementation that could promote cooperation and confidence building. As SSDDRC chairperson Deng Deng points out, at present it is still one of the most visible successes in terms of North–South cooperation, as both commissions continue to communicate with each other and work together.¹²⁴ This achievement should not be undervalued, particularly as it might be contributing to a broader process of confidence building between the two parts of the country and generating space for a wider discussion on security. While critics are understandably focused on the hard facts and figures of the DDR programme, the significance of the subtler effects should not be overlooked or discounted. 📌

VII. Improving the DDR programme

Refining the approach

Even when evaluated through the most optimistic lens, there is a tremendous need to improve Sudan's DDR programme. The good news is that it is not too late to do so. The DDR commissions, SAF, SPLA, GNU, and GoSS all have a vested interest in the programme's success. From this foundation, the further exchange of thoughts and concerns can flow. The programme could then be modified accordingly and relaunched with greater buy-in from all sides. Such a dialogue could begin by first listening to the national owners of the DDR programme.¹²⁵ The SSDDRC hosted a DDR review conference in November 2010, which was a step in the right direction (see Box 7). This discourse needs to continue in both Northern and Southern Sudan, and to be followed up with decisive action supported by all stakeholders.

Most urgently and fundamentally, the SPLA's increased involvement in the process is critical to the improved functioning of DDR in Southern Sudan. This would ideally include closer relations with the SSDDRC at a technical and planning level in order to take more ownership of the DDR process, and subsequently to modify it as necessary with the support of other stakeholders. For example, the SPLA could take the lead in working to improve the size and scope of reinsertion and reintegration packages, and to disaggregate the DD process to cater for senior SPLA officers. Both the SPLA and SAF also need to better prepare their troops (and WAAFG in Southern Sudan) in an effort to minimize confusion, dispel misinformation, and instil confidence in the process as a whole. For sensitization to be successful, it *must* begin with the armed forces themselves. Indeed, the scale and intensity of SAF and SPLA involvement in selling the DDR programme to their troops is a key factor underlying its likelihood of success. The UN and donors need to recognize this and request robust SPLA and SAF engagement and leadership in the DDR programme as a fundamental prerequisite for its continuation. 'National ownership' of the

Box 7 **The DDR Review Conference for Southern Sudan**

On 15–16 November 2010 the SSDDRC hosted a conference to review DDR in Southern Sudan with the aim of taking stock of progress to date and re-evaluating how best to move forward. Key stakeholders were represented, including the NSDDRC, and the conference received high-level political support from the GoSS with the attendance of Vice-president Riek Machar. The senior SPLA leadership, however, was conspicuously absent, with the army instead being represented by lower-ranking officers who contributed little to the review process. Vice-president Machar, senior SSDDRC and UN staff members, and other consultants and guests presented speeches.¹²⁶ The SPLA—the pivotal stakeholder—did not make a presentation, although its token presence and minimal involvement sent perhaps one of the most critical messages to stakeholders, albeit silently conveyed. While the presentations were more or less informative, the process was not a substantive review: the review conference unfolded more as a chance for the SSDDRC to air grievances and offer some novel ideas. There was a distinct lack of opportunity for other stakeholders to share, debate, and discuss proposals or to hold a conclusive discussion on the review itself. A serious re-examination of the DDR process and its structure and appropriateness in the post-referendum period is still required.

The ‘outcome’ of the review conference was an SSDDRC final communiqué presented by the chairperson without discussion, review, or input from external stakeholders (SSDDRC, 2010). The communiqué provided the anticipated caseload for future DDR phases followed by several key requests and recommendations, including the following:

- UNMIS should review its operational approach to DD with regard to the location of assembly areas, the transportation of ex-combatants over long distances, and the provision of reinsertion kits (which should be less focused on material items and more on educational activities).
- IPs should harmonize reintegration programmes with regard to both training (length and content) and material benefits (such as stipends and tool kits).
- The current strategy of providing reintegration training after demobilization should be replaced with an approach where training is provided to soldiers for six months while they are still on salary and with their military units (training could be provided by IPs, and UNMIS could help rehabilitate training facilities).
- The counselling and referral services for ex-combatants should be streamlined and ideally transformed into a system of case management by building up the capacity of SSDDRC state offices.
- Ongoing individual reintegration programmes should be complemented with community-based reintegration activities, which should be coordinated with GoSS ministries and the Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control.
- Donor and partner relations need to be streamlined, and roles and responsibilities need to be clarified (e.g. defining the term ‘co-management’).
- The management of donor funds and programme execution should be allocated to different agencies (not just UNDP) (SSDDRC, 2010, pp. 1–4).

These points are valuable in that they reflect the priority concerns of the commission and provide constructive ideas for improving on the DDR process. The feasibility and appropriateness of their implementation is another issue, and key stakeholders surely have their own views on the matter. For example, a community-based approach to reintegration needs to be explored in detail, because it would have widely differing implications for different stakeholders. In short, the SSDDRC deserves significant credit for having initiated a review process, although a tremendous amount of discussion will be needed before any concrete decisions can be made to help reorient the southern DDR process.

DDR programme is its most fundamental pillar; should this pillar prove irreparably weak, the international community cannot blindly shoulder the load.

The SSDDRC should consider follow-up discussions with stakeholders on the ideas proposed at the November DDR review conference (see Box 7), including community-based reintegration; pre-demobilization reintegration training; the build-up of information, counselling, and referral services within SSDDRC state offices; the clarification of a 'co-management' system with donors and partners; and the allocation of programme and fund management to different agencies. Again, better SPLA engagement in the process and collaboration with the SSDDRC would greatly improve the chances of real improvements being made.

For the DDR commissions to achieve their objectives, better support from the IUNDDR Unit is needed. The first step is to identify and address outstanding issues related to national ownership and capacity building, such as training needs and the sharing of budget information. Concurrently, the UN and the commissions should continue to focus on improving technical elements of DDR, the most immediate and prominent needs being:

- the standardization of reintegration support across IPs and training programmes (in terms of length of training, stipend, and the value and nature of post-training kits);
- the bolstering of PI campaigns for nationwide implementation, including the inclusion of successful reintegration stories;
- the further exploration and implementation of psychosocial support programmes for DDR participants in both Northern and Southern Sudan;
- follow-up on the implementation of the new SOPs on general candidate and WAAFG (in the South) eligibility verification;

- the further development of DDR mechanisms for child soldiers, while maintaining strong linkages with UNICEF; and
- increased linkages to ongoing community security and small arms control initiatives in both Northern and Southern Sudan.

Strengthening international support

It is incumbent on the IUNDDR Unit and donor community to ensure that, parallel with the provision of financial and technical support to the DDR commissions, they also make efforts to improve their internal practices as they relate to the DDR programme. The DDR programme review of September 2010 (completed in December 2010) is an encouraging step that provides further guidance on how best to move forward (UNDP, 2010a).¹²⁷ In the meantime, the IUNDDR Unit should be encouraged to continue after-action reviews of DD sites involving as wide an array of stakeholders as possible and ensure that any lessons are fed back into future DD efforts. A similar review of reintegration programming would provide an opportunity for IPs providing reintegration training to share experiences and learn from one another. Internally, further bridging of institutional differences between UNMIS and UNDP will improve the ‘integration’ of UNDDR. It is also critically important that UNDP work to keep donors fully informed of budget and reintegration programming developments.

As for the donor community, its members should be encouraged to re-evaluate and reconfirm their motives for supporting the DDR programme and their expectations, given contextual realities and national stakeholder priorities. Donors need to clarify what a ‘successful’ DDR programme means to them and what the corresponding indicators of achievement might be. It is also important that donors stay actively and consistently engaged in DDR developments, and work strongly together as a donor community. This is particularly important in Southern Sudan, where bilateral support to the SSDDRC would ideally be coherent and contribute to a larger capacity-building strategy. Donors should also come to terms with the fact that the disarmament component of DDR will remain internal to the two armies, and focus instead on exploring how to support other entry points on stockpile management and related CSAC initiatives. Finally, donors can work closely with the IUNDDR Unit and the DDR

commissions to start discussing the financial implications of a larger DDR caseload beyond the original 180,000, particularly given the revised figures provided by the SSDDRC (explored below).

DDR in 2011 and beyond

It is hard to know what lies ahead for the DDR programme in 2011 and beyond. Apart from earlier modifications to the programme and the ongoing debate over its structure, political uncertainties associated with the referendum on potential Southern independence might also lead to fundamental alterations to the programme.

At this point there are more questions than answers. The NSDDRC has stated that DDR will continue as planned into 2011, with second phases launched in Kadugli and Ed Damazin. The plan for Southern Sudan is for DD to continue in Kwajok, Bentiu, Malakal, Bor, and possibly elsewhere.¹²⁸ DDR is also scheduled to begin in Abyei at some point, although major political hurdles need to be overcome for this to occur.

The size and types of the caseloads remaining to be demobilized are not entirely clear. As outlined in the National DDR Strategy, phase 1 of DDR is to include up to 90,000 ex-combatants, largely composed of members of SNGs, and phase 2 is to follow with a further 90,000. To date, approximately 38,000 have been demobilized, which means that phase 1 is ongoing and should continue for some time (see Table 2). The breakdown of the remaining caseload for Northern Sudan is unclear, but in the South the SSDDRC is now describing the 34,000 members of the SNGs as phase 1, leaving 56,000 active-duty members of the SPLA for phase 2.¹²⁹

The number of Southerners going through DDR could also increase well beyond the additional 56,000, depending on two factors. First, there is a question of what will happen with the soldiers who are currently serving in the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs). These units are composed of approximately 32,000 soldiers from both armies (Rands, 2010, p. 21) and will be disbanded following the end of the CPA period in July 2011. According to SSDDRC chairperson Deng Deng, they are predominantly Southerners and potentially all are eligible for DDR. Assuming they stay in Southern Sudan, the SSDDRC anticipates a

potential caseload of 20,000–30,000, which it is referring to as ‘phase 1a’, given that they would need to be demobilized as soon as possible, concurrently with the ongoing phase 1 DD of SNGs. Notably, the NSDDRC has said it is not even thinking about the JIUs yet, suggesting that there is no immediate plan for them in Northern Sudan.¹³⁰ The second factor that might increase the DDR caseload in the South is that up to 20,000 former SPLA soldiers have been absorbed by GoSS security organs—including the police, prisons, and wildlife services—many of whom should be sent through the DDR programme because they are ill-equipped for their new posts. Many are elderly and of retirement age. This caseload would represent a potential phase 3 of DDR in the South, but would not likely begin until late 2012 (SSDDRC, 2010, p. 1).¹³¹

Combining all potential phases of DDR in Southern Sudan gives an overall DDR caseload as high as 130,000, according to the SSDDRC. This would have significant logistical and financial implications. It is encouraging that UNMIS is confident that it is flexible enough to divert resources to cater for a JIU caseload on short notice, but the additional expense would have to be negotiated with the donor community. Northern Sudan might also face extra DDR caseloads (such as from JIUs), but it is thought that the NSDDRC and GNU would take care of the cost and logistics themselves, without donor or UN involvement.¹³²

Post-referendum implications

On 9 January 2011 Southern Sudan began its referendum on self-determination. An overwhelming majority voted in favour of separation, an outcome the NCP has accepted. This has definite implications for the future of DDR. Prior to the referendum the NSDDRC was unwilling to officially comment on post-independence implications for the DDR programme, maintaining that it would continue as normal. In practice, however, Southern secession could lead to the drawdown of UNMIS in Northern Sudan. Because UNMIS was established to support the implementation of the CPA in Sudan, the GNU could ask the mission to withdraw from northern territory as soon as the CPA period ends. Should this occur, it is unclear who would support subsequent DD operations there. The NSDDRC has unofficially and informally suggested that either SAF would itself take care of DDR without UN support or that UNDP could be brought in to provide technical support, as it did previously in eastern Sudan.¹³³

In the South, SSDDRC chairperson Deng Deng believes that the referendum outcome will have no impact on DDR objectives and focus, and that DDR must and will move forward as planned.¹³⁴

The IUNDDR Unit and donors, meanwhile, are looking to the DDR programme review to provide details on possible post-referendum scenarios and their implications. Speculative planning aside, the international community will hold its collective breath until the political and security situation resettles following separation and hope that the DDR programme can then continue as planned. 📄

VIII. Conclusion

DDR programmes implemented even in the most stable, predictable, and secure contexts are complex and can face tremendous technical, logistical, financial, social, and political hurdles. The implementation of a smooth and speedy DDR programme in Sudan—an underdeveloped post-conflict state, ravaged by decades of war, lacking basic social services and infrastructure, economically and politically unstable, bereft of reliable security, and facing partition—is almost inconceivable.

But where there is motivation, there is hope. Although the GNU, GoSS, SAF, SPLA, and the two DDR commissions could decide at any moment to pull out of the DDR process, they have not done so. Both the NSDDRC and SSDDRC appear to be committed to the DDR plan—despite decrying the shortcomings of the process—and political support remains, particularly in the South. Of the key national stakeholders, the SPLA seems to be the most disengaged, but this is not due to a lack of interest, but rather to concern that the process is not robust enough to support and reward its war heroes. Should the DDR programme be modified appropriately the SPLA could become its most vocal champion. Of course, all current national DDR players are operating within the framework of the CPA—the birthplace of the DDR programme—and their motivations might shift as the interim period comes to a close with Southern secession.

It will take more than good intentions, motivation, and an undercurrent of hope to transform Sudan's DDR programme into a successful endeavour. The shortcomings of the programme in its present form are numerous, both technically and strategically, and until they are addressed the programme risks progressively becoming ineffectual, if not irrelevant. To avoid this scenario, national stakeholders will need to display stronger leadership, strengthen their ownership of the programme, and refine both its structure and approach.

In the meantime, the international community should press on with the provision of support to the DDR process. This has been a challenging, frustrating, and at times seemingly thankless task. Indeed, as pressures mount for

the DDR programme to 'succeed', external supporters have become easy targets for blame. In the immediate future, international support might best come in the form of listening attentively to the concerns of the national stakeholders and working together to determine how best to move forward. While greater engagement and cooperation are important, so is recognition of the fact that the DDR programme will only ever be as strong as the will of the national owners who drive it forward. 📌

Endnotes

- 1 'The parties agree to implement with the assistance of the international community DDR programmes for the benefit of all those who will be affected by the reduction, demobilization and downsizing of the forces as agreed' (GoS and SPLM/A, 2005, ch. VI, para. 3e, p. 88).
- 2 The IDDRP was officially launched in January 2006 with a budget of USD 69 million, but USD 3.2 million had already been spent in 2005, largely to support the National Interim DDR Authorities. See UNDP Sudan (2010).
- 3 For the sake of convenience, the term 'ex-combatants' is used throughout this paper to describe the participants going through the DDR programme, even though many are from SNGs and may not have been combatants.
- 4 Email correspondence with IUNDDR Unit staff member, January 2011.
- 5 Author interview with former IUNDDR Unit staff member, Juba, September 2010.
- 6 Author interview with former IUNDDR Unit staff member, Juba, September 2010.
- 7 Author interview with NSDDRC staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.
- 8 For more information on OAGs, see Small Arms Survey (2008) and Mc Evoy and LeBrun (2010).
- 9 For more information on the PDF, see Salmon (2007).
- 10 Although they are not addressed in the National DDR Strategic Plan, in October 2008 a presidential decree was issued on the structure of the DDR commissions for the Three Areas, calling for each area to have a joint DDR commission. Joint commissions have subsequently been formed in Blue Nile and South Kordofan, but not yet in Abyei.
- 11 Author interviews with IUNDDR Unit and NSDDRC staff members, Khartoum, September 2010.
- 12 Author interviews with IUNDDR Unit and SSDDRC staff members, Khartoum and Juba, September 2010.
- 13 Author interview with SSDDRC staff member, Juba, September 2010.
- 14 Author interview with SSDDRC staff member, Juba, September 2010.
- 15 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.
- 16 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.
- 17 Author interview with NSDDRC staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.
- 18 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.
- 19 The SPLA payroll was introduced in 2006.
- 20 Author interviews with NSDDRC and SSDDRC staff members, Khartoum and Juba, September 2010.
- 21 Author interview with NSDDRC staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.
- 22 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff members, Khartoum, September 2010.
- 23 This original caseload of WAAFG came from both the SPLA and the PDF. No further WAAFG were provided by the PDF/SAF after this (author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Khartoum, September 2010).
- 24 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.
- 25 The new SOP came in response to recommendations that emerged from an independent assessment report of the DDR process (see Rowe, Banal, and Berhe, 2009), released in November 2009, and UN after-action reviews of the DD process in Central Equatoria (SSDDRC and UN, 2010, p. 2).

- 26 Author interviews with IUNDDR Unit and SSDDRC staff members, Juba, September 2010.
27 For further information on SPLA reform, see Rands (2010).
28 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.
29 These figures are subject to change and are not based on confirmed names on the master lists.
30 Author interview with former IUNDDR Unit staff member, Juba, September 2010. The situation in the South was compounded by the death of the vice-president of Sudan and champion of the CPA, John Garang de Mabior, in July 2005. Critically, he died before the IDDRP could be presented to him and before he could throw his political support behind it.
31 Author interview with NSDDRC staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.
32 Author interview with NSDDRC staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.
33 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.
34 Author interview with NSDDRC staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.
35 Author interview with William Deng Deng, SSDDRC chairperson, Juba, September 2010.
36 The audit, funded by Canada, came at the specific request of the SSDDRC and was conducted by a team of auditors from PricewaterhouseCoopers in Kenya.
37 Author interview with William Deng Deng, SSDDRC chairperson, Juba, September 2010.
38 The current lack of capacity of the state offices is an ongoing concern for the SSDDRC and other stakeholders alike. A donor report of a visit to one of the offices describes staff members who were unable to clearly define their own jobs, let alone understand the larger process of DDR; there was no framework for staff members' daily tasks and activities; and the DDR state coordinator had never met the state governor to brief him on DDR developments (author interview with donor, Juba, September 2010).
39 Author interview with William Deng Deng, SSDDRC chairperson, Juba, September 2010. One national staff member at the SSDDRC headquarters has been successfully recruited under this initiative and is being directly paid by a donor.
40 Author interview with current and former IUNDDR Unit staff members, Khartoum and Juba, September 2010.
41 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff members, Khartoum, September 2010.
42 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff members, Khartoum and Juba, September 2010.
43 Author interview with SSDDRC, NSDDRC, and IUNDDR Unit staff members, Khartoum and Juba, September 2010.
44 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff members, Khartoum, September 2010.
45 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff members, Khartoum, September 2010.
46 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff members, Khartoum, September 2010.
47 Author interview with NSDDRC staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.
48 Funds for the MYDDRP are funnelled through UNDP.
49 Author interview with SSDDRC staff member, Juba, September 2010.
50 Author interview with NSDDRC and SSDDRC staff members, Khartoum and Juba, September 2010.
51 Author interview with NSDDRC and SSDDRC chairperson and deputy, Khartoum and Juba, September 2010.
52 Author interview with SSDDRC staff members, Juba, September 2010.
53 Author interview with donor, Khartoum, September 2010.
54 Author interview with donors, Khartoum, September 2010.
55 Author interview with donors, Khartoum, September 2010.

56 Author interview with donors, Khartoum, September 2010.

57 Author interview with donors, Khartoum and Juba, September 2010.

58 Author interview with SSDDRC staff member, Juba, September 2010.

59 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.

60 While the DD process was designed to be completed in one day, it should be noted that for a short time UNMIS did provide some cantonment support in Ed Damazin due to the logistical requirements related to transporting ex-combatants. And similarly, in Torit, the SPLA was supported by UNMIS to provide some cantonment support (author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Khartoum, September 2010).

61 The food ration comprises durra, beans, oil, and salt, and weighs a total of 243 kilograms.

62 Author interviews with staff from UNICEF in Khartoum and Juba, and the SSDDRC in Juba, September 2010.

63 In February 2010 in Kadugli, South Kordofan, ceremonial weapons destruction took place involving Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir and other senior invitees from the international community. Several symbolic weapons were set alight and a container was visible nearby reportedly containing approximately 4,300 weapons collected by SAF from the PDF (author interview with NSDDRC staff member, Khartoum, September 2010).

64 Author interviews with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.

65 Author interviews with donors, Khartoum, September 2010.

66 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Khartoum, September 2010, and email correspondence, December 2010.

67 According to one IUNDDR Unit staff member interviewed in Khartoum in September 2010, the assessment report not only led to some fundamental changes in the programme, but because it was perceived as being somewhat critical and provocative, it served to bring together the UNMIS DDR Unit and the DDR commissions as they united in their annoyance at the negative assessment.

68 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.

69 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.

70 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Juba, September 2010.

71 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff members, Juba, September 2010.

72 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff members, Khartoum, September 2010.

73 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Juba, September 2010.

74 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit and SSDDRC staff members, Juba, September 2010.

75 Of the USD 1,750 in support, USD 1,500 is funded from international donor contributions, with the remaining USD 250 to be provided by the GNU and GoSS. Disabled ex-combatants can potentially qualify for medical support worth an additional USD 240.

76 Sudan is starting its slow recovery from more than 20 consecutive years of a civil war that devastated infrastructure, shattered communities, and stunted the economy. Human development indicators remain dismal, even for sub-Saharan Africa: Sudan is in 154th place on UNDP's Human Development Index, out of 169 assessed nations (UNDP, 2010b).

77 For further details, see Brethfeld (2010).

78 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.

79 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.

80 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.

- 81 Through this centre, GIZ provides small business (eight weeks) and vocational training (three months) programmes, both of which are preceded by six weeks of literacy training or IT studies (for those who are sufficiently literate). There are about a dozen options for vocational training, including welding, masonry, and carpentry. Students receive a stipend throughout their training, contingent on attendance, and a start-up kit upon graduation (author interview with GIZ staff member, Juba, September 2010).
- 82 According to UNDP, Sudanese reintegration participants most often choose small business training (55 per cent), followed by agriculture (27 per cent), vocational training (9 per cent), livestock (7 per cent), and education (2 per cent) (UNDP presentation at the SSDDRC DDR Review Conference, November 2010).
- 83 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff members, Juba, September 2010.
- 84 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit and NSDDRC staff members, Khartoum, September 2010.
- 85 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.
- 86 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff members, Juba, September 2010.
- 87 Author interview with SSDDRC staff member, Juba, September 2010.
- 88 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Juba, September 2010.
- 89 Author interview with SSDDRC staff member, Juba, September 2010.
- 90 Author interview with SSDDRC staff member, Juba, September 2010.
- 91 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit and SSDDRC staff members, Juba, September 2010.
- 92 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit and SSDDRC staff members, Khartoum and Juba, September 2010.
- 93 To be fair to DDR planners, they often have to contend with pressures from above. One staff member within the IUNDDR Unit pointed out that senior and influential UN managers and donors with a lack of technical DDR experience may point to something like the IDDRS and apply pressure for it to be explicitly followed (author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Khartoum, September 2010).
- 94 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.
- 95 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit and SSDDRC staff members, Juba, September 2010.
- 96 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit and SSDDRC staff members, Juba, September 2010.
- 97 Email correspondence with SSDDRC staff member, January 2011.
- 98 Author interview with donor and SSDDRC staff members, Juba, September 2010.
- 99 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.
- 100 At the DD site in Kauda, a rather novel solution has been found to address the lack of female staff members on site. Six demobilized female ex-combatants were identified as having sufficient qualifications to be of assistance and were subsequently trained to conduct reintegration and HIV/AIDS briefings. At last report, their support was reportedly greatly appreciated by DD staff members and ex-combatants alike (author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member from Kauda, Khartoum, September 2010).
- 101 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff members, Khartoum and Juba, September 2010.
- 102 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff members, Juba, September 2010.
- 103 Author interview with NSDDRC staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.
- 104 Author interview with donor and SSDDRC staff members, Juba, September 2010.
- 105 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Juba, September 2010. The GoSS has provided approximately USD 250 per ex-combatant, which UNDP could feasibly use to cover this expense, given that this amount is not specifically earmarked for anything else.

- 106 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit and SSDDRC staff members, Juba, September 2010.
- 107 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff members, Khartoum, September 2010.
- 108 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Juba, September 2010.
- 109 Author interview with donor who heard the speech, Juba, September 2010.
- 110 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Juba, September 2010.
- 111 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Juba, September 2010.
- 112 Author interview with SSDDRC staff member, Juba, September 2010.
- 113 Author interview with SSDDRC staff member, Juba, September 2010.
- 114 Author interview with NSDDRC staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.
- 115 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit and SSDDRC staff members, Juba, September 2010.
- 116 Author interview with donor, Khartoum, September 2010.
- 117 For example, this criticism was highlighted by a DDR Programme Review team during their presentation at the SSDDRC DDR Review Conference in Juba, 15–16 November 2010. See sec. VII, below.
- 118 Author interview with donor, Khartoum, September 2010.
- 119 Author interview with NSDDRC staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.
- 120 Author interview with donor, Juba, September 2010.
- 121 Author interview with William Deng Deng, SSDDRC chairperson, Juba, September 2010.
- 122 Author interview with donors, Khartoum and Juba, September 2010.
- 123 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Juba, September 2010.
- 124 Author interview with William Deng Deng, SSDDRC chairperson, Juba, September 2010.
- 125 Author interview with William Deng Deng, SSDDRC staff member, Juba, September 2010.
- 126 Of note, Vice-president Machar, on behalf of GoSS president Salva Kiir, emphasized the need to make the DDR programme more attractive to combatants, and reconfirmed that it will continue in the South irrespective of the outcome of the Southern referendum. The IUNDDR Unit also reiterated its commitment to the DDR programme and explained that it was open and amenable to the idea of modifying it in any way necessary.
- 127 The DDR Programme Review comes after the arrival of the new UNMIS DDR chief, Sidi Zahabi, and as a result of pressure from both the SSDDRC and the UNMIS special representative of the secretary-general/humanitarian affairs coordinator. It is also noteworthy that in September 2010 UNDP initiated an internal general financial and programme audit of its DDR support, which, it is hoped, will contribute towards greater operational clarity. A similar audit took place of UNMIS DDR activities in June 2010, and while the report was not available for assessment, Zahabi has indicated that the preliminary highlights are encouraging (author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Khartoum, September 2010).
- 128 Author interview with NSDDRC and SSDDRC staff members, Khartoum and Juba, September 2010.
- 129 Author interview with William Deng Deng, SSDDRC chairperson, Juba, September 2010.
- 130 Author interview with NSDDRC staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.
- 131 Author interview with William Deng Deng, SSDDRC chairperson, Juba, September 2010, reiterated in SSDDRC (2010).
- 132 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff members, Khartoum, September 2010.
- 133 Author interview with IUNDDR Unit staff member, Khartoum, September 2010.
- 134 Author interview with William Deng Deng, SSDDRC chairperson, Khartoum, September 2010.

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About the author

Ryan Nichols worked in Sudan with both UNDP and UNMIS DDR in the period 2006–09, and has since consulted for the UN, the Small Arms Survey, and a number of NGOs. He worked previously on DDR and small arms and community security issues in Togo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Republic of the Congo, and Nepal. He holds an MA in International Politics and Security Studies from the University of Bradford, UK.

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Small Arms Survey

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies

47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland

p +41 22 908 5777

f +41 22 732 2738

e sas@smallarmssurvey.org

w www.smallarmssurvey.org

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For more information, please contact: Claire Mc Evoy, HSBA Project Manager, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland.

e claire.mcevoy@smallarmssurvey.org

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